The Roots of Soft Power
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The Trudeau Government, De-NATOization, and Denuclearization, 1967-1970

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Kingston, Ontario, Canada
2005

(Martello papers)

ISBN 1-55339-083-0


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Nothing in the world, particularly in politics, is more dangerous than to confuse the small with the great, to be led by the former, and so neglect to put our trust in greatness. It is for this reason that the spirit of reaction has acquired more weight than it would deserve on rational grounds. The arguments presented for and against our new military institutions grasp at so many details, left and right, back and forth, without a firm starting point or a clear conclusion, that no one can reach a final decision. This suits the purpose of the opposition....

Clausewitz, *Historical and Political Writings*
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Sean Maloney is in the tradition of military historians who pore over the documentary record to correct what they see as perverse and pervasive myths, and to reveal the ancient antecedents of what are often declaimed as innovative ideas. In this paper he takes us back to the late 1960s and early 1970s — the transition from the Pearson to the Trudeau era — to probe the government’s debates and decisions over defence policy.

Early in the paper he reminds us of the direct connection between Canada’s considerable military commitment to European and North American defence in the early post-war years, and its standing among the powers of the day. Canada was not neutral, and it had nuclear weapons. Part of the payoff from that posture came in the currency of what is now described as “soft power”. His depiction of the Pearson government has an eerie familiarity — a minority in Parliament, an agenda driven by domestic priorities including social programmes and anxieties over Quebec, and a resultant urge to divert resources from Canada’s military. Here he detects the beginning of the decline of Canada’s international presence.

At the core of the analysis, however, is the vigorous debate within the new Trudeau government over Canada’s membership of NATO and its implications for the role and profile of the armed forces. This was a period of unsettling change in the alliance: France had distanced itself, the new doctrine of flexible response had been introduced, and the Harmel exercise was trying to adjust NATO to the emerging era of détente. Cabinet documents reveal a government in which a determined minority of ministers — encouraged by a prime minister keen on debate if not necessarily set on change — dismissed NATO membership as anachronistic and military modernization as provocative. The issues were fought out through a
succession of in-house policy reviews. As Maloney sees it, while the critics lost that battle, their ideas survived and, energized by the end of the Cold War and the promise of a peace dividend, morphed into the soft-power doctrine of the late 1990s.

We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the QCIR or any of its supporting agencies.

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July 2005
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The public announcement of a new Canadian national security policy by the Martin government in the spring of 2005 is a significant move away from the dangerous and ineffective ‘soft power’ policies of the 1990s. Implicit in the new policy documents is the understanding that Canadian global influence has waned and that the role of military power in the calculus of that influence is a critical factor in the projection of Canadian interests. In many ways, the new policy is a refutation of ‘soft power’ as championed by former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and those in the bureaucracy and academic communities who supported him. Indeed, the Axworthy ‘soft power’ doctrine of the 1990s questioned the utility of military power in general and Canadian military power specifically, particularly outside of the UN context. Implicit in the ‘soft power’ argument was that Canada had little or no military power, nor should it. Attempts to retroactively recast Axworthian foreign policy concepts to portray them as less anti-military, after the successful employment of Canadian combat forces in and over Kosovo in 1999-2000 and particularly after operations in Afghanistan, have already started.

Though there was a significant draw-down of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, the dramatic de-emphasis of Canadian military power as a policy tool actually started under the Trudeau government, though it had as its underpinnings Pearson-era national security policies in which an alternative force structure designed for Third World intervention was proposed but not funded. The first moves, once the Trudeau government took power in 1968, were to distance Canada from NATO, and then remove Canada’s nuclear weapons capability. The emphasis on the Third Option in Canadian foreign policy after 1972 to distance Canada from the United States, plus dramatically-reduced funding for the remaining conventional Canadian Forces in the 1970s, built on these decisions.

Taken together, these were the distant foundations of ‘soft power’ in the 1990s. ‘Soft power’ in the Axworthian sense was a policy for a militarily weakened Canada operating in a utopian UN-centric world. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Trudeau-era tampering with a painstakingly-constructed national security structure
dramatically weakened Canadian power in almost all of its forms and sought to propel Canada into the “non-aligned” camp during the Cold War.

There is much we can learn from Canada’s participation in the Cold War, a period when Canada made significant contributions to the security of the West and wielded unprecedented influence. What do Canadians think of when asked about the Cold War? Most believe the Cold War was something that occurred a long time ago, that it had little impact on Canada or its history. Some even believe that Canada was neutral during the 1945 to 1990 period. This is not surprising given the Canadian cultural elite’s tendency to downplay involvement, particularly when it involves Canada’s nuclear capability.

Fifty-four years ago, the Canadian government sent a Canadian Army formation to serve with NATO’s Integrated Force, a commitment which lasted for forty-two years. 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, its successors and other military commitments from the Royal Canadian Air Force (1 Air Division with Canadian-built fighters) and the Royal Canadian Navy (with Canadian-built destroyers) served as a bulwark against political and economic intimidation, and nuclear annihilation. These forces, which were equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons, also provided the basis for unparalleled Canadian global power which, after its decline in 1970, we have been unable to regain. Comparing the 1950s to the 1990s is a revealing exercise.

During the Cold War, Canada took the lead in brokering solutions to global nuclear crises with our effective and esteemed diplomatic corps. The best known was the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Canada worked closely with the United States to prevent the escalation of the Israeli-Anglo-French invasion of Egypt into nuclear war. Lesser known was the 1961 Berlin Crisis: Canadian diplomats, with other allies, convinced the Kennedy administration to pull back from forcing NATO to accept a series of dangerous options which could have initiated a nuclear exchange over the divided city. In 1964 Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom operating as a team successfully prevented NATO from collapsing over Greek and Turkish violence on the island of Cyprus, a base critical to deterring Soviet moves in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

We received a large measure of security by keeping NATO strong and got the Auto Pact as part of the bargain: even Lester B. Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize was acquired through the universal respect for Canadian military capabilities, particularly those nurtured within the NATO alliance. UNEF and the means to deploy it would not have existed without our deep involvement in NATO operations and strategy. In the 1950s we could maintain peace in an area as complex as the Middle East with the Canadian-led and manned UNTSO and UNEF peacekeeping missions. Canada did not have to rely on other countries to deliver her forces to crisis areas: we now use contracted Russian aircraft and Norwegian ships. In what major international crisis have our diplomats taken the lead lately? Why is there any surprise when the Americans are intransigent over softwood lumber negotiations and fishing rights after Canada’s senior national security policy personnel
advocated obstructionism in NATO’s evolving strategy, declined to participate effectively in the Gulf War, and precipitously withdrew our forces and bases from Germany in the 1990s? Influence is built on a solid foundation and over time.

In the 1950s Canadian military leaders were globally respected and wielded significant influence, particularly General Charles Foulkes in NATO circles, Air Marshal Roy Slemon at NORAD, and General E.L.M. ‘Tommy’ Burns in the UN peacekeeping and disarmament fields. The fumblings over the 1996 Zaire mission and the Somalia affair demonstrate that Canada’s military leadership is not as universally respected as it once was. These three men took the lead in formulating and influencing alliance strategy and they used Canada’s significant military contributions as their entryway into those corridors of power. The fact that their efforts were coordinated with those of Canada’s professional diplomatic corps, specifically Lester B. Pearson, Robert Ford (Ambassador to the Soviet Union), John Holmes (head of External’s UN Division) and others in an effort to protect Canadian global interests speaks volumes about the sophisticated outlook and calculated response Canada had during a time of maximum danger. In contrast, infighting between Foreign Affairs and National Defence was so acute that a similar effort could not be sustained throughout the stabilization campaign period of the 1990s. This produced several incoherent and dangerous military deployments with dubious benefits to Canadians, specifically Somalia, Zaire, East Timor and the Central African Republic.

After the Second World War we had an advanced aerospace industry that designed, built, and sold F-86 Sabre jet fighter aircraft to practically every member of NATO, with the resultant economic benefits for Canadians. There is simply no comparison today: commuter jets and propeller aircraft for use in the bush are not instruments of influence. The CF-105 Avro Arrow affair has even assumed mythic proportions in Canadian history, though many are unaware of the Cold War context in which the programme was conceived. Canada wanted to defend herself against a very real nuclear threat, while at the same time bringing something effective to the table so that Canadian sovereignty in the continental defence partnership would be protected.

How did we do it in the 1950s and 1960s? One significant factor was that Canadian military forces were forward deployed, and respected by our allies and our enemies. The Soviets believed our 5000-man brigade group was as effective as a 20 000-man armoured division, particularly when it was equipped with nuclear weapons. They even mounted a special espionage campaign to keep track of the RCAF’s CF-104 nuclear strike force since it was equipped with megaton-yield nuclear bombs and provided 20-23 percent of NATO’s strike capability in the Central Region. These forces, along with the other NATO allies, deterred the imposition of totalitarianism on the newly freed Western Europe by a violent rogue state led and inspired by psychotics like Joseph Stalin and Lavrenti Beria. A French study released in 2000 indicated that Soviet leaders were responsible for the killing of some 20 million people, almost twice as many as the Nazis
killed during the Holocaust. These men and their successors were in charge of the largest army in the world which was equipped with the full range of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Canada could not just sit back and let others carry the burden, particularly not after losing thousands of men in the fight against Nazi totalitarianism less then ten years before.

Compared to the 12,000 Canadians stationed in West Germany and France from 1951 to 1970, Canada had, in the 1990s, problems sustaining 1200 men in the Balkans. Our troops in Rwanda and Croatia were taken hostage in Bosnia. None of the adversaries in these conflicts was armed with anything larger than T-72 tanks or AK-47 assault rifles.

During the early part of the Cold War, Canada’s military forces were at the cutting edge of doctrinal and technological capabilities. In those days, the cutting edge meant having access to nuclear weapons and the means to use them in the event of war in conjunction with conventional forces. Nuclear weapons were the currency necessary to wield influence at that time. In one case, declassified American records demonstrate that Canadian diplomats and military personnel were able to force the Kennedy Administration away from a dangerous sequence of events during the 1961 Berlin Crisis, events which could have resulted in nuclear war. We were only able to do so based on the leverage provided by Canada’s significant and salient military contributions to NATO and NORAD. Iceland, Norway, or Switzerland could not have built a ‘coalition of the willing’ during that dangerous period.

With our squadrons of CF-101 Voodoo interceptors equipped with MB-1 Genie nuclear rockets and the controversial BOMARC anti-bomber cruise missile, Canadian sovereignty was assured. We could destroy a Soviet bomber attack and at the same time not turn over control of our airspace to American fighters. NORAD was a truly cooperative effort, but based on salient Canadian military forces as much as geography. Air Marshal Roy Slemon was the only non-American to be able to command and control American nuclear forces and even release nuclear weapons in an emergency without direct verbal instructions from the American President.

At sea, the Royal Canadian Navy’s St Laurent-class destroyers and the RCAF’s Canadian-built Argus maritime patrol aircraft ensured that Soviet missile launching submarines operating near North America were tracked and targeted for destruction with nuclear anti-submarine weapons if the situation escalated. In a reversal of roles, studies have emerged which indicate that nuclear-capable RCN and RCAF forces even protected Boston and New York City from the Soviet submarine force at the height of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, since the bulk of American naval forces were conducting the blockade around Cuba and thus unavailable. The basis of Canadian military power was a strong, relevant, and capable armed forces. Nuclear weapons, in those days, were one of the key elements of Canadian power because the strategic situation of the day demanded them. Having these weapons gave Canada saliency within NATO and NORAD while at the
same time made the Canadian forces capable in the face of a significant threat to the Canadian homeland.

The decline of Canadian power was not initiated during the 1990s, though those supporting ‘soft power’ contributed to its acceleration. The Trudeau leadership style coupled with an arrogant dismissal of the existing Canadian national security establishment on the part of some of his advisors produced ‘rust out’ in the Canadian Armed Forces in the 1970s and the relegation of its obsolescent and severely-cut force structure to missions that were not salient in NATO, NORAD, or UN contexts, roles like supporting Katimivik, conducting fisheries patrols and counting caribou in the Arctic. The removal of Canada’s nuclear capability amplified the loss of influence in the alliances that counted Canada as a member. When the alliance strategies moved away from a nuclear emphasis, the new currency in an era of Flexible Response consisted of improved and expanded conventional forces equipped with precision guided weapons, a force structure the Trudeau government was unwilling to fund. Canada’s descent into irrelevancy continued.
2. The Pearson Government and the Americans

The changes in Canada’s nuclear force structure implemented by the Trudeau government and the debate over Canada’s future in NATO were in part the product of a perceived growing anti-American attitude in Canada in addition to the groundwork laid by the Pearson government in 1963. Two of the Pearson government’s priorities in 1963 were to restore confidence between Canada and the United States, restore confidence between Canada and NATO, and to undermine growing Quebec nationalism to ensure national unity, and preserve the survival of Canada as a nation. Accepting nuclear weapons into Canada’s force structure, an event delayed by the prevarication of the Diefenbaker government and a cabal inside External Affairs, contributed to restoring confidence in bilateral and NATO circles by 1964. Despite Finance Minister Walter Gordon’s economic nationalism, Canada-US relations improved under Pearson and Kennedy. After Kennedy’s assassination, however, they took a downturn. Lyndon Johnson’s growing involvement with the crisis in Vietnam and Pearson’s response to it produced new problems.

Leftist Quebecois, taking the Algerian experience as inspiration, launched a multi-faceted propaganda campaign to supplement their active terrorist campaign. Couched in Marxist rhetoric, the basic elements of the campaign portrayed Pearson and the Anglophone establishment as the colonial masters of Quebec who must be overthrown both because they contributed to the repression of the Quebecois and of “progressives” in South East Asia. Canadian leftist academics, both francophone and anglophone, were also against the war for a myriad of other reasons. Over time, the leftist academics and the Quebecois social revolutionaries set their sights on the most visible symbols of what they argued was American dominance: NORAD and NATO. This dialogue resulted in intense questioning about Canadian independence and objectives. In addition, the rapid expansion of television in the United States and Canada swamped Canadians with an excessive
amount of American popular culture, which Canada was unable to match in quantity or replace with quality. There was a subsequent increase in Canadian nationalism in Anglophone Canada, both in response to American culture and against Quebec nationalism. This in turn prompted growing doubts regarding Canada’s place in the world.8

In addition to the rise in anti-Americanism, there was a perceptible rise in anti-European sentiment in Canada in 1967 during Centennial Year festivities in Montreal. During a state visit, French President Charles de Gaulle uttered the infamous words Vive le Quebec libre! from a balcony above a cheering and fervently nationalist crowd. After being rebuked by the Prime Minister, de Gaulle cut short his trip and returned to France. Coupled with the French withdrawal from NATO integrated command and the removal of NATO headquarters to Belgium, this did not endear Canadians to the idea of continuing to spend resources defending Europe.

The Pearson government was a minority government and was thus weak. It could only move legislation forward with the assistance of three smaller parties: the New Democratic Party (NDP), Social Credit, and the Creditistes (a Quebec-based party). These three parties were hostile to Canada’s NATO commitments, were anti-nuclear, and “believed in emphasis on the protection of Canada, and maintenance of a light mobile force which was suitable for peacekeeping.”9

In the summer of 1967, Pearson recalled the former Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson (who was ill at this time) and asked him to undertake a foreign and defence policy review. These moves were prompted by Pearson’s belief that he was targeted by the academic community for his Vietnam policy. There is also the possibility that the NATO Harmel Report influenced Pearson’s’ decision (The Harmel Report will be addressed later).10 There was more anti-Americanism on Walter Gordon’s part in Cabinet, while Paul Martin wanted to get more involved in a mediatory role in South East Asia. Norman Robertson was a supposedly neutral player, and he undertook the review. Assisted by Geoffrey Murray and Geoffrey Pearson (Mike Pearson’s son) both from External Affairs, he produced a rough draft in October 1967. The final version was made available in March 1968, just before Pearson stood down. This document concurred with Martin’s view, which included continued involvement in Vietnam and maintaining effective Canadian contributions in NATO and NORAD. NATO was singled out for its impressive deterrent value and for how the Canadian contribution permitted influence with the Americans on other matters.11

Pearson was already contemplating eventual denuclearization and had expressed doubts to Paul Hellyer about Canada’s continuing military role in NATO by this time. The death of a thousand cuts started in early 1968. It included the removal of two Honest John launchers from Europe and the disbanding of two of the CF-104 strike squadrons, with further plans to eliminate the nuclear strike role by the mid-1970s.12
3. The Debilitating Effects of Unification

Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer re-engineered the Canadian defence establishment in 1964, in what became generally known as ‘unification’. The three traditional services were replaced with functional groupings which reported to a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), who at that time was General Air Marshal Frank Miller. Unification produced long-term disarray, which ultimately affected the military’s ability to respond when confronted by the anti-nuclear challenges of the Trudeau government in 1968-70.

The long-term effects and implications of unification were hotly and publicly debated between 1965 and 1967. There was, in fact, a great deal of uncertainty as to what unification consisted of. Hellyer’s conception of unification, however, evolved over time. He wanted to effect savings by integrating command and service functions (for example, eliminate the need for three different service chaplains, logistics systems, medical support) and merging three service headquarters into one. He then favoured the creation of joint commands which would wear one uniform and have one rank and pay structure. Pilots, for example, would not command infantry companies in this scheme, as some pundits alleged would happen.13

There was no clarity in Hellyer’s vision at this time except to Hellyer himself. He was not candid with the Chiefs about all aspects of his concept because, he rightly perceived, there would be opposition to it. By engaging in a questionable modus operandi to get integration and then unification implemented, he inadvertently confused the issue. Since unification was an evolutionary process (it was not anticipated that it would be complete until 1970), only part of it was implemented in 1964. There were several joint operational commands and no more services, but there was nothing to replace the intricate intelligence, administrative and planning mechanisms in Ottawa. A Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) existed, but it had major teething troubles inherent to any new organization. Who
was responsible for what and to whom? It would take almost six years to sort these problems out.

In 1965 problems with implementing the next phases of unification generated an intense public debate. Up to this point, the three services generally perceived unification to be a jointness project. The Army was “in favour and very enthusiastic;” the RCAF was “neutral with a ‘give it a go’ approach”; and the Navy was “sceptical to anti.”14 All three services made plans to survive the outright elimination of the services. For example, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff Planning and Coordinating Staff were manned by many former Army Headquarters staff officers and organizationally bore a remarkable likeness to a stripped headquarters. The Navy maintained “an ad hoc naval board”, while Air Marshal Annis took it upon himself to act as “an unofficial channel for any personal difficulties” that former RCAF leaders still serving in the system could turn to.15

These efforts were not covert enough, and Hellyer made every effort to stamp them out. Some senior Army men (Lieutenant-Generals F.J. Fleury, Robert Moncel, and J.P.E. Bernachetz) were prematurely retired, as was CDS Frank Miller, who Hellyer “firmly believed ...was the leader in not wanting to unify the services and that Moncel, Dyer and Fleury were willing collaborationists.”16 Miller retired because he “exhausted his rapport with Mr. Hellyer, and oft times referred to his Machiavellian tactics.”17 An observer noted that “if Moncel had been CDS, there never would have been unification.”18 Navy personnel were, however, the most reluctant to go along with the new programme.

Hellyer forcibly retired Vice Admiral Jeffry Brock in November 1964. Next, Commander of Maritime Command Rear Admiral William Landymore informed Hellyer in June and July 1966 that unification would irreparably damage Navy morale and that Navy personnel did not accept unification as a policy. He was invited to resign, which he did. The Deputy Command of Maritime Command, Rear Admiral Stirling, retired the same day. Admirals Dyer and R.P. Welland eventually prematurely retired. The media had a field day and dubbed it “the Revolt of the Admirals,” which was disingenuous at best. This was “not a co-ordinated or planned revolt in the classic sense, but just an exaggerated eye catching description of individual retirements of navy officers.”19

It certainly had the appearance of a purge even if it was not one. The Pearson government was taken somewhat aback since “As far as they were concerned the integration/unification issue was just a reorganization affecting another government department and they were content to leave the solution to its minister.”20 Essentially, the message that filtered down within the Canadian Armed Forces was that careers were finished if members disagreed with Hellyer’s concept. An atmosphere of fear enveloped CFHQ, and many senior officers developed survivalist mentalities. The priority was to protect one’s career first; all else was of secondary consideration.

The man selected to lead the Canadian Armed Forces through this wilderness was General Jean Victor Allard, in his incarnations as Vice Chief of the General
Staff and Commander of Mobile Command. Allard was: “more of a natural and courageous leader of men in the field (awarded three DSOs in World War II), and as an effective morale builder, rather than as a staff officer. Prone to be volatile, flexible and an “idea man”, possessing much charm, oft-times in a mercurial way, he therefore required strong staff and managerial support.”

Allard claims in his autobiography that Hellyer approached him in May 1966 and told him that the Prime Minister said that Hellyer could appoint him as CDS. Allard noted that he was the logical choice since he was the senior general in the Army and had wartime experience.

Allard, a francophone from Quebec, told Hellyer that he would take the job conditionally. If the government supported the bilingualization of the Canadian Armed Forces, the creation of so-called French Language Units, and he was allowed to initiate affirmative action for francophone officers in the organization, he would do it. This fitted with the Pearson government’s policy on strengthening the place of Quebec within Confederation, and Allard was subsequently approved as Canada’s second CDS later that year when Frank Miller retired.

Allard busied himself in 1966 and 1967 defining the role of the CDS; obtaining absolute control over the former three services by crafting new legislation; constructing new forces; reorganizing the logistics system, and “ensuring Canadian control over the administration of all our troops.” In his view, he had to deal with the details of the new construction first before dealing with strategic policy formulation “to support the still uncertain policy goals of the Canadian Government.” While Allard was preoccupied with these activities, two items crept by without any professional uniformed opposition.

First, Hellyer issued what he called Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) in November 1966. In it, he asserted that:

for us to base our required capabilities on the determination of the threat, and the consequent strategic position flowing from the threat, was open to question as far as Canada was concerned....the current threat and the logical strategic concept flowing from this threat really had no bearing on what in the final analysis the Government decided to spend on defence resources. The Government spends what, in their political judgment; they think is a fair share of our resources towards a collective defence arrangement.

In 1966 the Pearson government altered spending from a “need-based approach to a formula approach.” Basically, low “pre-determined percentage increases” in certain areas, most notably capital equipment acquisition, could not keep pace with monies spent in other areas (pay, operations and maintenance), to the point where operations and maintenance dominated the defence budget, and capital acquisitions dropped off dramatically. With a declining defence budget, a proper balance was not identified and struck between the two, which resulted in a game of catch-up.

The second event, which related to the DPG, was the 1967 reduction of the defence budget by 15 percent. This presumably reflected Walter Gordon’s
perspective on defence spending. It also was generated by the Pearson government’s exponential expansion of social programmes; for example, federally funded medical care replaced provincial and privately run medical plans. In 1950 the Canadian government spent $1 billion on health and welfare. By 1968 it was spending $9 billion in equivalent dollars. One analyst noted that “the Federal authorities set up new programs without any rational assessment of their costs or controllability.” This would eventually exacerbate the defence budget situation under the Trudeau government.

The implications of the DPG and the budget cuts were staggering. Canada was now to re-construct her defence forces without reference to the existing threat and without reference to the agreed alliance strategic concept designed to counter it. Canadian national security policy was now to be driven solely by how much money was allocated to the defence budget by the government, without professional input from the uniformed military leadership.

Rather than confront Hellyer and Pearson, Allard and his staff explored what cuts could be made. The options boiled down to the elimination of specific commitments or across-the-board cuts to everything. The first option included scrapping all of the nuclear-capable CF-104 and CF-101B aircraft, and withdrawing 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group from West Germany. The second option was chosen, since it “could be done in such a way that it would minimize the problem and be more acceptable publicly.” In other words, there was a fear that the Canadian public would react negatively toward a government policy which would involve withdrawal of Canadian forces stationed with NATO in Europe. This indicated that the Canadian public was not as anti-Europe as alleged.

Pearson then appointed Leo Cadieux as Minister of National Defence in September 1967 (Hellyer become Minister of Transport). Hellyer had threatened to resign from Cabinet several times over the past three years if he was not permitted to implement unification. It is possible that Pearson was tired of the negative media attention directed at National Defence and was tired of Hellyer’s behaviour. There were other pressing matters relating to national unity. This could account for the move. Hellyer claims that it was “just another service posting” to him.

Hellyer’s departure left a situation in which “Allard was the unchallenged centre of decision making in the Canadian Forces and his staff, CFHQ, was the centre for military decision making within DND.” Another observer noted that Cadieux was a fortunate choice because of his “calm approach and unassuming ways of getting things done with the most likable sense of humour....in spite of his gentle and unassuming manner, he could certainly stand up and fight for anything he thought was right.”

The slashing of the defence budget, however, placed a large number of restrictions on what Allard could actually accomplish. By the end of 1967, the Canadian Armed Forces were already well on the way to being cut out of the Canadian national security policymaking process, and there was nothing that could be done about it once Trudeau took control.
4. NATO Strategy Changes

The Canadian national security policy process was undergoing a crisis. At the same time, however, NATO was in upheaval. NATO was in the midst of dealing with the problems imposed by de Gaulle’s intransigence. The French challenged American dominance within NATO, were reacting against what they saw as second class treatment after the Skybolt affair (where it was made clear that the United Kingdom received preferential treatment in nuclear matters from the Americans), and were opposed to Flexible Response as a NATO strategy. The French wanted exclusive control over their own nuclear deterrent, and some believed that de Gaulle wanted the ability to “pioneer” some form of detente with the Soviet Union. In 1966 the French finally withdrew from the NATO integrated military structure. NATO HQ and SHAPE moved to Belgium. In addition, there was serious concern among the European NATO members that accepting a new strategy based on the principles of Flexible Response was designed by the Americans to decouple themselves from European defence.

There were three developments during this time which in some way affected Canadian national security policy. The first was the Harmel Report. The ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 stimulated some thought that a new détente might result. In 1966 Canada pressed for a study on the future status and roles of the alliance. This appears to have resulted from Pearson’s long-standing belief that non-military cooperation within NATO should be a foundation of the relationship. This push in part contributed to Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel volunteering (ostensibly) to assess this and other impacts on the future of NATO. Work started in January 1967. The real aim of the exercise, however, was to ensure continued French participation in the political machinery of NATO. In December 1967, NATO approved the Harmel Report. The report recommended that there be greater consultation amongst NATO members, that some means be discovered to protect NATO interests in the Mediterranean basin and other flank areas against Soviet proxy encroachment, and that NATO members develop proposals to reduce East-West tension.
The second development was related to the first. NATO members clamoured for more input into the nuclear aspects of NATO defence. Formal discussions were initiated in 1965. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed that working groups be established to facilitate nuclear information flow and confidence building among the NATO members prior to the establishment of a formal body that would carry out this function on a permanent basis.\textsuperscript{36} There were three working groups: nuclear planning, communications, and data exchange. The nuclear planning working group consisted of the UK, the US, West Germany, and Italy. Canada lobbied for a slot but was not able to acquire one. Canada was, however, represented on the other two working groups as a compromise. The reasons for and effects of this are unknown.\textsuperscript{37}

By 1967, NATO formed the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC). The NDAC consisted of all NATO members save Luxembourg, Iceland, and France. The NPG had four permanent members (US, UK, Italy, West Germany) plus three rotating members exclusive of France or Iceland.\textsuperscript{38} The NPG met twice yearly and consisted of the NATO defence ministers. Canada wanted to be a permanent member of the NPG but accepted a rotational position in return for first-time NPG membership. Again, the reasons are unknown.\textsuperscript{39}

The broad purpose of these bodies was to allow “candid” discussion of nuclear strategy and to convince the European NATO members of the American nuclear guarantee. It revolved around fair and open discussion to help policymakers understand the detailed complexities of nuclear war planning.\textsuperscript{40} The NPG’s objective was to “devise nuclear employment guidelines in a manner acceptable to all NATO members.”\textsuperscript{41} The first topics discussed were defensive tactical nuclear weapons use, political consultation on use, and the employment guidelines for atomic demolition munitions: When and how should NATO use nuclear weapons, and what purpose did nuclear weapons use serve? How much was enough? This debate continued from 1968 until December 1970, when all of the guidelines were approved.\textsuperscript{42}

The NPG was an important development. As Paul Buteux notes, it “marked a turning point in the politics of alliance nuclear policy making.”\textsuperscript{43} The NPG satisfied the search for alliance control over nuclear weapons use. The German ownership question which had caused a wide variety of problems was now irrelevant. Ownership had been exchanged for consultation on use. Buteux also notes, however, that national nuclear deterrents not committed to NATO are not under NATO control. The question which was not raised at this time was whether the NPG constituted real control or just the appearance of alliance control. At the least it now provided NATO European members with the ability to directly examine and question any proposed American strategic concept and related nuclear weapons use policy that might affect NATO.\textsuperscript{44}

The third development was MC 14/3, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” commonly known as
Flexible Response. This was the replacement for MC 14/2 (revised) that had been so long in arriving. Patch-up arrangements established by earlier SACEURs Norstad and Lemnitzer, like the 1962 Athens Guidelines and elements of the de-funct MC 100/1 strategy, were no longer necessary. MC 14/3 was, however, a compromise document.

The NATO Defence Planning Committee had accepted the strategic concept on 12 December 1967. The NATO Military Committee formally approved MC 14/3 on 16 January 1968 though they informally accepted it as early as 12 September 1967, in the waning days of the Pearson government. Note that MC 14/3 continued on as NATO’s strategy until 1993, and even now forms the basis of the current strategic concept MC 400.

MC 14/3 recognized that the Soviets were responding to NATO security initiatives but that they still had not “renounced the extension of Communist influence throughout the world.” They would still use all means, economic, political, propaganda, subversion, and even military, to achieve their aims and to gain an advantage over the West.

MC 14/3 postulated eight means by which the Soviets might initiate actions against NATO:

1) Major nuclear aggression to destroy NATO military potential along with attacks against industry and population.
2) Major conventional aggression supported with chemical and tactical nuclear weapons versus ACE and adjacent sea areas.
3) Major aggression against some NATO land regions without chemical or nuclear support.
4) Nuclear or conventional operations against NATO SLOC’s and naval forces.
5) Limited and confined aggression against a single NATO country.
6) Harassment on approaches to or attack against West Berlin.
7) Covert actions, incursions or infiltrations in the NATO area.
8) Politico-military pressures and threats against NATO members (individual or group) involving ultimatums, military demonstrations, deployment of forces, mobilization or related incidents.

NATO therefore had to have the ability to repel any one or any combination of these threats. Notably:

So long as the forces committed to NATO and the external nuclear forces supporting NATO are able to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will deliberately initiate a general war or any other aggression in the NATO area that involves a clear risk of escalation to nuclear war.

Though MC 14/3 did not fully discount the possibility of massive surprise attack, NATO planners clearly thought that the most probable situation would be one of a period of tension prior to aggression, perhaps “weeks if not months.”
Consequently, NATO should: “[make] ready and [deploy] reinforcements thus enabling the maximum use to be made of any period of forewarning to demonstrate the cohesion and determination of the Alliance and enhance the credibility of its deterrent posture.” In other words, formations like ACE Mobile Force (Land), ACE Mobile Force (Air) and the naval equivalent, Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), all of which Canada contributed to, were critical signalling devices in the context of the strategic concept.

To counter the enemy, MC 14/3 identified three types of defence that NATO would engage in: Direct Defence, Deliberate Escalation, and General Nuclear Response. Direct Defence was based on the principle that the enemy had to be denied what he wanted: NATO territory. The enemy also had to be defeated at whatever level of warfare he chose to engage in. This necessitated forces in being and pre-planned and selective nuclear weapons use. Direct Defence also included forward defence of the NATO area.

Deliberate Escalation was in principle to halt aggression by “deliberately raising, but where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat, making the cost and the risk disproportionate to the aggressors’ objectives and the threat of progressive nuclear response more imminent.” This could include, for example, using mid-intensity conventional response to local low intensity aggression. It could include the use of defensive nuclear weapons like ADMs, or even the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons. It could also include “selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets”, or “selective nuclear strikes against other suitable military targets.”

As for General Nuclear Response, this was the massive use of nuclear weapons against military and urban-industrial targets. There were no caveats placed on what circumstances would trigger its use, but the drafters of MC 14/3 indicated that it was “the ultimate deterrent and, if used, the ultimate military response.”

Regarding force structure, NATO commands were expected to possess forces which could function “with a full spectrum of capabilities.” The first type, strategic forces, had to be able to survive a first strike with enough force to “inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society.” In a departure from earlier concept, MC 14/3 noted that “there appears to be no way to prevent similar damage to the West from an all-out nuclear attack, risks are a necessary corollary of a policy founded on deterrence.”

MC 14/3 also incorporated and improved upon the Athens nuclear use guidelines. If there was an “unmistakable attack with nuclear weapons,” NATO should respond “on a scale appropriate to the circumstances.” If there was a major conventional attack, NATO forces should “respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances.” If a smaller scale of conventional aggression occurred in which “the integrity of the forces and the territory attacked” was threatened, the decision to use nuclear weapons would rest with the NAC. In the first case, there would be no time for consultation while in the second case there would be.
In summary, the new NATO strategy differed significantly from earlier NATO strategies. Flexible Response assumed that there would be a lead-up period of tension and even escalation prior to the onset of major conventional and nuclear war. NATO therefore had to have a force structure that could respond to any contingency including limited acts of aggression without immediately resorting to nuclear weapons use. There was, however, sufficient ambiguity in the document to allow broad interpretations. It was this ambiguity which added to the deterrent aspects of Flexible Response as a strategy.

It appears as though Canada was not involved in the process which produced MC 14/3 to the extent that she had been involved in substantially influencing and then implementing NATO strategy from 1954 to 1961. There are a number of possibilities as to why this may be the case.

It was not a question of being excluded from that process. Canada had every right to participate in it given the nature and extent of her military contribution and her past history of constructive criticism. If we take the Harmel Report, NPG, and MC 14/3 as three processes designed to solve the NATO crisis, it appears that Canadian diplomats threw their weight behind the Harmel Report as the solution. As Helga Haftendorf notes in her study, the Harmel Report was less important in the long run in solving NATO problems than MC 14/3 and the creation of the NPG.55 If this is the case, therefore, Canada selected the wrong venue and passed up opportunities to influence the new NATO strategic concept.

The turmoil within the Canadian defence establishment may also have prevented a full examination and then exposition of MC 14/3’s implications for Canadian national security policy to External Affairs and Cabinet. As we have seen, the entire structure was turned upside down and shaken up under Hellyer. The military leadership was in survival mode and not inclined to be outward or forward looking. This does not mean that MC 14/3 as a strategic concept was misunderstood by Canada’s military leadership. The 1964 White Paper was in part based on flexible response concepts which were for all intents and purposes MC 14/3’s predecessor concepts. This was understood and subscribed to by the Canadian military establishment. In 1966, however, Hellyer told Canada’s military leadership that Canada was no longer going to base her force structure and strategy on an alliance strategic concept. The amount of money provided to the armed forces was to be the driving force for future force structure.

The creation of the NPG, however, was important to Canada in the long term, since it allowed NATO members without nuclear weapons to observe and perhaps even influence the political guidelines provided to NATO commanders relating to nuclear use. Canada, in theory, did not now need nuclear forces to influence alliance strategy. There is, however, no evidence in the written record demonstrating that Canadian national security policymakers under Pearson or Trudeau made this connection and acted on it when the decision to denuclearize was taken later in the decade.
Ultimately, the Pearson government sacrificed Canada’s ability and willingness to exert influence in NATO by not being intimately involved in the formulation of MC 14/3. This was a serious departure from previous successful times in which she had in the 1940s and 1950s. When the Trudeau government seriously questioned Canada’s continued participation in NATO, the first argument that would be deployed against the commitment was a perceived lack of Canadian influence.
General Allard, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), was sceptical about keeping nuclear weapons in the force structure, as he thought the most likely type of conflict that would be fought in the nuclear age was a low intensity conflict in the Third World. Allard also believed, however, that “abandoning our nuclear role was sheer hypocrisy...we would leave the dirty job to the others, thus playing the role of Pontius Pilate.” In retrospect he claimed some degree of influence with Trudeau, but it was not as much as he wanted. He felt constrained by shifting domestic political opinion as expressed in the media and within the Trudeau government.

Consequently, Allard thought the first battle was to explain why the military existed before getting into specifics of strategy and influence:

Will social security always be pursued at the expense of the Forces? This is difficult to say. Here we may find ourselves defending two fronts. On the one front the outright Marxist, the slogan producers and violence-mongers; and on the other, the do-gooder socialists (with a small “s”) who will act more for political opportunities than for the good of the people at large. The instability they create will continue to breed doubts in the minds of the unadvised public and create a monumental challenge to us and our supporters.

The CDS had initiated a defence policy study, presumably in response to the Robertson Report, in March 1968, probably because he foresaw a growing need for it. Upon taking over the defence portfolio, Leo Cadieux endorsed the continuing study, which was completed in May 1968. He then sent a synopsis to Trudeau. The document produced, “Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces”, was passed on to Cabinet via the PMO and PCO.

The study clearly reflected many of Allard’s personal views on Canadian defence. A cognizant document, “Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces” explained
the matter of influence in explicit terms and how it related to Canadian forces stationed in Europe as part of NATO, and in North America as part of NORAD. Canadian influence was significant, the report noted, “only if exaggerated expectations are avoided.”60 Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD allowed Canada to express her views in European and North American defence. Participation counterbalanced the American preponderance of power in the creation of strategic policy, though the ultimate objective of the policy was security. Canada needed forces to participate in collective security, forces to deal with internal unrest, and forces to handle any contingency outside of these two areas.61

As for nuclear weapons, they would continue to be part of the European deterrent. Canada’s continued contribution in this area “depends principally on whether there are alternative ways in which Canada could make an effective contribution.” Notably, the study concluded that the Air Division’s apparent vulnerability to a missile strike “could in itself be de-stabilizing in a crisis, since it provides both sides with a strong incentive to strike first.”62 On the other hand, Canada’s nuclear forces gave Canada an increased voice in agencies like the NPG, and “there is no basis for claiming that Canada would somehow be better off if it dissociated itself from the decisions” made in the NPG, the NAC, or other forums.63

Withdrawal from Europe was not a good idea. “Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces” cited the “Multiplier Effect”, that is, if Canada pulled troops out of NATO, other nations might too. Canadian forces made a significant contribution to the direct defence of NATO. If they were removed there might be psychological effects on the alliance which could not be measured or anticipated.64

Cadieux, however, “was unable to give it his blessing as by then he knew that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet wished to have an entire review made of Canada’s Foreign and Defence policy....”65 In May 1968, “the Prime Minister encouraged the Cabinet”66 to call for a major defence and foreign policy review.

By July 1968 Cabinet (that is, Trudeau) rejected the defence paper as unsatisfactory, since it was “a restatement of current policy”67 which represented “the detested status quo.”68 If that was not enough, Donald Macdonald, the 36-year old President of Trudeau’s PCO expressed outrage that the drafters of the review had not considered the possibility of neutrality for Canada and urged his colleagues to withdraw all Canadian forces from Europe. How could Canada improve its relations with Czechoslovakia if ... [Canada] had aircraft in Germany ready to bomb Prague?

Allard was directed to incorporate the implications of a neutralist policy. He then concluded that such a move would double the defence budget. The CDS had a suspicion that the “Prime Minister was strongly in favour of [neutrality].”69 A new review was now needed because the professionals had presented their case and it did not jibe with the vision as it existed within the PCO/PMO and Trudeau’s mind. At the same time, Cabinet instructed Cadieux to “maintain [the Canadian Forces] until 1969-70, at the lowest financial level consistent with Canadian obli-
gations to NATO, NORAD and UN Peacekeeping, such level to be determined jointly by ...[DND] and the Treasury Board. This decision was taken without any professional military input. This was the second time in two years that this had happened to the Canadian Armed Forces. Cabinet also explored, on its own, possible gradual reductions to 4 Brigade and 1 Air Division.

The Trudeau Government’s reluctance to spend money on defence was in many ways related to the perceived need to make good on the Pearson government’s commitments to the Canadian people regarding social programmes administered and paid for by the federal government. This decision was driven primarily by domestic political factors, as Trudeau did not want to be seen by the electorate to be reneging on a previous Liberal government commitment with a resultant loss of political power. There is also an argument to be made, however, that these social programmes served a national security purpose by buying off the more moderate separatists or uncommitted Quebecois, strengthening the links between that province and the central government, and preventing a slide into revolution. Until better information becomes available, this argument must remain conjectural.

On 20 August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces brutally crushed the moderate Czech government with a multi-national coup de main which included East German and Polish troops. As Soviet tanks drove over wounded civilians in the streets of Prague, NATO forces were not officially alerted. SACEUR, General Lyman Lemnitzer, did, however, implement some low-level preparatory measures as the Soviets reinforced their East Germany-based forces with units brought in from the USSR.

Ottawa’s response to the Czech crisis was coloured by Cabinet’s plan to present NATO with reductions in Canadian Europe-based forces during the upcoming fall NATO meeting. Cabinet discussions on 28 August 1968 reflected more of a concern about prestige than about an appropriate NATO response to the crisis. If Canada announced cuts in the fall NATO meeting after this violent display of Soviet aggression, Canada’s image would be damaged. Therefore, some Cabinet members attempted to assert, with convoluted logic, that Canadian forces could now be reduced, since “the Soviet Bloc had become weaker” as a result of the Czech action. These people also asserted that the Soviet build up was merely for the purpose of keeping the Czechs “sealed” within their own country and posed no danger to NATO. Others believed that Berlin might be threatened next, however, if the Americans responded unilaterally. Ultimately, Trudeau instructed Cabinet members not to mention what were now “possible” cuts to Canada’s NATO forces in any forum, especially the media. The Americans were preparing a strong diplomatic statement and Canada would sit back and observe before making any moves.

NATO’s assessment of the threat posed by the Czech Crisis was initially dire. The situation was “unstable” and could “lead to upheavals and violence which, should it spread to East Germany, could be very dangerous.” SHAPE was particularly concerned about “the forward deployment of Soviet forces in a high state of
military and logistics readiness [which] combined with the unstable situation in
Eastern Europe has significantly increased the risk of incidents involving the con-
frontation of forces that could lead to hostilities.”75 The Soviets threatened the
West Germans in propaganda forums as well as militarily: six or seven additional
Soviet divisions were moved into East Germany to complement the existing 20
Soviet and 10 East German divisions. Intelligence reports also indicated that So-
viet troops based in Hungary were moving towards Yugoslavia.76

Canada’s response, according to Cabinet, should not contribute to “playing
into the hands” of the hardliners in the Warsaw Pact. This view took the line that
liberalization was occurring within the Eastern Bloc and, despite the actions in
Czechoslovakia, this liberalization might continue. If Canada and NATO rein-
forced to protect themselves, this would in some Cabinet members’ view give the
hardliners an excuse to crack down in other Eastern European countries. There-
fore, the logic went, Canadian cuts actually could contribute to stability. Secretary
of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp pointed out, however, that “to do
nothing because the Government could not come to a decision about the level [of]
Canadian military participation in NATO was to take a position which was diffi-
cult to defend.”77

By October NATO authorities re-assessed the situation and concluded that there
would probably be no “premeditated attack” on NATO, but the danger posed by
“the possibility of a spill over of internal unrest in Warsaw Pact countries into
Western Europe, resulting in limited hostilities involving NATO forces; and sec-
ondarily from the possibility of a miscalculation by the Russians an applying
against Berlin possible new pressure....”78 Cadieux then asked General Allard to
see what Canadian military moves could be made over the next year “to strengthen
Canada’s contribution” to maintaining security in Europe. This was in response
to a request from SACEUR, General Lyman Lemnitzer. The conclusions were
then passed on to Cabinet first. General Lemnitzer had specifically asked for “ad-
titional conventional ground and air forces to strengthen his capacity to control
hostilities without resort to the use of nuclear weapons.”79 Immediate response
measures that could be taken included beefing up 4 Canadian Mechanized Bri-
gade Group with an additional armoured regiment and an extra infantry battalion,
which would give the Brigade a total of six manoeuvre battalions instead of four.
The second measure would be to delay the planned drawdown of 1 Air Division,
a drawdown which would reduce it from 108 to 88 aircraft.80

What about Canada-based forces committed to NATO? Allard recognized that
“There was no way in which Canada could honour the balance of an infantry
division,” which was the original land force commitment to NATO dating back to
1951. There was no strategic sealift, and the formation had not trained as an entity
for at least five years. The militia was incapable of mobilizing, since it had no
combat equipment and was still situated in the National Survival role. As for
Hellyer’s vaunted CF-5 conventional fighter force designed to replace the nuclear
CF-104 aircraft, it would not be ready until 1970. In other words, the only possible
support that could be provided to NATO in an emergency were three brigade
groups from Mobile Command in Canada, but there was no way to transport them
to Europe rapidly.81

The Czech Crisis highlighted all of the problems endemic to Canadian na-
tional security policy formulation since 1964. Canada’s policy emphasized the
ability to operate in both nuclear and non-nuclear environments. Execution of
that policy dictated certain requirements which could not be fulfilled, since both
the Pearson and Trudeau governments declined to spend the necessary funds to
provide Canada with the requisite capability. Canada could participate in deter-
rming a nuclear war, could fight a short-term conventional or nuclear ground war in
Europe, could rebuild in the aftermath of a nuclear war, and could conduct small-
scale Cold War conventional peripheral operations in extremely low intensity
environments to reduce tension.

Canada could not, however, respond to a potential protracted conventional war
or respond to a crisis in which large-scale conventional forces could contribute to
deterrence. By not remaining au fait with NATO’s strategic policy, by not seri-
ously contributing to alliance policy formulation in 1967, and by not altering her
force structure accordingly, Canada could not respond effectively to a crisis in-
volving her closest allies. Rather than assessing the national security problem in
these terms and dealing with it properly, the Trudeau government was even more
inclined to extract itself from NATO altogether.

Another problem in Cabinet that prevented an adequate Canadian response to
the Czech Crisis was the belief, (appeared to have been generated by Postmaster
General Eric Kierans) that a prompt increase in Canadian conventional forces in
Europe would deleteriously affect the upcoming defence review, a process in which
Kierans and others hoped Canada would withdraw from NATO altogether. Even
the Prime Minister echoed this sentiment in one Cabinet meeting.82

The discussion at the beginning of November then drifted into how symbolic
1 Air Division’s CF-104s were. There was a planned reduction from 108 to 88
aircraft on the table (this was related to the across the board defence budget cuts
discussed earlier). Kierans amazingly thought it would be a provocative “escala-
tion” to retain the 20 aircraft. Cadieux favoured retaining 108 aircraft. Hellyer,
who was Minister of Transport, stated that the CF-104 force was “redundant”
since their targets overlapped with other allied nuclear forces. The aircraft were
“for show” and “consideration needed to be given to phasing in a conventional
response....”83

When NATO convened for a special ministerial meeting late in November,
Cadieux and Sharp told NATO that Canada would retain 108 aircraft in 1 Air
Division for one year, while Canada underwent a defence and foreign policy re-
view. Cadieux reported to Cabinet that “there had been considerable confusion
and disquiet concerning the Canadian position. On the one hand there was an
impression that Canada might intend to withdraw from NATO; on the other that
Canada might be prepared to undertake new commitments.”84
The Canadian media and the Opposition in the House of Commons interpreted the situation in the worst possible light: that the Trudeau government was actively contemplating withdrawal from Europe, from NATO, or both. Mitchell Sharp was on record stating that Canada had not made up her mind but in his view it “was doubtful that a policy of isolation would serve Canada’s national interests.”

Allard and Cadieux produced a new version of the rejected 1968 defence policy review. The new version expressly addressed the implications of ‘non-alignment’, that is, neutrality. Called the “Defence Policy Review” (DPR), it was released to Cabinet in February 1969 and was intended to be read in addition to the report of the Special Task Force on Europe (STAFFEUR) which will be discussed next.

Future Canadian defence policy, the DPR study advised, could follow either a “non-aligned” or an “aligned” path. No matter what path Canadian policy took, the nation would exist in a world which was dominated by stable mutual deterrence between the superpowers. The strategic implications of non-alignment were clear in this situation:

No power which had not decided to take the supreme risk of launching a surprise nuclear attack on the USA could afford to let Canada remain as a safe haven for the US population and as a reserve of power, food, and resources for use in re-building US strength. Canada’s exposure to nuclear attack is not a consequence of its alignment with the USA; if an intercontinental nuclear war broke out between the USA and USSR, Canada’s non-alignment would be irrelevant to the combatants...

The military implications of non-alignment were detrimental to Canadian security. If Canada did not defend Canadian territory, the Americans would. If Canada chose to defend Canada with modern weapons all by herself, it would be an extremely expensive proposition, “because no major power would be prepared to furnish its advanced military technology to a non-aligned country.” Furthermore, “existing sources of defence information would be drastically curtailed. It is also likely that many of the sources of non-military science and technological information (apart from the open literature) would dry up.”

The political implications were not good. Non-alignment “would not assist in solving any of the basic economic, social, or cultural problems posed for the Canadian way of life by the USA and, indeed, would be more likely to exacerbate them.” Consequently, “the American public would therefore be inclined to view Canada as a free-loading satellite, meriting treatment as such....Defence of Canadian democratic institution and beliefs would become more complicated....”

If Canada withdrew from NATO, economic and political relations between Canada and the individual countries might also be affected. Additionally,

Canada would no longer be participating in the formulation of Western policies on such matters as European security and disarmament, and that Western governments would regard Canada as essentially an outsider which no longer saw political interests in common with them....Soviet-bloc governments would welcome Canadian non-alignment as a propaganda defeat for the United States and would treat Canada henceforth with increased cordiality.
This in turn would lead to an increase in Soviet subversion since the fear of backlash from the United States and other allies would not exist.

If Canada chose to go it alone, her force structure would have to dramatically increase if Canada were to provide surveillance for Canadian territory and protect her sovereign interests. At a minimum, the Army would have to double, as would the numbers of long range maritime patrol aircraft (from 40 to 80). Ten interceptor squadrons totalling 200 aircraft would be needed, that is, triple the existing CF-101 force, equipped with a non-existent aircraft that Canada would have to design and build. At sea, at least nine nuclear-powered attack submarines would be required in addition to 30-40 surface ships which would include at least two ASW aircraft carriers/assault ships. There would be huge costs associated with acquiring the technological base to build twin-engine interceptor aircraft and nuclear submarines.92

Most importantly, these numbers were predicated on the assumption that the forces would be equipped with nuclear weapons “to significantly increase the capability.”93 Though strategic nuclear weapons were out of the question, From a purely military standpoint, defensive nuclear weapons for the air and maritime forces would be most cost-effective, and would enhance considerably the credibility of Canada’s defence. Whether the forces should possess these weapons, however, would be primarily a political decision and would involve the denunciation of the non-proliferation treaty and a very expensive nuclear weapons production program.94

Without nuclear weapons, the size of the forces might be even greater still. Anything less than these minimum numbers and capabilities would not guarantee Canadian sovereignty.

The Defence Policy Review did not merely explore the non-aligned option: it also presented a number of aligned options. Canada could participate in North American defence; in the defence of Western Europe; or “cooperate in the defence of one or more states in other areas (the Western Pacific, Far East, the Caribbean, or Latin America)” or a combination of these options.95

There was “no compelling reason” for Canada to involve herself militarily outside of Europe and North America, as “there are few military measures which Canada could usefully take... which would contribute to the prevention of general war originating in these areas.”96 North America had to be defended in any case. UN peacekeeping operations had “an uncertain future.”97 Therefore, the only area outside North America in which Canada could have any effect and influence was Western Europe:

Canadian participation in NATO can make a distinct contribution to the prevention of nuclear war, but how much cannot be said with any certainty. Its ultimate significance can be judged only against the background of Canada’s vital interest in the avoidance of war...In the event of Canadian withdrawal, Canada would no longer have the opportunity to bring to bear its views and influence on the formulation and implementation of Western security policy; doubts would be created about the long
term solidarity of the Alliance; and NATO’s ability to implement its strategy of flexible response would be diminished....Canada would be opting out of a joint endeavour aimed at keeping the peace in favour of obtaining a security by reliance of the good will of its friends and in default of making any contribution to theirs.\(^98\)

Like the earlier “Rationale” paper, the Defence Policy Review also explored the MC 14/3 strategy, why it was important, and why balanced forces deployed in Europe contributed to Canadian objectives in NATO. As for Europe-based forces, Canada’s objectives can be most fully and effectively achieved if its military cooperation in NATO consists principally of Canadian forces stationed in Europe. There are both political and military reasons for this. Politically, identifiable Canadian Forces physically present [in Europe] are the most tangible and, from the European point of view, most acceptable evidence of Canadian [involvement]. Military forces already on the ground...carrying out training on and over the ground where they would be expected to fight, are far more likely to respond quickly and effectively to military contingencies and forces requiring to be deployed from across the Atlantic; moreover, the dispatch of forces from Canada at the onset of the crisis might in some circumstances serve to exacerbate the crisis [emphasis mine].\(^99\)

As for North American defence, the Review explained future technologies and the rationale for continued participation in the air defence system. New technologies, including Over The Horizon (OTH) radar and Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) radar aircraft, would reduce the manpower and cost requirements for air defence since these systems would be more effective and replace the DEW and other radar lines. The Americans were footing the bill for the ABM system and were considering closing down the BOMARC sites. More emphasis was being placed on space surveillance systems by the Americans. If Canada did not remain part of the air defence system, she would not have access to this information.\(^100\)

The air defence system would be more cost-effective and would be more tailored to the realities of the ICBM age:

One of the objectives of improving the anti-bomber defence is to discourage the Soviets from building a new generation of bombers, and thus sending the bomber/anti-bomber contest into a new round of expensive escalation. In the face of the heavy threat from Soviet ICBM’s, the anti-bomber defence does not claim an important degree of damage limitation.

Naval forces were multi-purpose and thus critical to the conduct of national security policy. There was no conflict between SACLANT and Canadian maritime force commanders as both wanted Canadian forces to operate in the Western Atlantic against Soviet submarines.\(^101\)

If the Trudeau government chose to retain Canadian forces in NATO in the 1970s, there were several options. Air forces could include missile contributions to the NATO air defence system (considered unrewarding by the DPR writers); air superiority and ground support with a common aircraft type; or transport support. A nuclear capability was not discussed in the document.\(^102\)
As for ground forces, the existing commitment consisted of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in West Germany, and another brigade group (lightly equipped and theoretically air-portable) committed to AMF(L) on the northern and southern flanks. The options here revolved around how much of the forces should be kept in Canada and deployed to Europe in an emergency, and to what extent 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group should become an air-portable or air-mobile formation. Nuclear capability for the two brigades was not discussed. The Defence Policy Review was passed on to Cabinet.

Another product of Trudeau’s insistence that defence and foreign policy be reviewed was the Special Task Force on Europe or STAFFEUR, which was formed under the auspices of External Affairs. STAFFEUR in part consisted of Paul Tremblay (Ambassador to Belgium), Robert Ford (Ambassador to the Soviet Union), Lieutenant General W.A.B. Anderson, and Brigadier General Henri Tellier. The STAFFEUR report, delivered in January 1969, was a massive document. It moved from the general to the specific and included all aspects of Canada’s relationship to Europe. The STAFFEUR report cogently assessed Canada’s options. Some aspects warrant detailed analysis here so that readers can see what arguments the Trudeau men either retained and claimed as their own or rejected with cavalier disregard.

STAFFEUR defined five Canadian foreign policy objectives, which were in some ways similar to those objectives established by Pearson during the St Laurent government in 1948. The first was security. Canada had to have the ability to contain conflicts which might lead to global war. This included the need to protect the American deterrent, maintenance of stability in Europe, peacekeeping operations, and non-military initiatives like arms control. The second was national unity. Canada had to block unilateral Quebec links to emergent francophone nations and prevent French interference in Canadian affairs. At the same time, Canada had to promote the bilingual nature of Canada at home and abroad.

The third objective was national identity. Canada had to counteract American cultural influence without resorting to blatant anti-Americanism, which would “be unacceptable to the Canadian people.” As for economic interests, the objective was to promote economic prosperity by generating an improved world-wide economic environment. This could best be done by improving the Third World with aid and then profiting from the improved cooperation. Finally, there was the objective of world order, defined as a “free, stable, independent society based on the rule of law,” boosted by collective security.

STAFFEUR attacked the two most popular publicly-discussed foreign policy alternatives to the status quo: the Third World Option and the Non-Aligned Option. The latter option was based on neutralism advocate James Minifie’s provocative 1960 book Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey, while the former arose in the press and within academia in the early 1960s with the emergence of the decolonizing Third World on the international scene and in UN forums.

The STAFFEUR group recognized that there was a rise in anti-European sentiment in Canada. They ascribed it to four reasons. First, some Canadians wanted
to do something new and dynamic, to break from the status quo merely for the sake of doing so. Second, some people “associated [Europe] with power politics and immoral aspects of international affairs.” Third, still others had the impression that Europeans were not interested in Canada, while fourth, there was more interest in the Third World.\textsuperscript{109}

The report admitted that Canada could bring some degree of prosperity to the Third World and that there were opportunities for influence and prestige “that would be flattering to the Canadian psyche.”\textsuperscript{110} There were limits, though. For example, “The idea that instability in the Third World represents a threat to Canadian security comparable to the situation in Europe is...highly questionable.” In addition, “The Third World has very little to contribute to or do with the fabric of Canadian life in terms of either trade or culture or tradition or technology....”\textsuperscript{111}

As for the non-aligned option, would Canada be more attractive to Latin Americans, Asians, or Africans if she were not part of NATO and NORAD? This again was a doubtful proposition. The cost would be too high, unless Canada chose to be an unarmed neutral. There were, however, no unarmed neutrals. If Canada took this route, she would lose any advantage she possessed with the United States which could affect all aspects of that relationship, including trade. This in turn would have a negative impact on Canadian influence with other nations, since the Third World “value their connection with ...[Canada] in part because we are considered as a NATO member, to be involved in major world problems and to know what the great powers are up to.”\textsuperscript{112}

The non-aligned option totally ignored the fact that the Soviet Union was an “aggressive and expansionist” threat with an “enormous espionage and subversive” capability. If Canada pulled out of NATO, she would lose access to the valuable intelligence cooperation agreements, and the Soviets “might well step up attempts to meddle surreptitiously in Canadian domestic institutions.”\textsuperscript{113}

The STAFFEUR group included a summary of MC 14/3 and a lengthy discussion on how the concept was supposed to work, as well as what forces were required to make it work.\textsuperscript{114} There were four options other than the existing collective security arrangements in Europe. These included having the Western European Union replace NATO; creating a looser NATO without the committee structures; unilateral Western disarmament; or having the US, UK, and France create a large system and control all. None of these was possible or even acceptable at this time. NATO would continue as it had in the short and even long term.\textsuperscript{115}

Canada, in short, could not pull out of NATO. If she tried, there would be widespread repercussions. The strength of the alliance would decrease, since as the group noted the Canadian contribution was militarily significant. Canada “would lose a voice in the councils of the Alliance and any opportunity to influence decisions affecting real issues of war and peace” would be lost. Other interests, including economic ones, would be damaged.\textsuperscript{116}

As for the force structure, military forces were necessary so that Canada could contribute effectively to MC 14/3. Canada should, however, keep in mind that
“the formations contributed must be identifiably Canadian” [emphasis mine] to have influence. As for nuclear weapons, STAFFEUR concluded: “There is no compelling reason for nuclear arms for Canadian forces in Europe.” This was conditional. Canada should retain dual-capable systems which should include the CF-104 and its replacement. 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups’ M-109 self-propelled guns should have access to nuclear shells as well. Canada, they concluded, could not place the nuclear burden on the rest of the allies: It was unfair and gave the Germans too much control which in turn could cause problems in Europe.

The Defence Policy Review and the STAFFEUR Report provoked heated discussion in Cabinet throughout March 1969. Donald Macdonald, the President of the PCO, derisively referred to the voluminous and logically stated arguments posited in the documents as one-sided, “an argument for stagnation” and “entirely inadequate.” Macdonald was more worried about credibility with the public than about reviewing national security policy, since in his view, “The public would not believe that Cabinet, in forming a decision, had reviewed objectively, and taken into account opposing points of view.” Mitchell Sharp seriously disagreed with Macdonald. Macdonald then asserted that Canada could “influence the European political situation” by withdrawing Canadian forces from Europe, which in his view would contribute to a lifting of the military siege against the Soviet Union and influence the siege mentality of the Soviet leaders. Secondly, we could penetrate the Warsaw bloc countries to encourage liberalism and western contacts thereby accentuating internal problems within the Soviet empire to force a more rapid accommodation with these growing impulses.

Sharp and others, particularly Bud Drury, violently disagreed. Canadian withdrawal “would injure the balance of power concept reflected in NATO...Further, although there might be a short honeymoon in Soviet-Canadian relations as soon as the penetration began, Soviet adverse reaction would be unrestrained” once they figured out what was going on. This would reinforce the Soviet hard liners. Canada could not conduct such activity alone in any case. Macdonald asserted that non-acceptance of his proposal indicated that “There was no evidence that Canada had any influence in NATO. It was a gross exaggeration and evidence of influence was lean indeed.” Macdonald had a naive perspective of how the Soviet Union functioned and possessed grossly exaggerated expectations of what Canada could accomplish in certain areas.

Another Cabinet debate broke out on 11 March 1969. General Allard was in attendance for this one. The primary antagonists towards Canada’s continued participation in NATO were Kierans and Macdonald. Kierans thought that Canada’s current problems were internal, domestic, and related to Quebec unity within Confederation. Canada had taken, since 1945, “a very costly interest in other nations in the world.” Canada could no longer afford this “luxury.” Macdonald
then made the astonishing comment that “our ‘ally,’ France, is the main external threat to Canadian unity.” (This last remark was probably in reference to de Gaulle’s visit to Montreal in 1967, and his tacit support of Quebec separatism). Canada did not “have any influence anyway.” Kierans noted that “The fact that we had been in Europe in two world wars and were a member of NATO did not influence in the slightest the position of European negotiators in the trade area....Mr. Sharp had not proved to him that a single economic decision was favourably influenced by our NATO membership.”

General Allard and Bud Drury shot back that Canada had made a “valid and useful contribution” to Western security, and Sharp noted that Canada would have “no influence on the course of events if we withdrew.” Furthermore, Sharp was recorded as saying

the matter of our influence was the central question...we wanted a voice in the decisions taken.... The influence of individual members of an alliance could not be measured in the same way [that is, strictly on an economic basis]....it depended upon quality and other things. We should focus our attention on the big fellows and bring to bear independent thinking in a larger group....The world is not waiting for Canadian leadership, but that we must not let security be the exclusive preserve of the big powers. He attributed influence to our superior morality....what we were trying to do in NATO was trying to prevent a war. We had to ask ourselves whether NATO was a good thing and do we have a part to play? 

Prime Minister Trudeau privately asked for a summary of views on the NATO issue. He was told that Sharp, Cadieux, Allard, Paul Martin (who was at that time minister without portfolio and Leader of the Government in the Senate), Rodolphe Dubé (Minister for Veterans Affairs), Arthur Laing (Minister of Public Works), Bud Drury, Maurice Pépin (Minister of Trade and Commerce), and Paul Hellyer all strongly advocated remaining committed to NATO. The main antagonists to this position were Donald Macdonald, Eric Kierans, James Richardson (another minister without portfolio), and Trudeau’s old friend Gérard Pelletier.

Macdonald laid out his arguments for Canadian withdrawal in a proposal to Cabinet. In it he attacked a number of arguments he understood had been made to support continuation in NATO. The first, the “major cockpit theory,” revolved around the belief that Europe was the region at the highest risk of nuclear war and that Canada should remain committed there. In Macdonald’s view, the Europeans were now capable of defending themselves without Canadian assistance. The second argument, which Macdonald called the “domino theory,” suggested that if Canada pulled out, NATO would collapse. Macdonald merely discarded this argument without discussion.

Macdonald next turned to the “influence” argument. He casually asserted that in purely military terms, there cannot surely be any serious claim that we have very great influence. Influence in military terms is largely a factor of the amount of power deployed and even with the high quality of our present Armed Forces’ contribution
to Europe, no one can seriously pretend that we are a major military factor to be taken into account.\textsuperscript{126}

After discarding this argument, Macdonald then concluded that the reason for Canadian participation in European defence was diplomatic, “which we exercise out of all proportion to our military addition. In this respect I would regard the argument as basically not proven.”\textsuperscript{127} Macdonald then recommended that Canada withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty.

Cabinet Secretary Gordon Robertson threw his weight onto the anti-NATO side by directly communicating his views to the Prime Minister. His analysis was seriously marred by such incorrect assertions as “Canada does not maintain armed forces because of the threat of military attack. This is virtually ruled out in the Defence Review....”\textsuperscript{128}

Robertson was concerned that Canada’s NATO allies were complaining about planned reductions to the Canadian defence budget. He advocated pulling forces out of Europe and then increasing the defence budget by making the Department of National Defence responsible for the following activities:

- control of the long distance phone system
- store and control all government-issue material for other federal departments
- take over marine and air navigation aids from Transport
- assume responsibility for the Coast Guard
- construct, operate, and maintain all civilian airports
- assist in a Community Improvement Program
- take over and administer the Department of Veterans Affairs
- the Armed Forces should participate in “international development” in the Third World.

By padding the defence budget, Canada could then go to NATO and claim that she was contributing at the same rate as other NATO members. Robertson failed to see, however, that converting the Canadian Armed Forces to a national and ‘world Peace Corps’ would garner no influence with Canada’s allies and even less with the Soviet Union.

More importantly, Robertson attacked the concept of Flexible Response, asserting that it was unworkable and that Canada should not participate in it. He then asserted that the concept of nuclear deterrence was also unworkable and that Canada should not participate in it. He derided collective security as a sham and declared that it did not contribute in any way to Canada’s economic well-being.\textsuperscript{129}

On 27 March 1969, the Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence met to make recommendations to Cabinet on NATO participation. Canada was at a crossroads: She could be either aligned or non-aligned. Aligned did not necessarily mean that Canada had to make a military contribution to collective security. It did not imply that Canada had to contribute to defence in North America and/or Europe. In general, the members, led by Sharp, “agreed to support a policy of
military cooperative arrangement between Canada and the United States and a continued contribution under NORAD.” The members were unable to reach a consensus on a military contribution in Europe though Canada should continue to be a part of NATO.  

If Cabinet chose to keep 1 Air Division and 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany, it had to “recognize the need for decision as to... the serious imbalance between present force commitments and the present budgetary limitation of the Department of National Defence....”

PCO personnel, particularly Hume Wright (not to be confused with Hume Wrong), an External man working in the PCO, internally discussed the future nature of the European commitment. They took the aligned policy options presented in the Defence Policy Review and referred to them as the “transitional force structure” as though this option had been agreed upon. They thought that 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and 1 Air Division would be withdrawn from Europe and replaced with a single battalion-group committed to AMF(L) and perhaps a squadron or two of the impotent and short-ranged CF-5 close support fighters. It is unclear, however, why this occurred, but it added confusion as to what the actual policy was supposed to be.

To complicate matters a secret parallel study to STAFFEUR was concurrently produced by what came to be known as the “non-group.” Not even External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp or Defence Minister Cadieux knew of its existence prior to a crucial Cabinet meeting in March 1969. Trudeau was not impressed with the STAFFEUR product and had asked Ivan Head what could be done about it. Head agreed to do a study. In his view STAFFEUR claimed that the forces stationed in Europe gave Canada influence: this was “difficult to quantify”, and he saw the decrease in trade with Europe as evidence of a lack of influence.

This view of course neglected the security dimension. Head disregarded this since he asserted that the Soviets did not really constitute a serious threat.

The non-group included Head, Hume Wright; Henri de Puyjalon from the Treasury Board, and the now-retired Major-General Fred Carpenter, a former RCAF officer who had resisted and was against retaining a nuclear capability. The first two men were assigned to the non-group as a secondary duty, while Carpenter worked on it full time. As a result, the non-group paper reflected much of what Carpenter expressed many years ago when he opposed the equipping of 1 Air Division with nuclear weapons.

In essence, the non-group paper, as discussed by Ivan Head in his book The Canadian Way, viewed the 1 Air Division Strike role as “destabilizing,” and argued that NATO strategy was “inconsistent, incoherent and dangerous,” not to mention inflexible. Canada, in the Carpenter-Head view, must not contribute to provocative destabilization by providing an aerial nuclear strike force to NATO.

In retrospect, Head stated that “the nuclear strike role of the CF-104 lay at the heart of the decision” to denuclearize. 1 Air Division “could only be regarded as a first strike or at the least a first use system” by the Soviets. In a crisis, the inevitable link between use of the theatre nuclear force and SAC would result in
an attack on North America, which Head and Carpenter argued could not be defended against. Therefore, the BOMARCs had to go too.\textsuperscript{138}

In other words, anything that smacked of offensive action, which militaries needed to deter and then win wars, and anything that was defensive and could limit damage, was labelled ‘destabilizing.’ This included virtually the entire Canadian Forces except for transport aircraft, which not coincidentally Carpenter had been in charge of during the Congo affair in 1960 and had recommended be used to replace the CF-104s in the air division back in 1961.

The language in the non-group paper was yet another attempt to refute the Defence Planning Review and the STAFFEUR report. It asserted, without evidence or discussing intelligence estimates, that “Not since Confederation has there existed a viable threat to the territorial integrity of Canada. Nor does one exist now.” The United States would guarantee Canada’s security in North America because of the Monroe Doctrine. The paper then backed off and stated that “to say that there is no present threat to Canada’s territorial integrity is not to say that there is no present threat from without to Canada’s physical security.”\textsuperscript{139} To ensure Canada’s physical security, four aims had to pursued at the same time: protection of the credibility of the United States deterrent; deterring and settling wars that might escalate into nuclear war; peace forces and non-military initiatives to foster trust and strength; and dedication of an increasing percentage of Canada’s GNP to activities designed to relieve or remove such traditional causes of wars as economic insecurity.\textsuperscript{140} The non-group paper stated: “The extent of the participation by the Canadian Armed Forces in Canada’s pursuit of the above goals is not basically a military decision; the pursuit of the four goals does not primarily, or essentially, demand military input.”\textsuperscript{141}

This was a polite way of saying that Canadian military forces were not necessary and the opinions of professional, serving military officers were not relevant in the creation of national security policy.

The non-group paper was beguiled with the concept of mutual stability within the deterrence system and looked askance at anything that could be perceived as provocative and destabilizing. Thus Canada should contribute whatever it could to protect the American second strike capability and: “avoid doing anything which would have the effect of intimidating the Soviet second-strike capability [and] avoid adopting any posture or role which is credible in the eyes of the Soviets only as a first strike role.”\textsuperscript{142}

Therefore, 1 Air Division had to go, and Canadian ASW forces should not be allowed to track and attack Soviet ballistic missile submarines. This capability allegedly contributed to “eroding that stability.”\textsuperscript{143}

The non-group paper finally conceded that Canadian forces in Europe were valuable political tools. The PCO’s “transitional force structure” was tacked on as a timetable for the conversion of the Armed Forces. This amounted to removing 4 Brigade and replacing it in Germany with one battalion with no accompanying dependents. It would be rotated every four months. 1 Air Division would return to
Canada and scrapped, while 12 CF-5s would be stationed in Europe. In Canada, the CF-101B Voodoos were to be replaced with some new American interceptor on a one for one basis. The maritime forces would draw down to only 12 destroyers and 16 patrol aircraft.\footnote{144}

By the mid-1970s, the Canadian Armed Forces would, if this plan were adopted, be incapable of doing anything save for some internal security, some limited antibomber operations, UN transport missions, and minimal coastal protection. The forces in Europe would have no value whatsoever because they were numerically small, were ill-equipped, and had no role. There would be no alliance saliency in this new force structure.

The non-group paper was sprung on Cadieux and Sharp immediately before a 26 March 1969 informal meeting prior to a planned 29 March Cabinet meeting in which the issue of Canadian Forces in Europe was to be discussed. The details of this story have been told elsewhere.\footnote{145} When the non-group paper was included in the pre-meeting briefing papers, Mitchell Sharp had to restrain Leo Cadieux to prevent him from resigning immediately. After a tirade\footnote{en français} with the Prime Minister, the paper was withdrawn from consideration. The usurpation of the External Affairs and National Defence professional views on the matter was finally brought into focus.

In the formal Cabinet meeting three days later on 29 March, Donald Macdonald immediately attacked the DPR and STAFFEUR process as not being “objective” since it did not reflect his views. The Solicitor General, George McIlraith, was outraged since in his view, “the condemnation of official views had surely gone a little too far. The devaluing of the ability of experts to review past advice was a little excessive.” Trudeau finally chimed in and told his Cabinet that “Canada’s present military establishment was determined not to impress our enemies but rather to impress our friends.” In his view, “The political consequences of our force commitments were paramount.” He was able to get a consensus that Canada should remain “aligned.” Neutrality was not a credible option.\footnote{146}

The discussion carried over another day. Paul Martin noted that he was distressed with the economic determinism he saw in Cabinet. Canada’s contribution to NATO was psychological and military as well as economic. “Canada’s influence in NATO was considerable,” he correctly noted, but then he went incorrectly on to note that: “Canada’s contribution in military terms was not of great significance.” The political and deterrent significance of Canada’s possession of 20 percent of SACEUR’s nuclear strike capability armed with megaton-yield nuclear weapons was not explored or even mentioned. Trudeau then started to muse that perhaps Canadian forces could “be used to build highways, to solve problems of pollution [and] as cadres for social change.” Canada could be aligned but did not have to commit troops. He really believed that Canada could not influence Europe in any way.\footnote{147}

Postmaster General Eric Kierans asserted that “NATO was a non-event.” Canada should “indicate that we revere independence and respect the need for an increased
contribution to the underdeveloped countries of this world.” Therefore, the $1.8 billion spent on defence should be deployed there to alleviate suffering. This was a true expression of Canadian values, in his view. Finance Minister Edgar Benson, on the other hand, informed Cabinet that, in his view: “An abrupt withdrawal would tear the Canadian military structure to pieces....” Hellyer supported this view and also reminded Cabinet that a pull-out from NATO might lead to the same conditions that prevailed in 1914 and 1939 since “statesmen prior to those two world wars had not properly assessed the value of an established military deterrent. Korea evidenced for us the real problems of attempting to mobilize quickly in order to withstand an armed conflict.” Hellyer agreed with Benson in that “people could not be taken off the streets and immediately transformed into valuable members of the military system....the reduction of troops in Europe would not bail us out of our domestic or international problems.”

Sharp’s position supported Benson and Hellyer. He was concerned about the American reaction to a Canadian withdrawal. In his view, “until the United States was able to settle the Vietnam issue, the stability of international condition was vitally important. In that context, Cabinet Ministers should not underestimate Canada’s influence in contributing to stability.” There were economic consequences to a pull-out since “We expect to be treated in a special commercial sense in wheat negotiations, oil transactions, and in the exchange of defence information. The government should not necessarily expect that such treatment would continue.” Once again, Cabinet came to no decision on the matter, though Trudeau pledged to produce a compromise document which would debated in Cabinet before he made any public pronouncement on the issues.

The compromise memorandum “rejected the extreme alternative of non-alignment” and articulated the position that Canada should stay in NATO. As for European-based forces, however, a withdrawal would be implemented after NATO was informed in May 1969. Canada’s forces had to be able to employ the full range of operations, which had to include domestic deployments, peacekeeping and peace restoration, and collective security. They also would be expected to contribute to “national development programs.” Coastal and air surveillance of North America were paramount since this was directly related to sovereignty.

At the next Cabinet meeting on 1 April 1969, Leo Cadieux strenuously opposed the compromise since:

The Canadian forces...had been continuously reduced and we had just received equipment in order to carry out designated roles outlined for them by previous government policy. Now it was to be decided that the roles were to change and equipment be redesignated....the defence establishment had been seriously hampered by financial restrictions and the forces were suffering serious attrition at present.

The Prime Minister then pulled the compromise position paper and pledged to consult Cadieux and Sharp before making a public statement based on it. In two speeches in April 1969, Trudeau rejected neutrality as an option but also announced that 1 Air Division and 4 CMBG would be slashed in half.
This had an effect on the course of what was referred to as the “Defence Policy Review Phase II,” a euphemism for a small PCO working group which would recommend what further cuts could be made to the Canadian Forces. This recommendation amounted to slashing the Forces from 98,000 to 81,000 personnel in addition to cutting 1 Air Division and 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in half.\footnote{153}

Some wanted cuts to include the BOMARC system, since there had been rumours that the Americans were thinking about scrapping theirs. National Defence was concerned about this move. Major General Mike Dare, the Deputy Chief of Operations, told Cabinet in a briefing that the CANS$5 million annual saving might be a good economy measure, but that it “would encourage pressure to phase out the CF-101 which was also armed with nuclear weapons.” This would unacceptably degrade the air defence system which the Trudeau government was actually emphasizing in its new defence policy.\footnote{154}

On 20 May 1969, Cabinet finally agreed that by 1972 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group would be cut in half and assigned to ACE Mobile Force (Land). Only two CF-104 squadrons would remain in Europe by this time and these would be restricted to the photo reconnaissance role. No mention was made of nuclear weapons.\footnote{155}

Sharp and Cadieux effectively saved the European commitment from elimination. This move did not go unnoticed in Europe, however. SACEUR, who by this time was General Andrew Goodpaster, was furious. In a blistering cable to Cadieux, SACEUR bluntly informed him that if 4 CMBG were pulled out of Northern Army Group, he had no other forces to replace them in the line. If war broke out, Goodpaster told Cadieux, he would be forced to use nuclear weapons sooner rather than later. This “was the antithesis of the MC 14/3 strategy....”\footnote{156}

Goodpaster pleaded with Cadieux to have Canada reconsider the European cuts. NATO’s Defence Planning Committee sent a series of communiqués to Mitchell Sharp. NATO was formally protesting the cuts. Eventually, Cadieux and Sharp proceeded to Brussels to brief their counterparts on the Canadian position. In an acrimonious session in which Canada was castigated for turning her back on Europe, Cadieux, in a calm and deliberate voice, reminded the Belgian representative who made this remark that there were several thousand Canadians buried in his country from the First and Second World Wars, and thousands more in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany. Canada, he said, has already paid for the right to do what she wanted with her armed forces with the blood of her fallen. There were no Europeans buried in Canada save for twelve aspiring pilots who crashed during training in the Second World War. What more did Europe want? There were still Canadian forces stationed in Europe and more would come if they were needed in a crisis. There was nothing more to be said on the matter.\footnote{157}

In September 1969, Leo Cadieux announced that Canada would divest itself of the Honest Johns by 1970 and the BOMARCs by 1972. The CF-104 force would give up its nuclear weapons also in 1972.
What of Chief of Defence Staff General Allard’s input into this process? Citing “intellectual fatigue,” Allard requested retirement in July 1969 to become effective in September. In his memoirs, Allard says he “accomplished the bulk of my mission,” which, as we will recall, was the creation of recognized French Language Units within the Canadian Forces. He even had input into the selection of his successor, General F.R. Sharp, who pledged to continue with the policy of ‘francophonization.’ Sharp, however, “was not a Trudeau confidant and they rarely met during Sharp’s period in office.”

The lack of uniformed dissent on the purely fiscally-based national security policy, let alone denuclearization, should be attributed to several factors. Most importantly, uniformed professionals were steadily being cut out of the national security policy formulation process. Second, the disruption of the staff system and the elimination of internal means of debating defence issues prevented the formation of a unified perspective on the issue within the armed forces. We must not discard the atmosphere of fear prompted by the Hellyer purge, which generated a survival mentality amongst the military’s leadership, and its debilitating effects during this period of change.
6. Defence in the 1970s: Out with a Whimper

The 1971 White Paper on defence was engineered by Donald Macdonald, who replaced Cadieux as Minister of National Defence in 1970. Cadieux, apparently, was deemed “too compliant to the Department’s (of National Defence) views.” As the regiments departed Germany, the Honest John launchers were reduced to scrap, the aircraft mothballed, and the NATO-tasked nuclear weapons returned to the Americans, the armed forces learned that several new policy themes governed their existence, all endorsed by Macdonald and reflecting the priorities of the 1970 foreign policy White Paper:

1) foster economic growth.
2) safeguard sovereignty and independence.
3) work for peace and security.
4) promote social justice.
5) enhance the quality of life.
6) ensure a harmonious natural environment.

As analyst John Hasek put it: “There was no identifiable enemy in the brave new world which Trudeau seemed to be planning.” How did all this change affect the armed forces in terms of being able to carry out their assigned roles within the scope of Canada’s commitments?

The only nuclear weapons left in Canadian service were the AIR-2A’s. These were kept so as not to antagonize the Americans and to ensure maintenance of sovereignty. Canada retained the sixty-six CF-101s and they remained committed to NORAD. The BOMARCs were phased out at about the same time as the American BOMARCs were withdrawn from service in 1972. The DEW Line remained operational, as did a drastically reduced number of Pinetree Line radars. The Mid-Canada Line was closed by 1968. Strategic signals intelligence stations, however, remained at optimum strength. As for the rest of the air defence system, the
Americans had drawn down their components of it partly as a result of the 1972 ABM Treaty and partly because of a nuclear strategy emphasizing finite deterrence. The USAF Air Defence Command fighter force was reduced dramatically down to five regular and ten reserve fighter squadrons, while all surface to air missiles were eliminated. This resulted in an increase in the ratio of Canadian forces to American forces (four Canadian to 15 American).164

Canada’s maritime forces also declined in the 1970s. The 33 Argus maritime patrol aircraft would eventually be replaced in the 1980s with 18 Auroras, which were based on the American Lockheed P-3 airframe (the P2V Neptunes were discarded by 1968). The Auroras were deliberately not certified for nuclear ASW use. The Navy would rust out and lose its only aircraft carrier, HMCS Bonaventure. By 1978, there were only 16 front-line ASW destroyers in service (ten of them built in the mid-1950s), three conventional submarines, and three operational support vessels. One squadron of CS2F Tracker ASW aircraft now operated from land bases, mostly in the fisheries surveillance role. There would be no destroyer replacement programme until the late 1980s. The maritime forces would be tasked to SACLANT in wartime but would remain in the Canadian area. One destroyer was continuously dedicated to NATO STANAVFORLANT.165

The land forces stationed in Canada were reduced from three brigade groups and an Honest John training battery (totalling ten infantry battalions, three armoured regiments, and three artillery regiments) to three combat groups (seven infantry battalions, three light armoured regiments and three artillery regiments). One of these combat groups was tasked to reinforce north Norway in the event of war, but there was no strategic sealift. Strategic airlift had not increased dramatically enough to accommodate the ability to “Reforge” to Norway. Canada’s C-119 and Yukon fleets were paid off and replaced with four civilian-pattern 707s, which were not able to operate in a hostile environment. The Honest Johns were eliminated. While the personnel strength of the infantry battalions in the 1960s was approximately 80 to 90 percent of their war establishment, it dropped to less than 60 percent in the 1970s. The militia relinquished its non-combat National Survival role by 1971, but no money was spent to rebuild the seriously-depleted (manpower as well as equipment) organization back into combat-capable conventional fighting formations. There was a plethora of CF-5 light fighter-bombers, but these aircraft lacked range and many were mothballed and then sold to Venezuela. The 707 transports were dual-tasked as in-flight refuellers to get the Canada-based CF-5s to Norway. Some policymaker had not taken into consideration the possibility that such aircraft could not conduct both in-flight refuelling and strategic airlift missions at once.

The most pressing problem was that no money was allocated to construct a logistics system capable of supporting Canada’s depleted conventional forces in the event of a protracted conventional war lasting longer than seven days. This was particularly the case now that Canadian troops were committed to both Norway
and West Germany. There was not enough air or sealift. There were no realistic reinforcement plans for either theatre of war.\textsuperscript{166}

As for the commitment to the Central Region, there was two-thirds of a brigade group with ageing tanks, and three squadrons of obsolescent CF-104s which were not suited to conventional operations (though they were performing this task anyway). These forces were moved to the rear area in CENTAG and were not given any serious missions or tasks due to their lack of capability and now obsolescent equipment. Even the critical and salient AMF(L) commitment was reduced from two to one battalion group and it was supported with third-rate aircraft, the CF-5, if they could even get over to the operating area.\textsuperscript{167}

Canada’s armed forces were now capable only of fighting a three-day conventional war with the forces on hand in Europe. Their ability to survive longer than three days was in question. It was next to impossible to transport significant numbers drawn from the Canada-based forces over to Europe in a crisis. Canada could still contribute to countering the Soviet bomber threat, but without improvement to ASW and anti-aircraft equipment, Canada’s maritime forces were far less capable. Canada could still contribute to peripheral peacekeeping missions if the commitments were kept small and of a short duration. In the event of war, there would not be enough mobility to extract them as reinforcements for the main theatre of operations. There was no articulated overall strategic concept governing the rationale or employment of Canada’s military forces. As a point of comparison, the Canadian armed forces in the 1950s and 1960s were constructed to fulfil salient roles with specialized and unique capabilities within the context of an agreed-to strategic concept, all of which contributed to achieving Canadian national aims.

Canada did, in the end, retain a sort of residual nuclear capability in addition to the CF-101/AIR-2 air defence weapons. Four destroyers were still equipped with ASROC, though no overt service-to-service arrangements were made to provide them with nuclear-tipped torpedoes in peacetime. Twelve destroyers operated Sea King helicopters. Some of the Trackers retained their nuclear depth bomb wiring well into the 1970s.\textsuperscript{168} Tactics and techniques of nuclear ASROC and nuclear depth bomb use from the Sea Kings remained part of MARCOM’s training syllabi.\textsuperscript{169}

This left the M-109 artillery regiment integral to 4 CMBG. The M-109 mounted a 155mm gun that was nuclear-capable. American nuclear shells for the 155m included the Mk. 48, first deployed in 1964. It had a yield of approximately 0.1 kiloton.\textsuperscript{170} NATO planners developed an emergency capability for non-nuclear certified Canadian and West German M-109 SP gun regiments. Canadian gunners and staffs were trained in nuclear fire planning as a matter of course. Firing tables and data were kept under lock and key at 4 CMBG HQ but there were no warheads stored with 4 CMBG nor was there a custodial detachment. In the event of war, American field detachments equipped with secure communications and nuclear shells were prepared to augment allied M-109 units if nuclear artillery shells
were released by SACEUR and the CENTAG General Defence Plan called for their use. This would only occur once 4 CMBG was deployed to its assembly area or once the battle had started. The Canadian Army therefore retained some semblance of nuclear weapons involvement well into the 1980s.\textsuperscript{171}

Similarly, Canadian CF-18 Hornet pilots had a portion of their training curriculum dedicated to nuclear strike operations, though clearly no nuclear weapons of any sort were assigned to CF-18 squadrons either in Europe or North America.\textsuperscript{172} This aircraft was obtained in 1985 to replace the aging CF-101 and CF-104s. In American service, the F-18 could carry and deliver two B 57 (Mk. 57) or two B 61 (Mk. 61) nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{173} Fundamentally, however, the changes in NATO strategy by the 1980s precluded a need for Canadian nuclear weapons systems and placed a much greater emphasis on precision conventional capabilities.
7. Conclusions

In the end, the main problem was that the Trudeau government did not replace the nuclear forces with equivalent conventional forces to make up for the firepower shortfall, nor did they restructure the Canadian Forces to fight within the context of MC 14/3, the agreed-to NATO strategic concept. The existing commitments were lacklustre ones and had no real salience within the alliance. They were mundane and increasingly irrelevant as the equipment necessary to implement them deteriorated over time. National prestige, a precursor for other more tangible benefits, not the least being self-respect, does not accrue to a nation indifferently committed. Trudeau was committed to making Canada the largest of the small nations rather than maintaining Canada as the smallest of the large nations. In this he succeeded but at a cost to Canadian influence and long term military capability.

Though attempts were made in the 1980s by the Mulroney government to reverse the Trudeau-era generated “rust out” of Canada’s conventional forces and eliminate dubious missions like the commitment of a Canadian brigade group to Norway, the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Canadian economy did not permit re-equipment programmes to mature. This left Canada with a force structure that was a generation behind its allies in a technological sense and one structured for specific NATO and NORAD tasks. This state of affairs contributed to the perception that Canada’s military power was of questionable relevance in the early part of the world order era, something which the ‘soft power’ advocates used to their advantage in debates over future national security policy. The distancing between Canada, NATO, and the United States that occurred twenty years ago was also exploited by those who were ready to jettison Canada’s commitment to NATO for what they thought would be expanded influence in the resurgent United Nations in the early 1990s. It is somewhat ironic that the UN failed to live up to those lofty expectations by 1995, prompting NATO intervention in the Balkans during the rest of the decade using ‘hard power’ instead of soft, as in the case of Operation ALLIED FORCE where Canada committed fighter-bombers to coerce the Milosevic regime in 1999. The folly of the Trudeau-era attempts to alter
Canada’s national security policy were further highlighted by Canada’s commitment to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a war fighting mission using ‘hard power’ where Canadian troops fought alongside American troops in Afghanistan.

The currency of coalition influence in the first half of the Cold War was a combination of nuclear forces and high-quality conventional forces dedicated to deter an enemy attack and fight effectively if deterrence failed. This currency was devalued, leaving Canada the poorer for it. Today’s currency will rest on a combination of strategically-deployable forces and special operations forces conducting fill-spectrum operations, a force structure which is currently under construction. The lessons to take away from any study of the Trudeau-era national security policy debates are many. Canada cannot opt out of the global security environment. Canada must be able to participate effectively in coalition endeavours, especially when Canadian interests are involved. Elected policy makers have an obligation to honestly examine Canada’s security needs and not behave in a fashion which wantonly bypasses professional advice. Imposing policy on a philosophical whim has its limits.
Notes


2. See, for example, James Bartleman, Rollarcoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien’s Diplomatic Advisor 1994-1998 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005).


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 119.


17. Ibid., p. 159.

18. Ibid., p. 155.


20. Ibid., p. 277.


23. Ibid., pp. 248-249.


25. Ibid.


30. DHH, Raymont Study Vol. 2, pp. 255.

31. Ibid., p. 249.


33. DHH, Raymont Study Vol. 2, pp. 249.


37. Ibid., pp. 46-58.

42. Ibid., pp. 72-74.
44. Ibid., pp. 60-63.
45. Information provided by the SHAPE historian, NATO Military Committee, 16 Jan 68, “Final Decision on MC 14/3: A Report by the Military Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area.”
47. Information provided by the SHAPE historian, NATO Military Committee, 16 Jan 68, “Final Decision on MC 14/3: A Report by the Military Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area.”
48. Ibid.
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50. Ibid.
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52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
57. Allard interview with the author, Lahr Germany, 16 April 1993
59. DHH, The Raymont Collection, file 832, 3 May 68, memo Cadieux to Trudeau; (31 May 68) memo Allard to Cadieux, “Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces.”
60. DHH, The Raymont Collection, file 832, CFP 243, “Rationale for Canadian Defence Forces.”
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
70. ATI PCO, 19 Jul 68, Cabinet Conclusions.
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79. ATI PCO, 28 Oct 68, memo to Cabinet, “Canadian Military Contribution to NATO Europe.”
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. ATI PCO, 1 Nov, 68, Cabinet Conclusions.
83. Ibid.
84. ATI PCO 21 Nov 68, Cabinet Conclusions.
85. ATI PCO, 4 Dec 68, memo for the Prime Minister, “Meeting of the Commons’ Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, December 3rd.”
87. Ibid., p. 22.
88. Ibid., p. 24.
89. Ibid., p. 28.
90. Ibid., p. 29.
91. Ibid., p. 33.
92. Ibid., pp. 131-135.
93. Ibid., p. 133.
94. Ibid., p. 132.
95. Ibid., p. 36.
96. Ibid., p. 51.
97. Ibid., p. 31.
98. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., pp. 83-95.
101. Ibid., pp. 93-99.
102. Ibid., pp. 101-102.
103. Ibid., pp. 103-106.
106. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
107. Ibid., pp. 3-8.
110. Ibid., p. 36.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., p. 40.
113. Ibid., p. 188.
114. Ibid., see Ch. 9.
115. Ibid, pp. 90-93.
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118. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
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124. ATI PCO, 18 Mar 69, memo for the Prime Minister, “Ministers’ Views on Defence Policy.”
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129. Ibid.
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138. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
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148. Ibid.
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157. ATI PCO, 24 Jul 69, Cabinet Conclusions; telephone interview with Lieutenant General Henri Tellier (CF Ret’d), 18 November 1997.
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163. ATI PCO, 1 Jun 70, memo to Cabinet, “North American Defence Policy in the 70s.”


166. See Maloney, *War Without Battles*, Ch. 5.

167. Ibid.

168. Major Don Nicks correspondence with author.

169. Confidential interview.


172. Confidential interviews.

Appendices
RATIONAL
FOR
CANADIAN DEFENCE FORCES

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENCE OF CANADA, AND SHALL BE SAFEGUARDED, HANDLED, TRANSPORTED AND STORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS AND ORDERS FOR THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEARING HEREIN. RELEASE OF THIS PUBLICATION, OR INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, TO ANY PERSON NOT AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE IT, IS PROHIBITED BY "THE QUEEN'S REGULATIONS AND ORDERS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES" AND "THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT".

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RATIONALE FOR CANADIAN DEFENCE FORCES

INTRODUCTION

1. In the period since World War II the problems experienced by a number of the lesser Western powers in seeking to frame their defence policies have become increasingly complex. The classical yardstick by which national armed forces could be measured, which was their adequacy vis-à-vis those of potential adversaries, has largely ceased to be relevant. With some exceptions, the countries in question do not perceive any specifically national interests outside their borders that they are prepared to further by military means, while the only serious threat which they face is of such dimensions that they could not hope to defend themselves against it. Their security in fact depends almost exclusively upon the military power of the United States, and only marginally upon their own individual efforts. In consequence, this group of countries - which of course includes Canada and most of the European members of NATO - have found it increasingly difficult to arrive systematically at judgements concerning the type and size of armed forces they should maintain.

2. In Canada, this situation has given rise in recent years to a good deal of critical scrutiny and discussion of the Canadian Armed Forces and the resources allocated to defence. Doubts have been expressed about the usefulness of the expenditures incurred, and indeed about the need for Canada to maintain defence forces at all.

3. The purpose of this paper is to determine what national interests are served by the allocation of Canadian resources to defence activities, and whether the nature and scale of Canadian defence activities are appropriate to serve those interests. The first chapter identifies some of the considerations that bear on the formulation of Canadian defence policy, and sets out in general terms the reasons why Canada maintains armed forces and participates in collective arrangements. Subsequent chapters analyze in somewhat more detail the reasons for the specific defence activities that the Canadian Forces engage in. Also included is a discussion of the extent to which Canada needs to maintain armed forces for possible duty outside the area of present Canadian treaty commitments. The main conclusions that emerge from the paper are grouped in the final chapter.
CHAPTER I

CANADA AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

4. National armed forces are one of the means by which governments are able to further their chosen objectives. The traditional purposes of armed forces are to repel attack, to expand national territory, and to advance national interests abroad. Secondary purposes include carrying out civil works and acting as a source of disaster relief. Armed forces can also provide a focus for national sentiment, and in some countries, their use for the suppression of civil insurrection is of considerable importance.

5. Whatever other functions a government may assign to its armed forces, the minimum purpose they must serve is that of enhancing the national security. Even a government that does not entertain any external ambitions must take whatever steps may be open to it - including the maintenance of military capabilities - to protect its territory and population. Conversely, a government is not likely to consider it worthwhile to maintain forces on any significant scale unless its security can be enhanced by doing so.

6. Security can of course be defined in a number of different ways. In its narrowest sense, it is the condition of being effectively defended against attack. A somewhat broader definition would encompass not only direct defence, but also those measures, political as well as military, that materially reduce the risk of attack, whether in the immediate future or in the long term. A definition along the latter lines is for most purposes the more satisfactory of the two partly because it corresponds more closely to the manner in which countries generally employ military power, and partly because it avoids the sort of rigid distinction between defence and foreign policy which in present-day conditions has become entirely artificial.

7. In the narrow sense of the term, Canada has never been able to make adequate provision for its security out of its own resources, nor indeed has it ever had to try. Canada’s traditional first line of defence against any attack from outside North America was the control of the seas exercised by the British Navy, reinforced by the Monroe Doctrine, under which the U.S. declared the Western Hemisphere to be off-limits to any outside power. Within North America, Canada was for a time dependent upon British military forces for defence against the United States, but this requirement came to an end with the achievement, first of a modus vivendi and ultimately of friendly relations between Canada and the U.S.
Because of their relative freedom from security imperatives and external ambitions, Canadian Governments have enjoyed a considerable latitude of choice in their defence policies, at least in peacetime. A few attempts were made to contribute to imperial defence, and major forces were sent overseas in both world wars, but for the balance of its history up to 1939, Canada generally maintained only token armed forces in peacetime. In 1923-24 Canada’s *per capita* defence expenditures were $1.46, as compared with $23.04 for Britain, $2.33 for New Zealand and $3.30 for Australia. As a corollary, Canadian Governments also did not as a rule seek to influence international developments that were of significance in terms of Canada’s broad security interests. During the period leading up to World War II, active efforts were in fact made to dissociate Canada from international problems, most notably including collective security problems.

The period since World War II thus represents a considerable break with the past. Canadian policy throughout this period has been generally consistent with a definition of basic principles given in 1947 by the then Secretary of State for External Affairs.* These principles included:

a. Maintenance of national unity.

b. A belief in the concept of political liberty.

c. Respect for the rule of law.

d. Acceptance of international responsibility.

Particularly significant in relation to post-war policy was the public declaration of Canada’s willingness to accept international responsibilities. In effect, this represented a conscious decision by the Canadian Government to play an active international role and, more specifically, to make armed forces available for collective operations intended to uphold the rule of law and to prevent aggression.

National policies are determined by a complex inter-action of factors, and it is generally hazardous to try to ascribe them to a few simple causes. It is nevertheless worthwhile to highlight a few of the most important determinants of Canada’s post-war policy, particularly insofar as they are relevant to current decisions.

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11. Canada emerged from World-War II a much stronger nation, in both relative and absolute terms than it had been in 1939. It has even been suggested that for a brief interval in 1945, Canada was the fourth strongest nation in the world. This of course was due to an abnormal situation. However, even today an assessment based on an aggregation of factors such as national income, industrial and technological sophistication, and military power would probably still place Canada ninth or tenth out of the approximately 130 independent countries in the world. Canada has thus been in a position to play a much more important international role in the post-war period than at any previous time in its history.

12. A second determinant was a widespread conviction that Canada could not hope to isolate itself from major international developments, particularly in the field of peace and security. The two World Wars, in both of which Canada had participated from the outset, had demonstrated that major conflicts involving those countries with which Canada was most closely linked also inevitably involved Canada. The conclusion drawn from this experience was summed up in a statement by a Canadian spokesman that, “If the peace were to be a bad one, we should suffer the consequences, and suffer in proportion to our resources”.

13. The third major determinant of Canadian policy in the post-war period has been the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. Canadian Governments have considered that Canada’s security was identical with the security of the Western community of nations as a whole, and that Canada, as an important member of that community, has a material interest and a moral obligation to contribute to the common defence. In practice, this has meant a contribution to the defence of Western Europe as well as North America, because Europe has been the main area of East-West confrontation and thus an area in which there has been a serious potential risk of general nuclear war. For at least the past two decades Western Europe has, in effect, been an outer line of defence for Canada.

14. The fourth determining factor that must be singled out is Canadian geography. The huge Canadian land mass lying athwart the shortest aerial route between the Soviet Union and the United States, combined with the Soviet military threat, have served to make Canada-U.S. co-operation in defence not only desirable but inevitable. Canada’s options have been limited essentially to a choice between contributing to the joint defence of North America and leaving it to the U.S. to defend the territory and airspace of both countries. The latter course would have entailed a considerable abdication of Canadian sovereignty, since it would have been necessary to grant the U.S. more-or-less unrestricted access to Canadian territory in order to provide an effective defence for the continent. For Canada to have
withheld this minimum degree of co-operation particularly during the period when the manned bomber constituted the principal threat, would have been seriously prejudicial to the security of the U.S. and thus ultimately to the security of Canada itself.

15. This combination of factors explains the strong emphasis that Canadian external policy in the post-war period has placed on multilateralism and a broadly-based approach to problems of international peace and security. The multilateral approach has been regarded as the only means of obtaining an effective voice for middle and small powers, and of limiting the extent to which the conduct of international affairs would be governed by the national interests of a few powerful countries. Among the more notable manifestations of this policy were Canada’s active opposition to the Great Power veto provisions of the draft United Nations Charter in 1945, and the emphasis that Canada has consistently placed on the consultative aspects of NATO. This policy would have been a logical one even if it had had no other objective than to increase Canada’s ability to safeguard its own particular interests. In fact, however, it was also intended to serve the larger objective of promoting the rule of law in international affairs, and reflected a judgement that an approach to security problems that was based, even to a limited extent, on consultation and consensus was more likely to reduce the risk of war and promote the establishment of an international order than one based simply on power relationships.

16. Initially, it was hoped that the United Nations would be a fully effective agency of collective security on which all countries would be able to rely. With the breakdown of the wartime co-operation of the Allied powers, and the subsequent emergence of a Soviet threat to Western Europe, it became clear that collective arrangements on a more limited basis would be required if an effective defence was to be provided. The decision that was eventually settled upon, partly as a result of Canadian efforts, was to link the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, the United States, and Canada in a multilateral alliance under the North Atlantic Treaty.

17. Despite the limitations of the United Nations, Canada has continued to accord it a high priority in its foreign policy, and has made substantial elements of its armed forces available to the UN on occasions when they were required. The various UN responsibilities that Canada has accepted have been of value in preserving international peace and stability in specific cases, but it cannot yet be said that the United Nations has reached the stage where it could serve as an adequate alternative to the more limited security arrangements that Canada has found it necessary to enter into. In strict terms of
Canadian defence, the principal value of peacekeeping, peace-observation, and related activities is that they contribute to international stability and, by limiting and terminating local armed conflicts, reduce the risk of Great Power involvement and hence of confrontation. However, even if one could be sure that the UN would be 100% effective in this regard, it would still remain the case that East-West confrontations - the only direct source of danger to Canada - can arise from causes other than the escalation of conflicts in the “Third World”. In the event of such confrontations, there would be no substitute for the existing collective defence arrangements to which Canada is a party.

18. For most of the post-war period, it has been generally accepted in Canada that the decisions to maintain armed forces and accept peacetime military commitments were the right ones in the circumstances. The question that arises is whether the far-reaching changes that have taken place in a number of fields over the past 20 years or so have not affected the general validity of the considerations outlined above. Specifically, to what extent has Canada been able to achieve its objective of obtaining international influence through participation in multilateral organizations, in what sense can the Soviet Union still be described as a threat, and what are the implications of technological changes for Canada’s contribution to the defence of the West? These questions are discussed under successive headings below.

The Concept of Influence

19. The validity of the claim that Canada obtains influence through its participation in NATO and its bilateral co-operation with the U.S. can be appreciated only if exaggerated expectations are avoided, both with regard to the amount and the kind of influence that a country such as Canada can have.

20. The conjunction of circumstances prevailing until the latter part of the 1950s placed Canada in a particularly influential position. Europe was relatively weak and acutely conscious of the threat to its security, with the result that Canada’s military contribution was widely recognized to be of considerable significance. The U.S. for its part placed great emphasis on the need for a collective approach and, notwithstanding its position as the principal military power in the world, attached importance to obtaining the support of its allies on a wide range of international questions. Moreover, because the West faced not only a military danger but also a threat to its politico-social institutions, there was a perceived requirement for Western allies to extend their co-operation to non-military fields and to avoid actions damaging to each other’s interests.
21. If the implementation of Article 2 of the NATO Treaty had proven practicable, and if NATO had developed into a community of Western countries collectively seeking to promote stability and progress not only among its members but in the world at large, a close co-ordination of external policies among its member countries would have been essential. This would have increased the range of subjects on which Canada was able to influence its allies, and on which the allies were able to influence Canada. In practice, however, NATO has proven to be a much looser body than had been envisaged, and in recent years there has been a trend towards further disengagement and the pursuit of independent policies by the allies. The U.S. has become more absolute in its military power, more confident in its policies, and more willing to act on the basis of its own perceived interests in other parts of the world, whether its NATO allies are prepared to support it or not. NATO is thus primarily an organization concerned with European defence and security, and the decisions that Canada is in a position to influence by participating in NATO are generally limited to this field.

22. The same general point applies with regard to the influence Canada gains through its co-operation with the U.S. in the defence of North America. It is true that Canada’s status as an ally has probably enhanced Canada’s general standing in the eyes of the U.S., and has in some cases made the U.S. more receptive to Canadian views about certain bilateral questions outside the defence field. In addition, divergences of approach with regard to various world questions are probably less disruptive to relations between the two countries to the extent that U.S. confidence in Canada’s basic loyalty as an ally is maintained. There is however no basis for claiming that, by participating in NORAD, Canada acquires a special ability to influence U.S. policy on, for example, the Middle East or South-East Asia. Participation in the joint defence of North America gives Canada a right to express views about the joint defence of North America.

23. The essential consideration is that international influence is not an end in itself, but a means of furthering Canada’s national interests, both general and specific. The reasons for Canada’s participation in NATO and North American defence are in this respect analogous to the reasons for Canada’s participation in bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Each of these bodies deals with subjects that are important to Canada, and the decisions taken in these forums affect important Canadian interests. The extent to which Canada can influence other member countries depends to a very large extent upon the quality of Canadian ideas,
and upon the extent to which Canada proposals can be reconciled with the respective interests of other member countries. However, it is only by participating in these international organizations, and accepting the obligations this entails, that Canada can hope to influence their decisions at all. It is this type of consideration that leads even small countries such as Norway and Luxembourg to consider that they cannot afford to forego participation in NATO.

24. Security issues are the most fundamental of all international issues, and they are therefore also the most intractable. The obverse of this proposition is, however, that decisions relating to international peace and security are potentially the most far-reaching in their effects, not only on individual countries, but also on the general character of international affairs. An individual country may choose to play a part in such decisions or not as it sees fit, but the fact would remain that considerations of security and power relationships were the principal determinants of the kind of world in which that country had to exist and conduct its external relations.

25. Finally, the fact that issues affecting the security of the countries of Europe and North America are considered collectively upholds the principle that such issues should not be treated as the exclusive preserve of a few major powers, but that all countries affected by them are entitled to a voice in the decisions that are taken. It is in the long-term interests of Canada as much as any country that this principle should continue to be upheld.

East-West Relations

26. The classical precept holds that military planning must be based on the capabilities rather than the intentions of potential enemies. Capabilities are measurable and remain relatively constant. Intentions, on the other hand, are a matter of interpretation and are moreover subject to change in response to changing circumstances.

27. Like most general principles, this one must be subject to several qualifications if it is to provide a useful guide to policy formulation. In particular, it does not mean that the intentions of other countries should not be taken into account in any way. Some kind of calculation must be made about the intentions of others if only for the purpose of distinguishing friends from adversaries. Judgements about intentions are also an indispensable guide to decisions about the kinds of defences that are required. Because no country can hope to guard against every contingency with equal effectiveness, defence policy formulation is a matter of taking certain calculated risks for the purpose of minimizing certain
others. The risks taken must however be reasonable ones in terms not of intentions, but of the known capabilities of potentially hostile countries. Unless a country is prepared to place its basic security in jeopardy, it must - whether singly or in concert with others - maintain sufficient military strength to counter at least the principal capabilities that might in some circumstances be used against it.

28. In the context of East-West relations, the principal problem at present is to reconcile the legitimate security concerns of both sides with measures conducive to a relaxation of tensions and a reduction in the risk of war. That the Soviet Union is unlikely to launch an attack against the West is widely accepted. Militarily, it is deterred from doing so by Western collective defence arrangements, including the West’s strategic retaliatory forces. Moreover, the fact that these forces cannot be destroyed by a pre-emptive attack, and thus do not need to be launched on the strength of warning that an attack may be imminent, provides a further element of stability in the East-West military equilibrium.

29. If the present state of East-West relations were such that the Soviet Union was clearly being held at bay only by the forces arrayed against it, the West’s course would be a relatively straightforward one: to provide as much defence as it could possibly afford. In fact, however, the situation is considerably more complex. For whatever reasons, the general climate of East-West relations, and with it the perception of the threat in the Western democracies, have changed markedly over the past two decades. The mutual hostility and intense suspicion of the late 1940s have given way, not to cordiality, but at least to a certain willingness on both sides to seek mutual accommodations in some areas; concrete examples would include the treaties on Outer Space, Antarctica, Nuclear Testing, and, most recently, the joint tabling by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. of a draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. There has also been a great increase in East-West contacts and in various forms of economic co-operation. Perhaps most important of all as an influence on the current intentions of the Soviet Union and its allies are their acute internal problems, the growing disagreements among them, and the tense state of relations between the Soviet Union and China. None of the latter three factors is likely to be of purely short-term significance.

30. The present trend in East-West relations, and recent developments such as the liberalization of the regime in Czechoslovakia, thus provide some ground for encouragement. Against these considerations must, however, be weighed the clear evidence that there is still a substantial divergence of interests between NATO members and the Communist countries, and the fact that co-operation has so far been
limited to certain specific questions on which the interests of the two sides happen to coincide. On the central issue of a European settlement, there has been virtually no tangible progress; Germany remains divided and Berlin is as vulnerable to Soviet pressure as ever. Moreover, as Europe remains the area of principal interest to the Soviet Union, compromise on European questions is likely to be the most difficult and to take the longest to achieve.

31. Whatever the future course of East-West relations, there will be a continuing requirement for Western defence policies to take account of the military capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Despite the decline in East-West tensions, the Warsaw Pact countries still maintain large military forces, and the continuing modernization of their equipment has greatly increased their effectiveness. It is no doubt true that these forces are maintained at least partly for defensive purposes. Nevertheless, the mere fact that powerful Warsaw Pact forces exist, and could be used against Western Europe, North America, or to the detriment of Western security interests in other parts of the world is a sufficient and indeed a compelling reason for the maintenance of effective defences by the Western allies. There is always the risk that circumstances could arise in which the possession of armed forces could be of critical importance to Western security - perhaps as a result of developments unpremeditated by either side, perhaps because a new Soviet leadership decided to pursue a policy of more militant opposition towards the West.

32. This is not to say that there is no alternative to an indefinite extension of the East-West arms race, with each side continuing to strengthen its forces because it must match the capabilities of the other. Such a situation is certainly possible it may even be probable - but it is not inevitable. In a period when tensions are high, and any incident could lead to war, a prudent defence policy will seek to guard against as many contingencies as possible. An improvement in the political climate and an absence of overtly aggressive intentions on either side, on the other hand, can increase the feasibility of mutual arms limitations. Specifically, both sides are more likely to be prepared to take essential first steps such as foregoing those systems that contribute only marginally to their security. The indispensable prerequisite for any general programme for arms limitation is, however, that the programme be reciprocal. It is true that in some circumstances, a step can be taken unilaterally to see if it produces a response, and that force reductions by mutual example are a conceivable alternative to reductions by formal agreement. President Kennedy’s offer of a “bonfire of bombers” and the more recent U.S. offer to forego the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system are examples of the kind of exploratory proposals that can be advanced.
There is, however, a limit to how far one side can go unless the other responds. The ultimate limitation on unilateral measures is that, instead of reassuring an adversary and encouraging him to take similar action, they may bring about a change - for the worse - in his intentions.

33. Thus, in present circumstances there is really no alternative for NATO countries but to maintain their defences while continuing to seek means of effecting reciprocal force limitations or reductions with the Soviet Union and its allies. The threat posed by the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact countries cannot simply be wished out of existence. What is required is the patience to find means of reducing the defence burden borne by both sides that would not be prejudicial to the security of either.

The Role-of Non-Strategic Forces

34. The preceding discussion has been intended to establish the West’s general requirement for defences, and the reasons why Canada contributes to them. There remains the question of how the non-strategic forces of a country such as Canada can enhance Western security, particularly in view of the nature of modern warfare.

35. Fifty years ago the state of military technology heavily favoured defensive warfare. The military potential of aircraft and armoured vehicles had only begun to be exploited, and the great offensives of World War I were consistently blunted or rendered enormously costly by barbed wire, the rapid-firing cannon, and the machine gun. The latter two weapons, which enabled defending forces to apply a very high rate of fire from static positions, played a major part in turning World War I into a prolonged war of attrition in which decisive victories proved beyond the capability of either side. In the intervening period leading up to the present, however, technology has shifted the balance to the opposite extreme, and offensive warfare has now reached a kind of ultimate dimension with the development of the thermo-nuclear bomb, the long-range aircraft, and the ballistic missile. There is as yet no real sign that the trend will reverse itself again.

36. The inherent difficulties of this situation for the maintenance of an effective system of collective defence by the West have been apparent at least since 1949, when the U.S.S.R. successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. They have, however, become considerably more acute in recent years. Not only has military technology grown more complex, with the result that power has increasingly been concentrated in the hands of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but there has also been a decrease in the spectrum of capabilities on either side against which any effective defence is possible. So long as the manned bomber and conventional land forces constituted the
principal threat to North America and Western Europe, it was possible - and obviously desirable - to counter them with a strong system of active defences. The scope for such defences is much more limited today, when the main elements in the strategic balance are various kinds of ballistic missiles, supported by highly sophisticated systems such as satellites and over-the-horizon radars, and when the forces on both sides of the Central Front in Europe are equipped with literally thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that could nullify a large force as quickly as a small one.

37. While these developments have had far-reaching implications for Western defence arrangements, they have not eliminated the West’s requirement for conventional and non-strategic forces. The primary role of these forces today is to provide a capability of countering hostile acts short of general war, and thus to ensure that the vast nuclear apparatus on both sides is not called into play unless and until it is absolutely necessary to do so.

38. This strategy of flexible response is based on the premise that, as former U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara repeatedly pointed out, “a credible deterrent cannot be based on an incredible act”. The strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. are a credible deterrent only to those actions by the U.S.S.R. that would imperil the vital interests of the U.S.; their use in less serious circumstances would literally be an incredible act, since it would provoke a strategic nuclear response by the U.S.S.R., ending in the destruction of both countries. To a lesser extent, the same limitation applies to tactical nuclear weapons, although there is considered to be at least a theoretical possibility that their use would not necessarily lead to general nuclear war.

39. The West’s conventional forces are thus a part of its over-all system of deterrence and, like the strategic deterrent forces, they serve a psychological as well as a military purpose. The knowledge that an attack on any given scale would meet effective armed resistance serves to create uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about the price he might have to pay to achieve a desired objective. This is particularly true when the defending forces have the capability of escalating the hostilities by measures such as a counter-attack in a different area or by invoking tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, by maintaining a broad range of military capabilities, the West is able, not only to ensure that hostile acts fail to achieve their objectives, but also to reduce the risk that they will be attempted.
40. The strategy of flexible response is commonly thought of in the context of Western Europe. In fact, however, it is equally valid in relation to other aspects of the West's defences. This was most dramatically demonstrated at the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the ability to apply the necessary measure of conventional force, backed up by the strategic deterrent, enabled the U.S. to avoid a choice between nuclear war and acquiescence in what it regarded as an intolerable situation. The deployment of conventional forces to a threatened area can also be a useful means of demonstrating resolve, as was the case during the Berlin crisis of 1961. Finally, the presence of conventional forces in a period of acute tension can be an essential means of deterring or containing incidents which otherwise could trigger an outbreak of general hostilities. The risk that situations along the lines of the foregoing examples might arise need not be high. The West's conventional forces would have to prevent thermo-nuclear war only once in order to justify their existence for a very long time.

Conclusions

41. At the present stage of the twentieth century, security in the narrow sense of being effectively defended against attack from any quarter is not a realisable objective of defence policy. There is no way in which a country or any group of countries, however powerful can physically prevent an opponent armed with modern weapons from killing most of their population and destroying their economic infrastructure. What is possible, however, is for countries to employ a combination of measures to reduce the risk that an attack will take place. In addition to strategic nuclear deterrence, these measures include the maintenance of an adequate range of military capabilities to make the initiation of lesser levels of hostilities unprofitable, and diplomatic efforts to find practical ways of reducing international tensions.

42. It is sometimes suggested that, because of the growing sophistication of modern warfare, the maintenance of the strategic balance should be left entirely to the two super-powers, with the allies of the U.S. - and possibly those of the U.S.S.R. as well - in effect becoming bystanders. This would not necessarily involve the formal assumption of neutral status by the allies; they could still remain politically aligned with their protecting power and extend to it such cooperation as it required in the way of, for example, communications and overflight rights. They would not, however, maintain armed forces on any significant scale themselves, nor would they seek to play any role in collective defence arrangements.
43. An arrangement along these lines would have the advantages of being both practicable and economic. There are, however, two fundamental objections to it. First, it would represent a renunciation of the efforts that have been made to develop a broad, multilateral approach to problems of international peace and security. The relationship between the U.S. and its allies would, in effect, become analogous to that which prevailed in British imperial defence arrangements prior to 1939. As Canada’s experience during this period demonstrated, a policy of minimum participation in security arrangements mainly serves to reduce the ability of an individual country to do anything to prevent major conflicts; it does not materially alter the risk of being directly affected by them.

44. Secondly, even if in practice the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were quite capable of arriving by themselves at understandings over various questions, it cannot be assumed that the terms of these understandings would always be favourable to the interests of the international community as a whole. It is at least possible that in some cases settlements might be reached by the two superpowers to the detriment of their erstwhile allies. This point is perfectly well understood by the major Western European powers, which have no intention of settling for the role of bystanders in relation to East-West security affairs. What the “opting out” line of argument would amount to in practice, therefore, would be that small and middle powers such as Denmark, Belgium, Canada, and perhaps Italy would assume the sort of role in NATO that Iceland has at present, and effectively leave security questions to be settled by their larger allies.

45. Developments over the past decade or so have generally tended to make Canadian defence and foreign policy decisions more rather than less difficult. At the same time, there has probably been some reduction in the scope for Canada to play a constructive international role. The weight of evidence suggests, however, that the general policy course that was set in the immediate post-war period, and particularly the decision to participate actively in collective defence, was one which still serves Canada’s interests.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

235. The purpose of the discussion in this paper has been to determine what national interests are served by the allocation of Canadian resources to defence activities, and whether the nature and scale of Canadian defence activities are appropriate to serve those interests.

236. Up to a point, statements about national interests depend upon interpretations of collective values in a country. In consequence, there are generally fewer pitfalls in speaking of what a country perceives its interests to be, rather than of what they “really” are. This is particularly true of any discussion of the relative importance of various national interests and the means of resolving inconsistencies or conflicts among them. On the other hand, the perception of national interests is conditioned by certain fundamental factors such as geography, history, resources, and cultural links. For the purposes of this paper, the basis on which judgements about Canadian interests have been made is, first, the fundamental factors referred to above as they relate to Canada and, secondly, those policies which have been followed more or less consistently by Canadian Governments, particularly in the period since World War II, and which may therefore be taken to reflect a continuing Canadian consensus concerning certain national objectives.

237. On this basis, the national interests served by the allocation of Canadian resources to defence may be divided into three broad categories. First and most important is Canada’s interest in security from outside attack or military intimidation.

238. The security of the West, including Canada, depends on a system of deterrence rather than on defences in the traditional sense of the term. For all practical purposes, the West’s strategic deterrent forces are a monopoly of the United States, and decisions about their use must ultimately be taken by the U.S. alone. The function of the West’s active defences, and the contributions individual countries make to them, is to reduce the risk that the strategic deterrent would actually have to be used. To the extent that the maintenance of active defences helps to reduce the risk of general war, Canada has an obligation to play its part. This is partly a matter of national self-respect, but it also has a direct bearing on Canadian security, since Canada would suffer as much as any country if the present system of deterrence and defence should fail.
239. The second category of national interests served by the maintenance of Canadian defence forces comprises those interests that arise out of Canada’s existence as a sovereign country. Sovereignty implies that a government is capable of exercising certain capabilities if the need for them should arise. These capabilities include maintaining surveillance of national territory and preventing casual violations of it, of maintaining law and order at the request of the civil authorities, and providing various forms of emergency relief in the event of natural disasters. At the same time, the existence of Canadian armed forces capable of providing a substantial proportion of the active defences of Canadian territory enables Canada to treat with the U.S. as a sovereign country, and to maintain a voice in matters relating to continental defence.

240. Thirdly, Canadian defence activities serve to support Canadian foreign policy, and have a direct bearing on Canada’s position in the international community. This point can perhaps be best illustrated by summarizing some of the consequences that could be expected to follow from a major reduction in the Canadian armed forces and expenditures on defence:

   a. Canada would in some measure be isolating itself from the group of countries which, by virtue of their common interests and cultural background, are its natural associates. In particular, Canada would forfeit any right to a voice in Western security arrangements;

   b. Canada would in effect be abandoning its efforts to promote a multilateral approach to problems of peace and security. It would scarcely be credible for Canada to urge the development of a collective security system under the United Nations - which implies a willingness by member countries to accept international military responsibilities - if it had been demonstrated that Canada for its part was not prepared to contribute to the collective defence arrangements that are currently the basis of Canadian security;

   c. Canada’s ability to develop special relations with selected countries through the provision of military assistance would at best be extremely limited;

   d. Canada’s ability to respond to unforeseen external contingencies calling for the use of armed forces would be minimal or non-existent.
241. The three categories of Canadian interests discussed above - reduction of the risk of war, protection of Canadian sovereignty, and the maintenance of Canada’s ability to play a constructive international role - require that Canada continue to maintain armed forces on a sufficient scale to participate in collective defence. The proportion of its resources that Canada allocates to defence at present is smaller than that of virtually all of its allies, and indeed is one of the smallest of any comparable Western country. This situation suggests that Canada’s defence expenditures are certainly not excessive at present, and may on the contrary, be very close to or below the minimum consistent with the furtherance of Canada’s national and international interests.
CANADA AND EUROPE

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON EUROPE

Ottawa

February 1969
A sound and effective foreign policy for Canada, as for any country, must be based on a continuous reassessment of its own domestic requirements and its external environment. The broad lines of present Canadian foreign policy toward Europe were conceived in the immediate post-war period. Even if the world had not changed there would be scope for a general review of Canadian policy after two decades. In that period Canada has experienced a birth of national consciousness and, at the same time, a crisis of self-interrogation such as it has never seen before. There has also been such a broadening of horizons and searching for a role that it is imperative to re-examine the basic premises of Canadian foreign policy. The world around us has also changed enormously. Military power has never been so concentrated and yet, paradoxically, the restraints on its use have never been greater. Material prosperity has reached new heights and yet the gap between rich and poor is wider than ever. Technological advances have brought mankind greater opportunities than ever before but also infinitely greater dangers. Progress in transportation, communications and education have whetted the desire of the common people to participate more in national and international affairs, while middle and smaller powers demand a greater voice in world affairs.
While the reasons for a review are thus compelling, two essential points should not be overlooked: first, that to a certain extent Canadian policies have been under continuing review and have evolved; and second, that many factors vital to the determination of Canadian policy remain basically the same. In this report we attempt to draw attention to both change and continuity so that the thrust of Canadian policy may accurately reflect both dimensions.

Foreign policy objectives must reflect domestic requirements, while taking into account the relationship with other countries in an increasingly interdependent world. While we shall of course be concerned in this report primarily with Canada’s relations with Europe, it may be useful if we set out under the following headings the main areas in which we see Canadian national objectives having important implications for our foreign policy: security; national unity; national identity; economic interests; world order.

Common to the objectives in all these fields is the basic need to protect Canada’s national sovereignty in all its aspects. In the modern world national sovereignty is inevitably restricted by the international community but it remains a basic objective to ensure that Canadian sovereignty is delegated only with the consent of the Canadian Government.

Security

A vital objective for Canada, as for any country, is the protection of its national territory against any threat, whether of
overt aggression or subversion. For most countries, contiguous or nearby states pose the greatest threat to their physical security. Canada has a special position in this connection because it has only one neighbour close to its centres of population, the United States, with whom relations are so close that the expectation of military attack is nil. As a result Canada is not concerned with frontier defence, other than in the maintenance of coastal and air space surveillance. On the other hand, technology and the East-West division have created a potential for global nuclear exchange which, by design or accident, could destroy the fabric of Canadian life. Faced with this threat to our security, Canada’s objective must be the maintenance of peace, and particularly the containment of conflicts which could lead to global war and a nuclear attack on the North American continent. Policies to achieve this security objective could involve such activities as the protection of the American deterrent, the maintenance of stability in Europe, peacekeeping in other parts of the world or other non-military initiatives to lessen the possibility of conflict.

National Unity

Parallel to the need to protect the national territory is the objective of promoting national unity within the country. Unless a basic level of unity is maintained among different groups, centrifugal forces may either prevent effective government or lead to political separation. Canada is faced with a fundamental problem of
national unity which has both domestic and external dimensions. Domestically, the resurgence of Quebec and French Canada has given a new impetus to the reassessment of the basis of Canadian national life. The question of unity depends essentially on the internal responses to the challenges of contemporary developments and the policies adopted to reflect future domestic requirements. But it also has some important external aspects which have direct relevance to our relations with Europe: first, the objective of the Canadian Government to reflect in its foreign policy the bilingual and bi-cultural nature of the country; second, the quest of Quebec for closer and more direct links with France and other francophone countries; and the efforts of the Quebec Government to conduct foreign relations in its own fields of competence without due regard for the Federal Government’s role in foreign affairs; and third, the interference of the French Government, or rather of the French President, in Canadian affairs and his apparent disregard of the Federal Government’s responsibility for all external affairs.

In its White Paper entitled “Federalism and International Relations”, the Government has recognized the legitimate concern of provinces with the conduct of Canada’s foreign relations, whether by reason of their legislative responsibilities or, less directly, because of their interest in matters which have taken on an international character in the modern world. The Government has also reaffirmed that French-speaking Canadians have a clear interest in ensuring that their
preoccupations, like those of the English-speaking population, are given full recognition and expression in the development of Canadian foreign policy. If it is to be consistent with the requirements of national unity Canadian foreign policy must therefore reflect to the greatest possible extent the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canada and its federal constitutional structure.

National Identity

Linked with the preservation of unity within the country is the requirement for developing and maintaining a distinct national identity. For Canada, this involves the development of a greater degree of understanding between English- and French-speaking citizens about the nature of our country and its role in the world. It should also involve a greater appreciation of the distinctive combination of qualities which distinguish Canadian life from that of any other country. It is difficult to describe precisely what gives a country its unique character, but as far as Canada is concerned the total image is made up of such elements as its vast territory and sparse population, the diverse origins of its people and the co-existence of two main linguistic communities, the tradition of evolution, the habits of political compromise and tolerance, the developed economy, the high mobility of the people and rising living standards.

We assume that Canadians wish to have a national identity or distinctive way of life - however the concept is to be expressed - and that foreign policy should contribute to this goal rather than
impede it. Although this problem is essentially domestic, there is also an
important external element which is of particular applicability at the present
time. In fact, the current problem of identity is a classic example of the inter-
action of the domestic and international aspects of national life. Inevitably, in
our North American way of life, the influence of the United States is
widespread and powerful. While accepting and benefiting from this close
relationship, it is a Canadian objective to be conscious of, to nurture and take
pride in the unique elements of Canadian society. We regard Canadian national
identity as a positive objective which can best be fostered by a diversification of
Canadian external relations. A policy of anti-Americanism would be counter-
productive not only externally but also in terms of the very identity we wish to
preserve. It would also be unacceptable to the Canadian people.

If Canadian foreign policy is to give further substance to the domestic
objective of national identity, it must therefore broaden and deepen our relations
with other countries beyond the North American continent with a view to
strengthening the distinctive aspects of our national character.

Having to cope on the domestic scene with an often dissenting
and newly assertive Quebec, conscious as never before of the pervasiveness
of the American presence, we are faced in an acute form with the
twin problems of national unity and national identity. The search for one
may help the search for the other, for without national unity the chances
of continuing independence of the United States would be in
doubt. Conversely, unless there is an effective determination to preserve a Canadian identity which is more than just a reflection of or reaction against our American neighbour, it would seem to be equally doubtful that we could remain united.

**Economic Interests**

It is also a basic objective to promote the prosperity and well-being of the Canadian people, and for this purpose to seek the most favourable impact on the Canadian economy which can be derived from our external relations in the fields of trade, finance, immigration, science and technology and others related to the economic development of the country. The degree of Canada’s dependence on world markets makes it all the more important for it to seek through international economic cooperation to promote the best possible environment for its own economic development. Policies designed to implement these objectives may include aid for less developed parts of the world, where Canada’s longer term economic interests are reinforced by humanitarian interests.

**World Order**

A further basic objective is the maintenance of a free, stable and interdependent society based on the rule of law. Canada naturally associates with other like-minded countries that pursue similar objectives, particularly the Atlantic-community of nations. There are three ways in which foreign relations are connected to this objective:
(a) It is highly unlikely that Canada could preserve a free society internally in a world of anarchy, conflict or tyranny;

(b) Canadians hope that other peoples may share the benefits of a free and progressive society. Altruistic motives in this case parallel aims and policies related to the achievement of narrower national interests;

(c) Cultural and information programmes have a bearing on the improvement of understanding between peoples and in turn give an external dimension to our culture and provide a basis of mutual cooperation by which other policies are facilitated.

For all these reasons it is in Canada’s interests to pursue international cooperation in the interests of building a just and stable world order.

Success in achieving these objectives in our foreign policy is dependent to a large degree on the respect and influence which Canada can generate abroad. The image of Canada in other countries depends not only on our accomplishments but on responsible and consistent foreign policies pursued both in Canada’s interests and in the interests of the international community. Canada’s reputation abroad is important both because it helps us to measure the past success and future prospects of our policies and because it influences
the image which Canadians form of themselves. Constructive and imaginative accomplishments abroad help to build up confidence among Canadians in the viability of Canada as a national entity.
CHAPTER 4

BASIC FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES

There are several reasons why it is desirable to examine not only ways in which Canadian interests are involved in relations with Europe, but also the basic question of whether Europe is more or less important to Canada than other parts of the world, and whether there may be alternative options open to Canada which could be more meaningful in terms of the new realities created by changes both within Canada and in Canada’s external environment. One reason is simply the widespread and often unarticulated desire for a “new look”, a new role for Canada. Another is that there is a feeling abroad that Europe does not offer as much opportunity as do other regions of the world for Canada to play a distinctive and satisfying role. Partly this seems to be because Europe is associated in people’s minds with power politics, military alliances and other “immoral” aspects of international affairs. Partly it may be because there is an impression among Canadians that Europe is not interested in us and therefore that Canadian influence in Europe is insignificant. Still another reason is that Canadians are more aware of and interested in other parts of the world than they used to be and are often attracted by the possibilities of doing good there.

Against this background, there are two basic options which deserve examination. One is what might be called the “Third World option” - that is, concentration on those less fortunate and less
developed regions of the world such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where Canadian money and skills and perhaps even leadership would be warmly welcomed. The other is what might be called the “non-aligned option” - that is, withdrawal from all alliances and military engagements with other countries and pursuit of a politically neutral line in East-West relations. These options are not of course mutually exclusive. They could in fact be adopted individually or in combination. Nor do they cover all possible variations and permutations. But we think they do correspond to the most important basic opportunities that are open to Canadian foreign policy and we shall therefore examine them one after the other.

“Third World Option”

It is in fact a mistake to think of the “Third World option” as an option, in the sense that one has to choose between the Third World and other regions. It is not a case of “either - or” but rather of an order of priorities. A Canadian policy of giving first priority to relations with the Third World might seem at first sight to offer attractive advantages. It would enable Canada to make a significant contribution to alleviating the world’s poverty, to bridging the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” and thus reducing international instability and tension. In the process, it would bring opportunities for influence and prestige that would be flattering to the Canadian psyche. But there are limits to these advantages that would be quickly reached. Aid appropriations can usefully be increased, but the scale
of effective aid to the less developed countries, is in the short run at least, often limited by shortages of manpower in the donating countries and even more by lack of organization and skills in the receiving countries. The prestige and influence that might accrue to Canada would have very strict limits and in many cases would be more illusory than real. The Latin Americans and Afro-Asians are no more likely than any others to allow outsiders to intervene in quarrels of vital interest to them (e.g. Nigeria-Biafra) and we, for our part, would have no direct interest in doing so. If we were involved in such quarrels, our energies would be spent on problems that would have no real bearing on Canada’s own development.

The idea that instability in the Third World represents a threat to Canada’s security comparable to the situation in Europe is also highly questionable. In Korea, in the Suez crisis, the Congo affair, the Vietnam war, India’s disputes with its neighbours, and in the current Middle East crisis, the super-powers have demonstrated their resolve not to let peripheral issues lead to a direct clash between them. Europe is the only region of the world in which the super-powers have vital interests at stake - because the world balance of power is at stake - and where both declaratory policy and tangible action give evidence of commitments to the ultimate limit.

The truth is, that though Canada can make a contribution to the Third World, the Third World has very little to contribute to or to do with the fabric of Canadian life in terms of either traditions or culture or trade or technology or, indeed, in terms of our security.
In these terms, therefore, giving first priority to relations with the Third World would make Canadian foreign policy largely irrelevant to Canadian needs. The only relations that really count in these terms are those with the United States and with Europe. The most important effect of our opting for the Third World would be to leave our relations with the United States and Europe outside the purview of the Canadian Government’s concern and influence and therefore more subject than ever to the “natural” course of events that has already resulted in United States influence growing to unhealthy proportions.

Canada does not have to withdraw from Europe in order to make a worthwhile contribution to the Third World, and indeed it seems more likely that it is in cooperation with other developed countries of the world that Canada can put itself in the best position to give effective aid to the less developed countries. In any order of priorities based on Canada’s needs, however, it must be clear that the only meaningful option has to do with the balance between our relations with the United States, on the one hand, and our relations with Europe on the other. This is one of the most important issues of Canadian foreign policy. Unless the home base of that policy is secured in a united country, a firm sense of national identity and the means to express it, Canada will not be able to play the world role that our human and natural resources have prepared us for.

“Non-Aligned Option”

The second option we wish to examine does involve a real choice - between engagement (i.e. participation in alliances as at
present) on the one hand, and non-alignment (i.e. neutrality) on the other. It should be noted that this choice is often loosely identified in people’s minds with another choice - that between a military and a non-military role in the world - and that supporters of the non-military role see advantages in it similar to those described above for the ‘Third World option’. In other words, there is a tendency to think that Canada could play a more attractive and satisfying role if it divorced itself from all alliances and military commitments and devoted itself to the peaceful pursuits of detente, disarmament and UN peacekeeping, with the savings on armaments being put into economic aid. The argument goes that without military commitments to other countries, and particularly to the United States, Canada could be more independent to criticize or reject policies it does not like and to treat international issues on their merits regardless of the view of others.

In examining this argument more closely, it is as well to make an important distinction. It is one thing for a country to be non-aligned or neutral but quite another for it to be unarmed or practically so. If one looks around in Europe, for example, one sees that Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia are as heavily armed as they can afford to be in order to defend their neutrality or non-alignment. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s non-alignment was not voluntarily chosen. It was the result of being thrown out of the Soviet Bloc, and the Yugoslavs have simply made a virtue of necessity. Finland and Austria are lightly armed, but then their neutrality is guaranteed by severe limits imposed
by other powers on their freedom of international action. And none of these
countries occupies a strategically vital area. If Canada were to opt for unarmed
neutrality, it would be tantamount to making the United States’ strategic frontier
with the USSR defenceless. The United States would have no alternative but to
take whatever measures were necessary to ensure its security and Canadian
foreign policy would in the process be subjected to more severe restraints, not fewer.

Effective and credible armed neutrality for Canada would obviously
be expensive. Would it be worth it in terms of increased independence and
influence? If the purpose is to project Canadian views on detente and arms
control more effectively, it is difficult to see how withdrawal from our
alliances could serve this end. To begin with, it would deprive us of much of
the flow of political, economic and other important information we now
receive from the United States and our other allies. It would of course be
welcomed by the USSR and its associates, but there is no evidence that they
would be more prepared than at present to heed Canadian views on Europe
or other international issues. On the contrary, they would know that Canada
was no longer privy to the thinking of the major Western governments and
no longer in a position to exercise any influence on their policies. It is also
doubtful that a non-aligned Canada, with diminished sources of
information about the thinking of others, could develop views on
disarmament that would gain much greater acceptance than those that we
can advance in the ENDC in present circumstances as a member of NATO.
It is problematical whether non-alignment would enhance Canada’s influence with the neutrals in Europe or with countries in the Third World. The Swedes and Yugoslavs are prepared to discuss European problems with us now, despite the fact that we are not a European power, precisely because we are making a contribution to European security. The Latin Americans and Afro-Asians value their connections with us in part because we are considered, as a NATO member, to be involved in major world problems and to know what the great powers are up to. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that Canadian influence in the UN has been diminished by Canadian membership in NATO, rather the reverse. Nor has that membership so far inhibited Canada from playing a leading part in UN peacekeeping operations. Compare the real influence of non-aligned countries in the UN or the ENDC and it will be seen that their efforts have had little or no effect on issues where important great-power interests are involved.

Would non-alignment enhance Canada’s ability to adopt policies divergent from those of the United States on problems such as Cuba, Vietnam or China? It is true that we have to take account of the interests of the Alliance as a whole, but Canada and other members of NATO exercise considerable freedom in practice in formulating policies on such matters in the light of their own national interests. For example, not a single member of NATO has contributed to the United States military effort in Vietnam despite repeated United
States attempts to obtain their support. Political consultation in NATO on matters outside the geographic scope of the Alliance has contributed to mutual understanding of differing national policies. Whatever differences may exist, for example over China, they are less abrasive when viewed against the underlying community of interests symbolized by membership in the Alliance.

To sum up, the “non-alignment option”, like the “Third World option”, might give the impression of greater independence and influence but only at the price of real independence and effective influence. They would prove very expensive economically and the cost would bear little relationship to Canadian realities and needs. They would be risky in terms of protecting the essential base of Canadian foreign policy and would not enable Canada to contribute more to the maintenance of peace in the world. Indeed, there is a serious danger that the end result of either course, with its high cost and meagre fruits, would be disillusionment in Canada which would leave the country in a state of semi-isolation in North America, a situation which we believe would run counter to Canadian national objectives.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. This paper has been prepared to provide a basis for decisions by the Canadian Government on the broad choices available to Canada to assure its national security during the coming decade. To assist in reaching these decisions, the paper develops the discussion of strategic and political issues, and or possible military options, provided to the Government in the document entitled “Review of Canadian Defence Policy” dated July 8, 1968, and in subsequent oral briefings and written material.

2. This document is intended to be read in conjunction with the report entitled “Canada and Europe” being submitted by the Special Task Force on Europe, which deals at greater length with the political aspects of Canadian membership in NATO and a Canadian military contribution in Europe. Some of the material in the report on Europe has been adapted and condensed into the present paper.

PLAN OF PAPER

3. The paper is presented in three basic Parts. Part I, the Introduction, indicates the fundamental choices that Canada must consider, discusses the implications of these choices, and discusses the international outlook for 1970 - 1980. In Part II, Chapter 2 presents the components or the strategic balance as background for discussion, in the next three chapters, of the strategic and political implications of the two fundamental choices, non-alignment and alignment. Chapter 6 discusses the prospect for military co-operation with the United Nations in peacekeeping.
4. In Part I, the military options under a policy of non-alignment are presented in Chapters 7 and 8. The range of choice for military cooperation with allies under a policy of alignment is discussed in Chapters 9 - 11, and force options are presented in Chapter 12, with a summary of their military and foreign policy implications. There are two Annexes to the paper. Annex A describes briefly the military threat in North America, in Europe, and in other areas of the world, and Annex B gives an assessment of the forces which a non-aligned Canada might require for its own defence to replace the defences under the present aligned posture.

**FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES FOR CANADA**

5. Canada’s national security, and thus its defence and foreign policies, must be based on a choice between one of two fundamental approaches. The choice lies between non-alignment and alignment.

**Non-Alignment (or neutrality)**

6. A Canadian national security policy based on non-alignment would involve the following:
   a. Withdrawal by Canada from its present alliances and termination of all co-operative military and defence production sharing arrangements with other countries.

*Note: The terms “non-alignment” and “neutrality” are used in this paper in generalized senses which can be regarded as broadly equivalent to one another for practical purposes; each of these words, however, has additional specialized meanings which are not intended here (e.g. “non-alignment” and “non-aligned” often now refer to a specified group or mainly Afro-Asian and anti-colonialist states, and “neutrality” has a particular legal meaning applicable in time of war). These terms and their implications for Canada were more fully discussed in a paper entitled Canadian Defence Policy — the Option of Neutrality or Non-Alignment which was circulated in July.*
b. refusal to enter into any new military or political arrangements or consultations with other countries which might imply a possible willingness to cooperate with them in the event of war.

c. Refusal to permit Canadian territory, air space or territorial waters to be used for any military purposes by other states.

Alignment

A Canadian national security policy based on alignment and military cooperation with other states would involve the following:

a. Recognition by Canada and the states with which it chooses to cooperate that some common threat to their security exists;

b. Agreement by Canada and its allies that a collective response is a more effective and economical way of meeting this agreed threat than individual national efforts;

c. A mutual undertaking by Canada and its allies to come to each other’s assistance in the event of an attack upon any of them by the state or states perceived as the source of the common threat;

d. Readiness by Canada and its allies to consider each other’s views as to what constitutes an equitable sharing of the burden of defence against the threat, in relation to their respective resources;

e. Readiness by Canada and its allies at least to harmonize their individual policies with respect to the matters and areas covered by their alliance.
8. Defined in this way, a policy of alignment would not necessarily involve a total alliance for all purposes and areas, since: (i) the threats which each individual ally considers it faces need not be identical; (ii) the responses need not be identical; (iii) equitable sharing of the burden need not imply proportionately equal shares; and (iv) the harmonization of policies with respect to particular areas within the scope of the alliance need not imply unified policies, although it does imply a degree of abstention from the exercise of individual national freedom of action. Beyond the geographical scope of an alliance, there is also often some implied obligation to take account of the more general attitudes, collective and individual, of the other members; in other words a member of an alliance may be expected to consult formally or informally before adopting a policy sharply at variance with those of other members, and perhaps to exercise some restraint in public criticism.

The International Outlook 1970-1980

9. The world of the 1970’s is likely to be characterized by accelerating economic, technological and social change, accompanied by the persistence of political and ideological rivalries and tensions, and by a trend to domestic violence in many countries. With the UN still unable to agree on a workable system of universal collective security, world peace will continue to rest on the uneasy bi-polar stalemate between the two nations disposing of the ultimate military power, each capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the other, and each constrained by the awesomeness of its power from using it to the full. In time, some progress may be made with strategic arms control and with balanced force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but
large-scale disarmament is unlikely in the near future, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty will probably not be entirely successful in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

10. The prospects for an early political settlement of the intractable problem of the division of Europe remain extremely doubtful; while progress toward a detente with the USSR will probably be hindered, although not necessarily arrested, by Soviet unwillingness to permit the weakening of its political control in an increasingly restless Eastern Europe. The Western European nations will continue to advance economically at a rapid rate, but will probably make little progress toward political union in the near future. Until a genuine detente with the USSR is achieved, most West European government are likely to continue to see NATO as the only means available to maintain their own security in combination with the US deterrent, and as the principal mechanism through which they can work towards a political understanding with the USSR and the nations of Eastern Europe.

11. It is still uncertain to what extent China will seek to extend its political influence in South-East Asia; whether Sino-Soviet rivalry will lead to increased tension on China’s long common border with the USSR; and whether Chinese military strength and particularly its missile capability will become an important strategic factor beyond the area of the Far East in the latter halt of the 1970’s. Of equal significance is the position of Japan. As the only industrialized nation in Asia and the third strongest economic power in the world, Japan is likely to be the key nation in the Far East over the next decade, and the future course of its policies with respect to the USA, the USSR and China will be a matter of importance.
12. The “third world” in general will be marked by continuing economic difficulties, internal strife and political instability, intensified by the social stresses arising from the process of development itself. There is unlikely to be any significant growth in political cohesion among the underdeveloped countries. In various parts of Afro-Asia, Soviet policy, backed by an increasing reliance on sea power and amphibious forces, will continue to be a complicating factor, as is indicated by recent developments in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Events in the under-developed world, however, are unlikely to lead to a confrontation of vital interests between the super powers or a kind which would disturb the strategic balance.
CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

1. The major military threat to its national security, which Canada now faces, is that of a large-scale nuclear attack on North America. Canada is exposed to this threat primarily for reasons of geography. Because it occupies most of the northern part of the North American continent, Canada’s territory, in strategic terms, lies between the USA on the one side and the USSR and China on the other across the shortest and most likely routes for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or strategic bomber attacks by either side upon the other. No power which had decided to take the supreme risk of launching a large scale nuclear attack on the USA could afford to let Canada remain as a safe haven for the US population and as a reserve of power, food and resources for use in rebuilding US strength. Canada’s exposure to nuclear attack is not a consequence of its alignment with the USA; if an intercontinental nuclear war broke out between the USA and USSR, Canada’s non-alignment would be irrelevant to the combatants, since both countries would find it essential to take the steps they considered necessary to prosecute the war on or over Canadian national territory.

2. Canada’s centres of population, industry and commerce logically form part of the major target areas for a strategic nuclear attack on North America, because most of them are concentrated along the St. Lawrence and in the lower Great Lakes regions and virtually all are close to the Canadian-US border and because the Canadian and US economies are highly integrated with each other. Because the principal routes of attack lie across Canada, Canada provides the USA with strategic depth against the threat of missile and bomber attacks by the USSR. The USSR obtains strategic depth against similar threats of attack by
The USA from the Arctic ocean and, in relation to its own most populated areas and strategic bases, from its own northern and arctic territories. This strategic depth is available to the USA only with Canada’s cooperation, while the USSR has no requirement for the cooperation of Canada or of any other country. Canadian non-alignment would, therefore, impose a strategic penalty on the USA and confer a strategic benefit on the USSR. For this reason, the USA would regard Canadian non-alignment as prejudicial to its security and would react unfavourably to it.

4. At present, access to Canadian territory and air space is indispensable to the USA. The USA relies for its overland communications with Alaska on the North West highway route across Canada and requires the use of Canadian air space for the operations and training of the bombers of its strategic air command. In addition, a variety of military installations vital to the security of the USA against the main strategic threat are located in Canada. These include the rearward communications for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) against the threat of ICBM attack; the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) radio stations against the threat of submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack; the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, Pinetree Radar Stations and the facilities at North Bay for command and control of interceptors across the north of the continent against the threat of bomber attack; and the leased bases at Argentia and Goose Bay. (Maps 1 and 2)

5. New systems such as Over the Horizon (OTH) Backscatter Radar and an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for early warning and control of interception of strategic bomber attacks; and OTH Forward Scatter Satellite detection systems to give warning of ICBM attacks might to some degree
reduce but would not remove the need for access to Canadian territory for the
defence of the USA. The USA would, however, continue to require the use of
Canadian air space. Present indications are that access to both Canadian air
space and territory will be of value to the full exploitation of the new and
technologically advanced systems which are now or may, in future, be
envisioned in plans for continental defence.

6. In the unlikely event that it proved possible initially to achieve a
policy of non-alignment without prohibitive political or other costs to
Canada, the situation could change. The USA could find that the penalty to
its security interests was intolerable at any time as a result of change in the
strategic balance, unforeseen developments in military technology, or a
sharp increase in international tension implying an imminent danger of war.

7. Whether or not the USA eventually accepted that Canadian non-
alignment could be compatible with US security requirements, the
Americans would in their own self-interest remain profoundly concerned
with Canada’s security. They could not tolerate the military use of Canadian
territory by any power deemed hostile to US interests, and they would,
therefore, undoubtedly meet with armed force - perhaps even without
invitation - any attempt at the invasion, occupation or subjection of Canada,
or any significant part of it, by an outside power. It is probable that, if
Canada became non-aligned, the USA would act unilaterally against forcible
extra-continental intervention in Canadian affairs, in the spirit of the
Monroe Doctrine. A corollary would be that the USA would strenuously
resist any military arrangements between Canada and a third power which
the USA deemed contrary to its interests.

8. Non-alignment would, therefore, be unlikely to increase Canada’s
exposure to direct extra-continental attack. It could, however, increase
Canada’s exposure to the indirect threat of foreign subversion. It is uncertain whether the comparatively minor existing threat of armed assistance, perhaps clandestine in nature, by a foreign state to an insurrectionary element in Canada would be increased by Canadian non-alignment. In this instance, the primary defences would remain, firstly, the continuation of Canadian political and social stability and reliance upon constitutional means of effecting change, and secondly the maintenance of adequate internal security forces.

**DEFENCE MEASURES AGAINST THE MAJOR THREAT**

9. Although defensive measures can significantly increase the proportion of population and resources which would survive, there is not now, nor is there likely to be in the foreseeable future, any means of active or passive defence capable of preventing widespread devastation and heavy casualties resulting from a nuclear attack on North America. The only means, at present, of countering the threat of intercontinental nuclear war is to prevent it from happening.

10. To prevent nuclear war between the great powers in a divided world, it remains necessary to rely principally on the preservation of a stable balance of nuclear forces between the USA and USSR such that each continues to deter the other from launching a nuclear attack; and secondarily on measures to prevent or contain local conflicts arising by miscalculation in areas such as Europe where the vital interests of the Communist and non-Communist worlds are in close confrontation.

11. Adoption by Canada of a non-aligned policy would tend to introduce an element of instability into the strategic nuclear balance, (i) because it would impose a penalty on the USA by denying access to Canadian territory and air space needed for the defence of US territory and the protection of the US strategic retaliatory forces, and (ii) because a non-aligned Canada would interpose between
the USA and the USSR a large geographical area of defence concern to both, but which would be an unknown political quantity in times of international tension. Canada could not overcome this problem by maintaining substantial offensive forces of its own.

12. Because access to Canada’s national territory and in particular its air space is necessary to the defence of the USA, a Canadian military posture which would both meet US strategic requirements in full and be consistent with a policy of non-alignment is impossible. Canada might attempt to satisfy US defence needs in part, by providing from its own resources defences against, for example, the Soviet bomber and submarine launched ballistic missile threats, but it could not do so effectively without US cooperation in making available the necessary defensive weapons systems and without exchanging information with the USA on potentially hostile activities. Such cooperation would be de facto alignment and would be so regarded by the USSR. An attempt by Canada to adopt a military posture involving defences against both the USA and the USSR, in addition to presenting problems likely to prove insurmountable, would be detrimental to Canada’s security, both because it would tend to upset the strategic balance and because, in the event of failure of the strategic balance, it would invite both super-powers to take action to overcome Canada’s defences. It would, therefore, be the course of action best calculated to ensure Canada’s destruction.

13. The Defence Staff have made an assessment of the forces, which might replace the defences available under the present aligned posture and convince both the USA and the USSR of Canada’s non-alignment. These forces are presented in Annex B. The defensive weapons systems required to make these forces effective could not be acquired by a non-aligned Canada, because no major power would be prepared to furnish its advanced military technology to a non-aligned country in order to establish defences which might be used against it. The independent development and production of the necessary defensive systems by Canada would
clearly be beyond its resources. These forces are only presented therefore, to
give a measure of the cost of such an approach.

14. If Canada were to adopt such a policy of non-alignment, the forces
prescribed in Annex B could not be recommended both for reasons of
feasibility and cost and for reasons of military security. Because the
adoption by Canada of a policy of non-alignment would confer a strategic
benefit on the USSR, the Russians would be unlikely to take overt military
actions against Canada which might cause a change in Canadian policy. If
they did take such actions the USA would react to them. For its part, the
USA could bring massive non-military pressures to bear on Canada if it
wished to effect a change of Canadian policy and would, therefore, be
unlikely to have recourse to military measures. For these reasons, except in
the event of a failure of the strategic balance, a non-aligned Canada would
have little reason to fear an external military attack and would, therefore,
have no security reason to maintain armed forces other than those required
to assist in preserving internal security and to provide a reasonable level of
surveillance and control of Canada’s national territory. The forces needed
for these purposes are discussed in Chapter 7 and 8. Their size would be
largely a matter for political judgement in the light of the military factors
presented in each Option. Of course, even though they did not contribute to
the immediate requirements of its national security, a non-aligned Canada
might maintain armed forces larger than those discussed in Chapter 7 and 8
for such reasons as to retain sufficient military strength and competence to
keep open the options either of self-defence or of future alignment in the
event of a major change in the international environment.
 Imperial Implications of Non-Aligned Defence Science

15. Although the factors contributing to the influence exerted by a country on the international scene are numerous and are not constant with time or country, it is clear that in the modern era the indigenous capability in science and technology stands high. Similarly, while analysis has not yet completely identified all the factors necessary for modern economic progress, it is again clear that an essential ingredient is a good capability in scientific research and technology. A military requirement has often been the stimulus for major advances in both science and technology for both civil and military benefit. The division of the application of science and technology into civil and military spheres grossly over-simplifies the complex, interwoven relationship. In brief, in both the military and civilian spheres, science and technology are of primary importance to national prestige, influence and well-being.

16. Canadian scientific, engineering and technological reputation, both military and civil, is built upon a relative small amount of high quality work which is nourished by a large amount of foreign information. For example of the documents received in the Directorate of Scientific Information Service of the Defence Research Board, 74% come from USA, 11% from UK, 10% are of Canadian origin and only 5% from all other countries. During 1968 Canada has received about 45,000 US defence documents. However, the balance in Canada’s favour is currently equated against the value of Canada as an ally in the broadest sense. If Canada took a non-aligned position, existing sources of defence science information would be drastically curtailed. It is also likely that many of the sources of non-military science and technological information (apart from the open literature) would dry up. As an example, a particularly critical area from both defence and civilian viewpoint is the computer field. The US has exhibited reluctance to allow the most modern
and powerful computers to be exported even to some of her allies. While it might be possible to negotiate arrangements for exchange of information on a limited basis, probably quid pro quo, this is unlikely to be satisfactory and certainly the amount of information received would be very much less than under present circumstances.

17. To keep in the vanguard of the technological age without this help, a much greater percentage of national resources would have to be devoted to research and development. Translated into military terms, defence equipment would have to be largely of Canadian design and production if a modern force with up-to-date weapons were to be maintained. US policy seems to forbid the export of the latest equipment to non-aligned countries, so reliance on foreign equipment might lead to defence forces equipped with obsolescent weapons. A much higher percentage of national resources would therefore have to be devoted to research and development of military systems. It should be noted that the cost of defence research and development in non-aligned countries is often partly offset by the sale abroad of successful weapons systems.

18. Whatever option were adopted, it would be essential to carry out research and development related to reducing the effects on Canada of an attack by nuclear or biological weapons on USA.
CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL DUPLICATIONS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

1. The adoption of a defence policy based on non-alignment would constitute a profound shift in Canada’s external relationships. Its political implications may be demonstrated by examining how such a policy would affect Canada’s ability to pursue various basic domestic and foreign objectives.

PROTECTION OF CANADA’S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

2. Protection of its independence and territorial integrity must naturally be a fundamental aim of any sovereign state. In Canada’s case, however, the problem is only partly strategic and military; Canadian independence in a broad sense is also permanently subject to subtle political and psychological challenges, largely if sometimes unwittingly, from the United States. Whether non-alignment would make these challenges more or less difficult to deal with needs to be examined. The enforced removal of USA military installations and supporting personnel from Canada, and the fact that Canada would no longer consider itself as politically allied in any way with the USA, either bilaterally or with other countries as in NATO, might make a segment of Canadian opinion more confident of Canada’s independence and national freedom of action; to the extent that independence is a state of mind, this would be a net gain.

3. In practice, however, non-alignment would not assist in solving any of the basic economic, social or cultural problems posed for the Canadian way of life by the USA and, indeed, would be more likely to exacerbate them. The Government’s room for manoeuvre to take effective action on such problems would be narrowed, because of the severely worsened climate of
US-Canadian relations which would result from Canadian non-alignment. Even if the US Administration did not consider that fundamental US security interests were so vitally affected as to require the application of massive political or other pressures against Canada, Congress and the American public would be surprised, shocked and probably somewhat angered by the Canadian decision, which might well be regarded in the USA as a deliberate anti-American gesture and as contrary to the dictates of common sense.

4. Against this background, it would be a great deal more difficult for Canada to reach accommodations with the US Administration on problems of mutual concern, even when the US authorities saw advantage to the USA in doing so. Problems requiring Congressional action would become particularly intractable. The Americans would probably be left with the impression that the Canadians were counting on being defended by American arms in case of actual war, and therefore felt no need to co-operate militarily in time of peace; the American public would therefore be inclined to view Canada as a freeloading satellite, meriting treatment as such.

5. The problem of protecting Canadian independence under a policy of non-alignment could also have ramifications beyond the scope of US-Canadian relations. Defence of Canadian democratic institutions and beliefs would become more complicated under such a policy. Non-alignment would mean either the curtailment by Canada’s present allies, or perhaps Canada’s self-denial on principle, or the present substantial assistance which Canada receives in various forms to meet the threat of ideologically based subversion. There is no evidence that this decline in assistance against the threat of subversion would be matched by a decline in the threat itself. The Soviet Union might superficially treat a non-aligned
Canada with greater circumspection in order not to encourage a Canadian return to alliance with the USA, but the Russians would probably remain hopeful of eventually stimulating a more pro-Soviet Canadian attitude, and would therefore be reluctant to abandon and might well step up attempts to meddle surreptitiously in Canadian domestic institutions.

PROMOTION OF NATIONAL UNITY

6. The implications of Canadian non-alignment for national unity would depend largely on the short and long-term reactions of Canadian public opinion to the political dissociation from the USA implied by non-alignment. The immediate effect of the adoption of non-alignment could be to strengthen national unity, at least temporarily by providing a clear point of difference and dispute with the USA, particularly if non-alignment led to overt US pressures in defence of their security interests in Canada. As on some previous occasions in Canadian history, such pressures could make English and French Canadians feel that they had to work more closely together. However, if the policy was not equally accepted in all regions of Canada, and in the longer term if strains in US-Canadian relations continued and non-alignment had unpopular practical consequences, serious divisions could occur in Canadian opinion.

7. Changes in Canadian relations with countries other than the USA consequent upon non-alignment could also have certain implications for national unity. The termination of Canadian interest in the security of Western Europe, as expressed by Canada’s withdrawal from NATO, would hinder efforts to pursue Canadian interests in individual European countries thus diversifying contacts beyond the predominantly English-speaking North American environment.
8. The special relationship Canada enjoys with the USA is very broadly based. An abrupt withdrawal by Canada from existing defence arrangements would undoubtedly seriously impair this relationship, and this in turn would have direct and indirect consequences for existing and prospective economic cooperation with the USA. To a considerably lesser degree, economic relations with Europe could also be involved.

9. Termination of co-operative defence production arrangements between Canada and the USA would have direct, although not easily measurable effects on Canada’s most advanced industries, which depend heavily on technological co-operation with the USA, and on Canada’s ability to compete in other foreign markets for trade in technologically advanced defence equipment items. The cancellation of defence production sharing arrangements with Canada’s European NATO allies would also affect Canadian ability to compete for such items in world markets.

10. In addition, Canadian non-alignment could involve substantial indirect economic costs, although no precise estimates can be made. The USA could be expected, for example, to review its arrangements for economic and financial co-operation with Canada, including some or all of US imports of oil and natural gas and potential imports of uranium; consultative and co-operative special arrangements in respect of Canadian trade in a number of other commodities with the USA and third countries; US participation in the Automotive Agreement and possible future participation in such special arrangements in other sectors; mutually beneficial special financial arrangements such as the interest equalization tax and the USA’s 1968 program of restraints on capital outflows; and the flow of technology and private capital to Canada.
11. Whether the USA would choose to alter its policy in one or more of these areas would depend on their assessment of the net value to them of these co-operative arrangements, and of course on the tenor of US Congressional and public opinion toward Canada. Canadian vulnerability to developments in the USA and the importance of these special arrangements were demonstrated in the foreign exchange market early in 1968. Any action to narrow the scope of Canadian-US economic co-operation would hurt Canada more immediately and more drastically than it would the USA, even though the longer-term damage to US interests might also be substantial. Such a narrowing of co-operation would not be inconsistent with a long term objective of reducing the present degree of Canadian dependence on the USA as an export market and a source of imports of goods and capital; but in the short run it would be difficult to intensify Canadian trade and investment links with Europe and other industrial areas sufficiently rapidly to maintain Canada’s current economic growth rate.

12. In short, while the impact of a policy of non-alignment upon economic relations with Europe might not necessarily be negative, the direct and indirect economic consequences for Canada of an unhinging of the special relationship with the USA could well outweigh, for some time at least, any budgetary savings which might result from the possibility of reduced defence spending.

PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE

13. A non-aligned Canada might consider itself somewhat less inhibited than at present from criticizing publicly and forcefully the policies of its former Western allies. It might also be hopeful of increased opportunities to play a conciliatory role between the blocs at the UN or elsewhere. The
real question, however, would be whether in this new situation Canada’s ability to influence the policies of the leading Western and Soviet-bloc states would be increased or decreased. There is no reason to believe that non-alignment and increased public criticism would enhance Canada’s ability to influence positions adopted by the USA; indeed the reverse could be true. Moreover the termination of Canadian defence co-operation with the USA and Western Europe would mean that Canada would no longer be participating in the formulation of Western policies on such matters as European security and disarmament, and that Western governments would regard Canada as essentially an outsider which no longer saw political interests in common with them; the result would be a decline in the hearing which Canada was able to obtain for its views in Western capitals, even if those views, in Canadian eyes, continued to have intrinsic merit.

14. Soviet-bloc governments would welcome Canadian non-alignment as a propaganda defeat for the United States, and would treat Canada henceforth with increased cordiality. However they would not necessarily be more interested in Canadian views on issues of substance, as they would be aware that Canada was no longer privy to the thinking of the major Western governments and no longer in a position to influence Western policies. At the same time they might retain doubts concerning the credibility or permanence of Canadian non-alignment, in view of the unavoidable extent of Canada’s day-to-day transactions and connections with the United States.

RELATIONS WITH AFRO-ASIAN AND OTHER NEUTRALIST COUNTRIES

15. Canadian relations with these governments would probably be little affected by Canada’s adoption of non-alignment, unless at the same time there were a substantial increase in Canadian economic or military
assistance to them. On the one hand they might hope it would be somewhat easier to obtain the support of a non-aligned Canada for their views on various political (e.g., anti-colonial) and economic (e.g., aid) subjects at the UN and elsewhere; but on the other hand they might attach less importance to any such Canadian support than they do now, because they would know that Canadian ties with Washington and other leading Western capitals had weakened.

16. Because of the persistence of economic weakness and lack of cohesion among the Afro-Asian countries, their ability to influence the major Western and Communist countries on important international issues is likely to continue to be very limited in practice, despite the impression to the contrary sometimes created by Afro-Asian majority votes at the UN General Assembly. Canada would therefore not find association with the Afro-Asians very useful as an indirect channel of influence on the aligned countries of either bloc.

17. Canada’s ability to pursue separate foreign policies of its own affecting relations with Afro-Asian or other countries outside of Canada’s present alliances would be little changed under non-alignment. Canadian alignment with the USA and Western Europe has not prevented Canada from pursuing, in its own interest, policies divergent from the USA and other allies on such matters as Cuba, Vietnam, China, Law of the Sea, and UN membership. There will presumably continue to be many such divergences in the future, no matter what national security policy Canada adopts. However as in the case or any nation, the same basic restraints on Canada’s effective freedom of action would continue to apply under non-alignment before deciding on any important step in foreign policy, Canada would still
have to weigh carefully against one another, as at present, factors such as: its own frequently conflicting national interests; its domestic situation; economic and geographical limitations and the effect of a given policy on general Canadian relations with other countries in particular the USA. For Canada, as for any country, national freedom of action is and will remain a relative concept.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

18. As an aligned nation of moderate views, Canada has participated in virtually all international peacekeeping operations; in some cases Canadian participation was desired precisely because Canada enjoyed the confidence of the USA and other major Western countries. The participation of a non-aligned Canada in peacekeeping operations would doubtless also be desired, although for somewhat different reasons. However UN peacekeeping unfortunately has a rather uncertain future, not because of a lack of potential contributors but because of other factors, including East-West disagreement on peacekeeping, financial problems, and lack of sustained support from the Afro-Asians for the concept.

19. In international peacemaking activities such as conciliation and mediation efforts at the UN there is no reason to suppose that non-alignment would create opportunities for Canada to play a more useful role than at present, since Canada’s loss of influence on Western governments would probably not be counterbalanced by equivalent gains in influence on the Soviet bloc and other important groups.
CHAPTER 8

FORCES FOR SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF CANADA’S NATIONAL TERRITORY UNDER A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

1. Canada would be non-aligned and would maintain armed forces sufficient to provide for the surveillance and control of its national territory, in addition to those necessary to assist in preserving internal security discussed in Chapter 7.

DEFINITIONS

2. National Territory is defined, for the purpose of this paper, as including all land areas forming part of Canada; the continental shelf; the territorial waters of Canada; the air space above Canadian land areas and territorial waters; and the waters beyond the limits of Canada’s territorial waters to the extent Canada exercises jurisdiction over them.

3. Surveillance is defined as comprising those activities necessary to permit the detection or intrusions into or upon the national territory and the interrogation and identification of intruders.

4. Control is defined, generally, as the capability of the state to enforce its lawful jurisdiction within the national territory and, more particularly, as the capability, in situations short of war, to prevent unauthorized intrusions into or upon the national territory or, in the event that such intrusions occur, the capability to expel, capture or destroy the intruders.

FORCE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

5. The assumption is made, in this Chapter, that Canada would take no military measures to defend itself against any external military threat to its national security. The power to control intrusions into or upon the national territory, and to ensure the compliance of foreign nationals with domestic law
is one of the major attributes of an independent and sovereign state. Canada, because of its vast geographical area and long coastlines, extensive territorial waters and offshore rights, and sparse population in many regions, is clearly exposed to a wide variety of potential intrusions by foreigners and foreign states. A non-aligned Canada, which lacked adequate capabilities to control intrusions, would jeopardize its national security and its status as a sovereign state, even though it were not exposed to any specific external threat or military attack.

6. To maintain its national integrity, in addition to providing for internal security, Canada would require military or paramilitary forces to provide the means of policing its national territory in conjunction with the civil agencies having specific responsibilities in this regard. At a minimum, these combined forces must be able to demonstrate that they are capable of detecting persistent or major intrusions by foreign states or nationals, and of dealing effectively with them.

7. To achieve this capability, Canada would have to add to the forces required for internal security, the air and maritime forces needed to provide surveillance and control of its national territory. In assessing the requirement, the Defence Staff has sought to establish a level of forces capable of detecting and identifying frequent or large scale intrusions, but not all random intrusions, and of enforcing compliance of identified intruders with Canadian wishes, if this should prove necessary. The forces presented in this Chapter are not designed to defend Canada against external attack, but would have some capability to provide early warning of such an attack, if it should occur.
8. Planning the necessary forces have been complicated by the fact that a policy of non-alignment introduces uncertainties regarding the availability to Canada of both aerospace and maritime surveillance systems. The USA, as announced last year, has developed a new air defence system which can be deployed during the next five years and which will give more effective surveillance and control North American air space. At the present time Canada is participating with the USA in studies relating to this system and will benefit from the forthcoming developments in defence of its air space. This system is discussed fully in Chapter 10. Under a policy of non-alignment, Canada could not count on these advanced systems being available to it. For the purposes of this option it has been assumed that they would not be available. A non-aligned Canada would have to negotiate with the USA, if it wished to take over intact the existing US or jointly financed radar system over Canadian territory (The DEW Line and Pinetree Line). It has been assumed in this option that Canada could successfully negotiate the retention of these existing systems even though it were non-aligned. If this was not possible, Canada’s capability to maintain surveillance and control of its air space would be severely limited. The same problem would arise in the maritime field with respect to the underwater submarine detection system (SOSUS). The s.13(i)(a)/s.15(i) oceanwide systems, including those portions in waters of Canadian interest, are owned and operated by the USA with the exception of the terminal station at Shelburne, N.S. which Canada operates under a joint agreement with the USA. It is unlikely that, if Canada were non-aligned, any portions of this system would be made available to Canada, and it has, therefore, been assumed in this option that SOSUS would not be available.
9. **Air Forces.** Radar coverage equivalent to that provided by the present Pinetree Radar Line (which includes 27 Canadian and 3 US stations) together with its ground control facilities would be needed to provide surveillance and control over Canada’s heavily travelled southern air space. A more effective and probably less costly coverage could be provided if this military system were to be fully integrated with the civil air traffic control network. The Pinetree Line provides a good capability of detecting a highflying intruder but a considerably lesser capability against the low flying aircraft.

10. To provide surveillance in the North, the Canadian portion of the DEW Line radars would be needed. This system is, in essence, a static electronic fence placed along the Arctic Circle and designed to provide good early warning against the southbound intruder. However, it provides no surveillance at all over most of Canada’s vast northern territory and has a relatively poor capability of detecting low flying aircraft.

11. It would be necessary to maintain eight long range all weather interceptor squadrons (96 aircraft) spread geographically across the country to provide a capability to intercept the majority of intrusions into Canada’s southern air space and a very limited capability to deal with intrusions in northern areas. The increase from the level provided today (56 aircraft), would be required to cover both the Prairies and the central Canadian region now covered by US aircraft under joint defence arrangements.

12. **Maritime Forces.** Sufficient seaward surveillance to give warning of random intrusions into Canadian waters off both coasts and in the Arctic Archipelago is the essential factor in maintaining maritime sovereignty. Without the capability of the SOSUS system, however, which is necessary for initial
detection of potential submarine intruders. Canada would not be able to maintain any worthwhile surveillance of submarines in the waters off our coasts except for chance encounters.

13. On the other hand, limited surveillance of surface ships could be achieved by retention of part of the present maritime forces. On the East Coast, eight helicopter equipped destroyers, supported by one operational support ship and twelve maritime patrol aircraft, would be needed to cover the extensive coastline ranging up to the Arctic islands, while a lesser force of four similar destroyers and four maritime patrol aircraft would be adequate on the West Coast. Preliminary analysis indicates that such forces would provide about a thirty percent chance of detecting random intrusions by surface ships.

14. **Ground Forces.** The ground forces outlined in Chapter 7 were designed to handle the internal security threat only. To meet the additional requirements for home defence set out in the force planning assumptions, the ground forces would have to be partly restructured, since the lightly equipped internal security forces would not be capable of conducting defensive operations aimed at controlling intrusions in the North as well as on both coasts. Consequently, one of the light infantry battalions in Chapter 7 located on the Prairies would have to be converted into an airborne unit to operate in the North.

15. Similarly, one battalion group in the Maritimes and one in British Columbia would have to be equipped to enable them to conduct defensive operations against small lodgements on either coasts, and one light artillery battery and a squadron of helicopters would have to be added to provide these
units with the necessary firepower and tactical mobility. This increased capability could be supplemented at a very small cost by forming additional reserve units based on the indigenous or other resident population of the Far North.

16. **Support Forces.** With the increase in both size and complexity of the forces, the level of support set out in Chapter 6 would have to be significantly increased to provide for the wider command and control required, and the increased scope of the training and logistic activities.

17. **Total Force Requirement.** On the basis of the above, a total of about 59,600 military and 15,900 civilian personnel would be required and the estimated annual cost of such a force would be about $1,050 million. A more detailed breakout of the force structure and its costs is set out in Table 2.

**RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**

18. Scientific advice to the Department of National Defence, the collection of scientific information and technical intelligence, and operational research would be required, all at a significantly higher level than Chapter 7 because of the broader roles for the Canadian Armed Forces. The minimum research and development effort would be that necessary to evaluate the foreign equipment available and to give advice on the acquisition of technically advanced surveillance and control systems. Taking into consideration that the volume of the available foreign scientific and technological information would be much less than at present, defence research and development at at least the present level would be essential.
19. If however, the military need was for the most up-to-date equipment which modern technology could devise, such equipments would frequently have to be developed in Canada. The most technically advanced nations are reluctant to supply non-aligned nations with their most modern systems and technology, particularly in areas considered sensitive such as surveillance systems for continental approaches. For example, as a non-aligned nation it is unlikely that we would know of the existence of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), and even less likely that any technical details would have been released to us. The logical result would be an expansion of the defence research and development capability in Canada and in particular costly development of systems in industry. Special attention would probably have to be paid to Arctic research. Because of the strategic position of the Arctic we could not cooperate with either USA or USSR without compromising our non-alignment policy. We would have to resist actively any work by aligned nations in the Canadian area which had military connotations. We would have to go-it-alone in the Canadian Arctic.
### TABLE 2

#### FORCES FOR SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL

##### ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER & COSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILITARY PERSONNEL</th>
<th>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL</th>
<th>COSTS ($ MILLION)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL FORCES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Defence Forces</td>
<td>7,679</td>
<td>1,988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
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<td><strong>OTHER UNITS</strong> (Includes Search &amp; Rescue &amp; Band)</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUPPORT FORCES</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command, Control, Administration &amp; Communications</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>48.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Base Support</td>
<td>6,209</td>
<td>4,195</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training Support</td>
<td>9,341</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics &amp; Maintenance Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Force Administration</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Support (Including Terminal Leave)</td>
<td>2,259</td>
<td>335</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL REGULAR FORCES</strong></td>
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<td><strong>RESERVE FORCES</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ESTIMATED ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEFENCE COSTS</strong></td>
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</tr>
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</table>
CHAPTER 9

FORCES FOR A POLICY OF ALIGNMENT –
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The analysis in the preceding Chapter suggested that Canada can satisfy the requirements of its national security only by military cooperation with other countries; that Canada’s major security interests are to be found in North America and in Europe; and that if a national security policy based on alignment is decided to be in Canada’s best interests, Canada’s defence policy should continue to be based on contributing armed forces to the defence of both North America and Western Europe, under the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. If the foregoing is agreed, the problem remains of deciding what kinds and levels of armed forces it is appropriate for Canada to contribute. Since there is no simple formula to apply, the solution to the problem depends on a variety of considerations. Military analysis can assist by delineating current and future military threats, by indicating the risks associated with various military responses to these threats, and by assessing the costs and the military effectiveness of particular force elements and particular weapons and equipment.

3. There is, however, no way in which the desirable level of Canada’s armed forces can be derived from pure military analysis, since the major and only significant direct military threat to Canada is one with which Canada alone is incapable of dealing. In face of this major threat of devastation in the event of a nuclear exchange between the USA and the USSR, the principal concern must be with ensuring stability of opposing forces and other measures to prevent war rather than with winning the war if it should occur. A stable balance can be achieved over a wide range of force levels, and the effect of a particular military action on the stability of the balance is often uncertain. There is,
therefore, no precise equation, leading to a desirable force posture, which can
be derived from pure analysis. The strategic system consists of a large number
of interacting components, and the balance develops and is maintained through
a complex sequence of measures, counter measures, and counter-counter
measures in each of the components.

4. Canada has a choice of leaving the maintenance of the strategic balance
entirely in the hands of the super-powers, or of participating in it, through
collective security arrangements, to the limit that resources will permit. If
participation is the preferred policy, the posture that Canada finally adopts will
depend upon an examination and judgement of the following principal
considerations:

a. Resources: A determination must be made as to what share of
its total national resources constitutes a reasonable contribution
to Canada’s national security. This is primarily a domestic
matter although inevitably, in the context of an alliance, the
size of Canada’s effort in resource terms relative to the efforts
of its allies, and allied opinions of it, became factors in the
decision.

b. Participation in policy formulation: A determination must be made
of the degree to which Canada can and wishes to exercise
effective influence on its allies in the development of collective
strategic policies and plans and in decisions taken at times of
crisis. This involves a need to estimate the reactions of allied
governments to any particular military posture adopted by Canada
and, especially, the extent to which they will regard Canada’s
military contribution as representing a fair share of the common
burden.
c. **Capability:** A determination must be made of the future roles, and thus the types of forces within the framework of alliance strategy best suited to Canada’s military experience and to the exploitation of Canada’s industrial and manpower resources. These considerations, although in part domestic, involve the relevance to the requirements of allied strategy and plans of any particular roles sought for the Canadian Forces and, therefore, a need for inter-allied consultations on the desired roles.

d. **Sovereignty:** A determination must be made of the extent to which Canada is prepared to permit the USA access to Canada’s territory needed for the purpose of assuring its and Canada’s security. This is primarily a domestic matter: it is one of “optics” and of ensuring that a US presence in Canada is properly regulated by the Canadian Government.

5. The discussion which follows in Chapters 10 and 11 seeks to explore the range of choices open to Canada if it decides to cooperate militarily in the defence of North America and Western Europe respectively. In Chapter 12 optional force structures at varying levels of effort are presented, with a summary of the implications of each in terms of the considerations described above, in order to provide a basis for the judgements necessary to reach decisions on Canada’s future defence program.
6. Once the choice of alliance has been made it follows that the military rationale for Canada’s defence programs must stem to a very large degree from alliance strategies and that the military roles of the Canadian forces have to respond to the military requirements of the alliance. When the factor of major investments in equipment programs is added, these considerations inevitably limit the scope for subsequent changes in program policy.

Research and Development

7. A major advantage to Canada of an aligned position would be access to the pool of defence scientific and technological information of the allies. The Canadian defence science policy could be to continue the present approach of limiting activities to carefully selected areas of importance to Canada. The results of the work would be used as a subscription to the much larger pool of US and European knowledge. It should be noted that if the alignment were with NATO in Europe only, difficulties could be expected in obtaining US information, particularly on continental defence. There are signs now (recent exclusions from sessions at classified US meetings) which indicate that the present research and development defence activity is at the barest acceptable level for the exchange of information. Any reduction of such activity would adversely affect our access to US generated information.

8. As an aligned country, Canada could expect to be allowed to purchase the most advanced equipment from the countries of the alliance. There would be a clear need for research and development activity to provide the base for evaluation and selection of equipment.
1. As discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 13, an assessment was made by the Defence Staff of the forces which might replace the defences available under the present aligned posture and should be adequate to convince both the USA and the USSR of Canada’s non-alignment. For this purpose, the requirement for surveillance, control and internal security examined in Chapter 8 was broadened to include the capability to react vigorously to an attack by the armed forces of any foreign power upon Canada. As already noted in Chapter 3, the defensive weapons systems required to make these forces effective probably could not be acquired by a non-aligned Canada, because no major power would be prepared to furnish its advanced military technology to a non-aligned country, in order to establish defences which might be used against it. The independent development and production of the necessary defensive systems by Canada would clearly be beyond its resources. This analysis was only made, therefore, to show the magnitude of the costs which face an unaligned Canada should it decide to produce a credible defence against an external threat.

THE THREAT

2. The discussion in Chapter 3 above leads to the conclusion that the principal threats to the security of a non-aligned Canada would be:

   a. The nuclear threat, which would not be diminished and might possibly be increased due to the strategic uncertainty created by Canada’s non-alignment.

   b. The threat or increased external pressures on Canada because of the power vacuum created by her non-alignment.

   c. The threat to Canada’s external security, some aspects of which would probably increase from strains resulting from these external pressures.
3. **Nuclear Attack.** It is evident that a nation of twenty million cannot provide adequate defences against the threat of mass attack. In the face of the nuclear threat, Canada would have two choices. The first, which is largely theoretical, would be for Canada to form its own strategic nuclear force of sufficient size to deter any aggressor. This would involve denouncing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as losing the guarantees against nuclear attack provided to the non-nuclear powers, by the nuclear powers signatory to the Treaty. As this course is both politically and financially improbable it is not considered further. The other choice is for Canada to rely on a continuation of the present state of mutual deterrence and to provide armed forces of sufficient size to meet its requirements for national security as discussed below.

4. **Conventional Attack.** The only military means of countering the principal external threats would be to provide a military capability sufficient to deter both the USA or the USSR from using Canada’s national territory either for their own strategic purposes or to prevent its use by the other. In addition, it would be essential to convince the USA that Canada’s defensive capability was sufficient not only to contribute to the protection of US strategic interests in North America, but also that its economic and investment interests in Canada were secure. For these purposes armed forces would be required with the following capabilities.

5. The principle component that would be needed to meet the level of credibility required vis-à-vis the two super-powers would be surveillance of a sufficiently high quality to detect, track and identify incursions into Canadian air space and waters of national interest. This capability would have to be backed up by sufficiently effective air defence and maritime forces not only to deter the USA and USSR from exploiting Canada’s national air space and waters, but also to convince each power that the other could not profitably intrude.

6. The ground forces would require the capability to locate and destroy any intrusions, particularly on the coasts and in the North, and to handle the threat to Canada’s internal security. As in the case of the air defence and maritime forces, the ground forces would not be designed to defeat any large-scale attack, but rather would have to be sufficiently mobile and well equipped to require the USSR or the USA to mount a large scale military operation in order to invade Canada.

7. Having examined the strategic capabilities of a number of middle powers, it is concluded that the level of forces required to provide a credible defence in the eyes of the USA and the USSR would generally ensure that Canada was capable of both countering any possible third power threat and of protecting its air and sea-borne commerce.
8. **Tactical Nuclear Weapons.** From a purely military standpoint, defensive nuclear weapons for the air and maritime forces would be most cost-effective, and would enhance considerably the credibility of Canada’s defence. Whether the forces should possess these weapons, however, would be primarily a political decision and would involve a denunciation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a very expensive weapons production program.

**FORCES REQUIRED**

9. **Air Defence.** To provide adequate warning of incursions and attack, as well as to give the necessary control over our air space, both fixed and mobile air surveillance systems would be required. The minimum acceptable coverage would be that provided by a radar chain across Southern Canada equivalent to today’s Pinetree system (30 stations) and the Canadian portion of the present Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, but augmented by an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) with a total of at least fifteen AWACS aircraft. Such a level of surveillance would provide good warning of penetration into our vital air spaces from outside continental North America, but only very limited warning of over-flights from the United States. Although this system would appear to meet the requirement effectively, much detailed study would be required to determine the most cost-effective mix of these and other air surveillance systems to satisfy the postulates of this option.

10. Whatever combination of surveillance methods were chosen, however there would be a requirement for a sophisticated command and control system. This would be based on the present NORAD Regional Headquarters at North Bay plus three combat direction centres probably located at Cold Lake, Winnipeg, and Chatham, N.B. To be as effective and economical as possible the air defence warning and control system would be fully integrated with and complementary to the civil air traffic control system.

11. The results of initial examination indicate that ten interceptor squadrons totalling 126 aircraft, together with an operational training unit, would be needed to be able to intercept and destroy intruders from the North and on the approaches to both Coasts, as well as to act as a credible deterrent (in Soviet eyes) to military over-flights from the United States.

12. On the East and West Coasts there would also be a requirement for air strike aircraft to deal with hostile ships in our maritime approaches. It would be considerably more cost-effective to meet this requirement if these strike aircraft were land based, and this is the proposal in this option. Similarly, to be effective and credible, the ground forces would require strike aircraft support. To satisfy these two additional requirements five of the ten interceptor squadrons, which would be those based on the two coasts, would be equipped with dual-purpose aircraft with the capabilities of the Phantom type. These five squadrons would thus have the second task of supporting both the maritime forces and the ground forces in their defence roles.
13. The five remaining air defence interceptor squadrons would be positioned across the country, but to increase their capability to survive an attack and to make them fully effective they would have to be capable of rapid deployment, particularly northward, to counter any developing threat. To provide for this flexibility in deployment, twelve medium range transport aircraft have been included. Such a mobile posture would eliminate the need for additional interceptor aircraft and more bases.

14. Tactical nuclear armed air-to-air missiles would significantly increase the capability of these aircraft.

15. **Maritime Forces.** It is more difficult to determine the level of maritime forces that would be required for the nation’s security, since it is necessary to establish not only the nation’s defensive requirements, but also a level of credibility vis-à-vis the USA and USSR in terms of maritime forces that would be equivalent to that established for air defence. It is internationally accepted that a nation’s air space shall not be violated. On the other hand, international conventions have established the inviolability of freedom of the high seas. Thus, while it is accepted without question that Soviet bombers may not fly through Canadian air space unchallenged, national sovereignty is not necessarily violated by a Soviet nuclear armed submarine cruising in waters of Canadian national interest. Notwithstanding, it would be necessary for a non-aligned Canada to be able to assess the implications of the presence and movements of foreign maritime forces within waters of Canadian interest, and the approaches thereto.

16. To establish this level, the capabilities of the maritime forces would have to meet the following basic requirements:

   a. Provide a level of surveillance adequate to detect and track any foreign submarine incursions into waters of Canadian interest; and provide, where necessary, the means for control of such incursions.

   b. Provide for adequate surveillance and control of foreign surface vessels, whether naval units or other vessels capable of undertaking military activities, operating in Canadian waters.

   c. Provide for protection of Canadian sea-borne commerce.

   d. Provide protection for Canada’s offshore rights.

17. Additionally, these requirements would ensure that the USA and the USSR could not operate their submarines undetected from or through waters of Canadian interest. From the point of view of the two super-powers, this would also mean that the USA would not have to request the use of Canadian territory s.13(1)(a)/15(1) to maintain adequate surveillance of the main submarine approaches to North America, while for the USSR it would ensure that USA submarine forces would probably avoid Canadian Arctic passages and waters.
18. To provide the credibility specified above and the necessary warning needed for active defence, a series of integrated surveillance systems would be required off the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts and in the Eastern and Western Arctic. These systems would be based on static underwater sound surveillance chains (SOSUS), nuclear powered anti-submarine submarines and continuous maritime air surveillance.

19. In the Atlantic and Eastern Arctic, the areas which would have to be covered by surveillance would include our northern and eastern waters and their main approaches. Some capability for the surveillance of the southern approaches would be needed at sea at any time, requiring a total force of nine.

20. Four SOSUS chains would be required to provide a realistic underwater coverage of this area. As nuclear powered submarines provide the most effective single system at present capable of detecting as well as tracking and killing other nuclear submarines, they have been included in the maritime defence force. To cover the area, and to provide under ice surveillance in the Arctic three such submarines would be needed at sea at any time, requiring a total force of nine.

21. Assuming a deployment of maritime patrol aircraft to Greenwood, Argentia, Goose Bay and Frobisher, six squadrons of 80 aircraft would provide This capability would include patrols to the Arctic and would meet the requirements for operational training.

22. To cover the Western Arctic approaches, three submarines would have to be added to the proposed force based on the East Coast, since the approach to the Western Arctic is more secure and safer navigationally from the Atlantic than from the Pacific through Bering Strait.

23. On the Pacific Coast, a total of two nuclear powered submarines on patrol, requiring a total force of six, and twenty maritime patrol aircraft would provide the necessary level of surveillance of the waters of Canadian interest between Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and the Western American seaboard.

24. In order to provide the maritime forces as a whole with the balanced anti-submarine attack capability required, and a reasonably quick and sustained concentration of anti-submarine surface forces out to the extremities of the waters of interest to Canada, the kill capability of the maritime patrol aircraft and submarines would need to be augmented by a
surface force of helicopter equipped destroyers. This surface force, backed up by some larger destroyers armed with anti-surface and anti-aircraft missiles, together with the shore-based intercept/attack aircraft (para 12) above would also provide defence against any surface threat. The total surface force required would be 26 helicopter destroyers and seven large destroyers. Three operational support ships and one fleet maintenance ship would be needed to support these forces.

25. In addition a mine counter-measure force of a minimum of twelve mine-hunters would be needed to deal with the limited mining threat against Canadian harbours and coastal shipping.

26. In determining the size and most effective balance for the maritime forces, consideration was given to including ASW carriers because of their effectiveness in providing the capability for concentrated and sustained local operations. After a brief analysis of the possible force options for 1975 and beyond, it was concluded that, because of the improved capabilities of the maritime patrol aircraft, newer fixed detection systems and the nuclear powered submarines, carriers would not be essential in the context of home defence. A much more detailed operational analysis would be required, however, to determine the most effective type and balance of air, surface, submarine and fixed systems needed for maritime defence. One of the factors which would significantly affect this balance, including the need for ASW carriers, would be whether or not the force were to be armed with tactical anti-submarine nuclear weapons. If ASW carriers were needed, a minimum of two would be required.

GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES

27. The ground forces outlined in Chapter 7 were designed to handle the internal security threat only. To meet the additional requirements for home defence set out in para 6 above, the ground forces would have to be restructured, since the lightly equipped internal security forces would not be capable of full defensive operations.

28. In terms of the defence of Canada’s territory, the ground forces would require the capability to deal with small scale incursions in the North as well as on both coasts. Consequently, one of the light infantry battalions located on the Prairies would have to be converted into an airborne unit to operate in the North. Similarly, one battalion group in the Maritimes as one in British Columbia would have to be re-equipped to enable them to conduct defensive operations against small lodgements on either coast.

29. In this connection it should be observed that Soviet bloc trawler fleets operate regularly off our coasts, primarily in the Atlantic. On the
average there are 300 trawlers operating in waters of Canadian interest at any
time. These trawler crews total 14,000 para-military personnel, and are capable of
coor-ordinated activity.

30. Thus although the additional comments of home defence operations have
been added to the primary task of internal security, this could be achieved without
adding new units by double-tasking certain units in the original internal security
force. To do this effectively, however, it would be necessary to mechanise a
proportion of the ground forces, and to increase both their firepower and mobility,
as well as adding tactical and helicopter support. Without these additions, neither
the USSR nor the USA would find the defensive capability or the Canadian ground
forces credible. Reserve Forces would also be required to back up the regular
ground forces in the roles outlined in Chapters 7 and 8.

31. The tactical air support for defensive ground force operation would be
provided by the five squadrons of dual purpose interceptor/strike aircraft discussed
in para 12 above.

Support Forces

32. The size and diversity of the operational forces are such that an operational
command structure would be required to ensure that they could be directed centrally
and effectively. Consequently, a unified Home Defence Command Headquarters
would be proposed to handle the command, control and readiness of the operational
forces, and to be responsive to the direction of Canadian Forces Headquarters and
the Cabinet in Ottawa.

33. One of the keys to good end credible defence is an effective intelligence
system. Canada’s present intelligence relies heavily on international co-operation.
Canada as a non-aligned nation would have to rely largely on its own efforts.
Sufficient resources would have to be provided, therefore, to develop and operate a
fully independent intelligence agency, the costs of which would be high.

34. Communications requirements would be significantly larger to provide for
the enlarged air defence system, for additional SOSUS stations and VLF communica-
tions to submarines. Training, logistic and other administrative support would all
need to be increased substantially over those in Chapter 7.

Total Force Requirements

35. It is estimated that a force with these capabilities would need about 123,000
military and 32,250 civilian personnel and the estimated annual costs would be no
less than $2,600 million. This level of costs makes provision for about $775 million
or 30% of the annual expenditure to be spent on capital acquisition, and is based on
the assumption that the equipment acquisition program would take ten years to
complete. If the two ASW carriers discussed in paragraph 26 were to be added an
additional 7,100 military personnel would be needed and the annual operating costs
would be increased by $100 million. Further details are outlined in Table 5 attached.
Dr. Sean M. Maloney is from Kingston, Ontario and served in Germany as the historian for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian Army’s contribution to NATO during the Cold War. He is the author of several works dealing with the modern Canadian Army and peacekeeping history including the controversial *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means 1945-1970*, *Chances for Peace: The Canadians and UNPROFOR 1992-1995*. Forthcoming works include *Operation KINETIC: The Canadians in Kosovo 1999-2000* and *Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian Visits Afghanistan*. Dr. Maloney has extensive field research experience throughout the Balkans, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. He currently teaches in the RMC War Studies Programme, and is a senior research fellow at the Queen’s Centre for International Relations.