
Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations

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How people behave is the essence of civil-military relations. The status of any civil-military relationship can be gauged by how citizens, politicians, and soldiers act individually, within like-minded groups, and towards each other. Civil control of the military, if it is to be anything other than an abstraction, must be embodied in individual beliefs and attitudes and demonstrated in their actions and decisions. However, the essence of civil-military relations and the importance of controlling behavior have been eclipsed in many civil control programs in emerging democracies by the drive to build the hardware of civil-military relations. Central and eastern European states, for example, are urged, *inter alia*, to create laws, civilian-dominated ministries of defense, and parliamentary committees, and to appoint civilian ministers of defense. Yet many people in these states are frustrated because this effort has not produced the "democratic control" over the military politicians expected or the prudent, nonpartisan policies the military expected.¹

Although in most cases the hardware is at least adequate, problems emerge because the civil-military relations software has not been installed in the new structures for the civil control of the military. That is to say, the framework of ideas, principles, and norms that shape civil-military behavior in liberal democracies has not been adequately explained or incorporated into the officer corps, the political culture, and the defense establishments of new democracies.

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There are reasons particular to states why this is so. But generally, the source of the problem is the absence of a clear model of the software and an explicit description of "the means through which democratic norms and values become consolidated and internalized at political, military, and societal levels" in any state.² The challenge, therefore, for the "second generation problematic" in civil-military relations is to lay out the framework of ideas, principles, and norms that condition and modify the behavior of politicians and officers in mature liberal democracies and then to suggest how they might be transferred to the developing institutional structures for civil control in emerging democracies. This article accepts this challenge by describing in specific terms a normative civil-military regime of a Westminster-based, liberal democracy; that is, a civil-military regime in a liberal democracy defined as a political arrangement in which the people are sovereign, and where legitimacy for any action or decision of government rests with the people, an individual's rights are paramount, and the rule of law provides the fundamental basis for relationships between individuals, other persons, and the government.

Joining Theory to Practice

What has come to be called "the regime theory of civil-military relations" asserts that civil control of the military in every state in which a civil authority and a military exist is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Sharing is exercised according to a nationally evolved regime of "principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in matters of civil-military relations."³ Once civil-military relations are seen as an inevitable and necessarily cooperative relationship founded on a national regime, or so it is claimed, civil-military relations in most states become obvious and dynamics can be explained empirically.

If the regime theory is an accurate reflection of civil-military reality, then it may be a particularly effective device for bringing concepts into harmony with structures—to join the software to the hardware of civil-military relations. If it is also true that ideas embedded in institutions constrain policies and behavior,⁴ then exporting a clearly defined liberal democratic regime of civil-military relations to emerging democracies (respecting, as the theory demands, their particular history and social and political cultures) ought to result in behavior approximate to behavior in mature liberal democracies.

One of the first research challenges to this theory, and an early criticism of it, is the obvious need "to parse the notion of [a civil-military relations regime] into finer categories that can yield testable hypotheses across multiple cases."⁵ There is, in other words, a demand to examine closely particular civil-military regimes as codified in national constitutions and embedded in institutions.

"Parsing the notion" is offered here not merely to reinforce the underlying regime theory of civil-military relations and to build a framework for empiric studies of particular civil-military relationships; but, rather, this normative regime may have important and immediate relevance to the foreign and security policies of western democracies and their attempts to transfer their model of civil-military relations to emerging democracies in Europe and elsewhere. On the other hand, the model may serve as a framework for building the legal, behavioral, and institutional structure necessary to sustain effective and reliable civil control of the military in new polities. It suggests also that whenever western scholars, officials, and politicians encourage leaders in emerging liberal democracies to accept the western way in civil-military relations, they are recommending the adoption of some close variant or national form of this normative regime.

Understanding civil-military relations has been hindered—at least from a theoretical and international perspective—by ethnocentric analysis, narrow definitions of "the problem," dogmatic demands for unconditional "civilian control," and an inability to adequately explain, theoretically and otherwise, what is meant by the term, "civilian control," and how exactly civilians might exercise it. Not only does "the study of civil-military relations suffer from too little theorizing,"⁶ but many theories seem inconsistent with reality and thus have been forthrightly criticized.⁷ Yet, if control of the military by the civil authority is a defining characteristic of a liberal democracy and perhaps a prerequisite for the establishment of such a state, then scholars owe a duty to their societies to bring from theory the practical signposts to guide political and military leaders in matters of civil-military relations at home and abroad.

Policies aimed at spreading the virtues of liberal democracy around the world and attempts to pacify troublesome intrastate and regional conflicts require policy-makers and soldiers to confront military dictatorships and other problems related to dysfunctional civil-military systems worldwide. Whether in Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Sierra Leone, or elsewhere, the fact that soldiers or paramilitary units control many important aspects of social and political life in such troublesome

areas is often the first obstacle to democracy. But even if it were possible to disarm these factions, reformers would still need some model of civil-military relations to put in place, and few examples from the mature democracies seem appropriate or relevant to the conditions in these states. Again, few policy-makers in the democracies or at the United Nations seem prepared theoretically or practically for the task at hand.

Nevertheless, the assumption is that democracies have got it right. Western thinkers seem to believe that these states have more or less developed civil-military relationships that ensure adequate civil control of the armed forces while providing reasonably efficient and effective forces for national defense. Nevertheless, officers, scholars, and civilian leaders must acknowledge that there are contradictions and stresses in these relationships that have at times called into question the credibility of civil control of the armed forces. History suggests that one cannot assume that the mere declaration by the civil authority that it controls the armed forces explains how civil-military relations work in liberal democracies. Therefore, if western leaders wish to spread their model of democracy to other states, and especially to potential allies unfamiliar with this model, then they must answer the question: How does the liberal, democratic model of civil-military relations actually function in peacetime, military crisis, and war?

The difficulty in answering this question stems in part from an apparent high degree of ambiguity between what western writers describe as the principles underlying the relationship and the actual practice in states. For example, while the first principle of civil-military relations in liberal democracies is that elected civilians control the armed forces, it is difficult to escape Peter Feaver's thought that ultimately and inevitably only the military's "voluntary and purposeful adherence to the principle of civilian control ensures civilian control."⁸ This observation is almost a traditional view of relations in the United States. Morris Janowitz, for instance, came to the same conclusion when he noted that officers are "subject to civilian control, not only because of the 'rule of law' and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards."⁹ The idea is not only resident in the U.S., as Sir Michael Howard remarked, in the United Kingdom "neither [civilian nor military] institutions nor men can fulfill their purposes. . . save in an atmosphere relatively free from mistrust and tension between soldiers and civilians."¹⁰ Moreover, there are enough instances in western history in which officers have not volunteered to adhere to the principle, or have done so grudgingly, to raise a fair question as to whether the principle is merely a platitude.¹¹

Others, however, might argue that mature liberal democracies are beyond this worry. Time, education, and experience, plus the notion of "professionalism," have, they contend, removed the officer corps' voluntary acceptance of obedience to civil authority, replacing it with a deeply embedded fidelity to the concept of civil control. But the assumption is overshadowed by an inherent, everlasting anarchy—the civil authority has legitimacy, but the armed forces have the guns. Even if the idea of civil control is embedded in the officer corps, one cannot avoid the conclusion that it resides there because officers accept it, not because the civil authority has imposed it. The best one can say, perhaps, is that civil-military relations in mature liberal democracies stand on the willing obedience of officers to civil authority not because officers always respect the idea or the civil authority, but because they value above all else a liberal democracy, which they believe cannot exist without civil control of the armed forces.

Critics also ask: if there is a democratic system of civil-military relations that they should follow, where is it? Obviously, the arrangements in each western state are somewhat different. Which one is the most effective? If, as is commonly acknowledged, systemic differences arise from cultural, historical, and political variables, then is there a truly "democratic system of civil-military relations" or is it only rhetoric, and a confused rhetoric at that?¹²

If civil-military relations in emerging democracies are to be constructed from a western liberal democratic regime of civil-military relations, then this regime must be spelled out in explicit terms. To meet this demand, westerners should provide a conceptual and normative framework for a structure for managing civil-military relations that truly reinforces the civil authority's control of policy outcomes and the armed forces.

The Normative Pattern

Civil-military relations as practiced in each liberal democracy are based on cardinal principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures; a national regime that has evolved from the cultural, political, social, and military history of each state. In some cases, foreign or allied regimes, in NATO, for instance, have been adopted by states or imposed—as in Japan and Germany after 1945—by occupying forces. It is not the intent of this brief article to rehearse every history or to describe each national variation on the theme. Rather, the purpose is to draw a general deduction (what a colleague termed a "bloodless and conflictless"

hypothesis) from these histories to produce a normative, functional liberal democratic regime of civil-military relations. This purposefully simplified model might then serve as a research device and a benchmark for determining the degree to which a state falls within the definition of a liberal democracy from the point of view of civil-military relations.

However, one cannot escape entirely the challenge to at least refer to salient points in this evolution. Indeed, the literature is rich in ideas and background illustrating regime development motivated by reflection, ideology, and experience. Not surprisingly, much that is now taken for granted in civil-military relations in liberal democracies simply evolved from the discovery of what worked in the circumstances. Many of these ideas and methods were then incorporated into custom, administration, and law and were then later reinforced by other experiences.

The search for the roots of the regime that underpins civil-military relations in liberal democracies today takes several paths. An essential source is the writing and histories of individuals—soldiers, politicians, and others—who shaped the present by their decisions and attitudes and their joint experiences. Here we include politicians such as Oliver Cromwell, Edmund Burke, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, George Mason, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Charles de Gaulle. Innumerable senior officers have influenced relationships throughout history, including, in modern times and among others, Douglas Haig, Ferdinand Foch, John Pershing, Billy Mitchell, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Lord Ismay.

The present state of civil-military relations in most liberal democracies can also be traced over long periods of government within a liberal democratic framework and the decisions of leaders in peace, crises, and war. In Britain, for example, the Westminster tradition of government and civil-military relations originated in ancient times, suffered and was defined through the Cromwellian era, and then matured under Wellington's dominion and continually thereafter until the British civil-military disputes of the First World War. By 1939, the relationship and the expectations of the main players had assumed a more or less permanent state in custom, law, and organization.¹³

The second great influence on the evolution of liberal democratic civil-military relations arose from the experience in the United States. Although the framers of the American constitution held to many ideas on relations with the armed forces akin to those maintained by British citizens, they were intent on encoding the relationship in the Constitution rather than merely in custom and common law. Three concepts were

particularly significant to Americans: the absolute civil control of the armed forces; centralization of national defense in the federal government; and protection for society from the arbitrary use of the military by the civil authority, thus producing the separation of powers in military affairs.¹⁴

Arguably, the soundness of the constitutional arrangements was confirmed by three civil-military crises: (1) the strained relations between Washington and the Continental Congress during the revolutionary war; (2) the clashes over strategy between Lincoln and his generals, and the near defeat of the north during the Civil War; and (3) the dramatic and, at times, traumatic restructuring of the American armed forces and society during the Second World War and the Cold War era. Yet in every instance, the Constitution held, challenges were met, and military loyalty was rarely in doubt. Moreover, the constitutional arrangements proved effective and efficient during both peace and war, thus satisfying the interests of both military and political leaders, giving no great motive for substantial change.

Finally, the strength of the Westminster/American tradition and regime of civil-military relations is demonstrated by their incorporation into national and international structures for planning and managing national defence and in the transference of the regime to other states. Constitutions, laws, customs and political declarations may legitimize actions and decisions of governments but bureaucratic structures change them into operational outcomes and actual policies. There is a strong confluence, therefore, between the liberal democratic concepts of civil-military relations and the institutions designed to bring them into being in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere. This fact is evident not only in the look-alike defense ministries in western democracies, but also in the replication of this structure in western-based international defense organizations, especially in NATO.¹⁵ Moreover, proof that a type of regime transference—the adoption of western, liberal, democratic principles and norms by other states—is occurring can be seen in the striking similarity of the organizations, rules, and procedures in ministries of defense in both old and new liberal democracies.¹⁶

The pattern described in this paper accepts Krasner's classic terms concerning regimes: *principles* are "beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude"; *norms* are "standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations"; *rules* are "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions"; and *decision-making procedures* are "prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choices." While "principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime," rules and decision-making procedures provide its main operating features.¹⁷

The *civil authority* is defined as the elected civilians who by constitution, law, and custom represent and are responsible and accountable to the sovereign people. The civil authority may be assisted by appointed professional public or civil servants, but these civilians are not the civil authority.¹⁸ On the other hand, *the military* means any and all persons enrolled by the state in any unit or element of the armed forces.

The *defense establishment* is a broad term meant to include any military person, public or civil servant, scientist, or others (but not members of the civil authority) who are primarily employed within the armed forces or government departments and ministries and who are directly responsible for commanding and controlling the military and/or managing defense policy and resources.

The Principles

The people are sovereign and responsible for national security and defense.

The civil authority, elected civilians who by constitution, law, and custom represent and are responsible and accountable to the sovereign people, is the only legitimate source for decisions in matters of national defense and the entity from which the military draws all authority for its actions and decisions in peace and war.

The military is but an instrument for national defense and is unconditionally accountable to the civil authority.

Every action and decision of the civil authority and the military must be based on national laws specifically delineating, and, where appropriate, limiting the authority and powers of each.

The civil authority is solely responsible for enacting and administering the laws and regulations that govern the military, the defense establishment, and the government of the day that controls the military.

Every action and decision of the civil authority, the military, and the defense establishment is subject to independent public audit.

The Norms

Civil control is broadly conceived and, therefore, the civil authority, usually in the person of a civilian minister of defense, has the right of unrestricted access to every document, institution, plan, and decision within the defense establishment. Furthermore, the civil authority can, according to law, amend any policy, plan, or decision taken by military leaders or members of the defense establishment.

The civil authority usually appoints a civilian member of the government as "minister of national defense" and vests in that position responsibility for the direction and management of the armed forces and the defense establishment.

The military establishment is separated from the political process and from political associations, although members of the armed forces when acting as individuals are usually allowed a wide range of political freedoms.

The civil authority retains unto itself all matters dealing with the roles and missions of the armed forces, the allocation of resources to national defense, the national disposition of military units and entities, decisions related to the use of force by the military, and decisions concerning international commitments and obligations.

The civil authority, according to its own criteria, appoints the chief of defense who "serves at the pleasure" of the government of the day.¹⁹

The chief of the defense staff—or the chiefs of independent services where they are established—is the formal, professional military adviser to the civil authority and the sole link between the civil authority and the military chain of command. Usually, all orders and directives from the civil authority to the military will be issued to the military by the chief of the defense staff.

The chief of the defense staff recommends officers to the government for promotions and appointments to general or flag rank and the civil authority approves or disapproves these recommendations. However, the civil authority is restricted by law from selecting and promoting any member of the military to any rank or position except on the recommendation of the chief of the defense staff.

The military usually is allowed a degree of "rightful and actual authority"²⁰ over technical military matters, including those dealing with doctrine, tactical operations, training, discipline, military personnel policy, and the internal organization of units and entities of the armed forces.

The chief of the defense staff is allowed, within regulations, to promote and appoint members of the military to any rank or grade below general or flag officer without reference to the civil authority.

Members of the military swear to diligently discharge their duties according to the law and they make this pledge to the civil authority (i.e., the head of state or the constitution) and not to any military leader or institution.

Military officers are loyal to the concept of civil control of the armed forces and senior officers encourage and reinforce this view in the

military establishment through the education of their subordinates, by personal example and public behavior, and by disciplining wayward members of the armed forces.

The Rules

The law is the instrument that subordinates the civil authority to the people and the military to the civil authority. Liberal democracies insist and depend on the loyalty of every politician, officer, soldier, and public servant to the rule of law.

The control of the civil authority, the military, and the defense establishment requires a clear set of national defense laws especially enacted for this purpose. The defense law should unambiguously identify the chain of authority linking the civil authority to the military command; delineate authority by identifiable position; prescribe military codes of conduct, courts-martial procedures, military offenses, and punishments; and provide the basis for regulations concerning terms of service, promotions and pay, redress of grievances, and other administrative necessities.

The military ordinarily has no jurisdiction in civil affairs or over citizens who are not members of the military. Whenever the military does act in civil affairs it may do so only at the specific request of the civil authority, for a limited period of time, and according to laws and regulations established by the civil authority.

Military and police structures and policies are usually separated and directed by separate civilian ministers.

Military codes must require subordinates to obey orders from their superiors under threat of severe punishment. However, this power must be conditioned by two principles: orders must be lawful, and they must be issued by an authorized superior.²¹

A judiciary independent of the government of the day and the military must be available to resolve disputes arising from the law or any regulations that occur from time to time between these two entities and between them and any other person.

The national defense law linking superior to subordinate is intimately related to the principles of responsibility and accountability and the citizen's "right to know that the authorities, responsibilities, and duties . . . especially of leaders, are performed effectively and efficiently, and within the law."²² Ministers, therefore, should ensure that national defense laws hold identifiable persons responsible for every action and decision within the political, military, and defense establishments.

Any disciplinary action taken by the military against a member of the armed forces must be according to law and regulation and subject to review by the civil authority and/or the judiciary.

Neither the fact of enlistment nor any military necessity can deprive a member of the armed forces of his or her basic human rights, except as defined in law.²³

The Decision-Making Procedures

Weak, inept, or divided political leadership, especially in a crisis, may tempt the military or senior public servants to usurp the powers of the civil authority. Therefore, the civil control of the military is dependent on the unity of the civil authority before the defense establishment and particularly on the support the minister of defense can summon from the prime minister or head of state.

Multiparty committees on national defense composed of civilian members of the appropriate legislature are established to assist ministers and governments to control the military. They also serve as a public forum for discussion of national defense issues.

The military expects from government a clear policy set out in terms understandable to the military culture and supported by reasonable means. The government must develop its own competence to produce such a policy or at least a capability to critically assess policy recommendations provided by the defense establishment.

A ministry of defense is established to assist the civil authority, and defense ministers in particular, in the execution of their responsibilities. Such ministries are usually composed of three integrated, but not unified, sections: the political office of the minister, the military headquarters of the chief(s) of defense, and the departmental offices of the public service.

A high degree of transparency is imposed by the civil authority on the actions and decisions of the military and the defense establishment directly by, for example, the enactment of "freedom of information" statutes and the establishment of independent auditors and indirectly by encouraging the development of counter-expert, nongovernmental organizations in the media, academia, and the general public.

A consensus-building procedure involving the civil authority, military leaders, and senior public servants is the main mechanism by which complex defense decisions are made.

A formal governmental and/or ministerial committee system should be used to support the consensus-building process and to allow actors to

express and defend their interests and points of view. This system should descend from a committee chaired by the prime minister or president and his/her main advisers, to a central ministerial committee chaired by the minister of defense and seated with the leaders of the armed forces and the head of departmental public service, to military, managerial, and functional committees throughout the defense establishment.

The consensus/committee system should permit military and public service leaders to develop coordinated advice for ministers and opportunities to express reservations about the government's policies and priorities without challenging directly and publicly the civil authority's right to decide. Shared decision-making also allows ministers to find policies that, once agreed upon, tend to command military support and loyalty.

Defense budgets must be "voted in" by the civil authority for specific purposes and limited periods and there can be no allowance for unaudited secret funds nor any assumption by the military that it has a right to some "share" of the national treasure.

Ministers should manage defense allocations and expenditures directly and hold officers and officials accountable for doing with the funds what they have been told to do and what they have said they would do.

Ministers can best manage their experts by holding them accountable for the advice they provide and the results they deliver. This technique, however, requires the active supervision over the decision-making process by ministers. Active supervision, therefore, is the primary prevailing practice by which the civil authority controls the military.

For the Good of the Service

Not much will be accomplished, however, if politicians and officers simply learn to recite a catechism of civil-military relations. Rather, leaders in both entities must understand how these principles, norms, and rules affect the routine functioning of their relationship, and their place in the process—in sum, how the regime might guide and direct their individual and collective behavior in civil-military relations.

A strong military within a strong democracy is a powerful instrument for national defense. Officers might be convinced of this aphorism if they were educated in the history of democracies at war and its cardinal lesson that victory often depends on unifying the people, the government, and the armed forces in what they believe is a just cause.

Unity, however, seems contingent on the public's conviction that the armed forces are acting in the nation's interest and according to its rules. In other words, effective, verifiable civil direction of the armed forces reinforces the connection with the people and bolsters, rather than detracts from, military strength and the efficacy of national defense.

Liberal democracies have not always enjoyed a comfortable relationship with their armed forces, but they have found ways to manage the cardinal problems of civil-military relations and maintain effective national defenses. Much of this stability is owed to the officer corps, because officers have learned to value the implicit power that flows to their interests and to national defense when civil-military relationships stand on a consensus constructed cooperatively with the civil authority and officers have thus acted accordingly. This lesson may be difficult to learn outside "experience in crisis," but it is a lesson that should be firmly planted in every military mind.

If, however, there is one thing politicians and officers need to know about civil-military relations it is this: effective national defense requires social, political, and military harmony, but harmony is unlikely unless "civilian and military leaders base their thinking and action on common basic concepts."²⁴ In liberal democracies the basic concepts that underpin civil-military relations are, indeed, those few essential ideas that define such democracies in the first instance.

Notes

1. See Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe*, (NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).
2. Anthony Forster, Andrew Cottey, and Timothy Edmunds, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Control of Armed Forces In Central and Eastern Europe." Unpublished paper presented to the VII Biennial Conference, *ERGOMAS*, Prague, 2 December 2000.
3. Douglas Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, 1 (Fall, 1999): 10.
4. See Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1993), 12.
5. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 22.
6. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), vii.
7. For criticisms of American theory, see S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); Sam Sarkesian, "Military

- Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West," *International Political Science Review* 2, 3 (1981): 283-97. New explanations include K. W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, "Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits," *Armed Forces & Society* 19, 1 (1992): 7-26; Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society* 22, 1 (1995); Don Snider and Miranda Carleton-Carew, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995); Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control" *Armed Forces & Society* 23, 2 (1996) 149-78; and Richard Kohn, "How Democracies Control The Military," *Journal of Democracy* 8, 4 (1997) 140-53.
8. Peter Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 253.
 9. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 420.
 10. Sir Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), 22.
 11. History is replete with examples of stress, strain, and occasional ruptures in civil-military relations in western democracies. Consider, for example, the "Curragh incident" in the United Kingdom in 1914; the army "rebellions" in France between 1958 and 1962; MacArthur's challenge to President Truman; the so-called "crisis in civil-military relations" in the United States at the beginning of the Clinton era when the president apparently acquiesced to some significant military policy preferences; and the misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces during and after units deployed to Somalia in 1993. All these events, save perhaps the French rebellions, occurred without a direct assault on the concept of civil control of the military, but they were all resolved only after subtle applications of the idea by the players involved.
 12. Marco Carnovle, "NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces," *NATO Review* 2, 45 (1997): 32-35.
 13. See, for example, Sir Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments*; Sir John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (London: The Times Publishing Company, 1962); John Terraine, *The Western Front 1914-1918* (London: Hutchinson, 1964); Martin Edmonds, *Armed Forces and Society*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988); Diddy Hitchins and William Jacobs, "United Kingdom," in *The Political Role of the Military*, ed. Constantine Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996): 404-19; and Christopher Dandeker, "National Security And Democracy: The United Kingdom Experience," *Armed Forces & Society* 20, 3 (1994): 353-374.
 14. See for example, Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*; Allan Millet, *The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: An Historical Perspective*, Mershon Center Position Papers in Policy Sciences, No. 4 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1979); Richard Kohn, ed., *Revue Internationale D'Histoire Militaire*, No. 69-1990 (Washington: New York University, 1991); Danopoulos and Watson, eds., *The Political Role of the Military*, 420-39; and "The American Military and the Principle of Civil Control from McCellan to Powell," *Journal of Military History* 57 (October 1993): 27-59.

15. See Franklyn Johnson, *Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); Franklyn Johnson, *Defence by Ministry* (New York: Homes and Meier Company, 1980); Henry Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965); Stephen Cimbala, "United States," in *The Political Role of the Military*, ed. Danopoulos and Watson, 420-39; Robert Art, *Strategy and Management in the Post-Cold War World* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992); Robert Art et al., eds., *Reorganizing America's Defenses: Leadership in War and Peace* (New York: Pergamon Brasseys, 1985); Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: CISS, 1995). On NATO, see Robert Jordan, *The NATO International Staff/Secretariate 1952-57* (London: Oxford University Press 1967); Robert Jordan, *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987); Douglas Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Praeger, 1991).
16. See Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, "Introduction," and Section III, "The Postcommunist World" in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, eds. Diamond and Plattner, xxix; Jeffery Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996). Andrew Michta, *East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992); Jerzy Wiatr, "Poland" in, *The Political Role of the Military*, ed. Danopoulos and Watson, 361-73.
17. Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables" in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2-4.
18. This definition fits most states in most cases and satisfies the needs of the "general model." However, in some states, as in the United States, the civil authority might include "appointed" individuals such as members of the American federal cabinet and other civil servants. But in these cases, too, the civil authority is accountable to the electorate even through Congress and the president. Thus, the definition stands as a generally accepted notion.
19. In nations where the "services" are legally independent, the civil authority alone would appoint service chiefs of staff who would "serve at pleasure."
20. Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 5-12.
21. The implication of this concept is that it is an offence for anyone to obey "a manifestly unlawful" order and it therefore places individual responsibility above institutional order.
22. Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, Ottawa, 1997, 389.
23. There is a fundamental contradiction between military service and a citizen's human rights, most dramatically illustrated by the right of superiors to order individuals into situations where they will likely be wounded or killed, an act that deprives the

individual of his or her most basic human right but for which the individual has few lawful means of redress.

24. Henry Eccler, *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, (New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1965) p. 192.