The Claxton Papers

The Defence Management Studies program, established with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), is intended to engage the interest and support of scholars, members of the Canadian Armed Forces, public servants, and participants in the defence industry in the examination and teaching of the management of national defence.

The Queen’s University program in defence management studies is being carefully designed to focus on the development of theories, concepts, and skills required to manage and make decisions within the Canadian defence establishment. The Chair is located within the School of Policy Studies and offers an integrated package of teaching, research, and conferences, all of which are designed to build expertise in the field and to contribute to wider debates within the defence community. An important part of this initiative is to build strong links to DND, the Canadian Armed Forces, other universities, industry, and non-governmental organizations in Canada and other countries.

This program is built on Queen’s University strengths in the fields of public policy and administration, strategic studies, management, and law. Queen’s University is very pleased that we have been able to establish an agreement with Université Laval to provide substantial programming research and teaching in both official languages.

This series of studies, reports, and opinions on defence management in Canada is named for Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence from 1946 to 1954. Claxton was the first postwar defence minister and was largely responsible for founding the structure, procedures, and strategies that built Canada’s modern armed forces. As minister, Claxton unified the separate service ministries into the Department of National Defence; revamped the National Defence Act; established the office of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, the first step toward a single chief of defence staff; organized the Defence Research Board; and led defence policy through
the great defence rebuilding program of the 1950s, the Korean War, the formation of NATO, and the deployment of forces overseas in peacetime. Claxton was unique in Canadian defence politics: he was active, inventive, competent, and wise.

In 1937 then Colonel Maurice Pope wrote a staff paper to prompt the government and the defence and security establishment in Ottawa to look to the state of the “higher direction of national defence.” He found the central apparatus deficient in structure, policies, and procedures and with war on the horizon, he and others were gravely concerned. He acknowledged that war and the use of force was a responsibility of government and, therefore, essentially a political matter. However, he also concluded that there was “one further primary consideration — of a mechanical nature. It is that the machinery we should seek to evolve must be such as will ensure the full coordination of the working parts, not only in the planning stage, but in execution. It must also be flexible, rather than rigid, and so be capable of adaptation to varying circumstances.” By some accounts, Canada is still searching for this ideal mechanism and now needs it more than at any time since the end of the Second World War.

This paper examines this issue again from the premise that foreign and military affairs are two distinct yet inextricably combined aspects of national government. Diplomacy and the use of force are two sides of the same coin which work to further the security goals and policies of a national government. Yet it is often difficult to remember this link, and the existence of two separate departments contributes to a sense of separate worlds and separate tasks. In the Canadian case, the absence of any national security structure reinforces this sense of separateness. The focus here, therefore, is at that level of joint action where the two sides of the coin ought to come together in international and domestic affairs.

It is the thesis of this paper that there is a national security policy gap that needs to be addressed in Canada. The gap in question is not between declared and actual policies, but is rather a functional gap relating to the national security policy-making process and the “machinery of government.” Thus, we return to Pope’s original recurring concern for “a Canadian mechanism for the higher direction of national defence” and security.

Douglas Bland
Chair
Defence Management Studies Program
March 2000
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Finally, I wish to acknowledge Keith Banting, Director of the School of Policy Studies, for his continued support for the Defence Management Studies Program.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNFHQ</td>
<td>Multinational Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Air Defence Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORAE</td>
<td>Operation Research and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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Jane Boulden

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Dr. Boulden is a 1999-2001 NATO Fellow. From 1998-1999 she held the Department of National Defence R.B. Byers Postdoctoral Fellowship. In recent years she has been involved in the CARE Canada Complex Emergencies Project, has been a senior researcher for the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project at UNIDIR, and was a member of the Core Working Group on the Canadian government’s study on developing a rapid reaction capability for the United Nations.

CHAPTER ONE

The Higher Direction of National Security in Canada

THE PROBLEM FACE TO FACE

In mid-November 1996, a Canadian reconnaissance mission made its way to Rwanda in anticipation of Canada leading a multinational operation to facilitate the return of refugees from Zaire to Rwanda and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The advance party was initially diverted from Kigali to Nairobi because they did not have diplomatic clearance to land. When the party finally did reach Kigali there were further problems. “On arrival in Kigali, Rwandan authorities were surprised by the time of arrival of the recce party, its size, the fact personnel were armed, the fact more personnel were on route and the task of the recce party to site a MNFHQ in/near Kigali.”

When the advance party members were requested by Rwandan officials to surrender their weapons, communications means and transportation means, the reaction of the CF personnel was extreme reluctance and initially they resolved not to cooperate with the Rwandans because the only knowledge they had to base their decisions on was their recollection of what had happened in 1994 to Belgian soldiers who had given up their weapons. Ultimately, after negotiations, a resolution satisfactory to both sides was reached, but not until after a period of time when tensions were high and the situation potentially explosive.

This example provides a brief illustration of the problems that can arise in the absence of established interdepartmental planning, assessment, decision-making, and coordination procedures. Though dramatic,
this is not a unique example of the kinds of problems associated with the current Canadian strategic planning and decision-making structure for participation in multinational peace-support operations. Indeed, some of the problems associated with the Zaire operation had already been experienced in previous operations, such as in Somalia.

THE ISSUES

The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues associated with the coordination of Canadian foreign and defence policy on peacekeeping. Coordination in what sense? Foreign and military affairs are two distinct yet inextricably combined aspects of national government. Diplomacy and the use of force are two sides of the same coin which work to further the national security goals and policies of a national government. Yet it is often difficult to remember this link, and the existence of two separate departments contributes to a sense of separate worlds and separate tasks. In the Canadian case, the absence of any national security structure reinforces this sense of separateness.

The focus here, therefore, is at that level of joint action where the two sides of the coin ought to come together. Why does this issue need to be examined? Because Canadian involvement in various multinational peace-support operations since the end of the Cold War has demonstrated that there are some gaps or missing links in the Canadian policy and decision-making apparatus, which have had and could continue to have a serious impact on Canada’s credibility and ability to participate in such operations. As in the Zaire experience, failure of coordination and planning could cause serious harm to members of the Canadian Forces (CF).

Why look at Canada’s involvement in multinational peace-support operations? Because in the absence of other security threats, Canada’s national security is directly linked to international peace and security. This means that to the extent that Canada engages in national security activities that involve the use of the military (one side of the coin) it does so in multinational peace-support operations. These include “traditional” United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (of the type most often used during the Cold War), other UN operations such as peace enforcement (Somalia) or full-scale enforcement (Persian Gulf) operations, and, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operations (Bosnia, Kosovo).
Equally, national security operations include the use of the military in situations such as the Oka crisis and even during the ice storm. These examples are not examined here but the associated questions of policy and coordination are similar.\(^3\)

It is the thesis of this paper that there is a national security policy gap that needs to be addressed in Canada. At issue is not what kind of national security policy Canada should have, though the absence of an articulated government, as opposed to departmental, strategy is part of the problem examined here. The gap in question is a functional one relating to the national security policy-making process and the “machinery of government.”

On the surface not all that much has changed in the Canadian national strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. The threat of nuclear war, though much diminished from the worst years of the Cold War, remains the single most significant threat to Canada. Other territorial threats are minimal. As before, therefore, Canada’s national security policy and decisions are conditioned by Canada’s alliance commitments to NATO, North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) and the United Nations.

But while the basic national security equation remains fairly constant, many of the variables within it have changed a great deal. The international peace and security framework, to which Canadian security has traditionally been linked and committed, has changed dramatically. And these changes mean that Canada’s decisions to participate in international peace and security operations involve a much more significant commitment of resources than in the past, as well as a much more significant risk level. In the past decade, for example, Canadian forces have participated in six operations in which the use of force was authorized beyond self-defence or in which the parties to the conflict returned to fighting.

In spite of these serious changes in the international environment, Canadian national security decision-making procedures have not been adjusted or strengthened. Indeed, under the Chrétien government the national security process has been downgraded with the elimination of the Cabinet committee on foreign policy and defence issues. It is possible that at the end of the day, current Canadian national security decision-making structures and policies remain the most desirable and the best suited to the current national security environment. That possibility,
however, does not mean, given the nature and extent of the changes in the strategic environment and the Canadian risks and commitments that come with those changes, that it is not worth examining the situation to determine whether or not that is the case. Given the issues at stake and the risks involved, if some improvement is possible, however small, it is surely worth the effort to find out.

The idea that there is something lacking in Canadian national security policy-making is not a new one. In 1986, on the verge of the end of the Cold War, R.B. Byers wrote an Adelphi Paper on the challenges facing Canadian security policy. 4 Byers argues, in part, that an ongoing lack of interest in security issues by successive Canadian governments contributed to a reliance on the security framework and policies associated with Canada’s alliance commitments in NATO and NORAD. This means that there has been little questioning or examination of the basis of Canada’s national security policy and that “security policy has not served as a linkage between foreign and defence policy.” 5 In turn, this lack of linkage, and reliance on alliance commitments as a framework for policy, has created a discrepancy between “the security tasks we have set for ourselves and the resources we have been prepared to devote to fulfilling these tasks effectively.” 6 Byers calls this discrepancy the “commitment-capability gap.”

The commitment-capability gap description applies equally to today’s situation, although now it is the requirements of peace-support operations rather than Cold War commitments that point up the need for attention. In 1992, in an internal Department of National Defence (DND) program evaluation, the evaluation team noted that

for Canada peacekeeping is very much a Canadian political imperative. As such, the Canadian Government has been seen as being generally well disposed to meeting most requests for participation by Canada in both peacekeeping and other conflict-limiting operations. The general perception was that, when it is deemed to be in Canada’s political interests to accept a request, the lack of, or competition for available military resources alone will not be an acceptable reason for rejecting participation. 7

In a prescient observation, the evaluation team then went on to point out that while resource commitments had remained relatively constant until then, a call for a large military contribution or a rash of peacekeeping
commitments could send the basic assumptions behind DND planning procedures "awry."\textsuperscript{8} Thirteen years later the need to address these issues remains compelling.

**EXISTING LITERATURE**

Aside from Byers' 1986 study there is little literature directly focused on Canadian national security policy. And much of the literature that does exist focuses on the nature of the national security policy rather than the policy-making structure itself.\textsuperscript{9} Equally, there is a strong literature base on Canadian foreign policy and Canadian defence policy, though as separate policy issues.\textsuperscript{10}

There is a variety of government reports on foreign and defence policy, but almost exclusively on the policies as separate issues.\textsuperscript{11} For example, in 1994, two Special Joint Parliament Committees undertook a review of foreign policy and defence policy.\textsuperscript{12}

**THE PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY**

As mentioned, this paper is not intended to determine what Canadian national security policy should or should not be. Instead, the purpose is to examine whether and how improvements could be made to the mechanics of the national security process — policy development, decision-making, and implementation — at the interdepartmental level. In the Canadian system, this means that level beyond particular departmental decision-making mechanisms, but below the Cabinet level.

Inevitably, when studying the absence of a structure or phenomenon, one faces the difficulty of having to describe the absence by skirting around the gap, defining its boundaries on the basis of what exists, and explaining why what exists does not form a sufficiently useful or efficient structure. Accordingly, some aspects of this paper will touch on departmental decision-making and Cabinet decision-making, as well as the role of other actors such as the Privy Council Office (PCO) and Parliament. The paper will not, however, deal with the nature of decision-making in any of those units in any depth.

The study is focused on an examination of a very specific set of policy functions and associated tasks. As defined here, national security policy is assumed to be a set of national objectives relating to national
A National Security Council for Canada?

security, based on an assessment of threats, vulnerability, and goals, and an associated set of mechanisms (foreign policy and defence) to carry them out. The national security policy functions discussed here, therefore, include policy development and policy implementation. The associated tasks include: short- and long-term planning; ongoing research and assessment (policy information and advice); assessment of lessons learned from previous operations; crisis management; and coordination of the actors involved in implementation of the policy. In Canada’s parliamentary system the decision-making role falls to the prime minister and members of the Cabinet. Accordingly, the actual making of decisions is not dealt with in this paper although the national security functions discussed are all geared toward facilitating the best possible decision-making, and ensuring that those decisions are effectively and efficiently carried out. The functions and associated tasks are categorized in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy development</td>
<td>Short- and long-term planning/forecasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on research, information collection and ongoing assessment of current and previous situations (lessons learned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of independent (non-departmental) information and advice on issues and problems/crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy implementation</td>
<td>Coordination of departments and other actors as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis management coordination as necessary</td>
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</table>

It is a fundamental premise of this paper that national security, as a concept, is something that comprises more than defence policy or foreign policy or even a simple combination of the two. As indicated above, diplomacy and the use of force, foreign policy and defence policy are two
sides of the same coin, two different but inextricably linked concepts. In Canada, there is no permanent framework or structure that is used to guide, inform, or monitor this process. This paper seeks to determine whether that matters, and if it does what might be done about it. To do this the paper will examine examples of national security activity that involve both strategic and operational considerations. In the post-Cold War environment this means peace-support operations (peacekeeping and other UN operations) and, now, NATO operations as well.

The paper has three sections. In the first section, the current system of national security practices is examined in order to establish the nature and extent of the problem. To do this, the paper uses the decision-making processes associated with Canadian involvement in peace-support operations as the case material. The second section briefly examines the situation and experiences of other countries. The third section then provides a catalogue of the various proposals that have been made in recent years, through studies and government reports, for different mechanisms and structures to deal with national security issues. The conclusion draws together the various threads of the paper and outlines a series of options that might address the national security gap.

THE CURRENT NATIONAL SECURITY GAP

All forms of policy-making involve both formal and informal processes, the latter being developed over time and on the basis of specific experiences. This is certainly true in the national security decision-making process in Canada. While there is no formalized system for coordinated decision-making before and during peace-support operations there is a basic process, which is generally, though not necessarily exactly, followed.

The formal decision-making process starts once the possibility of a Security Council mandate authorizing a UN mission exists. At that time the UN Secretariat makes informal requests to member states about possible commitments to a potential mission. This request is made to the Canadian mission at the UN, which, in turn, funnels the informal request to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). DFAIT then contacts DND. Both DFAIT and DND run their own internal analysis processes while also engaging in ongoing consultation between themselves and with the mission in New York. When the time comes for
a formal decision, after a Security Council resolution is passed and the government receives a formal request from the United Nations, the two departments together present a set of options to Cabinet, usually to a Cabinet subcommittee.  

Cabinet members make their decision based on the information given to them by the departmental representatives. The military advice they receive, therefore, comes from the Department of National Defence, through the minister and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The political advice comes through DFAIT representatives.

Once Cabinet makes a formal decision, the two departments begin the implementation process.

In part, the ad hoc nature of this process is a reflection of the fact that UN Security Council decision-making is itself unpredictable. It is also, though, a reflection of the extent to which national security decision-making is not an ongoing or consistent aspect of interdepartmental, Cabinet and prime ministerial decision-making. This, in turn, reflects the nature of the Cold War decision-making environment as well as Canadian tradition. In the first instance, because the Canadian national security equation is so tied to Canada’s alliance commitments, and because the stagnancy of the Cold War meant there was little in the way of operational involvement beyond traditional peacekeeping, there was little pressure for any more formal or separate system. This fact was reinforced by the Canadian tradition of “wise men” decision-making on national security issues where a few men, generally with common backgrounds, acted as a kind of decision-making committee. The system worked well for Canada, but it did so because of the people involved and because the strategic environment at the time was of a different nature.

Thus, there is a kind of triangular process that begins at the interdepartmental level, moves up to the Cabinet decision-making level and then goes back to the interdepartmental level.
For traditional peacekeeping operations this system has suited the situation very well. Indeed, during the Cold War, when traditional peacekeeping was the primary form of UN activity, Canada established itself as one of the top UN peacekeeping member states, participating in every UN mission until the first UN mission in Angola (UNAVEM I) in 1988. The system, however, was designed or at least developed in response to these types of traditional peacekeeping missions. It is, therefore, geared toward situations in which there is a long lead time between the time a peacekeeping mission becomes likely and the time the interdepartmental team goes to Cabinet and the time of deployment.\(^{14}\)

In addition, in many of the cases of Cold War traditional peacekeeping, Canada was involved in the political processes that led to and involved discussion of a potential peacekeeping mission. This meant that there was a long lead time in which the potential for a peacekeeping mission would be clear, and, therefore, that the likelihood of a mission was often recognized within the system well before an informal request was received by the Canadian mission at the UN. There was, therefore, that much more planning and consideration time inherent in the process.

So while there exists a basic process that is common to these decisions — DND and DFAIT separately and jointly make assessments as to whether Canada could or should participate, a joint memo of options is presented to Cabinet, and if Cabinet decides in the affirmative the two departments undertake the implementation — the actual mechanics of the process are fairly loose. The ad hoc approach means that the process has a certain built-in flexibility but that looseness means that the process can disintegrate when under pressure, rather than tightening up to meet a challenge.

**Broader Policy Goals: Guidelines and Decision-Making Criteria**

What about the basis on which the decisions are made? What guidelines are used by the two departments and by the government in making these decisions?

*Advice to Cabinet*

In May 1996, the Auditor General issued a report on peacekeeping, which examined the practices of both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence.\(^{15}\) One of the areas of focus was
the kind of information provided to those making a decision about whether and how Canada should participate in a peacekeeping mission. The Auditor General outlined the criteria it expected Cabinet to consider when making decisions about peacekeeping:

- a clear statement of the nature and extent of participation and the potential for achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives;
- analysis of the political, humanitarian, and military situation in the country/region of conflict;
- an assessment of the physical risks to Canadian personnel and of the probable duration of involvement;
- the financial cost and other implications for Canada;
- an assessment of whether government guidelines for participation are being followed; and
- the different ways in which Canada could participate, and an assessment of the lessons learned from participation in previous missions.\(^{16}\)

The two departments, DND and DFAIT, both have general guidelines for policy decisions enunciated in departmental documents.\(^{17}\) For DND, the general policy guidelines are found in the 1994 White Paper.

- There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
- There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.
- The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners.
- In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.
- With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada’s participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.\(^{18}\)

The guidelines used by DFAIT are drawn from ministerial statements.\(^{19}\) These guidelines include a clear achievable mandate from a competent political authority such as the Security Council; consent of the parties to the conflict and a commitment to respect a cease-fire; and association of the operation with a political settlement process. The number of troops
and international composition of the operation must suit the mandate and the operation must be adequately funded and have a satisfactory logistical structure.

Not surprisingly the guidelines used by the two departments are not dissimilar. As is evidenced in the Auditor General’s report and the Somalia Inquiry, however, these policy guidelines are not always used in the decision-making process.

The Auditor General found that in DFAIT, “it was difficult to assess the basis on which the nature and extent of participation was recommended to ministers.” The Auditor General found that a clear statement of Canadian objectives was not always provided and when a clear statement of objectives was lacking, the prevailing assumption was that Canadian goals were the same as UN objectives as expressed in Security Council resolutions. In addition, according to the Auditor General, the information provided to decisionmakers generally did not include an assessment of the likelihood that Canada would continue to be committed to a UN operation beyond the initial six-month mandate usually authorized by the Security Council, and the implications for Canada or for other departments were given “insufficient” analysis.

With respect to whether or not government guidelines would be met by deciding to undertake an operation, the Auditor General found:

The extent to which the guidelines can be observed in any given situation is usually not referred to in documents to ministers. Officials explained to us that other factors, such as a pressing need to respond to severe emergency needs based on humanitarian considerations, often preclude observance of the guidelines. Thus it appears that these guidelines represent a desirable list of conditions in an ideal situation rather than a realistic basis for deciding whether or not to participate.

The Auditor General took issue with similar practices within DND and found that, in general, the procedure for decision-making “varied considerably from mission to mission.” The Somalia inquiry found that, as with DFAIT, DND’s guidelines were used fairly loosely. Indeed, with respect to the December 1992 decision to participate in UNITAF the inquiry found that the “criteria were essentially ignored.”

In the Somalia inquiry, the commissioners also found it difficult to determine to what extent policy guidelines were a decision-making factor
since they received different answers from different people as to the degree to which a decision to participate was weighed against basic policy guidelines in DND. Ambassador Robert Fowler and former CDS General John de Chastelain both testified that the guidelines were only used in a very general way. But Colonel Bremmer, who was director-general of International Policy at the time, stated that the guidelines were factors that had to be considered in the decision-making process.

The interdepartmental recommendations made to Cabinet, therefore, may not always take the broader policy implications into account nor match the proposed actions against government criteria for participation. This is where the informal elements of the system come into play. As indicated above, in some instances this may be because of an overwhelming need to participate in an operation, such as in situations of humanitarian emergencies. But in other situations this may reflect an implicit assumption that the decision to participate had already been made at a higher level.

The Somali Inquiry revealed that this was the case in the decision to participate in the UNITAF operation. In this instance there was direct communication between the Canadian CDS, John de Chastelain, and US General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by a telephone conversation between US President George Bush and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. The decision to participate happened very quickly and Canada announced its participation in the operation on the same day that the United States announced that it would be leading the operation. The Somalia Inquiry found that, in that context, “some planners felt that the decision to participate in UNITAF had already been made, thus reducing their function to justifying the decision.”

Although the decision to go to Zaire was not totally unexpected in that the government had been considering the possibility of participation in some kind of operation there, the decision to go as coalition leader and to go as quickly as possible was. In the Joint Staff Lessons Learned documents, a planning officer outlines the sequence as follows:

Prior to early November, there was little to no sense that CF involvement would consist of more than token efforts — the DART or a contribution to a multinational airlift. As a result, the only initiative taken was to confirm to the DART HQ that the African Great Lakes region could become a mission area, and as a result, should be a focus of their intelligence monitoring....
Several capability alternatives were identified, however, coordinated contingency planning had only been addressed briefly. The JOPP had been engaged with the issue of a ... planning guidance 7/8 November, however, this was too late, and too limited in the scope of the possible DND participation to be of more than limited use.... The capability alternatives were briefed to the government 9 Nov 96 by the A/CDS.... however, the information presented had been developed in isolation from government intentions. As a result, the very late statement of intention and desire by the government meant that DND was ill-prepared both mentally and organizationally to accept the task that was directed. 28

The Type and Role of Information

The Auditor General raised questions about the scope and type of information being provided to Cabinet and the fact that a number of key questions were rarely addressed. Those criticisms were in reference to the nature of the information being provided by the departments to Cabinet. Whatever the exact content or type of that information, it is important to remember that its source is a government department. The information, therefore, represents or presents the views of the department doing the providing. At minimum the information is a product of a departmental process of information development and selection. There is nothing inherently wrong with that fact; it is simply important that it be recognized.

This issue arises at two levels. Cabinet members have no alternative body to turn to for “outside” or “independent” information in order to provide a kind of counter-expert source of information to assist in judging the departmental information they are receiving. This is also the case for the ministers of the departments in question. Writing in 1996, General Gerry Thériault, who was CDS in the early 1980s, outlined the problem.

In Canada we have no National Security Council, no Cabinet Committee on Defence. The Minister is responsible to Cabinet and the PM for defence. But unlike his American and British counterparts, a Canadian minister does not have his own expert staff — the emphasis being on the word expert — to advise and assist him in the discharge of his considerable personal responsibilities, especially in developing his own informed assessment of the mass of proposals, opinions, recommendations that come to him from NDHQ. In the present arrangement, the Minister is reliant on
Department and Canadian Forces staffing and advice provided by the CDS and the DND. In the merged NDHQ, that means ... advice in which prior conflicting views have been reconciled, and which is also the result of a balance of the forces internal to the headquarters and the Forces themselves. By its very nature, this is ... not an open process insofar as the taxpayer is concerned. 29

The same thing might be said of DFAIT. After her brief stint as secretary of state for external affairs, Flora Macdonald spoke out about the extent to which she found the control of information a problem, and the lengths to which External Affairs’ bureaucrats would go to ensure that she would not have the benefit of “outside” advice and information. 30

The department has a history of attempts to develop an internally based policy-planning unit which has generated mixed results. 31

Another important source of information and experience is through a “lessons-learned” process that develops conclusions about past operations — what was done well and what was done not so well. In a sense, this is a form of institutional memory. Ideally, this kind of information should feed back into the policy process to inform the policy itself as well as future decision-making. DND has such an internal process. DFAIT does not have a formal internal lessons-learned process, although this does not mean that the exercise does not always occur. 32 There is, however, no interdepartmental lessons-learned process.
CHAPTER TWO

The Situation in Other States

THE UNITED STATES

The best example of an organization established to deal with national security issues is the National Security Council (NSC) in the United States. The NSC was a product of the experience of World War II. By force of circumstance, the war resulted in strong interservice cooperation within the military, and ongoing high-level cooperation among the president and the top military and diplomatic decisionmakers in the administration. That experience, combined with the sense that the US postwar role in international affairs would be one of significantly more involvement than prior to the war, led to the creation of the NSC. The NSC was created by an act of Congress. According to the Act, the NSC’s function is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

Along with being available for whatever duties the president might assign, the Act specifies that the Council will:

- assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security ... and ... to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

President Harry S Truman, a supporter of the creation of the NSC and the first president to have the NSC at his disposal, wrote to members
that he hoped the Council would act as a “channel for collective advice and information” on national security issues, making it clear, however, that “it is the prerogative of the President to determine such policy and enforce it.”

An examination of the history of the NSC provides a mixed account of its efforts. The extent to which the NSC has been used as a channel for collective advice, or as an alternative source of advice, or as a crisis-management mechanism, has varied from president to president. Each president has used the Council in a different way and a number of them have altered its composition and its duties according to their own personal vision of how US national security interests should be administered. The terms of the National Security Act are sufficiently broad to make the Council a fairly malleable instrument. Its effectiveness has varied accordingly.

Over time, the distinction between the NSC itself and the NSC Staff has become an important one. The NSC is composed of Cabinet-level advisors to the president whose membership changes over time and with changes in the presidency. The NSC Staff, on the other hand, looks after the core tasks associated with administration and coordination. It is a bureaucratic structure, and as such it has an institutional memory and objectives of its own, including establishing its role with respect to other government agencies.

There is no question that the NSC has contributed to bureaucratic tension within US administrations. Initially, other departments resented the NSC’s creation and felt threatened by its presence. In many ways that interdepartmental tension has never fully disappeared. In addition, there has been on-again, off-again tension between the roles of the secretary of state and the national security advisor. In this latter case, whether or not there is a rivalry or competition problem depends a great deal on the personalities involved, including that of the president. Indeed, times when the National Security Council can be said to have worked well and to have been used well, can be attributed, at least in part, to the personalities involved — because the people in question worked well together, because they believed in the value of the Council itself and because they had a clear vision of the Council’s role.

Since the end of the Cold War, the changes in the strategic environment have prompted a debate about the nature of the national security
needs and policy of the United States. This debate has been accompanied by a debate about whether and how the US national security decision-making structure should be altered in order to adjust to those changes. As with the debate about the future nature of US national security policy, to date the debate about the appropriate structures to address the challenges of the post-Cold War environment has not resulted in any major changes in the national security decision-making framework. 40

GREAT BRITAIN

Unlike the United States, Great Britain has no structure separate from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to deal with national security issues. The Cabinet is the main forum for major national security decisions and discussions. Inputs into national security decision-making, however, come from a wide variety of sources. The prime minister has the ability to have personal advisors on any issues he or she chooses and may also have advisors within the Political Office (which is related to the prime minister’s role as head of the governing party). 41 Both the MoD and the FCO have internal sections for research and analysis and policy planning.

There is also a strong tradition of interdepartmental cooperation between the two ministries.

Given that defence covers such a wide area, it is no surprise that liaison with the FCO is very close, especially on policy issues. Indeed, the two ministries, however unalike as cousins, tend to be natural allies within Whitehall, external affairs affect virtually every minister’s brief and the FCO and the MoD frequently find themselves defending a broad foreign policy picture against the special pleading of ministries in whose world external affairs are only one dimension. The annual statement on the defence estimates, now that it has come to include a series of essays and more general discussions, is the closest the British government ever comes to producing an annual statement on foreign policy, and there is a good measure of FCO input to it. 42

Prime Minister Tony Blair came to power in 1997, on an election platform that promised a strategic defence review. The new Labour
government began this process almost immediately. The first stage of the review involved establishing a policy baseline. The secretary of state for defence outlined the process.

The Review will be foreign policy led. We will work jointly with the Foreign Office to establish a policy baseline that will build on our strengths, and on the best features of existing policies and capabilities.... The Government will not take ad hoc or short-term approaches. We cannot shape the future simply by responding to the present. The Review will give the Armed Forces a coherent and stable planning basis for the year 2000 and beyond. To do this we must look first at our commitments and interests as a country, in Europe and more widely. We must be clear about our objectives. Those will then be used to reassess our essential security interests and defence needs; and, finally, to decide how the Armed Forces should be structured, equipped and deployed to meet them.43

The review contributed to, inter alia, a new White Paper on Defence.44 The review was a wide-ranging process involving internal and external experts as well as the defence and foreign affairs parliamentary committees and generated extensive discussion and analysis. A good deal of emphasis during the process was placed on the idea that the review was “foreign-policy led,” reinforcing the idea being that foreign and defence policy are directly linked. In its report on the Strategic Defence Review, the House of Commons Defence Committee made two interesting points on this issue.

We believe that it needs to be more explicitly acknowledged that choices about our military capability limit our capacity to be a force for good. The SDR may have been foreign policy led, but now the UK’s foreign policy will have to be constrained by its defence posture. The choice of an active and outward-looking foreign policy means that the government must be clear about why, when and with whom we seek to intervene in crises, or potential crises, overseas. It would be all too easy to fall back into the situation of over-commitment and overstretch of our Armed Forces from which the SDR was intended to free us....

Defence policy is intimately part of our security policy. The government’s manifesto promised a “strategic defence and security review.” We welcome
the Strategic Defence Review, but we are still awaiting the strategic security review. In a sense, we have received a two-dimensional review of a three-dimensional world. We cannot afford to allow the SDR to be a one-off experiment in inter-departmental cooperation.\(^{45}\)

AUSTRALIA

As a country whose political system also derives from Great Britain, Australia provides an interesting comparison to the Canadian system. Like Canada, in Australia the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence coordinate on peacekeeping issues. There is no separate structure for national security policy discussion or information. Consequently, it is not surprising that some of the same issues relating to peacekeeping policy and decisions have arisen in the Australian context.

In 1993-94, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade undertook a review of Australia’s participation in peacekeeping operations. The review was prompted by the end of the Cold War and by Australia’s participation in two major UN missions in Cambodia and Somalia. The committee supported the review of the armed forces’ role in peacekeeping undertaken by the Australian Department of Defence but expressed surprise that a similar review had not been undertaken by the Department of Foreign Affairs. In that light, the committee recommended that the government “develop and publish an integrated policy on peacekeeping, taking into account the diversity of peacekeeping activities and objectives in the evolving international order.”\(^{46}\)

The committee also concluded that while consultation between the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs worked well for the most part “a formalised process to deal with peacekeeping matters should be established to ensure that decision-making is informed by the views of all participants in an operation.”\(^{47}\) To that end, the committee echoed an earlier recommendation from a 1991 Senate inquiry on peacekeeping for the establishment of a permanent secretariat to coordinate peacekeeping policy and decision-making.

The secretariat staff should include representatives of all organisations involved in peacekeeping missions, namely the Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Federal Police, Australian Electoral Commission, Non-
Government Organisations, the Defence Industry Committee and private suppliers. The secretariat should be sufficiently flexible to include representatives of other organisations which may come to be involved in peacekeeping.48

OTHER COUNTRIES

A review of other countries reveals varied situations.49 In France and Finland, for example, the fact that the president plays a strong foreign policy role adds another actor to the interdepartmental mix.50 The Netherlands51 and Scandinavian countries, like Canada, have faced peacekeeping issues and experiences that raised serious questions about when they will participate in such operations and how these operations relate to their countries’ goals. None of these countries, however, have created a separate administrative body for peacekeeping or national security issues. To deal with cross-departmental issues, Sweden makes use of interdepartmental committees for policy development.52 By contrast, Norway uses a Special Advisor Office as a way of dealing with non-traditional or cross-cutting issues.53
CHAPTER THREE

Recommendations and Proposals

A number of studies since 1990, both government or government-sponsored and non-government, have touched on this issue. Generally, however, these studies have focused on broader questions, such as the events surrounding Canada’s deployment to Somalia or, as in the case of the Auditor General, the efficiency of the government’s management of its peacekeeping policy. This section provides a catalogue of various recommendations which have been made with respect to interdepartmental issues between DFAIT and DND on policy questions.

MILITARY REVIEWS

During 1990 and 1991, the Chief Review Services within DND undertook a military review of the participation of Canadian Forces in peacekeeping operations. The aim was to “review the policies, practices and controls which are in place to enable the CF to undertake the planning, mounting, deployment, sustainment, redeployment and command and control of peacekeeping forces in an effective efficient and economical manner.” In its review of the coordination of decision-making between DND and DFAIT (then the Department of External Affairs), the review team found that there was good coordination between the various groups in the planning process.

During interviews, the Review Team was informed that although the coordination and consultation between staffs among NDHQ Groups, DEA, the UN, and Commands were effective and worked reasonably well, most interviewees admitted that this was largely due to strong interpersonal ties and to the personalities of individuals rather than by a formal delineation of responsibilities.... While it is acknowledged that on the posting of a
member of DI Pol staff, handover notes might adequately prepare the successor, the absence of written procedures or checklists increases the possibilities of overlooking necessary coordination activities and perpetuates an ad hoc staff procedure.\textsuperscript{55}

In that light the review recommended that “ADM(Pol) should clarify with DEA the split in responsibility for the assessment of the criteria outlined in the White Paper.”\textsuperscript{56} In response, ADM(Pol) stated that from its viewpoint “there is no split in responsibility.”\textsuperscript{57}

The ad hoc nature of the processes in question, and particularly the lack of formal documentation is a consistent theme in the review. The review team found that this extended to the question of feasibility studies as well. The review team found that there “is no formal process of measuring the impact of a potential peacekeeping commitment and therefore is in contravention of the criteria listed in the [1987] White Paper.”\textsuperscript{58} This meant that deployments were made which had an impact on other commitments, such as the Defence of Canada role, without the nature or importance of that impact being considered in the decision-making process. The review recommended, therefore, that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) “formalize a method or procedure, such as a Military Estimate of the Situation, for determining the feasibility of such commitments.”\textsuperscript{59}

While taking issue with some of the assertions by the review team the DCDS responded reasonably positively to the recommendation for a military estimate, stating that a military estimate “discussing the criteria listed in the White Paper, should be attempted, even though many unknowns, or best judgements at the time, will continue to prevail.”\textsuperscript{60}

REPORTS BY THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA

Overall, the Auditor General found that the level of interdepartmental cooperation and personnel interchange between DFAIT and DND was good. As indicated above, however, the Auditor General took issue with the information being used for decision-making, finding problems in both departments. Problems include assessments not being written down, and inadequate analysis or presentation of uncertainties about a mission, especially relating to longer term risks and implications.

In terms of information provided to Parliament, the Auditor General suggested that “the government needs to provide a yearly comprehensive
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In responding to the Auditor General’s recommendations, DFAIT indicated that information on peacekeeping “could be reviewed in conjunction with other departments and agencies to ascertain whether additional information could be made available in a consolidated format.” The Department of National Defence echoed this sentiment by indicating that it agreed that potential for consolidating information “could be explored.”

Within both DND and DFAIT the Auditor General found gaps or problems in incorporating past experience into decisions and planning for new or ongoing missions. In DND the Auditor General found gaps in deployment planning, for example, pre-mission reconnaissance missions were sometimes not undertaken. Also, although information “on Canadian efforts was often sent to headquarters ... it was not then a requirement and it was not always evident how the information was used in planning future rotations.”

In DFAIT, the Auditor General pointed to the absence of an “established procedure to carry out evaluations or ‘lessons learned’ exercises in the area of peacekeeping” noting that this “increases the risk of not benefiting fully from the experience gained from previous participation.”

With that in mind, the Auditor General’s report stated that “we believe it is also necessary to periodically conduct a ‘standback assessment’ to determine the extent to which Canada’s interests have been served from a foreign policy perspective and what lessons have been learned from Canada’s experience in specific peacekeeping missions.”

THE SOMALIA INQUIRY

In 1995, the Canadian government established a Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia to investigate the events relating to the problems in the Canadian deployment to Somalia including the murder of a Somali teenager by Canadian troops stationed in Belet Huen, Somalia. In examining the sequence of events surrounding the Canadian deployment, the commission studied the decision-making process used in making the decisions to deploy Canadian troops to Somalia and then the ongoing monitoring and decision-making once the troops were deployed.
The scope and depth of the information provided by the inquiry provides considerable insight into how decisions involving the use of Canadian armed forces were made, ostensibly in support of foreign policy goals, and initially on the basis of altruistic impulses (UNOSOM in trouble), but ultimately for reasons that have little to do with the security issue at hand.\textsuperscript{66} In addition, the sequence of events outlined by the commission demonstrates how an ad hoc process occurring in a compressed time frame can contribute to serious problems.

As a result of its study, the commission developed a series of findings and recommendations for changes. On policy issues some of the commission’s suggestions echo those in the Auditor General’s report as well as other proposals. Although the inquiry was focused primarily on the activities of the Department of National Defence, given the policy questions they were studying the commission inevitably touched on interdepartmental questions. Their findings include the following:

- The effectiveness of the process for applying criteria at the time of the Somalia commitment was problematic.
- There was a lack of clear direction regarding the applicability of the criteria and the manner in which they should receive consideration from DND and the CF. No clear lines of responsibility existed between DND, the CF, and the Department of External Affairs (DEA) as regards assessment of the proposed operation against the criteria.
- No procedure was in place for examining the criteria and formally documenting the results of the review and the basis for any acceptance or rejection of specific criteria.
- New peacekeeping guidelines, updated to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping, had not been developed or were not in use at the time of planning for the Somalia deployment.
- At the time of planning for the Somalia deployment, there was no written doctrine or checklist relating to planning for traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, despite previous recommendations that such documents should be produced.
- Notwithstanding defence policy requiring peacekeeping guidelines to be considered in any decision about whether to participate in a peacekeeping operation, the guidelines played a negligible role at the various stages of decision-making after April 1992.
At the time the Government of Canada decided to participate in the UN-authorized US-led peace enforcement operation, no role for the Canadian Forces had been established. Based on these findings the commission recommended that the government “issue new guidelines and compulsory criteria” for decision-making, that the government “define clearly the respective roles and responsibilities of [DFAIT] and [DND] in the decision-making process” and that the government require that briefings to the government advising on participation in peace-support operations include “a comprehensive statement of how the peace-support operations guidelines and criteria apply to the proposed operation.”

The commission also recommended the creation of a permanent advisory body to coordinate peace-support operations and decision-making. “Members could include representatives of the CF, DND, DFAIT, the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and others and would be responsible for overseeing all aspects of policy and decision making for peace support operations.”

LESSONS-LEARNED STUDIES

The documentation produced as a result of the DND’s lessons-learned process after the multinational operation in Zaire, also provide a series of recommendations relating to the development and implementation of policy decisions for these types of operations. The recommendations found in these documents derive directly from the Zaire experience, but they echo and support the recommendations found in the Auditor General’s report and in the Somalia inquiry.

The Zaire operation experienced a range of problems from coordination problems to a lack of national direction to problems associated with Canada’s role as the lead nation. With respect to coordination between DND and DFAIT the operation ran into a number of difficulties. Aside from the problems associated with the lack of contact and preparation by the Chargé in the host nation, the most dramatic consequence of which was cited at the beginning of this paper, there were other problems associated with the poor exchange of information in Ottawa, an inability,
because of lack of time and lack of experience, to generate an interdepart-
mental strategic assessment process, and mixed views of the usefulness of an interdepartmental task force established to deal with day-to-day
issues.

These problems prompted a number of suggestions within the DND
lessons-learned analysis relating to questions of coordination with DFAIT. Read as a whole, these proposals suggest a need for ongoing work with
DFAIT on a routine basis from well before an operation begins. This
coordination should continue through the initial joint reconnaissance and
then through to a post-operations lessons-learned process. Coordination
would be beneficial not just with DFAIT but with CIDA and other non-
military organizations. The analysis report recommended that “specific
individuals/staffs should be identified to conduct routine coordination and
dialogue with these agencies on a regular basis instead of waiting for a
crisis situation.”

With specific reference to DFAIT, the analysis report recommended
that “staff action should be initiated to develop deployment SOPs with
DEA/DFAIT and military attaché resources for future international mis-
sions. The establishment of a national reconnaissance and assessment
capability should be a priority.” This need for a national strategic as-
sessment capability, one that includes both DND and DFAIT, is a con-
sistent theme in the lessons-learned documents.

An interdepartmental task force was established to deal with the Zaire
operation. It has received, however, mixed reviews of its utility. While
there was agreement that the task force contributed to a good information
flow and brought together various views and concerns, there was also
agreement that it did not have an impact on the direction of events or the
development of a common government position. And the DFAIT repre-
sentative responding to the DND lessons-learned questionnaire pointed
out that it would have been useful if DFAIT, or at least the DFAIT repre-
sentative, could have received the daily situation reports from the field
which were circulated internally in DND — a comment that is particu-
larly telling about the degree of actual interdepartmental information-
sharing.

Another consistent theme is the call for an interdepartmental lessons-
learned process to ensure that past experience inform future operations.
Both of these themes resulted in recommendations in the Staff Action
Proposal. Specifically this report suggested that “DND and the CF should
lead an initiative to create an effective national, interdepartmental lessons learned process.” And that “a high level, interdepartmental assessment capability which can deploy early to potential mission areas and provide strategic assessments and advice is necessary.”

There remains the problem, mentioned earlier in this text, of the government’s decision to undertake, on very short notice, a mission very different in scale and nature from the one originally envisaged. This had a knock-on effect throughout the system, creating a situation in which operational decisions had to be made quickly and in the absence of a full apprehension of the government’s intentions. In some senses this problem was resolved by the extent to which the situation on the ground in Zaire changed very quickly just as the multinational force arrived, creating what one respondent termed a situation of “mission search” rather than “mission creep.” Fortunately the changes on the ground brought about a quick end to the operation rather than compounding what were already significant operational problems. Beyond calls for clearer, prompter, and better national direction there are no specific recommendations in the lessons-learned documents on this issue.

The Department of Foreign Affairs undertook its own version of a post-operation analysis of the Zaire operation. The study and accompanying recommendations, however, are primarily geared toward the international rather than the domestic environment and therefore focused on issues relating to the nature of the multinational operation. Of note, however, for the purposes of this study, the DFAIT study made the point that by taking the lead of the mission without contributing combat troops, Canada was in a weak military and political position. In leading the mission without any significant numbers of combat troops, Canada was dependent on other nations to conduct any significant operations. Despite deploying a large number of forces to the region, Canada never had available the operational capability that would have enabled it to undertake military missions in Zaire on its own, had it wished to do so.

On a related point, like the DND lessons-learned documents, the DFAIT study indicated that the speed of the decision-making and the consequent absence of pre-operation analysis and planning was a critical factor. The DFAIT study found that “the speed with which the military can deploy was poorly understood by some. Some Government leaders,
humanitarian agencies and reporters demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the speed with which the military can deploy. There was a clear expectation that armies would be fully deployed in theatre almost instantly after a political decision was taken.\textsuperscript{78}

On the question of interdepartmental issues, in contrast to most of the comments in the DND lessons-learned process, the study found that the interdepartmental task force “worked well” and on that basis the study called for the task force idea to be replicated in similar future situations.\textsuperscript{79}

EXPERT STUDIES

In 1993-94, a blue ribbon committee, called the Canada 21 Council, undertook an examination of Canada’s international policies and priorities at the end of the Cold War and into the new century. With respect to peacekeeping operations the group recommended that

a unit similar to Operation Research and Analysis (ORAE) be established within the Department of National Defence to review continuously Canada’s experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and draw appropriate policy and operational conclusions. Such a unit should have strong and continuous input, probably in the form of secondments, from Foreign Affairs and, as appropriate, Elections Canada, CIDA and Environment Canada.\textsuperscript{80}

In order to provide ongoing comprehensive and cross-issue collection and analysis of information on the whole range of issues that relate to “common security” the Council found that “[r]egarding its internal operations and links with other governments, the Council urges the Federal Government to create an effective and accountable group to integrate and assess common security issues at the sub-Cabinet level. The purpose of this unit would be to conduct comprehensive long-range assessment and provide early warning.”\textsuperscript{81}

In 1996, in light of the Somalia inquiry the minister of national defence commissioned three studies to investigate related issues (specific terms) and provide recommendations. In his study, Albert Legault rejected the idea of creating a Canadian equivalent to the National Security Council but did agree that the issue of interdepartmental coordination in times of crisis needs to be addressed. Legault recommended the creation
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of two structures reflecting two levels of coordination, one at the chief of defence staff (CDS)/deputy minister level and one at the operational level.

Legault proposed that each peacekeeping mission should have an interdepartmental coordination structure that includes the CDS as well as the deputy ministers for National Defence and Foreign Affairs, along with representatives from the PCO, CIDA, Elections Canada, the RCMP, and other representatives as necessary. According to Legault this formula would make it possible “not to hold the Prime Minister ... responsible for every minor detail” while providing a way for “every military viewpoint” to be taken into account.82

In order to deal with the actual running of operations on an ongoing basis Legault proposed

that a second follow-up coordination cell be created, located inside DND, and comprising at least the following representative elements: one representative of the Department of [Foreign] Affairs, one representative of the Office of the Judge Advocate General or the Military Police, one representative of DND Political Affairs Branch, and one representative of each military service involved in the mission. This organization could coordinate a single mission or several simultaneous missions, if justified by circumstances, and operate as a crisis cell during the bulk of the operations.83

COMMON THEMES

Although the experiences and studies just outlined take different approaches to the issues, there are some clear common themes. First, and strongest, is the question of guidelines for decision-making. This is almost a universal issue. The absence of national regulations and the erratic practice of using departmental recommendations prompted calls for some kind of outline of compulsory guidelines which the government would have to address in any decision involving a commitment of resources, either to prove how the guidelines were being met or make the case as to why a commitment was being made even when it was not.

Second, there is the question of interdepartmental coordination. While there appears to be general agreement that overall interdepartmental cooperation is good, there is also agreement that this has been the result of good personal working relationships among the people involved. While this has proved a consistent fact over time it is not a situation that can be
guaranteed. There are mixed views as to the success of past efforts to create interdepartmental structures for coordination such as the interdepartmental task force established during the Zaire operation. One of the problems with these efforts is that they are temporary. They are created only after an operation is in motion and come to a close when the operation is over. The Zaire lessons-learned documentation, in conjunction with the other reports, make a compelling case for an ongoing interdepartmental entity of some kind which would be responsible for interdepartmental tasks such as pre-operation reconnaissance and assessments, monitoring ongoing operations, and undertaking interdepartmental lessons-learned studies.

The third theme has to do with information for decision-making. This is a crosscutting theme. In some ways the concern about guidelines is a concern for better informed decision-making. If the government is required to meet guidelines for participation it may have to get more information about resources and risks than it would have done otherwise, and that may prompt it to make a different decision. At least it might ensure that it makes a better informed decision. The calls for better, more permanent, interdepartmental cooperation are, in part, therefore, a call for better information gathering and sharing in order to facilitate better operations.

But in amongst the various proposals is a fairly consistent call for an information source that is independent of the decisionmakers, both at Cabinet level and within the departments. As General Thériault pointed out, the purpose of this is not to undermine the information being generated already but to ensure that decisionmakers receive the most complete information possible. In addition, given the turnover of personnel in both departments and in other agencies as well, and the extent to which individual peace-support operations differ in their nature and requirements, there is inherent value in the idea of an entity whose sole purpose is to research, monitor, and assess Canada’s past, current, and possible future operations, on an ongoing basis.

The foregoing analysis affirms the hypothesis that there is a gap that needs to be filled. The analysis reveals some consistent themes. Problems do arise in decision-making about these issues, especially when decisions are taken on short notice. In essence, there is no one entity or group that consistently looks at the national security picture as a single concept and looks at the picture on an ongoing basis — beginning, middle,
and end. This gap has two main elements: a source of research, information, and monitoring existing and possible areas that may require a Canadian response (a think-tank function) that is independent of the departments and policy actors. Second, it acts as a coordinating body that brings together the different departments to discuss and agree on decisions and actions. This function involves research and generic planning for possible future operations, strategic reconnaissance for imminent operations, monitoring existing operations and situations, and facilitating and coordinating crisis management as necessary.

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?

A spectrum of possible responses to this problem is available. These responses range from a Canadian version of the American National Security Council to some form of permanent interdepartmental mechanism to doing nothing at all and continuing the current state of affairs.

The NSC option is an unlikely one and not one that particularly suits the Canadian situation. In part, this is a question of scale. While national security issues are important to Canada and while, in the present international environment, Canada does engage in significant operations outside the country, Canadian national security requirements simply do not call for an organization of the size and scope of the NSC. The other NSC-type function, that of providing the prime minister with a personal source of advice, effectively exists. If he or she feels the need to have such a national security advisor, then an advisor or advisors may be appointed to the Prime Minister’s Office.

One step down from the NSC is the idea of an interdepartmental secretariat or directorate along the lines of the Australian proposal. Many of the studies and issues examined here suggest the need for some kind of interdepartmental entity to carry out a variety of tasks, including strategic assessment (general and pre-operation); ongoing monitoring and assessment during an operation; and evaluation of lessons learned and incorporation of those lessons into policy framework. These functions resemble those of the NSC Staff, and correspond to the Somalia inquiry recommendation for some form of permanent advisory body.

The third option is to simply proceed on the same basis as in the past. There are a variety of reasons that weigh in favour of doing nothing and staying with the current system. One is the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it” argument. This line of thinking would argue that there is nothing wrong with the current system, interdepartmental coordination occurs as necessary, the system has essentially “worked” so far, and there is a certain desirable flexibility involved in having an ad hoc process that allows decisionmakers to be responsive. A corollary to this argument is the assertion that the existing system is a fair reflection of Canada’s national security requirements in that Canada’s political and geographic position and the scale and scope of its foreign and defence policy mean that it does not need a more formal or larger national security apparatus than it has already.

But the problems associated with the operations in Somalia and Zaire suggest that if the system is not broken, it certainly is operating at less than optimum efficiency. The consistent calls for some kind of change in both governmental and non-governmental documents confirm that there is a problem that needs to be addressed. If nothing else, the extent and nature of the changes in international peace-support activity since the Cold War, and the Canadian government’s determination to remain a participant in those activities through the UN and NATO, is itself a compelling argument for changing or at least updating the system accordingly.

How, then, might this be done? From a functional perspective, the preceding analysis has demonstrated that there are two separate but linked national security needs: the need for information and the need for coordination. Two options flow from this assumption. First, that a single entity could fulfil both functions and second, that the two functions are separate enough that two different entities would be best. The first option, that of a single entity in the form of a national security secretariat or staff, would involve both members of the two departments as well as individuals who would fulfil the “expert” role.

The argument for the second option, two separate entities, depends on the assumption that it is desirable to have a real separation between the think-tank role and other institutional affiliations. The basis for this argument is that the very nature of the interdepartmental entity requires that it be “of the departments,” and given that the purpose of the information role is to provide an “outside” source of information, it makes sense to think in terms of two separate entities rather than a single national security entity which would encompass both functions.

Two separate organizational entities, therefore, would involve, first, an interdepartmental organization that would undertake coordination tasks
prior to, during, and after an operation. Its tasks would involve undertak-
ing an interdepartmental strategic reconnaissance when an operation is
pending and would monitor the operation while it is ongoing, providing
reports to Cabinet as necessary when adjustments are needed to the Ca-
nadian commitment or when events on the ground warrant attention. Even
in the event there were no ongoing operations this organization would be
engaged in considering and undertaking lessons learned from past opera-
tions and committing to generic planning for possible future national se-
curity tasks. This group could also be responsible for providing, on an
annual basis, a consolidated report on national security operations or a
“national estimate,” of the type envisaged by the Auditor General.

The second organizational entity’s purpose could be loosely termed
the “think-tank” or expert role. This role involves the ongoing collection
and analysis of information relating to possible and actual national secu-

ty roles. This information would be used primarily by decisionmakers
at the Cabinet level, providing an “outside” source of information about
the risks involved and Canada’s ability to meet all of its obligations with
the resources it has available. Such an entity could also provide informa-
tion to Parliament and other national security actors as required. Some
provision would have to be made to allow this organization to draw on
information from various departments, including intelligence sources. In
order to confirm and ensure its independence, such an organization would
be created outside any government departments.

There is always some hesitation about advocating the creation of yet
another government structure. In this case, however, we are not exactly
awash in them to begin with. There is also the possibility, with the US
example in mind, that new government structures will generate bureau-
cratic in-fighting and competition about roles and influence within the
decision-making process. The extent to which past operations have been
successful on the basis of ad hoc procedures and cooperation, however,
suggests a determination and focus in both departments on getting the
job done efficiently and effectively. On that basis, therefore, one might
expect that changes that facilitate the process of getting the job done will
be accepted. On the other hand, the thinly guarded lack of enthusiasm by
both departments to the Auditor General’s proposal for consolidating
peacekeeping-related information, and various responses and comments
from both departments about not seeing much of a problem with the cur-
rent system suggest a traditional and unsurprising lack of enthusiasm for
change. Bureaucratic resistance, competition, and in-fighting will probably, if not inevitably, happen. But that fact is not a sufficient argument to counteract the various benefits that would come from such changes.

In the end, of course, nothing changes the fact that there is no requirement for the prime minister and Cabinet to consult with anyone before making a national security decision. This is part of the very nature of Canadian parliamentary democracy. These two entities would and could, however, facilitate national security decision-making by contributing to a better organized, better informed decision-making process both in the lead-up to the decision and in the implementation afterwards.

Finally, there remains the question of articulated guidelines which the government uses to make decisions. Why, in various discussions and studies about decision-making processes is there such a fuss about guidelines? All of the studies, both those on the outside looking in and those done internally are replete with references to the need for guidelines or criteria. Why? At its base the fuss about guidelines is really a fuss about the absence of a national security strategy. For all of the government’s speeches and publications about foreign policy and defence policy, there is no overall linking strategy which is articulated in one document as a national security strategy, and which acts as a kind of policy anchor for both foreign and defence policy.

The reason this matters is that in the absence of a policy anchor in the form of a national security strategy, policy is driven by operational level considerations or by decisions made for reasons other than national security requirements. When that happens — when, in other words, there is a disconnect between the strategic and operational levels — the potential for problems is very strong. Ideally, just as defence and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin, the operational and strategic decision-making processes should be intertwined, with strategy directing the operational-level decisions and operational-level factors being considered in strategic decisions. In effect, we are talking about drawing together the commitment and capability strands of Byers’ commitment-capability gap. The two organizational entities proposed here would facilitate the connection between the operational and strategic levels by generating interdepartmental coordination on an ongoing basis and by providing for better informed decision-making at all levels.

Inherent in these ideas, along with the push for better decision-making, is a push for greater accountability in decision-making. Just as the fuss
about guidelines is a fuss about a need for a national security strategy, it is, therefore, also a fuss about being able to ensure that national security decisions are made for reasons that support Canadian objectives and carry with them the appropriate commitment of resources.

This is not an argument against taking decisions on short notice or without consultation with the two departments when circumstances call for it. Nor is it a hidden argument for a different national security policy. It is an argument for trying to ensure that decisions affecting Canadian security — decisions that place Canada, and the credibility it has on the international scene, into high-risk, political-military situations involving the lives of Canadians and others — be taken on the basis of a clear sense of achievable operational objectives, a clear sense of Canadian national security objectives, and on the basis of the best possible information about the situation being addressed and the risks inherent in becoming involved.
Notes


2Department of National Defence, J3 Lessons Learned 2, Op Assurance Phases One to Three - Lessons Learned Questionnaire, 10 January 1997, p. 84.

3For an early study on the procedures and requirements for crisis decision-making in respect to both foreign and domestic situations, see Canada, The Enhancement of Crisis Handling Capability within the Federal Structure, Ottawa, 15 October 1972.


5Ibid., p. 13.

6Ibid., p. 12.


8Ibid., p. 209.

9See, for example, David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, Canada’s International Security Policy (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1995). The study repeats Byers’ assertion that Canada lacks a Canadian security policy and outlines options for such a policy. Louis Delvoie argues that Canada’s policy rationales have been overtaken by events and that the Canadian government needs to develop new approaches. See Louis A. Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales,” Canadian Military Review, forthcoming.

10There are a large number and variety of works and studies on Canadian foreign policy. See, as examples, Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Issues and Themes (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980); R. Barry Farrell,
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11 An excellent detailed overview of the various government reports on these issues since the early 1990s has been done by Natalie Mychajlyszyn for the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security’s National Security Policy Project, *Baseline Paper*, December 1998.


14 A very good sense of the nature and length of the process can be gained by reading through the documentation available on the decision-making processes involved in the decisions to participate in the UN operations in Central America (MINUGUA in Guatemala and ONUSAL in El Salvador) and in the UN operation in Cambodia (UNTAC). See “OP SULTAN, OP MATCH, and Deployment of Observers to Guatemala, 1997, Deployment, Concept of OPS and Post-ops Reports,” Access to Information Request no. (A) 97/0909, and “OP MARQUIS, Deployment to the UNTAC in Cambodia 92-93: Concept of OPS, Ministerial Discussion, Staffing Mechanisms for the Decision to Go,” Access to Information Request no. (A) 97/0908.


16 Ibid., p. 6-15.


19See, for example, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet at the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” 25-27 September 1995, p. 3.
21Ibid., pp. 6-16–6-17.
22Ibid., p. 7-10.
23Somalia inquiry, p. 760.
25Ibid. Also, see pp. 237-38 where the inquiry notes that they were told by both Fowler and de Chastelain that the guidelines were “‘significantly’ flexible, and were taken into account only ‘somewhat, not in any particular detail.’”
27Ibid., p. 260.
28Department of National Defence, J3 Lessons Learned 2, 10 January 1997, p. 8.
29General Gerry Thériault, “Civil-Military Relations,” Defence Policy Review, 4 (October 1998):2. Also, see Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 287. Bland states: “Ministers of defence from all parties have complained over the years that they lack confidence in the advice they receive from military officers, or at least they wish for some way to verify and balance such advice.”
32For example, an internal Foreign Affairs appraisal of the Zaire mission was undertaken. The overall results are published in James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, “Lesson Learned from the Zaire Mission,” Canadian Foreign Policy, 5, 2 (1998):93-105.
33aNational Security Act of 1947,” Public Law 253, 26 July 1947. The Act also created the position of Secretary of Defense and provided for the three services — the Air Force, Army, and Navy — to be brought into one administrative unit.
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34Ibid., sec. 101 (a).
35Ibid., sec. 101 (b).
37This included the Oliver North episode when the Council was used to facilitate activities that had been forbidden by Congress.
39See, for example, Prados’ discussion of President Eisenhower’s use of the NSC. Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, pp. 57-95. Also see, Lord, *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*, pp. 70, 87.
41For example, Prime Minister Thatcher had a policy unit within her Political Office. In September 1999, Prime Minister Blair established a new research unit to provide the prime minister with factual information on key issues. See Alan Travis, “Super Think-Tanker,” *The Guardian*, 6 September 1999.
44 The White Paper can be found on the MoD Web site, www.mod.uk. Some of the supporting essays for the Strategic Defence Review are also available on the Web site.


47 Ibid., p. 53.

48 Ibid., p. 54.

49 A good, if slightly outdated, overview of the foreign policy side of the equation in different countries can be found in Zara Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982).

50 For an argument in favour of a National Security Council in France, see Eric Denécé, “Pour un conseil national de sécurité,” défense nationale (Novembre 1995): 29-35. On Finland, see Dag Anckar, “Foreign policy Leadership in Finland: Towards Parliamentarization?” Cooperation and Conflict, 19 (1984): 219-33. Note that it was the president of Finland who brokered the Kosovo peace agreement which helped bring about an end to the NATO bombing.


52 See B. Sundelius, “Interdependence, Internationalization and Foreign Policy Decentralization in Sweden,” Cooperation and Conflict, 19 (1984): 93-120. Sundelius notes that in contrast to the US experience where “formal mechanisms are often viewed as necessary instruments to bring order in a very diverse and huge policy-making setting,” the Swedish style “discourages open confrontation among ministries over foreign policy and reduces potential disputes to an internal settlement within the dominant unit, the Foreign Ministry,” p. 117.

53 See, for example, the discussion in Maurice East and Leif-Helge Salomonsen, “Adapting Foreign Policy-Making to Interdependence: A Proposal and Some Evidence from Norway,” Cooperation and Conflict, 16 (1981): 165-82.

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55Ibid., p. 17.
56Ibid., p. 18.
57Ibid.
58Ibid., p. 38.
59Ibid. This recommendation was also proposed by the Somalia Commission.
60Ibid.
61Auditor General, Peacekeeping, para. 6.40.
62Ibid., p. 6-30. Emphasis added.
63Ibid., para. 7.29. DND’s response to this recommendation indicated that it had changed this situation.
64Ibid., para. 6.55.
65Ibid.
66Somalia inquiry, Dishonoured Legacy, ch. 24, especially the summary, pp. 765-67.
67Ibid., pp. 763-71.
68Ibid., pp. 772-73.
69Ibid., p. 774.
71Ibid., p. 9.
72See the various lessons-learned documents, but especially NDHQ Joint Staff Lessons Learned Questionnaire-Op Assurance, p. 16.
73Ibid., p. 36.
75For example, see the comments in the analysis report, including: “The lack of national direction caused conflicts, confusion and forced subordinate HQs ... to issue direction based on logic and historic precedence. The lack of direction on an informed basis resulted in ... duplicating efforts and wasting valuable staff time,” ibid., p. 22.
76POR Collection Plan, Phase IV - Employment, p. 2.
78Ibid.
79Ibid., p. 105.
81Ibid., p. 73.
Albert Legault, *Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-First Century*, Study done for the Minister of National Defence, March 1997, p. 6. available on DND Website.

Ibid.

For example, during the Persian Gulf War an interdepartmental task force also had mixed success. See Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, p. 204. For a first-hand discussion of the crisis management centre within the Department of Foreign Affairs, including the experience in the Persian Gulf War, see Michael Shenston, “Foreign Service Crisis Management in the Nineties,” in *The Canadian Foreign Service in Transition*, ed. Donald C. Story (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1993), pp. 73-82.