

HANDBOOK FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS IN PHILOSOPHY

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

2011-12

Issued by the Department of Philosophy, Queen's University at Kingston, Ontario

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INTRODUCTION

Welcome to new graduate students, and welcome back to continuing students.

This handbook describes policies and procedures in the Department of Philosophy at Queen's University. It also provides some initial information about resources at Queen's, of which there are many. The handbook is issued annually in July, and all material is subject to revision. The largest changes to this year's handbook recognize evolving responsibilities of the Graduate Coordinator and Board of Graduate Studies, as well as changes to procedures reflecting the recently negotiated Collective Agreement for Teaching Assistants and Teaching Fellows.

Some of the entries here are formal documents, others are less formal suggestions as to how to best profit from your studies here. The handbook should be read in conjunction with the [Calendar of the School of Graduate Studies and Research](#) and the [Graduate School regulations](#) as well as the new Collective Agreement. All faculty and students should be familiar with the contents of these various publications and the relevant regulations. Please contact me if you have any questions.

I wish you an enjoyable and productive year at Queen's.

Susan Babbitt
Coordinator of Graduate Studies

RESOURCES FOR STUDENTS

Learning Strategies Development is an academic support service for undergraduate and graduate students aimed at assisting students, through web resources, consultation and workshops, in refining their core academic skills, thinking skills and self-management skills. www.queensu.ca/learningstrategies/facultystaff.html

Expanding Horizons: Workshops for Graduate and Professional Students: Workshops on applying for grants, preparing resumes, intellectual property, and other issues important to professional development. <http://www.queensu.ca/sgs/academicsupport/expandinghorizons.html>

Health, Counselling and Disability Services: LaSalle Building, 2nd Floor, 146 Stuart Street. Students are assisted with physical and emotional health needs, personal crises or problems with stress management, and physical and learning disabilities. <http://www.queensu.ca/hcds/cs/>

The Writing Centre: Learning Commons, Stauffer Library, ground floor. A valuable resource. The Writing Centre sets up tutorials to go over drafts and offers general workshops on writing papers and marking. www.queensu.ca/writingcentre

Society of Graduate and Professional Students: JD Centre Room 021. Tel. 613 533-2924. The SGPS works hard for graduate students, defending and expanding students' rights, lobbying the administration as well as the provincial and federal governments, offering small grants and other assistance to students, and participating in university governance at the Senate, the Board of Trustees and about 40 committees.

COMMITTEES AND POSITIONS

Graduate Coordinator

In 2010-11, the Graduate Coordinator and the Chair of the Board of Graduate Studies is Susan Babbitt. The Graduate Coordinator's responsibilities are to:

1. In conjunction with the School of Graduate Studies and the Departmental Assistant, answer enquiries and correspond with applicants.
2. Be the first point of contact for graduate students with respect to course selection, program options, comprehensive year requirements, and requirements for thesis proposals.
3. Maintain liaison with the School of Graduate Studies with respect to policies and individual students.
4. Structure and maintain the overall budget for graduate funding and related income and expenses.
5. Assign teaching assistants to courses.
6. Ensure that all MA students find supervisors for their Master's Theses.
6. Facilitate the examination of Master's Theses and PhD dissertations, as well as comprehensive examinations.
7. Provide assistance to graduate students applying for fellowships.
8. Provide assistance to graduate students in search of employment.
9. Report regularly to the Head of Department on activities of the Board.

Board of Graduate Studies

BOGS is a faculty committee consisting of the Graduate Coordinator and two or three other faculty members. In 2011-12 its members are Susan Babbitt (Chair), Udo Schüklenk, Jon Miller, and Mick Smith. Among the responsibilities of BOGS are to:

1. Review applications and recommend acceptance or rejection to the School of Graduate Studies.
2. Recommend individual students for fellowships and scholarships.
3. Make recommendations to the Graduate Coordinator and Head of Department in the event that a student has not met requirements.
4. Regularly evaluate policies concerning graduate programs, and propose any changes to the Department.
5. Meet with the Committee of Graduate Studies

Committee of Graduate Studies

COGS is a faculty/student committee comprised of the members of BOGS and three students elected by the graduate student body. Its role is to advise and make recommendations to BOGS and the Head of the Department on any and all matters of policy and practice concerning the Department's graduate programs.

Graduate Student Committee

The students on COGS are to be known as the Graduate Student Committee, which serves as a representative of the graduate student body as a whole, as well as a liaison between graduate students and COGS. The committee will choose a chairperson who will convene a meeting of all graduate students in the Fall to elect student members to relevant departmental committees, and to select a new Graduate Student Committee. The Committee chairperson will also attend regular departmental meetings on behalf of the students and will report back to students about relevant issues.

Departmental Assistant

The Departmental Assistant, Judy Vanhooser, handles all academic matters concerning graduate students, maintaining student files, including admission files, and managing paperwork concerning coursework and student programs. Judy Vanhooser is a key strength of our graduate program and you will find it useful to consult with her about procedures, policies and strategies.

COLLOQUIUM

The department has an excellent speaker program. The Colloquium meets every Thursday afternoon during the semester (4:30 – 6:30 pm, Watson 517), and in addition, the department usually hosts a number of special University lectures. Most talks are followed by a reception. Besides being interesting and enjoyable in themselves, these events are considered an integral part of the graduate program. The Colloquium provides an opportunity for students to become aware of what is happening in the field, and to learn to engage with a wide range of issues. An attendance sheet will be circulated for graduate students. Masters students and PhD students in residence are expected to attend regularly.

Graduate students are encouraged to participate in discussions and to present a paper, if they wish. The Colloquium Committee (Jon Miller, Rahul Kumar, Kerah Solomon-Gordon) can help you get involved. For instance, we usually take guest speakers to dinner after their talks, and if there is a speaker you would like to meet, please just let the Committee know. Also, if you have any suggestions for next year's speakers, please give them to the Colloquium Committee.

LIBRARY

The university library has an excellent collection of print, multi-media, and electronic scholarly materials. The library can provide assistance for students who would like to better learn how to use its resources; if you are interested, please contact Sylvia Andrychuk, the Research and Instruction Librarian <andrychs@queensu.ca>. The philosophy department, like the university's other academic units, is allotted a budget amount for specific library acquisitions. The departmental library representative (Henry Laycock in 2011-2012) expends this budget by placing orders with the library at the suggestion of faculty members and graduate students. If there is a particular book or periodical that you think should be added to the university's collection of philosophical works please contact the departmental library representative with your recommendation.

STUDENT GOVERNMENT

The Society for Graduate and Professional Students represents the interests of its members at a university wide level as well as providing some important benefits (e.g. their health and dental plan) and services (e.g. student advisors). To find out how to participate in student government or access SGPS services see their website at www.sgps.ca

GRADUATE STUDENT TEACHING

Most graduate students in philosophy have the opportunity to contribute to the department's undergraduate program by working as teaching assistants. The department recognizes the considerable contribution made by teaching assistants to its undergraduate program.

Doctoral students who seek a career in philosophy should accumulate significant teaching experience as TAs in a variety of courses, not just those in their area of specialization. In addition, the department recognizes the importance of experience running their own courses for doctoral students seeking an academic career. Subject to financial constraints, the department strives to ensure that doctoral students gain some experience of running their own courses, when doing so will not hinder completion of the dissertation by the fifth year of the program.

This year the Graduate Teaching Assistants and Teaching Fellows have negotiated a Collective Agreement through the Public Service Alliance of Canada (Local 901). This can be found at www.hr.queensu.ca/agreements/agreements.php and www.psa901.org. Please review this carefully to know your rights and responsibilities.

Teaching Assistants

1. Allocation of Teaching Assistantships

According to Article 12 of the Collective Agreement, Teaching Assistantships are offered according to four preference groups. In group A are those students for whom TAships have been offered as part of the funding package. Students in group A must submit their course preferences no later than 15 days before the start of term. Students in groups B, C and D, who wish to apply for a TAship, must submit CV and transcripts by a date set by the department which will be no later than 15 days before the start of the term.

A student may be ineligible for a TA-ship if he or she has insufficient facility with English to teach effectively. Such a student will be encouraged to take additional English language instruction, and may be required to take a language test as proof of competence in English before being given a teaching assignment.

If you have accepted a teaching assistantship, please see Marilyn Lavoie, the Department's Administrative

Assistant, upon arrival on campus. She will prepare an Employment Services Contract that will authorize Financial Services to place you on the monthly payroll. You will also be required to complete an income tax form (TD1) to be forwarded to Financial Services along with the contract. Teaching assistants may be allotted office space. If so, you will receive office and building keys from Marilyn.

2. Responsibilities of Faculty

It is the responsibility of instructors to provide their teaching assistants with a list of all assigned activities to be included with in the allotted hours of work. Instructors must meet with their TAs to review the Teaching Assistant Form (Appendix "A" of the Collective Agreement). As indicated in the Form, instructors should make clear their expectations, including details regarding the teaching of classes or seminars, should this be one of the assigned tasks.

3. Duties of Teaching Assistants

According to Article 16 of the Collective Agreement, TAs will not work more than 10 hours a week and no more than 8 hours a day. Most students will be expected to attend lectures, grade papers and tests, hold office hours and lead tutorials.

Please see Article 16 for hours of work, activities and responsibilities of a TA. Please see Article 23 for conditions regarding leaves of absence.

4. Guidelines for TA duties

To assist both instructors and TAs in planning TA duties, COGS and the Department have passed the following guidelines. Because the nature of assignments and expectations vary, these guidelines may not always be applicable. Whether these guidelines are being followed or whether the instructor has different expectations should be made clear when the instructor and student meet to discuss the Form.

Usually, the amounts of time noted below are allowed for these specified tasks. Reading and general preparation should be a component of every TA-ship, as specified below.

marking: 4-6 page paper = 30 minutes; 6-8 pages = 45 minutes; 8-10 pages = 1 hour

tutorial preparation = 1 hour per week

tutorials = number of tutorial hours per week

attendance in classes = number of hours to be attended per week

reading and general preparation (on top of tutorial preparation) = 2 hours per week

student meetings and office hours = 1 hour per week

lecture preparation = 3 hours per lecture plus lecture time per term

Sample Calculation of TA duties

For an MA student, full TA, no lectures, no class attendance

General preparation: 2 hrs/wk x 12 wks = 24 hours per term

Tutorial preparation: 1 hr/wk x 11 wks = 11 hours per term

Tutorials: 2 hrs/wk x 11 wks = 22 hours per term

Marking: 0.5 hrs/paper (4-6 page papers) x 2 x 50 students = 50 hours per term

Office hours and student meetings: 1 hr/wk x 12 wks = 12 hours per term

Total: 119 hours per term (i.e. 1 hour under contract)

5. Training and Evaluation

There will be a non-compulsory introductory workshop on teaching for all incoming graduate students during the

orientation week prior to the commencement of classes in the Fall. There may also be further workshops on teaching during the Winter term run in conjunction with the Centre for Teaching and Learning. Students are encouraged to make use of the Centre's facilities and workshops throughout the year. There is an excellent handbook for teaching assistants prepared by Centre for Teaching and Learning. See www.queensu.ca/ctl

Instructors should provide guidance to help TAs perform their jobs well. A TA who is experiencing a difficulty with their teaching assignment is advised to discuss the problem with the instructor as soon as possible. In case of any work-related dispute, please see Articles 11.01 to 11.03 of the Collective Agreement.

At the end of each course instructors are required to complete a written evaluation of each TA's performance. This evaluation is submitted to the Graduate Assistant. It is shown to the TA and a copy is included in his or her personal file.

Graduate students with general concerns about issues pertaining to teaching are encouraged to bring them to the Graduate Student Committee.

6. A.R.C. Duncan and Martyn Estall Awards

The A.R.C. Duncan Award for Excellence in Tutoring was established in honour of a former head of this department and one of the country's most distinguished teachers of philosophy. It is awarded annually to a teaching assistant whose contribution has been particularly outstanding. The Board of Graduate Studies receives nominations from faculty every Spring. It is a significant honour to receive the award.

The Dr. H. Martyn Estall Graduate Award in Philosophy Endowment fund was established to assist one student each year in the MA or PhD program in the department of Philosophy to attend a major conference. Preference will be given to students who wish to present a paper at or just attend the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association. If there are no applications for attendance of the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting, applications for other important conferences will be considered. Applications must be made in writing to the Graduate Coordinator who, with the Board of Graduate Studies, will make a recommendation based upon academic achievement.

Teaching Fellows

Teaching fellows are senior graduate students serving as the instructor for part or all of a course. The appointment of Teaching Fellows, according to Article 12.08 is made according to four preference groups, A-D. No TFships will be offered to candidates in group B until the qualified candidates in group A have been exhausted, and no fellowships will be offered to candidates in groups C or D until candidates in the previous group have been exhausted. The department will post at its website, at least 22 days before the beginning of term, the courses for which TFships are available, information about how to apply and the submission date for applications. TF responsibilities will be set out in the TF Form (Appendix "B" of the Collective Agreement) which will be provided to the TF at least two weeks before the start of term.

For hours of work, activities and areas of responsibility for TFs, please see Article 16 and for leaves of absence, please see Article 23 of the Collective Agreement.

In 2011-2, Deborah Knight is the chair of the Board of Undergraduate Studies (BUS) and is responsible for advice on teaching matters. Teaching fellows should seek advice about the production of a syllabus for the course they will be teaching, and about other aspects of designing and running the course. Teaching fellows are welcome to consult with the chair of BUS or any faculty member on this matter, particularly with those who have taught the course before. A teaching fellow should submit a copy of the proposed syllabus to the BUS representative before the course begins. Teaching fellows should raise with the BUS representative any problems they are having during

the course. A teaching fellow who experiences a problem of a serious nature (e.g. a conflict with a student, disruptive behaviour in class, academic dishonesty by a member or members of the class, etc.) should raise the matter with the Chair of BUS or the Graduate Coordinator as soon as possible.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOPS

In response to a request from the Graduate Student Committee, the department in 2011-12 is offering a series of professional development workshops for all graduate students in the Philosophy department. The aim is that there be one workshop each month offered by a faculty member. The first such workshop is on September 23 at which time Sergio Sismondo will provide students with assistance with grant-writing. On October 21, Udo Schuklenk will talk about how to get published in journals. Christine Overall has offered to do a workshop in the Winter term on writing a dissertation. Other spots are still to be filled. The workshops will be on Fridays from 1-3pm.

M.A. AND PH.D. DEGREE REQUIREMENTS

Please see the *Graduate Calendar* under "General Regulations" and "Department of Philosophy," under Degree Programs. What follows are some additional guidelines for successful completion of your degree.

Completion of Course Work

It is expected that course work will be completed on time. According to Department policy, a course will be registered "Incomplete" on a transcript only if the student has requested (in writing) and received the approval of the Graduate Coordinator or the Head of the Department, who is satisfied that circumstances warrant an extension.

The Department cannot emphasize too much the damaging effect incomplete course work has on students' programs, both in terms of the likelihood of finishing the degree in reasonable time, and in terms of prospects for funding, from Queen's or elsewhere. Very slow progress, in the absence of mitigating considerations, also constitutes unsatisfactory performance. It is important to add here, though, that if there are mitigating circumstances, students should talk to the Graduate Coordinator, or other relevant authority, as soon as possible so we can make appropriate adjustments to your program. Please note that the Graduate Calendar states that: "unsatisfactory performance by the student may cause proceedings to be instituted requiring the student to withdraw."

Procedure For Reviewing Unsatisfactory Grades

In the case of an unsatisfactory grade in a course (below 75%), the following procedures apply:

The Graduate Coordinator will notify the student and the instructor that the Board of Graduate Studies (BOGS) is to review the case.

BOGS will consult with the student and the relevant instructor, along with any other instructors the student has had in the graduate program, in order to learn of any circumstances that bear on the case. The student and the relevant instructor have the option of appearing before BOGS.

BOGS will make any one of the following recommendations, which will be forwarded to the Graduate School for consideration.

i) That the student repeat the course

ii) That the student take a substitute course

iii) That the student be required to withdraw.

It should be emphasized that the unsatisfactory grade cannot be effaced from the transcript.

M.A. PROGRAM

Course Requirements

For students beginning the program in 2011, who hold an Honours degree in philosophy, a Medal in philosophy and another subject, or an equivalent to either: 6 one-term courses (or equivalent), a Master's Thesis (approximately 50 pages). Courses taken must fulfill a distribution requirement by taking two courses falling under the heading of Metaphysics and Epistemology, and two courses falling under the heading of Value Theory. Students whose background is particularly strong in one or the other of these two broad areas may, with the permission of the Graduate Coordinator, be allowed to substitute other courses for that part of their distribution requirement. Questions about which courses fall under which heading should be directed to the Graduate Coordinator. By special arrangement, appropriate graduate courses in other departments may be taken for credit in a philosophy graduate program. Consult the Coordinator of Graduate Studies.

The Master's Thesis

Guidelines For Thesis Proposals

M.A. students must submit a Thesis proposal. The deadline for submission of M.A. Thesis proposals for 2011-12 is **January 20, 2012**. Proposals should be submitted to the Departmental Assistant, Judy Vanhooser.

Your MA Thesis proposal must be accompanied by a form from your nominated supervisor. Please obtain the supervisor approval form from Judy Vanhooser and append a completed copy to your submission. To ensure approval, you must get the proposal and form to your supervisor in sufficient time for him or her to read it carefully. A sample in this handbook should give you a good idea of what is expected.

You should seek advice when preparing the proposal, particularly from the professor you would like to nominate as your supervisor. Proposals will not be approved by BOGS. They must be approved by the nominated supervisor. BOGS just makes sure the thesis proposal is completed on time and approved.

MA Thesis Requirements

The Graduate School requires that "A thesis be expressed in a satisfactory form consistent with the discipline concerned, and display a scholarly approach to the subject and a thorough knowledge of it. A critical review of previous work related to the subject and a concluding summation of the contribution made in the thesis to scholarship in the chosen field must be included." In addition "A Master's thesis should demonstrate that the candidate is capable of original and independent work...." (section 8.6, "Thesis, General Remarks" from the Graduate Studies Calendar)

Consistent with the above, a philosophy M.A. Thesis should be understood to be a work that is considerably more extensive and deep than a substantial term essay. The criterion by which the quality of an acceptable thesis is

judged may be conceptualized as follows: Were it a substantial term essay by a graduate student, it would be deemed to merit a mark of not less than 80%. It is a good idea for Master's students to take a paper written for a seminar course and expand it into a deeper and more complete discussion.

Role of the Second Departmental Reader.

The second reader's role is to provide guidance for improving the quality of the thesis and helping ensure its readiness for the oral defense. The second reader may possess special expertise in the candidate's field of research, expertise that complements that of the supervisor, or simply take on the role of helping to assure that the thesis is coherent and effective in presentation. At a minimum the second reader should carefully review the thesis at the penultimate draft stage.

Note that according to Graduate School regulations, the candidate is guaranteed the right to have his/her thesis examined in whatever form he/she wishes to defend it even if the supervisor and second reader do not judge it ready for defense.

Master's Thesis Oral Defense

The MA Thesis is assessed as Pass or Fail at the end of an oral examination of the thesis. The examination committee consists of (a) the supervisor (b) the second reader and (c) a third person, either from the department or from another department at Queen's. The defense is chaired by a member of the Philosophy department's faculty, usually a member of BOGS.

Sample MA Thesis Proposal

MA Thesis Proposal
Submitted by: Jane Doe, January 31, 2007
Supervisor: Faculty Member

Metaphor and Narrative in Economics: The Cognitive Function and Epistemic Consequences of Rhetoric in Economic Theory

Overview:

The notion that metaphor plays an important cognitive role in structuring our understanding of the world poses interesting and important questions both for philosophers of language and philosophers of science. In the former field, questions about how metaphors work and what they mean have been taken up and re-examined by philosophers such as Max Black, John Searle, and Donald Davidson. Philosophers and historians of science have in the meantime recognized the relevance of such debates to their own analyses of model-building and theory choice. In particular, the notion that scientific explanation hinges largely on metaphoric re-description has attracted a great deal of attention. Mary Hesse, Richard Boyd, Thomas Kuhn and others have argued that metaphors play not just an exegetical or heuristic role in science, but are instead constitutive of the theories they express.

How might such views come to bear on economic theory? Economics as a discipline has moved far beyond basic animating metaphors such as Adam Smith's infamous 'invisible hand'. Indeed, most practicing economists place much less importance on the verbal exposition of their models than on the mathematics itself, and the notion that the 'rhetoric' of economics might be worth serious study has had little impact on the core of the discipline. Nonetheless, a small number of economists and philosophers of economics (including Donald/Deirdre McCloskey, Arjo Klamer, and Philip Mirowski) have begun to make space for the discussion of such issues, and have drawn some attention to their significance for the practice and self-understanding of the discipline. McCloskey, for example, has argued that economists share with other scientists a reliance on the creation of metaphors and

narratives, and that the explanatory power of their theories lies first and foremost in the rhetoric used to make economic phenomena intelligible — McCloskey's view of economic discourse has been highly influenced by a post-modernism of a Rortian flavour and shares some of its major epistemological (or post-epistemological) conclusions.

Objectives:

In my project, I intend to explore the cognitive function of metaphor and narrative in economic theory, and to assess the anti-realist or post-epistemological stance that economists following McCloskey's lead have adopted. My first task will be to argue that both metaphor and narrative make important contributions to the explanatory power of economic theories, and that metaphor in particular plays a crucial role in the development of economic models. To this end I will discuss an interactionist or structure-mapping theory of metaphor, and will examine two powerful economic metaphors (the Walrasian 'market' with its 'auctioneer', and the picture of certain economic interactions as strategic 'games'). My second objective will be to clarify some epistemological implications of the above insights. If much of what economists take to be literal language or purely mathematical analysis is actually structured by pervasive constitutive metaphors, what are we to make of the project of justifying knowledge claims in economics? Does it make any sense to speak of an economic reality that theories can approach with varying degrees of accuracy?

I will argue that we ought to look before we leap to McCloskey's self-proclaimed post-modern conclusions. Perhaps ironically, McCloskey's critical stance can be argued to have largely conservative implications for the actual practice of economics. As Alexander Rosenberg points out, McCloskey arrives at a very laissez-faire approach to business as usual in the discipline. I will defend the claim that explicit evaluation of economic metaphors is both possible and desirable. Insofar as we have the resources to locate both strengths and flaws in certain models and forms of discourse, we ought not to be reticent to question the nature of business as usual in economics. For example, in his *More Heat than Light* Philip Mirowski provides an extended analysis of what he takes to be an inadequate constitutive metaphor, arguing that modern neo-classical economics borrows extensively from the language of 19th century energy physics, but is ultimately incoherent because the essential part of the analogy (the principle of conservation) fails. To give another example, recent feminist work has been directed at uncovering inconsistency and androcentrism within constitutive economic metaphors.

What it takes to uncover incoherent metaphors and crucial disanalogies is of course a complex question, and the aim of this project will not be to provide an answer, but rather to point to its importance, value and seriousness as a question.

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PH.D. PROGRAM

Course Requirements

For students beginning the program in 2011, there are no specific course requirements. However, students must fulfill a distribution requirement by taking two courses falling under the heading of Metaphysics and Epistemology, and two courses falling under the heading of Value Theory. Students whose background is particularly strong in one or the other of these two broad areas may, with the permission of the Graduate Coordinator, be allowed to substitute other courses for that part of their distribution requirement. Questions about which courses fall under which heading should be directed to the Graduate Coordinator. By special arrangement, appropriate graduate courses in other departments may be taken for credit in a philosophy graduate program. Consult the Coordinator of Graduate Studies.

In order to remain in good standing in the program, a student must maintain an overall course average of 80%.

Comprehensive Area Preparation

By the end of the first week in June of the first year of the Ph.D. program, a comprehensive preparation committee of at least three faculty will be formed by the graduate coordinator, in consultation with the candidate and relevant faculty members, to direct the candidate in his or her second year in acquiring a good general knowledge of the areas in which he or she plans to write a dissertation and specialize. One member of the committee will serve as Chair. The role of the Chair is to take primary responsibility for administrative issues concerning the committee's work with the student.

Additional members above the standard three will be asked to join the committee if the graduate coordinator and the student agree that adding an additional member would bring a range of expertise to the committee that it would otherwise lack, and that adding this expertise would be important for the student's preparation in the general area in which he or she plans to work.

The comprehensive preparation committee's responsibilities are to:

1. Approve area reading lists for the candidate to work through over the year (these could develop over the course of the year). Normally, these area lists are developed by the candidate and then revised in discussion with the committee.
2. Consult with the candidate at regular intervals to discuss at least two short papers (approx. 10-12 pages, though they can be a bit longer) per term that the candidate has written that discuss issues in different sets of readings. Committee members may meet with the student individually or as a group, but should aim to do so at least twice a term.
3. Conduct an oral examination of the candidate's general knowledge of his or her areas of specialization by **the end of June of the second year**. The oral will cover the topics the candidate has written short papers on over the course of the year, as well as other material on the reading list that the candidate will not have written on.

A faculty member who does not sit on the comprehensive preparation committee, as selected by BOGS, will chair the examination. An examination normally lasts one hour, but is permitted to run longer at the discretion of the person chairing the examination.

Each member of the committee shall be responsible for asking questions about at least one of the topics identified on the reading list and/or about a topic on which the student has written a short paper.

Whether a student passes the oral is determined by a vote, the majority settling the matter. Assessment of whether a student's performance is adequate to merit a pass is guided by an assessment of a student's grasp of the material on which he or she has been questioned.

Additional guidance on 2nd year comprehensive:

1. Choosing an area

The role of the 2nd year comprehensive requirement as part of the PhD program is to assist you in acquiring a good general knowledge of your area of specialization. Work during the second year is done under the direction of a committee of normally three faculty members, one of whom will chair the committee. It is advisable that the chair of the committee be the eventual dissertation supervisor but this does not have to be the case. The earlier a student begins working with his/her supervisor, the more opportunity he/she will have to become well-grounded in the area of the dissertation. After all, there are different views of a specialization. Someone who wants to work in bio-ethics may need to know different literature in ethics than someone working, say, in metaethics or feminist philosophy. The committee is not responsible for oversight of the thesis proposal, which is written under the direction of the PHD thesis supervisor and the second reader, appointed after the comprehensive oral exam has been passed. However, students will likely make faster progress on their dissertations if some serious thought is given during this second year to the focus of the dissertation and the literature relevant to that particular focus.

As the aim of the work over the second year of the Ph.D. is to acquire a good general knowledge of an area of specialization, the reading list(s) should reflect both (a) the central topics (or a reasonable range of them) in that area of specialization and (b) the 'key' texts for each topic that anyone working in the area of specialization would be expected to know.

Students are assumed to have some general background in their area of specialization. For that reason, when guidance on constructing area lists is given, it is suggested that they indicate works they take to be relevant to their area that they have already read. This allows the committee members to determine (1) whether there are some topics to which the student, given his or her specific dissertation interests in the general area, has had adequate exposure, (2) some to which the student has had no exposure but should read up on as a matter of general knowledge (that is, things it is assumed by those working in the area that everyone knows) in the general area, and (3) some to which the student has had some exposure but it makes sense for him or her to look into more deeply.

2. Reading List

You should meet with the members of your committee to decide how to proceed on the construction of the list. Some committees will prefer that students draft an initial list, and that committee members offer suggestions for revision, while other committees prefer to proceed with more on-going dialogue or more proactively.

A reading list or lists should be divided into the central topics in the area(s) in which you intend to specialize, and under each topic, list what you take to be the key texts on that topic. You and the members of your committee can then easily add both topics and texts to the list.

It may be that you are well read on certain topics in your area of specialization, or that you have read some, but not all, of the key texts on certain topics. You should be sure to list these topics and texts on your reading list, indicating that you've read them (perhaps put them in bold face or something like that). That way, members of your committee will know what you've covered and what you haven't, allowing them to better direct you towards filling in relevant gaps in your reading.

Though the 2nd year reading list does not have to be a reading list for your thesis, it is a good idea to aim toward greater clarity about the topic you want to pursue for your thesis. Although you may know the area you want to work in, finding a focus can take a lot of time. You want to find a clear and precise question that you aim to answer, or to contribute to answering, in your dissertation. The reading you do in your second year provides an opportunity to work toward discovering this question.

3. Papers

Two short papers are required each term. The regulations say 10-12 pages, though they can be longer if you wish.

The purpose of the papers is to keep you writing and to help you discuss what you've been reading with members of your committee. Papers are not graded, and are not expected to be original. That is, you need not advance your own substantive view in a short comprehensive paper. You are not writing pieces of your thesis, nor are you writing papers to be used for conferences. Rather, you should think of the papers as philosophical literature reviews, in which you say something like "in this literature (citing some names) there is this general theme, or style of argument. It seems to me to be plausible/implausible/unclear about/etc. etc." Critical remarks and illuminating questions about what you're discussing are expected, but not an original view. If you write a longer paper (12-20 pages), you should do so because doing so is something you judge necessary to better expound your critical remarks on the literature or providing a more detailed review of the literature, not because you feel pressure to say something original.

Samples of papers are available from the Departmental Assistant, Judy Vanhooser, upon request.

Writing these papers ought not to be demanding, and so you should have no difficulty turning them in on a regular basis.

You should make an effort to talk to members of your committee on a regular basis in between writing the short papers, but you should definitely meet with each member of your committee to discuss your short paper after you've submitted it to your committee.

4. Exam

An oral exam will be held by the end of June of your second year. Examiners will ask you about things you wrote in your papers, and about things you've indicated that you've read. You are not expected to know all the details of every work you read. The questions will concern debates covered in certain papers. To the extent a particular paper is asked about, it will be a paper that is central to, and frequently cited within, a particular debate.

The exam will last about an hour. If you have been reading and thinking about what you've been reading throughout the year, the exam ought to be just a good occasion to discuss philosophy with members of the Faculty.

Procedures for appeals of negative decisions are described below, under "Appeals."

Ph.D. Progress Reports

At the end of the winter term, all Ph.D. students from Year 2 onward will be expected to complete a form reporting on their progress in the graduate program during the preceding academic year. Each student must discuss the report with his or her supervisor and arrange for the supervisor to comment on and sign the report. The report should then be submitted to the Graduate Assistant. Students whose progress is unsatisfactory will be asked to meet with a member or members of the Board of Graduate Studies to discuss the student's difficulties and plans to move forward. A written report of the meeting will be compiled and shown to the student, who can comment on it before it is placed in the student's file. Students who do not show satisfactory progress may be

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asked to withdraw from the program. Further details of the School of Graduate Studies policy regarding "Withdrawal on Academic Grounds" can be found at www.queensu.ca/sgs/forstudents/policiesprocedures.html

Thesis

1. Thesis Proposal

If a candidate passes the oral examination, he or she will then work with his/her thesis supervisor on developing a Ph.D. proposal **for submission within three months** of the oral examination. The final version, with its endorsement by the supervisor and the second reader, must be submitted to the department's Board of Graduate Studies. BOGS's primary roles are to monitor that the student's timely submission has the general form of a thesis proposal, and that a faculty member and a second reader have agreed to supervise the proposal. BOGS does not evaluate the detailed content of thesis proposals. BOGS is just responsible for making sure the thesis proposal is completed and approved by the supervisor and the second reader.

2. Thesis

The thesis committee will consist of a supervisor (although co-supervision may be arranged where desirable), and a second reader, who will play a role similar to that of the second reader for the M.A. thesis (see "Role of the second departmental reader" in the section above on the M.A. thesis). The candidate will work mainly with the supervisor. Patterns of supervision vary widely among supervisors, second readers, and students. It is the candidate's responsibility to request periodic meetings with his or her supervisor and the other member of the committee.

Once the thesis is completed, the supervisor is responsible for suggesting an external examiner to the Graduate Coordinator, for proposing a time for the oral exam, and for ensuring that six copies of the thesis are available in final form.

The committee that examines the thesis will consist of the supervisor(s), one other member of the Department (normally the second reader), the Department Head (or delegate), an external examiner from outside the University, and an external examiner from within the University; an appointee of the Graduate School chairs the examination.

The Graduate School requires that "A thesis be expressed in a satisfactory form consistent with the discipline concerned, and displays a scholarly approach to the subject and a thorough knowledge of it. A critical review of previous work related to the subject should be given." In addition, the doctoral thesis "must be original and be of such value as to merit publication" (section 8.6, "Thesis, General Remarks," from the Graduate Studies Calendar).

The C.G. Prado Thesis Prize

Established by faculty and friends in honour of Carlos G. Prado. During his distinguished career at Queen's he published more than a dozen books, supervised over thirty Ph.D. and M.A. theses, and continues to inspire many students. The prize will provide an annual award to a graduate student in the Department of Philosophy who submits an outstanding doctoral thesis. To be eligible, a Doctoral student's thesis must be submitted within 7 years of the candidate's first registration in the Ph.D. program in the Department of Philosophy (with accommodation being made for official leaves, etc.). Ordinarily, nominations are made by supervisors to BOGS, which makes a recommendation to the Head of the Department.

Sample Ph.D. Thesis Proposal

J. Bloggs
Dissertation Proposal

July 16, 2007

**Between Virtue and Vice:
Virtue Ethics and the Moral Psychology of Everyday Agents**

The recent revival of interest in the virtues has brought about a welcome emphasis on questions in moral psychology: the kinds of reasons for action the virtuous agent has, the sort of character that is required to recognize these reasons, and the ways in which practical deliberators can fail to recognize or act on those reasons. Answering such questions is sometimes even seen as a necessary precondition of engaging in moral philosophy at all. (Anscombe 1981) One of the unfortunate aspects of renewed interest in the virtues, however, is the sense, sometimes explicitly articulated, that one must be virtuous to act well. (see, for example, Hursthouse 1999) Sadly, many of us are less than completely virtuous, but we can nevertheless aspire to act well, as the virtuous do. Though we often fail, we also occasionally succeed: society is made up of people who act more or less well more or less of the time, not 'the few' who always act well and 'the many' who never do. If contemporary virtue-based approaches to ethics are to be vindicated, they will need to avoid an overly idealized moral psychology. My dissertation will provide an account of moral psychology of everyday, imperfect agents, and so aims to explain the ways in which those who are less than fully virtuous can nevertheless act well, and also to explain how they fail to do so. Since most of us are less than fully virtuous without being close to wicked, these questions are among the most important ones moral psychology can answer, since they are questions about how to describe, not ideal agents, but you and me.

Sources of Failure for Imperfect Agents:

Much of the contemporary discussion of moral psychology draws its inspiration from Aristotle, who identifies four broad psychological categories. An agent acts from virtue if he a) knows he is doing a virtuous action, b) decides to do the action for its own sake, and c) does the act from a firm and unchanging state." (Aristotle 1999, 1105a31-35) Agents can fall short of virtue in one of three ways. They can be, first, self-controlled, acting as the virtuous person acts, but having to overcome "excessive or base appetites" (appetites that the virtuous person does not have). (1146a13) They can be weak-willed, judging that they should act as the virtuous agent would, but acting otherwise under the influence of competing appetites. Finally, they can be vicious, neither acting, nor judging, nor feeling as the virtuous person does.

Aristotle's psychological categories are powerful, and have been widely influential. Aristotle's categories, however, do not fully capture imperfect agents in all their complexity. While self-control, weak will, and vice all explain some sorts of failures in virtue, there are imperfect agents who do not fit into any of those categories. A more complete description of the many ways in which agents can fail to be completely virtuous reveals that the psychological possibilities of imperfection are much more finely-grained than the classical categories would suggest.

Provisionally, there appear to be (at least) two types of imperfect agent. The first is the agent who possesses some virtue or virtues to an imperfect degree: she is for the most part generous, for example, and generally acts well, as the generous person acts. On occasion, however, she fails in generosity. The second is the agent in whom virtue is not unified: he is compassionate and courageous, but intemperate in the face of bodily pleasure. How, if at all, can such agents be understood?

The two types of imperfect agent each presents a different challenge. The agent who is only generous on some occasions displays an inconsistency that calls out for explanation. How is it that she could successfully recognize and be moved by the appropriate reasons for action on some occasions, and yet fail to recognize or be

moved by those reasons on others? How, in other words, is it possible to possess and exercise the knowledge or ability required to act well only some of the time? The existence of failure would seem to cast success into doubt, as there is the temptation to think that someone who fails in generosity reveals herself to have been only apparently generous in the first place.

Following Aristotle, this sort of imperfect agent is frequently explained in terms of weakness of the will: though she judges that the generous action would be best, she is moved to act contrary to her best judgment under the influence of a competing appetite. No doubt this sort of weakness is a common explanation of failure to act well, but it is not the only such explanation. For example, Donald Davidson argues that not all cases of weakness of will should be understood as conflicts between reason and passion, with passion defeating reason: there are “plenty of cases where we act against our better judgment which cannot be described as succumbing to temptation.” (Davidson 2001, p 29) So not all weak will involves precisely the sorts of conflicts Aristotle identifies.

More importantly, not all cases of failure to act in accord with virtue can be attributed to weakness of will. The classical Aristotelian categories of imperfect agents—the self-controlled, weak-willed, and vicious—do not fully describe the psychological terrain. Other sorts of failures of practical reason are possible. These include such failings as self-deception, addiction, moral blindness, and hypocrisy. Though the discussion begins with Aristotle’s categories, the aim is not to interpret Aristotle’s text, but rather to enrich the contemporary discussions of virtue and weakness.

Consider, for example, the hypocrite. This is the agent who judges that she has a decisive reason to be, say, generous on one occasion, and yet judges that he has no reason at all to be generous on another, seemingly similar occasion. This hypocrite is not weak-willed; she may be irrational, but her irrationality is not that of the agent who acts contrary to what she judges to be best. Rather, her irrationality involves a stark inconsistency between two judgments on separate, but similar, occasions. How can such failures be explained? One type of hypocrisy can be attributed to what might be called ‘moral blindness’: the inability to recognize the moral import of some morally relevant consideration. A hypocrite may see suffering as morally relevant in some situations, and yet fail to do so in other, relevantly similar situations. Yet not all moral blindness is linked to hypocrisy: moral blindness can be more or less systematic, and so need not result in the inconsistency characteristic of hypocrisy. Nor is all hypocrisy connected to moral blindness. My dissertation aims to give a more fine-grained account of the various sorts of failures of virtue than the traditional categories allow, making room alongside self-control, weakness of will, and vice for such categories as self-deception, addiction, moral blindness, and hypocrisy.

The second type of imperfect agent—who is generous and considerate, yet intemperate—presents a different challenge, and one that is potentially more troubling for Aristotelian moral psychology. While the first type requires expansion of the categories of failure, second type seems call into doubt a centrally important part of the Aristotelian account of virtue. According to the doctrine of the unity of the virtues, in order to have any virtue, it is necessary to have all of them. If the doctrine is correct, then this second type of imperfect agent seems impossible to explain. In fact, the doctrine is often rejected or ridiculed on the basis of what seems to be the obvious existence of agents who are neither fully virtuous nor fully vicious: it seems to be inconsistent with moral agents as we know them to be.

The unity thesis, however, seems to be a consequence of some of the most central elements of Aristotelian moral psychology: the emphasis on the role of practical reason in virtue, the connection between virtue and knowledge, and the holistic and uncodifiable nature of that knowledge. (McDowell 1997) If a strong unity thesis is incompatible with a seemingly common sort of imperfect agent, this speaks against a broadly Aristotelian approach to moral psychology, if that approach is indeed committed to the strong unity thesis. So the exact strength of the unity of the virtues thesis is an important issue. What truth is there in the unity thesis, and how can it make room for the possibility of acting well by agents in whom virtue is not unified? Coming to an understanding of the unity thesis that allows for imperfect agents will also shed light on the distinction between the two types of imperfect agents.

Acting Well for Imperfect Agents:

Having described the variety of ways in which agents can fail in virtue, it remains to discuss the ways in which such imperfect agents can, nevertheless, act well, at least on occasion. The distinction between acting well and failing to do will cut across several of the categories of failure: some self-controlled agents, while perhaps not fully virtuous, nevertheless undoubtedly act well, while other examples of self-control are clear cases of failure. (Foot 1978a) Similarly, the hypocrite and the morally blind agent may reveal themselves to have utterly failed to act well, or to have, despite their failures, acted admirably. It will be important to see what sorts of failures leave open the possibility of acting well, and what sorts of failures make acting well impossible.

Among the relevant issues is the possibility of acting well uncharacteristically. Some virtues, it seems, can be exercised out of character: the habitual coward can rise to the occasion, and the Scrooge-like miser might have rare episodes of generosity. (Hurka 2006) Other ways of acting well, however, cannot be so easily accomplished uncharacteristically—it is difficult to act from friendship, or love, or loyalty, uncharacteristically, since such virtues depend on the existence of relationships based on patterns of characteristic behaviour. Imperfect agents can approximate some virtues, but not others, and assessing which virtues are accessible to them, and which are not, is part of understanding such agents.

Examining how imperfect agents can act well, and how they cannot, will provide insight into both the role and the content of the concepts virtue and 'acting well' in neo-Aristotelian approaches to ethics. Though these concepts occupy a central place within neo-Aristotelian ethics, they will best understood in terms of the various ways of failing: success in this area is best judged in terms of degrees of imperfection. This is particularly important given the emphasis such approaches put on moral development and moral education. A catalogue of the various degrees of failure and success is a necessary component of any such developmental story, and so a more fine-grained account of imperfect agents can illuminate how the virtuous agent succeeds in acting well.

The Situationist Challenge:

The account of imperfect agents that I advance comes from within the neo-Aristotelian approach to moral psychology, though I extend and challenge that approach in several ways. My account must therefore confront a recent and powerful objection to the neo-Aristotelian approach. Drawing on empirical evidence from social psychology, several philosophers have recently argued that the ascriptions of stable character traits such as virtues are generally mistaken. In fact, there is considerable experimental evidence that ascriptions of character are generally ineffective at predicting behaviour, particularly in novel situations. According to this 'situationist' objection, behaviour is generally a function of situational variation much more than individual disposition. (Doris 1998, Harman 1999) In other words, if a virtue is, as Aristotle says, a "firm and unchanging state", then people do not have virtues. Explaining the nature of imperfect agents from within the neo-Aristotelian approach is an important part of any response to situationism. Since the objection depends on an appeal to the prevalence of agents who fail to act from a firm and unchanging disposition, an adequate response to the objection requires an explanation of such agents that appeals to more than simple situational factors.

Explaining the psychological sources of imperfect behaviour is only a partial response to the situationist objection, however. Virtue concepts are normative; they do not merely describe behaviour, but single that behaviour out for praise. Praise and blame, in turn, presuppose responsibility. (Strawson 1982) Situationism, however, seems to threaten the very possibility of responsibility, since it attributes behaviour wholly to situational factors that are independent of the agent. Though situationism is rarely presented as an explicit denial of the coherence of responsibility, such a denial seems to be a consequence of the position. The denial of responsibility is also the strongest objection situationism can present to a moral psychology that makes room for the virtues, since such a denial undercuts the coherence of virtue concepts.

Situationism therefore highlights several important issues concerning virtue and responsibility. Does an expanded moral psychology that makes room for imperfection undermine the Aristotelian emphasis on virtue, and so undermine the neo-Aristotelian approach to moral psychology? If not, what account of responsibility should such a neo-Aristotelian approach adopt? Does situationism threaten that account of responsibility? Again,

explaining the variety of imperfect agents will be an important part of any such account of responsibility. There are some types of failures to act well for which agents should be held responsible, while other types of failures are of the sort to absolve the agent of responsibility. An account of responsibility should make this distinction clear, and so requires a companion account of the varieties of imperfect agents.

Anscombe's challenge to modern moral philosophy was to come up with a plausible moral psychology in advance of doing moral philosophy. An important part of such a moral psychology is an account of imperfect agents, and an explanation of the ways in which such agents can both succeed and fail to act well. If Aristotelian moral psychology can provide such an account, then that speaks strongly in favour of embracing an Aristotelian approach to moral philosophy more generally. Though my dissertation will focus on the plausibility of such an Aristotelian approach, it will also occasionally consider the extent to which a competing, Kantian inspired moral psychology can plausibly explain imperfect agents. For example: can the Kantian approach accommodate as wide a range of possible failures? Can it make sense of acting well imperfectly? Does the situationist challenge present a problem for Kantian moral psychology? Does either approach have a more plausible account of responsibility? Such comparisons will serve to evaluate the overall plausibility of each approach, but it will also, by way of contrast, put the Aristotelian account into a sharper focus.

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ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

All students should familiarize themselves with the information on the following site: <http://www.queensu.ca/academicintegrity/index.html>. It is important that you know University policies on academic integrity in your roles as a student and in your role as a Teaching Assistant or Teaching Fellow. The School of Graduate Studies has its own academic integrity policy that can be found at: <http://www.queensu.ca/sgs/forstudents/policiesprocedures.html>

APPEALS

Graduate Student Appeals against Academic Decisions for Coursework.

The Department makes every effort to ensure that students' work is assessed carefully, fairly, and objectively. There may be circumstances, however, in which students would like to appeal a decision on procedural, academic, or other grounds.

(a) The graduate student should request a review and reconsideration of a decision by his/her instructor. Should the student not be satisfied following the review by the instructor, a grievance may be presented to the Board of Graduate Studies.

(b) In the event of dissatisfaction with the ruling of the Board, an appeal may then be made to the Head of the Department.

(c) Should the Head of Department decide a further review is required, he/she appoints an ad hoc committee consisting of three members of the Department, none of whom are members of the Board of Graduate Studies or the instructor involved in the issue. In addition, a senior graduate student (i.e., one who has already passed the comprehensives) will be a member. The graduate student will not cast a vote concerning the academic standing of the appealing student.

Graduate Student Appeals against Academic Decisions on Comprehensive Examinations

If a student wishes to appeal the composition of the committee responsible for setting his/her examination questions, approving his/her Area Research Proposals, evaluating his/her papers, or conducting his/her oral examination, such appeal must be made in the first instance to the Graduate Coordinator immediately on learning of the committee's composition. The Graduate Coordinator will consider the appeal and decide whether it requires reconstituting the committee. Any further appeal must be made in writing to the Department Head. In either case the candidate must state the basis of the appeal in writing.

If a candidate wishes to appeal the outcome of any part of the examination process on procedural, academic or other grounds, he/she must do so in writing to the Department Head within a period of one month after being informed of the result. The appeal must include a statement of the candidate's reasons for thinking that the outcome should be reconsidered. The Department Head will consider the appeal and decide whether it requires reconstituting the examining committee. If the appeal is allowed, the Head will convene a new examining committee of two members of the Department, one of whom shall have been a member of the original committee. The decision of this new committee shall be final. In the event of conflicting assessments, the Head shall appoint a third member of the Department, not on the original committee, to serve on the new committee. The decision of the new committee shall be final.

It should not be assumed that procedures governing comprehensive appeals have any bearing on appeals relating to coursework or vice-versa.

TRAVEL AWARDS

The Graduate School makes funds available for graduate students to travel to and present at conferences, symposia, and other academic occasions. If you wish to apply for conference funding, you must submit a request for funding to the Graduate Coordinator well prior to the conference (see Judy Vanhooser for the appropriate form). Students can normally expect no more than \$300.00 in support, though sometimes more is available, depending on the case.

JOBS: CURRICULUM VITAE, REFERENCES, ETC.

Before you apply for a job or scholarship (anything from a SSHRC fellowship to a tenure track position) you should seek advice. In the present employment climate a badly prepared CV will be the first and last piece of your work seen by an employer or hiring committee. Career Services offers one or two workshops a year on how to prepare a CV. The Expanding Horizons series offered by the School of Graduate Studies and Research also offers workshops on CV preparation.

There is a folder of written advice, sample vitas, and sample post-doctoral proposals, available from Judy Vanhooser, the Graduate Assistant. There is also a dossier service available for all graduate students in this department. Ms. Vanhooser will keep your materials on file and send them out quickly and in a package when you ask her to. The dossier will typically contain confidential letters of reference and post-secondary school transcripts; students are expected to send other materials out themselves. When you wish to apply for a position, provide Ms. Vanhooser with the necessary details and the dossier will be prepared and mailed. Along with the documents, a note will be enclosed which will explain that letters of reference, unless otherwise specified, have been submitted to us by the candidate's referee on the mutual understanding that the letter is confidential and has never been seen by the candidate. A request will also be made that the file be destroyed when it has served its purpose. All students will have free access to this service for two years. After that, an administrative fee of \$5.00 per mailing will be charged.

FELLOWSHIPS

Continuing students should keep in touch with the Coordinator of Graduate Studies regarding fellowship applications and deadlines, and also review the departmental bulletin board on a regular basis. To qualify for Queen's awards, candidates *must* show that they have applied for external awards as well.

Students are responsible for checking from time to time with the Graduate Assistant regarding the status of their fellowship applications in order to determine whether any required items, such as letters of recommendation, are missing. It is up to you to ensure these items are received on time.

MISCELLANEOUS

A guide to finding philosophy research tools in Douglas and Stauffer Libraries may be had from the library's reference department. Tours of the library will be set up at the beginning of the Fall Term.

The School of Graduate Studies offers two courses of potential interest to all graduate students, SGS 801* and SGS 901*. The former is designed to help students for whom English is not their first language, the latter to assist senior PhD students with professional development, especially teaching. Details can be found in the [Calendar of the School of Graduate Studies and Research](#).

Dates and deadlines of importance to graduate students are listed in the *Graduate Calendar*. Students should familiarize themselves with this information.

The [Society for Graduate and Professional Students](#) and the [International Centre](#) provide information and services that may be of use to students. Check with senior graduate students on these things or contact the organizations directly.

Students experiencing financial problems should let the Graduate Coordinator know. Although the Department has very limited funds available for additional support for graduate students, the Graduate Coordinator may be aware of possible opportunities for research assistantships, etc.

Each graduate student has a mail tray located in Room 310. Students are requested to check regularly for mail. Outgoing and incoming mail are exchanged at approximately 2:00 p.m. and the incoming mail is usually sorted shortly after that.

In keeping with the University's general non-smoking policy, the Department affirms that there shall be no smoking in graduate student offices, or in the corridors, departmental offices, lounge, classrooms, elevator area, or washrooms.