Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate
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The Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the Martello Papers. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security.

Even in times of war, defence policy has rarely been a prime item for national debate in Canada. Over the past decade, however, the air-war over Kosovo, the events of September 2001, the intervention in Iraq and, of course, Canada’s critical and costly role in the Afghanistan mission have engaged the political class, the media and the public in an intense national discussion over the means and ends of national defence. Much of the running has been made by those who argue that, at least from the early 1990s on, governments have spent, and done, far less than necessary to sustain the Canadian Forces. The price we pay for this negligence is a military establishment debilitated almost to the point of collapse, a loss of respect among our major allies, and a measurable incapacity to defend the country and advance its interests abroad.

This case has been made eloquently and effectively, to the point that, over the past five years, the CF have witnessed a marked increase in their financial resources, including major new capital acquisitions, and undergone a far-reaching transformation in doctrine and command structures. Yet, as Philippe Lagassé and Paul Robinson point out in this paper, for the CFs’ most avid supporters this is not enough, and indeed may never be,
given the tendency of perceived threats – and the missions they generate – to expand to exceed the resources available.

In their critique of the way Canada’s recent defence debate has been framed, the authors begin by reminding us of the classic realism that has underpinned Canadian foreign and defence policy for much of its history. From King through Chretien, they insist, Canadian governments have in fact been remarkably successful in making the fine adjustments needed to match means and ends, power and interests. Applying those same realist precepts to assessing Canada’s current security environment, they argue, does not support claims for further increases in the military budget, although it certainly calls for some reordering of how the projected $18 B are to be spent. Proceeding from a comprehensive definition of national security and an appreciation of the importance of well-equipped and well-trained armed forces, their paper deploys a crisp cost-benefit analysis to sort through the claims made on behalf of the CF for further spending and grander visions. Its aim is to turn Canada’s national defence debate in a new and more fruitful direction.

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1. Introduction

Since the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, there has been a resurgence of realist thinking about defence policy in the United States. Fuelled by a belief that the Iraq war was driven not by any realistic appraisal of America’s national interests but rather by an idealistic faith in America’s ability to transform the world, this realist resurgence has questioned Washington’s reliance on armed force and sustained foreign interventions to defeat transnational terrorist groups and halt the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These realist critiques have been forwarded by some of the United States’ most respected foreign and defence policy scholars. Barry R. Posen has recommended that Washington adopt a foreign policy of restraint, one that seeks to shape international developments rather than control them. Richard K. Betts has called for modest reductions in American defence spending, a cautious approach to interventions and threat assessments, and an appreciation of the opportunity costs associated with prioritizing apparent defence needs above other sources of national power, such as a strong diplomatic corps and a healthy economy. John Mueller has highlighted the counterproductive consequences of overreacting to terrorist threats. Andrew J. Bacevich has warned of a worrisome American “tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means.” Of the Iraq war itself, Bacevich has asked the most realist of questions: “But how exactly do these sacrifices serve the national interest? What has the loss of nearly 4,000 U.S. troops and the commitment of about $1 trillion – with more to come – actually gained the United States?” And, proving that realism crosses political boundaries, liberal commentator Anatol Lieven and conservative analyst John Hulsman came together
to co-author a book urging an ‘ethical realism’ in which the United States would abandon its ‘messianic commitment’ to spread democracy world-wide and instead exercise restraint in the use of force.\textsuperscript{6}

Similar analyses and propositions are regularly voiced by members of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a group of scholars and policymakers who promote an “alternative vision for American national security strategy,”\textsuperscript{7} a vision that appreciates the limits, and true price, of military interventions and nation-building endeavours. Though they often disagree about particular issues, these scholars are united in their application of realist principles, such as weighing costs and benefits, matching ends and means, holding a comprehensive understanding of the national interest, and seeking good returns on defence investments. While these realists remain a minority in the American defence analysis community, they have nonetheless ensured that the American defence debate is rich and varied.

Canada’s current defence debate is not nearly as rich, nor as varied. Although a few analysts have offered realist observations about Canada’s defence policies,\textsuperscript{8} this perspective has not been clearly or consistently articulated. Defence debates have centered on the necessity of turning failed states into democracies, how best to secure Canada a place of pride in the world, and on Canada’s commitment to the Afghan people. Though important and worthwhile issues, these debates have largely eschewed blunter discussions about the role defence policy should play in promoting national interests and protecting Canadians in an affordable, effective manner.\textsuperscript{9}

Within Canada’s defence analysis community vagueness abounds. A common refrain is that Ottawa must do more to protect Canadians in an ever more dangerous world. Another is that Canada must demonstrate an unwavering resolve in the war on terror, lest the United States shut its northern border, wrecking the Canadian economy. Yet another is that a ‘realistic’ approach to defence should always seek to strengthen Canada’s military. Hard evidence that the world is getting more dangerous, or that Canadians face greater threats to their security, is rarely offered. The fact that the deployment of the Canadian Forces to Kandahar has not prevented controls on the Canada-United States border from being tightened is overlooked. Careful readings of what realist theory actually says about the utility of military strength are seldom undertaken. Several of the community’s more widespread proposals, furthermore, are founded on truisms that merit a re-evaluation, such as the idea that CF deployments automatically raise Canada’s international influence, or the notion that increased defence
expenditures necessarily make Canada more secure. The invocation of these truisms is at times motivated by an understandable imperative to advance organizational interests. Service representatives believe that they must stress the need for additional resources to meet a growing range of threats. Otherwise they stand to lose in budgetary battles. Arguably, however, repeated references to these truisms is unduly narrowing the debate about Canada’s defence requirements, Canada’s alliance obligations, and the military’s place in Canadian homeland security.

This narrowing debate is restricting the community’s openness to alternative policy proposals. Analysts too quickly dismiss arguments that Canada spends a rational amount on defence, that higher military expenditures would be unsustainable, that fewer and/or shorter international deployments would benefit the CF and Canadian security, that additional defence dollars are an inefficient means of boosting Canada’s influence or of ensuring an open border with the United States, or that extra money earmarked for the military might be better used to fund other security instruments or national priorities. Each of these arguments can be supported by an application of realist principles and are worthy of in-depth discussion. Yet contentions such as these are habitually dismissed as undeserving of serious consideration. As a result, Canadians are left with a rather poor marketplace of defence ideas.

Realism’s muted voice in the current Canadian defence debate is surprising from a historical standpoint, given that a realist approach was a prominent feature of Canadian defence policy from the late 1950s to the turn of the twenty-first century. From the end of the Korean War to the end of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s ministry, successive Canadian governments crafted defence policies that reflected Canada’s status as a secondary power within NATO, the absence of a conventional threat to North America, and the logic of prioritizing socio-economic considerations above the country’s ambiguous defence needs. There were times when Ottawa overstretched the Canadian military. Canadian governments of this era were known for mismatching defence commitments and military resources; the commitment-capability gap was a recurring Canadian defence dilemma. But the overall history of Canadian defence policy in the past 60 years is one of success. Thanks in part to Ottawa’s realist approach to defence policy, Canada was able to maintain a stable economy, reasonable tax rates, and a generous social welfare system, while maintaining good relations with NATO allies and contributing to global stability in a manner consistent with its secondary standing in the international system.
Canada’s defence efforts were consonant with the level and types of threats the country faced. While a case for additional defence capabilities could always be made, it is unclear how a far greater investment in the military would have made Canada substantially more secure.

Yet, the prevailing wisdom at the moment holds that the history of Canadian defence policy from the early 1950s to the turn of the century is one of gradual decline and ultimate failure. Had Ottawa maintained the level of military strength it built following the Korean War, it has been argued, Canada would have been a better ally and a more important international player. If Canada had devoted greater resources to the military and not cut as deeply into defence spending when the Cold War ended, the CF would be a stronger, better equipped armed force today. For many prominent critics, the historical approach is an anathema because it condemned Canada to military mediocrity. Now, with the Conservative government committed to expanding the CF, Canada has a second chance to fulfill its potential. “Canada is back,” the current saying goes, because it is finally building a respectable military that takes on arduous international tasks. Re-embracing Ottawa’s traditional approach to defence could scuttle this endeavour, leaving Canada with a middling military and a reduced capacity to act in the world.

Those focused on magnifying Canada’s role in the world may be right to hope that realism remains dormant in the Canadian defence debate. Beyond asking whether existing threats justify higher defence expenditures, a realist critique would question whether being a ‘contender’ is a goal worth pursuing in light of the costs involved. It would also ask if Canada could ever really be a ‘contender’ given its relative power, and it would enquire which other goods are being traded-off in the pursuit of international recognition. Above all, it would demand to know whether the current emphasis on rapidly expanding the CF and sustaining continual international deployments is good for the long-term health of the military, important for Canadian security, and in keeping with an affordable and effective safeguarding of the national interest. It may very well be that Ottawa’s current policies are sound and that these apprehensions are overblown or off the mark. But to dispel these concerns and deflect these critiques, realism must first be brought back into the Canadian defence debate. Leaving realism out of the debate will merely heighten suspicions that Canada’s current policies are based on overly optimistic appraisals about the future size of the defence budget, the military’s role in boosting
Canada’s influence, and the CF’s ability to assist with a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

This monograph offers a realist critique of Canada’s current defence policies. In so doing, we aim to revive the realist position in the Canadian defence debate and encourage a franker discussion about Canada’s defence policy alternatives. The monograph begins with a brief overview of realist thought and principles. Next, it provides a realist reading of the history of Canadian defence policy from the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King to the present day. Third, the monograph undertakes a realist critique of contemporary Canadian defence policy truisms and assumptions. Lastly, it provides a series of realist-minded policy alternatives for the defence analysis community’s consideration.
2. The Realist Perspective

Realist theories hold that two key concepts are at the centre of all political relations: power and interests. Political actors, whether they be individuals, parties, transnational groups, or states, seek to promote or protect their interests, defined as that which is advantageous to the actor or that which improves the welfare of the actor.\(^{14}\) To promote and protect their interests, political actors seek to preserve and enhance their power, defined in terms of material strength or an ability to influence the decisions of others. The accumulation of power can itself be seen as an interest, since the more power an actor has, the better the actor is able to secure its other interests. Based on these initial premises, it would appear that realism believes that states should always seek to maximize their power.

Yet the realist tradition also identifies factors that constrain the power accumulation of states. The first of these limiting factors is the tendency of states to balance each other’s power. If one state or group of states grows in power, a second state or group of states will attempt to do the same. Second, realists hold that there are multiple sources of state power and that, in a world of finite resources, this variety of sources constrains how much overall power states can accumulate. Hans Morgenthau argued that national power is determined by a state’s geography, natural resources, economic strength, military strength, population, diplomatic prowess, governance, national cohesion, and national character.\(^{15}\) Few states can hope to build their strengths and capacities in each these areas simultaneously. Most states must strike a balance; they must determine which strengths and capacities are most important in light of the interests they are seeking to promote and protect. Indeed, the quality of a state’s governance, which is itself a source of power, is partly determined by the ability of leaders to
arrive at a balance of national strengths and capabilities that is suited to the
types of challenges their state faces. A state that faces few conventional
military threats but is highly vulnerable to international economic disrup-
tions would be wise to focus on building economic strength rather than
military capabilities. All governments must avoid the “fallacy of the single
factor,”\textsuperscript{16} thinking that one type of strength or capability is has an inordinate
impact on overall national power.\textsuperscript{17} Military strength is no more
important to total national power than economic strength.

Realists also argue that states should behave in ways that reflect their
relative power ranking in the international system.\textsuperscript{18} In addition to pro-
tecting their particular interests, superpowers and great powers can afford,
and are expected, to act as world leaders. Their power allows them to shape
the international political environment. Secondary powers, on the other
hand, should be more circumspect. Rather than striving for a significant
role or high degree of influence in international affairs, secondary powers
should concentrate on using their relatively modest power to protect their
relatively modest interests in the most efficient way possible. Any other
strategy is wasteful. The dynamics of the international system will not
allow secondary powers to hold a position, or exert a level of influence,
that is inconsistent with their relative power. Hence, secondary powers
which, in a vain attempt to ‘punch above their weight’, build strengths and
capabilities that are unnecessary to protect their interests are making bad
investments. Interests should come before image.

When deciding which strengths and capabilities to emphasize, states,
and secondary powers in particular, should be mindful of the opportunity
costs associated with their choices.\textsuperscript{19} Instead of asking “would an increase
in strength A be good?”, they should ask “which strengths am I not in-
creasing because I am choosing to increase strength A?” Stated differently,
states should be aware of the trade-off they are making when they pick one
investment over another. An awareness of these trade-offs, in turn, should
prompt states to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the options they have
before them. Assume, for example, that a state has $100 million to invest
in either strength A or strength B. After undertaking a cost-benefit analy-
sis, the state discovers that a $100 million investment in strength A will
yield a return of $150 million in benefits, whereas the same investment in
strength B will yield a return of $200 million. Although both options offer
a positive return, the benefit of investing in strength B is far superior. Un-
less an increase in strength A is deemed absolutely necessary to protect
Related concerns are cost-effectiveness and the law of diminishing returns. Cost-effectiveness analyses compare “alternative ways of achieving the same objective.”20 All things being equal, states should prefer to achieve their objectives at the lowest cost. The more money that is saved in reaching an objective, the more funds are available to finance other priorities. States should always consider whether there are less costly means of achieving an end or performing a function. When deciding which strengths and capabilities merit enhancement, states should give preference to those strengths and capabilities that can be used to achieve the greatest number of objectives, or those that can perform the widest variety of functions. Cost-effectiveness further demands that states seek out economies of scale and avoid an unnecessary duplication of capabilities. When cooperating with another state to achieve an objective or produce an effect, states should endeavour to provide complementary, rather than redundant, capabilities. If capabilities X and Y and Z are required to achieve an objective, for instance, then it is logical for allied states to share the burden. State A can provide capability X, while state B can provide capability Y, and both should can supply half of capability Z. Likewise, if state A offers both capabilities X and Y, then state B need only provide capability Z. It is wasteful for state B to duplicate either capability X or Y, since state A has already offered them.

For its part, the law of diminishing returns compels states to appreciate that, in some cases, each additional dollar they spend on a strength or capability will earn them gradually fewer returns. As the returns on each additional dollar spent decline, states should question at what point further investment in the strength or capability is wasteful or an inefficient use of limited funds.

States should also be concerned with matching means and ends. When it is evident that the means are insufficient to reach a particular end, it could be argued that the means should be increased until they are sufficient to reach the end. Yet it is equally logical to recommend that the end be adjusted to match available means, particularly if the end can be scaled down without significantly undermining state interests. For instance, state X wishes to play an important role in a multilateral military operation, but it only has a single naval frigate available. Confronted with this dilemma, state X would have two options. If it is convinced that playing an important
role in the operation is vital for its interest, it could try to find additional units to deploy. Alternatively, state X could conclude that a token role in the operation would be acceptable and not damaging to its interests, in which case it would simply deploy the frigate. In making this distinction between what is merely desirable and what is absolutely necessary, state X discovers which solution to the mismatch between means and ends is preferable. Though states may always want to match means to ends, in a world of limited resources and opportunity costs there are times when it makes more sense to match ends to means.

Realism rejects the notion of perfect security. It accepts that risk is inescapable. No matter how much attention and resources are devoted to achieving security, risks will remain. Attempting to address all risks is a wasteful exercise, since risk cannot be eliminated, and energies and resources spent on eliminating various risks come with opportunity costs. Every dollar spent addressing a risk is a dollar not spent on another risk or on another, more productive, endeavour. This prompts realist thinking to recommend that states concentrate on protecting themselves against likely risks, since focusing on improbable risks diverts money away from other national goods and objectives. States, like individuals, must accept that risk is relative and that likelier risks merit more attention than unlikelier ones.

Realism demands that states elevate the good of their citizens above making their citizens feel good. This means that states should place their national interests ahead of their national pride. Pride is a state of mind, while interests are related to tangible goods. At times the protection of national interests and the cultivation of national pride coincide. In such cases, building pride is a positive externality that should be embraced. When interests and pride conflict, however, a state must be prepared to swallow the latter.

Realism embraces a consequentialist ethic. The moral worth of an action is judged by its outcomes, not the intent which prompted it. When evaluating whether an action was ‘right’, the answer is found in whether or not it produced a ‘good’ result, not whether it was done for the ‘correct’ reason.

These principles provide analysts with a strong set of guidelines for evaluating the worth and wisdom of a state’s defence policies. By upholding a comprehensive understanding of the sources of national power, realism demands that we avoid the fallacy of thinking that military strength is the only, or preferred, means of promoting and protecting the national
interest. In many cases, military power is of limited use in protecting or promoting interests. All states must be aware of the opportunity costs and trade-offs that are involved in focusing on military power above other strengths, such as economic prosperity. Realism holds that it is wasteful for secondary powers to use military power to boost their relative standing in the international system. A state’s influence and importance in the international system are more or less predetermined by its overall relative power. Secondary powers who hope that more military power will allow them to transcend their secondary rank in the global political arena will have limited or temporary success. Increasing military power may lift a secondary power’s international standing and influence by some degree, but it will not allow a secondary power to have the same weight as a great or super power. Secondary powers who invest in military strength to increase their international influence will face progressively diminishing returns on their investments.

All states should seek efficiency and cost-effectiveness when building or maintaining military capabilities. In light of opportunity costs, no more should be spent on defence than is necessary to protect and promote the national interest. When a mismatch between military means and ends appears, states should reconsider both the means and the ends. If a state discovers that a particular military end is vital for the national interest, then defence means should be increased. If, however, a military end is not vital for the national interest, then a state can alter the end to match available means. States should also question whether military forces are the appropriate, or most efficient, means of achieving an end. When working with allies to achieve a military objective, duplication and redundancy should be avoided. Secondary powers need not contribute more to an allied military effort than their relative power and standing merits.

When crafting defence policies, states should focus on likely risks and threats. Preparing for improbable risks and threats diverts funds away from other capabilities, strengths, and priorities. States must accept that military risks cannot be eliminated. Defence policy should not aim to address all possible risks and threats. Instead, the measure of a defence policy should be whether it addresses likely risks and threats in an efficient and affordable manner. Crafting a defence policy to address all imaginable contingencies is not realistic; it is a form of utopianism.

When judging the success of a defence policy, the most important criterion is whether the policy produced a desirable outcome. The motives behind the policy are inconsequential. In cases where they conflict, defence policy
outcomes that improve the material well-being of states and their citizens should be considered more valuable than defence policy outcomes that make a state and its citizens feel better about themselves.

As we shall see in the next chapter, during the Cold War Canadian defence policy by and large followed these principles. The chapter after, however, shows that in recent years those guiding the policy debate in Canada appear to have lost sight of them. Chapter Four then examines Canada’s national interests and the threats to them, allowing us in Chapter Five to provide suggestions on how to reapply realist principles to produce a better defence policy for the twenty-first century.
3. From King to Chrétien: Realism in Canadian Defence Policy

The history of Canadian defence policy from the late 1940s to the turn of the twenty-first century is routinely presented as a fall from grace. Canada, many pundits and prominent scholars argue, went from being a nation that was serious about defence to a nation that cannot even think seriously about it. In fact, Ottawa has often been accused of blindness towards the critical role that defence forces play in protecting national interests. Critics also lament that Canada abandoned its standing as a respected member of NATO and became a brazen alliance free-rider. The post-Cold War era is seen as an especially dishonourable period in Canadian defence history, given the sizable budgets cuts that were imposed on DND and the slow pace of CF re-capitalization. Only when the Liberal government of Paul Martin decided to significantly increase defence spending and accelerate the acquisition of new equipment, it is commonly asserted, did Canada begin to earn back a modicum of international clout and to promote the national interest in a clear minded fashion.

If the measure of a state’s standing and ability to protect its interests is the size of its armed forces, then the critics are right. But if realist principles are applied, a different perspective is suggested. From the late 1940s to 2003, Ottawa arrived at a balance of strengths and capabilities that were well-suited to the types of challenges Canadians faced and the multifaceted interests Canada sought to protect. Contrary to what critics claim, Canada maintained a military that was cost-effective, sustainable, and ready to promote and protect the national interest. The CF successfully deployed
on a large number of NATO and UN missions, ensuring that Canada kept its seat at the allied table. Likewise, the CF played a visible and important part in the defence of North America. In addition, Canadian defence expenditures were consistent with the country’s security situation. Facing no direct conventional military threat to their security, and residing on the world’s most stable continent, Canadians correctly surmised that there was no pressing need to spend far greater sums on their armed forces.

Had Ottawa not kept defence expenditures low, Canada would have been economically weaker, and thus a less powerful nation. Thanks in part to its fiscally prudent defence policies, by the late 1990s Ottawa had significantly reduced the national debt and escaped crippling budget deficits. Together with sound fiscal and trade policies, this prudent approach to defence spending helped make Canada one of the more successful states in the world. The country experienced strong economic growth, and Canadians benefited from a high standard of living and decent health and education systems. If properly defined, these were successes that clearly served the national interest.23 As a secondary power, moreover, Canada was right to be content with a modest degree of international influence. If it had fielded a larger military, Canada might have played a more prominent role on international operations, but the opportunity costs of doing so would have been substantial, and it is unclear how a larger international military presence would have dramatically improved Canada’s ability to shape world affairs or the policies of its allies. From a realist perspective, Canada’s defence policies were fundamentally sound.

Golden Age or Golden Exception? 1945-1957

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King slashed defence expenditures. Economic imperatives lay behind this decision to deeply cut the defence budget. Although the Canadian economy was prosperous, high levels of inflation threatened to drag Canada into a recession and possibly a depression if left unchecked. To combat the inflationary threat to Canada’s economic stability, all public expenditures needed to be reduced.24 Defence, which represented a large portion of public spending, was no exception. Although Canadian decisionmakers were concerned about the Soviet military’s burgeoning capacity to attack North America, dealing with the inflationary threat to Canada’s economic well-being had to take precedence. At this
time, after all, the United States still had a monopoly on atomic weapons, a reality that lessened the risk of an all-out Soviet attack on the continent or Western Europe. If the Canadian economy was allowed to disintegrate, Ottawa would be poorly placed to participate in a future war against the Soviets. In what would become a regular pattern in Canada’s approach to defence policy over the next sixty years, Canadian leaders prioritized protection of the country’s economic strength over the maintenance of existing, but costly, military capabilities.

Given the evident economic risks Canada faced, the uncertainty of the Soviet threat, and the United States’ preponderance of military strength, the King government’s choice was a sign of good governance. When this pattern recurred at later points in the evolution of Canadian defence policy, the choice would be equally wise. As Canada was blessed with a geography that protected it from large-scale conventional attacks, was a neighbour and ally of the world’s greatest military power, and was vulnerable to domestic and international economic disruptions, the Canadian national interest demanded that defence policy should be subservient to economic considerations.

In 1949 Canada became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective defence agreement meant to unite North America and Western Europe against Soviet aggression. The creation of NATO and tenser relations between the communist and capitalist blocs compelled Canada to reinvest in its armed forces. After communist North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, Western governments no longer doubted that the communist bloc was intent on waging aggressive wars of expansion. Canada not only joined the American-led and United Nations (UN) sanctioned war to expel North Korean forces from the South, but also initiated a significant rearmament programme. After the Korean War ended in 1953, Ottawa used its newly built military strength to help contain further Soviet aggression. Canada deployed land and air forces to Western Europe, and the Canadian navy was assigned to the defence of the North Atlantic. Alongside this contribution to NATO, Canada helped to prevent open war between the capitalist and communist blocs by undertaking peace operations that kept the superpowers out of regional conflicts in the Third World. Best known among these peace operations was the peacekeeping force deployed to the Suez in 1956. In addition, Canada and the United States constructed an elaborate air defence system to protect North America, and the American nuclear deterrent in particular, from long-
range Soviet bombers. This led to the creation of the binational Canada-
United States North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957.²⁸

Canada was well-placed to afford these numerous military commitments
and a vastly enlarged force structure. Apart from a slight downturn in 1954,
the Canadian economy was strong and prosperous from the end of the
Korean War to 1957.²⁹ The nature of the communist threat justified the
maintenance of a large Canadian military. Though the United States and
Soviet Union each developed atomic and nuclear weapons, the Korean
War demonstrated the continuing relevance of conventional armed forces
in the containment of communist expansion. Given the large number of
conventional Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe, and the possibility
that Moscow might attempt a rapid conventional conquest of Western Eu-
rope that would test the United States’ will to respond with nuclear weapons,
NATO prudently chose to pursue its containment policy with both conven-
tional and nuclear forces. Though the Soviet threat to North America was
a nuclear one, an effective air defence against Soviet bombers necessitated
the maintenance of a substantial fleet of fighter-interceptors. Likewise, an
effective defence of the sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic
depended on the presence of significant NATO naval forces in those wa-
ters. During this decade Canadian decisionmakers recognized the
importance of fielding a large military and of accepting significant mili-
tary commitments.³⁰ Since the Canadian economy was doing well and a
sizable portion of Canadian trade was with Western Europe,³¹ there was
no disjunction between the protection of Canada’s economic interests and
its defence commitments.

Scholars and commentators view the period from 1945 to 1957 as the
‘Golden Age’ of Canadian defence policy.³² Yet the period is more a ‘Golden
Exception’. Canadians and their leaders perceived an evident threat to North
America and Western Europe. Containment of this threat was thought to
require large numbers of both conventional and nuclear forces. Canada
was well-suited for a leading role in peace operations during this period
because its larger allies were either former colonial powers directly in-
volved in the conflict the operations were attempting to contain, or
superpowers that the operations were attempting to keep out of the con-
flict. Most importantly, aside from the balance of payment crisis of 1947-48
and the slight downturn of 1954, the Canadian economy was under mini-
mal strain before 1957, and there were few other demands on the federal
budget that would have raised questions about the opportunity costs in-
curred by defence expenditures. Never again would such circumstances
align. Rather than looking upon this age as an example to emulate, it is preferable to understand the unique conditions that existed during these years. Although it is appealing to romanticize the 1950s and uphold them as a template to follow today, realism demands that defence policies reflect current threats and conditions, not those of a bygone era.

It has also been argued that Canada’s international standing and influence were at their highest during this era, when defence expenditures reached upwards of 7.8 percent of GDP. This is upheld as proof that Canada can gain significant influence by building military capacity. Such arguments are based on questionable assessments of Canada’s influence in the 1950s. There is no evidence that Canada played a significant role in shaping American grand strategy during this decade. If Canada could be said to have had a degree of international influence that was greater than its total relative power during these years, this resulted from the reality that many European and Asian powers, such as West Germany and Japan, were still recovering from the Second World War. Taken together, these realities belie the notion that Canada was a heavy-weight contender from 1945-1957 or that the strength of its military placed it in that class.

**Holding Steady, Seeking Efficiency: 1958-1968**

Canadian defence expenditures ceased to increase in the years that followed the Korean War. Between 1955 and 1958 the defence budget was cut from $1.7 to $1.4 billion. Defence spending also began a steady decline as a proportion of all federal expenditures. In 1957, defence spending counted for approximately 30 percent of the federal budget. By 1960, this figure had fallen to approximately 20 percent. Due to an increase in inflationary pressures that occurred between 1957 and 1961, the Canadian defence dollar could buy less than in preceding years. Since tensions between the communist and capitalist blocs were high at this time and Canada’s commitments to NATO and North America security remained constant, critics hold that these budgetary decisions reflect a critical turning point in the Canadian government’s attitudes towards defence. Rather than recognizing that the decline in the purchasing power of the Canadian defence dollar merited a larger defence budget, Ottawa chose to cut defence expenditures. Instead of realizing that the international security environment demanded a renewed commitment to military strength, Ottawa began looking for ways to make the armed forces and the Department
of National Defence more efficient and cost-effective. Simply put, beginning in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the Canadian government lost its nerve and embraced military mediocrity.

Nor, according to the critics, did the situation improve between 1963 and 1968. Though the federal government increased the defence budget during this period, the increases were outpaced by inflation, resulting in an overall decline of the purchasing power of Canada’s defence expenditures. Although the number of people enlisted in the armed forces fell drastically, personnel and operations and maintenance costs consumed upwards of 85-90 percent of the defence budget, leaving little money for the acquisition of new capital equipment. The proportion of the federal budget which was spent on defence kept shrinking. In an effort to achieve greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in meeting its defence policy commitments and objectives, the government unified the military services, a decision for which some critics have never forgiven it. All this occurred, moreover, at a time when the Soviet Union was building and refining its military capabilities, NATO was stressing the role of conventional forces in deterring the Soviets, the United States was embroiled in the Vietnam War, and the Canadian military was undertaking more peacekeeping missions. As the 1960s progressed, on this reckoning, the slide towards military mediocrity was unabated.

While this tale of Canada’s descent appears convincing, from a realist perspective the choices Ottawa made were understandable. The inflation Canada experienced between 1957 and 1961 was accompanied by higher levels of unemployment. Known as ‘stagflation’, this combination of inflation and unemployment marked the end of Canada’s postwar boom. From 1957 on, Ottawa rightly recognized that greater attention needed to be paid to the stability and security of the Canadian economy. Allowing Canada’s economic situation to worsen would weaken the country’s overall power and strength. Unless the personal economic security and well-being of Canadians was protected, Canada’s national cohesion and morale would suffer. While contributing to the deterrence of Soviet aggression was a vital objective, guarding the public welfare was equally important; allowing the personal security and morale of Canadians to decline would be detrimental to the national interest and Canada’s national power. Accordingly, beginning in 1957, the federal government spent far more on public health and unemployment and old age insurance. In the mid and late 1960s, Ottawa and the provinces introduced the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and comprehensive health coverage for all Canadians. These social welfare...
programs were costly, and their creation partly explains why defence’s share of all federal spending declined so dramatically between 1958 and 1968. Ottawa did not take money out of the defence budget to pay for these programmes. But it is likely that the federal government weighed the opportunity costs of devoting additional funds to either the public welfare or military strength, and discovered that public welfare was viewed as the better, and more necessary, investment.

Part of the reason defence was considered a relatively poor investment was due to the inefficiencies that plagued the military. Defence ministers from Brooke Claxton (1946-54) on were troubled by the military’s inefficient practices and policies. No matter how much Ottawa spent on defence, the military always wanted more. There never seemed to be a level of defence expenditure that was considered sufficient to meet Canada’s alliance commitments or to protect the national interest. This engendered a healthy scepticism among the political class about how much was actually enough to meet the country’s objectives, and about the organizational interests that lay behind the military’s assessments and advice. Adding to this scepticism were inefficiencies related to maintenance of three separate military services. Service parochialism led to unnecessary duplications and endless funding battles that were only resolved by giving additional resources to all three branches. The 1962-63 report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization noted that the existence of separate services was wasteful and that a unification of the military’s three branches was in order. The 1964 decision to unify the forces was consistent with an independent assessment of how to efficiently spend Canada’s defence dollars without sacrificing capabilities. Spending more on the military before unification was imposed, when inefficient practices persisted, would have been poor governance, especially at a time of when inflationary pressures were reducing the purchasing power of federal dollars. In fact, the inflation levels Canada confronted during these years created a further disincentive to spend more on defence. Significantly boosting defence spending during this period would have exacerbated the inflationary forces that were eroding the purchasing power of Canada’s defence dollars.

For critics, none of these explanations justifies the decision not to spend more on defence between 1958 and 1968. The sole criterion for defence expenditures should be the level of threat Canada and its allies faced, and the amount of military strength required to protect the national interest. When these factors are included in the equation, the logic of Ottawa’s approach to defence from 1958 to 1968 is weakened, but not by much.
Canada’s decision not to devote more resources to defence did indeed go against NATO policy. Yet Canada continued to meet its basic alliance commitments and the superpowers’ nuclear standoff raised legitimate questions about the necessity of spending more on conventional forces. Indeed, the gelling parity of conventional military strength and nuclear weaponry between the communist and capitalist blocs rendered Canada’s defence requirements far more ambiguous. As the ability of NATO and Warsaw Pact to destroy each other many times over became obvious, the value added by Canada devoting more of its limited financial resources to defence was at best unclear, and at worst non-existent.

By the mid-1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with high-yield thermonuclear warheads. The deployment of these weapons reinforced the dynamics of deterrence, but altered perceptions about the plausibility and desirability of war between the communist and capitalist blocs. ICBMs reinforced the allure of first-strike doctrines and the necessity of protecting the American nuclear deterrent. Given the rapidity with which they could deliver a warhead to its target, ICBMs were an ideal first-strike weapon; they could destroy an opponent’s missiles and bombers before they were able to be launched in retaliation. If the United States could retain a first-strike capability against the Soviets, containment would be reinforced and the capitalist bloc would be in a position to prevail if war broke out. In this sense, the ICBM reinforced the logic of Canada’s role in strategic defence.47 As it had during the bomber era, Canada continued to deploy forces that served to both protect the American deterrent and bolster the United States’ first-strike capability. These included nuclear-armed fighter-interceptors and surface-to-air rockets, while in the early 1960s Canada joined the United States in tracking and assessing ballistic missile launches.48 Canada’s stalled defence expenditures, it must be stressed, did not prevent the Canadian military from fulfilling these functions and commitments.49

ICBMs highlighted the sheer terror – some would say lunacy – of nuclear warfare. ICBMs could reach their targets quickly, and they could also be launched rapidly, implying that an attempt to execute a first strike would likely result in mutual annihilation. To many, including American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1961-68), this reality meant that the communist and capitalist blocs were caught in a situation of mutually assured destruction (MAD).50 If neither bloc believed that it could execute a first strike or survival a retaliatory bombardment, then war was less...
likely to break out. This stabilizing aspect of MAD led decisionmakers to make the entrenchment of assured destruction a pillar of Canadian diplomacy in the 1960s. Ottawa, for instance, opted out of the United States’ anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system because it seemed to undermine MAD. Ottawa’s diplomatic support of MAD was inconsistent with Canada’s active role in supporting the United States’ first-strike doctrine. Similarly, given NORAD’s ballistic missile tracking and assessment mission, Canada was in fact involved in the American ABM system. This might suggest that Canadian decisionmakers and diplomats were either dishonest or unable to grasp the complexities of nuclear strategy. But while it may be true that they were dishonest, holding that the politicians and diplomats “didn’t get it” is too simplistic. Permitting a contradiction between declaratory policy and actual practice is often a sign of smart politics. Although they knew that containment and the maintenance of NATO solidarity required a facilitation of the United States’ first-strike strategies, working to prevent an all-out nuclear exchange that would annihilate Canada served the national interest. Canadian leaders arrived at a careful compromise between two equally compelling positions. Rather than criticizing Canadian leaders for their apparent duplicity, one should applaud their diplomatic dexterity.

MAD raised numerous questions about the utility of conventional forces. By the mid-1950s, the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons had already pushed Canada to abandon plans for a future war mobilization. In the event of a war with the Warsaw Pact, Canada would fight with its existing forces. Known as a ‘forces-in-being’ strategy, this approach was representative of Ottawa’s growing ambivalence towards the relevance of large conventional force structures in the nuclear age. MAD reinforced this ambivalence. While escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange could in theory be contained, friction and the fog of war could instead have led the communist and capitalist blocs to launch their high-yield nuclear weapons soon after hostilities broke out. Once these weapons were used, the number of conventional forces in the field would be inconsequential to the final outcome of the war. After a nuclear holocaust was unleashed, there would not be much for conventional forces to fight over.

Given this apocalyptic scenario, the imperative to spend more on conventional forces, or even to link defence expenditure increases to the rate of inflation, was diminished. In a MAD world, the money Ottawa spent on conventional forces faced a law of drastically diminishing returns. While Ottawa needed to maintain sufficient forces to fulfill its alliance obligations
and retain a respectable degree of influence within NATO, it was doubtful whether devoting additional resources to the military would have made Canada more secure. When coupled with the economic dangers posed by inflation and the country’s interest in funding social welfare programmes that enhanced Canadians’ personal security, the diminishing ability of conventional forces to markedly improve Canada’s national security fuelled suspicions that earmarking additional funds for defence was a poor investment.

All that said, Ottawa’s choice not to boost defence expenditures or maintain additional conventional forces was inconsistent with the evolution of NATO doctrine between 1958 and 1968. Although MAD appeared, on the surface, to imply that a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was unlikely, an alternative reading of the threat of assured nuclear destruction suggested the opposite. The very frightfulness of MAD appeared to call into question the ‘usability’ of high-yield nuclear weapons. Since both sides believed that the use of high-yield nuclear weapons would mean their own destruction, it was possible that NATO would not be prepared to launch its arsenal first. This in turn implied that these weapons might not be used to respond to a limited conventional attack. Knowing this, NATO planners feared that the Warsaw Pact could undertake a series of limited conventional assaults against Western Europe with the expectation that NATO would not retaliate with high-yield nuclear weapons. In effect, the Warsaw Pact could call the MAD bluff. Because the Warsaw Pact was stronger in terms of conventional forces, there was a distinct possibility that NATO would be unable to defend itself against this type of assault. To respond to this threat, NATO embraced a doctrine of ‘flexible response’.51 Essentially, flexible response held that NATO should be able to defend Western Europe from a variety of attacks, from the purely conventional to all-out nuclear war. For flexible response to work, however, NATO members would need to deploy a larger number of conventional forces to Western Europe.

Ottawa’s choice not to increase the size of Canada’s conventional forces thus ran counter to the evolution of NATO doctrine. In fairness, however, it must be noted that several other NATO members also failed to enlarge their conventional forces at this time.52 Nor is there significant evidence that this choice undermined Canada’s influence within the alliance, nor that the security of Europe and North America suffered as a result (war did not, after all, break out). By these measures, and in light of all the other
considerations mentioned above, Canada’s middling devotion to flexible response was unexceptional and not noticeably detrimental to the national interest.

Retreat and Return: 1969-1984

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is routinely identified as the man who irreparably damaged the Canadian Forces and Canada’s international standing. His ambivalence towards the utility of conventional forces in an age of MAD, his decision to ‘de-nuclearize’ Canada, and his choice to reduce the Canadian military’s presence in Europe are some of Trudeau’s purportedly ‘anti-defence’ legacies. In addition, the Trudeau government has been blamed for refusing to adequately fund the Canadian military. This heritage has prompted Trudeau’s critics to declare that he held “a profoundly anti-military attitude” and that he “killed the Canadian Forces.” If one focuses on Trudeau’s first years in office, a few of these criticisms stand up to scrutiny. From 1969 to 1971, the Trudeau government implemented some questionable defence policies. Yet, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the Trudeau government reconsidered a number of its decisions and pursued policies that strengthened the CF and lifted the purchasing power of the defence budget for the first time since 1957. Far from killing the military, Trudeau allowed the CF to fight on another day. Given the state of the Canadian economy during his tenure as prime minister, Trudeau’s decision to keep the CF afloat should merit commendation, not condemnation, from pro-defence commentators.

Trudeau was determined to reshape Canadian defence policy when he became prime minister. Convinced that his predecessors had crafted defence policies to please Canada’s allies rather than protect essential Canadian interests, he was determined to develop an alternate set of defence policies that would put Canadians and Canada first. The prime minister’s aversion to his predecessors’ defence policies was driven by his ideological predispositions and his particular reading of the international security environment. A liberal who was sceptical of the utility of military force in resolving problems, Trudeau held that an expeditionary military and Canada’s alliance commitments should not exist for their own sake. Unless the CF’s expeditionary capabilities and commitments to NATO could be shown to support Ottawa’s foreign policy objectives or to protect Canada’s vital national interests, these capabilities and commitments could be diminished or discarded.
When he looked at the international security environment, Trudeau was unconvinced that the military capabilities and alliance commitments his government had inherited were necessary or desirable. MAD called into question the utility of maintaining the CF’s existing commitment of conventional forces to NATO. The United States’ nuclear capabilities seemed to obviate the necessity of arming Canadian forces with nuclear weaponry. UN peacekeeping operations appeared ineffective and wasteful. From Trudeau’s point of view, Ottawa’s existing policies overlooked various pressing defence concerns. Political instability in the United States and secessionist violence in Quebec suggested that the CF should play a larger role in protecting Canadians at home. American activities in the Arctic threatened Canadian sovereignty in the region, demanding a more forceful response from Ottawa. While Canada did not necessarily need to wholly abandon its international commitments to address these threats, Trudeau believed that addressing these imminent dangers was a high priority.

The Trudeau government could have devoted additional resources to internal security and sovereignty protection without reducing Canada’s international defence commitments and endeavours. Yet the reality was that the Trudeau government was ill-positioned to ask the CF to do more. After a decade of relatively high inflation, the defence budget could no longer sustain the CF’s current structure and commitments, let alone accommodate additional roles and tasks. As during the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments, economic factors compelled the Trudeau government to cap the defence budget. Inflation continued to plague the Canadian economy in the late 1960s, pushing Ottawa to keep federal expenditures relatively level. Defence spending was no exception, and an inevitable part of the Trudeau government’s defence review would be a cut in the CF’s size and commitments. In April 1969, as Cabinet was mired in a debate about the direction of Canadian defence policy, the Trudeau government announced the extent of these cuts. Military personnel would be reduced from approximately 100,000 to 80-85,000. The CF’s strength in Western Europe would be reduced by fifty percent, and Canada would abandon its nuclear capabilities.

In 1971 the Trudeau government released a white paper that outlined its defence priorities and policies. Titled *Defence in the 70s*, the white paper listed the country’s defence priorities as “(a) the surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines, i.e. the protection of our sovereignty; (b) the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States; (c) the fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; (d) the
performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.” Both the rankings and the language stressed that the defence of Western Europe and UN peacekeeping were of secondary importance to sovereignty protection and continental defence. Defence Minister Donald Stovel MacDonald also used the white paper to outline what the government saw as the proper relationship between defence policy and the wider national interest. Defence policy, the paper emphasized, was subservient to national policies that aimed to “foster economic growth,” “promote social justice,” and “enhance the quality of life.” This meant that defence expenditures would not be increased at the expense of social welfare programs, a sound and stable fiscal policy, or Canada’s economic growth and prosperity.57

Defence in the 70s and the decisions that preceded it have been widely criticized. Some of these criticisms are warranted, others are not. One fair criticism is that the decision to reduce the Canadian military presence in Western Europe angered allied governments. While this does not apply to the United States since Washington was hoping to scale down its military presence in Western Europe as well, Canada’s relations with France, West Germany, and other European allies were undermined by the decision. 58

A second valid criticism is that the reduction of conventional forces and the abandonment of the CF’s theatre nuclear weapons ran contrary to NATO’s flexible response doctrine. Since the doctrine aimed to prevent an all-out nuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Canada had a vested interest in supporting flexible response. 59

The validity of these two criticisms must be weighed against the larger context in which Defence in the 70s was written. Above all, it must be noted that the Trudeau government wrote the document during a period of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under détente, the United States and the Soviet Union expressed their willingness to accept each other’s spheres of influence, to negotiate strategic nuclear arms control treaties, and to reduce tensions overall. The Trudeau government’s decision to draw down Canada’s conventional forces in Western Europe is understandable. In addition, the realities of the Canadian economy must be recognized when judging Defence in the 70s. Given the high rate of inflation the country faced, increasing the size of the defence budget to avoid personnel and capabilities cuts would have been poor fiscal policy, as it would have further fuelled inflationary pressures. It was wise of the Trudeau government to elevate Canada’s economic needs above those of NATO.
An unfair criticism of *Defence in the 70s* is that the Trudeau government was wrong to state that defence should be secondary to economic growth, social justice, or quality of life. Economic growth, social justice, and quality of life can all be sources of national power, and efforts to secure them serve the national interest. Unless a state faces a significant military threat, it is realistic for a government to focus its efforts on building these and other sources of national power. While Canada did face a significant military threat in the early 1970s in the form of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, *Defence in the 70s* was right to state that there were substantial limits on what more the Canadian military could do to defend the country against it. The Trudeau government understandably chose to concentrate on fostering economic growth, social justice, and quality of life over building or sustaining Canada’s military strength.

In the years that followed the publication of *Defence in the 70s*, changes in the international security environment and setbacks in Canadian foreign policy prompted the Trudeau government to reevaluate its defence policies. While this reevaluation is often presented as proof that the policies outlined in *Defence in the 70s* were fundamentally flawed, an alternative reading is that the Trudeau government shrewdly and realistically adapted Canadian defence policy to meet the demands of the day.

Détente ended after the resignation of Richard M. Nixon as President of the United States in 1974. Alongside a downturn in the American economy and the United States’ defeat in Vietnam, Nixon’s departure signalled that the United States’ was in a position of relative weakness. The Soviet Union seized on this moment to pursue a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy. Washington and Western European capitals were concerned with these and other developments, such as growing instability in the Middle East. NATO leaders put increasing pressure on Canada to boost defence expenditures and meet its commitments to collective defence and collective security. Western European leaders also let it be known that they had not forgiven Canada for the 1969 decision to halve the CF’s strength on their continent. When the Trudeau government tried to build economic ties with the European common market, Western European governments made it clear that they expected Ottawa to strengthen the CF’s contribution to NATO before any deal could be struck. In light of these events, the Trudeau government realized that a reinvestment in the Canadian military was required to lift Canada’s standing in allied circles.

By the mid-1970s, Ottawa recognized that inflation could no longer be allowed to significantly erode the real worth Canada’s defence
expenditures.\textsuperscript{62} As of 1974, double digit inflation was erasing the savings achieved by the earlier defence cuts, leaving the CF with an unsustainable force structure. This funding crisis coincided with a more aggressive set of stabilization policies and a change in Ottawa’s attitude towards budget deficits.\textsuperscript{63} In the past, Ottawa had tried to combat inflation by limiting government spending. Now Ottawa began running ever higher budget deficits, while relying on price and wage controls to keep inflation in check. Under this new fiscal thinking, the argument that defence expenditures had to be kept in line to combat inflation no longer applied. The time was opportune for an infusion of money into the military.

In 1975 the Trudeau government completed a Defence Structure Review (DSR).\textsuperscript{64} The DSR stressed the necessity of strengthening the CF’s combat capabilities and of indexing Canadian defence expenditures to inflation. The DSR also initiated a re-capitalization of the CF and a policy whereby capital expenditures were to account for at least twenty-percent of the defence budget. Canadian defence expenditures climbed from $1.9 billion in 1972-73 to $7.9 billion in 1983-84.\textsuperscript{65} In real dollars, Canadian defence spending ranked sixth in NATO. Several new platforms were acquired, including the Leopard C1 main battle tanks, the CF-18 fighter-interceptors, and the Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. Together these demonstrated Canada’s commitment to NATO and NORAD. The Trudeau government also reaffirmed Canada’s interest in UN peacekeeping, and the CF was equipped, albeit imperfectly, to help prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war between the superpowers, the only existential threat Canada faced.

For some, however, Trudeau’s later defence policies were a failure. Despite the substantial spending increases and the new equipment, critics lamented Canada’s ‘commitment-capability gap’.\textsuperscript{66} When examining the commitment-capability gap, what must be noted is that the Trudeau government’s later defence policies were crafted during a very precarious economic period. Double digit inflation continued to saddle the Canadian economy in the late 1970s. When inflation died down in the early 1980s, Canada experienced what has been called the ‘Great Recession’.\textsuperscript{67} Canadian economic growth slowed and unemployment rose to eleven percent. Ottawa continued to run large budget deficits and financial experts began to voice their concerns about the size of Canada’s national debt.\textsuperscript{68} In this economic environment, the opportunity costs of devoting still ever more resources to defence would have been staggering. Indeed, in light of the economic calamity Canada found itself facing, the investments the Trudeau government made in defence were fairly impressive.
Historian J.L. Granatstein offers a different critique of Trudeau’s approach to defence. Granatstein remarks that Trudeau may have “believed that Canada could have no real impact” on the “central issues of foreign policy that divided the West and the Communist world.” Trudeau, Granatstein continued, likely held that “Even if he doubled the defence budget and the size of the Canadian Forces, nothing would change.”

If Granatstein is right, then the true realism behind Trudeau’s defence policies shines through. Nothing much would have changed if the Trudeau government had doubled the defence budget or the size of the CF. The capitalist and communist blocs would still have threatened one another with total annihilation, thanks to their expanding and more precise nuclear arsenals. The balance of power between the two blocs would have remained roughly the same. Ottawa’s ability to influence either Washington or Moscow on key Cold War issues would not have markedly increased. The most important result of a doubling of the defence budget and of the size of the CF would have been a worsening of Canada’s already troubled economic situation. Granatstein’s critique, then, actually reinforces the underlying logic behind Canadian defence policy during the Trudeau era. A far larger investment in defence would have brought little return, and a doubling of defence expenditures would have been wasteful, and worse still, harmful to the Canadian economy. Not spending more than was necessary to secure a seat at the allied table, defend the continent, protect Canadian sovereignty, and aid the civil power/authority was the realistic option.

**Big Dreams, Bigger Debts: 1984-1993**

Following their victory in the 1984 federal election, the Progressive Conservatives of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney vowed to revitalize the Canadian military and renew Canada’s standing as a stalwart ally. At the end of its first mandate, it appeared that the Mulroney government had fulfilled this pledge. A new white paper promised a large-scale recapitalization program and a significant, long-term increase in the defence budget. By the end of its second term, however, international developments and economic realities had forced the government to reverse course. Procurements and promised defence funding increases were cancelled and Ottawa ended the permanent stationing of the CF in Western Europe. For critics, the Mulroney government’s defence legacy is tragic. A government that took the military and Canada’s alliance commitments seriously succumbed to the demands of penny-pinchers and the false hope
of a more peaceable world. In truth, however, much like in the case of the Trudeau government, the Mulroney defence legacy is one of an initial miscalculation, followed by a realistic readjustment.

Cold War tensions were at their highest since the early 1960s when the Mulroney government was elected. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, an American commitment to ‘roll-back’ communist expansion in the developing world, and an accelerating arms race between the superpowers ensured that the early to mid-1980s were the ‘hottest’ phase of the Cold War since the early 1960s. Faced with this international environment, influential members of the Mulroney government resolved to show the United States and other NATO allies that Canada would better meet its alliance commitments. While the Trudeau government had begun to recapitalize the military, and defence expenditures neared $9 billion in 1984-85, officials thought that far more was required given the persistence of the CF’s commitment-capability gap and widespread perceptions that Canada was a NATO laggard.

A first step in demonstrating Canada’s renewed Cold War resolve was taken in March 1985, when Ottawa and Washington agreed to the North American Air Defence Modernization Program. Designed to address continuing and emergent Soviet threats to North America, the Program represented the largest investment in the continent’s aerospace defence infrastructures since the 1950s. With this agreement, the Mulroney government reaffirmed Canada’s vital interest in defending the continent and the American nuclear deterrent.

Next on the agenda was the drafting of a new white paper. This proved more difficult than anticipated, due to disagreements within Cabinet about how much should be spent on the military. Those committed to far higher defence spending were convinced that the Soviet threat was growing and that Canada had a moral responsibility to help confront that threat. They also held that Canada had free-ridden on its NATO allies for too long and that the CF required new capabilities to better safeguard Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Those Cabinet members responsible for the government’s finances, however, did not believe that the country could afford to devote far more money to the military. Ottawa continued to run sizable budget deficits and the federal debt kept expanding. Though Canada was not yet facing a fiscal crisis, there were concerns that it would unless spending was curtailed. They correctly surmised that it was not worth endangering Canada’s economic prosperity and stability for a better reputation among the allies and improved protection of Canadian sovereignty.
Those favouring a stronger military won the argument. Drafted under the leadership of a enterprising and enthusiastic young minister, Perrin Beatty, Canada’s 1987 defence white paper, *Challenge and Commitment*, was an ambitious document that pledged to expand the CF’s capabilities. Among the pledges made in the paper were promises to acquire more tanks and maritime patrol aircraft, improve Canada’s space surveillance capabilities, and procure nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines. With respect to spending, the white paper outlined plans to increase defence expenditures by two-percent above inflation over fifteen years. In making the case for these funding increases and procurements, *Challenge and Commitment* warned Canadians of the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, of the need to meet Canada’s alliance obligations, and of the necessity of safeguarding Canadian sovereignty, particularly in the Arctic.75

Within very few years domestic and international developments compelled the Mulroney government to abandon many of the policies, and most of the procurements, outlined in *Challenge and Commitment*. The white paper’s ‘hawkish’ tone dampened Cabinet’s already fragile support of the policies outlined in the document. An easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 undermined the paper’s assumptions of the international security environment. Coupled with Canada’s progressively deteriorating financial situation, these events allowed the finance minister to successfully lobby for a cancellation of the proposed two-percent annual increase in defence expenditures. Cuts to the existing defence budget followed shortly thereafter.76

In 1992 the Mulroney government announced further reductions in the size of the Canadian military and the withdrawal of permanently stationed CF units from Western Europe. Though critics decried these decisions,77 they were based on a realistic assessment of Canada’s national interest. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the underlying factor that had kept the CF in Western Europe since the early 1950s was gone. While there was a possibility that the Soviet threat might reemerge, the risk seemed low and, more importantly, the cost of keeping a significant military contingent in Europe merely to offset an improbable occurrence was quite high. By 1992 Canada was facing a fiscal calamity. Despite initial efforts by the Mulroney government to address Canada’s economic challenges, the country’s credit rating was being scrutinized because of the size of the federal debt and the continuing practice of running budget deficits. In cutting the size of the
military and withdrawing the CF from Western Europe, the Mulroney government hoped to recoup funds that could be used to help balance the federal budget and preserve Canada’s solvency. In light of the extinguishing of the conventional military threat posed by the Soviet Union, giving priority to the protection of Canada’s economic power was a wise choice.

The military that weathered the transition from Challenge and Commitment to the Western European withdrawal suffered bruised morale, but was otherwise capable of aiding the civil power, contributing to the defence of North America, and of making visible contributions to collective security operations. During the summer of 1990, the CF helped counter and contain a sustained Mohawk protest near Oka, Quebec. The CF continued to contribute to NORAD’s North American aerospace defence mission. Canada took part in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the CF was deployed on numerous United Nations peacekeeping operations. In an effort to boost its internationalist credentials, the Mulroney government arguably over-deployed the CF, sending the military on missions that were neither vital to protect Canadians nor cost-effective in terms of boosting Canada’s international influence. These deployments needlessly taxed the military and the defence budget. If there is a criticism to be made of the Mulroney government’s overall approach to defence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was this tendency to multiply the CF’s deployments while simultaneously curtailing military expenditures.

Critics have claimed that the Mulroney government’s later defence policies harmed Canada-US relations and diminished Canada’s influence within NATO. This is a curious charge. During Mulroney’s tenure as prime minister, Canada and the United States negotiated both the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), two treaties that symbolized the strength of the relationship between the two countries. NAFTA, which was signed after the Mulroney government initiated its defence cuts, was passed by the U.S. Congress despite a notable degree of opposition from protectionist elements. If Ottawa’s defence policies truly irked Washington, there surely should have been some impact on NAFTA, the most important file in the Canada-US relationship during this period. That the passage of NAFTA was unaffected by trends in Canadian defence policy implies either that the US was essentially unconcerned with the Mulroney government’s defence cuts, or that Washington was concerned but not enough to jeopardize the progress of free trade. Even if the latter was the case, it demonstrates that displeasure with Canadian defence policy was
not linked to more prominent, and arguably more important, aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Equally curious is the claim that Canada’s influence in the United States and NATO diminished during the latter part of Mulroney’s premiership. Mulroney’s friendly relationship with American President George H.W. Bush is well-known. He leveraged these personal ties into a noteworthy degree of influence for Canada. His purportedly unpopular defence policies did not prevent Mulroney from winning this influence.81 If Mulroney’s defence policies did cause any damage to Canada-US relations, it must have been very minor. Therefore, considering the precarious state of the country’s financial affairs, the end of the Cold War, and the lack of damage to Canadian influence and Canada-US relations, the Mulroney government’s later defence policies were realistic.

The Fundamentals Were Sound: 1994-2003

No Canadian government is more scorned for its defence policies than that of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. The general consensus is that the Chrétien government decimated the CF, leaving Canada with much reduced international respect and influence, and limiting Ottawa’s ability to protect and promote the national interest. Anecdotal evidence supporting this view abounds. Under the Chrétien government, the CF experienced a troubling number of shortfalls and embarrassments. Important procurements were delayed or cancelled. Low morale and public apathy about their plight meant that the Chrétien era was allegedly a “decade of darkness” for Canadian military personnel. Allies regularly chided Canada for its relatively low defence expenditures. The story of how the Chrétien government gutted the Canadian military is so well-known, in fact, that it needs no further elaboration.82 Yet the tale is also incomplete. When subjected to a realist analysis, the Chrétien government’s defence policies were in keeping with the national interest. Though they were far from perfect, they allowed Canada to regain its economic strength, keep its seat at the allied table, and protect Canadians when disasters struck. Moreover, they prepared the ground for the current expansion of Canada’s military strength. It is clear that the defence policies pursued during the Chrétien era were fundamentally sound.

When they were elected with a majority government in 1993, the Chrétien Liberals were determined to save Canada from financial peril. Chrétien and his finance minister, Paul Martin, were adamant that federal budget
deficits had to be eliminated and that the federal debt needed to be substantially lowered. There could be no other course. If viewed from a realist perspective, the economic crisis the new Chrétien government faced in 1993 was a clear and present danger to the Canadian national interest and way of life. Federal debts and deficits threatened Canada’s economic power, the country’s social welfare and education systems, and Canadians’ standard of living. Exceptional measures were required to address the debt and deficit. Ottawa would need to deeply cut expenditures across the board. Defence was no exception. Defence expenditures were a logical target for sizable reductions. The Cold War was over and Canada faced no conventional military threat. It was sensible to search for economies in the defence budget and to use these savings to erase the federal deficit.

A first effort to demonstrate his new government’s defence frugality was Chrétien’s decision to cancel the procurement of a replacement for the CF’s aging Sea King maritime helicopters. A rash decision rooted in partisan politics and symbolism, the cancellation and long-term impact on the CF’s maritime capabilities became a symbol of the Chrétien government’s mismanagement of defence policy. However ill-advised the maritime helicopter decision was, it was not symptomatic of defence policymaking in the first years of the Chrétien ministry. In late 1993 the Chrétien Cabinet ordered officials at the Department of National Defence (DND) to begin writing a new defence white paper. Although the white paper was meant to reflect the findings of a Parliamentary committee on defence policy that would sit in 1994, the only constraint imposed on the departmental officials was a budgetary one. As long as the policies that came out of the white paper were consistent with the budget cuts planned by the Chrétien government, defence officials would be free to propose those policies that they felt best served the CF and the national interest. Hence, while the maritime helicopter decision and the creation of a Parliamentary committee gave the impression that the white paper was highly politicized, the defence department was granted a good deal of discretion in setting its own future.

DND released its *White Paper on Defence* in December 1994. The white paper contained three essential policies. First, despite calls for Canada to reduce the CF to a constabulary peacekeeping force, it reaffirmed that the Canadian military would retain multi-purpose combat-capabilities. Second, though it set the stage for a notable reduction in the size and strength of the military, the paper ensured that the CF retained a skeletal force with core capacities and capabilities that could be strengthened once Canada’s
economic situation improved. Third, it reaffirmed the CF’s roles in protecting Canadians, helping the United States defend North America, and making contributions to international peace and stability. Contrary to what some have implied, therefore, the 1994 White Paper on Defence did not disarm the CF, nor did it represent a turn away from international deployments. On the contrary, the White Paper promoted the CF’s combat capabilities, preserved the military’s core capacities, and committed the CF to wide-ranging expeditionary operations.

Following the release of the white paper, the Chrétien government announced that the defence budget would be cut to $9.5 billion and CF personnel would be reduced from 74,000 to 60,000. Critics have complained that these cuts starved the Canadian military during the remainder of Chrétien’s time as prime minister. This assessment is incorrect. The cuts themselves were not responsible for the difficulties the CF encountered over the next eight years; a $9.5 billion budget was sufficient to afford the force structure outlined in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. What caused the military’s woes over the next decade was the propensity of the Chrétien government to deploy the CF on nearly every mission carried out by the UN and NATO. This wholly non-selective approach to deployments overstretched the CF. The military was asked to do far more than was reasonable, given the personnel and budget reductions. This high operational tempo diverted money from the capital budget to the operations and maintenance budget, resulting in few dollars being available to buy new equipment or modernize older platforms.

Some of the deployments that the CF undertook during the Chrétien era were undertaken to preserve Canada’s reputation as a reliable ally. Notably, the CF took part in so-called “peace enforcement” operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the Canadian military assisted with the containment of Iraq. In the aftermath of September 2001, the CF deployed to Afghanistan and nearby waters to assist with the removal of the Taliban regime and the capture of Al Qaeda forces. Each of these deployments served the national interest of keeping Canada’s seat at the allied tables, though some, such as Bosnia, arguably dragged on for too long. In addition to these operations, the CF was also deployed on myriad other missions that contributed little to Canada’s international reputation or standing. From the Golan Heights to Rwanda, East Timor, and Congo, the CF were sent around the globe to tout Canada’s commitment to international peace and stability. The military’s contribution to these missions was often small, but their costs eventually added up. Contrary to Andrew Cohen’s suggestion
that Canada drifted into isolationism during the Chrétien era, the CF was sent everywhere. If anything, it was the Chrétien government’s commitment to internationalism that directly contributed to the military’s overstretch.

An immediate response to the claim that the CF woes were related to a high operational tempo is that the Chrétien government should have boosted defence expenditures and personnel levels to offset the overstretch. This is a fair criticism. If the Chrétien government wanted the CF to do more, it should have given the military additional resources. Yet, given the state of the economy, the Chrétien Liberals could not afford to do so until the late 1990s. When federal deficits were eliminated at the turn of the century, the Liberals did begin to modestly reinvest in defence and the CF was progressively strengthened. When Chrétien left office in 2003, the defence budget had climbed up to approximately $13 billion, which placed Canada as the eight highest military spender in NATO when measured in real dollars. But even this figure was insufficient. The CF was still overstretched. Overcommitment continued to gnaw at the military’s capabilities. A reduction in the CF’s deployments was, and arguably since the mid-1990s had always been, the most direct and efficient means of redressing the problem. Canada’s 2004 National Security Strategy said as much, when it declared that the government would be increasingly “selective and strategic” when deploying the Canadian military. Matching ends to means, instead of trying to match means to ends, was rightly, and as it turned out quite briefly, seen to be the best way to halt the CF’s overstretch and to minimize the shortfalls caused by over-commitment.

Whatever the underlying conditions of the CF’s difficulties, the shortfalls the military experienced during the Chrétien era have overshadowed many of the defence policy successes that were achieved between 1994 and 2003. Apart from the 2003 Iraq War, the CF contributed to all major NATO and American-led operations during Chrétien’s time as prime minister. Canada’s contributions to these operations reflected its standing as a secondary power in the alliance. While the contributions of NATO members such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy tended to be larger than Canada’s, this reflected economic and demographic realities. Larger powers tended to make larger contributions. This is neither surprising nor unusual. A related Chrétien era defence policy success was the enhancing of the CF’s interoperability with the United States military and other NATO members. While DND had to invest in high-cost technologies to pursue interoperability, this capability allowed the CF to make efficient, yet visible,
contributions to allied operations. Enhancing the CF’s naval interoperability allowed Canadian naval ships to integrate into American carrier battlegroups, as well as to lead allied naval task groups.92

Another success of the Chrétien era was the development of a more efficient command and force structure. Like all defence departments, DND was burdened by cost overruns, mismanagement, waste, and poor planning.93 Nonetheless, Canada’s defence department fared well on these fronts. Forced to operate within tight budget constraints, DND and the CF learned to make the most of their human, material, and financial resources.94 Most importantly, the Canadian military rarely failed to achieve an objective or goal, and Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen/airwomen were well-trained and highly skilled. Keeping defence expenditures at a modest level helped make the CF a highly effective, yet affordable, military.

Yet another line of attack against the Chrétien government’s defence policies is that they left Canada and Canadians insecure and vulnerable.95 It is difficult to see how this charge holds. The CF successfully contributed to North American aerospace defence throughout the Chrétien era. Canada’s sovereignty and economic interests were protected by the military during the so-called ‘Turbot War’ of 1995. Military personnel were available to help Torontonians dig out of a 118 centimetre snow storm in January 1999. The CF also performed admirably when assisting civil authorities during the 1998 ice storm that struck Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. Military search and rescue aircraft assisted those in distress. Unless one contemplates hypothetical contingencies that did not occur, it is difficult to see how additional military capabilities would have markedly improved the security of Canadians between 1994 and 2003. Even if one uses the September 2001 terrorist attacks as an example of a North American security failure, it is unclear how higher defence expenditures would have better protected the continent. Though the point is obvious, it deserves to be made: being the world’s highest military spender did not protect the United States from the 9/11 terrorist attacks. If there was a lapse in North American security prior to 9/11, it was a failure of intelligence and policing, not military power. This was why the Chrétien government wisely chose to invest heavily in civilian security capabilities after September 2001. Defence forces were not the proper means of protecting the continent against terrorism.

An enduring critique is that the Chrétien Liberals unduly harmed Canada-United States relations.96 This criticism does stick, but the souring of relations between Ottawa and Washington was only indirectly related to
the Chrétien government’s defence policies. From the mid to late 1990s, the principal irritants in the Canada-United States relationship involved foreign policy issues. Chrétien’s second foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, championed several causes, such as the landmines treaty and International Criminal Court, that the United States opposed. On the defence side, however, the Canadian and American militaries grew increasingly close when Axworthy was Canada’s foreign minister. Military interoperability, for instance, flourished while Axworthy was trumpeting his supposedly ‘anti-American’ international policies. Washington would have liked Canada to spend more on defence in the late 1990s, but it was not a significant problem in the relationship. In fact, at the turn of the century, analysts were speaking of a ‘vanishing’ Canada-United States border and of the ‘special relationship’ between the two countries.97 If Canadian defence expenditures were hurting the relationship, the harm was cosmetic at best.

After the attacks of September 2001, the Chrétien government joined the United States’ war on terror and the CF was deployed to Afghanistan alongside the American military. However, American and Canadian critics complained that Ottawa was not doing enough to secure North America. For instance, Paul Cellucci, the American ambassador, commented that Canada was not spending enough on defence.98 Yet, in spite of the fact that the Chrétien government invested precious few extra dollars in defence, Canada and the United States successfully negotiated border security arrangements that allowed cross-border trade, a vital Canadian interest, to resume. Though defence expenditures stayed more or less stable, Ottawa and Washington also agreed to novel continental defence procedures.99 If Canadian defence expenditures had truly angered or troubled Washington, far greater pressure could have been applied. That this pressure was not applied suggests that securing higher defence expenditures from Canada was a desire, rather than a pressing concern, of the George W. Bush administration.

Lastly, critics charge that the Chrétien government’s defence policies limited Canada’s overall international influence. When making this claim, critics often lament that Canada should have been more like Australia, a country that spends well over two percent of GDP on defence.100 Because it devoted a larger relative portion of its wealth to defence, Australia was able to mount independent military operations and earn the respect of the United States. Had Ottawa spent more on defence, the argument goes, maybe Canada could have done the same. Perhaps this is true. But the opportunity costs of doing so would have been large and the benefits unclear.
Thanks to the Chrétien government’s fiscal restraint, Canada entered the twenty-first century with a strong and prosperous economy, without federal deficits, and with a low debt to GDP ratio. It is highly questionable whether trading off these economic advances for the sake of a larger defence budget and more prominent international military presence would have been sensible or worthwhile. It is unclear, for instance, whether being able to mount a sizable independent military operation would have merited a downgrading of Canada’s standing in the G8. Likewise, it is not obvious why Canadians would have benefited more from having a stronger military than from having a federal government that could begin reinvesting heavily in health care at the turn of the century. Most of all, Kim Richard Nossal has noted that Australia and Canada have two very different geostrategic realities. Australia lives in a dangerous neighbourhood populated by large military powers and zones of instability. Canada does not. When this key difference between the two countries is appreciated, Nossal argues that, “there are few strategic lessons that Canadians can learn from the robust foreign and defence policies pursued by [Australia].”

While the CF encountered several shortfalls and difficulties from 1994 to 2003, the fundamentals of the Chrétien government’s defence policies were sound. When the Chrétien government took power, Canada was in recession and the federal government’s fiscal situation was in shambles. When Chrétien resigned as prime minister, Ottawa’s books were in order and the Canadian economy was growing steadily. To reverse Canada’s economic downturn, the Chrétien government had imposed strict fiscal restraint on all federal departments. DND was especially hard-hit. Nonetheless, throughout Chrétien’s premiership, the CF protected Canadians, helped defend North America, and contributed to international peace and stability. Indeed, it was precisely because the Canadian military was so active overseas that many of the CF’s shortfalls appeared. Had the Canadian military been deployed less, the CF would have faced fewer difficulties. In spite of these difficulties, the CF was adequately equipped to promote and protect the Canadian national interest. The Chrétien government realized that it did not need to spend far more on defence in order to do so. From a realist perspective, its defence policies were successful.

All told, the history of Canadian defence policy from the end of the Second World War to the first years of the war on terror was not one of progressive decline and error, as the critics charge. Instead, successive Canadian governments wisely balanced Canada’s military requirements against other concerns to arrive at an equilibrium of national powers that
served the national interest. Especially laudable, given the absence of a conventional military threat, was the choice of several governments to give priority to the protection of Canada’s economic health above the cultivation of military strength. Though none of their records were impeccable, governments adopted a wise and realistic approach to Canadian defence policy from 1945 to 2003. Unfortunately, questionable assumptions have led Ottawa to abandon this approach since 2005.

A number of problems plague Ottawa’s existing approach to defence. The prolonged deployment to southern Afghanistan has overstretched the CF, exacerbating the sustainability problems that the military encountered in the post-Cold War era. It has also complicated recruitment efforts and likely worsened the CF’s retention challenges. The financial costs of Afghanistan and the recent decisions to prioritize the acquisitions of non-essential equipment over the replacement of the military’s core platforms have further contributed to these problems. Though the resulting shortfalls have led to calls for ever more increases in defence spending, the federal government will be ill-placed to answer them. Budgetary choices made by the Conservative government will probably limit Ottawa’s willingness to further substantially boost defence expenditures. These realities suggest that Canada’s current defence policy is misdirected and harmful to the long-term interests of both the country and the CF.

This chapter explores the sources of the difficulties that surround current Canadian defence policy. It begins with an overview of how policies pursued since Chrétien stepped down as prime minister at the end of 2003 have exacerbated the means/end gap. Next, the chapter examines how procurement, administrative, and operational decisions made since 2003 contribute to the gap. Lastly, the chapter argues that the additional defence dollars will either be unavailable or insufficient to close the means/end gap.
Stuck in the Means/End Gap

In April 2008 strategic assessments from the CF’s three branches were leaked to the media. The leaked assessments painted a disquieting picture of the Canadian military. All three services noted that they were plagued by shortfalls tied to a high operational tempo and a lack of funds. The air force, for instance, reported that it was having to ground a number of aircraft due to a budget shortfall of over $500 million. The air force assessment noted that infrastructure costs associated with the recent procurement of C-17 strategic lift and C-130J tactical lift aircraft were diverting funds needed to maintain older platforms, such as the military’s CF-18 fighters. Canada’s navy reported similar problems. Its assessment noted that operational readiness was being undermined by the mounting cost of the mission in Afghanistan. The navy also warned that a replacement of the CF’s aging destroyers has yet to be approved. Consequently, the navy may be without a destroyer capability in coming years. In its turn, the Canadian army noted that, in spite of the military’s vigorous three-year recruitment campaign, the CF’s land force is short 250 officers and 1000 non-commissioned members. “The Army,” the assessment continued, “is now stretched almost to the breaking point.” What is more, the army noted that the Kandahar mission has run down key platforms, notably the land force’s light armoured vehicles. As demonstrated by David Perry from Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, “equipment is being used in theatre at a rate far higher than the peacetime operational tempo upon which equipment life cycles are based…the equipment is simply being used ‘harder’ than it was originally designed for.” Finally, all three services observed that staffing requirements for the CF’s new ‘transformational’ commands were imposing heavy personnel burdens on them.

News of these shortfalls has led critics to charge that the Conservative government is under-funding the military. Senator Colin Kenny, for instance, asked whether the Conservative government realized that it had devised a “funding plan that pretty much guarantees that by the time we get to 2011, we won’t have much of a Canadian Forces left?” Firing a more direct criticism at Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Kenny charged that “He has linked the dots between proper funding and a strong military, but hasn’t come through with the money.”

Canadians may well be surprised to hear that their military is still under-funded. After all, in the past two-years Ottawa has increased defence expenditures by over twenty-two percent and the Conservative government
has announced a series of new procurements and equipment upgrades. The government’s Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) pledges to lift defence spending to nearly $30 billion over the next twenty years.\textsuperscript{107} Parliament has also sought to offset the cost of the Afghan war by providing special mission-specific funds. More importantly, the minister of national defence has assured the House of Commons that enough is being spent on the military.\textsuperscript{108} It is commonly assumed that, thanks to the spending increases put forward by the Conservatives and the leadership of Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, the CF has been rebuilt.\textsuperscript{109} And yet, if the leaked assessments are accurate, the military is still facing significant personnel and budgetary shortages.

To square these two apparently incompatible realities – that the CF has been ‘rebuilt’, but that the military has reached a breaking point – one must analyse the evolution of Canadian defence policy since 2003. When one looks back at the past five years, one discovers that instead of giving the military more money to do what it was already doing, and hence closing the funding and capability gaps of the Chrétien era, the government and DND used these additional funds to do more, which meant that the existing gaps were never closed.\textsuperscript{110} As noted in chapter 2, the principal problem the CF encountered during the Chrétien era was overstretch. The military was doing more than the defence budget could sensibly afford. There was a mismatch of means and ends that produced shortfalls and rendered Canadian defence policy unsustainable over the long-term. Either giving DND more money while keeping the level of commitments steady, or sending the CF on fewer missions while keeping the level of spending the same, could have closed this gap. But neither of these options was chosen. Instead, the additional defence dollars were used to expand both the capabilities (means) and the missions/tasks (ends) of the CF, with the result that the imbalance remains. In absolute terms, the military is getting more money. Yet, in relative terms, the ends continue to overwhelm available means.

\textbf{Capabilities}

A capability, members of the defence community often stress, is not a thing but an effect, or rather, an ability to produce an effect. While equipment is an important part of a capability, it cannot be reduced to equipment alone. As Christopher Ankersen has noted, capabilities are generated
through a combination of people (personnel, training, recruitment, and retention), things (equipment, systems, infrastructures, and the maintenance and procurement of these), ideas (creation, understanding, and dissemination of doctrine), and training (the assembly of people, things, and ideas into usable units). Yet the fact that capabilities are effects and that they are composed of numerous elements should not blind us to the fundamental role that equipment plays in delivering them. Platforms tell us quite a bit about what kind of capabilities a military has, and procurements tell us a great deal about what kind it plans to develop. In analyzing whether an armed force is maintaining or expanding its capabilities, examining the military’s platforms and planned procurements is a good place to start.

Since 2005 DND has either procured or modernized, or is planning to procure or modernize, a number of the CF’s core capabilities, including:

- The acquisition of twenty-eight maritime helicopters to replace the aging Sea Kings ($1.8 billion).
- The acquisition of seventeen C-130J tactical lift aircraft to replace the CF’s older C-130Es and C-130Hs ($3.2 billion).
- A life-extension and modernization of the CF’s twelve Halifax-class frigates ($3.1 billion).
- The acquisition of new heavy and medium support vehicles to replace the CF’s older trucks ($1.1 billion).

Each of these procurements is necessary and justifiable. Maritime helicopters carry out maritime traffic surveillance, search and rescue, and submarine detection. Tactical lift aircraft shuttle goods and people across Canada and the world. Canada’s frigates are the mainstay of the Canadian navy, suited to both domestic tasks, such as sovereignty enforcement, and international roles, such as interdictions, escorting, and force protection. Medium and heavy trucks are critical for land transport and logistical support.

Alongside the procurement and modernization of these core capabilities, however, DND has procured, or is planning to procure, a number of platforms that will build on the core capabilities that the CF has relied on since the mid-1990s. This includes:

- The acquisition of four C-17 strategic lift aircraft ($1.8 billion).
- The acquisition of six to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships ($3.1 billion).
- The leasing of twenty, and the acquisition of one hundred, modern main battle tanks ($650 million).
The acquisition of sixteen medium-to-heavy lift helicopters ($2 billion).\textsuperscript{119}

The acquisition of three Joint Support Ships ($2.1 billion).\textsuperscript{120}

Only one of these, the medium-to-heavy lift helicopters, is necessary. As suggested by the current mission in Afghanistan, an ability to move soldiers by helicopter when in theatre can save lives and improve operational effectiveness. The other four procurements, on the other hand, are questionable.

Commentators have long lamented the lack of an indigenous Canadian strategic airlift capability. Having to rely on private contractors or the United States military to transport certain CF assets was often said to be a source of shame. A respectable military, critics implied, should not need to rely on anyone else to deploy. This is an understandable criticism, but it treats the merely ‘desirable’ as a necessity. The reality was that Canada was never unable to undertake a major deployment due to the lack of a national strategic airlift capability. Private contractors were, for the most part, available when the CF needed strategic airlift, and relying on a private contractor is not an inherently shameful thing. Even the world’s sole superpower, the United States, relies on private military contractors for the provision of many services, such as personal security and logistical support. Nor is there something inherently distasteful about relying on an ally for strategic airlift. As Alan S. Williams notes, “Normally in western coalition warfare, each country contributes something to logistics that supports and complements its allies.”\textsuperscript{121} When part of an American-led coalition, it is understandable that the CF is transported by U.S. military aircraft. It should also be noted that Canada was not a logistical ‘free-rider’ during coalition operations. Indeed, as Williams further outlines, “In OP Apollo, for example, as of April 2003, Canadian assets had been used to move three times as much freight and five times as many passengers for US forces as were American assets to move Canadian freight and passengers.”\textsuperscript{122} Canadian and American military logistics were thus complementary, as allied efforts ideally should be.

Having one’s own strategic airlift capability allows for the rapid transport of heavy equipment over large distances and reduces a military’s dependence on allies and contractors. But strategic airlift was not a capability that the CF truly needed. Even General Hillier accepted this fact when he became CDS. The future CF force structure proposed in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement, which Hillier guided, did not include a strategic airlift capability.\textsuperscript{123} The decision to acquire the C-17s was a political
one made by the Conservative government. A strategic airlift capability was likely prioritized by the Conservative government because the Liberal-era Defence Policy Statement (DPS) excluded it and because the defence community had been declaring that the lack of such a capability was shameful. Political expediency, not military necessity, drove the procurement of these optional aircraft.

Canada requires an improved capability to patrol the Arctic and its exclusive economic zones (EEZs). While one could task the CF’s frigates to patrol the EEZs, these vessels are better suited to expeditionary operations. Considering the lack of a significant military threat within these waters, cost-efficiency demands that EEZs patrols be assigned to smaller, constabulary ships. According to this criterion, it may appear that the A/OPS will be a wise purchase. The patrol ships should be acquired, but they should not belong to the CF. Instead, the A/OPS should be part of a refurbished and armed Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), and the cost of these ships should be borne by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The same holds for any additional efforts to increase Canada’s presence in Arctic waters, including the deep water docking and refueling facility in Nanisivik. Given the absence of a military threat, CCG ships, not the CF, should form Canada’s maritime presence in the Arctic.

The 2005 DPS declared that the CF would be abandoning main battle tanks in favour of a wheeled direct fire support platform, most likely the Mobile Gun System. Having not seen active service since the end of the Cold War, the CF’s tanks were considered an inessential and cumbersome platform. After experiencing the realities of operating in Kandahar province, though, the Canadian army decided that main battle tanks were a necessity. It was thought that tanks would provide the firepower and protection required to cope with realities on the ground. The CF initially deployed its older tanks to Kandahar, but when it became evident that these older machines were too outdated to perform their missions effectively, twenty modern main battle tanks were leased from Germany. At the same time, DND opted to acquire one hundred slightly used tanks from the Netherlands. This was a questionable decision. Tanks carry a heavy logistical burden and permanently retaining a tank capability undermines previous efforts to make the CF a lighter, more mobile force. Before reversing the force structure vision of the DPS and returning tanks to a prominent position in the CF forces structure, the long-term performance of the leased tanks in
Afghanistan should have been properly assessed. Likewise, an in-depth comparison of the protection offered by American tanks and wheeled direct-fire support systems since the beginning of the Iraq War should have been undertaken. Only when it could be decidedly shown that tanks clearly offered a greater degree of protection than wheeled platforms, and only when a comprehensive ‘lessons learned’ study could have shown that tanks are well-suited to contemporary peace enforcement and counterinsurgency campaigns, should the tank procurement have been approved. Had the value of tanks been clearly demonstrated, the defence department could then have taken the time to examine which modern main battle tanks best meet the CF’s needs. Instead, a significant decision regarding the CF’s future direct fire capability was rushed through Cabinet, a poor way to conduct force development.

Replacing the navy’s two auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) ships is a priority. These vessels allow the navy to resupply its warships, permitting the force to operate on extended expeditionary operations. The CF’s replenishment ships are also used to resupply allied vessels during coalition operations. The CF’s current replenishment ships are four decades old and obsolete. There is a clear need to acquire new replenishment ships. However, DND’s current procurement plan calls for the acquisition of three ships that are more capable than a regular AOR. The Joint Support Ship (JSS) program calls for ships that can do roll-on, roll-off (RO-RO) and lift-on, lift-off (LO-LO) cargo transport as well as replenishment. In addition, the JSS will be able to serve as a joint task force headquarters and a platform for up to four helicopters. Like strategic airlift, these additional features are not necessary. The Canadian military has successfully operated without RO-RO and LO-LO ships in the past, and the CF can continue to operate without them. Similarly, the CF has operated without a maritime joint headquarters and multi helicopter ships in the past, and it can do so again in the future. Rather than procurement JSSs, a more cost-effective alternative would be to acquire two basic AORs.

In addition to their questionable necessity or appropriateness, the C-17s, A/OPS, tanks, and JSS procurements have delayed, or may delay, the acquisition of more vital equipment. From fiscal year 2007-2008 to fiscal year 2011-2012, DND’s capital budget is likely to total between $16 and 20 billion (not counting cumulative prior years’ commitments). According to the figures listed above, DND’s current or planned procurements will cost at least $18-19 billion. This leaves little or no money for additional
acquisitions in the near term. As a result, the CFDS proposes a twenty-year timeline for the following procurements:

- New fighters to replace the CF-18s (estimated cost of between $9 and 12 billion).\(^{125}\)
- New warships to replace the navy’s four Iroquois class destroyers (estimated cost of $5-6 billion).\(^{126}\)
- New fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft (estimated cost of $1.3 billion).\(^{127}\)
- New light armoured vehicles (LAVs) to replace those LAV IIIIs run down by the Kandahar deployment (estimated cost unknown).

All four of these procurements are necessary to preserve the viability of core CF capabilities. Fighters are the keystone of Canada’s contribution to North American air defence. Destroyers permit the CF to play a visible, yet cost-effective, role in coalition operations and in securing the global maritime commons. Fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft are needed to save the lives of people in distress across the country. Providing this capability is a fundamental responsibility of the CF, since there is no other Canadian agency or department with the infrastructure or personnel to assume this role. Finally, LAVs are required to deliver defensive and offensive fire and to shuttle infantry around a battlefield. A fleet of fully functional LAVs is an indispensable asset for an army that regularly operates in combat zones. Waiting up to twenty years to replace these core platforms is a sign of misdirected priorities. Each of these capabilities should have taken precedence over strategic airlift, main battle tanks, and elaborate replenishment ships.

We can see, therefore, that while some of the CF’s basic platforms are being replaced or modernized, the procurement of equipment that the CF does not actually need has delayed the replacement of another set of core capabilities until the next decade. The military’s current expansion, far from helping the military, has in fact prevented the CF from closing the gap between its procurement requirements and the available capital funds.

**Missions/Tasks**

Alongside the expansion of the CF’s capabilities, the means/ends gap is being exacerbated by administrative and operational overstretch. This overstretch is imposing heavy operational and maintenance costs on the military. It is slowing the training of new recruits and hurting the CF’s ability to
retain experienced personnel. What is more, the policies that are driving this overstretch are based on questionable assumptions about what missions and tasks the Canadian military should be undertaking.

As part of its effort to ‘transform’ the Canadian military, DND has created four new CF commands: Canada Command, Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), Canadian Special Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), and Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). Ostensibly, the purpose of these new commands is to make CF deployments more efficient and integrated. Rather than asking various cross-country commands to coordinate their efforts when mounting an operation, these new commands give a single commander the power and authority to organize and direct deployments and operations. The commander of Canada Command, for instance, is responsible for organizing and directing all of the CF’s domestic operations. In terms of integration, the new commands ensure that the military’s three services are better prepared to mount ‘joint’ operations. Simply put, focusing on jointness means that the army, navy, and air force should operate as a single force, rather than as three stovepiped environmental services. By operating as a joint force, it is held, the CF can optimize the use of its relatively scarce resources and produce a more meaningful operational ‘effect’ both domestically and internationally.

On the surface, these new commands appear to uphold the promise of more efficient and effective operations. Canada Command, in particular, was born of a sensible decision to treat the entire country as a single theatre. In practice, however, the new commands seem to have produced rather inefficient results. Superimposed on top of the CF’s existing command structure, they have augmented the military’s headquarter staffing requirements and compelled DND to build additional infrastructure. The commands’ thirst for staff, in particular, has placed significant personnel burdens on the military. Instead of making DND and the CF more efficient, evidence suggests that the new commands have done the opposite. As the Chief of Review Services (CRS) notes, the CF is “feeling stretched too thin due to the transfer of resources [to the new commands], as fewer staff remain to produce the same results.”

Similarly, a CRS survey discovered that “A majority of the respondents acknowledge potential duplication of services/efforts in delivering support to the new Command structure.”

More problematically, it is unclear whether CANOSCOM, CEFCOM, and CANSOFCOM are actually necessary. The CF was able to
successfully organize and mount deployments in the past without these commands; their exact value is not evident. Unless concrete information can be produced showing what the new commands have allowed the CF to accomplish that they could not in the past, they are open to the charge of simply being an outgrowth of bureaucratic empire-building that has added an unnecessary, additional layer of administration on the military and defence department. Even the claim that the new commands are making the CF more ‘joint’ is suspect. The navy continues to operate alongside allied navies around the world; the air force continues to provide continental air defence, airlift, and surveillance; and the army engages in ground combat, patrols, and mentoring and training of Afghan national forces. Fully integrated operations are rare, to say the least. The three services also continue to develop their own separate operational visions and doctrines. And while navy and air force personnel are deployed to Afghanistan, having soldiers, sailors, and airmen/airwomen working next to each other in theatre is a fairly basic level of ‘jointness’ that could have been achieved without the establishment of new commands. In fact, the CRS casts doubt on whether jointness has progressed since the new commands were formed. As the CRS notes: “Joint operational doctrine, which in turn represents the vital bridge between military-strategic and Environmental operational/tactical doctrine, is severely deficient and in need of attention. As a result, in the absence of higher-level direction or guidance, the individual Environments have been left to unilaterally develop doctrine for a number of new capabilities, thereby potentially putting jointness and interoperability at risk.”

Beyond the new commands, the means/end gap is being perpetuated by an operational overstretch of the CF. The principal cause of this overstretch is the CF’s prolonged deployment to Kandahar Province in Afghanistan. Kandahar has proved to be a challenging mission for the Canadian military. Though the CF has ably defeated insurgent forces in a number of battles, ambushes and improvised explosive devices have claimed the lives or limbs of many Canadian soldiers. A relatively high rate of post-traumatic stress among returning soldiers has been reported as well. Reports have surfaced that the demands of the Kandahar mission are inducing some experienced CF personnel to leave the military. It appears that the CF’s attrition rates have risen by nearly two percent since the Kandahar mission began. Given the CF’s already significant retention challenges, this exodus may leave the military short of the experienced personnel it requires to serve as an effective armed force. In theory, the CF should be able to replace these departing personnel with new recruits, but the Kandahar
mission, and staffing requirements for the new commands, are limiting the number of senior non-commissioned members (NCMs) available to train them. There are not enough NCMs to go around. As a result, the CF is failing to meet its expansion objectives. DND will not succeed in increasing the size of the military’s regular force to 68,000 by 2011-2012.

The Kandahar mission is also taking a toll on equipment, the LAV III in particular. The deployment is thus widening the gap between the DND’s available capital funds and the CF’s equipment requirements. In addition, the mission is lifting the military’s operations and maintenance costs. In 2007, defence minister O’Connor admitted that the Kandahar mission is experiencing sizable cost overruns. By 2009, it is likely that the mission will have cost over $6 billion. While the government is providing DND with additional money to pay for the mission, it has been reported that these extra funds have not been sufficient to cover all supplementary costs. As a result, DND has felt it necessary to curtail other military activities to absorb the cost of the Kandahar mission. The leaked assessments imply that the navy and air force are bearing the brunt of these cutbacks.

Focusing on Kandahar has also forced Ottawa to revisit plans for a greater military contribution to homeland security. During the 2006 election campaign, the Conservatives promised to bolster the military’s ability to respond to man-made and natural disasters, especially in urban centres. This proposal aimed to improve the CF’s relatively modest ability to assist with consequence management efforts. Enhancing the military’s capabilities in this area should be a high priority. Yet the CFDS abandoned the promise to improve the military’s consequence management capabilities. Though the government did not say so explicitly, the demands of the Kandahar mission are the reason why this promise cannot be realized. Contrary to claims that the Kandahar mission is making Canada and Canadians safer, the requirements of the war in Afghanistan are diminishing the military’s ability to aid the civil authority during domestic crises.

The prolonged commitment to the war in Afghanistan is contributing to CF overstretch, exacerbating the means/end gaps, undermining the military’s future personnel strength, and limiting the armed forces’ ability to provide sufficient consequence management capabilities. Owing to these negative impacts, a strong case can be made that Ottawa should have refused to extend the Kandahar deployment beyond 2009. Doing so would have given the Canadian army a much needed operational pause, and alleviated these problems.
Supporters of the Kandahar mission extension have offered several arguments in favour of extending the deployment. A common refrain is that Canada has to stay in Kandahar for the sake of the Afghan people. If Canada leaves, efforts to build a new Afghanistan will fail. Another widespread argument is that Canada had made a commitment to NATO that it should not abandon. Ottawa freely accepted responsibility for Kandahar province; thus Canada cannot leave until the ‘job is done’. Nor should Canada expect another NATO ally to replace the CF in 2009. A strong and sustained CF presence in Kandahar is also said to lift Canada’s stature and influence within the alliance.

These claims do not stand up to close scrutiny. The fate of Afghanistan and the Afghan people is in the hands of the entire NATO alliance. If the Afghans were to suffer because the CF withdrew from Kandahar after an intensive and costly four year campaign, fault would lie with the entire alliance, not just Canada. And if the alliance is so dysfunctional that no other country would be willing or able to replace the Canadian contingent, then Ottawa should question whether NATO has the sufficient political will to succeed in Afghanistan at all. Getting the ‘job done’ is an alliance objective that can only be achieved collectively. The burden should not, and over the long-term cannot, be shared disproportionately; smaller powers such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark do not have the resources to stay deployed indefinitely. At some point, these smaller powers will need to be relieved and replaced. Though it is true that a ‘principle of rotation’ does not exist in NATO, a principle of perpetual deployment does not exist either. It is simply false to claim that Canada agreed to remain in Kandahar until the ‘job is done’. Ottawa agreed to deploy the CF to Kandahar until 2007. Parliament then voted to extend this commitment until 2009 and later 2011. These extensions were not automatic; they were entirely optional. There has always been a clear end date attached to Canada’s mission.

It is true that Canada’s stature has risen due to the CF’s presence in Kandahar. Evidence of this is seen in the praise that NATO and Afghan leaders have offered the Canadian military and government in recent months. But it is far from clear that the mission has given Canada broader influence over its allies. Ottawa was unable to convince larger European powers to reinforce the CF in Kandahar during NATO’s 2008 summit, and despite Ottawa’s efforts to reverse the trend, the Canada-United States border has gotten ‘thicker’ since the CF deployed to Kandahar. An example of this thickening is the American demand that travellers present a
secure document, such as a passport, when entering the United States by
car or boat. Ottawa lobbied hard to dissuade Washington from imposing
this security measure along the Canada-United States, but to no avail. Here
again, Canada’s purported influence failed to produce tangible results. While
politicians and officials in the United States are willing to commend Canada
for its contribution to the war in Afghanistan, this respect has not given
Ottawa greater sway in Washington.

More problematically, even if Canada’s military commitment to Kandahar
is a source of influence, then current policies are ensuring that this influence
will eventually decline. By extending the CF’s mission until 2011
and thus overstretching the military, Ottawa is running the risk that the
land forces will be exhausted when they return from Afghanistan. Hence,
in overusing the tool that supposedly gives it influence, the Canadian
government is ensuring that the tool will be less effective in granting influ-
ence later. This is a possibility that supporters of the mission’s extension
have failed to properly acknowledge or address.

All told, the creation of new military commands and the extension of
the Kandahar deployment beyond 2009 were two questionable decisions
that aggravated the means/ends gap in Canadian defence policy. It does not
seem that either decision has produced, or ever will produce, the results
that policymakers hoped for.

Economic Constraints

Senator Kenny suggests that one way to address the CF’s shortfalls and
means/ends gap is to increase defence expenditures. Unfortunately, more
money cannot solve most of the difficulties that DND and the CF face
today. Though retention bonuses may help keep more experienced person-
nel from leaving the military, spending more on defence will not create
more experienced NCMs or free them to properly train new recruits. Only
a reduced operational tempo can meet that objective. Money alone cannot
solve the staffing problems associated with the CF’s new ‘transformational’
commands for similar reasons. Higher defence expenditures are also in-
sufficient to accelerate the procurement of essential platforms whose
purchase has been delayed to allow for an expansion of the CF’s capabili-
ties in less vital areas. With the exception of rare “off-the-shelf” acquisitions
such as the C-17, procurement programs require a good deal of time and
specialized personnel to bring to fruition. Simply giving DND a larger
capital equipment budget will not speed up the procurement process, since
the department will still encounter personnel and time constraints. Only reconsidering the priority of current procurement plans can ensure that essential CF equipment is replaced in a timely fashion. Spending more on defence will not prevent the Kandahar deployment from exhausting the CF’s equipment or preventing the military from playing a larger role in Canadian homeland security. However intuitively appealing the notion may be, devoting more money to defence is not the answer to many of the DND and the CF’s existing woes.

Even if higher defence expenditures were able to solve the challenges that surround current Canadian defence policy, the federal government is averse to spending substantially more on the military. Since they were elected in 2006, the Conservatives have cut the Goods and Services Tax by two percent, earmarked billions for debt reduction, and agreed to solve the ‘fiscal imbalance’ by transferring billions of additional dollars to the provinces. Coupled with the costs of the war in Afghanistan, these decisions have left the federal government with a narrower margin of fiscal manoeuvrability. Unless the Conservatives are prepared to post a budget deficit, which would be politically dangerous for them, it is thus unlikely that Ottawa will have far more funds to give DND in the near future. In fact, reports indicate that the Conservatives have already told DND that defence expenditures will remain fairly steady. From 2008 to 2011, expenditures will grow by 1.5 percent above inflation. After 2011, that number is slated to increase to two percent after inflation.140 Such increases will be easily swallowed by overstretch, operational and personnel costs, or procurements that go over budget.

To conclude, Canadians should not be surprised at their military still struggling with shortfalls, in spite of the substantial increases in defence spending that have been made since 2005. As the CF’s capabilities have expanded in the past three years, so too have the military’s missions and tasks. Higher spending has not, therefore, closed the means/end gap. There is ‘still not enough’ spent on defence, because the military keeps doing more. Problematically, however, the more that military is doing is both unessential and ill-advised. The central problem facing DND and the CF, therefore, is not a lack of funds, but overambitious policies and plans. In the next chapter, we will show how faulty perceptions of Canada’s interests and the threat to those interests lie behind this excess ambition. The solution to Canada’s defence problems thus lies not in giving DND more money but in carrying out a more realistic appraisal of the international security environment. This we will now proceed to do.
5. A Realist Critique of the Contemporary Canadian Defence Debate

An exaggerated perception of threat and of the utility of force currently prevails within the Canadian defence community. As seen in the last chapter, the military is struggling with a means/end gap. Prominent members of the defence community use this fact to claim that Canada must spend more on defence. They reinforce this claim by arguing that we live in an increasingly dangerous world, and that Canada’s international influence and standing are unacceptably low due to the purportedly small size of its armed forces and the inadequate level of its defence expenditures. Even recent increases in defence spending, amounting to 22.2 percent over the past two years alone,141 are thought insufficient to address existing threats and boost Canada’s declining international importance.

This chapter analyses these claims. It presents a logical defence planning process model, which identifies Canada’s interests and threats to them. It argues that the propositions put forward by those demanding greater defence spending are based on questionable assumptions and worst-case thinking. This pessimistic perspective is often coupled with idealized views of past Canadian glories and an exaggeration of the effectiveness of military force as a solution to security problems. A more realistic analysis of the threats to Canadian security, and a balanced analysis of the contribution military force can make to reducing those threats, concludes that large increases in defence spending are unnecessary to make Canadians safer in the future. Defence spending also faces a stark law of diminishing returns when used to boost Canada’s international standing and influence.
The Case For, And Against, Greater Defence Spending

Canadians, claim J.L. Granatstein and Roy Rempel, have failed to base their foreign and security policies on an analysis of the national interest. Instead, Canadians have allowed themselves to be seduced by vague notions of spreading Canadian values, a vision too often guided by a fuzzy, pacifistic worldview, leading to what Granatstein describes as “the harmful idealization of peacekeeping” and a “naive foolishness” about the violent nature of the world and the concomitant requirement to use force to defend one’s interests. Allied to “sanctimonious, opportunistic anti-Americanism,” a desire by politicians to pander to “pacifist” sentiment in Quebec, and the ability of Canadians to free-ride on the United States’ defence efforts, these failings are seen as having encouraged successive Canadian governments to deny the Canadian Forces (CF) the resources they require to adequately defend the nation. Douglas Bland makes the case clearly. “Since 1952,” he states, “no government in Canada has provided to national defence what was needed.”

One result of this neglect is said to be a collapse in Canada’s international standing. As Andrew Cohen wrote in 2003, “Canada is in decline in the world today. … now – with the country’s leadership in play, the war on terrorism in train, and the military in eclipse – the sense of loss has become more acute, gathering a momentum of its own.” Canada’s armed forces, Cohen complained, “are among the weakest in the industrialized world … undermanned, underfunded, overextended and ill-equipped.” Canadians have, “effectively chosen unilateral disarmament. … Canada has become, for all intents and purposes, defenceless.”

Cohen’s views echo Granatstein’s. Canada, says the latter, “has reached a new level of irrelevancy in foreign and military affairs. … Canada has ceased to matter internationally. Shaky defence and foreign policies … have left a proud global legacy in ruins.” “The weakness of the Canadian military,” he continues, “has played a part … in destroying the country’s reputation in global capitals.”

According to like-minded defence analysts, the situation was so dire three or four years ago that even a large injection of funds would not be able to save the CF from what Brian MacDonald of the Canadian Defence Association described as a “a mass extinction scenario.” According to Douglas Bland in his 2004 edited volume, Canada Without Armed Forces?, “The next government will be caught up in a cascading policy entanglement initiated by the rapid collapse of Canadian Forces core assets and
Reviving Realism in the Canadian Defence Debate

This problem will inevitably disarm foreign policy ... Even if the government were to increase defence allocations to national defence immediately and substantially, that pending crisis could not be avoided." Canada, he stated, "is heading for a long period when the government will be without effective military resources ... Canada in a few years will be effectively disarmed." Indeed, "The rate of erosion of some capabilities is now so steep and accelerating so quickly that even if the government were to act immediately and aggressively to halt the decline, many defence capabilities cannot be recovered before they become militarily ineffective."

Before the validity of these claims is analyzed further, a few comments are necessary. First, much of the case being made is based upon worst-case predictions, which in some instances have already proved to be incorrect. Take, for instance, the warnings of a "mass extinction scenario," the 2004 argument that the CF was not merely facing a crisis, but that this crisis could not be avoided even if defence spending was massively increased. If this had been true in 2004, we should now be seeing the crisis in manpower and equipment reaching a peak, with the capabilities of the armed forces collapsing even further. Yet this has not happened. The CF continues to experience a means/end gap, and many of its platforms are obsolete. But the collapse of the CF that was predicted did not occur. This alone should encourage a greater degree of scepticism towards worst-case thinking.

As shown in Chapter 3, the repeated claims that 'years of neglect' rendered the CF incapable of serious prolonged military operations is belied by the facts. Sean Maloney of the Royal Military College of Canada, an ardent supporter of higher defence expenditures, admits that, "There can be little doubt that Canada had the military means to contribute in an effective and salient fashion to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. ... the capacity and capability to deploy battle group- or battalion group-sized forces exists ... and Canadian soldiers are well trained." Two years before that, when Canada deployed to Afghanistan to help topple the Taliban regime, Canadian troops performed well and were well regarded by American commanders. The US commander in this particular instance, Colonel Frank Wiercinski, told reporters that because the Canadian soldiers were well trained, they would be integrated fully into his task force. Since then, the CF has won repeated praise for its contribution to the war effort in Afghanistan, and those commentators who in the past complained that the CF was incapable of sustained operations, and would
still be incapable of them even if spending was increased, are now among the strongest proponents of extending the mission in Afghanistan indefinitely.\textsuperscript{158} None of this is compatible with the picture of a force facing imminent collapse.

At any rate, the purpose of defence policy is not to maintain strong armed forces. The success of a defence policy is not measured by the size and quality of the military it produces. Instead, a successful defence policy is gauged by how well it secures the country, its people, and its interests. Rather than focusing on the comparative size of an armed force or the level of defence spending, determining an appropriate defence policy should involve an assessment of what a country’s defence needs are, and how best to meet them.

Models of Defence Planning

Models of what constitutes the ideal defence planning process vary in details, but are fairly consistent in broader terms. Roughly speaking, the favoured model consists of the five following steps:\textsuperscript{159}

- First, one identifies one’s national interests.
- Second, one analyzes the domestic and international security environment, and determines what threats to those interests exist.
- Third, on the basis of steps one and two, one develops a national strategy to protect the identified interests from the perceived threats. Not all interests will be threatened in a serious fashion, and military power will not be an appropriate tool for defending all of those interests which are threatened. At this stage, therefore, one should concern oneself only with vital interests which are under threat and to the defence of which the military can usefully contribute.
- Fourth, on the basis of the national strategy developed in stage three, one determines the military capabilities required to enact the strategy.
- Fifth, one decides the level of defence spending necessary to create and maintain the capabilities identified in step four.

Inevitably, various pressures (political, financial, bureaucratic, and so on) prevent defence planners from following this model exactly. Nevertheless, the model is a useful tool for analyzing defence policy, and it is worthwhile applying it to Canada today, beginning with an analysis of Canada’s national interests, moving on to examine the international security
environment and the threat to those interests, and then determining whether increased defence spending constitutes an appropriate national strategy in response to those threats.

**Measuring Defence Expenditure**

An important point concerning steps four and five of the model must be addressed at the outset. The capabilities identified in step four are an absolute quantity – so many soldiers, so many tanks, so many aircraft, and so on. This means that the budget identified in step five is also an absolute amount. This figure is *not* some proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is a certain amount of dollars – $x$ billion – *not* $x$ percent of GDP. This is fundamental. Yet, if we look at the demands for greater defence spending above, we find that they are couched in terms of a percentage of GDP. Indeed, the critics of Canadian defence spending invariably complain that the country spends less of its GDP on defence (currently about 1.3 percent) than most fellow NATO members, not that the absolute level of spending is too low.

Granatstein, Gordon Smith and Denis Stairs, for instance, comment that, “The ideal would be spending on defence that meets the NATO average of 2.2 percent of GDP (about $25 billion in 2007 dollars). As this is probably not politically achievable, we recommend 1.5-1.6% GDP.” Senator Hugh Segal agrees, writing that “Defence spending in Canada should be increased – substantially – closer to 2 percent of GDP.” Similarly, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) recommended in October 2006 that the annual defence budget be increased to about 2 percent of GDP.

This device of linking defence spending to GDP is well exposed by Robert Higgs, senior fellow of the US-based Independent Institute, in an article *Military Spending/GDP = Nonsense for Budget Policy Making*. Higgs’ analysis of the “defence spending as a percent of GDP” fallacy is so illuminating as to deserve a lengthy quote:

GDP purports to be the value at market prices of all currently produced final goods and services the US economy brings forth in a year. It includes everything from hamburgers to H-bombs. Why, we might ask, should military spending bear any particular proportion to this figure? Does it not make much more sense to assess the actual threats the country faces, to determine the optimal means of meeting or deterring these
threats with a sufficient degree of confidence, and then adding (sic) up the costs of obtaining the stipulated means? Whether this total amount happens to be 1 percent or 20 percent of GDP is entirely beside the point, which is to protect the American people from potential, likely, external attackers. … If the national economy produces more hamburgers and computer software next year, these economic developments in no way imply that more money should then be spent for defense. If the threats remain the same and the costs of acquiring defense goods and services remain the same, then the defense budget can remain fixed in amount and still serve its proper purpose. Notice, however, that if the GDP continues to grow, this adequate, fixed-amount, military budget will constitute a smaller fraction of GDP.163

In short, if one is following a logical defence planning model, determining expenditure in terms of GDP is an exercise in randomness and possible waste. In fact, the ill-logic of correlating the effectiveness of a state’s military to its defence spending as a percentage of GDP is made clear when one considers what this would mean in terms of ranking the world’s most militarily powerful states. Using this measurement, the United States would rank as the world’s twentieth-eighth military power, while Oman would rank first.164 A measurement that is so divorced from reality surely deserves to be discarded.

When one measures military expenditures in real dollars, on the other hand, one discovers that Canadian defence spending is not nearly as low as is often claimed. In 2007, Canada was the 13th highest military spender in the world, and the sixth highest in NATO.165 While it is true that, as a percentage of GDP, Canada is well below the NATO average, ranking sixth in the alliance in terms of real dollars reflects Canada’s standing as a middling power and second-tier partner within the alliance. Thus Project Ploughshares rightly concludes: “The charge that Canada’s military spending has shrunk to unconscionably low levels relative to the rest of the world simply does not stand up.”166

National Interests

Once the GDP measure is abandoned, a more accurate means of determining the appropriate level of defence spending must be introduced. Following the logical model of defence planning, the first step in making this determination is to outline Canada’s national interests.
Defining Interests

Precision and caution are required when evaluating national interests. There is a tendency among foreign and defence analysts to speak as if national interests were objective facts. To some extent this may be considered true: clearly if a foreign power were to invade Canada, overthrow parliamentary democracy and enslave the people, this would have a sufficiently negative effect on a sufficiently large number of people that preventing such an incursion would be widely recognized as an objective national interest. In many other cases, though, judgments of national interest are thoroughly subjective in nature. What one person or group considers an interest, another person or group may not. It is also possible that something may benefit the country as a whole, but harm a minority of its citizens. Determining whether such a thing constitutes a ‘national’ interest is difficult.167

In addition, people may agree that something constitutes a national interest but assign different levels of importance to it. Different people will assign different values to interests. Moreover, not all interests are worth fighting for, and worth spending defence dollars protecting, and even when important interests are threatened, military power may not be the best means of countering the threats. The mere existence of an interest, or of a threat to an interest, does not by itself justify defence spending.

Interests worth fighting for are often referred to as ‘vital’ interests, while others – those not worth fighting for – are ‘secondary’. These are sometimes further subdivided into ‘survival’, ‘vital’, ‘major’ and ‘peripheral’ interests.168 They may also be categorized as permanent and temporary – one might say, for instance, that Canada has a permanent interest in maintaining international stability but only a temporary interest in Afghanistan (in so far as the current campaign there contributes to stability). Similarly, interests may also be matters which concern the country directly or only indirectly. International stability, for instance, may be considered less an end in its own right than an indirect interest, since instability leads to problems which threaten other interests. These distinctions matter, since temporary, peripheral, and indirect interests cannot justify defence expenditure in the manner of permanent, vital and direct interests. Determining which category an interest falls into is, though, often highly subjective. In some cases, the categorization is clear. In other cases, the definition of an interest may be rather amorphous, and its categorization highly debatable.
Interestingly, however, it is often these amorphous, debatable interests that most excite calls for greater defence expenditure.

With this category of interests in mind, a deeper analysis of Canada’s national interests is possible. Some of these interests are sufficiently clear that they require almost no explanation. These are generally the most important ones. Others require more detailed analysis.

*Survival Interests*

Rempel describes Canada’s vital interests as “those interests associated with the continuation of the Canadian state, the society that it protects, and the Canadian way of life.”169 This provides a good starting point. Interests of this sort include protecting Canadian territory from invasion or occupation, maintaining a democratic form of government, preserving a prosperous and stable national economy and high per capita income, and maintaining law and order within Canadian society, such that the state does not become threatened from within. Whatever other goals they serve, defending the Canadian state and preserving Canadians’ way of life must be the first objective and justification of Ottawa’s defence policies.

Canada’s vital interests also include ensuring the unity of the country. This is an important point. One of the criticisms of previous Liberal governments is that they sacrificed Canada’s defences in order to appease pacifist opinion in Quebec, thereby tarnishing our relations with the United States. However, a truly hard-headed realist view of national interests would put the unity of the country above an avoidance of the occasional diplomatic dispute with a foreign power, however important. Acting to slow the advance of the separatist cause, far from harming the national interest, is entirely congruent with it.

*Protection of Life and Property*

Closely linked with the survival of the Canadian state and Canadians’ way of life is the interest of protecting Canadian citizens and their property from attack both by other citizens and by foreigners, at home and abroad. This is clearly one of the foremost roles of any government, and defence policy should aim to fulfill this objective, while balancing the costs of military expenditures with other national priorities, such as the maintenance of a strong economy, competitive tax rates and social welfare programs.
Economic Prosperity and International Stability

Also of great significance is boosting the economic prosperity of Canada as a whole and of Canadians as individuals. This in turn leads to another set of national interests: maintenance of good relations with Canada’s closest neighbour, the United States, and contributing to the relative stability of the increasingly interdependent international economic system.

In the Canada-United States relationship, there is one overriding interest: keeping the US-Canada border open for trade. Eighty-seven percent of Canada’s trade passes over this border, and this trade constitutes some 43 percent of Canadian GDP. The economic consequences of a prolonged closure of the border would be catastrophic.

The most likely present-day reasons for a closure of the border would be American fears that Canada was being used as a conduit for terrorists to enter the United States, or an American perception that Canada is unwilling or unable to pursue measures designed to tackle home-grown terrorists or to keep transnational terrorists out of North America. The importance of the issue to the Canadian economy means Ottawa must invest in homeland security measures and contribute to select joint Canada-United States continental security and counterterrorism efforts.

Canada’s economic prosperity is also linked to the stability of the global economy. Though not as vital or evident as the bilateral Canada-US trading relationship, a stable international economy contributes to Canadian economic prosperity in a number of ways. Above all, a stable global economy is important because the health of North America’s economies is tied to economic events in Asia and Western Europe. If trade or communications with Asia and Western Europe are hampered, both the Canadian and American economies will suffer. Many of the goods Canada trades with the United States depend on ‘just-in-time’ imports from Asia, and Canadians have grown to enjoy their free access to many Asian high-technology imports. Economic or political crises in either Asia or Western Europe can have spill-over effects on the American economy, which can then spill over further into Canada. What is more, as an exporter of raw materials and natural resources that is increasingly interested in expanding its already significant trade with Asia, Canada has an interest in maintaining a stable Asia-Pacific rim. Undoubtedly, international stability, and the stability of the increasingly interdependent globalized capitalist economy, constitute a national interest, albeit an indirect one.

That said, the Canadian state can be secure and prosperous in an international environment that is marked by the occasional regional war,
intrastate conflicts, some fragile states, and pockets of social and political upheaval in the developing world – as it was during the Cold War. Attempting to address more than a fraction of these problems with military power would require a financial investment in CF that would be far larger than most pro-defence groups are arguing for, or than would be affordable or sustainable over the long-term.

Efforts to preserve international stability can be detrimental to national and global security in certain cases. The so-called ‘blow-back’ effect is a case in point. Backing authoritarian and oppressive regimes to promote international stability in the short-term can sow the seeds of long-term insecurity. Prolonged foreign military interventions have been shown to foster feelings of resentment and anger on the part of local populations, which can in turn increase the number of threats against intervening states. Before it adopts policies or takes part in foreign military operations that ostensibly serve to preserve global security, the Canadian government should be aware that these efforts may ultimately be detrimental to international stability and Canada’s national interests. A high degree of prudence and scepticism should guide Ottawa’s contributions to international peace and stability.

Sovereignty

Perhaps more directly linked to the survival of the Canadian state is the issue of ‘sovereignty’. This word is much used but ill-defined. The desire to protect it is repeatedly invoked in favour of increased defence spending. Michael Ignatieff has complained that in the past, “Canada made the mistake of assuming that we could have sovereignty without substantial military expenditure.” Granatstein has commented that, “It’s long past time for Canadians to act like a sovereign nation. That means having a substantial military.” Neither Granatstein nor Ignatieff bothers to explain what they mean by ‘sovereignty’ or being a ‘sovereign nation’. This makes the nature of the interest they wish to promote rather unclear.

At times, the word seems to refer to the nation’s territorial integrity. This appears to be the meaning in most discussions of Arctic sovereignty. Canada’s interest here lies in defending its legitimate claims to the islands of the Arctic archipelago and the surrounding waters, including the North West Passage. At other times, sovereignty seems to refer more generally to the nation’s ability to make its own decisions on important security mat-
ters. Undoubtedly, sovereignty in both these meanings constitutes a national interest.

Having said that, sovereignty is often shared, and its boundaries are unclear. Some would say that by participating in joint military institutions with the United States, Canada complements its sovereignty. Others would say that these manoeuvres undermine its sovereignty. There are no obvious objective criteria for determining who is right. In some instances, sharing of sovereignty may even be considered a price worth paying for the attainment of other benefits. This certainly seems to be the opinion of those states which have joined the European Union.

Interests may not all be attainable simultaneously. Some will on occasion have to be sacrificed to achieve and defend others. They may also sometimes contradict one another: the pursuit of one interest may harm another. National leaders need to prioritize and be prepared to abandon the pursuit of lesser interests. Doing so is not a sign of weakness but of statesmanship.

Influence

One rationale that is often invoked when sacrificing a degree of sovereignty is the desire to gain influence over others. By allowing those others to have some say over what one does, one may gain some say over what they do, and this could well be a worthwhile trade. The desire to have ‘influence’ is possibly one of the most commonly cited arguments in favour of higher defence expenditure. Influence occupies a high position on the vital national interest lists of numerous politicians and security analysts. Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently announced that “Countries that cannot or will not make real contributions to global security are not regarded as serious players. They may be liked by everybody. They may be pleasantly acknowledged by everybody. But when the hard decisions get made, they will be ignored by everybody.”

Influence implies having the ability to change the way others behave, or the ability to make others do things that they would rather not do. But if we are talking about changing behaviour that assumes that we have some alternative vision of how others should behave. Though Ottawa and the Canadian military may disagree with its allies about particular issues that surround foreign and defence policy, Canada does not have – and if we are truly honest never has had – a grand strategy that radically differs from that of its major allies. As Sokolsky noted about Canada during the Cold
It is difficult to know what influence Canada has had over US strategy through NATO councils, but on the surface there appear to have been no fundamental disagreements. Furthermore, Canada and its allies probably never will have such fundamental disagreements. Canada’s geographic position, bordering on a disproportionately more powerful neighbour, makes it nearly impossible for Canada to develop a truly alternative grand strategy. As Robert Sutherland advised defence minister Paul Hellyer in 1963, a wholly Canadian strategic rationale for defence “does not exist, and cannot be invented.” Hence, while Ottawa should attempt to have a degree of influence over its allies when specific points of disagreement arise, it is questionable whether Canada truly needs – or is able to acquire – a level of influence sufficient to affect the grand strategies of its larger allies, and the United States in particular.

One should only invest scarce resources in influence-increasing capabilities if they can be shown to actually raise one’s degree of influence. Investing in such capabilities under the mere assumption that they can increase influence is wasteful. Equally wasteful are efforts to build influence when one already agrees with an ally’s policies. Rempel laments Canada’s loss of influence over the United States. Yet he denounces Canada’s support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the landmines treaty, the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Accord, all of which the U.S. has refused to accept. It is unclear why he believes that Canada needs to better influence Washington, since he holds that Ottawa should mirror the United States’ foreign policy choices.

As a secondary power of relatively limited means, Canada has been, and likely always will be, constrained to a modest level of international influence and importance. While a greater investment in defence may increase Canada’s current level of influence, additional investments will face ever-diminishing returns. If this is the case, the logic of devoting scarce resources to defence in the hope of gaining influence is further undermined.

National Pride and Honour

Often the term ‘influence’ is a code for something more ephemeral. When some commentators declare that Canada lacks influence, they actually mean that Canada lacks ‘respect’. In other words, what is at stake is not influence but honour. This is evident in statements made by those who support a large-scale expansion of the Canadian military. These reveal a strong sense that national honour constitutes a vital interest. On the one hand, an
argument can be made that having a reputation for strength can deter attack, and therefore can rightfully be considered an interest. On the other hand, it is hard to say that the pursuit of honour for its own sake constitutes a national interest, or at least a very significant one — while it is good to be praised by others and to have a sense of pride in oneself, it is questionable whether these goods are worth a substantial investment in the military at the expense of other national goods and priorities.

An analysis of certain pro-defence statements indicates that a strong military is routinely linked to national pride and honour. Having a weak military, by contrast, is seen as humiliating and a source of shame. As Michael Ignatieff complained during his previous career as a US-based academic, “In Washington, I live my working life in a policy environment in which Canada is a kind of well-meaning Boy Scout. We are not taken seriously.” Andrew Cohen follows a similar logic, writing, “In his memoirs, Charles de Gaulle memorably said, ‘All my life I have had a certain idea of France.’ The power of that statement is arresting. It’s so full of pride and possibility. There is a sense of the nation, a sense of its purpose. … You can find it in any great people with a sense of achievement. … Yet when it comes to Canada, or more precisely Canada in the world, we do not have the same sense of confidence as other peoples. … Two generations ago we had that idea of ourselves. We were a warrior doing what we thought we had to in the world.”

There is, in such statements, a feeling that being ‘strong’ is an end in its own right. Granatstein typifies this viewpoint, writing recently, “I don’t think the government can get a vote [to extend the Afghan mission] through the House. I think it’s very sad. … It will really be a test of Canadians, whether we have the stomach to fight, to fight a war.” This is tied to the sense that Canada once had a glorious past as a powerful military nation, and that this glory has been squandered. “Canada,” says Granatstein, “is a nation with a history of doing great deeds in the past and the strong belief that it can do great deeds in the future.” Greatness, he implies, is intimately connected with a state’s ability to maintain and deploy a powerful military. The way to build national greatness and respectability is, it follows naturally, to spend more on the military. Thus, Senator Colin Kenny notes, “For $130 extra per Canadian, the government can – over two or three years – make us respectable again.”

The desire for respectability lay in part behind Canada’s decision to deploy troops to Kandahar, and not, as NATO had first suggested, to the region of Chaghcharan in Afghanistan. As reported by Janice Gross Stein
and Eugene Lang, in 2005 Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier noted that, “I didn’t like the option of a deployment to Chaghcharan at all. There was no upside, no profile because Chaghcharan was so isolated. No one would have noticed that we were there at all.”

Likewise, this desire is reflected in the subtitle of the Defence Policy Statement: a Role of Pride and Influence, which makes it clear that the cultivation of national pride is the top priority.

National pride and honour are good things. They can inspire citizens and lift national morale. But it is questionable whether military strength is either the most effective means of making a country proud. The CF’s role in Afghanistan, for instance, has divided Canadians, leaving at least half of the public ambivalent about their country’s contribution to this nation-building and counterterrorism mission. Though Canadians are undoubtedly proud of their military and the sacrifices it has made in Afghanistan, a significant portion of them are not necessarily ‘proud’ of their country’s combat mission. Seen from this vantage point, it is questionable whether Canada’s display of military strength in southern Afghanistan has actually resulted in a higher level of national pride.

Values

Finally, there is the issue of Canadian values. Some commentators draw a distinction between values and interests, denying that values may rightfully be considered interests. They object to the foreign policies pursued in the 1990s by Lloyd Axworthy, complaining that these subordinated interests to values, and in the process “ideologized” Canadian policy, making it “detached from reality.”

“All this moralizing,” Granatstein notes, “is naïve foolishness.”

“Some hard-eyed realism,” he continues, “some recognition of our national interests and what we need to protect and advance them, would serve Canada and Canadians far better.”

Yet, a pure divorce between interests and values is not actually possible. All interests are to some extent value-judgments. Indeed, there are many who argue that the only way we can secure our interests in the long term is by helping spread our values around the world. This is a belief that unites people from the left to the right of the political spectrum, and it has played an important role in justifying military intervention in recent years.

Nonetheless, Canada’s long-term interest in spreading democratic values, free markets, and the like, do not necessarily accord with its shorter-term interests in promoting international stability and other
objectives. As the eminent British philosopher John Gray has noted, liberal-democratic capitalism has a “revolutionary character.” It “unsettles every aspect of human life. Not only politics and government but also culture and society are continuously transformed under the impact of the anarchic energies of the market.” Bringing democracy and free markets to Iraq might have been in the long-term interests of the Western world, but since the process of doing this unleashed violent conflict, it was certainly not in the short-term, or even the overall interest of the West.

Spreading Canadian values may rightly be considered a national interest, but it is difficult to consider it an interest of such overriding priority that it merits a large-scale increase in defence expenditures and interventionist foreign and defence policies. Given the short-term insecurities that foreign military interventions tend to engender and the high costs associated with them, it may be advisable and far more effective to spread Canadian values by setting an example for societies to follow. Often derided as a form of useless posturing, this ‘soft power’/indirect approach to spreading national values may in fact be more effective and enduring over the long-term, since it encourages others to accept our values of their own accord, rather than compelling them to do so.

Conclusions Concerning Interests

What we can conclude from this discussion of Canada’s national interests is the following: First, some interests are worth fighting for, and others are not; thus some justify defence spending, while others do not. Survival of the state and the Canadian way of life, and to some extent, depending on the scale involved, the protection of the life and property of our citizens, clearly fall into the first category. These interests are vital, direct, and immediate. Other interests – such as influence, national honour, and values – are of lesser importance, more indirect, less clearly defined and agreed, and more long-term. These provide rather less justification for defence expenditure, but, paradoxically, it is on these latter interests that the proponents of stronger military forces tend to concentrate.

The International Security Environment and Threats to Canadian Interests

Demands for greater military expenditure are too often based on improbable scenarios and on exaggerated, indeed demonstrably false, claims
about the dangerous nature of the contemporary international security environment.

The tendency to base decisions on worst-case scenarios has gained traction since 11 September 2001.\(^{190}\) It is often said that the failure to predict what happened on that day was a failure of imagination. Today, therefore, we are invited to imagine other possible disasters, and the very fact that we can imagine them is considered to be reason enough to take action to prevent them. Accordingly, in its report Managing Turmoil, SCONSAD states that “A reasonable starting point for planning defences against potential threats at home and abroad is to ask ‘What if?’ questions.”\(^{191}\) The report then proceeds to paint an alarming picture of potential catastrophe at home and abroad, without quantify the probability of the catastrophes actually taking place.

The problem with these ‘what if’ scenarios is that they focus on the worst case rather than the most likely case. An ability to imagine something happening does not mean that it will happen, or even that it is at all likely to happen. One can always imagine something worse. If the mere possibility of something happening is sufficient basis to spend money on preparing responses, there is no logical reason why one should plan on the basis of one ‘what if’ scenario and not on the basis of another, or indeed of all of them at once. ‘What if’ is not enough. To forecast realistically and in good faith, one must make a genuine effort to substantiate the likelihood of the threat happening, and the likely damage it would cause if it did. This requires planners to step back from imagining unlikely disasters and instead to engage in what is sometimes called ‘evidence-based planning’. Doing this, one finds that the threats to Canadian security are significantly less substantial than is often claimed.

*The International Environment*

Behind most calls for increased military expenditure lies the proposition that the world is a very dangerous place. Many go beyond this. The problem is not just that the world is dangerous, but that it is getting more dangerous. The stability of the Cold War, we are told, has been replaced by a new and dangerous instability,\(^{192}\) and with this has come, “a different kind of international conflict, a different kind of trauma. No nation can isolate itself from the perils and trials, the tribulations that the world goes through.”\(^{193}\) The consequence, claims SCONSAD, is that “Canadians are
likely to be confronted with a wider variety of major threats, and that there is a good chance that more than one of them will come at us at the same time”, 194 – a claim for which the committee provides no evidence.

This logic also lies at the heart of the 2005 Defence Policy Statement, according to which:

At the dawn of the 21st century, Canada faces a complex array of security challenges. The world remains an unpredictable and perilous place, where threats to our well-being, our interests, and our values persist. Failed and failing states dot the international landscape, creating despair and regional instability and providing a haven for those who would attack us. Global terrorism has become a deadly adversary, and Canadians are now, in some ways, more individually threatened than at any time during the Cold War. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether to state or non-state actors, raises the horrible prospect of massive civilian and military casualties. And intra- and inter-state war continues throughout the world. These developments affect Canadians as never before.195

This type of threat analysis is too vague to properly guide defence policy. Take, for instance, the statement that the world “remains an unpredictable and perilous place.” One has to ask by what standards that is measured. It could be argued with equal truth that the city of Ottawa is unpredictable and perilous. Every year, Ottawa residents are mugged, murdered or killed in traffic accidents. Yet by international standards the city is fairly safe. Equally, saying that the world is perilous and unpredictable is meaningless unless quantified. Nor is it enough to say that threats “persist.” What needs to be known is on what scale they persist. The same objections could also be raised with reference to a number of other routinely recycled claims about the international security environment. Unless such statements and propositions are quantified and qualified, one is left with an array of platitudinous clichés, instead of a solid threat assessment upon which to formulate sound defence policies.

The underlying premise of most of these assessments is incorrect. The world has not become more dangerous since the end of the Cold War – far from it. Canadians are living in an age of almost unprecedented peace and prosperity. The Cold War was not a time of international stability, but one of ever increasing tension and conflict, full of war, terrorism, ethnic conflict, state failure, and other problems. Since the end of the superpower standoff the incidence of almost all of these has fallen, in many cases dramatically.
Take, for instance, the claim in the *Defence Policy Statement* that “intra- and inter-state war continues.” That is true. Wars are still being fought. But what the *Defence Policy Statement* fails to mention is that while intra- and inter-state war continue, they do so at a much, much lower level than during the Cold War. This omission is important, since it contributes to an inaccurate reading of international security trends. A number of surveys of international conflict conducted in recent years have reached the same conclusion: the world is substantially more peaceful than it was 15 years ago. According to an analysis of armed conflict published by the University of Maryland in 2007:

> The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline in the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in the general magnitude of such conflicts. According to our calculations, the general magnitude of global warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2006 to its lowest level since 1964.\(^{196}\)

Other surveys using slightly different methodologies, conducted by groups such as Project Ploughshares, the University of Uppsala, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, have confirmed this trend.\(^{197}\)

A common riposte to these findings is that the nature of conflict has changed; that past wars were between states, whereas contemporary ones are within states, and thus the yardstick is not measuring accurately. But in fact during the Cold War the overwhelming majority of wars were intra-state wars, and the massive reduction in armed conflict since then is almost entirely due to a reduction of such wars within states rather than those between them.\(^{198}\)

Nor is it true that new types of war, such as ethnic wars, which are more violent and brutal than other wars, are replacing those of the past. Despite well-publicized examples, such as the wars over the area of former Yugoslavia, the incidence of ethnic conflict worldwide fell throughout the 1990s.\(^{199}\) Similarly, examples such as Rwanda notwithstanding, there was a “dramatic decline” in the number and scale of genocides “through the 1990s.”\(^{200}\)

Not only has the frequency and magnitude of armed conflict declined since the end of the Cold War, so too has the number of international crises which fall short of war. These crises “reached an all-time peak in 1981 and
have been declining steadily ever since.”

Contrary to common claims, the world is significantly more stable and more peaceful today than it has been for many decades. Evidence for this is overwhelming.

Paradoxically, despite enjoying the luxury of living in such a peaceful world, Canada not only spends more on defence in real terms than it did at the peak of the Cold War (see above), but also faces demands to spend still more. If defence expenditure is in any way related to the condition of the international security environment (as surely it should be), this is a sign of an unrealistic policy.

**Attacks on Canada by Other States**

Traditionally, because of the preponderant power wielded by states, the greatest threat a state could face has been attack by another state, and the role of armed forces was to prepare for such a contingency. Fortunately for Canada, the incidence of inter-state war in the modern world is very low, and has been for several decades. Canada’s geographic isolation makes it an extremely unlikely target for large-scale attack by a foreign power. Nevertheless, SCONSAD intimates that Canada faces a possible threat from Russia forming a “new power bloc with China and India.”

Fortunately this threat is unlikely to emerge. While Russia, like other states, is laying the grounds for claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to parts of the Arctic Ocean (on the grounds that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of Russia’s continental shelf), its claims are restricted to the ocean and the seabed; Russia has never made any claim to the islands of the Canadian Arctic, nor has there been any suggestion by the current Russian administration, or even any opposition political party in Russia, that Moscow might wish to do so. Realistic threat assessments should identify some semblance of intent when claiming that a competitor has malicious intent. This scenario lacks this key piece of evidence. More problematically, the proposal that Canada might wish to go to war with a nuclear-armed power to retain its Arctic sovereignty merits a careful reconsideration.

Equally improbable is the suggestion that China or India might attack Canada. Leaving aside the logistical hurdles these states would face when mounting a large-scale conventional attack on a country that is on the other side of the globe, the absence of a motive is apparent here as well. Unless one can identify what either state would gain by attacking Canada, the threat remains purely hypothetical, if not abstract.
More credible than the idea that Russia or China (in alliance, or not, with India) will choose to attack Canada is the notion that we face a threat from that ill-defined group known as ‘rogue states’. In spite of the fact that the states which make up NATO account for over 60 percent of all the money spent worldwide on defence, whereas the so-called rogue states spend only one percent, the threat posed by these countries is often cited as a reason for enhancing our military capabilities.

A particular fear is that "countries such as Iran and North Korea are developing nuclear missiles that might be able to strike North America in the next decade." First, it must be noted that the qualifier ‘such as’ no longer applies. In the small gallery of states officially designated as ‘rogues’, one, Iraq, has been conquered and occupied; another, Libya, has abandoned any nuclear efforts; a third, Syria, has no such capability or even a credible project to create it, while the same applies also to the fourth and last, Cuba. The ‘rogue state’ threat, therefore, comes down to two states, Iran and North Korea. The former does have ballistic missiles, but even if the most ambitious prognostications about their range are true (an estimated maximum of 2,500-3,000 kilometres), the best ones currently in their inventory could not reach much further than Berlin. The latter has twice tried in the past decade to launch a multi-stage missile, which if it worked would be able to reach as far as, but no further, than Hawaii. Both tests failed. In short, the missile threat from these two ‘rogue states’ is by no means imminent.

The Central Intelligence Agency claims that Iran has abandoned its nuclear weapons ambitions, while North Korea is negotiating the end of its nuclear program with the Americans. The nuclear-tipped missile threat is thus even less imminent than the missile threat itself. Even if that were not the case, the problem of motive and intent presents itself here as well. The conditions that would prompt either Iran or North Korea to fire a nuclear-tipped missile against North America are far from evident. The assumption appears to be that their leaders are “mad,” but the foundation of this analysis is at best a manifestation of ‘worst-case’ thinking. General John Abizaid, former commander of the US Central Command, has commented that the US “can live with a nuclear Iran.” If the US can, so can Canada.

A direct attack on Canada by another state is too improbable to warrant a serious build-up of the Canadian military. If a strengthening of Canada’s military forces is to be justified, an alternative threat needs to be found.
Internal Threats and Aid of the Civil Power

Likely threats are insurrections, such as the one that occurred in Oka in 1990, or large-scale disasters and emergencies. It is entirely appropriate and necessary for the CF to assist civil authorities in maintaining law and order in the event of an insurrection. Since Canada does not maintain paramilitary forces, the CF must be equipped and prepared to act as the last line of defence against lawlessness and disorder. It is a role the Canadian military and militia has been asked to perform throughout the country’s history. If called upon by civil authorities, it is vital that the CF be properly equipped, trained, and located to respond to natural or made-made disasters or emergencies. If concerns about the disastrous effects of climate change and the threat of transnational terrorist organizations prove to be accurate, the likelihood of such events will increase. The ability of the CF to act as an effective consequence management force must be improved. The CF should be prepared to assist with the maintenance of order and security during significant events, such as the Kananaskis summit and the 2010 Olympics.

Failed and Failing States

Current Canadian defence policy identifies ‘failed and fragile states’ as a significant threat to Canada and international stability. According to the 2005 Defence Policy Statement, “Failed and failing states dot the international landscape,” and they “have resulted in civil wars, humanitarian catastrophes and regional instability.” Similarly, Canada’s 2004 National Security Strategy notes that “The growing number of failed or failing states is one of the most disturbing of recent security developments.”

The difficulty with these claims is that they are not backed by a sufficient degree of evidence or analysis. It is unclear which states even fall under this category. There is no agreed definition of what constitutes a fragile, failing, or failed state, and the existing academic studies of failed states do not make year-by-year comparisons of the number of such states, making it difficult to determine trends. What we do know is that complete state failure is relatively rare. The latest Brookings Institution survey on the subject lists only three states (Somalia, Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo) as ‘failed’. A much larger number of states (perhaps one third of the world’s countries) may be considered...
“fragile”, that is to say lacking some legitimacy and unable to deliver some basic services to their citizens, but most “fragile” states are not “failing” ones, in the sense of being in the process of collapse. In fact, many supposedly “fragile” states are, by most measures, stable. Moreover, it is also known, as was shown above, that the level of violent conflict within states has dramatically declined in recent years, suggesting that the trend is likely one of fewer states joining the ranks of the failed and fragile due to civil war and conflict.

If the failures “dot the landscape,” it is in a rather minimalist fashion. Analyses of global governance suggest that since the end of the Cold War there has been a dramatic increase in the number of democracies worldwide, and a large decrease in the number of autocracies. There has also been a growth in the number of “anocracies” – that is to say states with “a mix of democratic and autocratic features.” These are more stable than might be presumed. As Monty G. Marshall and Jack Goldstone conclude, “In the past fifteen years, there have been far fewer failures of anocratic regimes than would be expected from the historical trends. … there has been a steady decrease in global trends in violent conflict and fewer than expected outbreaks of new political instability events.”

In brief, the belief which forms the basis of both the National Security Strategy and the Defence Policy Statement, namely that failed and failing states constitute a major and growing international problem, is refuted by the available evidence. State fragility is currently a very small-scale problem, and one which appears to be shrinking. We may therefore conclude that Canadian defence policy is currently premised on the basis of a very weak, if not false, central assumption.

Even if failed and failing states are rare and becoming rarer, those few that exist may constitute a threat to Canadian national interests. Analysts suggest that they provide safe havens for terrorists, create an environment in which transnational organized crime can flourish, and can provoke undesirable mass movements of refugees across borders, as well as spill-over conflicts in neighbouring countries which damage international stability. Nevertheless, failed and failing states are not ones with which Canada does significant trade. Instability among them only marginally affects our economic interests. Canada’s geographic position also largely protects it from the negative consequences of migratory flows in these countries. While the abuses of human rights which often accompany state failure are an affront to our values, such values, while constituting a national interest, do not constitute a vital interest. From a realist perspective, they do not per se justify military intervention.
Only the terrorist and criminal connection, post 9/11, actually produces a serious security concern for Canada with regard to failed and failing states. Afghanistan suggests that we cannot ignore state failure, even in countries in which we have no apparent interests, for if such countries become terrorist havens they can cause inestimable damage, as on 11 September 2001. There is truth to this suggestion, but the strength of the proposition is disputable. At present, the threat to Canada (and all other Western states other than the U.S.) from terrorism appears to come more from home-grown radicalization than from terrorists based in failed or failing states. As a recently declassified report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) says, “While the 2001 attacks were undertaken by core Al Qaeda (AQ) recruits, who were trained, financed and directed by AQ … the newest threat is from locally born youth or those who moved to the West at a young age. … They have no apparent link to ‘formal’ terrorist organizations.” Former CIA officer and terror expert turned author Marc Sageman comments that the latest generation of terrorists, far from being religious fanatics are “more likely to be made up of disaffected, homicidal youths who are closer in profile to criminal gang members.” The problem for the West with Afghanistan was not so much that the state had failed as that the state which did exist had chosen to cooperate with terrorists – in other words, the problem was more one of a ‘rogue’ state than a ‘failed’ state. Recent research has demonstrated that the link between transnational terrorism and state fragility is more of an exception than a rule. Before vastly increasing defence expenditures in order to address the problem of terrorist havens in fragile states, the Canadian government should ensure that it is aiming in the right direction.

**Terrorism**

Terrorism is said to be an extremely dangerous threat to Canada and Canadians, one different from any threat the country has faced before. Granatstein, Smith, and Stairs argue, for example, that “terrorism … has become a real threat to Canada now, and it will become more threatening in the future,” and that the struggle against “Islamic fundamentalism” is “the defining struggle of our times.” Canadian terrorist expert Tom Quiggin argues, “the warning lights are blinking red,” since an increasing number of Muslims within Canada are becoming radicalized and being attracted to extremist groups (and it is notable that in Quiggin’s analysis, the threat comes from home-grown radicals, not from those based in failed
or failing states). There is a very real possibility of a major terrorist attack within Canada in the near future.

Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the threat from terrorism. Most databases of terrorist activity suggest that the incidence of international terrorist acts peaked in the mid-1980s, and then entered into a period of long decline. In the meantime, however, the deadliness of terrorist attacks has increased. This means that there are now substantially fewer terrorist attacks than during the Cold War, but those which do occur kill more people. This last conclusion, however, is distorted by events in Iraq and Afghanistan. If they are subtracted from the statistics, it turns out that elsewhere in the world the number of people being killed by terrorists has actually declined. In short, the incidence and deadliness of terrorism in the Western world are now far below the Cold War peak.

Worldwide, the average annual death toll of international terrorism is about 420. This compares with 30,000 traffic deaths each year on roads in the US alone. More specifically, the MIPT terrorism database records 16 international terrorist incidents in Canada in the decade from 1968 to 1979, dropping to 11 from 1980 to 1989, dropping again to two from 1990 to 1999, and then rising only back to half the 1980s level, with 5 incidents between 2000 and 2008. This evidence does not suggest that the current terrorist threat is at unprecedented levels.

Ottawa should not be complacent about terrorism, but the scale of the problem must be kept in perspective. The United Kingdom, whose Muslim population is to date far more radicalized than that of Canada, has so far suffered only 55 deaths due to Islamic terrorism. This compares to an average of 100 deaths every year between 1969 and 1999 due to various forms of Irish terrorism. Yet during the thirty years of Irish attacks, which at one point caused significant damage to the City of London and its financial sector, life in the United Kingdom continued largely unaffected by the terrorist phenomenon. There is no reason why we should believe that Canada will be less able to cope. Quiggin himself notes that Islamic terrorists are unlikely to cause much physical damage: “the real damage these guys do is not the physical damage,” he says, “it’s the political damage.”

**Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The invariable riposte to these arguments is the suggestion that there is a real risk that terrorists will obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and cause unprecedented harm. A WMD attack would be so destructive that Canada must arm its military to actively hunt terrorists. The threat may even warrant pre-emptive attacks in other countries, where governments which are sympathetic to terrorists are developing WMD. The true scale of the danger posed to Canadian security by weapons of mass destruction (in other words, by chemical and biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, sometimes referred to as CBRN) must, therefore, be examined. The threat comes from two directions – from ‘rogue states’ and from terrorists.

We are told that, “Almost certainly, there will be more nuclear powers within the next two decades.” SCONSAD supports this claim. “Iran is moving defiantly toward acquiring nuclear weapons,” it says, “Meanwhile traditional powers race to contain the loose nuclear weaponry left scattered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.” But WMD proliferation may not be as alarming as claimed. On the nuclear front, contrary to the statement above, it seems unlikely that there will be more nuclear powers within the next decade, as no state which does not already have such weapons, except for Iran, is suspected of building them, and Iran is believed to have suspended its program. As for the concern with loose Soviet-era nuclear weaponry, these weapons were taken back to the Russian Federation from other parts of the former USSR in the 1990s. The challenge now is securing these weapons, an effort Russia, the United States and other states have been undertaking, with a good deal of success, for more than a decade.

That leaves the prospect of a terrorist nuclear device. “There is a clear possibility that one or more non-state actors will acquire access to some sort of nuclear capability. … The greatest risk comes from a nuclear weapon, even of the most rudimentary form, coming into the hands, or being made by, a terrorist group,” claim three prominent Canadian defence analysts. No terrorist group would be able to produce nuclear weapon on its own. These groups would either need to steal a nuclear weapon from a state or be given one by a state. Unless one resurrects the ‘madman’ hypothesis, it is unclear what any state would gain by giving a terrorist group a nuclear weapon. If the state announced that it had provided a terrorist group with a nuclear weapon that was used against Canada, it would face massive retaliation. If, on the other hand, the state which provided the weapon did not claim responsibility, it is difficult to see what it would gain from the attack. The likelihood that a state will freely give a nuclear weapon to a
terrorist group is extremely small. The theft of a nuclear weapon, on the other hand, is rightly a cause of greater concern, although also very unlikely. To prevent against the theft of a nuclear weapon, states should work cooperatively to secure existing warheads and nuclear materials. Such a cooperative effort would require an investment in diplomatic and civilian security capabilities, not the military.

Radiological weapons represent a more likely, yet still mitigated, threat. Although it is theoretically feasible for them to do so, in practice terrorists would have great difficulty in constructing a radiological weapon capable of contaminating a large area and killing large numbers of people. Far more probable is the construction of a crude ‘dirty bomb’ which would use conventional explosives to scatter a radioactive substance over a fairly small area. According to nuclear physicist and military technology specialist, Dr Frank Barnaby, “the radioactive material in the bomb would be dispersed into the air but would be soon diluted to relatively low concentrations … Deaths and injuries caused by the blast effects of the conventional explosives and long-term cancers from radiation would likely be minimal.”

This is confirmed by Dr Antone Brooks, professor of radiation toxicology at Washington State University. As Dr Brooks colourfully comments: “low doses of radiation are a piss-poor carcinogen.”

The primary effects of a dirty bomb would be economic and psychological. It could cause significant panic, as well as immense financial damage. This makes such a bomb an attractive weapon for terrorists. However, a radiological weapon would not kill many people. Accordingly, radiological devices should not be classified as weapons of ‘mass destruction’.

The other two categories of WMD are chemical and biological weapons. Some terrorist groups are quite interested in using these. Insurgents have used chlorine on several occasions in Iraq. Prior to that, in 1995, the extremist sect Aum Shinrikyo used Sarin nerve agent in an attack on the Tokyo subway. Further chemical and biological terrorism is highly likely. As with radiological devices, however, it is disputable whether chemical and biological weapons deserve the label ‘weapons of mass destruction’ at all. Neither the chlorine attacks in Iraq nor the Sarin attacks in Tokyo killed more than a handful of people, far fewer than if the terrorists had chosen to use conventional explosives. This was not an accident. While deadly chemicals are relatively simple to produce, it is extremely difficult to disseminate them in such a way as to kill large numbers of people. Brian Jones, a former
WMD analyst for the British Defence Intelligence Staff, has commented that:

To produce large numbers of casualties an appropriate concentration of the chemical has to be achieved over a wide area that contains a large number of potential victims, and despite the highly toxic nature of some chemicals, and the low concentrations needed, very large quantities of CW are required … It is difficult to see even the most potent chemical agents (including toxins of biological origin) as a threat to national security.\(^\text{236}\)

Biological weapons are even more problematic. Dissemination is again the major difficulty. The Aum Shinrikyo sect tried several times to spread anthrax around Tokyo: it failed to kill a single person. Despite newspaper headlines in the UK about an al Qaeda “plot to poison Britain,” the alleged weapon in that case – ricin – was decidedly not a WMD. As one commentator notes, “To use ricin to kill many people, someone would have to dump hundreds of tons of it on a small area. To kill many with anthrax or botox, someone would first have to get the victims to sniff weapons-grade anthrax or eat botulism-contaminated food and then shun antibiotics or antitoxins.”\(^\text{237}\)

To date, the average death rate of terrorist CBRN attacks is 0.5 people per attack, half the rate of attacks using conventional means.\(^\text{238}\) In short, while it is quite possible that terrorists might decide to strike Canada using chemical or biological weapons, it is most improbable that they would kill large numbers of Canadians in the process. As John Mueller rightly says, the threat from WMD terrorism is “overblown.”\(^\text{239}\)

Rather than thinking of potential terrorist CBRN attacks as an existential threat requiring a massive investment in the armed forces, it is far wiser and more realistic to view them as a problem that must be addressed with vigilance, caution, and resilience. Both the federal and provincial governments should be prepared to deal with the aftermath of CBRN attacks, and the CF should be in a position to contribute units and resources to civilian-led consequence management efforts. Doing so would minimize the amount of damage, both physical and psychological, that a terrorist attack might produce. The key, as Stephen Flynn argues, is to make Canadian society more resilient to terrorist attacks.\(^\text{240}\) The more resilient the society, the less the public will be gripped by paralyzing fear and the sooner everyday life can resume after an attack. When dealing with terrorism, a refusal to be intimidated or to overreact is the best response. Terror will be abandoned as a tactic when it ceases to terrorize.
The Threat from the United States

Those calling for greater defence expenditure often argue that Canada must invest more in the military to guard itself against the United States. This argument arises from the fear that if Canada does not work hard enough at protecting America against the threats that it perceives it faces, the United States may take action to protect itself, in a manner which will seriously harm Canadian national interests. The implication appears to be that the United States might occupy Canadian territory, or invade Canadian airspace and waters. According to Professor Bland, "Should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new obligations, it seems likely that the United States will blockade its northern border, undertake covert intelligence operations in Canada and act unilaterally to defend itself by deploying its armed forces in Canada whenever the President deems it necessary."\(^{241}\)

This proposition is questionable. As demonstrated by the small number of permanent forces dedicated to its homeland defence command, US Northern Command, the United States understands that military forces provide little security against internally-based terrorist attacks. Intelligence, policing, and screening measures are the tools needed to defend against terrorism in North America. As a result, if it is the case that United States is expecting Canada to invest more in continental security, Washington is expecting Ottawa to spend more on homeland security, not homeland defence. Indeed, given the nature of the threat, the United States would likely express concern if Canada spent less on civilian security agencies to increase the CF’s role in defending North America.

With the exception of Ottawa’s decision to decline a role in ballistic missile defence, there is no evidence that the United States is displeased with Canada’s current contribution to the defence of North America.\(^{242}\) Canada and the United States are jointly defending North America’s aerospace via the binational North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary in 2008. The Canadian homeland defence command, Canada Command, is building a solid working relationship with its counterpart US NorthCom, and the two countries are working together to improve North American maritime security. Ottawa and Washington recently formalized an agreement whereby Canadian and American consequence management units will be able to perform cross-border operations. While the United States may want Canada to do more in terms of continental security, therefore, there are no shortfalls in the CF’s contribution to continental defence that warrant a significant increase in military expenditures.
While it is true that the United States might restrict trade across the US-Canada border in the event of another major terrorist incident, border security is the purview of civilian agencies, not the military. As Joel Sokolsky correctly notes, “Canada’s defence problem is to convince Washington that Canada is not an American defence problem.” “Fortunately,” continues Sokolsky, “even today, this stance does not take much in the way of national defence resources.”

It is unlikely that the United States would deploy its military to Canada, without Ottawa’s permission, to pre-emptively defend itself against a terrorist attack or to cope with the consequences of such an attack. A number of conditions would need to exist for this to take place. First, Ottawa would have to refuse to deal with the threat or the consequences using Canadian military and police forces. Second, Canada would be unable to deal with the threat or the consequences on its own, yet Ottawa would still refuse to give the United States permission to intervene. Third, Canadian decision-makers would be unable to give the United States permission to intervene, for whatever reason. The first of these scenarios is utterly unlikely. The second and the third are highly unlikely. If the assistance of the United States is required to prevent or cope with the consequences of a terrorist attack, the Canadian government should have no qualms about requesting American assistance, or granting Washington’s request to intervene. To do otherwise would be to needlessly risk Canadian lives and would represent an abrogation of the Canadian government’s responsibilities to its citizens.

The immediate rebuttal to this argument is that Canada should have the resources and capabilities to independently address any incident on Canadian soil. To do otherwise is to abandon a degree of sovereignty. If there were no opportunity costs associated with large-scale defence expenditures and sovereignty were upheld as an inviolable good, this might be true. But this is not the case. Even the United States, the world’s foremost military spender and a stalwart protector of its national independence, was glad to accept Canadian military assistance when it was overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina. It is unclear why Canada should be made to feel as if it is a lesser, irresponsible, state, if one day it, too, requires the help of a friend and ally in a time of crisis.

Non-Conventional Threats

Our focus thus far has been on armed threats to Canadian security. Canada’s economic prosperity, and the lives and property of its citizens are
affected by many other, non-traditional, threats as well. These include problems such as environmental degradation and pandemics. Arguably, given Canada’s secure position, the country and its citizens are threatened far more by dangers such as climate change and HIV/AIDS than they are by terrorism, failed states, or weapons of mass destruction.

Interestingly, Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence in the United States assessed the same for all of North America, telling the *New Yorker* magazine in 2008 that Al Qaeda was not the greatest threat to American national security. “Terrorism can kill a lot of people,” he said, “but it can’t fundamentally challenge the ability of the nation to exist. … we have to have some balance in terms of equitable distribution of wealth, containment of contagious diseases, access to energy supplies, and development of free markets. There are national security ramifications to global warming.”

To this list should be added natural disasters, such as the 1997 flood in Manitoba, the 1998 ice storm, and of course, Hurricane Katrina. There seems to be a clear requirement for an emergency response capability to such events; the armed forces should be in a position to assist with this response.

**Conclusions Concerning Threats**

The following graph, taken from the US Naval War College’s *Fundamentals of Force Planning*, shows the spectrum of threat as perceived by the U.S. during the Cold War: The x-axis indicates the probability of the threat materializing; the y axis, the damage which would occur if it did.
The probability of strategic nuclear war was considered low, but it was assessed that if it had happened, the impact would have been devastating. Limited war was more likely but less damaging, hostile surveillance even more likely and even less damaging, and so on.

Today, the threats which mark the top of the line – strategic and theatre nuclear war, and global conventional war – have become sufficiently unlikely that they no longer form a realistic basis for Canadian defence planning. Today, the threat which is regularly listed as the most potentially damaging is that of nuclear terrorism. This, though, has a very low probability of occurrence, certainly no higher than strategic nuclear war during the Cold War (a possibility which at the time seemed frighteningly real). Nuclear terrorism therefore lies roughly in the same position as forms of nuclear war in the Cold War chart, but its damage would be much lower than the damage of nuclear war, in which states were exchanging devastating weapons. This means that the threat chart for today looks more like this:

Post-Cold War Threat Analysis

The line has flattened out, indicating a threat environment which is safer. In these circumstances, demands that Canada spend more on defence in real terms than during the Cold War are unjustifiable from a realist perspective.

To summarize, demands for greater defence expenditure are based upon false premises about the dangerous nature of the world and the scale of the threats Canada faces. Contrary to the claims of defence advocates, the world has become substantially more peaceful in recent years. While some states
have failed or are failing, as a whole international stability is greater now than during the Cold War. Canada faces no major threat from other powers, and although there is a terrorist threat to it, there is no reason to believe that terrorists are capable of inflicting sufficient damage on Canadian society to threaten the survival of the nation or the Canadian way of life. A more realistic danger is that as a by-product of terrorism, the United States might tighten border controls in such a way as to harm the Canadian economy. Meanwhile, non-traditional threats such as environmental degradation possibly pose a greater danger to Canadian lives and property than do foreign powers or non-state actors such as terrorists. How useful military expenditure is in meeting these various threats will be addressed next.

As we have seen, current Canadian defence policy adheres to a number of questionable, and sometimes even demonstrably false, assumptions. The Defence Policy Statement (DPS) exaggerates the threat posed by failed and fragile states and terrorism. The DPS and many pro-defence critics also make unsubstantiated claims about how military power translates into international influence. Despite Canada’s military commitment to southern Afghanistan, Ottawa’s influence in Washington and other NATO capitals has failed to markedly increase, while the Canada-United States border has become thicker. With respect to the protection of Canada’s vital interests, the return on Ottawa’s recent defence investments has been poor.

In addition, Canada’s current defence policies are perpetuating the means/ends gap and emphasizing unessential missions and capabilities. Additional dollars will not eliminate these difficulties. Only a less cavalier commitment to expeditionary operations and force structuring can bridge the means/ends gap and make Canada’s defence policies sustainable.

In light of these realities, this chapter offers a set of realist-minded alternatives to current Canadian defence policy. It concludes that in light of the opportunity costs and inefficiencies surrounding defence expenditures, Ottawa would be wise to resist demands for higher military spending. Canada can promote the national interest, safeguard its citizens, contribute to the security of North America, and make sufficient contributions to international stability, without increasing defence spending. Canada’s current defence expenditures are sufficient, provided that a more moderate approach to force structuring and expeditionary operations is adopted. Existing
priorities need to be changed, and unessential procurements cancelled to allow for the replacement of more important capabilities. In order to prevent overstretch, the government should accept fewer prolonged land force deployments, and in order to make the country more resilient and less fearful of terrorist attacks and natural disasters, CF resources should be redirected to fill lingering gaps in the military’s ability to assist the civil power and authority.

**Opportunity Costs**

Before we examine in depth the capabilities which Canada needs to defend its interests, a few remarks are first necessary. First, we must mention again the issue of opportunity costs. As noted in chapter one, the costs of defence expenditure are not limited to the direct costs, measured in financial and human terms; there are also opportunity costs – i.e. the costs of not being able to do other things because resources are limited and one is spending those resources on defence and not on something else. These are often greater than the direct costs.

The existence of opportunity costs means that even if defence spending can be shown to do some good in promoting Canadian interests, it is still not necessarily a good investment, since by spending the money on defence we are unable to devote our resources to other methods of promoting our interests which might be more efficient. In fact, the available evidence suggests that they generally are more efficient. Over the past few years a group of economists, working under the title of the ‘Copenhagen Consensus’, has been carrying out cost-benefit analyses of various forms of government intervention. It has discovered that the cost-benefit ratio of security and counter-terrorism measures is substantially worse than in the case of other activities which are undertaken to improve the world, such as actions to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, to reduce the incidence of malnutrition and malaria, and to liberalize trade. Within the already inefficient parameters of counter-terrorism measures, enhanced defensive measures, including military activity such as that undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, are the least cost-effective means of enhancing security, “even when the most promising assumptions are invoked.” These facts suggest that the opportunity costs of spending more of Canada’s limited resources on defence may be very high.

With Ottawa’s budget surpluses going towards tax cuts and provincial transfer payments, the Canadian population aging, and Canada’s urban...
infrastructures in need of major and expensive repairs, one must be cognizant of the significant opportunity cost dilemmas the federal government will face in the coming decade. Ottawa may well be able to spend billions of additional dollars on defence now without short-changing other national priorities, but this is unlikely to be the case in coming years.

The Inefficiency of Defence Spending and the Need for Reform

Additional factors which must be considered with determining appropriate levels of defence spending include the financial inefficiency of most defence institutions and the concomitant need for institutional reform. Demands for greater defence expenditure more commonly come from the political right than the political left. This is odd, for where almost every other aspect of government is concerned, the modern political right urges financial restraint, and casts doubt upon the efficiency of government as a provider of services. Spending more money on services such as health care is, we are regularly told, pointless without substantial reform of the system. Socialist-style top-down government systems which provide free services are believed to be fundamentally inefficient, and even an encouragement to complacency and laziness. Investing more money into them will not improve outputs, or at least not proportionately to the increased expenditure, but rather will increase waste. Yet, the defence establishment, the archetypal top-down government system, is exempted from this logic. Higher spending is accepted to be an obvious way to improve armed forces, solve problems of overstretch, and eliminate the capability-commitment gap.

There is no reason to believe that the world of defence is any more efficient in managing money than any other part of the government. On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that it is less efficient. Most of any increase in funding will merely lead to increased waste, encourage the government to add to its commitments, and leave the capability-commitment gap just as wide as before, if not wider than ever.

One can see this by comparing Canada with other nations, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom. The former spends some four percent of GDP on defence, almost three times the level of Canada’s spending. Yet US commentators regularly complain of the ‘broken army’. The United Kingdom spends a little over two percent of GDP on defence – the level that many people in Canada believe is appropriate for us – and yet the British press is now complaining that “British Defence Spending is a Disgrace.”
There are good reasons why this is so. ‘Parkinson’s Law’ famously states that bureaucratic “work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion” 251. The larger a bureaucracy, the more it will find to do. The more one spends on defence, the more one’s armed forces end up doing. Equally, as capabilities increase, so too does the tendency of governments to use them. In consequence, the capability-commitment gap is never closed.

Worse still, as the defence budget increases, so too does the temptation to purchase large budget items. Another ‘law’ – ‘Augustine’s Law’, named after former Undersecretary of the US Army Norman Augustine – states that “there was never more than a 10 per-cent chance that a defence program would meet its budget, nor more than a 15 per-cent chance that it would meet its schedule.” 252 This is not far from the truth. The problem is that larger budget items will go further over budget than small budget items. The horrible consequence, therefore, is that the more one spends, the more one goes over budget. Thus, says Eugene Lang, “a very wise and long-serving defence official told me that no matter how much money any government put into DND, there would always be a ‘sustainability gap’. That insight is probably true of every defence department in the world.” 253

What is more, faced by a growing budget crisis, something always needs to be cut. The obvious choices are the big budget items which are causing the problem. Unfortunately, defence ministries are notoriously incapable of prioritizing, and each service is hesitant to question the capabilities and priorities of the other, lest their own be targeted in turn. Hard decisions are rarely made, especially those relating to large procurement projects (A third law of defence economics applies here – ‘Kagan’s Law’ – which states that “When the military is asked if it wants more soldiers or a new plane and is told it must choose one, it always chooses the plane.” 254) Too often, as the budget goes up, the ‘poor bloody infantry’ end up suffering more in order to make up for the shortfalls caused by inflated procurement ambitions.

Spending more on defence without fundamental reform of the defence system leads to waste and inefficiency. The problem is that the defence system is notoriously difficult to reform. It is not a top-down government-led system for no reason; it cannot be anything else. There are a number of characteristics which distinguish defence markets from civilian ones. These include: a single buyer (the defence agency); a few, relatively large, suppliers; extensive barriers to exit and entry which reduce competition; highly specialized products; extremely long lead times for products; and a strong preference for domestic products or foreign products with large domestic
industrial and regional benefits. Put together these mean that defence ‘markets’ are not really markets at all; the mechanisms which promote efficiency in most of the private sector simply cannot be properly replicated in defence economics.

One way to render the defence system slightly more efficient is the exercise of tight budgetary control by the civilian authorities. Respected US security analyst Richard K. Betts comments that budget caps are useful, because they provide a means by which civilian managers can deny senior military officers their favoured, and often unnecessary, programs. They can simply say that the money is unavailable. If the money is available, the military leadership can insist that the programs are necessary, and the civilian managers will lack the technical status to deny the claim. Profligacy within the Department of National Defence thus has a final negative effect of weakening civilian oversight over military procurements and reducing incentives to prioritize and use resources efficiently.

Added to this, there is strong evidence of a spiral effect whereby greater security spending makes citizens feel less and not more secure, and thus leads them to demand even more spending. As Frank Harvey writes, “The greater the financial costs, public sacrifice and political capital invested in security, the higher the public’s expectation and corresponding standards for measuring performance, the more significant the public’s sense of insecurity after each failure, and, paradoxically, the higher the pressure on governments and citizens to sacrifice even more to achieve perfect security.” As a result, “the more security you have, the more security you will need.” Canadians should be very wary before starting off on this spiral journey, particularly in the high-cost, high-inflation defence sector.

We conclude, therefore, that rather than demanding more resources the Department of National Defence should focus on using the resources it already has more efficiently. Efforts to improve efficiency should include a wholesale review of the CF’s command structure. Eliminating unnecessary duplication of command functions and inessential layers of command is a first step in achieving sustainability and fostering a culture of efficiency throughout the defence department and armed forces.

Given their ambiguous achievements and reported inefficiencies, an audit of the CF’s new ‘transformational’ commands is in order. It may be that the new commands are necessary to make the CF a more effective armed force. But this needs to be proven before the new commands expand any further. If evidence of the new commands’ value is lacking or unclear, they should be discarded and the CF should return to its pre-2006 command
structure. Alternatively, a committee on defence organization, akin to the Glassco commission of the early 1960s, should be formed to recommend ways of improving the efficiency of the CF command structure and the administration of the Department of National Defence.

Of equal importance, the CF must demonstrate that investing in ‘transformation’ will bring tangible and positive returns. Transformative change can be both positive and negative; there is nothing inherently good about a transformation. Nonetheless, the term is currently treated as synonymous with positive change. What is more, as the Defence Policy Statement correctly notes, transformation is a process, not a outcome. Rather than talking about how it will achieve its goals, the defence department should discuss the objectives that are sought. Doing so will allow observers to identify metrics for measuring the value, as well as the success or failure, of transformation. If acquiring new technologies and capabilities is an objective, then DND should concentrate on presenting and justifying the technologies and capabilities it believes the CF needs. If ‘jointness’ is an objective, then DND should talk about jointness and, without imprecision, explain why the services must operate jointly. Simply stating that the international security environment demands new capabilities and greater jointness is not enough. Declaring that “The transformation process is evolutionary and has no definable end state,” and that “Transformation is an iterative and continuous process, and its success is easy to see only in hindsight” is unacceptable.259 This type of thinking permits inefficiency and empire-building to flourish.

A significant portion of DND’s infrastructure is in disrepair. As part of its Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), the Conservative government has announced that it will accelerate efforts to restore up to fifty percent of the defence department’s infrastructure. Though necessary, this effort should be accompanied by a comprehensive study of the military’s infrastructure and basing requirements. The CFDS notes that “Defence is the single largest property holder in the federal government, with over 21,000 buildings and more than 12,000 roads and utilities on over 800 properties.”260 Before repairs to these various buildings, roads, and properties are undertaken, it would be fruitful to explore whether DND could eliminate some of them. This holds true for bases as well. A country of Canada’s size needs many, widely dispersed military bases to allow the armed forces to provide aid to the civil power and authority wherever necessary. Several air bases are also needed to permit the CF to fulfil its air defence and search and rescue missions. But there are probably some CF bases that could be closed or
consolidated to reduce DND’s infrastructure and maintenance costs. In addition, some bases and infrastructures may need to be relocated to facilitate aid to the civil power and authority operations in urban centres. At the very least, conducting a study of the military’s infrastructure and basing needs would encourage a culture of efficiency within DND and the CF.

The Canadian government is planning to expand the size of the CF to 70,000 regular force personnel and 30,000 reserve force personnel. This enlargement of the military is unnecessary. As long as the military’s operational tempo is reduced to a moderate level, the CF can effectively protect Canadians, assist with the defence of North America, and selectively and strategically contribute to international stability at its current size of 65,000 regular force personnel and 24,000 reservists. What is more, enlarging the CF will be costly, assuming the goal can even be attained. Personnel costs already make up half of the defence budget. Increasing enlistments will place additional burdens on the defence budget and exacerbate shortfalls in the near term. Instead of expending time and resources on this expansion, the military should concentrate on the challenges of retaining experienced personnel in vital trades and recruiting/training a new generation of soldiers, sailors, and airmen/airwomen to replace retiring personnel. DND has already begun to address the CF’s retention problem and recruitment figures are strong. But the difficulties associated with retaining experienced CF members in key trades and with properly training new recruits are significant. They deserve the services’ and Chief of Military Personnel’s full attention.

Survival Interests

The survival of the Canadian state is not under serious threat. Nor does Canada face a realistic danger of attack by a foreign power. It is impossible, therefore, to suggest that we have any survival interests which justify heightened defence expenditure. Since it is the survival interests which above all else justify the maintenance of military forces, this conclusion casts doubt on whether Canada must spend ever more on defence.

Protection of Life and Property

One reason would be that military can protect life and property, whereas other forms of government expenditure cannot. This is true. There are some
threats to life and property (most significantly, of course, military ones) which only military force can protect against. On the other hand, spending money on health care, road safety, national infrastructure, and the like also protects life, so the question of opportunity costs is raised again.

The size of the threat to Canadian life and property is relatively minuscule. No direct attack by a foreign power is at all likely, so the primary threat comes from terrorism. Yet the likely damage of non-nuclear terrorism is minor, and the numbers of Canadians likely to be killed in a non-nuclear terrorist attack is small, especially when compared to various forms of disease, road traffic accidents, and so on. It is vital for the CF to maintain a cross-Canada consequence management capability, but vastly increasing expenditures on homeland and continental defence is an inefficient means of protecting Canadians. Spending tens of billions of dollars on homeland and continental defence may protect life, but at a rate of hundreds of millions of dollars per life. Life is priceless, and the state has an obligation to protect it, but the ratio of lives saved to dollars spent is almost certainly many degrees greater in other cases, such as, again, health care and road safety.

If protecting life and property is the primary function of government, the case for spending more on defence in order to do so is a weak one given the paucity of threats to North America that can be effectively addressed with military force. Undoubtedly, if terrorism takes place on a sufficient scale to disrupt normal social life, as it did in parts of Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’ of 1969-1999, and as it does nowadays in Iraq, then military forces have an important role to play in maintaining a degree of security. This, though, is not the situation in which Canada finds itself. Domestically, counterterrorism is best left mainly to Public Safety Canada and CSIS, leaving the CF to provide aid of the civil power and consequence management in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

An argument can be made that the CF can play a useful role in protecting Canada by fighting terrorists overseas. This is where the issue of ‘failed and failing’ states comes into play. As the Defence Policy Statement says, “By helping to stabilize these countries, we prevent threats from spreading further, and deny terrorist cells the haven and support that sustain them. In turn, this helps reduce the prospect that terrorists will reach our shores.” In other words, “we must fight them over there, so we don’t have to fight them over here”.

This is a rationale that is routinely evoked by those seeking to build the CF’s expeditionary, and particularly land force and transport, capabilities.
The problem is that there is scant evidence to suggest that the expeditionary strategy achieves the goals for which it is intended. As former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted, “Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?” On the other hand, we have some evidence that the expeditionary strategy is counter-productive. As noted above, the terrorist threat to Canada comes more from home-grown radicals than from terrorists hiding in safe havens in failed and failing states. However, our determination to hunt down the latter may be adding to the former. CSIS suggests as much, stating in a recent report that certain elements of the Canadian Muslim population are being radicalized by the military campaigns fought by Western powers in Iraq and Afghanistan: “Radicalization and recruitment [into terrorist organizations],” says the report entitled *Islamist Extremism within Canada*, “are influenced by what is happening abroad in the larger Muslim countries. A key radicalizing factor is a desire to help the Muslim community and to defend Muslims who are perceived as being under attack from the West. The conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas are often cited as justifications for jihad.”

American counter-insurgency expert Steven Metz puts the problem well:

> At the strategic level, the risk to the United States is not that insurgents will ‘win’ in the traditional sense, gain control of their country, or change it from an American ally to an enemy. The greater likelihood is that complex internal conflicts … will generate other adverse affects. … Given these possibilities, the US goal should not automatically be the direct defeat of the insurgents by the established regime … but rather the rapid resolution of the conflict. … Protracted conflict, not insurgent victory, is the threat.

Despite this warning, NATO seems determined to commit itself to a prolonged campaign in Afghanistan, a campaign which provides much of the justification for the current increases in Canadian defence capacity. Indeed, regardless of the evidence that a lasting presence in Muslim countries may increase the terrorist threat, NATO has abandoned a purely counter-terror mission in Afghanistan in favour of a protracted, expensive, and tenuous nation-building, society-transforming campaign. Instead of seeking to merely deny Al Qaeda safe haven in the country, NATO has declared that it will stay until Afghanistan is rebuilt into a self-sustaining democracy. However noble, this grander mission may be undermining the counterterrorism mission that served as the original motive for dislodging
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Sun Tzu commented that, “there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.”Canada and NATO would do well to heed his words.

The usual counter-argument is that Islamic terrorists will attack Canada regardless of what our military does overseas. Granatstein argues “Canada has had troops in Afghanistan for six years … Does this activity increase the likelihood of terror attacks on Canadian soil? The answer is unequivocal: yes it does. … But does this mean that Canada should opt out of the war against terror? No, not at all. … Canada is a target whatever we do.” The reason is that “we are vulnerable because there are those who live elsewhere who want to do us harm because we are a Western liberal, democratic, and secular state.” In other words, the terrorists target us for what we are, not for what we do.

Certainly, the Islamic terrorist threat is not entirely a product of Western foreign interventions; it has its own internal impulses. That said, the idea that terrorists act as they do solely out of some primordial hatred of the West is not supported by the evidence. Robert Pape’s analysis of suicide terrorists, for instance, draws a solid link between suicide terrorism and the desire to end various foreign occupations. There is, moreover, no point in aggravating an existing problem. One must think strategically. The aim is to reduce the risk of Canadians being killed by terrorists. Since prolonged military interventions do the opposite, engaging such protracted interventions is counterproductive.

It is estimated that Ottawa will have spent some $5 billion in Afghanistan by 2011, but the assertion that Canada is safer as a result of this expenditure is merely an assertion. There is little evidence to support it. Ottawa would be wise to heed Richard Betts’ advice that, “muscular military activism tends to multiply enemies, whereas sound strategy should reduce and divide them.”

We therefore conclude that DND can better achieve its primary mission of protecting Canadians by strengthening the CF’s capacities to aid the civil authority than by engaging in overseas operations. More precisely, Canadian defence policy should prioritize an enhancement of the CF’s capacity to assist governments (local, provincial, federal) during crises, such as natural disasters, critical infrastructure failures (bridge collapses, major blackouts, etc), and terrorist attacks. Improving the military’s capacities in this area is an important step towards making Canada and Canadians more resilient to domestic emergencies and terrorist attacks, thereby making Canada a more secure and less fearful society. Among the
measures that should be taken to enhance the CF’s capacity to assist the civil authority are:

- Reviving and implementing the policy of increasing the CF’s presence near urban centres.
- Making aid of the civil authority the reserves’ main role and strictly limiting the deployment of reservists overseas.
- Focus the CF’s Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company (JNBCD) on nuclear and radiological threats/incidents, and expand the unit to battalion size.
- Create and permanently maintain a regular force, battalion size Domestic Disaster Assistant Response Team (D-DART).

To better protect Canadians, DND must also improve the CF’s search and rescue capabilities. The acquisition of new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft must be prioritized above other procurements. The CF’s search and rescue capacity should be extended in the Arctic.

Assisting with the maintenance of law and order (aid to the civil power) must be the CF’s second priority. As part of this mission, the CF must maintain sufficient forces in Canada to help contain major insurrections and assist other agencies and departments in providing security during major sporting/culture events, as well as during diplomatic summits.

Maritime security is another function that the CF should share with civilian agencies. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and an armed, enlarged Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) should provide maritime security on the Great Lakes. They should also enforce Canadian laws off the coasts. The interdiction, boarding, or destruction of potentially dangerous vessels, however, should be a CF responsibility. A CF frigate should be kept on permanent standby on each coast to perform these tasks, and special operations forces stationed in Halifax and Esquimalt should be ready to perform particularly dangerous counter-narcotic or counter-terrorism boardings.

**Economic Prosperity and Relations with the United States**

The greatest threat to Canada’s economic prosperity comes from the possibility that in the aftermath of another major terrorist incident in North America, the United States might choose to close the US-Canada border, or at least severely restrict traffic across it, causing great damage to the foreign trade on which our economy is so dependent. A more indirect, but
still notable, threat to Canada’s prosperity comes from the spill-over effects of economic insecurity or political instability in other parts of the world. But there is little that the Canadian military can do to address such difficulties. At most, the Canadian navy can play a role in securing the global maritime commons, and in protecting maritime trade routes that are essential to the health of Western European and Asian economies, including the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf and the sea lines of communication around the African continent.

On this basis, Ottawa should seek to further enhance Canada-United States maritime security cooperation. This should not require significant financial investments. Those same forces, units, and capabilities that are used to protect Canada’s maritime security would also contribute to North America’s maritime forces. What would be required are provisions allowing Canadian and American maritime security to easily come to each other’s assistance in times of emergency, crisis, or imminent threat. Canada and the United States should also try to negotiate a cooperative security strategy for the Arctic. While this may prove politically impossible, an effort should nonetheless be made. A pooling of resources is the most efficient means of ensuring that both Canada and the United States can rapidly respond to events and incidents in that region.

The United States and Canada recently signed a Civil Assistance Plan that “allows the military of one nation to support the armed forces of the other nation during a civil emergency.”271 This is a positive step. To better assist the United States during an emergency, however, Canada should enhance the CF’s ability to aid the civil authority in the manner described above.

All other efforts to increase North American security should focus on civilian agencies and departments. Beyond the roles described here, there is little else that the CF can efficiently or cost-effectively contribute to the defence of the continent given the types of threats that North American currently faces.

As for the Canada-United States border, this is also not a problem which military expenditure can do much to solve. Ottawa cannot force the Americans to keep the border open, and spending more on homeland and continental defence will do little to reduce the likelihood of a major terrorist incident taking place. The arguments in favour of greater expenditure are, therefore, more indirect. To ensure that perceptions of Canada in the United States are favourable and sympathetic, Canada should make some visible contributions to those American-led military operations overseas
which advance Canadian interests, most particularly those that do not involve prolonged interventions in foreign states. Here again Canadian naval contributions are ideal. Deploying the navy on allied operations is cost-effective and has minimal ‘blowback’ effects associated with foreign interventions. While these contributions may not help to keep the border open after an attack, they may speed its reopening, since some American politicians may be disinclined to cause prolonged harm to a reliable ally.

The best way Ottawa can prevent a closure of the border and maintain favourable views of Canada in the United States is to ensure that another terrorist attack does not occur. Given the importance of Canada’s trade with the United States, this is the primary security imperative for the Canadian government. If Ottawa is seeking to keep the border open, then, it is wiser to invest additional dollars in the civilian security, police, intelligence agencies which are at the forefront of Canada’s counterterrorism efforts rather than in the military.272

It should be borne in mind that favourable opinions in the United States about, and sympathy towards, Canada should not be confused with a Canadian ability to greatly influence American policies, especially those related to the Canada-US border, homeland security, or protectionist trade policies. Washington does not draw a strong connection between a country’s military contributions to US-led alliances and its economic policies towards that country. Linkage is difficult to establish in Canada-United States relations.273 At best, defence expenditures and contributing to American-led operations provide Canada with indirect benefits. Higher military expenditures and a visible role overseas will rarely ensure a direct benefit to Canada in its economic relationship with the United States.

**Sovereignty**

The primary sovereignty concern is encroachments by foreign powers in the Arctic. To preserve and promote Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic some form of Canadian presence must be maintained in contested areas. The military has a role to play in this regard – NORAD can keep track of Canadian airspace, unmanned aerial vehicles could provide aerial reconnaissance of remote areas, and the Canadian Rangers can provide feet on the ground. Beyond this, though, there are few reasons to increase Canadian military power in the Arctic. Canada has no incentive in confronting allies, such as the United States or Denmark, with military force over what are essentially territorial and legal disputes. Nor is there much sense in
using force against shipping companies who opt to sail Canada’s Arctic waters without Ottawa’s permission.

Rather than deploying additional military assets to the Arctic, Ottawa should rely on the civilian CCG to increase Canada’s presence in the region. Even SCONSAD, typically a strong advocate of increased defence spending and of military solutions to security problems, has argued that “Arctic sovereignty should not be a significant part of DND’s mandate.” Thus, while surveillance and sovereignty enforcement should remain a CF mission, the military should concede a greater portion of this responsibility to civilian agencies, especially the CCG. Patrols of the Canadian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and assertion of sovereignty in Arctic waters should be a CCG responsibility. To allow the CCG to perform these tasks, the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS) Ottawa is planning to acquire should be assigned to it. The CF’s contribution to sovereignty enforcement should include the maintenance of the Victoria-class submarines to provide clandestine patrols and surveillance off the coasts. In addition, DND should maintain, and eventually replace, the CF’s Aurora maritime patrol aircraft.

Another challenge to Canadian sovereignty could come if the United States took measures to protect North American aerospace without consulting Canada. It makes sense for Canada to try to have a say in decisions which may affect it. For this reason, cooperating with the United States in the defence of North America through NORAD as the continent’s binational aerospace defence command is sensible.

DND must preserve the CF’s capability to defend the continent’s airspace. In keeping with NORAD’s mandate, this capability is required to provide internal air security and to address Russian aerial activities in the north. Within the next five years, the defence department must implement a procurement plan to replace the military’s CF-18 fighter-interceptors. DND could consider the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as a replacement for the CF-18, but, given the nature of the threat, its capabilities exceed Canada’s air defence requirements. The costs of the JSF are also escalating, and could threaten future budgets. The F-16E/F, which is still being produced for export, represents a more affordable option, and is adequate for the CF’s needs. Sixty-five of these aircraft will be sufficient to meet Canada’s NORAD obligations.

Canada should reverse the Martin’s government’s decision not to formally include Canada in the American ballistic missile defence system (BMD). BMD may be a waste of money, as critics charge, and given the
relatively small threat of ‘rogue’ ballistic missile, the system appears to be designed to address an unlikely threat. However, Canada has not been asked to contribute any money to BMD and the United States has not asked to place any missile defence infrastructures on Canadian territory. The system will continue to operate regardless of whether Canada is involved or not. The Canadian government therefore has nothing to lose by taking part in BMD. Joining BMD may allow NORAD to preserve its soon-to-expire role in providing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) of ballistic missile launches to US Northern Command. ITW/AA is the function that makes NORAD an aerospace defence command, rather than a mere air defence command. Though keeping NORAD as an aerospace defence command and retaining a Canadian role in ITW/AA are not essential to Canada’s security, they are, for all intents and purposes, costless to retain. Simply put, Canada has little to lose, and something to gain, by negotiating a formal role in BMD.275

International Stability

Canada does have an interest in international stability, but only an indirect one. Furthermore, the idea that prolonged military interventions by Western states actually improve international stability is questionable. Certainly, there have been cases in which such interventions have been successful. But there have been even more in which military intervention has led to no notable improvement, and others still in which it has made matters worse.276 For every Sierra Leone, there are Somalias and Iraqs. Moreover, the fact that interventions occasionally succeed in improving regional and international stability should not blind one to the fact they are costly, diverting funds from other projects, such as humanitarian and development assistance, that have more tangible benefits.

It is important to recognize the very circumscribed role that the Canadian military can play in preserving international stability and protecting the global trade flows. Both the major Asian powers and Western Europe are stable, and military power would be of no use in trying to contain financial crises in either region.277 Nor is it likely that Canada will play a significant part in a conventional land or air war in Asia or Western Europe in the conceivable future.278 Rather, what the Canadian military can contribute to global economic stability are forces that can assist the United States and other allies in commanding and securing the maritime commons (i.e. oceans, seas, and international waterways) that are used for
international shipping. Indeed, the United States Navy (USN) has recently asked allies to assist in the security of these maritime commons, since the USN feels that it must partner with allies to effectively accomplish this task. Insofar as global economic stability is an indirect interest, threats to the maritime commons are few, however, and Canada is only one of the United States’ many allies, so the Canadian military’s commitment to the command of the maritime commons need not be prohibitively burdensome.

Similarly, there is a role for the armed forces in terms of protecting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but it is once again a circumscribed one. Of all the roles that the CF can play in counter-proliferation, the navy’s is the most cost-efficient and effective. Moreover, this naval role has the added advantage of giving Canada a visible role in the campaign against terrorism. But whereas a naval contribution is valuable, developing an expeditionary land and air force for the purposes of counter-proliferation is not. As Betts notes:

Proliferation … cannot be solved through the deployment of large and expensive conventional forces. … the only sure military way to eliminate another state’s WMD program in their early stages is to invade that country and occupy it – a path that the debacle in Iraq makes highly unlikely to be followed anytime soon. In the end, the least unsatisfactory to use are diplomatic and economic ones: rewards for cooperation and sanctions for non-compliance.

Insofar as military intervention does help maintain international stability, the most successful type of operation in past decades has been traditional United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. The UN is plagued with inefficiencies and has failed dramatically on certain occasions, such as in Rwanda in 1994. But, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, it is the worst form of international governance except for all the others. An analysis of post-1945 military interventions by Mark Peceny and Jeffrey Pickering indicates clearly that UN-led interventions are far more likely to lead to political liberalization in the target state than those led by individual Western nations. While the latter sometimes succeed, more often they do not. UN failings in the Balkans and elsewhere notwithstanding, its overall record is better than that of nations operating outside of its mandate.

In addition, traditional post-conflict peacekeeping appears to be a more cost-effective way of improving international stability than the more violent forms of peace making and peace enforcement which Western states, including Canada, have adopted since the end of the Cold War. This is reflected in the final conclusions of the aforementioned Copenhagen
Consensus, in which post-conflict peacekeeping was the only security measured rated by the contributing economists as having a worthwhile cost-benefit ratio.282

In spite of the uneven success of American-led and NATO interventions, Canada nonetheless has an interest in contributing visible assets to at least some of these operations. Canada, after all, stands to lose its ‘seat at the table’ if it appears to be a blatantly lacklustre ally. Yet, if Canada is truly interested in promoting international stability, Ottawa is advised to re-examine its current aversion to UN peacekeeping operations.

**Influence**

It has been argued that Canada should contribute to American-led military operations in order to maintain favourable opinions of Canada in the United States and to maintain ‘a seat at the table’. Yet it must again be stressed that Canada gains little by going beyond the minimum required to get that seat. Joel Sokolsky comments that Canada’s traditional strategy has always been “to answer the question ‘how much is enough’ by spending just enough: just enough to keep the forces somewhat compatible with those of the Allies, just enough to reduce the need for an American presence in Canada, and just enough, as well, to secure the Canadian seat in Allied councils.”283 This is surely the correct strategy. Anything more than ‘just enough’ confronts a steeply diminishing law of returns in terms of Canada’s international ‘influence’, making ‘more than enough’ a poor investment.

One objection to this argument is that a ‘just enough’ strategy is a form of ‘free-riding’ – i.e. of taking advantage of the allied military strength without contributing one’s fair share. But while free-riding might be regarded as unethical – taking something for nothing – realism concerns itself not with ethics but with interests. If a realist policy is what is sought, then getting something for nothing is an attractive option. More importantly, if the ranking of defence spending in real dollars is used as the measure of an ally, Canada was never a free rider. As Sokolsky has argued, it is fairer to say that Canada was an ‘easy’ rider, an ally that did its part and did what was expected, but not much more.284 This approach to defence was realistic and reasonable given Canada’s standing as a secondary power and Ottawa’s other priorities and concerns.

The best argument against free-riding, or easy-riding, is a selfish one – nobody likes allies who consistently refuse to pay the bills; free-riding reduces one’s influence. If one wants influence, one must be prepared to
pay for it. However, the importance of influence is often overstated since there are rarely alternative grand strategies towards which Canada wishes to influence its allies. The idea that greater military expenditure will increase Canadian influence in allied, and especially American, councils is unproven. Superficially it rings true, but there is no solid evidence for it. There is, however, some evidence against the theory. Despite the CF’s notable role in Afghanistan, the Canadian government was unable in 2008 to convince larger NATO powers such as France and Germany to deploy 1000 additional soldiers to Kandahar province. In the end, France opted to deploy to Kabul, which allowed the United States to reinforce the Canadian contingent. This outcome was foreordained, since the United States preferred to send 1000 troops to Kandahar rather than having to replace the entire Canadian force of 2500 if Ottawa chose to withdraw the CF due to inadequate reinforcements. When asking members of NATO to send reinforcements to Kandahar, moreover, Ottawa was backed by Washington. Regardless of its commitment to Kandahar and in spite of the United States’ assistance, the Canadian government could not convince NATO members to reinforce the CF. Whatever else this signalled, it demonstrated that significant military commitments do not automatically, or perhaps meaningfully, boost Canada’s influence in allied circles.

Canada’s ability to influence the United States will stay weak, even if the CF were enlarged and took on evermore dangerous tasks. As Sokolsky notes, “Although contributions are welcomed, the United States will not adjust the conduct or objectives of a mission to accommodate the particular wishes of contributors.”285 Proof of this is seen in Britain’s failed attempts to shape American foreign policy since 2001. The military efforts of Tony Blair’s Britain do not appear to have brought the United Kingdom any meaningful influence on policies of the George W. Bush administration, except perhaps to encourage Bush to pursue policies he was already planning to implement. If Blair was popularly known as ‘Bush’s poodle’ it was not because he was noted for his influence on American decision-making.

This is not some transient phenomenon associated with the Bush administration. Rather it reflects deeply-held convictions among the American political elite and is unlikely to change in the immediate future, regardless of who wins the 2008 US presidential election. Thus Sokolsky is right to conclude that “It is not entirely self-evident that allocating more wealth to the Canadian Forces, especially for US-led multinational operations over-
seas, will give Ottawa the kind of standing and influence that many analysts are convinced should be the case.\textsuperscript{286}

Canadian history indicates that Canada can successfully opt out of its allies’ military entanglements with few direct consequences.\textsuperscript{287} Prime Minister Lester Pearson, for instance, refused to send forces to Vietnam.\textsuperscript{288} No harm came to Canada. Similarly, it is hard to see how Canada has suffered by staying out of Iraq. The Canada-United States relationship is remarkably resilient.

The United States does not expect Canada to make a major contribution to its military endeavours; having Canada take part in some way is sufficient. In some cases, moreover, a Canadian failure to take part has not, and will not, bring the dire consequences that the proponents of greater defence spending routinely predict. What is more, if Canada aims to increase its international influence, military power does not represent the optimal investment. In economic terms, the military is not an area in which Canada has a ‘competitive advantage’. Even if Canada spends the two percent of GDP demanded by many advocates, the country will still be a secondary power compared with the United States and even the United Kingdom and France. It is far better to invest additional resources in those categories of national power where Canada has traditionally excelled, such as economic power and diplomatic power.

National Pride and Honour

This leaves the suggestion that current defence expenditures are incompatible with national pride and honour. Honour, wrote Aristotle, “is the reward for virtue.”\textsuperscript{289} Courage and strength are virtues, and thus there is undoubtedly honour to be gained from displaying them. Military power and success on the battlefield do add to national pride and help in the process of nation building. However, courage and strength are not the only, or even the most important, virtues. There is honour to be won in displaying the virtues of charity, prudence, magnanimity, peacefulness, industriousness, and many others beside. There is no particular reason why national pride must be associated with military glory alone. It is perfectly possible to enhance it by undertaking non-military endeavours. One does not have to have a powerful military to be respected by others or to feel proud of oneself.
Values

We have already seen that the promotion of Canadian values is not a vital interest; nevertheless, if the interest can be furthered at small cost, then it may still be worth pursuing. Certainly, one can argue that having sufficient military power to prevent our way of life from being crushed by a hostile ideology, such as communism during the Cold War, is necessary. But this is essentially a passive role for military force; defending our way of life, not seeking actively to export it. Since, however, no hostile force currently possesses sufficient power to assault the said way of life existentially, the passive role is not relevant. If one is to make a link between defence spending and Canadian values, it surely involves the more active strategy of exporting democracy, human rights, and free market liberalism.

Unfortunately, there is no reason to suppose that greater defence spending does in general promote these values. This is not to deny that on occasion it can, particularly when local populations are open to democratic ideals. But occasional successes should not obscure the knowledge that democracy is unlikely to take deep root in traditional societies with long histories of ethnic strife. The United States’ poor track record of democracy-building in Iraq is a case in point.

Defence and promotion of Canadian values is often cited as a reason why Canada must stay in Afghanistan. We are told, for instance, that the Taliban denied basic human rights, especially to women. Fighting in Afghanistan allows us to provide education to girls who would otherwise never obtain it. This is true, but we must consider the opportunity costs. Aid and development can only be brought to combat zones if protected by a considerable military force. This means that for every dollar one spends on aid and development, one must spend several dollars on military power. This is the case in Afghanistan, where up to last September Canada had spent some $3.1 billion on the military mission (not including an extra $1.2 billion on leasing new tanks), but only $670 million on development. In short, one gets little ‘bang for the buck’ in development terms by choosing to focus one’s efforts on a war zone. If aiding others is the objective, one could do more good by spending the entire $3.7 billion on aid, without any military contribution, in an underdeveloped part of the world which is not plagued by war. To put it another way, if the intention is to put girls in school, that can be done far more effectively by spending money in, for instance, a relatively peaceful state in Africa where few girls currently go to school.
Put bluntly, when opportunity costs and cost-effectiveness are considered, military power turns out to be a poor way of promoting Canadian values.

**Expeditionary Missions and Capabilities**

Drawing from the preceding sections on international stability, honour, and values, we conclude that Canada should continue to deploy the CF on American-led, NATO, and UN expeditionary operations, but exercise more discrimination in choosing when to do so. Participating in these operations preserves Canada’s ‘seat at the table’ and can occasionally ensure that allied governments show a degree of consideration towards Canada’s interests and concerns. However, these expeditionary missions are of limited use in giving Canada actual influence over the policies and priorities of its principal allies. Though subtle, there is an important difference between having an ally consider one’s interests and having influence over one’s allies. Consideration means that allies will seek to accommodate one’s interests, as long as they do not directly conflict with their own. Influence, on the other hand, implies an ability to shape an ally’s policies and decisions. Indeed, a true sign of influence is the capacity to get allies to do something that, all things being equal, they would rather not do, or that they would not be doing anyway. Expeditionary military operations can encourage allies to be considerate towards Canada, but they have not tangibly lifted Ottawa’s influence. Devoting additional resources to expeditionary operations in the hope that they will grant Canada influence is thus wasteful. When deploying the CF overseas, Ottawa should aim to provide ‘just enough’ forces to encourage allies to show consideration towards Canada’s interests and concerns, but no more. Ottawa must also be careful not to overstretch the CF and to match means to ends.

To foster a consideration of Canada’s interests while also avoiding an overstretch of the military or a downgrading of Canadian homeland security, Ottawa should adopt the following criteria for expeditionary operations:

- First, Ottawa should only deploy forces that are not needed to enforce Canadian sovereignty and to provide sufficient aid to the civil authority/power. Protecting Canada and Canadians must be the CF’s real, rather than rhetorical, top priority.
- Second, Ottawa should deploy the CF selectively. In practice, this would mean not accepting more than one land force commitment,
one maritime force commitment, and one air force commitment at a time.

• Third, token contributions must be avoided. Ottawa must think strategically when deploying the CF, and limit itself to those deployments where Canada’s presence is visible and noteworthy, and thus likely to provide some strategic advantage.

• Fourth, Ottawa must avoid missions where success is unlikely. This includes missions where local or regional dynamics impede the attainment of objectives, missions where Canada’s larger partners are lacking in their commitment to the attainment of objectives, and missions whose objectives are grandiose, unattainable, or detached from realities on the ground.

• Fifth, Ottawa must avoid missions that involve long-term, open-ended commitments. Every CF deployment must have a firm end date, and the services should be prepared to take an operational pause if continuously deployed for more than three years.

• Sixth, in all cases, Ottawa must assess whether military intervention is the most efficient and cost-effective means of achieving an objective. If it is not, alternative forms of intervention should be considered.

• Seventh, Ottawa should be particularly wary of missions that might produce significant ‘blowback’ effects that threaten Canadian security.

• Eighth, DND’s capital expenditures should represent between 25-30% of the entire defence budget. Ottawa should avoid deploying the CF on any operation that threatens to reduce this percentage.

• Finally, expeditionary operations should only take place when they enjoy a clear popular mandate. National unity is a fundamental survival interest of the Canadian state. Special care should be taken to avoid military deployments which threaten it.

Alongside contributions to allied and UN operations, the CF should be prepared to undertake humanitarian assistance operations throughout the world. However, before Ottawa agrees to deploy the CF on such operations, the government must ensure that the commitment will not weaken Canadian homeland security. In addition, Ottawa must assess whether the military is the most efficient and cost-effective means of delivering humanitarian assistance in given cases. If international and non-governmental organizations can provide greater assistance for the same amount of money, Ottawa should fund them instead of deploying the CF.

The Canadian military should also take part in expeditionary missions and activities that safeguard Canada’s security and economic prosperity.
As noted in chapter 3, however, these types of missions and activities are few and specific. For instance, Canada should assist with the securing of the global maritime commons. Since threats to the maritime commons are relatively sparse, and do not for the most part involve other naval forces, the CF’s contribution does not need to be especially large or expensive.

With the findings of chapter 4-5 and these recommendations in mind, we can draw the following conclusions about the CF’s expeditionary capabilities:

- The CF should retain interoperable, combat capabilities in order to play a visible role on highly select and strictly time-bounded overseas operations. These operations should not be permitted to erode the capital equipment budget, overstretch the CF, or diminish the military’s ability to provide rapid and adequate aid to the civil power and authority within Canada.
- Given the acquisition of C-17s and plans to procure C-130Js, the Canadian air force is equipped – indeed over-equipped – to provide airlift for operations across Canada, North America, and the world. In terms of expeditionary air force capabilities, DND should proceed with the acquisition of medium-to-heavy lift helicopters. Since Canada’s allies are well-equipped to provide air support on coalition operations, the new fighter-interceptors acquired for the air force should be reserved for the defence of North America.
- The navy should proceed with the modernization of the Halifax-class frigates. New surface combatants to replace the destroyers should also be acquired. Rather than procuring three elaborate Joint Support Ships, DND should acquire two regular AORs to replace the navy’s existing replenishment ships.
- The army should delay the acquisition of new main battle tanks until a comprehensive, multinational review of their effectiveness during peace enforcement and counterinsurgency operations can be performed. Tanks leased for the current mission in Kandahar should be kept as part of an effort to assess their utility future operations. If the value of tanks is not proven, the army should reconsider the option of procuring the Mobile Gun System. Replacing the LAV IIIIs that have been run down by Kandahar deployment should be a priority for the army. Once the Kandahar mission is over, the army should have a two to three year operational pause. From 2014 on, the army should maintain an ability to deploy and rotate a contingent of 1000-2000 soldiers in a single theatre for a maximum of three years.
This approach to expeditionary capabilities and operations reflects the more stable and less threatening international security environment Canada currently enjoys. It also conforms with Canada’s standing as a secondary power of limited influence and importance. Such an expeditionary force structure would be sufficient to retain Canada’s seat at the table and to encourage allies to be considerate of Canadian interests. Most importantly, it would allow Canada to devote additional military resources to Canadian homeland security.
7. Conclusion

Realism served Canadian defence policy well throughout the Cold War. Its abandonment in recent years has done neither the country nor the CF any favours. Bringing realism back into the defence debate will enable Canadians to forge a more sensible defence policy that accurately meets their needs in what is, by historical standards, a benign international security environment.

Realism demands that defence policy be based on a thorough examination of national interests, and the threats to those interests, along with an awareness of which elements of national power are best suited to defending against those threats, as well of the opportunity costs created by use of military power. Following this logic, we have shown that some of Canada’s current defence policies are based on questionable assessments of Canada’s interests and of threats to those interests. The threats are minor and a more powerful military is not required to promote or protect Canadian interests. The idea that Canada spends too little on defence is not borne out by an evidence-based analysis of the issues. Spending more on defence is not an efficient means of providing an additional degree of protection to Canadian life, property and sovereignty, nor of enhancing international stability, Canada’s international influence, or Canadian values. Spending substantially more money on defence and on military solutions to problems detracts from other strategies and priorities, creating opportunity costs and cost-efficiency concerns which cannot be ignored.

This is not to say that Canada can dispense with the CF, but it does indicate that existing defence dollars can spent in a more efficient fashion. A defence budget at the current level of approximately $18 billion dollars (with adjustments for inflation) should be sufficient to fund the policies
and priorities listed in the previous chapter. While these policies envisage a larger role for the CF in Canadian homeland security, the cost of increasing the military’s involvement in this area would be offset by a reduction in the size, regularity, and duration of the armed forces’ expeditionary operations. Limiting the CF’s expeditionary operations would further allow between 25-30 percent of the defence budget to be devoted to capital expenditures. Were thirty percent of the defence budget devoted to capital expenditures, DND would have approximately $5 billion (with adjustments for inflation) a year to spend on equipment procurements and upgrades. This amount would be sufficient to afford the acquisitions recommended above. Keeping the CF at 65,000 regulars and 24,000 reservists would also prevent personnel costs from climbing too steeply.

An $18 billion defence budget is affordable. This amount would not be a drain on the economy, nor would it necessarily push the federal government to raise taxes during an economic downturn, or force Ottawa to post a budget deficit, or reverse existing plans to pay down the national debt. Of course, a defence budget of this size would still involve significant opportunity costs. But compared to the defence spending increases proposed by the CFDS (two-percent increases above inflation) and those demanded by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (military expenditures of two-percent of GDP, which would total upwards of $35 billion), the opportunity costs of an $18 billion defence budget would be reasonable. Indeed, a defence budget of $18 billion would leave the federal government with enough fiscal flexibility to invest in programs that could markedly improve the security of individual Canadians, such as nationwide transport infrastructure improvements, critical infrastructure protection, public safety and health, and emergency management. Alternatively, the money saved could be used to strengthen the Canadian economy and Canada’s productivity through greater investments in research and development, education, or larger personal and corporate tax reductions. Still another option would be to invest more in foreign aid. If Ottawa is concerned about relations with the United States and the openness of the Canada-United States border, more could be invested in border security, intelligence, and counterterrorism. Given the absence of a conventional military threat, the restricted contribution military strength can make towards addressing asymmetric threats, and the limits placed on the international influence of secondary powers such as Canada, the return on these alternative investments would likely be greater than spending more than $18 billion on defence.
A realist examination of Canada’s interests, and of the threats to those interests, as well of the instruments of national power best suited to defending the country against those threats, indicates that Canada can adequately secure its interests within current levels of defence spending. Doing so will allow the country to utilize resources to maximum benefit, avoiding unnecessary opportunity costs. Reaping this advantage, however, requires present and future governments to abandon unrealistic ambitious, and return to the realist roots which have served the country so well in the past.
Notes

9 A case in point is the Independent Report on Canada’s Future in Afghanistan. The Report did not factor into its recommendations any considerations of how much the CF mission in Kandahar is costing, how the operation is affecting CF recruitment and retention, or how the deployment is limiting the army’s ability to fulfill homeland defence roles, such as consequence management. See Canada, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Independent Report on Canada’s Future in Afghanistan (Ottawa, 2008).


15 ibid., chapter 9.

16 ibid., 174.


18 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 159.

19 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986), 266.

20 ibid., 264.


27 Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970 (St. Catherine’s: Vanwell, 2002), chapters 3-5.


It should be noted, however, that even at this time, the Canadian military felt shortchanged. Although the Canadian government opted to field significant forces, there was a degree of specialization imposed on the military and plans for total war mobilization were abandoned in favour of a ‘forces-in-being’ policy that relied on winning a short war with existing units. Although the decisions to specialize and rely on forces-in-being can be seen as another example of the unwillingness of Canadian governments to provide for an adequate defence, an alternative reading is that politicians understood that the military would never be satisfied with what it was given; there would always be demands for ever higher defence expenditures. Like the Eisenhower administration in the United States, the Canadian government understood that, if left unchecked, the military’s calls for additional forces could eventually overstretch and bankrupt even a highly prosperous economy.


Norrie and Owram, *Canadian Economy*, 569-572.

Granatstein, *Who Killed*, xvii. Granatstein argues that “No prime minister, not one since Louis St. Laurent left office in 1957, has cared about the Canadian Forces or understood the role military can play in bolstering our foreign policy and in protecting Canada’s sovereignty and its people.”


Norrie and Owram, *Canadian Economy*, 569-572.

ibid., 586-594.


ibid.


47 See Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Canada’s Cold War Nuclear Experience,” in David G. Haglund, ed. Pondering NATO’s Nuclear Options (Kingston: Queen’s Quarterly, 1999).


49 On the contrary, when the ICBM became the nuclear delivery vehicle of choice in the mid to late 1960s, both Canada and the United States seized the opportunity to reduce the number of fighter-interceptors they deployed in fulfillment of their NORAD roles. The increasing importance of ICBMs helped validate a reduced air force commitment to the defence of North America.


53 For a thorough critique of Trudeau’s defence policies, see Sean M. Maloney, “The Roots of Soft Power: The Trudeau Government, De-NATOization and Denuclearization,” Martello Papers No. 27 (Kingston: Queen’s Centre for International Relations, 2005).

54 Granatstein, Who Killed, 99, 124.


56 ibid; Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson, Canada’s International Policies, 135-139.

57 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: 1971).


59 ibid. 37-38.


61 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Decision and Determinants, 38-39.


63 Norrie and Owram, Canadian Economy, 602-604.

64 Middlemiss and Sokolsky, Decisions and Determinants, 39-41.


67 Norrie and Owram, Canadian Economy, 603.

68 ibid.

69 Granatstein, Who Killed, 123.

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74 Tomlin, Hillmer, Hampson, *Canada’s International Policies*, 139-143.


76 Tomlin, Hillmer, Hampson, *Canada’s International Policies*, 143.


79 ibid., 109.


81 A good indicator of Mulroney’s relations with George H.W. Bush is the number of times, and the contexts in which, the Canadian prime minister is mentioned in the President’s memoirs. See, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998).

82 Those unfamiliar with the story should see Granatstein, *Who Killed*, chapter 6; Douglas L. Bland, ed. *Canada Without Armed Forces?* (Kingston: Queen’s School of Policy Studies, 2004).

83 Tomlin, Hillmer, Hampson, *Canada’s International Policies*, 144-150.


85 Tomlin, Hillmer, Hampson, *Canada’s International Policies*, 149.


87 For details about the CF’s involvement in containing Iraq, see Sean M. Maloney, “War with Iraq: Canada’s Strategy in the Persian Gulf,” *Martello Paper No. 24* (Kingston: Queen’s Center for International Relations, 2002).


89 For a complete and detailed list of the CF’s post-Cold War operations, see Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Kingston: Queen’s School of Policy Studies, 2004), 225-272.


As will be argued in the last chapter, once the 2005 *Defence Policy Statement* was released, the commitment to a more reasonable operational tempo was abandoned, resulting in yet another episode of CF overstretch that continues to this day.

94 For a critical assessment of the military’s ability to cope with the constraints of the 1990s, see Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Stability: Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 131-146.
95 See, for instance, Conference of Defence Associations, A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations, 2002).
96 Hillmer and Granatstein, For Better or For Worse, 312-313.
97 ibid., 309-310.
98 ibid., 312.
100 Roy Rempel, Dreamland: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy has Undermined Sovereignty (Kingston: Queen’s School of Policy Studies, 2006), 125-131.
105 Pugliese, “Navy risks running aground.”
106 Broadcast anchor Don Newman asked raised this point during the 25 April 2008 edition of his show Politics on CBC.
107 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy: Long-term funding framework.
108 Pugliese, “Navy risks running aground.”
109 For a sample of these views, see J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Back: The Speech from the Throne, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, October 2007; Bruce Campion-Smith and Les Whittington, “Hillier ushered in a new style of candour,” Toronto Star, 16 April 2008; Rosie DiManno, “’The end of the beginning’ for Hillier,” Toronto Star, 16 April 2008; Chantal Hébert, “Hillier the driving force on policy,” Toronto Star, 16 April 2008; Don Martin, “Hillier is just one of the boys now,” Ottawa Citizen, 16 April 2008.
110 To understand what occurred, consider this simply analogy: suppose Bob has a cost of living of $1000 per month, but he only makes $900. Bob thus has a shortfall of $100. One day, however, Bob gets a $100 raise. If he kept his current lifestyle, he would come out even. Yet Bob instead chooses to use the money to improve his lifestyle by spending an additional $100 on goods and services. This raises Bob’s cost of living to $1100, leaving him with a $100 shortfall once again.
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112 Canada, Department of National Defence, Backgrounder: The Maritime Helicopter Project, 23 November 2004; available at http://www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1414

113 Canada, Department of National Defence, “Canada First” Defence Strategy: Reference Table for Project Costs and Procurement, 29 June 2006; available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/first/BG_06_014_table_e.html

114 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Newsletter: August 2007; available at http://www.dnd.ca/site/minister/newsletter/2007-08/index_e.asp

115 DND, “Canada First” Defence Strategy: Reference Table for Project Costs and Procurement.

116 ibid.

117 Canada, Department of National Defence, Backgrounder: Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, 10 July 2007; available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2370


119 DND, “Canada First” Defence Strategy: Reference Table for Project Costs and Procurement.

120 ibid.

121 Alan S. Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement (Kingston: Queen’s School of Policy Studies, 2006), 2.

122 ibid.


124 General Hillier, in fact, said the main battle tanks were a millstone around the CF’s neck.


126 ibid., 38.


129 ibid., iv.

130 This point was also raised by Senator Kenny. See, Colin Kenny, “Our Military Badly Needs Repair,” Globe and Mail, 10 June 2008.


132 Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief of Review Services, Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine (Ottawa: March 2007), 27.


140 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy: Long-term funding framework.
142 See for instance, Roy Rempel, Dreamland, 6.
145 Rempel, Dreamland, 68; Granatstein, Whose War Is It?, 92; J.L. Granatstein, Who Killed, 197.
146 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil: The Need to Upgrade Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change, October 2006, 7.
149 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept, 27.
150 ibid., 172-173.
151 Granatstein, Who Killed, 2.
152 ibid., 3.
153 ibid.,188.
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162 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil, 23.


166 Project Ploughshares, “Increased Security Spending Doesn’t Mean Increased Defence Spending,” Ploughshares Briefing 02.6.


168 ibid.

169 Rempel, Dreamland, 158.


173 J.L. Granatstein, cited ibid., 34.


178 Rempel, Dreamland, 37-43.

179 Michael Ignatieff, cited in Granatstein, Who Killed the Canadian Military?, 179.


182 Granatstein, Whose War Is It?, 182.


185 Canadian support for the Afghan mission has declined steadily since the CF deployed to Kandahar. This decline in support has occurred across the country, not merely in Quebec. By January 2008, support for the mission had fallen to 39 percent. For details, see Strategic Counsel, Economy, Leader Positives/Negatives, Afghanistan, Carbon Tax (14 January 2008), 22.

186 See, for instance, Rempel, Dreamland, 23 and 34.

187 Granatstein, Whose War Is It?, 16.

188 ibid. 48.


191 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil, 12.

192 For typical comments to this effect, see Granatstein, Smith and Stairs, A Threatened Future, 2.


194 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil, 5.


198 Marshall and Goldstone, Global Report, Figure 2, 4.


200 The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, Figure 1.11; available at http://www.humansecurityreport.info/.

201 The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, Figure 1.5.

202 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil, 19.

203 For details of Russia’s claims in the Arctic Ocean, as submitted to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as well as the responses of the UN Commission and other interested nations, see: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm

204 If the attack were nuclear, the United States and other NATO allies would be obliged to respond under article 5 of the NATO treaty.

205 In 2006, out of a worldwide total of US$1,297 billion, NATO countries spent US$804 billion on defence, compared with US$15 billion spent by the ‘rogue states’ of Iran,
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210 Granatstein, Whose War Is It?, 102.


214 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2008), Figure 1, 12.


216 Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Threat Overview: Islamist Extremism within Canada (Ottawa), 5, excerpted in Stewart Bell, “They’re Young, They’re Angry and They’re Canadian,” National Post, 30 January 2008.


221 The data on this subject is usefully summarized in The Human Security Report, part 1, 42-4.


225 Macleod, “The Warning Lights.”

226 Granatstein, Smith and Stairs, A Threatened Future, 8.

227 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil, 18.


The United States largest effort in this area has been the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. For details about the Program and its successes, access http://lugar senate.gov/nunnlugart/


ibid., 42-3.


Sokolsky, “Realism Canadian Style,” 10.


Canadian Cabinet ministers acknowledge this thickened and have criticized their American counterparts for it. See, for example, “Border issues a ‘two-headed monster’: Prentice,” *Reuters*, 7 May 2008.


This attitude is well illustrated by the title of the Fraser Institute’s 2007 report on the Canadian health care system, Fraser Institute, *Paying More: Getting Less*: Brett Skinner


253 ibid.


258 ibid.


266 Granatstein, *Whose War Is It?*, 195.


269 The figure of $5 billion represents the ‘incremental’ cost of the war, in other words “the cost which is over and above the amount that would have been spent for personnel and equipment if they had not been deployed on the task.” Mike Blanchfield, “Afghan War Costs $1 Billion Per Year,” *Winnipeg Free Press*, 21 April 2008.


272 Sokolsky, “Realism Canadian Style,” 37.


274 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Managing Turmoil, 89.

275 For a summary of this argument, see Philippe Lagassé, “La participation si nécessaire, mais pas forcément une participation: Le Canada et la défense contre les missiles,” in André Donneur, ed. Le Canada, les États-Unis et le monde: La marge de manœuvre canadienne (Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2005)

276 This is clearly illustrated in tables drawn up by Mark Peceny and Jeffrey Pickering showing the effect of military intervention on political liberalization in target states: Mark Peceny and Jeffrey Pickering, “Can Liberal Intervention Build Liberal Democracy?,” in T. David Mason and James D. Meernik eds. Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies (London: Routledge, 2006), 130-148.

277 While China may pose a military threat to the Asian status quo, given the devastating effect a (perhaps nuclear) war between China and the United States or China and Japan would have on the global economy, Canada should help to defuse tensions between capitalist states and the world’s last communist great power, rather than fuel these tensions by contemplating a military preparations to the hypothetical Chinese threat.

278 Even if a major war were to break out in Western Europe or Asia, the existence of massive nuclear arsenals in both continents would likely ensure that the war would be over before Canada could intervene in any meaningful fashion.


281 Peceny and Pickering, “Can Liberal Intervention Build Liberal Democracy?”


285 ibid.

286 ibid., 20.

287 Bow, “Rethinking ‘Retaliation’ in Canada-US Relations.”

288 For a discussion of these and other examples, see Robert Bothwell, “Afghanistan if Necessary, but not Necessarily Afghanistan,” Globe and Mail, 16 February 2008.


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