

# Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces



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## *The Claxton Papers*

The Defence Management Studies program, established with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), is intended to engage the interest and support of scholars, members of the Canadian Armed Forces, public servants, and members of the defence industry in the examination and teaching of the management of national defence.

The Queen's University program in defence management studies is being carefully designed to focus on the development of theories, concepts, and skills required to manage and make decisions within the Canadian defence establishment. The Chair is located within the School of Policy Studies and offers an integrated package of teaching, research, and conferences, all of which are designed to build expertise in the field and to contribute to wider debates within the defence community. An important part of this initiative is to build strong links to DND, the Canadian Armed Forces, other universities, industry, and non-governmental organizations in Canada and other countries.

This program is built on Queen's University strengths in the fields of public policy and administration, strategic studies, management, and law. Queen's University is very pleased that we have been able to establish an agreement with Université Laval to provide substantial programming research and teaching in both official languages.

This first publication in what will become a series of studies, reports, and opinions on defence management in Canada is named for Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence from 1946 to 1954. Claxton was the first postwar defence minister and was largely responsible for founding the structure, procedures, and strategies that built Canada's modern armed forces. As minister, Claxton unified the separate service ministries into the Department of National Defence; revamped the *National Defence*

*Act*; established the office of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, the first step toward a single chief of defence staff; organized the Defence Research Board, and led defence policy through the great defence re-building program of the 1950s, the Korean War, the formation of NATO, and the deployment of forces overseas in peacetime. Claxton was unique in Canadian defence politics: he was active, inventive, competent, and wise.

*Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces* is an examination of the opinions of Senators and Members of Parliament completed in the winter of 1998-99. It is an attempt to gauge the interest and knowledge that these individuals have on matters related to defence policy, management, organization, and civil-military relations. Though some specific opinions no doubt have changed between the time the survey was completed and finally analyzed and published, and as a result of the recent war in the Balkans, most of the findings regarding major issues reflect long-standing attitudes toward national defence. Many scholars, military officers, and observers assume that politicians know nothing and care less about national defence. This survey therefore is an attempt to test the validity of this assumption.

*Douglas Bland*  
*Chair*  
*Defence Management Studies Program*  
*September 1999*

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Finally, I wish to acknowledge Keith Banting, Director of the School of Policy Studies, for his continued support for the Defence Management Studies Program.



*I*

*Introduction*



## *What Do We Know for Sure?*

There is one thing everyone knows: Canadian politicians are not interested in defence policy. Neither are they conversant with nor much interested in the Canadian Forces, except in a kind of folksy regard one has for the family pet. But how do we know this? If Parliament is uninterested and unmindful, who determines policy and who controls the defence establishment in Canada? What accounts for the occasional flurry of political controversy over defence policy and, indeed, in the more than occasional focus on defence policy and the armed forces during federal elections?<sup>1</sup>

What everyone knows is not often studied and our assumptions about what we know may explain why there is not much literature in Canada on the relationship between Parliament — the civil authority — and the armed forces. In 1972, the late Rod Byers (1972; 1973) conducted a seminal study of Parliament's surveillance of the defence executive, which included a survey of the members of the House of Commons Defence Committee. Since that time, however, academics have paid scant attention to the relationship between Parliament, defence policy, and the armed forces. Any work in the field to date is mostly indirect, such as the study by the Auditor General of Canada and the Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia, or as part of research into particular issues such as Canada's relations with allies or on deployments overseas. Ironically, one of the frankest reviews was made by Parliament itself during the 1993 proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence (SJC) (1994).

Does it really matter whether Canadian politicians are actively engaged in the formulation and supervision of national defence policy and the armed forces? It should matter, for two reasons. First, the armed forces and the Department of National Defence exercise considerable discretion

over vast resources, the lives of citizens, and the welfare of the country. Who decides who gets what and how armed force is used by the state are important matters of government. Second, evidence indicates that although politicians are not routinely occupied by national defence, they become interested and involved during a crisis or emergency. It is at this point that Canadians often discover that they do not have the defence policy they thought they had nor the compliant and effective armed forces they thought they controlled. Although the effective defence of Canada may be largely the province of the major powers, the civil control of the Canadian defence establishment is a national responsibility.

Comments about politicians' disregard for defence policy and the Canadian Forces are often uttered in a sneering tone which suggests that a lack of interest equates to neglect of a vital national policy and a critical institution. But is this assumption valid? Is it even true? How do we know? We know because we assume we know, no more and no less. What Canadian politicians think about defence policy and the armed forces is largely hearsay because there is little empirical evidence to support any of the assumptions regarding the interaction between Parliament, defence policy, and the armed forces. How does one know what politicians think about defence policy and the Canadian Forces without asking them?

The counter-assumption is that politicians know well most of what they need to know and what they expect from defence policy and the armed forces. They may be guilty of not exercising sufficient control over the defence establishment, but we make a critical error if we mistake failures to supervise for lack of interest in the ends and means of defence policy. This is an especially important distinction when leaders of the defence establishment are reluctant, and perhaps even hostile, toward the attitudes, ideas, interests, and directions of the civil authority. If we discover that politicians have a coherent view on policy and the Canadian Forces, but that the leaders of the defence establishment seek to replace that strategy with their own, then we face a civil-military relations problem and not a case of political neglect.

Research into politicians' thoughts on defence policy and the armed forces might reveal a rationale that is too often neglected in defence studies and commentary. It might also expose the source of the surprises and the conflicts that characterize civil-military relations in Canada. Finally, a clearer understanding of what politicians think in these matters when compared with what military and public service leaders think might map

a route toward a more coherent defence policy that citizens and their representatives will support.

This paper is a report on an attempt to find out what politicians think about defence policy and the Canadian Forces. It is based on a survey of Senators and Members of Parliament conducted in the winter of 1998-99. The survey was supported by some interviews with individuals, including in particular, members of Cabinet and of the House of Commons Defence Committee. The results provide a view from a point in time. Whether the conclusions gathered in this paper will remain valid in the future remains to be discovered. But at least for today, we can say we understand something of what the politicians think about defence policy and the Canadian Forces because we have asked the participants.

## THE SURVEY

This survey was a type of “executive survey” intended to gather information about leaders’ ideas and policy preferences, but it was not an opinion poll. Senators and Members of Parliament were asked questions in seven categories: personal background information, political information, general defence policy, defence budget, capital procurement, defence organization, and civil-military relations. The aim of the questionnaire was not to find out what they knew about national defence, but to try to assess what they thought was important and in what direction they thought defence policy should move.

Sixty-five individuals responded to the survey by completing the questionnaire. A further 15 responded by declaring variously that they did not answer surveys as a matter of principle. The total response, therefore, was 80 individuals (20 percent of those contacted).

There are several factors that seemed to contribute to the level of response. First, after the initial mail-out, we became aware that reaching Senators and Members of Parliament by mail and getting their attention was more difficult than expected. In many cases, respondents reported that they had not received or could not find the questionnaire in their offices. Indeed, we were encouraged to find, after we had mailed a follow-up letter to non-respondents, that some Members of Parliament asked for additional copies because they were “eager to respond.” Second, many politicians simply refused to answer surveys and not everyone was courteous enough to inform us of their policy. Finally, although more than 50

percent of the respondents were members of the Liberal caucus, despite assurances that individual responses would be protected there were some private indications that the government did not encourage its members to join the survey.

Even though the level of response may appear to be low, the results suggest that the assumption of “no interest” and “neglect” is not completely valid. It is unrealistic to expect every Senator and every Member of Parliament to concentrate all their attention on defence policy. It is more realistic to expect a graduated interest conditioned by constituent affairs, party duties, and personal convictions and preferences. The survey suggests that there is, indeed, a small group of Senators and Members of Parliament scattered throughout the parties who are interested in defence policy and the Canadian Forces and that these individuals understand defence issues to a degree and have reasoned opinions on the subject. The first general conclusion is that anyone interested in building political support for national defence and the armed forces should concentrate their efforts on these individuals. The tactical principle is “reinforce success, not failure.”

## DEFENCE AS PERSONAL POLITICS

Members of Parliament and Senators were asked a series of questions regarding their personal interests in defence policy and the Canadian Forces in particular. Most respondents had served more than one term in the House of Commons or Senate but few had ever undertaken any significant defence-related responsibilities. Although some individuals reported that they had some military experience, none had held any rank other than an occasional honorary position with a unit of the Canadian Forces.

A number of respondents had some sort of defence installation in their ridings (27.5 percent), but a majority reported that they were aware that many members of the armed forces resided in their ridings. However, contact with the Canadian Forces at the local level was limited in all cases. For example, only 40.9 percent (Q-8) of the respondents visited military bases in their ridings. On the other hand, they stated that they had spoken with members of the Canadian Forces at home and abroad, 76.6 percent (Q-9), and with general officers more often, 66.1 percent (Q-11). The value of this statistic is problematic given that 1998 was the



year of the “great ice storm” in eastern Canada and the widespread flood in Manitoba, when contact between the armed forces and the public was unusually high. Although 41.9 percent (Q-15) reported that “national defence issues are a major issue in my riding,” defence issues were not a major factor in the 1996 general election. According to 50 percent (Q-17) of the respondents, there were no major defence issues interesting the public. This observation was made in the face of the Somalia affair and the untimely death of the inquiry established to investigate it!

Interestingly, although 40.6 percent (Q-12) reported that they had spoken with the Chief of the Defence Staff on some occasion, only 34.4 percent (Q-13) had ever visited National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. This situation reflects more on the lack of attention that senior officers and defence officials pay politicians than any failing of the politicians themselves. Nevertheless, respondents indicated that they were aware of defence issues and spoke about them occasionally in Parliament (37.5 percent), in public (53.1 percent), and in caucus a surprising 69.8 percent (Q-16). The nature of these interventions should be examined in more detail to find out what is discussed. But the figures suggest, at least, that officers and officials are not well connected to individual politicians and may be missing an opportunity to interest them in defence concerns.

## MATTERS OF POLICY

The survey tested the opinions of respondents concerning military threats, defence missions, and the relationship between defence and foreign policy, among other things. The results showed no clear preference for a single mission for the Canadian Forces, but it revealed a surprising difference between the views of politicians and those held by most academics and interested observers of Canada’s place in the world.

The survey listed possible military threats to Canada and asked the respondents to list in priority those they thought most dangerous for Canada. This list included specific threats, such as nuclear proliferation, and more general regional sources of conflict that might involve Canadians. An overwhelming majority (37.5 percent) (Q-22) of politicians cited “international terrorism” as the main threat to Canada’s national defence. This concern was followed at a distance by threats that might arise from “internal disagreements in Canada” (18.8 percent), war in the Middle East (25 percent), membership in NATO (15.6 percent), and wars resulting from the

actions of the government of the United States (14 percent). Although politicians worried about NATO, only 9.4 percent of the responses indicated that conflict in Europe was a source of danger.

Most politicians believe that Canada's defence ultimately depends on the actions and decisions of the government or the Canadian Forces (44.4 percent), an opinion that may be contested by some of the authors in Canadian defence literature. Respondents credit Canada's defence to the United States (34.9 percent) and to NATO (27 percent) fairly equally. However, no matter how they interpreted the question, a clear majority (59 percent) agreed that "Canada should seek ways to strengthen its defence ties to the United States."

There was a high degree of ambivalence in the minds of politicians concerning the most appropriate missions that ought to be assigned to the Canadian Forces. Politicians were asked to identify those missions around which the Canadian Forces should be *mainly* organized and given a choice between "UN peace support," "engagement in wars alongside traditional allies," and "domestic operations." They responded as follows:

UN support	for - 46.8 %	against - 51.6%
War and allies	for - 46.1	against - 50.8
Domestic operations	for - 51.6	against - 48.4

On the other hand, asked if "the demands of war-fighting should be the primary criteria for organizing, training, and commanding the Canadian Forces," 21.9 percent strongly agreed, 23.4 percent agreed, 42.2 percent disagreed and 6.3 percent strongly disagreed.

Two related questions were included in this part of the survey. The first concerned the place of women in direct combat roles in the armed forces; 71.4 percent of the respondents supported this idea. Clearly the issue is settled, at least in society. The second question addressed the so-called "body-bag" issue. Respondents were asked if the expectation of significant personnel casualties to members of the Canadian Forces deployed on "peacekeeping missions" would deter such deployments. They split on the answer, 43.8 percent saying it would deter operations, while 46.9 percent said that it would not prevent such deployments. These results suggest that the question of missions should be revisited more precisely, but they also indicate that politicians want an armed force that can function in a variety of situations without resort to high levels of violence.

Canadian politicians have an exceptional view of the history of and influence attributable to Canada's defence policy. Throughout the Cold War era, by any objective measure, Canada placed all its defence "eggs" and most of its defence dollars in the NATO basket and prepared its armed forces for nuclear war. Yet 69.8 percent of the respondents agreed that "Canada's most significant contribution to international peace and security since 1950" was in the United Nations. Only 23.8 percent considered Canada's contributions to NATO as significant. Nevertheless, 82.5 percent believe that Canada's military contributions to the alliance give Canada "influence" in NATO. Similarly, 85.7 percent agree that the Canadian Forces maintain Canada's influence in the United Nations.

However, despite a strong preference for cooperation with the United States in matters of defence, 61.9 percent of the respondents disagreed when asked if Canada should use the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping operations to win favour with the United States. Even though 55.6 percent stated that Canada had used the Canadian Forces precisely for this purpose in the past, 38.1 percent disagreed.

## THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF DEFENCE

Critics often say that Canadian politicians may not be much interested in national defence policy, but that they are very interested in defence dollars; especially if these dollars can be made to flow toward their ridings. The survey, however, reveals that the respondents, at least, have pragmatic concerns for spending and generally would like monies distributed rationally according to the real needs of the Canadian Forces.

A large number (39.7 percent) of the respondents reported that defence spending had a "major impact" in their ridings. This observation seems contrary to other research which suggests that defence expenditures have little effect on local economies, except in particular cases. We should assume, therefore, that many of the respondents come from these particular ridings. Politicians were divided on the question of whether defence expenditures should be used to stimulate local economies with 51.6 percent against the idea and 46.9 percent in favour.

Members of Parliament and Senators were asked a series of questions about where defence funds should be spent in relation to missions, activities, and organizations. In terms of spending on major commitments,

the respondents' priorities reflected popular thinking and policies. Asked to list their four spending priorities in order and by traditional commitments, politicians chose as follows:

Mission	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
	(percent)			
Defence of Canada	50.8	21.3	14.8	13.1
United Nations Operations	35.5	24.2	16.1	24.2
Defence of North America	23.0	32.8	18.0	26.2
NATO Operations	11.3	29.0	40.3	19.4

Taken from another perspective, politicians would spend first on the defence of Canada (50.8 percent), then on the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States (32.8 percent), then on NATO operations (40.3 percent), and finally (assuming prior spending on North American defence) on United Nations operations (24.2 percent).

These figures reflect long-standing priorities for defence spending in Canada, but they can be misleading. First, operations of the Canadian Forces cannot be segregated into mission packages. Second, it has always been difficult to attribute an operation or a decision — say on Arctic surveillance or equipment procurement — to only one mission for they can often encompass two or more missions. Finally, spending need not always follow priority concerns. For example, if the defence of Canada were reasonably assured because threats were low or other efforts addressed the need, then spending could logically be directed elsewhere without removing this mission from its invariable first place. The better question (perhaps for another survey) might be, where is Canada most vulnerable and where, as a consequence, should expenditures be made?

When politicians were asked to allocate defence spending to particular activities, their lack of detailed knowledge soon became apparent. Most choices between competing entities, such as land, sea, and air forces, were assigned to the “equally” or “don’t know” categories. For example, 65.6 percent of the respondents thought the defence budget was “too small.” However, even when given a choice between \$15 billion, \$10 billion, and \$5 billion, an astonishing 52.5 percent of the respondents stated they did not know how much was enough. On the question of whether spending should be directed mainly toward personnel or re-equipping the Canadian Forces, or current operations, 70.3 percent opted for “shared equally.”

Where defence funds should be allocated to Canadian Forces organizations seems a mystery best left to professional judgement, although it is a critical policy decision if means are to be brought into line with policy ends. The land element of the armed forces was favoured (16.9 percent) over the sea and air components, but most politicians had no opinion on the matter, preferring “divided equally” (79.7 percent) to a real choice. Similarly, on the question of the personnel strength of the regular force of the Canadian Forces — given choices of 120,000, 85,000, 60,000, and 45,000 — respondents answered 43.5 percent “don’t know.”

Whether the Canadian Forces should be mainly composed of regular force or reserve force members, 84.1 percent accepted “some combination.” Although 47.5 percent had no opinion on the appropriate split between the regular force elements, the army clearly was favoured by 36.1 percent over the navy, (0 percent) and the air force 1.6 percent. Politicians’ choice for reserve force allocations mirrored their preferences for the regular force: 46.8 percent land, 1.6 percent air, 1.6 percent navy, and 40.3 percent “don’t know,” although a majority, 54.8 percent, had no opinion on how many persons should be enlisted in the reserves.

Politicians’ response to questions related to defence procurement (broadly defined) seem to belie the negative stereotype many critics like to point out. Asked to identify the “main criterion for procuring major military equipment,” 79.7 percent favoured the needs of the Canadian Forces over “low cost,” (7.8 percent) and “the impact on the Canadian economy” (4.7 percent). They agreed that spending should be directed to “the most cost-effective source” (46.8 percent) over Canadian business (41.9 percent) and North American business (4.8 percent). Even though they obviously want to spend defence funds in Canada, “given the choice between buying *the most effective* military equipment from foreign markets and buying *less effective* equipment manufactured by domestic producers for *the same price*,” 85.2 percent of the respondents agreed that the government should buy from foreign sources if there was a “large” difference in effectiveness.

In terms of “regional spin-offs” from defence spending, choices became more distinct. Respondents agreed (72.9 percent) that “defence spending for all purposes” should be determined according to the needs of the Canadian Forces rather than by regional interests. If defence contracts were awarded to foreign contractors, politicians prefer “off-setting provisions” included in the contract equal to the cost of the contract (33.3 percent),

but not at the expense of savings for not doing so (45.6 percent). If off-sets were negotiated, politicians were unsure about what the preferred off-set might be in fact. They selected direct spending (12.5 percent), defence-related jobs (14.6 percent), defence-related technology transfers (12.5 percent) defence-related subcontracts (22.9 percent) and “other programs” (31.3 percent). One-quarter of the respondents failed to answer the question (there was no “don’t know” choice).

## THE HIGHER DIRECTION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Investigations into the actions and decisions of senior officers and officials in National Defence Headquarters and a continuing worry about the ambiguous relationships between political, military, and public service leaders have brought the entire structure of the defence establishment into question. This survey confirms these worries and indicates that recent changes may not have appeased them.

Politicians, even after more than 30 years of “unification,” are still not confident that the Canadian Forces are well organized, but they seem confused about which concept of organization might be best. Although 36.1 percent of the respondents regard unification a “success,” 46 percent do not. On the other hand, 32.8 percent supported dividing the forces into three distinct elements under their own chiefs of staff, while 50.8 percent rejected this notion. Nevertheless, 61.3 percent of the respondents agree that the Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff, “a single authority over the Canadian Forces, created as part of the concept of unification [is] an effective and worthwhile office.” They seem oblivious to the logic that once a single authority is appointed over the Canadian Forces, then the armed forces are, *ipso facto*, unified and must live by the consequences of that concept.

Politicians indicated in the survey that they believe the widely held assumption that deputy ministers of the Department of National Defence have had too much say in military matters that are outside their professional and legal responsibilities. They agreed (62.9 percent, of whom 29 percent “strongly agreed”) that the deputy minister should be “restricted to matters dealing only with financial management, public service personnel issues, and procurement and contracting.” Moreover, 67.7 percent agreed (30.6 percent strongly agreed) that the deputy minister “should not play a significant role in determining Canada’s military arrangements

for operations.” Yet, they were split on whether National Defence Headquarters should be “divided into a defence ministry and a military headquarters: 38.3 percent voted for the status quo, while 38.3 percent wanted division. As with questions related to Canadian Forces organization and the Chief of the Defence Staff, politicians signaled their dissatisfaction with the present situation, but little comprehension of it. In such circumstances it is difficult to imagine how politicians might expect to lead the defence establishment.

### CANADIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Again, the travail of the post-Somalia deployment and the questionable performance of senior military and public service leaders excited discussion of Canadian civil-military relations perhaps more than at any time since the end of World War II. Politicians, as a result of media attention and not their own deliberations, became interested in the Defence Department, the generals and their staffs, and in relationships between themselves, officials, and officers.

Despite the obvious difficulties ministers encountered during and after the Somalia deployment, politicians see no need to radically overhaul the *National Defence Act*. Of these politicians, 62.9 percent agree with the statement “the minister has adequate laws and regulations to ‘direct and manage the Canadian Forces’,” and 19.3 percent disagree. They also believe, by a wide margin — 34.9 percent agree, 60.3 percent disagree — that “Parliament plays an effective role in the civil control of the armed forces.” Despite the evidence of serious failings in Canadian Forces operations in Somalia and Bosnia, 75 percent of politicians believe that Parliament adequately supervises such operations.

Although they appear satisfied with their supervision of the armed forces and the wider defence establishment, politicians are not happy with the machinery by which they exercise this responsibility. For example, 48.5 percent do not think that operational deployments of the Canadian Forces outside Canada are well coordinated by the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Neither do they agree (30.2 percent for and 68.3 percent disagree) that the Defence Committee of the House of Commons is an effective structure for the overseeing of defence affairs. A majority (72.2 percent) of the respondents would improve the committee by “establishing a

permanent research staff answerable to the committee as a whole.” Politicians also agreed (50.9 percent versus 24.6 percent) to establish a type of “national security council” to better coordinate defence and security policies.

The Defence Committee usually considers issues sent to it by the minister of national defence, but some members would like to present certain critical decisions for routine review by the Defence Committee. They believe that the committee should interview officers nominated for general or flag rank before they are appointed (46.1 percent in favour, 42.8 percent against). They are even more convinced (61.9 percent versus 31.7 percent) that they should interview officers nominated as Chief of the Defence Staff before that appointment is confirmed. However, 61.3 percent do not wish to interview officers selected to command significant field operations and seem content to let the Chief of the Defence Staff make such decisions alone. Politicians would also like to involve the Defence Committee in procurement issues and 76.2 percent think that they should review all “major crown projects” before contracts are let.

Politicians, generally, believe that they should be more active in national defence issues. They feel (51.6 percent), for instance, that “Parliament should agree to all overseas deployment of Canadian Forces units.” But they are not confident that the bureaucracy provides them with the means to conduct any serious review of defence policy or Canadian Forces operations. Asked if they had “adequate access to defence information,” 59.4 percent stated that this was not so. They concluded (44.3 percent), according to the survey, that this problem originates mainly in the “secrecy and executive control of information by the government and public servants.”

## WHAT TO EXPECT FROM PARLIAMENT

The remaining and basic question that follows from this study is not why do politicians and military officers disagree, but why do they ever agree on any critical defence policy? The answer seems to be that agreements occur in peacetime only when they fit military preferences or when crises arrive that fully engage political leaders. The first reality is that political leaders will not normally involve themselves in debates about “effective” national defence. Nor will they spend much time worrying about coherence between ends and means. Rather, defence policy will



come to Cabinet as distinct issues, such as major spending projects. Then the discussion will probably turn around the presumed “benefits” of the project to local interests. So-called strategic matters, if they ever reach the Cabinet agenda, will most likely be decided in terms of buying influence with allies at the lowest possible cost. Emergencies and international crises may prompt some political debate, but usually they will be addressed in isolation and once resolved, they will disappear from the table. Nevertheless, when real defence and internal security crises appear, prime ministers often turn to their chiefs of defence and generally accept their advice so long as it is reasonable and consistent with short-term policy requirements.

Fortunately, at least for military officers, the reward of irrelevance is freedom from political oversight. Governments put the Canadian Forces on the “back burner” and rarely bother attending to the details of defence policy or defence administration. Officers and officials can arrange matters to satisfy their own views within the budgets that governments supply. On those rare occasions when the defence establishment is faced with the unwelcome ideas of eager ministers, the reaction is to bring ministers around to the establishment view, present dilemmas and predict catastrophes, refuse to make real choices — as in championing the “general purpose and multi-purpose force” models, or simply to wait for the offending minister to leave office.

Nevertheless, one fact of national life seems immutable; military concepts and doctrine cannot substantially change political ideas and attitudes concerning national defence. The immediate challenge facing the senior officer corps, therefore, is to establish within the Canadian Forces a set of ideas that will bring the officer corps into line with the way most Canadians think about national defence. This means that officers will have to rethink their assumptions about threats, defence objectives, capabilities, organizations, relations with allied military leaders, and operational methods. The dilemma for the officer corps, however, is to find leaders to do this from the ranks of officers raised to do just the opposite.

Some pieces of this new framework have already been erected following the turmoil and inquiries into the Somalia affair. Much is left to be done. But the most trying test will be to overpower officers’ tendencies to discount, in quiet periods, the “the facts of national life” and their habit of substituting in their place unrealistic and unworkable military interests and aspirations. Canadians are fortunate, however, because

Canadian Forces officers at this moment seem ready to meet the challenge, well armed with a fresh appraisal of their professional responsibilities and a willingness to be guided by the ethics of their profession and the interests of Canadians.

However, Parliament cannot and should not expect the Canadian Forces to automatically change in ways that benefit civil-military relations in Canada. It is not the place of officers to divine defence policy in the absence of political direction. Members of Parliament set the goals for national defence and then supervise the defence policy process. It is too complex a task for one minister and besides, national defence is, theoretically at least, the duty of Parliament. As the SJC reported to Parliament in 1994, "whatever our individual views on particular issues of defence policy and organization, there was one matter on which we agreed almost from the beginning — that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny and development of defence policy" (Canada 1994, p. 57). This survey indicates that Parliament has yet to meet this worthy goal.

#### NOTE

<sup>1</sup>Consider, for example, the controversies caused by North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) agreements, the Cuba missile crisis, unification, nuclear weapons policy, and "rust-out" of the Canadian Forces and the "commitment-capabilities gap" during federal elections since 1956.

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
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# *II*

## *Survey Data*




**Q1 - Responses by party**



**Q2 - Chart not included.**


**Q3 - I have been a member of a Defence Committee of:**



\* H of C - House of Commons.

\*\* JPC - A Joint Parliamentary Committee.


**Q4 - Parliamentarians with military experience**




CIL - Cadet Instructors list.  
 CIC - Cadet Instructors Cadre.  
 COTC - Canadian Officer Training Corps.

**Q5 - Chart not included.**


**Q-6 - My riding includes:**




### Q7 - My riding includes CF Personnel




### Q8 - I have visited CF Bases in my riding:



**Q9 - I have visited/spoken with CF members:**




**Q10 - During recent domestic emergencies\*, I visited/spoke with CF members:**



\* Saguenay Floods, Manitoba Floods, Eastern Canada Ice Storm.




**Q11 - I have met and spoken about defence policy with General and Flag\* rank officers of the CF.**




**\* Flag rank officer - Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral, Admiral.**


**Q12 - I have spoken about defence policy with the current or a previous CDS.**




**Q13 - I have visited NDHQ on defence policy business.**



**Q14 - I have spoken about defence policy/issues:**




**Q15 - National defence issues in my riding are a major issue with the public.**




**Note: S. Agree = Strongly Agree. S. Disagree = Strongly Disagree. This is true for subsequent charts.**


**Q16 - I have spoken about defence policy in caucus.**




**Q17 - National defence policy was not a prominent issue in the last general election because:**




**Q18 - Defence policy is discussed in my party caucus:**




**Q19 - My constituents are unwilling to commit the CF to “Peacekeeping Missions” if there is a high expectation of significant personnel casualties.**




**Q20 - Canadian politicians generally ignore defence policy and defence issues.**



**Q21 - My primary Parliamentary interests are:**





**Q22 - The main national defence threats facing Canada are:**




**This data reflects respondents' cumulative assessment of the highest and second highest threats facing Canada.**


**Q23 - No data**



**Q26 - Canada should seek ways to strengthen its defence ties to the United States.**




**Q27 - In future, Canada should use the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping efforts to win favour with the United States and allies.**







**Q28 - Canada has used the CF to win favour with the U.S. in the past ten years.**




**Q29 - Canada's most significant contribution to international peace and security since 1950 has been to:**




**Q30 - The CF should be organized mainly for UN Peace Support Operations.**




**Q31 - The CF should be mainly organized for warfare alongside traditional allies.**




**Q32 - The CF should be mainly organized for domestic operations.**




**Q33 - The demands of war-fighting should be the primary criteria for organizing, training, and commanding the Canadian Forces.**




**Q34 - Women should have unrestricted access to all ranks and military occupations including direct combat positions in all branches of the Canadian Forces.**




**Q35 - Canada's, military forces gain "influence" for Canada in NATO.**




**Q36 - Canada's military forces gain "influence" for Canada in the United Nations.**




**Q37 - Defence expenditures have a major impact on the economy of my constituency.**




**Q38 - Defence expenditures should be used to stimulate economic activity in Canada.**




**Q39 - First priority for defence spending should be:**




**Q40 - The defence budget in 1998 is:**




**Q41 - An appropriate defence budget would be approximately:**



**Q42 - The main portion of the defence budget should be allocated to spending on:**




**Q43 - The defence budget should be allocated mainly to:**






**Q44 - The defence budget should be allocated mainly to operations:**




**Q45 - Chart not included.**


**Q46 - The main criterion for procuring major military equipment should be:**




**Q47 - Defence spending for equipment for the Canadian Forces should be directed mainly to:**




**Q48 - Given the choice between buying the most effective military equipment from foreign markets and buying less effective equipment manufactured by domestic producers for the same price, the government should:**



**Q49 - Defence spending in Canada for all purposes should be allocated by:**




**Q50 - Major defence equipment contracts let to foreign manufacturers should always include off-setting\* provisions:**




**\* Off-setting refers to benefits returned to Canada from foreign contractors.**


**Q51 - Off-sets for major foreign defence contracts should be made in terms of:**




**Q52 - In the current and foreseeable future, Canada should base its national defence mainly on:**



**Q53 - Given the current defence budget, an appropriate strength of personnel in the regular force of the Canadian Forces should be approximately:**




**Q54 - The regular force should be composed mainly of:**




\* ***All three environments*** was not an option on the questionnaire; however, it has been added to reflect respondents' answers.

**Q55 - An appropriate level of personnel in the reserve force of the Canadian Forces would be approximately:**




**Q56 - The reserve force should be composed mainly of:**




**\* "All of the above" was not an option on the questionnaire; however, it has been added to reflect respondents' answers.**


**Q57 - National Defence Headquarters today is an amalgamated organization of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. It should:**




**Q58 - The unification of the armed forces as envisioned by the Liberal government in 1967-68 has been a success.**



**Q59 - The position of Chief of the Defence Staff is an effective and worthwhile office.**




**Q60 - The Canadian Forces would be more effective if it were recognized into three distinct services - army, navy, and air force - each under its own Chief of Staff who would have direct access to the Minister of National Defence.**






**Q61 - The Chief of the Defence Staff should have direct access to the Prime Minister on issues he/she believes are important to the Canadian Forces or national defence.**




**Q62 - The responsibilities of the Deputy Minister of DND\* ought to be restricted to matters dealing only with financial management, public service personnel issues, and procurement and contracting.**




\* DND - Department of National Defence.


**Q63 - The Deputy Minister of DND should not play a significant role in determining Canada's military arrangements for operations.**




**Q64 - The Minister of National Defence has adequate laws and regulations to "direct and manage" the Canadian Forces.**




**Q65 - Parliament today plays an effective role in the civil control of the armed forces.**




**Q66 - Parliament's surveillance of the missions and operations of the Canadian Forces is adequate.**




**Q67 - The current House of Commons Defence Committee is an effective defence policy oversight structure.**




**Q68 - The House of Commons Defence Committee should have a permanent research staff answerable to the Committee as a whole.**




**Q69 - The Commons Defence Committee should routinely interview officers nominated for General or Flag rank before they are appointed or promoted.**




**Q70 - The Commons Defence Committee should routinely interview any officer nominated for appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff before he/she is confirmed by Order-in-Council.**




**Q71 - The Commons Defence Committee should routinely interview officers nominated to command significant Canadian Forces units scheduled for deployment on international security operations before the unit is deployed.**




**Q72 - The Commons Defence Committee should routinely review all "major crown projects" (programs costing more than \$100M) before contracts are let or expenditures made.**




**Q73 - A Permanent Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on national defence should be established.**




**Q74 - Parliament should agree to all overseas deployments of Canadian Forces units.**



**Q75 - Decisions to deploy the CF on operational missions outside Canada are generally well coordinated between NDHQ\* and the Department of Foreign Affairs.**




**Q76 - Canada's defence and foreign policy would benefit from the establishment of a type of "National Security Council" to oversee and coordinate policies.**







**Q77 - As a Member of Parliament, I feel that I have adequate access to all the information I need to make informed decisions about Canada's national defence.**




**Q78 - If parliamentary surveillance of defence issues is a problem for Senators and Members of Parliament, the problem originates in:**




**Q79 - I have read the entire Report of the Somalia Inquiry.**




**Q80 - I have read the Executive Summary of the Somalia Inquiry Report.**




**Q81 - I have read only public statements about the Somalia Report.**



**Q82 - I have read the Report of the Special Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services (the Dickson Report).**



**Q83 - I usually read the reports of the Auditor General of Canada that refer to the Canadian Forces, DND, and defence policy.**



# *III*

## *Survey Questionnaire*



# *Survey of Parliament – 1998*

## **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

### **1. Political Party Affiliation:**

- Liberal
- Reform
- Bloc Québécois
- New Democratic Party
- Progressive Conservative Party
- Independent

### **2. Number of years in:**

- House of Commons \_\_\_\_\_
- Cabinet \_\_\_\_\_
- Senate \_\_\_\_\_

### **3. I have been a Member of a Defence Committee of:**

- the House of Commons
- the Senate
- a Joint Parliamentary Committee
- none

### **4. Military experience in years:**

- Regular Force \_\_\_\_\_
- Reserve Force \_\_\_\_\_
- Cadet Instructors List/Cadet Instructors Cadre \_\_\_\_\_
- Army/Air/Sea Cadets \_\_\_\_\_
- Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC) \_\_\_\_\_
- Honourary Appointment \_\_\_\_\_
- None \_\_\_\_\_

5. **Highest military rank, if any:** \_\_\_\_\_

6. **My riding includes:**

- one military base
- more than one military base
- no military base

7. **My riding includes members of the Canadian Forces** (*meaning those who declare your riding as their “usual place of residence” for election purposes*).

- more than 1000 members of the Canadian Forces
- less than 1000 members of the Canadian Forces
- no members
- do not know

8. **While in office, I visited the Canadian Forces base(s) my riding.**

- more than four times per year
- once a year
- never

9. **I have visited with and spoken to members of the Canadian Forces.**

- in Canada, including aboard Her Majesty’s Canadian ships in or near Canada
- during visits to operational missions outside Canada

10. **During recent domestic emergencies in the Saguenay, Manitoba Flood, and Eastern Canada Ice Storm, I visited with and spoke to members of the Canadian Forces.**

- daily
- occasionally
- never



**11. I have met and spoken with General and Flag rank officers of the Canadian Forces about defence policy.**

- often
- occasionally
- never

**12. I have spoken about defence policy with the current or a previous Chief of the Defence Staff.**

- often
- occasionally
- never

**13. I have visited National Defence Headquarters on defence policy business.**

- often
- occasionally
- never

**14. I have spoken about defence policy/issues.**

- in Parliament
- in public meetings
- in my constituency
- never

**15. National defence issues in my riding are a major issue with the public.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**16. I have spoken about defence policy in caucus.**

- often
- occasionally
- never

## POLICY QUESTIONS

- 17. National defence policy was not a prominent issue in the last general election because:**
- there was no major issue before the public
  - the policy is not relevant at the riding level
  - no party proposed an alternate policy to that of the government
- 18. Defence policy is discussed in my party caucus.**
- often
  - occasionally
  - never
- 19. My constituents are unwilling to commit the Canadian Forces to “peacekeeping missions” if there is a high expectation of significant personnel casualties.**
- strongly agree
  - agree
  - disagree
  - strongly disagree
  - don't know
- 20. Canadian politicians generally ignore defence policy and defence issues.**
- strongly agree
  - agree
  - disagree
  - strongly disagree
  - don't know

**21. My primary parliamentary interests are:** (*check two — 1 being the highest*)

- national unity
- social policy
- foreign policy
- defence policy
- economic policy
- labour policy
- none of the above

### **DEFENCE POLICY**

**22. The main national defence threats facing Canada are:** (*list in priority by placing a number in each box - 1 is the highest threat*)

- internal disagreements in Canada
- actions and policies of the United States
- international terrorism
- conflict in Europe
- conflict in Asia
- conflict in the Middle East
- conflict in Africa
- conflict in Latin America
- Islamic fundamentalism
- interstate war involving the United States and another power
- interstate war involving members of NATO
- nuclear war
- none of the above

**23. If your answer is “none of the above,” describe in a few words the main military threat to Canada, if you see one.**

**24. The most important question facing defence planners in Canada today is: (select one)**

- morale in the junior ranks
- lack of resources to meet government directed commitments
- responding to changing international threats
- civil control of the defence establishment
- conditions of service of members of the Canadian Forces
- ethical failures of General officers

**25. Canada's defence ultimately depends on:**

- NATO policies
- Canadian policies
- United States policies

**26. Canada should seek ways to strengthen its defence ties to the United States.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**27. In future, Canada should use the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping efforts to win favour with the United States and allies.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**28. Canada has used the Canadian Forces to win favour with the United States in the past ten years.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**29. Canada's most significant contribution to international peace and security since 1950 has been:**

- to NATO
- to the UN
- to North American defence
- to other allies or agencies

**30. The Canadian Forces should be organized mainly for UN Peace Support Operations.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**31. The Canadian Forces should be mainly organized to engage in war alongside traditional allies.**

- strongly agree
- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**32. The Canadian Forces should be mainly organized for domestic operations in aid of the civil authorities and to provide assistance to civil powers.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**33. The demands of war-fighting should be the primary criteria for organizing, training, and commanding the Canadian Forces.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**34. Women should have unrestricted access to all ranks and military occupations including direct combat positions in all branches of the Canadian Forces.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**35. Canada's military forces gain "influence" for Canada in NATO.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**36. Canada's military forces gain "influence" for Canada in the United Nations.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**DEFENCE BUDGET**

**37. Defence expenditures have a major impact on the economy of my constituency.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**38. Defence expenditures should be used to stimulate economic activity in Canada.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**39. Indicate your priorities for defence spending** (*circle one number in each line, "1" is the first priority*).

- United Nations operations 1-2-3-4
- defence of North America in cooperation with the United States 1-2-3-4
- defence of Canada 1-2-3-4
- NATO operations 1-2-3-4

**40. The defence budget in 1998 is:**

- too large
- about right
- too small
- don't know

**41. An appropriate defence budget would be approximately:**

- \$15 billion
- \$10 billion
- \$5 billion
- don't know

**42. The main portion of the defence budget should be allocated to spending on:**

- current operations
- personnel
- re-equipping the armed forces
- shared equally among these objectives

**43. The defence budget should be allocated mainly to:**

- land forces (army)
- naval forces
- air forces
- divided more or less equally

**44. The defence budget should be allocated mainly to:**

- operations in Canada
- operations in North America
- operations under NATO auspices
- operations under United Nations auspices

**45. The percentage of the defence budget allocated annually to the Reserve component of the Canadian Forces is:**

- 20 percent
- 40 percent
- 60 percent
- don't know

**CAPITAL PROCUREMENT**

**46. The main criterion for procuring major military equipments should be:**

- low cost; "lowest qualified bid"
- impact on Canadian economy
- regional equity
- needs of the Canadian Forces



**47. Defence spending for equipment for the Canadian Forces should be directed mainly to:**

- Canadian businesses
- North American businesses
- other foreign businesses
- the most cost-effective source world-wide

**48. Given the choice between buying *the most effective* military equipment from foreign markets and buying *less effective* equipment manufactured by domestic producers for *the same price*, the government should:**

- always buy equipment from foreign sources
- always buy equipment from the domestic firm
- buy from foreign sources only if there is a large difference in equipment effectiveness

**49. Defence spending in Canada for all purposes should be:**

- equally divided between the Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, and western regions
- divided according to regional contributions (i.e. population or tax returns)
- directed towards the needs of the Canadian Forces regardless of regional interests
- devoted to low income regions

**50. Major defence equipment contracts let to foreign manufacturers should always:**

- include off-setting<sup>1</sup> provisions equal to the cost of the contract
- include off-setting provisions as close as possible to the cost of the contract
- include no off-sets
- include no off-sets if there is a substantial cost saving for not doing so

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<sup>1</sup> “Off-setting” refers to benefits returned to Canada from foreign contractors.

**51. Off-set for major foreign defence contracts should be made in terms of:**

- direct spending related to the defence budget
- defence related jobs
- defence related technology
- defence related sub-contracts related to the contract
- other normal programs not necessarily related to defence spending

**DEFENCE ORGANIZATION**

**52. In the current and foreseeable future, Canada should base its national defence mainly on:**

- the regular force
- the reserve force
- a combination of the two
- don't know

**53. Given the current defence budget, an appropriate strength of personnel in the regular force of the Canadian Forces should be approximately:**

- 120,000
- 85,000
- 60,000
- 45,000
- don't know

**54. The regular force should be composed mainly of:**

- army personnel and units
- air personnel and units
- naval personnel and units
- don't know

**55. An appropriate level of personnel in the reserve force of the Canadian Forces would be approximately:**

- 120,000
- 85,000
- 60,000
- 45,000
- don't know

**56. The reserve force should be composed mainly of:**

- militia (army) personnel and units
- air reserves personnel and units
- naval reserve personnel and units
- don't know

**57. National Defence Headquarters today is an amalgamated organization of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. It should:**

- remain generally as it is
- be structured as two closely related but distinct staffs
- be divided into a defence ministry and a military headquarters
- don't know

**58. The unification of the armed forces as envisioned by the Liberal government in 1967-68 has been a success.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**59. The position of Chief of the Defence Staff, a single authority over the Canadian Forces, created as part of the concept of unification, is an effective and worthwhile office.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**60. The Canadian Forces would be more effective if it were reorganized into three distinct services, army, navy, and air force, each under its own Chief of Staff who would have direct access to the Minister of National Defence.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**61. The Chief of the Defence Staff should have direct access to the Prime Minister on issues he/she believes are important to the Canadian Forces or national defence.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**62. The responsibilities of the Deputy Minister of DND ought to be restricted to matters dealing only with financial management, public service personnel issues, and procurement and contracting.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**63. The Deputy Minister of DND should not play a significant role in determining Canada's military arrangements for operations.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

### CANADIAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

**64. The Minister of National Defence has adequate laws and regulations to "direct and manage the Canadian Forces."**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**65. Parliament today plays an effective role in the civil control of the armed forces.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**66. Parliament's surveillance of the missions and operations of the Canadian Forces is adequate.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**67. The current Commons defence committee is an effective defence policy oversight structure.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**68. The Commons Defence Committee should be improved by establishing a permanent research staff answerable to the committee as a whole.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**69. The Commons defence committee should routinely interview officers nominated for General or Flag rank before they are appointed or promoted.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**70. The Commons Defence Committee should routinely interview any officer nominated for appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff before he/she is confirmed by Order-in-Council.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**71. The Commons Defence Committee should routinely interview officers nominated to command significant Canadian Forces units scheduled for deployment on international security operations before the unit is deployed.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**72. The Commons Defence Committee should routinely review all "major crown projects" (programs costing more than \$100M) before contracts are let or expenditures made.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**73. A Permanent Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on national defence should be established.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**74. Parliament should agree to all overseas deployments of Canadian Forces units.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**75. Decisions to deploy the Canadian Forces on operational missions outside Canada are generally well coordinated between National Defence Headquarters and the Department of Foreign Affairs.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**76. Canada's defence and foreign policy would benefit from the establishment of a type of "National Security Council" to oversee and coordinate policies.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**77. As a Member of Parliament, I feel that I have adequate access to all the information I need to make informed decisions about Canada's national defence.**

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

**78. If parliamentary surveillance of defence issues is a problem for Senators and Members of Parliament, the problem originates in:**

- lack of information
- Parliament is ill-equipped to follow policy issues
- secrecy and executive control of information and issues
- there is no problem

**79. I have read the entire Report of the Somalia Inquiry.**

- yes
- no



**80. I have read the Executive Summary of the Somalia Inquiry Report.**

yes

no

**81. I have read only public statements about the report.**

yes

no

**82. I have read the Report of the Special Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services (the Dickson Report).**

yes

no

**83. I usually read the reports of the Auditor General of Canada that refer to the Canadian Forces, DND, and defence policy.**

yes

no



## *Douglas L. Bland*

Dr. Douglas Bland is Associate Professor and holds the Chair in Defence Management Studies in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. His research is concentrated in the fields of defence policy making and management at national and international levels, the organization and functioning of defence ministries, and civil-military relations. He has published books, articles, and reports and lectured in these fields in Canada, the United States, Europe, and South Africa.

Dr. Bland is a graduate of the Canadian Army Staff College, the NATO Defence College at Rome, and holds a doctorate from Queen's University. He was a 1992-93 NATO Fellow. His publications on defence management include: *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947-84* (1987) and *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (1995). His most recent book is *Canada's National Defence* (1998).