CRITERIA FOR STABILITY CAMPAIGNS

in

“Wars Amongst the People”

by

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A Master’s Research Project submitted to the School of Policy Studies in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration

Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
July, 2007

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Abstract

The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has resulted in two hundred thousand deaths and millions of displaced persons. As a result of these tragedies, politicians such as Jack Layton have called upon the international community to participate in an armed intervention in Sudan. The following Masters Research Project provides the federal government with a policy making instrument to help determine whether a stability campaign should be undertaken. Although the situation in Darfur certainly demands international attention, it is important for Canadians to understand not only the tragedies that are occurring in Sudan, but the difficulty in mounting a successful stability operation. Therefore, using Sudan as a model, this Masters Research Project will draw on the lessons learned from previous stability campaigns and propose a rigorous set of criteria that should prevail, or be created, prior to mounting a stability campaign.

“Criteria” includes participation and operational considerations such as: whether the proposed operation is in the national interest, if the government of Canada is prepared to apply a ‘whole of government’ approach to the stability campaign, there is a political authority to back, there is an appropriate infrastructure within the proposed theatre of operations and the commensurate logistical support to enable operations, and finally, the Canadian Forces have the appropriate military capabilities to execute the mission. The project will then utilize this criterion as a framework to judge whether Canada should participate in a military intervention in Darfur.
Acknowledgments

The completion of the following Masters Research Project would not have been possible without the assistance of several individuals. First and foremost, Professor Douglas L. Bland deserves thanks for agreeing to take on this project as my supervisor. His direction and guidance throughout the course of the project was invaluable. Without his assistance, this paper would not have been possible.

Throughout the duration of the project my brother, Timothy Quinlan, was an invaluable source of information and guidance and deserves thanks as well.

Finally, my wife, Alexandra Pietrzak, deserves special thanks. Throughout the entire project she was my source of inspiration. Without her support, this project would not have materialized. The following work is dedicated to her and to the members of the Canadian Forces who through their sacrifice and commitment continue to protect Canada and make us proud to be Canadian.
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**Introduction**

On January 23, 2007 Jack Layton, leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada, appeared before students and faculty at the University of Quebec at Montreal to deliver a speech titled “Canada’s Role in the World: Bridging the Divide or Deepening It?” Differentiating his party from the Liberal Party of Canada and the governing Conservative Party of Canada, Mr. Layton advocated at once the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Afghanistan and a major Canadian commitment to a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Western Sudan. Participating in a “peacekeeping” mission in the Western region of Sudan, Mr. Layton stated, would serve as a better example of the kind of role “everyday Canadians wish to see Canada play on the world stage. Not dividing people, but building bridges, not waging war, but keeping the peace.”

**The Parameters of the Master's Research Project**

There is no question that the Sudan is a deeply conflicted region. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Government of Canada should deploy the Canadian Forces to the region in an attempt to redress the suffering. By advocating the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Afghanistan and a Canadian commitment to a stability campaign in Darfur, Mr. Layton’s New Democratic Party raised an important question that merits the attention of politicians and policy-makers alike. How should a country such as Canada make decisions regarding the deployment of the Canadian Forces? The following research project answers this question by developing a set of criteria that would have to prevail or be created prior to mounting a stability campaign in a failed state. Such criteria are intended as a policy making instrument to help the federal
government determine whether a stability campaign should be undertaken. By then applying this criterion to the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan, the question of whether Canada should participate in a stability campaign in the Sudan will be explored.

_Literature and Overview_

In chapter one, theory from Carl Von Clausewitz and literature from Douglas Bland, K.J. Holsti and Sir General Rupert Smith will be used to examine the changing nature of warfare and peacekeeping. The discussion will begin with an analysis of the new paradigm of war – wars amongst the people. Since the end of the Cold War, United Nations operations have increasingly focused on failed and failing states where wars are being conducted not on a battlefield between states, but within states and amongst the people. There are significant risks involved in such operations and since 1989, the vast majority have involved the use of force. As such, United Nations operations are better understood today as stability campaigns.

Chapter two will introduce the Sudan. As the criteria for failed states from Robert I. Rotberg’s “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure” demonstrates, the Sudan is without doubt a failed state obviously in need of international attention. Through an overview of the post-colonial history of the Sudan, the various problems evident within the failed state will be exposed. Literature from Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, Nicholas Coghlan, Gerard Prunier, Robert D. Kaplan, and human rights scholar Samantha Power all aid in identifying and analyzing two diverse, yet interconnected theatres of conflict in the Sudan: the North-South Civil War and violence in Darfur. These observations are relevant to the project because the conflicts evident throughout Sudan are systematic of continuous warfare amongst the people.
Douglas L. Bland’s *Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces*, Eddie Goldenberg’s *The Way it Works: Inside Ottawa*, J.L Granatstein’s *Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post 9-11 World*, Roy Rempel’s *Dreamland: How Canada’s Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty*, and *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* all aid in our understanding of who makes decisions regarding the deployment of the Canadian Forces, and how decisions to deploy the Canadian Forces are reached. Furthermore, the 1987 and 1994 Canadian White Papers on Defence lay out the criteria it is suggested the Canadian Government use to evaluate Canadian participation in stability campaigns abroad.

However, this literature also reveals that in the past, criteria for decisions to deploy the Canadian Forces were not rigorously applied. As will be demonstrated by examining the campaigns in Somalia and Zaire – failed states where continuous wars amongst the people are evident – factors that should not have had a bearing on decisions regarding the use of force were evident in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the criteria in place failed to address certain key issues surrounding stability campaigns conducted in failed states.

Chapter four reveals that Canada’s 2005 *International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* falls short of addressing several vital concerns. Drawing on the lessons learned from stability campaigns in Somalia and Zaire, the chapter utilizes literature from, among others, General Anthony Zinni, Hans Morgenthau, Douglas Bland, Carl Von Clausewitz, General Sir Rupert Smith, Stanley Hoffman, Howie Marsh, and Roy Rempel to develop a new set of criteria that must be employed prior to the Canadian Government committing the Canadian Forces to stability campaigns abroad.
In chapter five, the newly developed criteria are applied to the proposed United Nations stability campaign in the Sudan. Although organizations such as STAND Canada have recommended that Canada participate in the United Nations mission to Darfur, the application of the developed criteria reveals that Canada should not, and cannot, participate in the proposed stability operation to the Darfur region of the Sudan.

In conclusion it will be argued that the developed criteria should not just be utilized to inform decision-making regarding the proposed operation in the Sudan. This new criteria should also form the basis for future decision-making concerning deployments in stability campaigns. For example, the criteria should be applied to the current operation in Afghanistan in order to evaluate whether the Government of Canada should renew their commitment to the Afghan mission in 2009.
Chapter One: The End of Peacekeeping

On March 6, 1991 President George H.W. Bush appeared before the nation to inform Americans, and indeed citizens around the world, that the American led, and United Nations sanctioned, coalition of nations had successfully expelled Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Forces from Kuwait. The Gulf War was over. In concluding his speech, President Bush stated:

Until now, the world we’ve known has been a world divided – a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order.3

According to President Bush, the fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Kuwait demonstrated that the world had entered into a new era based on international law, justice, and peace.4 In the ‘new world order’, the United Nations – freed from the obstructionist Soviet Union apparent during the cold war era – was “poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders – a world in which freedom and respect find a home among all nations.”5

However, according to Douglas Bland:

The new world order depended on the willingness of the members of the Security Council, with or without the General Assembly’s involvement, to use their military, economic, and diplomatic powers to discipline recalcitrant states. Success, however, also depended greatly on the credence that leaders and citizens in uncooperative states gave to pressures applied to them by the major powers.6

Yet, as the 1990s unfolded, Bush’s vision of the ‘new world order’ began to unravel as leaders and citizens in regions such as Central Africa and the Horn of Africa demonstrated that they “were willing in pursuit of their own aims to suffer (or rather allow their citizens to suffer) not only United Nations condemnations, but also significant military force.”7 Thus, it appeared as though “the end of the Cold War heralded not so
much a new world order as the emergence of a “new world disorder.” This “new world disorder” marked the conclusion of the interstate industrial war, and the emergence of a new type of warfare: continuous ‘war amongst the people.’

In *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, author General Sir Rupert Smith states that “war no longer exists.” To be sure, confrontation, conflict and combat exist throughout the world. Furthermore, states still have armed forces which they yield as instruments of power however, “war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.” Beginning with the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 and becoming the dominant form of warfare at the end of the Cold War (1989-91), “a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred.” The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war. The new paradigm is continuous war amongst the people.

**Interstate Industrial War**

The old paradigm of interstate industrial war is rooted in concepts put forth by, among others, Carl Von Clausewitz. In *On War*, Clausewitz defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” In the paradigm of interstate industrial war, the “enemy” is defined as a nation-state and wars are interstate rather than intra-state conflicts. For Clausewitz, “physical force...is...the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory is the true aim of warfare.”
Another defining feature of the Clauzewitzian model is the sequence of events in war. In the old paradigm of war:

There was an initial crisis where diplomatic negotiations could not reconcile the incompatible foreign policy or defence requirements of the states concerned. An ultimatum or an incident – often staged by the aggressor – then led to a formal declaration of war.\textsuperscript{15}

As K.J. Holsti explains in \textit{The State, War, and the State of War}, “we know the exact dates that eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and early twentieth-century wars commenced.”\textsuperscript{16} Following declarations of war, armed combat led either to stalemate or a decisive military defeat in a single battle or a short series of battles, “the defeated party then agreed to a formal armistice and sued for peace.”\textsuperscript{17} In the paradigm of industrial war “the premise is of peace-crisis-war-resolution, which will result in peace again, with war, the military action, being the deciding factor.”\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, the overarching pattern of warfare had at least some crude structure to its progress. There was a measure of finality in which wars could be begun, fought, and concluded. However, with the emergence of a new type of war – “continuous warfare amongst the people” – the traditional markers of interstate industrial warfare disintegrated.

\textit{The Changing Face of Warfare}

Differing from the Clauzewitzian model of interstate industrial war is the new paradigm: war amongst the people. According to Smith, war amongst the people is a conceptual framework for the type of warfare occurring in the post-Cold War: “it reflects the hard fact that there is no secluded battlefield upon which armies engage, nor are there necessarily armies, definitely not on all sides.”\textsuperscript{19} In defining war amongst the people, Smith stresses
the importance of not viewing it simply as asymmetric warfare - a phrase created to explain a situation whereby “conventional states were threatened by unconventional powers but in which conventional military power in some formulation would be capable of both deterring the threat and responding to it.”20 War amongst the people defies such categorization:

It is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.21

Thus war amongst the people effectively blurs the line between civilians and combatants, and strategic targets and collateral damage. Since the conclusion of the Second World War, and particularly since the termination of Cold War hostilities (1989-91), however, this new conceptualization of war has been further complicated by the fact that wars have not only occurred amongst the people, but that they tend to be continuous as well.

By joining the concept put forth by General Sir Rupert Smith to a concept not seen since the Middle Ages, Douglas Bland defines continuous warfare as:

Wars that endure in various degrees of intensity without end, simply because no belligerent has the power to overcome any other or no politician has the power and legitimacy to control local conflicts or bring them to an end. This new regular pattern of warfare involves military and paramilitary forces, “low-tech” weapons and devices, intermingled military and political authorities, contrasting and contradictory aims, intense fighting interspersed with “cease fires,” and truces followed by the resumption of disorder.22

If this new paradigm of war holds and “no belligerent has the power to overcome any other or no politician has the power and legitimacy to control local conflicts or bring them to an end”23 then it follows that in this new era of warfare, the nature of “peacekeeping” operations must changed as well.
The End of Peacekeeping

According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “traditionally, peacekeepers have been placed between hostile states to supervise cease-fires and, on occasion, the withdrawal of forces.” In the small Mediterranean nation of Cyprus for example, where members of the Canadian Forces participated in United Nations Peacekeeping operations from 1964-1993, the United Nations supervised a cease-fire agreement between the Greeks and the Turks and there has been no violence or bloodshed on the island since 1974. However, in Somalia, where the Canadian Forces were deployed from 1992-1994, “peacekeepers were not sent in to maintain a cease-fire, but to make sure relief supplies were distributed, and to stabilize the situation.” These operations differ from traditional peacekeeping operations, and thus, Canadians should conceptualize military operations in failed states such as Somalia as stability campaigns.

Stability Campaigns

The purpose of military organizations such as the Canadian Forces is to apply disciplined violence at the direction of the state to coerce or defend other states or internal actors. However, in the new paradigm of warfare, the application of force has not always deterred or coerced belligerents into consenting to the will of the international community. As Thomas R. Mockaitis states in Peace Operations and Interstate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch? “although soldiers can stop fighting, they cannot by themselves “keep,” “make,” or “enforce” peace. Thus, traditional peacekeeping operations are no longer evident in the vast majority of theatres where, among others, the Canadian Forces have been operating since the conclusion of Cold War hostilities.
In the post-Cold War era, military operations are better understood as stability campaigns.

In *Campaigns for International Security* Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney state that:

> Stability campaigns and operations are not peacekeeping as the term and concept have been understood throughout the cold war era. Although the ends of peacekeeping and stability operations may be similar – the establishment of a harmonious order leading to a permanent peace – the operating principles of the two are significantly different.\(^{29}\)

This is consistent with the emergence of continuous war amongst the people. According to Bland and Maloney:

> Neither the civil authority nor their force commanders intend that stability campaigns be neutral or impartial, as is the case in United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operations. In every campaign and all operations mounted since 1989, the convening authority has identified a party or parties, if not as belligerents, then as the group to be controlled.\(^{30}\)

Differing from Cold War era peacekeeping operations such as those in Cyprus, military commanders leading stability campaigns do not see themselves or their forces as “referees between contending parties to a dispute. Rather, they tend to operate on the assumption that the duty of soldiers is to impose, reinforce, and maintain order by force of arms if necessary.”\(^{31}\)

This is not to say that elements of the changing nature of warfare have gone unrecognized by the Government of Canada – as exemplified by the Paul Martin government’s release of *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Differing from previous documents put forth by the Department of National Defence or the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the document recognizes elements of the new paradigm of war and thus, the complex
environments the Canadian Forces will continue to operate in. According to the 2005 policy statement:

In these demanding and complex environments, where civilians mix with friendly, neutral and opposing forces, often in urban areas, our military must be prepared to perform different missions – humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, combat – all at the same time.\(^{32}\)

These operations have increasingly been more complex and dangerous, “with our troops deployed to failed and failing states…where there is little if any peace to keep.”\(^{33}\)

In the post-Cold War era, participation in stability campaigns involves a much more significant commitment of resources than in the past, and a much more significant risk level as well: “in the past decade for example, Canadian forces have participated in six operations in which the use of force was authorized beyond self-defence or in which the parties to the conflict returned to fighting.”\(^{34}\) This escalation of resources and risk has coincided with the emergence of failed and failing states, in which the new paradigm of warfare is very much in evidence.
Chapter Two: Failed States and Sudan

At the outset of the government’s 2005 Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, it is stated that the Canadian Forces will continue to focus their expeditionary capabilities on operations in failed and failing states. Definitions of failed states are numerous and complex. Common explanations usually indicate the absence of a strong central government, the failure or unwillingness of government elites to develop their country, the inability to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the presence of persistent conflict. For example, according to Susan E. Rice of the Brookings Institution:

Failed states are countries in which the central government does not exert effective control over, nor it is able to deliver vital services to significant parts of its own territory due to conflict, ineffective government, or state collapse.

Rice suggests that failed states often serve as safe havens and training grounds for terrorist organizations, and create environments that spur or exacerbate regional instability and conflict.

Consistent with this definition is the explanation put forth by Michael Ignatieff who believes that elites in many failed states are “incapable or unwilling to use resource revenue to develop their countries and end civil wars”. What all failed states have in common though, is their inability “to maintain a monopoly of the internal means of violence.”

Robert I. Rotberg of the Kennedy School of Government agrees with Ignatieff:

Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Official authorities in a failed state sometimes face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal
discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within
the state.\textsuperscript{39}

However, Rotberg notes that it is not the intensity of violence that characterizes failed
states, but rather the enduring nature of the violence.\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, the state’s inability or
unwillingness to deliver vital services to the populace, develop their nation, and control
the violence within their borders serves to rationalize or justify violence in the minds of
insurgents.\textsuperscript{41}

Rotberg brings some clarity to what is an intricate concept in “The New Nature of Nation-
State Failure.” He presents a set of indicators that could be used to identify where state
failure has occurred, or where it is in danger of occurring. In doing so, he captures the
numerous definitions often put forth to explain the characteristics of a failed state in a

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\textbf{Causes and Indicators of State Failure} \\
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1. Failed states are deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested. \\
2. The civil wars that characterize failed states usually stem from or have 
roots in ethnic, religious, or linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity. \\
3. Failed states cannot control their borders. They lose authority over 
chunks of territory. Often, the expression of official power is limited 
to a capital city. \\
4. Failed states prey on their own constituents. \\
5. The growth of criminal violence is evident within failed states. \\
6. Failed states provide only limited quantities of political goods. \\
7. Failed states exhibit flawed institutions. \\
8. Failed states are typified by deteriorating or destroyed infrastructures 
and decrepit or neglected public services. \\
9. Failed states offer unparalleled opportunity, but only to a privileged 
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Sudan: A Failed State?

When Robert I.
Rotberg’s criteria is
applied to Sudan it
reveals Sudan indeed
is a failed state.

Sudan has always been a deeply conflicted country. Violence which has its roots in
ethnic and religious enmity has repeatedly broken out in Sudan. The degree of control
that the Sudanese government has over its borders is tenuous at best. The numerous
elections held throughout the 1980s and their resulting chaos also demonstrates that Sudan’s institutions are deeply flawed. Evidence suggests that regions of Sudan and Darfur in particular, are typified by neglected infrastructure and public services.42 Lastly, both the North-South civil-war and the conflict in Darfur provide evidence that the Sudanese government prey’s on their own constituents. To fully appreciate Sudan’s status as a failed state however, it is first necessary to understand both the composition and contemporary history of Sudan.

Sudan: Geography, Religion and Ethnicity

Stretching from Egypt in the North to Uganda in the South, Sudan borders the Red Sea and seven other countries: Libya to the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea to the east, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south, and Chad and the Central African Republic to the west.43 Sudan, situated at the crossroads between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, has many cultures. With hundreds of language groups and ethnic subdivisions, Sudan’s population is among the most diverse in Africa.44

In 2006, the population of Sudan was approximately 41 million.45 Of those, 22 million reside in Sudan’s Northern states which envelop most of country including the vast majority of urban centers.46 The Sudanese who live in this region are both Arab and black African. Despite ethnic differences, the vast majority of the people in Northern Darfur are Arabic-speaking Muslims belonging to tribal groups including – but not limited to – the semi-nomadic Baggara of Darfur; the Fur, Massaliet, and Zaghawa of Darfur, the Beja of Eastern Darfur, the Kababish of northern Kordofan – a camel-herding people – the Nuba of southern Kordofan, and the Nubians of the northern Nile areas.47
The Nile is the vital resource that sustains life in Sudan. Harsh deserts and lack of water characterize much of Sudan. Nomads come to the Nile to water their herds and farmers to drain off its water for their fields. The Nile also facilitates commerce and administration. Consequently, Sudan’s capital city, Khartoum, became the nation’s administrative center. The location has “enabled the urban elites to control the scattered and often isolated population of the interior while enjoying access to the peoples of the outside world.”

Standing in stark contrast to Northern Sudan is the southern and predominantly black African region of the country. With a population of roughly 6 million people, southern Sudan is largely rural and contains many more languages and tribal groups than Northern Sudan. The vast majority of Southern Sudanese practice indigenous religions and includes a sizable Christian population. The Dinka, with a population of approximately 1 million, is the largest of the numerous black African tribes in the south. They are among the Nilotic tribes, along with the Nuer and the Shilluk.

**Sudan: What is the Problem?**

Even before the concept of ‘failed states’ had entered the academic lexicon, Sudan was deteriorating into a failed state. The core area of Sudan, centered on Khartoum and inhabited by Arabs, “has largely ignored the country’s peripheral areas, though they represent the greatest part both of the territory and the population.” Thus, since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has been engulfed in a series of violent and bitterly contested conflicts pitting Khartoum’s Arab-dominated governments against civilians and rebels from marginalized groups throughout Sudan. Unfortunately, conflict over land and resources has exacerbated violence, as has the compendium of ethnic
and religious distinctions evident within Sudan. This violence is situated in two diverse, yet interconnected theatres of conflicts: the North-South Civil War and violence in Darfur.


On the eve of receiving independence, Sudan’s “civil service and administration were placed increasingly in Northern Sudanese hands – largely excising the Southern Sudanese from the government.”\(^{53}\) This government then reneged on their promise to create a federal system.\(^{54}\) The first period of the civil war broke out on August 18, 1955 when southern elements of Sudan’s armed forces, fearing that Southern Sudan would not receive adequate political representation and economic assistance, launched a low intensity civil-war “aimed at establishing an independent south.”\(^{55}\) Following the attack, Khartoum’s Arab-dominated government affirmed the fears of many southerners by continuing to neglect the region. They failed to incorporate southern communities into the central government and concentrated capital and, thus, development in the Northern regions at the expense of those in the south. For the next seventeen years, the south continued to experience civil-strife and various southern leaders continued to advocate for an independent Southern Sudan.\(^{56}\)

By the late 1960s, civil strife had resulted in approximately five-hundred thousand deaths, with hundreds of thousands more displaced both internally and in neighbouring countries.\(^{57}\) However, under the leadership of President Jaafar Nimeiri, civil-strife abated. By October of 1971, Khartoum had established contacts with one of the largest rebel groups in the south, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). After intense negotiations, the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed, ending the civil-war. The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed a degree of autonomy for the south:
The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern region...under a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. The High Executive Council or cabinet named by the regional president would be responsible for all aspects of government in the region except such areas as defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning, and interregional concerns, authority over which would be retained by the national government in which southerners would be represented.  

In addition, the accords recognized English, and not Arabic, as the principal language in the south. It was to be used in administration and taught in schools. Furthermore, southerners, including many soldiers from southern rebel groups, would be incorporated into a southern command of the Sudanese army. Although the accords provided the south with a degree of autonomy, a lasting peace between the north and the south proved to be elusive. Beginning in the late 1970s, a series of government initiatives resulted in greater tensions between the north and the south and in time, re-ignited the civil-war between Northern and Southern Sudan.

*Resource Conflict*

The North-South civil war was also exacerbated by a resource conflict. In 1978, Chevron USA made the first significant oil discovery in Sudan. Estimates of the reserves varied, however, they were significant enough to lead then President Nimeiri to redraw the borders of Sudan so that the bulk of the newly created oil state ‘Unity’ would fall in the Northern, and not Southern, region of the country. The redrawing of Sudan’s borders was viewed in southern Sudan as a robbery - an issue that would “reverberate down the years.” For example, when the second phase of the civil-war broke out in 1983, the area surrounding the town of Bentiu where the oil was located attracted rebel attacks. In 1984, three Chevron workers were killed by southern rebels grouped together as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), under the leadership of John Garang.
Throughout the second phase of the civil-war Sudan’s oil reserves continued to be a source of conflict between the north and the south, and a point of reference for organizations such as Human Rights Watch concerned with the treatment of civilians indirectly involved in the civil-war. Reports from the organization indicate that over 200,000 people – mostly civilians from the southern Nuer and Dinka tribes – were internally displaced from ‘Unity’ during the period of 1998 to 2001:

They were pushed off their land, in some cases many times, by government army or militia forces, for the purpose of emptying the oil areas of southern civilians whom the central government regarded as “security threats” to oil development, solely on account of their ethnic origin and therefore presumed rebel loyalties.66

Religious Tolerance

Khartoum’s policy regarding oil resources and land ownership and their ensuing human rights violations was a factor in the escalation of tensions among the north and the south. However, the 1983 implementation of state-wide Islamic shariah penal code was considered particularly oppressive and is thus credited as an event that eroded the Addis Ababa agreement, and led the north and the south into the second phase of the civil war.

In September 1983, President Nimeiri issued several decrees that made Islamic shariah the law of the land. Known in Sudan as the “September laws,” the imposition of the law was bitterly resisted among southern Sudanese due to the presence of secular people and Christian’s throughout the south.67 When the laws took effect banks could no longer charge interest and petty thefts carried the penalty of amputation. “Even non-Muslim foreigners could be whipped in public for being in possession of alcohol.”68 Several
judges who resisted the implementation of the laws were quickly dismissed and replaced by men with little or no legal training. These appointments contributed to “a virtual reign of terror in the court system” throughout the nation, plunging Sudan into civil war once again. According to former Canadian Representative in Sudan, Nicolas Coghlan, by 1985 “Sudan was sliding into instability and pariah status.”

That same year, a coup toppled President Nimeiri and free and fair elections were held in Sudan. Sadly, elections in Sudan did nothing to bring stability to the country. In fact, elections increased instability within Sudan:

Sudan’s newly elected democracy led immediately to anarchy, which in turn led to the most brutal tyranny in Sudan’s postcolonial history: a military regime that broadened the scope of executions, persecuted women, starved non-Muslims to death, sold kidnapped non-Muslim children back to their parents for two hundred dollars, and made Khartoum the terrorist capital of the Arab world.

During this time period, the government escalated the civil war by arming northern tribes of Arab origin, providing them with air support, and pitting them against black Christian tribes in the south. In 1987 for example, 1,000 Dinka – the largest tribe in the south – were massacred by government supported northern Arab forces in a single attack.

Kidnapping was not just a feature of government behavior. Numerous atrocities were also committed by southern factions as well. Southern forces kidnapped tribal civilians and sold them into slavery “so as to prop up drudge support for southern soldiers.”

The terrorism evident with the late 1980s also continued to flourish in Sudan well into the 1990s. With the emergence of Hassan al-Turabi and General Omar Bashir’s fundamentalist party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda were provided with a safe haven in Sudan. From 1991 to 1996, Osama bin-Laden resided in Sudan and the fundamentalist party allowed numerous terrorists to
travel on Sudanese passports and allowed al-Qaeda to establish terrorist training facilities in Sudan as well.\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{The Cost of Civil War}

Throughout the 21-years of civil-war, fighting killed over 2.2 million people. After the civil war in the Congo, the Sudanese civil-war was the second-deadliest conflict in post-World War II history.\textsuperscript{75} In January 2005, the civil-war officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. According to John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen:

The deal granted autonomy to the area and gave the SPLA majority control of the new Government of Southern Sudan, based in Juba, and a minority role in the Government of National Unity, in Khartoum. It also provided for a referendum in 2011, in which the people of southern Sudan will decide whether to secede from the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{76}

Unfortunately, the current status of the peace agreement is not encouraging. The National Congress Party has not adhered to critical components of the arrangement such as the demobilization of their proxy armies and the transparent distribution of oil revenue to the south.\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, “war clouds have been forming since John Garang, the SPLA’s charismatic leader and a leading proponent of a unified Sudan, mysteriously died in a helicopter crash.”\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Darfur}

Darfur, which is roughly the size of France, was a semi-independent kingdom until its integration into British-controlled Sudan in 1916.\textsuperscript{79} Populated by approximately ninety tribes, it is ethnically diverse. However, unlike the populace in the south of Sudan, virtually all of Darfur’s six million residents are Muslim. Despite religious similarities,
ethnic distinctions remain. Due to decades of intermarriage, obvious physical differences between “Arabs” and black “Africans” have disappeared. However, despite the tradition of ethnic-mixing between Arabs and Africans, the population recently began subdividing between “Arabs” and “Africans.”

Resource Conflict

Darfurians who claim to be of Arab decent tend to be semi-nomadic, herding camels in Northern Darfur and livestock in Southern Darfur. Africans – such as the Fur (Darfur means “land of the Fur”), Zaghawa, and the Masaaleit – tend to farm. However, African tribes such as the Zaghawa have been known to herd animals throughout Southern Sudan as well. Competition for land – and in particular soil, grazing land, and watering wells – has always been fierce between Arab and African. Yet, tribes have historically been able to resolve disputes peacefully. In the 1980s however, severe drought exacerbated resource competition between tribes as Darfurians struggled to find suitable soil for their crops and water for their livestock:

African farmers grew hostile to the camel-riding Arab nomads from the north who increasingly trampled their farmland as they roamed in search of pasture…farmers who once celebrated the annual return of Arab nomads, whose animals had fertilized their farmland and helped carry their harvests to market, began to impede their migrations.

By the late 1980s, tribes began gathering arms and serious battles broke out over land resources. Instead of intervening to resolve the conflict, Khartoum ignored the gathering tensions between the tribes. In 1989, the violence between Fur farmers and Arab herders took the lives of twenty-five hundred Fur and five hundred Arabs. In addition, scores of Fur villages were burned and thousands of nomad livestock destroyed. A local inter-tribal conference was held following the violent conflict between the Arabs and
African Furs; however, the conference’s recommendations for conflict resolution, such as compensation and punishment, were largely ignored by Khartoum “leaving outstanding grievances that would explode fourteen years later.”

Political and Economic Marginalization

On Friday April 25, 2003, violence between Darfurian rebels and the Sudanese government broke out at a tiny airport in El Fashir, central Darfur:

Sleeping Sudanese soldiers, who were encamped in a nearby garrison, awoke and scrambled out of their barracks toward an ammunition depot across the street. Many of the soldiers, some still in their nightclothes, were picked off by machine-gun fire as they ran. Rebel Darfurian marksmen were perched high in trees.

The attackers were members of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). Employing over two-hundred and fifty men and almost fifty Toyota land cruisers, the rebels were able to take over the military outpost, kill 100 soldiers, and destroy five Antonov airplanes and two helicopter gunships. This was the first in a series of attacks by the SLA.

Attacks by the SLA (formed in February of 2003) were a response to a series of grievances. Chief among them was the fact that the SLA felt that the region had been completely ignored. The Government in Khartoum:

Rarely paid for road building and repair, schools, hospitals, civil servants, or communications facilities in Darfur. Those who considered themselves ethnically African were angered by the government’s practice of awarding most of the top posts in the region to local Arabs, even though they were thought to be a minority there.

These claims were certainly justified. Since its incorporation into Sudan in 1916, Darfur has been neglected. According to Alex de Waal:

The file ‘Economic Development, Darfur Province’ in the Khartoum national achieves, contains just five entries for the entire period 1917-50. Most bemoan
the impossibility of doing anything except encouraging modest exports of cattle and gum. In 1935, Darfur had just one elementary school, one ‘tribal’ elementary school and two ‘sub-grade’ schools. This was worse than neglect.88

Public health too had been completely ignored. Prior to the 1940s, there were no maternity clinics in Darfur and at independence in 1956, “Darfur had the lowest number of hospital beds of any Sudanese province.”89 After Sudan received independence in 1956, Khartoum continued to ignore the region. Darfurians have “received less education, less healthcare, less developmental assistance and fewer governmental posts than any other region – even Southerners who took up arms 21 years ago to fight for their rights, had a better deal.”90

Besides neglecting the provision of basic public services, the absence of infrastructure in Darfur is another indication that the region and its peoples have been marginalized. According to John Ryle, Darfur is “150,000 square-miles of desert and savannah…linked to Sudanese capital, Khartoum, by 700 miles of dirt road and a single-track railway.”91 In terms of automotive infrastructure, construction on the first paved road outside of a major town in Darfur did not begin until the late 1970s.92 The road, which was supposed to link Nyala with Al Geneina, was halted halfway, at Zalingei.93

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Darfurians had appealed to Khartoum as well as foreign governments to include their concerns on the agenda of the peace process between the north and the south. Their efforts failed. Thus, many Darfurians concluded that if their grievances were to be addressed they would have to follow the example of the SPLA and take up arms against the government.94 This strategy has had a disastrous effect for civilians in Darfur.
Instead of recognizing the legitimacy of their grievances, the Sudanese government has employed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to crush the rebellion. The grievances regarding land resources evident during the 1980s have also resurfaced today. Among the ranks of the Janjaweed are many of the nomadic herders of Arab origin that clashed with African Fur farmers in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{95}

In July 2003, the Sudanese government engaged Darfur’s Arab tribal leaders in the hope that they could create a proxy army to defend Darfur against rebel groups and specifically, the SLA. Musa Hilal was one of the first to answer the government’s call and soon became the coordinator of the Janjaweed in Darfur.\textsuperscript{96} According to Harvard University’s Samantha Power:

Hilal long had a reputation in Darfur as a troublemaker who instigated skirmishes against the Fur and other African tribes, with the aim of controlling more grazing land and amassing greater wealth for himself...in 2003, with funds and arms from the government, Hilal set up a training camp near his home town of Mistiriyah, and rallied Arabs to the cause of suppressing the SLA rebellion and populating the land with Arabs.\textsuperscript{97}

In concert with the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed are pursuing a campaign of violence against Africans – as well as some Arab tribes – across Darfur.\textsuperscript{98} Throughout the crisis, the Sudanese government’s objective and that of the Janjaweed has remained unclear.\textsuperscript{99} Power suggests two theories to explain the violence. One theory holds that the rebel attack enabled the government to unleash a plan that was crafted in the 1980s to “Arabize” Darfur.\textsuperscript{100} In October, 1987, a letter was drafted by a group of influential Arab intellectuals and sent to Sudan’s Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi:

The signatories demanded a larger proportion of local, state, and national jobs, warning, “if this neglect of the participation of the Arab race continues, things will break loose from the hands of wise men to those of the ignorant.” Soon afterward, the process of removing Africans from senior civil posts in Darfur and replacing them with Arabs began. The current assaults on Darfurians who are considered “black” are thought by some to be phase two of Sudan’s Arabization plan.\textsuperscript{101}
A second theory is that the Sudanese government could not afford to placate another rebel group. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated with rebels in the south granted them the right to secede. However, to negotiate with Darfurians rebels in the same fashion would have emboldened other disaffected minorities throughout Sudan – rebels in Eastern Sudan for example – which could have unravelled “the patchwork state of Sudan.” The government was particularly worried about losing Darfur, a Muslim territory. Therefore, they decided to pursue a strategy of crushing the rebellion by relying on Musa Hilal and other Arab tribal leaders.

In any case, the evidence suggests that the government is supporting Janjaweed forces. Together, they are conducting a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing across Darfur. Employing strategies evident during the civil-war, the Sudanese government has provided the Janjaweed with air support while they spread out across Darfur to enter villages to kill thousands of civilians. Although the government denies that it has targeted civilians with military aircraft, in February, 2004, a British journalist taped a radio conversation between a commander on the ground and an Antonov pilot revealing the government’s tactics:

*Commander:* We’ve found people still in the village.

*Pilot:* Are they with us or against us?

*Commander:* They say they will work with us.

*Pilot:* They’re liars. Don’t trust them. Get rid of them.

*(Later)* *Pilot:* Now the village is empty and secure for you. Any village you pass through you must burn. That way, when the villagers come back they’ll have a surprise waiting for them.
Air raids such as the one recorded by the British journalist indicate the involvement of the Sudanese government in the attacks on Darfurian villages. The raids require the consent of the Chief of Staff’s office in Khartoum, and only the government in Khartoum has the Antonov planes that are used in the attacks.  

On the ground, the intensity of the violence has also been well documented. According to Alex de Waal, in one village, “sixty-six villagers were tortured in the local dispensary before being killed – some hanged by their feet, others decapitated. In another, school girls were chained together and burned alive.” Sexual violence, and in particular rape, has also been used as an instrument to “destroy the fabric of the targeted communities and perhaps even to create a new generation with ‘Arab’ paternity.” According to de Waal, “these rapes are…orchestrated to create a dynamic where the African tribal groups are destroyed.”  

The Current Situation  

According to John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, between 200,000 and 450,000 Darfurians have perished since April 2003, and some 2.5 million persons have been driven from their homes. Furthermore, over 4 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance of some kind. In May 2006, negotiators were able to establish the Darfur Peace Agreement. However, like the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and the south, the Darfur Peace Agreement is tenuous. Negotiators were only able to secure signatures from leaders of one rebel faction, which alienated two other rebel groups. What is worse, “the conflict has since spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic – causing another two million people in those
countries to require humanitarian assistance.” Furthermore, “Khartoum has been supporting an array of rebel groups and militias in both countries in the hope of overthrowing their governments and installing friendlier regimes.”

*Understanding Sudan as a Failed State*

When Robert I. Rotberg’s criteria for failed states are applied to this analysis of Sudan, it becomes clear that Sudan is indeed a failed state. As the multitude of recurring conflicts indicate, Sudan is a “deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested” state. Many of the conflicts there are rooted in ethnic and religious differences. The state cannot control its borders and preys on its constituents. Furthermore, flawed institutions and neglected infrastructures and public services are both a cause and a symptom of the internal conflicts. Not only is Sudan a failed state, but the bitterly contested and deeply rooted conflicts which divide it are systematic of continuous warfare amongst the people.

While there is undoubtedly a humanitarian crisis unfolding in Sudan, it does not necessarily follow that engaging Canadian Forces in a stability campaign in that country is the best solution. In deciding whether military intervention is a viable course of action, a rigorous set of criteria – derived in part from the mistakes and experiences of previous interventions in failed states such as Somalia and Zaire – must be developed and applied.
Chapter Three: Defence Decision-Making in Canada

When making decisions regarding the deployment of the Canadian Forces, there are certain procedures that are generally, though not necessarily exactly, followed. According to Douglas Bland:

The formal decision-making process starts once the possibility of a Security Council mandate authorizing a UN mission exists. At that time the UN Secretariat makes informal requests to member states about possible commitments to a potential mission. This request is made to the Canadian mission at the UN, which in turn, funnels the informal request to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).¹¹⁶

DFAIT then contacts the Department of National Defence (DND). Although the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade takes the lead in the decision-making process, both DFAIT and DND are “inextricably linked throughout the process” and once the informal request is made, both departments analyze the request internally while also engaging in consultation with each other and the Canadian mission in New York.¹¹⁷ Prior to making a formal decision, a United Nations Security Council resolution has to be passed authorizing the mission. Following the authorization, the Government of Canada receives a formal request from the United Nations. At that point in time, DFAIT and DND will come together to present a set of policy options to Cabinet, usually through a Cabinet submission.¹¹⁸ Cabinet members then make their decisions based on the information provided by departmental representatives. Political advice comes through representatives at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), they receive military advice from the Department of National Defence.¹¹⁹

The policy analysis within the Department of National Defence involves a host of actors including, but not limited to, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, and the
Director General – International Security Policy. Traditionally, policy analysis within the Department of National Defence has three parts:

First, the mission would be examined to ensure its consistency with Canada’s defence policy objectives and to ascertain the likelihood that it would meet determants of success necessary for UN operations. Second, the operation would be assessed to determine whether it was logistically supportable. Finally, the mission would be examined to ensure proper funding and availability of troops.120

The Director General – International Policy is central to the planning of all operations involving the Canadian Forces abroad. The Director General takes the lead in analyzing the mission for consistency with Canada’s defence policy, and coordinates information and estimates prepared by operations staff analyzing the mission from an operational perspective. Taken together, the Director General then prepares the response which is fed up through the chain of command to the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, and the Minister of National Defence. A letter is then drafted for the Minister setting out options and recommendations. When approved, the letter is sent to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade who then seeks Cabinet approval of the response.121

The decision-making process involves a wide-array of actors. The Canadian decision not to participate in the American invasion of Iraq for example, “came after weeks and months of consultations with ministers, Canadian ambassadors, foreign leaders, and members of parliament.”122 The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) had a role to play as well. However, when it comes down to the actual decision, the decision inevitably falls exclusively to the Prime Minister of Canada. The views of others are significant factors in that decision but, in the end, only the prime minister can make the decision. According to Eddie Goldenberg, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Chrétien, “that is what heads of government are elected to do. That is
what leadership and governing are all about in a democracy.” Continuing, he states that “the real story behind a major decision however, is often more complex and more interesting…decision making is an art not a science.”

In his book, *The Way it Works: Inside Ottawa*, Goldenberg attempts to put “the actions of a government into context”, showing readers what goes on behind the scenes when requests are being processed and decisions made. However, throughout the tenure of the Chrétien government, the factors that informed decisions relating to defence and foreign affairs were not always obvious. Whether an art or a science, defence decision-making showed a complete disregard for defence policy. Even worse, defence-decision making failed to occur within the proper context as decisions were made within the paradigm of industrial warfare at a time when the paradigm had clearly changed to one of continuous warfare amongst the people.

**Somalia**

Such was the case in the stability campaign that took place in Somalia (1992-1995) – United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) and United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). In December of 1992, disaster broke out in Somalia, partly natural and partly man made. In the early 1990s, Somalia had deteriorated into a failed state. Drought and starvation were rampant throughout the country and a series of violent factions controlled the capital city of Mogadishu, and many rural regions as well. The principal belligerent was General Mohamed Aidid. Throughout the 1990s his faction, among others, brutalized the populace, prevented humanitarian relief workers from distributing aid, and in time, attacked military forces from nations contributing to the multi-national coalition. Thus, Somalia presented much more than a humanitarian
problem. According to General Anthony Zinni, Director of Operations for the American led United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia from 1992-1993, “a purely humanitarian problem might be defined as say, simple earthquake, famine, or hurricane relief.” In Somalia by contrast, coalition forces faced “the multiple problems of peace enforcement, collapsed infrastructure, and humanitarian disaster.”

UNOSOM I was initially dispatched to Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians suffering from starvation. UNOSOM I operated under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter which placed strict limits on the use of force. In response to the escalation of violence in Somalia, On March 26, 1993 the United Nations passed Resolution 814 which considerably broadened the mandate. The new mission, UNOSOM II, operated under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which authorized the multi-national coalition to use force to stabilize Somalia and assist humanitarian efforts.

It soon became clear however, that principal antagonists, such as General Aidid, did not respect the authority of the United Nations. In June of 1993, his forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers assigned to UNOSOM II, wounding an additional 44. The following day, the United Nations adopted Resolution 837 which permitted a more aggressive military stance toward Aidid.

Despite continued attacks against Aidid, UNOSOM II was unable to compel Aidid to lay down his arms. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger, an assault force comprised of various elements of the United States military, traveled from their compound to Mogadishu in an attempt to capture leaders of Aidid’s militia. During the operation, two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. Trapped at the crash site, an urban
battle ensued throughout the night and the Task Force suffered significant causalities. In the event that would become known as “Black Hawk Down” 18 American soldiers were killed and another 73 were wounded.\textsuperscript{131} Recounting the withdrawal of coalition forces from Somalia, General Anthony Zinni commented that as he left Somalia he turned around and saw a devastated Mogadishu in worse condition than when coalition forces had arrived two-and-a-half years earlier.\textsuperscript{132}

According to Rupert Smith, “the paradigms of war are of importance because they are the structure, conceptual and factual, through which force is applied, whilst military forces are the means with which force is applied.”\textsuperscript{133} Unfortunately, the stability campaign in Somalia demonstrated that “our bane today is a conception of force and formulated forces within the paradigm of interstate industrial war, whilst our conflicts are those of the paradigm of war amongst the people.”\textsuperscript{134} As Thomas Mockaitis remarks in \textit{Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?}, conflicts in failed states such as Somalia tend to be primarily political problems that cannot be solved by a sufficient application of force: “while military power has a role to play in...peace operations, its misapplication will do more harm than good” – a point lost on the United States and coalition forces.\textsuperscript{135}

\textit{Somalia and Defence Decision-Making in Canada}

Although not a party to the combat operations that took place throughout the stability campaign, Canada was a participant in the operation in Somalia. At the time of the deployment, Canadian defence policy documents implied that certain criteria would be taken into account when making decisions regarding the deployment of the Canadian Forces. However, the inquiry into the deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia
revealed a less than rigorous approach to defence decision-making. Instead of developing criteria that could serve as the basis for defence decision-making in the new paradigm of war, the criteria more or less applied came from the paradigm of interstate industrial war. As such, the “official” criteria that were supposed to be used to make decisions were dismissed. Furthermore, decision-makers disregarded concerns put forth by officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence.

During the policy analysis phase prior to the Somalia deployment, officials in the Department of National Defence (DND) were guided by policy documents such as the 1987 White Paper on Defence. According to the document, the Department of National Defence was required to consider seven criteria before participating in a stability campaign:

- There must be a clear and enforceable mandate;
- The principal antagonists must agree to a cease-fire and agree to Canada’s participation;
- The mandate should serve the cause of peace and have a good chance of leading to a political settlement in the long-term;
- The size and composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate;
- Canadian participation will not jeopardize other commitments;
- There should be a single identifiable authority overseeing the operation and;
- Participation in the mission must be equitably and logistically funded.

Theoretically, stability operations were to be weighted against the criteria, however, testimony before the inquiry revealed a less than rigorous approach. According to Chief of Defence Staff General de Chastelain, “it was not the policy of the department to go down the list of criteria like a checklist, but rather to consider them in a general way.” Deputy Minister Robert Fowler also downplayed the significance of the
guidelines stating that, in his view, "the guidelines were taken into account only
"somewhat, not in any particular detail."140

An additional problem in the decision-making process was that very little analysis of the
changing nature of peacekeeping had been done.141 Thus, criteria used to evaluate the
stability campaign were still rooted in the old paradigm of interstate industrial war. The
criteria put forth by in the 1987 document for example, were at the end of the Cold War.
As such, they might have served the Canadian government well in analyzing a potential
deployment to Cyprus, but certainly not one in Somalia where the principal antagonists
had failed to agree to a cease-fire and to Canada’s participation in the stability
operation.142

The criteria in place at the time of the campaign in Somalia were simply not equipped to
evaluate essential elements in the situation in Somalia. To begin, “no dominant party or
figure was able to exert authority even over the capital of Mogadishu."143 The void left by
the lack of an authority figure meant that there was no one with whom to negotiate, and
no counterpart within Somalia to support or endorse a stability campaign. Furthermore,
the warlords who did maintain some marginal control over areas of Somalia had little
incentive to facilitate the stability campaign:

First, restoring order and rebuilding Somalia proved not to be in the
interests of Somali warlords, many of whom were profiting from the
anarchy in the country. Second, the UN had failed to anticipate that
the delivery of humanitarian aid was not a neutral act in a nation at
war with itself.144

Because these norms had been so fundamentally changed by the new paradigm of
continuous warfare amongst the people, they needed to be specifically addressed before
any such campaign was undertaken.
In addition, there were severe limitations imposed by the infrastructure, or lack thereof, in place in Somalia. The conflict in Somalia had “affected every aspect of Somali society. It destroyed at least 60 percent of the country’s basic infrastructure.” To satisfactorily carry out the mission, it was therefore necessary to plan and compensate for this lack of infrastructure, and the commensurate logistical difficulties it presented. This reality was not acknowledged in the criteria used to evaluate the Somalia mission. As a result, “UNOSOM II was an operation that attempted to carry out a nation building mandate that was considerably beyond its capabilities.”

In his testimony before the inquiry, General de Chastelain acknowledged the absence of suitable criteria stating that “very few of them would have made sense if applied to Somalia, since they were designed for traditional peacekeeping operations.” Understandably, officials at the Department of National Defence were hesitant to deploy the Canadian Forces to Somalia.

When, during the early months of 1992, Canada was asked to contribute military observers to the proposed United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the Department of National Defence recommended that Canada not participate because of “significant concerns about the viability of sending 50 unarmed observers into a place like Mogadishu.” After receiving the recommendation, the Clerk of the Privy Council, Paul Tellier, outlined the situation, including the reservations, in a memorandum to the Prime Minister. At the UN, Canada’s concerns were noted and thus, it seemed unlikely that Canada would be formally approached to participate in the mission.

Throughout 1992, the situation in Somalia deteriorated. Despite previous reservations regarding participation, staff at the Department of National Defence were asked by the
Clerk of the Privy Council to conduct a feasibility study to determine the Canadian Forces’ capability to provide a security battalion to Somalia should the United Nations request one.\textsuperscript{150} Anticipating a new Security Council Resolution authorizing the deployment of a security battalion, DND and DFAIT officials collaborated on a Memorandum to Cabinet advising Cabinet Ministers, as well as the Prime Minister, on options for a Canadian response to the crisis. Three options were presented:

- Canada could respond incrementally to needs in Somalia as they arose, beginning with the provision of airlift support to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

- Canada could consider a request for combat troops for up to six months, in addition to the airlift support, once the technical team report was completed.

- Canada could take a more active leadership role in the issue by pledging support for the UN plan; providing military support by way of a combat unit; and lobbying other members on the issue of assessed contributions.\textsuperscript{151}

Believing that the risks were still too uncertain, DFAIT and DND recommended the first option. However, the Privy Council Office recommended option three. On August 13, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations confirming Canada’s support for the operation.\textsuperscript{152}

According to testimony, “the overarching concern in deciding whether to participate in the Somalia operation was that “1,000 to 3,000 people were dying a day and it was going to get worse.”\textsuperscript{153} This concern required the guidelines to be “significantly” flexible.\textsuperscript{154} In an August 18, 1992 memorandum to the Prime Minster, the Clerk of the Privy Council stated that: “press attention and public interest is growing day by day. A Government statement on Canada’s response to security and humanitarian needs in Somalia would be timely and well-received” Three days later, Canada’s commitment to the stability operation was announced publicly.\textsuperscript{155}
In light of the ad hoc nature of decision-making regarding the deployment of the
Canadian Forces abroad, the Somalia Inquiry recommended that the Government of
Canada issue new guidelines and compulsory criteria for decisions about whether to
participate in a stability campaign.\textsuperscript{156} It also suggested that in briefings or advice to the
Government relating to participation in operations, the Government of Canada require a
comprehensive statement of how the peace support operations guidelines and criteria
apply to the proposed operation.

\textit{Zaire}

The Canadian deployment to Zaire provides yet another illustration of the problematic
nature of defence decision-making in Canada. In November 1996, Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien called his foreign affairs advisors together for a crisis meeting; “he had decided
that Canada would lead a major military intervention in central Africa.”\textsuperscript{157} The request
had come from the United States’ President Bill Clinton. In the aftermath of Somalia,
there was considerable reluctance within the Clinton administration to lead a multi-
national coalition to alleviate the growing crisis in which a million or more people were at
risk of starvation and war.\textsuperscript{158} According to Roy Rempel, “in Canada the Americans found
a political leadership hungry for the media spotlight but unwilling to ask hard questions.
Indeed, within one day the prime minister had already agreed.”\textsuperscript{159} Canada would lead

According to government policy, the 1994 \textit{Defence White Paper} criteria for deployment
should have been used to evaluate the mission. The revised white paper includes, but is
not limited to, criteria such as:

- There must be a clear and enforceable mandate;
- In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there must be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures;

- The size, training and equipment of the force must be appropriate to the purpose at hand and remain so over the life of the mission; and

- There must be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.\textsuperscript{160}

The Government of Canada, however, failed to adhere to its own policy. According to Roy Rempel, Canada’s ability to carry out the mission was dubious. Zaire was more than 12,000 kilometers away from Canada and:

The Canadian air force had no heavy-lift transport aircraft. Its 32 C-130 medium transport aircraft…represented a modest airlift capacity. It had no overseas bases to support such a mission. It has no strategic or tactical reconnaissance capability to adequately assess the situation on the ground. It had no…expertise on the region and its conflict. The army had no rapid deployment capability since the airborne regiment has been disbanded a year previously. Neither did it have any heavy- or medium-lift helicopters, essential for operations in that part of the world.\textsuperscript{161}

Even had Canada possessed such capabilities, there were significant problems with the infrastructure within the region. For instance, the lack of nearby and adequate airports meant that permission had to be obtained to use the airports of neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{162} These were important problems that did not appear to have even been given consideration during the decision-making process. This is especially troubling since “effective logistics support…cannot be overstressed. Without it, contingents will always feel abandoned and unable to operate at their optimum.”\textsuperscript{163}

Although nominally the lead nation in the operation, Canada lacked the appropriate military muscle to mobilize the international support that was required to sustain the mission. As a result, hundreds of thousands of refugees were abandoned and the civil war continued.\textsuperscript{164} Still, the Canadian government seemed content. Rising in the House
of Commons, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien described Canada’s leadership of the mission as indicative of:

…a new world nation, without the burdens of history that weigh so many nations down…a diverse bilingual country that knows the importance of accommodation and understanding…(whose) only enemy is human suffering. Our only foe is hunger and disease. Our only adversary is pain and misery.165

With little regard to the capabilities and logistical support that would be needed to sustain the mission, the Canadian Forces were thrust into a failed state in a distant region of the world. As a result of the failure, the venture became known among the Canadian military as the “bungle in the jungle.”166
Chapter Four: Lessons Left Unlearnt – Criteria for Stability Campaigns

In 2005, the Canadian government released Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. It attempted to redress some of the shortcomings of previous deployment criteria and listed eight issues as critical considerations:

- the mission supports Canada’s foreign policy objectives;
- the mandate is realistic, clear and enforceable;
- international political and financial support as well as other resources are sufficient to achieve the desired end;
- the proposed forces are adequate and appropriate for the mandate;
- an effective process of consultation between mission partners is in place;
- there is a clear exit strategy or desired end-state;
- there is a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement; and
- the mission does not jeopardize other Canadian Forces commitments.  

However, these criteria still failed to address several other vital concerns.

Although recognizing the new era of warfare in the 2005 policy statement, the Government of Canada failed to formulate the aforementioned criteria within the context of the new paradigm of warfare and its attendant stability campaigns. As such, a rigorously developed set of criteria needs to be crafted to serve as the basis for decision-making criteria whenever the Government of Canada contemplates deploying the Canadian Forces abroad. As the failed operations in Somalia and Zaire demonstrated, without such criteria, deployments could be arbitrary, ill-considered, and highly risky operations endangering members of the Canadian Forces and the national interest.
This newly developed idea of criteria should have two components – participation criteria and operational criteria.

Criteria for Stability Campaigns: Participation Criteria and Operational Criteria

Participation criteria includes a wide-range of political considerations that governments – and in particular the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – should use when deciding to participate in a stability campaign. Examples of participation criteria that should be evaluated prior to participation in a stability campaign include considerations such as: the proposed operation is in the national interest, the government is prepared to apply a ‘whole of government approach’ to the operation, and there exists an indigenous political authority to back it.

In additional to a rigorous evaluation of participation criteria that could aid the government in deciding whether to partake in a stability campaign, the government – and in particular the Department of National Defence – should utilize a set of operational considerations. These include factors such as: whether there is a capable nation to lead the multinational coalition, there is an appropriate infrastructure within the proposed theatre of operations, the commensurate logistical support is available, and the Canadian Forces have the appropriate military capabilities to execute the mission.

Taken together, a suitable set of criteria for stability campaigns in the era of continuous war amongst the people should include the following:

- the proposed operation is in the national interest;
- the government of Canada is prepared to apply a ‘whole of government’ approach to the stability campaign;
- there is an indigenous political authority to back the intervening authority;
- there is an appropriate infrastructure within the proposed theatre of operations and the commensurate logistical support to enable operations;
- the Canadian Forces have the appropriate military capabilities to execute the mission and;
- a capable nation is willing to lead the multinational coalition.

Although the purpose here is to establish a set of criteria that should prevail or be created prior to participating in a stability operation, it is important to note that when it comes to military intervention, there should be no absolutes. Success may be unlikely for a given mission and thus, the Government of Canada should not be compelled to act if all its criteria are met. Conversely, it should not be prevented from acting even if some criteria are not met. Simply put, definitive sets of rules can unnecessarily tie the hands of policy makers. Still, establishing definitive guidelines can serve to strengthen and streamline the process, and help to provide consistent parameters for defence decision-making.

*The National Interest*

The stability campaigns in Somalia and Zaire demonstrate the importance of injecting a degree of realism into Canadian foreign and defence policy. Based on the evidence provided in the Somalia Inquiry and the evidence put forth by Roy Rempel regarding the failed mission in Zaire, it is clear that empathetic interests guided the Canadian responses. According to General Anthony Zinni, the American decision to intervene in Somalia was based on empathetic interests as well:

I think it was clear that President Bush made the decision to intervene not based on any political motivation. Obviously, you couldn't find anything that you could even remotely tie to a vital national interest in our intervention in Somalia. You
had a President who was leaving office, probably forever, so there was nothing to be gained personally for him. I think truly what has become known as the “CNN effect”…motivated then-President Bush to attempt to do something good.\textsuperscript{169}

There is certainly virtue in attempting to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians whenever and wherever it is needed. However, as Richard Haass reminds readers in \textit{Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World}: “a justified intervention needs a genuinely deserving victim to rescue; a wise one needs…an interest of one’s own to be served in the process.”\textsuperscript{170} Unfortunately, both the Somalia operation and the Zaire operation were devoid of any obvious vital national interests.\textsuperscript{171}

While the 2005 international policy statement captures the changing nature of warfare, it fails to identify Canada’s vital national interests. For example, according to the document; “in charting a path forward, Canada’s interests will guide us. They are intimately linked to the character of our society and the values it embodies.”\textsuperscript{172} Instead of defining clear national interests that could serve as the basis for directing the aims of foreign and defence policy, the focus is instead on “values” and on global engagement as a means of promoting those values.\textsuperscript{173} As the operations in Somalia and Zaire demonstrated however, defining Canada’s national interests in terms of values and ideals may not be appropriate in the era of continuous war amongst the people.

In \textit{American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination}, author Hans Morgenthau states that “to establish a hierarchical order, an order of priorities, among all possible objectives of a nation’s foreign policy must be the first step in the framing of a rational foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{174} According to Bland:

In the turmoil of a world of continuous warfare and uncertain belligerents and demands for alliances of the moment, there are only two strategic imperatives for Canada – the defence of Canada and alliance with the United States in the defence of North America. Beyond these two imperatives, all else is national choice.\textsuperscript{175}
Although successive Canadian defence policy statements all indicate that the defence of Canada is indeed the government’s number one priority, documents such as the 2005 International Policy Statement devote the majority of its pages to expeditionary operations in failed and failing states. The defence of Canada however, is a strategic imperative and thus, should be treated as such. A major earthquake in British Columbia followed by terrorist attacks in one of Canada’s major cities or perhaps even on the Alberta Oil Sands is certainly not out of the realm of possibilities in the post-9/11 world. In the case of these unfortunate events, the Canadian Forces should be able to respond in a timely and efficient manner. Unfortunately, as J.L. Granatstein states in Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World, Canadian Forces planners have been telling the government for years that “the military is completely incapable of responding to two major incidents at the same time.” Still, the focus of Canadian defence policy has been on expeditionary operations.

An ordering of priorities that included a Canada First defence strategy, followed closely by a strategic objective to aid the United States in defending North America, would not be an uncommon strategy. In Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, the Australian Government cites five strategic interests and objectives. According to the Australians:

- Highest priority is accorded to our interests and objectives closest to Australia.
- Our second strategic objective is to foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood.
- Our third strategic objective is to work with others to promote stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia.
- Our fourth strategic objective is to contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific Region.
- Our fifth strategic objective is to contribute to the efforts of the international community, especially the United Nations, to uphold global security.  

Differing greatly from the Government of Canada, the Australians rank contributions to expeditionary campaigns fifth on their ordering of strategic interests and objectives, while the defence of Australia and Australia’s immediate neighbourhood are their top two strategic interests and objectives. The attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, London, and Glasgow all demonstrate that attacks on the homeland will continue to be a common occurrence in the post-9/11 era. Canada is not immune to such attacks. Furthermore, natural disasters such as earthquakes in Western Canada could occur as well. Thus, an ordering of strategic interests and objectives must begin with a Canada First defence strategy followed closely by the defence of North America with the United States. As Bland suggests, “beyond these two imperatives, all else is national choice.”  

*Applying a ‘Whole of Government’ Approach to Stability Campaigns*

Although Clausewitz’s theory formed the basis of our understanding of interstate industrial war, several concepts in his major work *On War* are relevant today. Chief among them is the idea of the ‘remarkable trinity of the state’. This Clauzewitzian concept is rooted in the Napoleonic era and specifically, Napoleon’s conviction that the whole state and its machinery should be mobilized for war. According to Rupert Smith, “it was he who decreed that the first duty of the strategist is to select the aim of the military force in support of, and in order to realize, the political purpose.” Based on this conceptual insight, Clausewitz put forward the triangular relationship, one in which all three sides are equally relevant – the military, the government, and the people – and in which all three sides much be kept in balance if war is to succeed. Relating this concept to the utility of force in the modern world, Smith has stated that, “this trinity is
crucial to all forms of war, to this very day." The whole government must be mobilized for war, sufficient resources need to be allocated to the cause, and the public must support the campaign. Unfortunately, Canada has failed to recognize this important aspect of stability campaigns.

In *Dreamland: How Canada’s Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty*, author Roy Rempel states that Canada “is not a global power as much as it is a global dabbler.” Instead of focusing Canada’s resources on a few particular problems, in the post-Cold War era, Canada has spread its resources across the globe with little effect. Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier agrees with this assessment. In March, 2007, the CDS stated that in the past, “parceling out small parts of the Canadian Forces in many missions worldwide achieved little, besides making us feel good that we were contributing in many places.” Moreover, Hillier stated that “the costs exceed security or political benefits by deploying to many places in small numbers.” As a result of these past practices, “the military has learned to pick and choose its missions, and to go in big when deployed rather than sprinkling a handful of troops over a larger number of different operations.”

With continuous war amongst the people most evident in failed and failing states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, the Sudan, costly reconstruction efforts are a necessity. Humanitarian crisis’s in failed and failing states often occur following the outbreak of conflict. As Robert I. Rotberg states in “The New Nature of Nation State Failure,” the conflict evident within these zones of instability often arises due to grievances such as the lack of public services and infrastructure. Without addressing these grievances, restoring stability in these troubled states promises to be extremely difficult. Harvard University’s Stanley Hoffman states:
If the humanitarian crisis is...‘structural’, provoked either by the disintegration of a state or by the deliberate evil policies of a government, it becomes extremely difficult for the interveners to remedy the humanitarian disaster without addressing the causes that produced it.\textsuperscript{189}

In failing to address the roots of the conflict, “victims will remain in danger and the intervention will risk, at best, being no more than a band-aid, and at worst, becoming part of the problem.”\textsuperscript{190} Yet, like the country’s military resources, Canada has spread its financial assistance across the globe.

In the 2005 international policy statement, the Paul Martin government declared that it planned to restructure Canada’s aid policy by focusing Canadian assistance on a core group of 25 nations.\textsuperscript{191} On April 19, 2005, these partners were announced. They include 14 African nations, 4 Latin American nations, 6 Asian nations, and one, the Ukraine, in Europe.\textsuperscript{192} However, according to Rempel:

These countries will not be the only recipients of Canadian aid. Indeed, only two-thirds of the bilateral portion of the aid budget (about $1.5 billion in 2005 dollars) will be allocated to them. Remaining bilateral and multilateral aid (totaling some $2.1 billion in 2005) will still go elsewhere. If divided evenly out of today’s budget, each of Canada’s principal aid partners would receive just under $60 million a year. This does not provide much in the way of real “focus.”\textsuperscript{193}

Furthermore, some of the largest recipients of Canadian aid are not identified among the core nations. Afghanistan, for example, is not listed as a principal aid partner despite being the “largest recipient of Canadian aid internationally, home to the largest Canadian military presence abroad, prominently among the least developed countries in the world and of vital security interest for the West.”\textsuperscript{194} Countries such as Afghanistan, which is purportedly a model for the whole of government approach to stability campaigns\textsuperscript{195}, are not even identified as a developing country where Canada can make a difference. This is despite Afghanistan being the largest benefactor of Canadian aid.
Diplomatic resources are also crucial in the new paradigm of war. Unfortunately, as a result of years of “relentless budget cutting,” Canada’s Foreign Service has been “stripped to the bone.”\textsuperscript{196} Yet, one of the main themes evident within Smith’s \textit{The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World} is that although military forces will continue to serve a purpose in the new paradigm of war, they “will have to mesh with a network of other capabilities” if they are going to be effective.\textsuperscript{197} As Thomas R. Mockaitis states in \textit{Peace Operations and Interstate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?}, “although soldiers can stop fighting, they cannot by themselves “keep,” “make,” or “enforce” peace.\textsuperscript{198} If the Government of Canada is intent on restoring stability to troubled regions of the world, the Foreign Service will be an invaluable asset. The authors of “In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insure World” have noted that the service is “the delivery agent of thoughtful and strategic foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{199} Unfortunately, “much of its traditional strength has been squandered…and it will now take years to rebuild.”\textsuperscript{200}

The ‘whole of government’ approach to stability campaigns does not just imply a concerted government effort through the involvement of several government departments such as DND, DFAIT, and CIDA and significant allocation of resources. Another important factor is securing the support of the populace. If the government of Canada is to participate in a stability campaign it is important that the populace, and specifically Parliament, support the operation. Although absent from successive Canadian defence policy papers, the criterion of domestic and governmental support is evident in those of other nations.

In Presidential Decision Directive 25 for example – a policy document produced by the Clinton administration following the debacle in Somalia – one of the criteria states that
prior to participating in a stability campaign, domestic and congressional support should either prevail or be marshaled. However, an important caveat must be added to this criterion. It is vital that this criterion be evaluated in concert with the others – specifically, the national interest criterion.

In Somalia, polls conducted by Gallop and CBS and the New York Times on June 18-21 and June 21-24 1993 revealed that 65 percent and 66 percent of respondents approved of military operations against General Aided. However, a selection of 13 polls conducted following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident revealed that just between 21% and 36% of respondents supported the stability campaign. Once casualties began to mount, the public grew concerned that the mission was an improper one for the Untied States.

According to former National Security Advisor to President George H.W. Bush Brett Scowcroft, this dramatic drop in public support was due to the lack of a vital national interest in Somalia. Comparing the operation in Somalia to the first Gulf War in Iraq, Scowcroft commented that, “it was quite clear to us that our national interests were intimately involved in Desert Storm…Somalia was almost the other extreme…it was purely humanitarian.” For the Untied States, Somalia was not a vital national interest. Although an important component of the ‘whole of government approach’, public support should not be an overriding criterion. It should only be evaluated within the context of the ‘whole of government’ concept and in concert with other criteria principally, whether the mission is in the interests of Canada.
Political Authority

The presence of a political authority that the Government of Canada and the Canadian Forces can back is yet another criterion that should prevail prior to participating in a stability campaign. The failed state of Somalia was devoid of peace or any prospect of peace. No belligerent had the power to overcome any other, and no politician had the power or legitimacy to control the conflict and bring it to an end. According to Zinni:

We had thought we were going to fix the problem in the short term, but we weren’t going to solve the problem in Somalia. As soon as we left, this problem was just going to start up again and require humanitarian assistance.205

This lack of a sufficient political authority can effectively make any potential stability campaign a non-starter. While this concern is partially addressed by the 2005 criterion that the mandate be realistic and have a clear end-state, focusing on an authority figure with the power to control the conflict and/or authorize international intervention makes this criterion far less amorphous.

Infrastructure and Logistics

Suitable infrastructure and logistical support is essential for the conduct of stability campaigns. Regarding these elements, important distinctions can be drawn between military operations evident throughout the Cold War era and those occurring in failed and failing states in the post-Cold War era. Although many Canadians believe that the principal focus of the Canadian Forces has been peacekeeping operations since the conclusion of the Second World War the reality is that, throughout the Cold War, Canada devoted nearly “90 percent of its military effort since 1949” to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).206
The principal aim of this peacetime military alliance was to defend Western Europe and North America against the Soviet Union. Thus, sizeable land and air components of the Canadian Forces were assigned to Germany throughout the Cold War to deter Soviet aggression. Deploying military forces to Germany was feasible however. In Germany, there were adequate roads, rail, and air fields. In addition, there were plentiful supplies of food, fuel, and water as well as numerous other amenities such as hospitals. Conversely, many failed and failing states lack not only the appropriate infrastructure for stability operations, but essential amenities as well.

When reflecting on the campaign in Somalia, General Zinni stated that:

> We were operating in an area the size of the state of Texas and with a population that was traumatized, and an infrastructure that was nonexistent – meaning no roads, or anything like that you could use. We literally had to build our way out to these people.  

Thus, the capabilities of the Canadian Forces cannot be examined in the abstract. It must be considered in concert with the existing infrastructure, or lack thereof, in the failed state. As General Zinni’s quote exemplifies, it may be possible for Canadian Forces to assist the people, but it may not within their capabilities to reach those people. Logistical support is also complex in these operations. In the absence of food, fuel, water, and other essential services for the Canadian Soldiers, arrangements have to be made to supply, ship, unload, station, and re-supply these critical elements.

**Capabilities**

Further lessons can be drawn from both the failed missions in the Congo and Somalia. Principally, capabilities have to match commitments. Canada should not be everywhere
in the world. Canada cannot be everywhere in the world. As Retired Colonel Howie Marsh has stated:

We need to acknowledge that the global influence that Canada’s postwar generation enjoyed was an historical aberration caused by World War II, the influence of World War II on its citizens, and the Korean Postwar period of investment, (1950-1960)...the military investments of the early Cold War years have been spent. Canada is back to its historical norm of being a military power dependent on others for transport, security, and re-supply.208

In *Canada Without Armed Forces?* Marsh elaborates on the current capabilities of the Canadian Forces, including logistical support, stating that:

Since the mid-1980s, successive Canadian governments have provided ever-decreasing expenditure allocations to defence policy, while maintaining, rhetorically at least, an activist international dimension to Canada’s foreign policy. This perennial theme has undermined successive defence policies and plans and created various “commitment-capability gaps” – more is pledged in declarations than is made available in fact.209

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the Canadian government pledged support to stability campaigns across the globe despite the presence of shrinking defence budgets and thus, declining military capabilities that occurred throughout the same time period.210 As a result of such policies:

Canadian Forces resources of people, equipment, and logistical support are now so modest that the members of the armed forces struggle to meet the ever increasing operational tempo required of Canada’s defence and foreign policies. What is most worrisome about this contradiction, evident since at least 1987, is that it now heralds the approach of negligible military capability, perhaps even the collapse of some core capabilities. The gathering crisis is not simply about the loss of these capabilities, but about the effects of this loss on the larger issues of national sovereignty, independent foreign policy, support to the United Nations, and all aspects of relations with the United States in a world of fierce security challenges.211

According to Douglas Bland “military capability is the essential element among a host of fundamentals that together provide the foundations for decisions on the ends and means of national defence.”212 Unfortunately, “the very long-term survival of Canada’s military capabilities is in question.”213
**The Multi-National Coalition Must Include a Nation Capable of Leading the Operation**

While participating in stability campaigns, Canada has historically acted in concert with other nations or international organizations. The operation in Somalia for example was sanctioned by the United Nations. Logistical support was provided by, among others, the United States, and a host of nations contributed forces to the campaign. In Zaire, although the mission was supported by the United Nations, Canada proved to be incapable of sustaining the mission. In *Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention* Michael O’Hanlon states that sustainability is an essential element that must be rigorously evaluated prior to the commencement of a stability campaign. According to the author:

> Sustainability, probably the Achilles’ heel of most militaries in the world today, involves equipment such as trucks, port and airfield loading and unloading equipment, medical facilities, water purification systems, and the like, as well as combat sustainability in realms of ammunition, spare parts, and fuel. At present, very few western militaries are capable of supporting themselves at great distances from their own territories.  

James Kurth concurs. In “Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities” he states that, due to the difficult nature of military operations in the post-Cold War era, stability campaigns can only be undertaken by a modern state with modern expeditionary capabilities. However, only the United States, Britain, France, and Australia possess such modern expeditionary military forces.  

> “As for Canada, which no longer has substantial expeditionary capability, the only places where it might take the lead in an intervention are certain former British colonies in the Caribbean.”

As the stability campaign in Zaire demonstrated, Canada is not capable of leading a multi-national stability campaign. At the very least, Canada is not able to provide the
requisite logistical support necessary to sustain a stability campaign in a failed and failing state. While it is true that Canada has played an important role in Afghanistan, readers should bear in mind that there, Canada has been logistically supported by Britain and the United States throughout the entire campaign.

Although recognizing the new era of warfare in the 2005 International Policy Statement, the Government of Canada failed to formulate the stated criteria within the context of the new paradigm of warfare and its attendant stability campaigns. Furthermore, the inclusion of essential criterion was completely omitted from the document as well as those before it. As such, the rigorously developed set of criteria must serve as the basis for decision-making whenever the Government of Canada contemplates deploying the Canadian Forces abroad. Using Sudan as a model, the following chapter will apply the criteria to the proposed stability campaign in the Sudan thus illustrating the necessity of placing criteria for defence decision-making in the context of continuous war amongst the people.
Chapter Five: Sudan – Considerations and Recommendations

In Arguing about War author Michael Walzer asks:

To intervene or not? – this should always be a hard question. Even in the case of a brutal civil war or a politically induced famine or the massacre of a local minority, the use of force in other people’s countries should always generate hesitation and anxiety.\footnote{217}

There is no question that the Sudan is a deeply conflicted region. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Government of Canada should deploy the Canadian Forces to the region in an attempt to avert the crisis. As the failures in Somalia and Zaire vividly demonstrate, prior to committing the Canadian Forces to a stability campaign in the Darfur region of Sudan, it would be prudent for the Government of Canada to rigorously apply the newly developed criteria below to the proposed operation in the Sudan.

Option Considered

On August 31, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1706, authorizing a United Nations stability campaign in the Darfur region of the Sudan. As in the United Nations operations in Somalia in the early 1990s, contributing nations will act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes the use of force in stability campaigns.\footnote{218} The resolution calls for the deployment of 17,300 military personnel as well as a 3,300 person strong civilian police component and up to 16 Formed Police Units.\footnote{219}

Canadian Participation?

As the previous analysis has demonstrated, in the new era of warfare, stability campaigns are dangerous and complex operations. Thus, as Michael Walzer has stated,
participating in these campaigns demands a rigorous evaluation. This evaluation should include considerations such as:

- the proposed operation is in the national interest.
- the Canadian Forces have the appropriate military capabilities to execute the mission.
- a capable nation is willing to lead the multinational coalition.
- there is an appropriate infrastructure within the proposed theatre of operations, and the commensurate logistical support to enable operations.
- there is an indigenous political authority to support the intervening authority.
- the government of Canada is prepared to apply a ‘whole of government’ approach to the stability campaign.

The National Interest

The Sudan, and in particular, Darfur, is not a vital national interest for Canada. As Bland has stated, in a world of continuous warfare and uncertain belligerents, there are only two strategic national interests for Canada – the defence of Canada and close relations with the United States, “all else is national choice.” This is not to say that Canada could not participate in a purely humanitarian campaign.

In fact, a May 19, 2007 poll suggested that 52 percent of Canadians supported contributing troops “to a United Nations peacekeeping force to stop the genocide.” However, conditions in the failed state of Sudan demonstrate that ending the conflict simply by sending in Canadian Forces is no longer a reality in the new paradigm of continuous warfare amongst the people. As Sean Maloney has stated, Sudan will not be a simple matter of peacekeeping – “there will be casualties.”
In the American experience during the humanitarian mission in Somalia, as soon as casualties began to mount, public support for the mission drastically diminished, and the Clinton administration came under increasing pressure to withdraw American forces from the theatre. Scare military resources and the lives of soldiers were thus extinguished for little gain. Today, Somalia remains a failed state. As an evaluation of the remaining criteria for intervention demonstrates, with the current state of the Canadian Forces, it is unrealistic to expect a different outcome should a military intervention be undertaken in Sudan. Good intentions will not be enough.

Military Capabilities

J.L. Granatstein believes that, “along with a national interest calculus, the government needs to assess the Canadian Forces’ capabilities carefully before it accepts requests to deploy anywhere.” In terms of a specific Canadian commitment to the stability operation, STAND CANADA has stated that despite Canada’s existing military commitments, the Canadian Forces (CF) has:

The capability to make a significant contribution to the proposed UN intervention force in Darfur without undermining our mission in Afghanistan…the CF is capable of deploying and sustaining 3 companies of infantry – approximately 450 troops – with the equipment necessary to operate safely and effectively in Darfur without diverting troops from Afghanistan.

However, assessments from Bland and Marsh indicate that it would be very difficult for the Canadian Forces to mount such an operation at the present time. In addition, both Granatstein and former Canadian General Romeo Dallaire have directly addressed this proposed commitment. According to Granatstein:

The simple truth is that Canada is a small country, at best a mid-rank middle power, with limited resources. There is little it can do on its own and, with its present military strength, relatively little it can do in cooperation with its friends. Even basic peacekeeping, let alone a major peace-support operation over and above the Kandahar commitment, is beyond Canadian capacity in 2007.
Romeo Dallaire has also challenged claims that Canada has the military capacity to make a significant contribution in the Sudan. According to Dallaire, “no perfect solution exists to address the tragedy” and furthermore, “armed intervention by Canada against Sudan’s will is not feasible.” At present, Canada is unable to send troops to Darfur.227

Is There a Capable Nation to Lead the Multi-National Coalition?

As James Kurth reveals in “Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities” only the United States, Britain, France, and Australia possess modern expeditionary military forces.228 However:

If one adds up all of the potential addicted countries that might be rescued by Britain, France, Australia, or Canada, it is obvious that large numbers of countries (and especially large countries) are outside these countries’ combined sphere of intervention. Excluded countries include such present and potential arenas of massacres or genocide as Sudan, Congo, Burundi, and, not too far in the future, other parts of Africa as well.229

Kurth acknowledges that Britain and France have the capacity to undertake an intervention in small nations such as Sierra Leone or the Ivory Coast. However, their capabilities do not match the resources necessary for the leading a stability campaign in large African failed states such as the Sudan.230 The only country with the requisite capabilities to do so is the United States. However, as Kurth notes:

The Iraq War has had very damaging consequences for humanitarian intervention. The war has developed in a way that will make it almost impossible for the United States to undertake such an intervention over the next several years, and it has greatly impaired both the political will and the military capability necessary for such interventions.231

Thus, at present, there is no credible nation capable of leading the proposed stability campaign in Sudan.
Logistics and Infrastructure

Even if there were a nation that could lead the proposed stability campaign in the Darfur region of Sudan, the lack of suitable infrastructure and logistical support further complicates an intervention in the region. Unfortunately, there are very few paved roads or rail lines in Darfur. Commenting on logistical support and infrastructure to support proposed UN deployments in the Congo (formally Zaire) and Darfur Granatstein believes that:

> Neither Darfur nor the Congo are territories with the infrastructure a western army needs to operate – unlike Afghanistan, where first the Soviet and then the American military built the airfields, hospitals, and water plants and provided other basic needs. There is no way to get Canadian troops and equipment into these hellholes easily and, even more important, no way to get the troops out quickly in an emergency.\(^{232}\)

Sudan lacks the requisite infrastructure and logistical support to mount a stability campaign. Simply put, any mission where the extraction of the Canadian Forces promises to be a problematic venture should not be undertaken.

**Who is the Political Authority?**

Matters are complicated further by the fact that the stability campaign was approved despite the consent of only one of the three rebel groups operating in the Sudan and without the consent of the Government of Sudan. Although the Canadian sponsored and United Nations supported document *The Responsibility to Protect* permits the international community to violate the sovereignty of another nation in cases where a population is suffering serious harm due to “internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure”\(^{233}\) it should be understood that the presence of a supportive political authority is still an essential ingredient to conducting a stability campaign. The Somalia Inquiry for
example, criticized the decision-making process surrounding the campaign because, among other failings, “General Aided…had not formally accepted the security battalion.”

According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, the failure to win the support of the various groupings of rebels battling the Sudanese government “poses dangers” for contributing nations. Failing to secure the consent of the Sudanese government presents significant challenges to intervening force as well. As John R. Schram has stated, “the Sudanese government and army would be formidable enemies for Canadian or any other unwanted peacemakers.” Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has repeatedly criticized U.N. resolutions calling for U.N. troop deployment to Darfur as a violation of Sudan’s sovereignty. Despite claims that the Sudanese government has since reconsidered and is thus now willing to permit United Nations forces into the country, such claims are tenuous. They continue to show no inclination that they are willing to support United Nations efforts in Sudan.

There are important implications that arise due to the lack of a political authority to back in Sudan. First is the risk inherent in the operation. As Maloney, Zoellick and Schram have stated, contributing nations should expect to incur casualties. More importantly, the failure to achieve the support of the principal belligerents demonstrates that Sudan certainly conforms to the new paradigm of warfare. Unfortunately, without the backing of a political authority, be it either an elected government or a unified front of rebel groups, willing to aid the intervening authority, intervening forces will not be able to stabilize the failed state. Thus, the failure to secure the support of a political authority essentially makes the proposed stability campaign a non-starter.
A Whole of Government Approach?

In Sudan, a failed state where continuous war amongst the people occurs and where a compendium of problems are evident – both security related and structural – token military deployments and minimalist government polices will not suffice. A whole of government approach is a necessity. However, the application of a ‘whole of government approach’ in the Sudan is complicated by the fact that there presently exists no political authority to back.

Without at least one of the principal belligerents – either the Sudanese government or a unified front of rebel groups – developmental activities aimed at addressing the grievances of the conflicting parties will be difficult if not impossible to implement. In addition, from a purely Canadian perspective, the application of a whole of government approach to the conflict is currently unfeasible as it would require a major restructuring of Canadian priorities – militarily, financially, and diplomatically.

Currently there are 2,500 Canadian Forces soldiers in Afghanistan serving as part of Joint Task Force Afghanistan in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. This force is committed in Afghanistan until 2009. In addition, Canada has pledged over a billion dollars in financial assistance to the Afghan people. Furthermore, “more than 70 Foreign Affairs officers work on Afghan issues, both at headquarters and abroad. In August 2006, there were 24 Canadian-based staff and 34 locally engaged staff working at the embassy in Kabul.” As the prior analysis has demonstrated, Canada’s military and diplomatic resources are scarce. In terms of financial aid, the tax-payer funded coffers of the Canadian International Development Agency are also limited. In order to apply the whole of government approach to the
Sudan Canada would have to redirect the military, diplomatic, and financial resources engaged in Afghanistan to Sudan. Such a policy would not only require Canada withdraw from its commitment to NATO, but such a policy would mean that Canada would be willingly abandoning the Afghan people as well. Thus, at least until 2009, it appears as though the whole of government approach will remain engaged in Afghanistan.

**Recommendation**

Taken together, the application of participation criteria and operational criteria reveals that Canada should not, and cannot, participate in a stability campaign in the Sudan. Although some may wish to challenge this conclusion, the lessons learned from the stability campaigns in Somalia and Zaire, including evidence presented regarding past decision-making practices in Canada, demonstrate that in an era of continuous war amongst the people a solid foundation for decision-making, one that provides the Government of Canada with realistic assessments of proposed stability campaigns, is a necessity. As the analysis revealed, in committing to the proposed stability campaign in the Darfur region of Sudan the Government of Canada would be committing the nation to an unsustainable and highly risky operation – one that would endanger both the members of the Canadian Forces and the national interest.
Conclusion

On January 23, 2007 Jack Layton, leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada, appeared before students and faculty at the University of Quebec in Montreal to deliver a speech titled “Canada’s Role in the World: Bridging the Divide or Deepening It?”

Differentiating his party from the Liberal Party of Canada and the governing Conservative Party of Canada, Mr. Layton advocated the immediate withdrawal of Canadian forces from Afghanistan and a major Canadian commitment to a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Western Sudan. Participating in a “peacekeeping” mission in the Western region of Sudan, Mr. Layton stated, would serve as a better example of the kind of role “everyday Canadians wish to see Canada play on the world stage. Not dividing people, but building bridges, not waging war, but keeping the peace.” By advocating the withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Afghanistan and a Canadian commitment to a stability campaign in the Darfur, Mr. Layton’s New Democratic Party raised an important question that merits the attention of politicians and policy-makers alike. How should a country such as Canada make decisions regarding the deployment of the Canadian Forces?

The criteria developed within the Master’s Research Project should serve as a policy instrument in answering this question. Prior to deploying the Canadian Forces to distant regions of the world, the government should evaluate the mission against the following participation and military criteria:

- the proposed operation is in the national interest.
- the government of Canada is prepared to apply a ‘whole of government’ approach to the stability campaign.
- there exists a political authority to back.
- there is an appropriate infrastructure within the proposed theatre of operations and the commensurate logistical support to enable operations.
- the Canadian Forces have the appropriate military capabilities to execute the mission.
- a capable nation is willing to lead the multinational coalition.

While analysis demonstrated that the application of these criteria reveals that Canada should not participate in the proposed stability campaign in the Sudan, the criteria – to be truly effective – must be used to inform decisions regarding future stability campaigns as well. The application of the developed criteria to the present mission in Afghanistan for example, reveals sharp differences between the proposed mission to the Sudan and the current mission in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

Despite arguments from Mr. Layton to the contrary, the mission in Afghanistan is an appropriate one for Canada. Afghanistan harboured international terrorists whose intention it was to attack the North American continent. On September 11, 2001, the North American continent was indeed attacked by the elements of a terrorist network – al Qaeda – operating out of Afghanistan. In Washington, D.C., New York City, and Pennsylvania, these attacks claimed the lives of 2,752 persons,245 24 of whom were Canadian.246 Thus, eliminating this threat, while attempting to restore stability to Afghanistan, accomplishes both of Canada’s vital national interests – the protection of Canada and close collaboration with the United States in defence of the North American continent.
Canada is also applying a whole of government approach to the operation in Afghanistan. Canada has pledged over a billion dollars in financial assistance to the Afghan people and “more than 70 Foreign Affairs officers work on Afghan issues.” Unlike the proposed Sudan operation, in Afghanistan, the Canadian government is backing, and has the support of, Hamid Karzai, the democratically elected President of Afghanistan. Even during the initial military campaign against the Taliban, Canada’s allies had the support of the Northern Alliance, a large rebel faction who consented to and supported allied forces during the invasion of Afghanistan. Thus, both the whole of government criteria and the political authority criteria are evident in Afghanistan.

There is also a capable nation and coalition of nations leading the operation in Afghanistan. The United States Military, with their attendant logistical support, has supported Canada’s operations in the nation. A compendium of NATO allies, including Britain, is operating in concert with Canada providing the Canadian Forces with logistical support as well. Furthermore, Sudan presents serious logistical obstacles. Darfur is vast and the areas poor roads. Thus, “ground transportation of troops would be difficult.” Conversely, as J.L. Granatstein stated, Afghanistan has the infrastructure necessary for military operations.

The problem facing the Afghanistan mission is the same problem that emerges each time a stability campaign is considered: lack of military capability. Although Canada has been able to sustain 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, scholars such as Granatstein question how long Canada can continue the deployment. Considering that Canada is operating with NATO allies, and with the attendant logistical support of the United States Military, this is a worrisome proposition. Added to this is the reality that Canada lacks the requisite capability to defend itself against natural disasters and potential terrorist
attacks, and Bland and Marsh’s assessment that “the very long-term survival of Canada’s military capabilities is in question” becomes very apt. By this analysis, the divide which Mr. Layton speaks of is actually the gap between the expectations of Canadians, and the reality facing the Canadian Forces.

Endnotes

Introduction


Chapter One: The End of Peacekeeping


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Chapter Three: Defence Decision-Making in Canada – Lessons Learned


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Chapter Four: Lessons Left Unlearnt – Criteria for Stability Campaigns


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See “CIDA announces new development partners: developing countries where Canada can make a difference.” http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7

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Chapter Five: The Sudan – Considerations and Recommendations

219 Ibid, pg. 3.
224 Granatstein, pg. 46.
226 Granatstein, pg. 46.
227 It should be noted however that despite acknowledging Canada’s inability to contribute troops to the proposed stability campaign, Romeo Dallaire believes that Canada should be active on the issue, engaging allies, and specifically European allies, on the matter. He also believes that Canada should increase financial assistance to the Darfur region. See: Dallaire, Romeo. “We Can Help Darfur.” The National Post. Tuesday, April 3, 2007. Pg. A12.
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