North American Security
North American Security
America’s Response, Canada’s Role

Jeffrey Turner
Bruce Johnson
David Miller

Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
2005
North American security: America’s response, Canada’s role / Jeffrey Turner, Bruce Johnson, David Miller.

(Martello papers, ISSN 1183-3661; 28)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-55339-084-9


© Copyright 2005
In Memoriam

Nils Ørvik
1920-2005
Founding Director
Queen’s Centre for International Relations
The Martello Papers

The Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of security studies, the Martello Papers. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

Each year the QCIR hosts Visiting Defence Fellows from the armed forces of Canada, Germany and the United States. One of their tasks is to undertake research on some aspect of security and defence, for publication by their respective services and by the QCIR. Not surprisingly, many of the American VDFs have been attracted to topics exploring Canada’s participation, current or prospective, in the defence of North America.

This Martello Paper is the fruit of three such studies by recent American VDFs. In the first, Lt Col Jeffrey Turner (US Army, 2004-5) describes the nightmarish but not improbable scenario of a terrorist attack on the continental US with a nuclear weapon. He sets out with brutal clarity the strategic logic that would compel Canadian cooperation with a threatened or wounded America, and the impact of that country’s response on the global order. If we think the consequences of September 11, 2001 were revolutionary for world politics, they would likely pale compared to what would follow in this case.

If the threats to North America have mutated and multiplied, the institutional response by Canada and the US has proved innovative. Lt Col Bruce Johnson (USAF, 2002-3) was at Queen’s when the new American Northern Command was stood up in the fall of 2002. His paper describes the thinking behind that decision, the structure of the new command, and the debates to which it gave rise in Canada. While he suggests that early fears for Canadian sovereignty were unfounded, he also highlights the connection to NORAD’s future. Writing before the discreet modification of NORAD’s role and the Martin government’s subsequent decision not to participate in the missile-defence scheme, Johnson is prescient in laying out the choices Canada will have to face.
The third paper, by Lt Col David Miller (USAF, 2004-5) is, in effect, a sequel to Johnson’s study, using a model of defence-policy decision-making, modified from its original American application, to suggest how Canada might respond to the prospect of a more elaborate North American defence architecture. Such a scheme would be built on the foundations of the US Northern Command, the new Canadian Command, and an extension of the NORAD model — if not NORAD itself — to land and sea. Miller’s model underlines the domestic and institutional interests to which any Canadian government would have to pay heed in its decisions on this issue.

We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of their services, the QCIR, or any of its supporting agencies.

Charles C. Pentland
Director, QCIR
July 2005
Contents

North American Security Cooperation:
What Can America Need From Its Neighbours?
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Turner, United States Army ................. 1
  Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
  If It Hasn’t Happened In Sixty Years, Why Now? ................................. 3
  Nuclear Weapons Effects .......................................................................... 9
  U.S. Response ............................................................................................. 12
  Targets ......................................................................................................... 14
  Recommendations ....................................................................................... 17
  Conclusion ................................................................................................... 21
  Notes ............................................................................................................ 21
  Bibliography ................................................................................................ 24

Shifts in the North American Security Landscape
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce A. Johnson, United States Air Force .......... 29
  Overhaul of the US National Security Policy ......................................... 30
  Restructuring the Department of Defense ............................................. 32
  Standing Up NORTHCOM .......................................................................... 34
  Changing Roles for JFCOM and ACLANT ............................................. 37
  Standing Down USSPACECOM ................................................................. 38
  The Future of NORAD ............................................................................... 39
  Fielding a Missile Defense ....................................................................... 42
  Notes ............................................................................................................ 46
  Bibliography ................................................................................................ 48
  Glossary ....................................................................................................... 52
# A Future North American Defence Arrangement: Applying a Canadian Defence Policy Process Model

*) Lieutenant Colonel David A. Miller, United States Air Force ............................

**Introduction** ................................................................. 55

The Future of North American Defence Cooperation ................................. 56

The Bi-National Planning Group ......................................................... 56

The BPG Interim Report ................................................................ 57

A Continental Defence and Security Agreement (CDSA)? ....................... 58

A Challenge to Enhanced Cooperation ............................................. 62

Understanding a Defence Policy Process Model ................................. 62

Canadian Defence Policy as a Plan or Course of Action .......................... 63

Canadian Defence Policy as a Component of National Security ............ 63

Canadian Defence Policy as a Political Process .................................. 68

Canadian Defence Policy Process Impact on a CDSA .......................... 73

Conversion Structures ................................................................... 81

Conclusion: A CDSA Progress Report ............................................. 86

Notes ....................................................................................... 88

Bibliography ............................................................................. 95
North American Security Cooperation
What Can America Need From Its Neighbours?

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Turner
United States Army

Introduction

“Canada’s defence problem is that it has no defence problem.”¹ Dr. Joel Sokolsky’s observation may lie at the heart of the importance of the United States forcing North American security cooperation. Failure in this task would have catastrophic consequences for not only the United States but also the world, its system of states, and the international organizations established to serve their interests.

By way of explanation, I set out to examine the security and defence relationship between the United States, Canada, and Mexico post September 11 in light of the security deliberations underway in the Bi-national Planning Group. Out of a fascination with the “New World Order” writings of the early 90s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I chose Samuel Huntington’s three-dimensional chessboard analogy as a framework for analysis. In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington describes the competition between nations on military, economic, and soft power planes. A nation can be in a position of power on one plane and have its overall status undercut by losing on another plane. Given the different perspectives of the countries involved, this seemed like a valid framework for analysis.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
I had hoped to draw some conclusions about the future direction of North American military cooperation needs after the Cold War. Current speculation surrounds the expansion or contraction of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as a base for increased cooperation. In the face of the possible formation of a Canadian Command as a Canadian counterpart to Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Canada’s decision not to participate in ballistic missile defence, NORAD’s expansion was not assured. A single conclusion overwhelmed the analysis in its early stages. The relationship between Canada, the United States, and Mexico is viewed primarily in economic terms and secondarily in social or soft power terms by America’s neighbours. It is viewed primarily in security terms by the United States. More precisely, the United States perceives a very real security threat to its survival. Its North American neighbours (and most European allies) do not perceive a survival threat. This problem is further compounded by the fact that, in all environments save the air, real jurisdiction for North American security falls to civilian not military organizations in the United States. Except in the aerospace domain, the Department of Homeland Security, state and local police authorities have the jurisdiction and responsibility to provide security. Despite the creation of a military NORTHCOM, the U.S. responsibility for North American security remains squarely on the shoulders of non-military organizations. With some variations, this is also true for Canada and Mexico. If anything, the creation of Northern Command, with the mission to “Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned area of responsibility” including “Canada” and “Mexico”, made military cooperation politically more difficult given the sovereignty issues and anti-American sentiment its announcement raised. The circumstance of U.S. land and sea jurisdiction renders the question of increased military cooperation along the model of NORAD largely irrelevant, if not entirely moot.

Given the presence of anti-American sentiment and the lack of a perceived threat in Canadian and Mexican politics, their defence question becomes “How much is just enough?” If North American security is guaranteed by the United States, its neighbours need not concern themselves with how many planes or ships they need to fight off potential invaders. They perceive no potential invaders. They have to ask the question: “what does the United States want from us in order to keep the border open to commercial traffic?” They seek to minimize America’s infringements on their sovereignty and political capital at home. North American security cooperation boils down to what America perceives it needs from its neighbours and how those needs can be met politically in Ottawa and Mexico City at least cost. In order to plumb the recesses of this question in the military plane, I decided to look at a case.

This study examines the feasibility and fallout (pun intended) of a terrorist attack on the United States using a nuclear weapon. That possibility is the basis of what is now the top homeland defence national planning scenario.
technologies for a massive conventional explosion, chemical, or biological attack may differ, the risk of attack and North American security considerations are similar enough to treat the nuclear attack as representative of this class of security problem: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In its potential impact on world order a nuclear attack may be the worst case, but the impact of a successful significant chemical or biological attack could well be of a similar magnitude. In that regard, the nuclear case also represents the entire class Americans call WMD.

This study examines the viability of terrorists putting together or stealing a nuclear weapon. It will look at how they could gain access to the United States and what kind of immediate outcome America could expect. Lastly, it will postulate possible American reactions in the international arena. In conclusion, the study will examine the type and extent of North American security cooperation needed to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist succeeding in such an attack.

If It Hasn’t Happened In Sixty Years, Why Now?

Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in anger since 1945. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world perceived the risk of nuclear war to be greatly reduced. But the demise of this former world power also increased the risk of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology proliferating. This is the so called “crossroads of radicalism and technology” cited by the President as the “gravest danger our Nation faces.” With the breakdown of Soviet society, the guarantee

Access to Fissile Material

The Soviet Union designed its nuclear materials security system with the assumption that people could be monitored and controlled. By contrast, the United States’ system assumed that people were the weakest link. As a result, the post-Soviet system lacks many of the redundant safeguards that prevent access to weapons or nuclear material contained in the U.S. system. Additionally, if access to fissile material is gained, it is less likely than in the U.S. system that the loss would be discovered through an accounting system. Russia’s homegrown automated accounting system has yet to prove more reliable than the “shoe box” manual system it was designed to replace. With the breakdown of Soviet society, the guarantee
that people can be controlled has largely been replaced with a “kleptocracy.” The Soviet social safety net has been replaced with a self-help system that seems to know no bounds.9

During a radio interview in 2003 Chairman of the Russian Financial Monitoring Committee Victor Zubkov announced that “criminal activity in Russia accounts for up to 50 percent of the country’s total income”.10 That sentiment is not limited to the civilian sector. Reports of theft and misappropriation among military commanders remain common. In 2002, “a Russian military court found General Georgy Oleynik (former head of the military budget and financing department of the defense ministry) guilty of abuse of office. General Oleynik had authorized the transfer of $450m to Ukraine as payment for materials which were never delivered.”11 Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Igor Khmelnov was sentenced in 1997 for diverting the proceeds from the sale of 64 excess ships, including two aircraft carriers, to his personal use.12 In 1992, Yuri Smirnov was arrested for stealing three pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Luch Scientific Production plant south of Moscow. He took the material from his employer 50 grams a time over a five month period.13

The physical security of Soviet nuclear materials took a trajectory similar to that of Russian society. Again, the Soviet system relied more upon the ability to control people than on physical safeguards and accountability designed to protect against a single person or conspiracy intent upon stealing fissile material. Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was no market for fissile material accessible in Russia. As the economic situation in the former Soviet Union reached new lows, there was little enthusiasm to spend what little money was available on building a new physical security system to address society’s changes. The immediate result was not only less security but in many cases, abandonment in place as programs ceased to function and people stopped being paid.14 In 1993, the U.S. Department of Energy removed 1,278 pounds of HEU from an abandoned Soviet production facility in Kazakhstan. This nuclear submarine fuel plant was abandoned in the late 1980s. The uranium in the facility was secured with a single padlock. There was enough uranium fuel to make twenty-two crude atomic bombs.15 While members of the G-8 have pledged two billion dollars a year to help secure former Soviet Union nuclear weapons and fissile material, there is wide agreement that there is much left to do.16 By the end of 2004, only 26 percent of Soviet nuclear materials had been secured with a comprehensive security upgrade. At the same time, only 46 percent of an estimated 600 tons of Russian HEU and separated plutonium had undergone even a rapid (hasty) security upgrade.17 Experts estimate that at the current rate of effort, it will take 12 years to complete the job of securing nuclear materials in Russia alone.18

This effort largely does not extend to civilian research and power applications of HEU around the world. At these sites, power generation and research must compete on an economic basis with fossil fuels. As a result, security expenses
must be factored into the competition. At civilian power stations, the most valuable products may be sitting out back in a waste storage pond.

Weapons grade HEU is highly desirable to a terrorist because it doesn’t require a complicated implosion design to detonate as a bomb. Spent nuclear fuel rods contain plutonium. While plutonium requires a complicated bomb design to work, it can be separated from the spent reactor fuel using a chemical process behind radiation shielding. By contrast, if a terrorist wanted to enrich uranium to fuel a bomb, he would have to connect many gas centrifuges. The centrifuge technology is controlled internationally. The chemical separation route using plutonium to manufacture bomb material is simpler, cheaper, faster, and easier to conceal than uranium enrichment. Some experts believe that a very crude bomb could be made using garage-level technology following the plutonium route. They suggest that raw plutonium oxide as opposed to the finished metal could yield an explosion. Unused mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is another, safer source of plutonium. This fuel is used in some nuclear power stations, particularly in France. Separating plutonium from reactor fuel is feasible but requires tons of fuel to obtain enough material for one bomb. Stealing bomb material is still the simplest method of obtaining the needed fissile material.

Despite the progress made in securing Russian nuclear materials, the assessment that they are not secure enough is valid today. National Intelligence Council reports prepared in advance of President Bush’s 2005 meeting with President Putin contained that concern as well as an assessment that unaccountable nuclear material had already been stolen over the past 13 years. While arrests for smuggling nuclear materials shifted from Germany in the 1990s to Turkey in more recent years, the fact that there is enough of a market to drive smuggling would indicate that materials are available and that there are willing buyers.

The identification of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (father of Pakistan’s bomb) as a major proliferator of bomb technology and enrichment equipment early in 2004 demonstrated that the world’s efforts to prevent nuclear weapons technology proliferation are failing. The Khan nuclear trading ring provided bomb designs as well as enrichment equipment and designs to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. The analysis of Libya’s nuclear program revealed that Pakistan’s Dr. Khan also provided over a ton and a half of uranium hexafluoride gas, believed to have originated in North Korea. This was enough raw material for at least one bomb after enrichment. One can draw two significant conclusions from Libya’s program. First, it represents a third major class of sources of fissile material: sympathetic nuclear powers. Second, it shows that the current non-proliferation scheme including intelligence collection is inadequate in keeping nuclear weapons ambitions beyond the grasp of fundamentalist Islamic and pariah states and by extension, terrorist organizations.

The relatively weak forces of counter-proliferation are competing against the stronger forces of organized crime and religious zealotry, which are backed by
massive financing. Russian organized crime’s pervasiveness and ruthlessness is legendary. This strong force is capable of being motivated by al Qaeda’s financing. Before 9/11 it was estimated that al Qaeda’s budget was $30 million per year. There are no good estimates available of al Qaeda’s post 9/11 financing. While some inroads into reducing al Qaeda’s cash flow have been made, there is general agreement that it remains well financed. There have been numerous reports in the last few years that bin Laden is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. It has been reported that he has offered up to a million dollars for an atomic bomb. He has declared that it is a religious duty to acquire this capability. At one point, he claimed to already possess nuclear and biological weapons as a deterrent but declined to give any details. There is at least one report that the 40 Chechen terrorists that raided the Moscow theatre in 2002 initially considered attacking a Russian nuclear material storage site. The Russians have reported that they “twice thwarted terrorist efforts to reconnoitre nuclear weapons storage sites in 2002.” Chechen terrorists have demonstrated their ability to operate deep in Russian territory in large, well organized, suicidal groups. This represents another strong force (other than organized crime and disenfranchised citizens) possibly attempting to acquire nuclear materials in Russia.

Assuming that a bomb or highly enriched uranium could be made available: would a terrorist organization be able put the pieces together and carry out an attack?

The Technology to Build a Bomb

Al Qaeda (“the base”) has exhibited more than mere competence as a guerrilla or insurgent organization. It exhibits some new genius in guerrilla operations, enjoys support from radical factions in many countries, and fully exploits the benefits and baggage of globalization. This makes it and its associate and successor organizations especially dangerous.

Al Qaeda’s founders and trainers went to the best possible insurgency school. They spent ten years under the tutelage of Central Intelligence Agency operatives in places like Pakistan, fighting the world’s other super power’s best forces in Afghanistan. This experience was further refined in the following ten years training foot soldiers and operatives in Sudan and Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance and in Kashmir. Al Qaeda’s real genius comes in overcoming the guerrilla’s traditional weakness: its support base, and in their unique efficiency in carrying out attacks.

By tapping into not only the frustration of Muslims around the world but also their tradition of charitable giving, al Qaeda has guaranteed its needed refuges, replacement foot soldiers, and funding. Its unique efficiency comes from the availability of modern global communications and a kind of venture capital terrorism to augment centrally planned operations. Global communications provide a means to get out the propaganda, solicit and distribute funds, and move people and ideas
between safe harbours in dispersed political jurisdictions. Globalization guarantees that these means, required to be open and free for the functioning of the world economy, remain available to support guerrilla operations. One should not under estimate the advantage this quantum leap in freedom and scale of movement represents. Al Qaeda’s mastery of global communications is unique in history. The genius of venture capital terrorism is found in avoiding the limitations and risks of central planning, preparation, and logistics. In place of vulnerable centralized operations, al Qaeda has essentially hung out a sign to all potential jihadists saying “bring us your good ideas and we’ll fund you to carry them out.” Like a venture capitalist, al Qaeda has the very brightest and most motivated potential terrorists lined up at its virtual door waiting to be vetted, trained, and funded. Somewhere in line is the terrorist equivalent of the inventor of “Velcro” or the silicone chip waiting for a CIA-trained mentor and a million dollars in terrorist venture capital. That genius is uniquely positioned to gain control of a nuclear weapon or enough highly enriched uranium to build one.

If there is any question about an al Qaeda subsidiary’s ability to hide a bomb in development, one only has to look to al Qaeda’s success in preparing and executing the September 11th attacks. Much of the preparation was actually done undetected in the United States. For more technical programs consider three examples of successful WMD attacks in the last two decades. Members of Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult, experimented with biological weapons in Japan in the early 1990s until they finally settled on the chemical weapons used in the Tokyo subway attacks. An unknown person or group used the US Postal Service system to attack the U.S. government and a newspaper office with anthrax in October 2001. In an effort to throw a local election in Oregon in 1984, members of the Rajneeshee, another religious cult, successfully developed, tested, and deployed an incapacitating biological weapon without being detected by the authorities for a year. Over 700 people were made ill in that attack. These groups successfully gathered the money, equipment, technical expertise, and raw materials needed to produce viable WMD. They hid their efforts under the noses of western authorities for years. They were not deterred by the possibility that their actions would force the authorities to utterly crush them in their sanctuaries. Al Qaeda could certainly hide a program in a country with a sympathetic population and “ungoverned regions”.

The level of technological sophistication needed to create a nuclear weapon today is not very high. This was proven by MIT and Princeton undergraduates successfully designing crude atomic weapons in 1974 and 1976 respectively. It is reported that senior Pakistani nuclear scientists, including Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, met with Osama bin Laden and discussed nuclear weapons in depth. While well guarded, Pakistan’s nuclear community is certain to continue to have well-placed Islamic radicals inside its scientific and security organizations. For many years, al Qaeda provided Pakistan with mujahideen to fight in Kashmir. If any non-converts need help or coercion, they are available in the form of former
Taliban and al Qaeda forces taking refuge and operating in Pakistan after the fall of Afghanistan. Egyptian universities, long-time hotbeds of radical Islam, provide another ready source under-employed technical talent. Bomb design and construction is not rocket science.

**The Will to Employ a Nuclear Weapon**

The threat of mutually assured destruction formed the basis for nuclear deterrence throughout the Cold War. Diplomatic and economic sanctions continue to pressure regional powers not to acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that countries like Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and North Korea believe that they can hide a state sponsored transfer of WMD to a terrorist, they will not be deterred. These strategies will not work at all with al Qaeda. It has no territory to protect from destruction. It has no economy to protect or civil international reputation to uphold. In fact, if one believes that al Qaeda’s goals include motivating moderate Muslims to join the radical elements in jihad, then it might actually seek a strong American response. On the other hand, al Qaeda’s ability to deter America from continuing to support or influence governments in the Middle East (a major al Qaeda aim), would be dependent upon America perceiving a credible nuclear threat. Once the threat is appreciated, America has the option of ceding influence in the Middle East to the radical Islamic totalitarians and being held hostage economically, or “reducing” the threat militarily. Given those options, al Qaeda would be inviting a ruthless, truly grand battle by issuing the threat.

It doesn’t seem logical for al Qaeda’s leadership to hold a nuclear weapon in reserve where it would risk being taken away in a swift strike when they could probably gain a better result by employing it before a threat was issued. It would seem more logical for al Qaeda to strike as soon as it acquired the capability, take responsibility for the event, and threaten more attacks in the future if America doesn’t accede to its demands. This scenario at least has the possibility that America would consider it a one-time event like 9/11 or to feel vulnerable to a second strike. I highlight this thought because military planners and politicians are famous for over emphasizing the best possible outcome and dismissing the less desirable possibilities. Al Qaeda’s pattern to date has been one of striking, claiming responsibility, and threatening more if America doesn’t change its pattern of actions. While demonstrating patience, al Qaeda is not known for holding back a capability after it was deemed operationally ready.

Bin Laden revealed in an interview in 1998 that he drew the opinion that America would not stand and fight after watching America withdraw from Somalia after taking 18 casualties. In his post-9/11 interview, bin Laden highlighted the enormous economic damage caused by the 9/11 attack and his comparatively small outlay. He likened the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan and its eventual demise to the war al Qaeda was starting with America. In bin Laden’s opinion, America would either shrink from a fight, leaving the Middle East to him, or
bankrupt itself and suffer the Soviet Union’s fate, again leaving the Middle East to him.\textsuperscript{36}

I believe that all of these considerations point to bin Laden being much more likely to employ a nuclear weapon at his first available opportunity rather than holding it in reserve.

\textit{Access to the United States}

Access to America appears to be the weakest link in the chain of security. The professional smuggling of illegal cargo and undocumented personnel into the country remains at epidemic levels. President Bush stated in his 2005 National Drug Control Strategy that the residents of seven U.S. cities have the distinction of spending at least a billion dollars a year on illegal drugs.\textsuperscript{37} The smuggling chains that bring in those drugs and millions of illegal aliens every year could be used to smuggle in a nuclear weapon and operatives to employ it. Over nine million commercial shipping containers enter the U.S. every year. Over 116 million vehicles cross U.S. borders every year.\textsuperscript{38} In September 2002 and again in September 2003, ABC News successfully smuggled a slug of depleted uranium into the United States in a shipping container: first from Turkey then from Indonesia.\textsuperscript{39} While less radioactive than HEU, the depleted uranium is a fair stand-in for the real thing for the purposes of the exercise. The U.S. border, the last line of defense, represents the weakest link in the chain.

\textit{Nuclear Weapons Effects}

Even a very small yield nuclear weapon detonated in a modern city would produce damage not seen in the western world since World War II. The United States, not having suffered significant damage in either world war, would be uniquely traumatized by the spectacle.

A low yield nuclear device is capable of tremendous destruction. The Hiroshima bomb was rated at 15 kilo tons (kt). It caused 66,000 deaths and 67,000 injuries. The Nagasaki bomb was rated at 21kt. It killed 39,000 and injured 25,000 people.\textsuperscript{40} These yields would represent some of the smallest weapons in the U.S. or Russian arsenals.

Let us consider Manhattan as a possible ground zero. It makes a good target and al Qaeda has attacked there twice. The 1990 census lists the average population density of residents for New York County, New York as about 67,000 per square mile.\textsuperscript{41} This figure does not include commuters working in Manhattan during the day. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University gives a $\frac{3}{4}$-mile radius devastation zone for a 10kt bomb.\textsuperscript{42} That is about 1.7 square miles. It is easy to imagine 100,000 deaths and an equal number of injuries from a single attack in Manhattan. This is just a “back of the envelope”
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Turner

estimate based upon the Japanese experience, a census estimate, and an unclassified nuclear weapon effect prediction from Harvard. One could make a case for doubling the casualties based upon the presence of daytime workers. If we only considered half of the estimated casualties to be a more accurate number, the results of the exercise would be identical.

On September 4, 2002 William C. Thompson Jr., Comptroller of New York City, estimated that the four-year fiscal impact on gross city product from the September 11th attacks would be between $82.8 and $94.8 billion dollars. This estimate was based upon a year of study and the experience gained from recovering from the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing. It is not hard to imagine even an ill placed nuclear device easily causing a trillion dollars in fiscal impact.

The Twin Towers attack on September 11th did not include a radiological clean up. While immediate and residual radiation were factors in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts, they were airbursts. At an altitude of about 1,600 feet above ground, their fireballs never touched the earth and fallout was completely absent. A terrorist bomb delivered in a van would burst at surface level. A surface detonated bomb would irradiate soil and debris hundreds of feet from the center of the blast, pulverize or vaporize this radioactive material, and loft it high up into the air. Much of that radioactive debris would fallout almost immediately within a mile or two of the site depending upon wind direction and speed. While the actual fallout would depend upon a myriad of factors, one can gain a point of reference by looking at a similar device tested in 1957 in New Mexico.

The Boltzmann shot consisted of a 12kt bomb detonated 150 meters above open ground (no skyscrapers). One should expect that our 10kt terrorist example detonated at ground level to produce more fallout and irradiate more local debris. The Boltzmann shot produced two plumes of radiation. The first started at ground zero and extended about 35 miles north (down wind). The second started about eighty miles north of ground zero and extended about twenty miles north of that point. The dose rates in those plumes were above 100 milliroentgen per hour soon after the shot. Radiation levels decrease in time. That level of radiation did not pose a significant health hazard if victims were to leave the area and did not ingest any fallout. The only medically significant radiation was found right at ground zero. Still, it is unlikely that citizens and public officials in New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey would tolerate this level of contamination.

Our Manhattan ground zero would pose a health risk for some time after the blast. Heavily contaminated buildings, roads, and rubble would have to be land filled or abandoned in one of the world’s most expensive real estate districts. Radiation is an unseen, unfelt hazard that engenders a special kind of fear in humans. The combination of not being able to see or feel the damage and the risk of cancers developing years in the future put the fear of radiation in its own category. Society might try to decontaminate lightly contaminated structures and
take the risk that residents would not suffer health effects later in life. Given America’s response to the Three Mile Island incident, I doubt that the public would expose their families to detectable levels of radiation even though the level might not be medically significant.

Nuclear devices emit an electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). Our blast would destroy most modern electronic and many electrical devices for a mile around. This pulse basically overloads sensitive circuits in computers. Nearly every modern device relies on these circuits to operate: phones, radios, heating and air conditioning controls, and automobiles all contain electronic circuits. EMP is a tricky thing to predict. The phenomenon is believed to be caused by (negatively charged) electrons rushing out of the blast faster than the heavier, slower (positively charged) nuclei. If the rush were uniform as in a stable atmosphere, there wouldn’t be an EMP. In our blast, the ground and nearby buildings would ensure that the rush was not uniform. As the blast moved out through, over, and around the local terrain, distortions would form electrical lobes projecting our EMP. The lobes, hence the EMP, would not be uniform. In some directions, a fairly strong effect might be felt miles from ground zero. In other directions there would be very little effect. Virtually anything that we use in our modern information-based society could be at risk up to several miles from ground zero.

Lastly, the well understood effects of blast and thermal radiation would overwhelm any response New York City could mobilize. Unlike September 11th where the public stood around in shock for an hour permitting emergency responders to flow into very small area to render aid, a nuclear blast would cause immediate panic. Several orders of magnitude more severely injured people would be flowing out assisted by the lightly injured and uninjured. Emergency services would be swimming against this tide and the pull of crowd to dress their injuries and to transport their gravely injured neighbours to the overwhelmed medical treatment facilities. Think about the images of people running away from the twin towers as they collapsed. Then think about that ten fold or a hundred fold with the fire departments and police being on the outside instead of on the inside of the crowd.

The Tokyo medical system collapsed under the crush of 5,000 people seeking treatment after the subway chemical attack in 1995. Most of the 5,000 people had only stress induced symptoms. Fairly few were actually ill and required medical intervention. Consider ten thousand or a hundred thousand people that actually need burns or cuts dressed or bones set. Consider an additional half million that want to know how much radiation they have received and what kind of pills you can take for it.

The purpose of looking at results of a small nuclear attack on an American city was to gain an appreciation for the level of physical, financial, and human damage inflicted. To summarize, one could expect that there would be 33 times the number of casualties America experienced in on September 11th. That would be twice the number of U.S. deaths suffered in 10,000 days of fighting in Vietnam. The injured could fill all of the acute care beds in New York and New Jersey. The
financial damage would rival or exceed the annual federal budget of the United States. The trauma, drama, treatment, and clean-up would monopolize the news for weeks if not months.

**U.S. Response**

The greatest damage that may come from al Qaeda acquiring a nuclear weapon might not be the physical destruction such a weapon could cause in a major urban center like New York City or Washington, D.C. The greatest damage might come from the mobilization of the United States and its allies to a full wartime footing and their deployment into the Middle East, North Africa, and the Pacific region. Their targets could be the perpetrators, nuclear proliferating and terrorist sponsoring regimes, as well as governments which were ineffective in cleaning out radical Islamic sanctuaries in their own countries. In short, it would lead to World War III. This is reflected in America’s response to the September 11th attack and in its published policy. The second greatest effect would be reforming or replacing ineffective international institutions as happened after World Wars I and II.

I have found fairly little written on possible U.S. responses to a nuclear event on its home soil since the Cold War. During the Cold War theorists were concerned with fighting an escalating nuclear war or mutually assured destruction. There were variations on targeting strategies, but those theories are of no use in considering this problem. To address the problem, I examined limitations in America’s capabilities to wage war, rationales for targeting countries, and which countries might belong in each target group. The analysis in no way provides a blue print for a response but I believe that it can provide some insight into the future.

**Capacity**

The world was shocked when the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11th. It was an unimaginable increase in commitment and aggression from a nation that had reluctantly put a division of soldiers on the ground in Bosnia in 1996 and had refused to set foot in Kosovo a few years later.\textsuperscript{48} The expanded level of effort post September 11th including attacking Afghanistan and Iraq represented, at most, about four percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) being spent on an all-volunteer force. Compare that with about 8 percent of GDP during the Vietnam War, about 13 percent during the Korean War, and 37 percent during World War II.\textsuperscript{49} America’s history would indicate that when its interests or survival is at stake, it can accommodate significant growth in defence spending. Since the Civil War, America’s prowess in expanding industrial capacity to meet military needs has been unquestioned. Monetary and industrial resources should not be a limiting factor in escalating military activity.
Recalling the sentiment after September 11th, I believe that Americans would support a military draft after a domestic nuclear detonation. Even a crude nuclear detonation would represent a one or two order of magnitude increase in death and destruction over the September 11th attacks. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that motivated a neutral isolationist American public to support a world war created less than one-tenth the damage of a nuclear attack and did not even strike the mainland. The risk of a follow-on nuclear attack would border on threatening the survival of the nation. The time separation between the First and Second World Wars is not unlike the time separation between the Vietnam War and today. I doubt that the public’s feelings about war on the eve of WW II in light of WWI were any less vivid than America’s current feeling in light of Vietnam. Memories of the draft, maimed soldiers, and the Great Depression were over shadowed by calls for patriotism, defence and revenge. The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) has significantly reduced the number of people required to effect regime destruction. Compare the forces arrayed for the rolling start of the second Iraq war to the iron mountain start of the 1991 Iraq war. Next, consider that the 1991 Iraq war was an RMA war. Arguably, picking up the pieces (regime change or stabilization) could be left to the remnants of the destroyed regime and concerned international actors. Forcibly disarming a nuclear program need not involve controlling an entire nation. Does a war of revenge necessarily have stabilization and rebuilding phases? Manpower need not be a limiting factor.

**Allies and International Pressure**

Clearly, an order of magnitude increase in American aggression is not only possible (as a percent of GDP and through the draft) but entirely likely after a nuclear event. The ensuing conflict would provide the now expanded NATO with an opportunity to reciprocate America’s support in World War II and the Cold War and justify its continued existence. The United States could also probably count on Russia’s support in exchange for political support in fighting Chechen terrorists and some level of forgiveness if the nuclear material used in the attack originated in Russia. New allies could be found to be “with us.” They might want to make sure that they didn’t make the “against us” list as after the second war with Iraq. They might want to settle old regional scores. They might want to use this opportunity to adjust the power balance in their region.

World public opinion and ruling elite opinion may split over anti-Americanism, national interest, and the path to stability in the world. The choice of whether America reacts strongly or not is a false choice. The no action option could lead to a second strike and further damage to the world’s economy. It would signal withdrawal of American leadership from the world stage. Failure to react would be a failure for globalization. It would signal a return to American isolationism, could lead to a global depression, and speed the eventual change to Chinese
leadership in the world. That said, the real choice is between America acting multilaterally with many allies under an international organization’s banner or America acting unilaterally with few allies. Absent a smoking gun, I doubt that the United Nations or a consensus of NATO members could see through their national interests quickly enough to underwrite any American military response. The 2003 pre-Iraq invasion political formula works well for most nations’ national interests. If certain countries gridlock the multilateral institutions, everyone except America can get off the hook for paying for the invasion, claim the moral high ground in public opinion, reap soft power benefits for not using hard power, and at the end of the day still enjoy the international order created by American leadership and military power. Justifications for being an ally or not as dictated by national interests have little bearing on the American response. America is politically prepared and militarily equipped to act unilaterally if necessary. Allies and international sanction need not be a limiting factor.

There does not appear to be a natural limit to the capacity for American aggression in an economic, manpower, or political form. Human history is one of warfare. Despite the wishes of interest groups and worldwide rise in anti-American sentiment, it is unlikely that world peace will break out and that America will not respond militarily to a nuclear attack. Without knowing the future in order to see which countries assisted the nuclear attackers, it is still possible to examine which countries might be at risk.

**Targets**

I believe that there will be three sets of targeted countries in World War III based upon America’s political rhetoric. The first set will be countries found to have participated in the attack or supported the attackers. These could be viewed as revenge attacks. The second set will be regional nuclear powers that fail to disarm and fully submit to International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring. These are disarmament attacks. The third set will be countries that fail in their sovereign duties to prevent terrorists receiving sponsorship, sanctuary, or support within their borders. The last set of attacks is designed to “drain the swamps.” Not surprisingly, these three lists have some commonality in America’s political rhetoric.

The first set of targeted countries will likely be those responsible for the attack as it was after September 11, 2001. This list can’t be formed until an investigation is begun after the attack. We can expect to see two kinds of states on the list. Countries that were home to the functioning al Qaeda cells that prepared the attack would have some tough questions to answer. Half measures in shutting down recruiting and sheltering sanctuaries for al Qaeda would not be acceptable. Tacit government support for terrorists would be fatal. Given the global, networked nature of al Qaeda, this effort would likely involve several countries. Somewhere there would also be a nuclear material barn door that needed to be closed. This
represents the second kind of states with some responsibility for the attack: nu-
clear powers, proliferators, and marketing states. If a state was found to have
passed nuclear material to a terrorist, it could be considered an act of war worthy
of retaliation. States which were found to be mere sources of loose nuclear mate-
rial or had trading and smuggling rings would also have questions to answer.
States with a degree of government complicity in the smuggling could be viewed
as not only failing in sovereign duties but also as worthy of retaliation. The idea
that a state would pass nuclear material to a terrorist is not far fetched when you
consider the amount of secret nuclear materials trading that has already gone on
between states that purport to be opposed to proliferation. Consider also the de-
gree to which Iran and Pakistan can control the actions of radical elements in their
own governments.

Recalling Iraq after September 11th, the second set of target states after those
responsible for the attack might be regional nuclear powers. These states, espe-
cially the “axis of evil,”51 might be asked to immediately and verifiably dismantle
their nuclear weapons capability to prevent a second attack on the United States.
Those counties that didn’t comply might expect regime change, regime destruc-
tion, or precision strikes on their nuclear capabilities in their immediate future.
President Bush’s National Security Strategy says “The overlap between states
that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.”52 The case
might be made in the UN and NATO, but in the end the United States would be
forced to take action with willing allies and without international sanction if nec-
essary. Patience to let negotiations or international institutions have an effect would
be an unaffordable luxury. The regional nuclear powers group might include Iran,
North Korea, and Pakistan. I include Pakistan despite its aid to the United States
against Afghanistan over the last twenty-five years because of its nuclear trading
and support to radical Islamists. Should governance in Pakistan collapse, the se-
curity of its nuclear materials could easily be compromised.53 Such a collapse
could be initiated by democratic forces as in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 or Islamic revo-
lution as in Iran in 1979. World War III could look very much like a “Clash of
Civilizations” to Islamists in Pakistan and prompt a collapse. India is not on the
list because there is no evidence that it was a nuclear trading country or had any
links to Islamic radicals. Libya is not on the list despite its history of supporting
terrorism because it dismantled its nuclear program. Senator Nunn believes that
in ten years, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia may join the Islamic nuclear
power list.54

Given the national treasure required to generate and maintain a state nuclear
weapons program, states will be reluctant to give up what they must view as an
essential part of their national security formula. This reluctance and fear of their
neighbours or the United States could lead to a hesitancy to comply, a pleading
with other authorities (allies or the UN), or a try at brinksmanship that might see
the passage of the deadline and start the wheels of regime destruction turning.
Telegraphing the military preparations for a U.S. strike at the risk of losing
operations security will be important to avoid a miscommunication or misinterpre-
tation of America’s intentions.

Those that might argue that it is too much to demand that a state give up the
Holy Grail of security would do well to re-read the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America. The section titled “Prevent Our Enemies From
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends With Weapons of Mass Destruction”
mentions North Korea by name. It lists “Proactive counter-proliferation efforts”
as the first item on the “comprehensive strategy to combat WMD” list. The key
capabilities in counter-proliferation are “detection, active and passive defences,
and counterforce capabilities.” The WMD section goes on to justify the case for
pre-emptive actions. Those with lingering doubts might consider the case for
America’s second war with Iraq as well as its current fascination with North Korea
and Iran. Given America’s current engagement in this area, this part of the war
might start before enough evidence has been gathered to start revenge attacks
against the nuclear perpetrators in the first set.

The third set might be those states that fail in “denying further sponsorship,
support, and sanctuary to terrorists … (and) accept their sovereign responsibil-
ies.” A nuclear detonation in the United States would likely signal that the
waiting period for sovereign states to shoulder their responsibilities was over.
Those found wanting would be subject to regime change or regime destruction.
This group might include Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Su-
dan. Pakistan heads my list as the chief nuclear proliferator, likely home to bin
Laden and his followers, and as a country with significant sympathy and support
for radical Islam. In America’s eyes Iran and Syria actively support and export
militant radical Islamic terrorism. Saudi Arabia is the home of Wahhabism, a
puritanical branch of Islam associated with intolerance and extremist teachings.
Much of the private money needed to fund madrassas preaching extremist views
around the Middle East is believed to come from Saudi Arabia. Whether some
or all of these governments go may depend upon their actions immediately fol-
lowing the nuclear attack. Some may resemble Pakistan’s turn away from the
Taliban after September 11th and earn a second chance in the Administration’s
eye. Some may model Afghanistan’s adherence to principle in the same period
and become a footnote in history.

A New World Order

Lastly, much like the building or re-building of international institutions after the
First and Second World Wars, I would expect a call to scrap those institutions that
were perceived to have failed to prevent this calamity. The current American Ad-
ministration’s position on the value and efficiency of the United Nations and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is well known. The IAEA probably
has a future with some added protocols including surprise inspections and
accountability down to the corporation and individual levels. The UN is probably headed the way of the League of Nations given its reputation for inefficiency, corruption, and stalemate. With the lack of a defined threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is showing signs of bi-polarity. The delay principally led by France in planning for the defence of Turkey prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was an early sign of this bi-polarity. If the European Union (EU) forms a strong defence policy and begins to wield party discipline in NATO, the result could be a permanent polar standoff between America and the EU in NATO similar to the situation in the UN Security Council. This would be disastrous to the future of NATO.

The conclusion that I draw from this response exercise is that the no response option is politically unviable from national and international points of view. There are no significant resource limitations that cannot be overcome to striking several countries militarily in retaliation, coercion, or to forcibly disarm them. An escalation in military activity is more in keeping with both the Bush Administration’s policy as well as human history than is a shift toward isolationism or patience and a reliance on multilateralism. While a precise American response may be difficult to predict before a nuclear attack has taken place neither a lack of capability, nor a shortage of potential targets or objectives would limit such a response.

**Recommendations**

There are some obvious actions that the United States and other nations can take in order to reduce the threat of an attack on the United States and to reduce the damage the United States might cause in response. Solutions reducing the threat to the United States broadly take the form of reducing the availability of bomb making materials and finding bombs or terrorists before they arrive at American cities. Longer term solutions may involve improving the lot of mankind to reduce the number of terrorists produced. Solutions reducing the threat that the United States poses to world peace take the form of reforming international security organizations to the degree that the United States would choose multilateral options for its security.

**Making the United States Safe from the World:**

**Securing Fissile Materials**

The pace of securing the former Soviet Union’s fissile material stocks needs to increase. The longer it takes to establish security and accountability, the longer the window of vulnerability remains open for this material to be diverted into a terrorist bomb. The tone of the annual reports from within and outside the government would indicate that the bureaucrats in America and Russia are turning the
program into a career. It may be time to shift management motivation of this program to a pay for performance contract and get it out of the hands of the Department of Energy.

It is not clear that U.S. intelligence is focused on this matter in an operational way. Given our fifty year obsession with the Soviet Union, the United States should have the intelligence capability to cooperate with Russia in crushing fissile material theft and smuggling rings inside and around the former Soviet Union if Russia could be convinced to cooperate. Honey pot or sting operations could go a long way in providing both a negative incentive to theft and trading in fissile materials and in vacuuming stolen materials out of the hands of thieves and back into government accounts. The fear of exposing corruption close to the ruling elite makes deeper cooperation in Russia problematic. Russian security concerns prevent direct U.S. access and assistance at their Federal Agency for Atomic Energy site where most of the material of proliferation interest is stored.59 Sadly, these same concerns slow the economic and political reforms needed to correct societal problems that gave rise to the fissile material security problem.

One international institution with some promise is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Arming the IAEA with a Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) with universal enrolment, surprise inspections, expansion of responsibility to corporate and individual level and expansion of coverage to all possible sources of enriched uranium and unseparated plutonium would do much to assure the world that the fissile materials were safe. It would also give potential proliferators pause. Fear that their actions could be traced back from a nuclear detonation should motivate them to either not share the material or sabotage the program before a detonation takes place. Happily, support for improving IAEA effectiveness is on the rise both in the United States government and the UN.

The United States should take the lead in implementing the NPT in spirit by dismantling more nuclear weapons and diluting their uranium cores into reactor fuel. It is a little baffling that with thousands of tons of excess HEU in the world, the world continues to mine uranium and enrich it. The market should be flooded with free non-weapons capable reactor fuel. The only price should be IAEA monitoring of the spent rods to control the plutonium.

**Border Security**

United States border security is an easy target without an easy answer. The fact that the United States is intertwined with the rest of world makes the free flow of people and products essential to its survival and welfare as well as the welfare of the rest of the world. While the Container Security Initiative, proposal for an “outer security perimeter”60, and improved intelligence regarding goods and people entering the United States will reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, globalization and human nature will continue to leave the border as the weakest link in the chain. Intelligence can be thought of as the key to making border security effective
enough without crippling trade. The idea is that America only has to inspect three percent of the containers entering the country if they are the right three percent. That is, intelligence makes surveillance effective as a both a barrier and a deterrent. The reality is that a terrorist only has to evade detection once to be successful. This reality benefits from human nature that wants to make a profit smuggling drugs, goods, and people into the country as well as the human nature that wants to consume them. The Government Accountability Office lists the Customs and Border Protection’s lack of a “comprehensive set of assessments vital for determining the level of risk for ocean-going cargo containers and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk” as an “emerging area of high risk.”61 That ranking means that the money spent on border security today is among the most questionable investments of taxpayer money in all of government. There is room for great improvement in border security but it should never be a cornerstone of an effective counter terrorism program.62 It is more like painting a bridge. You have to do it all the time to prevent a near term failure but in the end the bridge is going to rust anyway.

**North American Military Cooperation**

The fact that the primary jurisdiction for border security lies in the hands of civilian organizations does not mean that military cooperation has no role in avoiding WW III. Military aid to civil power in an interception or consequence management scenario can be enhanced through military cooperation. Cooperation welds shut national boundary gaps in coverage. It brings additional, unique assets to consequence management when host nation assets are scarce, likely to be exhausted, lacking in expertise, or directly affected by the disaster.

Military cooperation also brings a level of uncommitted resource to intelligence sharing and situational awareness not available in the civilian side of government. Civilian agencies have primary and additional duties other than defending the homeland. Their expertise lies in regulating the flow of airplanes, enforcing the law, safety on the water, responding to natural disasters, and a myriad of other tasks. The military, by contrast is not encumbered with another primary mission. It trains, rehearses, executes, and learns from its experiences. It fuses intelligence and maintains situation awareness as a primary mission. Improving the timeliness, accuracy, and clarity of information is the heart of the Revolution in Military Affairs.

In this dimension, a greater interagency coordination (including the military) and coordination across national boundaries can have an impact on keeping WMD out of an American city. It is difficult to put a value on the synergy that exchanging military staffs and deputy commanders can have in a military cooperation or coordination system. Living in the neighbour’s society and working for their leaders brings not only an appreciation of values and many dimensions of understanding,
it also breeds trust. Trust is a key and essential component of any information system. More than precision or even speed, an information system that is to extend across national boundaries must have the trust of the leaders and decision makers that would keep nuclear weapons and terrorist operatives out of America. That is the real value that military cooperation can bring to this problem.

Making the World Safe from the United States: International Institutions

There is a universal call for better international institutions today. The Europeans would like to see the rule of law and multilateralism restrain the unilateralist actions of the United States. The United States would like to see a more efficient, less corrupt international forum in which to exercise its leadership. While both positions are reasonable, they are at odds with each other. Moreover, there is no evidence that an ideal system could work in the real world. An ideal international system based upon the rule of law and a multilateral security guarantee should eliminate a regional (or global) power’s need for nuclear arms. The first resolution of the United Nations in 1946 called for the elimination of “weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represents as near an ideal example of a multilateral security organization for common defence as exists in the real world. Even this arrangement found states needing to develop indigenous nuclear weapons and states that felt they needed to provide or receive nuclear weapons to and from other allies. This was the situation at the height of the Cold War when NATO had a common enemy to promote solidarity. In a time without a common enemy, the UN as a much larger group of nations with divergent interests has little hope of achieving a better security arrangement than NATO achieved at its best.

Lord David Hannay was a member of the most recent United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. In his keynote remarks to the Symposium on the Future of the United Nations, he called his panel’s work “the most far-reaching official review of the UN’s role, in particular in the fields of peace and security, since the founding fathers met in San Francisco in 1945.”

His panel broadened the threat agenda past terrorism and WMD to include failed states, poverty, environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, and organized crime. Regarding unilateral use of force, the panel “set out certain guidelines … for reaching such decisions … so giving a greater degree of predictability … and some deterrent effect, to decision-taking in this matter.” In his remarks, Lord Hannay cautions not to let the issue of membership of the Security Council dominate the agenda for change. Overall, this most recent recommendation for improving the United Nations doesn’t seriously address America’s lack of confidence in the United Nations or individual states’ insecurity that motivates them to possess WMD in the short term. It does attempt to dig at the roots of problems that lead to conflict and improve treaties to make the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) more effective. It also endorses President Bush’s call for criminal penalties in all countries for nuclear material and technology traffickers.65

I conclude from this that an improved United Nations would not provide enough of a security guarantee to persuade regional powers to give up their nuclear arms. It is equally unlikely to give the United States enough of a security guarantee to rely on it for a multilateral security solution. Similarly, even in the close community of NATO allies, national interests will undermine confidence in the protection that the multilateral organization can provide and confidence that it can act offensively when needed. Evidence of this is in France’s ability to delay the planning for Turkey’s defence prior to America’s second war with Iraq. The immediate solution for preventing the United States starting WW III does not realistically lie in reforming the UN.

Conclusion

It is clear that nuclear materials will be relatively available for at least the next five to ten years unless we substantially increase efforts to secure them. Similarly, the current generation of radical Islamic terrorists has the motivation, means, and unique talent to strike truly devastating blows against the United States. Though the jurisdiction for addressing this problem in North America falls almost entirely in civilian hands, military cooperation can significantly enhance the usefulness of cross border information systems needed to secure the homeland. Military cooperation can ease the challenge of consequence management after an attack. The question of whether the weak forces of nuclear counter proliferation and North American border security or the strong forces of radical Islamic terrorism and organized crime win the race can only be answered by time. What hangs in the balance looks like World War III or “The Clash of Civilizations.”

Notes

3. David Haglund, What NATO for Canada, Martello Papers, vol. 23 (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2000).
21. Ibid.
28. Unattributed, “US Intelligence Concludes Theft of Russian Nuclear Material ‘Has Occurred’.”


51. George W. Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” ed. Office of the President of the United States (Office of the Press Secretary, 2002).


56. Ibid., p. 6.


63. Ibid.


Bibliography


______ “President Delivers State of the Union Address.” ed. Office of the President of the United States: Office of the Press Secretary, 2002.


Our great challenge is to protect the American people. The most basic commitment of our government will be the security of our country.

— President George W. Bush

On September 11th, 2001 the United States came under a vicious attack. Three thousand people died at the hands of nineteen al Qaeda terrorists. President George W. Bush vowed to never let it happen again. In his effort to protect the American people, he had his National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, overhaul the National Security Strategy and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld restructure the military. Most of the changes were in direct response to the emerging terrorist threat and the “war on terrorism,” although some of the accompanying changes had been in the policy review cycle before the attacks waiting for an opportunity to be implemented. The Department of Defense established United States Northern Command, and placed Canada within its area of responsibility. It disbanded United States Space Command, realigned the responsibilities of Joint Forces Command, and altered the Canadian-American military relationship. The changes also modified NORAD’s command structure, and with President Bush’s decision to deploy the Ballistic Missile Defense system by the end of 2004, inherently changed the continental security arrangement with Canada. The paper evaluates the significance of the shift on security policy, the effects of the Department of Defense restructuring and the ramifications of deploying the Ballistic Missile Defense system. The North American security landscape has changed,
and Canada will have to make some difficult decisions to retain its influence in the security of in North America.

**Overhaul of the US National Security Policy**

After the January 2001 inauguration of President George W. Bush, the new Republican administration began the task of developing its own *United States National Security Strategy (NSS)*. Bush’s administration was in the final editing throes in September 2001 when terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attack forced the administration to completely overhaul its NSS and delayed publishing it until the following September, a year after the attacks. The Secretary of Defense’s *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* is another insightful source into the Bush administration’s formulation of a new security policy. The *QDR Report* defines the strategy and guidance for developing the US military forces and capabilities. The *QDR Report*, like the NSS, is a congressionally mandated document and it is required by United States Code (federal law) to consider the role alliances, allies and coalitions might play, and thus provides insight into the US perceived role of Canada and NORAD in the security of North America. Equally interesting is the fact that the *QDR Report* was published three weeks after the September 11th attacks, and although it had been quickly revised to reflect the significance of the attacks, it primarily captures the administration’s perspective on the US defence structure prior to the attacks.

In evaluating the Bush administration’s NSS from a Canadian perspective and in comparing it to the Clinton administration’s 2000 NSS, there are three distinct observations to note. First is the overwhelming impact that the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks had in reshaping American security strategy. The totality of the effects of enduring the catastrophic attacks and the American public feeling of vulnerability to future attacks meant that the Bush administration had to undertake extraordinary measures to minimize the probability of such an attack reoccurring. The second observation is the absence of Canada and NORAD in the security dialogue. The absence is not to say Canada’s role in the security of North America is unimportant. As long as Canada is not perceived as a threat or security weakness to the United States, it does not require specific mentioning in the NSS. And last, the NSS places great emphasis on “igniting a new era of global economic growth” and “championing aspirations of human dignity” as a means to advance prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. This theme of achieving a more prosperous, safer, better world carries the overtones from Clinton’s last NSS. One may even see similarities with Canada’s former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s human security agenda. But for President Bush, this better, safer world is to be achieved through Republican economic stimulus concepts such as encouraging business investment, removing trade barriers and lowering marginal
tax rates. It is interesting to note that the only mention of Canada in the NSS is in the section discussing the importance of resolving ongoing trade disputes.\(^3\)

It is difficult for foreigners, including Canadians, to comprehend the enormous impact the attacks had on America’s psyche. The attacks shattered the American psychological myth of invulnerability. It changed how the United States perceived its security. It forced the United States to react to a direct threat to the territory of the United States and resulted in a global “war on terrorism.” In response to the threat, the Bush administration established a cabinet department for homeland security and restructured the military. Lastly, the Bush administration and NSS placed disrupting and destroying “terrorist organizations with a global reach” as the top US security priority.\(^4\)

To achieve the aim of destroying the terrorist organizations, the United States will work within the framework of multinational institutions like the United Nations (UN), Organization of American States (OAS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and will look for “coalitions of the willing” to augment these institutions in the “war on terrorism.”\(^5\) The United States views Canada as a reliable ally, as a co-member of these institutions and as part of the coalition of the willing. It also looks to Canada to fulfill its obligations in the security of North America. The NSS goes on to state, quite controversially in the view of American allies, that “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, [the United States] will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively.”\(^6\)

Canada’s role in the defence of North America is small but politically important for both Canada and the United States. NORAD serves the dual purpose of protecting Canadian sovereignty while giving the United States an integrated aerospace defence of North America. That the NSS does not mention Canada should not be viewed as an oversight, but rather as a compliment in terms of the faith the US government places in Canada as a trusted ally defending the northern flank of North America. Canada is the only US ally with a role in providing for the defence of North America and the territorial United States. The QDR Report states, as part of the planning of the US force structure, that the US forces will provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defence and uphold US commitments under NORAD.\(^7\) The United States recognizes that Canada is difficult to defend by itself, given its large geographic area and its relatively small population. Some American officials, such as US Ambassador Paul Cellucci, view Canada as unwilling to pay for an adequate defence on its own.\(^8\) As Joel Sokolsky points out, the reality is that the Canadian government will “not spend significantly more on defence because it [does] not believe it [has] to in order to secure vital Canadian interests — the security of the country and its prosperity.”\(^9\) The key for Canada is to continue providing sufficient defence so that in light of the shifts in the North American security landscape, Canada does not become perceived as a security threat or vulnerability to the United States.
One final observation is how little the Clinton and Bush administrations’ National Security Strategies really differ once the effects of the September attacks are put aside. In Western democracies, security strategies are mostly driven by national values, interests and perceived threats and are for the most part apolitical. Clinton’s strategy, like Bush’s, discussed the importance of enhancing security at home. This included countering asymmetric threats such as terrorism, developing a missile defence, and pursuing democratization, open markets and free trade abroad. Absent from Clinton’s NSS are the effects of addressing a catastrophic terrorist attack within the United States. Absent from Bush’s NSS are the lists of accomplishments, the overwhelming detail, and Clinton’s softer foreign-policy words such as “engaging, shaping, responding and preparing.” In neither version of the NSS are Canada and North American Aerospace Defense Command mentioned, except with respect to the importance of bilateral and multilateral defence and security arrangements. The real difference between the two administrations lies in the means of the implementation of the strategy and in President Bush’s mandate to achieve victory in the struggle over terrorism.

Restructuring the Department of Defense

The second major outcome of the terrorist attacks is the realization that the United States military was not organized to best defend the United States and support the civil authorities. The United States Code, Title 10, provides the authority for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the missions and responsibilities of combatant commands at least every two years, and recommends to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any necessary changes. The Chairman’s Directorate for Plans (J5) directs the review. Once it is approved by the President, the Chairman publishes the changes in the Unified Command Plan, the document that establishes the combatant commands, and provides the commanders their missions and responsibilities.

On 17 April 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers announced at their press conference the most recent changes to the Unified Command Plan. It created a new unified combatant command, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and assigned it the mission of defending the United States and providing military assistance to the civil authorities. The plan also reassigned the geographic responsibilities, and most of these changes were in response to the establishment of NORTHCOM. The map in Figure 1 shows the newly assigned areas of responsibility for the regional unified commands. With NORTHCOM receiving the geographic responsibilities from United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the Chairman changed JFCOM from a regional into a functional command and assigned it the mission of transforming the US military.
Figure 1. Unified Commands’ Areas of Responsibilities
Another noticeable change is the assignment of Russia, Canada and Mexico to a unified command for the first time. Previously, these countries were under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and were not assigned to a unified command. For several years, the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff debated the merits of assigning Russia to the United States European Command. Once that decision was made, and the need to establish a NORTHCOM developed, all countries including Canada were assigned to a unified command’s area of responsibility.

In a subsequent change to the Unified Command Plan, the Chairman transferred United States Space Command’s responsibility to United States Strategic Command and dissolved United States Space Command effective 1 October 2002.14

Standing Up NORTHCOM

The press conference held on 17 April 2002 by Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers announced the establishment of NORTHCOM, effective 1 October 2002. This announcement, with the provision to include Canada in the command’s area of responsibility, raised concerns in Canada about the intentions of the United States. The concern was overblown, mostly generated by some on the Canadian political left who made the misguided assumption that Canadian forces would eventually fall under NORTHCOM.15 In reality, NORTHCOM was set up as a US-only, unified command focused on the mission of homeland defence. The fact that Canada was assigned to NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility has no more significance than Great Britain having been assigned to United States European Command’s area of responsibility over 50 years ago. The geographic assignment gives a combatant commander the responsibility for regional defence planning, security cooperation and military coordination with friends and allies within the region.16

The Department of Defense created NORTHCOM in order to rectify a security vulnerability. Since the establishment of a unified command structure in 1946, the United States had never included the continental United States, Mexico or Canada in any regional combatant commander’s area of responsibility. This changed with the establishment of NORTHCOM. It was driven by the realization that the American military was not organized to best support homeland defence and to defend itself against the emerging terrorist threat from al Qaeda. While the establishment of NORTHCOM is predominantly an American phenomenon, the event does have some implications for Canada.

Northern Command’s mission is to provide homeland defence and civil support. Specifically, the command’s mission is to:

Conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility,
and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.\textsuperscript{17}

The mission is focused introspectively on the United States. The only exception would be if American interests outside of the United States were threatened in a way that included the security of Canada. This is not a divergence from, but a continuance of, American security policy to protect its interests in North America.

The NORTHCOM commander, as a regional combatant commander, has a broader, international charter with a heavy emphasis on the US-Canadian relationship. The NORTHCOM commander’s responsibilities include: defending the United States against attack; conducting land and maritime defence planning; providing military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations; providing security cooperation, military coordination and military engagement activities with the countries in the geographic area of responsibility; assuming command of NORAD (unless a Canadian officer is designated commander); and in the event of war, becoming the combatant commander.\textsuperscript{18} The commander’s geographic area of responsibility, as shown in Figure 1, includes the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The command structure and organization is similar to the other eight unified commands except that it has very few assigned forces and no permanently assigned service component commands. Outside of the command staff, there are only two joint task forces and a joint task force headquarters assigned to NORTHCOM. The Joint Forces Headquarters – Homeland Security (Joint Forces HQ-HLS) is the homeland security component headquarters that coordinates the land and maritime defence of the continental United States, and coordinates military assistance to civil authorities. Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) provides the command and control for US military forces deployed in support of a lead federal agency managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive incident in the United States. Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) provides the Department of Defense counter-drug support to law enforcement agencies. In the event of a crisis requiring combat forces, the President or Secretary of Defense will operationally assign forces from Joint Forces Command or other unified command as deemed necessary.\textsuperscript{19} Figure 2 shows the command relationship and command staff organization.

Several observations can be made from the NORTHCOM’s mission, responsibilities and structure. First, although concerns about sovereignty were raised in Canadian media, there is in fact no role for or intent to subordinate the Canadian Forces inside NORTHCOM, nor was NORTHCOM established to defend Canada. That remains the sovereign responsibility of Canada and the US-Canadian bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command. Yet the Canadian government and military will want to work with NORTHCOM in planning for the bi-national US-Canadian land and maritime defence, and in conducting joint
military engagement activities such as military exercises and continuing the military officer exchange programs. Good cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Department of National Defence is increasingly critical, as the complementary functions performed at JFCOM and the operational planning role in NATO’s Allied Command Atlantic were dissolved.

As the United States organizes its Department of Homeland Security, and NORTHCOM matures and the US leadership shapes its missions, roles and responsibility, it is important that Canada protects and pursues its interests. And in fact, the Canadian government has done just that. As part of discussions between Canadian and US officials to improve the safety and security of citizens through enhanced cooperation following the events of 11 September 2001, the governments have concluded an agreement to enhance Canadian security cooperation with the US. As part of the agreement, the Department of National Defence has established a bi-national Planning Group with the Department of Defense at NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs to work together on contingency plans for defending against and responding to possible threats in Canada and the US, including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.20
Changing Roles for JFCOM and ACLANT

As of 1 October 2002, United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) surrendered the geographic area of responsibility it inherited from United States Atlantic Command to NORTHCOM, United States Southern Command and United States European Command. It also transferred its responsibilities of providing the military assistance to civil authorities and planning the territorial land and maritime defence of the United States and Canadian region to NORTHCOM.²¹ JFCOM was responsible for bi-national US-Canada defence planning. The bi-national land defence planning was mostly inconsequential. There was no viable land threat other than terrorism, and the US and the Canadian armies only occasionally worked together in defence of North America. But JFCOM was the source of the close bi-national naval planning and coordinating of US-Canadian naval exercises and operations outside of NATO. Now, this planning has been transferred from JFCOM in Norfolk, Virginia, to NORTHCOM in Colorado Springs. Meanwhile, the United States Atlantic Fleet Headquarters remains in Norfolk and is now nearly a continent away from the planning activity.

Thus, JFCOM was changed from a regional command with a geographic responsibility to a functional command responsible for developing joint doctrine, integrating joint forces, and joint training and, in the time of crisis or war, providing continental US-based forces to the combatant commanders. While Joint Task Force 6 and Joint Task Force Civil Support were transferred to NORTHCOM, the component commands — Forces Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, United States Atlantic Fleet and Air Combat Command — remained with JFCOM, the joint forces provider.

The second source of close US-Canadian naval cooperation was likewise severed, but in this case the responsibilities are being transferred to Europe. The Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) was the NATO command responsible for trans-Atlantic naval planning, exercises and operations. It provided a close working relationship for the US and Canadian navies under NATO. ACLANT headquarters was also conveniently located in Norfolk with JFCOM and United States Atlantic Fleet. ACLANT has changed into Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and “will lead NATO’s military transformation, enabling creative solutions to the operational challenges of coalition warfare against new threats and ensuring NATO forces are jointly integrated and interoperable with US forces.”²² Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, has become the sole strategic operational headquarters for NATO. SHAPE has been renamed Allied Command Operations (ACO). The NATO tether supporting close bi-national naval operations is now an ocean away from both National Defence Headquarters and United States Atlantic Fleet.
Standing Down USSPACECOM

Initially *Unified Command Plan 2002* made no provisions to modify United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), but a subsequent change transferred USSPACECOM’s mission and responsibilities to United States Strategic Command and dissolved USSPACECOM as of 1 October 2002 to correspond with the standing up of NORTHCOM. This change to the *Unified Command Plan* eliminated the USSPACECOM headquarters and its staff. All the subordinate commands and organizations were transferred to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). This event, combined with the Bush Administration decision to pursue a Ballistic Missile Defense, has several significant ramifications with long-term consequences for Canadian security interests.

The most significant ramification, the separation of the NORAD commander from space operations, could result in the loss of Canadian access to US space planning and operations. Before 1 October, the commander of NORAD was also the commander of USSPACECOM and the United States’ Air Force component command, Air Force Space Command. Since the inception of USSPACECOM in 1985, Canadian military officers were assigned to USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command staffs. This inadvertent infiltration of the US military staffs was part of an officer exchange program designed to give Canadian officers exposure to space operations. This was seen to benefit NORAD since all the sources of missile launch warning and space surveillance data came from US space resources. The exchange was inherently easy to arrange since the same commander ran all three organizations. With USSPACECOM now dissolved and the Air Force Space Command reassigned to USSTRATCOM, this access is at risk and may be completely lost. With it, the Canadian military may lose access to US space planning, operations and intelligence. The space planning and operations experience has assisted Canada in pursuing its own limited space program, but more importantly, the operations and intelligence give Canada an inside seat to world events and pending crises it would not otherwise have.

The second implication is the risk of renewing the Canadian nuclear allergy. With the recent elimination of USSPACECOM, NORAD has been brought into closer relationship with USSTRATCOM, the owner of the US nuclear arsenal. Since 1 October 2002, USSTRATCOM, now the combatant command of all Air Force space assets, provides NORAD with its missile warning and space surveillance data to support NORAD’s Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM now operates the Missile Warning Center, the Space Control Center and the Operational Intelligence Watch, of which all operationally report to NORAD Command Center. This close relationship has the potential to raise the nuclear discomfort of the Canadian public. Canadians recognize the need for nuclear deterrence, but do not want to be closely associated with the nuclear weapons themselves. Thus far the Canadian public has been relatively mute on this concern. Few people noticed that when the Air
Force’s Strategic Air Command was disbanded in the early 1990s, the Air Force reassigned the intercontinental ballistic missiles wings to Air Force Space Command. Nor did many notice that Air Force Space Command was assigned as component command to both USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM. Nor did the public take notice that, starting in the early 1990s, the United States Air Force went one step further and integrated the missile and space career fields, and the Canadian officers were working with US missile officers in space planning and operations. But the biggest bugaboo, the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), could change public perceptions, particularly when USSTRATCOM has both the offensive and defensive nuclear capability under its command, and the Canadian general officers in NORAD take their turn in rotation as the potential assessors, ready to confirm that North America is under attack and authorize the employment of BMD interceptors.24

The Future of NORAD

While America has modified its national strategy and restructured its military, NORAD has functionally and organizationally remained unchanged. Its governing document is the NORAD Agreement that is renewed approximately every five years. The Agreement was last renewed early in June 2001, a year early in order to avoid the pending contentious US decision to deploy a missile defence. Now, with President Bush having withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and committed the Department of Defense to deploying the BMD system, the very nature and structure of NORAD is at risk.

NORAD is responsible for providing the aerospace defence for the United States and Canada. That includes providing territorial air defence against hostile aircraft and cruise missiles, ballistic missile warning and space surveillance. Since 1991, NORAD received the additional responsibility of reporting counter-drug surveillance information to law enforcement agencies. After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the importance of air defence was revitalized, and NORAD received the additional responsibility of assisting the US Federal Aviation Administration and Nav Canada in tracking North American air traffic and in detecting internal aviation threats.25

NORAD is a bi-national military command of which the commander is traditionally an American, and the deputy commander is traditionally a Canadian. The commander is the chief of the strategic aerospace defence forces for both countries, and reports to each country’s national command authority. Within the United States, the commander reports to the US President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Within Canada, the commander reports to the Prime Minister through the Chief of Defence Staff and the Minister of National Defence. The NORAD agreement includes mechanisms to ensure effective political control from each government.
The headquarters is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, on the same installation that headquarters NORTHCOM. The daily command and control of NORAD forces is managed from the NORAD Command Center (NCC) in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. The other NORAD centers process air, missile and space surveillance information and report to the NORAD Command Center. The Air Warning Center (AWC) is the focal point for all air defence matters. Below the AWC, NORAD’s air defence responsibilities are assigned to three NORAD regions: Canada, Continental United States (CONUS) and Alaska. They use military assets such as fighter aircraft, radar sites, AWACS aircraft and other assigned resources.

The space surveillance and missile warning missions use only US assets and are assigned to USSTRATCOM but are under the operational control of the NORAD Command Center. The Missile Warning Center (MWC) provides ballistic missile launch warning only. Currently, there is no ballistic missile defensive capability, and only the US has a ballistic missile counter-strike capability. The Space Control Center (SCC) processes and provides space surveillance data to the NORAD Command Center. The other USSTRATCOM work centers operationally reporting to the NORAD Command Center include the Operational Intelligence Watch (OIW), System Center and Weather Center. All the centers are manned 24 hours 7 days a week. The complex command structure of NORAD is diagrammed in Figure 3.

There are several things NORAD does well. Historically what it has done best is to provide deterrence during the Cold War by protecting the deterrent — the United States. However, NORAD is also important in that it serves to preserve Canada’s sovereign role of defending its part of North America. Canada’s large area and limited population and wealth inhibit it from providing a level of aerospace defence adequate to satisfy America’s security interests. But Canada, partnered with the United States, is able to provide the air defence resources sufficient to maintain its own air sovereignty, and when necessary, can approve of additional US military assets to augment Canada’s air defence. Consequently, some have viewed NORAD as providing Canada “a defence against help” from the Americans.

A concern for both Canada and the US is the future of NORAD. If Canada continues to balk at cooperating in the BMD program, it could put the entire space-operations portion of NORAD at risk. Canada contributes only marginally to the space defence mission with no military space assets, and without Canada’s political support for BMD, it is foreseeable that NORAD could be returned to an air-defence only command. Canada would lose its access to Air Force Space Command and US intelligence. The Chrétien government put off these concerns and took a politically safe approach to “wait and see” before committing Canada one way or the other. This attitude did not strain the US-Canadian relationship unduly, principally because on his watch there was no impetus to resolve the issue on either side of the border. With President Bush’s decision to field the
BMD system, time began to run out, pushing the Canadian government toward a decision it preferred not to make.

Another concern for Canada is that United States Strategic Command will most likely become the command to operate the BMD system and, when it does, it will have operational command over both the missile launch warning and missile defence. This will make the NORAD ITW/AA mission redundant, and with Canada not providing any military space control or missile warning assets, this raises the question: is there sufficient political value in continuing the NORAD missile defence mission outside of BMD? [ed. note: the amendment to the NORAD agreement in August 2004, making its missile warning data available to US BMD commanders, has met most of those concerns.]

The days of the Soviet bomber threat are long gone, but the September 11th attacks did revitalize the importance of the air defence mission and ensured its continuance. The Canadian Forces contribute significantly to NORAD’s air defence
mission. They provide F-18s on alert for intercept, 280 military personnel assigned to NORAD, AWACS crewmembers and the North Warning Radar network. The combined US-Canadian aircraft surveillance and counter-air capability is adequate. The only significant vulnerability is in cruise missile detection and surveillance, and the United States Air Force, Army, Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency have on-going research and development activities to resolve this vulnerability. Cruise missile defence could become a future area for Canadian military involvement.

The future of NORAD will not have to be decided until the agreement comes up for renewal in 2006. By then, Canada should have made its decision whether to support BMD, and the United States should have made its decision whether it still needs or desires Canada’s contribution to part or all of the bi-national command. [ed.note: The Canadian government opted out in February 2005. Bi-national command arrangements remain in place.]

Fielding a Missile Defense

When I came to office, I made a commitment to transform America’s national security strategy and defense capabilities to meet the threats of the 21st century. Today I am pleased to announce we will take another important step in countering these threats by beginning to field missile-defense capability to protect the United States as well as our friends and allies.

— President George W. Bush

On 17 December 2002, President Bush announced plans to deploy the first ten interceptors of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system by 2004. To the surprise of most Canadians, the next day Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham responded that Canada was ready to discuss the development and deployment of a North American missile shield with the Americans. In an apparent reversal of the Liberal government’s position, Mr. Graham went on to say that the renewed dialogue involving the Russians and Americans has changed the international climate allowing for further talks. He further commented that, “when it comes to preparing for potential threats to our shared continent, we’re in this together.” The supportive Canadian government rhetoric continued through the spring culminating with Defence Minister John McCallum’s announcement on 29 May 2003 that Canada would enter into discussions with the United States on its potential participation in a North American missile defence system.

Since the days of President Reagan’s Strategic Defensive Initiative, Canada’s position on strategic missile defence had been at best ambiguous and overall unsupportive. As part of its foreign policy, Canada has been a strong promoter of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regimes, and has advocated for
the elimination of nuclear weapons. While the Canadian government has stated that missile defence need not be incompatible with arms control and disarmament, it has also stated that strategic missile defence capabilities are potentially destabilizing and may encourage states to renew a nuclear arms race. According to the Canadian government, its ultimate decision whether to support America’s BMD lies with its own national interests and its concern with operational concepts which alienate Russia and China or do not sustain non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.\(^{32}\)

The United States government has been in consultation with the Russians, Europeans and Canadians to assuage their concerns and to request that they consider a new strategic framework. In addition, the United States pursued talks with the Russian government in order to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty while negotiating further nuclear arms reduction. The Americans were unable to negotiate changes to the ABM treaty to allow for further anti-ballistic missile testing and deployment of the BMD system, and decided to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty in December 2001. Although the Russian government criticized the withdrawal, the United States and Russia were still able to agree to and signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty five months later in May 2002. Along with continued discussions for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III, the international fear of a new arms race with Russia has been muted.

The United States pursues the BMD program to mitigate the growing threat to the territory of the United States from the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles. To counter this threat, the US is developing missile defences to preserve freedom of action, prevent a state from using military coercion, “enhance deterrence by denial [as opposed to assured destruction] and mitigate the effects of attack if deterrence fails.”\(^{33}\) In addition, the Bush administration views missile defence systems in a new framework which supports non-proliferation because missile defence systems marginalize the importance of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile by mitigating their asymmetric value. Furthermore, a limited missile defence system is not intended to destabilize the strategic balance with Russia. Lastly, a missile defence system could provide the United States and its friends and allies with a means to protect against the event of an accidental missile launch. A critical concern is whether China views BMD as a threat to the viability of its limited nuclear ballistic missile arsenal. More important is how China might react to the deployment of the BMD system. An analysis of these concerns is beyond the scope of this paper, but will most likely be considered in Canada’s longer-term view of whether to support BMD.

The United States plans to field its Ground-based Midcourse System, formally known as the National Missile Defense system, as its defence against long and intermediate range ballistic missiles. It is composed of six parts: the Defense Support Program (DSP) missile early warning satellites; the upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR); a new Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX); the upgraded Cobra Dane Radar in Alaska; the ground based interceptors (GBI); and the Battle
Management, Command, Control and Communications (BMC3) element. As depicted in Figure 4, the architecture is designed to use the DSP early warning satellites to detect and track the ballistic missiles, and provide the initial launch data for the BMD system. As the ballistic missile comes over the horizon, an upgraded Early Warning Radar will take over the tracking of the missiles until BMD system can hand them off to the X-Band Radar or the Cobra Dane Radar. These radars will discriminate the warheads from the decoys, and will improve the intercept solution for the ground based interceptor missiles. The BMC3 element will hosts the battle management staff that would assess whether the United States is under a ballistic missile attack and make the decision to launch interceptors to destroy the incoming warheads. The proposed Ground-based Midcourse architecture will be able to augment its radar coverage with 15 upgraded Aegis BMD Destroyers and Cruisers from the Sea-based Midcourse System program.

The plan is to field an initial capability that includes: deploying 16 interceptors in Alaska, deploying 4 interceptors in California, and upgrading the Early Warning Radars in California and Alaska, and later in Greenland and in Great Britain. The

![Figure 4. Ground-Based Missile Defense Architecture (Initial Capacity)](image)
Sea-Based X-Band Radar will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean and probably based in Hawaii. As the system matures, additional X-Band Radars will be required, and could be sea-based or installed in Alaska, Greenland, Great Britain or at other locations. Currently, there are no plans to build facilities in Canada.34

Canada still has many concerns with the deployment of the BMD system. Although Great Britain has agreed to permit the United States to modify the radar at RAF Fylingdales, and Denmark has indicated it will agree likewise with the site at Thule, Greenland, Canada remains wary that its commitment may come with additional unforeseen expenses. Although the United States has not requested any Canadian contribution, Canada has concerns that the United States may wish to pursue a radar site in Canada and may ask Canada to offset some of the facility costs or request the return of US military personnel into northern Canada as part of the price tag for integrating BMD command and control into NORAD for the Canadians. On the other hand, it is in Canada’s interests to maintain a command director/assessor role in NORAD and to stay involved in the space control and missile warning missions. This will require participating through NORAD in the command and control of the BMD system. The alternative for Canada is to risk having NORAD reduced to the air defence mission, and to lose influence over continental security matters.35 [ed. note: See reference above to August 2004 amendment of the NORAD agreement.]

The North American security landscape has shifted and Canada needs to decide on how to best protect its interest and influence in North American security policy. NORAD remains the cornerstone of the North American security relationship between Canada and the United States, but its future is clouded without Canada’s declared support for the United States’ ballistic missile defence. The standing up of Northern Command should enhance bi-national military relations. For the near term, however, the US-only command will be focused inwardly on the defence of the continental United States. Meanwhile, the bi-national Planning Group provides an excellent means for Canada and the US to plan land and maritime contingency operations. The timing may also be right to explore the possibility of pursuing an expanded bi-national command to include land and naval operations. But the most difficult and pressing decision for Canada remains whether to support the United States as its ballistic missile defence system takes shape. Canadian participation in BMD is desirable and politically attractive for the United States, but it is no longer a prerequisite to fielding the system. None of the elements of the system requires basing in Canada. As bi-national military cooperation becomes closer, the Martin government may become more supportive of the deployment of the BMD system and, despite its announcement in early 2005, may yet come to view such a system as in its national interests. Canada is well aware what is at stake in NORAD. If it declines to participate in BMD, Canada may lose its seat on the missile warning and assessment process.
Notes

3. Ibid, 19.
4. Ibid, 3.
5. Ibid, President Bush’s Letter.
8. Mike Blanchfield, “Military Relations with US to be Probed,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17 Jan 03.
13. Ibid.


Bibliography


Blanchfield, Mike “Military Relations with US to be Probed,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 17 Jan 03.


Jockel, Joseph T., “Four Commands and a Country: NORTHCOM, NORAD, SPACECOM, STRATCOM and Canada,” St. Lawrence University, Canton, NY, (draft paper to be published).


Glossary

ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACLANT  Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
ACO  Allied Command Operations (NATO)
ACT  Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
AFB  Air Force Base (American)
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System (E-3 Sentry, American)
AWC  Air Warning Center (NORAD)
BMC3  Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications
BMD  Ballistic Missile Defense (American)
CFB  Canadian Forces Base (Canadian)
CONUS  Continental United States (American)
DFAIT  Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian)
DND  Department of National Defence (Canadian)
DOD  Department of Defense (American)
DSP  Defense Support Program (early warning satellite, American)
ITW/AA  Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (NORAD)
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff (American)
JFCOM  United States Joint Forces Command (American)
JF HQ-HLS  Joint Forces Headquarters – Homeland Security (American)
JTF  Joint Task Force
JTF-CS  Joint Task Force – Civil Support (American)
MCC  Military Coordination Committee (Bi-national)
MWC  Missile Warning Center (NORAD)
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>NORAD Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td><em>National Security Strategy</em> (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIW</td>
<td>Operational Intelligence Watch (NORAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board on Defense (Bi-national)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBX</td>
<td>Sea-Based X-Band Radar (American, BMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Space Control Center (NORAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td><em>Unified Command Plan</em> (American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEWR</td>
<td>Upgraded Early Warning Radar (American, BMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command (a.k.a JFCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command (a.k.a NORTHCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSPACECOM</td>
<td>United States Space Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XBR</td>
<td>X-band radar (American, BMD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Future North American Defence Arrangement
Applying a Canadian Defence Policy Process Model

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Miller
United States Air Force

Introduction

When the U.S. decided to form NORTHCOM, they invited Canada to join. Although we had been courting for 43 years, the Canadians felt that it was a very sudden move.

— LGen Rick Findley, NORAD/CV
October 2004

The geostrategic environment for North America has evolved dramatically over the past several decades. More recently, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) coupled with the rise of international terrorism have added new dimensions to traditional views of continental defence. Mindful of these new

This project has its origins in my assignment to the Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) in Kingston, Ontario, Canada as a National Defence Fellow. It was here that I began to become aware that although the U.S. and Canada shared many cultural similarities and a rich history of security and defence cooperation,
realities, leaders on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border have attempted to address with appropriate capabilities and structures, the aerospace, land, maritime and information threats that could endanger Canada and the United States (CANUS). These threats may include state and non-state actors that sympathize with terrorist activities or permit the transit of illegal material (such as drugs, weapons, explosives, etc.) or persons bound for the CANUS Region.¹

The Future of North American Defence Cooperation

The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 made it clear that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer insulate the U.S. and by extension, Canada, from foreign aggression.² Postulating that an attack on one nation affects the safety, security, economy, and well being of the other nation, U.S. and Canadian decision makers began exploring new strategies for protecting their homelands and strengthening the existing CANUS partnership to meet new challenges to common interests. By working more closely together, they contend that both nations can better meet the challenges of the new security environment.³

The Bi-National Planning Group

In 2002, by mutual agreement between Canada’s Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, the two nations created the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) to address the future of the relationship. To ensure that the perspectives of both nations had been considered, the BPG team was fully integrated with members of the Canadian Forces (CF), and U.S. representatives from North American
Aerospace Defence (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The group is led by the Canadian General who also serves as the Deputy Commander of NORAD and its analysis is vetted by the U.S. General Commanding NORAD/NORTHCOM. Since its inception the BPG has worked toward broadening bi-national defence arrangements and establishing an environment of continuous progress toward enhanced military cooperation between the two nations.

In 2003 the BPG undertook a formal analysis in order to determine the changes in concepts, policies, authorities, organization, or technology needed to facilitate improved CANUS military cooperation. The Canadian-U.S. Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation (Dec 2002) directed the BPG to determine the optimal defence arrangements in order to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks, as well as respond to natural disasters and/or other major emergencies in Canada and the United States. Following President Bush’s visit to Canada in November of 2004, the BPG’s mandate was extended by mutual agreement in order to continue its efforts. In February 2005, more than two years of effort culminated in the BPG’s Interim Report which posited several initiatives in order to facilitate closer Canadian and U.S. military cooperation.

The BPG Interim Report

The BPG report notes that “critical mechanisms that could contribute to detecting or sensing in the maritime domain are not as robust as those serving NORAD.” Additionally, the BPG found existing CANUS military agreements “do little to facilitate defending, defeating, or acting against asymmetric threats.” Finally, the BPG report highlights a “lack of formal, bi-national plans, policies and procedures to act in support of civil authorities of both countries.”

Essentially, the BPG identified gaps among the aerospace, maritime and land domains between the two countries. It determined that not only do such seams and gaps exist along the geo-political borders between the nations, but procedural seams were also prevalent between different departments and agencies. The lack of bi-national shared situational awareness, unity of command, and unity of effort, all contribute to these seams. At a recent conference hosted by NORAD/NORTHCOM, U.S. General Bill Hodgins, the NORAD J5, explained the post-9/11 challenge that NORAD faces is one of shifting from the old mission of providing “additional strategic warning” of attack to one of “time sensitive targeting in new environments.” In the maritime realm, in particular, he offered, “How do you respond to a maritime track [or target vessel] of interest? A bi-national approach makes sense and we are working very hard … the ‘how’ to do it is a question of resources.” A tabular summary of the BPG’s specific gap analysis in both defensive and civil support (CS) mission areas sorted by key defence functions is found below.
### Table 1. BPG Current Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defensive Operations</th>
<th>Civil Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerospace</td>
<td>Maritime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect, Sense</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deter, Prevent, Shield</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend, Defeat, Act</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused Logistics, Sustain</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Key: Bold “X” represents robust relationship; “X” represents less robust relationship; Blank Cells represent the lack of formalized relationship; Lines between each cell represent seams or gaps.

A Continental Defence and Security Agreement (CDSA)?

Thus, in the view of the BPG, there is “an opportunity to make bold and meaningful strides towards streamlining continental defence and security policy.” The Group points out that since NORAD has enjoyed bi-national success in reducing the seams and gaps within the aerospace domain over the last 46 years, additional levels of cooperation may be attained by building on the NORAD model. These levels are discussed within the context of maintaining the ability to act unilaterally, while simultaneously attaining synergy in all domains. “BPG planners
conducted an analysis of the information and intelligence, maritime defence and MDA, land defence, and CS mission sets as each related to the five operational functions. This analysis helped determine the “mechanisms” by which to ensure effective and efficient mission accomplishment. According to the BPG, these mechanisms are not necessarily synonymous with “organizations” — they may be net-centric, web-based, plans, policies, procedures, agreements and/or organization-centric approaches. The relationships between the mission areas, functions and potential mechanisms for implementation are depicted in below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. BPG Interrelationship Analysis


In conducting its analysis, the BPG highlighted four levels of cooperation that decision makers may consider in order to determine the appropriate organizational changes to achieve a new CDSA. The four levels the BPG considered are briefly summarized below:

- Level 1: Coordination between the National Defence Command Centre (Canada) and the Domestic Warning Center-Current Operations Group (US) continues on a “management by exception” or ad hoc basis. Formal information sharing is conducted between Canadian and US operations centers without personnel augmentation, and there is no change to existing personnel structures.
• Level 2: Parallel Commands with the use of a Combined Operations and Intelligence Center and with Liaison Officer exchanges.
• Level 3: Bi-National, Joint Command that has regionally based subordinate commands — *an air, land, maritime “NORAD”*
• Level 4: Bi-National, Joint Command that has functionally-based subordinate commands — the most robust integrated structure

Figure 2 below overlays these levels of cooperation along a historic CANUS defence cooperation timeline in order to depict a functional assessment of cooperation levels.

**Figure 2. BPG Assessment – Levels of Cooperation**

![Figure 2. BPG Assessment – Levels of Cooperation](image)


Ultimately, the BPG proposed that the desired end state for the future is a command that would address the *global domain* (aerospace, maritime, land): “The NORAD concept can be expanded to integrate all domains in a coherent military strategy that will seal our common seams and gaps.”12 Figure 3, below depicts the BPG’s “level 3” structure of cooperation — a bi-national command with regional sub-commands. This is the level of cooperation that most closely represents adding
the land and maritime domains to the existing NORAD command and control structure. It is such an organization that most analysts seem to evoke when assessing the prospects for enhanced continental defence cooperation into new mission areas. Therefore, it is useful to visualize such an organization — albeit only one of four discussed in the BPG’s comprehensive report — as one considers the prospects for an enhanced CDSA.¹³

**Figure 3. Bi-National Command with Regional Sub-Commands – an “Expanded NORAD”**

![Diagram of Bi-National Command with Regional Sub-Commands](source)


A Continental Defence and Security Agreement (CDSA) providing national authority and intent could replace the current NORAD Agreement and provide the mechanism that streamlines national policy with regard to bi-national defence and security. Such an agreement is envisioned to provide the national policy authority under which an all domain command would be established, enabled and matured. According to the BPG, “if a CDSA is adopted by both Governments, an expanded, multi-domain North American Defense Command could be established before the end of 2005.” The result: “through enhanced military cooperation, the defence of our two nations can achieve the synergy required to defeat the threats that we collectively face in this new millennium.”¹⁴
A Challenge to Enhanced Cooperation?

The prospects for such a negotiation are complicated by the February 2005 decision of the Government of Canada not to participate further in the US missile defense program. This decision, while certainly the right of a sovereign nation to take in its pursuit of national interests, came as something of a surprise to observers in Canada and the U.S. Indeed, the Government of Canada had projected increasingly positive signals in the months, weeks and days prior to the Prime Minister’s announcement, yet it ultimately chose to “opt out.” The US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, publicly expressed dismay and concern about the announcement and its implications for the future of Canada-US relations. It is widely accepted that Prime Minister Martin made the decision based on weak public support for Canadian participation in BMD and, perhaps even more interestingly, based on calculations of the negative consequences his government’s participation would have inside his party caucus. Essentially, domestic politics may have exerted a substantial influence on a major foreign policy decision. Given this possibility, it seems appropriate to attempt to understand the workings of Canada’s defence decision making process in a manner that considers domestic variables. It is hoped that such an approach will prove generally illuminating and specifically relevant to gauging the chances for achieving a CDSA.

The Objective of This Project

The principal objective of this research is to inform the reader of the key aspects of and prospects for a possible bilateral Continental Defence and Security Agreement between the US and Canada. The approach here will be to apply a Canadian defence policy process model as a framework to analyze recent and pending Canadian government decisions with respect to CANUS defence. This policy model was originally formulated by U.S. researchers to examine the US defence policy process and has been modified by the author as a tool for understanding the Canadian case. Areas for exploration include a brief history of the CANUS defence relations, the lineage and evolution of the current proposal for enhanced bilateral cooperation, a summary of the current proposal for such an agreement accompanied an evaluation from the Canadian perspective and an assessment of the future prospects for a CDSA. A by-product of this research is that it will provide the reader insights into past and present CANUS defence relations as well as a framework for understanding Canadian defence decision making.

Understanding a Defence Policy Process Model

This chapter provides baseline analytical material in order to establish a context in which Canadian defence policy is made. The discussion below stems from an
adaptation of a model of American defence policy outlined by Hays, Vallance and Van Tassel in their comprehensive text entitled *American Defense Policy*.

**What is Canadian Defence Policy?**

The best way to begin a discussion of Canadian defence policy is to examine the term itself. Some confusion may arise if one does not recognize that this term has more than one meaning. Canadian defence policy can be viewed as a plan or course of action, a component of Canadian national policy, or a political process. A political process model outlined below will be the primary organizational construct and framework for policy analysis for this project.18

**Canadian Defence Policy as a Plan or Course of Action**

The meaning that defence policy first brings to mind is: “a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine future decisions.”19 Thus, Canadian defence policy can be seen as a plan or course of action regarding the recruitment, training, organizing, equipping, deploying, and use of military forces.20 Examples of this definition might cover the spectrum of conflict (as defined in traditional security terms) encompassing nuclear war through conventional war, low intensity conflict to military operations other than war. Although Canadian defence policy is intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters regarding Canadian military forces, it also can have unintended or unforeseen consequences, as is evident from some of the current concerns of Canadian defence observers, policy makers and practitioners. What, for instance, have decades of budget and manpower cuts done to Canada’s ability to recruit quality soldiers, sailors and airmen and field a viable future force for any nationally desired purpose? How do declining operations and maintenance budgets impact the military’s ability to adequately train for a variety of roles? How will the tempo of current worldwide operations affect the Canadian Forces’ current and future readiness?21

Viewing Canadian defence policy this way, however, raises a fundamental question: what is the policy’s objective? In attempting to answer this question, one encounters the term’s second meaning: Canadian defence policy is also a component of national security.22

**Canadian Defence Policy as a Component of National Security**

The terms “Canadian defence policy” and “Canadian national security” are often used interchangeably. They are not synonymous, however, and a distinction must
be made between them. National security refers to protecting Canada, its citizens, and its interests through the potential or actual use of power. "Power is A's ability to get B to do something that B otherwise would not have done (compellence). It is also A's ability to stop B from doing something B would have done (deterrence). The sources of power are numerous. Among the tangible sources are geography, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, and military capability. Intangible sources include national character, image, morale, and leadership."23 Canadian defence policy is therefore but one component of Canadian national security. The military component, in turn, consists of numerous tangible and intangible elements, including the size and structure of a force, the quantity and quality of weapons, and the kind of strategy and tactics pursued.24

Other major components of Canadian national security are economic and political power. Economic power depends on a country’s natural resources and broad economic capacity. It is most commonly used to compel and deter through sanctions and incentives affecting international trade, international finance, and international aid.25 Political power is usually exercised through diplomacy, which can be defined as "the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels, the highest as well as the subordinate."26 Diplomacy is conducted by representing interests, gathering and interpreting information, sending and receiving signals, negotiating agreements, and managing crises.27

Canada’s three enduring core national security interests are outlined in its first-ever National Security Policy (NSP) document published by Prime Minister Paul Martin’s government in April of 2004.28 Foremost is “to protect Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad” — “the right to life, liberty and security of individuals as elaborated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Second “is to ensure that Canada is not a base for threats to [its] allies.” The NSP explains that the interconnected nature of the modern world makes it impossible to isolate Canada from the effects of any serious threatening event or activity. Third is to continue Canada’s long tradition in “contributing to international security.” A Canadian formulation, according to the NSP, of exercising the military, political and economic components of national security on the world scene in pursuit of Canada’s interests is via the situational marriage of “defence, diplomacy and development (the ‘3 Ds’).”29

It is also important to note that power is a complex concept, the components of national security are highly interrelated, and the components affect and are affected by both international and domestic factors. Power is complex in that it is dynamic, subjective, relative, and situational. It is dynamic in that it changes over time. The perception of power matters in that a potential aggressor will draw on that perception in determining whether or not to act. Power is assessed in relation to the actor against which it is directed. It is also assessed in relation to the situation in which it is being threatened or used. Although U.S. military power succeeded during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, its results in the ensuing insurgency have been less clear cut.30
Diplomacy, for example, may be strengthened if backed by a credible threat of economic sanctions or military force. Economic and military powers are also highly interrelated. It is difficult for a state to sustain a military if it does not have sufficient economic vigour. Likewise, foreign military sales can strengthen political ties between the states involved, provide economic benefits and reduce domestic weapons costs. These examples also indicate that the components of national security affect and are affected by both international and domestic factors. In other words, Canada's national security and Canadian defence policy face the international and domestic systems simultaneously.

As this second definition suggests, national security involves the determination of national interests; the identification of threats to those interests; and the formulations of strategies, policies and programs to reduce the identified threats. Although the primary objective of Canada's national security — which is the "protection and safety of its citizens" — has not changed much since Canada's Confederation in 1867, the nation's interests, threats and strategies have evolved. These changes can be divided generally according to the periods in which they occurred: before the Cold War, the Cold War, after the Cold War, and after 2001.

Pre Cold War Experience: Before the Cold War Canada had completed its journey from subject nation to fully sovereign dominion that had achieved "a distinct international character and a nationally directed foreign policy" with an emphasis on securing trade relationships in order to develop a solid economic base. Canada chose to seek national security in the form of alliances first with the British Empire and then on the eve of the Second World War with the emerging power to the South. Through these alliances, Canada found itself involved in the major armed struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries: its armed forces were postured to participate with strong partners in these global efforts rather than provide solely for security along its own borders and ocean approaches.

As war loomed in 1938, speaking in Kingston, Ontario, President Roosevelt declared that "the Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give you my word that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by another Empire." Prime Minister King later replied:

We, too, have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.

Taken together, the leaders' remarks "constitute the normative core of the Canada-U.S. security obligation" to demonstrate nearly as much concern for each other's physical security needs as for its own. In August of 1940 a decision would be taken in Ogdensburg, New York through an exchange of notes between the two leaders that not only allowed for the coordination of North American
defence for the duration of the war, but established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). This board, on which Canada would meet the U.S. on equal footing, inaugurated an unprecedented integration of the strategic efforts of the two nations. The PJBD continues its work to this day.

**The Cold War:** During the early years of the Cold War Canada’s government undertook an understandable reduction in military forces from World War II levels, yet remained engaged both bilaterally with the U.S. as well as on the international scene. The Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was established in 1946 to facilitate the exchange of information between the two defence establishments relating to North American defence. During this period “Ottawa’s foreign policy was predicated on Canada’s taking an active role in global diplomacy and adopting international stability and order as its goals.” Additionally, Canada pursued multilateral arrangements as a charter member of the UN and NATO in order to secure its place in a peaceful world. NATO was deemed attractive by Canada as a means to deter and, if necessary, win a conflict against the Soviet Union through close integration with the nuclear-capable U.S, while simultaneously protecting Canadian sovereignty and independence from being subsumed in a strictly bilateral alliance with its larger southern neighbour.

As the Cold War continued, both governments became increasingly concerned about possibility of a Soviet bomber attack that might be capable of inflicting great harm on the populations of North America and, perhaps more importantly, the U.S. nuclear deterrent force. Thus, the North American Air Defence Command was established in 1958 in order to formalize an “increasingly integrative and cooperative approach to air defence.” It took shape as a joint command — in essence, an alliance — headed by U.S. and Canadian generals jointly responsible to both governments for the air defence of the continent. Among the by-products of the NORAD relationship was increased economic integration through a Defence Production Sharing Agreement which established a partial free-trade regime in defence products and ultimately led to a market relationship in which the U.S. became the prime market for Canadian defence products and the Canadians purchased the bulk of their equipment from U.S. manufacturers.

The 1950s also saw Canada assume the peacekeeping role that would become a distinctive component of the Canadian “brand-name” in the years to follow. The decision to expend defence resources on international peacekeeping was consistent with governments’ overall approach to foreign and defence policy during the Cold War. Canada, above all, sought to promote international order and stability — in some cases such as Cyprus, with the aim of preserving NATO unity, in others such as Suez, to calm a potentially all-consuming international conflict. To this end, Canada elected to participate in every UN peacekeeping operation undertaken prior to 1989.

The latter part of the Cold War saw declines in Canadian defence expenditures from a post-World War II high of nearly eight percent of gross national product to
substantially more modest levels as the result of policy decisions made by governments that had to balance the need for armed forces against an array of economic and social demands. Canada was free to undertake such reductions as some of the Cold War tensions eased while its continental and NATO allies sustained more robust — including nuclear — capabilities, and thus, underwrote Canada’s security.

The Post-Cold War Experience: The end of the Cold War brought a sea change to the international environment and led to substantial structural alterations in Canadian national security and defence policy. Faced with a safer world and a large fiscal deficit, the Canadian government under Prime Minister Chrétien attempted to reap a substantial peace dividend. The accumulated debt of the federal and provincial governments stood at approximately $750 billion; the federal government’s annual debt servicing payments in 1994-95 alone would amount to $44 billion — more than the budget deficit of $39.7 billion and some 27 percent of the total federal budget. Under these conditions, the selected response was a flexible, realistic and affordable defence policy, one that would have the means to apply military force only when Canadians considered it necessary to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests, at home and abroad.

Nonetheless, dedicated to the “Pearsonian” view articulated, yet again, in the 1994 Defence White Paper that “Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature,” Mr. Chrétien committed the Canadian Forces to numerous and frequent UN and NATO operations. The resultant operational tempo for the Canadian Forces coupled with the continued funding cuts dealt what knowledgeable observers on many fronts have characterized as an unacceptable blow to Canada’s national security. At any rate, “the peace dividend failed to materialize and it was during this period that Canadians in parliament, in government, in uniform, and in civil society — including universities — began, yet again, to wonder about the strategic purpose or value of continuing to underwrite a dwindling military capability.” The events of 2001 would intervene in this ongoing national discussion in a substantial way.

Beyond 9/11: On September 11th, 2001, it was a Canadian general posted to NORAD who directed the immediate US and Canadian aerospace reaction to the attack. In the immediate aftermath, Canadian land, sea and air forces rapidly stood at the ready to defend from any follow-on attacks on North America and offer post attack aid to the stricken United States. Some weeks later, Canada responded along with the U.S. and other willing partners in deploying forces for the mission in Afghanistan. At the height of operations there, Canada was the fourth largest contributor with nearly 3,000 personnel supporting the international coalition against terrorism. Her combined contributions included a Naval Task Group, a light infantry battle group, a tactical airlift detachment, Special Forces and associated support elements. While small numbers of Canadian
Forces remain deployed today in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the government has ordered a one year major operations stand-down in order to rest, refit, and prepare for the Fall 2005 ISAF rotation. To the extent that it was able, Canada has sought to honour its continental and international collective and cooperative security obligations — at the cost of accelerating the decline in CF capability and long term viability.54

This post-9/11 period has seen substantial changes to Canadian national security and defence policy. Although Canada remains globally committed and its interests coincide in many ways with those of the U.S., direct threats to Canadian interests beyond terrorism have not always been easy to identify, and at any rate, may not always be best dealt with by the military. Acts of God compete with acts of men in the threat hierarchy.55 Indeed, the exact nature and implications of a terrorist threat to Canada are viewed by some as less profound than for the U.S. Thus, other components of Canadian national security remain important. Indeed, as the Government of Canada endeavours to manage and reduce the risks to its interests in the current security environment, it expresses a desire to work with international partners and build a more effective, integrated national security system.56

The challenges of this period have already led to Canada’s above-mentioned, first-ever National Security Policy document. Recently, the long-awaited International Policy Statement as well as the first Defence “white paper” since 1994 have been tabled.57 As the effects of these reviews are felt, it is worth noting that many national security issues are actually international, transnational, or global problems that require multinational solutions. They also include a number of military issues such as international counter-terrorism, homeland defence, and nuclear counter-proliferation. Thus, reasonable observers may disagree as to the proper mix of military versus other elements of national power in addressing the current security environment. Nonetheless, for the foreseeable future these issues will be examined and dealt with using the major structures and processes created during the Cold War that endure to this day. This point leads to a final definition — Canadian defence policy is a political process.58

**Canadian Defence Policy as a Political Process**

Thus far, this chapter has focused on actions of the Canadian state operating in the international system as a unitary, rational actor — a “realist paradigm.” Such a paradigm may be limited in that it treats states as “black boxes” that determine their interests and threats to those interests; and then simply select the optimal strategies, policies and programs to address the identified threats.59 Accordingly, one need not look inside a state to understand its actions. While such a model may be useful in understanding crisis decision making and other phenomena, its
explanatory power may falter on more routine decisions and the politics that occur within states. For the latter, a model like the one depicted below is proposed.60

**A Defence Policy Process Model**

This Canadian defence policy process model is adapted from a similar model proposed to understand the U.S. process in the text *American Defense Policy*. It draws on historic elements of political systems and bureaucratic politics theory.61 As such, the model consists of inputs, communications channels, conversion structures, outputs, lenses and feedback within an international and domestic environment.

**Figure 4. A Defence Policy Process Model – Canada**

*Inputs:* The defence policy process model begins with inputs. These consist of needs, wants, demands, and expectations from three sources: the international environment, the domestic environment, and feedback from previous outputs. Most military threats to Canada’s national security originate in the international environment, which can be described as anarchic — conflict and war remain prominent features of the international landscape. The domestic environment, however, shapes Canada’s responses to those threats. A key component of the domestic environment
is Canada’s strategic culture — how Canadians think about national security and defence. Dr. David Haglund argues convincingly that Canada’s experience in overcoming various internal separatist challenges inculcated certain domestic values that ultimately inform Canada’s strategic thinking. “Thus, through its emphasis on inclusiveness (and its assumption that this must mean negotiation and the search for compromise), and because of the stress it places on conflict management, cooperative security can be linked to a Canadian foreign policy style that is synonymous with a ‘Pearsonian [or internationalist] tradition’ itself characterized by a distrust of dogma, an abhorrence of grand designs, a belief in compromise, and a disposition towards pragmatism — all attributes that Denis Stairs holds to be derivative of a domestic political culture whose ‘ultimate origin ... lies in the application of the basic principles of liberalism to the governance of a polity composed of too few people, of too heterogeneous a composition, living in a space too large with a topography too varied’.”62 Internationalism in its various forms — collective security, cooperative security, human security — is at the core of Canada’s strategic culture.63 Canada’s strategic culture can then be understood as a subset of its political culture which is often described as liberal, democratic, multicultural and collectivist. To this strategic culture should be added the reality of Canada’s sharing a continent and long border with an economic giant and the world’s only remaining superpower. The implications of this relationship manifest themselves in persistent Canadian concerns about protecting national sovereignty and mostly latent, although sometimes spectacular displays of anti-Americanism.

Domestic politics, including a variety of economic, social, and environmental issues, also will affect Canadian defence policy. Although Canada’s defence spending of approximately C$13 billion represents a decline of about 60 percent since the mid-1980s, it still remains a substantial portion of the government’s discretionary budget, and, thus, faces significant domestic competition for additional resources.64 Those who want to spend defence dollars elsewhere often argue that the issues of concern to them also pertain to national security and are even more urgent than Canada’s defence needs, even in the current international environment. Among Canada’s most pressing economic issues are its federal debt (which is approximately $600 billion, 40 percent of GDP), slowing economic growth and a widening per capita income rate gap with the US.65 Its social issues include perennial Quebec separatist tendencies, sustaining multiculturalism, and shortfalls in the public medical care, social welfare and education systems. Because budgets are finite, tough choices have to be made between these and other public policy needs. To make these choices, the government needs to know how much defence spending is enough — or as Dr. Joel Sokolsky puts it, “How much is just enough?”66 A definitive answer may only be understood in the years hence.

Inputs are also created through feedback from previous outputs. As outputs are implemented, they are assessed to determine whether they should be continued, terminated, or modified. Overwhelmingly positive feedback creates needs, wants,
demands, and expectations. Overwhelmingly negative feedback creates inputs to end a strategy, policy or program. Mixed feedback falls somewhere between these two extremes. A decision in any of these directions, however, results in additional inputs for the actors involved in the defence policy process.67

The Actors: The defence policy process model assumes that individuals and organizations are the most important actors. More specifically, the Prime Minister (and his cabinet), Parliament, the bureaucracy, interest groups, the media, and public opinion are the principal actors in the Canadian defence policy process. Interest groups, the media, and public opinion serve as communication channels — the second box in the model — and “provide for the aggregation, organization, and representation of needs, wants, demands and expectations” to the government institutions. The Prime Minister, Parliament, and the bureaucracy are conversion structures — the model’s third box. They “receive the varied, and frequently conflicting, system inputs and convert them into decisions of government.”68

Each of these actors has its own sources of influence. Under the Canadian Constitution, legislative authority rests with the Parliament of Canada — consisting of the Queen (represented by the Governor-General), the House of Commons and the Senate. Executive government and authority rests with the Government of Canada — consisting of the Queen (again, the Governor-General) aided and advised by the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. By custom, ‘the Government’ consists of the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers — who are the “active” Privy Councillors.69 As the Queen’s representative, the Governor-General has been the head of state and commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces since the earliest colonial days. With the development of the Canadian system of parliamentary government, however, the actual centre of political and legal authority over defence policy has changed along with the formal mechanisms by which this control is exercised. Thus, while the Governor-General remains the symbolic head of the Canadian Forces, Parliament and, more specifically, the Cabinet has become the dominant defence policy-making player in Canada.70

Ultimately, the Prime Minister is wholly accountable for the economy, security and other national concerns and since Canada’s legislative and executive branches are effectively fused because of the Prime Minister’s very close controls over his Cabinet and party caucus in Parliament.71

This unity is most evident in the House of Commons and especially in the governing party. The government maintains its position and advances its policies by controlling the day-to-day activities of the Commons — it sets the agenda, schedules votes, and defines or limits debates. The government’s grip over its own Members of Parliament is such that members must vote with the party or risk their political future. “Party loyalty coupled with party discipline ensures that the government (and even minority governments for long periods) can force, if necessary, most any legislation through the House of Commons. The Opposition may criticize, delay, and at times embarrass the government and some of its
members, but it rarely changes anything of substance once the government has set its collective mind on a particular course or policy.”

Parliament may vigorously debate any policy decision and can even bring down a government on a matter of significant disagreement through a “no confidence” vote, which equates to a drastic, but legally available check on the government’s power.

The Senate of Canada, whose members are appointed by the government and serve until retirement age, can delay legislation, but essentially “rubber stamps” matters under consideration. Although both the Senate and the House of Commons routinely establish committees focusing on matters of national defence, these committees do not have budgetary authority and, thus, rarely act outside the interests of government.

The bureaucratic element of Canada’s decision-making process is comprised of functional departments or ministries directed by elected members of the governing party. Key DND civilian leaders are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the prime minister. This power of appointment over the public servants in DND combined with the responsibilities afforded to the Minister of Defence via the defence portfolio enables the Prime Minister to set and oversee implementation of DND policy through control over his ministers and the professional lives of senior public servants. This control extends into the Canadian Forces in that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is similarly appointed by the Prime Minister. “Prime ministers, of course, exercise control in other customary ways by, for instance, opening and closing the doors to the treasury, supporting favoured projects, and championing the armed forces in public. In return, he expects and gets compliance, good order, and discipline in the ranks, and public support for his policy from the chief of defence.” Thus, bureaucratic organizations such as DND and the CF primarily provide information and analysis to decision makers and implement output.

Information is the primary source of interest group influence and is used to lobby the government and the Canadian people. Interest groups and issues advocates do not carry the same weight in Canada as they might in the U.S. due to campaign contribution limits and the relative inexpensiveness of Canada’s parliamentary elections. Information and the speed with which it can be delivered are the media’s most important assets since the media largely determine what the public see and how they see it. For its part, public opinion usually sets the broad parameters for Canadian defence policy. In high profile cases, such as the recent ballistic missile defence decision, however, it can affect the specifics of a strategy, policy or program, thereby reminding us that power is indeed dynamic and situational — a fact that applies to individuals and organizations as well as states.

The Lenses: Along with their own sources of power, the individuals and organizations involved in the defence policy process have their own preferences regarding ends and means. Understanding Canadian defence policy, therefore, requires knowledge not only of who the actors are but also of their point of view and why
they hold those views. This divergence of opinion is represented by the concave lenses in each of the model’s middle boxes.78

Because there are numerous actors and each has its own powers and perspectives, converting inputs into outputs requires coalition building. Achieving agreement among the actors is made easier by what Halperin and Kanter called “widely shared values and images of international reality” and certain rules of the game.” These images and rules are associated mainly with the actors’ common strategic and political cultures and are represented by the convex lenses in each of the model’s middle boxes. They also result from the constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, procedures, customs, traditions, etc. which organize the government and structure the process by which decisions are made and actions are undertaken.79

In addition to emphasizing individuals and organizations, the defence policy process model assumes that decision making cannot be “rational” in the broadest, most demanding sense since, more often than not, the actors fail to agree on interests and threats, examine every alternative, consider every advantage and disadvantage, and select optimal solutions.80 Instead, in most cases decisions are made incrementally, resulting in agreeable, not necessarily perfect solutions. Decision making is incremental because defence policy issues are highly complex. Small steps are taken to avoid big mistakes, especially when a nation’s security is at stake. Decision making is also incremental in that it requires coalition building, bargaining and compromise — small steps may be all that can be agreed upon.81 Allison and Halperin wrote that “the actions of a nation result not from an agreed upon calculus of strategic interests, but rather from pulling and hauling among individuals with differing perceptions and stakes.”82

Summary and Road Ahead

In summary, this chapter outlined three definitions of Canadian defence policy — as a plan or course of action, a component of Canadian national policy, and a political process — in order to lay the ground work for understanding the Canadian decision making environment. The defence policy process model outlined above will be the primary organizational construct and framework for policy analysis throughout the remainder of this paper in attempting to understand possible outcomes relating to the future of North American defence.

Canadian Defence Policy Process Impact on a CDSA

Inputs

As previously stated, the defence policy process model begins with inputs. These consist of needs, wants, demands, and expectations from three sources: feedback
from previous outputs, the international environment, and the domestic environment. Canada’s future role in North American defence arrangements, in general, and a Continental Defence and Security Agreement, in particular, will be determined by the way these inputs interact with the other elements of the policy process.

**International Environment:** In *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*, Prime Minister Martin emphasized that “the September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats. Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security.” President Bush has described the CANUS relationship as “vital” stating, “We share the same values: freedom and human dignity and treating people decently.” Further, within his *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America* he states, “…there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada …” Additionally, during his November 2004 visit to Canada Mr. Bush reaffirmed, “The relationship between Canada and the United States is indispensable to peace and prosperity on the North American continent.”

Prime Minister Paul Martin states it simply: “All Canadians understand that our most important relationship is with the United States. As a government, we treat it that way, devoting energy and effort to ensuring the relationship remains strong, sophisticated, productive and focused on common goals, such as the security of our borders, the health of the North American economy and the free flow of trade between our nations.” The former Canadian Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Ray Henault, echoes that the “U.S. is Canada’s most important ally and defence partner. Our defence relations are longstanding, well entrenched, highly successful, and mutually beneficial.” Evoking the linkage of security concerns to the trade relationship to both the U.S. and Canadian economies, General Henault further explains, “[W]hile neither country wants to restrict trade, security considerations are increasingly the driving concern for American decision-makers following September 11th. In this environment, it is in Canada’s national interest to work collaboratively with the U.S. to strengthen continental security.”

These statements seem to point toward a Canada determined to rededicate itself to the continental defence role while building a force capable of acting in concert with the U.S. and other allies in furtherance of Canada’s international aims. Similarly, an avowed primary objective of the United States is to work closely with Canadian friends and allies to deter aggression or coercion, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

To these voices on the international scene is added that of the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci. In numerous public forums Mr. Cellucci has offered his consistent advice that Canada should spend more on defence and contribute more to international as well as continental security. His “wish list”
leaves little doubt as to specific U.S. desires from Canada — enhanced intelligence analysis capabilities, a larger and more capable JTF2 special operations unit, some form of strategic lift, and a rapidly deployable brigade-sized strike force — in order that Canada may “punch above its weight” in the international security ring. Mr. Cellucci joins those in the BPG calling for an enhanced and expanded NORAD — a CDSA: “We can’t defend North America alone. Canada occupies a huge piece of territory here in North America and we need Canada’s help in defending the air, the land and the sea.” It is safe to say that the U.S. government has sent the message that it desires more from Canada continentally and internationally. Given the future force outlined in Canada’s proposed defence budget, it is also reasonable to assert that the government of Canada has received the message.

Feedback from Previous Strategies, Policies and Programs: As stated earlier in this report, for Canada, alliance commitments and the nature of international relations have been major influences on the historic content of defence policy. Throughout the past sixty years, bilateral continental defence cooperation provided Canada a cost-effective means of gaining a seat at the table with the U.S. while imposing few constraints on Canada’s European and internationalist defence policy orientations. Specifically, NORAD participation allowed Canada to stake out and protect the Canadian interest in a lopsided continent. In this sense continental collective defence forces assist in protecting Canadian sovereignty. This is what has been called the defence against help role of Canada’s armed forces, and it applies especially to North American defence. The concept, originated by Nils Orvik, is based on the premise that, without a Canadian military contribution to the defence of North America at sea in and particularly in the air, all continental defence tasks would be assumed by the U.S. Canada would be unaware of measures that the U.S. might be planning for the defence of the continent. “Defence against help,” then, means safeguarding Canadian sovereignty against unwanted U.S. “help.” Understanding this concept is helpful when considering official Canadian government statements regarding a CDSA.

The Canadian government’s recent decision to “opt out” of BMD will have an impact on CDSA outcomes as well. CANUS relations may not have been irreparably damaged, but there will be work for Prime Minister Martin to rebuild trust with his U.S. partners. His challenge will be in doing it while not alienating the significant part of the Liberal party that thinks he has been right all along. Indeed, some players inside his political caucus remain at least sceptical if not hostile toward any close cooperation with the current U.S. government. In the wake of his BMD decision “Mr. Martin said that Canada remains committed to the defence of North America, as shown by [the] $12.8 billion increase in funding for the Canadian Forces.” Furthermore he offered that “Canada recognizes the enormous burden that the United States shoulders when it comes to international peace and security … The substantial increases made yesterday to our defence budget
are a tangible indicator that Canada intends to carry its full share of that responsibility.\textsuperscript{97} The recent budget increase may indicate the government’s acknowledgement of the need to reverse the previously discussed long-term erosion in CF capabilities. It is relatively certain that the announced dollars will be applied to a force structure that attempts to achieve an optimal mix between a continental defence and an international expeditionary role.

Additionally, Canada’s involvement in North American defence is conditioned, but not determined, by the perception of the threat to the continent — after 9/11, concerns about terrorist events have held the prime position in certain defence planning scenarios, yet our look at Canadian public opinion indicates that Canadians find other concerns more pressing and compelling.

**Domestic Environment – Pre-eminence of Trade/Economics/Social Programs:** In the Speech from the Throne before Parliament, Prime Minister Martin set forth his assessment of Canada’s priorities for the legislative year ahead. He noted that Canadians now enjoy the benefits of a “balanced budget which helps foster a strong economy, which in turn increases business and consumer confidence.” Additionally, he reiterated his commitment to “bring down the national debt — to 25 percent of our GDP within the next decade” in order to protect the future of Canadians while lowering taxes and investing in important social programs. He announced $41 billion in federal health care spending increases over the next decade along with Medicare reforms in order to respond to “the number one priority of the people …”\textsuperscript{98} The Prime Minister further outlined his other priorities to include education, child care, and the environment. He reminded Canadians that “seismic” changes to the world economic, security and political landscape demand that Canada be active beyond its borders in order to protect its interests from the threat terrorism and nuclear proliferation presents to Canada’s trade relations with the U.S. and the world. Thus, he announced force structure increases that would be reflected in his February 2005 budget plan in order to expand Canada’s role in the world and enable “Canada to continue to be an instrument of peace.”

In Canada, one generally hears that September 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2001 was as significant a day for Canadians as September 11\textsuperscript{th} was for Americans — for different, but related, reasons. $1.8 billion in goods and services cross the Canada-US border every day — much of it on board the 45,000 trucks (one every 2 seconds) that make the daily crossing.\textsuperscript{99} In 2003, the U.S. was the destination of 85.81 percent of total Canadian merchandise exports; likewise, the U.S. was the source of 61.88 percent of total Canadian imports.\textsuperscript{100} Canada’s preoccupation with a free flowing border with the United States is a rough, but instructive, measure of the degree of economic integration that exists in North America. Canada’s economy is now hugely dependent on its uninterrupted ability to deliver goods to and receive goods from the U.S. market. Beyond any short-term effects on current trade levels, possible border interruptions can also affect long-term investment by eroding Canada’s
attractiveness to both North American and overseas firms as a location from which to serve the North American market. Many plants in Canada now have North American product mandates and are producing for the entire Canada-U.S. market, while those in the U.S. operate in the same fashion. That means a huge amount of cross-border trade is now intra-company trade. Canada is especially sensitive to anything that could slow (or halt) the cross-border flow as happened just after the 9/11 attacks and again at the start of the war with Iraq. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, border waits for trucks hauling cargo increased from just a few minutes to 10-15 hours, delaying shipments of parts and perishable goods. One crossing point saw a 36 kilometre line of trucks backed up awaiting entry into the U.S. The auto industry was hit hardest, resulting in the closure of Ford plants in Ontario and Michigan due to “just-in-time” parts halts. To the extent that Canadian participation in a CDSA can be linked to securing Canada’s profound economic dependence on access to the U.S. market — either from a future post-attack border closure or simply the US economic fallout — the prospects for achieving a CDSA will be strengthened. Such a linkage, must however, be reconciled with Canada’s other above-mentioned domestic priorities.

Communication Channels

Interest Groups: In Canada, as in many countries, are found groups that organize for the purpose of enabling their members to act collectively to influence government policy in the direction of their common interest. These groups vary greatly in their degree of organizational rigor, the scope and depth of their interests and objectives. Some examples include:

- Business/economic interests — such as the Conference Board, Chamber of Commerce, and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives which tend to link Canada’s trade and economic fortunes to US perceptions of Canada’s role as a good neighbour from a security perspective
- Defence-related think tanks and interest groups — which propose and evaluate various defence and security policy options and generally support improving Canada’s defence capabilities in order to further a variety of international and continental interests (CDA, IRPP, CIIA, plus several government sponsored defence groups)
- Academics — mostly political scientists and historians that offer ideas and assessments ranging from the traditional to the post-modern.
- “Out-of-the-box” thinkers/critics — such as Canada25, the American Assembly, as well as various peace and disarmament groups, and some of the “the “big idea” literature from groups such as the CD Howe Institute which may tend to challenge the status quo on a more basic level and offer more dramatic alternatives to Canada’s traditional international and defence policies
There is no shortage of voices representing a broad spectrum of interests. Each of these groups produces reasoned (or at least impassioned) arguments advocating its particular view of the proper approach to promoting Canada’s interests and determining its role in North America and the world. From so-called “big ideas” — linking security, defence and trade in one comprehensive agreement with the U.S., to big departures from historic paths such as extricating Canada from the US influences on the very same issues — exploring other market relationships and other defence roles and partners, to small agendas and steps in discrete policy areas — such as niche roles for the Canadian Forces; ideas, data, and policy options, decision makers and the Canadian public can draw upon a wide array and volume of interest group advice.

Furthermore, Canada’s decision makers have established links to various groups in order to tap into their efforts and ideas. Thus, in some sense, a symbiotic relationship exists between the interest groups, the decision makers, the media, and ultimately the public. Ideas advanced in interest group forums or academic circles are echoed by DND bureaucrats, staff officers and government ministers. Interests groups have much to say that pertains to a CDSA — and other actors seem to draw liberally from the well.

Public Opinion: When asked in the December 2002 Macleans survey, “What is the most important issue facing Canada today?”, Canadians responded as follows:106

- Health care/education/social services – 37%
- Unemployment/economy – 14%
- Environment – 8%
- Government/deficit – 7%
- Foreign issues – 5%
- Terrorism – 5%

According to a Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute/Dominion Institute poll (Nov 2004) 88 percent of Canadians surveyed report being interested in events or issues on the international scene with 43 percent saying they are very interested.107 Additionally, 75 percent agree that given how important trade is to Canada’s economy, protecting trade relationships should be Canada’s top foreign policy priority.108

A bare majority (51 percent) of Canadians do not believe the U.S. can be trusted to treat Canadian concerns fairly while almost as many (46 percent) disagree. Although few Canadians are undecided about this basic orientation towards the United States, the fundamental differences on this question appear to be regional and linguistic. A majority of Ontarians (54 percent) agree the U.S. can be trusted as do an even larger number of Atlantic Canadians (68 percent). Two out of three Quebecois (66 percent), however, do not trust the U.S. to provide fair treatment of
Canadian concerns. Similarly, a bare majority of 50 percent of anglophones trust the United States while 60 percent of francophones do not. \(^{109}\)

Almost four out of five (79 percent) Canadians provide endorse the view that the “U.S. is behaving like a rogue nation — rushing into conflicts without attempting to first find solutions by working with its friends and allies” — 54 percent strongly agree with this statement. The Bush administration’s so-called doctrine of pre-emptive actions with or without multilateral sanction does not find a receptive audience in Canada. \(^{110}\) While Canadians are still more likely to believe the US is a force for good rather than a force for evil, there is a Canadian consensus that the U.S. is acting like a rogue nation. \(^{111}\)

Additionally, Canadians may be strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage — 75 percent supported an “engaged” international policy, yet 81 percent do not support doing so if it means doing without things in areas like healthcare and education. \(^{112}\) An April 2004 poll found that 55 percent of Canadians advocated increased government spending on fighting terrorism in Canada and 54 percent believe the national defence budget should be increased. This level of support by Canadian for the military is indicative of an “opt-in” attitude. \(^{113}\)

If, as stated in the previous chapter, public opinion in Canada establishes the broad parameters and the boundaries beyond which the public executive must not transgress, these parameters and boundaries may be summarized as follows:

On balance, polling data would seem to suggest that Canadians desire free and unfettered trade, its resultant economic prosperity, and the associated societal benefits prosperity can underwrite. If defending Canada’s continental (i.e., trade and economic and security) interests against terrorism implies closer cooperation with the U.S., however, it appears Canadians are divided on their perception of whether the U.S. would treat them fairly in any such arrangement. Furthermore, Canadians appear willing to be internationally engaged, but much less so if such engagement comes with a hefty bill attached. It follows that a CDSA may receive cautious public support and that the support would rapidly erode if a CDSA required substantial capital outlays at the expense of highly prized social programs.

**The Media:** The media appear to occupy an important position in the defence policy making process in Canada, serving to inform and educate the general public as well as interest groups and to help establish the general boundaries within which the political leadership and the bureaucracy must act. The media, especially the print media, have been influential in defining and reciprocally, in reflecting, the broad contours of what is acceptable to the Canadian public in security matters. \(^{114}\) On the CDSA issue substantial print and electronic coverage is available. While various reporters and op-ed page editors tend to focus on the politics of the policy matters relating to a CDSA, through well-established relationships with various interest group “experts” the media have served as a means to convey the substance of a CDSA and its implications for the government and
the people of Canada. Additionally, while the media do occasionally publicize dramatic defence issues, especially those that serve to embarrass the government of the day — such as the current government’s reportedly clumsy management recent BMD decision — they do so only on an intermittent basis.

Again, it is in the media that Canada’s political and public opinion landscape has been painted in broad brush strokes. One such element of the scene is a somewhat muted perception of the terrorist threat to Canada under girded by the notion that the U.S. ultimately would come to the aid of Canada in an unlikely time of need. As one reporter explains, “I think Canadians by-and-large just don’t feel threatened. And we’ve become a little smug and complacent, perhaps. 9/11 didn’t seem to shake that up too much, because we have been protected more or less by the U.S. security umbrella.” Also, latent anti-Americanism, traditionally linked to sovereignty concerns, finds new strength in general Canadian scepticism about the current U.S. administration’s foreign and trade policies. Thus, there is “a tendency for any prime minister in Canada to play the anti-American card — if you want to put it that way — every so often. And sovereignty seems to become an ill-defined end in itself.” Canada’s decision to opt out of BMD is usually explained as a reflection of Canadians’ general caution and scepticism in dealing with the U.S. in matters of foreign and security policy. As one media observer summarizes, “proponents of missile defence have to do a much better job selling the concept if they ever hope to get Canadians onside.” Sage advice it would seem for proponents of a CDSA as well.

**Inputs and Communication Channels Summary.** As outlined in the previous chapter, interest groups, the media, and public opinion serve as communication channels — the second box in the defence policy process model — and “provide for the aggregation, organization, and representation of needs, wants, demands and expectations” to the government institutions. The Prime Minister, Parliament, and the bureaucracy are conversion structures — the model’s third box. They “receive the varied, and frequently conflicting, system inputs and convert them into decisions of government.” The following items outline the varied and, indeed, potentially conflicting images facing Canada’s decision makers as they consider a decision on CDSA:

- **Needs** — an ultimate security underwriter, assured trade/economic linkages with the U.S.
- **Wants** — free and unfettered trade, robust and costly social programs, a broad “internationalist” security/defence agenda
- **Demands** — budgetary constraints, national debt reduction mandate
- **Expectations** — cheap defence (“just enough” to satisfy the United States, cooperation with the U.S., but not too much, a military that can protect Canada’s sovereignty and sustain an image of a certain kind of Canada — one that makes a difference in the world)
Conversion Structures

Parliament: Parliament has a role in generating public awareness of issues such as CDSA through debate and a daily House of Commons question period regarding important decisions. Also, given the government’s current minority status, it is impossible for the Prime Minister to ignore the potential perils of misreading the will of all the parties that came together to allow him continue governing. Getting a CDSA decision “wrong” might not bring the government down, but it certainly would not strengthen a government’s future political prospects — which are directly reflected in the makeup of Parliament. As previously stated, it was this dynamic that is widely reported to have been responsible for Canada’s decision regarding ballistic missile defence. As Jean Lapierre, the Transport Minister, stated to Liberal convention delegates in March, “I must tell you that the decision by the prime minister and cabinet on missile defence will make the task easier for us to rebuild and regain ridings in Quebec” and, thus, capture a majority government.120

Nonetheless, as related earlier in this report, given the relatively low priority of defence matters (more mundane than BMD) to the Canadian public and political decision makers when compared to other matters on the national agenda as well as the virtual fusion of the executive and legislative branches of government, the political executive in Canada has been free to conduct defence policy without having to constantly defer or refer to Parliament.121 Still, the Senate and House of Commons defence committees have provided a forum in which senior military and civilian defence officials have had to explain policies and provide information on the activities of the forces. In that role, these committees perform a public education function and contribute to the national dialogue on CDSA. For example, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has recently produced several reports that are central to the CDSA discussion. One, entitled Canada’s Coastline: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World focuses on how best the plug the surveillance, policing and defence gaps in Canada’s coastal waters.122 Another report from the same committee is For an Extra $130 Bucks: Update On Canada’s Military Financial Crisis A View From the Bottom Up. These reports and others like them chronicle the challenges Canada faces in fielding and funding a force capable of playing a meaningful role in either continental defence or international security. To the extent that parliamentary committees draw on the research efforts and ideas of interest groups or deal with controversial issues, some momentum has been generated that again, is reflected in public declarations of decision makers.

Nevertheless, recognizing its own inherent inability to implement desired defence policy changes, the Senate committee observes that none of its “recommendations has the slightest chance of being implemented unless the central agencies of the Government of Canada — the Prime Minister’s Office, the
Privy Council Office, Treasury Board and the Department of Finance — join forces to expedite the rejuvenation of Canada’s armed forces, instead of dragging their heels to resist it.”

The Bureaucracy: “The Department of National Defence, like other departments and agencies, must compete for a limited amount of government revenue. And it must do so in a political environment in which national security and defence issues are rarely a high priority for the prime minister and his cabinet. This competition must also take place in a political culture in which there are very few votes to be gained by spending more on defence.” As one expert notes, “In the choice between ‘guns and butter,’ the Canadian public may want some of the former, but they want a good deal more of the latter. Thus, at the highest political level, where decisions and trade-offs must be made … DND often finds itself in somewhat of a disadvantaged position.” The government’s 2005 budget, then, appears somewhat of a departure from past decisions in that while generous in traditional domestic policy areas, it also set forth substantial new dollars for defence. While not universally embraced across Canada, this budget has been widely understood to have generated enough appeal among diverse constituencies to enhance the prospects for survival of the current minority government.

It appears that the voices calling for improvements in CF manning, operations and maintenance and capital account funding have found a sympathetic ear in the current government. “Not only does the budget signal the government’s intention to increase defence spending, it also indicates what kind of military capability it wants by allocating monies to particular military objectives.” In reviewing these implications, it is important to note not only what the government is willing to buy, but also how the government intends to allocate the funds over time. The bulk of the 2005-2008 dollars are for sustainment (operations/maintenance and infrastructure) and land force troop strength increases. New equipment, however, is not significantly funded until 2009-2010.

The government has directed that the $12.8 billion added to DND over the years 2005-2010 be spent to address the following shortfalls and acquire the following capabilities:

- $3.0 billion to expand the CF by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reservists
- $3.2 to address sustainability (infrastructure and “the base”)
- $2.8 billion to acquire medium capacity helicopters, logistics trucks, arctic utility aircraft, and to expand JTF2 SOF facilities
- $3.8 billion for post Defence Policy Review requirements (most likely strategic lift — a mix of sea and air)

The 2005 budget builds upon the Government’s 2004 commitment to acquire new maritime helicopters, a mobile gun system, and a search and rescue aircraft. On balance, it appears that real capabilities will be added to the CF if all the budget promises are kept by the current and any future Canadian government.
Along with these new capabilities will come a renewed CF that emphasizes joint operations and establishes “Canada as an operational theatre” in order to better conduct operations to support the needs of all Canadians and “to prevent threats from being manifested in Canada.” This reinvigorated CF will be able “to have the maximum profile and footprint for Canada’s benefit anywhere [it] does business” and it will be particularly well-suited for brigade-level expeditionary, stability operations — a stated goal of the CDS as well as the Prime Minister. Such an expeditionary CF would be capable of “making a difference in the world” and guaranteeing Canada a “seat at the table” in dealing with international partners.

Some of the new equipment — for example, maritime patrol aircraft — outlined in Canada’s budget will be “dual use” in that it will provide utility in both the CDSA and the expeditionary missions. Other items such as strategic lift, more land force troops, and medium lift helicopters appear more suited to an expeditionary role. Absent from the budget is any mention of a next generation fighter aircraft, a replacement for the Navy’s four ageing destroyers or upgrades for her 12 capable frigates. Canada’s navy, conditioned over the decades to support overseas task force operations, may be less inclined to commit or seek assets best suited for continental defence. It is in this area where a CF CDSA capabilities gap should be examined.

Canada’s navy currently possesses 12 maritime coastal defence vessels which, because they are lightly armed and slow, are usually assigned to training naval reservists rather than offshore security patrolling. Therefore, the navy “is presently compelled to task two frigates on the east coast alone for domestic security related roles.” Replacing current coastal defence ships with an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) that is optimized for the task and interoperable with other CDSA maritime partners would likely come at the cost of replacing a future “ocean-going” surface combatant that would be better suited for an international role. Thus, a “difficult choice” will be required by decision makers. It should be noted that neither ship appears slated for funding under the current budget proposals. It is doubtful that the $14 billion for a future surface combatant or the $5 billion for an OPV replacement will appear any time before 2010. To the extent that the capabilities of either type of vessel would be critical to the success of a CDSA, the absence of either presents a potential gap in the CDSA maritime mission areas of Deter, Prevent, Shield, Defend, Defeat, and Act that extends as far as the eye can see. In the near term, the navy will certainly continue to fill that gap with other ships of the line at the cost of making them available to support missions farther from the continent.

In explaining why the U.S. chose after 9/11 to stand up NORTHCOM, General Ralph Eberhart related that it reflected U.S. policy makers’ recognition that “the home game is not a lesser included version of the away game.” He noted that defending the NORTHCOM AOR required certain unique force capabilities and organizational arrangements that could not be drawn together on an ad hoc basis.
“We should not,” he offered, “be exchanging business cards at the site of the next ground zero” following a future attack on our nation. Thus, NORTHCOM creates demands on the DoD for unique forces and formations tailored to meet its mission to deter, prevent, defeat and mitigate threats within its AOR while working in harmony with other combatant commanders and interagency players.

General Eberhart’s “home game/away game” analogy may be helpful in analyzing the comments of the new CDS, General Hillier, regarding Canada’s budget and its intended transformational influences on the CF. This, in turn, may shed light on Canada’s current and potential contributions to a CDSA. At a recent conference in Canada, General Hillier noted that budget presented by the government represented the dollars required for people, capital and infrastructure requested by DND. Essentially, DND got what it asked for.135

What DND appears to have asked for, and what General Hillier seems to be talking about with his renewed emphasis on joint expeditionary operations while treating Canada as an operational theatre,136 may be related to concepts outlined by two Canadian scholars in their recent book entitled Campaigns for International Security. Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney propose that Canada’s national security will be best served by “harmonizing deterrence and defence at home with the protection of North America and such overseas interventions as threats and interests warrant. The guiding principle must be to prepare the armed forces for a single strategic imperative encompassing the defence of Canada, North American and international operations defined by the circumstances of what the authors refer to as the world order era.”137 Such a strategic harmony would be enabled and assisted by a unified command and logistics system directed by the CDS and assisted by a unified central staff. DND would provide a capability set based on the level of resourcing afforded by the government. The CF would then apply its capabilities across three broad mission areas:138

- **The Harmonized Mission in Canada** — aimed at the defence of Canada, Canadians and their property by detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile and illegal intrusions, internal security and traditional aid to civil authorities for a range of domestic activities.

- **The Harmonized Campaign in Cooperation with the U.S.** — not just the defence of North America, but cooperative national defence with the US on a worldwide basis in pursuit of Canada’s interests. Convincing the U.S. that no serious threats to the U.S. will originate from Canadian territory and undertaking in unison expeditionary operations on matters that may threaten mutual CANUS security and defence. **Forward defence** of North America would occur in areas far from the homeland such as Afghanistan and Haiti. Additionally, the CF would be prepared to act with or without direct support from the U.S. wherever and whenever the U.S. cannot do so.

- **The Harmonized Campaign in International Security Affairs** — continue to make militarily significant commitments and contributions to international
security institutions and alliances under guidelines of relevance, selectiveness and practicability. In other words, “make a difference in the world”

The Defence portion of the 2005 IPR names establishes a new organization, Canadian Command (CANCOM), as the transformed CF command structure that will undertake a fully integrated and unified approach to operations. It will be a single operational command headquarters that will enable the CF to more effectively meet its fundamental goals to protect Canadians at home and deliver timely, relevant force modules as required internationally. When viewed through this lens, General Hillier’s statements and by implication, his policy recommendations through the Defence Minister to the Prime Minister and his cabinet — would seem to favour enhanced cooperation with the U.S. across a broad spectrum, perhaps with CANCOM as the Canadian component interacting with some form of a CDSA. Optimism that capabilities of Canada’s force structure can meet the commitments implied in this concept of strategic harmony, must be tempered, however, by a cleared-eyed assessment of the current state of the CF coupled with an understanding of what is and isn’t in the budget.

The Prime Minister: Historically, “Canada has answered the question ‘how much is enough’ by spending just enough — just enough to keep its armed forces together and allow the military to operate alongside allied units undertaking similar roles. The allies have not been altogether happy with this but there is little they can do … Canada’s allies have almost no real leverage over the size of Ottawa’s defence budget. If they did, it can safely be argued that Canada would be spending much more on its military than it currently does.” All of Canada’s important force structure decisions have been made by the political executive and the bureaucracy with little or no direct parliamentary, interest group, or public involvement. To be sure, there have been intragovernmental discussions, and outside experts were sometimes consulted. But mainly, it is the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs that “are involved, with differences between them being resolved and final decisions made, by the cabinet. All of this is done in secret, and the results are presented as faits accomplis to the public.”

The current government’s international policy review (IPR), which Mr. Martin launched more than a year ago, maps out a plan to streamline and reinvigorate Canada’s place abroad by refocusing military, foreign aid and diplomatic priorities. It serves as a guide for the Minister of Defence’s first policy review since the 1994 White Paper — as such, it is intended to show what, among other security needs, Canadians will expect their armed forces to satisfy. Officials from four departments engaged in a “pulling and hauling” exercise in order to ensure the document reflected the proper mix and measure of Canada’s 3 “Ds” — defence, diplomacy and development. Apparently dissatisfied with early drafts of the review, Mr. Martin looked outside his cabinet and traditional circle
of bureaucratic advisors and handed the review over to Oxford University professor Jennifer Welsh in order to put the finishing touches on the project. “Welsh’s academic work and recent book on Canadian Foreign Policy have addressed the same basic question Martin hopes will be answered by his review: How can Canada make a difference in the world?”

Dr. Welsh advocates a “mature relationship with the U.S.” based on the premise that “we are friends, but not best friends.” She encourages Canada to pursue its role as a “model power” for the world based on its credentials and worldwide “brand” as “relatively successful liberal democracy — civil, pluralist, internationalist” in outlook. As to the role of the military, Welsh argues that Canada should share the risks and burdens of continental defence with the U.S. and build a deployable “peace enforcement brigade” capable of operating alongside the U.S. or alone in order to “help others help themselves.” In such a role, Canada would be understood to play the role of “regime builder versus regime changer” and act as a member of the collective international community that both “pulls its weight and exercises restraint.”

The 2005 IPS appears to fully embrace Dr. Welsh’s concepts of Canada’s proper role in North America and the world — as a means for Canada “make a difference.” Indeed, as one observer noted, “[t]he phrase occurs no less than 18 times in the foreword and the text, and serves as the heading of the PM’s message and of the longest chapter in the statement.” An initial review of the IPS indicates that continued momentum from the Prime Minister’s policy advisors appears to have been generated in favour of enhanced North American defence cooperation. Such future cooperation with the US will likely be examined in the context of the PJBD, the BPG and the upcoming NORAD renewal discussions. The defence portion of the statement indicating Canada’s intent to renew its “commitment to continental defence through enhancing [its] domestic capabilities and establishing a single national command structure” implies a role for the newly developed and equipped CANCOM in a strengthened “continental defence architecture.”

While neither the Overview nor the Defence portion of the IPS elaborates a CDSA timeline, neither document presents any obstacles to near-term cooperation. The document does not appear to indicate that the Canadian government will allow the BMD decision to spill over into more traditional aspects of continental security. Therefore, those in favour of more robust CANUS defence cooperation have reason for cautious optimism.

Conclusion: A CDSA Progress Report

Since the Bi-National Planning Group began its work, considerable progress — in the form of numerous small victories — has been made across domains in the realm of North American defence and security. Continental defence has clearly been elevated to a priority position for both governments. Substantial commitments
have been made and honoured in areas beyond defence as well. In Canada, the
government established a new cabinet-level portfolio for Public Safety and Emer-
gency Preparedness Canada, a more or less parallel organization to the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. NORAD has re-engineered itself to look in-
ward as well as outward and respond rapidly to emergency situations. Maritime
cooperation between CANUS navies and coast guards continues to blossom
through exercises and the continuation of previous operational relationships. Cana-
da’s Maritime Security Operations Centres will be operational and further
enhancing the North American common operations picture by summer 2005. Yet,
the role of Canada’s Coast Guard in the security realm must continue to evolve
and the Canadian Navy’s coastal patrol capabilities augmented or assumed by
other Navy assets. In the near term, the most progress on continental defence
coopreation can be expected in the lower cost areas associated with enhanced
situational awareness. It is in the areas requiring a concrete Canadian commit-
ment to providing platforms that the future of a CDSA force remains in doubt
even in the event of a Canadian decision to participate. In the near term, should
Canada “opt in” on CDSA — regardless of the organizational construct selected —
new capabilities will be a long time in materializing. Current capability gaps will
remain, even with agreement and resolve to overcome them.

It is because the external environment does not automatically determine all of
Canadian defence policy that the governmental and domestic environments are
also important in understanding the process and content of defence decision mak-
ing.” In this spirit, the Canadian defence decision making model examined inputs,
communications channels, conversion structures, outputs, lenses and feedback
within an international and domestic environment. In choosing to consider possi-
ble CDSA outcomes in light of the model, it is hoped that the reader has been
given an appreciation for the complexity of the decision that will ultimately rest
in the hands of the Government of Canada.

While each actor in the defence policy process will influence the CDSA policy
outcome, the need and ability to make defence policy choices will remain. “For to
govern is to choose, and despite all the readily apparent constraints, Canada’s
[past] defence policies have been of Canada’s own choosing, commensurate with
its sovereignty and independence. Only if Canadians and their governments refuse
to recognize the need to decide, if they become too sceptical of their ability to
make policy, will the choices no longer be available. If this should happen, then
indeed, Canada’s sovereignty and independence, as well as security will be
diminished.” After September 11th, the U.S. made it clear that security came ahead
of other matters, including trade and the economy. These new U.S. priorities and
their enforcement threatened and continue to threaten the Canadian as well as the
U.S. economies. The evolution of CANUS defence cooperation shows how a re-
relationship clarified by crisis can move successfully and rapidly into new areas.

According to Dwight Mason, former chairman of the U.S. section of the Per-
manent Joint Board on Defense, “Negotiating a new agreement that will create an
all domain NORAD [a CDSA] is clearly in the interests of both countries. We need the improved capabilities it promises.” Mason continues, “The bi-national principle institutionalized in NORAD has proven successful. Expansion is particularly in Canada’s interest because it is the most effective and practical way for Canada to control key elements of its own defence at a reasonable cost. It is also a good way to expand Canadian capabilities in the land and sea domains because, as in NORAD now, Canada will be able to call on the resources of both countries”154 — not only for defence, but for civil support should the need ever arise.

While the Government of Canada’s decision not to further participate in U.S. ballistic missile defence presents an obstacle to organizing a CDSA, the decision illuminates other forces at work that may affect the chances for ever achieving a CDSA. It would seem that policy makers on both sides of the border who consider a CDSA the right next step for CANUS security should consider a more deliberate “strategic communications” plan that reaches actors deeply embedded in Canada’s domestic political process. Surrendering the rhetorical “high-ground” to nameless/faceless actors — with perhaps narrowly construed aims or biases unrelated to continental defence — will lend an air of unpredictability to the process of achieving CDSA. “Nevertheless, it is in the interest of both countries to surmount these difficulties to renew and extend NORAD. An early, strong Canadian endorsement of the [Bi-National] Planning Group’s recommendation would be a smart move — one that demonstrates vision and leadership.”155

If the CF is to meet the challenges of the 21st century — in terms of international security as well as continental defence — the historic Canadian cycle, where making ends meet takes away from an ability to prepare for the future, must be broken. Three ingredients are needed to overcome current challenges associated with past choices — resources (personnel, material, financial), political commitment, and time.156 The Government of Canada’s latest defence budget coupled with apparently strong commitments to CDSA and to a role in the world based on the concepts set forth in the 2005 IPS would be a strong and positive step in the right direction.

As the analysts assigned to the BPG point out, the desired end state is “[e]nhanced defence and security of Canada and the United States, such that our mutual societies continue to prosper in an environment where they are, and feel, free and safe.” (emphasis added)157 This is surely a goal worth striving towards.

Notes

2. Ibid, 1.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, i.
5. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
12. Ibid, ii.
13. Figure 3 depicts the added possibility of expanding such an organization to include the forces of other North American nations (i.e., Mexico) in such a future arrangement. This option, however, is beyond the scope of this research project and will not be discussed here.
14. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
29. Ibid, 47.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.


35. Ibid, 9.

36. Ibid, 14.

37. Ibid.


40. Ibid, 16-17.

41. Ibid, 18-19.

42. Ibid, 21.

43. Ibid, 23.


45. Ibid, 10.


48. Ibid.


54. Bland, Canada Without Armed Forces, xiv.

55. Author’s interview with members of the Privy Council Office staff, Ottawa, August, 2004.

56. Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, 8.

57. The new so-called “white paper” is actually the defence component of the International Policy Statement. Both were released simultaneously in April 2005. See: Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Defence, (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005).


59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
64. Author’s lecture notes Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Fall 2004, Political Science 472.
66. Ibid. The implication here is that Canada needs to find a balance as much informed by any threat mitigation approach as satisfying international and domestic expecta-
tions commensurate with Canada’s obligations.
68. Ibid.
70. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 61.
73. Ibid 29-30.
74. Ibid, 28-29.
75. Ibid, 29.
76. Answers.com, np.
78. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.


86. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview, Ottawa (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005), forward.


88. Ibid.

89. BPG Report, Appendix VI, 2-3.


92. Analysis of the 2005 budget is offered later in this chapter.


94. Ibid, 154.


98. The Speech from the Throne is similar to the US State of the Union speech. It outlines the Government’s priorities for the upcoming legislative session and is accepted by the Parliament via vote as its agenda for the session as well. Office of the Prime Minister, Address by the Prime Minister in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, 5 October 2004, np, http://www.pm.gc.ca.


102. Waddell, np.

105. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 121.
106. MacLean’s Annual Poll, 30 December 2002, Macleans.ca, Rogers Media Inc., np.
110. Ibid, 15.
111. Ibid, 4.
112. Ibid, 4 &15.
114. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 130.
115. Interview with Dr. Douglas Bland, Queens University, March 2005.
117. Ibid.
121. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 99.
124. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 223.
125. Ibid.
127. CDA, Budget, 2.
128. Ibid.
130. Ibid.


133. Ibid.


135. Hillier, np.

136. This new direction for the CF became apparent after numerous interviews by the author with individuals familiar with current DND strategic plans who preferred to remain off the record.


140. Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 220.

141. Ibid, 222.


143. Ibid.

144. Panetta, “Foreign Policy …”, np.


146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Louis Delvoie, former Deputy Minister of National Defence for Policy, Comments before panel at Queen’s Centre for International Relations, May 2005.


150. Ibid.


152. Ibid, 228-229.
155. Ibid.
156. Canada’s National Security, CDAI, 4.

**Bibliography**


Canada, Department of National Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Ottawa, 2005.


Cernetig, Miro “Cellucci offers wish list for our military.” *Toronto Star*, 18 February 2005.


Dominion Institute of Canada and The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, *Visions of Canadian Foreign Policy*, survey by Innovative Research Group, 4 November 2004.


Fife, Robert and Anne Dawson, “Spend More on spies, soldiers, Cellucci urges — And don’t forget the planes to carry them around,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 4 February 2005, from Canada.com.


MacLean’s Annual Poll, 30 December 2002, Macleans.ca, Rogers Media Inc.


Sokolsky, Dr. Joel C. *Political Science 462*. Lecture. Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, Fall 2004.

