Maxine Reitzes, Paper prepared for
the
Green Paper Task Group on International Migration
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Introduction
In my first presentation to the task team, I argued that there is more continuity than change in the new post-apartheid government's responses to the issue of migration, and that current immigration policy is neither cost-effective or sustainable. I suggested three reasons for this, and focused mainly on the limitations of the paradigm which largely informs immigration policy in South Africa. My intention in this presentation is to address the other two reasons which I mentioned. These concern some of the largely untested assumptions which inform immigration policy, relating to the dominant perceptions concerning the extent of undocumented migration to South Africa, and the nature of its economic, social and political impact. These issues are of fundamental importance, if coherent, consistent, cost-effective and politically and normatively sustainable policy responses are to be developed, not only in relation to immigration, but also to health, education, housing and social welfare; policing, defence and correctional services; and foreign affairs.
The Extent of Undocumented Migration to South Africa
Attempts to quantify the number of undocumented immigrants and migrants in South Africa, are beset with difficulties, which may account for the diverse official statistics, which range from 2 million to 11 million. The most obvious difficulty with quantifying undocumented migrants, is that, given their "illegal" and therefore insecure and vulnerable status, they do not make themselves available for counting.
Much quantification proceeds without attempting to distinguish between a number of different categories of migrants. When statistics are presented, it is not clear how many people included in them are illegal migrants, illegal immigrants, undocumented migrants, undocumented immigrants, and refugees. If it were possible to produce reliable estimates, it would be important to dis-aggregate these categories and to indicate how many people are included in each one, as these categories have diverse policy implications. For example, the impact of migrants on South Africa's political economy may be substantially different to that of immigrants, and policy responses would have to account for this; undocumented migrants and immigrants may require different responses to those who are in fact illegal; and refugees also require a particular response. Thus, appropriate policies need to be informed by reliable information concerning the extent and nature of each of these categories. The main distinctions between them include :
I will attempt to identify some of the distinctions between these categories, and raise some of the problems which attempts at quantification are likely to encounter.
Migrants
Much of the migrant population is in a constant state of flux,
increasing the problem of quantification. Many migrants in South
Africa regard themselves as migrants per se, rather than
as immigrants. They do not desire permanent residence in South
Africa. They are here for specific purposes and expect to return
to the country of their birth; or they wish to maintain a home
base in their country of origin, and continually commute across
South Africa's borders. Many are transient, trading artefacts
which they bring from other African countries. They exit with the
proceeds, and South African consumer goods - for example,
electronic goods, which they have purchased in South Africa;
procure more goods, and return to sell again. Many also enter to
find work, take remittances and goods back to dependants, and
then re-enter. Thus, to the extent that it may be possible to
count them as they enter and exit South Africa, one person may be
counted many times, thereby inflating the figures.
Furthermore, at present migrants have no option but to remain undocumented, and therefore "illegal", as there is no policy which adequately addresses their requirements. It is expensive and time-consuming for them to have to continually re-apply for temporary permits each time they wish to re-enter the country. Applicants for temporary work and work-seeker permits have to pay R360 each time they apply for permits or seek extensions, and the tariffs are non-refundable, whether the application succeeds of fails. The same fees and conditions apply to applicants who wish to extend or alter their temporary residence permits (Financial Mail, 21/06/1996).
For migrant citizens of SADC states, the exemption was also inappropriate. It granted permanent residence to those who could fulfil the conditions, but migrants do not desire permanent residence. Furthermore, one of the conditions was that prospective applicants had to provide evidence of continuous residence in South Africa from 01 July 1991. Because of their transient residence, had migrants wanted to secure permanent residence, they would have been precluded from doing so. Ironically, given fears that the exemption would prompt a large influx of immigrants' families, the only way in which migrants could seek to legalise their status was to apply for permanent residence, which would have allowed them to bring their families with them. They may not have wished to do so, but some might have found this option preferable to remaining "illegal".
In a study conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies in Winterveld, some migrants said that, in response to arrest and deportation, they re-enter the country with a number of relatives, in order to ensure that at least some will reach their destination, and secure property and goods which others might have left behind (Bam S and Reitzes M, 1996 : 25). Thus current policy unintentionally results in an actual increase of undocumented migrants in South Africa. Including them in statistics may also exaggerate the apparent numbers, as the presence of such people is often temporary.
A long-term, multiple entry, temporary work or residence permit may be one way of regularising and legalising the status of migrants.
Immigrants and Migrants: Illegal, Undocumented or
Criminal?
The definition of "illegal" immigrants is highly
contested. Many immigrants who are categorised as
"illegal", are in fact undocumented. An official of the
Affected Foreign Residents in South Africa Association (AFRISAA)
notes that many black foreigners have lived here for longer than
20 years (Reitzes M, 1995b : 4). This observation was endorsed by
research conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies in Winterveld
last year, where it became clear that many, if not most, of the
immigrants in that community are not recent arrivals. Some have
lived there for a quarter of a century. Many have been
economically active; some own property, and have married locals.
They have therefore fulfilled residence requirement, but have not
been granted the legal status of temporary or permanent residence
(Bam and Reitzes : 35).
In spite of the SADC exemption, many such citizens of SADC states are likely to remain undocumented, for a number of reasons. These range from satisfaction with forged documents; distrust of the government and its motives, or of Home Affairs officials; or their assumptions that, in spite of acquiring legal documents, they are likely to continue to be harassed by state officials and police, and have their documents confiscated or destroyed.
Furthermore, many SADC citizens who have lived in South Africa for more than five years, and who are economically active, lack the documentation to prove this, and were therefore unable to apply for the exemption. This may be for a number of reasons, including that they were self-employed; or because employers refused to provide them with the relevant documentation, as they do not wish their immigrant employees to legalise their status, possibly making them less vulnerable and exploitable. The Department of Home Affairs anticipated some of these problems, and, failing documentary evidence to prove that applicants do meet these criteria, allowed them to submit a signed affidavit. However, the success of their application is then determined at the discretion of officials (Department of Home Affairs, 1996 : 4-5). Anecdotal evidence suggests that some Home Affairs officials were ill-informed about the exemption requirements, or openly hostile to, and intent on subverting, the process.
Thus, although many immigrants may qualify for legal status, they may be counted as "illegal" for a range of reasons, thus further inflating the statistics.
The exemption was granted exclusively to SADC citizens. Thus undocumented non-SADC citizens who could meet the conditions for legal status, will continue to be officially counted as "illegal".
Finally, immigrants who are undocumented and/or "illegal", are often deported and re-enter the country many times. Thus, basing statistics on the number of deportations or attempted illegal border-crossings, are potentially also misleading, as, once again, one person is counted many times.
Another category distinction which is sometimes not made, often for political reasons, is that between criminality and illegality. Not only are undocumented migrants or immigrants identified as being illegal, but the categories of illegal and criminal are often conflated. There is little doubt that international crime syndicates are increasingly penetrating South Africa. However, members of such syndicates are often illegal because they are criminals, and do not wish to have their presence here documented. Thus, many foreign criminals are illegal. However, it does not therefore follow that all illegal or undocumented immigrants and migrants are criminals.
Nevertheless, this is how statistics are often presented. Media reports such as : "The operation would not focus solely on illegal immigrants and weapons smuggling. Other forms of crime would also be dealt with" (The Citizen, 13/07/1995), suggest that crime and illegality are two sides of the same coin.
The association of these two categories results in the conflation of criminal, and illegal or undocumented immigrant, statistics. For example, Col Brian Van Niekerk has been quoted as saying that "[s]woops on illegal immigrants ... accounted for 20% of all arrests made by police in the Witwatersrand operational area in June 1995" (The Star, 14/07/1995).
The overall result of the association of these categories, and the conflation of criminal and illegal statistics, exacerbates South Africans fear of, and xenophobic responses to, foreigners; and creates the impressions that the already high crime rate is even higher; that illegal immigrants are partially responsible for this; and that security forces are more successful at combating crime than they in fact are. It also misinforms policy-makers, and results in inappropriate responses.
Refugees and Immigrants
The distinction between illegal immigrants and refugees is
also open to challenge. The majority of refugees in South Africa
are from Mozambique. Prior to 1993, the South African government
did not afford official status to Mozambicans. In 1993, the
government became party to a tri-partite agreement with the
Mozambican government and the UNHCR. This afforded group status
to Mozambicans who arrived between 1985 and 1992, and the only
people given documentation were those who registered for
"voluntary" repatriation.
Chris Dolan, a researcher at the University of Witwatersrand's Rural Facility, argues that the distinction between political refugees and economic migrants is spurious. Mozambicans in rural areas have been largely defined as refugees, and prior to 1993, were granted this status by "homeland" governments, while those resident in urban areas were defined as illegal immigrants. Policies of voluntary repatriation from rural areas and forced deportation from cities have reinforced this divide. But the distinction is arbitrary, because many "illegals" arrived as refugees, and because rural jobs are scarce, were subjected to the same economic compulsions as many people in rural areas : to migrate to urban areas (Reitzes M, 1995b : 5). For refugees who have remained in rural areas, the fact that the territorial and administrative entities which granted them such status no longer exist, has exacerbated the problem of their legal status.
Some organisations refer to a category of "economic refugees", which attempts to illustrate the fact that, although not being outside their country as a result of a well-founded fear of persecution, many people would not be able to survive economically if they were returned to their country of origin. However, in response to a call for the accommodation of "economic refugees" from the UNHCR, church groups and COSATU, Minister Buthelezi claimed that such a term is a misnomer (The Star, 20/06/1995; Business Day, 26/06/1995).
In the southern African context in particular, and in the global arena in general, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between immigrants, migrants and refugees. Even the UNHCR has acknowledged this :
There are as many reasons for moving as there are migrants. A particular set of reasons, involving persecution and the lack of national protection, distinguishes the refugee from other migrants. In practice, it is often difficult to pick out a specific cause for departure. People leave their homes as the result of a complicated mixture of fears, hopes, ambitions and other pressures which can be hard, if not impossible, to unravel.
Even for refugees, the reasons fro flight are normally complex. The immediate cause of an exodus may be individual persecution, armed conflict, campaigns of repression, the violent collapse of civil society or a dozen variations on these themes. Behind these phenomena lie deeper and often interrelated patterns of political, economic, ethnic, environmental or human rights pressures, which are further complicated by the interplay between domestic and international factors.
It can be difficult to make a clear distinction between refugees and non-refugees. It has always been common for large-scale economic migrations to be accompanied by politically motivated exile or flight, and vice versa...
Refugees and other migrants often use, or attempt to use, the same avenues for entry into another country. If labour migration channels are open, refugees may opt to avoid bureaucratic rigours and uncertainties of asylum procedures and simply enter as workers (UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 1993 : 24-25).
Such ambiguities further inflate illegal immigrant statistics, as a result of the inclusion of those who see themselves as refugees, or who have previously been afforded such status. The legislating of the Refugee Bill, and the regularisation of asylum seeker application procedures may assist in addressing some of these problems, and producing more reliable statistics.
The Socio-Economic and Political Impact of Immigrants and Migrants in South Africa
There exists a pervasive perception that undocumented and illegal immigrants and migrants have a negative impact on South African society which justifies stricter immigration control. The most commonly held assumptions about immigrants include that their presence here in general aggravates high rates of unemployment, and that they "steal" jobs from South Africans; that they are a drain on scarce social services, and thereby undermine the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme; and that they exacerbate rising crime.
Much research still needs to be done in order to substantiate or invalidate these assumptions. However, evidence from research which has been undertaken on these issues suggests that many of these assumptions are at best, dubious, and at worst, unjustified. Research conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies to date, reveals that the effect of migration is far more complex than the current policy debate tends to assume.
Immigrants' and Migrants' Participation in the Economy
The informal sector
Research findings from a study conducted in 1994 by
Septi Bukula in the Johannesburg inner-city, and from a study
conducted in Winterveld by the Centre for Policy Studies, suggest
that many immigrants and migrants are self-employed, and few seem
to be competing with South Africans for jobs in the formal
sectors of the economy. They are engaged in a range of
economically productive activities, including hawking fresh
produce and selling artefacts; running spaza shops, barbershops
and hairdressing salons; and working as technicians and artisans,
for example, mechanics, plumbers, etc. In doing so, they
sometimes create employment for others, to whom they may impart
certain skills.
According to Bukula, certain markets, such as trading in the informal sector, have low entry barriers, and would in any event be over traded, regardless of the participation of immigrants. He suggests that South Africans should welcome immigrants, as they provide initiative, skills and products which are not available in South Africa. On the other hand, South Africans have an advantage over immigrants of knowledge and awareness of local conditions. He suggests the diversification of markets, and the exploitation of potential markets that have not been tapped, such as in informal settlements, where retail stores have not yet been established. He argues that these conditions present opportunities for South Africans and immigrants to co-operate through combining their knowledge and skills (Reitzes M, 1995a : 78).
Little research has been conducted on the nature and extent of informal trade between South Africa and other African countries, and because much of this trade is informal - although not necessarily illegal - this information is difficult to access. Most of the foreigners involved in this trade are migrants, as defined above. Under apartheid, South Africa was largely isolated from the informal trade networks which have straddled the rest off the continent for centuries. Many crafts-traders come from Francophone Africa, and some are part of extensive religious-based, West African trading brotherhoods which had already penetrated most African states : they are simply extending this penetration to South African commercial space : "...they embody paradigms of supranational commercial practice and economic survival which, although alien to South Africa, have been tried and tested on the rest of the continent". (Ansell G, 1995 : African Agenda 1(2)).
The formal sector
Anecdotal evidence suggests that immigrants are
concentrated in certain sectors of the economy, such as
agriculture; services - mainly tourism, catering and domestic;
and construction. More research needs to be conducted to
establish whether this is true, and why. Factors which might
influence these trends include :
Whereas many South Africans regard immigrants as economic competitors, immigrants dispute this perception. Some immigrants in Winterveld reported an incident in which locals chased away a building contractor who had come to the area to recruit labour. They apparently said they "were sick and tired of seeing immigrants working for low wages, thereby threatening the livelihood of everyone". Immigrants dismiss this view : "Immigrants have not asked people whom they meet on the side of the road digging trenches to hand in their shovels; neither have they gone to owners of companies and asked them to employ only immigrants"(Reitzes and Bam, 21).
These statements are worthy of comment. The first betrays an oft-heard circular argument : immigrants, because they are illegal, are vulnerable and exploitable. They are therefore prepared to tolerate harsh working conditions and low pay. Therefore, they must remain illegal, and harsher legislation must be enforced against them.
However, it would seem that the problem lies partly with the policies which render immigrants undocumented and illegal. Were their status to be regularised, they may be less likely to be subject to exploitation and abuse, and unfair competition between citizens and "illegals" would be substantially undermined. Furthermore, if exploitative employment practices are pervasive in certain economic sectors in which there are high concentration of immigrant workers, this would seem to suggest that the structure of these industries needs to be addressed, and conditions of employment regularised, so that unequal competition below a certain standard, cannot take place. A case in point agriculture, where spokespersons have suggested that farmers in the Limpopo district are dependent for their survival on the cheap labour of illegal immigrants (Reitzes M, 1994 : 9). Finally, some commentators have argued against the myth that only illegal and undocumented immigrants and migrants work for sub-minimum wages. They cite examples of South Africans employed in the hotel industry whose remuneration is totally inadequate, and contend that "unscrupulous employers will exploit anyone they can" (Reitzes, 1995a: 78).
The immigrant response quoted above implies an understanding of economic participation as contingent on free and equal competition, and the supply and demand of job opportunities and labour. It suggests a rejection of privileging national identity as a criterion for access to economic opportunities.
Immigrants also contend that employers are often hostile, and cited the case of a contractor who allegedly employed immigrants for a fortnight and then handed them over to the police, recruiting a fresh group. Contractors in Mabopane, Soshanguve and surrounding areas were accused of the same practice (Bam and Reitzes, 1996 : 21). This apparent collusion between employers and the authorities could be a strategic response by the former to policies which penalise them for employing "illegal" labour. Thus the sanctions imposed on employers in order to enforce stricter immigration control, fail : either because immigrants and migrants are self-employed, or because employers co-operate with the police to circumvent them. Once again, this would seem to suggest the need for the regularisation of the status of foreigners and employment practices.
The state's refusal to protect immigrants' economic rights could adversely effect the economy. If their willingness and capacity to take responsibility for, and improve, their own welfare is obstructed by citizens and the authorities, they may be forced to make greater demands on social services, or withdraw their financial contribution to the market.
Immigrants and migrants as consumers
Available evidence suggests that immigrants and migrants
constitute a consumer market for goods and services. They
contribute to the economy by stimulating the demand for basic
consumer goods, such as food, drink and clothing, and by
purchasing electronic and other goods, on which they pay VAT.
Craftspeople, traders and artisans also locally purchase tools
and materials necessary for the production of artefacts, and the
provision of their services. They also create a demand for, and
consumer services for which they pay, such as accommodation,
transport, health, etc. Were their status to be legalised,
payment for services would be legally enforced, and they would be
obliged to pay tax on their earnings.
By stimulating demand, they may also stimulate the creation of employment opportunities in sectors where their need for goods and services is greatest. A cafe owner interviewed near the Pretoria station, claimed that his clientele consisted almost entirely of migrants who commuted by train. Some taxi-drivers interviewed have also indicated that they are largely dependent on income from migrants' transport requirements.
Research currently being conducted by the Centre for Policy Studies reveals that migrants take very little revenue out of the country, and, to the extent that they do, those who are traders use it to purchase goods and artefacts in their countries of origin, and return to South Africa to sell them.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that migrants develop and adopt rational and sophisticated economic survival strategies. One observation made during the research is that, even when foreigners are unemployed, they are nevertheless able to survive. This is either a result of complex support networks into which they are integrated, or because they have developed certain strategies. For example, one respondent, who undertakes piecemeal work, related how, when he is employed and does have the available finances, he purchases electronic goods, for example a television set. For him, this doubles as unemployment security. When he is unemployed, he sells the set, and survives off the proceeds of the sale. "We do not automatically resort to crime", he explained. Investment in durable consumer goods is also an "investment" strategy, as undocumented or illegal immigrants and migrants experience great difficulties in operating a bank account, as they lack the identification documents required to do so. In Winterveld, many respondents said that they bury their money in their shacks.
The evidence presented in this section would suggest that, while they are seen by many South Africans as economic competition, many immigrants appear to be contributing services, skills and resources, and not merely consuming them.
Social Services
Education
Research conducted in Winterveld reveals that, since the 1994
elections, both immigrants and locals have perceived a new level
of discrimination against foreigners in schools. In order to
avoid detection and possible eviction, arrest and deportation,
some immigrant parents admitted that their children present
themselves as South Africans with assumed surnames. One immigrant
observed that as a result of fear of discrimination against
immigrant children in schools, "a large number of immigrant
children are out on the streets" (Bam and Reitzes : 19). The
prospect of some immigrant children roaming the streets, rather
than receiving schooling, is potentially socially destabilising.
Besides intentional exclusion by citizens and the authorities, some immigrant children are precluded from access to schooling because they are not competent in the language of instruction.
Health
Some immigrant and migrant Winterveld respondents claimed
that they were not discriminated against by health-care providers
for being foreigners per se, but for not being able to
speak seTswana. (This applied equally to South African citizens).
All immigrant and migrant respondents claimed that, as long as
they paid for services, their legal status was unimportant.
The above findings suggest that :
As noted in my first presentation, these conclusions are enforced by immigrants themselves. In a survey conducted among immigrants by the Centre for Policy Studies, many respondents claimed that they did not expect the state to provide for their social security.
Immigrants, Crime and the Police
As mentioned above, there exists a tendency for immigrants to be criminalised by the authorities and policy-makers. This a conceptual problem which results in a distorted view of reality and unreliable statistics, which misinform decision-makers and result in inappropriate policy.
Contrary to the widely held view that immigrants are disproportionately engaged in crime, a pervasive perception among them, is that South African criminals, and sometimes the police, consider them to be soft targets for criminal activities. Many immigrant respondents in Winterveld claimed that locals stole from them, knowing that immigrants would not report these incidents to police for fear of arrest and deportation.
Immigrants insisted that they are denied police protection from criminals, and that they are repeated victims of unwarranted police action. Some are threatening to respond by taking violent action against the police : in one instance this has already occurred, when migrants and immigrants ambushed police at Orange Farm. Thus the actions of authorities who are supposedly enforcing immigration policy is often mis-directed, and potentially destabilising. Equally, or more importantly, conflict between immigrants and police could further erode the SA Police Service's ability to act effectively against lawlessness at a time when rising crime is perhaps the country's most important challenge.
Although Winterveld is, according to the police, a high crime area, police admit to having no evidence that immigrants are more likely than South Africans to be engaged in crime.
Immigrants also claim that they are victims of corrupt behaviour by police. This raises the possibility that current immigration policy is a source of police corruption, which is one of the most important barriers to effective crime prevention.
Furthermore, the hostile and sometimes corrupt ways in which police engage with immigrants deligitimises immigration policy in particular, and the government and state in general. It may be significant that a member of the Western Cape Aliens Investigation Unit has suggested that a possible reason for corruption in the police force when dealing with immigrants is that the police feel demoralised by their attempts to implement an unenforceable policy. Some have therefore given up, and instead attempt to use it to their own advantage. And if immigrants themselves are not treated within the bounds of legality, they cannot be expected to comply with the rules of the state.
Political impact
In the run-up to the 1994 national elections, party
workers apparently aggressively canvassed Winterveld immigrants'
support, and encouraged them to obtain identity documents
enabling them to vote : many did so and did vote. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the same strategies were employed by
political parties in Mpumulanga, Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Gauteng,
seeking to augment their share of the vote. Immigrants who voted
in the 1994 elections perceive themselves to have been accepted
as South African citizens or permanent residents; to have a
vested interest in the South African polity, economy and society;
and assume that they may vote in the next general election. They
now perceive attitudes to have hardened against them since the
1994 elections. Thus their expectations of South African
citizenship have been raised and frustrated a relatively short
time. This has eroded the credibility and legitimacy of
immigration policy in particular, and the new government in
general.
These developments have potentially serious implications for political stability. The exclusion of constituencies which perceive themselves as having legitimate and vested interests in decision-making, (and whose perceptions were previously encouraged and validated), does not necessarily render them powerless. If members of this community are denied the recognition of their interests, a number of negative repercussions can be anticipated.
An adversarial immigrant solidarity could be forged, in the face of an increasingly hostile South African citizenry and state. Immigrants could refuse to recognise the legitimacy of decisions taken without their participation, but which they believe affect their interests, As a result, they might mobilise against or sabotage the implementation of such policies (Bam and Reitzes, 15).
Finally, if the government continues not only to renege on promises which it made to immigrants, but also to persist in assuring the South African electorate that it intends to enforce stricter controls and to remove immigrants, and demonstrably fails to do so, its credibility is likely to be compromised, and large sections of its domestic constituency will be alienated.
Conclusion
Unreliable, and at times, exaggerated, statistics concerning the number of undocumented migrants and immigrants in South Africa, coupled with largely unsubstantiated assumptions related to their socio-economic impact, are likely to misinform immigration policy. Policy which does not accord with the reality which it is intended to address, is unlikely to be enforceable, cost-effective, or sustainable. Furthermore, the dissemination of untested assumptions is likely to increase xenophobia, which could in turn have a destabilising impact, both domestically and regionally. It could also result in the electorate exerting increasing pressure on policy makers to achieve the impossible : the elimination of immigrants and migrants from our society. Finally, unenforceable policies are likely to threaten the credibility and the legitimacy of the new government, and degrade its democratic intentions.
Bibliography
Bam, S and Reitzes, M. 1996. One foot in, one foot out: Immigrants and civil society in the Winterveld. Johannesburg : Centre for Policy Studies.
Department of Home Affairs. 1996. Departmental Circular No 28 of 1996. Pretoria.
Reitzes, M. 1994. Alien Issues. Indicator SA 12(1):7-11.
---------- 1995a. "Summary and Conclusions : Debunking some of the myths". In R de Villiers and M Reitzes (eds), Southern African migration: domestic and regional policy implications. Workshop proceedings 14:77-81. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
---------- 1995b. Divided on the 'demon': Immigration policy since the election. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1993. The State of the World's Refugees. New York : Penguin.
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