THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK IN EVOLUTION
Report of the
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1. The Transatlantic Link in Evolution: What Has Changed Since 11 September 2001

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Introduction

This seminar was a follow-up to one held at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) in mid-April 2000, sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in collaboration with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). That initial seminar, organized around the theme of “International Security: What Role for Canada and the Netherlands?” brought together a small group of government officials and academics from each country to discuss important issues on the international security agenda and, especially, to probe the possibilities for developing joint initiatives whereby the two countries might further common interests.

In her welcoming remarks to the Ottawa seminar, Ms. Susan Cartwright (DFAIT) noted that the first seminar had been adjudged, by both governments, to have been so successful that hosting a second such event presented an opportunity her department was more than happy to pursue. She also stressed a theme with which none present could disagree, namely that the two countries did constitute a “special relationship,” one characterized by a commonality of values, interests, efforts and even preferred institutional forums. For Canada, said Ms. Cartwright, the Netherlands was and remained an “important ally.” It would be clear from the two-days’ proceedings that the Dutch thought similarly vis-à-vis Canada.

As with the first seminar, this one featured a relatively small group of government officials and academics from the two countries, but this time the discussions
took place over two working days rather than one. They were organized into five substantive panels. This report conveys the important points made by the principal speakers of each panel (i.e., one presenter and at least one respondent, with duties alternating between Dutch and Canadian speakers). As well, a sense of the ensuing discussion is provided, although those who participated in the debate are named. Panels one through three were held on the first day, and panels four and five on the second day.

**PANEL ONE: Global Security and Foreign Policy**

The lead presenter, as well as moderator, of this panel was Prof. Alfred van Staden (Clingendael), who began by noting that at least one major aspect of the Canada-Dutch special relationship stemmed from the part played by the Canadian Army in the liberation of the Netherlands in 1945, but the ties went beyond that historical legacy. Not so long ago, it was common for many in the Netherlands to conceive of “like-minded” groups and countries as constituting a pillar of Dutch foreign policy, and in this category Canada regularly figured. However, continued Prof. van Staden, one no longer hears much reference to the “like-minded,” leading him to ask whether it might be possible and worthwhile to resuscitate the category.

He went on to observe that the theme of this seminar, namely “security,” could not have been more well-chosen given the events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. More than ever it was necessary to develop a “comprehensive” understanding of security, including and especially the sources of contemporary terrorism. Prof. van Staden confessed to subscribing to the “root-causes” theory of terrorism, one that holds the phenomenon to be a function of feelings of relative deprivation nested in objective socio-economic disparities as between the developed and the developing world. He noted that his analysis was a “far cry” from that of US President George W. Bush, whose recent “axis of evil” speech was said to minimize the importance of socio-economic source(s) of terrorism.

Prof. van Staden argued that, in general, Europeans tended toward the “root-causes” understanding, and that this set them at odds with the Americans’ assessment of the problem and its origins.

Differing perceptions regarding the origins of the problem have also been reflected in differing responses to terrorism as between the US and the Europeans. Prof. van Staden noted that while in the US, the attacks have triggered a return, at least in part, to the “Hobbesian” view of the state as the best guarantor of security, the same has not happened in Western Europe, where civil-libertarians have been much more successful than in the US in their bid to minimize the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on individual liberties. To some degree, this was explicable in terms of the relative impact of the “shock” among Dutch (and other Western European) publics triggered by the 11 September attacks.
On the transatlantic level, the terrorist attacks and their aftermath have also had a differential impact, resulting from America’s decision to “go it alone” in the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the offers of European allies to join in the struggle as full participants. NATO allies’ invocation of Article 5 commitments, coupled with NATO’s assigning AWACS planes and crews to North America, had only marginal import (with the latter being described by Prof. van Staden as a “side show”). The US decision to minimize reliance upon the NATO allies was argued to be a function of the US desire to minimize constraints of coalition warfare as were evident during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, and second, the conviction in the US that the European allies fundamentally lacked the capability to play a useful military role. Prof. van Staden detected a trend within the alliance, whereby it would become more of a “political” and less of a military grouping. One implication of the trend would be to make it easier for Russia to accept the alliance’s enlargement into the Baltic republics.

On the level of the European Union, the “good news” was to be found in the greater unity of purpose displayed by Western Europeans in the current crisis as compared with their disunity a decade ago, when Yugoslavia started to tear itself apart. That said, the responses of major countries in the EU betrayed a growing preference for bilateralism, as one European leader after another demonstrated “unseemly” haste to get to Washington to meet President Bush. The UK’s role as linchpin was not something likely to enhance the EU’s own influence, nor did Prof. van Staden detect anything in the Afghanistan war as having enhanced the credentials of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), notwithstanding its having been “declared operational” as a result of the current crisis. Still, should the US “backfill” militarily by reducing its presence in the Balkans, the impact may turn out to be positive for the ESDP, forced as the Europeans would be to assume more of the burden of conflict management in the former Yugoslavia. However, Prof. van Staden cautioned against expectations that European countries have become any more willing to take on greater responsibility for their own defence than they were before 11 September.

Prof. van Staden ended by noting that “NATO has been called the big loser of the Afghan War — and rightly so.” He detected a widening divide between the US and its European allies, certainly in the political dimension but also in the military one, where he envisioned the “spectre of military apartheid.” The EU members would be well-served, in this new environment, if they avoided the temptation to “kowtow” to America, if they continued to stress the root causes of terrorism, and if they succeeded in developing greater operational capability, whether through spending more on defence or spending more wisely (i.e., avoiding duplication and achieving greater rationalization). He suggested that European publics were unlikely to want to allocate more resources to defence, but did feel greater rationalization could be attained. In his parting shot, he hinted that perhaps Canada might wish to have a role in the elaboration of European security and defence.
The Canadian respondent to Prof. van Staden was Ms. Jill Sinclair (DFAIT), who began by stating her general assent to the claim that security needed to be conceptualized in a much more inclusive manner. She also agreed that preventing terrorism did require close heed to the conditions that bred it. In her view, there was and remained much that Canada and the Netherlands could do together in responding to the contemporary security challenge, not the least important undertaking being to argue jointly the case for a broadened understanding of security consistent with the conception, “human security.” She also worried that “we haven’t learned the lessons of 9/11 yet.”

These points of agreement having been broached, Ms. Sinclair identified areas where the Canadian and Dutch positions seemed to differ. First was the question of the meaning and impact of the attack on America. Notwithstanding the contemporary mood of the Dutch (and by extension of the other members of the EU), Canadians continued to experience the trauma of 11 September. “Canada,” she said, “felt the attack on the US as an attack on Canada in the most visceral sense.” Not only did Canada take the initial shock in a manner different from the Dutch, but Canada had decidedly not gone back to a business as usual position. Instead, “our country has changed irreversibly.” The threat is taken very seriously, and Canadians are “more closely related to the US than ever before.” Ms. Sinclair continued by observing that there had developed a new awareness of what it meant to be a neighbour of the United States, as well as of what it meant to be a Canadian, and she noted that Canadians were in the midst of a debate over where the country would or should fit in the new command structure(s) being envisioned for US homeland security.

A second comment concerned NATO. Ms. Sinclair stated, “I think the alliance is as healthy as it has ever been.” The invocation of Article 5 for the first time constituted a powerful symbolic statement, and demonstrated that the alliance had more than adequately met the test of solidarity. Indeed, she described the Article 5 invocation as “scintillating in its magic.” Another encouraging development was the way in which NATO’s further enlargement was shaping up, given that the expansion of the alliance was tantamount to the expansion of the zone of peace in Europe. The new NATO was not only becoming in many ways a partner with which Russia could work, but was also evolving into more of a political grouping, harking back to an earlier Canadian preference that the allies pay closer heed to the processes and norms of political, economic and societal cooperation (associated with the concept of an “Article 2” alliance). NATO’s adaptation was healthy, and gave the lie to those who were predicting its demise in the early aftermath of the ending of the Cold War.

A third point concerned the current state of relations between the EU and North American. It was not just the US that found it frustrating trying to deal with Europe, she observed, with an allusion to the celebrated comment of Henry Kissinger’s about being unable to find Europe’s phone number: Canada, as well, too often found no one at the other end of the line, but just a “demonic call-forward system.”
Fourthly, Ms. Sinclair thought the expression “military apartheid” a bit unfair. It was true that no one country could compete with the US when it came to developing military capability, but why was it important to do so? She doubted that the current administration in Washington represented a long-term challenge, if that is what it was, to the interests of the other allies, and suggested that those allies should rejoice in America’s willingness to shoulder a disproportionate share of the military burden, which meant that they were freer to focus their own initiatives on addressing the root causes of terrorism. In her view, lamenting the existence of a capabilities “gap” detracted from the business of addressing root causes.

Finally, and the above disagreements notwithstanding, Ms. Sinclair reiterated that “we are absolutely kindred spirits,” and suggested that the world had more need now than ever of creative policy ideas stemming jointly from the Netherlands and Canada.

Because of the richness and length of the two presentations, time proved scarce at panel’s end, resulting in a decision to reserve general debate until the conclusion of the morning’s second panel.

PANEL TWO: Multilateral Security Institutions

The lead presenter and moderator of this panel were also Dutch. Prof. van Staden served in the latter capacity. Mr. Herman Schaper (MFA) began his presentation by noting that contemporary institutions of greatest significance for security represented an evolution of the structures erected by the West during the Cold War. In this vein, he observed that the idea of inclusive security institutions represented nothing new, and cited the Marshall Plan as an example of a security undertaking that went far beyond the simple military dimension.

Mr. Schaper departed from the first panel’s lead presenter insofar as concerned the causes of terrorism. He pointed out that Dutch government officials tended to shy away from the “root-causes” phraseology, as it seemed to constitute a diminution of the challenge posed by terrorists. These latter, he reminded his auditors, “are criminals, after all.” Moreover, it was unclear what exactly was connoted by the expression, “root causes,” all the more so in that it was far from apparent that poverty per se must rank as one such cause (as a glance at the economic status of the 11 September hijackers reveals). Far better, said Mr. Schaper, would be simply to conceive of terrorism as a “phenomenon in and of itself.”

Mr. Schaper stated that the United States had a central role to play in the security of Europe, a fact that was widely acknowledged on the part of European officials, not least because American involvement “allows for” purely European cooperation within a wider compass than might be the case in the absence of such involvement. By contrast, the UN had an extremely limited role in European security, something that was unlikely to change. What was worrisome from the Dutch perspective was the huge disparity within Europe between the greater and
the lesser powers. Institutional structures (i.e., NATO and the EU) provided the Netherlands with a “seat at the table,” something that could not be said for the UN. However, recent talk within the EU of bestowing greater leadership functions upon a three-power “directory” was disturbing from the Dutch perspective.

From the above analysis, Mr. Schaper inferred a set of four political objectives for his country: (i) maintain the transatlantic link; (ii) support the process of European supranational integration; (iii) spread democracy and prosperity to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); and (iv) manage conflict in the Balkans. In respect of the latter, he noted that few would have expected, a decade ago, that the Netherlands would be deploying thousands of troops in the former Yugoslavia. By the same token, even more recently few would have imagined that the Netherlands would be sending hundreds of soldiers to Afghanistan.

In the realm of defence policy, Mr. Schaper was guardedly optimistic about the prospects of ESDP: “I’m not saying it is successful, merely that it has been making progress.” An encouraging development has been the growing pragmatism of France vis-à-vis the alliance, reflective of a recognition in Paris that NATO was the “only game in town.” For the Dutch, security priorities could be listed in the following order: (i) enhance the EU’s military capability so as to avoid a “Potemkin-village” model; (ii) foster closer EU-NATO collaboration; (iii) find some means of bringing NATO members, including Canada, more explicitly into the picture as concerns EU-NATO collaboration; (iv) develop the EU’s crisis management capabilities in the non-military aspects of security; and (v) reform the institutions of the EU itself to make it capable of responding to new challenges.

Turning to the important issue of increasing military capabilities, Mr. Schaper’s previously stated guarded optimism shifted to outright pessimism. For all its rhetorical promise, ESDP continued to experience a “disappointing reaction” from European governments unwilling to allocate more resources to defence, or even to reform their militaries significantly. Realistically, only three EU members seemed to be taking the issue of enhancing capabilities at all seriously: France, the UK and the Netherlands.

Finally, Mr. Schaper added a word about the OSCE, which the Dutch will be chairing in 2003. His country considered this security institution to be useful, particularly as it could provide early warning of impending crises. Some means of endowing it with a wider role, while at the same time reducing Russia’s residual concern about its “interventionism,” should be sought. Mr. Schaper suggested adding combatting terrorism, drug trafficking and crime to the organization’s mission.

The Canadian respondent to Mr. Schaper was Prof. Alexander Moens (Simon Fraser University), who prefaced his remarks with a welcome to the Dutch participants, delivered in Dutch. Prof. Moens made no secret of the fact that he viewed the “bilateral house” after 11 September as being decidedly beset by stormy weather, not as a result of any specific Dutch-Canadian tensions but rather because of the transformations in US foreign policy set in motion by the attacks on
Washington and New York. The effect of those attacks had been to render obsolete certain policy options that just a few years ago seemed worthwhile (as for instance the proposal to integrate military planning between NATO and the EU, which Prof. Moens himself once advocated but has now abandoned as being beside the point).

He added that 11 September had brought “a sudden end to the drifting 1990s,” and in so doing had provided a glimpse of future security environment. Beyond dispute, he argued, was the transformation wrought by the attacks upon America’s foreign policy, which had turned decisively away from recent “Wilsonian” and multilateral formulations in favour of a reconcentration upon American security and power. Prof. Moens reminded the group that the rise in American power should not necessarily be conceived as being detrimental to the interests of America’s partners, even if it was likely to make Washington take its European allies less seriously than heretofore. (As for Canada, geography would oblige Washington to take it seriously, indeed.)

Fundamentally, the US seemed to be abandoning the security order it had created in the aftermath of the Second World War. Less than ever before would it be interested in being entangled by alliances, and while the term “unilateralism” might not accurately capture the new American dispensation, it was obvious that for the Bush administration the current perceived threat from terrorism left little time or inclination for reflection upon “root causes” of the phenomenon.

What was to be done? Prof. Moens imparted some advice he gave to his students: throw out your old text books, and learn to “think outside the box.” Insofar as initiatives that Canada and the Netherlands might develop in common, he urged that we “do something radical” together, perhaps by developing some capacity to actually make a difference in the struggle against terrorism.

**Discussion (of panels one and two)**

- The “root-causes” thesis may be based on a fallacious assumption that development and peace are directly correlated, which flies in the face of at least one theory of political change associated with the “revolution of rising expectations” (i.e., that instability initially increases as objective conditions improve).
- If we take Afghanistan as the model for future conflict against terrorism, we may be making the mistake of “preparing to fight the last war”; in this respect, military institutions may be less relevant to the campaign against terrorism than police and intelligence assets.
- The military will, notwithstanding the comment immediately above, continue to have a vital counter-terrorism function in respect of the challenge posed from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, while the US may be losing interest in NATO, it will still want to build coalitions.
• Even though the “root-causes” thesis may be problematical in some respects, Afghanistan demonstrates the danger to our security if we ignore the problem of “failed states.”

• It may be misleading to assume that the shock of 11 September has dissipated in the Netherlands, and that there has been a return to the status quo ante; after all, the Dutch are now debating in a vigorous and novel manner their refugee and immigration policies.

• The “marginalization-of-NATO” thesis may need to be qualified, for not only does the organization remain vital for a variety of reasons not directly related to terrorism, but the upcoming Prague summit may demonstrate a new resolve to enhance capabilities.

• A curious diplomatic paradox looks to be emerging: the extension of multilateral structures is placing a growing premium on bilateralism.

• The attack on America has resolved, for Canada, the Herman Kahn puzzle (i.e., of Canada’s being a “regional power without a region”)—Canada has now been unequivocally given its region and it is called North America.

PANEL THREE: Current Peace Operations Challenges

Both the moderator and the lead presenter were Canadians, respectively MGen Michel Maisonneuve (Canadian Forces) and Prof. Joel Sokolsky (Royal Military College). Gen. Maisonneuve provided context for the discussion by drawing attention to how much the nature of peace operations had been changing even before 11 September 2001. Specifically, he suggested that peace operations had evolved through three stages: first, the so-called “golden age” of classical peacekeeping of the pre-1989 period; second, the “New World Order” burst of enthusiasm of the years 1989 to 1993; and third, the profoundly more complex “gray zone” peace operations since 1993.

Prof. Sokolsky began by stressing that, in parallel with the evolution in peace operations, Canadian defence policy was becoming more closely integrated with American policy than ever before. This was not something caused by 11 September, but the attacks of that day would accelerate the trend. Yet this did not mean Canada would be focused militarily on North America. To the contrary, “if there is anything big going on in the world, we expect to participate in it.” Canada had some 4,500 military personnel deployed in overseas operations, with the bulk of the latter being led by the US.

A second important aspect of Canadian defence policy concerned Europe. As did Washington, Ottawa too saw value in enlarging the alliance, and working with new allies as well as PfP (Partnership for Peace) members in a “trans-European bargain” intended to promote and consolidate democracy in the CEE. Despite those who thought that Canada somehow “quit” Europe as a result of the 1992 decision to end the stationed force presence in Germany, the reality was that by
the end of the 1990s there were almost as many Canadian military personnel in Europe (in ex-Yugoslavia) as there had been in Germany at the start of the 1990s.

What was new was the emphasis now being given in Washington to “homeland security.” This, said Prof. Sokolsky, had led decisionmakers in Ottawa to seek to strengthen bilateral ties with the US, *inter alia* so as to reassure Americans that Canada would not become a “security liability” to them. In this regard, it bore noting that the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review in the US had identified the defence of the homeland as the country’s top security priority. The new agenda suggested both sovereignty and budgetary implications for Canada, and with respect to the latter it was clear, from the most recent federal budget (of December 2001), that while more money would be allocated to security measures, it did not follow there would be major increases in the budget of the Department of National Defence.

Prof. Sokolsky concluded by emphasizing how much the new security agenda was being shaped by one overriding concern, the combatting of international terrorism. “It’s as if the Cold War is back, and with it, Cold War type implications are presented to Canada.” This, he said, meant that the US would be relying on NATO for political support and legitimacy, and that Canada would find itself “firmly affixed to its seat at the table of the American-dominated Western alliance.”

There were two Dutch respondents to Prof. Sokolsky. The first was **LGen P.J.M. Godderij** (Ministry of Defence [MOD]), who remarked upon the similarities between the two countries’ alliance interests, and reminded everyone that NATO continued to be held together by America’s Article 5 commitment to its allies. Apropos the comment about Canada wishing to be part of any major military operations, Gen. Godderij regretted that Canada “had other priorities” in Afghanistan than participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deployed to Kabul. But he did remark upon the successful cooperation between Canada, the Netherlands and the UK in Bosnia, with SFOR.

Gen. Godderij emphasized that if the Europeans wanted to enhance their influence within NATO, they would have to develop the capacity to manage peace operations from which the US chose to abstain. Could they do so? Perhaps the lesson of UNMEE suggested they might be able to, and to do so with Canadian involvement. For in the Ethiopian-Eritrean case, both Canada and the Netherlands were able to function well together as the spearhead of a UN-centred “group of friends.” Moreover, the Netherlands was able to prevail upon its EU partners to increase their contributions to post-conflict peacebuilding, by getting them to provide more economic assistance. A second “lesson” of UNMEE was that, notwithstanding the obvious reality that Canada would go along with the US most of the time, just as the Netherlands would go along with the EU most of the time, there did remain scope for constructive bilateralism as between the Dutch and the Canadians.

Insofar as concerns the evolution of policy governing peace support operations, Gen. Godderij informed the seminar of some recent reforms introduced in
the Netherlands, intended to render more effective such operations. These were prompted by difficulties experienced with the UNPROFOR deployment to Bosnia, especially those associated with the “Srebrenica debacle.” Among the objectives of the reform initiative had been to clarify command and control arrangements, and to render as “robust” as possible the rules of engagement.

The second respondent was Dr. Dick Leurdijk (Clingendael), who observed that there were also less positive experiences shared by the two countries (viz., Bosnia and the tragic events of Srebrenica). The experience of the past decade in the Balkans, especially since NATO had become a central player there, demonstrated that a part of Europe that was once considered “out of area” for the alliance had now emphatically come to be regarded as very much “in area.”

Turning to the alliance and 11 September, Dr. Leurdijk remarked that NATO invoked Article 5 only after receiving clear evidence of a linkage between external (to the US) terrorist groups and the attacks on Washington and New York; ironically, he observed, the support given to the US by the EU was more forthcoming, as well as less conditional, than that accorded by NATO.

Discussion

- One should not underestimate the impact of the prime minister on Canada’s propensity to be part of significant peace operations, for Jean Chrétien is very much an activist.
- Should Canadian military participation in Afghanistan even be conceptualized in terms of “peacekeeping,” and is there a risk that sustaining its involvement there will mean that Canada, too, might consider ending its deployment in Bosnia?
- Apropos the comment immediately above, Ottawa accepts that Canadian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom means we are “in a state of armed conflict, we are at war” with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; thus we are not there in a peacekeeping role.
- As for Bosnia, the view from Ottawa is that we would like to reduce the size of our deployment, but we are not likely to announce any large-scale withdrawal by a specified date, and in this respect Canada’s position on Bosnia differs from that of the US.
- Tony Blair may have stolen the Canadian terminology, given that Ottawa’s announced doctrine on peace operations is “early-in, early-out,” but the reality is “we don’t have the capacity to be early, unless it happens a couple of miles outside of Petawawa”; sometimes we do leave early (e.g., Ethiopia, East Timor), but usually we are “end-staters.”
- So, too, are the Dutch end-staters by preference, but regarding Bosnia they worry that a culture of dependency — both economic and military — has been fostered, and that this will militate against any solution ever being found.
In Afghanistan, “ad hocery” governed where the Canadian Forces would be deployed; there was no deliberate choice to go with the US as opposed to ISAF and the Europeans.

PANEL FOUR: Future of Arms Control and Disarmament

This panel, the first on day two of the seminar, was moderated by Prof. Jan Geert Siccama (Dutch MOD), and featured as lead presenter Mr. Robert McDougall (DFAIT), who began by referring to a “pervasive sense of crisis in the field of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament” (NACD). Part of the problem resided in the fundamental tension between NACD, held to be “inherently international” in nature, and national security, which by definition put a premium on the efforts of single states, at least in the first instance. The tension mattered, because a sound national security strategy was one in which there was, or should be, close complementarity with NACD regimes; mutatis mutandis, the reverse held as well. Often, however, state decisionmakers lost sight of this complementarity.

Another source of the current crisis, Mr. McDougall continued, stemmed from suboptimal regional dynamics, in that while it was “axiomatic” that NACD could and did enhance prospects for regional peace and stability, it was often the case that a modicum of regional stability must first have been attained before conditions conducive to arms control could apply. What this suggested was that “we cannot expect countries to negotiate, join or sustain NACD commitments if they do not see such a step as reinforcing their national security.”

An increasingly important issue confronting NACD, said Mr. McDougall, was the pace of technological development of weapons systems. New weapons were especially problematical (e.g., miniaturized nuclear “bunker busters,” strategic missile defence, and spaced-based systems); these could be grouped under the rubric of “qualitative” or “vertical” proliferation. Then there was the more or less traditional problem of “quantitative” or “horizontal” proliferation, used to characterize the acquisition of established weapons systems by growing numbers of states or nonstate actors. Mr. McDougall explained that a technological race was also underway pitting those who would proliferate against those who would detect and check proliferation, so the story was not entirely a gloomy one.

In large measure, how the story ended would have much to do with geostrategic circumstances. Mr. McDougall identified three such circumstances: (i) the future of the US-Russia relationship; (ii) the dual-edge ramifications of 11 September (meaning that while one consequence of the attacks had been to elevate the allure of non-proliferation in the campaign against terrorism, another consequence had been to render less attractive either arms control or disarmament, “always a tough sell in wartime”); and (iii) the changing manner in which war was fought (with particular reference to the Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA).
For Canada, Mr. McDougall listed a set of near-term priorities, including:
(i) promoting compliance with commitments to the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT); (ii) working with “like-minded” states (see the comments by Prof.
van Staden, above) to strengthen efforts to stanch bio-weapons proliferation;
(iii) establishing a dialogue on outer space, with a prospect of achieving a
weaponization ban; and (iv) furthering efforts to reduce the levels of small arms
in circulation worldwide. These were all areas in which Mr. McDougall foresaw
much scope for enhanced bilateral cooperation between Canada and the Netherlands.

There were again two Dutch respondents to a Canadian presenter. The first was
Prof. Paul Rusman (University of Groningen), who gave what he called an “outsider’s”
perspective. He began by echoing a theme set out in the Canadian
presentation: the current war had indeed provided impetus to non-proliferation
efforts linked to counter-terrorism. But no such impetus had been witnessed in
respect of arms control, of which the US in particular took a dim view. To some
degree, said Prof. Rusman, US misgivings with multilateral arms control regimes
were well-founded, at least if the experience of the NPT inspection regime pro-
vided guidance: “for any bio-weapons verification regime is likely to repeat the
NPT inspection regime, in which most inspection resources are spent in checking
on the most unlikely proliferators (Germany and Japan), while left much more
dangerous offenders off the hook.”

Regarding the control of chemical weapons, here the major source of concern
seemed to be the “chaotic manner in which Russia is proceeding with its manda-
tory ... destruction effort.” Likewise in the nuclear area Russia figured as a worry,
given the quantity and geographic dispersion of its sizable holdings of fissile
materials. Also disquieting was the US decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty,
although its doing so was not expected to jeopardize arms reduction talks be-
tween Moscow and Washington, as had once been thought. More worrisome, from
the arms control perspective, had been the US decision to withhold ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had the added demerit of
eliminating America as “the world’s arms control beacon.”

The second Dutch respondent was MGen (Ret) C. Homan (Clingendael), who
commenced on an upbeat note by remarking that the impending enlargements of
NATO and the EU should bode well for cooperative security in Europe. Similarly
uplifting was the record of arms control in Europe, starting with the CFE Treaty,
and continuing through the Open Skies Treaty. Gen. Homan suggested that the
key to remedying the defects associated with global NACD efforts might be found
by trying to learn from, and apply, the lessons of the European experience, which
had been replete with positive results in the area of conventional weapons sys-
tems. Gen. Homan suggested two avenues of possible Dutch-Canadian cooperation:
first, control of small arms, and second, resistance to the weaponization of space.
In particular, he stated that should the US succeed in achieving space dominance,
it would be a “destabilizing and dangerous development.”
**Discussion**

- Can it be said that the ending of the Cold War has led to the current “malaise” in NACD, and that absent the bipolar contest of yore, there no longer exists any coherent strategic rationale for arms control? In this regard, can one really generalize from the record of the European experience with conventional arms control? Might not stability, say, in South Asia require giving both sides more secure nuclear arsenals?

- While there is no alternative to dialogue on NACD, the only real achievement of the UN Conference on Disarmament was the NPT, which depended upon a particular geostrategic context that has ceased to exist.

- Like it or not, the US is going to weaponize space, and the spectre of an “arms race” in space is the product of overworked imaginations, for the reality is that no one else will be able to compete with Washington in this enterprise; in this sense, “we are better off today than we were in the 1945-1960 period.”

- To the extent that arms controllers in Canada and the Netherlands evince disquiet about the RMA, does this not complicate their countries’ stated determination to become more technologically relevant to the US, via the enhancement of their military capabilities?

- The reaction to the changed US attitude to arms control and disarmament should be twofold. Because effective arms control is not feasible without American support, ways and means should be found to cooperate with the US in strengthening the NACD regimes, particularly those related to WMD (as the Ottawa treaty has shown, arms control related to conventional weapons can also be successful without the US). At the same time, the long-held belief in the value of multilateral arms control and disarmament should not be cast away overnight. Canada and the Netherlands share those policies and could cooperate to identify ways of bringing the NACD agenda forward.

- Has not the tenor of this panel’s presentations represented an instance of going “forward to the past,” in that it skirts the real issue, namely trying to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of irresponsible regimes?

- Arms control has to apply to everyone, and the effect of the RMA is to render much easier the decision to go to war.

- Iraq will be key to the future tenability of NACD, for it is not enough just to be able to detect WMD, they have to be destroyed.

- If we are serious about intervening in the affairs of others to get them to treat their own population they way we treat ours (viz., the thrust of “human security”), should we not applaud the RMA precisely because it makes it easier to achieve the goals of war with fewer casualties?

- We do not need nuclear weapons to destroy WMD in the hands of terrorists, and we should not use them to do so.
• Arms controllers should go after “irresponsible” regimes, but more than that, they should also seek to establish greater predictability and thus help to resolve the security dilemma.
• Why, exactly, is the weaponization of space thought to be dangerous?

**PANEL FIVE: The Transatlantic Link and Bilateral Relations**

In many ways this panel was the capstone session of the seminar, with the principal speakers being the ambassadors from the two countries, and the moderator being Ms. Cartwright. The presenter was **His Excellency Como van Hellenberg Hubar** (Ambassador of the Netherlands to Canada). The respondent was **His Excellency Serge April** (Ambassador of Canada to the Netherlands).

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar began by stating how central transatlantic links are for the Europeans and emphasized that these connections could not and should not be reduced to those between Europe and the US, as seems often to be the case. Canada had an important role to play as a “political force-multiplier,” helping in the process to minimize the pressures that would drive the Atlantic allies apart. But the bilateral (Canada-Netherlands) relationship had to be understood as one between countries each of which was growing ever more integrated with its own continental partners. This trend, while necessary to recognize, did not need to be deplored.

Indeed, according to Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar, there was much wisdom in Canada’s aligning itself more closely with the US, just as there had been great benefit derived by the Netherlands from its decision to integrate more fully with Germany and other European countries. “I do believe,” he said, “that a country locked into a cooperative setting, be it in Europe or in North America, has more chance to uphold the essence of its views on cooperation than in isolation.” That is why the ambassador rejected the charges brought by some against John Manley, Canada’s deputy prime minister, namely that he was too quick to sacrifice sovereignty in pursuit of closer integration with the US after 11 September. Just the opposite applied, accordingly to the ambassador, for Mr. Manley understood that close and fruitful cooperation with the US was a “necessary precondition for the survival of Canada as a viable state.” The deputy PM was right to think as he did, and in so doing to confute the preferences of some of Canada’s “academic elite,” steeped as the latter have been in the “traditional anti-Americanism of the Franz Fanon generation, grown up with the ideology of ‘Les Damnées de la Terre,’ and [the] insularity of the British.”

As for the Netherlands, integration on the European scale was so logical that almost all the country’s political parties supported it. But, said Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar, Europe would not be allowed to constitute the sole focus of the country’s external reach; Dutch economic, political, military, and cultural interests extended far beyond Europe. This was all the more pertinent given the recent redirection of
the European integration project, away from the federalist preferences of the Dutch and toward the kind of Europe of states envisioned by Charles de Gaulle. “We are now at a turning point, and De Gaulle’s vision seems more up-to-date than I, for one, ever believed possible.”

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar acknowledged that there were major differences in the processes and norms of continental integration on the two sides of the Atlantic, stemming largely from the disproportionate weight enjoyed by the US within North America as compared with that of even the largest European country within the EU. Some things, however, were similar: Canada, like most of the EU countries, had been spending less than it should on defence. Canada and the European NATO members had allowed the capability gap separating them from the US to expand. Nor were matters helped by Canada’s “regrettably ... falling behind” in the provision of non-military assistance to developing countries, particularly in light of the country’s declaratory policy and its capacity to pay.

Neither the EU allies nor, by extension, Canada should have an interest in promoting a division of labour within the alliance that left the burden of military intervention (“hard power”) to one ally or only a few allies; subscribing to such an idea would be the quickest way to self-marginalization for a country. It also constituted “an expression of defeatism, or at least of a complacent attitude.” In fact, through the military support and other solidarity it had provided the US since 11 September, Canada had shown itself to be ahead of the other allies. There were, said the Ambassador, many explanations in addition to altruism that accounted for Canada’s rapid rallying to America’s side, and notwithstanding ongoing difficulties in certain sectors (e.g., softwood lumber) it was undeniable that Canada’s standing with the US had been elevated, leaving it placed better than most if not all the others in the “competition among Allies [over] who reacted in the most appropriate way to the distress of the US.”

As for the Canada-Netherlands bilateral relationship, it sometimes appeared as if the two kindred countries were saddled with “the problem that they have no problem standing in the way of their friendship.” As a result, it was too easy, since there was nothing fundamental for the two to solve, for them to succumb to the temptation of not doing anything together. So to think would be wrong. More than ever after the events of 11 September was it incumbent upon the two to “make good use of the benefit we derive from our international orientation and ... act in a complementary manner on the world stage.”

Amb. van Hellenberg Hubar concluded by sketching the outlines of a few items that could figure on a productive agenda for bilateral diplomacy. Foremost on his list was enhanced military cooperation between the two countries, including providing some role for Canada in decisionmaking within an evolving ESDP; this latter would also have the merit of contributing to Dutch efforts to solidify ties between NATO and the ESDP. Cooperation might also take the form of procurement of military equipment. Outside the military sphere, cooperative ventures could be mounted involving commercial and academic constituencies. The point
to stress was that the willingness was there, in both countries, to pursue important projects together for mutual benefit.

The Canadian responder, Ambassador April, commenced by acknowledging that the Dutch, more so perhaps than any other Europeans, realized that Canada was “more than just an additional dose of glue with which to bind the United States to Europe.” Canada appreciated that the Netherlands had long accepted Canada as a “partner in its own right” in the transatlantic relationship. And while at times the overconcentration of Europeans (and Canadians) upon the US might be misplaced, such was not the situation after 11 September: in the early aftermath of that tragic day, it was assumed by many that US policy would demonstrate a recommitment to multilateralism. But this had not turned out to be the case, notwithstanding the initial expectation that NATO’s invocation of Article 5 would reveal it to be an “Alliance of equals.”

Instead, what had emerged was a reconfirmation of prior signs that America would practice, at best, a very selective “multilateralism,” one in which the utility of international institutions would be assessed according to their usefulness for securing American objectives. As a result, “although we are convinced the Americans need us to preserve a stable international system, we are increasingly worried that the Americans do not realize this.” What this implied, in turn, was nothing other than a reversal of the conventional manner in which transatlantic relations had been conceived. In the past, the challenge had been to maintain America’s commitment to Europe; today, “the challenge is to ensure that we remain engaged with the United States and retain a capacity to influence its actions.”

More than ever, preserving a healthy transatlantic relationship presupposes that the allies demonstrate an equal concern for American security. Ambassador April noted that Canada had for many decades played an integral part in America’s “homeland security,” even if no one actually employed that rubric until very recently. There could not be any question of Canada’s choosing to be seen by the US as anything other than a reliable partner. All the same, Canada remained as concerned as any European ally about US unilateralism. As a result, he continued, a “redefined bridging role” was emerging for Canada, one in which the country’s efforts would be bent to the task of showing Washington that Europe could make a worthwhile contribution to American security. “Rather than being the other ‘outsider’ encouraging them to commit to Europe, we will be the other ‘insider’ encouraging them to engage with Europe on issues of global security.” And whoever said “global security” was often as not heard in the US to be saying “American security.”

What had to be done, said Ambassador April, was for the allies to begin to make progress in shrinking the capabilities gap, and in this respect there was a danger that an overconcentration on ESDP would absorb energies that were needed for the urgent task of once again “reinventing” NATO. Here the Dutch could play a very important role, by “keeping NATO high on the European agenda.” NATO remained needed, but it also was necessary for it to be reformed, so as to become
equipped to respond to the emergence of new and unconventional threats. Although he did not specifically mention Iraq, the ambassador clearly had that country in mind when he cautioned that the allies would have to develop a coherent policy to govern their response to the challenge of WMD programs in countries viewed with suspicion.

Another area in which they need to make progress concerned ESDP, not only in terms of endowing it with the capability to assume its self-assigned (yet ill-defined) “Petersberg” tasks, but also to move beyond those responsibilities, and in doing so continue to enable Canada to play a meaningful role in European security. Here the ambassador was frank in expressing his (and Canada’s) dismay at what could appear to be the country’s marginalization: “[Q]uite apart from our sense that after six decades of helping defend Europe it is a bit unfair to put us on the same footing as Russia and Ukraine ... we have yet to be reassured that if we did participate in an operation, we would have adequate input on how it was run.” On the matter of bilateral cooperation between the militaries of Canada and the Netherlands, the ambassador noted experience had shown that they could and did work very well together (viz., the Multinational Division Southwest in Bosnia and UNMEE). On the basis of this experience, it was only reasonable to imagine there would be further such opportunities, perhaps as part of the struggle against terrorism, for the two countries to work together militarily.

Even more “robust” had been the pattern of bilateral cooperation on political matters, with Canada considering the Netherlands to be one of the “like-minded” countries, and this in some measure accounted for the decision to initiate a new emphasis (nouvel élan) in the relationship, so as to provide some means of assuring continuity in bilateral ties in light of the corroding effect that time’s passage inevitably had upon some of the foundational pillars of Dutch-Canadian cooperation.

**Discussion**

- It is sometimes forgotten the extent to which the Netherlands, as a kingdom, is also a land of the western hemisphere, one for whom Venezuela is a neighbour. This means that the Netherlands shares some of Canada’s hemispheric political and economic concerns, and as a European country it also shares the commitment to transatlantic links.
- One possible focus of joint endeavour stems from the way in which the “new multilateralism” is putting a premium on bilateral diplomacy, and inheres in the possibility of Dutch-Canadian initiatives both on EU and on Canada-US issues.
- There are three ways of regarding ESDP: (i) as a vehicle for redressing intra-alliance burden-sharing difficulties; (ii) as a counterweight to US influence (and some in the Netherlands worry that this is really what the French are promoting); and (iii) as a “counterfeit, a fake, a Potemkin
village”; if the last image is the most accurate one, then there is nothing really for Canada to be involved with.

• Canada was initially more supportive of ESDI/ESDP than the US, but began to have difficulty with the concept(s) in 1999, when it looked as if the European project would necessarily exclude Canada.

• Canadians will for some time be preoccupied with the implications of the new North American military command. There will likely be better opportunities for Dutch-Canadian initiatives outside Europe rather than inside it.

• From a Dutch perspective, cooperation with Canada outside Europe gets handicapped by Ottawa’s habit of cutting spending on ODA.

• From a Canadian perspective, Canada’s access to the EU, and hence its ability to cooperate fully with the Netherlands, is likely to be affected negatively by new visa requirements in the Schengen group, limiting Canadians to three-months maximum of visa-free entry; nevertheless, since 11 September, there may be more potential for bilateral efforts on Third Pillar items.

• Perhaps working together on a joint threat assessment, say on WMD, might prove worth doing.

• Another possible area for cooperation is the Caribbean region.

Closing Remarks

From the Dutch side, Prof. Siccama observed that much of the focus of the seminar over the two days had been the US in the aftermath of 11 September, which led him to remark upon a major difference between Canada and the Netherlands: the former was part of America’s “strategic space,” the latter was not. By implication, Canada’s ability to influence US thinking had risen, while the Netherlands’ had declined. Indeed, compared with the height of the Cold War, when all reinforcements destined for the Central Front would have had to pass through Belgian and Dutch ports, you could even say that Dutch strategic standing vis-à-vis the US had changed “drastically.”

Less explicit as a focus of the discussion was a theme that intruded several times at the margins of the debate: the question of Europe’s finalité. This, suggested Prof. Siccama, would have great bearing on the quality of Dutch-Canadian relations in the future. The EU’s future constitutional order was more likely to reflect French and British, rather than German, preferences, in that it was doubtful that future constitutional order would much resemble “federalism.” As for the Netherlands, “we have to admit that we have abandoned the supranational, federal position ourselves.” Only Germany and Belgium appeared today still to be committed to a federal Europe.
To state the obvious, he continued, no one could say where all of this was leading. The best way of thinking about Europe’s future might be to rely on the familiar bicycle metaphor, whereby the goal of remaining in motion was, in itself, as important as, if not more important than, determining where one should be headed; for, not to remain in motion on a bicycle meant to fall. The metaphor’s logic suggested we study closely three tests currently or soon to be put to the EU: first, European Monetary Union: Could we count on it remaining workable, or would it succumb to pressure brought by inflationist members of the currency group? Second, EU enlargement on a large scale: Would this prove too much for the EU to digest? And third, Second Pillar issues: Could ESDP be made effective and made to function cooperatively with NATO?

Prof. Siccama proffered his own list of items that might constitute an agenda for Dutch-Canadian bilateral diplomacy: human security, peacekeeping, linking development cooperation with security, regional conflict management, and working with the US to get it once again to see multilateral arms control as being in its own best security interest.

With hardly anything left unsaid during the two days of candid, constructive, and always thought-provoking discussion, Ms. Cartwright concluded by expressing her thanks to all the participants for their contributions, and observed, with some irony, that it was “always a challenge to have an irritant-free relationship.” Still, she said, it would be wrong to infer from the lack of bilateral irritants any cause for complacency, and she likened the bilateral relationship to a marriage, which regardless of how solidly established it might be, always required and deserved ongoing attention.

David G. Haglund
Queen’s University
31 March 2002
THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK IN EVOLUTION
WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001?

Charles C. Pentland
Editor

Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
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The Martello Papers

The Queen’s University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of security studies, the Martello Papers. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

This, the twenty-fifth Martello Paper, includes a report by David G. Haglund (Queen’s University) on the proceedings of the Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar on Security, held in Ottawa on 28 February and 1 March 2002. Like its predecessor, held at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) in April 2000, the seminar was sponsored by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Haglund’s report summarizes the papers presented at each of the five panels, gives highlights of the respondents’ comments, and conveys the flavour of the discussions that followed.

In addition, this volume includes three of the papers presented at the seminar. The first, by Professor Alfred van Staden (Clingendael), confronts the spectre haunting so many such meetings at that time — what difference might the events of the previous September make to the global and regional security environment? The second paper, by Joel J. Sokolsky (Royal Military College of Canada), explores the post-Cold War evolution of peacekeeping and its implications both for Canadian military practice and for the public myths about it. The third paper, by Robert McDougall (DFAIT) takes an unsentimental look at the big picture of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament in the light of four sets of factors shaping their prospects: national security concerns, international institutions, scientific and technological advances, and the political-strategic environment.

We are grateful to the Embassy of the Netherlands in Ottawa for its financial contribution to the publication of this volume, and to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the QCIR or any of its supporting agencies.

Charles C. Pentland
Director, QCIR
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Second Canada-Netherlands Seminar
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Ottawa
28 February – 1 March 2002
2. The Security Implications of 11 September 2001: A Dutch Perspective

Alfred van Staden

I

My brief is to deal with the security implications of the September 2001 drama to underscore the fact that security is featuring prominently on the foreign-policy agenda again. It is interesting to remind you of many contentions made some ten years ago, suggesting a paradigm shift or some sort of Copernican revolution to occur on the world stage as regards the priorities and directions of foreign policy. Scholars and practitioners alike predicted that penetration of foreign markets rather than the control of territories would be the overriding goal of foreign policy. Economic competition was supposed to supersede military rivalry, and trade and finance, not security concerns, was to dominate the international arena, with the struggle for technological superiority playing a decisive role: the victory of geo-economics over geopolitics, as it was proclaimed. These prophecies have proven false or at least hopelessly one-sided. Security is back in town. Ask the people in New York and Washington.

This does not mean, however, that we can afford to apply conventional methods or follow a business-as-usual approach in order to come to grips with the problems at hand. The sources of insecurity are manifold, almost beyond any attempt at theoretical classification, but deliberate plans for military aggression are only one of them and perhaps not the most important these days. The idea of comprehensive security is more relevant than ever. It is based on the assumption that security problems need to be put in the wider context of economic and social development,
as well as ecological sustainability. For zones of peace and stability to be extended outside the OECD area, these problems have to be dealt with by employing the full arsenal of foreign policy tools available, ranging from preventive diplomacy, economic and environmental assistance, to the use of military force as the final resort.

What are the sources of today’s terrorism? It is useful to distinguish between the immediate and underlying causes. The so-called root-causes thesis was eloquently stated recently by Michael Ignatieff. He pointed to “the coincidence of globalized prosperity in the western part of the world with disintegration in the states that achieved independence from the colonial empires of Europe in the 1960s” and before. The collapse of state institutions, Ignatieff held, “has been exacerbated by urbanization, by the relentless growth of lawless shantytowns that collect populations of unemployed or underemployed men who can see the promise of globalized prosperity on the TVs in every café, but cannot enjoy it themselves.” A case in point is Pakistan, now the reluctant US partner of necessity, where the government fails to furnish basic services to the poorest people. As a result, Islamic parties, funded from Saudi Arabia, “step into the breach, providing clinics, schools and orphanages where the poor receive protection at the price of indoctrination in hatred.” Of course, the relationship between poverty and proneness to terrorism is less linear and direct than often is suggested. Many variables intervene in the equation. Just to mention a few: the deeply entrenched feelings of resentment about western economic and military superiority in the Islamic world, the syndrome of victimization especially inflicting the Arab masses, and the role of political entrepreneurs exploiting the frustrations and deprivation of the disenfranchized. But any sophisticated analysis of the problem will be a far cry from the main thrust of President Bush’s recent “axis of evil” speech, reducing complex world problems to the malicious intentions of a bunch of bloody dictators. Direct military confrontation may be necessary and even inevitable in the here-and-now but cannot be a substitute for a viable long-range strategy of counter-terrorism.

In my presentation I will focus on the security implications of 11 September 2001 at three political levels: the national, the Atlantic, and the European. Let me begin with discussing the impact on our national societies. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, many news analysts asserted that politics in western democracies would be restored to its previous important role in the lives of citizens. The familiar view was taken that the more people feel insecure, the more they will turn to their government for defence. As you will recollect, this view goes back to Thomas Hobbes’ famous line: because the life of man is “nasty, brutish and short,” people band together and create governments for self-protection. The validity of the underlying argument was proven, at least to some degree, in the United States. One of the noticeable changes that took place on that side of the Atlantic was not only the outburst of patriotism but also a sharp rise in the level of public trust in
The Security Implications of 11 September 2001

the institutions of government, not least the presidency. Amazingly, this was only one year after the Florida imbroglio on vote counting.

A similar effect did not occur, however, in the Netherlands (and probably not in other European countries). The reason should be clear: after the immediate shock caused by the onslaught in New York and Washington the sense of insecurity soon faded away. A few months after the event there was only a faint awareness in the Netherlands that what had happened in the US might also occur in the Low Lands behind the dikes. Not surprisingly, there was a strong reluctance in Dutch society to give the state more power over individual citizens. Perhaps this attitude should also be attributed to the libertarian tradition of the Dutch nation. At any rate, civil liberties campaigners (with professors of criminal law in a leading position) voiced concern that anti-terrorist measures taken by the European Union would erode personal freedoms. I am referring especially to proposals for making it easier for governments to catch and prosecute terrorists, as well as to the new European search and arrest warrants, replacing extradition procedures between member states.

In Dutch society there was a rapid movement back to normal, that is to say, to the political situation as it was before the September events. This also explains why radical pleas for administrative restructuring in the security sector that had been heard in the Netherlands just after these events have fallen all but silent. One of these was the suggestion by a former minister of the interior to designate a super minister who would coordinate all policies pertaining to external and internal security, as well as all intelligence operations. One cannot fail to recognize that old bureaucratic habits die hard. The vested interests in the government apparatus easily survived sweeping reform proposals. To be sure, a task force, called “Counter-terrorism and Security,” was established under the leadership of the prime minister. However, this was only a temporary venture and did not involve any administrative rearrangements. Similarly, an official panel headed by the permanent under-secretary of defence concluded that there was no reason to fundamentally reconsider the missions and overall structure of the Dutch armed forces.

The 11 September terrorist act called for the Dutch government to balance solidarity toward the United States with due regard for domestic concerns about the unintended effects of large-scale counter-violence on the civilian population. The government was forced to explain itself in order to stifle doubts about the firmness and scope of the Dutch commitment to back up the United States. Why had these doubts been raised? At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, immediately after the terrorist attacks, the Netherlands had irritated the US because it had been the sole member of the alliance to ask questions about the legal implications of invoking Article 5 before the decision on the invocation could be taken. Perhaps the Dutch government was afraid, at the time, of criticism by the Dutch parliament for rushing into ill-conceived, hasty decisions. I should make clear
that the Dutch parliament has asserted itself on matters concerning the deployment of Dutch troops outside NATO’s treaty area. It has gained the right of co-decision on participation in international peace support operations. By the end of November, when the Dutch parliament insisted on clarification of the intended missions of the relatively large package of military forces the Netherlands had offered to the US, it turned out that combat tasks had explicitly been ruled out. The government was not able to take away the public impression that it had sought “high political visibility” at “low military risk.”

The Dutch self-image of being not an ordinary small country, but a small country writ large is crucial in this regard. The image closely correlates with the inclination of self-aggrandisement or, to put it more bluntly, the Dutch penchant for punching above one’s weight. This was exemplified by Prime Minister Kok’s enforcement of a last-minute invitation to attend the impromptu dinner for the larger EU members held by Tony Blair in early November. The Economist amusingly wrote: the “British beef had never seemed so appetising,” although the Dutch prime minister arrived only in time for dessert. Afterwards there were proud feelings in the Netherlands (especially in parliament) that indeed they had succeeded in sitting down at High Table.

II

I move now from the national level to the Atlantic. The key question is whether NATO, after 11 September, has managed to find the new sense of purpose, a new strategic rationale, that it had been looking for since the end of the Cold War. Initially, many believed it had. I recall that the alliance, in its Strategic Concept of April 1999, had underlined that allied security interests could also be affected by acts of terrorism. The unprecedented invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, generally hailed as a striking demonstration of political solidarity by European allies with the US, had raised expectations that the alliance would become the main platform for a concerted western approach to combating terrorism. The US government, however, saw precious little point in making NATO the linchpin of the battle against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. By choosing a go-it-alone military posture the US, quite ironically, prevented European allies from fulfilling their treaty obligation, apart from side-shows performed by European crews with AWACS flying above the American homeland and in the Caribbean.

Three reasons have been given for this, and none of them augurs well as to NATO’s future. The first explanation derives from the strong desire of the US military leadership to avoid the complication of working with foreign forces (with the exception perhaps of those from Britain), whose governments have the annoying habit of demanding to be consulted on military actions. The Kosovo experience, as witnesses Wesley Clark’s book, brought American anguish of
coalition warfare to the surface. If it is true that one cannot conduct war by committee, then the question should be addressed of how one can sustain the political legitimacy of military operations. There is no easy answer to that. The second reason concerns the American perception that European military forces, given their out-dated equipment, had little military value to add to what the Americans were able to deploy. But one wonders why the US had insisted on European participation in the air campaign against Milosevic, and why particularly the Dutch air force was praised by the Americans for the significance of its contribution almost three years ago. Finally, the presumption that NATO’s own organization has little of specific military assets that might be useful help in the fight on terrorism can be seen as the third reason why the alliance was by-passed.

There are strong indications that the US now considers the 19-member NATO as some sort of political and military supermarket where it can shop for moral, political, and legal support. The tendency on the part of the American administration to forge coalitions by posses of states for specific tasks will be strengthened the more the alliance expands its membership. Probably this development of building ad-hoc coalitions of the willing and able is inevitable but the case of Afghanistan shows that there are also significant risks in underutilizing and sidelining particular European allies. By excluding French and other European military forces from the campaign in Afghanistan, the US had become more vulnerable to criticism from European political elites who otherwise had felt a minimum sense of “ownership” regarding the American military strategy and political goals. Thus, European governments were embarrassed to find vocal segments of public opinion seemingly more worried about the US government’s alleged maltreatment of captured members of Al-Qaeda than about the threat of terrorism itself.

I firmly believe that the past developments have highlighted the fact that NATO’s value will lie increasingly in its function as a broader forum for common security concerns. Its relative military role has declined, while its relative political importance has grown: more Article 4, less Article 5. The more this trend is in evidence, the easier it will be for Russia to accept the Baltic states joining NATO, and for the alliance to engage Russia in discussions about common interests without giving Moscow a veto on vital decisions.

III

From NATO I now turn to the European Union: How did the fight against terrorism and particularly Washington’s strategic priorities affect the EU’s plans to develop a more cohesive and effective foreign, security, and defence policy? Has the momentum that made itself felt on issues of domestic security been matched by a similar movement forward in the domain of CFSP and ESDP? The picture, I would argue, is a bit confusing because the signals are mixed.
The good news is that European member states showed more unity in comparison to previous crises. Let me recall the Yugoslav crisis at the beginning when Germany and France took different sides and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait while France preferred pursuing its own agenda rather than working with its EU partners to achieve common goals. Two days after the terrorist attacks, the EU stated in a joint declaration, issued by heads of state and government, president of the Commission and the high representative for the CFSP, that CFSP and ESDP should be strengthened, “ensuring that the Union is genuinely capable of speaking out clearly and doing so in one voice.” That was more than mere rhetoric because, subsequently, the EU went out of its way to support the US and none of the European partners broke ranks with the common position of European solidarity toward the US.

But, on the other hand, the bad news is that all declarations for consorted EU policies notwithstanding, few member states have been waiting for Mr. Solana to translate the common European response into practical diplomatic action. Once again, there has been a lot of solo diplomacy. Thus, European leaders, apparently wishing to enhance their public profile, resorted to an unsightly scramble to the White House, but did little to forge a united response in the military field. EU’s larger players, the UK, France, and Germany made it clear that at times of serious crisis national responses still easily override the lofty words of European solidarity and cooperation. The UK, in particular, played its archetypical role of “transnational bridge” between “Europe” and the US with dedication, at times even with devotion. Washington by no means attempted to discourage individual responses by the larger European countries. In matters of international crisis management, it still did not recognize the EU as a serious player in its own right. Of all people, European Commission President Prodi tried to put a brave face on the lack of common diplomatic action on the European side. He contended that a “common policy is not … the same thing as a single policy uniformly adopted by every member state.” Prodi also lectured that “a common policy pools the different strengths of different individual countries, enabling them to pursue shared goals using shared instruments.”

In spite of the fact that the ESDP was declared operational last December, the EU refrained from taking the opportunity to run the ISAF peace support operation in Afghanistan as the first full-fledged joint military operation under European command. But, of course, part of the good news is that, as a result of Washington’s decision to reset its strategic priorities from Europe to Central Asia, leading to the reassignment of US troops from peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia to more active missions, the prospect was raised of a Europeanization of the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Macedonia, and perhaps in the longer run also Kosovo. Backfilling had become the name of the new game.

On the face of it, 11 September offered a window of opportunity to European governments to persuade citizens of the need to increase defence budgets. It turned out, however, that in practice this window was not very wide. Thus, for example,
the Dutch government decided to increase expenditure for international and domestic security with a relatively small amount of about 90 million euro, mainly earmarked for the improvement of home surveillance and intelligence capabilities. As far as I can see, the increases (if there were any) in security spending in other European countries are also modest, at any rate nothing like the massive rise in the US budget that has been proposed.

IV

In conclusion, I would argue that the security implications of the September drama, as outlined in my analysis at the three levels, are most serious in the Atlantic context. NATO has been called the big loser in the Afghanistan war, and rightly so because in the course of the military campaign the alliance was pushed to the sidelines. It was US CENTCOM, not NATO SHAPE, which ran the show. In any case, the terrorist threat did not provide the new, magical glue that could fix the cracks in the Atlantic building. It certainly did not offer the recipe for a bright Atlantic future. On the contrary, the new threat had neither stopped unilateralist proclivities in American foreign policy nor had it put an end to American accusations of European inclinations to appease rogue states while passing the buck to Washington. Needless to recall that President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech stirred up an acrimonious debate between Europeans and Americans, testifying to the low temperature right now in Atlantic waters. Clearly, the US administration and European governments are divided by a different world outlook in general and by different sets of belief systems concerning the nature and sources of the terrorist threat in particular.

No less important than the political divide is the widening gap in military technology between the two sides of the Atlantic. The Afghanistan war has raised the spectre of growing obsolescence of European armies in modern warfare. A situation of military apartheid is looming where the US is the chef who decides on the menu and cooks all the great meals, while the NATO allies are the busboys who stay around and clean up the mess and keep the peace indefinitely. Obviously, this prospect should be a cause for grave concern.

What is to be done? There is no reason why European governments (and the Canadian government for that matter) should kowtow to the US administration while belying their belief that the fight against terrorism can only be won by employing a balanced, well-thought out strategy addressing both the symptoms and the causes of the new security threats. I repeat: military means are indispensable in this strategy, but they cannot do what economic assistance can to alleviate the plight of the poor and to raise the prospect of a decent living in distressed areas, undermining dictatorships with education and development. At the same time, the lesser breeds in the alliance cannot harbour any illusion about the possibility of influencing official American attitudes if they fail to get their security
and defence acts together. I do not believe in the attraction or wisdom of a division of labour between the two sides of the Atlantic where Americans take care of the so-called hard dimension of security whereas the Europeans and Canadians specialize in the soft parts thereof. Such a task differentiation would certainly sow the seeds of increasing political decoupling. Indeed, to cite Lord Robertson, the choice is between political marginalization or military modernization.

What must be done, therefore, is to persuade our governments to invest more in equipment and planes that can take off from the US. But, I realize, this is not very likely to happen as long as Europeans (and Canadians) do not feel threatened by enemies to the same degree as Americans do. So the only real option left for our countries to remedy deficiencies of military capabilities (lack of strategic lift and air surveillance capabilities, of unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided munitions) is to rationalize our defence spending and get rid of the shameful mismatch between military inputs and outputs on the European side. I am aware that this view is neither new nor revolutionary, but perhaps its implementation might save us from the frustrations of impotence.

Notes

2. Ignatieff, “Barbarians at the Gate,” p. 4.
3. **Glued to Its Seat: Canada, Peacekeeping and the Western Alliance in the Post-Cold War Era**

*Joel J. Sokolsky*

**Introduction**

In 1989, just before the end of the Cold War, in an article entitled, “A Seat at the Table, Canada and Its Alliances,” I wrote,

> Canada’s alliance relationships, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) constitute nearly the sum total of Canadian defence policy. From the weapons acquired and the forces deployed to the very strategic and tactical assumptions under which the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) operate, the needs and perceptions of the Allies are dominant. Since both NATO and NORAD are American-led pacts, Canadian defence policy complements and is closely coordinated with US global strategic interests and postures.¹

Today, more than a decade into the post-Cold War era, despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Canadian defence policy is more closely linked to that of the United States than at any other time in our history. Ottawa seems to be “glued” to its seat at the allied table. There are three related reasons for this: the “Americanization” of peacekeeping in the 1990s; trends within NATO; and the recent emphasis by the United States upon “homeland security,” an emphasis that preceded but has been given the highest priority with the tragic events of 11 September 2001. President Bush created a Cabinet-level position to coordinate “homeland security.”
And, in its *Quadrennial Defence Review Report* (QDR) issued on 30 September 2001, which makes direct reference to the attacks, the US Department of Defense now declares that “homeland security” will be the “highest priority of the U.S. military.” This emphasis will provide additional impetus for the deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system.

All three trends are related to policy of the government of the United States to preserve and enhance its dominant position. As Michael Mastanduno has argued, since the end of the Cold War, “US officials have in fact followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective-the preservation of the United States’ preeminent global position.”

The response of the Canadian military has been to stress the importance of interoperability with the United States. As the 1994 White Paper put it, Canada must be prepared to fight with the best against the best. On the land, at sea, in the air and in space, the Canadian Forces (CF) has been scrambling to find the funds for the equipment and training to meet this objective. In *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*, this is made explicit. The CF must strengthen its “military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable, forces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence).” In particular it calls for expansion of “the joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with US.”

Given the history of the post-Cold War decade which saw the CF deploy abroad along with the US and its principal allies, in a host of UN and especially NATO operations, this approach is the only one that makes sense for the CF. Interoperability is the direct military consequence of accepting unipolarity or at least American dominance.

**From UN Blue to US Green: Canada and the Americanization of Peacekeeping in the 1990s**

In October 2001, Canada sent six warships and three aircraft as its initial contribution to the American offensive against Afghanistan, the opening campaign in the “war on terrorism.” Small numbers of special forces were also, quietly, deployed. When in January 2002 this was followed up by a 750-person ground force equipped with armoured reconnaissance vehicles to join the American units and pointedly not the British-led multilateral force, it was abundantly clear that this was definitely not a peacekeeping mission, even by the definitions of the 1990s. For many, this marked a radical departure by Ottawa from UN “blue” to US “green.”

In fact, this trend has been well underway for over five years.

In December 1997, *The Globe and Mail* had an article on Canada’s “shrinking peacekeeping role.” It noted that the 250 Canadian Forces soldiers on various United Nations (UN) operation was the lowest number since Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace prize 40 years ago. It also mentioned, parenthetically, that there
were 1,300 Canadian troops in Bosnia. According to the article, these forces did not count because they were “part of a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] rather than UN force.”5

In the following few years, the imbalance between Canada’s UN and NATO peacekeeping commitments has become even more pronounced. As of 1 June 2000, there were some 2,756 CF personnel on overseas operations. Of these, 1,596 were with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovnia and another 522 with Alliance’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). In support of NATO operations in the Balkans, Canada had 118 personnel with the allied air forces at Aviano, Italy. If the ships company of the HMCS Fredericton (225) sailing with NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLAN) is added, it means that 93 percent of all CF personnel overseas were deployed in support of NATO and its new peacekeeping operations.6 In addition, Canada has continued to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, with the HMCS Calgary now deployed there. Only about 220 personnel — 190 of these on the Golan Heights and the remainder, in small contingents of less than ten — were assigned to various UN activities.7 Canada did send troops on a limited UN mission to Eritrea, but they only served for a limited time. Meanwhile, it also dispatched forces to serve with NATO in Macedonia in August 2001.

The imbalance between blue and green operations is even more telling when it is considered that the CF has deployed its most advanced equipment to the NATO operations, the CF-18 aircraft, the Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicles, Leopard Main Battle Tank and the Patrol Frigates. In comparison to NATO’s other middle powers, such as Belgium and Spain, Canada has a higher percentage of its available forces outside its borders: 6 percent as opposed to an average of 2 percent.8 While the prime minister might declare that generally speaking, “we are very reluctant to join an intervention that is not under the umbrella of the UN,”9 the reality is otherwise.

The discrepancy between the UN blue helmet commitments and the United States organized and led NATO green helmet commitment, tells the whole story of international peacekeeping in the 1990s and what has happened to this quintessentially Canadian (and supposedly un-American) role for the CF. It also tells the story of what has happened to Canada’s relationship to NATO and the American role in the alliance. In the 1990s, Canada was over there, the classic “over there,” in Europe with Uncle Sam.

This is not how the future looked at the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the 1990s, the “Canadianization” of US defence policy seemed to be at hand as the UN, with considerable American support, launched a series of peacekeeping operations which in a few years saw nearly 80,000 blue helmets deployed from Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia.10 With American global security interests contracting and with the Security Council now able to reach a consensus more easily, peacekeeping offered Washington the prospect that the UN would be able to respond to regional crises and civil strife without the need to deploy US forces.
The UN also undertook to intervene in countries on humanitarian grounds in response to starvation or atrocities brought on by these internal struggles. Despite some early successes, it soon became clear that UN peacekeeping forces were not able to deal with all situations. In contrast to Cold War peacekeeping operations, the blue helmets were now being sent to areas where the fighting had not stopped, where in fact there was “no peace to keep.” Its forces soon became bogged down in Somalia and at serious risk in Yugoslavia.

This led to a new variation in UN peace efforts. Rather than sending in lightly armed multinational forces under UN command, the Security Council authorized a coalition of states, usually led by the United States, to intervene more forcefully into civil conflicts and impose a peace or at least a cease-fire. Such was the approach in Haiti and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) sent into Bosnia after the US brokered Dayton Accords. This new, more muscular, peacekeeping very much reflected a shift in American policies. The earlier enthusiasm for peacekeeping evident in the Bush administration and initially under President Clinton was replaced by a growing opposition, especially in Congress, to the UN and peacekeeping operations. Even though the American troops killed in Somalia had not been under UN command, many in Congress blamed the UN for the debacle and peacekeeping became a lightning rod for opposition to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy which seemed to place too much trust in the world body. In the spring of 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) had set out strict conditions for American participation in UN operations and for US support. More importantly, PDD-25 made it clear that if international action was required and American troops were to be involved, then Washington would lead the operation under a UN mandate but not under UN command and administration. It was not so much that the United States was not paying its peacekeeping assessments — although it was not — it was that Washington was taking steps to make sure that peacekeeping would be done the American way or not at all.

As the decade wore on, the number of peacekeeping missions declined. By mid-1996, there were just 26,000 troops in blue helmet UN operations. At the same time, the US was working through NATO, and other “coalitions of the willing” took the lead in implementing those UN mandates which it had helped sponsor and which were consistent with American policies and interests. It did appear that this approach was more effective in certain circumstances such as Bosnia and Haiti. For Canada, it was this “Americanization of peacekeeping,” not opposition to it by the US, which had the most profound impact.

Ottawa had supported Washington in the Gulf War, diplomatically and with forces. But it also eagerly embraced the renaissance of UN and peacekeeping in the early 1990s. Within a few years, nearly 5,000 CF troops were abroad, most in the former Yugoslavia with small numbers dispatched to Latin America and Cambodia. All of this reflected the long-standing Canadian desire to play an active role in international security affairs, and a distinctively Canadian one. The 1994
Defence White Paper stressed the importance of contributing to international security efforts and responding to humanitarian disasters. It stated that the CF would also maintain a global combat capability. With cuts to the defence budget and personnel, it became increasingly difficult to maintain that Canada had anywhere near such a capability. Indeed, the heavy peacekeeping demands of the early 1990s had greatly strained the CF.

Even as Canada was increasing its contribution to UN efforts in the early 1990s, it was also taking part in NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia. From the beginning, allied, including American, forces were supporting the efforts of the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). Canada endorsed these allied efforts and the CF was involved in them. For example, the Navy participated in NATO’s maritime enforcement of the UN arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea. On the ground it was becoming evident that, despite helping to avoid even more widespread fighting and atrocities, UNPROFOR was not working. Indeed the force could not even protect itself. Canadian troops were threatened and in some cases taken hostage. While concerned about the deteriorating situation, Ottawa also worried about American calls for attacks on Serb forces lest they put UNPROFOR in greater danger. By the summer of 1995, the government was looking forward to withdrawing the CF. Then came the NATO air strikes and the Dayton Accords, followed by the decision to deploy IFOR. After some hesitation, Canada agreed to contribute forces to the NATO force and these have remained for over four years. In a similar fashion, Ottawa, which had early on taken the diplomatic lead in pressing for UN action against the military government of Haiti, eventually endorsed and then participated in the American-sponsored intervention.

Canada made a major commitment to IFOR and the follow-on Stabilization Force SFOR, supplying one of the largest national contingents — in excess of 1,200 troops — in addition to a continuing deployment of a ship to the NATO naval force in the Adriatic. As well, to the extent that SFOR now focused on post-conflict resolution and a wide variety of non-military activities to assist the population, the commitment was fully consistent with Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s “human security agenda.”

Kosovo, however, represented the apogee of the Americanization of peacekeeping in the 1990s and thus a major departure for Canada. Although the operation could be justified on moral grounds and was consistent with a human security agenda, the fact remained that this was a war against a sovereign country without a UN mandate. Ottawa readily mounted up to join this latest American-led posse. Indeed, Canada mounted its largest overseas combat operation since the Korean War. In the Kosovo air campaign, “Canadian pilots flew 682 combat sorties, or nearly 10% of the missions against fixed targets and they led half the strike packages they took part in, and were among only five countries delivering precision guided munitions.”13 In total, 1,400 personnel deployed to KFOR, including an infantry battle group, a reconnaissance squadron, a tactical helicopter squadron, and an engineer contingent.
The Transatlantic Link in Evolution

The Kosovo operations also showed that given sufficient warning, the Army can move quickly overseas with vehicles and integrated helicopter units. The Edmonton-based Lord Strathcona’s Horse was the second NATO force to enter Kosovo and the Pristina area after the British.

Less than 72 hours after rolling hundreds of military vehicles and containers off a freighter in Greece, the Strathcona’s were already spying on Russian peacekeepers and Serbian armoured units around Kosovo’s only airport ... Some 24 hours after that, a US Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade that is suppose to specialize in quick deployments arrived in country.14

In the spring of 2000, Ottawa decided to consolidate its Balkan presence in Bosnia where a Canadian Major General would assume command of the Multinational Division Southwest. This region comprises 45 percent of the total SFOR area.15

To be sure, neither Canada nor the United States has entirely abandoned UN peacekeeping. For example, in both Yugoslavia and Haiti, UN operations were mounted after or in conjunction with the American-led interventions. And some modest reforms have been made at UN headquarters to improve its capacity to deploy and sustain peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, more sweeping changes, such as the Canadian suggestion for a greater multilateral stand by capability, have received little US support.

As a result of the Americanization of peacekeeping in the 1990s, the CF has been engaged in a number of near-war operations and foreign interventions alongside American forces. It would appear that with the defence of North America, mainly through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) (of Western Europe through NATO), declining in relative importance, the focus of bilateral defence relations has shifted to what used to be called “out of area.” From Washington’s standpoint, Canada has been a welcomed contributor to NATO and other more vigorous peacekeeping operations which the US has organized and led. To be sure, the Canadian contributions have been small in comparison to what the US can deploy. In a “unipolar world” the US does not need the Canadian contribution from a military standpoint, although politically it is important to involve other allies such as Canada. While the most the CF has often been able to send has been a ground unit of about 1,000, a squadron of six aircraft or a single ship, this level of support does compare favourably with that of other smaller allies. In addition, the CF brings to these operations an acknowledged professionalism and the ability to work closely with the Americans that is the result of years of allied cooperation.

This was not what the end of the Cold War was suppose to bring. Surprisingly, there has been little public comment; whereas, as recently as the 1980s, any hint of Canadian support for US intervention abroad would bring some protests from peace groups and compel the government to carefully word its response to the American action. Canadian deployments to IFOR, Haiti, and especially KFOR occasioned no such domestic response. Indeed, there was widespread public support for the war against Yugoslavia.
The significant trends in peacekeeping in the 1990s have highlighted in the post-Cold War era what has been a persistent duality in Canadian foreign and defence policy since the Second World War; the desire to play a more independent and distinct role through the UN and a strongly held instinct to join the US and other traditional allies when unified western action was organized. Both are the result of Ottawa’s determination to remain active in international security affairs. During the Cold War, when it came to having to choose between collective security under the UN or some other multilateral umbrella and collective defence under NATO, Ottawa invariably sided with its traditional allies in NATO. And this has been the case again in the post-Cold War era. In part, it is the result of the changing nature of peacekeeping. If Canada were to remain in the forefront of this activity then it would have no choice but to participate in the American-sponsored, NATO-based new peacekeeping. But it is also the result of the very fact that NATO, under continued American leadership, became what international political theorists say it cannot be, a collective defence organization and a collective security organization. And this is the direct result of a new international bargain which has come to characterize the alliance.

The United States and the “Trans-European Bargain”

Flexible response was not simply the official name given to NATO’s strategy adopted in 1967; it was, in a profound sense, the way the alliance approached all its seemingly intractable and inherently contradictory problems of a strategic and, above all, political nature. True to the messy nature of democratic government itself, this collection of democracies managed to surprise and confound its critics and attain victory in the Cold War by adopting a series of initiatives that placed political compromise above military and strategic orthodoxy and intellectual rigour. The end result was that the allies stayed allied and in doing so, achieved ultimate victory in the Cold War. The same approach has been followed in the post-Cold War era, and this accounts for the continued centrality of the alliance in European and indeed global security.

The alliance was quick to respond to the breath-taking fall of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself. Beginning in the early 1990s, it revised its strategic concepts and then its very organization and structure. Most importantly, it immediately reached out eastward. A North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created to bring old adversaries (and neutrals) into the consultative process. Special agreements were concluded with Ukraine and with Russia. As discussed below, the alliance became involved in the new peacekeeping and peace enforcement of the 1990s. Most importantly, the push was to expand, culminating in the admission of three new members: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

This is not to say all has gone smoothly, especially on the matter of enlargement. On the one hand it extends the alliance’s efforts to promote stability in the
East while at the same time raising new concerns in Moscow. Then, there is the question of whether in extending its membership eastward the alliance has truly guaranteed the security of the new allies. And whether the United States has in fact extended its deterrent over these countries or whether it simply made more intractable its never-resolved nuclear dilemma. True to its historic methodology of flexibility, the alliance has not paused to resolve these complications but rather has adopted a range of other initiatives to cope with them in the hope that in the post-Cold War era, as in the period that preceded, stability will be its own reward and all will be well in the end.

The most important of these is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program which has been viewed as a halfway measure between membership and exclusion from NATO. This may be the case. But given the difficulties of further expansion, PfP provides a mechanism for involvement of more than 30 countries in European security through a web of military exchanges and exercises. It may be said that whereas NATO remains a collective defence organization, PfP’s thrust is collective or cooperative security. In theory, it may not be possible for the alliance to be both. In practice, however, it is both, largely because of PfP.

The reason for this is that PfP has been championed by the US. In essence, this program has provided Washington with a multilateral institutional framework for further extension of American influence in Europe in a way that diminishes the importance of the older, and especially smaller, Western European allies. It resembles in some ways the old transatlantic bargain, whereby the US guaranteed the security of Western Europe. In this new “trans-European” bargain, American links to the former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet republics extend directly across Western Europe, so that they now constitute the core of the new NATO, at least insofar as concerns the US.

The emphasis placed by Washington upon cultivating relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, north and south, may be viewed as consistent with what Mastanduno has described as the American effort to “preserve the unipolar moment” in Europe through engagement. But this begs the question of why the US wishes to preserve and extend its influence in European security by fostering NATO expansion to the east. Two related rationales suggest themselves.

First, Washington shares with the countries closest to Russia fear of the unknown and uncertainty. The Americans no doubt hope that Russia will evolve into a liberal democracy that eschews any revival of hegemonic aspirations along its western border. Much of American diplomacy and a good deal of money is directed at trying to promote this benign future. Yet, should the domestic situation in Russia deteriorate and bring to power an anti-American government, the firmer Washington’s relations with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are, the better the chances of deterring recklessness in Moscow. The US is also interested in preventing miscalculation on the part of the countries in the region. In the meantime, Washington will, as critics in Russia surmise, be in a position to
hold in check Russian influence in the region. America’s close relations with Ukraine, for example, are meant “to counter any expansion of Russian power.” 18

The second reason for Washington’s eastward thrust is that the Americans do not fully trust the Western European governments, either individually or collectively, to manage European security in the East, especially in a manner fully consistent with American interests. The record of the 1990s in the Balkans speaks for itself. Only by involving itself directly in the affairs of the East, using NATO as a justification both externally and domestically (for the purposes of public and congressional opinion), can the US assure itself that further ethnic strife can be avoided. To this extent the new “trans-European” bargain can be seen as part of an American effort to sustain the relevance of the old transatlantic bargain. And the older NATO allies seem content with following Washington’s lead. At the same time, the shift of America’s focus to the east is having an impact on the character of the alliance.

For the older members, NATO remains a collective defence organization. But given the absence of any kind of threat to Western Europe and the inability of the Western Europeans to develop any common policy toward the east, it is not surprising that the links now binding America to Europe run over and around these countries. Even the admission to the alliance of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic may be viewed as less the accession of these states to NATO and more the formalization of their security ties to the US. To be sure, the Western European allies and Canada are deeply engaged in the PfP process. Moreover, they are also concerned about the relationship between the countries of the east and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the European Union (EU). But their governments have been more or less compelled to go along with Washington’s eastward push, or else risk undoing what remains of the transatlantic bargain.

All of this points to what Coral Bell has called the “pretense of concert in American national security policy in the post-Cold War era. In the current international environment, America need only conform to the “pretense of concert.” The Clinton administration has adopted the view that “the unipolar world should be run as if it were a concert of powers.”

In a sense, the post-World War II “institutionalization” of diplomacy — through the UN, NATO, the G-7, the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, the OSCE and so on — has more or less imposed that strategy on policymakers. Resolutions must get through the Security Council and consensus must be sought in other organizations to “legitimate” the policies that are deemed to be in the US national interest. Of course, the policies could be followed without seeking their legitimation by the “international community,” but the advantage of securing it are worth the diplomatic labor it takes. A resolution or consensus eases consciences both in America and abroad, and helps protect US allies from their respective critics at home (though not in Washington, of course). 19
With regard to the new trans-European alliance, Canada as always is in a somewhat different situation, but one that has nevertheless been affected by the new character of the alliance. For Ottawa, the old trans-Atlantic bargain provided the security in Europe it sought and did so without compelling Canadians to choose between their American and European allies. Although extended deterrence put Canada at risk, by bolstering the transatlantic ties, it nonetheless fostered a stable strategic environment where war seemed less likely and thus, Canada more secure. And it did so without placing high demands for conventional forces. Moreover, the politics of the alliance, with its formal equality of participation, offered Ottawa a seat at the most important international table, consistent with its aspirations toward middle powermanship. Finally, there was always the hoped-for, though not always achieved, counterweight objective. The Western European allies, especially the middle and small states, might be looked to to counter the influence of the US on Canadian defence policy.

The trans-European bargain also offers advantages to Canada. Its overwhelming political character accords with Ottawa’s long-standing desire to obtain maximum participation at minimal cost in defence expenditure. Thus, while Canadian forces left Germany in 1993, Canadians have been active participants in the new NATO’s eastward thrust and other political activities. As with the US, there is a sense now that Canada’s ties to European security extend through Western Europe to the emerging democracies of the East. Ottawa, for example, has cultivated a special relationship with Ukraine and is assisting in educating officers and defence officials from many countries in proper democratic civil-military relations.

At the same time, the new trans-European bargain, to the extent that it has generally diminished the role of the older Western European allies and enhanced the already dominant role of the US, has certainly raised new questions about NATO serving as a counterweight to American influence on Canadian defence policy. This has been exacerbated by the apparent inability of the Western Europeans to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe on their own. Canada now finds itself caught between the EU to which it does not belong and which has proven ineffective in promoting stability in Europe on its own, and the “unipolar” superpower which believes it must step in to sort out the mess. Along with the older West European allies, Canada found itself pulled by the American emphasis on Eastern Europe and how Washington wishes to deal with the problems there.

Indeed, because of Washington’s efforts to promote NATO’s eastern emphasis, the Canadian Forces have been on active duty in Europe almost continually since the end of the Cold War. At the end of the 1990s, the CF had almost as many personnel in Europe as it had when the Cold War ended. More importantly, unlike the previous 40 years, the CF has been involved in actual military operations, increasingly as the decade wore on, under NATO. Not surprisingly, therefore, being able to operate with its NATO allies, especially the US, has again become the focal point of military planning.
With NATO invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the aftermath of 11 September, with the allies offering assistance to the campaign on terrorism “out of area,” and with dispatch of NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) planes to patrol American skies “over here,” the alliance appears to have become even more central to Western European collective defence. Thus, the dispatch by Canada of a relatively substantial contribution to Afghanistan suggests that the western alliance has returned as a focus for Canadian defence policy.

At the same time, in view of trends in transatlantic relations and the way in which the US is conducting the war on terrorism, Canada may wish to distance itself from its traditional European allies, especially for an American audience. It is evident that while the United States is anxious to enlist NATO, this war, touching the very heart of American vital interests is one where Washington believes it has less military and political need to rely upon its traditional allies. The Balkans operations of the 1990s were not considered vital to American interests, Washington was therefore prepared to cultivate and accommodate coalition approaches. Today, America is prepared to act without waiting for others to follow or worrying about any pretensions of multilateralism. At an operational level the Kosovo campaign demonstrated how wide the military technological gap has become between the American armed forces and those of its major allies. In the war on terrorism, what the United States needs more than force contribution is countries willing to provide locations for temporary bases. This means that places like Pakistan and Uzbekistan are more important than most NATO allies (with the potential exception of Turkey in the event of a strike against Iraq). Moreover, there is a level of dissatisfaction and even anger with some traditional allies who, despite outward statements of support, still seem hesitant and counsel restraint and the need for Washington to consult more, especially concerning the next moves.

The relatively large Canadian contribution to the Afghanistan campaign, and the fact that the CF’s land, sea, and air forces are fully integrated into the American war-fighting forces instead of the British-led multinational force, suggests that Ottawa too has abandoned any pretense of concert. Indeed, it appears that Canada is going out of its way to emphasize to Washington that it, unlike some other allies, can be counted upon when the chips are down. While NATO made a come-back in Canadian defence policy in the 1990s, in the post 11 September world, Ottawa appears to be anxious to strengthen its bilateral security ties with the US, an approach it believes it cannot avoid without imperiling vital national interests.

“A Very Important Piece of Real Estate,” Again: The Return of “Homeland Defence”

In one crucial respect, Canada is unlike other allies and friends, new and old, who are enlisting under the war against terrorism. It is directly involved in the defence
of the American homeland. As former US Under-Secretary of Defense John Hamre recently told a Canadian audience, “There is no longer a way to secure the United States without securing the United States and Canada simultaneously.” This is nothing new: strategic defence has long been the essence of the bilateral Canada-US defence relationship.

In 1938, in Kingston, Ontario, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared that: “the Dominion of Canada is a part of the sisterhood of the British Empire: I give you an assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.” A few days later in response, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King stated that Canada too had its obligations as a “good and friendly neighbour, and one of these is to make sure that our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arrive, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canada.”

The two declarations reflected the growing apprehension of Ottawa and Washington about the deteriorating international situation and the potential threat to both countries. They also bespoke the friendly feeling between the two countries and indeed between the two leaders. But they also displayed differing strategic perspectives based upon complementary but not identical national interests. For the United States, the problem was that Canadian weakness might endanger American security. Canada could not become a strategic liability in the defence of the US homeland. For Canada, the problem was satisfying this legitimate concern without compromising, however benignly, its own national sovereignty. This could be accomplished by taking measures on its own, to secure its territory, airspace, and maritime approaches.

Although the focus was overseas, North America itself had lost the protection afforded by its ocean boundaries with the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers. America could not hope to credibly extend its deterrent if the US itself, and especially the deterrent, were vulnerable at home. Thus, strategic air defence, between the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the United States Air Force (USAF) came to be the most important dimension of the bilateral defence relationship, although at sea, especially in the Atlantic, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the United States Navy (USN) maintained and developed close collaboration in monitoring the maritime approaches to the continent. In essence, the Cold War brought about a situation wherein the North American continent was to be regarded as a “strategic unity” for purposes of defence. This made Canada, as John Foster Dulles once put it, “a very important piece of real estate.”

The end of the Cold War brought about a decline in the importance of traditional continental defence. But new concerns were even then arising. While the events of 11 September 2001 have raised this concept to the top of the American national security agenda, the trend in this direction has been evident since the end of the Cold War.
In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought about a marked scaling back of NORAD activities. To be sure, neither Washington nor Ottawa was prepared to dismantle the radar lines and disband the interceptor squadrons. Moreover, to the extent that NORAD’s prime missions had become warning and assessment of missile attack and space surveillance, there was a continued role for the combined command. Thus, the agreement was renewed in 1991 and 1996. But the strategic value to the US of Canadian airspace, which had steadily declined throughout the Cold War in any case, was greatly diminished. Indeed, by the early 1990s, despite the NORAD renewals, there were suggestions in the United States that NORAD be dismantled with its missile warning and attack assessment missions handed over to United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) or United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), while the residual air defence role be given to the USAF Air Combat Command (ACC), a component command of the newly created United States Atlantic Command which had responsibility for most of the defence of the continental United States.

Although the defence of North America was on the decline in the early 1990s, another paradox of the present era is that American overseas operations contributed to a revival of interest in missile defence, as part of a revived concern with the defence of the American homeland, an interest that had not been seen since the early days of the Cold War. The revival in missile defence was initially the result of the Gulf War, when attention was focused on Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), the need to provide protection for deployed forces and regional allies. In its 1994 White Paper on defense, the Canadian government seemed to alter its position to a possible BMD role for NORAD:

The Government will examine closely those areas which may require updating in accordance with evolving challenges to continental security. Canada will work towards an agreement that furthers our national interests and meets our defence needs, now and into the 21st century.22

Canada’s potential role in ballistic defence will not be determined in isolation, but in conjunction with the evolution of North American and possibly NATO-wide aerospace defence arrangements.23

The impetus for the new concern with BMD came from continued American activities abroad. Richard Betts observed that US policies abroad may actually increase the danger to the American homeland. “Today, as the only nation acting to police areas outside its own region, the United States makes itself a target for states and groups whose aspirations are frustrated by US power.” It is “US military and cultural hegemony — the basic threats to radicals seeking to challenge the status quo — that are directly linked to the imputation of American responsibility for maintaining world order. Playing Globocop feeds the urge to strike back.”24 This especially includes ballistic missile threats from so-called “rogue states.” These states were developing or already had, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) weapons.
A new concern with “homeland” defence was emerging in the United States, one not seen since the 1950s. Paradoxically, again, these fears arose at a time when America’s relative military power had never been greater. While fears about homeland defence were being pushed most forcefully by Republicans in Congress, polls in the late 1990s conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that while “Americans feel secure, prosperous and confident,” with “fear of armed threats from a rival superpower diminished, they are, nevertheless ... alarmed by violence at home and abroad” and “support measures to thwart terrorists, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and keep defense strong.” Moreover, while the vast majority of Americans did not see vital threats to US interests abroad, fully 84 percent regard “international terrorism” as the number one “critical threat” to American interests.25 Here at least, the supposedly “uniformed” and “disinterested” American public “know-nothings” knew something.

In what is now an eerily prophetic comment, the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission), in a report titled New World Coming, predicted in 1999 that,

America is becoming increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland — and our military superiority will not protect us.... In fact there is a school of thought that American military superiority on the conventional battlefield push our adversaries towards unconventional alternatives. This school further postulates we are entering a period of “catastrophic terrorism” with terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas and computer viruses. States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.26

Yet another important indication of growing American concern with homeland defence was the renaming of USACOM in October 1999 to become United States Joint Forces Command, (USJFCOM). In addition to its responsibility to prepare US forces for overseas deployment, USJFCOM responsibility for “homeland defence” included “providing military assistance to civil authorities for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents within the continental United States, its territories and possessions.”27 It will also “support the WMD consequence management efforts of the other combatant commands” throughout the world. In setting up CJFCOM, then Secretary of Defense William Cohen appointed an Army National Guard Brigadier General as the first commanding general of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). “The JTF-CS will ensure Department of Defense assets are prepared to respond to requests for support from a lead Federal Agency such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency” (FEMA).28

In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, the US military has made homeland security, the defence of the United States, “the highest priority.” As the QDR notes:
The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the US domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attack emanating from outside US borders, as appropriate under US law. US forces will provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold US commitments under NORAD. In addition, DoD components have the responsibility to, as specified in US law, to support US civil authorities as directed in managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and CBRNE-related events on US territory. Finally, the US military will be prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism committed on US territory or the territory of an ally.29

As part of this new emphasis, the US intends to again review the organization of its forces within the continental United States. The QDR called for a continued examination of the “roles and responsibilities” of the active and reserve forces “to ensure they are properly organized, trained and equipped, and postured.” It is clear, the report went on, “that U.S. forces, including the United States Coast Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations to perform these missions. As part of this examination, DoD was to review the establishment of a new unified combatant commander to help address complex inter-agency issues and provide a single military commander to focus military support.”30 The United States Marines expanded the scope of their special units to deal with attacks that might take place in the United States. Senior administration officials were suggesting revision to the US posse comitatus laws that restrict the use of the regular armed forces in civilian law enforcement.

This rising concern with homeland defence was already affecting the bilateral defence relationship, and indeed, the character of overall relations between the two countries before 11 September. As noted above, the American strategic interest in Canada is that it not be a strategic liability for the United States. In the Cold War, with both countries accepting shared threat, the strategic unity of the continent ensured that this would not be the case. But the real defence of the continent lay in the deterrent capabilities of the US not in joint measures for direct defence.

In the wake of the attack on the United States, Canada has once again become a very important piece of real estate for Americans. This started minutes after the first attacks of 11 September as Canadian personnel at NORAD joined in the effort to prevent further attacks and secure North American air space. The air defence role, which had been in decline since the late 1950s, has taken on a new focus in order to prevent a repeat of those attacks. The “undefended” border now needs to be secure if trade is to continue to flow in a timely manner. Canada has been told to reform its immigration policies and augment its internal counterintelligence efforts so as not to make itself a security liability.

In the war on terrorism, as in the Cold War, forward-deployed offensive forces will accompany the new emphasis on homeland defence. Indeed, despite statements regarding the priority now attached to homeland defence, the bulk of the mighty American military posture will still be focused upon the projection of force overseas. However, the relative importance of homeland security will
increase. This is already evident with regard to BMD where the events of 11 September gave President Bush all the justification he needed to finally do what his administration had promised to do — withdraw from the AMB Treaty and go forth with a BMD system. Along with the new emphasis upon air defence, this will again bring Canada’s role in NORAD to the top of Ottawa’s bilateral security agenda.

In the fall of 2001, USJFCOM established a new Homeland Security Directorate which was tasked with developing an organization, mission, roles, and doctrine for its new mission. The focus of the new directorate is given as being on land and maritime defence, while for aerospace defence, it is “partnered” with NORAD and US Space Command. This, however, appears to be only a temporary measure.

In January 2002 it was announced that by 1 October the US would stand up a new unified command, Northern Command, whose Commander-in-Chief (CINC) will “have responsibility for homeland security for the United States.” The specific tasks of the command and its relationship to other branches of the US government still need to be worked out. According to General Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

From our standpoint, this individual is going to have to take NORAD and ensure that the very, very long-standing close relationship with Canada is maintained and nurtured and taken properly into the future and to figure out, is there a way, then, to add to the air defense, the land and sea defenses? He’s going to have to figure out, for starters, where is the best place to be? We want him near the Capital region, probably in the Capital region — maybe not, if homeland security is something that we want to be concerned about with some kind of an attack in and around Washington — and then building the staff and what types of functions do we want this CINC to be able to perform — posse comitatus, how much do we want our military to actually do or not do inside the United States?

Right now we have folks who are going to be detailed to the borders of the United States in support of other government agencies, and how do we work all that? So I can’t give you a precise answer yet, because we are just in the beginning of understanding the types of capabilities that we need this country to have. And then who best should perform those functions and provide those capabilities? Should it be the states? Should it be the federal government? And if it’s the federal government, should it be FEMA? FBI? The military? We need to make all those determinations.

So whoever this new CINC is going to be, come 1 October, he is going to be very busy just figuring out what questions to ask and then determining how to go about answering them.

As noted above, in the US, responsibility for the maritime defence of the homeland is presently divided between USJFCOM in the Atlantic and PACOM in the Pacific. Traditionally, the USN has jealously guarded its dominance in the Pacific. Whatever the specific new arrangements, since terrorist are capable of making use of the seas to bring WMDs to America, it is likely that Northern Command will take renewed steps to secure its ocean approaches. This could include, as
proposed, making greater use of the US Coast Guard, perhaps bringing it under the new command. For Canada, this will mean that its traditional sovereignty protection roles, ones that will be directed against non-military threats, will now take on added meaning in terms of overall North American security. The Navy will still be tasked with protecting Canadian economic resources and enforcing Canadian law. But the relative importance of its other long-held tradition of collaboration with the USN in the maritime defence of the continent, is likely to become more important than it has been since the end of the Cold War.

Yet if the necessity for interoperability in overseas operations raises concerns about Canadian sovereignty and independence, how much more so does it when it comes to North America? To some extent, the fact that North America tended to be a strategic backwater for the United States during the Cold War eased Ottawa’s apprehensions and the “defence against help” dilemma. Now, worries about how much bilateral defence cooperation will be required to assure Washington may yet emerge again, even more so given the scope and intensity of American concerns. And, here, there is little discretion available. Ottawa can choose not to deploy overseas, but it cannot ignore American efforts to secure the maritime approaches to the continent. In addition, overall sovereignty concerns will be exacerbated if NORAD is to be subsumed within the new Northern Command, thus depriving it of its distinctive bilateral character, so important to Canadian considerations of autonomy. Indeed, the prospect of a new overall American command, whether solely US or some continental or hemispheric “Americas” command has already generated controversy in Canada. Foreign Minister Paul Manley has raised concerns with former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and former Defence Minister Paul Hellyer recently, sounding the alarm by claiming that Canada is in danger surrendering sovereignty at home.33

Once again, Canada is in familiar waters, not just because they are its own. But with regard to North American security efforts, sovereignty concerns can be addressed without sacrificing autonomous interests. To be sure, Ottawa will have to take care to ensure that Canadian interests and laws are respected and any new command arrangements are put in place. This could be a difficult task if for no other reason than the sorting out of responsibilities within the US may be complex and confusing. (Indeed, it may be easier for Washington to reach agreement with Canada than amongst the American services and other federal agencies.)

While any new arrangements will tie Canada closer to the US in terms of continental security it needs to be remembered that interoperability in North America will allow the CF to make a contribution in the face of a direct threat to Canada. After all, here Canada has a vital national interest. The stark reality is that with 85 percent of Canadian trade now conducted with the US, Ottawa cannot afford American doubts about security to the North. The “undefended” border now needs to be secure if trade is to continue to flow in a timely manner. In the wake of the attacks, Ottawa announced that over a quarter of a billion dollars would be spent for “national security” — more customs officers, police surveillance capabilities,
measures to prevent terrorist organizations from raising funds in Canada. Increased collaboration with the US in the defence of North America must be a priority for Canadian defence policy, consistent with the other steps Ottawa is now taking. In other words, interoperability should begin at home if the CF is to fulfil its primary role, the defence of Canada’s national interests.

One factor which the government may be able to count on is that overall the Canadian public is favourably disposed to continued military cooperation with the United States. Indeed, (and this is another paradox) the end of the Cold War has provided the government with a relatively permissive public opinion climate in this regard. This may be the result of the fact that in the 1990s Canada joined the US, in what can only be described as a series of popular humanitarian interventions under the broad banner of peacekeeping. There was, for example, overwhelming public support for the action in Kosovo. Apart from arms control interest groups, the general public opinion in Canada seems to be either indifferent to or positive about missile defence for North America. In the aftermath of 11 September, the Canadian public appears to be overwhelmingly predisposed to closer security cooperation with the United States.

**Conclusion: A “Traditional” Response to a Non-Traditional Threat**

It has been said repeatedly that everything has changed since 11 September. This is true in the sense that combatting international terrorism has now become the central focus of American foreign policy after a post-Cold War decade in which no grand organizing principle similar to containment and deterrence emerged. During these years, many argued that the very definition of “security” had changed and expanded. No longer could it be viewed in strictly military or national terms. The economy, the environment, culture, and especially “human” security now dominated international strategic relations. But combined with other trends in the 1990s the impact of the “attack on America” has brought back aspects of the Cold War world and catapulted traditional concerns about national security to the top of the agenda in order to deal with a non-traditional challenge. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has cautioned the American people that this is to be a protracted struggle comparable to the Cold War. We hear another presidential address to the American people asking like-minded nations in all parts of the world to join the United States in what we are told will be a “long twilight struggle.” Here again we have Washington asserting indispensable leadership against a threat which, because it is directed primarily against America, endangers the entire western world. Once more, the NATO alliance is called upon to lend its material support and more importantly, legitimacy and unity to American efforts. Once more the United States is supply military assistance and advisors, as in the Philippines, to help Third World governments deal with insurgencies. Indeed, Daniel
Pipes has compared the campaign against Islamic terrorists with the Cold War efforts to confront and contain communism wherever it existed. And in this effort, there is to be more than just containment. Rollback of the “axis of evil” is to be the order of the day.

It was the global character of America’s Cold War policies that made the seat at the table so important for Canada. Sharing Washington’s appreciation of the pervasiveness of the threat and sharing a continent, it was essential that Ottawa also become concerned with its own “national” security and how its policies would be coordinated and adjusted to accommodate and support its closest ally. This approach carried on into the post-Cold War era as the US continued to be globally engaged.

After 11 September, Canada has once again been drawn into a global effort, one within even greater and more complex ramifications for bilateral security relations. Its response was to do what it has done in the past: to join in the campaign alongside America and its western allies. Along with its NATO partners, it invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty declaring the attack on America to an attack on all alliance members. Ottawa dispatched forces overseas and turned anew to efforts to ensure that it did not become a security liability for the United States. Just as Canadians were glued to their television sets in early September 2001, so too have these events emphasized and reinforced the bonds of common strategic interests, concepts of world order and shared values that keep Canada firmly affixed to its seat at the table of the American-led and dominated western alliance.

Notes


15. “Operations Update,” at <www.dnd.ca/menu/weeklybrief/jun00/01NwsConf_m_e.htm> (1 June 2000).

16. It was a duality noted by Henry Kissinger in *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 383.


30. Ibid, p. 19
4. Factors in the Future of Arms Control and Disarmament

Robert McDougall

In the field of non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD) there is a pervasive sense of crisis. This observation applies to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the struggle to bring full legal force to its ban on nuclear testing; to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the failure of its protocol negotiations and December 2001’s derailed Review Conference; to the prospects for fulfillment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) Thirteen Steps; to the search for a post Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty strategic framework and a context in which strategic arsenals might be transparently and irreversibly reduced; to a challenged International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and to a cash-starved Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Canada’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chris Westdal, has spoken eloquently on this crisis and on the need to maintain the momentum of multilateral arms control. I do not propose to repeat what he has said, but I urge you to read his text.¹ I will take a different line.

To me, it is clear that those committed to advancing the NACD cause, in the interests of international peace and human security, must remain true to their goals while adapting tactics to current realities. Above all, they must remain both vigilant and active. But they must also ensure that their activity is based on a clear analysis. In my remarks today, I therefore propose to look at four sets of factors important to this analysis: national security, institutional frameworks, technological advance and geo-strategic considerations. I speak in this regard on a personal basis.
National Security

NACD must always be situated as part of national and international security. The basis of its value is the fact that reduction in the number of weapons available and in the freedom of action of states (and other possessors) to use them makes conflict and consequent death and destruction less likely. When properly established, participation in the broad NACD regime acts as a complement to a well-maintained military establishment by reducing the threat it faces, but neither aspect should be regarded as replacing the other. The basic problem is that NACD is inherently international (bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral) in nature with national implications, while security is inherently national with international linkages and ramifications. For the two aspects to balance and reinforce each other, their complementarity must be perceived by at least the major pertinent actors in the more influential states concerned; since one aspect is external and the other internal to a given national security system, this perception is not automatic.

A further problem is that, while NACD may well contribute to long-term collective security for all, it does not always contribute to the short-term security of any given state. Different countries see NACD as contributing to or challenging national security in different ways. A country that feels under increasing threat and therefore in need of enhancing its security by gaining additional or more advanced weapons systems will consider effective NACD restraints a problem to be avoided in terms of commitment or compliance. Other countries in a more favourable security situation may see NACD as positive where it restricts weapons systems from reaching other countries but negative where it restricts their own weapons development/deployment, transfer to favoured state or non-state supporters, or use in power projection abroad. A third group of states sees multilateral NACD restraints as beneficial to its interests, since they restrict both destabilizing weaponization by have-not powers and unrestricted development and use by the big establishment powers. This third group is generally capable of independent weapons development, but does not regard it as the best or most cost-effective means of reinforcing its own security.

The position of each of these three groups has its own consistent internal logic. The fact that one may disagree with others’ analyses of the problem, or with the solutions they propose, does not make them necessarily wrong in their own terms. Even a strongly unilateralist position — characterized by a focus on national military strength, maximum freedom of action globally and the reduction of multilateral legal restrictions in NACD and other terms — can be logically sustained under certain geostrategic, geopolitical and economic conditions. The problem comes when the actions of one state or group of states infringes on the ability of one or more other states to protect and advance their own NACD interests. This infringement can range as far as willingness to prevent others from creating new initiatives or reluctance to allow a widely-supported agreement to enter into force. Given
the complex inter-linkage between bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the same field, it can also reflect simple disregard for the consequences of national action on the NACD interests of other states.

At the very least, the implications of the various national approaches to security result in different priorities and sensitivities as to which types of NACD initiatives (if any) to favour, affecting in turn the ease or difficulty in reaching international agreement in a given NACD field. The basic split is whether the best approach is to seek a common multilateral commitment and rules and then struggle to verify and enforce them, or to determine and set the rules nationally or with a “coalition of the willing” and then seek to influence international behaviour on that basis. The current international NACD system is a combination of the two approaches (a largely multilateral treaty regime with aspects such as export controls organized on a national and plurilateral basis). This combination is somewhat unstable and currently under pressure. The question will be how to defend the useful aspects of each approach and allow for further development of both, in the face of growing divisions between different power groups.

Meanwhile, at the regional level, it is axiomatic that NACD efforts can contribute to peace and security. It is also clear in many instances, however, that little will be possible on the NACD front without an improvement in the regional security situation, a development necessary before a level of interstate confidence can be reached, sufficient to allow meaningful NACD agreements to be reached. In practical terms this means developing more ambitious NACD initiatives only in tandem with medium-term broader security initiatives, while focusing short-term NACD efforts on confidence-building and security assurances.

Some of the differences of approach noted above are based on different perceptions of the external risk to a given nation. Of particular significance to the arms controller in this regard is that a given state’s own threat perception will have a major impact on what it is prepared to agree to in terms of new NACD commitments or compliance. This is complicated by the fact that risk analysis is notoriously variable and often affected by national imperatives of various sorts. One important approach in trying to develop a broad international consensus on a given NACD initiative is therefore to seek common ground on the risks that initiative seeks to address. This may in part be addressed by internationally-agreed transparency measures as part of a multi-stage NACD process.

National security factors will thus form one broad set of limitations on which NACD initiatives may be practical at a given moment. We cannot expect countries to negotiate, join or sustain NACD commitments if they do not see such a step as reinforcing their national security. This may mean adapting tactics on NACD initiatives to reflect the national or regional preoccupations of major players. On the other hand, it can also mean addressing their NACD concerns as part of a broader approach that focuses on such factors as increased external security, threat reduction, and enhanced internal stability.
Institutions

Institutions are a factor in planning NACD initiatives insofar as they represent mechanisms for turning concepts into agreements, especially in terms of legal commitments and coordinated activities. While certain organizations, especially those with an independent staff, can play an independent role in this process, most are limited by the range of agreement among at least the major players among their members. This unfortunately means that circumstances such as those now current, with strong divisions both among national positions and more generally between the committed multilateralists and those less enamoured of global or regional NACD processes, often make for institutional deadlock or for lowest-common-denominator results.

This is especially so among consensus-based organizations such as the Conference on Disarmament, although it has also often held true with reference to the negotiating or review conferences of major NACD instruments or initiatives. The best example in the latter case is probably the recent collapse of the negotiations on the BTWC compliance protocol and of the subsequent BTWC Review Conference. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was arguably an exception in that it managed to adopt an ambitious final document by consensus, but the proof of that pudding will be in the eating: the April 2002 first session of the next review process, which will monitor the implementation of NPT commitments. The 2001 UN small arms conference illustrates another aspect of the institutional setting: the final document was significantly watered down in order to reach consensus despite the fact that provisions for voting existed in the rules of procedure and that the hold-outs on many key issues were in a clear minority. Even when abandoning consensus might be an advantage in a given situation, many countries fear to do so lest voting procedures be used to their own disadvantage elsewhere. Thus, while existing institutions have many advantages for promoting new NACD initiatives — especially established credibility, memberships, and mandates — there are also clearly problems with this approach, and careful consideration must be given to the likely reception of a given proposal, and to the tools available to opponents wishing to stall or derail the process.

That said, there are also existing bodies posing less danger to an NACD initiative. First, there exist certain intergovernmental arrangements through which activity other than negotiations can be pursued. These include, for example, the UN’s Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), the OPCW, and the IAEA. One cannot expect such bodies to push the envelope too far (they answer to the same mixed collectivity of nations), but they can be helpful on issues such as research and implementation projects. Second, there are regional bodies where NACD initiatives can sometimes get a favourable start. Finally, there are a few forums where voting rather than mandatory consensus is an accepted procedure. The best example here is the UN First Committee. Although its resolutions are not legally binding, votes there (or in the parent UN General Assembly) have had
an important impact on NACD issues, ranging recently from the formal adoption of negotiated texts and their opening for signature (e.g., the CTBT and the Firearms Protocol) to the direct establishment of important negotiating sessions (e.g., the 2001 small arms conference) to the establishment of influential experts groups with a global imprimatur (e.g., on small arms and missiles) and the establishment of voluntary regimes (e.g., transparency measures such as the UN Conventional Arms Register, UNCAR.

Another institutional approach essayed with some success has been the stand-alone negotiation. This was successful in the case of the landmines convention and is now the basis of work on the missile International Code of Conduct (ICOC). It can be successful in cases where the weapons systems concerned are widespread, allowing a “critical mass” of states to be assembled without necessitating universality. It also tends to work best when negotiations or pre-negotiations elsewhere reveal a wide base of support being blocked by a few strong opponents. The approach cannot, however, be used in all circumstances, but it nevertheless represents an approach that should be kept in the toolkit.

The caucus mechanism prominent in the UN and in many treaty negotiating or review sessions has proven to encompass both positive and negative aspects. Perhaps the most notable recent development in this regard has been the rise of groupings involving states from different caucuses or regions. Examples include the New Agenda Coalition, active primarily on nuclear matters in the UN and the NPT, and the Human Security Network (established by Canada and Norway), whose broad range of concerns includes NACD issues such as small arms and landmines. Both examples are geographically representative and include key NACD activists from traditional North and South constituencies. This approach may well be worth pursuing at a time when formal consultative structures are increasingly blocked.

In any event, it is clear that institutional approaches must be matched carefully to the nature of a given NACD initiative, with options ranging from traditional channels to stand-alone exercises and with the creation of issue-specific, like-minded coalitions an increasingly important consideration.

**Technological Advance**

Not all the important factors in assessing new NACD initiatives are geopolitical. The technology of weapon systems is also constantly evolving, for example, posing new NACD challenges and modifying existing ones.

One important aspect of this evolution is the constant development of new weapons. Currently, for example, these include the proposed development of new nuclear weapons for special uses (e.g., small scale weapons and “bunker-busters”), the creation of strategic missile defence systems, research on possible space-based weaponry (including development of laser-based and other “exotic” weapons)
and an increased reliance on “stand-off” conventional weapons. The reality or imminence of such new systems creates multiple problems for arms control. They can effectively get around existing NACD agreements by creating the same destructive impact with technically distinct systems. They can represent entirely new weapons types or deployment options, posing the difficult choice of seeking pre-emptive restrictions (something generally opposed by states with advanced weapons development capabilities) or awaiting deployment and being faced with the difficulties of convincing possessors to build down systems in which they have by then invested extensive financial resources and political commitment and on which they have based military strategy and planning. Many of these new weapons or systems development advances also raise broader security-related and even moral issues which touch on the arms controller’s considerations.

Beyond these aspects of weapons development, which fall generally under the rubric of qualitative improvements or vertical proliferation, is the issue of horizontal proliferation, or the quantitative increase in the number of states (or non-state actors) possessing a given weapons technology. This applies not only to the direct transfer (or illicit acquisition) of entire weapons systems, but perhaps more importantly the increase in the number of state or other actors with the scientific/technological and production capabilities to reproduce or develop advanced weapons indigenously. The first sort of transfer can be addressed by fairly straightforward means. The second requires an approach at once more subtle and more far-reaching. The success on the missile and nuclear front of states not regarded as powerhouses of advanced technology, argues that a combination of material and scientific proliferation can be very hard to stop. As the adage goes, once a weapon has been invented and demonstrated, it cannot be “uninvented”; it also becomes an immediate target for imitation and theft, provides a strong demonstration effect and often yields an arms race. Horizontal proliferation must thus remain a key target of rational NACD approaches, as well as one reason to discourage initial development and deployment of new weapons systems.

On the positive side, science and technology can also contribute much to enhance the possibilities for verifying NACD agreements or detecting violations. A major example lies in the use of satellites with finer and finer resolution and an increasingly useful range of sensors for measuring compliance with existing agreements (such as conventional force deployments or production of nuclear weapons/materials) or potential ones (including weapons deployment in the earth’s orbit). Aerial observation under agreements such as the Open Skies Treaty can also be improved by scientific advance (if agreed to by the parties). The experience of the OPCW and bio-defence researchers has greatly increased the sensitivity of detection equipment in the chemical and biological weapons field, and the UN Special Commission on Iraq developed some very useful techniques for integrating data of widely differing types and from diverse sources into a coherent computer-based analytical evaluation. Also noteworthy are the many advances, pioneered by both government and private sector agencies, on methodologies for destruc-
tion and clean-up activity in fields ranging from disposal of weapons-derived fissile material to destruction of small arms and landmines and other explosive remnants of war and to clean-up of weapons-related sites in terms of nuclear, chemical, and biological contamination.

The bottom line here is that any rational suite of NACD initiatives must take into account the impact of scientific and technological development across a whole range of angles, including circumvention of the letter or spirit of current NACD agreements; the possibilities of dealing with future developments in advance (e.g., by prospective banning) and the fact that science and technology is also advancing the possibilities for enhanced detection, verification, and weapons destruction activities. This role of scientists and engineers in providing an independent technical evaluation of weapons systems and related developments becomes increasingly important as such weapons become more complex in their operation and impact, making such experts increasingly important allies for arms controllers.

**Geostrategic Factors**

A final, looser cluster of factors can be grouped around geostrategic and military considerations.

The first is the evolving relationship between the United States and Russia. This bilateral relationship has for many years provided the key element of strategic stability that permitted the elaboration of an extensive bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral NACD framework, especially in terms of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. The winding-down of Cold War security approaches over the past decade was signposted most recently by the American decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and halt the process of legally-binding and verified nuclear reductions under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). The two sides agreed that a new “strategic framework” must be created to re-stabilize the situation, but many questions related to strategic stability and missile defence remain unresolved, including the impact of the new framework on the predictability and confidence-building that underpin nuclear reductions; the impact of missile defence deployment on qualitative and/or quantitative improvement in nuclear arsenals; the global effectiveness of deterrence versus defence; the pressing need for better risk/threat analysis; and better comprehension of the relationships between bilateral and multilateral approaches. What is clear now is that resolution of the US/Russian negotiations will be a key factor in both future development on the elaboration of agreements and progress in forums such as the Conference on Disarmament, in terms of substance and tactics, especially on issues relating to nuclear, missile, and space programs.

A second short-term strategic factor lies in the impact of the events of 11 September 2001. These flow in both directions. The first relates to the contributions
that existing and proposed NACD can make to the counter-terrorist effort. This covers a wide range of possible actions, including the universalization, full implementation and strengthening of existing legal instruments restricting access to weapons; enhanced support for related national and international implementation bodies and export control regimes; improvements in physical security and management of production and storage facilities for sensitive weapons-related materials and their protection in transit; closer cooperation on intelligence-sharing, enforcement, and prosecution on weapons-related offences; destruction of excess weapons and related materials; and assistance to states lacking the expertise and financial resources to carry out such steps. This approach is being worked out as part of the international campaign against terrorism, becoming one of the most active areas in NACD work.

Another broad impact works in the opposite direction, that is, from the counter-terrorist effort to NACD. The most important result has been to shift the balance in NACD matters away from arms control and disarmament (always a tough sell in wartime) to non-proliferation and from multilateral efforts (i.e., dealing with all countries on an equal basis) to national and plurilateral action. A more specific effect that may have a longer term impact on NACD initiatives is the increasing focus on restricting access to weapons and related materials (especially but not exclusively nuclear, chemical, and biological agents) on the part of non-state actors, particularly terrorists but also by extension unofficial armed and violent groups of all kinds. This non-governmental sector is already becoming a much stronger focus of efforts in areas such as export controls, intelligence-gathering, and enforcement.

Yet another factor relates to the changing nature of war as it is actually fought on the ground. Cold War assumptions of global conflict, featuring heavy weapons (both nuclear and conventional) and the likelihood of direct engagement on a massive scale between roughly equal forces, have largely been replaced by three different (historically common) types of war — battles between neighbours in the same region with or without international spillover, conflicts internal to a country, and conflicts between a large outside attacker and a comparatively small defender. From an arms controller’s point of view, the first two types of conflict are usually characterized by the use of conventional weapons (ranging from machetes to small arms, artillery, tanks, mines, missiles, and aircraft-delivered bombs) and occasionally chemical or biological weapons, all of no particularly sophisticated technological level. Such conflict has probably resulted in the most casualties over the past decade, arguing to many that, as compared to the Cold War period, the weapons used may well be an increasingly important target for NACD, as witnessed by the increasing attention paid to small arms, landmines, and missiles.

The third prevalent type of battle has tended to be increasingly dominated by the tactics of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with its emphasis on stand-off and “smart” weapons, computer technology, air/space dominance and distance attack, generally facilitated by a strong asymmetry in the technological levels of
the weaponry on opposing sides. As noted in the previous section, the RMA and its associated armaments pose their own special problems for arms controllers.

Finally, and linked with each of the previous aspects, is the evolution of military doctrine. This is an issue for arms controllers because doctrine can limit the freedom of action of national NACD policymakers and negotiators. The military doctrines of one state or group of states can also be used to justify weapons build-up or retention by others (e.g., by opponents who fear attack or by states looking to validate their holdings by citing the value placed publicly on similar weapons by others). In NACD terms, military doctrine can cover such vital areas as definition of state and non-state enemies; limitations or other planning assumptions regarding theatres of action, weapons numbers, and deployment; use of weapons in conditions of tension short of war (including such aspects as threat of use, security assurances, deterrence and defence); and actual use in battle (including such concepts as tactical versus strategic warfighting and escalation) *inter alia*.

The strident response to a new draft Indian strategic doctrine that posited a nuclear weapons triad of land, sea, and air basing and second-strike survivability — a response that led to its rapid disavowal — underlined the importance of military doctrines in a security and diplomatic sense. The Russian decision a few years ago to renounce “no first use” and re-emphasize the potential use of nuclear weapons was an important doctrinal shift with major NACD implications. The alliance aspects of military doctrine are perhaps most notable in the context of NATO, now the only real multistate military entity with sufficient cohesion to negotiate and hold to a detailed joint military doctrine. The NATO Strategic Concept is a closely-debated consensus document whose recent renegotiation included a close re-examination of the alliance’s role in NACD. Such examples amply demonstrate the pertinence of military doctrine to arms control efforts.

**Conclusion**

I have a few final thoughts to suggest what all this analysis may mean for NACD action in the short term.

Flexibility and adaptability are the keynotes of a rational NACD strategy, given the power of contrary forces and the size of obstacles in the way. As Deng Xiaoping said in another context, “Who cares if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice?” It is also important to underline, however, that long-term goals need not be abandoned when times get tough — even though immediate targets, interim goals, building-block approaches and short-term tactics may be adapted.

There is a clear need to re-engage the big players in the multilateral process, but this is likely to be a long-term process. The key will be to find specific areas where we can work productively when our interests coincide, while agreeing to disagree on other questions. One such approach could be to focus on the intersection of the counter-terrorism thrust with control, enforcement, and other aspects
of classic non-proliferation. This will combine a strengthening of available tools (also applicable to traditional proliferation) and implementation of new approaches.

An active approach on multilateral NACD initiatives can also be taken in consultation with like-minded countries. Such states could be highly effective if they worked together in such areas as universalization, implementation, destruction, and verification relating to existing agreements, action plans and the like. Such a practically-oriented group could focus *inter alia* on contact with key “hold-outs,” technical assistance, promotion of technological advance to support compliance mechanisms, and the funding of practical disarmament measures. Expanding confidence-building measures on a voluntary basis under treaties such as the NPT and BTWC, or other understandings, such as UNCAR, could also be beneficial. The common thread is to make existing arrangements work better toward the basic NACD goals of peace, security, and human life.

It is also worth noting that informal study and discussion have proven instrumental over the last decade in getting productive multilateral consideration underway on such issues as landmines, small arms, and missiles. Such pre-negotiating activity is particularly useful for raising awareness of the problems, gaining consensus on the need for governments to address them, and providing a forum for trying out various approaches to their resolution. It is especially pertinent in areas where NACD has not yet been applied to existing weapons systems (e.g., missiles), or where evolving technology is clearly moving to bring new systems on line (e.g., space weapons) and the option is present to deal with the problem before it arises.

Beyond the various alternative approaches identified above, it may still be desirable to move ahead on the negotiation of new initiatives. In these cases, it may be best to approach these negotiations on a piecemeal or “building-block” basis. Such an approach allows proponents to avoid direct confrontation with opponents and to build support and confidence gradually for a new idea. The ultimate option in this regard is creation of new negotiating forums, as was done for the landmines convention and for missile ICOC.

In dealing with specific existing agreements and other initiatives, the challenge will be to consider the most productive ways forward in the face of shifting and sometimes increasing opposition (ranging from secret non-compliance to outright defiance/retraction to foot-dragging and bureaucratic sabotage). In some cases, the challenge will be to choose the most important aspects on which to focus, from a field of many possibilities. The following are among Canada’s near-term priorities in this regard:

- At the upcoming first Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2005 NPT review cycle, promote compliance and accountability for all NPT-related commitments by all member states.
- On the BTWC, work with like-minded states to promote strengthening of the multilateral preventative regime as part of an integrated and comprehensive approach to combatting bio-weapons proliferation.
• On missiles, focus on the successful negotiation and wide acceptance of the ICOC and on consideration of broader missile issues by the UN Experts Group.

• On outer space, put priority on establishing an open international dialogue on the issues, including the possibility of a weaponization ban.

• On small arms, focus on facilitating national and international implementation of the UN Programme of Action, including activity in practical areas such as brokering, marking/tracing, and collection/destruction.

I would note that there are a number of NACD areas in which Canada and the Netherlands might usefully work together. Some reflect shared interests and long-time activism, for example in small arms, in transparency regimes for armaments, and in missile non-proliferation (the original draft of the ICOC is a Dutch creation). I would argue that these are all areas in which the two countries might logically examine the possibilities for closer cooperation.

We could also work with like-minded allies to create focused diplomatic campaigns to convince targeted states to adhere to key NACD initiatives, such as the CTBT (especially the 13 states still needed for entry into force), the BTWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa landmines convention and IAEA full-scope safeguards.

Finally, we could jointly seek to make greater use of the UN and other forums to set in motion consideration of key new NACD issues through study groups and other mechanisms. This seminar might set its mind to specific topics on which such work might be most useful.

Note
