



LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA
RENEWAL COMMISSION

.....

A Democratic Society Taskforce

R E P O R T O N

SECURITY

.....

By: Honourable David Collenette



SECURITY PAPER

BACKGROUND

The 20th century was one of tumult, with wars, revolutions and genocide. Most notable were two conventional world wars and forty years of a Cold War that at any time could have precipitated a nuclear conflagration. On the face of it the likelihood of Canada participating in large-scale interstate conflict in the 21st century is relatively low; however there are new security challenges that threaten to undermine regional stability in many parts of the world and stability within Canada's own borders.

After the Korean War, Canada's security commitment was two fold: confronting the Soviet threat to Europe by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as partner with the United States in the North American Air Defense (NORAD); and, in peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations. Since the ending of the Cold War era, Canada has participated in UN security missions and, more recently, those under NATO in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

Canada has always taken pride in giving assistance by way of development aid or in using the Canadian Forces, the RCMP and other federal agencies in nation building and reconstruction after conflict and natural disasters. There appears to be a broad consensus within Canadian society to continue these types of roles.

However the civil war in the Balkans and the need to root out terrorism in Afghanistan has provoked debate especially within the Liberal Party as to the degree to which Canadian lives and resources should be committed in other countries.

Finally, in recent years we have seen threats to Canadian security from non-traditional sources and this may become an ever-increasing trend:

- the relatively recent threat posed by global terrorism to security and critical infrastructure;
- maintaining or restoring law and order where it is beyond the power of civil authorities;
- the increasing challenge posed by natural disasters;
- the re-emergence of global health pandemic phenomena;
- criminal activities such as smuggling contraband and illegal immigrants
- sovereignty in the Arctic as climate change makes this under-populated part of Canada subject to foreign incursion;
- over-fishing by foreign fleets within our territorial oceanic limits;
- environmental degradation caused by accidents or dumping effluent on our coastal waters.

In light of increasing security challenges closer to home as well as the traditional security challenges abroad, this paper will emphasize the need to address these issues in order to shape Party policy in the run-up to the next general election.

CANADA IN A CHANGING WORLD

Most conflicts in the present era are likely to be within states rather than state against state. These civil wars often tend to be low intensity and without regard to established norms and conventions, usually resulting in large-scale human rights violations.

In cases of mass violations of human rights, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) adopted by the United Nations, establishes a good framework to tell us when intervention is justified. In such cases everything from covert operations to the outright use of overwhelming force can be acceptable. The UN should focus on prevention rather than crisis management, and R2P can serve as a useful framework within which to launch preventative intervention operations.

Canada should continue to commit its military forces only within the framework of institutional internationalism provided by the UN Charter and other multinational organizations such as NATO and NORAD. We have seen the recent disaster unfold in Iraq when the US-led coalition acted without the legitimacy afforded by a UN resolution. On the other hand post 9/11 in Afghanistan and a decade earlier in Kuwait, the United States as the world's most powerful country was able to lead an effective coalition to confront those who would undermine the integrity of nation states or export terrorism because it had the UN support. In this context Canada made the right decision to refuse participation in the US led force in Iraq, but was right to commit to a sharp end engagement and reconstruction in Afghanistan. While very few Canadians question the former, many appear perplexed about our role in Afghanistan. It is incumbent upon the Party leadership to effectively explain the rationale for the Afghan commitment.

The notion that one can engage militarily in nation building without being prepared to ensure security is possible, but likely to be resented by our allies. Why should Canada have the luxury of doing good works but leave the difficult job of enforcing security to others? The Task Force believes the Liberal Party must accept that a sharp edged military is a vital necessity in the 21st century. We believe this is compatible with the preferred mission of peace-keeping and reconstruction of unstable, repressed or war-ravaged societies where the military is augmented by civilian police and other professionals.

In meeting our international commitments Canada's defense, diplomacy and development assets must work in close cooperation but we cannot shy away from the fact that the military is a crucial instrument of discharging a nation's foreign policy. Over the past thirteen years Liberal governments have cut back resources to the Canadian Forces, partially to help address the financial deficit in the 1990's, but also because a philosophical choice was made to diminish the

military's place in Canadian society and invest in other priorities. However this has come at a price. Our traditional allies have questioned the commitment of one of the world's wealthier societies to roll up its sleeves to take on the tough jobs required to make the world a safer and better place. There is reason to believe that this perception has manifested itself in the impact of Canada's opinions being somewhat diminished and our military not being taken into full confidence by our allies.

One theme that will permeate this paper is that the Canadian Forces continues to be the most effective instrument to discharge our commitment to international security through the United Nations and our role in NATO, yet at the same time on the domestic front be a key instrument in aiding the civil authority and helping to make Canada and the world a more secure place.

Over the past two years both Liberal and Conservative governments correctly advocated a reinvestment in our military. The maintenance of a multi-purpose, combat-capable armed force must be a national priority. Canada must reinvigorate our army, navy and air force, both at the regular and reserve levels.

The army needs to be able to deploy two battle groups of up to 2,500 soldiers on short notice. This will enable Canada to continue our important commitments in Afghanistan and the Balkans but at the same time permit deployment of troops to a place like Sudan where human rights abuses abound and where cries for international assistance have not been adequately addressed. The effective strength set at 60,000 regular and 23,000 reserves in the 1994 White Paper has actually been well below that figure. Commitments abroad have required reservists to make up around 30% for most missions. With the growing number of national disasters that have occurred there is an urgent need to set new targets for effective strength: 70,000 regulars and 40,000 reserves.

The air force must have varied strategic lift capability that would allow it to transport troops, materiel and supply infrastructure for deployed troops. In this context the recent government commitment is welcome except for the fact that two heavy lift transport planes should meet requirements instead of the four announced. There is a need for an urgent upgrading of the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, used for coastal security, an examination of options for an F-18 fighter upgrade or new equipment and, finally, new search and rescue planes.

One of the embarrassments of recent years is that funds have not been available to crew and operate the existing naval fleet. The navy must have appropriate funding allowing for full utilization of the frigates, coastal patrol vessels and the newly announced supply ships. The Upholder Class submarines, despite initial deployment problems, must become fully operational as cornerstones of maritime surveillance.

In providing new resources for Canadian Forces the Liberal Party must not shy away from using sole source procurement in order to avoid the long delays in the normal tendering process. Canada's military equipment needs cannot wait for

completion of long and drawn out procurement process as we saw with the maritime helicopter purchase. The Task Force believes there is an urgent need to streamline military procurement so that the specification and request for proposal processes facilitate the timely delivery of equipment.

The Canadian Forces historically has done a good job in reflecting the country's linguistic duality. However it needs to improve recruitment practices in order to attract Canadians of the many ethno-cultural groups that make up our society. In particular the Canadian Forces should offer places to qualified medical and technical personnel, who for various reasons have yet to receive their accreditation by provincial professional associations.

DEFENDING CANADA AND CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY

There are those in the post-Cold War environment who believe that the traditional threats to Canada from belligerent states no longer exist. While that appears to be apparent for now, the international situation could change at any time. Russia, although now an ally, has become increasingly uncomfortable with its weakened position in world affairs. This together with the threat to its national security as a result of its declining population and the presence of unstable regimes in bordering states presents new challenges to the Russian leadership. Moreover it is seeking to create a regional block in Central Asia to ensure its own integrity and to include China in that alliance. This grouping combined with the Chinese economy's incredible appetite for resources may pose new challenges for stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The threat from so called rogue states must also be addressed. Iran has been moving towards developing its own nuclear capability ostensibly for peaceful purposes and North Korea has recently given cause for alarm with the testing of a long-range missile that could reach North America.

The United States is convinced that some type of ballistic missile protection should be instituted to protect North America. Yet the American military has failed to demonstrate that such technologies can work and that the cost is manageable. While the implementation of a missile defense shield is an American decision, it has an impact on Canadian sovereignty. Canada should not necessarily endorse these American plans but it also cannot afford to take on a spectator role. We should indicate our willingness to be part of discussions within NORAD to determine whether such a North American ballistic missile shield is not only viable but also desirable.

Threats to our sovereignty are also manifested in other ways. Global warming is making navigation of the North West Passage an easier task. Over the past number of years foreign ships have entered Canadian waters without our permission. It is conceivable the Passage could become a key trade route raising the issue of territorial sovereignty on the contiguous lands. In addition, the potential for harmful pollution spills pose a threat to the sensitive ecosystem

in the region. In 1995, Canada took extreme measures to combat illegal over fishing within the 200- mile territorial limit off our Atlantic coast. This demonstrated that Canada must have a physical presence and be prepared to use it in order to enforce both international law and defend our national interest. A significant expansion of the Canadian Rangers, improved satellite surveillance, deployment of a modern underwater sensor network and permanent presence of ice-breaker capability should be a priority.

All of these challenges clearly point to the need for more naval resources and aircraft to patrol coastal waters; a need to ensure there is proper coordination between the many governmental agencies involved; and a clear enunciation of Canada's self interest and intent to act when appropriate (as was established in the "Turbot War" of 1995).

However, there needs to be a greater clarity within the US about Canada's role in defending its coastal waters. On the one hand, the United States expects and encourages Canada to pull its weight in continental defense (witness the expansion of the NORAD mandate to include coastal protection), yet it contests Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The Canadian government must forcefully address this issue in bilateral discussions because the United States can not have it both ways.

INTERNAL SECURITY

The events of September 11th, 2001 have reverberated around the world but within North America have caused a fundamental re-examination of continental security. The first issue that needed to be addressed was the structural ability of the governments in both Canada and the United States to act quickly to deal with a future security crisis. In the U.S. the President chose to create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and integrate all relevant agencies within it. This machinery of government change has had a profound impact within the American administration, as different organizations, with their own cultures and histories merged. Machinery changes result in governance changes and governance changes require statutory enactment. All the time the system must continue to operate. There are many who argue that the all-encompassing DHS model failed in dealing with the domestic security and disaster management issues during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

While Canada looked at the DHS model, Prime Minister Chrétien felt, given our parliamentary system, it was more appropriate to act in a collaborative and less institutionalized manner. An ad hoc committee of Cabinet was established to deal with public security issues. Rather than merging bureaucratic structures like the DHS model, the Canadian solution ensured that key players were brought together on issues in a timely manner, yet utilizing existing structures and personnel. The Martin government borrowed somewhat from the DHS model by merging some functions under one minister, yet key agencies such as the Coast Guard and the Canadian Air Transportation Security Agency (CATSA) were left

within their existing departments. Many believe this hybrid model to be ineffective. The Task Force believes we must revisit the issue of public safety coordination and revert to the earlier model with the policy coordinating and decision making being the preserve of cabinet, leaving operations to be discharged by line departments.

Much has been done in the field of aviation security- screening of passengers, airport workers/suppliers and securing airport perimeters. However air cargo security has largely been ignored leaving a huge vulnerability. Resources must be allocated to this serious security weakness. Marine security has not received the same allocation of resources despite the consensus that both Canada and the United States are vulnerable from maritime-based threats. Technologies do exist which can address maritime security although the cost is high. For example the port of Hong Kong has invested in technology whose goal is to screen all containers, although 100% screening is not always consistent with 100% detection. Canada and the United States recently announced an expanded mandate of NORAD to include for the first time, maritime defense. This should go a long way to establishing a secure environment, although, again, this will require enormous financial resources.

The land border between Canada and the United States has come under increased scrutiny by American legislators, oblivious to the fact that all of the of the 9/11 hijackers were legally resident in the United States and that border agents for both countries have been successful in apprehending some engaged in terrorist acts. There is pressure on Canada to arm the members of the Canadian Border Protection Agency (CBPA). This is an issue that the Liberal party must address fairly soon. If these agents are not to be armed then there must be more resources added to the RCMP to perform such tasks.

The United States has mandated that all persons entering its territory overland must possess some form of identity card by 2008. This threatens to cripple trans-border trade and tourism. Given the intransigence on this issue within the US Congress, the Canadian government should move to issue an acceptable travel document, probably a modified passport document, to all Canadians. This is an expensive proposition but the government should ensure the cost is reasonable. The current cost of a passport of \$80 is too high a burden for most Canadians and the five-year term for this document should be extended to ten years. Provision of this key travel document must not continue to be used as just another revenue-generating mechanism for the Treasury. Another alternative which bears examination but which is anathema to many civil libertarians is a National Identity Card. These would be multi-purpose documents that would encompass drivers' licenses as well as social insurance and health cards.

Canada must continue to work with the US government to develop a comprehensive, integrated command and control regime to discharge border security using modern dispatch management communication systems, global positioning systems and digital mapping technology. This would lessen the

requirement for deployment of an enormous number of border agents along the remote parts of the land border.

While security of rail traffic between the US and Canada has been largely addressed by the intense use of screening technology on rail consists, more needs to be done to secure rail marshalling yards. Ports have long been thought to be vulnerable to security breaches and funding from both the American and Canadian governments still falls short of providing for all necessary security measures. In both cases there must be a commitment to enforce perimeter security using intelligent video and other technologies.

Canadians take for granted an uninterrupted supply of food, water, electricity, heating oil, natural gas, and gasoline. Yet the associated critical infrastructure (CI) is particularly vulnerable. Pipelines, nuclear plants, electrical transmission wires, communication towers, bridges, rail networks are potential terrorist threats. It appears that Canada lags behind the United States in terms of sharing information between government and CI owners. While the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI in the United States have been conducting semi-annual briefings for the past three years, Canadian counterparts have only recently begun to share this information.

DHS has developed reporting systems based on the principle of the need to share information from which Canada could benefit. However this is not the culture that exists within Canadian law and security agencies. Therefore a more systematic approach must be taken towards the development of guidelines and procedures for the effective sharing of information between the relevant public security agencies and the owners/operators of critical infrastructure. In the United States many in industry feel this dialogue is only one way and constitute lectures given by DHS instead of real collaboration.

Modern Canada has been built by an open immigration system that has welcomed people to our shores from around the world. The low birth rate in Canada does not provide for replacement of the existing population unless immigration is maintained and even augmented. The principle of multiculturalism has been enshrined in the Canadian Constitution since 1982, yet today has its critics given recent revelations there is inadequate security screening of immigrants. Security screening supervised by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in the field must be an essential part of the immigration process when dealing with high-risk areas. The Task Force believes additional financial and human resources must be applied to the process.

In the post 9/11 certain groups of newcomers to Canada are being increasingly viewed as possible security risks. If this is not dealt with then civic harmony within Canada is at risk. The Liberal party must restate and explain the basic tenets of multiculturalism that celebrate differences and accept the existence of a pluralist society as part of a Canadian identity. More has to be done to integrate newcomers into the Canadian mainstream to avoid the creation of linguistic, cultural, racial and religious ghettos. The federal government should redouble its

efforts to work with provincial governments so that services, benefits and opportunities offered to Canadians, reflect the principles enshrined within the Constitution.

There is a limit to the degree that Canadians citizens are prepared to accept enhancement of security systems/regulations and intrusion into their right to move freely within society so anticipation and prevention of terrorist attacks must be a key goal. This can be achieved through improved intelligence gathering, which has become somewhat of a forgotten activity in Canada over the past number of years. While there is better coordination between agencies with overlapping security mandates in both Canada and the United States, intelligence gathering must continue to receive more funding. Canada should also consider mandating an agency such as CSIS or the Security Communications Establishment (CSE) with the task of intelligence gathering by agents overseas.

SECURITY AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Over the past decade Canada has faced increasing threats to internal security from a host of natural disasters: floods in the Saguenay and Red River regions, a hurricane in Halifax, forest fires in British Columbia, the Ice Storm in Quebec and Ontario, contaminated water in Ontario and Saskatchewan, the electrical blackout in Ontario, SARS and BSE. As a result public attitudes have changed dramatically towards the issues of disaster management: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

The management of emergencies and disasters usually fall to first responders: police, fire, emergency measures personnel. These together with hospitals and other municipal services fall under provincial jurisdiction. The principal way the federal government becomes involved is usually through the Canadian Forces and the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA).

Usually military assistance to provincial governments is routine and ongoing liaison mechanisms in Ottawa and the provinces are used for command and control. However in situations where provincial governments are unable to maintain order or deal with an emergency, the National Defense Act authorizes a provincial government, through the Attorney General, to request, in writing, assistance from the Chief of Defense Staff. The CDS has the legal obligation to respond, as he sees fit and in a timely manner, after consultation with the Minister of National Defense. Commonly known as *Aid to the Civil Power*, this was used to maintain order on a number of occasions before World War II and on four occasions since, including the FLQ crisis in 1970 and the standoff at Oka in 1990. Requests were also made to the military for assistance with a number of floods, forest fires and the Ice Storm of 1998.

The protocols used in applications of *Aid to the Civil Power* have worked remarkably well. In the various emergencies with which the Canadian forces have been involved there have been few problems in large measure due to the military's command and control system used to discharge the political will of a provincial government. In this way Canada has avoided the type of scenario the United States faced in New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina where the chain of command did not work and where the Louisiana National Guard, responsible to the state Governor often found itself at odds with the Federal Emergency Measures Agency (FEMA), responsible to the Secretary for Homeland Security and regular armed forces reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also appeared that NGO's operated independently of government led emergency efforts.

Natural disasters can strike anywhere and at any time. The nearest military bases may be hours away. Roads may be washed out and weather may restrict the operation of relief aircraft. For this reason the augmented reserve force of 40,000 mentioned earlier must be apportioned generously throughout the country. Local armouries must be refurbished and, in some cases, re-opened to provide logistical support for first responders and NGO's. Appropriate equipment and emergency supplies must be stored at these local operations.

The Task Force believes that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must work with the provinces and territories to develop an appropriate system of technological instruments to facilitate reduced emergency response times, improve interoperability of emergency response systems and provide cost effectiveness to deal with disaster management. Examples worth noting include:

- Computer-aided dispatch to seamlessly integrate interactive/real-time map display with call dispatching, records and information management, remote access and mobile communications;
- Global positioning and geospatial mapping to better manage the allocation of emergency resources.
- Data access so that no matter where it resides, what format it takes or how it changes, it is integrated into the work-flow of emergency response.

The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) had long been in place for natural disasters, but the emergence of the virulent disease called SARS, exposed a fault line in the program. The Ontario government, the principle provincial jurisdiction affected, did not appear to qualify for payments under this plan and this caused unnecessary public debate between Ottawa and Queens Park. Similarly when BSE or "mad cow disease" broke out, principally in western Canada, the DFAA also did not appear to have relevance. The Task Force believes that the DFAA must be subject to a fundamental review in particular examining eligibility requirements and the trigger mechanisms required to ensure a timely response in times of emergency.

CONCLUSION

Your Task Force recommends the following:

- Canada should encourage the United Nations to focus on prevention rather than crisis management;
- Canada should continue to commit its military forces only within the framework of institutional internationalism afforded by the UN Charter and those of other multilateral organizations;
- The Liberal Party must accept that a sharp-edge, multi-purpose, combat capable military is a vital necessity in the 21st century and this is compatible with the preferred mission of peace-keeping;
- The Canadian Forces must be more reflective of the multicultural diversity of Canada and recruitment must be improved to attract recruits from across the cultural spectrum;
- The Canadian Forces should provide roles for immigrant recruits who possess medical and other skills, not immediately recognized by provincial professional associations. The federal government should work with the provinces to ensure that such practical CF experience facilitates full accreditation for application in society at large.
- Legislation should be introduced in Parliament to give statutory effect to the mandate of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council which encourages employers to protect the jobs of reservists engaged in overseas missions;
- Military procurement should be streamlined so that the specification and request for proposal processes provide for a timely delivery of equipment for the Canadian Forces;
- Canada should be willing to engage in NORAD discussions to determine whether a North American ballistic missile defense system is not only viable but also desirable;
- Canada must commit to demonstrating its sovereignty in the Arctic, by increasing the number of Canadian Rangers, improve satellite surveillance, deploy a modern underwater sensor network and establish a permanent ice-breaker capability;

- The federal government should review its public safety coordination with a goal to revert to the earlier model where policy co-ordination and decision-making is discharged by cabinet and operations are left to line departments;
- Appropriate funding must be allocated to completely address the dangerous gaps in air cargo security screening;
- Appropriate enforcement at border check points must be a priority and a definitive decision must be made either to arm members of the Canadian Border Protection Agency (CBPA) or allocate increased numbers of RCMP;
- Given the current climate and pressures from US law-makers, passports should be more affordable, renewable every 10 years instead of 5 years and contain other relevant personal data subject to provincial cooperation and privacy concerns;
- Canada and the United States must develop a comprehensive, integrated command and control system to discharge border security using modern dispatch management communication systems and digital mapping technology;
- There should be a national system of protocols to ensure there is effective sharing of information between relevant public security agencies and the owners/operators of critical infrastructure;
- Additional financial resources must be applied to the security screening process of immigrants in their home countries and CSIS should be more involved in the process;
- The federal government must work with the provinces and within the constitutionally-enshrined principle of multiculturalism to redouble efforts to integrate newcomers into the Canadian mainstream so as to avoid the creation of linguistic, cultural, racial and religious ghettos which could undermine security;
- More resources must be allocated to intelligence gathering to head-off potential terrorist threats and Canada should consider mandating a government agency to establish an overseas intelligence network;
- To improve the ability of the Canadian Forces under the Aid to the Civil Authority provisions of the National Defense Act, the augmented CF reserves, should be allocated generously across the country, particularly in rural Canada. In this context a major project should be taken to re-open or refurbish local armouries to assist municipal authorities and NGO's in time of need;

- The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must work with the provincial/territorial governments to develop an appropriate system of technological instruments in order to facilitate reduced emergency response times, improve interoperability of emergency services and provide better cost effectiveness in dealing with disaster management;
- The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements must be subject to a fundamental review in the area of eligibility requirements and the trigger mechanisms required ensuring a timely response during an emergency

TASK FORCE

The Chair, the Honourable David Collenette, PC worked with a group of fifteen, some of whom work for government or government agencies who wish their names not to be used. I wish to thank all members of the Task Force and in particular:

Senator Romeo Dallaire
Captain Barrie Harris
Hugh Andrew
Peter Gregg
Cameron Summers
Faraz Ahmed