

**STABILITY CAMPAIGNS:  
LESSONS LEARNED AND LESSONS  
APPLIED**

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## Stability Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Lessons Applied

### United States

#### *Military Transformation and Innovation*

**Odom, Thomas P, et al. "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units." *Military Review*, Volume 85, Issue 3. May 2005.**

Odom et al are concerned with the operational experience of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), stability operations and support operations (SOSO), and the contemporary operating environment and how this has influenced US Army transformation. The authors argue that small units (infantry units and squads) are the key to success in any military engagement. Since small units are needed for stability operations, the key for transformation is to start at the lowest level. The Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has documented many operational experiences that support low-level Army transformation.

**Cohen, Eliot A. "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 27, No. 3. September 2004.**

The article analyzes the ideas of radical change and transformation of military affairs that has been discussed by military analysts over the past twenty years. Cohen poses the question, has there actually been a 'revolutionary' change to military affairs? Or are the changes we are witnessing the natural progression of technology and the evolution of war fighting? The context of this article is framed around the ideas of the 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) and 'military transformation'.

Cohen argues that transformation is as much a bottom-up as it is a top-down within the US military. The greatest changes in war are brought about by spontaneous innovation in reaction to tactical problems. At the heart of real change in military affairs is the notion of a 'learning organization'. But Cohen also notes that the focus of the RMA debate failed to adequately incorporate the enemy factor. However, the US military experience in Iraq has illustrated its ability to adapt and apply the lessons it is learning to its force structure. The conversion of American heavy divisions (4ID or 1AD) to counterinsurgency forces is a good example of this. The lessons learned from Iraq are being adapted to 'realistic training' exercises in the US before deployment. Cohen concludes that while the RMA is 'here to stay', it requires a greater inclusion of how enemy forces are approaching transformation efforts.

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**Dunn III, Richard J. “Transformation: Let’s get it right this time.”**  
***Parameters*, Spring 2001.**

Dunn documents the US military’s experience in the Middle-East in the 1980’s and early 1990’s and how this has led to efforts to ‘transform’ the US Army. Dunn is critical of the traditional elements of the Army and the military bureaucracy. He calls the Army sometimes its own worst enemy when it comes to change. Dunn is supportive of gradual transformation efforts that the Army has employed as the institution has changed itself. Most notably the development of the High-Technology Light Division (HTLD) is what the Army needs to adopt as a major part of its transformation. Dunn also cites Kosovo as evidence the Army needs the HTLD to be more effective in stability-like campaigns in the future.

### ***Military Doctrine and Training***

**Biddle, Stephen. “Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam.”** *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 30, No. 1. February 2007.

This article presents an interesting perspective on American defence policy that reflects advocating transformation and a shift toward a “smaller, faster, leaner, higher-technology US military” for high-intensity operations. Scholars believe that the US speed, precision and situation awareness accounted mainly for the low number of casualties suffered by the Coalition. This article suggests, based on first-hand experiences and evidence collected from participants in both sides of the conflict display Iraqi weakness (i.e. failure to prepare infrastructure for demolition, the survival of remote facilities) as the main reason for low casualty costs. Essentially, the interaction between Iraqi choices, Iraqi military shortcomings, and Coalition strengths produced this outcome – a fact that should be examined more fully for effective defence policy, in the author’s opinion.

**Burpo, F John. “The Great Captains of Chaos: Developing Adaptive Leaders.”** *Military Review*, Volume 86, Issue 1. January 2006.

Burpo is primarily concerned with how the officer corps of the US Army adapts their actions in the field. Burpo believes the US Army needs to question whether its leader-development system adequately identifies and prepares the adaptive leaders an operating environment requires. He specifically recommends a number of changes to the leader-development system including: requiring more graduate and post-graduate education from its officers (for advancement); and reversing the trend of increasingly privatizing teaching staff at schools, instead selecting commanders from the field for teaching assignments.

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Burpo refines the Army's definition of adaptive leadership and recommends specific courses of action to develop adaptive leaders. Accepting the unpredictability of the operating environment, identifying the variables that define environments and continually developing adaptive leaders in demanding situations is the path to creating adaptive leaders. He suggests that the Army must find ways to identify and further develop future middle officers who will be able to adapt and be successful in the field.

### **Petraeus, Lieutenant General David H. "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review*, January-February 2006.**

This article supports the author's initial statement that the US Army has learned a great deal in Iraq and Afghanistan about the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, especially surrounding asymmetrical attacks to avoid US strengths – firepower, manoeuvre and technology. Petraeus acknowledges fourteen observations from soldiering in Iraq that include:

1. "Do not try to do too much with your own hands."
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.
5. Analyze "costs and benefits" before each operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader's most important task is to set the right tone.

Petraeus further recognizes that institutional structures are solely inadequate for capturing lessons – they are dependant on soldiers' thoughts and impressions. He concludes by stating that now, more than ever, modern militaries must rely on lessons learned in the past to understand the "changing environment of conflict" into the future.

### **Johnston, Paul. "Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies." *Parameters*, Autumn 2000.**

Johnston argues that writing doctrines is not enough if the purpose of that doctrine is to change the way an army fights. An army's behaviour in battle is usually a reflection of its character and culture more than the contents of its

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doctrine manuals. Johnston notes that history has shown that armies tend to reform themselves through wartime experience, not peacetime innovation. Johnston uses case studies of British interwar years; the French army between 1914 and 1940; and the US experience during Operation Desert Storm to illustrate the influence of operational experiences on developing war fighting doctrine.

**RisCassi, Robert W. "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Combined Environment: A Necessity." *Military Review*, Volume 77, No. 1. January/February 1997.**

RisCassi argues that for the foreseeable future (21<sup>st</sup> Century), American military leaders will most often be leaders of multinational military coalitions. As doctrine continues to evolve out of the post-Cold War era, coalition warfare doctrine must remain a priority effort among all services. The tools and lessons developed from this doctrine must be captured and employed in the formation of ad hoc coalitions to accelerate the cohesion of coalition forces. More care must be taken for US commanders to be adaptive to coalition force leadership through the development of a shared and understandable doctrinal approach to future campaigns.

### ***Stability/Peace Operations***

**Vines, John R. "The XVIII Airborne Corps on the Ground in Iraq." *Military Review*, Volume 86, Issue 5. September 2006.**

After a brief review of the Corps' year in Iraq, Vines focuses specifically on three areas: the operational environment, battle command, and the challenges in achieving a common relevant picture in a dynamic electronic warfare domain; to better prepare Soldiers and units for deployment. This article is very technical in its presentation of lessons learned. However, the main argument is that to succeed in current and future conflicts, the US Army must be able to maximize battle command and create systems that are accessible at the lowest levels of the chain. The US Army must recognize the importance of integrating soldiers into the information battlefield (via education and technology) to better approach future campaigns involving stability operations.

**Rose, Donald G. "Peace Operations and Change in the US Military." *Defense Analysis*, Volume 17, No. 2, 2001.**

The article examines the US Army's involvement in peace/stability operations in post-Cold War conflicts of the 1990's. Rose asks the question of did involvement in these operations bring about changes in Army doctrine and training? In addition, did the US Army learn from its experiences? By studying operations in

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Northern Iraq, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Rose argues that the US Army has in fact learned from its experiences by institutionalizing the lessons learned into doctrine and training.

The article specifically examines the US Army's experience in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq and Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. Rose traces the how the lessons from these operations were disseminated by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and incorporated into doctrine and training. The various changes to the Army's field manual (FM series) during the 1990's illustrates the increasing importance of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in Army deployments. With these changes to doctrine, Rose examines how unit training began to incorporate these lessons learned. Finally, the article examines the implications of these lessons incorporated on the force structure of the US Army. Rose notes the issue of preparing forces for primarily high intensity conflicts minimizes the amount of OOTW training units can learn. Alternatively, the more OOTW Army units train for, the less prepared they will be for high intensity conflicts. Rose concludes that the Army's move toward a brigade style approach to future conflicts indicates an acknowledgement on the Army's part of recognizing the need to maintain traditional war fighting capabilities while having sufficient training for peace/stability operations.

**Berdal, Mats. "Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in 'Peace Operations' in the 1990's." *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 7, No. 4. Winter 2000.**

Berdal argues that during the 1990's the armed forces of many western countries embraced a view that 'peace enforcement' operations were a military activity distinct from 'war'. The contextual approach to Berdal's analysis critiques the assumptions that military force can be used impartially to enforce compliance without designating an enemy, and that using force in this manner will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict in question. The experience of military operations in Somalia and Bosnia, however, suggests that these assumptions are empirically unsustainable and optimistic in the extreme.

Berdal argues that while armed forces' doctrine has changed to incorporate peace operations over the past decade, there is a more urgent need for political decision-makers to rethink these experiences. Specifically, political decision-makers need to rethink the requirements for the effective use of force in terms of what armed forces can achieve, not what they can do. Berdal concludes that advocates of maintaining peace operations as separate from 'war' are allowing governments to avoid hard decisions about the implications of deploying military personnel. Based on the experiences of peace operations in the 1990's, revising military doctrine to include peace operations is not enough. Political decision-makers must approach possible force deployments in the context of what the use of force can achieve, not what it can do.

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**Farrell, Theo. "Sliding into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine." *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 2, No. 2. Summer 1995.**

Farrell argues that the US Army intervention in Somalia, while warranted, reflected the Army's flawed conception of peace operations. These pre-conceptions led the Army to believe that it could slide from consent-based peacekeeping, to coercive peace-enforcement and back again. A clearer distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement would have highlighted the operational risks, requirements, and irreversible nature of the shift from the former to the latter. Farrell points out that the lessons from Somalia have not been forgotten as the US Army has subsequently changed its doctrine in light of its experience in Somalia operations.

During the deployment to Somalia, the US Army followed its doctrine released in 1986 that emphasized Joint 'AirLand Battle' operations. The 'AirLand Battle' Doctrine mistakenly combined peacekeeping and enforcement, leading in part to the 'imbroglio' of the military operation in Somalia. Following the lessons learned from Somalia, in December 1994, the Army released its doctrine on peace operations, *FM 100-23: Peace Operations*. The new doctrine provided an illustration of lessons learned and applied by the US Army when approaching situations requiring either peacekeeping or peace-enforcement.

### ***Theoretical Approaches***

**Grissom, Adam. "The Future of Military Innovation Studies." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 29, No. 5. October 2006.**

This article assesses the state of the art in military innovation research. Grissom analyzes the four main schools of thought on this issue: civil-military, intraservice, and cultural, on military innovation and how they relate to the concepts of top-down and bottom-up innovation. Interestingly, these four main schools do not mention the notion of bottom-up innovation, even though lessons from the field have been well documented in the past.

Grissom argues that while the four schools of thought may still have value in explaining top-down innovation, their lack of acknowledgement of the existence of bottom-up innovation would suggest they are no longer fully adequate. There is a need to develop more comprehensive approach to bottom-up innovation. The literature regarding how units learn in the field of combat and how those lessons are applied to later operations is vast. The future of military innovation studies must pay more attention to the influence of battlefield experience and how it changes the ways armed forces conduct operations.

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**Gray, Colin S. "Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View." *Parameters*, Summer 2006.**

Gray argues that 'stability operations' are an integral part of modern warfare and need to be included in overall strategic planning. Gray contextualizes his argument using the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR) released by the Department of Defense (DOD). He evaluates the QDR to determine whether or not its approach is adequate in including stability operations in its future strategy. Stability operations cannot be part of 'phase 2' of warfare planning as it has been in US strategic planning.

The QDR places a heavy emphasis on the primacy of irregular and asymmetric warfare, but does not adequately incorporate the need to include stability operations (through lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan) in strategic planning. The QDR misrepresents the 'long war' on terrorism. Understanding that well-planned and executed stability operations are designed to protect, and in effect win the support of the public, not to destroy the terrorists, can help the US in its current and future campaigns.

**Yates, Lawrence A. "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes." *Military Review*, Volume 77, No. 4. Jul/Aug 1997.**

The focus of this article is on the US military's experiences with Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Yates develops patterns and themes in the US military's experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. He finds that common to these experiences are notions of 'non-traditional environments', 'operational constraints', 'cross-cultural interaction,' and others. His main argument is these patterns and themes are not isolated notions, rather they are interrelated. This interrelation must be recognized by training methods so officers are better prepared for OOTW. Yates argues better preparation comes first through an analysis of the historical record (finding patterns and themes) and second to understand the implications of each for current and future operations.

### **Canada**

#### ***Stability/Peace Operations***

**Coombs, Howard G. and Gen. Rick Hillier. "Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-Conflict Afghanistan." *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn 2005.**

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Coombs and Hillier note the difficulties CF operational commanders face in current peace/stability operations. These difficulties have increased since the end of the Cold War. Post-Cold War stability operations are more than just monitoring for the prevention or cessation of fighting between parties. Stability campaigns in the 1990's (Bosnia) and currently (Afghanistan) illustrate the complexities of conducting stability operations on the ground in post-conflict zones.

The CF's operational approach to Afghanistan today can be attributed to its experiences and lessons learned in post-1992 conflicts. Stabilization efforts are characterized by the harmonization of reconstruction and redevelopment efforts. The authors argue that the key difference learned that separates conventional military campaigns from stability campaigns is that 'kinetic' operations are concerned with the destruction of the enemy; whereas during stability operations, the military component must constrain the growth of threat forces and manage perception that there is an increase in measurable government capacity. The authors note that in some ways, the goal of reaching a stable and secure 'end-state' has become the de facto Canadian way of conducting war. The current Canadian approach to Afghanistan is unique in that stability efforts are not entirely enshrined in doctrine, but legitimized through practice in the field based on the lessons gained from previous operations.

### **Henrichon, Patrick. "Protecting the Canadian Forces Against Asymmetric Threats." *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2002-2003.**

Henrichon outlines the increasing prevalence of asymmetric threats to the CF in this article. The end of the Cold War has increased the use of asymmetric warfare against troops deployed abroad in stability operations. Unconventional tactics requires armed forces to adjust and adapt their own doctrines for fighting against these types of threats. The majority of CF overseas deployments are for stability/peace operations. These post-Cold War operations have posed a number of challenges for the CF, many of which are related to asymmetric threats. CF deployments to Bosnia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have all seen examples of asymmetric tactics used against the CF.

Henrichon notes that better intelligence is the key to combating these threats. He argues that technology alone cannot prevent or counter unconventional warfare on its own and thus cannot be relied upon. The best assets for intelligence gathering to combat asymmetric threats will continue to be human intelligence (HUMINT) and open sources (OSINT). Henrichon also points out that while the CF has collected notable data on asymmetric warfare from the field, it has no overarching doctrine to handle asymmetric approaches. Based on what the CF has learned and is learning today, it must incorporate asymmetric warfare into its stability campaign doctrine.

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**Garnett, G.L. "The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level." *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2002-2003.**

Garnett examines the transition efforts of the CF to meet the challenges and demands of post-Cold War conflicts. As the CF participated in stability campaigns in Europe and Africa, the CF recognized the need to reorganize as part of its 'evolution' toward joint and combined operations. The increasing frequency and complexity of operations demanded greater harmonization of the command structure at both the operational and strategic levels. Garnett argues the need to move more efficiently towards greater 'joint-ness' in command and control structures. The example of Operation "Apollo" illustrates the need and urgency required in developing a coherent command and control structure for the CF. Garnett argues that the CF C2 system is addressing this reality through research and changes, but needs to move faster.

**Legault, Dr. Roch. "The Urban Battlefield and the Army: Changes and Doctrines." *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn 2000.**

Legault examines the emerging importance of urban warfare doctrine of NATO countries in post-Cold War conflicts. The experiences of Mogadishu and Grozny illustrated the difficulty of conducting urban operations against non-conventional forces. Legault looks at a number of urban warfare doctrines, including the US Marines, and the US Army, noting that both have stressed the importance of avoiding urban combat, employing it only as a last resort. Legault then compares these doctrines to the Canadian Army's, arguing that it is limited and lacks rigour, clarity, and depth. Subsequent updates to Canadian military doctrine in 1998 did not address the shortcomings of the previous doctrine, treating fighting in urban areas in vague and superficial terms. Legault argues the Canadian Army can no longer avoid the importance of urban warfare operations in its doctrine. Both doctrinal and cultural changes are needed to address this problem.

**Robertson, Dr. Scott. "Experimentation and Innovation in the Canadian Forces." *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2000.**

Robertson analyzes the sometimes conflicting differences of experimentation and innovation in the armed forces. He argues that the CF needs a coherent 'futures process' to exist. A futures process will allow a programme of experimentation that can assist in meeting the identified need to develop an innovative force model for the future. There must be a balance struck between short-term immediate needs and the more abstract needs of long-term goals. For experimentation the goal is to generate and explore issues associated with future

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warfare with some regard to developing force structures. Robertson believes that experimentation needed in the CF now more than during the Cold War. Since the Cold War has more defined and determined military requirements, military experimentation was not as important as it is in the post-Cold War world.

### **Other Countries**

**Vegič, Vinko. “The Effects of Previous Deployment on Soldiers’ Attitudes to Peace Operations.” *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 14, No. 2. April 2007.**

This article explores how Slovenian contingents operating as part of Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 2003-04 felt about their mission based on empirical research (surveys). Data reflecting soldiers’ opinions regarding their mission environment, expectations, motivation, personal morale, and support at home showed each of these influences had substantial impact on an individual soldier’s motivation. Also, affects of previous experience in peacekeeping operations led to soldiers’ feeling that their participation in stability forces, based on support from home and motivation surrounding these memories, was not necessarily positive all the time. It is clear from the author’s findings that there are many external factors that affect soldiers’ motivation in peacekeeping and stability campaigns.

**Kiszely, Lieutenant General Sir John. “Learning About Counterinsurgency.” *Military Review*, March-April 2007.**

Kiszely examines how modern militaries (the British armed forces in particular) have and have not adequately adapted their approaches to counterinsurgency campaigns. He notes that insurgencies are not a new concept with Britain and the United States both having experience fighting these types of conflicts. However, Kiszely finds that learning in the military has been constrained by inherent problems such as anti-intellectualism, resistance to criticism, and confusing progress with activity. Thus, he argues that cultural changes are needed for militaries facing insurgencies. Armed forces must recognize that operations other than war, especially insurgencies, are each unique to themselves and do not have a general doctrine that can be applied. Furthermore, there is a need to temper the warrior ethos that currently exists in many armed forces if soldiers are going to be able best combat insurgency campaigns. Kiszely concludes that training armed forces based on theories and doctrine is not enough to fight insurgencies because of their uncertain and unpredictable nature. Education must be given as much priority to help train soldiers to cope with and adapt to complex and ambiguous environments; something that cannot be achieved with pre-deployment training. There is also a need of armed forces to recognize the “non-military” factors inherent in

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counterinsurgency, thus moving beyond the narrow focus of combat operations that do not address significant underlying issues.

**Gooren, Robert H E. "Soldiering in Unfamiliar Places: The Dutch Approach." *Military Review*, Volume 86, Issue 2. March 2006.**

Gooren's article documents the need for modern militaries to learn from previous operational experiences and adapt those lessons to future campaigns. He uses the Dutch military experiences and contrasts this with the recent lessons learned by the US military. The focus of this article is on the importance of cultural sensitivity training for soldiers before deployment. Gooren's main argument is soldiers must see that awareness of cultural difference and basic respect for host-nation culture are crucial to force security and/or mission success in stability campaigns. These lessons are based on the US experience in Iraq.