

Kathleen Claussen November 2019 What do you do when another country is engaged in acts, policies, or practices that are contrary to freetrade rules?

What might those acts, policies, or practices be?

How do I know what qualifies before I take action?


FORMS OF PROTECTIONISM

Border measures

Non-border measures

WTO rules

Measure	Legality	Frequency of use
Tariffs / tariff rate quotas (within bindings)	Legal	Very frequent




Measure	Legality	Frequency of use
Tariffs / tariff rate quotas (within bindings)	Legal	Very frequent
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties	Legal	Frequent

List of products from Canada

Case No	Product Name
A-122-855	Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate Resin
A-122-857	Certain Softwood Lumber Products
C-122-858	Certain Softwood Lumber Products
A-122-853	Citric Acid And Citrate Salt
A-122-503	Iron Construction Castings
A-122-863	Large Diameter Welded Pipe
C-122-854	Supercalendered Paper

Figure 2. U.S. AD/CVD Orders In Force by Country



Measure	Legality	Frequency of use
Tariffs / tariff rate quotas (within bindings)	Legal	Very frequent
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties	Legal	Frequent
Safeguards	Legal	Occasional

Politics

Canada reveals final trade safeguards for heavy plate, stainless steel wire











Trade tribunal report recommended against protections for other steel products

Janyce McGregor · CBC News · Posted: May 10, 2019 4:20 PM ET | Last Updated: May 13



Measure	Legality	Frequency of use
Tariffs / tariff rate quotas (within bindings)	Legal	Very frequent
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties	Legal	Frequent
Safeguards	Legal	Occasional
National security measures	Unclear	Rare

United States Announces Deal with Canada and Mexico to Lift Retaliatory Tariffs

05/17/2019

Washington, DC – Today, the United States announced an agreement with Canada and Mexico to remove the Section 232 tariffs for steel and aluminum imports from those countries and for the removal of all retaliatory tariffs imposed on American goods by those countries. The agreement provides for aggressive monitoring and a mechanism to prevent surges in imports of steel and aluminum. If surges in imports of specific steel and aluminum products occur, the United States may re-impose Section 232 tariffs on those products. Any retaliation by Canada and Mexico would then be limited to steel and aluminum products. This agreement is great news for American farmers that have been subject to retaliatory tariffs from Canada and Mexico. At the same time, the Agreement will continue to protect America's steel and aluminum industries.

Measure	Legality	Frequency of use
Tariffs / tariff rate quotas (within bindings)	Legal	Very frequent
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties	Legal	Frequent
Safeguards	Legal	Occasional
National security measures	Unclear	Rare
Unilateral trade action	Unclear/it depends	Rare

OFFICE of the UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974



March 22, 2018

BEHIND THE BORDER MEASURES

Measure	Legality	Frequency of use
Regulatory action	Legal under certain circumstances	Very frequent





BEHIND THE BORDER MEASURES

Measure	Legality	Frequency of use	
Regulatory action	Legal under certain circumstances	Very frequent	
Other informal action	Unclear	Common among certain states	



INSTRUMENTS TO RESPOND TO PROTECTIONISM

- Domestic procedures
- WTO committees
- Negotiation
- Dispute settlement (WTO / FTA)
- Unilateral action / retaliation

- What options should Canada or other WTO members have to respond to harmful trade practices that are not covered by the WTO rules?
- What options should Canada or other WTO members have to respond to harmful trade practices that may be violations of WTO rules but cannot effectively be proven to breach those rules under the WTO dispute settlement system?
- What options should Canada or other WTO members have when facing a trading partner such as China with an institutional market structure that the rules seemingly do not accommodate?

FACTORS GOVERNMENTS MAY CONSIDER IN CHOOSING INSTRUMENTS

- Effectiveness
- Timeliness
- Impact on own economy
- Impact on relationship with trading partner(s)
- Impact on the rules-based system
- Impact on bargaining leverage

CASE STUDY



RESPONDING TO CHINA

	Effective- ness	Timeliness	Impact on economy	Relationship	Rules-based system	Bargaining leverage
Domestic action	\Rightarrow	?	+	•	+	+
WTO Council/ Committee		+	+	+		+
Dispute settlement	?		+	+	+	+
Negotiation (specific)	+	+	?	+	?	×
Negotiation (broader)	+	+	?	+	?	\Rightarrow
Retaliation	?	+				+

RESOURCES I MENTIONED

All of these are available on my SSRN page (specific links below). See also @Claussen_K

- Trade's Security Exceptionalism (discussing hard/soft security exceptions in US law allowing the president to raise tariffs)
 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439705
- The Other Trade War (discussing the WTO AB issue and 4 causes):
 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278391
- Forgotten Statutes: Trade Law's Domestic (Re)turn (discussing the Section 301 and the three questions in slide 19):
 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3395291

Not mentioned but possibly of interest

- Reimagining a new way forward for trade and labor in USMCA, etc.:
 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3258639
- Discussing path dependence in certain trade agreement chapters:
 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3200105