Untangling NATO Transformation
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The Martello Papers

The Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security.

The end of the Cold War transformed the international system into something at once promising and menacing to the western states and their institutions. Accordingly, they in turn sought in varying degrees to transform their foreign and security policies, their militaries and their relations with allies. As LCol Stephen Mariano notes in this study, what began as an undertaking centred on the US military soon crossed the Atlantic and was adopted by NATO at its Prague summit in 2002.

Transformation meant many things to the alliance. Its roots were in successive attempts, through the 1990s, to redefine and update NATO’s “strategic concept.” By the time of the “transformation summit” in Prague, the agenda had become multifaceted, stressing enlargement, new relationships with partners and, in particular, capabilities. LCol Mariano’s paper looks in detail at the last of these, finding a degree of progress but also a number of shortfalls some five years after the enunciation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment.

The study traces the trajectory of transformation through NATO’s command structure, its force structure, the new NATO Response Force (NRF), and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Its critical finding is a lack of close fit between these new arrangements and the capabilities being sought or delivered by the allies. The problem is partly one of domestic politics,
which requires budget-driven compromises, and partly one of rear-view mirror driving, in which thinking continues to be shaped more by past missions than by current and future threats. This is a balanced and sobering analysis by a politically savvy officer experienced in the ways of military multilateralism.

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As a concept, the term “transformation” bubbled to the surface of security studies in the late 1990s. Two relevant phrases which preceded it were “the revolution in military affairs” (RMA) (Alcala and Bracken, 1994, 36) and its sidekick “network centric warfare” (NCW) (Cebrowski and Garstka, 1998). Though the terms RMA and NCW are still used in specific ways, in general terms they yielded to the now ubiquitous term, transformation. Transformation has taken on a life of its own, frequently with more political than military attributes. In the 1999 US presidential campaign, for example, transformation became a buzzword in George W. Bush’s election rhetoric (Bush, 1999). Two years later, Donald Rumsfeld codified transformation as a tenet of American defence policy in his 2002 article in Foreign Affairs, “Transforming the Military” (2002, 20-32) and created the Office of Force Transformation within the department of Defense. The Pentagon even submitted a bill to Congress called the Defense Transformation in the 21st Century Act in an effort to permanently anchor transformation into American national security decision-making processes.

The term crossed the Atlantic about the same time and officially entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lexicon during the Prague
Summit in 2002. During the meeting, which has since been dubbed the “transformation summit,” nations agreed on NATO’s transformation goal by employing a multifaceted approach: “transforming NATO with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners” (NATO, 2002). While US efforts to expand the meaning of transformation had been steadily growing during the early years of President Bush’s first term, NATO’s adoption of the term was a resounding bureaucratic success.

This paper discusses NATO’s transformation efforts in general, but one area in particular: NATO’s military capabilities. It starts with an overview of NATO’s “Prague Capabilities Commitment” and continues with a detailed examination of several components of NATO’s capabilities transformation. It seeks to untangle the capabilities segment of NATO’s transformation initiatives but finds several problems in the alliance approach to transformation. The main point is that NATO’s command arrangements are not adequately married to the capabilities being sought by NATO and its nations. Also, as new initiatives get turned into policy and programs, they take on lives of their own, never quite supporting the original transformation objectives.

The paper contains sections on the NATO Command Structure, NATO Force Structure, the NATO Response Force, and the Combined Joint Task Force. Each concept is described, exposed as largely disconnected from other initiatives, and shown to be designed for the last war, not the current or even next war. The conclusion concedes a measure of progress in each area, but identifies lingering shortfalls. It then makes recommendations for improving NATO’s transformational capabilities.

Another major obstacle to developing coherent military capabilities is an outdated Strategic Concept. NATO is operating from its 1999 version which predated not only the attacks of September 11th, but also the military responses since that time. NATO has not stood idly by as the war on terror unfolded, but it has struggled to keep pace with meaningful military capabilities. NATO’s inability to come to political terms with “transformational” raison d’être prevents it from improving its military effectiveness.

Thus far and not surprisingly, NATO’s transformation efforts are balancing unsteadily between political will and military commitment. Heads of state, foreign ministers and defence secretaries make political commitments during summit meetings or when seated at table in Brussels, but return home to find that competing domestic requirements limit their ability to obligate militarily. Particularly in the “peace-dividend” era, the
requirements of the social welfare state superseded the security requirements of the alliance; in the “terrorist era,” the tap on European funds is not yet open. As can be expected from an international institution with a dual political and military identity, NATO’s transformational work is proceeding in an uneven way along these two lines. The bottom line, however, is that the political decisions on Prague Capabilities Commitment programs are disconnected from NATO’s other military programs.

**NATO’s Transformation Agenda**

One part of NATO’s transformation agenda, enlarging NATO’s membership from 19 to 26 members, comprised the single largest increase since the alliance’s 1949 inception. Adding Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania was, however, merely an extension of the 1999 enlargement which brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Extending NATO’s membership was happening whether or not the word transformation was employed, but the timing of that round of enlargement lent itself to the transformation rubric. Future rounds of enlargement will likely make Europe “whole and free” by including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Expanding the western European zone of peace eastward was simply the ultimate expression of alliance political will.

A second part of the transformation agenda, creating new relationships with partners, was essentially aimed at Russia and Ukraine but alluded to the European Union (EU) as well. At the military level, NATO enjoyed considerable success in developing partnerships with these two countries due to robust Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and extensive military contacts, but political differences over expansion, the Balkans, and terrorism required that new relationships be put in order. Similar to enlargement, using transformation terminology with respect to Russia, Ukraine, EU and other PfP relationships was a pragmatic way of demonstrating the political will of an alliance in transition.

The third Prague agenda item was transforming NATO with new capabilities. It was the less anticipated theme but one that addressed the issue of political will nonetheless. Coming in the wake of the US-led coalition’s swift toppling of the Taliban, one could jump to the conclusion that the term “capabilities” meant more European hardware to keep up with the
Americans. Generalizing transformation in this way is not only incomplete, but doing so misses the important organizational and doctrinal characteristics of the initiative.

In the official Prague communiqué the phrase “new capabilities,” encompassed seven initiatives:

1. Create a NATO Response Force (NRF);
2. Streamline NATO’s military command arrangements;
3. Approve the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC);
4. Endorse the agreed military concept for defence against terrorism;
5. Endorse the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives;¹
6. Strengthen capabilities to defend against cyber attacks;
7. Conduct a NATO Missile Defence feasibility study (NATO, 2002).

Alliance leaders belatedly realized that “endorsing a military concept” or “conducting a feasibility study” did not provide NATO with improved military capability and soon deconstructed the official statement. NATO rebuilt the transformation initiatives into “a three-pronged approach to improving its defence capabilities:”

1. Launching of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC);
2. Creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF);

With the other four capability efforts derailed, or at least left standing at the station, NATO transformation programs started running down these three parallel tracks. Not all of these efforts were completed in time for NATO’s Summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006 and it remains to be seen whether they will ever come together in any meaningful way.

A cursory comparison of the capabilities listed above with those needed in Afghanistan or even a possible mission in, for instance, Darfur, shows the list to be inadequate. Implementing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives, strengthening computer network defences, and conducting a NATO Missile Defence study are all worthy security initiatives but they do not provide obvious advantages in the ongoing or most likely future missions.

¹ The five are: a Prototype Deployable NBC Analytical Laboratory; a Prototype NBC Event Response team; a virtual Centre of Excellence for NBC Weapons Defence; a NATO Biological and Chemical Defence Stockpile; and a Disease Surveillance system.
NATO’s New Map

Even more curious at Prague was the lack of debate on revising NATO’s Strategic Concept. In the months leading up to the Prague Summit, NATO had invoked its Article Five provision, deployed aircraft to the United States in response to the September 11th attacks, and initiated a maritime interdiction operation in the Mediterranean. All of these events were figuratively and literally off the NATO map. If NATO genuinely wished to transform, then creating something akin to “NATO’s New Map” (Barnett, 2004, 435), would have been an appropriate first step. Prague was the first opportunity to take that step.

Unveiled at the 1999 Washington Summit, the Strategic Concept was intended to reflect the “dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War” (NATO, 1999). A review of the document indicates, however, that it merely consolidates NATO’s experience of the five previous years rather than provide any ideological direction for the next fifty. For example, the term “Non-Article Five Crisis Response Operations” was introduced as the paradigm for future conflict but this language was deeply influenced by regional experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo (Ibid; The Insider Report, 1999).

Not surprisingly, the words “region” or “regional” are mentioned nine times in the Strategic Concept while the words “terrorist” or “terrorism” are mentioned only twice; “Russia” appears eight times, “Middle-East” not at all2 (Chubin, Shahram, Green, and Larrabee, 1999). Few could have predicted that Al Qaida operatives would fly airplanes into buildings and kill thousands, but between 1999 and 2001 there were plenty of indicators of other terrorist threats to North Atlantic security. Certainly, by the time of the Prague meeting in 2002, there was overwhelming evidence terrorism had proliferated in Europe3 (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2006). That capabilities pursued at Prague are not well suited to counter the terrorism threat foreshadows NATO’s larger transformation problem.

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2. The report made the point that the Strategic Concept did not adequately focus on the Middle East.
3. According to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism between the 1999 Washington Summit and 11 September 2001, there were 31 terrorist attacks against France, 21 in Germany, and 16 in the United Kingdom compared to 13 in the United States (The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2006).
The Prague Capabilities Commitment

While NATO’s internal disputes over Iraq are well known (Meyer, 2004, 83-97), the recurrent controversy is the transatlantic “capability gap” (Yost, 1997, 5-15; Flanagan, 2005, 5). Simply put, this gap refers to the fact that most European nations do not have the military capability — primarily in terms of manpower and hardware — required to operate with the United States in most operations. Lord Robertson put a sharp point on it when he confessed that despite best intentions, “the truth is that mighty Europe remains a military pygmy” (Robertson, 2002). To appreciate why the gap was a major issue at Prague and understand the origins of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a brief review of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is required. In fact, the failure of the DCI gave birth to the PCC. Each program was intended to improve military capabilities and close the gap between European, Canadian and American forces.

DCI was unveiled in 1999 at NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington D.C. It was “designed to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges” (Mariano and Wilson, 2003). DCI gained momentum because of NATO’s shaky experience in Kosovo but more specifically due to the lack of military-technical interoperability between US and European air forces (Lambeth, 2001, 230). Despite biased opinions to the contrary (Clark, 2001, 479), and even though NATO nations possessed relatively large fleets of aircraft on paper, only a few nations had air forces capable of making meaningful contributions in the US led air operations. European and Canadian forces lagged behind US military capabilities in a number of areas:
[T]he allies generally lacked the level of precision and all weather capabilities that would allow them to carry out missions by day and night while ensuring the minimum civilian damage. The United States provided 700 of the 1055 aircraft deployed in the allied effort and flew by far the greatest number of sorties. Europeans also lacked capabilities to deploy personnel and equipment to the field of operations and to sustain them as long as necessary. The United States provided more than 90 percent of aerial refuelling aircraft, the bulk of airlift capabilities and all tactical jamming capabilities (Peters, 2001).

Accordingly, “DCI identified 58 major areas as shortfalls after NATO’s Kosovo 1999 air campaign” (NATO, 2005b). Overwhelmed by the discrepancies, DCI was supposed to close this gap by getting allies to focus on five of the most critical deficiencies: mobility and deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications (NATO, 2004a).

Unfortunately, European and Canadian progress has been sluggish. Most defence budgets declined during the intervening years, with only seven nations$^4$ spending the targeted two percent of GDP on defence in 2005 — a longstanding goal that was reaffirmed at the Prague Summit (Roosevelt, 2005). One important study, however, demonstrated that copious funds do not necessarily help militaries prepare for the next war (Rosen, 1991, 252). Political will, therefore, is fundamental to improving European capability but in its postmodern “paradise” Europe seemingly lacked the will to increase its military power (Kagan, 2003, 68).

As nations prepared for the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s leadership must have seen that the will to implement DCI was flagging. With no tangible results, even “spin” could not produce good news. One acronym, DCI, was abandoned for another (PCC) and the new transformation campaign was formally begun. The capability categories were slightly modified and now consisted of eight very specific but still lagging capabilities:

1. Strategic air and sea lift;
2. Air-to-air refuelling;
3. Deployable combat support and combat service units;
4. Command, control and communications;
5. Air-to-ground surveillance;

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4. The seven countries are Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6. Intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
7. Combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
8. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence capabilities (NATO, 2004b, 9).

The introduction of another “shopping list” attempted to accomplish three objectives: erase the failure of DCI, single out the most critical capability shortfalls, and strengthen Europe’s political commitment to the alliance.

**European Ambition**

EU sensitivities were explicitly important in any capability improvement exercise: “efforts to improve capabilities through the PCC and those of the EU to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) should be mutually reinforcing, while respecting the autonomy of both organizations, and in a spirit of openness” (NATO, 2002).

Throughout the 1990s, European members of the alliance pressed for their own independent military capabilities, nominally under the command and control of the EU, in documents like the ECAP and more recently the European Security Strategy, without committing the resources needed to turn ambition into reality (Flourney, Smith, Ben-Ari, McInnis, and Scruggs, 2005, 5, 15). To counter the funding problem, European nations have increased their coordination efforts, thereby gaining efficiencies and achieving a modicum of success organizing multinational consortia: Spain leads on air-to-air refuelling, Norway on strategic sealift, and Germany on strategic airlift. European success in previous multinational developments has been inconsistent, and the 20 plus year saga of the Eurofighter consortium provides an excellent example. Although filling these European capability holes is a long way off, credit should be given to nations for getting their collective security act together.

A prime example of European solidarity might end up being the alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. The AGS was born from the success of the NATO Airborne Warning Air Command and Control System (AWACS) and given a serendipitous boost after 11 September 2001. The NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force proved its worth after the terrorist attacks by flying in Operation Noble Eagle in the United States, a mission scarcely dreamed of during the unit’s inception in 1980. The AWACS model serves as a solid example for AGS because the aircraft were purchased with NATO common funding, are manned and maintained
by a genuinely multinational crew, and commanded on a rotational basis by a “NATO” general officer. Likewise, the AGS is being commonly funded and will have a multinational contingent operating its aircraft as well as its ground-based radar components. By acquiring AGS, NATO will obtain a modern capability, modeled after the US Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, and add a much needed instrument to the NATO toolbox.

Significant tools, however, are still missing from this box. First, as the Balkan operations demonstrated, NATO lacks an effective intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition system that collects information and then processes it into actionable intelligence. Second, after nearly a decade of trying, national efforts have produced only a few improvements to combat effectiveness by outfitting, for example, combat aircraft with Link-16 communication equipment and precision-guided munitions. Third, nations have not supported development of strategically deployable and tactically mobile logistic units. Like all the PCC subject areas, obtaining the above capabilities has the twin advantage of helping NATO and contributing to the EU’s discernable European Security and Defence Policy.

Unfortunately, AGS, air-to-air refuelling, and strategic lift are capabilities more likely suited for the last war than the next. Accordingly, and as a result of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, an entirely new set of military capabilities and requirements were introduced after the PCC areas were set: the defence against terrorism programme. The capabilities being developed in this effort are reliant on “cutting edge technologies to protect troops and civilians against terrorist attacks. These technologies are aimed at preventing the kinds of attacks perpetrated by terrorists, such as suicide attacks with improvised explosive devices, rocket attacks against

5. Canada, for example, is only now upgrading their CF-18s with Link 16 (Defence Industry Daily, 2006).

6. ESDP is the EU’s official policy; the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) has been developed within NATO and “is an integral part of the adaptation of NATO’s political and military structures. At the same time, it is an important element of the development of the European Union (EU). Both of these processes have been carried forward on the basis of the European Union’s Treaties of Maastricht in 1991 and Amsterdam in 1997, subsequent declarations made by the Western European Union and the European Union, and decisions taken by the alliance at successive Summit meetings held in Brussels in 1994, Madrid in 1997 and Washington in 1999 and at regular ministerial meetings” (NATO, 2001).
aircraft and helicopters” (NATO, 2006b). The DAT initiatives, like their PCC brethren, are disconnected from NATO’s organizational and doctrinal developments.

Trying to simultaneously acquire modern equipment for current missions and develop tools to meet future challenges exacerbates NATO’s political-military dilemma: which effort has priority? Modernization programs like AGS, air-to-air refuelling and strategic lift should be followed through to completion, but they will conflict — financially and philosophically — with development of the current and future force. National debates over defence spending are difficult enough, but bringing that debate into the multinational spotlight magnifies the difficulties 26 fold.

Creating a future force, for example, that includes a NATO unmanned aerial vehicle fleet, a NATO Missile Defence system, or a computer network attack (or defence) unit, all NATO ambitions, would require substantial political debate before committing the appropriate resources. Having that debate would not only indicate European sincerity in meeting new threats, but would also improve transatlantic relations. NATO has a commitment problem, however, and as a former NATO Secretary General, Sir George Robertson acknowledged, “We must make sure that our means match our ambitions” (Burns, 2005, 17).

The Comprehensive Approach

Aligning ends, ways and means was not part of the PCC agenda in Prague, but perhaps it should have been. Occurring just one year after the September 11th attacks and more than three years after the 1999 Washington Summit, the Prague discussions missed a critical opportunity to reorient NATO’s strategy. The 1999 Strategic Concept was a significant accomplishment but, as mentioned at the outset, it failed to identify the extent of the terrorist threat and capture the international character of global Islamic extremism (NATO, 1999). Hence, NATO transformation efforts need both a rewrite of the Strategic Concept and a strategic planning process that links political objectives with security concepts and then matches necessary (largely, but not solely, military) resources. Only then can NATO and its member nations develop a full range of political and military capabilities that provide security to its member states.

NATO relies on a defence planning process (DPP) based on a “Level of Ambition” (LOA). Thankfully that LOA was recently reduced from conducting three loosely defined “major joint operations” outside the NATO
area of operation? (Flourney, Smith, Ben-Ari, McInnis, Scruggs, 2005, 46) to two major joint operations and six smaller joint operations. The LOA and a combination of subsequently developed scenarios are described in a document called the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG). As the name implies, the DPG is intended to provide national defence ministries with the guidance needed to develop plans and capabilities.

Unfortunately, the document is at once too broad and too narrow; in trying to be all things to all nations the DPG fails to reach its objectives. On the one hand, operations outlined in the DPG must define a big tent under which all nations can camp. Consequently, the document allows many interpretations that frequently run in opposition to one another. Disputes over the term “out-of-area” provoke discussions about old and new Europe as well as spark debates over NATO involvement in Africa. On the other hand, the DPG must be specific enough to tell nations which capability they should acquire (or not) and why (or why not). It is not clear that the DPG and alliance leadership has the wherewithal to be that precise. The bottom line is that the DPG is not binding and in the absence of an agreed threat, nations lack the political will to surrender more than token national sovereignty.

Theoretically, NATO’s planning process should facilitate the “strategy-to-task” progression but instead the DPP acts as an impediment to progress. Defence planning is described in an official NATO document as:

… a comprehensive endeavour that encompasses seven different planning disciplines: force resource and armaments planning; and four supporting disciplines: logistics, nuclear, C3 (consultation, command and control), and civil emergency planning…. In practical terms, there is no standard defence planning process or defence planning cycle per se. Each one of the seven principal disciplines are [sic] managed by a different NATO body and apply [sic] special procedures. They also contribute differently to the overall aim of providing the alliance with the forces and capabilities to undertake the full range of its missions (NATO, 2005d).

Clearly then, critics have plenty to debate across seven planning “stove-pipes” with no recognizable system linking them together, particularly in an international organization where agreed procedures have habitually provided common ground. Establishing a standard, strategic planning

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7. One might notice that the “three major joint operations outside the NATO area” sounds similar to the old US “two major regional conflict” construct.
process that establishes strategic objectives and provides directions to each of the organizations charged with a planning discipline, would help coordinate PCC efforts and improve the effectiveness of individual contributions to the alliance.

In addition, a strategic planning process could translate strategic objectives into achievable programs. Because of myriad disconnected planning processes, NATO and its member nations continually struggle to produce coherent and complementary capabilities. As previously mentioned, one of the main aspects of the DPP is to develop planning guidance (NATO, 2005d). The guidance coming out of the current process, however, does not flow from the Strategic Concept, is not tightly woven to the PCC objectives, and does not provide direction for development of national capabilities and multinational concepts.

As part of the original DPP, a catalogue of NATO forces were matched against Soviet forces and based on contingency plans to protect German, Norwegian and Turkish borders. Forces were generated in type and quantity to fight the least likely battles rather than the most likely (Cohen, 1984, 151-181). Using the Soviet template as a force planning model simply does not help NATO cope with current operational challenges. When it comes to generating forces for operations today, the system makes it difficult for nations to know what type of forces NATO will need and when, and then commit these forces as needs arise. Afghanistan is a notable example. Of course NATO planners cannot routinely envisage the need for forces in specific locations like Pakistan or the United States (in support of natural disasters), but they ought to be able to generate forces and predict what type of capabilities will be needed to get those forces outside of Europe.

In short, NATO does have an operational planning process (OPP), but its lineage is neither long nor distinguished. Consequently, the process has trouble predicting future “real-world” requirements and problems dealing with the fluid nature of the NATO Response Force (Ames, 2006). The existing OPP process also neglects the sizeable NATO and national exercise requirements (Mariano, 2003, 92-101). Planners are finally beginning to

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8. “In essence, defence planning existed during the Cold War but ‘operational planning,’ in the sense that we now know it, did not. This was because it was the task of force (and nuclear) planning to identify all the forces required to implement the collective defence war plans and members were expected to assign and employ the requested forces virtually without question. These war plans were, in effect, the only ‘operational plans’ of the era” (NATO, 2005d).
focus on new threats and develop plans for out of area operations (NATO, 2005c). The planning aspect of transformation has provided some “shock therapy” for NATO’s old business processes. As one US legislator said, NATO needs to be able to “go out of area, or go out of business” (Lugar, 2002, 10).

According to Brendan Wilson, a Force Planner at the NATO Headquarters, the problem is not the planning system or even the availability of forces; the problem is the old nemesis, political will:

Nations are unwilling to give those forces to current operations when they are asked for by NATO. Force Planning’s job is to ensure the forces are available in the force structure and developed with the capabilities required for operations… No force generation has ever failed because the forces and capabilities were not available in the force structure. …We have the assets we need to fill the operations in which we are currently engaged; the problem is in political willingness to provide the forces. For example, the NRF force generation is not failing due to lack of capabilities in the force structure. We know where those assets are and which nations have them (Wilson, 2006).

So even if out of area plans are developed, military requirements will be difficult to derive because of the political mismatch between international ambition and domestic funding.

Given the often fierce bureaucratic turf battles associated with these processes, the NATO Secretary General should appoint an independent commission of outside experts to redesign NATO’s defence planning processes to be more rational, integrated, agile, and more responsive to the needs of member states (Flournoy, Smith, Ben-Ari, McInnis, Scruggs, 2005, 11).

In response to such suggestions, NATO officials, such as former Chairman of the Military Committee General Harald Kujat, have been calling for a new look into the current planning system: “a comprehensive approach to planning for NATO operations … with broadly agreed contingency operation plans and associated statements of requirements, is key to assure this predictability and, In Fine, [sic] the availability of forces for NATO operations” (NATO, 2005c). But Kujat’s words are oddly similar to those in documents from earlier decades. First, from a 1987 Defence Planning Committee meeting:

As we move ahead, we must take care to sustain this balance between the military and political components of our strategy, and to ensure a comprehensive, integrated and coherent approach to all elements of arms control and security, nuclear and non-nuclear (US Department of State, 1988).
Second, taken from the 1977 Ministerial Guidance:

In developing more rational procedures for NATO’s long-term planning for defence the alliance must seek to harmonise planning mechanisms for the various co-operative and supporting programmes, and to dovetail the results of this effort with the present NATO force planning procedures into a comprehensive approach for alliance defence planning; the need for early identification of the resource implications of major co-operative projects will be of special importance (NATO, 1977).

Even the most optimistic transatlanticist would be disheartened to learn that a comprehensive approach to planning has been a long-standing, unrealized alliance goal.

At Riga, nations agreed on an updated version of comprehensive planning called the Comprehensive Political Guidance (see Appendix II). It is not clear, however, how these comprehensive planning efforts are being brought together or how progress on the PCC initiatives is helping NATO achieve its objectives in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Perhaps more time is needed to produce tangible results, but time may not be on NATO’s side. As one scholar noted, “the Atlantic alliance has been dying a slow death” since 1991 when it lost its central purpose and “began to crumble like a bridge no longer in use — slowly, almost invisibly” (Joffe, 2003, 159).

What is Missing from the PCC?

The work that has gone into the PCC, while considerable, does not cut across all the transformational areas, is not well connected to NATO’s planning procedures or organizational structures, and not particularly relevant to ongoing operations. Three areas are glaringly underdeveloped: establishment of an intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition system, improvement of combat effectiveness, and creation of deployable combat support and combat service support forces.

The repackaging of the original Prague objectives caused a few other important initiatives to disappear from the radar screen. One example is missile defence. NATO appears set on proceeding with a multi-billion dollar missile defence program (Agence France-Presse, 2004) but it has given no attention to this subject in its command arrangements. Defence against cyber attacks is another item specifically mentioned in Prague but for which no tangible progress or identifiable leader exists.
And while the Czech Republic serves as an example for smaller NATO nations developing niche capabilities, its necessary efforts in developing a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) battalion are insufficient. The CBRN unit is primarily designed to react to situations rather than defend against them. Moreover, the capabilities to prevent or preempt a CBRN attack do not reside in this military unit and the political furor over Iraq has prevented any reasonable discourse on the merits of further CBRN capabilities.

Disunity persists in the other PCC strands and their association with organizational structures: no civilian entity or military headquarters to deal with intelligence, including integration of the emerging AGS force; no dedicated office to coordinate strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling capabilities; no entity responsible for managing deployable combat support and combat service support capabilities; and no single office, agency or headquarters leads the effort to manage improvements in combat effectiveness and precision strike (though one could argue every operational headquarters has this mission).

Add to this list the “defence-against-terrorism” initiatives and NATO has a menagerie of capabilities initiatives with no dedicated keeper. No new offices or headquarters are needed to take up this slack but as will be shown, transitioning the few redundant or excess headquarters into new entities and assigning the task to underemployed offices throughout the civil and military structures could solve the problem. By its own admission and almost unbelievably, NATO does not have a comprehensive planning process to integrate these efforts (NATO, 2005d).

NATO is currently pursuing each capability in a vacuum, with the possible exception of the developing NRF. The Brussels bureaucrats are working hard to get national commitments and multinational corporations are collaborating on technical solutions but creative thinking on the military application of these capabilities is lagging behind. Rather than waiting until the capabilities are fielded before developing a command arrangement, the North Atlantic Council should task a military body (rather than a civilian entity) to integrate these emerging capabilities — ostensibly the role of Allied Command Transformation. Once the capabilities and concepts become operationalized, a field command, ostensibly the Allied Command Operations, should assume responsibility for their management. The political bodies in Brussels should adapt too, and not remain in their Cold War indolence.
Creation of the NRF

The NATO Response Force was the second major transformation issue was conceived by Americans during the pre-Prague period. The NRF was described as a way to “close the transatlantic capability gap, transform militaries for new missions, and gain a stronger European voice in alliance deliberations (Binnendijk and Kugler, 2002). The United States saw that the DCI efforts were stalling and rightly feared that without some type of catalyst, the PCC initiative would falter as well.

After little debate, nations agreed to the NRF proposal. The NRF was defined at inception thusly:

The NRF is a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council. The NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the alliance’s military capabilities…. The NRF and the related work of the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both organisations (NATO, 2002).

The force was intended to have a full range of missions, including “evacuations, disaster management, counterterrorism, and acting as ‘an initial entry force’ for larger, follow-on forces” (NATO, 2006c).

9. To ensure the NRF was on top of the Summit agenda, the authors published a shorter version of their argument in the *International Herald Tribune* one month before the meeting (Binnendijk and Kugler, 2004).
CJTF and the NRF

To fully comprehend the NRF proposal, an understanding of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is mandatory. In fact, the two concepts have more in common than American ancestry.

In October 1993 the United States proposed the CJTF concept as a means of establishing a genuine European military capability that was “separable but not separate” from NATO’s integrated military structure. At the same time, CJTFs serve the purpose of projecting security and stability to the East by giving NATO the flexible military structure to address tasks such as peace operations. NATO heads of state approved the CJTF initiative at their summit meeting in January 1994 (Barry, 1994, 47).

Happily, and almost unwittingly, the CJTF concept achieved half its objectives by opening its doors eastward and promoting interoperability with PfP and non-NATO European Union nations. Unhappily, the complex CJTF concept was riddled with political interests and bounced around NATO for over a decade without being used in a single military operation, despite the twin opportunities of Bosnia and Kosovo. Accordingly, the CJTF never quantifiably improved the alliance’s deployable capabilities and never provided real-world lessons learned. The concept was plagued by “too many moving parts for it to be a workable option for a political entity such as NATO” (Cooke, 1999, 135).

The DCI-PCC relationship is similar to the one between the CJTF and NRF: birth of the latter was due to stagnation of the former. As the CJTF idea lost momentum, the NRF presented new opportunity. The NRF was intended to be undeniably modern, militarily capable and politically friendly. The US used CJTF-like rationale to promote the NRF: the NRF would provide genuine military capability; it would facilitate alliance transformation by improving European nations’ capabilities; and it would recognize the importance of interoperability with the European Union.

Thus, in many ways, the NRF is the “son of CJTF”: it deploys and operates out of area; uses modern equipment; draws forces from the force structure; consists of land, sea and maritime components; acts in a joint capacity; takes orders from the NATO command structure; and improves interoperability.

In other ways, however, the NRF breaks from the past: it is small, about one-third the size of a CJTF, (approximately 20,000 versus 60,000); deploys in a matter of hours and days rather than weeks and months; focuses
primarily on combat operations (though non-combatant evacuation operations or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions are also expected, as deployments to help earthquake victims in Pakistan and hurricane victims indicated); is lighter and more mobile; maintains a rotational scheme with one NRF always on standby (and others on lower levels of readiness); and rather than improving interoperability of NATO nations with non-NATO, European Union and Partnership for Peace ( PfP) nations, the NRF is designed to increase the interoperability within NATO (Mariano and Wilson, 2003).

Nations are supposed to contribute their best forces to the NRF. By being nominated for an NRF rotation, these units should be prior objects of national reform efforts. Once these units receive organizational, technological and educational upgrades, they are certified to participate in NRF specific training and exercises (or theoretically, an operation). Afterward, these forces return home to spread their experience and further institutional knowledge back through the remainder of their national establishment. Ultimately, this process is supposed to infuse an alliance-wide military culture of modernity or “transformation.” Some skeptics, however, are concerned that the gap is too big and the inability to conduct “technology transfer” with European nations will result in a “dumbed-down” NRF (Bishnoi, 2005). Others just blame it on lack of political will (Bensahel, 2003, 82).

If too many moving parts plagued the CJTF concept, then the NRF may be an uncertainty, representative of the entire alliance. An irritating dichotomy within NATO is one of political grouping versus military capability (Hillen and Noonan, 1998, 22). The NRF struggles with its dual roles as a war fighting force and transformational tool. Balancing current operational requirements with future force requirements will prove a daunting task, one with which even the well-resourced US military struggles (Jaffe and Karp, 2005, 3).

Even before the declaration of full operational capability in November 2006, the NRF has been a battleground for the war fighting versus transformation debate. In 2004, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) used parts of the NRF (despite the reservations of several nations) to bolster NATO troops in Afghanistan during an election period and to support Greek national forces during the Olympic Games in Athens. In 2005, approximately 1,000 members of the NRF deployed to Pakistan to for a humanitarian assistance mission (SHAPE, 2005) and NRF
air and maritime assets also assisted with Hurricane Katrina disaster relief (Joyce, 2005).

The rationale for using the force in this way was straightforward: even if not a combat mission, the force would deploy, be used in a meaningful way, gain operational experience, return to home base, provide feedback to future deployments, and transform the collective force. Opponents of these deployments insisted that the NRF remain a coherent unit rather than a piecemeal collection of capabilities. Critics feared that breaking out elements of the NRF would degrade its overall capability in the event of a “real” crisis. Rigid insistence that the NRF be kept together would guarantee, however, much like the CJTF, that the force would never be used. Keeping the NRF under glass and breaking it out only when the “right” emergency comes along will jeopardize the entire transformational enterprise.

Commanding the NRF on actual operations may also be quixotic for several reasons. First, nations still do not fully commit forces to the NATO commander until very late in the planning process. Consequently, commanders usually do not own forces until they arrive in theatre, which is a questionable military procedure. Furthermore, nations have the upper hand in opting out of a difficult mission by showing what is commonly known as the national sovereignty “red card” (Toczek, 2006, 60).

Second, the small force has a large mission set. The NRF has already performed several missions that were completely distinct from one another, and none required the entire complement of land, maritime and air forces. The military capabilities required to help the Afghan commanders protect election stations do not resemble those used to assist Greek authorities at Olympic venues. These mission sets required altogether different assets than those deployed to help the Pakistani and American governments with disaster relief.

Third, the NRF may have to deal with tasks on land, sea or air — singly or simultaneously. This broad range of service-specific and joint tasks requires a variety of specialist that may not exist in the lightly manned NRF headquarters.

Fourth and similarly, because NATO’s entire command and force structure is designed to command forces at the corps level (or above) and not a relatively small brigade sized joint task force, the NRF will be prone to micromanagement by the four star headquarters in Naples and Brunssum.

Fifth and finally, as a crisis grows beyond the scope of the NRF, technical mechanisms are needed to smoothly transfer command of forces from
a seabased headquarters to landbased facility as well as transitioning from brigade level operations to corps level campaigns.

**What is Missing from CJTF and NRF Policy?**

For better or for worse, the CJTF policy is still on NATO’s books as a deployable force concept. Despite never having been tested in an operation, the CJTF policy has been reformulated twice: first to include PfP nations, and second, to accommodate streamlined command structure and the NRF. The new CJTF policy acknowledges use of high readiness forces and fits nicely over the smaller NRF, provided the NRF is deployed and then grows to a larger force.

The CJTF concept also served the useful purpose of forcing NATO’s acquisition of deployable (communications) assets. Unfortunately, the lengthy political and acquisition processes are making the contracted equipment obsolete before delivery. Military planners glossed over the details of the NRF using the CJTF equipment in NRF operations.

CJTF deployable communications modules are too big and too heavy to meet the demanding requirements of a rapidly deployable force. A threat may have come and gone by the time technicians take the communications equipment apart, put it on a plane and put it back together in the crisis area. NATO needs to get with the 21st century program and purchase modern, off the shelf, rapidly deployable, and air-land-sea transportable (“roll on, roll off”) communication assets. This equipment will electronically link headquarters with forces, serve the entire integrated command structure and meet the PCC goals.

When SACEUR deployed parts of the NRF on operations in Afghanistan, Greece, Pakistan and the United States, he won the initial rounds of debate on whether the NRF is operational or transformational. Being two things at once is not easy and the primacy of each idea will be tested regularly. Thus far, it seems the NRF will not go the way of the CJTF — an operational construct that consumes a decade of resources but is never used.

Other issues like training and deployment of the NRF still need to be institutionalized. Given the diverse nature of the military headquarters, the NRF needs to have its training relationships better linked to operational headquarters. NATO’s collective security depends on not letting realistic training slip through bureaucratic cracks. When it comes to deployment
training, for example, geography matters. Deploying the NRF to the Canary Islands might be pleasant for the participants and give them practice dealing with environmental issues, but rehearsing an NRF deployment at strategic distance outside Europe to sub-Saharan Africa with little or no host nation support might be a more useful military, as well as political, exercise. The NRF is also expected to fulfill combat roles that will require precision strike and the use of special operations forces, but as previously noted, NATO lacks command of these aspects of warfare.

10. From Radio Netherlands: “Last weekend, Spanish authorities announced that one of their frigates would monitor the waves around the popular holiday islands off the African coast, during the NRF ‘Noble Javelin 05’ exercise in April, to detect whether whales are present in the exercise area. If they are, participating ships will be asked to limit use of sonar equipment or change course” (van de Vreij, 2005).
The third agenda item at Prague, and the one overshadowed at the Riga Summit by discussions over Afghanistan, was streamlining NATO’s command arrangements. NATO’s multinational, integrated command arrangements have been a fundament of alliance cohesion since 1949. The structures have continually evolved since the organization’s inception but for 40 years they were never operationally tested. When NATO began undertaking military operations in 1995, member nations realized that existing structures, forces and systems were outdated and embarked on their own version of Base Realignment and Closure.

The NATO Strategic Concept announced in Washington D.C. in 1999 was a landmark demonstration of NATO’s commitment to change. By acknowledging the “new threat” environment, NATO took on missions outside its traditional area. But two years later, the attacks in Washington and New York showed that the threat went beyond regional predictions of 1999 and highlighted the limitations of the Strategic Concept. Though new and improved force and command structures will be prepared in time to meet their agreed deadlines in 2006 (on paper at least), it is not obvious that the new arrangements will help NATO be more effective in meeting the challenges of the next decade.

A jumble of command and control initiatives was already underway when the Heads of State and Government used the term “NATO Command Arrangements” in 2001. In doing so, alliance leaders referred not only to NATO’s command and force structures, but also to the operational concepts
that link them together.¹¹ Command structure is roughly defined as the fixed headquarters throughout the United States and Europe that fly a NATO flag at the entrance to the building (Canada does not currently have a NATO headquarters on its territory). Force structure is generally defined as the people, tanks, airplanes, and ships that nations offer to NATO to be commanded by a NATO headquarters, although recently NATO has expanded the traditional understanding of “forces” to include multinational headquarters, even though they do not have any combat forces permanently assigned. Theoretically, NATO uses the operational constructs discussed earlier (CJTF or NRF) to connect the headquarters with the forces and operate outside of Europe.

NATO Command Structure

The changes conceived in Prague are the third attempt in a decade to bring the command structure out of its cold war organization and into something better-suited to meet current and future missions. Command structure consistently consumes a significant portion of the common fund and earlier critiques still apply: “left unreformed, the current structure…will continue to drain nations’ limited defence budgets and produce suboptimal collective capabilities” (Young, 2001, 31).

Other observers have suggested overhauling both the existing command and force structure, in some cases before the current structure has been given a chance to succeed or fail (Millen, 2004, 125). These views represent a skeptical belief that NATO efforts are bound to fail unless US planners, strategists, politicians and financiers lead the fight against the forces of NATO bureaucracy and push for reforms¹² (Smith, 2003, A3). This belief is not particularly helpful to the alliance in the wake of its “near

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¹¹ “Integrated Military Structure” is a phrase used in the original Military Committee document on the subject, MC 57/3. The document lags behind post Cold War and post 9/11 realities; for example, it refers to the Soviet Union and Major NATO Commanders, which both cease to exist.

¹² In addition, the 2006 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review lists as one of the DOD’s major accomplishments, “Spearheaded steps to transform NATO” (US Department of Defense, 2006).
death experience” (Black, 2003)\(^{13}\) over the Iraq War and a perception that the US has marginalized NATO through unilateral action (Serchuk, 2005, A12).

Admittedly, each attempt to restructure the headquarters has demonstrated incremental success. The 1992 effort cut the number of headquarters from almost 130 down to 78. Unfortunately, the remaining headquarters were not any better designed to deal with emerging threats and missions. The 1997 reductions went even further — reducing the number to 20 — but still did not do much to improve military effectiveness. The 2002 attempt to reinvent NATO’s command structure was not an overwhelming success either, but marked steady progress nonetheless. For a third time in ten years, the number of operational headquarters was reduced; this time from 20 down to ten. In 2007, another round of closures is in the offing and the International Military Staff at NATO headquarters is the process of recommending even more closures.

While the number of headquarters was cut in the last round by nearly 50 percent, the overall number of personnel reductions was just over ten percent. One of the reasons for the modest decrease in personnel was an increase in the number of centers and schools — organizations that fell short of the criteria to be officially called “headquarters,” such as Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOC)\(^{14}\) and an entirely new transformational structure.

On the operational side of the command structure, all of the headquarters were placed under the command of the SACEUR (NATO, 2005a). Despite North Atlantic Council intentions to have new names and titles as immediate and visible signs of transformation, both SACEUR and his headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe

\(^{13}\) Then US Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, referred to NATO’s inability to reach agreement on sending troops to Iraq as a “near death experience” for the alliance.

\(^{14}\) Air command and control (C2) had been a sore subject for NATO, particularly since the world got a glimpse of US capabilities in the Balkans. Newly on nations’ minds, however, were air operations in Central Asia, where many participated in a “coalition of the willing.” Nations saw first hand the extent of the capabilities gap. Reducing the number of CAOCs fit in with the alliance’s emerging ideas on air C2. The Air Command and Control System (ACCS) and the NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System (NATINEADS) provide a complex but sophisticated capability to the alliance. Further effects included reviewing personnel assignment policies and redistributing qualified personnel to the remaining NATO-sponsored CAOCs.
(SHAPE), retained their names. The names would stand because of entrenched European bureaucracy: the headquarters would have had to change stationery, work with Belgian authorities to replace road signs, amend contractual arrangements, and somewhat dubiously, modify international standing under “the Paris Protocol.” The compromise was changing the name of the command from Allied Command Europe (ACE) to Allied Command Operations (ACO) in order to better represent the scope of SACEUR’s trans-Atlantic responsibilities. Consequently, ACO is responsible for all alliance operations but is still based in Mons, Belgium. The commander is always an American and remains dual-hatted as Commander, US European Command (USEUCOM). He is responsible for three different levels of command: the strategic, operational and component or tactical. Figure 1 shows the wire-diagram depicting the subordinate units and their locations.

Figure 1: Allied Command Operations

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STRATEGIC:

SACCEUR = Commander SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

OPERATIONAL:

JFC Brunssum
The Netherlands

JHQ Lisbon
Portugal

JFC Naples
Italy

COMPONENT:

CC-Air HQ
Ramstein, GE

CC-Mar HQ
Northwood, UK

CC-Land HQ
Heidelberg, GE

CC-Air HQ
Ismir, TU

CC-Mar HQ
Naples, IT

CC-Land HQ
Madrid, SP

CAOC
Uedem, GE

DCAOC
Uedem, GE

CAOC
Finderup, DK

CAOC
P. Renatico, IT

DCAOC
P. Renatico, IT

CAOC
Larissa, GR

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After some “horse-trading,” the component commands, CAOC structure and locations were agreed.16 A bonus in this round of restructuring was cutting quasi-multinational CAOCs from the NATO roster. Excluding excess “national” CAOCs from the NATO line-up not only eased management of air operations, but also reduced the burden on the NATO common fund.17

The most important feature of the current command structure was not quantitative reductions in the operational structure, but rather the qualitative break from the traditional organization. Nations drank the transformation “Kool-Aid” and agreed to create an entire command dedicated to the idea of change. Transformation is not just about advancing technology but also about promoting new ways of thinking (Hone, 2004).18

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created as a functional command out of the remains of the old Allied Command Atlantic. Transforming the Norfolk-based strategic command from a primarily maritime organization to a fully joint and largely cerebral headquarters, NATO was able to preserve the transatlantic link at the highest military level. The United States offered to keep NATO’s transformation headquarters in Virginia, as a literal next-door neighbour to the US organization charged with the same transformation mission, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), “thereby bringing obvious advantages to NATO” (NATO, 2004b). In a way similar to his operational counterpart, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation is dual-hatted as the Commander, USJFCOM.19 The

16. A full description of the political machinations that surrounded placement of headquarters is offered in the Appendix.
17. One example of the many quirks in the command structure was creation of a small team of air specialists at Torrejon Air Base in Spain under NATO command. The ostensible purpose was to help train and exercise the two deployable CAOCs. But Spain argued persuasively that national legislation required they retain some type of national/NATO connection with respect to air space management. Consequently, the team’s existence is more emblematic of the politics of restructuring than any standard of military requirements or effectiveness.
18. For a NATO example see the remarks of then-General Harald Kujat at the New Defence Agenda’s International Conference, “Reinventing NATO: Does the alliance reflect the changing nature of transatlantic security?” 24 May 2005. Kujat, as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee stated, “…transformation in its largest sense is as much an affair of mindset” (Kujat, 2005).
19. Unlike its European counterpart, bureaucracy on the west side of the Atlantic did not prevent changing the name of the commander, its headquarters or its command.
“wireless” diagram at Figure 2 shows the organizational design of ACT and alludes to the non-hierarchical nature of the organization.

**Figure 2: Allied Command Transformation**

One obvious advantage of being next to USJFCOM was opening a side door through which NATO’s European nations could participate in US transformation efforts. The less obvious advantage was (re)building a bridge to the US across the divide that developed over Iraq (Cornish, 2004, 63). On the subject of transformation, NATO nations should be rightly proud of making a courageous decision that allows its European members to benefit from the spiralling advancement of US technological, organizational, and doctrinal innovations. Alliance benefits may be small at first, but over time this USJFCOM-ACT relationship will bear fruit not only by increasing physical capabilities of Canadian and European platforms, but also by improving mental interoperability of their personnel.

At lower military levels, the American transformation prototype will be difficult for NATO to replicate. Each one of the columns in Figure 2 was designed to represent a transformation “process” and provide a basis from
which transformation initiatives can be germinated and grown. But the associated entities portrayed by each box are mostly old NATO headquarters with new missions and names. They are not yet resourced the way the US has outfitted its simulation centers, battle laboratories, instrumented ranges or education facilities. It will take time to mature a cadre of NATO transformational specialists and fill the manning rosters. Despite successes like using the Joint Warfare Centre as a training ground for headquarters going to Afghanistan and involving the NATO School in Oberammergau in educating officers in the Iraqi National Army, creating a sister-set of transformation entities is still hundreds of people, several years, and millions of dollars away.

What is Missing from the NATO Command Structure?

NATO’s two command structure modifications in the 1990s took place prior to a full assessment of the Balkan operations and were also not informed by today’s Middle Eastern and Central Asian missions. The alliance has since gathered considerable lessons not only from its activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, but also and almost surreptitiously, two missions in the United States. A consensus will likely develop around operational issues such as training and employment of special operation forces, the inefficiencies associated with deploying national logistics systems, and the lack of multinational intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. Establishing the capabilities and improving the linkages between these functions will improve the deployed commanders’ ability to operate in the next war, rather than the Cold War.

Two other PCC aspects not included in the command structure review are precision strike and special operations forces. Progress in these areas would have directly supported the Prague objective of “improved combat effectiveness” but little has been done. Nations that have special military forces guard them closely, only selectively letting them participate in multinational operations. But it is in that area that many NATO nations have experienced the most collective success at the tactical level of operations. In Afghanistan, US special operations forces worked side-by-side with Special Forces from, inter alia, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. The current NATO doctrine for training, organizing and employing these type of units follows the “lead nation” concept. That Cold War legacy may have worked in a previous strategic environment and even Afghanistan, but given the widening threat
of global Islamic jihad, it is time to reconsider the approach. Developing a NATO Special Operations Command would allow nations to build on the considerable successes of recent experience, better align NATO and national doctrine and serve as a starting point for work on the PCC goal on combat effectiveness.

Command arrangements could also help integrate deployable combat service support units with other PCC objectives. NATO has yet to develop an efficient logistics doctrine to manage the “tail-to-tooth” ratios. Currently, “up to 30 percent [of deployed forces] of any NATO led operation are purely there to support their own national contingents. That is wasteful, inefficient and it must be transformed in the future” (Jones, 2005, 19). These National Support Elements (NSEs) are not designed to be strategically deployable or tactically mobile and consequently they are disconnected from the PCC’s logistics agenda. Even though NATO has tinkered with the idea of a Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC), it is a midlevel construct, similar to the J4 (logistics office) on any joint staff and has not matured into a useful organization.

Conceptually splitting the MJLC idea in two might help. On one hand, NATO could create a tactical multinational logistics unit for deployed operations that could do more than act as a tour guide for national support elements. On the other hand, it could establish a functional logistic headquarters in Europe that could manage everything from strategic air and sealift to fuel storage to ammunition distribution. The US Army is working on a similar idea, US Army Field Support Command (AFSC) that is designed to link “America’s arsenal to the 21st century expeditionary Army. By synchronizing and integrating all facets of logistics support and expertise, AFSC delivers sustaining readiness power forward to the battlefield” (US Army Field Support Command, 2005). Modifying NATO’s logistics pipeline in this way would help alleviate the burden currently imposed by bloated NSEs and specifically support a PCC program objective.

Another structural shortfall — and connected with first item on the PCC shopping list — is NATO’s lack of organic intelligence capability. Until recently, the Allied Command Counter Intelligence unit provided the only multinational intelligence “capability,” but it is US centric and limited in scope (US Army Field Manual 34-37, 1997). The opening of a NATO

20. Chapter 9 gives an overview of the 650th Military Intelligence Group’s mission as the main element of the ACCI.
intelligence “fusion center” in the United Kingdom is the right idea, but it too will have limitations (Mitchell, 2006). Nearly all of NATO’s “intelligence” is based on information that is gathered by national sources, processed through national systems, analyzed by national analysts, and then passed to a NATO commander. But even handing over the information is a tortured process because of two factors. First, different technical standards prevent connectivity between national and NATO computer systems, and second, lack of political will precludes policy changes that could remedy the problem. Creating a NATO unit along the lines of the Multinational Joint Intelligence Center, located adjacent to the US European Command’s Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom, and improving system connectivity would be additional steps toward improving NATO’s collective intelligence capability.

Providing a single point of contact for intelligence, however, is not sufficient. NATO and its nations must obtain surveillance and target acquisition hardware sought in the PCC, integrate those assets into the command arrangement and factor in a human intelligence. Only then can the PCC’s intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition initiative be turned into intelligence “capability.”

During the next round of discussions, it is possible that instead of deleting the headquarters with questionable utility or a redundant capability, infrastructure could find new life by filling the special operations, logistics and intelligence gaps. The subsequent effort should also spend more time integrating the PCC areas with headquarters and defining the relationships between static headquarters and deployable forces. The military architects of the current command structure conducted a significant overhaul but they eventually hit a political barrier. Fortunately for NATO, the new command structure makes huge strides in fulfilling the objectives of the Prague Summit in 2002 and helps NATO meet the threat of the current international security situation. Regrettably, the structure falls short in more than one area and is disconnected from PCC efforts. Unfortunately, more effective command structure requires yet another round of closures, reorganization and transformation.

21. Appendix I describes why headquarters in Lisbon, La Spezia, Heidelberg, and Madrid could be of questionable utility or a redundant capability.
NATO Force Structure

The second element of NATO Command Arrangements is the NATO Force Structure. Underneath the command structure headquarters lies a complex web of national and multinational headquarters and forces, almost all of which are still poised to defeat the Red Army as it crosses the Fulda Gap in Germany. As anachronistic as that image may be, the difficult truth is that most national headquarters and combat forces are still poised to fight the next war from their garrisons in Western Europe. Because of this sorry situation, a pre-Prague force structure initiative to improve national capabilities was pursued under a NATO banner: air, land, and sea high readiness force headquarters.

Military operations in Kosovo, during which NATO confronted deployability and air force interoperability problems, also influenced thinking about land headquarters. The United Kingdom-led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was established as a multinational corps headquarters in 1991 and seen as a solution to the land headquarters problem. The ARRC proved useful in Bosnia and again made a significant contribution in Kosovo. The ARRC’s achievements were largely due to its deployability but also because it was multinational, interoperable, and invaluable; in a word, it was “usable.” Its success was aided by the fact that it costs NATO very little to keep the ARRC on retainer because participating nations directly pay most of the expenses.

As the proud ARRC webpage states, “As a result of the ARRC’s success five more High Readiness Force (Land) headquarters have been created” (ARRC, 2005). In addition to the ARRC, the alliance now enjoys direct access to NATO Rapid Deployable Corps in Spain, Turkey and Italy, as well as the first German/Netherlands Corps in Münster, Germany, and even the EUROCORPS in Strasbourg, France. If the belated French contribution of a Lille-based Rapid Reaction Corps is included in the tally, NATO actually has a total of seven High Readiness Force (Land) headquarters. In their current configurations, most headquarters are only a few years old, yet many have already made a valuable contribution to the alliance by taking rotational turns at commanding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Until the recent merger of Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF missions, the high readiness force headquarters were theoretically too large to command that size of operation and not required at high readiness. The Afghanistan mission, however, has been a good way for most of these new headquarters to obtain operational
experience; specifically, it forced them to deploy personnel and equipment off the European continent by land, sea and air. Development of these headquarters and their use in Afghanistan has been a watershed event for NATO.

Oddly, the high readiness headquarters were designed before the forces they command and before the headquarters under which they fall. Instead of designing command arrangements in a logical top to bottom (or even bottom up) approach, NATO accidentally created a winning idea at the midlevel and has been forced to push changes up and down the chain of command. Luckily, these force headquarters have done an admirable job at becoming what the command structure headquarters are not: deployable.

But even these deployable force headquarters have the debilitating characteristic of being “hollow.” The well equipped and nearly over trained ARRC is reduced to a paper tiger if it is not given troops to command. Until recently, when NATO looked into its pool of deployable forces, it found that there were really only three consistent, reliable, robust, national capabilities to choose from: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Compounding the problem, other national contributions are racked with national caveats when deployed on operations (Banusiewicz, 2005). In the case of German forces during one Afghanistan rotation, there were apparently 17 pages of restrictions (Deutsch Welle On-Line, 2005).

NATO’s deployable maritime headquarters are in slightly better shape than the land headquarters. In the original discussions, three nations offered maritime command and control assets. The United Kingdom, Italy and Spain have each presented a national platform to serve as a NATO High Readiness Force (Maritime) Headquarters. France came forward with an offer in a later round of discussions, most having to do with the NRF. All these maritime headquarters have met the NATO criteria for multinational manning, English language skills and operational standardization, or come close to it. While these offers are helpful to the maritime mission, none have the capacity to support expanded joint operations.

NATO, however, has a hard time refusing national offers even if no need exists. Consequently, the United States convinced Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom to co-offer their multinational headquarters which is now called, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO or SFN) as a high readiness maritime headquarters. This unit gives NATO the flexibility to expand maritime operations into a joint activity and would allow SFN to command the NRF when at sea. The problem is that SFN works from the quadruple-purposed
USS Mount Whitney,\textsuperscript{22} home ported in Gaeta, Italy, and therefore risks availability problems.

If land headquarters receive high marks and maritime headquarters get passing ones, then the air headquarters are outright failures: NATO currently has no deployable air command and control (C2) assets. In the short term and for recent operations NATO has relied completely on individual nations, usually the United States or ad hoc contracts, and a liberal application of common funding. In an aberrant stroke of practical genius, Iceland, which possesses no military assets, managed to provide air and ground controllers to run the airports in Pristina and Kabul under a NATO flag (and used NATO common funding to do so). In the long term, the two Air Component headquarters in Ramstein and Izmir, along with the CAOCs, Deployable CAOCs, and ACCS, are designed to handle any foreseeable combination of air C2 missions. Regrettably, this reality is both false and distant. First, the planned air C2 capabilities do not meet the scenarios set forth in the aforementioned level of ambition, and second, procurement schedules will not deliver those capabilities before the year 2014 (Basic Ordering Agreement, 1998).\textsuperscript{23} Despite the nagging difficulties of deployable air C2 in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, NATO does not have an integrated plan to fix the problem.

\textbf{What is Missing from the NATO Force Structure?}

NATO’s High Readiness Forces have been the real catalyst for transformation, even before the word “transformation” entered the NATO vocabulary. The land versions have been the most useful formations thus far and are providing a valuable contribution to operations. NATO should build on the force structure’s success and expand the numbers of headquarters at lower readiness. Already NATO has three volunteers with Greece, Poland and a

\textsuperscript{22} In addition to the SFN mission as an NRF C2 platform, the USS Mt Whitney serves as the flagship for the US Sixth Fleet (its primary mission), a maritime headquarters for a NATO Extended Task Force and the command platform for the sea-based CJTF HQ fielded by the JFC HQ in Naples.

\textsuperscript{23} For example, the Basic Ordering Agreement between the General Manager of the NATO C3 Agency and Ingenieria De Sistemas Para La Defensa De España S.A, shows the inclusive dates of the contract to be 1998-2014.
multinational headquarters called “Multinational Corps Northeast,” involving Denmark, Poland, and Germany, offering their services at lower levels of readiness. The maritime headquarters also have made, and will continue to make a contribution given NATO’s increasing concern over the Mediterranean Sea, but another C2 platform is needed to relieve the overtaxed USS Mount Whitney.

The aforementioned air C2 gap exists because nations elected not to pursue High Readiness Force (Air) headquarters when the NATO Force Structure Review was being conducted. By their nature, airplanes are mobile and deployable. For that reason, the architects of the current force structure somewhat naively believed that NATO command of deployed air forces would not be a problem. The decision haunts NATO planners today and they will find few solutions in the near term. One pragmatic solution is to use the United States capabilities that are co-located with NATO headquarters in Germany and Italy and a technique called “reach-back” whereby small units deploy and “reach back” to the larger, static headquarters for the needed expertise. Sharing American assets will get harder to do with one air headquarters moving from Naples to Izmir and reach back requires increased deployable communication modules, so neither option is particularly advantageous.

Another solution pertains only to smaller operations — around 200 sorties per day. France and the United Kingdom have combined assets and offered a deployable Joint Force Air Component Commander for the NATO Response Force (NRF). Despite the potential of this and similar capabilities, nations can be reluctant to submit themselves to the NATO certification process.

The vacancy of deployable air headquarters in the force structure stands out as the missing link inside NATO’s command arrangements and fails to support a key capability required at Prague: “deployable command, control and communications.” Without its own certified capability, NATO will continually over depend on the United States for larger missions, and France and the United Kingdom for limited operations. The bottom line for NATO: develop deployable air C2 capabilities along the lines of the force structure’s land and maritime headquarters or risk more embarrassment as an impotent military alliance (Schwartz and Layne, 1999).

Developing deployable headquarters is only half the story, albeit an important one. The other half of the nagging force structure saga is the lack of deployable ground forces. Not only are the PCC’s deployable support capabilities missing from the force structure, but also the number of
deployable combat formations is notoriously deficient. In a 2003 speech, the NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson stated:

> In theory, the availability of relevant resources should not be a problem for our alliance. The 18 countries of NATO’s Integrated Military Command Structure in principle declare around 250 combat brigades to the alliance, each up to about 5000 strong. A huge figure. But fewer than half of that number are [sic] declared deployable, and therefore useable for today’s real world operations. In fact, if you subtract the U.S. contribution, together with those forces, which NATO assesses to be undeployable in practice, your figure of 240 combat brigades falls to fewer than 50 brigades. Quite a drop, isn’t it? But of course, the figure of 50 does not take account of the fact that troops need to be trained, rotated, and rested. If you take this into account, the number of non-US combat brigades actually available at any one time drops to around 16 brigades, or some 80,000 soldiers (Robertson, 2003, Emphasis added).

The situation has not improved; that speech was given when NATO had 19, not 26, members. Adding under resourced brigades from the newest NATO members will probably make the ratio even more lopsided. When it comes to force structure, and despite some improvements in command and control, NATO still does not have the deployable forces it needs for 21st century missions.

No one can doubt the progress that NATO continues to make in the area of command and force structure as well as the artful transition away from the CJTF concept and toward the NRF model. Unfortunately, each structure was created inside an organizational stovepipe with little external coordination. When NATO planners awake to the requirements of the transformed alliance, they will discover not only that additional modification is needed within each policy, but also that linkages are needed between the eight PCC areas, operational concepts, and the streamlined command arrangements. The Allied Command Transformation was designed for this purpose. ACT commanders have actively sought the role of force developer and concept integrator but their ambition has been kept in check by limited resources and authority.
Conclusions

NATO’s current problems do not have anything to do with political differences over Iraq or even NATO-EU relations. As one author put it, “those who focus on NATO’s political difficulties cannot see the forest for the trees” (Trachtenberg, 2004, 3). NATO’s most pressing problem is not even having an empty military toolbox when called upon, though there are obvious problems with its capability menu. The problem is twofold: first, not having a common purpose in the contemporary security environment and second, not having the capacity to manage change in a multinational bureaucracy. Solving the problem starts with alliance-wide agreement on a new strategic purpose for NATO. Subsequently, NATO should rewrite its Strategic Concept and move forward on the heap of transformational initiatives. The new Comprehensive Political Guidance is a step in the right direction and should serve as the basis for a new Strategic Concept. Given NATO’s penchant for the historical, a new Strategic Concept should be the goal of the 60th anniversary summit in 2009.

When it comes to managing change in a multinational organization, transformational triumph will depend on effective leadership at every level. Successfully reinvigorating the alliance will require new management, in terms of people and systems; the NATO management mechanism initiated in February 2006 acknowledges that fact and will try to integrate planning disciplines. Managing transformation, however, was the original mission of Allied Command Transformation and shifting responsibility around alliance structures is not helpful. ACT needs genuine authority and commensurate resources to do its job. Also as part of this new push, NATO needs a strategic planning process and a new Strategic Concept. The Comprehensive Political Guidance provides the basis for that future work and
even provides a remarkable assessment of the strategic environment; it
does not provide any process, however, for employing the time honoured
ends-ways-means formulation which will lead to a “Strategic Concept to
reflect the paradigm-shifting events of the last several years and to chart a
way forward for the alliance in the 21st century” (Flournoy, Smith, Ben-
Ari, McInnis, Scruggs, 2005, 11).

NATO should rewrite its existing Strategic Concept to reflect the present
and coming reality. NATO’s path to success lies in maintaining a balance
between political consensus and military efficiency. Part of this balance
means finding consensus on its strategic purpose. That consensus implies
developing a common view of threats. Defining a new enemy is not as
simple as replacing the word communism with terrorism or extremism,
but it needn’t be that different either. NATO needs to dialogue and debate
aspects provided by the treaty’s Article 4 before making a decision on
whether or not global jihad poses a threat to member nations. But so far,
nations prefer to sail the safe waters of “transformation.”

In the meantime, and as part of the transformation effort, NATO will
first need to modify the defence planning process so it is more predictable
for nations. Requirements should be based not only on current operations
but also future contingencies, thus attaining the right kind of forces will
require better contingency plans. Better plans will require better intelli-
gence and out-of-the-box thinking, qualities for which NATO has not earned
its reputation. Second, NATO needs a system whereby it “crosswalks” the
PCC elements with the command structure capacity. Where there is a ca-
pacity shortage a decision is needed: either develop C2 capacity or accept
the risk of not having it. Developing a strategic planning process and ro-
bust management matrix will be attractive to technocrats, but that approach
carries the enormous risk of running amok in the headquarters bureauc-
ry. Third, NATO needs to get the internal C2 house in order. Myriad
command and force structure efforts have not been tightly woven with
concepts for deploying forces. The defence-against-terrorism programme
appears to be equally disconnected. These ideas should be articulated in a
coherent way so every service member, from every NATO nation, can under-
stand them.

An example of this situation appears in NATO’s “integrated command
structure” — the phrase appears in the title of the command arrangement
bible. The NATO document that governs this relationship was written in
the 1950s, has been amended more than nine times, yet fails to take into
account the changes of the last decade. The existing publication is a useless
planning tool or even doctrinal guide; it also scares off Brussels bureaucrats as a Pandora’s box of national issues. The document has yet to include the High Readiness Force Headquarters, Berlin Plus Agreements, and the command structure.

Life goes on without an overarching document to explain how the PCC, NRF, CJTF, NCS and NFS pieces and parts fit together, but, then again, it does not go very smoothly. Every time NATO makes a political commitment, it then grinds its teeth looking for forces and headquarters to fulfill the requirements. The solutions are seldom graceful but that clumsiness need not persist. Breaking down the organizational stovepipes of the PCC areas, the NRF, CJTF, NCS and NFS should lead to connecting the capability “dots.” Linking C2 concepts with the PCC subjects would create meaningful capabilities and command arrangements. Updating old doctrine would help establish a standardized playbook, something NATO is known for possessing.

With a little luck and even more determination, NATO can grow the new command arrangements into a productive system of headquarters, forces and concepts. Headquarters, however, need to be aligned with PCC efforts and the stated mission in the Strategic Concept, be it the extant or a new one. The current procedures do not provide the commanders with consistent forces or reliable capabilities for training or operations. Hopefully, the new ideas on strategic and operational planning being drafted will address the deficit. But hope is not a method for success; vision, leadership and political will are required (Sullivan and Harper, 1996, 294). The PCC identified the problem and the NRF is a step in the right direction, but the NRF touches only a fraction of the national forces offered to NATO and only scratches the surface of the PCC initiatives. Whether or not it is poised to assimilate the defence-against-terrorism capabilities also remains to be seen.

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO avoided any detailed discussion about a transformed alliance, particularly on its military capabilities, and the subsequent declaration spends only one sparse line on “efforts to ensure that the command structure is lean, efficient and more effective” (NATO, 2006d). The alliance instead focused on a kaleidoscope of issues: unveiling the Comprehensive Political Guidance; supporting its continued missions in the Balkans, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and Darfur; confirming its support to President Karzai and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (which in terms of content dominated the agenda by being mentioned 17 times); applauding European governments for improved
military capabilities; crediting military authorities for fielding a fully operational NATO Response Force; inviting Albania, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia to join NATO in 2008; welcoming Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia into the PfP programme; praising Ukraine for its steadfast commitment to the highest democratic ideals; noting Russia’s failure to withdraw troops from Moldova; expanding its partnerships with non-NATO countries; promoting the UN Secretary General’s “alliance of Civilisations”; and complimenting itself for seamlessly handing the Bosnia operation to the European Union.

Though the word “transformation” appears seven times in the Riga Summit Declaration, NATO’s current trajectory does not help it answer the question “transformed to do what?” According to one newspaper editorial, what NATO really needs is a “big think” to answer the nagging post-Cold War question, “what is our purpose?” (Christian Science Monitor, 2006) By over-focusing on Afghanistan during the Riga Summit and spreading itself thin across dozens of issues, NATO missed another opportunity to chart a course into the 21st century. NATO should publicly admit to what its member nations privately know: transformation means developing a new strategic purpose. Anything less leaves Europe unprotected, forestalls re-emergence of NATO as a credible international organization, and risks further “continental drift” (Bergsten, 1999).
Even before the Prague Summit and discussions of transformation, NATO’s military authorities had developed a Minimum Military Requirement (MMR) for command structure. The MMR was an assessment based on a political document called “Ministerial Guidance,” which spelled out NATO’s so-called “Level of Ambition” or LOA of three major joint operations outside the NATO area of operation (Flournoy, Smith, Ben-Ari, McInnis, Scruggs, 2005, 46). The MMR determined the number of headquarters required to meet the scenarios described in the LOA and also roughly defined a mission for each headquarters. In addition to identifying the appropriate number of headquarters, the MMR addressed air space management, traditionally viewed as a national responsibility largely outside NATO’s purview. The final product eliminated several “national” CAOCs that previously served a loose coordination function between NATO and national air traffic managers. Surprisingly, all this calculating was done independent of geography; neither the geographical location of the headquarters nor the possible geography of a future conflict was taken into account. It was only after agreeing to the number of headquarters and their missions that these military requirements that the (then) 19 NATO members consented to putting names on the map. As part of this process, nations agreed on the concept of military transformation and set the stage for the ensuing work.

The transformation process that started with military logic, however, ended up as a political procedure. NATO’s Military Committee did its job
to a point, but it could not proceed beyond the political morass of placing headquarters into countries. Although it was widely unpopular, an ad hoc organization called the Senior Officials Group (SOG) sat on the proverbial shoulder of NATO’s Military Committee pressing it for military advice rather than political solutions. The SOG was free from many of the normal NATO procedures and eventually coerced NATO nations to agree on placement of all the headquarters, an act viewed as “a challenging diplomatic feat, skilfully managed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)” (Trachtenberg, 2004, 3). To the group’s credit, the political compromises of 2003 were more palatable than those of 1997. Though it took another year to iron out the details of the new command structure, the political-military process worked. With the negotiations finished, NATO nations, commanders and staffs set about implementing the new structure. What resulted was part incremental progression and part radical change for the alliance. If streamlining the command structure by reducing numbers was a continuation of previous downsizings, then creating a transformation command was a complete break with past.

Politics had entered previous command structure reviews and did so again this time, albeit with a decidedly better outcome. As with all multinational agreements, negotiators took into account national sensitivities. Accordingly, bargains were struck and trade-offs made. Portugal, for example, had been a staunch supporter of the US as it built its “air bridge” to Afghanistan in the early part of Operation Enduring Freedom and it appears to have been consequently awarded the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) on political, rather than military, ground; the JFCs in Brunssum and Naples could easily accomplish the JHQ’s mission. Because the Lisbon based JHQ is barely supportable by military rationale it should be one of the first of at least three entities that ought to be scrutinized in next round of command structure reductions.

Despite some cynical views to the contrary, the command structure “winners” were not just those nations supporting the US effort in Iraq (“NATO/International: New Command, Continuing Tensions,” 2003, 1). Germany strongly opposed US involvement in Iraq, both through NATO and the United Nations. Nonetheless, Germany retained the traditional headquarters in Heidelberg and Ramstein and even gained support for its national CAOC in Uedem becoming one of the four NATO CAOCs. And in the case of the small training team in Torrejon, outside of Madrid, it was a Spanish legislative requirement, (to have a Spaniard command Spanish
airspace), that was more important politically than meeting any collective security or military requirement. Similarly, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) demanded by Greece was really handed to them as a gift for their complicity in incredibly complex political-military negotiations, despite long-standing rivalries with another NATO ally.

The Greece-Turkey drama did not play out directly on center stage but their longstanding disputes over balance, prestige, territory and culture were eventually accommodated — at least in the context of command structure negotiations. The logic of the agreed structure was not immediately apparent to either constituency but NATO staff members patiently explained the idea to national representatives accustomed to playing a zero-sum game.

In the old structure, Greece had possessed not only a CAOC, but also one of the much maligned Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC). Turkey, too, had a CAOC and a JSRC. In the reduced structure agreed in the MMR, NATO would eliminate one of each. Both nations accepted that they would lose one entity, but neither could see the benefits of any asymmetry (i.e. either both losing their CAOCs or both losing their JSRCs). The best interests of the alliance, however, were not served by either symmetric option. In the end, a genuinely “out-of-the-box” solution moved the JSRCs out of both countries and an Air Component Command (ACC) headquarters was relocated from Italy to Turkey; Greece was allowed to keep its CAOC. For a moment, transformational thinking started working at NATO headquarters.

The net effect of this arrangement was to bind Greece and Turkey, politically and military, through air command and control. In time of war or other military operation, the air headquarters in Turkey will likely assume command of NATO air operations. Obviously this solution satisfied Turkish concerns of pride and effectiveness. Remarkably, Greece was satisfied, too, once it realized that the air headquarters in Turkey could not fulfill its mission without the critical assets residing in the Greek led CAOC. Each side seemed content in the solution until, at the last minute, Greece exacted a final concession from nations. It seemed the prestige that went with the 120 person CAOC was not exactly equivalent to the 800 person ACC headquarters. Consequently the final political act involved a synthesis of domestic and international politics and brings the command structure story back to the footnote of maritime training on Crete. Internationally, Greece needed a bit more status; domestically, the Greek navy had a bit
more influence over Greece’s national position than expected. Since the Greek navy’s earlier bid to obtain a Maritime Component Command failed, they could be content with the resultant and aforementioned NMIOTC.

The NMIOTC sits uncomfortably in the structure and will not get much, if any common funding. Nations may not even take advantage of the Greek proposal, though in a moment of weakness they agreed to it. Proponents say it will add value to the war on terror, particularly because NATO still conducts maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean and needs some type of touchstone for that special duty. Along with the JHQ, the detachment of airmen in Torrejon, and the land headquarters in Germany and Spain, opponents of this Greek training facility see it as another political construct that goes beyond any semblance of military necessity. Creation of this center would be but a footnote in the command structure story if it were not for its involvement in the larger geopolitical saga.

When it came to the research and development aspect of transformation, NATO nations swallowed hard. Nations knew that NATO does not have R&D as a “core competency” but acknowledged its role in the transformation processes. NATO does have entities to look after research and development with the principal keeper of the genes being the Research and Technology Agency (RTA) in Paris, France. But the RTA is a civilian organization, disconnected from the military structure and its commanders, and merely serves as a clearinghouse of research and development ideas.

Military research can ostensibly be conducted at the ACT headquarters in Virginia (or any of ACT’s entities) or the loosely affiliated “centers of excellence” throughout Europe. Specifically, ACT has only one dedicated research facility and it is narrowly focused on a vestige of the Cold War. The Undersea Research Centre (or URC, previously known as the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic Research Centre or SACLANTCEN), in La Spezia, Italy, provides NATO with a capability to conduct undersea research on issues like underwater acoustics and submarine warfare. Today it nominally does the same, but in the relatively stagnant area of NATO undersea warfare, the URC is mostly a facility and location searching for a mission.

The bottom line for NATO’s R&D efforts is that they are currently stuck in an uncomfortable position, neither innovating on its own nor funding the creative work of others. In the next round of transformational restructuring, extending the organizational life of the URC should be questioned. Back room discussions about enlarging NATO’s organizational
changes to encompass the RTA and other alliance agencies should be reinvigorated in the upcoming year. NATO should either delete the URC from the command structure or make a serious run at developing land, air, space, and surface maritime research centers. Given the general trend to decrease headquarters, the former options should be pursued.

With overall numbers of headquarters reduced, missions more clearly defined, and political harmony more or less achieved, NATO gained several efficiencies and crossed perennial redlines. Even removing the north-south-east-west orientations from the names of the headquarters was a solid indication that significant change is afoot. The development of a transformational “corps” inside the NATO command structure was a bold break with the past and an investment in NATO’s future. Overall, these command structure accommodations were politically crafted, military tolerable, financially supportable, and geographically sensitive. The command structure compromises provided a “geopolitical” solution required to the delicate issue of multinational equivalent of base realignment and closure.
Appendix II
Comprehensive Political Guidance

Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006

Introduction

1. This Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, setting out, for the next ten to 15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence. This guidance, to be reviewed periodically, also aims to increase their coherence through an effective management mechanism.

Part 1 – The Strategic Context

2. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept described the evolving security environment in terms that remain valid. This environment continues to change; it is and will be complex and global, and subject to unforeseeable developments. International security developments have an increasing impact on the lives of the citizens of Allied and other countries. Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next ten to 15 years. Instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects; the growing availability
of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources are likely to be the main risks or challenges for the Alliance in that period. All of these factors can be interrelated or combined, most dangerously in the case of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

3. Peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever. This places a premium on close cooperation and coordination among international organisations playing their respective, interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management. Of particular importance because of their wide range of means and responsibilities are the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations Security Council will continue to have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The European Union, which is able to mobilise a wide range of military and civilian instruments, is assuming a growing role in support of international stability. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe also continues to have important responsibilities in this field.

Part 2 – Implications for the Alliance

4. The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership.

5. Collective defence will remain the core purpose of the Alliance. The character of potential Article five challenges is continuing to evolve. Large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly unlikely; however, as shown by the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 following which NATO invoked Article five for the first time, future attacks may originate from outside the Euro-Atlantic area and involve unconventional forms of armed assault. Future attacks could also entail an increased risk of the use of asymmetric means, and could involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. Defence against terrorism and the ability to respond to challenges from wherever they may come have assumed and will retain an increased importance.

6. The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including through non-Article five crisis response
operations, as set out in the Strategic Concept. The Alliance has undertaken a range of operations of this kind since the end of the Cold War. Experience has shown the increasing significance of stabilisation operations and of military support to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The role of the UN and EU, and other organisations, including as appropriate non-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and future crises will put a premium on practical close cooperation and coordination among all elements of the international response.

7. Against this background, NATO must retain the ability to conduct the full range of its missions, from high to low intensity, placing special focus on the most likely operations, being responsive to current and future operational requirements, and still able to conduct the most demanding operations. There will continue to be a requirement for a mix of conventional and nuclear forces in accordance with extant guidance. In particular, the Alliance needs to focus on:

i. Strengthening its ability to meet the challenges, from wherever they may come, to the security of its populations, territory and forces;

ii. Enhancing its ability to anticipate and assess the threats, risks, and challenges it faces, with special attention to the threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

iii. Providing forces able to conduct the full range of military operations and missions;

iv. Being able to respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances;

v. Ensuring that NATO’s own crisis management instruments are effectively drawn together. While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations;

vi. Continuing to adapt planning processes to meet the new demands.

8. The evolving security environment requires that commitments from nations, recognising the primacy of national political decisions, to NATO operations be translated into concrete terms by the development and fielding of flexible and sustainable contributions, and also by a fair sharing of the burden. It is also important to have an early indication of the likely military demands and potential availability of forces and resources when making an Alliance decision to launch an operation.
9. All of this requires Allies to continue the process of transformation, including conceptual and organisational agility and the development of robust capabilities that are deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and usable.

Part 3 – Guidelines for Alliance Capability Requirements

10. Given the likely nature of the future security environment and the demands it will impose, the Alliance will require the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges, which may emanate far from member states’ borders and arise at short notice. The Alliance will also require effective arrangements for intelligence and information sharing. As in the past, intelligence and lessons learned from operations will also inform capability development.

11. In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations, and the Alliance must retain the capability to conduct large-scale, high-intensity operations.

12. Regardless of its overall size, each operation is likely to require a command and control structure able to plan and execute a campaign to accomplish a strategic or operational objective, employing the appropriate mix of air, land and maritime components. It also requires forces that are structured, equipped, manned and trained for expeditionary operations in order to respond rapidly to emerging crises, for which the NATO Response Force would be a key element, effectively reinforce initial entry forces, and sustain the Alliance’s commitment for the duration of the operation.

13. On this basis, the Alliance requires sufficient fully deployable and sustainable land forces, and appropriate air and maritime components. This requirement is supported by political targets as set out by Defence Ministers for the proportion of their nation’s land forces which are structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations (40 percent) as well as the proportion undertaking or planned for sustained operations at any one time (eight percent), and by the Allies undertaking to intensify their efforts, taking into account national priorities and obligations, to this end.
14. NATO and the EU and their respective members states have already agreed procedures to ensure coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to both organisations. NATO’s planning disciplines should continue to take full account of these principles, objectives and procedures.

15. The development of capabilities will not be possible without the commitment of sufficient resources. Furthermore, it will remain critically important that resources that Allies make available for defence, whether nationally, through multinational projects, or through NATO mechanisms, are used as effectively as possible and are focused on priority areas for investment. Increased investment in key capabilities will require nations to consider reprioritisation, and the more effective use of resources, including through pooling and other forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. NATO’s defence planning should support these activities.

16. Over the next ten to 15 years, the evolving security environment and the need to deal with conventional and especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they arise, will put a premium on improvements in meeting the following capability requirements:

i. The ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. This requires forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable and the means to deploy them. It also requires a fully coordinated and, where appropriate, multinational approach to logistic support;

ii. The ability to adapt force postures and military responses rapidly and effectively to unforeseen circumstances. This requires, inter alia, an effective capability to analyse the environment and anticipate potential requirements, a high level of readiness for our forces, and the necessary flexibility to respond to any sudden shifts in requirements;

iii. The ability to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorism, and more particularly to contribute to the protection of the Alliance’s populations, territory, critical infrastructure and forces, and to support consequence management;

iv. The ability to protect information systems of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks;
v. The ability to conduct operations taking account of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, including the ability to defend deployed NATO forces against theatre missile threats;

vi. The ability to conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic environments;

vii. The ability, through appropriate equipment and procedures, to identify hostile elements, including in urban areas, in order to conduct operations in a way that minimises unintended damage as well as the risk to our own forces;

viii. The ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously;

ix. The ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts across all phases of a crisis, including to establish a safe and secure environment, within the full range of missions; military support to reconstruction efforts will be provided to the extent to which conditions in the theatre of operations prevent other actors with primary responsibilities in this field from carrying out their tasks. This should embrace the ability to support security sector reform, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, and to bring military support, within available means and capabilities, to humanitarian relief operations;

x. The ability to field forces with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardization amongst Allies, and the flexibility also to cooperate with the forces of partners, including, to the extent possible, through the release of appropriate standards.

17. Delivering these capabilities requires an openness to new technologies, concepts, doctrines and procedures supporting, in particular, an approach to operations which, bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 7v above, aims at the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome. Such an effects based approach should be developed further and might include enhancing situational awareness, timely operational planning and decision making, improving links between commanders,
sensors and weapons, and deploying and employing joint expeditionary forces coherently and to greatest effect.

18. Among these qualitative requirements, the following constitute NATO’s top priorities: joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them; high readiness forces; the ability to deal with asymmetric threats; information superiority; and the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with other actors. The NATO Response Force is a fundamental military tool in support of the Alliance and a catalyst for further transformation and has top priority together with operational requirements.

Part 4 – Principles for a Management Mechanism

19. The NATO committees and bodies responsible for the relevant planning disciplines, including operational planning and intelligence, are to implement the Comprehensive Political Guidance in their work through the development, as necessary, of detailed policies, directives and guidance which they in turn provide for their respective disciplines.

20. An effective Management Mechanism is an integral part of the implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance. The Management Mechanism will be established by the NATO Council in Permanent Session to provide for the development of further detailed guidance, and for monitoring and ensuring compliance of these planning disciplines with the provisions of the Comprehensive Political Guidance and ensuring coherence and harmonisation among them*. The Management Mechanism will comprise a system of effective arrangements, including, as required, formal direction, with the aim of achieving aligned planning processes, consistent guidance and harmonised requirements and supporting structures.

21. Implementation of this Comprehensive Political Guidance should lead to the development of more usable capabilities for future operations and missions.

* The Management Mechanism was established in February 2006.
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Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Mariano was commissioned in 1986 through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB). From 1987-1990, he served in Augsburg, Germany as a logistics platoon leader and company executive officer in a 2d Corps Support Command supply & service company. From 1991-1993, he served as a staff officer and company commander in the 7th Infantry Division (Light). During a tour at the United States Military Academy at West Point from 1994-1999, he served as an Assistant Professor of Military Strategy and Comparative Military Systems and later as Executive Officer to the Commandant. From 1999-2001, he was posted to the US European Command in Stuttgart, Germany as a NATO/PfP Exercise & Engagement Planner; after September 11th, he served first as the Chief of the Coalition Planning Group. Those experiences led to an assignment at the NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium, on the International Military Staff as a strategic planner from 2002-2004. LTC Mariano then served six months as the Military Advisor to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Kabul, departing Afghanistan in June 2005. He is currently serving in Iraq. He holds a B.A. in Mathematics & Economics from UCSB, a M.S. from the Naval Postgraduate School in Strategic Planning, International Organizations and Negotiations and is completing his doctorate in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. In 2005-06 he was the US Army Visiting Defense Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. His wife is Monica (nee Richey). They have three children: Alaina (age 15), Dominic (age 14) and Zachary (age 14).