Peacekeeping: Perspectives Old and New

Edited by:

Howard G. Coombs, Magali Deleuze, Kevin Brushett and Marie-Michèle Doucet



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Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Title: Peacekeeping: perspectives old and new / edited by Howard G. Coombs, Magali Deleuze, Kevin

Brushett, and Marie-Michèle Doucet.

Names: History of Peacekeeping: New Perspectives (Symposium) (2017 : Kingston, Ont.), author. |

Coombs, Howard (Howard G.), editor. | Deleuze, Magali, editor. | Brushett, Kevin, editor. | Doucet, Marie-Michèle, 1986- editor. | Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Centre for International and Defence Policy, publisher. | Royal Military College of Canada. Department of History, host institution.

Series: Martello papers; 46.

Description: Series statement: Martello papers; 46 | This volume is the product of the annual symposium held by the Department of History at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston

on November 2-3, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: Canadiana 20230193862 | ISBN 9781553396628 (PDF)

Subjects: LCSH: Peacekeeping forces—History—Congresses. | LCSH: Peacekeeping forces—Africa—

Congresses. | LCSH: Peacekeeping forces, Canadian—Congresses. | LCSH: Peacekeeping forces, Australian—Congresses. | LCSH: Peacekeeping forces, American—Congresses. | LCSH: United Nations

Emergency Force—Congresses. | LCGFT: Conference papers and proceedings.

Classification: LCC U270 .H57 2023 | DDC 355.3/57—dc23

Table of Contents

Introduction, Kevin Brushett	1
Chapter 1, Maple Leaf and Blue Beret: The Rise, Fall and Promise of Canadian Peacekeeping, Walter A. Dorn	23
Chapter 2, UNEF: The Origins and Realities of Canadian Peacekeeping, Michael Carroll	61
Chapter 3, History of Australian Peacekeeping, Peter Londey	77
Chapter 4, A Clash of Ideals? American Victory Culture and the Debate over Peacekeeping, Michael Holm	99
Chapter 5, Gender and Peacekeeping: What Future for Peacekeeping Operations?, Ariane Larouche	121
Chapter 6, The Evolution of Peacekeeping Training in the Canadian Military: From General Purpose Combat to Child Soldiers, Howard G. Coombs and Lindsay M. Coombs	141
Chapter 7, The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping to Protect Civilians: A Necessary Evil, Kofi Nsia-Pepra	171
Conclusion: Peacekeeping - Quo Vadis?, Howard G. Coombs	189
Contributors	209

Introduction

Kevin Brushett

The following volume is the product of the annual symposium by the Department of History at the Royal Military College of Canada. Over the years, the symposium has adopted various themes coinciding with anniversaries of important historical events or important trends and emerging shifts in the study of military and diplomatic history. For the 2017 symposium, the organizers (the editors of this volume) selected the theme of peacekeeping. There were a number of important reasons to do so. First, 2017 represented the 60th anniversary of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lester B. Pearson, then Canada's Secretary of External Affairs and later Prime Minister, for his crucial role in organizing the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), later UNEF I, to help resolve the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. Pearson's role in deploying peacekeepers to resolve the conflict was not only a crucial turning point in the institutionalization of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, but it also began the long and proud history of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) of providing support to peace operations ever since. Equally important was the electoral promises of the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau to recommit Canada to a UN peacekeeping role after a decline in support for such missions during the governments of Stephen Harper and Paul Martin. For many Canadians, Trudeau's aspirational catch phrase "We're back!" led to a belief that their armed forces would reassume their tradi-

tional "Blue Helmet" roles in UN operations, including the deployment of Canadian soldiers to conflict regions, such as the Central African Republic and Mali. Indeed, Canada's "return to peacekeeping" came at a time when many were beginning to reflect on peacekeeping's future both in Canada and beyond, including the newly elected UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres who worried that the UN was "underperforming in conflict prevention, in peace operations, and in efforts to sustain peace."1 Moreover, it was not just governments and international organizations who were beginning to question the future of peacekeeping, but academics and practitioners, who were contributing to a burgeoning body of literature analyzing the successes and failures of peace operations in the early 21st century.² It appeared to us that the time was ripe for a re-examination of peacekeeping from a broad range of perspectives, but particularly those informed by historical approaches and methodologies. Given the turn of events in Afghanistan during 2021 and the collapse of decades of nation building there is more impetus than ever for scholars to delineate the utility and best application of international peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping as we know it has evolved significantly from its origins in the early Cold War, and from Pearson's and Canada's first efforts in the field, more than sixty years ago. Peace operations have evolved in

and Mateja Peter, eds., United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global

Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

^{1.} Guterres cited in Richard Gowan, "Peace Operations," in The Oxford Handbook on the UN 2nd ed., eds. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 420; Sedrik Pocuch, "The Fall of Canadian Peacekeeping: Should it be Revived, NATO Association of Canada, (September 23, 2019), available at http://natoassociation.ca/the-fall-of-canadian-peacekeeping-should- it-be-revived/; Tim Donais, "Is Canada Really Back: Commitment, Credibility, and the Changing Face of Peacekeeping," Peace Research: the Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies 50, no. 2 (2018): 79-104; and M. Landriault, "Post-Afghanistan Syndrome?: Canadian Public Opinion on Military Intervention Abroad After the Afghanistan Mission," Peace Research: the Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies 50, no. 2 (2018): 57-78; and Canada was not the only Western nation looking for a "return to peacekeeping," as similar events were occurring across European nations as well, See J. Koops and G. Tercovich, "A European return to United Nations peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead," International Peacekeeping 23, no. 5 (2016): 597-609. 2. See for example, Mats Berdal "The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 5 (2018): 721–750; Cedric de Coning

their conception from the basic "Holy Trinity" (consent of the parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence) to a range of both military and civilian interventions that seek not simply to keep the peace, but to enforce it where it does not exist, and to build it where it has proven unable to take root. Increasingly, what Canadians have commonly understood as "peacekeeping" now involves a broader range of activities (humanitarian assistance, refugee management, state capacity building, and support to civil society organizations); a broader range in the rules of engagement for military forces; and a wider assortment of partners drawn from international and regional organizations such as NATO and the African Union, as well as national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Though many Canadians continue to hang on to the mythical image of the neutral and unarmed Blue Helmet standing between combatants, those images now rarely meet the realities of what Canadian, and other nations', soldiers are asked to provide when they enter conflict zones as peacekeepers.³ Much of the shift from peacekeeping to peacemaking and peace building (and the concomitant shifts from Chapter VI to Chapter VII UN Mandates) has obviously been due to changing geopolitical realities on the ground, particularly since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the emergence of terrorism and non-state actors as important security threats.4 Many in the field

^{3.} More than a decade ago Canadian military historian Jack Granatstein warned Canadians of the "harmful idealization" the Blue Helmet peacekeeping that no longer exists. J. L. Granatstein, Whose War Is It? 1st ed. (Toronto: Phyllis Bruce Books, 2007). Historians who have contributed to this volume, Howard Coombs and Michael Carroll, have repeated Granatstein's warnings and caution Canadians to realign their expectations as to what their beloved peacekeepers might be able to accomplish in the future. See H. Coombs, "The Harsh Reality: Canada and 21st Century Peacekeeping," Canadian Global Affairs Institute Policy Update December 2017, https://www.cgai.ca/the harsh reality canada and 21st century peacekeeping; and M. K. Carroll, "Peacekeeping: Canada's Past, but not its present and future?" International Journal 7, no. 1 (2016): 167–176. For an excellent understanding of just how Canadians came to see peacekeeping as embedded in the DNA of the country, see Colin McCullough, Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

^{4.} Oliver Richmond, "Peace During and After the Age of Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* 24, no. 4 (2014): 509–519. Richard Gowan, "Peace Operations," in *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* 2nd ed., eds. T. G. Weiss and S. Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 420–440; J. Koops,

of peacekeeping studies have generally referred to the existence of five broad chronologically ordered "generations" of peace operations over which peacekeeping has "evolved" to its more modern and more "robust" forms. Others have focused more on mission "typologies" noting that there are significant differences between missions within each generation as well as commonalities across them. Some of those perspectives and debates are present here, and while the authors in this volume do not come to any unified response to those debates, we believe their contributions provide a range of perspectives on peace operations in the 21st century regarding "How have we got here?" and "Where are we going?" that will enrich the literature and enliven debates with the study of peace operations writ large.

Middle and Superpowers such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, all of whom appear in this volume, have been accused of using outdated methods of conventional warfare and peacemaking in our new world order of conflict. Consequently, building an effective peace requires the ongoing study of the factors that contextualize and compromise humanitarian intervention, conflict resolution, and conflict preven-

N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, and P. D. Williams, "Introduction: Peacekeeping in the 21st Century, 1999–2013," in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, eds. J. Koops, T. Tardy, N. MacQueen, and P. D. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 607–615; T. Benner, S. Mergenthaler, P. Rotmann, *The New World of UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); J. Karslund, "From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism," *International* Peacekeeping 26, no. 1 (2019): 1–21.

^{5.} Kai Michael Kenkel, "Five Generations of Peace Operations: from the 'thin blue line' to 'painting a country blue'," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56, no. 1 (2013): 122–143. See also the work of Ramesh Thakur who has identified six generations. Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 34–47.

^{6.} Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,' International Affairs 69, no. 3 (1993): 451–464; A. Bellamy, P. Williams & S. Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); T. Tardy, ed., Peace Operations After 11 September 2001 (London: Routledge, 2004); R. Wilde, "Determining How the Legitimacy of Intervention is Discussed," H. Charlesworth and J. M. Coicaud, eds., Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 327–344; A. J. Bellamy and P. D. Williams, "Trends in Peace Operations 1947–2013," in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, eds. J. Koops, T. Tardy, N. MacQueen, and P. D. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13–41.

tion. *Peacekeeping: Perspectives Old and New* will examine some of the past, present, and future of tools and philosophies around peacekeeping to assist with ongoing conceptual work to find lasting solutions for contemporary conflict solutions. In particular, it focuses on the contextualizing aspects of institutions and policy that surround and enable (or not) peacekeeping.

British military theorist and historian Major-General John Frederick Charles Fuller believed that the ultimate weakness of all strategy during much of the 20th century to be its misunderstanding of the role that peace played in shaping warfare. Fuller thought that disconnect between the violence of conflict from the stratagems required for the establishment of a lasting peace results in nothing more than a temporary cessation of hostilities or absence of war, but not a true peace. Fuller's idea advanced during the early years of the Cold War, appears to have come to fruition at the dawn of the 21st century, particularly in light of the results of Western-led military interventions in places like Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and later Libya (2011). Military activities designed to promote peace and stability such as those of UN missions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia (1992-1995), and Rwanda (1993-1996) were notoriously unsuccessful, and undermined public confidence and support for peacekeeping.8 Additionally, at the time of writing, the mixed achievements of alliance or coalition military operations against networked transnational organizations like ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)⁹ and regional military operations against smaller but similar groups such as Boko Haram, in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon, highlight the need for a re-examination of the assumptions, which have been guiding interventions in failed and failing states and not creating a lasting and durable peace.

^{7.} J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1961), 76.

^{8.} Edward Luttwak, "Give War A Chance" Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 36–44.

^{9.} ISIS is also commonly known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). It is also known as *Daesh*.

A unifying theme throughout this volume is the role of politics, international, national, and organizational, along with institutions and policy in shaping the form of peacekeeping efforts. To contextualize the discussion that takes place in the following chapters it is necessary to examine the UN in some degree of detail, including the institutional structures, policies, and practices that have emerged over the years to facilitate peacekeeping and peace operations.

Created in the wake of the crucible of violence of the First and Second World Wars, as well as the diplomatic failures of the Interwar years, the founding of the UN on the ruins of the failed League of Nations was heralded as the dawn of a new era of international cooperation that would "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Unlike its predecessor, the UN would be a viable forum and instrument for peace supporting the international system. From the beginning however, the UN's institutional organization, like any large bureaucratic organization, offered opportunities for both cooperation and competition between its constituent bodies – the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat. This is particularly true of the evolving relationship between the interests General Assembly, which represents all member states, and the Security Council, created to protect

^{10.} Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Rise of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 41. Recent scholarship highlights the degree of continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations. See Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Place: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); M. Mazower, Governing the world: The history of an idea, 1815 to the present (New York: Penguin, 2013); and Susan Pederson, "Back to the League of Nations." The American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (2007): 1091–1117.

^{11.} Much has been written about the United Nations and its role in promoting international peace. For example, see William J. Durch, ed., 21st Century Peace Operations (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006); Allan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990); and, Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

^{12.} Information pertaining to organization of and responsibilities within the United Nations can be found at United Nations, "Main Organs," available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html.

and promote the interests of its five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). As a result, conflicts of all types that have occurred since then have, at times, made immaterial that the aspirational sentiments expressed in the Preamble of the UN Charter.

To focus solely on the failure of the high ambitions of the UN founders to save the world from the "scourge of war," means however, overlooking the development and evolution of institutional structures and policies to deal with interstate and intrastate conflicts since World War II that have pre-empted or lessened many conflicts and the enormous political, economic, and social costs that would have followed in their wake. 13 Indeed, in the words of its second Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, the UN was "not created in order to bring us to heaven but in order to save us from Hell."14 Through a range of mechanisms, including peacekeeping, the UN has since 1945 assumed a central role in preventative action, utilizing "diplomacy, good offices and mediation." 15 As part of this activity the UN sends special envoys and political missions to potential conflict areas to diffuse the situation. Despite these efforts pre-emption is still nascent in form and evolving. In the main, most options for international peace and security remain focused on intervention during and after conflict when the problems are evident for all, and world opinion has created the will to act. Therefore, the most problematic regions have normally required peace operations that evolve to combine military and other organizations to address the dilemmas of fractured and violent environments. These missions are divided into categories corresponding to the relevant articles of the UN, either Chapter VI "Pacific Settlement Of Disputes" or Chapter VII "Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of

^{13.} See Ramesh, Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

^{14.} Gary Wilson. The United Nations and Collective Security (New York: Routledge, 2014), 2.

^{15.} United Nations, "Maintain International Peace and Security," available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-international-peace-and-security/index.html.

The Peace, And Acts Of Aggression."16

The genesis of any UN action is based upon emergency. As a crisis develops the International Community examines its options. Regional or global powers discuss dangers and options. Some undertake bilateral or multilateral efforts to resolve or ameliorate the crisis. At the UN, the Secretary General and the General Assembly review reports and debate if and how best to act. If the conditions continue to disintegrate the UN Security Council becomes involved and assesses the need for a peace operation, and if one is deemed necessary, defines its mandate. The UN Secretary General then works out the terms of reference and oversees the creation of each mission and the General Assembly then oversees the ongoing financing of the mission. No two operations are the same. Each confronts different obstacles; each has its own cast of players, and each adheres to its own timetable. These issues are replicated in every chapter of this book.

Additionally, a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is appointed to head each UN operation, who coordinates but does not direct, the work of the various UN agencies. The SRSG also establishes formal and informal mechanisms for coordinating the efforts of all the other peace partners operating in the mission area.¹⁷

Generally speaking, under Chapter VI, UN forces are deployed once negotiation, mediation or arbitration have led to some form of agreement and the parties to the conflict agree to allow the UN to deploy military forces to monitor the agreement. Chapter VII missions have a different purpose. They are intended to impose or enforce peace, either by military, non-military actions or combination of the two instruments. The purpose of a Chapter VII mission is the restoration of international peace and security. The key difference is that Chapter VI calls for the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means while Chapter VII calls for the resolution of

^{16.} United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations" (1945), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf, 8–11.

^{17.} Howard G. Coombs, "The Evolution of Peace Support Operations – A Canadian Perspective," (History 380 "Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement" lecture presented at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario during the 2013/2014 Academic Year), slide 10.

conflicts by the threat of or use of military force. The choice of Charter chapter used to restore peace and security between warring factions depends upon the level of consent provided by the belligerent parties. That level of consent determines the capabilities needed by the military forces deployed to a mission. In general, regardless of the section of the UN Chapter these peace operations are multi-faceted operations conducted impartially involving military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to enable a long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate.

While these UN operations had a successful start in 1956 with the UN Expeditionary Forces used to defuse the Suez Crisis, more contemporary missions have been troubled to say the least. The hope for a lasting peace following the collapse of the Soviet Union was short lived. With the Cold War over and the implosion of the bi-polar international system, the restraints on many parties were removed and tensions, and conflicts rooted in long-standing cultural, ethnic, and religious differences erupted. In these situations, the willingness of belligerent parties to cease hostilities was low. The rise of these intra-state threats further meant that ceasefire agreements were extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish and even if they were, violations were more likely to occur. The number of UN missions expanded exponentially in response to the exponential increase of violence. By the mid-1990s it was evident that these missions posed challenges that the UN forces committed to implement assigned mandates were unable to resolve. The failure of the UN interventions in Rwanda to forestall the Génocidaires in their murder of Tutsi and moderate Hutu during 1994 and in Bosnia prevent the massacre of Muslims in the Srebrenica during 1995 exemplified the inability of the UN to effectively create peace in the evolving security environment.

On top of this, the types of threats in conflict zones continued to expand and become even more unconventional. As some states collapsed and others struggled with growing vulnerability, in hindsight it is perhaps no surprise that non-state actors gained importance. There was the emergence of international organizations working directly against the values of the UN Charter, namely, organized crime, narcotics syndicates,

terrorist organizations, and regional warlords. Non-state actors operate across international boundaries posing a problem to UN missions that were normally defined by a specific mandate and limited to a geographical region.

Resultantly, in the 1990s peace operations increasingly fell into a grey area, which some referred to unofficially as Chapter VI ½ missions. 18 This term was developed to describe the "mission creep" of the 1990s where missions began with a lightly armed Chapter VI mandate but were eventually expanded beyond original parameters and transformed into a form of Chapter VII operation when the peacekeeping process stalled. Many of these peace missions often had to be eventually established and enforced by outside military forces operating in a Chapter VII mandate. The hallmark example of this was the UN Protective Force in the Former Yugoslavia that with the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization led mission established under a Chapter VII mandate. While Chapter VII mandates were not unknown in the late modern period the only real example of a Chapter VII mission prior to the 1990s was the UN directive for the forces countering North Korean and Chinese military actions during the Korean War (1950-1953). Even Chapter VII mandates have had less than optimal results. The UN Operation in Somalia transitioned to a Chapter VII mission in 1993 and subsequent events involving American forces and the Battle of Mogadishu have been highly publicized in Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War and the film Black Hawk Down. As a result of this failed operation the United States withdrew from the mission and the effort ended ignominiously in 1995. Today, Somalia still poses a grave challenge to the international community. Other modern Chapter VII interventions, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, have at this time demonstrated less than stellar outcomes. This has caused a search for answers but no real paradigm shift.

Some might opine that this lack of progress is because the UN's main

^{18.} Sometimes known as "wider peacekeeping" or "robust peacekeeping." Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 194–195.

role over the years, arising out of the Charter, has been to maintain international peace and security with a view to preventing another global conflict. One could argue that although that is an admirable aim the structure of the UN and processes of the Security Council, in particular the veto of the P5, was meant to maintain peace within the Westphalian system and prevent conflict from the major states in the P5; however, that model has proven unsuitable. Accordingly, as a result of the conflict that has manifested over the last few decades, a new and potentially revolutionary role emerged. That is to establish and maintain standards for, and supervision of, the protection of global human rights. This idea aligns with the evolving world order in that it acknowledges that intervention is necessary in failed and failing states to protect the security of individuals not necessarily states. It recognizes that individual sovereignty is often more important than state sovereignty. Implicit in these ideas is the acknowledgement of the numerous non-state actors who may have deleterious effects on various groups of people and the need to act against them. In this effort, ideas concerning the "Responsibility to Protect," commonly known as "R2P," have come to the fore. Behind this was the Brahimi Report,²⁰ produced in 2000 and named for Lakhdar Brahimi, the chairman of the commission that created it. The Brahimi Report argued for the need to protect civilians. This was followed by the "The Responsibility to Protect" created by the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.²¹ Subsequently, this document was adopted by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit²² and provides justification for 21st century intervention:

^{19.} See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), "Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty – The Responsibility to Protect" (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, December 2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

^{20.} United Nations, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (17 August 2000), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.as-p?symbol=A/55/305.

^{21.} ICISS, "Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty."

^{22.} United Nations, "2005 World Summit Outcome" (24 October 2005), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf.

...we are prepared to take collective action...should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.²³

R2P was radical. For a brief, shining moment the theoretical and practical basis for a paradigm shift to establish a modern peace seemed to be possible. The ideas underlying R2P were akin to those articulated in "just war theory," describing the conditions under which war is acceptable. These are that (1) the ends must justify the means, (2) violence must be kept to the minimum required to attain the goal, and (3) one must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and avoid harming the latter.²⁴ Modern interpretations of just war theory provide the basis for states to go to war within a Westphalian construct. In similar fashion, R2P provided justification for intervention and is derived from three fundamental ideas: (1) the responsibility of every state to protect its citizens, (2) the obligation of the world community to aid a specific state in carrying out its obligation to provide security for its nationals, and (3) in situations where a state fails to fulfil its obligations for the safety of its citizens the international community is obliged to take whatever steps necessary to stop these abuses. While at first peaceful, these extra measures that may be taken against a nation failing in its responsibility to provide for the security of its people could include force or the threat of force as mandated by Chapter VII of the Charter. At the same time, R2P calls for the use of force only under strict criteria and as a last resort. R2P provides the basis for intervention to ensure stability in an evolving world order. It is the philosophical framework for creating the peace when the need arises.25

^{23.} Cited in Alex J. Bellamy, "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit," *Ethics & International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (June 2006), accessible at http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Bellamy-Alex-Wither the Responsibility to Protect.pdf, 144.

^{24.} See fn 16 in Bruno Pommier, "The use of force to protect civilians and humanitarian action: the case of Libya and beyond," *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, No. 884 (December 2011): 1067.

^{25.} Bruno Pommier, "The use of force to protect civilians and humanitarian action: the case of Libya and beyond," *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (December 2011): 1066.

Despite this, the innovative and needed perspective provided by this new doctrine of intervention has faltered. Interpretations of R2P were never stable from the beginning and it quickly became the subject of rancorous debate and, notwithstanding its intent, proved to be a somewhat hollow initiative. Nonetheless, it succeeded in getting the idea of making the protection of civilians in intrastate conflicts something the UN needed to address. With this authority the UN Secretary General went on to create this strategy for the "protection of civilians," which was to be practical linkage to take the theory of R2P to action. However, in the absence of the political will to intervene, R2P has not been effectively utilized. Garth Evens, who chaired the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, noted:

Political will is not something you find if you look in the right cupboard. It has to be laboriously crafted, case by case, using the resources of both insiders and outsiders, bottom up from civil society and through peer group pressure from those in positions of influence nationally and internationally.²⁹

Consequently, while R2P provides the necessary context for change the desire to implement R2P through the UN is lacking. This shortfall can

^{26.} For discussion of the debate, confusion and different interpretations of the R2P document which followed the 2005 summit see Alex J. Bellamy, "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit," *Ethics & International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (June 2006), accessible at http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Bellamy-Alex-Wither the Responsibility to Protect.pdf, 143–169.

^{27. &}quot;Resolution 1674 (2006) marked a watershed in the protection of civilians by providing a clear framework for action by the Council and the United Nations in this area – action that is as critical and necessary today as it was in 2007, when the Council considered the first report on the protection of civilians." United Nations, United Nations Secretary General "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict" (28 October 2007), accessible at http://www.unhcr.org/47e8d1dd2.pdf, 1.

^{28.} During 2000–2009 Evans fulfilled the appointments of President and Chief Executive Officer the International Crisis Group, an international conflict prevention and resolution organization based out of Brussels, Belgium. For his biography see *Gareth Evans: Official Site*, "Summary Biography of Gareth Evans," available at http://www.gevans.org/biography.html.

^{29.} Cited in Frank Chalk, Romeo Dallaire, Kyle Matthews, Carla Barqueiro, and Simon Doyle, *Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), 3.

be attributed to collective stagnation of perspective despite the evidence provided by the record UN efforts in the realm of peace and security. The sole usage to date of R2P to underpin a modern intervention was Libya in 2011 – and sadly that mission is viewed as flawed by the international community.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Libya was sanctioned by the UN. In this case the excesses of the Gadhafi regime against its own population in the quelling of civil insurrection led to military operations that evolved from protecting the civilian population of Libya to regime change. After that goal was achieved, however, subsequently the country collapsed into chaos, which is still ongoing. Arguably the application of R2P was flawed but nevertheless in this case the outcome may have been worse than the previous *status quo*. This has led the UN and its member nations to avoid using it to underpin other interventions.³⁰

One can see that a number of UN peace missions in the 1990s failed disastrously because the international community tried to solve complex situations or emergencies using traditional Chapter VI methods when Chapter VII would have been more appropriate. As a result, the international community recognized that the limitations imposed by traditional peacekeeping methods would not solve the emerging conflicts of the 1990s and Chapter VII mandates became the norm. However, these same disasters that led to a rethinking of how to deliver peace operations, also chastened action for fear of further failure and the erosion of the UN powers in the process. As a result, the UN has become less inclined to intervene, which has negatively impacted on the revolutionary concept of R2P. On top of this the will to intervene is further eroded by the limited capability of the UN for rapid response of any type. Furthermore, the proliferation of non-state actors who will act to resolve or pre-empt

^{30.} See Jayshree Bajoria, "Council On Foreign Relations: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" (24 March 2011), available at http://www.webcitation.org/5xsX2ZLd2; and, International Crisis Group, "Libya: Getting Geneva Right - Middle East and North Africa Report N°157 (26 February 2015), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/157-libya-getting-geneva-right.aspx.

crisis without UN mandate, such as *Médecins Sans Frontières*, undermine the credibility of the UN. Finally, the lack of a consistent funding stream hinders the UN to create and sustain a credibly structured response to complex emergencies. Taken together all these factors have acted as barriers to the UN providing the guidance created by the shifts in thought, underpinned by R2P, needed to establish a durable peace.³¹

Much of the preceding discussion about the evolution of peace operations in the modern period draws upon political scientists and international relations specialists. However, once the bailiwick of these disciplines, historians have increasingly entered the field of study over the past two decades. Our choice of making peacekeeping the focus of our 2017 annual symposium was driven by the belief that historians and historical methodologies have much to contribute to contemporary debates on the future of peacekeeping. Like their colleagues in political science and international relations who are contributing to this burgeoning field, historians are trying to understand the various evolutions of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding since the mid-20th century.³² As one of the contributors to this volume, Walter Dorn, emphasizes in his chapter the history of peacekeeping, the history of the Canadian Armed Forces, and indeed, the history of Canada, are all significantly intertwined. For that reason, historical approaches towards Canadian peacekeeping operations have become a very rich field over the last decade. To use the title of a recent volume on Canadian foreign relations, Canadian scholars now have histories of Canadian missions from "Kinshasa to Kandahar" 33 and

^{31.} Howard G. Coombs, "The Evolution of Peace Support Operations – A Canadian Perspective," (History 380 "Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement" lecture presented at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario during the 2013/2014 Academic Year), slide 24.

^{32.} See in particular Joachim A. Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Roland Paris, "The Geopolitics of Peace Operations: A Research Agenda," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 4 (2014): 501–508.

^{33.} M. K. Carroll, and G. Donaghy, eds., From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2016). For an overview see also S. M. Maloney, Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945–1970 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Pub, 2002); Michael Kiernan Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada

everything in between including: the UNEF in Suez,³⁴ to the Congo Crisis,³⁵ Cyprus,³⁶ Somalia,³⁷ Rwanda,³⁸ and the former Yugoslavia.³⁹ These studies rooted in historical methodology of deep archival research have produced much greater nuance to the story of Canadian peacekeeping, introducing new themes and frameworks to examine its larger meanings in Canadian military and foreign relations histories. Similarly, historians of the UN and its member nations who have contributed to peacekeeping operations have begun work on historical approaches and contextualization of those missions across the 20th and early 21st centuries. Many of these histories of peacekeeping acknowledge the changing practices of peacekeeping as it has evolved into the 21st century. Missions have increased in frequency and complexity with more robust military and civil mandates to not only help keep the peace but help warring parties transition to stable states and societies. From the brief outline of recent decades one can perceive that new actors and institutions have entered the fray from NATO, to the African Union, to various "coalitions of the willing,"

and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2009).

^{34.} Michael K. Carroll, Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956–67 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2009).

^{35.} Kevin A. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).

^{36.} Greg Donaghy, "A Calculus of Interest Canadian Peacekeeping Diplomacy in Cyprus, 1963–1993," Canadian Military History 24, no. 2 (2015): 183–204. 37. Grant Dawson, Here is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia (Vancouver: UBC, 2007); and Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). [\i{Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism}, Book, Whole (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

^{38.} Carole Off, The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle: A story of generals and justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2001); and R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2004).

^{39.} S. M. Maloney with J. Llambias, Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans 1992-1995 (St Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 2004); Carole Off, The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle: A story of generals and justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2001); and Sean M. Maloney and Gen Mike Jackson, Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo (Lincoln, Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2018).

but they also note they have not displaced the UN as the chief vehicle of delivering and sanctioning peace operations. Many of these histories, as do some of the chapters in this volume, highlight the addition new civil society actors such as the plethora of International NGOs whose numbers and scope of concerns (such as women peace and security, child soldiers, human rights) have mushroomed since the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, by adopting a longer term perspective, some of these historical approaches challenge current trends that the fundamental goals and functions of peacekeeping, whether at the national or international level, have substantially changed over the last half century. 40 Increasingly, the national and international literature both in history and international relations are employing comparative studies not just between various missions, but across national experiences through both time and space to better understand what is new and what is not in the practice and theory of modern peace operations. The goal of our symposium, and this volume of the papers that emerged from it, was to increase the cross talk between senior and emerging scholars of peace operations within the historical community as well as across disciplinary approaches to advance these directions in the research.

This volume provides perspectives, or viewpoints both examining the past to discern the foundations of today's peacekeeping and outline the structural aspects of peacekeeping. Also, touched upon are some of the specific facets or considerations for peace interventions. In the first chapter Walter Dorn, from the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College reviews Canada's comprehensive historical record of involvement in peacekeeping missions over the last five decades. As he

^{40.} C. Kertcher, The United Nations and peacekeeping, 1988–95 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016); Neil Briscoe, Britain and UN Peacekeeping, 1948–67 (London: Palgrave, 2003); Peter Londey, Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping (Allen & Unwin, 2004); Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (Routledge, 2006). Norrie Macqueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960 (Routledge, 2014); {\\ildot\i

notes in his chapter, because of Canada's long-standing participation in UN peacekeeping missions the vicissitudes of both histories are inseparably linked. Also, brought out in this chapter are the part that politics plays in peacekeeping; a thread that is central to following chapters by Michael Carroll, Australian Peter Londey and American Michael Holm. In fact, the parallel experiences of Canada and Australia concerning the discourse surrounding their involvement in peace interventions illuminate them as strategic cousins. At the same time the same challenges are noted in Holm's examination of Canada's southern neighbors.⁴¹

In Chapter 2, Michael Carroll, author of a remarkable book on the first Canadian mission in Suez, revisits UNEF's history to remind us of the real risks and dangers Canadian peacekeepers faced on the ground in Suez.⁴² By cutting through some of the myths of Canada's initial foray into peacekeeping, Carroll's chapter provides both context and important signposts for understanding where Canadian peacekeeping operations might go in the future and the challenges they will face when they get there. Next, Peter Londey, Professor of History at Australian National University and Associate Editor of the Official History of Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Affairs and Post-Cold War Operations in Australia, takes stock of the research on Australian peacekeeping. 43 Londey reminds us that Australia and Canada share a common histories as former white settler Dominion in the British Empire who adopted peacekeeping as a means of establishing an independent foreign and defence policy. Like Canadians, Australians also like to boast of their being "present at the creation" as well as being staunch supporters of UN peacekeeping ever since. Nonetheless, Londey's chapter finds that while Australians, like Canadians, have much to celebrate in their peacekeeping past, official

^{41.} See John C. Blaxland, Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 2006).

^{42 .} Michael K. Carroll, *Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force*, 1956–67 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2009).

^{43.} Peter Londey, Rhys Crawley, and David Horner, The Long Search for Peace: Volume 1, The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations: Observer Missions and Beyond, 1947–2006 (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Australian support for peacekeeping has been much more influenced by changing directions in domestic politics than in Canada. Londey's chapter also reminds readers to that the unique geopolitical considerations of individual nations have never been far from their calculations when engaging in UN peace operations. Finally, like Dorn, Londey's contribution tries to temper the rhetoric of Australian participation with the reality of the pragmatism that governs commitments to UN peacekeeping missions. Nonetheless, like Dorn, Londey does point ways forward for Canadians and their governments to rediscover their relevancy to the future of peace operations in the 21st century.

In Chapter 4, Michael Holm, a historian at Boston University and a specialist in United States foreign policy, focusses primarily on the disjuncture between popular and programmatic American conceptions of the UN and of peacekeeping. Here, Holm reminds us that despite widely held narratives that Americans have little faith in the UN, support for the ideals of the UN remains high among the American population. What Americans have less faith in are the everyday operations of the UN, including peacekeeping. He concludes with some ideas on how that disjuncture might be bridged in the future, particularly in the area of greater United States involvement in peace operations. The political debate is reminiscent of the discourse and friction that is present within the UN itself, as well as member nations like Canada and Australia,

The last three chapters of the volume shift the terrain of analysis towards more contemporary issues and concerns in peace operations. In Chapter 5, Ariane Larouche, a former graduate student in Political Science at the University of Ottawa, provides an overview of the integration of gender analysis in UN peacekeeping operations. As peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions have come to focus increasingly on managing internal civil conflicts and their impacts on civilian populations the concerns of women and gender have come to the forefront.⁴⁴ Scholars and

^{44.} Some of the earliest work on issues of gender and peacekeeping appeared in the 2001 volume of *International Peacekeeping* such as G. J. DeGroot, "A few good women: Gender stereotypes, the military and peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 2 (2001): 23–38, and Judith Hicks Stiehm, "Women, peacekeeping and peacemaking: Gender balance and mainstreaming," *International*

practitioners have long recognized that there is a greater role for women to play in peacekeeping operations; however, as Larouche notes there is much work to be done in this area of human security - and as pointed out in other chapters obstacles to overcome. Larouche is followed by Howard Coombs, Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada and a former serving Canadian Armed Forces officer who participated in various peace enforcement missions, and Lindsay Coombs, a former graduate student in Political Science at Queen's University, who explore the historical evolution of training Canadian soldiers for peacekeeping operations. Here they illustrate that the increasingly complex environments in which Canadian peacekeepers have had to operate in the post-Cold War era has required a shift to more specialized training and away from more general-purpose combat preparedness. They focus on the issue of child soldiers to reveal those important changes and to reflect on how national interests influence approaches to peacekeeping. Finally, Kofi Nsia-Pepra, professor of Political Science at Ohio Northern University, and author of one of the first studies on robust peacekeeping explores the great dilemma of the use of force - further elaborating on issues surrounding R2P - in peacekeeping missions, particularly as the need to protect civilian populations has moved up the list of priorities.⁴⁵ Nsia-Pepra's chapter weaves a number of threads raised by his colleagues in the later chapters of the collection, particularly the necessity of ever

Peacekeeping 8, no. 2 (2001): 39–48. More recently, the work of Sabrina Karim critically examines the successes and shortfalls of the move towards gender mainstreaming in peace operations after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. See Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, "Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking?" International Interactions 39, no. 4 (2013); 461–488; and Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: The Need for Gender Equality in the Search for Quality Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

^{45.} K. Nsia-Pepra, UN Robust Peacekeeping: Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014). For the controversies over the move towards robust peacekeeping see: T. Tardy, "A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations," International Peacekeeping 18, no. 2 (2011): 152–167; James Sloan, "The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping," Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 674–702; and Mats Berdal and David H Ucko, "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations," The RUSI Journal 160, no. 1 (2015): 6–12.

more robustly trained and equipped soldiers from states who are willing to act decisively. Perhaps here is the solution to the problem that Holm raises earlier in the book. Together and further building upon the foundation provided by the first chapters of the volume, Larouche, the Coombs' and Nsia-Pepra chapters illuminate some of the evolving and ongoing challenges of 21st century peacekeeping.

Drawing on his own experience in the Canadian missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, Howard Coombs conclusion to the volume contextualizes and weaves together the themes, issues, and questions each of the previous chapters raises about what the history of peacekeeping can provide to present and future practitioners, be they soldiers, diplomats, or development personnel. Here, Coombs foregrounds the idea of human security and its international context that has come to dominate the policy and practice of peacekeeping in the 21st century. He also connects the themes of brought out in the chapters to this security setting. In doing so he reminds us that while peacekeeping has primarily been an activity of national militaries, the human security agenda has in many cases reordered if not levelled the hierarchy between defence, diplomacy, and development. Far more than ever before the relationship between those 3-Ds has become increasingly fluid and much more "comprehensive." Equally important, Coombs reminds us that peacekeeping, like war, is a human activity full of possibilities for both promise and pain.

In closing, we would like to thank our conference co-organizer, Dr. Jean Lamarre, the Department of National Defence, the Royal Military College of Canada, and the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre for their financial support. We would also like to thank our other partners: Queen's University Center for International and Defense Policy (CIDP), the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research (CIMVHR-CIMVHR), and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Maple Leaf and Blue Beret: The Rise, Fall, and Promise of Canadian Peacekeeping

Walter A. Dorn

Peacekeeping is one of the most prominent and publicized activities of the United Nations, and perhaps its most effective contribution in alleviating violence and war. It places armed international forces into conflict zones to support peace processes and agreements. Ironically, it was not even mentioned in the UN's 1945 Charter. How peacekeeping emerged is a tale consisting not only of on-the-spot improvisation in the face of imminent tragedy, but also of personal heroics during armed conflicts and timely diplomacy in the halls of UN headquarters and national capitals. Some nations were initially skeptical but soon embraced peacekeeping; others, including most developing world countries, only became involved much later. Canada was one of the early pioneers that sustained its contributions for a half-century, but that commitment declined dramatically in the twenty-first century. In 2015, the Trudeau government promised to "re-engage" Canada with UN peacekeeping. Ironically, during Trudeau's mandate Canada's participation fall to its historic low, with only a temporary spike in 2017–18.

As Canada seeks to find its way back to peacekeeping, history points

to lessons of both success and failure. It also shows how a national identity can be tied to an international activity like peacekeeping. This theme is also contained in following chapters by Michael Carroll who further examines Canadian involvement in the UN and Peter Londey who provides us a perspective on Australian peacekeeping. Many Canadians are proud that a Canadian foreign minister, Lester Pearson, proposed the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping force, which helped solve the world-threatening Suez crisis in 1956. Canadians are also proud of the efforts of General Roméo Dallaire, who saved tens of thousands of lives as commander of the UN force in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. But Canadian peacekeepers had their challenges and defeats, particularly in conflict zones such as Rwanda and Bosnia 1993-95, as well as the embarrassing behaviour of a few Canadian soldiers in Somalia in 1993. These experiences provide valuable insights into the conduct of peacekeeping: both how to and how not to do it. Because of Canada's long-standing involvement, a review of Canadian contributions to peacekeeping is also a review of the history of UN peacekeeping itself. Other nations can benefit from the story of the waxing and waning of Canada's involvement in UN peacekeeping and its promised re-engagement.

Early Development: Observer Missions 1947–1956

In first few years of the United Nations, the Security Council had only limited success in fulfilling its "primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security." As Cold War tensions encroached on the Council it became obvious that the new world organization, born out of the Second World War, was largely failing as an enforcer of peace. The breakdown of the postwar security system under the UN Charter (especially Chapter VII) pressed the United Nations to search for other ways to deal with conflicts. Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with the "pacific settlement of disputes," was used less by the veto-prone Security Council than by the General Assembly. Indeed, the latter began to develop significant procedures to help in dispute settlement. In 1947, the General Assembly established UN field missions/commissions in Palestine,

the Balkans, and Korea using military personnel from member states.¹ These bodies developed methods of inquiry and observation that helped UN operations deal with some high-stakes conflicts, such as the one in divided Korea.

In its first mission, Canada proved to be a wavering member. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), 1947–48, was created to help establish democracy in Korea, but it triggered an unusual cabinet crisis in Canada.² When Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King learned that two Canadian military officers had been deployed to UNTCOK to supervise military withdrawals of American and Soviet forces and help supervise the first Korean elections (held only in the south), he admonished his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent. Prime Minister King, who may have felt that his interest in the occult empowered him to predict that there was going to be a war in Korea, stressed that he wanted Canada to have no part in it. But King's rationale was not only rooted in his misgivings about future problems in the East; he was also a cautious isolationist wanting to limit Canada's involvement in a dangerous world. Ironically, the incident became a "coming of age" for Canada, for many of King's cabinet ministers threatened to resign if the nation withdrew from the UN's Korea Commission. Thus, the aging Prime Minister King had to allow Canada's participation, including two UN military observers. Though King's prediction about the war in Korea proved accurate, he was very wrong about Canada's isolationist future.

^{1.} The Security Council had established in 1946, a Consular Commission with observers in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) to help oversee the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesia dispute but Canada did not participate in that mission, unlike Australia. See David W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). See also the chapter by Peter Londey in this volume. The United Nations does not list the mission among its peacekeeping operations (https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations) because it was not under the operational control of the UN Secretary-General; similarly, for the UNTCOK mission discussed in this chapter.

^{2.} Walter A. Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" Canadian Foreign Policy 12, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–32.

^{3.} Department of National Defence, Directorate of Peacekeeping Policy, "Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations (as of December 2003)," available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/past-eng.html.

The nation became an ardent supporter of the United Nations, especially in its mission to support international peace. St. Laurent lent special salience to this point when he became Prime Minister in 1948 by declaring: "the UN's vocation is Canada's vocation."

The Canadians helped observe and supervise the Korean elections that preceded the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK, i.e., South Korea), with North Korea refusing to allow UN elections in its territory. After North Korea attacked the ROK in June 1950, Canada contributed 27,000 troops to the UN-authorized "police" action to defend the ROK. While this was enforcement rather than peacekeeping, it demonstrated Canada's commitment to the United Nations. Five hundred and sixteen Canadian soldiers lost their lives in that war, which did free the Republic of Korea from an invading Communist force.

Canada contributed to UN observer missions in other post-war hot spots, especially to deal with the necessary, but messy decolonization processes. These were the pioneering operations of UN peacekeeping, especially the observer mission created to deal with the Kashmir crisis.

The end of colonial rule in British India and the partition into India and Pakistan in 1947 led to fighting over the border princely state of Kashmir, thus beginning a long and complicated consideration of the Kashmir question by the Security Council. The Security Council by resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948 recommended the use of observers to help stop the fighting.⁴ The mission was named the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), conceived to support a cease-fire agreement, observe the cease-fire line, and report violations by either side.

As the mission slowly assembled, Canada contributed eight of UN-MOGIP's 40 or so observers. More importantly, Canada provided the first chief military observer, Brigadier-General Harry Angle, in November 1949. It was an honor that a Canadian general was given the command of the observer mission at the outset, but the tribute ended tragically when General Angle was killed in a plane crash on 17 July 1950 while

^{4.} United Nations, "UNMOGIP Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.shtml.

performing his duties. He was the first and highest ranking of over 120 Canadians to die in UN peacekeeping missions. Over the years, many other Canadian officers also served as head of UN operations.

After war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Security Council set up an additional peacekeeping mission to oversee the cease-fire along the entire border. Another Canadian general, Brigadier Bruce Macdonald, was appointed to command the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM). But it was only a temporary (eightmonth) mission. By contrast, UNMOGIP remains in existence today, like another early observer mission, also created in 1948 – the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

The proclamation of independence by Israeli leaders in May 1948 and intense fighting with its Arab neighbors created an enormous challenge for the United Nations. After the disputants rejected two Security Council calls for a truce, a third demand in Resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948 resulted in a thirty-day cease-fire. The resolution called for the supervision of the truce by a UN mediator and a group of military observers who arrived in June from Belgium, France, and the United States. Sadly, hostilities resumed at the end of June and the mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated in September. But armistice agreements were soon signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors after significant UN efforts by the Acting Mediator and UN civilian staff member, the American Ralph Bunche. As a result, the mission came under the operational control of his boss, the UN Secretary-General. Such control continued in all peacekeeping missions created thereafter. In 1949, Resolution 73 assigned new functions to UNTSO to supervise the armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, notably Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

UNTSO was the second official UN observer mission created by the Security Council in 1948, but the first to actually deploy to the field.⁵

^{5.} UNMOGIP was created by the Security Council before UNTSO. But because of the delay in UNMOGIP's actual commencement of operations until January 1949, UNTSO was deployed to the field first and thus the United Nations considers UNTSO as its first peacekeeping mission. For details on UN missions see Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams, eds.,

Canadian participation in UNTSO started late (1954) but grew when Canadian Major-General E.L.M. "Tommy" Burns was appointed head of the mission. General Burns received repeated praise in the Security Council for his dynamic service as Chief of Staff.⁶ Burns held the position until he was appointed the commander of a new UN force in November 1956, part of a major evolution in UN peacekeeping.

Interposed and Interventionist Forces 1956–1974

Following the creation of the early observer missions, UN peacekeeping went through a phase of dynamic development as a mechanism of conflict control, with Canada playing a key role. During this period UN operations were not only larger, they involved armed units with responsibilities that went well beyond observation. They had to separate belligerents by positioning themselves in between to prevent small flare-ups or disputes from becoming wars. The first such mission, created in 1956, was proposed by Canada and served as an important model for subsequent missions.

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

After Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, Israel, Britain, and France coordinated an invasion of Egypt and demanded the latter's acceptance of their occupation of the Suez Canal and other parts of Egypt. Many nations condemned the invasion, including the United States, which introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling on Israel to withdraw and Britain and France to refrain from using force in the Suez Canal area. When Britain and France vetoed the resolution, diplomatic action switched to the General Assem-

The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

^{6.} Alastair Taylor, David Cox and J. L. Granatstein, *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 116–117. General Burn's memoire is *Between Arab and Israel*, (Toronto, Clarke, Irwin and Co, 1962).

bly, where Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, made a remarkable speech that gave birth to the first UN peacekeeping force. In his Assembly speech at the Emergency Session, he declared:

we need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace... a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.⁷

After hasty consultations with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and others to persuade them of the feasibility of the concept, Pearson introduced a resolution that passed in the early morning hours of 4 November by a vote of 57 to 0 with 19 abstentions (including the protagonists, Egypt, France, Israel, and the United Kingdom). Within 12 hours Secretary-General Hammarskjöld recommended, and the General Assembly accepted, the establishment of a UN mission with Canada's Major-General Tommy Burns, then Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the Commander. Canada also announced its willingness to contribute troops to the mission.

A cease-fire became effective 7 November and by 15 November advance units of UNEF arrived in the Canal Zone. By mid-December, the force was fully operational and shortly thereafter British and French troops completed their withdrawal. Addressing the Assembly on 23 November, Pearson foresaw that this force "under United Nations control... may be the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our Organization... the organization of the peace through international action." Indeed, UNEF went far beyond earlier unarmed observer missions, like UNTSO or UNMOGIP. It was a peace force, about 6,000 strong, drawn from ten countries that formed an armed barrier between the combatants. True to Pearson's prediction, it ushered in a

^{7.} Hon. L. B. Pearson, The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December, 1956 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1957), 9–10. Also available at https://undocs.org/A/PV.562.

^{8.} Speech by L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the UN General Assembly, 23 November 1956, 1 GAOR, Eleventh Session, 1956–7, vol. I, p. 26S. Available at https://undocs.org/A/PV.592; In Chapter 2 Michael Carroll provides his interpretation of the Canadian motivation underpinning involvement in UNEF.

new era of UN peacekeeping, demonstrating a greater degree of force for self-defence.

True to Canada's creative role in conceiving UNEF, Canada performed many functions from the outset of the mission besides providing the Force Commander. For example, the UNEF buildup involved almost every long-range transport aircraft that the Royal Canadian Air Force had at the time. The United Nations also asked Canada to contribute a signals squadron, a field hospital, a transport company, and a RCAF communications squadron. There followed a rapid deployment of these units and by 6 December, about a month after the initial resolution, almost 300 Canadians were in Egypt. The Canadian signalers were scattered amongst the various national contingents, so they served everywhere UNEF was deployed. Then, on 17 December, Canada authorized three new units for UNEF, as well as an air component for communication and observation, and officers for General Burns' staff. This second wave of Canadians for UNEF was transported to Egypt by Canada's aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent. The Canadian contingent was to soon number some one thousand personnel, more than 20 percent of UNEF's total strength of 4,700 (on average over time).9 This indicated the level of Canadian commitment to a new enterprise for which it was a lead nation.

In UNEF, Canada pioneered aerial reconnaissance in peacekeeping to supplement ground reconnaissance. The mission patrolled the Egyptian-Israeli border from the air and by ground for over a decade from November 1956 until May 1967. Then, in 1967, the winds of war again blew across the Middle East as the situation between Israel and its Arab neighbors deteriorated to the point that no peacekeeping mission could halt the gathering storm. Egypt demanded the withdrawal of UNEF, and UN Secretary-General U Thant felt compelled to comply. Much to the dismay of Lester Pearson, now Canada's Prime Minister, the withdrawal of UNEF began and war broke out soon after.

Despite the setback, the instrument of peacekeeping had already become well established. Two years after the establishment of UNEF in

^{9.} Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 46–48.

1956, the United Nations created another mission: the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Canada contributed about 10 percent of the force, which was mandated to uncover illegal arms shipments to rebel forces. Air observation made it possible to observe the entire country in some way and became a very important part of the UN operation, especially when the airborne observers located vehicle convoys possibly smuggling arms into Lebanon. After a separate and short deployment of US marines to Lebanon in July 1958, tension increased, and the new president of Lebanon demanded the marines withdraw. To facilitate this Canada contributed an additional 50 observers. The strength of the mission reached 591, including 75 Canadians.¹⁰

The utility of Canadian aerial reconnaissance was proven again in the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM, 1963–64). To observe the cease-fires between the intervening forces of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia, the UN mission needed aircraft to survey Yemen's mountainous terrain. In 1963 Canada agreed to provide UNYOM with two Caribou and one Otter aircraft and personnel. Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) ground crews had to deal with dust and sand penetration of all parts of the aircraft. By the time the mission withdrew in 1964 after 14 months, the best that could be said is that it had exerted a restraining influence on hostile activities in the area. At its peak the military strength of UNYOM numbered 150 personnel of which 50 were Canadians. The dispute in Yemen was to continue until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war compelled Egypt to withdraw its troops from Yemen. Three years later the parties in Yemen came to an agreement and the civil war of that era ended.

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

Despite the crises in the Middle East, the UN's biggest and toughest mission of the Cold War was in Africa. There the United Nations and Canada had to learn its largest and harshest lessons in the difficulties of

^{10.} Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 148.

interventions in civil wars. The *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC) was a milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping. Its peak military strength was almost 20,000 of which 420 were Canadians. ¹¹ Without infantry unit contributions, Canada could not compete in numbers with other troop contributing countries (TCCs), but by providing skilled staff officers it could still have a major impact on the mission. In addition, there was an important civilian operations component comprised of some 2,000 experts, of which many were Canadian. ONUC was an extremely complex operation whose mandate was made more robust due to the rapidly changing situation in the Congo. The mission was also costly in terms of finances and lives: 245 military personnel were killed (three of whom were Canadian) as well as Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. ¹²

Canada participated in ONUC from the very outset, including running the mission's air operations. The bilingual Canadians served in many other capacities in the Congo. Mission headquarters included Canadians, but signals was Canada's primary role, which Canada had already extensively played in UNEF. The communications squadron was headquartered in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) with many detachments scattered throughout the vast Congolese interior.

Ironically, even as the gradual withdrawal of the UN force in the Congo began, Canada made dangerous but life-saving contributions to the Congo operation. When the UN force was reduced from almost 20,000 to a mere 5,500 personnel, military Congolese renegades, called the jeunesse perpetrated atrocities against missionaries and aid workers in several provinces, as well as burning villages. The ONUC Chief of Staff, Canadian Brigadier-General Jacques Dextraze, assembled a force to rescue missionaries and protect the victims. The rescue missions involved quick insertion of rescue teams by helicopter, often under fire from the ground, and air evacuation of the missionaries, who had been gathered by a ground assault team with fire support from helicopters. A Canadi-

^{11.} Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 260.

^{12.} United Nations, "Republic of the Congo – ONUC, Background," available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm.

an Otter aircraft played the reconnaissance and command/control roles. Many rescue missions were carried out and more than a hundred people were rescued, often while under fire.¹³

The experience of ONUC precipitated a feeling of angst in the United Nations over large and complex missions in African conflicts devoid of agreement between the parties. The immense operational challenge in the Congo was also accompanied by enormous financial costs. For a long time, the United Nations shunned such expensive and complex operations and did not carry out another operation in Arica until 1989. But as ONUC was ending in 1964, another ambitious UN initiative was already underway to deal with a raging conflict on a southern European island.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

When Cyprus gained independence from Britain, tensions ran high between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Tensions broke out into open fighting in 1964. Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 created the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) "to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

Canada played a principal role in the formation of the mission. When Canada announced on 12 March 1964 that it would participate in UNFI-CYP, it was the only country that had pledged to do so. Pressure mounted as Turkey announced it would intervene militarily unless the UN force was deployed on the island in a few days. As Professor King Gordon wrote: "it is generally conceded that in a period of great international tension it was Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, who saved the peace." ¹⁵ After consulting with Secretary-General

^{13.} Paul Mayer, "Peacekeeping in the Congo: The Operation at Liembe" *The Canadian Guardsman* (1965), 136–141, as cited in *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*, Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds., (Toronto, Dundurn Press, 2001), 211.

^{14.} United Nations, "UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," "UNFICYP Background," available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html.

^{15.} Gordon, J. King, "The UN in Cyprus," International Journal XIX (Summer

U Thant in New York, Martin called many countries to round up more troops, and secured assistance from Sweden. Within days the force was on its way. The Canadian contingent deployed with great speed, thanks to the RCAF, and was the first to become operational, which helped persuade Turkey to call off its planned invasion.¹⁶

The Canadian advance party arrived in Cyprus on 15 March 1964. The next day RCAF flights began to arrive in Cyprus with the 1,100 strong Canadian contingent, comprised of an infantry battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, and headquarters troops. The heavy vehicles and materiel arrived two weeks later on Canada's last aircraft carrier, the *Bonaventure*. For most of their time in Cyprus, Canadians were deployed in the region of the Cypriot capital, Nicosia, where inter-communal fighting had been intense.

UNFICYP did succeed in reducing tension on the island and the size of the force was reduced from an initial strength of 6,500 (of which about 1,100 were Canadians) in 1964 to about 3,500 (with about 480 Canadians) from 1969 to 1974. Yet, a political settlement was not attained as the Greeks insisted on a unitary state controlled by them without the measures to protect the Turkish minority that had been part of their previously agreed constitutional arrangement.

In July 1974 a sudden coup d'état by Greek Cypriot National Guard forces advocating enosis (union, in this case with Greece) precipitated armed intervention by Turkey in support of the Turkish minority. UN-FICYP suddenly had to deal with a full-scale invasion and war between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish army. UN headquarters in New York could only tell the UNFICYP Commander, General Prem Chand, to do his best "to limit violence and protect civilians," which the UN force did heroically, sustaining many casualties. During and shortly after the 1974 war, 74 UN soldiers were shot, of which nine were killed.

Upon the renewal of hostilities in 1974 Canada almost doubled its contribution to UNFICYP, increasing the strength of its contingent from

^{1964): 335.}

^{16.} Most information in the UNFICYP, UNEF and UNDOF sections is taken from Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping* (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 87.

480 to 950. Canadian soldiers played a key role in limiting violence during the 1974 war, including by keeping UN control of Nicosia's airport, thus preventing it from being overrun. Canadians also helped place the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia under UN control, and evacuated UN personnel from areas under heavy fire.

When a cease-fire came into effect on 16 August 1974 Cyprus was a divided island with Turkey controlling the northern third and the Greeks controlling the southern two-thirds. Nicosia remained partitioned as before the war, but a "green line" now extended across the entire island from east to west spanning 180 kilometers. Canadians were again given responsibility for the highly sensitive Nicosia area, and remained in Cyprus until 1993, providing some 59 rotations of battalion-sized contingents. In almost three decades of service on the war-torn island, 21 Canadian soldiers were killed, but the mission earned a prominent place in Canadian military history.

When UNFICYP was created in 1964, Canada was still experiencing its "Golden Age" in international affairs. It was recognized as one of the world's most committed and competent peacekeepers.¹⁷ This confidence was also shown when Canada again committed to a new mission called UNEF II, six years after UNEF had been asked to leave Egypt.

United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)

As victor of the Six Day War in 1967, Israel, occupied large stretches of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack against Israel to recapture lost territory. Egyptian and Syrian forces achieved surprise by attacking on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur and initially made considerable gains, encouraging Jordan to join the war. However, within the week Israeli counterattacks were not only able to turn the tide and regain most of the territory the Arabs had

^{17.} For a detailed discussion concerning the evolution of peacekeeping as a core part of the Canadian national identity and the role of domestic politics in creating that perspective see Colin McCullough, *Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

just recaptured but threatened Damascus and surrounded the Egyptian 3rd Army in Sinai, raising fears of Soviet intervention on Egypt's behalf. On 22 October a cease-fire took effect briefly, but hostilities soon resumed until intense American and Soviet pressure led to the acceptance of a new cease-fire demand contained in Security Council Resolution 340 (1973)¹⁸ of 25 October that the parties accepted the next day. Resolution 340 demanded the return of all forces to positions of 22 October, increased the number of UNTSO observers, established a new peacekeeping mission called United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) to act as a buffer in the Sinai, and asked the Secretary-General to report on these arrangements within 24 hours. The Security Council allowed the Secretary-General to expand the authorization of the use of force from self-defence to include "defence of the mission." ¹⁹

UNEF II quickly interposed itself between the opposing armies, established observation posts and checkpoints, conducted patrols, and prevented moves forward. Canada's peak contribution to UNEF II was 1,145 military personnel, about 15 percent of the force. Canada's role was mostly logistical. Canadian Brigadier-General Douglas Nicholson headed the 11-man evaluation team that assessed the logistical requirements for all of UNEF II. From nothing, the Canadians quickly created a logistical support system. A Polish logistics contingent was expected to play a key role, but the Israelis refused to allow Poland, a Soviet-bloc member and therefore Egyptian ally, into their areas of operation. Canadians then had to assume additional duties. The Canadians also became operational much sooner and did the work assigned to the Poles for several months.

In November 1973 Canada agreed to provide a signals unit. A massive airlift that month comprised of 20 flights airlifted 481 troops, 43 vehicles and 115 tons of equipment in three days. Later that month Canada agreed to provide a supply company, a maintenance company, a postal detachment, a military police detachment, a movement control unit, and an air transport unit. The latter, 116 Air Transport Unit, used two Buffa-

^{18.} United Nations, "Middle East - UNEF II Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef2backgr2.html.

^{19.} Trevor Findlay, "The Use of Force in Peace Operations" (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 102.

lo aircraft and 50 technicians to logistically support the entire UNEF II operation.

One of the initial tasks of the Canadians was to deliver food and water to the surrounded Egyptian Third Army, whose fate had threatened Soviet intervention in the war. Also, Canadians quickly deployed to front line positions on either side of the canal including Rabah and Ismailia.

Tragically, in 1974, a Canadian Buffalo aircraft with 116 Air Transport Unit at Ismailia was shot down by Syria on a routine flight to Damascus killing all nine Canadians aboard. It was the largest loss of Canadian peacekeepers in a single day. Several decades later, the Canadian Parliament chose that day (August 9) as National Peacekeepers' Day to annually commemorate Canadian sacrifices in peacekeeping.

The conclusion of the Middle East Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 ushered in the end of UNEF II. It was clear the Soviets would have vetoed a new UN force, so the Security Council allowed UNEF II's mandate to expire in July. To monitor the implementation of the Camp David Accords including the withdrawal of Israelis from all Sinai, a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was assembled outside of UN auspices. Canada contributed 140 personnel. Though not a UN mission, it was modelled after UN peacekeeping operations. The United States was the main supporter, but Canadian generals have held command of the mission at various times, including from 2014 to 2017.

The success of UNEF II, including as the forerunner of MFO, was immense and cannot be understated. It was the only peacekeeping mission in the region that terminated with a peace treaty. Moreover, the peace between Egypt and Israel changed the Middle East. But it did not solve the problem of Israel's occupation of Syrian territory after 1967.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

While UNEF II deployed rapidly in October 1973 to oversee an Egypt-Israel ceasefire, Syria-Israel tensions remained high until the United States mediated a disengagement agreement on 31 May 1974. The same day the Security Council adopted Resolution 350 (1974) which established the

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to supervise the agreement. UNDOF maintains a buffer zone in the Golan Heights that is 75 kilometers long and ranging in width from about 10 kilometers to 200 meters. ²⁰ Israeli and Syrian forces are on opposite ends of the buffer zone and their forward lines comprise areas of limitation where both forces and arms are restricted.

Out of the UNDOF's original strength of 1,335 military personnel, Canada provided 230 personnel, comprised of a logistics company, a signal troop, and staff officers for UNDOF headquarters in Damascus. Canada and Poland shared logistical responsibilities. Japan requested to join Canada in providing logistics, beginning a strong thirty-year partnership.

The dynamic period of UN peacekeeping from 1956 to 1974, part of the "Golden Age" of Canadian foreign affairs, saw the creation of nine new peace missions of which five had responsibilities greater than monitoring. The 1956 UNEF mission, proposed by Canada, was the first mission to interpose itself between parties and secure a cease-fire, not merely observe it. Five peacekeeping operations during this period had responsibilities involving the facilitation and supervision of disengagement of armed adversaries.

During this period of rapid development in peacekeeping, Canada's role was one of leadership. A Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, won the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the 1956 Suez Crisis, introducing the idea of a peacekeeping force – a dramatic innovation from previous observer missions and a novel way to use the armed forces of UN member nations. Canadian generals commanded five missions of the traditional type (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNIPOM, UNEF, and UNFICYP). Furthermore, Canadian soldiers participated in all of the UN's peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, even as the number of field missions declined considerably.

^{20.} United Nations, "UNDOF Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/background.shtml.

The UN's Quiet Period 1975-1987

Following the establishment of UNDOF in 1974, which marked the end of the UN's dynamic period of peacekeeping during the Cold War, reticence regarding new peacekeeping missions became evident. In fact, only one new peacekeeping operation (UNIFIL, see below) was established from 1975 until the end of the Cold War in 1988–89, though most of the existing missions were maintained. In part, the decline was due to financial difficulties and the refusal of some UN Member States to pay their assessed (obligatory) peacekeeping fees. There was also a disenchantment arising from the perceived limitations of peacekeeping and the fact that some missions had not met the UN's original expectations. Although the UN's most ambitious operation, ONUC, had prevented the breakup of the country, it had become mired in a civil war that had failed to bring about lasting peace and stability in the Congo. UN member states accepted that certain criteria had to be met before creating new missions, particularly the consent of the parties to resolve their conflict.

The one new mission (in Lebanon) that was established during this period was plagued with turbulence and in many ways was a contributor to the disenchantment with peacekeeping. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up after the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, which was in response to a series of rocket and commando attacks into Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Security Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) mandated UNIFIL to confirm an Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and security, and assist Lebanon in re-establishing its effective authority in the region. Canada agreed to provide a signal troop to the mission though only for six months since UNEF II was putting a strain on Canadian communications personnel. By June Canadian signalers in UNIFIL numbered 120.²¹

To some extent UNIFIL's high casualty rate, manifold problems, and limitations were responsible for the UN's reticence to launch even one other peacekeeping operation from 1974 to 1988. There were certain-

^{21.} Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto, Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 154.

ly other factors, including the continuing ideological conflict within the Security Council. Some even declared peacekeeping "dead" as a tool to deal with new conflicts. But in 1988, with the ending of the Cold War, the United Nations finally overcame it reticence and embarked upon a dramatic and robust reengagement in what is now called modern peace operations.

The Resurgence of Peacekeeping 1988–1992

In 1988 the United Nations established three new UN missions, signaling a renaissance in peace operations. There followed a major jump with another eight new missions from 1989 to 1991 with greatly expanded mandates and responsibilities, bringing the total number of new missions during this period to 11 in four years, almost as many as during the four-decade Cold War (13 missions). Canada played an active role in these new missions. To punctuate the renewed enthusiasm for peacekeeping, the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to UN peacekeepers. Of the 800,000 who had served in the field, about 80,000 (10 percent) were Canadians. They received the glory of the prize but not any of the prize money. (These funds eventually went to create the Dag Hammarskjöld medal, which is awarded posthumously to peacekeepers who had died while on mission and is presented to the next of kin.)

The three missions launched in 1988 were all primarily observer missions, though with important additional functions. The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), from 1988 to 1990, facilitated the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United Nations dispatched 50 military observers to Afghanistan and Pakistan to monitor the implementation of the agreements for the departure of Soviet troops from the region. Canada provided five of these observers for the duration of the mission. The mission succeeded in fulfilling its mandate in a climate of great unrest and danger. Unfortunately, the United Nations, and the international community as a whole, lost its focus

^{22.} Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 73.

on Afghanistan after the Soviet forces departed. In hindsight, this was a strategic miscalculation. The Canadian military had to return to Afghanistan in much larger numbers post-9/11, but in a combat mode, not as a peacekeeper.

The second mission established in 1988, the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), was much larger than UNGO-MAP. After dynamic mediation by the UN Secretary-General that helped end the Iran-Iraq War, UNIIMOG helped end a barbaric eight-year war characterized by human waves and slaughter on the front lines, as well as chemical attacks, and missile attacks aimed at cities. From 1988 until 1991 the mission monitored the successful cease-fire. At its peak UNII-MOG consisted of about 400 military observers aided by a large Canadian signals unit (525 personnel). The mission established and monitored the cease-fire lines, investigated violations, supervised and confirmed the withdrawal of all forces, and oversaw exchanges of POWs.

The third observer mission created in 1988 was the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) which verified the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, made possible by the end of the Cold War. This small UN mission, peaking at only 70 observers, was the first UN peacekeeping operation in which Canada did not participate, though Canada did contribute to the follow-on mission, UNAVEM II (1991–95). With the two missions taken together, it is correct to say that Canada participated in every peacekeeping operation of the Cold War and until 1995, the only country with such a record.

The next UN mission was launched on a much grander scale and was the UN's first foray into Africa since the 1960s (ONUC, Congo). The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) facilitated the decolonization of Southwest Africa as it became Namibia, an independent state. To facilitate this, UNTAG operated from April 1989 to March 1990 as a multidimensional peace operation with important responsibilities. Clearly the prevention of hostilities between South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was of enormous importance, but UNTAG' responsibilities went well beyond those normally undertaken by traditional peacekeeping forces. It successfully organized

elections and helped the country prepare for independence. It was a huge mission of 4,493 military personnel, 1,500 civilian police, 2,000 international and local staff, and some 1,000 additional international personnel who worked during the UN-supervised elections.²³ Canada contributed 250 logistic personnel, 100 police officers, 50 election monitors, and an expert on computerized election results. Canada also gave the mission \$15 million in budgetary support, 4,000 ballot boxes, and offered two Hercules aircraft to transport supplies to northern Namibia and Angola as the mission began.²⁴ UNTAG was the first of many peacekeeping missions to which Canada provided police, mostly from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).²⁵

The UN's next peace operation, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), did not serve as a mid-wife to a new nation like UNTAG, but it was the UN's first mission in Latin America, helping struggling nations to begin anew after paralyzing civil wars. Hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras over the presence of the "Contras" who launched attacks into Nicaragua, had frustrated the implementation of the "Esquipulas II Accord." That agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, promotion of free elections, and the end of support for insurrectionist forces. ONUCA was established in November 1989 to conduct on-site verification of the security undertakings in the agreement. One aspect involved the demobilization of the Contra rebels, which could only be undertaken after the rebels agreed to it. Following the defeat of the Sandanista government in the UN-monitored Nicaraguan elections in February 1990, the Contras disbanded and ONUCA's mandate was twice expanded to accommodate demobilization. In 1990, the UN performed its first election monitoring in a sovereign member state (Nicaragua), opening a new frontier for UN support of democracy, replicated in

^{23.} United Nations, "Namibia - UNTAG, Facts and Figures," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagF.htm.

^{24.} Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 73.

^{25.} The experiences of Canadian police in UNTAG and subsequent missions are described in Beno Maure, *Leading at the Edge: True Tales from Canadian Police in Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Missions Around the World* (Mounted Police Foundation, 2021).

dozens of countries afterwards.

At its peak, ONUCA personnel numbered 1,195. Canada's peak contribution comprised 175 personnel of which 130 were with the air unit (helicopter detachment).²⁶ Canadian naval personnel were also deployed aboard patrol ships seeking to interdict weapons bound for the rebels.

In the busy peacekeeping period after the Cold War, Canada contributed a record number of troops. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), 1991 to 2003, monitored a 200 km demilitarized zone between the two countries. UNIKOM's peak strength was 913, of which Canada contributed 301 personnel comprised of one military observer and 300 engineers.²⁷ Fifteen Canadian personnel were sent to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 33 personnel to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and 11 to the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).²⁸

The UN's largest mission of this period was in Cambodia, a nation that had been torn apart by civil war and genocide. During its four-year rule (1974–79), the Khmer Rouge killed about two million of the country's nine million people. In accordance with the 1991 Paris Peace Accord, the United Nations was to take on major responsibilities in the war-ravaged country. First the Security Council created the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to assist the four Cambodian parties to maintain their cease-fire until the larger UN mission, namely the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was in place. The Advance Mission deployed 1,090 military personnel²⁹ supported by international and local staff, and Canada contributed 103 personnel.

UNTAC supervised a cease-fire that held firm despite Khmer Rouge

^{26.} Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," in W.J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993), 449.

^{27.} W. J. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission," in Durch, op. cit, p. 263.

^{28.} Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 74.

^{29.} United Nations, "Cambodia - UNAMIC, Facts and Figures," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html.

threats, and the mission oversaw national elections, which the Khmer Rouge did not sabotage. UNTAC's expansive mandate also included the protection of human rights, military security and civil administration, maintenance of law and order, resettlement of refugees, mine clearing, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and economic reconstruction and development. To achieve this, UNTAC was comprised of seven components: military, police, and civilian (human rights, civil administration, electoral, rehabilitation and repatriation). UNTAC consisted of 15,991 troops, 3,359 police and during the elections some 900 international polling officers. Canada contributed 213 personnel. The multidimensional nature of the mission was characteristic of modern peace operations to come.

In the early 1990s, peacekeeping seemed to have a new life. With the creation of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the United Nations had established in five years (1988–92) the same number of peace operations that it had created during the Cold War, i.e., in the forty years after the beginning of peacekeeping.³² In addition to this historical precedent, ONUMOZ turned out to be another encouraging success. It delivered Mozambique from civil war, demobilized and disarmed (voluntarily) more than 76,000 soldiers from both sides, and engineered a huge humanitarian assistance program. Furthermore, the democratic elections supervised by the United Nations led to the inauguration of a new parliament and president in December 1994³³. Canada's contribution, however, was small: 15 UN military observers, deployed at headquarters and throughout the country, as well as election officials (civilians).

Peacekeeping was expanding, and Canada contributed increasing

^{30.} United Nations, "Cambodia - UNAMIC, Facts and Figures," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.

^{31.} Jockel, Joseph T. Jockel, Canada and International Peacekeeping (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 75. A firsthand account is given by Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad in Scarce Heard Amid the Guns: An Inside Look at Canadian Peacekeeping (Dundurn Press, 2011).

^{32.} Stephen M Hill and Malik, Shahin P., Peacekeeping and the United Nations, Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1996, p. 118.

^{33.} United Nations, "Mozambique - ONUMOZ, Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozS.htm.

numbers overall, reaching a peak in July 1993 of some 3,300 uniformed personnel. To further establish peacekeeping in the national consciousness, the National Peacekeeping Monument (titled "Reconciliation") was erected next to the National Art Gallery in Ottawa where important peacekeeping ceremonies are held at the monument each year.

Until 1993 Canada was the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces. But in 1993–95, Canada shared with the UN some of the worst tragedies and setbacks in UN and Canadian military history. Part of the challenge was how to adapt traditional peacekeeping, which was mostly between standing armies of nations, to the new and more vicious environments of civil wars within nations.

In his seminal 1992 report "Agenda for Peace," Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali redefined peacekeeping as involving "hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned." He envisaged a deviation from the previously accepted principle of consent of the parties; "peace enforcement" would be a component of new missions to enforce a cease-fire by taking coercive action against any party that violated it. This ambitious concept would soon be put to the test and required a modern force and mentality that the UN did not have. In addition, expanded peacekeeping operations were sent to three extremely difficult arenas of conflict: Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.

Tragedy and Setback: 1993-1995

The exuberance for "peace enforcement" that had been displayed by the Secretary-General as well as the members of the Security Council was destined to be checked by one all-encompassing reality of the post-Cold War world. Even if power bloc rivalries were now at an end, and if ideological competition would no longer plague the international community, peacekeeping operations would still require ample strength to "enforce peace." The mere arrival of peacekeepers in a conflict zone would not quell violence if the peacekeepers were weaker than the parties engaged in fighting. The mission in Somalia was to be the first to demonstrate this.

^{34.} B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace (United Nations, New York, 1992).

The UN's means did not match its mandate in the more robust form of peacekeeping that was being called for.

The civil war that broke out in Somalia following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991 created nearly one million refugees and threatened five million people with hunger. The Secretary-General organized talks between the factions, who agreed to a cease-fire, monitored by UN observers. On 24 April 1992 the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the cease-fire, protect UN personnel, and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from sea and airports to distribution centers in Mogadishu and its environs. Canada contributed headquarters staff.

Unfortunately, intense fighting in Somalia obstructed the relief effort. In August the Security Council deployed an additional 3,000 troops to protect humanitarian aid and workers. Canada sent 750 personnel. The famine situation still worsened, as did the attacks on aid workers. The United States in November 1992 offered to lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, an idea which the Security Council accepted. The mission was authorized in December 1992 to use "all necessary means" to support the relief effort. The US-led operation became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and was comprised of contingents from 24 countries. Canada agreed to deploy 1,300 Canadian soldiers, fatefully choosing inappropriately trained soldiers from the Airbourne regiment.³⁵.

The UNITAF force aided distribution of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu and the surrounding area enormously, and early in 1993, 14 Somali political movements agreed on a cease-fire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM. Thus encouraged, the Security Council decided in March 1993 on a transition from UNITAF to a new mission, UNOSOM II, which it endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. Not many Canadian soldiers, up to nine at a given time, served in that mission.

UNOSOM II had a momentous task. UNITAF had patrolled less than

^{35.} Karsten Jung, Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests through Peacekeeping (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2009), 60.

half of Somalia with 37,000 troops, while UNOSOM II had to cover all Somalia with only 22,000 peacekeepers.³⁶ Moreover, certain Somali factions that had pledged compliance did not respect the cease-fires. The killing in June 1993 of 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan as well as civilian casualties, led to aggressive US attempts to catch the leader of the clan that had killed the Pakistanis. But the October killing of 18 American soldiers, while on a US operation independent of UNOSOM II, led the US to announce its withdrawal from the country. UNOSOM II itself was finally withdrawn ignominiously in March 1995. It was evident that feeding and freeing Somalia required forceful intervention against the warlords, and the world community, particularly the United States, was unwilling to sustain the costs of such intervention.

A feeling of incredible failure was felt by the United Nations and international community, and especially Canada. Though Canada was part of the UN-US unsuccessful efforts in Somalia, the Canadian news was even worse. Several Canadian airborne troops, operating under the USled UNITAF, were discovered to have tortured and killed a Somali youth caught stealing from their camp in March 1993. A court martial of those individuals uncovered more misbehaviour. The government launched a broader inquiry into the events in Somalia, including inadequate preparations for deployment, but this inquiry faced stonewalling by senior generals, including Canada's top military officer, who was forced to resign. The final report of the prolonged inquiry, titled Dishonoured Legacy, shocked the nation. Also, the government disbanded the entire Airborne Regiment, which in hindsight was the wrong regiment to send on a peacekeeping mission. It was trained for rough combat and not for the subtleties of peacekeeping. It also contained racist elements.³⁷ This proved to be a disaster in the history of the Canadian military.

As the mission in Somalia was still underway, another tragedy was

^{36.} United Nations, "Somalia - UNOSOM II, Background," available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr1.html.

^{37.} Donna Winslow, "The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry." Canadian Government Pub Centre, 1997. Razack, Sherene. *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism* (University of Toronto Press, 2004).

in the making. The United Nations asked Canada to provide the force commander for a mission in Rwanda. Brigadier-General Roméo Dallaire was chosen to lead the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). He diligently set up a mission in the heart of Africa, but nothing could have prepared him for the atrocities he was to witness. In a hundred days about 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered in the most intense genocide since Second World War. At the start, Dallaire could not even convince UN officials that genocide was occurring. His urgent requests for reinforcements were rejected under American, British, French, and Belgian pressure.³⁸ Only Canada responded to the appeals of its general; it was the only nation to send additional troops to UNAMIR during the genocide, though the numbers were still inadequately low (less than 100). However, with fewer than 300 peacekeepers General Dallaire managed to save the lives of over 20,000 people who had sought refuge at UN-monitored sites. Nonetheless, Dallaire felt so distraught and impotent in the face of the Rwandan slaughter that he later attempted suicide back in Canada. For their part, UN leaders took many years, unfortunately, to assume any responsibility for the Rwandan tragedy, blaming it on an overly cautious Security Council that suffered from the "Somali syndrome," or crossing the "Mogadishu line," i.e., fear of overextending a mission mandate to enforcement. Dallaire ultimately recovered and was appointed to the Canadian senate. After the genocide ended in July 1994, the follow-up mission, UNAMIR II, was also commanded by a Canadian general (Major-General Guy Tousignant) but that mission ended by Rwandan request in 1996.

As if the disasters in Somalia and Rwanda were not enough, another debacle was stalking the United Nations (and Canada) in Yugoslavia. The disintegration of the country precipitated the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), initially established by the Security Council in February 1992 in Croatia to create conditions that might foster peace and security. In this regard it had many functions, such as the demilitarization of United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and monitoring a cease-fire

^{38.} Karsten Jung, Of Peace and Power: Promoting Canadian Interests through Peacekeeping (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2009), 62.

agreement between Croatia and local Serb authorities. When confronted by Croat atrocities and ceasefire violations in the Medak Pocket, a Canadian unit held its ground and engaged in a major firefight with Croat forces until the latter withdrew.³⁹

When the Yugoslav conflict intensified and civil war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was among the first to call for an international response. The Security Council subsequently expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to include the containment of the civil war in Bosnia and continued to add multifarious tasks to the mission such as escorting humanitarian aid convoys and protecting "safe areas." Unfortunately, the UN mission once again lacked the capacity to execute its ever-expanding mandate, especially to force peace on those who wanted war.

Canada's 1,200 soldiers in Bosnia were repeatedly exposed to gunfire and UNPROFOR was in jeopardy. The force was authorized to request air support from NATO when under attack, which led Bosnian Serbs to take 150 UN personnel hostage. In response to later air strikes, 370 UN peacekeepers, including Canadians, were kidnapped and used as human shields to protect military equipment.⁴⁰ In June 1995 the Serbs overran UN safe areas ignoring the understrength UNPROFOR units and killing thousands of Muslims. In the Protected Area of Srebrenica, the Canadians had turned over responsibility to peacekeepers from The Netherlands in 1994, who in 1995 embarrassingly departed after extreme intimidation from Serb forces. These Bosnian Serbs went on to slaughter 7,000 Muslim men and boys. In response to all these attacks, the United Nations approved a massive air campaign against the Serb forces by NATO. This finally brought Serb forces to the negotiating table and resulted in the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. These were enforced by a 50,000 strong NATO operation called the Implementation Force (IFOR), followed a year later by the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), to which Canada contributed over 1,000 soldiers at a given time. NATO's

^{39.} Carol Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War (Vintage Canada, 2010).

^{40.} Carol Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War (Vintage Canada, 2010), 64.

I/SFOR missions secured peace in Bosnia because the Serbs knew that defying IFOR would have grave and destructive consequences for them, unlike defying UNPROFOR, which had precipitated pointless Security Council resolutions that the UN missions were unable to implement.

UNPROFOR, UNOSOM II, and UNAMIR thus had suffered the same problem – an ambitious mandate for a UN force with insufficient capabilities to implement it. Canadian soldiers on these missions remembered their helplessness.

Frustration with UNPROFOR provided another perceptual blow to Canadian peacekeeping, adding to the personal anguish Canadians felt after the Somali and Rwandan disasters. Canadian contributions declined and have never come back. At its peak, in 1993, over 3,000 Canadians were still on UN duty; thus, the world's 60th largest army was contributing 10 percent of its peacekeepers. No UN member state could match Canada's half-century contribution to peacekeeping, though ironically the Canadian military questioned its own participation in the activity. The backlash of the Somali, Rwandan, and Yugoslavian missions could not be averted, either for Canada or the United Nations. There had to be consequences.

The Great Canadian Decline: 1997–2006

By 1997 UN peacekeeping had shrunk markedly, partly since new missions were not required. Only 26,000 blue berets remained in the field, down from 70,000 in previous years. The number plummeted much further by 1998 with only 15,000 UN peacekeepers deployed.

Canada was part of this downturn, but not for the same reasons. Another element entered the formula for Canada. It was the nation's mounting national debt and the pressing need to cut the annual deficit, which led to massive cuts in defence expenditures. The need for fiscal restraint coupled with the concern in Canada over the emotional costs on peace-keepers and its toll on the military caused the government to step back and reconsider. By 1997 only 254 Canadians⁴¹ still wore the blue beret,

^{41.} Carol Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War

though its numbers were higher in NATO's peace operation in Bosnia. The nation that had once contributed 10 percent of all UN peacekeepers now contributed less than 2 percent. Later, it was to fall to less than 0.2 percent.

UN peacekeeping, however, was bound to recover, though Canada's contribution did not follow suit. The new UN operations established in the late 1990s were relatively small and limited in scope, yet a UN rebound was in motion, and would become phenomenal in the twenty-first century.

A great test came in 1999 in Kosovo. The world community could not ignore Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing, a repeat of what it had earlier seen in Bosnia. NATO was the first to act. When peace negotiations failed to bring about a settlement, the Alliance decided to intervene with force, even without the sanction of the UN Security Council, which was skewered by Russia's opposition and its threatened veto. Canada participated even in the absence of a UN mandate in the interest of saving lives. Determined to ensure Kosovo did not become another Bosnia, Canada contributed to a massive air campaign in March 1999. Though providing only 2 percent of the aircraft, Canada flew nearly 10 percent of the patrol missions.⁴²

When the air campaign ended, the Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to rebuild and administer the province. NATO, not the UN, was given the military mission of "peace support" (to use NATO terminology for peacekeeping), creating the Kosovo Force (KFOR), operating under UNMIK. Canadians contributed 1,450 troops to KFOR, as well as advanced equipment like the Coyote armoured reconnaissance (recce) vehicle.⁴³

The second half of the nineties also saw a series of missions in Haiti that helped bring temporary stability and some law and order to the troubled island. These included the United Nations Mission in Haiti

⁽Vintage Canada, 2010), 78.

^{42.} Carol Off, The Ghosts of Medak Pocket: The Story of Canada's Secret War (Vintage Canada, 2010), 86.

^{43.} W. A. Dorn, Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology and Innovation in UN Peace Operations (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2011), 147–149.

(UNMIH, 1993–96), the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH, 1996–97), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH, 1997), and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH, 1997–2000). Canada provided 500–600 military personnel at a given time to UNMIH and UNSMIH and was rewarded with the Force Commander position for UNTMIH. Over 600 Canadian police officers⁴⁴ served in Haiti between 1994 and 2001 both for training and technical assistance to the Haitian National Police.

Canada also sent police officers to serve in the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA 1997) designed to verify the agreement between the Guatemalan government and revolutionaries. In 1999, more Canadian police served with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which observed the cease-fire and disengagement of forces between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States. It continues with a toe hold of 5–10 staff officers to this day.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), established in 1999, made use of Canadian police and civilians, but not Canadian military personnel. The mission oversaw a successful referendum on 30 August, in which the Timorese people voted in favour of independence. Indonesian forces, both military and militia, then instituted a reign of terror on the Timorese that only ended when tremendous international pressure was applied on the Indonesian government, including the threat of denying loans from the International Monetary Fund. Indonesia quickly capitulated and allowed an Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to enter the half-island. Canada deployed troops, two C-130 aircraft, and an operational support ship, HMCS Protecteur, as part of this UN-mandated mission, though with embarrassingly slow speed, given the setbacks on the Canadian ships during the Pacific crossing. Canadian soldiers were sent to a difficult part of the island in the border province with Indonesia's West Timor. Canada briefly transferred a 280-strong infantry company to the subsequent mission, the

^{44.} Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Peacekeeping: 2000-2001 Annual Review, 11.

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which governed the country until newly elected leaders could take over the responsibility two years later.

The rise and fall in Canadian contributions are seen in the graph of Figure 1.1. NATO took over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia in 1996, so Canada sent most of its deployed troops to NATO, not the United Nations. As well, UN peacekeeping itself declined to a small number for several years. It was only with the dawn of the new century that the world organization saw a surge in demand for its missions. Canada, like most developed world countries, did not participate in this. But Canada did maintain approximately 200 troops (logistics personnel) in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). Elsewhere, Canada only sent forces for two small and short increases. One was part of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) to which 450 troops were deployed along with Canada's Coyote reconnaissance vehicle to monitor movements across the temporary security zone. The other surge was to Haiti after President Jean Bertrand Aristide was forced from office in 2004. Canadian soldiers deployed alongside US forces and then were re-hatted as UN peacekeepers before being withdrawn. But these were short (six month) non-rotating deployments.

In the new century, the Liberal governments of Jean Chretien and Paul Martin looked favorably upon peacekeeping, but the military was less than enthusiastic. Stung by the experiences of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, many senior officers preferred to serve under NATO. Then, after the 9/11 attacks on the USA, Canada began its decade-long engagement in Afghanistan, giving National Defence Headquarters a ready excuse not to deploy with the United Nations. After Canada's substantial deployment into Kandahar in 2006, Afghanistan became the main preoccupation of the Canadian Forces. Canada became virtually a single mission military and Canadian peacekeeping suffered even more.

Conservative Government: Further Decline (2006–15)




Figure 1.1. Canadian contributions of uniformed personnel (military and police) since 1950, showing the peak number for each year and the missions giving rise to the peaks.

Sources: Canada, "Canadian Forces Overseas Operations" (2019), available at https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations.html; Canada, Canadian Armed Forces, "Past Operations" (2019), available at http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/index.page; Canadiansoldiers.com, "Peacekeeping," available at http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/history/peacekeeping/peacekeeping.htm

Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Deneau & Wayne, 1987), 260–261; United Nations, "Troop and Police Contributors" (2019), available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

This shift to a counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan suited well the newly elected Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. It did not share the Liberal Party's sense of ownership of "Pearsonian" peacekeeping. Instead, it strongly identified with the Canadian combat mission in southern Afghanistan. Within two months after coming into power in January 2006, the Conservatives withdrew the 200 or so Canadian logisticians serving in the UN mission in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). This brought Canada to a new low in its UN contribution: only about 60 Canadian troops, while in Afghanistan the contributions to the NATO mission surged to over 2,500. The Canadian contribution of troops in Afghanistan stayed at this level throughout the Kandahar deployment (2006–2011).

The need for police, however, escalated in UN missions, especially in Haiti. As a result, Canada found itself in the unusual position of providing more police officers than soldiers to UN missions. The United Nations also relied on Canada to provide successive Police Commissioners for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The job carried a responsibility to oversee the 2,000 UN police in MINUSTAH and exerted strong influence over thousands in the Haitian National Police.

Even with the police contribution, the number of uniformed Canadians in peacekeeping remained small. Canada dropped in rank to 70 out of about 120 countries, far down from its former number one spot. While the number of uniformed personnel has remained small in recent decades, in a few ways Canada's peacekeeping contribution and legacy was maintained. Financially, Canada continued to be the 8th largest contributor. This was not an act of benevolence but a requirement under the UN system of national assessments, which are roughly proportional to a nation's GNP. Canada could boast that it has consistently paid its dues "in full, on time and without conditions" unlike its neighbor to the south. Canada continued to chair the Working Group of the UN's Special

^{45.} Kevin Spooner, "Legacies and Realities: UN Peacekeeping and Canada, Past and Present," in Collin McCullough and Robert Teigrob, eds., *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits and Prospects* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016), 214.

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, called the Committee of 34 or C34—denoting the number of original members, which had swelled to 124 states. Canada assumed this role decades earlier and the Conservative government was not so hostile to the United Nations that it would shirk this inherited responsibility.

At UN headquarters, however, Canadian military presence in New York fell off the radar. By 2007, there was not a single Canadian officer in the Office of the Military Adviser (OMA) at UN headquarters, although over 70 other countries had seconded one or more officers to OMA. This was only slightly corrected in 2010 when a Canadian colonel took the leadership of the Military Planning Service at UN headquarters but another Canadian was not sent to OMA when he retired in 2014.

Despite government apathy in peacekeeping, the Canadian public continues to view peacekeeping as Canada's most important contribution to the world. In this, the Conservative government was not in step with the opinion of the Canadian population, as well as the perception of Canada in the international community. But the government changed after the election of 2015. One can see these similar domestic influences, reinforced in the following chapters by Carroll and Londey, but in particular Michael Holm's discussion of the same disconnect between supportive American public opinion and a lack of governmental commitment to peacekeeping.

Trudeau Government: Reality Not Meeting Rhetoric

Upon election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised that Canada would re-engage in UN peacekeeping. He gave explicit instructions to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in the minister's Mandate letter (12 November 2015) to strongly support United Nations peace operations. The government made major pledges at the Peacekeeping Ministerial in London, UK (8 September 2016) of "up to" 600 military and 150 police. The Prime Minister made additional pledges at the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Vancouver on 15 November 2017.46

^{46.} Prime Minister, "Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter" (November

Despite the promises and rhetoric, the Canadian contribution to peace-keeping fell to a lower level than under the Harper government. In May 2018, it reached an all-time low: 19 military and 21 police. Not since Pearson proposed the first peacekeeping force had the numbers been lower. While the Trudeau government sought to champion an increase in women from around the world contributing to UN peace operations, the Canadian numbers dropped to only one military women (in South Sudan) and five policewomen (all in Haiti) in peacekeeping.

Canadian military leadership in UN operations was also lacking: while Canada had provided nine military commanders of UN peace operations in the 1990s, it has not won the honour in the subsequent two decades. It missed an opportunity to provide a force Commander to the UN mission in the Congo in 2007, in Mali in 2017 and it posted no one to the Office of Military Affairs in New York, an office that a Canadian general once headed (Maurice Baril, 1992–95).⁴⁷

However, Canada briefly re-engaged in UN peacekeeping in a limited way in 2017–18. In July 2018 it provided the UN mission in Mali with an aviation task force of eight helicopters and an aeromedical team, involving an estimated 250 personnel in total. This was a substantial contribution, but the commitment was only for one year. And this would be less than the half of the maximal pledged military contribution (600 personnel). This contingent was withdrawn in 2019, despite repeated UN requests to reconsider. Furthermore, a new mission for Canadian police contributions was not announced. Canada's contribution fell to an all-time low afterwards of 34 personnel in August 2020 and has stayed low. On the contribution of th

^{12, 2015),} available at https://www.walterdorn.net/269. UK, "Pledge Slide Show" at Peacekeeping Ministerial, London, available at https://www.gov.uk/govern-ment/topical-events/un-peacekeeping-defence-ministerial-london-2016.

^{47.} See Walter Dorn, "Tracking the Promises: Canada's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping," available at https://www.walterdorn.net/256.

^{48.} It was cited that the Canadian helicopters and personnel were required for Canadian domestic operations., Branka Marijan, "Canada's reluctant participation in peacekeeping in Mali: What it reveals," Project Ploughshares (April 24, 2019); available at https://ploughshares.ca/2019/04/canadas-reluctant-participation-in-peacekeeping-in-mali-what-it-reveals/.

^{49.} See Walter Dorn, "Tracking the Promises: Canada's Contributions to UN

Conclusion

Throughout the UN's twentieth century history, Canada provided key leadership, personnel, and equipment to assist with the evolution of peace-keeping. At the top of the list is Lester Pearson, aptly called the father or co-founder of UN peacekeeping forces. Included in the list are many UN force commanders: from Brigadier-General Angle who died while on service in Kashmir (1950) to Major-General Burns who commanded the first UN peacekeeping force (1956) to Major-General Dallaire who won national and international acclaim for his conscientious efforts to mitigate the inhuman avalanche of the Rwandan genocide (1994). Later, Brigadier-General Robin Gagnon stood on strong moral principle to lead the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH).

It was not only Canadian generals who made personal sacrifices to lead peacekeeping missions. Many soldiers and military aviators lost their lives in the activity. Until 2003, Canada was the nation that had lost the largest number of personnel (then overtaken by India), an undesirable honour but nevertheless one that indicates a history of deep commitment. Canada was the only country to contribute to all the UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War. It maintained a leadership position well into the mid-1990s, before the number of Canadian troops fell precipitously (see the graph in Figure 1.1).⁵⁰

In the twenty-first century, UN peacekeeping surged: the world organization deployed more peacekeepers to hot spots than at any time in the organization's history. The number of UN peacekeeping personnel in the field grew more than fivefold from 2000 to 2015 but Canada did not contribute to the surge. Canadian contributions stagnated and then declined. During the presidency of Donald Trump (2016–2021), UN peacekeeping declined as a whole in numbers under US pressure and Canada made one major but short effort (Mali) to increase the number of Canadian

Peacekeeping," available at https://www.walterdorn.net/256.

^{50.} See Kevin Spooner, "Legacies and Realities: UN Peacekeeping and Canada, Past and Present," in Collin McCullough and Robert Teigrob. *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits, Prospects* (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017).

personnel deployed.

In the early 2020s, with about 90,000 military and police serving in 14–16 UN-led peacekeeping missions, the UN deploys, supports, and directs more uniformed personnel in field operations than any actor in the world, including the US government – more than the UK, France, China, and Russia combined. However, Canada moved from its number 1 spot to 81st in rank. Many more troops deployed in other types of operations, especially for NATO on traditional combat-oriented ones like the Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia.

Since 1999, not only has the number and size of UN missions grown, but UN missions are now more robust, more multi-faceted, and more complex, though still inadequate to meet the ambitious tasks. The mandates include the protection of civilians, thanks in part to a Security Council resolution advanced by Canada in 1999. The rise in demand for peacekeeping has been most notable in Africa, where more than 72,000 peacekeepers are deployed in places like Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and South Sudan. The demand for peacekeeping is expected to rise, not fall, in coming years, given the dire state of wartorn areas of the world. Contributions from experienced countries with advanced military and logistics remain much needed to create more operational capacity.

The future of the world would be brighter if countries make increased and sustained contributions to UN peacekeeping, especially countries like Canada with militaries that are well trained, combat-ready, multilingual, and multi-dimensional. Contributors like Canada that have not been colonial powers but have a legacy of working for peace are especially welcomed in peace operations.

However, Canada is still not on track and the Trudeau government's repeated promises remained unfulfilled. Rhetoric remains lofty on paper and in speeches, but the Canadian government has yet to match its words with deeds. As a result, Canada's re-engagement has been slow and hesitating. Canada has not heeded its own advice to the world, when the Defence Minister Sajjan addressed the UN Security Council: "The time

for change is now and we must be bold."⁵¹ It seems Canada has ignored the words of Lester Pearson when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957: "We made at least a beginning then. If, on that foundation, we do not build something more permanent and stronger, we will once again have ignored realities, rejected opportunities, and betrayed our trust. Will we never learn?"

^{51.} Speech of Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan to the UN Security Council meeting on "Collective Action to Improve Peacekeeping," (28 March 2018). See also Walter Dorn and Peggy Mason, "Harjit Sajjan has Defaulted on Canada's Peacekeeping Promises," *The Globe and Mail* (9 August 2021), available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-harjit-sajjan-has-defaulted-on-canadas-peacekeeping-promises.

UNEF: The Origins and Realities of Canadian Peacekeeping

Michael Carroll

When the Trudeau government was elected in October 2015, it did not take long for government officials and political observers to announce that "Canada is back." Launching a high-profile bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, the prime minister announced: "we need to focus on what brings us together, not what divides us. For Canada that means re-engaging in global affairs through institutions like the UN. It doesn't serve our interests – or the world's to pretend we're not deeply affected by what happens beyond our borders." Peacekeeping was one of the ways in which Canada was to re-engage with the world, revitalizing the myth that peacekeeping is where Canada finds success on the world stage. But the reality behind the myth certainly questions the idea of "success."

Canada's Minister of National Defence, Harjit Sajjan – an experienced and decorated peacekeeper in his own right – led a much publicized fact-finding mission to Africa in August 2016 to decide on the de-

^{1.} Canada, "Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's Address to the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly," available at http://pm.gc.ca/.

^{2.} See Canada, "Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter," available at http://pm.gc.ca/.

ployment of Canadian peacekeepers: yet it took almost two years before portions of a substantive peacekeeping deployment plan – Canada's support for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was announced.³ Even Canada's hosting of the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference produced few substantive policy commitments. In part, the delay can be chalked up to uncertainty regarding Canadian-American relations and the extent of Canada's operational commitments to NATO and other existing military obligations. Prime Minister Trudeau and Minister Sajjan also clearly stated that Canada would not "fast track" any peacekeeping deployment, but rather would do it "responsibly and thoughtfully" to make "sure that we get it right so that we can have the maximum contribution on the ground."4 More importantly, however, there was a sense of reticence on the part of some policymakers and members of the public due to the seemingly "new" realization that peacekeeping is dangerous and success is often elusive. The response to the Mali announcement highlighted this: much of the initial criticism focused on the fact that the mission that Canada announced was actually quite dangerous, as if Canada should only have chosen the safest option for its troops, rather than where the need was the strongest or where Canadian intervention could be most effective. This realization that peacekeeping is indeed a dangerous undertaking, however, is hardly a recent development. The Canadian Armed Force's (CAF) first major UN deployment with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956 demonstrated that peacekeeping operations were difficult and dangerous undertakings and subsequent missions did nothing to dispel that truth. To make sufficiently informed decisions about future peacekeeping deployments, one must push beyond the myth that has enveloped Canadian peacekeeping to arrive at an historically accurate vantage point from which modern-day military operations can be more

^{3.} Department of National Defence, Royal Canadian Air Force, "RCAF to deploy Air Task Force to UN Mission in Maili," available at http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/.

^{4.} Bruce Campion-Smith, "Canada won't be rushed into military peace mission, Trudeau says," *Toronto Star* (25 March 2017), available at https://www.thestar.com/.

soundly judged. It is in the details of Canada's first major peacekeeping mission with UNEF – the details of its inception, mandate, and withdrawal; the details of its financing; and the details of life on the ground – that the value of history can be found and lessons may be gleaned for Canada's future forays into peace support operations.⁵

The myth of Canadian peacekeeping was a Cold War construct which promoted the idea that Canada was a natural peacekeeper, altruistically focused on the cause of world peace. Some of this has been explored by Walter Dorn in the previous chapter. It should be noted that the myth is not a complete fabrication, and altruism and Canada's national self-interest need not be construed as mutually exclusive. Yet Lester Pearson's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Suez Crisis were entirely in Canada's self-interest, in keeping with his famous saying that "foreign policy is, after all, merely domestic policy with its hat on." Finding a way to extricate the British from the Suez debacle helped to bridge the gaping chasm between Canada's two closest allies, the United Kingdom and the United States, and maintained relationships within NATO, the UN, and the Commonwealth, all cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy. Interjecting a peacekeeping force between Egypt and Israel helped reduce tensions in the Middle East and prevented a regional conflict escalating to a nuclear showdown between the two Superpowers. All of these were worst case scenarios for Canada, but finding a peaceful resolution pro-

^{5.} In Chapter 4 Michael Holm expands on the American situation regarding UN peacekeeping – public support and governmental reluctance – a situation not unlike Canadian involvement with the Mali mission.

^{6.} For a glimpse into some of the debate behind the myth see: J.L. Granatstein, "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality," *Canadian Forum* (August 1974): 14–19; Lane Anker, "Peacekeeping and Public Opinion," Canadian Military Journal 6.2 (Summer 2005): 23–32; Sean Maloney, "From Myth to Reality Check: From Peacekeeping to Stabilization," *Policy Options* (September 2005): 40–46; Walter Dorn, "Peacekeeping Then, Now and Always," *Canadian Military Journal* 6.4 (Winter 2005-2006): 105–106; Eric Wagner, "The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War," *Canadian Military Journal* 7.4 (Winter 2006–2007): 45–54; Michael K. Carroll, "Peacekeeping: Canada's past, but not its present and future?" *International Journal* 71.1 (2016): 167–176.

^{7.} L. B. Pearson, "Canada's Role as a Middle Power," in *Canada's Role as a Middle Power*, ed. J. King Gordon (Toronto: CIIA, 1968), 195.

vided benefit for the entire world.

Propelled by Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his role in creating UNEF and bringing about an end to the Suez Crisis, the myth has subsequently taken on a life of its own and peacekeeping, according to one journalist, "is in our genetic code as a nation." While there are elements of truth in the myth, it has ultimately led to unrealistic expectations about what Canada, and the blue berets, can accomplish on the world stage. Re-examining UNEF from a perspective that is more realistic and not coloured by a desire to highlight or glory in Canada's contribution, allows policymakers to create a more accurate definition of peacekeeping "success" that includes efforts towards peacemaking and also allows for a public understanding of the real risks and dangers that the Canadian Forces and civilian personnel undertake each time Canada supports a mission.

It is often forgotten that Canada was, initially, a very reluctant peace-keeper. Canada was not a part of the first official UN observer mission in the Middle East in 1948 – the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) – and the following year when the UN sought support for an observer force to keep the peace between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, Canada's Cabinet, in the words of one minister, was "allergic" to the idea. Yet Cabinet ultimately held little sway over the conduct of foreign affairs and the new Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, had confidence in his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson. Both Pearson and St. Laurent realized that boots on the ground would provide Canada with a measure of international credibility and four CAF officers were duly deployed to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Five additional soldiers – including General E.L.M. Burns as the force commander – were assigned to UNTSO in 1954. These are hardly the numbers upon which myths and

^{8.} Carol Off, The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle: A Story of General and Justice in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Toronto, Random House, 2000, 2.

^{9. &}quot;Canada and Peacekeeping Operations," Report no. 4, Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters, 22 October 1965; DHH, Cabinet Conclusions, 13 January 1949, LAC, RG 2, vol. 2643.

legends are built. The cost of seconding nine officers to UN duty was negligible, yet there was little enthusiasm for peacekeeping among Canadian military officials. The idea of unarmed observers walking along a demarcation line with a pair of binoculars and writing reports held little appeal to soldiers who had come of age storming Juno beach and fighting in the epic battles of the Second World War. Approximately 200 military personnel and diplomats from External Affairs were assigned to the International Control Commissions in Indochina in 1954 and, while this was not a UN mission, it was nonetheless viewed by officials in National Defence headquarters as a drain on limited resources that should more appropriately be directed towards Europe and NATO. It was not until after the deployment of UNEF in 1956, and the international recognition that came along with it, that Canada, and its military, became enamoured with peacekeeping.¹⁰

Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 shocked the world, but appeared, on the surface, to have little direct effect on Canada. "This is primarily a European matter," the Minister of National Defence commented a week after the fact. "It is not a matter which particularly concerns Canada. We have no

^{10.} While public opinion in Canada has been supportive of peacekeeping operations since the creation of UNEF the academic literature has, as of yet, been unable to pinpoint an exact date as to when public expectations became a prime motivator compelling Canadian governments to act in the service of peace. Public opinion was in favour of contributing to the Congo mission in 1960, but as Kevin Spooner deftly demonstrates in his work its influence was not decisive. Likewise, the Liberal government had pressing foreign policy concerns that went hand in hand with their decision to contribute to UNFICYP in 1964. Nonetheless, by this point in time peacekeeping had become a major plank of the 1964 White Paper on Defence and was, on some level, embraced by successive governments throughout the rest of the 20th century. Military policy makers always prioritized their Cold War alliance responsibilities, but embraced peacekeeping once they realized that public support for UN peacekeeping could be harnessed for justifying increased military spending. See, among others, Kevin A. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping 1960-64 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), Sean M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing, 2002), Norman Hillmer, "Peacekeeping: Canada's Inevitable Role," in War in the Twentieth Century: Reflections at Century's End, ed. Michael A. Hennessy and B.J.C. McKercher (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

oil there. We don't use the Canal for shipping."¹¹ Yet the economic and psychological importance of the Suez Canal to Great Britain, and the impact that could have upon Canada, did not escape Pearson's notice. Nor did the growing divide in rhetoric espoused by leaders in United Kingdom and the United States. From the Canadian perspective Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal opened a Pandora's box – unleashing competing and potentially divisive interests in Canadian foreign policy.

The lid finally came off with Israel's invasion of Egypt on 29 October 1956. Four days later the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all troops in the Suez region. Canada was one of six notable abstentions in the vote, with Pearson reasoning that while the goal was worthy, the resolution was inadequate in dealing with the essence of the crisis. "The resolution does provide for a cease-fire and I admit that that is of first important and urgency," Pearson explained to the General Assembly. "But it does not provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a cease-fire would be only of temporary value at best." Yet the "Canadian resolution" which laid the groundwork for UNEF, that was passed 24 hours later, had little more bite.

To achieve widespread appeal, the Canadian-sponsored resolution shrewdly avoided going into detail and simply placed responsibility for the creation of a peacekeeping force in the hands of the Secretary-General. Calling for a peacekeeping force to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities," the resolution provided a general idea of the conflict resolution mechanism but provided no clear vision of how to resolve the underlying problems in the Middle East. The result, according to one observer, "was a set of general principles which pleased nobody one hundred per cent but which everyone could, without too much reluctance,

^{11.} Quoted in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 26 November 1956, Fourth (Special) Session, Twenty-Second Parliament, Official Report, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956, p. 13.

^{12.} United Nations, General Assembly Official Records (GOAR), 562nd Plenary Meeting, ES-I, 1 November 1956.

^{13.} United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-I), 3 November 1956.

accept."¹⁴ The resolution passed by a vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions.

The speed at which UNEF was subsequently organized was nothing short of amazing. Within 48 hours of the initial resolution being passed, the Secretary-General was able to cobble together his initial report, and in little more than a week later troops were on the ground with a mandate for peace. Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia all contributed troops to this pioneering peacekeeping mission and offers from a dozen other nations had to be turned down. According to Under-Secretary General Ralph Bunche, UNEF was "the most popular army in history, an army which everyone fights to get into." Whether consciously or not, it was with UNEF that the shape of UN peacekeeping really came into being. A 6,000 strong, lightly armed, 10 nation force, UNEF was, in the words of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, designed to be "para-military in nature," though "not a force with military objectives." 16

Yet despite the initial level of success in creating the force, Hammarsk-jöld freely admitted that "In order to gain the necessary time, I accepted a certain lack of clarity." ¹⁷ The Secretary-General was forced to concede the supremacy of Egyptian sovereignty over the UN mission, a decision that Pearson recognized, somewhat prophetically, ¹⁸ the UN might later come to regret. Yet it was a political trade-off without which the force never would have come into being. Even when UNEF's mandate was amended to include the patrolling of the Israeli-Egyptian border in February 1957, and the threat of conflict was no longer an imminent concern, no attempt was made to direct the UN to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Almost a decade before Egypt played the sovereignty card and insisted

^{14.} Quoted in Peter Calvocoressi, Suez: Ten Years After, ed. Anthony Moncrieff (New York, Pantheon Books, 1967), 133.

^{15.} Quoted in Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche (New York, W.W. Norton, 1993), 270.

^{16.} United Nations General Assembly, A/3302, 6 November 1956, available at https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Urquhart_A-3302_e.pdf

^{17.} United Nations General Assembly, A/3302, 6 November 1956, available at https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Urquhart A-3302 e.pdf

^{18.} Comments by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson to Questions put to him by Mr. Yousuf Karsh, September 1958, LAC, MG26 N2, Vol. 89.

upon UNEF's withdrawal, Pearson lamented that "the intervention of the United Nations was incomplete and only...partially successful." In Pearson's opinion the UN "failed to take advantage of the atmosphere of crisis and anxiety by tackling the problems, especially those of relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours, which brought about the crisis in the first place." General Burns, the most visible Canadian after Pearson to be involved with the conflict, also indicated that he would not wish to remain as the force commander, nor did he think that Canadian troops should be maintained with UNEF, unless a permanent solution to the problem was actively being sought. Nonetheless, so long as UNEF was able to facilitate a peaceful status quo in the Middle East, there was little impetus for diplomats to delve into the centuries-old debate surrounding the Arab-Israeli crisis, and nothing in the mandate of the peacekeeping mission required movement towards such a goal.

Peacekeeping, as it developed, was a far cry from what Pearson had originally envisaged. The presence of peacekeepers along the Israeli-Egyptian border was never intended to be of an indeterminate duration, nor was support for UNEF intended to be dependent on the dictates of individual UN member nations. Pearson regretted not insisting on a stronger mandate to deal with the underlying issues at UNEF's inception, though recognized that at the time it may have severely delayed or even scuttled the peacekeeping effort altogether. Time was of the essence, lest a regional conflict escalate to a global, and nuclear, scale. A decade later, when Egypt demanded the removal of UNEF's troops in 1967, the UN Secretary-General felt compelled to accede to the request and Pearson was forced to wistfully watch the drama unfold as war again broke out in the Middle East. A careful look at UNEF should dissuade UN officials from compromising on a mission's mandate and creating a situation in which the nations in conflict, rather than the UN itself, are the arbitrators of its presence.

Laudable as UNEF's creation was, member states felt little compunc-

^{19.} Comments by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson to Questions put to him by Mr. Yousuf Karsh, September 1958, LAC, MG26 N2, Vol. 89.

^{20.} Cairo to External, 24 December 1956, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, Vol. 6109, file 50372-40 [pt. 11.2].

tion to pay the costs associated with peacekeeping which left the UN teetering on the verge of bankruptcy throughout much of the 1960s. It was originally envisioned that the majority of peacekeeping costs would be borne by the UN, with contributing nations only picking up the tab for their individual troops' equipment and salaries.²¹ Budgeted at \$25 million for its first year – almost half the regular UN budget – the Secretary-General deemed it necessary to fund UNEF outside of the regular budget to ensure the peacekeeping force had access to the funds in a timely manner. However, not including UNEF in the regular UN budget made the force's costs seem extraordinary to some members.

In December 1956, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1089 by a vote of 62 to 8 with 7 abstentions, establishing that the costs of UNEF should be apportioned among the UN member states using the regular assessment scale.²² While the negotiations surrounding the resolution had been difficult and complex, given the fact that members of the General Assembly had originally approved the creation of UNEF and had also approved a mechanism for its financing, it was perhaps not entirely unreasonable for the Secretary-General to expect that UN members would remit payments in a timely manner. Few, however, were truly willing to follow through financially in support of such an expensive collective policy.

Ultimately, the problem of paying for UNEF was political, not financial. Canadian diplomats around the globe championed the UN's cause and preached the concept of collective financial responsibility, yet few nations heard the call. Throughout the 1960s the UN General Assembly only provided *ad hoc* financial support for peacekeeping operations to enable troops to be kept in the field. To appease the increasingly cost-conscious General Assembly, peacekeeping missions were consistently scaled-back in scope by the UN, while some were cancelled outright. UNEF felt the pinch as its budget was slashed from \$25 million to \$15 million. And

^{21.} United Nations General Assembly, A/3302, 6 November 1956, available at https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Urquhart A-3302 e.pdf.

^{22.} United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1089 (XI), 21 December 1956, available at https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50b-f6485256ce10072f637/c73b0379bdc6d7f3852560df006939d0.

yet, with the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967 – ten and half years into its mission – a permanent solution to the UN's financial predicament still had yet to be found.

Lacking the resolute support of all members of the Security Council, there was little that Canada – or the United Nations as an organization – could do to force recalcitrant states to support peacekeeping operations that they did not perceive to be in their national interest. As a result, peacekeeping in the 1950s and early 1960s was often of a reactionary, extemporized nature. With debts approaching \$60 million in 1959, the UN comptroller warned that the organization's fiscal situation was becoming dire.²³ Yet Dag Hammarskjöld was in no ways worried. "To my mind," the Secretary-General mused, "it is absolutely excluded that members would, for what really is a small amount of money, consider wrecking a most important political operation."24 Peacekeeping arrears at the end of 2016, however, amounted to a considerably larger sum than "a small amount of money": \$1.8 billion. Yet Secretary-General Antònio Guterres attests that "the overall financial situation of the Organization is generally sound."25 Perhaps Hammarskjöld was right to be unconcerned with the financial aspects of peacekeeping. If missions are in the interest of the permanent members of the Security Council, there is always a way to find financial support. Yet without a sound and predictable financial basis that is beyond the realm of politics, for those nations in need around the globe which are beyond the direct interests of the major powers, there are very clear limits as to what the UN, and peacekeeping, can achieve.

As the creation of UNEF helped restore peace in the Middle East and diplomats across the globe turned their attention towards how to pay for it, few people actually gave much thought to the difficulties facing the troops on the ground. As the first major UN deployment, UNEF and its Canadian commander, General E. L. M. Burns, were required to write the book on modern multinational peacekeeping operations. Faced with

^{23.} Permis NY to External, 3 June 1959, LAC, RG 19, series F2, vol. 4286, file 8204-11-2 (2).

^{24.} Permis NY to External, 14 August 1959, LAC, RG 19, series F2, vol. 4286, file 8204-11-2 (2).

^{25.} UN doc. A/71/440/Add.1, 8 May 2017.

limited resources, conflicting cultures, and backed only by moral authority, the odds were not in UNEF's favour. Each of the contributing nations came to the task with varying levels of professionalism and preparedness, and for Burns organizing these disparate contingents was a challenge hampered by language barriers, sovereignty issues, and of course financial constraints. Burns also had to walk a fine line so that his judgement could be trusted and respected by both Arabs and Israelis alike.²⁶ This was no easy task.

Military planners in Ottawa had originally intended to supply an infantry battalion for peacekeeping duty in the Middle East in 1956. But given the fact that Canadian soldiers were loyal to the same Queen, spoke the same language, and wore similar uniforms to the British troops troops that were still occupying parts of Egypt - President Nasser was, somewhat understandably, unwilling to allow a battalion of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada to deploy on Egyptian soil. Yet given Pearson's instrumental role in bringing UNEF into being, Nasser's refusal to allow Canadian troops to participate - and his ability to dictate to the UN which nations could or could not participate in the mission – was considered a slap in the face and the cause of considerable domestic embarrassment. A compromise of sorts was achieved when General Burns came to the conclusion that Canada was one of the few nations capable of providing vital logistics, signals, and transport elements for the mission.²⁷ Nasser again demurred to the idea of including Canadian soldiers in UNEF, but relented upon hearing that Burns would then be obliged to resign as the force commander.28

Even though Canada did not supply infantry troops, they provided personnel for nearly everything else from dentists to pay clerks to supply officers to engineers. Canadian doctors, medics, chaplains, and postal workers were even included in UNEF's makeup. To provide Canada some

^{26.} Blair Fraser, "How Tommy Burns Tries to Keep the Peace," *Maclean's* (19 January 1957): 19.

^{27.} Burns to Pearson, 19 November 1956, DHH, 410.019 (D3)

^{28.} Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, vol. 2, eds. John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis (University of Toronto Press, 1973), 263.

front-line exposure, and to downplay criticisms of Pearson's "typewriter army," a reconnaissance element was added to the Canadian contingent in February 1957.²⁹ With the permanent members of the Security Council excluded from service, Canada was one of the few nations with a well-trained and professional military capable of supplying specialized support troops. While this contribution may not have been deemed as desirable as a front-line infantry battalion, it was nonetheless vital to the success of the mission, and many considered it the core of the peacekeeping force.

Yet providing troops for UNEF was a challenge for the Canadian military. The original plan to send a self-contained infantry battalion such as the Queen's Own Rifles would have been relatively straight-forward. Plans were well entrenched as Canada had earmarked a stand-by battalion for UN duty since the end of the Korean War. Providing troops in a piecemeal fashion, however, was a task for which the military was less prepared. And in the case of the proposed reconnaissance squadron, the CAF were initially opposed to the idea as there were no mobile armoured units readily available, and if a squadron was pieced together for UN duty it would create difficulties for scheduled training exercises for the entire Armoured Corps. ³⁰ The same argument held true for other administrative and logistics troops assigned to UNEF.

The Canadian military also found themselves on unfamiliar ground with UNEF and had no idea what to expect. As the commanding officer of the first group deploying for Egypt briefed his troops: "I have no idea what you are going to be faced with. Do what you have to." And they

^{29.} Editorial, Globe and Mail (20 November 1956), 6; Cabinet Conclusions, 31 January 1957, LAC, RG2, vol. 1892.

^{30.} Chief of the General Staff to the Minister, 21 December 1956, DHH, Raymont Papers 73/1223, series 1, file 450; Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 18 December 1956, in Greg Donaghy, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 22, 1956-1957, Part I, DFAIT, 2001, document 203; Memorandum for the Minister of National Defence, 14 January 1957, DHH, 112.1.003 (D11), vol. 1.

^{31.} Interview with Col. (Ret'd) Arthur J. Byford, 8 February 2002, interview conducted by David W. Edgecombe, Canadian War Museum (CWM), George Metcalf Archival Collection (GMAC), Canadian War Museum Oral History Project (CWMOHP), 31D2 Byford.

did. While the Canadians had operated as part of larger forces in the First and Second World Wars, they had never directed headquarters and support staff activities. It was not until they arrived in theatre, however, that the Canadians were informed that they would be running the show. Nonetheless they relied on their training and set out to do their jobs the same as they would have in Canada, Germany, or any other locale. Canadians became known for their flexibility and ability to improvise as situations dictated. These skills continue to serve Canadian soldiers well around the globe and it is in their specialized capacities that Canada still has much to offer.

The expulsion of UNEF from Egypt in 1967 sounded a wake-up call for peacekeeping operations in general, and for the Canadians in particular, who had become very comfortable with their "helpful fixer" image. It also highlighted the deficiency of having a peacekeeping mission at the whim of its host. Though widely publicized in Canada at the time, this public humiliation has conveniently been forgotten and omitted from subsequent nostalgia regarding Canada's golden era of peacekeeping.

The reasons for Canada's, and UNEF's, withdrawal are generally regarded as a failure of peacekeeping, and are swept aside as an anomaly. But it is important to note that it was not a failure of peacekeeping in particular, but one of diplomacy in general. The peacekeepers did their job well and, so long as they were deployed, conflict between Egypt and Israel was contained so that it did not boil over into open conflict. Canada's Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, made this point crystal clear in a speech before the House of Commons in June 1967: "The fault is not with the peace keeping force – not at all – it is with the failure to come to grips with the social, economic and political problems that made the peace keeping force necessary in the first place." 32

UNEF managed to keep the peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border for over a decade, but it did so at a price: \$214 million spent, and 106 dead peacekeepers.³³ Of the 10,000 Canadians who served with UNEF,

^{32.} Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 22 June 1967, Second Session, Twenty-Seventh Parliament, vol. 112, no. 33.

^{33.} United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, Department of Public Information, 1996), 693.

32 died in the service of peace. And to what end? War broke out in the Middle East less than two weeks after the request for UNEF's withdrawal.

For Canada, the initial achievement in defusing the Suez Crisis, and Lester Pearson's subsequent Nobel Prize, equalled "success." This was the genesis of Canadian support of, and justification for, participation in future UN peacekeeping initiatives. Yet when considering the ability to create a lasting peace rather than merely to keep a peace – peacekeeping as imagined by the UN is ineffectual on its own. The UNEF, and other long-term missions in Cyprus or India and Pakistan, were all able to measure a degree of success in maintaining peace between hostile forces. However, all too often peacemaking did not go hand-in-hand with – or even follow – peacekeeping.

Broad questions of UNEF's success, or failure, miss its true value which is in the details. So, what can we learn from its history that applies to today and Canada's efforts to re-engage in peacekeeping? First of all, the details of UNEF's inception, or rather the lack of specific governing detail, made it difficult to mandate parallel peacemaking efforts while the peacekeepers kept things quiet on the ground – which ultimately led to a return to conflict. As it was, Canada's first peacekeeping effort taught a lesson that continues today to be a challenge and is, perhaps, the source of the current government's hesitancy to meaningfully re-engage: The parties in conflict need to ceaselessly strive for peace, and the UN needs to have structures in place to aid with these efforts.

Secondly, the details of UNEF's financing show the lack of accountability when it came to paying for peace, and subsequent budget cuts meant the force often subsisted hand-to-mouth. If peacekeeping is always seen as the "extra-curricular" activity of the UN rather than part of its core mandate, then its importance – and the need to pay for it – will always be questioned. This is particularly the case now as nations are slowly turning their gazes inwards. Financial participation being optional also highlights the "extra" in the extra-curricular. If peacekeeping is not part of the mandatory collective but rather remains at the behest of Security Council members that too have their own political agenda, then

the United Nations will never be able to fulfill its primary mandate "to maintain international peace and security."³⁴

Finally, the details of life on the ground during Canada's first peace-keeping effort demonstrate that peacekeeping is inherently difficult, and it always has been. Despite these difficulties, Canada and the UN rose to the challenge, and UNEF was able to make a valuable though temporary contribution to peace and stability throughout the Middle East, and throughout the world. Canada's contribution came by stepping up where others could not, where the CAF had the capacity or expertise to share. Precision peacekeeping so to speak, adding value where others cannot, and being particular and specific with the roles occupied is perhaps Canada's best contribution.

It is on these realities that the origins of Canada's peacekeeping legacy should rest, and the realities against which future operations should be judged and measured rather than behind the hazy, rose-coloured glasses of Canada's mythical success at peacekeeping.

^{34.} United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 1.1, available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter.

The History of Australian Peacekeeping

Peter Londey

On 14 September 2017, the Australian Peacekeepers' Memorial was dedicated in Anzac Parade, Canberra, a boulevard lined with war memorials to various campaigns, services, and allies. The date for the unveiling was carefully chosen, as it fell exactly 70 years after the day in 1947 when United Nations peacekeeping began. Most writers on peacekeeping treat either United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948 or United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I in 1956 as the beginning of peacekeeping. Australians have a different perspective and regard our own group of military observers in Indonesia in September 1947 as the first UN peacekeepers. I have written about this at length in a volume of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, but in the way of Official Histories that may reach a limited audience. So, in this paper I would like to lay out in brief the reasons for the Australian claim, partly to correct a historical misapprehension, but more because a close examination of the Indonesia operation can provide us with significant insight into – or, to take up the title of this volume, a new perspective on – the initial development of UN peacekeeping.1

^{1.} Peter Londey, Rhys Crawley and David Horner, The Long Search for Peace: Observer Missions and Beyond, 1947–2006, volume I of Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations (Cambridge

Australia has had peacekeepers in the field every single day of the more than 70 years since 14 September 1947, yet Australian claims to be a significant peacekeeping nation are overstated, and certainly pale into insignificance beside the similar but better-founded claims often made by Canada. In the second part of this paper, I will suggest reasons for Australia's more limited engagement with peacekeeping, while also commenting briefly on the qualities, good and bad, which Australian personnel bring to multinational peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping, and the Limitations of the United Nations Charter

Viewed through the long lens of history,² the UN Charter is a remarkable document. The Charter and its predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations, were something new in human history. There had even in the distant past been attempts at general peace agreements, such as the Common Peace agreements of 4th century BC Greece,³ but nothing which aspired both to universality and to a moral basis for international relations in the way which the Covenant and the Charter did. Nevertheless, the Charter is a puzzlingly naive document. It is a common observation that it is written as though all future conflicts will be of state against state and ignores intra-state conflict, and it is all too easy to point out that inevitably the drafters had in their minds the conflicts launched in the 1930s by aggressive states such as Germany, Italy, and Japan. Yet the

University Press, 2020), 31–133; for a statement of the arguments that Indonesia was the first peacekeeping operation, see 383–389. I had written on this earlier at Peter Londey, *Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2004), 13–28; Peter Londey, "Inventing Peacekeeping," in *Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field*, eds David Horner, Peter Londey and Jean Bou (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11–32.

^{2.} My own academic training was in ancient Greek history: hence the examples which follow.

^{3.} T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece (Oxford University Press, 1965); Jehne, M.J., Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v.Chr. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994).

most casual glance at history would have reminded them that conflict – bloody and destructive – could arise in all sorts of more complex ways, with attendant moral ambiguities. To take another example from Greek history, it is as though readers of Thucydides had remembered Melos but forgotten Corcyra.⁴ The blindness may well have been intentional: the leaders of the great powers which were driving the creation of the United Nations did not want a Charter which might justify interference in their own internal affairs.

Whatever the reason, the Charter was left deficient, especially in the apparent assumption underlying Chapter VII that, subject to fact-finding missions, moral clarity could always be assured. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Charter itself, and its underlying principles, stimulated the outbreak of internal and often morally ambiguous conflicts with its strong advocacy of decolonisation. This is one area where the Charter went much further than the Covenant, while at the same time displaying no appreciation on the part of its authors that, in practice on the ground, decolonisation was likely to be a messy process. The result was that most early peacekeeping operations were attempts to smooth the transition to decolonisation, or to manage the conflicts which flowed from it. Examples for Australian peacekeeping are conflicts in Indonesia, Kashmir, Israel, Cyprus, Zimbabwe, Namibia (and, more recently, Bougainville and East Timor). None of this is foreseen in the Charter.

Nor did the Charter provide adequate tools to deal with such conflicts.

^{4.} Thucydides 5.84–116 on the destruction of Melos by Athens, an act on which the UN Charter would have had a clear view. Compare 3.70–85 and 4.46–48, on *stasis* (violent internal conflict) at Corcyra, a situation not clearly covered by the Charter, though since exiles in neighbouring territories were involved, and since Athenians, Spartans and others joined in the conflict, an ancient Security Council might have been able to act on the grounds that the conflict was one "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 34). Similarly, since 1945 the Security Council has had to stretch the meaning of the Charter in order to intervene in largely internal matters which clearly called for an international response. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 1.1, available at https://www.un.org/en/abu-22.46/ll-charter.

^{5.} Compare Articles 73–77 of the Charter with Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

In a series of conflicts – Indonesia, the Middle East, Kashmir, Korea, Cyprus – the United Nations' efforts to bring the parties together through the tools offered in Chapter VI – negotiation, good offices, mediation – proved remarkably ineffectual at the macro level. It reminds me of an Australian policeman serving with United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) who once told me that the joke among the Australian police was that if someone infiltrated the buffer zone the police's only sanction was to call out, "Stop, or I'll say 'stop' again." On the other hand, Chapter VII provides the bluntest of blunt instruments, tragic when wielded badly (as in Korea), but usually simply too costly to allow it to be wielded at all.

Yet there was a middle way: military personnel (such as military observers) or forces (such as UNEF I) could be used in a way designed to keep peace rather than make war, and the idea of doing so was not new. The too quickly dismissed League of Nations provided the example of the International Force which supervised the Saar plebiscite in 1935. An account of the plebiscite had been published in 1940,6 but the stresses of a global war seem to have meant that this was soon forgotten: when Australian mediator in Kashmir, Sir Owen Dixon, was casting around in 1950 for a means of ensuring a free plebiscite in the Vale of Kashmir, he seems to have been quite ignorant of the precedent offered by the Saar force. Dixon did go as far as to imagine UN administration of the area, but proposed that, failing total demilitarisation, the UN administrators rely on the armies of the parties, India and Pakistan, for security.7

The Problem of Indonesia

These problems can be demonstrated in concrete form by turning to the problem of Indonesia, where (on my argument) the first UN peacekeepers were deployed in September 1947. At this time what is now Indonesia

^{6.} Sarah Wambaugh, The Saar plebiscite: with a collection of official documents (Harvard University Press, 1940).

^{7.} See UN S/1791, "Report of Sir Owen Dixon, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, to the Security Council" (15 September 1950), especially pages 18–25, available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/632731.

was the Dutch colonial territory of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), consisting of 14,000 islands, the largest and most populated being Java, Sumatra and much of Borneo. On the eve of the Second World War the population was approximately 70 million. The Dutch had exploited the area economically since the 17th century, and the state had taken over from private interests at the start of the 19th century. But despite professing policies to improve the economic well-being and education of the Indonesian population, resources were lacking and by 1930 only 7.4 percent of the local population was literate.⁸

Before the Second World War, Australians had generally been in total sympathy with such paternalistic white colonialism. A journalist, Richard Moorehead, who accompanied a trade delegation in 1933, enthused about the paradise which Java provided for its Indonesian population:

all the complexities and burdens of government they allow to rest on the broad and willing shoulders of their Dutch overlords. The white man rules and sweats in a to him almost insufferable climate, carrying the weight of a vast and complicated system of banking, trading, framing laws, administering justice, caring for the health and well being of over seventy million subjects. And the brown man obeys and smiles.⁹

Moorehead was, of course, wrong: the Indonesians did not "obey and smile," and before the Second World War numerous nationalist organisations sprang up, eventually ruthlessly quashed by the military superiority of the Dutch colonial government. But, as in so many places, the war changed everything, in ways which the United Nations both foresaw and failed to foresee. In the case of Indonesia, the Japanese occupation fatally interrupted Dutch control. The occupation was a disastrous period for the Indonesian population – perhaps 150,000 died as forced labour and there was widespread famine – but in a parting gesture before their surrender the Japanese allowed two prominent Indonesian leaders, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, to declare Indonesian independence on 17 Au-

^{8.} For a useful summary, see M.C. Ricklefs, *A history of modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 181–232.

^{9.} R. J. Moorehead, *The cruise of the goodwill ship* (Melbourne: Ruskin, 1934), 133.

gust 1945.10

The result, both on the ground and in international legal terms, was a mess. The British (under Lord Louis Mountbatten) accepted the Japanese surrender but did not have the resources to restore Dutch authority. Fighting broke out between many groups. The British had enormous problems in their attempt to reoccupy Java; fighting in Surabaya led to at least 6,000 deaths. The Dutch, who had hoped simply to walk back into their colony, found themselves faced by a formal entity, the Indonesian Republic, with its own armed forces and a determination to resist the Dutch reoccupation. The Republic was strong in Java and parts of Sumatra, but weak elsewhere. Yet its existence added to the legal ambiguity of the situation: the Dutch claimed, naturally, that conflict between themselves and Indonesians who were conducting an insurrection was an internal matter within their own territory, and not a matter for the United Nations. The Republicans regarded themselves as a separate state and wanted the United Nations to intervene.

Australia was too close geographically to remain uninvolved. The Dutch had been a wartime ally, but Australians were also very aware of the fact that in the future an independent Indonesia would be their nearest neighbour. As a white settler society which had ruthlessly suppressed its own indigenous population, and as a country which retained deep emotional ties to Britain, Australia might have been expected to side with the Dutch, and at first the government did. In January 1946, when the Ukraine proposed a Security Council commission to investigate the situation in Indonesia, Australia fell in behind Britain in rejecting Security Council involvement in Dutch internal affairs.¹³

^{10.} On the whole period, see M. C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 233–270 and n. 8. There are also many useful articles in Peter Post *et al.*, eds., *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

^{11.} M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 248–257 and n. 8.; William H. Frederick, "The Aftermath", in Peter Post et al., eds., The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 46–60 and n. 9.

^{12.} On the latter point, see Alan Rix, *Intermittent Diplomat: The Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. Macmahon Ball* (Melbourne University Press, 1988), 256–257.

13. Alastair Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (London:

But Australian views of Asia had matured considerably since Moorehead's comments in 1933. At the end of 1945 Australia had sent an academic political scientist, Macmahon Ball, to size up the situation. A fortnight after his arrival, he wrote in a memo that the situation was worse than Canberra had realised. Official reports had failed to capture the "general disorder, the shootings and street battles, the burning bitterness between Dutch and Indonesians." Ball was impressed by the British commander, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, who believed that only the United Nations could save the situation. The war had brought Australians into unprecedented contact with Asian cultures, and the old easy assumptions of white superiority were now under challenge. Ball himself was appalled at the brutal treatment of a Japanese officer with whom he shared a flight to Singapore, where the officer was to stand trial for war crimes.¹⁴ Australians also resented the apparent Dutch sense of superiority in Indonesia. An Australian judge, Richard Kirby, sent to investigate the murder of three Australian war crimes investigators, had been disturbed to see Indonesian servants prostrating themselves as they served food and drink in the Dutch governor's mansion.¹⁵

Australia had 50,000 troops in the NEI at the end of the war, but mainly in Borneo and other outer areas where the Japanese navy had run the occupation and had done less to encourage the nationalists than the army had in Java and Sumatra. Australia's Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, proposed that an Australian force should occupy the territory and establish a peaceful environment for negotiations. The idea was promptly vetoed by the Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, who simply wanted Australian troops home. ¹⁶ In any case, Australian instincts were always to

Stevens, 1960), 14–18, 43; Philip Dorling, ed., *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents 1947* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994), xiv–xv.

^{14.} Alan Rix, Intermittent Diplomat: The Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. Macmahon Ball (Melbourne University Press, 1988). 256–257 and n. 11.

^{15.} Blanche D'Alpuget, Mediator: A Biography of Sir Richard Kirby (Melbourne University Press, 1977), 55; On the changes wrought by Australian soldiers' wartime contact with Asian cultures, see Lachlan Grant, Australian Soldiers in Asia-Pacific in World War II (Sydney: NewSouth,, 2014).

^{16.} Cablegram E48, Evatt to Makin and Chifley, 23 November 1945; cablegram 1802, Chifley to Evatt, 26 November 1945, *Documents on Australian Foreign*

trust Britain, and for the time being Britain provided the occupying force and the auspices under which the Dutch and Indonesians could negotiate. In November 1946 the Dutch and Republicans agreed on a statement of principles, the Linggadjati Agreement, which would lead to Indonesian independence as a federal state. The British then departed, leaving the parties to thrash out the detail between them, but the Dutch now became increasingly intransigent, and final settlement never eventuated.

At this stage the nationalist Republicans controlled Java and Sumatra, apart from some small Dutch enclaves around Batavia and Surabaya, while the Dutch controlled the rest. In July 1947 the Dutch grew frustrated with negotiating and turned to military action, launching an invasion of Republican territory. Still projecting this as an internal matter of law and order, they termed it a "Police Action." In terms of the Charter, this could still be seen as a case of sovereign authorities putting down a local insurgency, though the formal status granted to the Indonesian Republic in the Linggadjati agreement did allow Evatt, who was a lawyer by trade, to argue that the Indonesian Republic would in future become a member of the United Nations, and that thus the United Nations could legitimately treat the conflict between the Republic and the Netherlands as an international one.¹⁷ That feels like special pleading, to get around the inadequacies of the Charter (which Evatt himself had helped to draft, as a moderately prominent spokesman for middle powers at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization).¹⁸

The Beginning of Peacekeeping

At this point, with active fighting continuing in Indonesia, both India and Australia referred the matter to the Security Council. India asked the

Policy, vol. VIII, docs. 411 and 414, available at https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/history-of-australian-diplomacy/Pages/documents-on-australian-foreign-policy

^{17.} Cablegram, Evatt to Burton, 23 July 1947, Philip Dorling, ed., *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents 1947* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994), n. 13, doc. 142.

^{18.} See W.J. Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1993).

Council to take action under Chapter VI, but Australia argued that the fighting constituted a breach of the peace as described in Article 39 and urged that the Council "take immediate action to restore International Peace and Security." But what could the Security Council do? It could scarcely be denied that fighting was taking place, but given the precarious legal status of the victim, the Indonesian Republic, it was unlikely that the full collective security regime outlined in Article 42 would find any support. In any case, in this period of post-war exhaustion it would take far more than altruism to encourage member states to provide forces to quell distant conflicts. Both Australia and Britain had had sizeable armies in Indonesia: both had been eager to get them home as soon as possible. The Security Council fell back on the obvious moves: it called for an immediate ceasefire, and then created two bodies: a Consular Commission, to report on the situation, and a Good Offices Committee (UNGOC) to help the parties negotiate a settlement.²⁰

The Consular Commission consisted of the six career diplomatic consuls posted to Batavia, who represented Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The consuls set about an energetic program of diplomatic inspection tours, but it was immediately apparent that fighting was continuing under cover of the ceasefire, as the Dutch mopped up Republican forces which they had simply bypassed in their advance. This was where the purely diplomatic approach proved limited, and where the diplomats on the ground, faced with concrete problems, started filling in the gaps in the Charter. The consuls needed more manpower, and in particular they needed more military experience if they were to assess what was really happening in the field. The driving forces for this view were the veteran American consul, Walter Foote, and the Australian, Charles "Moth" Eaton, a former air force officer who had spent part of the war bombing Timor. There is no

^{19.} W. R. Hodgson (acting Head of the Australian Permanent Mission to the UN) to Trygve Lie (UN Secretary-General), 30 July 1947, Philip Dorling, ed., *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents 1947* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994), n. 13, doc. 196.

^{20.} UN Security Council Resolutions 27 (1 August 1947), 30 and 31 (25 August 1947), available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0.

evidence that the idea came from the United Nations, but the US State Department in Washington may have been thinking along these lines. At its first meeting, on 1 September 1947, the Commission decided that each of the consuls was to ask their own government for military observers, and all six countries provided them.²¹ Their immediate objectives would be, "to observe any possible violations of the cease-fire order; to investigate, where possible, allegations of violations of the cease-fire order and to gather any other data that might be of value to the Consular Mission and to the Security Council."²²

Australia, sympathetic to the Republican cause and angry at Dutch encroachments, was very quick off the mark, and its four observers arrived in Batavia ahead of the rest, on 13 September. They were the first UN peacekeepers. The four were drawn from all three services: Brigadier Lewis Dyke, Major David Campbell, Commander Henry Chesterman, and Squadron Leader Lou Spence. The Commission was under pressure to report to the Security Council as soon as possible, so the four Australians did not wait for the other contingents to arrive but went into the field on 14 September 1947. The four split into two pairs, each inspecting one side of the conflict. When they re-joined each other in a fortnight, they combined their observations into a joint report. Their report was partly a factual account of conditions on either side, but also included some discussion of what the Security Council resolution calling on the parties to "cease hostilities" actually meant. Given that the resolution offered no guidance (and of course Security Council resolutions suffer from the Byzantine political processes required to produce them), the peacekeepers arrived at their own definitions, based on their military experience and their common sense. The joint report reflected a process of compromise between the two who had seen the Republican side up close

^{21.} Cable 295, Batavia (Eaton) to Canberra, 1 September 1947, Philip Dorling, ed., *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents 1947* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994), n. 13, doc. 309; cable 344, Batavia (Foote) to Washington, 3 September 1947, *FRUS* (Foreign Relations of the United States) 1947, Far East, vol. 6, doc. 845.

^{22.} UK memo, Batavia to London, 1 September 1947, UK National Archives: FO 810/4, vol. 1.

and those who had worked with the Dutch.²³ Thus, the process of impartial peacekeeping could begin.

The observers themselves now took over the role of developing peacekeeping practice, though the word "peacekeeping" was still some years in the future. They were very conscious that they were working for the United Nations rather than for their own governments and worked hard to maintain both neutrality and the appearance of neutrality. After a period, the observers were transferred to the operational control of the Committee of Good Offices (UNGOC), though they continued to be recruited by the Consular Commission. As the other nations' observers joined the Australians, the observer group became more organised and established a range of operating procedures. The senior observers formed a Military Executive Board, which tasked observers and reported to UNGOC. The observers worked in mixed nationality teams and reported jointly. Their functions soon moved beyond simple observation. They were to maintain contact with forces on both sides of the line, and would, if necessary, broker local ceasefires when fighting broke out. Their roles included repatriation of troops and families stranded on the wrong side of ceasefire lines; demarcation and monitoring of demilitarised zones; and humanitarian work. The principle was established that the observers could not issue orders to the parties but were "to assist in bringing both parties into agreement through the use of initiative, a sense of fair play, ingenuity and common sense."24 In 1948 they also acquired their own transport, white-painted jeeps, allowing them greater independence of movement.

Piece by piece, we can see many of the elements of the jigsaw of later UN peacekeeping put into place in Indonesia in 1947 and 1948. But as

^{23.} Brig. L.G.H. Dyke, Cdr H.S. Chesterman, Maj D.L. Campbell and Sq Ldr L.T. Spence, "Report of Australian military observing officers to the Consul General for Australia on the military situation in Java, August–September 1947", c. 1 October 1947, NAA (National Archives of Australia): A4355, 7/1/7/6 (shortened version at Philip Dorling, ed., *Diplomasi: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents* 1947 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994), n. 13, doc. 360).

^{24.} Much of this was set out, following a conference of observers, in Ungoc Milexboard Directive no. 4, "General instructions for military observers, Committee of Good Offices", 20 March 1948, NAA: A10158, 62.

in many places, the peacekeepers could mitigate the effects of conflict, and work to minimise violence, but could not themselves bring about a settlement. Settlement only came about when the Dutch overplayed their hand, launching a second "police action" in December 1948. International, and especially American, patience ran out, and the Dutch were forced to give Indonesia its independence in December 1949.25 But the idea of using military personnel in a neutral capacity - what we would call peacekeepers – prospered, and military observers soon turned up in Greece (with the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UN-SCOB)), Israel (UNTSO), Kashmir (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)) and Korea (United Nations Commission On Korea [UNCOK]). Even in cases where UN diplomacy failed completely, such as Israel and Kashmir, peacekeepers could add a little stability and help to minimise the outbreak of further conflict. But it was in Indonesia that this practice first began, though it quickly gathered pace. The first mention of "military assistants" (the usual UN term for military observers at this stage, though in fact "military observers" was very soon being used in Indonesia) in a UN resolution seems to be in the Security Council resolution of 1 November 1947, asking the Consular Commission to continue to make them available to UNGOC.²⁶ In Greece UNSCOB did acquire observers in January 1948, but they had not been specified in the General Assembly resolution setting it up in October 1947.²⁷ Similarly, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK),

^{25.} For two insiders' accounts of this process, see Alistair M. Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960); John Coast, *Recruit to Revolution: Adventure and Politics during the Indonesian Struggle for Independence* (London: Christophers, 1952); On the Second Police Action and its consequences, see Groen, P.M.H., "Dutch armed forces and the decolonization of Indonesia: the Second Police Action (1948–1949), a Pandora's box", *War and Society* 4, No. 1 (1986): 79–104.

^{26.} UN Security Council Resolution 36 (1 November 1947), available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0.

^{27.} UN General Assembly Resolution 109 (21 October 1947), available at https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/76; UNSCOB's predecessor, the Commission of Investigation set up by the General Assembly on 19 December 1946 (resolution 15) never acquired military staff. R.E. Riggs and J.C. Plano, *The United Nations: international organization and world politics*, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth: Belmont, 1994), 113–114, see UNSCOB as the first peacekeeping operation, but

set up in November 1947 was given no military assistants;²⁸ its successor, the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK), did acquire military observers, though they are not specified in the General Assembly resolution setting it up.²⁹

Australian Politics and Peacekeeping

Since September 1947, Australia has been a consistent contributor to multinational peacekeeping, most often but not always for the United Nations: Australia has also contributed to non-UN operations led by the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand, and Australia itself has led the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville (1998-2003), International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in East Timor (1999–2000), and the International Peace Monitoring Team (2000-02) and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (2003-17) in Solomon Islands. Altogether, Australians have served in over 50 missions in around 28 theatres. But I would not say that Australia has been a great peacekeeping nation, and I would not endorse the title of a chapter in a recent book produced by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Australia and UN peacekeeping: steady and unwavering support."³⁰ Australian peacekeeping has been characterised by brief periods of enthusiasm punctuated by long periods of neglect, and a nation which has provided somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 peacekeepers over the last seventy years has, at the time of writing, just 60 in the field (in UNTSO, the Multinational Force and Observers [MFO], United Nations

have presumably overlooked the early deployment of observers in Indonesia because they were not mentioned in the initial Security Council resolutions.

^{28.} UN General Assembly Resolution 112 (14 November 1947), available at https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/76; As Wainhouse observes, UNTCOK "was neither intended nor suited to perform peace observation functions," D.W. Wainhouse, *International peace observation: a history and forecast* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 327. I thank Walter Dorn for a valuable discussion concerning UNTCOK.

^{29.} UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (12 December 1948), available at https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/76.

^{30.} Moreen Dee, in Australia and the United Nations, eds., James Cotton and David Lee (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012), 228–264.

Mission in South Sudan [UNMISS] and *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies* pour la stabilisation au Mali [MINUSMA]).³¹ Australian civilian police, who had a long tradition of peacekeeping, in Cyprus (from 1964 to 2017) and a number of other places, have now left the peacekeeping field altogether.

While Canadian peacekeeping has suffered a somewhat comparable decline, over the years Canada can still make a claim to having been a "peacekeeping nation" that Australia cannot match. A big part of the difference is down to perceptions of geography. Australians, perched at the south-eastern tip of Asia, have traditionally felt insecure about their remoteness from their European and American allies. European Australians have been fantasising enemies for a long time: Russia, China, Japan, even Indonesia. Many Australians remain convinced that the Japanese were on the verge of invading Australia in 1942 (it is not, in fact, true) and fail to see that distance and the vastness of the Australian landmass constitute significant protections. The result has been that both major political parties have been consistent supporters of the alliance with Britain and the United States. Only one side of politics, the centre-left Australian Labor Party (ALP), has also expressed enthusiasm for the multilateral ideals of the United Nations, and as a result three of Australia's periods of greater enthusiasm for peacekeeping have coincided with Labor governments.³²

The first period, in the 1940s, coincided with the term of Dr. H.V. Evatt as Minister for External Affairs. As noted above, Evatt was deeply committed to the United Nations, and Australia played a part in UN attempts to settle conflicts in Indonesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, and

^{31.} Current numbers (September 2021) appear to be 12 in UNTSO, 27 in the MFO (both in the Middle East), 20 in UNMISS (South Sudan), and 1 in MINUSMA (Mali). See http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/ (accessed 26.9.2021). These 60 peacekeepers are a small proportion of the well over 1,200 Australian military personnel currently deployed overseas.

^{32.} For a more detailed account, see Peter Londey, "Australia and peacekeeping", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 18 (2014): 175-194. For accounts of Australian peacekeeping in general, on which the following pages draw, see Peter Londey, *Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2004), n. 1; and the various volumes of the *Official History of Australian Peacekeeping*, *Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011–2020).

Korea. Evatt himself played a significant role in the partition of Palestine.³³ Directly or indirectly, this led to the service of Australian peace-keepers in Indonesia from 1947, Korea and Kashmir from 1950, and the Middle East from 1956.

But after Evatt's party, the ALP, lost office in 1949, the emphasis shifted from instinctive multilateralism to support for Britain and the Commonwealth on the one hand and on the other for the United States as leader of the "free world" against communism. So, although Evatt had shown an interest in Kashmir, by the time Australia provided mediator Sir Owen Dixon in 1950, Lieutenant General Robert Nimmo as commander of UNMOGIP from 1950 to 1966, and observers from 1952 to 1985, this was driven largely by the fact that India and Pakistan were fellow members of the British Commonwealth. In 1950 Australia provided observers to UNCOK in Korea, and they would play an important role in establishing that North Korea initiated hostilities in June 1950. Yet when the United Nations requested a more senior officer as Chief Military Observer, Australia refused, citing manpower shortages. But once the war broke out, and it became necessary to support Cold War allies, Australia sent 17,000 troops over the next three years. As conflict increased in Australia's own region, in British Malaya, between Indonesia and Malaysia, and in Vietnam, Australian reluctance to deploy peacekeepers to distant areas increased. Australian police served with UNFICYP in Cyprus from 1964 to 2017, but they were only there in the first place because policy officers in the Department of External Affairs mounted a determined rear-guard action to overturn government reluctance to contribute.

The Australian attitude changed during the brief Labor Party government of Gough Whitlam, from 1972 to 1975. Whitlam, who had long opposed Australian participation in the Vietnam War, believed strongly in the multilateral alternative to Cold War politics. In 1974 he told the UN General Assembly, "we wish Australia to be always among the first nations from which the UN would ask for peacekeeping forces: we shall

^{33.} See Daniel Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

be among the first to respond."³⁴ Sadly he had no chance to make good on this promise, as Australia was passed over in the search for contributors to UNEF II and United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), though after Whitlam lost office the earlier Australian offer to UNEF II did result in Australian helicopters flying in the Sinai in the late 1970s.

Whitlam was succeeded by an unusual Liberal Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, who, while not a great fan of the United Nations, did have a marked social conscience about the world at large, and was especially hostile to racism in southern Africa. Fraser helped push the British government towards the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979, and Australia contributed to the resulting Commonwealth Monitoring Force which monitored the cantonment (though not disarmament) of the Patriotic Front guerrillas in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), leading to free universal elections in March 1980, and black majority rule. This was a dangerous operation conducted in a highly volatile environment. The Australian command were suspicious of white Rhodesian intentions, but also of the British, fearing that the latter might try to avert a victory by the overwhelmingly popular Robert Mugabe. These fears proved unfounded, but the Australian fears remind us that on this occasion Australia was trying to lead Britain, not to follow it. Alliance politics had become more complex. With excessive trepidation, Fraser also agreed to join the US-led MFO in the Sinai, and a promise made by the Fraser government later resulted in an Australian contribution to United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.

When the Labor Party returned to power in 1983, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, a veteran of opposition to Vietnam, was hostile to overseas deployments in general. But in September 1988 he was replaced as foreign minister by Gareth Evans, and Australia entered its most outward-looking period of peacekeeping. Evans, like Evatt and Whitlam, believed in the multilateral ideal. In concert with staff of the

^{34.} Address by Prime Minister of Australia, E. G. Whitlam, to UN General Assembly (30 September 1974), available at https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00003410.pdf, 7.

Department of Foreign Affairs he wrote a book, Cooperating for Peace, 35 trying to set out how the United Nations could be more effective. Evans was both intelligent and dynamic, and for a brief period under his influence Australia became what might be termed a "peacekeeping nation." Evans was, of course, aided in this endeavour by arriving in the position just as the end of the Cold War was opening up new possibilities for the United Nations. Australia contributed engineers to Namibia, observers on the Iran-Iraq border, mine-clearance specialists in Pakistan and Afghanistan, signallers in Western Sahara and, by Australian standards, major contingents in Cambodia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Under Evans Australia played significant roles in arriving at a peace agreement in Cambodia and in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention: Australia was, for a time, fully committed to the multilateral approach. In 1993 there were over 2,000 Australian peacekeepers in the field, far more than at any point previously. For the Australian Defence Force, a dozen years after the end of Vietnam, this was all good news: meaningful overseas service after years of stagnation, and rehabilitation in public estimation.

It did not last – just as the international community became wary of peacekeeping in the wake of disasters in Somalia and Rwanda, in 1996 the Labor Party lost office to the Liberal government of John Howard. In the event, Australia did a lot of peacekeeping under Howard, but the motivation had changed considerably. These were operations in Australia's own region, in Bougainville (part of Papua New Guinea), East Timor (now Timor Leste), and Solomon Islands, and Australian participation was driven by a desire for regional security rather than multinational engagement. Back in 1964, arguing the case for Australian participation in UNFICYP, External Affairs officer Patrick Shaw had put the view explicitly that peacekeeping was best done in distant places where Australian interests were not involved.³⁶ That approach, which helped underwrite

^{35.} Gareth Evans, Cooperating for peace: the global agenda for the 1990s and beyond (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), I should say, as a disclaimer, that Evans was until recently Chancellor of my university. For Evans' own account of many of the issues with which he dealt, see Gareth Evans, *Incorrigible optimist: a political memoir* (Melbourne University Press, 2017).

^{36.} Patrick Shaw to Minister for External Affairs [Sir Garfield Barwick], 20 April

Australian peacekeeping deployments in Asia, Africa, and Europe, has now been thoroughly abandoned.

The so-called "war on terror" saw large numbers of Australian troops serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. The numbers have now reduced, but as late as 2018 there were still over 1,600 personnel on deployment in the Middle East. Up to 600 ADF personnel contribute to efforts to prevent refugees ("illegal maritime arrivals") from reaching Australia, and to protect Australian maritime interests in other ways.³⁷ That compares with the 60 current Australian peacekeepers noted above. There appears to be little or no public pressure to alter this balance.

Internationalism Versus National Interest

Australia is a nation of migrants and travellers, ³⁸ yet the cosmopolitanism of individuals such as H.V. Evatt, Patrick Shaw, Gough Whitlam, and Gareth Evans is not always in evidence. Despite so many Australians being born overseas, the general population is often insular to the point of xenophobia. Australia runs a particularly brutal regime to turn away asylum seekers, with evident public approval. In 2020, Australia's response to Covid-19, again with plentiful public support, was to close its borders so tightly that even many Australians remain stranded overseas. Nevertheless, Australians have generally appeared supportive of contributions to multinational peacekeeping, mainly on compassionate grounds, and are very possibly indifferent to whether support is being given to people in crisis in Somalia or Solomon Islands.

For governments the stakes are different. Politicians operate like boards of companies: the latter focus on short-term profit and sharehold-

^{1964,} NAA: A1838, 913/5/1 pt 1.

^{37.} Deployment numbers are available at http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/. 38. Almost 30 per cent of Australia's population was born overseas (data available at https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/migration-australia/latest-release), while although the 11 million arrivals of Australians returning from overseas in 2019 (before COVID-19) includes a lot of double-counting of individuals, it is still a lot in a population of 25 million (data available at https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/industry/tourism-and-transport/overseas-arrivals-and-departures-australia/dec-2019#resident-returns-annually-2019).

ers' dividends; in a similar way, politicians profess a narrow concern with some ill-defined "national interest." Gareth Evans had to cloak compassion and altruism with the phrase, "good international citizenship," even when the public was well ahead of the politicians in wanting to help in, say, Rwanda in 1994³⁹ (just as the public is today well ahead of the government in its desire for action on climate). The decisions on peacekeeping are made by politicians, not by the public, and the politicians can see a big difference between Somalia and Solomon Islands. The latter is in Australia's area of strategic interest, along with Bougainville and Timor Leste. Africa is not, yet Australia has contributed to peacekeeping operations in the Congo (albeit in a small way), Zimbabwe, Western Sahara, Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Sudan, and South Sudan.⁴⁰ Sometimes internationalism does prevail.

This difference between internationalism and national interest makes itself felt at the political, and to some extent the bureaucratic level.⁴¹ Apart from Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's interest in southern Africa (which came out of a personal abhorrence of racism, not always shared by his conservative colleagues), Australia's more far-flung peace-

^{39.} Jean Bou somewhat dismissively refers to this as the "CNN effect" (Bou, Jean et al., *The limits of peacekeeping: Australian missions in Africa and the Americas*, 1992–2005, volume IV of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 226, but the fact is that once the public is informed about human suffering, many people are inclined to do something about it. This idea is observed upon in this book by Dorn, Carroll, Holm – even though at times governments are more realist - and these ideas are imbued in the discussion of R2P by Nsia-Pepra.

^{40.} To this list may be added very small numbers in Ethiopia/Eritrea and Sierra Leone. I have not included Egypt, since Australia has traditionally regarded the Middle East as an area of strategic interest, initially because of the importance of the Suez Canal for Australian trade.

^{41.} In the 1990s in Australia, for example, there were significant differences between departments over peacekeeping: the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade took the internationalist approach, often supported by the Australian Defence Force, which was keen for operational experience. In between was the Department of Defence, concerned to see that Defence dollars were directed towards the security of Australia and thus often opposed to proposals for peacekeeping. For a brief discussion, see David Horner and John Connor, *The good international citizen: Australian peacekeeping in Asia, Africa and Europe,* 1991–1993, volume III of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 22–28.

keeping adventures have generally been initiated by Labor, the party of Evatt, Whitlam, and Evans.⁴² The Liberal-National coalition has been more influenced by the need for security in its own region, or pursuing "national interest" via alliance politics. Under a Liberal government in 1965, Australians went to Vietnam as a payment on the American insurance policy in south-east Asia.⁴³ For almost twenty years from 2001, Australians fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, an area well outside any immediate Australian interest, but for the same reason: to show support for the alliance. Unfortunately, peacekeeping does not have any such powerful external sponsors, and it will take another period of "good international citizenship" to revive Australian peacekeeping. At present, that seems some way off.

Australian Peacekeepers

In the course of my research, I have interviewed many Australian peace-keepers, who have universally told me that Australians carry out this role peculiarly well. Obviously, this is not reliable testimony. The Australian self-image as peacekeepers is as people who, when they see a problem, do something about it. I think this is an Australian characteristic – at least it is a quality which is esteemed in Australian society. Australian personnel are for the most part well trained, energetic, and willing to show individual initiative. To other people, of course, these characteristics may

^{42.} Even in the case of Indonesia in 1947, outlined above, in which Australia was scarcely disinterested, having become a member of Ungoc as the nominee of the Indonesian Republicans, it can be argued that for people like H.V. Evatt and his influential Departmental Secretary, John Burton, support for the principle of decolonisation and self-determination was more important than a desire for good relations with one of Australia's closest neighbours. Certainly Australia presented its position as supporting "the principles of the United Nations, including the stated principle of self-government" (Burton, speech to New Delhi conference on Indonesia, 20 January 1949; see David Lee, ed., *The Transfer of Sovereignty: Australia and Indonesia's Independence: Documents 1949*, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998), 112, n. 117.

^{43.} The fullest account of the political calculations is Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts* 1948–1965 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992).

simply make them appear meddlesome, unwilling to leave a system which works in place, and unduly arrogant in their approach. I am not aware of many studies in Australia of how Australian peacekeepers appear to others. One published study on East Timor, after INTERFET, found that many other participants, especially those from Asian countries, found the Australians brash and over-confident: even in little things, like their love of wearing reflective sunglasses and of giving rapid-fire briefings in English to non-native speakers, the Australians did not endear themselves to peacekeepers from other countries.⁴⁴

At the same time, Australians' traditional sympathy for the underdog has helped them, as peacekeepers, to work with the victims of violence and intimidation. In places like Indonesia and Zimbabwe, this helped overcome any innate tendency to side with the white colonialists who otherwise might have seemed obvious recipients of Australian sympathy. Whether this will continue is hard to say. Australia, with the exception of the civilian police, has never trained its forces specifically for peacekeeping. Rather, soldiers have in effect trained themselves on the job, employing (to quote the words of the peacekeepers in Indonesia in 1948),45 "the use of initiative, a sense of fair play, ingenuity and common sense." That works best when there is a regular tempo of peacekeeping. Australia's largest peacekeeping operation was in East Timor from 1999, where many of the troops had had earlier peacekeeping experience in the large operations of the 1990s. That dynamic is now steadily eroding, as increasing numbers of defence personnel have chiefly had experience fighting wars, principally in Afghanistan and Iraq, sometimes with considerable brutality: damning accusations have, for example, been made recently against Australian special forces in Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Despite the

^{44.} Alan Ryan, "Primary responsibilities and primary risks": Australian Defence Force participation in the International Force East Timor (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000).

^{45.} Alan Ryan, "Primary responsibilities and primary risks": Australian Defence Force participation in the International Force East Timor (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), n. 24.

^{46.} See Australia, Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Report of an inquiry ... into questions of unlawful conduct concerning the Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan (Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), public

new Peacekeepers' Memorial, Australia has only had brief periods as a "peacekeeping nation." Whether it can or will choose to return to that role remains to be seen.

Author Note

I would like to thank Professor Magali Deleuze of the Royal Military College of Canada for inviting me to the conference at which I read an earlier version of this chapter, her and her staff for making me welcome in Kingston, and other participants for a very stimulating conference. I would also like to thank Howard Coombs and the anonymous readers for their help in bringing this chapter to publication.

version available at https://afghanistaninquiry.defence.gov.au/.

A Clash of Ideals? American Victory Culture and the Debate over Peacekeeping

Michael Holm

During the final years of the Bill Clinton administration, the debate over the United Nations and especially its peacekeeping operations reached a fever pitch in Washington. The 1990s had witnessed a cacophony of shifting opinions, viewpoints, and ideals as American policymakers, officials, intellectuals, and reporters debated the United States' role in the new post–Cold War world. For a brief euphoric moment in 1991, President George H. W. Bush could speak of a New World Order in which the UN through its international legitimacy as the gatekeeper of justice finally assumed its historical role of the universal warden of the peace and the guarantor of human rights. If the UN had been stymied by the Cold War for the better part of four decades, the President was now ready to unleash the forces "worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children's future."

Bush was hardly alone in expressing such exalted ideals. Americans

^{1.} George H. W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," (29 January 1991), available at https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-29-1991-state-union-address.

joined in aplenty. Most who spoke in such terms assumed that the United States would be in the vanguard of the world organization and that American values would shape the UN's actions and future. They did so not simply because the spoils of the Cold War went to the victor, but because they detected harmony between the United Nations' ideals and the principles they associated with the United States. Albeit through a slightly different prism, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama in 1989 had draped the future of mankind in very similar terms. In his widely read article and later book The End of History, Fukuyama insisted that the liberal democracies' victory against fascism in the Second World War and Communism in the Cold War ensured that no competing ideologies existed to challenge the Western vision of the world. Future conflicts, Fukuyama argued would be small and isolated rather than global.² So firm and widely held was this belief that the UN and the Wilsonian vision had, after all, stood the test of time that even George Frost Kennan, the old realpolitik advocate and arch-critic of international moralism and legalism, conceded that the nation's 28th president who led the United States into the Great War in 1917 on the belief that the "right was more precious than peace" had not been wrong but simply ahead of his time.³

Kennan's view was in lockstep with the public's interest. In the early 1990s American popular support for the United Nations stood at nearly double the level of the mid-1980s. By 1997, 85 percent of Americans insisted that the UN "plays a necessary role in the world." Such considerable support was not unusual. A Gallup poll taken within a week of the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 found that despite the loss of 18 American lives in Somalia, close to 60 percent of Americans not only supported peacekeeping missions but US troop contributions to such missions. Six years later, that number had climbed to 75 percent. This pop-

^{2.} Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* (Summer, 1989); *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, 1992).

^{3.} John G. Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 49; A discussion concerning the history of the post-Cold War international security environment and its relationship to a peace-keeping is contained in the Conclusion.

^{4.} According to Gallup, 54% of Americans believed that the U.N. was doing a

ular support has often stood in contrast to the view of the United States Congress. The legislature recoils from UN peacekeeping missions in part because the UN perpetually lacks the resources to operate effectively, because of its weak institutional structural design in the realm of mission-execution – be it peacekeeping or peace enforcement – and perhaps most importantly Congress has for almost a century, consistently worried about multinational organizations threatening the legislature's influence over foreign policy. This congressional opposition to the UN has had serious consequences. Not only for America's role in the world but especially for the millions of people on whose behalf, the United States has refused to intervene abroad. Although hardly a supporter of peacekeeping, then House Member Dick Cheney (R-WY) captured the problem succinctly in the 1980s. At heart Congress is a deliberative body. Its nature is compromise.⁵ In the realm of overseas UN operations, Congress' insistence on scrutinizing every UN measure and its exhaustive decision-making process undermines the kind of assertive leadership necessary to deter regimes, war lords, terror organizations, and rulers from unleashing violence against neighboring states or against minorities within their own borders. The cruel irony is that American politicians' refusal to intervene or to provide more than a token amount of support measures poorly both with America's traditional role in the world and with the views the American public have historically held about the UN This view found its roots not in isolationism - a sentiment many historians have long since rejected as myth – but rather in post-1945 optimism. Among historians, a new perspective is emerging that moves the debate about the United Nations away from simple dichotomies of "realism" and "idealism" or "isolationism" and "internationalism." Seeking to provide a fuller understanding of America's global role in the era of the United Nations, this chapter builds on this scholarship to contrast the highly ideological optimism that Americans placed in the new organizations, in moderniza-

good job. In the mid-1980s, the number had hovered in the 20th percentile. Also see Steven Kull, "Misreading the Public Mood," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 51 (1995): 55–59.

^{5.} Richard Cheney, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Who's in Charge?", SAIS Review 4, No. 1 (Winter-Spring, 1984): 107–115.

tion visions and in the UN and its operations with the gloomy outlook that too often prevails. It also provides an interesting complement to the preceding chapters concerning the impact of national politics on peace-keeping, as wells as the sometimes dissonance of those governmental viewpoints with public opinion.

For the UN, the history of peacekeeping has been a checkered one; occasionally successful but often operations – or attempted ones – have been marred by institutional restraints, a lack of direction, and a lack of power. Congo in the 1960s and Somalia in the 1990s fall in the latter category. In the United States, Somalia remains the epicenter of congressional criticism. Just as "Munich" has become an accepted metaphor lambasting appeasement so "Mogadishu" became shorthand for everything that is wrong with the UN and US involvement in peace operations. Anchored in broad opposition to any multinational operation under the UN umbrella, this view shows little interest in distinguishing between the complex differences that surrounded the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from the later Unified Task Force (UNITAF). In the political mindset, UNOSOM and UNITAF have simply merged to serve as a vehicle intended to obstruct any expansion of an American UN operational role. The Minnesota Republican Senator Rod Grams captured this sentiment well at a Senate Subcommittee Hearing on "United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Their Proliferation" in August 2000. Like many other conservatives, Grams specifically targeted the Clinton Administration's support for what former UN Ambassador and then Secretary of State Madeline Albright dubbed "Assertive Multilateralism." Albright's philosophy of global leadership – in many respects a holdover from the George H. W. Bush administration - rested on the idea that working alongside international partners inside and outside of the UN, the US could reduce cost and casualties while increasing the effectiveness of operations targeting atrocities and other breaches of international peace.6 It was not a sentiment for which Grams had much sympathy. "I

^{6.} James D. Boys, "A Lost Opportunity: The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991-1993)," *European Journal of American Studies* (Online) 7, No. 1 (Spring 2012).

thought the tragedy in Somalia, where the administration sacrificed the lives of 18 brave American soldiers without regard to whether such action advanced our vital national interests, marked the end of U.S. support for such forays, but I was wrong." In his prepared statement, Grams proceeded to chastise proposed UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, dismissing any notion that peacekeeping operations could lead to nation-building. By 2000, Grams was hardly alone. Scores of congressmen and conservative writers were vying for a restrained American global role and Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush, not without irony, spoke of drastically scaling back American overseas commitments and bring a halt to nation-building policies. Bush's eventual Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton who made a career out of denouncing the UN and advocating cuts to its budget, forcefully insisted that the UN's mission mattered only when in lockstep with American national interests. Bush's eventual interests.

Interrupted as it was by the neoconservatives' far more traditional embrace of a US internationalism and the aggressive advance of American principles overseas in the early 2000s, the antagonistic anti-internationalism of the post-Somalia era reflected an ever-present clash between national interests and ideals. Often boiled down to a clash between realism and idealism, these conflicting philosophies are not new to historians of American policy, of course. But if scholars have spent much time "siloing" presidents and advisers in one category or the other, less energy has been devoted to the importance of this clash and why it is decidedly more important in Americans' relationship with the world than is the case for any other western country. A distinction between the United States and

^{7.} United States Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Their Proliferation*, 106th Congress (5 August 2000).

^{8.} For examples of such criticism see: Ernest W. Levefer, "The Limits of U.N. Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993): 17–20; John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs* 73, No. 1 (January-February, 1994): 56–66; Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, No. 6 (November-December, 1994): 20–33; Max Boot, "Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping," *Foreign Affairs* 79, No. 2 (April 2000): 143–148.

other western nations is important because ideology matters to Americans in a way it does not Europeans, Australians, or Canadians, None of this is to say that other western nations do not possess ideals, it is rather to draw a distinction between ideals and ideology. For example, it was ideals and a sense of duty that in the late 1990s inspired British Prime Minister Tony Blair's doctrine of Humanitarian Interventionism in response to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Kosovo. During visits with refugees in camps in Kosovo Blair saw the misery brought on by Slobodan Milosevic's armies and learned firsthand the stories of murder, rape, and looting. His call for a ground invasion to support NATO's bombing campaign and his willingness to commit some fifty thousand British troops to a coalition ground force rested on his refusal to once again stand on the sidelines while an emerging slaughter of civilians took place. It was a humane and a humanitarian response above all. In contrast, when Americans went to war in Vietnam, in Iraq, and the manner in which they fought the Cold War, they did so, on the basis of a universal ideology and the idea of global principles. However flawed it may have appeared at times, democracy-promotion undergirded by theories of modernization have traditionally been the key ingredients inspiring the projection of American foreign policy. This is because the United States at heart is a very ideological nation and much like the ideologues on the far right and the far left that Americans helped defeat in the 20th century, the US embodies a particular victory culture that is deeply wrapped up in a self-perceived sense that theirs is the exceptionalist nation. Although this victory culture has remained reliably present in the American mind since the Revolution, it crystalized across political party lines and in the national perception in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. What historians often refer to as the consensus era – the period when the

^{9.} On the role of ideology and convictions see for example: Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Cornell University Press, 2010); David Ekblad, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton University Press, 2011); and, Michael Holm, The Marshall Plan: A New Deal for Europe (Routledge, 2016).

combined victory against fascism and the new struggle against international Communism brought Americans together – the post-1945 moment cemented a widespread national can-do attitude that came to dominate much of the debates about a more activist US role in the world. Support for democratic forces, new initiatives in foreign aid policy in Europe and around the world, membership and indeed leadership in international organizations inspired the "grand expectations" that Americans had of themselves. To borrow from the great historian of colonial history Gordon Wood, "[T]o be an American is not to be someone, it is to believe in something." To many Americans what this means is that if their nation is not "leading the world toward liberty and free government, then what is their "history all about?" ¹¹

To understand the American view of the UN's role in principle on one hand and particular missions on the other, requires acknowledgement of the depth and breadth of this ideology in the American mind. This helps clarify why Americans embrace peacekeeping as an essential vehicle to solve international crises but also manage to view it as a costly and more than anything, weak response to international crises; a response that a nation whose ideology is driven by perceptions of victory struggle to commit itself to.

This distinction between ideals and ideology is significant when considering the manner in which American approach questions of peace-keeping. Especially so because this raises questions about the contradictory context in which this anti-UN involvement view actually subsists. Even if the dismissive view presented by Grams and Bolton often wins

^{10.} On postwar victory culture see for example: James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States*, 1945-1974 (Oxford University Press, 1997); Wilson D. Miscamble, *From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade Against the Soviet Union*, 1945-1956 (Manchester University Press, 1999); Michael Holm, *The Marshall Plan: A New Deal for Europe* (Routledge, 2016). This victory culture temporarily vanished in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. On this, see Tom Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Nation*, rev ed. (University of Massachusetts Press, 2007).

^{11.} Gordon S. Wood, *The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States* (Penguin Press, 2011), 322–332.

out in the American foreign policy narrative, Americans have been - and continue to be – far more supportive of the United Nations, the United States' role in that organization, and especially about peacekeeping than critics let on. None of this is to imply that there is no ambivalence in American thinking about the United Nations. Stated differently, Americans believe in the ideology of the UN, but they have a harder time reconciling its grand promises with engagements at the operative level. Policymakers and national security advisers may operate in real-time, and their role is to assess the viability of an organization and its operations in that temporal context. Of more interest to historians of American foreign relations, however, is the manner in which the public, intellectuals and advisers assess the United Nations and its operative role on the long axis. This is so, because it helps us understand something fundamental about the United States as a nation but also because it should give those who favor an enlarged role for the UN cause at least for cautious optimism regarding the US future role in the organization.

In response to Grams' tirade in 2000, the Brookings Institution's Michael O'Hanlon in front of the Senate insisted that in "foreign policy terms, the United States derives much of its legitimacy as a world leader from the moral dimension of its foreign policy." Invoking Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan, O'Hanlon went on to insist that "...it is noteworthy that the World War II and post–World War II generations helped solidify democracy, helped solidify market economies. This was a very moral foreign policy and I think it is part of why we have legitimacy among our allies." The combination of Wood's emphasis on ideology and the moral obligation to which O'Hanlon refers, provides a master key when seeking to appreciate why Americans vacillate over UN missions abroad.

To understand this requires an awareness of the origins of the UN, the intent behind the organization, and the role the United States played in its founding in the 1940s. This serves as a candid reminder that peacekeep-

^{12.} U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Their Proliferation*.

ing operations, even when they work, are not a reflection of the United Nations' success. They are a reflection of its failure. None of this is to take anything away from the role of peacekeepers. Blue helmets are rightly considered a universal symbol of the United Nations' commitment to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for a lasting peace. Always outnumbered and only lightly armed, they stand between rival groups to maintain an often-fragile peace. Nonetheless, however, admirable, dangerous, and necessary, their work is, it is devoid of any constitutional basis in the United Nations Charter. Improvisation does not, perhaps, equal failure, but the reality is that peacekeeping is an emergency measure at best. It is designed to provide limited mediation in conflicts that the organization's founder believed should never have escalated in the first place. To understand Americans' ambivalence necessitates recognition of the clash between the world Americans wanted to create after the Second World War and the one the UN has been able to sustain.

When the UN architects arrived at Dumbarton Oaks in the late summer of 1944 to draw up the principles upon which the new organization would be founded, peacekeeping meant something quite different from that with which it is associated today. The United Nations that the Americans envisioned was an organization that in addition to the League of Nations' emphasis on conflict prevention was to be an overwhelmingly egalitarian operation. The aim was not a democratic institution with an emphasis on majority rule. It was rather an organization that protected individuals through the strengthening of rights and the enforcement of these rights. The goal was not to prioritize national interest over civilians' lives anywhere. Rather than envisioning the deployments or stabilizing interventions of the modern era, the UN was meant to prevent the outbreak of conflicts. If conflicts were to occur, the organization would not - as is almost always the case today - be a neutral party. Its purpose was to stop aggressors; aggressor nations that launched attacks against other states and - of equal importance - regimes that perpetrated rights violations against their own citizens or failed to protect their own citizens. The proposal that the U.S. Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. presented to British, Soviet, and Chinese representatives at Dumbarton

Oaks over the formation of the Charter emphasized these new international responsibilities and placed strong emphases on social and economic improvements, and on human rights. ¹³ The American Charter proposal would

[make it] the duty of each member of the organization to see to it that conditions prevailing within its jurisdiction do not endanger international peace and security and, to this end, to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its people and to govern in accordance with the principles of humanity and justice. Subject to the performance of this duty, the Organization should refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of any of its members.¹⁴

Washington, in other words, was proposing an organization in which a member's failure to preserve *internal* tranquility and rights could prompt a UN intervention. Despite what is repeatedly stated by critics of the UN – and regardless of how politically difficult it might be to create such an organization – the US was not seeking jurisdictional limits. Even the Security Council veto power which by the San Francisco Conference the following summer emerged as a demand from all Council members, Americans did not originally envision as an instrument that members could introduce in matters that concerned their own actions. The Americans were quite conscious that if the veto could be wielded indiscriminately to protect the permanent Security Council members' policies at will, this would greatly undermine the entire organization's effectiveness and its integrity.

Americans did not, of course, get their way. The 1945 Charter went on

^{13.} For Stettinius' recollections of Dumbarton Oaks and the emphasis, he and President Franklin Roosevelt placed on the significance of the U.N. as the world's lead advocate and enforcer of human rights see, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. The Diaries of Edward Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946, eds., Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New Viewpoints, 1975), 103–151.

^{14. &}quot;Tentative Proposals," Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1944 (FRUS), Vol I, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1944), 655-670. Also see, U.S. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), 595–606. The comparable British plan was considerably more general. It merely suggested that the new organization acquire a role in "guarding the right of man to seek his freedom, and [support] increase in the well-being of human society," FRUS, Vol. I (1944), 671.

to secure veto power and protect national sovereignty against any type of world government intervention. Still, it is worth nothing that the full expectation in Washington was that the British and Soviet ability to avoid an institutional commitment to human rights was a temporary hold-over; a hold-over that subsequent amendments to the United Nations Charter would rectify much the way the United States' own Constitution had been mended through its legislative process. It was with no sense of concern, therefore, that the Republican Senator from Michigan Arthur Vandenberg could declare the Charter an "Emancipation Proclamation for the World." ¹⁵

This was a vision that proved popular with the American public. Just over half of the public wanted the US delegates to pledge the country to join the world organization *and* promise the use of American forces if needed. In a 1945 *Roper/Fortune* poll, well over 80 percent favoured American membership and its headquarters to be placed in the United States.

Many Americans, in fact, were willing in the first years of the UN to see its power go further – much further. A majority said the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the US. Americans were willing to see the new union take on a broad range of responsibilities in the postwar era, with majorities saying such an organization should prevent member countries from starting wars, decide what military strength member nations could have and even set up different systems of government for countries that had systems that "might lead to trouble." ¹⁶

What Americans had in mind for the UN was not modern peacekeepers but an activist organization. Seventy percent of Americans favoured giving the UN the authority to determine the military strength of its members. Fifty-two percent went as far as to support granting the UN the right to set up a new "system of government in those countries where

^{15. &}quot;Text of Vandenberg's Conference Report: Informs Senate San Francisco Charter Promises Justice as Substitute for Force," *Washington Post* (30 June 1945).

^{16.} Kathleen Weldon, "Seventy Years of U.S. Public Opinion on the United Nations," *Huffington Post* (23 June 2016).

it looks as if their forms of government might lead to trouble." Only 29 percent disapproved of a proposal to give the UN the last word in determining "which side is right if a civil war breaks out in a member nation and support that side." Forty-six percent favoured granting the UN such powers while 25 percent remained undecided.¹⁷

Combined with the Roosevelt and Truman administration's wartime convictions, these numbers highlight that the envisaged organization was one that would wield considerable authority as an instrument of conflict prevention and as the patron of global peace. What they were not imagining, was an organization responding only in an ad hoc manner with deployment of small contingents of forces to assist in localized crises management in areas of limited interest to the Security Council Members. Even less did they imagine an organization – as it remains today – able only to deploy blue-helmets not sufficiently empowered to create conditions for success on the ground. Instead of an organization sanctioned with effective operative powers the world instead got, as the journalist Kathleen Teltsch in 1976 incisively insisted, UN peacekeepers who "cannot make peace" but who "can only keep it so long as the combatants let them." At best, Teltsch insists, peacekeepers "provide breathing space for resolution of differences that caused the fighting, at worst, an excuse for the rest of the world to forget the crisis until the shooting starts all over."18 In stark contrast to the original intent, modern-day peacekeepers only arrive when conditions are - supposedly at least - ripe for the limited mandate they are often authorized to oversee. Peacekeeping is, as another scholar points out, simply "a non-military mission, carried out by military personnel."19 Consequently there was from the start a clash between the ideological original purpose of the UN Americans wanted and believed in and the UN that actually emerged.

This mattered little over the course of the Cold War. This battle be-

^{17.} Kathleen Weldon, "Seventy Years of U.S. Public Opinion on the United Nations," *Huffington Post* (23 June 2016).

^{18.} Kathleen Teltsch, "Peacekeeping is a Thankless Role," *New York Times* (26 March 1978).

^{19.} John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering the Void: Charting the UN.'s New Strategic Role," *Foreign Affairs* 72. No. 5 (1994): 26–34.

tween the liberal democracies and the Communist world limited the UN's capacity for the better part of half a century. Apart from the Soviet empty Security Council chair error in judgment that enabled the military intervention in Korea in 1950, the operative capacity as either peacekeeper or enforcer of the peace remained limited, as the veteran UN diplomat Giandomenico Picco points out. In his words, the "two superpowers defined the red-lines of international behavior, signaling to other nation states and political groupings what activities were off limits because they threatened the interests of the bipolar contestants." ²⁰ The result was that the UN for much of the Cold War became a sideshow. A platform from which Moscow and Washington could take turns lambasting each other over policies from Greece to Vietnam and from Czechoslovakia to Chile, and Afghanistan.

In the final decade and half of the Cold War, the organization continued to linger meaninglessly. For all the principled ideals of both the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administration, neither found the UN particularly meaningful as an instrument of crisis management. The First Gulf War's successful conclusion in 1991 changed much of this in the United States. In a manner that surprised many so-called realists in the United States – and undoubtedly many casual observers of foreign policy as well – the UN re-emerged as a force in American consciousness. True, some conservative critics such as Charles Krauthammer pushed a foreign policy driven by a nationalistic American agenda. Another vocal minority rallying behind Patrick Buchanan's failed presidential bids, called for an American withdrawal from international affairs. However, at the time the far more powerful vision was the one pushed by presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.²¹ Both called for an increasingly strong and effective United Nations organization and an expansion of its operations

^{20.} Giandomenico Pico, "The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary General out of It," *Foreign Affairs* 73, No. 5 (September-October 1994): 14–18. 21. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, No. 1, (1990/1991): 23–33. During the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Buchanan's criticism of an activist US international role, his call for the removal of UN headquarters from New York City, and the end to all US foreign aid programs dominated his public performances and writings. See for example, Patrick J. Buchanan, *A Republic Not an Empire* (Regnery Publishing, 1999).

and mandate. Clinton went so far as to reinstitute the cabinet rank for his UN ambassador, in large parts because he valued her input on national security.²²

The problem was that while the ideology of the UN remained in place to promote such good intentions, the kind of credible deterrent that the founders of the organizations envisioned had never been created. The result has been that "civil-war like conflicts are unrestrained by an awareness of 'red lines' and of who will set or enforce them." Rather than becoming the dominant enforcer of internationally accepted principles and ideas, the post-Cold War UN has been a neutral actor in most cases. This is most clearly exemplified by the role of the Secretary General, and as such it is an organization that is entirely ill-equipped to handle emergency military matters. This allows critics to insist that on the rare occasions where UN peacekeeping succeeds it is because (1) the disputing parties agree to a UN role and its scope; (2) in its responsibilities the United Nations is neutral; and (3) that its resort to force comes only in the very limited circumstance of self-defence. This may indeed be but if success occurs only under these circumstances, it is not because this is all the UN can do or was intended to do but because it is all member states - including the United States – will allow it to do.²³

The UN's ability to act is constantly balanced against individual nations' case-by-case interest. The absence of an effective UN supra-structure and the lack of will to identify aggressors and carry out operations that authorize the use of lethal force, mean that while the organization embodies the ideals that Americans want to export, the mechanisms for doing so, do not exist. As a result, even public support for UN peacekeeping operations has rarely convinced members of Congress – and certainly not conservative intellectuals and media – that the United States ought to

^{22.} Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004), 455; Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (New York, Hyperion, 2003), 161–165 and 169–172.

^{23.} Giandomenico Pico, "The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary General out of It," *Foreign Affairs* 73, No. 5 (September-October 1994): 14-18; A far more critical view can be found in Jesse Helms, "Saving the U.N.: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No. 2 (September-October, 1996): 2–7.

be particularly engaged or even that the UN has any particular legitimacy. At the height of UN popular in the early 1990s, the conservative commentator Ernest W. Lefever insisted that "[I]nternational action enjoys no special moral status over unilateral action" and that even a "unanimous Security Council vote authorizing measures to deal with a threat to or a breach of the peace does not necessarily mean that these measures are right or just."24 To put it differently, this school of thought effectively denies the UN any form of legitimacy in terms of operations conducted under the Charter's chapter VI's "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" or under Chapter VII's "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace...[and] Acts of Aggression." The constitutional reality is, however, a lot more complex. The Charter does in fact contain precisely the kind of language that Stettinius proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, albeit less declarative. Because while Article 2 does not "authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," Article 7 goes on to insist that this particular "principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures."

Historically, such distinctions have mattered little to those American critics who believe national interest rather than morality ought to guide America's role in the world. After Ronald Reagan's ill-fated 1982 deployment of US forces to join a multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon led to the death of over 200 Marines in Beirut, the military in particular became skeptical of these kinds of operations. Reagan's deployment – conducted at the urging of Secretary of State George Schultz but over the vigorous objections of the Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and the military – brought along the so-called Powel (Weinberger) doctrine. This doctrine, which in many respects survives to the present day, insists that US troops must be committed only as a last resort and if it is in the national interest. It furthermore holds that military and political objectives must be clearly defined and attainable, public support must be assured, and the means to ensure victory must be clear. Following this logic, John Bolton insisted in front of the Senate that "the United Nations can

^{24.} Ernest W. Levefer, "The Limits of U.N. Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993): 17–20.

be a useful instrument for American foreign policy. In some cases it may not be. It depends. It is simply an instrument. It is certainly not anything to approach with theological devotion, which is the way some people do it." This may sound appropriate but to base overseas involvements including the deployment of peacekeepers on such perquisites is not only problematic in the context of the UN system it is antithetical to it. What Bolton is effectively saying is that the UN is a nice organization as long as it is *not* the UN.

As early as 1994, President Bill Clinton's administration, wrongly convinced that Somalia had curbed the national enthusiasm for overseas peacekeeping engagements, sought to find some level of middle ground between the belief in the UN and the opposition leveled by critics. That year Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25 sought to clarify that future peacekeeping operations should be undertaken only when "political and military objectives are clear and feasible" and opposed when objectives are "not viable or when it would interfere with U.S. interests." Instead of insisting that peacekeeping operations had to be specifically in the United States' interest, the new directive merely insisted that such operations should not impede US interests around the world. Bureaucratic juggling of this nature unsurprisingly failed to pacify congressional critics who had long had the UN in their crosshairs. Those who control the purse strings stood far more firm on Bolton's views.

The choice of national interest as the determining factor for American involvement ran counter to much polling in the 1990s, but this had little impact on policymakers who rarely had to fear that their individual seats in the House or Senate could be threatened by their votes for or against UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, even if polls demonstrate robust American commitment to United Nations ideals, *including peacekeeping*, it is equally clear that the public is conflicted over the role Americans should play in that process. Peacekeeping is defensive, uncertain, and it lacks most crucially to Americans, the prospect of victory. In the eyes of

^{25.} National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning PDD-25, Peacekeeping," *Clinton Digital Library available at* https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36623; Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (New York, Hyperion, 2003), 184–185.

Americans, peacekeeping is, in short, for Europeans. Even as staunch an advocate for peacekeeping operations as Clinton's former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, insists that "peacekeeping is not at the center of our foreign or defense policy. Our armed forces' primary mission is not to conduct peace operations but to win wars."26 Perhaps if the United Nations had been equipped with such a capacity, no apparent disconnect would exist. But, the United Nations has a military capability on paper alone. It may have a constitutionally designed Military Staff Committee which still meets but it has none of the apparatus required to accompany it. Debates over an institutionalized military enforcement capability stretches back to the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty peace negotiations in Paris in 1919, it reappeared in the UN talks leading up to the San Francisco Conference in the spring and summer 1945, and it has periodically resurfaced since. But it is exceptionally difficult to envision the surroundings under which such a force could be created.²⁷ In the absence of that and in the absence of a UN military that much like the NATO mission is almost always entirely under American military command, it is difficult to see this changing.²⁸

If anything, Lake's suggestion of a commitment to military victories flies squarely in the face of the UN's own rules and regulations. Official policy is that when peacekeepers become involved in either "robust peacekeeping" (i.e., the use of deadly force at the tactical level) or even "peace enforcement" (i.e., the potential use of military force at the strategic or international level under Article 2 [4]), the ultimate aim of such use of force "is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace pro-

^{26.} Anthony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," New York Times (6 February 1994).

^{27.} William R. Keylor, "Leading From Behind When No One Is In Front: Eight Years of Frustration With the International Community's Failure to Share the Burden of Preserving World Order," in Les États-Unis et la fin de la grande stratégie? Un bilan de la politique étrangère d'Obama, dir. Maud Quessard et Maya Kandel. Études de l'IRSEM,52 (septembre 2017), 61–74.

^{28.} The 2011 military operation in Libya strongly underlined the limits of European military capacity as they quickly became reliant on U.S. logistical support and materiel. See for example Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, "NATO Runs Short on Some Munitions in Libya," *Washington Post* (15 April 2011).

cess or seeking to harm civilians" it is not "to seek their military defeat."²⁹ By insisting that the purpose of the US military is to win wars, Lake – perhaps inadvertently – captured a more crucial point about America's role in the UN and the view in the United States of the UN. Although the United States remains the largest financial contributor to peacekeeping operations, the role of American blue-helmet operatives does not mirror this. At the time Lake spoke in 1994, the United States was annually spending close to \$300 on defence for every single dollar spent on peacekeeping and this was a time when the US military was not overextended as a result of global engagements of the kind common in the 21st century.³⁰

In that lies a key distinction between the American and European view of the military role. For sure, at times, the United Kingdom and France like to reimagine themselves as great powers - the 2011 overthrow of Gadhafi in Libya comes to mind – but their present militaries are not designed to fight let alone win wars. Despite its considerable role in Second Gulf War after 2003, it seems doubtful that Great Britain could presently even muster the kind of force that Tony Blair and his Secretary of State for Defence and later NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson were willing to commit to Kosovo in the later 1990s. The European role is today far more conservative, far more defensive, far more designed to maintain peace or at least to prevent conflicts. Despite these much more limited capabilities and their much smaller defence budgets, the Europeans consistently play a much larger peacekeeping role than do the Americans. It is not simply France, Italy, and the United Kingdom that contribute far more peacekeepers in the 21st century than the United States, so do Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and most others. In 2016, the United States ranked 74th on the list of nations providing soldiers, police officers and staff to operations.³¹ The reference to the Eu-

^{29.} Daniel H. Levine, *The Morality of Peacekeeping* (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 7.

^{30.} Madeline K. Albright, Anthony Lake, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, U.S. Army, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," *The DISAM Journal* (Summer 1994): 42–54.

^{31.} United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributors," available at www.un.org/.

ropean contributions is not meant to imply that they, by volume, are the strongest contributors to operations – by 2016 the top five contributors were Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Rwanda – but rather to challenge the common American explanation that their lack of participation is because African peacekeepers are best suited for missions in Africa. While that may be the case, peacekeepers from Western and Eastern Europe, Latin American, and elsewhere serve across the world as blue helmets. Americans do not. The 1993 British jab at UN Ambassador Albright that Washington seems to want "representation without taxation" still holds in this realm.³²

The United States' reluctance to engage on the ground is also in part a question of doctrine. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff view the doctrine governing US troops in military roles – be it Desert Storm or elsewhere where enforcement of the peace has been sanctioned – as entirely antithetical to standard UN peacekeeping practice.³³ The point is as the Boston University historian Andrew Bacevich, himself a veteran of the Vietnam War, bluntly insists, that the Department of Defense does not play defence. Its business is "power projection."³⁴

This pragmatic military reality clashes with polls that indicate that Americans support peacekeeping missions for highly ideological reasons. In February 1994, 84 percent of Americans in a PIPA poll favoured peacekeeping operations, 46 percent favored them strongly, and only 13 percent opposed. In the event of "large scale atrocities," 83 percent favoured engagement, while 63 percent favouring it "strongly." Even in the case of civil wars, 69 percent of Americans favored a UN intervention with 63 percent favouring an American role.³⁵ There is no doubt that in the short term, the Iraq War tempered some of this enthusiasm but even in 2005, 74 percent of Americans favoured a UN intervention to stop the

^{32.} Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir* (New York, Hyperion, 2003), 170.

^{33.} Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Doctrinal Statement of Select Joint Operation Concepts, Washington, D.C., (23 November 1992).

^{34.} Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power (Metropolitan Books, 2008), 3.

^{35.} Steven Kull, "Misreading the Public Mood," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 51 (1995): 55–59.

genocide in Darfur.³⁶ This level of American support can to a large extent be attributed to what Bacevich elsewhere calls the American "global order myth."³⁷ This myth is anchored in the American cultural narrative; it rests on the widely held belief in the United States as the enforcer of good and the chief advocate of democracy standing stands against the totalitarianism and crimes against humanity. The reality is of course considerably murkier, but myths always serve the purpose of blurring the lines between appearance and reality.

It may well prove of particular significance that the ideology underpinning this myth also ensures that Americans have historically maintained an almost theological belief in the enshrined UN principles and ideals. And why would they not? Ever since the 1940s, these principles have in effect been American ones. But American victory culture - the idea that Vietnam scarred so overwhelmingly – leads especially Congress to recoil from operations they fundamentally do not think are for Americans or in the national interest. To be both the moral enforcer of values on one hand and insist that what matters is national interest on the other is of course not a tenable position. Reconciling the national interest with a UN operational mandate will require a return to the visions of the 1940s and above all a realization that resurgent nationalism poses a serious threat to global stability, ideas of supranational democracy, and above all to collective problem-solving and protection of international peace. An impediment to this may well be that while present day American senators such as Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Lindsay Graham (R-SC) talk a big game about American global leadership, they lack the courage and vision exhibited by the policymakers at the end of the Second World War.

Despite all the polling data in the 1990s supporting American global involvement, these contemporary senators and their colleagues embody the fact that then – as now – there was more than a little truth to the French accusation lobbed at the United States during that decade, that the position as leader of the free world had become vacant. It may well

^{36. &}quot;Americans on the Darfur Crisis," available at http://worldpublicopinion.net/americans-on-the-darfur-crisis/

^{37.} Andrew J. Bacevich, "The 'Global Order' Myth", *H-Diplo*, *ISSF* (Online) (13 July 2017).

remain so, at least as long as American congressmen and congresswomen recoil from engaging the United States in the kind of roles intended to protect freedoms and human rights. Still, now that it appears clear that the America First Policy pursued by Donald Trump's administration was as flawed as the one championed by anti-internationalists in the 1930s and early 1940s, there are indications that the United States in the third decade of the 21st century might yet return to its conventional role of global leader. If that occurs, the manner in which the Trump era scarred the United States reputation around the world might well lead Washington to remember that however mythical the idea of America may be, it still instills considerable hope in the world. The irony may well have been that a far more robust argument for UN peace enforcement instead of peacekeeping in places like Rwanda, Sudan, and Syria would likely have seen far greater American national support because it would have married ideology and victory culture. It would have instilled the sense of purpose that believers in American exceptionalism have always touted, and which peacekeeping most definitely does not. Would this mean a change to what the UN now is? So it would. But it would also mean a return to what the United Nations was fundamentally intended to be. The enforcer or peace and the guardian of those who cannot protect themselves from war, oppression, and human rights violations; a move toward enforcement and away from peacekeeping would be a return to its roots. It would also likely come with more broad American political support.

Gender and Peacekeeping: What Future for Peacekeeping Operations?

Ariane Larouche

At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations (UN) initiated a period of reflection or introspection on peacekeeping operations. For instance, in 2000, the publication of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report) reiterated the need for the reform of peacekeeping operations and for strong commitments from member states. Entitled *Agenda for Peace* (1992) and written by former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the milestone report launched an international dialogue within the UN, among member states government, and scholars.¹

Among its most important recommendations, *Agenda for Peace* urged the international community to take into account and respect the rights of vulnerable groups, including women and girls.² Despite this acknowledgement, the international community would have to wait until the end of 2000 for the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1325 – entitled "Women, Peace and Security" – that formally recognized gender-spe-

^{1.} UN Secretary-General, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (A/47/277)" (17 June 1992).

^{2.} UN Secretary-General, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (A/47/277)" (17 June 1992).

cific impacts of armed conflicts. Almost twenty years later, the Security Council, and the UN as a whole, has taken various initiatives in the same direction, including the adoption of subsequent gender mainstreaming programs and platforms, including increasing women's representation in peacekeeping forces.³

However, scholars and experts have decried those previous UN efforts as "too little, too late." Women and girls remain victims of war crimes and atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), rape, torture, deterioration, and/or loss of economic status. The lack of women representation in armed forces, in military and political leadership positions, and in peace agreement negotiations are only examples of the main failures and obstacles preventing women from getting more involved in peacekeeping operations. From this point of view, how can gender mainstreaming be integrated to peacekeeping operations to make it more gender-efficient? What lessons can be learned from past failures for the UN to move forward?

Drawing on these questions, this chapter offers a critical historical and gender perspective on past and current peacekeeping missions, specifically their capacities to protect vulnerable populations highlighted in the *Agenda of Peace*. The chapter is divided into four main sections. First, it briefly defines the main concepts used throughout its analysis. Second, it critically reviews the main UN initiatives pertaining to women, peace and security, and gender equality in the context of armed conflicts. The third section analyzes successes and failures of the peacekeeping operations. Finally, the chapter ends with a critical reflection on the future of peacekeeping operations from a gender and feminist perspective. Like following chapters by Howard and Lindsay Coombs, as well as Kofi Nsia-Pepra, this section shows peacekeeping as constantly evolving in response to many imperatives.⁴

^{3.} UN Security Council Resolutions from 1946 onwards can be found on the United Nations website at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0.

^{4.} The Canadian Government has provided a bibliography of resources on women and children in armed conflict in support of the Elsie initiative at <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/van-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-national-department-nat

Defining the Main International Relations (IR) Concepts

Feminism constitutes one of the IR theories that first emerged in the 1980s. Feminist IR scholars have studied a variety of issues such as armed conflicts, international threats to security, globalization, and international trade and their impacts on specific groups of individuals (women, girls, migrants, refugees, etc.) rather than centralizing their perspective on the actions and ideas of States. Some feminist IR theorists have formulated their own recommendations on how peace operations can become more efficient at protecting vulnerable populations in the context of armed conflicts.

Prominent in feminist IR work are the concepts of gender, patriarchy, and gender mainstreaming. Gender, which is too often misused as a synonym for sex (the biological identity of an individual as female or male), relates to the "socially constructed characteristics of women and men – such as norms, roles, and relationships of and between groups of women and men. It varies from society to society and can be changed."5 As a social construct the definition of gender within a specific community can help understanding the distribution of social roles are distributed, and how social, political, and economic inequalities form. A second term frequently used by feminist IR literature is "patriarchy" which refers to "a system in which females are subordinate to men, in terms of power and status, and which is based on the belief that it is proper for men to command and women to obey." Finally, gender mainstreaming (also referred to as "gender-based analysis," or GBA) is a tool developed in IR to help carrying gender-specific analysis. The first such use of GBA to enhance equality and justice for women occurred in 1985 during the Third United Nations World Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya. Even though the Conference final report does not explicitly use the term gender mainstreaming, it includes the following recommendation:

couver-principles/bibliography.html.

^{5.} World Health Organization, "Gender" (2018), available at http://www.who.int/.

^{6.} Tricia Ruiz, "Feminist Theory and International Relations: The Feminist Challenge to Realism and Liberalism," *California State University, Stanislaus* (Online) (2005).

Women should be an integral part of the process of defining aims and shaping development [...] and other means which enable women to contribute their interests and preferences into the evaluation and selection of alternative development goals [...] This would include specific measures which are conceived in such a way that the autonomy of women is enhanced so that they bring women into the mainstream of the development process on the same basis as men.⁷

Gender mainstreaming first appeared explicitly in the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* (1995), which called for UN member states to adopt and "promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes." Since then, the UN has made progress on promoting gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment.

In addition, some member states have been more proactive and implemented their own GBA policies. For instance, the Canadian government started releasing GBA for public policies. The federal budget of 2018–19 has conducted GBA for the main initiatives announced in the budget by citing gender specific statistics and specifying how those measures impact differently men and women. Sweden is another country where GBA has been used since several years to better assess policies impact on women and girls. Swedish legislation must be discussed with the Department of Gender Equality before being adopted by the parliament, and different government departments must "report their own work for gender mainstreaming and report to the Division for Gender Equality."

Overview of the International Framework and UN initiatives

As previously stated, Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council represented a major milestone in the studies of gender and peacekeeping.

^{7.} Gender Kompetenz Zentrum, "History of Gender Mainstreaming at international level and at EU level" (2 January 2010), available at http://www.gender-kompetenz.info/.

^{8.} UN, "Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action" (1995), available at http://www.un.org/.

^{9.} European Institute for Gender Equality, "Sweden") 2018), available at http://eige.europa.eu/.

Prior to its adoption in 2000, several international UN conventions and legal instruments contained dispositions regarding women's rights and empowerment. First, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979) was an important first step for the rights of women and girls as it explicitly protected women from various forms of discrimination and "se[t] up a national agenda to end such discrimination." In addition, Articles 7 and 8 of CEDAW recommended to member states to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women, such as obstacles to fully participate in the political and public life of the country, including the equal opportunity to represent their government on the national and international scene. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) has been recognized as the global "agenda for women's empowerment." One of its strategic objectives specifically addresses the topic of women in armed conflict by aiming to protect women and increasing their representation in conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. It also promotes non-violent forms of conflict resolution through the provision of resources and training for women in vulnerable populations (refugees, internally displaced people, etc.). Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) classifies sexual violence (including sexual slavery and forced prostitution) and rape, which are known to largely target women and girls in the context of armed conflicts, as war crimes (Article 7) under its jurisdiction. 12

In 2000, the 15 member states of the Security Council unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 which was the first to specifically address rights and situation of a specific group of civilians affected by armed conflicts. The clauses of Resolution 1325 call for member states to increase women's representation in all deci-

^{10.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (31 December 2007), available at http://www.un.org/.

^{11.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (31 December 2007), available at http://www.un.org/, n. 189.

^{12.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Facts and figures: Women, peace, and security," available at http://www.un.org/.

sion-making institutions, invite the UN Secretary-General to appoint women in leadership and advisory positions, and calls for studies on the specific impacts of armed conflicts on women. Though most observers considered Resolution 1325 a good first step, scholars and civil society organizations (CSOs) identified major gaps. For instance, they pointed out that Resolution 1325 did not implement protection mechanisms for stateless women and girls, individuals with an unofficial status of citizenship, or for those occupying unrecognized areas, such as women refugees or those internally displaced because of an armed conflict. Furthermore, the resolution does not address the gender-specificities of armed conflicts. For instance, there is no explicit mention of rape or SGBV in the text of Resolution 1325. It also does not address the need to increase women's representation in the peacekeeping forces, nor the creation of special contingents or "battalions" of women to help other women. In short, the text of Resolution 1325 put forward broad and general terms rather than specific objectives and calls to action.

Since then, the Security Council has adopted seven other resolutions on women, peace, and security. Eight years after adopting Resolution 1325, Resolution 1820 (2008) was the first to formally recognize SGBV as part of armed conflicts affecting women and girls. Subsequent resolutions reiterated the need highlighted by Resolution 1820 to combat SGBV as a tactic of war used against women and girls. For instance, Resolutions 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 2122 (2013) also call for the implementation of several gender-mainstreaming measures, including gender analysis in peacekeeping missions. Among these resolutions, one of the main recommendations is the appointment of a Women Protection Advisor (WPA) who would be responsible in the context of armed conflicts to address issues affecting women and girls. Another part of their mandate would be to "ensure the consistent delivery of conflict-related sexual violence (CSRV) mandate by thousands of military, police, and civilian peacekeepers."13 The most recent resolution on women, peace, and security (Resolution 2242 [2015]) calls for the UN Department of Peace-

^{13.} United Nations, "Building Capacity of Women's Protection Advisers" (1 April 2015), available at https://www.un.int/.

keeping Operations (DPKO) to conduct a gender analysis through all the stages of the peacekeeping missions, including the planning, deployment, monitoring, and evaluation phases.

Following the adoption of these Security Council resolutions, some peacekeeping missions took additional steps to ensure greater representation of women in leadership positions among the military and police personnel deployed. Some examples include the appointment of women in leadership positions for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which operated from July 2000 to July 2008. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) also employed a gender specialist among the staff to implement the gender mainstreaming provisions of Resolution 1325. Although the Sierra Leone mission made some progress on gender mainstreaming in peace, women's CSOs, such as the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, criticized the DPKO for its insufficient provision of funding and resources for gendermainstreaming strategies.¹⁴ More recently, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) implemented a Gender Office within the mandate of the mission. The office is responsible for promoting gender equality awareness within the country. 15

Finally, other UN initiatives related to gender mainstreaming and peacekeeping were initiated by other UN organs than the Security Council. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is one of the many examples of UN organs who have included gender equality among their priorities of action. Besides the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), including Goal 5 (Gender equality), numerous initiatives have linked women's empowerment with sustainable development such as panels on women and climate change organized during the annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the United

^{14.} NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Mapping Women, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council: 2017" (2017), available at http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org.

^{15.} For details on United Nations missions see Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).16

Despite the optimism about the prominent place of global discussions on women empowerment and gender equality in the international agenda, armed conflicts continue to affect women in a different way than men. Researchers like Nicola Pratt, Sophie Richter-Devroe, and women's CSOs, like the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, have been critical of the resolutions of the Security Council and other initiatives of the DPKO on women, peace and security. They have argued that peacekeeping operations should have specific indicators regarding the gender dimension (for example, quotas for gender representation among peacekeeping forces or signatories to a peace agreement, number of women organizations consulted in the peace negotiation process, etc.) and that those should be mandatory components for every UN peacekeeping operation. From this perspective, member states could also be called to adopt clear and quantifiable GBA indicators when contributing or participating in peacekeeping missions.¹⁷

However, it must be highlighted that state sovereignty is an important IR principle that needs to be considered in drafting, planning, and implementing the dispositions contained in the peace agreements or other types of UN documents or resolutions. State sovereignty represents an obstacle to the implementation of the Security Council's initiatives and measures as some member states could use this as justification of their refusal to take action on certain issues regarding the rights and empowerment of women. Therefore, the various conventions and international documents cannot be fully effective unless member states decide to cooperate with the UN, CSOs, and other non-state actors to implement their dispositions and achieve their objectives.

^{16.} See the United Nations website at https://www.un.org/en/.

^{17.} Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe, "Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security," *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13:4 (2011): 489–503.

Challenges to Gender-Specific Peacekeeping Operations

As mentioned throughout this chapter, the overwhelming occurrence of sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflicts largely affects women and girls. The low representation of women in peace negotiations can make peacekeeping operations inefficient and inadequate to protect vulnerable populations. SGBV is often mentioned in the feminist IR literature as one of the most gender-specific impact of armed conflicts. Considered as a tactic of war by different scholars and women's groups, it manifests in different forms (rape, sexual abuse, sexual violence, etc.). In 2019, the UN documented over 2,838 cases of SGBV in conflicts of which 96 percent of them were known to target women and girls. Furthermore, the under-representation or absence of women in the peace negotiations or armed forces constitutes another important obstacle in achieving gender equality representation in peacekeeping missions. Despite past efforts to appoint women to leadership and/or advisory positions at the DPKO or in the management of peacekeeping operations, the proportion of women actively participating in the elaboration of a peace agreement has remained low for a number of years. In point of fact, UN Women stated that between 1992 and 2019, women accounted for only 13 percent of the negotiators at peace tables.18

Before discussing gender inequalities in peacekeeping operations, it should be stated that gender inequalities are well represented outside of the context of armed conflicts and are only exacerbated by those contexts. For example, women generally earn a smaller wage than men and are under-represented in high-paying jobs or in senior management positions. In developing countries, girls are most likely to quit school before the age of 16. According to data from UN Women, in conflict-affected areas, girls' enrolment rate for primary education is 77.5 percent (compared to 91 percent for the global rate). Women also remain politically underrepresented accounting for an average of 22.7 percent of the seats

^{18.} United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Facts and figures: Women, peace, and security," available at http://www.un.org/. 19. UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," 2018, available at http://www.unwomen.org/.

in parliaments throughout the world.²⁰ Armed conflicts and post-conflicts also exacerbate the gender gap in access to basic healthcare services or education. For instance, the rate of maternal mortality is more than 2.5 times higher in conflicts situations (531 deaths per 100,000 births) than the global average (210 deaths per 100,000 births).²¹ Conflict countries also find themselves amongst the states with the highest proportion of child marriage (which UN Women defines as the "percentage of women aged 20–24 who were married before the age of 18") such as the Central African Republic (68 percent), Mali (55 percent), Guinea (52 percent), and Somalia (45 percent). Armed conflicts contribute to enlarge the gender gap and further ostracize vulnerable and marginalize groups of population.²²

Since the adoption of Resolution 1325, it seems that the Security Council has made slow progress and only has adopted subsequent resolutions or publishing reports instead of taking concrete measures and actions to address the issue. Eight years following the acceptance of Resolution 1325, Resolution 1820 (2008) was adopted which formally recognizes for the first time SGBV as a specific gender-specific conflict threat and as tactic of war tactic. Many stakeholders, including women's CSOs, had voiced their criticisms as to why the adoption of Resolution 1820 took eight years as SGBV was known to be present in armed conflicts for a significant time before. This has resulted in some delays by the Security Council, and indeed the UN as the whole, in tackling the issue of SGBV and taking appropriate measures to address this issue. Lastly, it should be mentioned that obtaining precise data and indicators on SGBV could be essential in efficiently addressing these types of violence in the context of armed conflicts. However, the retrieval of precise statistical data on SGBV during armed conflicts can be quite challenging. It should be also underlined that a culture of silence for sexual violence is still pres-

^{20.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," 2018, available at http://www.unwomen.org/.

^{21.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," 2018, available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 193.

^{22.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," 2018, available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 193.

ent in numerous countries across the world. This constitutes an obstacle for women to testify publicly or even to identify themselves as victims of SGBV. Legislation in some member states can also make it difficult for victims to come forward and denounce any form of sexual violence, not to mention that justice and public safety institutions are often weakened and inefficient to protect the vulnerable during armed conflicts. The Security Council, as the UN organ responsible for the preservation of international peace and security, including the women, peace and security agenda, could remedy this situation by enhancing its collaboration with women's CSOs to conduct gender-based analysis, data collection, or briefings to member states to fully understand the impact and reduce SGBV in armed conflicts.²³

Another main obstacle is the under-representation or absence of women in armed forces, including UN peacekeeping forces, and in the peace negotiations. Although the absence of gender parity representation is far from being unique to peacekeeping operations, the low number of women in peace negotiations has made several women's CSOs question whether peace agreements are truly efficient at protecting and addressing issues specific to vulnerable groups of the population. As the cases outlined below demonstrates, it is crucial to make peace negotiations more inclusive to increase the diversity of the different stakeholders involved. This could be done by putting mechanisms in place to ensure the substantive representation (rather than solely descriptive representation) focusing on issues and obstacles faced by specific groups sharing similar socio-demographic characteristics. Without a heterogeneous group of peace negotiators, there is a significant risk of missing or misunderstanding the particular experience of those vulnerable groups of population, which could lead to inadequate, incomplete, or less sustainable peace agreements.²⁴ Increasing the representation in peace negotiations can be done

^{23.} NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Do our voices matter?' An analysis of women civil society representatives' meaningful participation at the UN Security Council" (2021), available at http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org.

^{24.} Government of Canada, "Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+)" (2020), available at https://cfc-swc.gc.ca/.

in various ways including imposing quotas to ensure a larger number of women and representatives of vulnerable groups are present during the discussions. However, the efficiency of quotas to increase representation have been the subject of many debates. Although an efficient shortterm measure to increase representation, imposing quotas might not be the optimal solution to create a sustainable solution to the problem of under-representation of women in peace negotiations. Some CSOs have suggested that member states and the UN should start by protecting and promoting the participation of women in peace negotiations as a fundamental human right to take part in decision-making. To achieve this goal, the Security Council, or more broadly the UN, could set aside funding and resources to support local CSOs who work directly to empower women and girls and promote equality at local levels. As suggested by the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, providing funding aimed towards program delivery could help addressing the needs specific to women and girls while empowering them to play an active role in decision-making.25

A recent example of peacekeeping operations has demonstrated the importance and the efficiency of inclusive and diverse representation of the stakeholders during peace negotiations. The negotiation of a peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, which started in 2012, included a gender subcommittee (the first of its kind), and an entire chapter of the peace agreement is a gender-mainstreamed initiative. Since the beginning of the peace negotiations, the main objective of the whole process was to ensure that various groups of the population were represented and that the negotiations were as inclusive as possible. In October 2013, a year after the beginning of the negotiations, more than 450 women gathered in Bogota to discuss the peace negotiations

^{25.} NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "Do our voices matter?' An analysis of women civil society representatives' meaningful participation at the UN Security Council" (2021), available at http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org.

^{26.} NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, "'Do our voices matter?' An analysis of women civil society representatives' meaningful participation at the UN Security Council" (2021), available at http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org, n. 192.

that continued in Havana, Cuba (also known as the "Peace Talks"). As a result, organizations representing women and other marginalized groups of the population were invited to take part in the Peace Talks. In total, one-third of the delegates to Peace Talks in Havana, Cuba were women. The Peace Talks were inclusive by increasing the representation of the various groups of population. Women participants are believed to have played a key role in broadening the scope of the agenda of the peace agreement (notably by discussing rights to justice for victims of repression, the impact of SGBV, and land restitution for the rural population), increasing accountability and public support for future peace negotiations and ceasefires.²⁷

Other examples of peace negotiations, which took place before the Colombian Peace Talks, demonstrated that the presence of female signatories during the peace negotiation process could lead to a more inclusive peace agreement. A notable case is the 1996 peace agreement between the rebel group Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity and the government, which included two women signatories at the peace table.²⁸ One of them, Luz Mendez, was in constant dialogue with women's civil society groups and voiced their concerns during the negotiations of the peace agreement. As a result, the agreement "included provisions for women's equal access to land, credit and productive resources, health care, and education and training."²⁹ Following the conclusion of the peace negotiations in Guatemala, Mendez was elected to represent women organizations in the National Council for the Implementation of the Peace Accords and became an advocate for the empowerment of women and girls, the victims of sexual violence during armed conflicts.³⁰ The involvement

^{27.} Council on Foreign Relations, "Colombia Case Study: Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace" (2020), available at https://www.cfr.org/.

^{28.} Piia Bränfors, Jana Krause and Werner Krause, "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace" in *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Research* 44 (2018): 999. 29. Piia Bränfors, Jana Krause and Werner Krause, "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace" in *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Research* 44 (2018): 1003 30. Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, "Luz Mendez" (2021), available at https://genderandsecurity.org/.

of Mendez illustrates the example of effective substantive representation of women in peace negotiations.

Other examples show similar results. The 2003 inter-Congolese negotiations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, demonstrated the relevance of partnering with CSOs and UN agencies to empower women to effectively participate in peace negotiations. In this specific case, 12 percent of the delegates were women. Prior to the negotiations, female delegates had received pre-negotiation training and could benefit from the support of an expert group of women which "advised on issues such as security sector governance and constitutional law." As a result, the final peace agreement text reflected some of the priorities of the women participating in the peace negotiation process (such as the implementation of a quota of 30 percent for women representation in decision-making bodies and the creation of a national watchdog for human rights) and formally recognized the need for women's political participation in the constitution. ³²

The 2001 case of the Papua New Guinea peace agreement (Bougain-ville Peace Agreement) demonstrates the limited impact when women account for a small proportion of the participants to the peace negotiations. In this specific case, only one female delegate, Ruby Mirinka, participated in the peace negotiations process. This sole female representative was the result of a gender representation quota. Throughout the peace negotiation process, Mirinka was in constant communication with women's groups, who could have contributed to increase the perceived legitimacy of the peace agreement.³³ However, her impact was considered minimal "on the content of negotiations or the inclusions of provisions for women's political participation."³⁴ The text of the final agreement only

^{31.} Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, "Luz Mendez" (2021), available at https://genderandsecurity.org/, 1004.

^{32.} Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, "Luz Mendez" (2021), available at https://genderandsecurity.org/, 990; Council on Foreign Relations, "Democratic Republic of Congo Case Study: The Sun City Agreement (Intercongolese Negotiations: The Final Act)" (2020), available at https://www.cfr.org/. 33. UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," 2018, available at http://www.unwomen.org/, 1004, n. 193.

^{34.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and

includes a short mention to provide that female members can be elected or appointed to legislative bodies to represent the interests of women and other vulnerable groups. The peace agreement failed to recognize specific issues, such as sexual violence for instance, faced by women and girls, but rather focused solely on women's political rights.³⁵ This can be attributed to a lack of female delegates to the process who could have given voice to women's and girl's concerns.

Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, overall changes toward gender-based peacekeeping missions have been happening at a very slow pace. As the previous examples have demonstrated, numbers of women participating in the peace negotiation process are still low and have had limited impact on the contents of the final peace agreement texts, especially when gender representation is obtained throughout the imposition of quotas. Other specific cases where women participants substantively represented the diversity of women's groups demonstrated a longer-lasting impact on the implementation of the peace agreement. However, if the future agenda of women, peace and security seems uncertain, some substantial changes are still possible over the medium- and longer-term if the UN, and especially the Security Council, is willing to implement some governance changes in the way it oversees peacekeeping missions.

Moving Forward: The Future of Gender and Peacekeeping

The obstacles and failures mentioned above, as well as the overall slow pace of progress of the initiatives on women, peace and security, can lead to question the relevance and the contribution of gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations. One of the main criticisms of UN peacekeeping missions is that the deployment and management of peace operations are mostly conducted through the DPKO following specific and limited man-

Security," 2018, available at http://www.unwomen.org/, 1004, n. 193. 35. University of Edinburgh, "Peace Agreements Database" (2021) available at https://www.peaceagreements.org/; Council on Foreign Relations, "Papua New Guinea Case Study: Bougainville Peace Agreement" (2020), available at https://www.cfr.org/; UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, 999, n. 193.

dates issued by the Security Council. Those mandates were debated and adopted solely by member states. To date, few, if any, consultations with women's CSOs and gender experts have taken place during the drafting of peacekeeping missions mandates and the subsequent allocation of resources. Peacekeeping operations could also benefit from knowledge-sharing and greater collaboration with other UN organs such as UN Women, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization Those actors, including external actors to the UN such as CSOs advocating for the rights of women and other vulnerable populations, should be involved in every stage of the management of peace missions, from planning to deployment of peacekeeping forces to post-mission reviews.

Furthermore, specific initiatives on women, peace, and security coming from the DPKO or the Security Council have been criticized by feminist IR theorists, like Christine Sylvester, and women's CSOs for giving limited powers to the WPAs in the overall operation and management of peacekeeping operations.³⁶ WPAs have limited influence in peacekeeping operations, which reduces their capacities to advocate and take concrete measures to protect women and vulnerable populations in armed conflicts. Critics have also pointed out that Security Council discussions on issues related to women, peace and security accounts for a very small proportion of all their meetings on a yearly basis (in 2019, only 1 pecent of country-specific discussions included a mention to the participation of women in the peace negotiation process, according to the NGO on Women, Peace and Security).³⁷ It was also pointed out that a majority of peace agreements will put forward short-term gender-based initiatives looking to increase women representation in democratic institutions with quotas or seek judicial remedies for specific victim groups of women. Even if those measures constitute a good starting point, there is a need for the implementation of initiatives that will go beyond the sole issue of representation and will propose sustainable solution to longer-lasting problems faced by women and girls.

^{36.} See Christine Sylvester, "Contending with Women and War," *Politics & Gender* 11, no. 3 (2015): 586–595.

^{37.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 189.

As previously mentioned, the under-representation of women affects the long-term viability of peace agreements because it precludes them from significantly participating in the negotiation process and therefore voicing the specific concerns and issues faced by women and girls that could contribute to more successful implementation of peace agreements in their communities. A recent 2018 study by researchers Piia Bränfors, Jana Krause, and Werner Krause, has empirically demonstrated a positive correlation between women's participation in peace negotiations with voices and leadership roles and higher agreement implementation rate and longer lasting peace.³⁸ Initiatives seeking to increase the representation and involvement of women in the various aspects of peacekeeping operations and peace negotiations are needed to achieve the implementation of an efficient gender-based approach to peacekeeping operations. Not only is the intersectional substantive representation of various groups of women is required throughout the peace process, but mechanisms to strengthen the collaboration between the Security Council and other UN organs, such as UN Women and UNICEF are crucially needed. The Security Council could also look into giving substantive powers to the WPAs in peacekeeping missions and providing women's CSOs more opportunities to participate in the elaboration and the planning of peacekeeping operations both during and outside the Security Council meetings.³⁹ However, it is important to understand that the women's participation is not a stand-alone factor of success to lasting peace and other issues need to be taken into consideration in the implementation of effective gender-based initiatives for peacekeeping operations.

Regarding the issues of SGBV experienced by women and girls during armed conflicts, the first step towards a sustainable solution would be to have access to complete and reliable data. Solid statistical data could help to understand how SGBV specifically affects women in armed conflict, the number of victims, the type of resources available, etc. In this regard, the use of gender-based analyses, conducted by WPAs, women's CSOs

^{38.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, 986, n. 189.

^{39.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 189.

or other experts, can more broadly help to understand how a particular conflict impacts specific groups of vulnerable populations. It also allows a better analysis of which resources are needed to resolve the situations those groups of populations are most likely to face. In order to be fully efficient, such analyses should be used by the Security Council and DPKO, earlier on in the pre-deployment phase or in the first stages of the operation to quickly predict and address problems before trying to fix them in the aftermath. To achieve those objectives, the Security Council could start by systematically using GBA perspectives in the elaboration of each peacekeeping missions. This could be done with the collaboration of women's CSOs, notably by inviting them regularly to attend and give briefings during Security Council meetings where peacekeeping operations are being reviewed and discussed. The Security Council could also put forward mechanisms to hold each member state accountable for the UN commitments on the women, peace and security agenda.

Finally, to properly address specific issues faced by women and girls in armed conflicts in the longer term while responding to the constantly evolving nature of the threats to international peace and security, substantive reform of the Security Council governance needs to be considered. The actual decision-making process of the Security Council is centred around the 15 member states, who ultimately adopt resolutions containing the mandate and operations of peacekeeping missions and gives little to no place for CSOs or non-state actors. Furthermore, many women's CSOs have reported that there are some "inconsistencies between Security Council members on how they engage and listen to women civil society briefers" which constitutes a major obstacle on the civil society's ability to influence the outcomes and processes related to international peace and security. Changes in governance could start by inviting a variety of non-state actors, including women's CSOs, to the discussion table and by creating new channels of cooperation or enlarg-

^{40.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 189.

^{41.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 189.

ing the existing ones. 42 For instance, women's groups could be invited to brief the member states during country-specific meetings or discussions on issues related to women, peace and security. Some mechanisms could be put in place to further integrate civil society and non-state actors in the decision-making process, and to ensure consistent cooperation between CSOs and member states. This proposal would allow the Security Council to keep its role as the responsible oversight organ for peacekeeping missions and operations within the UN while adding more voices to the discussions around the table, and to do so without changing or increasing its own membership. The member states of the Security Council could therefore benefit from different expertise and points of view from stakeholders inside or outside the UN System, particularly women who have witnessed and experienced first-hand the effects of armed conflicts.

Conclusion

Over the last two decades the UN has created opportunities to put women's issues and gender equality on the global agenda. This is particularly true in the case of armed conflict and peacekeeping where some UN initiatives have proven to be effective in the short-term to address immediate problems and issues. However, much work remains to be done, particularly in implementing sustainable long-term solutions. As this chapter demonstrates, obstacles ranging from the lack of gender mainstreaming mechanisms to the under-representation of women in peacekeeping negotiations remain significant barriers to protecting vulnerable populations in peace operations. The omnipresence of a patriarchal culture in the global governance system and armed forces throughout the world prevent women from being fully involved, represented, and even accounted for while studying the impacts of armed conflicts on civilians. In this regard, additional measures still need to be taken to create a more inclusive, lasting, and sustainable peace.

Solutions to create "gender-specific" or "gender-oriented" peacekeep-

^{42.} UN Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, "Peace and Security," (2018), available at http://www.unwomen.org/, n. 189.

ing missions should be implemented in the future of peacekeeping operations. Beyond the adoption of Security Council resolutions and UN initiatives, an extensive reform of the governance of peacekeeping operations and the Security Council processes is needed. CSOs representing the voices of vulnerable civilians need to be provided with greater opportunities to participate in the Security Council discussions on peacekeeping operations. This could take several years of reflection through the publication of studies and reports from CSO, scholars, and other actors on the most efficient way to reform the Security Council to make it more inclusive, especially in the management of the peacekeeping missions. The willingness and commitment of member states in taking actions, implementing GBA mechanisms, collaborating with non-states actors and being involved in global discussions are crucial to the future successes of peacekeeping missions. As many feminist scholars and CSOs have pointed out, the UN and its member states have spent significant time reflecting and discussing other problematic issues and potential solutions at a high level, but not so much time achieving concrete and long-lasting actions and results in the field, in the situation of conflicts, or peace negotiations. From this perspective, member states, especially the members of the Security Council, should reach out and collaborate with organizations and individuals who have a full understanding of the challenges in the field and have the resources and expertise to address specific situations in armed conflicts. The key to success in these endeavors will need to be a strong commitment from the UN leadership and the Security Council to respect its commitment of its women, peace and security agenda in order to achieve gender equality and empower vulnerable populations by making them central actors to create sustainable peace around the world.

From General Purpose Combat to Child Soldiers¹

Howard G. Coombs and Lindsay M. Coombs

The days of simply taking off your helmet and putting on your blue beret are gone.² – Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, Peace Support Training Centre, 09 June 2017

A Commandant of the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC),³ Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, in this statement eloquently summarized the complexity of the changes that have occurred since Canada's first military operations "in the service of peace." Recent debate on Canada's

^{1.} This chapter was taken in part from research conducted for Howard G. Coombs, "25 Years after Somalia: How it Changed Canadian Armed Forces Preparations for Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* 17, No. 4 (Autumn 2017): 35–46 and Lindsay Coombs, "Are They Soldiers? Or Are They Children? Preparing the Canadian Military for the Contemporary Security Environment," *The Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) General Sir William Otter Paper* 16, No. 1 (December 2016): 1–10.

^{2.} Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, interview with Howard G. Coombs, Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), Kingston, Ontario, 09 June 2017.

^{3. &}quot;The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) is a Canadian Army, Joint, Inter-agency, and Multinational training establishment located in Kingston, Ontario." See "Peace Support Training Centre - Home: Learn, Prepare Succeed," available at https://peacesupport.ca.

^{4. &}quot;In the Service of Peace" is struck on the reverse of the standard UN Medal. The medal ribbon from which the medal hangs is unique to a specific mission.

proposed involvement in Africa, particularly Mali, illustrates the myriad challenges posed by the contemporary security environment. Nowhere are these complications more evident than in Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) training for peace operations. There have been many changes in preparing for peacekeeping since the inception of Canadian involvement in peace operations. The original philosophy of training military personnel primarily for combat and deploying them on peace missions has been replaced in the past twenty-five years by a more nuanced approach. This relatively recent conceptual approach maintains the need for warfighting skills, but at the same time highlights the requirement for supplementary training. The additional knowledge gained in this specialized formation addresses the precise requirements of establishing and maintaining peace in the war-torn regions where Canadians are deployed. Such specificity in preparing for today's peace operations is evidenced in changing perspectives towards preparing for encounters with child soldiers.

Canada and Peace Operations

Peacekeeping has a long and storied history in the minds of Canadians. When Canadians visualize peace operations – or "peacekeeping," as it is popularly known – they tend to visualize an iconic image of soldiers wearing blue berets interposing themselves between warring factions in order to bring a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflict.⁷ In 2010, Ca-

^{5.} For discussion of conflict environments see articles by Matthew Fisher, "For Trudeau, a UN mission in Africa appears ever more daunting: The Liberals could not have picked a worse time to be considering a blue beret — or more accurately, a blue helmet — mission in Africa," *National Post* (5 July 2017); Lew MacKenzie, "Looking for a sweet peacekeeping spot in Africa? Don't do it" RCMI SITREP: The Journal of The Royal Canadian Military Institute 76, No 6 (November/December 2016), 7-8; and "Canada Enters Dangerous Year-Long Peacekeeping Mission in Mali", The Hill Times (August 8, 2018).

^{6.} The name "Canadian Forces" (CF) was changed to "Canadian Armed Forces" (CAF) in 2013.

^{7.} Peacekeeping consists of activities, normally undertaken by military personnel, predicated on "consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force" and aimed at creating a durable and lasting peace. While peace operations consist of a broad range of actions in which expeditionary military and police forces undertake to "prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath."

nadian academics, Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liégeois argued that this image has, in part, been created by the public rhetoric of successive Canadian governments who utilized it as an element of national identity; they actively reinforced the national myth that "Canada is a country of peacekeepers."8 Further investigation of the peacekeeping myth and its construction was published in 2016 with the release of historian Colin McCullough's work Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past, which argues successive governments over a fifty-year period from 1956 to 1997 reinforced this idea.9 Regardless, to many Canadians peacekeeping is considered a well-known symbol of Canada and its engagement in global affairs. However, by 2000 there was a diminution of governmental support for Canada's military participation in peacekeeping after that time due to a perception that, within a fractured post-Cold War international system, military activities might not be the most effective method of creating peace.¹⁰ One can argue that since the election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2015, there has been a popular resurgence amongst Canadian to once again deploy "blue berets."11

Canadian involvement in United Nations (UN) operations commenced in 1949, and throughout the Cold War Canada contributed to many

Peace operations may be non-permissive, may favour one side or another and might not be limited in their use of force. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams with Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2nd ed, 2010 (reprint, 2011), respectively pages 173–75 and 18.

^{8.} Jocelyn Coulon and Michel Liégeois, "Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping? The Future of a Tradition," Calgary, AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (January 2010), 41.

^{9.} See Colin McCullough, Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past (Vancouver and Toronto, UBCPress, 2016).

¹⁰ Colin McCullough, Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past (Vancouver and Toronto, UBCPress, 2016), 16–17.

^{11.} The present Canadian government's commitment to peacekeeping was evident in the months after its election victory in 2015, "'We're back' says Justin Trudeau at Ottawa rally," *The Canadian Press* video, 1: 31 (20 October 2015); Canada, Prime Minister, "Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter," (released 13 November 2015); and, Canada, Governor-General, "Making Real Change Happen", Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Forty-second Parliament of Canada, Canada, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2015), 7; also, see *DND*, *Strong*, *Secure*, *Engaged*: *Canada*'s *Defence Policy* (June 2017), 54–55, 84, and 91–92.

peacekeeping missions. Initial Canadian military reception to the concept of peacekeeping can be best described as reserved. In a Cabinet meeting discussing possible Canadian contributions to the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan during December 1948 Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, convinced Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, of the necessity of being involved. Pearson "even offered to have External Affairs pay the costs for two of the four officers requested."¹²

Peacekeeping was soon embraced as a means of maintaining Canada's status as a middle power.¹³ One can argue that participation in UN missions confirmed Canada's position as a country maintaining saliency within the affiliated block of Western states, while furthering the bilateral interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).¹⁴ They permitted Canada to be a committed member of the Western alliance and "an international arbiter with sufficient freedom to act decisively in the cause of peace."¹⁵ In a 1965 report on peacekeeping then Lieutenant J.L. Granatstein, now one of Canada's preeminent military historians opined:

Canadian isolationism is dead, and its resurrection seems most unlikely. The shrinking of the world has given new responsibilities to every nation, but very few are willing to pick up the burden. If peace is maintained and a nuclear holocaust averted, the credit may well go to those nations that took steps to prevent wars. Canadians can take justifiable pride in the role they have played.¹⁶

^{12.} Letter from Secretary of State of External Affairs to the Minister of National Defence, 18 January 1948. Quoted in Lieutenant J.L. Granatstein, "Report No. 4, Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters: Canada and Peace-keeping Operations," Ottawa: DND, 22 October 1965, 9.

^{13.} Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985), 10–11.

^{14.} In 1981, the "A" in NORAD changed from "Air" to "Aerospace" in recognition of the growing importance of space to continental defence.

^{15.} Norman Hillmer, "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise," Canadian Defence Quarterly 19, No. 1 (Summer 1989): 57.

^{16.} Granatstein, "Report No. 4," 25; Granatstein's thoughts mirror the tenor of the times, but since 1965 Canadian perspectives regarding peace operations have evolved in a pragmatic fashion. In a 2016 newspaper editorial entitled "Think carefully before deciding to deploy peacekeepers," Granatstein observed: "Yes, Canadians can play a useful role in such conflicts, but we need to understand the

Indeed, that is how the separate services of the Canadian military visualized and trained for peacekeeping during the Cold War. From the beginning, there was a steady stream of Canadian casualties, starting with Brigadier-General Harry Angle in 1950, who was killed while serving with the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. 17 The omnipresent danger of violence during peacekeeping likely made defaulting to a training framework based on general-purpose combat training (GPCT) self-evident, particularly for a military that had just participated in the Second World War (1939 - 1945) and later Korea (1950 - 1952). Reinforcing that was successful involvement in the first large-scale UN mission of this period, known as UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) (1956 -1967).18

Peace operations of the Cold War were typically carried out under the auspices of the UN. These missions were divided into categories corresponding to the relevant articles of the UN Charter, either Chapter VI "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" or Chapter VII "Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts Of Aggression." The purpose of Chapter VI missions was the resolution of disputes endangering international peace and security. Generally, under this chapter, military contingents are deployed once negotiation, mediation, or arbitration have led to some form of agreement and the parties involved in the conflict agree to allow a UN force to monitor the agreement. Canadian examples of such Chapter VI operations include contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (1964 - present) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (1974 - present) located in the Golan Heights.19

desiderata before we send our men and women overseas." He went on to suggest that, amongst other conditions, any peace operations contingent must be "welltrained" to deal with the current challenges they would encounter. J.L. Granatstein, "Think carefully before deciding to deploy peacekeepers," The Globe and Mail, (3 October 2016).

^{17.} See "Casualties in Peacekeeping Operations 1950-1980," 82/222, DHH and "BGen Angle DSO Harry Herbert" *Roll Call of Honour*.

18. DHH, "Operations Database," available at http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.

^{19.} United Nations (UN), "Charter of the United Nations" (1945), 8-11; available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf; and DHH, "Op-

Chapter VII of the Charter allows for actions pertaining to threats to stability, transgressions of an established peace, or in reaction to acts of aggression. This chapter allows the UN to impose or enforce peace, by any means required whether they are military or non-military in nature, with the goal of these activities being the restoration of international peace and security. Examples of Canadian participation in Chapter VII operations include the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992 – 1993); the NATO led Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR) (1995 – 1996); the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) (1999 – 2000); the NATO organized International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (2003 – 2014); and, *Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti* [UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti] (MINUSTAH) (2004 – present).²⁰

UNEF I affirmed that at the core of peacekeeping training were the military skills needed for general-purpose combat. Due to rapid deployment, the Canadian contributions had no specialized training. While a number of challenges were cited with regards to this Middle East peacekeeping mission, training was not discerned as one of them.²¹ Discussion of the

erations Database," available at http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/.

^{20.} United Nations (UN), "Charter of the United Nations" (1945), 8–11; available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf; DHH, "Operations Database," available at http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/; also, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for supporting regional arrangements to maintain peace. While Canada has had little to do militarily with Chapter VIII missions in the wake of the Western involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq the idea working alongside, in partnership or through regional organizations instead of creating Western led intervention may gain popularity in many quarters. UN, "Charter of the United Nations," 11.

^{21.} The challenges encountered during the first UNEF deployment by Canadians included the need to create a standard unit mobilization plan; a requirement for appropriate message classification to ensure that information was not overly classified, requiring special handling and putting a strain on communications centres during the initial period; a demand for sufficient maps of the mission area; a request that Army Headquarters should only concern themselves with the organization by trades and numbers of personnel, leaving the selection of individuals its subordinate formations; discussion of the requirement to create a table of organization early and match equipment to it to ensure proper resourcing. The employment of the Canadian UNEF contingent is discussed and no appreciable difficulties are highlighted as having been encountered. Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, "Report No. 94, Historical Section Army Headquarters, Canadian participa-

requirements for peacekeeping in the early 1960s affirmed the principal that the core of successful peacekeeping training was based on normal professional military skills – the same that were required for general-purpose combat. At a Department of National Defence sponsored conference in 1964, representatives from the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) opined that the involvement of their services in peacekeeping was little different from normal operations. The Canadian Army was in general agreement, but also noted a requirement to be prepared to aid civil authorities in the maintenance of order, as well as to be able to control areas through cordon and search operations and the establishment and maintenance of checkpoints. There would also be a need to deal with both the press and UN authorities. At the same time, the focus would be on combat operations like patrolling, ambushes, and attacking armed insurgents. In general, it was understood that the main requirements of the Canadian UN standby battalion were that it "be lightly equipped, fit and hard, and highly adaptable to adverse conditions."22

A couple of years later, in 1966, Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jean Victor Allard, reaffirmed these ideas before the House of Commons Defence Committee:

In any future peacekeeping or peace restoration mission, we must ensure the most judicious application of our forces is made...The deployment of strong, highly organized multi-purposed forces to an area of trouble does not mean that force will be used; it merely means that a deterrence to more serious types of conflict will have been achieved.²³

That same year, a study of Canadian military operations supporting

tion in UNEF", DND (1 June 1961), 40-43.

^{22.} See annexes to "CFHQ S 3451-3 (DI Plans) Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of Peace-Keeping Operations Ottawa 2-6 Nov 64, 9 Nov 64," including papers used at the conference, 75/314, DHH, quote from the enclosure entitled "Organization and Training of the Stand-By Battalion," 5. 23. General Jean Victor Allard testimony to "House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence – June 21, 1966," 306, cited in Dan G. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, rev. ed., (Ottawa: DGL Publications, 1997), 35; and General Paul D. Manson "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 8.

the UN re-affirmed that RCN and RCAF training for these types of military activities "is to some extent consistent with other operational commitments." It noted that for the Canadian Army "the transition from other types of operations to UN operations is not great." However, the study also observed that there was a premium on organic mobility, the ability to deploy on short notice, and the need to focus on the same types of military tasks noted in the earlier 1964 conference. These included a wide variety of responsibilities, "from the police-type role in aid to the civil authorities to that of military operations to suppress armed insurgency." These competencies were viewed as specific training necessary for peacekeeping.²⁴ This perception that the training needed for peacekeeping was similar to that necessary to discharge general military duties continued into the 1970s. It also included the acknowledgement that awareness of language, culture and other regional factors, plus a broader background in the social sciences – particularly international relations – would be useful for officers.²⁵ These ideas persisted into the 1980s. This conceptual approach of general-purpose combat training and of being "soldiers first," was the underlying principle of preparing for peacekeeping. In 1989 the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Paul Manson, wrote an article entitled "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy" for the professional journal Canadian Defence Quarterly. Within that piece Manson highlighted that:

Canadian soldiers are trained as 'soldiers first;' that means that Canadian contingents can be deployed in peacekeeping roles as integrated, self-sustaining units capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military contingencies. The determination to deploy only fully-trained military personnel in what can be, potentially, a very dangerous role, bears witness to Canada's unwillingness to put the lives of those who serve in Canadian peacekeeping contingents at unnecessary risk."²⁶

^{24. &}quot;CFHQ V 3451-9 TD 6017 (DOps) Paper – Canadian Operations in Support of the United Nations, 11 May 66," 112.302 (D1), DHH, 6–7.

^{25.} Enclosure, "'Papers From Contributors to the Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces,' 'Annex B Canada's Military Involvement in United Nations Peace-Keeping Activities in the Seventies,' Leland M. Goodrich, Department of International Studies, University of Toronto, May 1971," to "NDC 1150-1/2 CDS Study Seminar – 14–16 Oct 71 Fort Frontenac, 19 August 1971," Vol. I, 87/25, 10–12.

^{26.} General Paul D. Manson "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence

Manson's thoughts reflect the conceptual perspective that peacekeeping was an adjunct to war, with training for peacekeeping missions considered part of preparing for normal operations, having no separately mandated professional competencies or standards. This idea of preparing for peacekeeping as "soldiers first" was borne out through the losses suffered by Canadian peacekeeping forces since first involvement, as well as the violence evidenced by some Canadian missions, like that in the Congo. Canadian officers, such as Colonel Jacques Dextraze, who was Chief of Staff *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC) from December 1963 – June 1964, and who later became the CDS (1972 – 1977) were well aware of the violence that could sometimes erupt during peacekeeping.²⁷ UN missions demanded troops capable of combat operations.

However, the end of the Cold War not only resulted in a dismembering of the Soviet Union, but a change to the operational environment. This new setting included failed and failing states, as well as the involvement of non-state actors. Violence, prevailed. Along with these changes, the missions became more complicated, and the roles demanded of peacekeepers expanded. Canadian deployments to Somalia in 1993, Rwanda during 1993-1994, and disclosure of incidents at Bacovici in the former Yugoslavia in 1993-1994 created a great deal of public and private introspection in Canada regarding the nature of both the profession of arms and peacekeeping. Walter Dorn examines these missions in greater detail in a preceding chapter. In some cases, the focus on general-purpose combat skills in an environment where threats were difficult to discern, define, and neutralize resulted in frustration by those trained for combat. At times, this manifested itself in untoward events which, in a rapidly globalizing world, were quickly made public and negatively affected both the mission and Canadian public support of its military.²⁸

Policy," Canadian Defence Quarterly 19, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 8.

^{27.} See "Annex E Talk Given by Brigadier-General J.A. Dextraze, CBE, DSO, OBE, CD on Peace-Keeping Operations in the Congo," enclosure to "CFHQ S 3451-3 (DI Plans) Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of Peace-Keeping Operations Ottawa 2–6 Nov 64, 9 Nov 64," DHH.

^{28.} See Donna Winslow, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 6, No. 3 (2004): 345–367.

It was the incidents in Somalia that received the greatest attention. They resulted in the "Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia" or, as it is more popularly known, the "Somalia Inquiry" (1993-1997). The Somalia Inquiry reaffirmed that, in a tumultuous security environment, GPCT was the foundation of peacekeeping training. This statement was tempered with the ideas that: (1) Canadian peacekeepers would need to be trained and educated in functions applicable to a cross section of peace operations, (2) centralized oversight and direction was required for pre-deployment training, and (3) Canada needed to assist with peace operations training in other countries as part of its' contribution to peacekeeping.²⁹ These thoughts, along with direction that had already been put in place by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (CF), later the CAF, to maneuver in a changing operational environment, irrecoverably changed how the Canadian military would prepare for peace operations. In turn, they would also lead to a re-professionalization of the CAF.³⁰

While many flaws were found in the training of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG),³¹ the Somalia Inquiry noted that GPCT had been the foundation of all deployments during the Cold War. The Inquiry went on to observe that GPCT still constituted part of the core training, but not exclusively so, for peace operations. GPCT provided soldiers and units the ability to successfully complete a spectrum of combat functions and integrate them collectively to meet larger opera-

^{29.} Allen G. Sens, "Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia" Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 110–111; "Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Volume 1," 2 vols, (Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 151–153 and Volume 2, 557–652.

^{30.} See David J. Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, No. 3 (2009): 31–39.

^{31.} The CARBG consisted of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Headquarters, Command Group Headquarters Commando, 1 Commando, 2 Commando, 3 Commando, Service Commando, "A" Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons, and First Airborne Field Squadron (Canadian Military Engineers). "The Canadian Airborne Regiment".

tional requirements. These individual skills included proficiency in weapons, fieldcraft and communications, protection against biological and chemical agents, first aid skills, and attainment of an acceptable level of physical fitness. These individual skills, once attained, were combined in collective training scenarios at successively higher levels until the desired objective was achieved. This, along with some mission-specific training, formed the basis of Cold War peacekeeping preparations. There was a philosophy that peacekeeping would require the same skills as combat, but to a lesser degree. Any supplementary training specific to the mission could be achieved in the time between the mission notification and deployment. Regrettably, this did not transpire with the CARBG and the Somalia mission.³²

Throughout this period, more emphasis was placed on training appropriate to peace operations. A Senate Report of 1993 acknowledged GPCT as the basis for this training; it suggested that "the best trained peacekeeper is a well-trained soldier, sailor or airman, one who knows his or her trade." At the same time, this Senate Report also identified that the current military training could be "improved by adding to the curriculum subjects which are not necessarily military in character," such as mediation.³³ The Somalia Inquiry recommended that along with GPCT, both generic peacekeeping training (UN processes and common peace operations tasks) and mission-specific training (theatre particular) be taught. Additionally, due to the quantity and broad applicability of these topics, they needed to be integrated into the general training system.³⁴ In turn, the Inquiry led the Canadian military to implement systemic oversight of peace operations and standards through a series of Deputy Chief

^{32. &}quot;Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Volume 2," 2 vols, (Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 558–559.

^{33.} Senate of Canada, "Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs" (February 1993), DHH, 94/183, 11.

^{34. &}quot;Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Volume 2," 2 vols, (Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), 559-561.

of Defence (DCDS) staff instructions and mandated training evaluation of pre-deployment peacekeeping training at the individual and collective levels. This supervision continues today with Canadian Joint Operations Command.³⁵ On top of this, with the commencement of DCDS direction, along with the Somalia Inquiry and other recommendations, training specific to peace operations became mandated and institutionalized.³⁶

^{35.} At that time, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff was responsible for overseeing all CF operations. In 2006, this management of and responsibility for all operations was transferred to Canadian Expeditionary Forces and Canada Commands. The former took charge of international activities and the latter became responsible for domestic operations. Later, in 2012, these two commands were unified within the current Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), which is responsible for all operational force employment. The RCN, CA, RCAF, and other force providers, are responsible to generate trained military contributions for CJOC. See Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Bill Bentley, with a forward by Romeo Dallaire, Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto, Dundurn, 2015) and Trista L. Grant-Waddell, Soldiers First': The Evolution of Training for Peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces, 1956-2000, PhD diss., (University of Western Ontario, London, 2014).

^{36.} The recommendations of the Somalia Inquiry pertaining to the institutionalization of peace operations training on Canada and assisting with peace operations training capacity in other countries were addressed with the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in 1996. The Somalia Inquiry Report lauded the formation of the PSTC, and its' connection to the Lessons Learned Centres established by the CA. It highlighted: "that they should help to satisfy the need for co-ordination of training, the production of training material, and the updating of training content and standards in a more systematic manner than has been true in the past." The PSTC delivers pre-deployment peace operations training and provides peace operations training assistance to Canadian and other foreign organizations. The role of the PSTC has enlarged over time to give "specific, individual [peace operations] training to prepare selected members of the Canadian Forces, Other Government Departments and foreign military personnel." As part of this, the PSTC increases foreign peace operations capacity through (1) active participation in foreign and domestic conferences, (2) dispatching instructors to other countries to support their training and build capacity, and (3) training foreign instructors and students in Canada. Today the training they provide is closely linked to Government of Canada objectives and reflects both UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization requirements. A small unit of about 60 personal, that utilizes significant CA augmentation in support of its courses, the PSTC provides enormous joint institutional capacity, far outweighing its size. "Dishonoured...", vol. 2, op cit. 626; DND, "Peace Support Training Centre: PSTC History, History of the Peace Support Training Centre" (10 June 2015), available at http://acims.mil.ca/trg/PSTC/SitePages/PSTC History.aspx; and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which was established during the same period to train civilians, military and police together was closed in December 2013 due

GPCT still forms the foundation of mission preparedness and, over the years, it has been broadened to incorporate areas of general and specific training that today includes, but is not limited to: cultural, religious and historical awareness; use of force; rules of engagement; refugees and internally displaced persons; civil affairs and language; communications, command structure and logistics; dealing with international organizations, non-governmental organizations and regional organizations; public affairs; environment specific medical training; tactical training in operations; information gathering; mediation; negotiation; use of technology; and gender integration. Ethics material is imbued within much of this training, as is the need to support vulnerable populations. This includes people who, individually or collectively, are at greater risk than the general population of being harmed or having a lower quality of life imposed upon them. Related to this latter area, and illustrative of the nuanced approach to peace operations training that has evolved, are recent initiatives designed to address the challenges posed by child soldiers.³⁷

to a cessation of federal funding. A. Walter Dorn and and Joshua Libben, "Unprepared for Peace? The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and What to Do About It)", Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and Rideau Institute on International Affairs, (February 2016), 7; Senate of Canada, "The Standing Senate Committee on National Security And Defence - Evidence" (21 September 2016); Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, interview with Howard G. Coombs, Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), Kingston, Ontario, 09 June 2017.

^{37.} DND, Army Lessons Learned Centre, *Dispatches: Training for Operations* 3, No. 1 (February 1996); Dispatches: Training for Operations 3, No. 2 (April 1996); *Dispatches: Operations in the Former Yugoslavia* 4, No. 1 (September 1996); *Dispatches: Law of Armed Conflict, Peace Operations and You* 4, No. 2 (March 1997); DND, Peace Support Training Centre, "CAF Peace Support Operator Course Curriculum In Comparison To UN CPTM" (September 2013); DND, Canadian Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters, "Briefing Note For Commander CADTC How the Peace Support Training Centre Trains Soldiers So They Are Prepared To Support Vulnerable Populations" (07 March 2017), 1 [Briefing Note in possession of Howard G. Coombs]; and, Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Healey, interview with Howard G. Coombs, Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), Kingston, Ontario, 09 June 2017; Upon considering this list, which is constantly evolving, one could also argue that these skills are demanded by most twenty-first century military operations, not just peace operations. On top of this, CAF peace operations doctrine created since the Somalia Report and updated within the last decade or so is still relevant and regularly scrutinized.

Children in Armed Conflict

Throughout history children have been involved in armed conflict on almost every continent. During the nineteenth century, the British Army recruited youth for their Gurkha regiments in Nepal, and in East Africa indigenous groups like the Maasai frequently inducted adolescents as warriors. Similarly, in the West children fought in both the Union and Confederate armies during the American Civil War. Mark Drumbl, Director of the Transnational Law Institute at Washington and Lee University, has illustrated that children performed a variety of roles during these conflicts including "fighting as soldiers; maintaining morale as drummer boys; cooking, portering, and sustaining garrison life; and serving as a defence of last resort."

The participation of children in conflict continued to expand throughout the twentieth century. This is partly a consequence of the development of modern weapons that are both efficient and easy to operate. This is clearly evidenced when comparing the emergence of weapons like the 1947 *Avtomat Kalashnikova*, to preceding armaments, like black powder muskets. English journalist Robert Fisk captured the impact of this technological shift with his description of a child soldier from *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (1990): "He was wearing khaki dungarees about three sizes too big for him and a boy's shirt with pictures of Mickey Mouse printed across the front. In his right hand he held the barrel of a Kalashnikov." During the rise of the Third Reich from 1933 to 1945, children between the ages of 10 and 13 became involved in National So-

^{38.} Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik, *The Children of Islamic State* (London, UK, Quilliam Foundation, March 2016), 21.

^{39.} Mark. A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 28.

^{40.} Mark. A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 27.

^{41.} Avtomat Kalashnikova, or Kalashnikov assault rifle, named after its inventor, Mikhail Kalashnikov, who was a member of the Soviet Army. Michael Hodges, AK 47: The Story of the Peoples Gun (London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 2007), 1–3.

^{42.} Cited in prefatory material to Michael Hodges, AK 47: The Story of the Peoples Gun (London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 2007), 1–3.

cialist youth groups like the Hitler *Jugend*, known in English as the Hitler Youth. Many of these children were later drafted into the German Army, often at 16 years of age but sometimes younger, to fight against Allied forces in the Second World War.⁴³

Despite the recent emphasis on developing more comprehensive international humanitarian and human rights laws, the practice of child soldiering continues to be pervasive. It has frequently been cited that roughly 250,000 to 300,000 children across the globe are associated with armed forces or armed groups.44 Furthermore, scholars have maintained that children have been involved in armed struggle in roughly 75 percent of global conflicts.⁴⁵ Although these numbers have become embedded in public discourse, they are subject to a degree of contestation as the actual number of child soldiers is rather difficult to ascertain. This is due to a variety of reasons including, but not limited to: the concealment of the age of child soldiers by commanders or by the children themselves; that children may be present in remote regions or may perform low-visibility roles; and that regional borders where child soldiers are most prevalent can be quite porous, which can cause child soldiering to become a cross-border issue and thus less easily quantifiable.⁴⁶ Taken as a whole, the number of child soldiers has likely declined since the turn of the century, however the practice remains endemic.⁴⁷

Given the pervasiveness of child soldiers in some conflict regions, it is perhaps unsurprising that members of the Canadian military have en-

^{43.} See Michael Kater, *Hitler Youth* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2004).

^{44. &}quot;Canadian Dept of National Defence: Proposed amendment to the National Defence Act to reflect commitment to the new UN Protocol on child soldiers." M2 Presswire (22 March 2000), 1. For access to the M2 Presswire Archives see https://www.m2.com/m2/web/page.php/archive; and Mark. A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 26.

^{45.} See Lieutenant Colonel Judith A. Hughes, "Child Soldiers: Are US Military Members Prepared to Deal with the Threat?" *Air and Space Power Journal* (March 2008).

^{46.} Mark. A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012), 26.

^{47.} Child Soldiers International, Louder than Words: An Agenda for Action to End State Use of Child Soldiers (London, UK, 2012), 15.

countered this phenomenon. Major-General (Retired) Terry Liston, who served in the Congo with ONUC in 1962–1963, described his experience:

As a young lieutenant in 1963, I was the Liaison Officer and Advisor to a Congolese battalion cleaning up the disparate militias in Katanga after defeating the separatist Katangese Gendarmerie. In a village, the local war lord had agreed to lay down his arms and thereby receive amnesty, etc. He advised that he would parade his troops and surrender formally in a dignified manner. My Congolese Commander and I were greeted by about 75 bare-foot and scruffy-looking soldiers, with their rudimentary weapons piled beside their commander, in nicely aligned ranks who jumped to attention on our arrival. The last platoon consisted of kids that seemed to be as young as 13 years old. I thought they were cadets and whispered to my Commanding Officer that they looked cute. The Commanding Officer gave me a dirty look and "neglected" to inspect this last platoon. Afterwards he told me simply, somewhat angered with my inability to understand, that they were part of the militia and to avoid further showing my ignorance, I never pursued our discussion. I had no idea what they were doing or why their parents let them hang out with the militia. I thought they were some sort of youth group like the Boy Scouts, or the "Jeunesse Congolaise." It was only decades later that I learned about the phenomenon of child soldiers in African militias. It then hit me like a ton of bricks that this militia group had paraded its platoon of child soldiers and I did not even recognize what they were much less do anything about it. I still don't know what I could have done, if I had properly recognized the situation.⁴⁸

The dilemma of child soldiers was also encountered by Lieutenant-General (Retired) Romeo Dallaire during his service in Rwanda in the 1990s, and later resulted in the formation of the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (RDCSI). In his Defence Policy Review submission, presented on 28 June 2016, Dallaire argued that the RDCSI should partner with Canadian military institutions like the PSTC to deliver training, both at home and abroad, that would be more reflective of the realities of the environments in which contemporary peace operations occur.⁴⁹ As part of this, it was recommended that the CAF and the RDCSI work together to create a "new doctrinal framework that [would] assist in providing new tactics, new training and potentially new equipment" to be able to better prepare CAF personnel for the potential risks of encounters with

^{48.} Email exchanged between Howard G. Coombs and Terry Liston 04 December 2016 [Email in possession of Lindsay M. Coombs].

^{49.} Roméo Dallaire, "Submission by LGen The Honourable Roméo Dallaire to the Department of National Defence Forum Review of June 28, 2016," 2.

child soldiers.⁵⁰ Additionally, individuals employed by the RDCSI, like Dr. Shelly Whitman and Darin Reeves, produced numerous publications which argued that the CAF must address these deficiencies in doctrine and training.⁵¹ Furthermore, CAF personnel at the PSTC had noted that soldiers would benefit from a more in-depth analysis of issues concerning war-affected children during pre-deployment training and education initiatives.⁵² In light of these and other discussions, in March 2017 the Canadian military released "Joint Doctrine Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers" (JDN 2017-01) to address various issues regarding these children.⁵³

The Canadian Military Before JDN 2017-01: Lacking Child Soldier Related Training

Prior to the promulgation of JDN 2017-01, there was a lack of formal training and education available for Canadian military personnel regarding interactions with child soldiers. First and foremost, issues concerning child soldiers were not contained in the pre-deployment training instructions provided by Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) for any of the CAF's three services – the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This is significant because CJOC, as noted earlier in this chapter, is responsible for the management of all force employment during both domestic and international operations. In practical terms, this means that CJOC provides detailed direction for deployment preparation across the entire

^{50.} Roméo Dallaire, "Submission by LGen The Honourable Roméo Dallaire to the Department of National Defence Forum Review of June 28, 2016," 3.

^{51.} Shelly Whitman and Darin Reeves, "Preventing the Use of Children as Soldiers: A Critical New Operational Capacity for the CAF," CDA Institute (29 June 2016); and Roméo Dallaire and Shelly Whitman, "How Canada Can Defuse ISIL's Child Soldiers," The Ottawa Citizen (23 February 2016).

^{52.} Lindsay Coombs, "Are They Soldiers? Or Are They Children? Preparing the Canadian Military for the Contemporary Security Environment," *The Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) General Sir William Otter Paper* 16, No. 1 (December 2016): 5.

^{53.} See DND, Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine (CFJD) Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017). Released by the Department of National Defence with no severances under Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Request, file number A-2017-00281 [JDN 2017-01 in possession of Lindsay M. Coombs].

spectrum of military operations.⁵⁴ As part of these activities, CJOC provides formation instructions to each of the services regarding pre-deployment activities for specific operations, as well as directives to maintain standard readiness through training and education.⁵⁵ In sum, because issues concerning child soldiers were not included in the directions given from CJOC to the CAF's three services, the topic was not a standardized component of CAF training and education material.

Additionally, the topic of war-affected children was also not included in the Individual Battle Task Standards (IBTS) for the Army or the Navy. Notably, the Air Force does not have a service-specific IBTS; instead, it uses CJOC's training direction as the main standard for individual readiness for deployed operations. ⁵⁶ These documents are the capstone policies by which all Canadian Army and Navy individual training standards are measured. IBTS directed training normally occurs during pre-deployment training, and to a certain extent on an annual basis. Although, for example, the Canadian Army's IBTS for Land Operations does discuss topics that are applicable when interacting with vulnerable populations, such as human rights and ethics, it does not address any issues specifically related to children in armed conflict. There is also no mention of child soldiers in the IBTS for Naval Operations. From this, one could conclude that if child soldier related training were to occur, it would likely take place during pre-deployment initiatives like Mission Specific Training. However, unless a need was identified in advance of deployment to prepare

54. See Paul Johnston, Chris Madsen, Paul Mitchell, and Steven Moritsugu, "A Canadian Approach to Command at the Operational Level," *Canadian Military Journal* 14, No. 4 (Autumn 2004): 6–7; Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto, Dundurn, 2015) and DND, "Canadian Joint Operations Command," (2018-07-12), available at https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/organizational-structure/canadian-joint-operations-command.html.

^{55.} See Paul Johnston, Chris Madsen, Paul Mitchell, and Steven Moritsugu, "A Canadian Approach to Command at the Operational Level," *Canadian Military Journal* 14, No. 4 (Autumn 2004).

^{56.} While this direction does not include the topic of child soldiers, it does provide instructions for training on topics like the Laws of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, weapons, and administration. Email exchange between Howard Coombs and Brigadier-General Scott Clancy July 24, 2017 [Email in possession of Lindsay M. Coombs].

CAF personnel for potential interactions with child soldiers, training on the topic would neither occur during Mission Specific Training.⁵⁷ Taken as a whole, this means that issues concerning child soldiers were not an aspect of standardized CAF training and education either as directed by CJOC or as a component of individual training standards, nor was it a systematized component of pre-deployment training.

Notably, although the topic of child soldiers was not a standardized aspect of CAF training in 2016, it was addressed by some military instructors. For instance, the PSTC in Kingston, Ontario, has regularly included the subject of child soldiers in their training programs since 2015. In brief, the PSTC is a "Joint, Inter-agency, and Multinational training establishment...[that] supports the intellectual development and training of Canadian Forces, members from other government departments, and international audiences."58 It is also the CAF Center of Excellence for Peace Support Operations training; this means that the PSTC is responsible for, and controls the development of, all CAF training for peace operations.⁵⁹ In their courses, they utilized a variety of methods, as well as academic and legal resources to inform CAF personnel of some of the issues that could arise as a result of encounters with child soldiers. Some of their methods included the distribution of information pamphlets, slide show presentations, scenarios, and role-playing. During their classroom training segments, the PSTC educated CAF personnel on the legal background of children in combat and provided a clear definition of child soldiers in accordance with international law.60 They also reviewed classic percep-

^{57.} Since the early 1990s, peace operations training has been graduated into three areas: (1) general-purpose combat training, the basic skills of the soldier, (2) general peace operations training and education, taught to most personnel during various professional courses, (3) mission specific training, which are military activities designed to prepare CAF personnel for the conditions of a particular mission. See Howard G. Coombs, "25 Years after Somalia: How it Changed Canadian Armed Forces Preparations for Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* 17, No. 4 (Autumn 2017): 35–46.

^{58.} See DND, "Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC)," last modified 24 February 2016, available at https://peacesupport.ca.

^{59.} Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, "Evidence" (21 September 2016).

^{60.} Definition of child soldiers provided at this time was as stated in the Paris

tions of child soldiers, including the perpetrator versus innocent victim debate, and provided a brief overview of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives.⁶¹

Although the PSTC made clear in their training material that children do suffer immensely while living in societies experiencing armed conflict, CAF personnel were trained to understand that an armed child is still a combatant and must be treated as such. In order to acclimatize soldiers to the harsh realities of many conflicts across the globe, trainers at the PSTC stressed the fact that a child may present a lethal threat. Accordingly, the PSTC attempted to make their practice scenarios as realistic and intense as possible, occasionally even incorporating actual children into the situations. Despite the fact that the PSTC included a variety of issues related to child soldiers in their training, they only had enough time allotted to cover the most rudimentary facets of this important subject. This constituted roughly twenty minutes of classroom training time, and perhaps one practical scenario. 62

With regards to mental health initiatives, the CAF also did not provide specific preparation to mentally cope with encounters with child soldiers. However, it was mentioned as a possible challenge when CAF mental health practitioners delivered pre-deployment mental health briefs for combat missions. At this stage, child soldiers were discussed in the context of some of the possible extreme challenges of combat and, moreover, how these challenges may impact CAF personnel. Furthermore, pre-deployment mental health briefs also included a detailed explanation of the

Principles. See United Nations General Assembly, "National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights," (A/RES/48/134), ratified 20 December 1993, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r134.htm. 61. For more information on the perpetrator versus innocent victim debate, see Mark. A. Drumbl, *Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012).

^{62.} Notably, children used in these scenarios were hired through local talent agencies. See Brian Healy, "PSTC 101 Brief," Power Point presentation created on 20 July 2016 [Slides in possession of Lindsay M. Coombs]; and, also see DND, Canadian Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters, "Briefing Note For Commander CADTC How the Peace Support Training Centre Trains Soldiers So They Are Prepared To Support Vulnerable Populations" (07 March 2017) [Briefing Note in possession of Howard G. Coombs].

human stress responses, like the fight-flight-freeze response, as well as its effects on cognitive functioning while soldiers are in a level of heightened physiological response. It was emphasized that these stress responses are automatic and, as such, it remains important for soldiers to understand that no matter how well trained they are, it is impossible to predict how their brain will respond to signals emitted by the amygdala in the milliseconds after exposure to a stressor. Other CAF initiatives, like the Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR) awareness and skills training program, were similarly designed to ensure that appropriate training on responses to sources of stress was available throughout each stage of the deployment cycle.⁶³

At the end of the deployment cycle, the CAF conducted an Enhanced Post-Deployment Screening (EPDS) process with the intent of getting individuals with deployment-related health problems into care more rapidly. The EPDS was a fairly comprehensive process which consists of:

- 1. The completion of a health survey. This is a general questionnaire on the health status of soldiers returning from deployments;
- 2. Segments of a "Patient Health Questionnaire" which assesses physical symptoms of Operational Stress Injuries like depression, suicidality, panic disorder, and generalized anxiety;
- 3. Reviewing a patient checklist for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD);
- 4. Examining alcohol abuse through an "Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test";
- 5. Using a 30-item questionnaire that attempts to define a level of scale to combat exposure; and
- 6. A traumatic brain injury screening.

Following the completion of the EPDS process, soldiers would participate in a 40-minute interview with a clinician based upon the interpretation of the questionnaire responses. Finally, the clinician would create a summary of their impression of the health of the returning soldier and

^{63.} Canada, Veterans Affairs, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, "Interim Report on the Operational Stress Injuries of Canada's Veterans" (June 2015), 12; and DND, "Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR)."

would provide recommendations for the soldier going forward. While the primary purpose of the EPDS process was to promptly identify and offer treatment to those who have deployment-related health problems, the screening served other purposes as well, including: providing advice on the reintegration process or other issues that may arise during the process; screening for health problems which may be unrelated to deployment, and; de-stigmatizing mental illness and mental health care. Although there were a few questions in the EPDS that inquired about engagements with civilians, or if the soldier had difficulty distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, there were no questions concerning encounters with child soldiers.⁶⁴

With the creation of JDN 2017-01, this situation changed. Documents like JDN 2017-01 are critical elements which support the ongoing transformation of the CAF and guide the professional development of its' leaders. ⁶⁵ Designed to provide formal guidance to individuals, units and commanders on how to approach engagements with children in conflict, JDN 2017-01 has laid the basis for CAF training in this subject.

Canada's Joint Doctrine Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers

In the doctrine note, the issue of child soldiering is considered within the broader context of vulnerable populations.⁶⁶ Within JDN (Canada's Joint Doctrine Note) 2017-01, vulnerable populations are generally de-

^{64.} Most of the information used in the creation of this section came from Lieutenant-Colonel Suzanne M. Bailey, SSO Social Work & Mental Health Training, CAF Health Services Group Headquarters, Email exchange with Lindsay M. Coombs 11 March 2016.

^{65.} DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01, Canadian Military Doctrine (April 2009).

^{66.} Vulnerability is an inherently complex term. Although vulnerable groups are presented as homogenous, like every individual within that group is vulnerable to the same extent, in reality the situation is much more complex. For instance, generally speaking children are perceived to be more exposed than adults, however "not all children are equally vulnerable, nor are all children more vulnerable than adults." Phobe Godfrey and Denise Torres, eds., *Emergent Possibilities for Global Sustainability: Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender* (New York, Routledge Press, 2016), 335.

fined as "those individuals or groups who have a greater probability than the population as a whole of being harmed and experiencing an impaired quality of life because of social, environmental, health, or economic conditions or policies." These groups are often identifiable within the general population and include, but are not necessarily limited to, the elderly, women, children, visible minorities, or those with physical and cognitive disabilities. Furthermore, the doctrine note indicates that these groups are more likely to be exploited in regions experiencing armed conflict. With reference to UN policies and programs to support vulnerable populations, the document explains that the CAF must be aware that children are especially vulnerable in situations of armed conflict. In particular, the recruitment and use of child soldiers as well as sexual violence against children receive significant consideration in the doctrine note.

The doctrine note highlights that vulnerable children may be recruited to join an armed force or group in a number of different ways. It states that abduction and coercion are the most common methods through which a child might become involved in armed conflict, but that children may also volunteer to join an armed force of group.⁷⁰ The doctrine note further indicates that child volunteerism may occur as a means of self-preservation, to gain opportunities in an internally displaced person camp, or to regain a sense of belonging after losing family.⁷¹ Further to this, JDN 2017-01 also illustrates that children are recruited because they

^{67.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-1.

^{68.} DND, CFID Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-1.

^{69.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-1; See the following United Nations documents, United Nations Security Council, 5235th Meeting, "Resolution 1612 (2005) [Children and armed conflict]" (S/RES/1612) (26 July 2005); United Nations Security Council, 4948th Meeting, "Resolution 1539 [Children and armed conflict]" (S/RES/1539) (22 April 2004) available at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1539. United Nations Security Council, 6176th Meeting, "Resolution 1882 (2009) [Children and armed conflict]" (S/RES/1882) (4 August 2009); United Nations Security Council, 7129th Meeting, "Resolution 2143 [Children and Armed Conflict]" (S/RES/2143) (7 March 2014); and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), "Policy on Mainstreaming the Protection, Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict Within UN Peacekeeping Operations," (1 June 2009).

^{70.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-5.

^{71.} DND, CFID Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-5.

take less time to train and are often perceived as more expendable than adults.⁷² Additionally, child soldiers are cheaper than adult combatants, given that they require less food and money to sustain them. Moreover, the use of child soldiers in combat holds some distinct strategic advantages. This includes the fact that their small size allows easy concealment, and they have been known to slow the progress of professional forces who may be reluctant to engage child soldiers.⁷³

In the doctrine note, sexual violence against children is discussed more generally under the umbrella of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Although the topic is not explored in the doctrine note as extensively as the recruitment and use of child soldiers, it does constitute a significant first step towards a more inclusive understanding within the CAF of the complexities of the lived experiences of child soldiers. In JDN 2017-01, it is noted that the manners in which children are vulnerable to both SGBV as well as to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) must be considered when preparing to undertake an operation.⁷⁴ As such, the doctrine

^{72.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-4 to 1-5.

^{73.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1–4 to 1–5; See Lindsay Coombs, "Are They Soldiers? Or Are They Children? Preparing the Canadian Military for the Contemporary Security Environment," The Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) General Sir William Otter Paper 16, No. 1 (December 2016); and Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities "Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. Forces. Report on the Cultural Intelligence Seminar Child Soldiers: Implications for U.S. Forces held on June 11, 2002" (November 2002), 19; and Peter Singer, "Western Militaries Confront Child Soldiers Threat," Jane's Intelligence Review 17, No. 1 (January 2005), 3.

^{74.} In JDN 2017-01, sexual and gender-based violence is described as "conflict-related violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty." Sexual exploitation is characterized by the UN as "any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another." Similarly, sexual abuse is identified as "the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions." Although descriptions of SGBV and SEA do appear similar, the term SEA is typically used to describe when such abuses are perpetrated by UN or other coalition / allied personnel. DND, *CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers* (March 2017), 1-4; United Nations, United Nations Secretariate, Secretary-General's Bulletin, "Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse," ST/SBG/2003/13 (9 October 2003), 1.

note underscores the need to include gender-based considerations related to the issue of child soldiers during each stage of mission planning. For instance, utilizing Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) is regarded in the doctrine note as a critical operational level consideration.⁷⁵ This analytical perspective would ensure to not only identify gender-based considerations related to the issue of child soldiers, but would also assess the expertise and gender composition of deploying forces. Among other benefits, it is argued in JDN 2017-01 that a more diverse range of personnel may provide for better interactions not only with child soldiers, but with local populations in general.⁷⁶ While this would not necessarily suggest the establishment of gender quotas for deployed personnel, it does entail an acknowledgement of the advantages of more balanced forces.⁷⁷

Although the concept of vulnerable populations is not new to the CAF, the doctrine note's acknowledgment of the need for child soldiering to be considered in relation to other intersecting issues – like why and how they are recruited, as well as issues of SGBV – is indicative of how pervasive these problems are. It is also important to bear in mind that these issues, their implications, associated legal concerns, and the actions required to respond to them have clear linkages to well-established international legislature, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, and the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁸ As such, it is clear that military responses to

^{75.} GBA+ is an analytical tool created by the Government of Canada that is "used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people may experience policies, programs and initiatives. The "plus" in GBA+ acknowledges that GBA goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences." Over the past few years, there has been a significant push to integrate this method of analysis into CAF training, education, and operational conduct. See Canada, Status of Women Canada, "What is GBA+?"; and also see, DND, "Thinking About Gender in Military Planning and Operations".

^{76.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017),1-6 and 2-7.

^{77.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 2-7.

^{78.} See United Nations Security Council, 4213th Meeting, "Resolution 1325 (2000) [Women, Peace and Security]" (S/RES/1325); see DND, Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels: Joint Doctrine Manual (2001). https://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Canadian_LOAC_Manual_2001_English.pdf and also, see United Nations, "Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Protocols Additional to the Conventions," available at

child soldiers, and to vulnerable populations in general, must be reflective of these laws and agreements. Following from this, JDN 2017-01 suggests that future doctrinal guidance to the CAF regarding the issue of child soldiers is likely to be incorporated into "more all-encompassing doctrine related to the overarching considerations related to vulnerable populations."⁷⁹

From this discussion, it becomes evident that the potential of encountering child soldiers has an abundance of military and security sector implications that must be considered during mission planning and execution. Building upon existing CAF documents, as well as policy guidance provided by both NATO and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, JDN 2017-01 calls attention to numerous planning considerations. In addition to the considerations discussed regarding vulnerable populations, the doctrine note underscores the need for the CAF to include issues related to child soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as well as the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE). These critical considerations for each level of mission planning and execution are outlined in the table located in Appendix B and include topics from mission analysis, to detainee handling, to supporting security sector reform. Nevertheless, the "CAF's assigned mission will ultimately determine what preparations and precautions will be taken in light of the possible or known presence of child soldiers."80 Therefore, although the doctrine note recognizes many planning considerations, at the end of the day mission preparation will reflect the goals and objectives of the respective operation. For instance, some missions may be in a position to work with non-governmental organizations and other local groups to address some of the underlying challenges that may enable the use of child soldiers, like weak governance.81 Non-combatant

http://www.eytv4scf.net/gc.htm.

^{79.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-2.

^{80.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-7.

^{81.} DND, *CFJD Note* 2017-01, *Child Soldiers* (March 2017), 1–5. Ideas concerning the protection of child soldiers as well as the need to address the root causes of their recruitment and use are inherently linked to Dallaire and the RDCSI, see Roméo Dallaire and Shelly Whitman, The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldier Initiative, "To End the Use of Child Soldiers Look to the Security Sector" (9 November

missions, on the other hand may "need to be prepared to encounter child soldiers and ensure guidance is available on how to handle such encounters, while not seeking to address governance issues, recruitment, and other factors."82

Given the reality that CAF personnel are likely to deploy to regions where child soldiers are prevalent, like some areas in Africa or the Middle East, ensuring that CAF personnel are well-prepared and trained to respond appropriately to potential interactions with child soldiers remains a critical preparation and planning consideration. As such, the need for training and education on the topic of child soldiers figures prominently in the doctrine note. In particular, the need for subject matter concerning child soldiers to be included in professional military education (PME), during pre-deployment training, and in relevant mental health programs are brought to the fore in IDN 2017-01.

With regards to PME and pre-deployment training, the doctrine note recommends that CAF personnel be trained and educated across all levels of command regarding the potential presence of children in regions experiencing armed conflict. Not only should CAF personnel be cognisant of the possible presence of child soldiers, but also of CAF policies and processes regarding issues that may arise during and after encounters with these children. Hence, training "related to the protection, rights, and welfare of children, including in international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law" should be provided to all deploying personnel. 4

Altogether, JDN 2017-01 outlines that CAF personnel must be given clear direction regarding their rights and responsibilities towards child soldiers. This direction should also indicate what actions CAF personnel may undertake when child soldiers are armed and present a valid threat. Ultimately, CAF personnel must be prepared for the possibility that they may have to "engage child soldiers with deadly force to defend themselves or others, or to accomplish the mission in accordance with

^{2014).}

^{82.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-5.

^{83.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 2-3.

^{84.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-8.

mandate authorized [rules of engagement]." 85 These requirements may necessitate the allocation of additional time for training and education that specifically addresses the challenges posed by child soldiers. 86 Furthermore, mission-specific training before or during an operation should reflect existing alliance, coalition, or UN-required pre-deployment training material on the topic of child soldiers. 87 While recognizing the importance of training at each stage of the deployment cycle, the doctrine note also acknowledges that training on the topic of child soldiers should not solely be limited to deploying troops. Rather, consideration of issues concerning child soldiers should be included "in all force generation activities to adequately prepare CAF personnel both militarily and mentally." 88

The doctrine note also suggests that encounters with child soldiers during operations can be particularly traumatic for the personnel involved, especially if someone is injured or killed as a result of the interaction. ⁸⁹ This is largely because "child soldiers enjoy a moral edge in battle, as professional adult soldiers, particularly Western ones, may be reluctant to engage child soldiers and may experience negative psychological effects as a result of encountering or combating them." ⁹⁰ By educating deploying CAF personnel on issues related to child soldiering, as well as the possibility that they may need to engage child combatants with force, the doctrine note suggests that proper preparation may help mitigate the potential psychological impacts these encounters may have on CAF per-

^{85.} DND, CFID Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 2-12.

^{86.} DND, CFID Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 2-7.

^{87.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 2-8.

^{88.} DND, CFID Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 2-3.

^{89.} DND, *CFJD Note 2017-01*, *Child Soldiers* (March 2017); Lindsay Coombs, "Are They Soldiers? Or Are They Children? Preparing the Canadian Military for the Contemporary Security Environment," *The Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) General Sir William Otter Paper* 16, No. 1 (December 2016): 5; North Atlantic Treaty Organization AC/323(HFM-159)TP/222, Research and Technology Organization, RTO Technical Memorandum TM-HFM-159, "Child Soldiers as the Opposing Force: Final Report of the HFM-159/RTO Task Group" (January 2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a539989.pdf, 2–4. 90. DND, *CFJD Note 2017-01*, *Child Soldiers* (March 2017), 1–5.

sonnel.⁹¹ This preparation should include both classroom and scenario-based mission-specific training. Moreover, CAF personnel must participate in the R2MR program at each stage of the deployment cycle. In short, R2MR is the CAF's mental health training package that is embedded throughout CAF member's career. It is designed to promote mental resilience that will both improve short-term performance and long-term mental health outcomes. 92 Notably, access to appropriate mental health professionals both during and after a deployment is a significant aspect of this program. Ultimately, ensuring the readiness of Canadian military personnel to undertake missions that may involve encountering child soldiers is critical for the attainment of operational success. Readiness, in turn, stems from the provision of adequate training and education on the topic of child soldiers at all levels of command, during PME and at each stage of the deployment cycle. Coupled with R2MR and its follow-on equivalents, this training will also assist in minimizing the psychological impacts encounters with child soldiers may have on deployed personnel.

Conclusion

The types of conflict have changed, and therefore the manner in which the CAF prepares for and conducts operations has also changed. One can discern this through an examination of the evolution of peacekeeping training from the earliest days until now. Canada's military has moved from focusing almost solely on general-purpose combat training to a model that includes the need to accommodate a vast spectrum of dilemmas in the contemporary security environment. Canadian initiatives to deal with child soldiers illustrate that philosophical and practical shift. Children are now integral components of warring parties, including government forces, rebel groups, and terrorist organizations. It is therefore incumbent that Canadian soldiers are provided the appropriate competencies to better manage this aspect of conflict and help reduce the exploitation of children in regions afflicted by violence. This includes training and ed-

^{91.} DND, CFJD Note 2017-01, Child Soldiers (March 2017), 1-6 and 2-12.

^{92.} DND, "Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR)," last modified 13 August 2015.

ucation related to the protection, rights, and welfare of children, as well as understanding how child soldiers may present a threat to Canadian military personnel.

Due to the prevalence of children on the modern battlefield, the CAF now recognizes and prepares Canadian soldiers to encounter the threat that can be posed by child soldiers in regions afflicted by conflict. Although children have been present in conflict throughout history, their continuing use creates a pressing problem not only for professional armed forces, but the international community as a whole. This concern has become even more pressing with Canadian Government announcements of peacekeeping support in Africa, where child soldiers are omnipresent. Documents like JDN 2017-01 are critical elements which support the institutional evolution of the CAF and professional preparation of its' leaders. Ultimately, JDN 2017-01, and like direction, represents a vehicle for military change that will help ensure that CAF personnel are adequately trained to respond to encounters with child soldiers and other challenges. In the security atmosphere of the twenty-first century, militaries have the responsibility to anticipate, prepare for and deal with a multitude of crises and conflicts. Military capabilities and forces are used to counter a broad range of threats and requirements, from conventional to asymmetric warfare. Child soldiers are just one part of this challenge. With the changes wrought over the last twenty-five years since the Somalia Inquiry, the CAF seems to be well-positioned to adapt to meet the specific dilemmas of peace operations.

The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping to Protect Civilians: A Necessary Evil

Kofi Nsia-Pepra

We intervene to protect thousands of innocent people...¹ – President Clinton, on the order for a military campaign in Kosovo, March 25, 1999

United Nations peacekeeping missions have historically been reluctant to use force other than for self-defence, consistent with traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality, state consent and minimum use of force for self-defence. As a result, the use of force to protect vulnerable civilians was not a normal characteristic of UN missions. The post–Cold War era saw a proliferation of civil wars along national, religious, and ethnic fault-lines involving both state and non-state actors that often targeted civilians. This spread of internecine violence increased demand on the UN and in particular peacekeeping forces deployed in those conflicts, to prevent and halt such violations. The United Nations, however, failed to prevent or halt the Rwandese genocide and Bosnian massacres of the early 1990s. These traumatic failures necessitated a reassessment of the fundamental principles of traditional UN peacekeeping and the de-

^{1.} BBC News Online, "World: Americas Clinton's statement: Stabilising Europe" (March 25, 1999), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/303693.stm.

ployment of more robust and forceful missions to protect civilians from attacks.² Since the inception of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, today's peacekeeping operations are usually Chapter VII missions mandated to protect civilians using "all necessary means" including force.³

However, the use of force in UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians has not been well received by all. It has triggered debates within both academic and policy circles. Critics cite the loss of impartiality, conflict escalation and reprisals against civilians and peacekeepers as risks associated with the mandated use of force by UN peacekeeping missions.4 This chapter argues that despite these criticisms, the use of force to protect vulnerable citizens and non-combatants is a necessary evil because it fulfills the fundamental objective of the UN "to save future generations from the scourge of war." 5 To do otherwise diminishes the efficacity of the UN. For example, the United Nations' failure to use force to protect Rwandese during its mission in that country led to a genocide that damaged the UN's reputation and discredited its peacekeeping doctrine. Abandoning vulnerable civilians is a moral failure and, aside from the physical harm caused to these victims, implicitly condones atrocities that undermine the organization's credibility and legitimacy. The use of force by UN peacekeepers to protect vulnerable populations is thus more than a moral obligation.

The following chapter discusses the historic evolution of the use of force to protect civilians, the inherent dilemmas and challenges, necessity, and effectiveness of the use of force to protect civilians, borrowing

^{2.} See L. Brahimi, *The Report of The Panel on UN Peacekeeping* (New York, NY: UN Security Council, 2000).

^{3.} For details on United Nations missions see Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

^{4.} Thierry Tardy, "Robust Peacekeeping a False good idea?," in *Beyond the 'New Horizon' Proceedings from the UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges*, eds. Cedric de Coning, Andreas Øien Stensland and Thierry Tardy, (Geneva, Department of Security and Conflict Management Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), 66–75.

^{5.} United Nations, United Nations Charter, "Preamble," available at http://www.un.org/.

from game theoretic *barrier* model of robust peacekeeping success.⁶ The chapter concludes with recommendations drawn from the application of the theory.

Historical Evolution: Use of Force to Protect Civilians

As laid out in the Dorn and Holm chapters Cold War era UN traditional peacekeeping missions traditionally had a non-interventionist posture consistent with its principles. This was a result of Cold War superpower rivalry that paralyzed the Security Council in decision-making regarding authorization of the use of force to protect vulnerable civilians in mission theatres. As a result, these missions were not explicitly mandated to protect vulnerable civilians because they lacked the requisite "muscle," or means, to do so. Although civilian protection was not the explicit objective of UN missions,⁷ it was intrinsically achieved through peacekeepers' strategic interposition as a buffer between conflict parties.8 Peacekeepers' fixation with the fundamental tenet of impartiality and an apprehension concerning reprisals undermined their desire to protect civilians. During the Congolese crisis in the 1960s, the Council's authorization of the UN Operation in the Congo, or Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), to use force beyond self-defence to prevent civil war and to expel foreign mercenaries divided the Security Council. Furthermore the 234 UN fatalities represented one of the highest military loss rates associated with a UN mission.¹⁰ Rather than welcoming it as a novel model

^{6.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra, UN Robust Peacekeeping: Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 74.

^{7.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra "Moral Obligation: UN Missions Should not Abandon Vulnerable Civilians during Critical Times" NYU, *Global Peace Operations Review* (25 August 2017), available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/moral-obligation-un-missions-should-not-abandon-vulnerable-civilians-in-critical-times/.

^{8.} Siobhan Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9.

^{9.} Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: SIPRI & Oxford University Press, 2002), 51–86.

^{10.} Esref Aksu, "The UN in the Congo Conflict: ONUC," The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change (Manchester: Manchester Uni-

worthy replication, the Congo mission was regarded as an aberration that should be avoided. The UN was "more interested in forgetting than in learning, more interested in avoiding future ONUCs than in doing them better." ¹¹ Subsequent UN peacekeeping missions for the next quarter of a century, were limited to small observation or goodwill missions, most of them monitoring post-conflict situations. ¹²

The post-Cold War decline in superpower rivalry and perception of a growing worldwide peace revived optimism within the Security Council about UN capacity to assist with stabilizing war-torn regions. However, the UN was drawn into civil wars involving both state and non-state actors who disregard international human rights and humanitarian laws targeting civilians. The killing of civilians, in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda precipitated international outcry and demands that UN peacekeeping forces intercede to prevent these atrocities. Unfortunately, the UN was less than effective and a general sense of failure permeated discussion around UN interventions. The need for civilian protection came to overshadow subsequent debates on the future of the UN.¹³ Within this discourse ambivalence towards the use of force became a central theme in UN debate. Traditional peacekeeping principles originally designed for Cold War interstate conflicts were inappropriate to protect civilians in a violent post-Cold War security environment. This realization created a fundamental reassessment of the principles of traditional peacekeeping - consent, impartiality, minimum force - and the realization that civilian protection required the use of much higher levels of force than were previously accepted for UN operations.

The normative doctrinal shift to more robust mandates to protect civilians was fostered by critical conceptual developments centering on

versity Press, 2003), 100-129.

^{11.} William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960–1964," in *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York, St Martin's Press), 315–349.

^{12.} These were UNSF (1962–1963); UNYOM (1963–1964); UNFICYP (1964–); DOMREP (1965–1966); UNIPOM (1965–1966); UNEF II (1973–1979); UNDOF (1974—); UNIFIL (1978—); UNGOMAP (1988–1990); UNIIMOG (1988–1991). 13. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peace-*

keeping in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 317.

the use of force to protect civilians.¹⁴ For example, the 1995 General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations noted that self-defence "might be interpreted as entitling United Nations personnel to open fire in a wide variety of situations" including civilian protection.¹⁵ In policy documents such as this, one can discern the ongoing change of perspective regarding the means of peacekeeping.

Long serving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan provided impetus to this debate on civilian protection by urging member states to soberly reflect on the organization's "inadequacy of symbolic deterrence in the face of a systematic campaign of violence; the pervasive ambivalence within United Nations regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace."16 Annan redefined the principle of impartiality stating, "impartiality does not and must not mean neutrality in the face of evil."17 He acknowledged "the need for timely intervention by the international community when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and when the state in charge is nominally unable or unwilling to stop it."18 Annan promoted an interventionist operational paradigm. He recommended abandoning outdated neutral peacekeeping and adopting more robust peace operations to avoid another Rwanda-like occurrence. He also acknowledged that the world could not stand by as terrible atrocities were committed against defenseless civilians. 19 The 2000 Brahimi Report also recommended mission forces that were more assertive and capable of deterrence to confront the challenges of human rights violations in

^{14.} Stian Kjeksrud, "Matching robust ambitions with robust action in operations - Towards a conceptual overstretch?," *Norwegian Defense Research Establishment* (20 April 2009), available at https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapport-er/09-01016.pdf, 12.

^{15.} UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations," UN/210/TC/GG95 (October 1995), 20.

^{16.} UN General Assembly, 54th Session, Report of Kofi Annan, "The fall of Srebrenica," A/54/549 (15 November 1999), 108.

^{17.} Kofi Annan, "Walking the International Tightrope," *The New York Times* (January 19, 1999), 19.

^{18.} Kofi Annan, "Two concepts of sovereignty," *The Economist* (September 16, 1999), 7.

^{19.} Kofi Annan, We the peoples: The role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (United Nations, 2000), available at https://www.un.org/en/events/paste-vents/pdfs/We The Peoples.pdf.

volatile conflict areas.20

The 2001 ad hoc International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty created what become the widely accepted international norm of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) which advocated for the use of force to protect civilians. Following on from R2P, the 2007 UN Capstone Doctrine urged peace operations to use force proactively to defend their mandate and protect civilians under threat.²¹ Furthermore, since the first landmark UNAMSIL resolution 1265 (1999), most UN missions have been authorized under Chapter VII to "take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of violence..."22 This authorization provided Chapter VII missions with more robust Rules of Engagements (ROE), than those traditional peacekeeping operations authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Despite this generally welcomed change the use of force, UN peacekeeping operations, as noted in the Introduction, continued to generate concerned debate amongst policy makers and researchers.

Challenges and Dilemmas of the Use of Force

The use of force by UN peacekeepers has triggered political debate that threaten to undermine the gains that have been made in the protection of civilians. A major challenge is the disagreement between protectionists – such as China, who strongly uphold the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and limited use of force – and that of interventionists – such as the US, who uphold the principles of R2P and humanitarian

^{20.} UN, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (17 August 2000), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol==A/55/305, paras 48–50, 55, 66d.

^{21.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra "Moral Obligation: UN Missions Should not Abandon Vulnerable Civilians during Critical Times" NYU, *Global Peace Operations Review* (25 August 2017), available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/moral-obligation-un-missions-should-not-abandon-vulnerable-civilians-in-critical-times/.

^{22.} See UN Security Council Resolution 1299 (2000), available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0.

intervention. For example, China's concerns regarding deployment of a strong UN force without concurrence of the Darfur government led to the deployment of a hybrid mission – the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) – with a diluted mandate that has failed to protect the population of Darfur.²³

Overall, the UN lacks a functional operational doctrine for the use of force to protect civilians. The Capstone Doctrine, developed to alleviate this gap, does not "override the national military doctrines of individual member states."²⁴ This caveat creates the potential lack of consistency in the application of force amongst the various national contributors to a UN mission. Related to this drawback, another serious dilemma is the absence of conceptual clarity and articulation on the use of force by troop contributing nations to protect civilians. The phrase "all necessary means" in relation to the use of force in robust mandates is ambiguous leaving the decision to use force to field commanders of the contributing UN countries.²⁵ Resultantly, participating contingents are affected by a "phone home" syndrome deferring to their national legal frameworks pertaining to the use of force. Consequently, these contingents are reluctant to use ROEs incompatible with their national laws on the use of force. This leads to more inconsistency in the use of force, which in turn leads to operational incoherence that adversely affects civilian protection. The Uruguayan battalion (URABATT) of the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC) failed to protect civilians in the Congolese city of Bunia during 2003 because despite the Chapter VII ROE, after consultation with their national authorities - the Uruguayan Parliament - URABATT was not authorized

^{23.} Adam Day, "Case Study 2: Peacekeeping Without a Partner: A Review of UNAMID's Political Strategy in Darfur" (Netherlands: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2020), available at.https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/3-PeaceOps-2020-1245-Darfur.pdf, 47.

^{24.} UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" (March 2008).

^{25.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra "Moral Obligation: UN Missions Should not Abandon Vulnerable Civilians during Critical Times" NYU, *Global Peace Operations Review* (25 August 2017), available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/moral-obligation-un-missions-should-not-abandon-vulnerable-civilians-in-critical-times/, 64.

to use force except in self-defence.²⁶

Another challenge facing interventionists is the appropriate level of force used by mission forces in the "grey area" between Chapter VI "peacekeeping" and Chapter VII "peace enforcement." The dilemma is how much force is enough to deter violence, while at the same avoiding escalation into peace enforcement? Too little force could lead to mission failure to protect civilians, as in Rwanda, while too much could be deemed excessive and elicit violent reprisals from some actors as in the case of UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The dilemma is finding the right balance in applying force that avoids popular resistance and wins the trust of the people. There are concerns that UN peacekeeping missions are becoming peace enforcement and member states and practitioners who adhere to the strict divide between peacekeeping and enforcement actions resist such doctrinal shift.²⁸ Some of the major traditional troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are wary of a shift to peace enforcement as this increases reprisals against their troops by spoiling forces.²⁹ Enforcement mandates that target specific groups have negating implications for the UN as an impartial arbitrator and honest peace broker. There is a dilemma as to whether peacekeepers should either be reactive or proactive. For example, MONUC has repeatedly been criticized of not protecting civilians because its responses to civilian attacks is reactive and peacekeepers arrive too late to protect. On the other hand, proponents of proactive response cite the successful protection of civilians by the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation

^{26.} Victoria Holtnand, Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (New York: Holt & Taylor, 2009), 271.

^{27.} The UN Charter is available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter#:~:text=The%20Charter%20of%20the%20United%20Nations%20is%20the,and%20came%20into%20force%20on%2024%20October%201945.

^{28.} Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for peacekeeping operations, argued in an internal memo in March 2013 that UN peacekeepers "are neither trained nor equipped to implement such a mandate," UN Security Council, "In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013" (31 January 2014).

^{29.} John Karlsrud, "The UN at War: examining the consequences of peace enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali," Third World Quarterly 36, No.1 (2015): 40–54.

en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) Force Intervention Brigade. This UN formation was authorized to proactively conduct "targeted offensive operations" against potential attackers but the fear of this preemption is the mission itself becomes a party to the conflict. Indeed, some perceive that the use of force contradicts the constitutive principles of traditional peacekeeping and may fuel conflict resulting in attacks on mission forces and civilians by parties seeking retribution for UN actions. The dilemma is finding the correct balance between using force and maintaining impartiality – all with the goal of protecting the civilian population.³⁰

UN missions, unlike those conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), lack a common training doctrine and centralized pre-deployment training. This is particularly problematic for essential mission tasks, such as the use of force to protect civilians. Each troop contributing country has different training doctrine. The result is discrepancies in critical areas like the use of force, which in turn undermines the effective use of force to protect civilians.

The use of force becomes more problematic where civilian killings are conducted by government troops such as in Darfur, Southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). UN Under Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor argues that "it is extremely difficult to make war and peace with the same people on the same territory at the same time." The paradox is that the UN forces need host nation consent and cooperation. As a result, these UN missions cannot act forcefully against state perpetrators. In these cases, UN forces are sometimes reduced to bystanders, unable to fulfill their protection mandates while civilians are killed.³²

^{30.} See Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

^{31.} Anthony Zinni, 'It's Not Nice and Neat', *Proceedings Magazine*, US Naval Institute 121/8/1-110 (1995): 263.

^{32.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra "Moral Obligation: UN Missions Should not Abandon Vulnerable Civilians during Critical Times" NYU, *Global Peace Operations Review* (25 August 2017), available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/moral-obligation-un-missions-should-not-abandon-vulnerable-civilians-in-critical-times/.

As well, amongst some member nations there is a general lack of willingness to accept casualties while fighting non-existential threats. National perspectives in this regard affects the willingness of troop contributing nations (TCNs) to allow "their" UN forces to be exposed to danger. Illustrative of the consequences of such risk avoidance by UN forces was the massacre of over 180 people in Kisangani in May 2002. This atrocity which took place near a MONUC military camp illustrates the failure of UN contingent who put their force protection ahead of protecting civilians. 4

On top of this UN peacekeeping missions sometimes suffer from mandate-resource discrepancy and consequently lack requisite capabilities to execute combat operations in support of mission mandates. This resource discrepancy, sometimes attributed to a reluctance in member nations to honor UN financial obligations, can affect many areas of the mission including funding, personnel, logistics, and equipment. In conjunction with financial challenges the UN also lacks a standby force ready for an immediate deployment and intervention. As a result of all this, there is a growing disparity between the capacity of the UN and its ability to meet the demands of civilian protection obligations.

Major power non-participation in UN peacekeeping missions compounds this resource problem. With the exception of China, many major powers do not contribute large numbers of troops to UN peacekeeping, especially in conflicts without strategic interest to them. The United Kingdom and the United States are reluctant to contribute military forces to UN missions because of their involvement in other commitments such as counter terrorism, which are deemed more pertinent to their national security interests. Other major nations, like Germany, Japan, and Russia, contribute few personnel due to national perspectives on the use of military forces in support of international UN operations.

^{33.} Fiona Blyth, "Too Risk-Averse, UN Peacekeepers in the DRC Get New Mandate and More Challenges," *IPI Global Observatory* (Online) (10 April 2013) available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/04/too-risk-averse-un-peacekeepers-in-the-drc-get-new-mandate-and-more-challenges/.

^{34.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra, UN Robust Peacekeeping: Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 135.

Use of Force for Civilian Protection: A Moral Obligation and a Necessary Evil

The fundamental objective of the United Nations interventions is the creation of a durable and lasting peace to save successive generations from the scourge of war. As part of this broader mission, UN peacekeepers have a legal and moral obligation to protect civilians. This mandate is derived from the humanitarian provisions of the laws of armed conflict and international human rights laws. Amongst this body of international human rights law is Article 1 of the UN Charter which advocates the protection and promotion of human rights as a, if not the, purpose of the UN. In Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, all members "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organisation" to achieve these outcomes.³⁵

Resultantly, one can argue that the principles of human rights and concern for human dignity and rule of law imbued in the UN Charter and other legislation legally and morally oblige UN missions to use force to protect imperiled civilians. The Rwanda and Srebrenica massacres have ensued a strong sentiment amongst the UN community of "never again" spectating when vulnerable civilians are killed. Building on the legacy of these tragedies is the generally held opinion juris, or legal necessity, to deploy robust peacekeeping missions, such as UNAMSIL when the situation demands such intervention to stop atrocity and protect vulnerable populations. Attempting to remain impartial while innocent civilians are killed is morally wrong and undermines the legitimacy of the UN. The Brahimi Report reinforced this sentiment and observed that inaction is tantamount to ineffectiveness and complicity with evil. The universal acceptability of moral obligation to stop heinous crimes was reflected in the acceptance of guilt by the international community, particularly the United States, following its failure to stop the Rwandese genocide. Former United States President Bill Clinton's atonement speech to Rwandese

^{35.} UN, "United Nations Charter," https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter#:~:text=The%20Charter%20of%20the%20United%20Nations%20is%20the,and%20came%20into%20force%20on%2024%20October%201945.

survivors in 1998 clearly indicated these feelings of guilt.³⁶

In its simplest form robust intervention by UN forces to protect civilians demonstrates that states do not tolerate behaviour that violates respect for human dignity and such action signals to the victims that their plight is not unnoticed. It demonstrates to the citizens of the global community that every life is important and that offenses against human dignity will not be tolerated. Robust intervention shows the importance society assigns to the norms that prohibit genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It also reinforces the principle of using force to prevent these abhorrent acts along with that no one in the international community can act with impunity. Impunity unchecked in early stages may lead to a cycle of perceived immunity from accountability, undermining effective resolution of underlying differences, reconciliation, and peacemaking. Robust early opposition by international organizations like the UN obviates inhumane or unjust conduct by state and non-state participants. This, one hopes, ultimately encourages conformity with the norms of international law. UN member states have a commitment to R2P and "saving the next generation from the scourge of war." 37 Abandoning vulnerable civilians would not only be a moral failure and embolden destructive actors, but would also perpetuate the cycle of impunity, as well as implicitly condone conscience-shocking atrocities that undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the UN.

Keeping those deductions in mind, one can argue that robust peace-keeping authorized to use force reduces civilian killings.³⁸ I demonstrate the effectiveness of robust peacekeeping through a game theoretic *formidable barrier* model of UN robust peacekeeping mission success. The model posits that the success of UN peacekeeping missions in staving

^{36.} See CBS News, "Text of Clinton's Rwanda Speech" (March 25, 1998), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-clintons-rwanda-speech/.

^{37.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra "Moral Obligation: UN Missions Should not Abandon Vulnerable Civilians during Critical Times" NYU, *Global Peace Operations Review* (25 August 2017), available at http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/moral-obligation-un-missions-should-not-abandon-vulnerable-civilians-in-critical-times/.

^{38.} Kofi Nsia-Pepra, UN Robust Peacekeeping: Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 70–75, 90.

off deliberate civilian killings is a function of its deterrent capacity. It presumes deliberate civilian killings are a rational process consisting of careful deliberate calculations by rational actors. The political calculations make it possible for combatants to perceive civilian killings and peace as alternative policies and to compromise between them depending upon their objectives. The choice of continued fighting depends on the estimation of costs and benefits to the those involved in the conflict. Combatants will not continue to fight and kill civilians if they perceive the net expected benefits to be less than that which can be achieved through peaceful negotiations. A group's probability of success or loss, perception of benefits and costs of killing civilians is a function of its relative capabilities compared to that of the intervener – in this case robust UN mission forces. To kill civilians therefore, the actors must consider the relative strength of the UN force. A group will continue to fight and kill civilians only when it believes it is stronger than the intervening forces.

Therefore, success of peacekeeping missions in preventing the targeting of civilians, is a direct function of its ability to constrain combatants' violent behaviour. From this there is a cost-benefit calculation by the combatants that will likely lead to the choice of peace rather than continued fighting and killing. In this sense, the UN force capacity to raise the cost of continued fighting by combatants is dependent on its relative capabilities compared with those of the combatants. As a rule, a stronger UN military contingent in terms of large force size, stronger firepower reflected in its robust rules of engagement and overall stronger combative and repulsive capacities resulting from major TCNs may alter the calculations of those involved to choose peace rather than the alternative of continued violence.

In the face of overwhelming UN military power, to avoid incurring heavy loses, rational combatants will opt for peaceful negotiations rather than confrontation with a UN force. Robust peacekeeping, by designation, has the ability to increase the relative costs of continued fighting and killings and show the benefits of peace to be more preferable. Robust peacekeeping missions, characterized by large force strength, use of heavy weapons, major power participation and the rules of engagement

that allow the use of all "necessary means" to protect civilians as well as for self-defence, combined with a high cost-tolerance level for risk by the UN forces can provide the necessary barrier or impediment to intentional civilian killings by the conflict participants. The underlying strategy of robust peacekeeping is to alter the parties' calculations so as to make it too costly to attack civilians and more beneficial to choose peace. The basic presumption of the use of deterrent force to restore stability is that hostilities harden bargaining positions and attitudes rather than encourage concessions by parties who suffer costs. The probability of accepting a diplomatic resolution to a conflict by parties afflicted by human and other related costs in an ongoing violent conflict is predicated upon the cessation of all hostilities. A UN deterrent force can create stability encouraging political dialogue to resolve the conflict. This indicates that this is a need to address UN operational deficiencies in order to positively affect the calculus of violence.

The Way Forward: Policy Recommendations

The UN needs to develop a unified and coherent doctrinal definition for the use of force to mitigate the adverse effects of national caveats on the protection of vulnerable populations. This new unified operational doctrine should establish principles and definitions, and the structure under which robust missions can use force to protect civilians under threat. These qualities will facilitate specific interpretation of ROEs consistent with the protective mandates of a particular UN mission. This should be done in consultation with TCNs and other involved parties, such as non-governmental actors, that operate in the same conflict.

It is recommended that whenever the Security Council is ineffective in making protective decisions to halt mass atrocities, the General Assembly's protective obligation should be ignited through the 1950 General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution 377 as it did in the 1950s on the Security Council impasse over Korea.³⁹ The resolution guarantees

^{39.} Richard Connaughton, *Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality* (London, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 19.

the General Assembly the power to deploy military force when this is "necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" when the Security Council, "because of lack of unanimity fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The International Court of Justice advised that the General Assembly had "secondary" responsibility for peace and security, and if the use of veto prevented the Security Council from acting, the General Assembly could organize peacekeeping operations at the request or with the consent of the States.

A robust mission to protect civilians in a dangerous and complex conflict environment would require a clear mandate, and a coherent and streamlined UN training doctrine similar to that of NATO to guide the mission. The UN training doctrine should override national training doctrines. There should also be a centralized pre-deployment training of forces pertaining to essential mission tasks, such as the use of force to protect civilians. These will help UN troops have a common understanding on the use of force to protect civilians. NATO's success in building and maintaining consensus concerning the application of force during the Kosovo crisis exemplifies a collegial approach to successful conflict resolution involving different TCNs. 41 Pre-deployment training based on a unified training doctrine will increase UN force collective skills by building the necessary competencies, esprit de corps, and enhance unanimity of purpose, thus enabling UN troops to successfully execute their protective mandates. Training would adequately prepare and provide military personnel with the requisite mental attitude much needed for robust missions in turbulent conflict environments such as Darfur. This training will prepare UN forces psychologically to reduce the impact of incurring casualties and dealing with the atrocities one can encounter during military operations. The UN must also consult with TCNs to address their deployment concerns or setbacks and harmoniously formu-

40. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/377(V) A (3 November 1950), available at https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/55C2B-84DA9E0052B05256554005726C6.

^{41.} Siobhan Wills, Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 76.

late a rapid deployment process for speedier early deployment. All of this is based on the assumption that UN members must honour their responsibilities in providing resources, particularly funding, personnel, logistics, and equipment for missions. The Brahimi Report acknowledges that troops need to be resourced before they can protect civilians under threat. To allow this to happen the UN must make strategic reforms to ensure financial transparency in addition to eliminating corruption and waste in the organization in order to encourage members to honour their financial obligations.⁴²

In addition to the aforementioned points, it is also is high time the hierarchical UN command and control structure became agile and flexible to deal with the complexity of civilian protection mandates. This will enable UN field commanders to unilaterally take tactical initiatives to confront daily threats to civilians without seeking higher UN consent. In the fluid, volatile, and turbulent conflict environment of robust missions, UN force commanders need to make expedient on-the-spot or daily tactical decisions to confront threats to vulnerable populations. Seeking authorization from the UN Headquarters in New York delays the immediate tactical decisions required to protect civilians. If UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda Commander Major-General Roméo Dallaire had been granted the flexibility to act – seize the weapons and arrest the planners of the Rwanda massacre – the genocide could have been averted. For an integrated chain of command and common procedures, the Security Council should consult with TCNs and harmonize their caveats to develop a consensus so that all troop contributors, notwithstanding different military traditions, are comfortable with UN command and control arrangements.⁴³

UN missions with protective mandates must be authorized to act pro-

^{42.} UN, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (17 August 2000), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305, 48–64.

^{43.} Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Robust peacekeeping: Building political consensus and strengthening command and control," in *Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force*, ed. J-M Guéhenno (New York: Center of International Cooperation, New York University, 2009), 7–11.

actively on the model of MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade, which is credited with the success of protecting civilians in eastern Congo. To effectively safeguard at risk populations, military operations need to occur, in part, before the threat becomes imminent. Such preventive operations and preemption require effective intelligence and early warning mechanisms. UN military organizations need to be mandated, structured, and equipped to carry out these tasks.

UN missions must also avoid relationships with state governments guilty of civilian killings. Force alone can never solve violence and the UN must combine military approaches with robust diplomacy. Vigorous diplomacy includes the use of political dialogue, but also targeted sanctions against those identified as creating outcomes inimitable to the peace process. The UN must rally diplomatic pressure against obstructionists including host governments to keep them in the peace negotiations and protect civilians. In 2013 during the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict, bilateral diplomatic pressure by the United States, in conjunction with UN military action, led to the defeat of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. The UN Force Intervention Brigade victory was due to heavy international pressure, especially American, leading to the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops and diminished support for the rebel militias. Western donors openly identified Rwanda and Uganda as rogue actors and applied substantial financial leverage to change their behaviour. Thus, the armed groups in Ituri province had lost their Rwandan and Ugandan backing by the time the UN offensive began. This forced them to flee with relatively little fighting. The new thinking after this success is for the UN to have flexible conceptual mission model, which permits changing of the UN force posture from peacekeeping to peace enforcement to meet the changing conflict dynamics and need to protect civilians along the model of the MONUSCO UN Force Intervention Brigade.44

The complexity of robust peacekeeping requires the participation of

^{44.} See Jay Benson, "The UN Intervention Brigade: Extinguishing Conflict or Adding Fuel to the Flames?" *One Earth Future Discussion Paper* (June 2016); available at https://www.oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/uninterventionbrigade.pdf.

major powers that have the requisite military capabilities, particularly advanced weapons training, intelligence, mobility, and targeted firepower, to increase the ability of UN forces to fulfill civilian protection mandates. The support of influential states demonstrates and boosts confidence in the global community's commitment to civilian protection. It signals to potential aggressors that the world would not stand by when terrible crimes are committed against innocent civilians and that human rights violations carry real penalties. To ensure global stability in an ever-contentious twenty-first century major nations need play a part in addressing the destructive influences in the international security environment. Researcher Francis Fukuyama as argued, "Since the end of the Cold War, weak and failed states have arguably become the most single important problem for international order."45 This is a problem that must be addressed with international support particularly in continents that have had little success with resolving conflict. Highlighting this issue, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice called Africa a "veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism."46 It behooves the UN and its member states to pay attention and take action.

^{45.} Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004), 92.

^{46.} Susan E. Rice "Testimony before the subcommittee on Africa of the international relations committee," Washington, DC, United States House of Representatives (2001), available at The Avalon Project: Testimony of Dr. Susan E. Rice Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa - "Africa and the War on Global Terrorism"; November 15, 2001, at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/susan_rice_001.asp

Conclusion: Peacekeeping – Quo Vadis?

Howard G. Coombs

"Change is inescapable." This statement by Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, sometimes paraphrased as "change is the only constant," aptly illustrates the steady adaption of peacekeeping during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The authors in this volume examine the implementation of peacekeeping, past and evolving, in an ever-changing international security environment and international, as well as national, ideas of encouraging peace. Also, consistent across the chapters are the politics, policies, and organizations that help or hinder peacekeeping. In the complex setting portrayed in this book, it is necessary to anticipate and deal with a myriad of challenges. Thusly, civilian and military peacekeeping resources must be integrated in order to counter a broad range of conventional and unconventional threats. Peacekeeping missions will need to address the challenges which American political scientist Sam Sarkesian described in his 1993 *Unconventional Conflicts*:

The primary questions posted by unconventional conflicts are political-psychological, multi-dimensional, and rarely susceptible to single-component strategies or orthodox political-military operations. While all wars are po-

^{1.} Philip Ellis Wheelwright, *Heraclitus* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 32.

litical and psychological, in unconventional conflicts military operations quickly and pervasively take on political and psychological dimensions, often placing military operations in second place.²

Sarkesian's ideas have importance as one seeks to understand the essentials of peacekeeping from the perspective of those attempting to provide stability, to prevent violence, or to ameliorate the carnage in failing or failed regions.

Walter Dorn and Michael Carroll's examination of Canada's early large-scale peacekeeping involvement starting the UN Treaty Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) demonstrates that peacekeeping is governed by politics and bureaucracies – large and small.

Both Dorn and Carroll, demonstrate initial Canadian reception to peacekeeping was at first best described as reserved:

There was little enthusiasm in meeting this request [contribute to the Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan December 1948]. The matter was referred to the Cabinet by Hon. Brooke Claxton [Minister of National Defence], and in his words the Cabinet was 'allergic' to the proposal, wondering why Canada had been asked and who else had accepted...The decision as to whether or not Canada should participate was left up to the Prime Minister and the S.S.E.A. [Secretary of State for External Affairs] ... There can be no doubt that Mr. Pearson carried the day. He even offered to have External Affairs pay the costs for two of the four officers requested.³

Canada's formalized military contributions to the UN commenced in 1949 and since then Canada has contributed to almost all missions. Regardless of initial hesitancy in committing to peacekeeping, it was soon embraced as a means of maintaining Canada's status as a middle power with strong bilateral ties to the United States. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) brokered by Lester Pearson demonstrates that non-military con-

^{2.} Sam Sarkesian, *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 134) (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 22.

^{3.} Letter from Secretary of State of External Affairs to the Minister of National Defence, 18 January 1948. Quoted in Norman Hillmer, "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, No. 1 (Summer 1989): 9.

siderations have been central to mission mandates from the earliest years. Participation in UN missions confirmed Canada's position as a country maintaining saliency within the affiliated block of western states, while furthering the bilateral interests of NATO and NORAD. They permitted Canada to be a committed member of the western alliance and "an international arbiter with sufficient freedom to act decisively in the cause of peace."4 The airlift during the 1960 Congo operation was not possible without American support. Additionally, the United States provided financial aid and very public political support throughout that operation. Canadian involvement in Cyprus was not altruistic but as a member of NATO to prevent conflict between two alliance members. As an anti-communist western nation, Canada was chosen in 1954 to serve on the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) until 1972.5 The three nations of the ICCS represented all interests; Poland the East, Canada the West, and India as the neutral arbitrator. Although peacekeeping seems to have little direct connection with Canadian-United States defence activities, there was sometimes considerable pressure to undertake certain missions such as service on the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) after the 1973 Vietnam Peace Agreement.⁶ There can be little doubt that participation in peacekeeping provided a degree of Cold War forward security within the context of the alliances of the western Pax Americana.

Similarly, Peter Londey, emphasizes the regional and international dimensions of the Australian peacekeeping experience and highlights the complexities that contextualize the decision to participate or not. Londey, like both Dorn and Carroll, indicates that even from its earliest years peacekeeping was not a straightforward military endeavour, conducted

^{4.} Norman Hillmer, "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise," Canadian Defence Quarterly 19, No. 1 (Summer 1989): 57.

^{5.} James Earyrs argues that Canada committed to mutually exclusive roles in Indochina by the acceptance of the ICSC mission. One role was that of supervisor of the Geneva Accords while the other was as protector of American interests in the region. See *In Defence of Canada*, vol. V, *Indochina: Roots of Complicity* (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

^{6.} Norman Hillmer, "Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise," Canadian Defence Quarterly 19, No. 1 (Summer 1989): 55–57.

to achieve a durable and lasting peace, but a pragmatic effort to ensure regional influence in promoting stability.

Walter Dorn differs from Carroll and Londey in his focus upon Pearsonian ideals of peacekeeping in the context of past and present missions which involve Canada. He highlights the difference between national rhetoric and the reality of Canada's limited engagement in modern UN peace operations. Dorn views Canadian commitment in the more robust hybrid interventions, like Afghanistan that have occurred since the 1990s and the concomitant diminution of Canadian support to traditional peacekeeping have lessened the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Dorn believes that the nuances of the conflict environment are best addressed by countries, like Canada, who bring a credible reputation and multi-dimensional abilities to peacekeeping operations. He advocates a revitalized return to the ideals of early UN missions with increased capabilities to establish and maintain an enduring peace in conflict regions.

This type of comprehensive engagement is reflected in Canada's involvement in the NATO-led and UN mandated Afghanistan mission, which provided the initial trial of the official amalgamation of defence, diplomacy, and development – known in the early years of the Afghan conflict as the 3D approach – which has characterized the expression of Canadian foreign policy in conflicted regions since 2003.⁷ This concept has evolved into the ideas represented by the more all-inclusive expression "whole of government" and in essence remains primarily concerned with integrating all instruments of governance and development, regardless of department or agency, in order to produce a desired effect linked to national strategy. The growth of the integrated approach to this conflict was well recognized by 2010–2011 during Canada's last year of involvement in the combat mission.⁸ If any discernable lessons arose for

^{7.} Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto, Ontario: Penguin Group, 2007), 107–108.

^{8. &}quot;Behind every girl now in a classroom, behind every healthy baby in its mother's arms, behind every farmer who can feed his family without taking up arms ... behind all of this progress, are innumerable acts of heroism and selfless devotion to duty by...the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our aid workers." The Right Honourable Steven Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, "Address to Task Force Kandahar," Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 30

Canada from this conflict, they were those associated with the whole of government methodology to deal with "unconventional conflict." 9

These chapters create a discourse on the evolution of peacekeeping and the international order over time and the relationship of this constant change to the historical evolution of peacekeeping. American statesman and diplomat Henry Kissinger noted in his work World Order: "Every international order must sooner or later face the impact of two tendencies challenging its cohesion: either a redefinition of legitimacy or a significant shift in the balance of power."10 Kissinger went on to explain that the international order was undergoing tumultuous change. The legitimacy of the nation-based relationships within the global community have been questioned due to the rise of militant Islam and the impact that this has had on the delicate state system of the Middle East. Also, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the redefinition of major power relations fostered by the rise of China has created further turmoil. One can argue that today's international order is characterized by significant changes that have been occurring since the 1990s, with the ending of a bipolar world order centred on western and eastern power blocs. This period of change is well reflected in the discussions in this book. Concurrently, there has also been a lessening of the monopoly held by nation states with regards to waging conflict. This transformation reflects the challenges of the post-Cold War period and increased globalization. This interconnectedness is characterized by decreasing relevance of a Westphalian model of state relations, along with increased frictions and destabilization. As some states collapse and others struggle with growing vulnerability, it is perhaps no surprise that non-state actors have risen in importance and the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping has declined. These non-state actors are numerous and include international organizations, non-governmental organizations, multi-national corporations, regional organizations, and private security companies, as well as

May 2011.

^{9.} Kimberley Unterganschnigg, "Canada's Whole of Government Mission in Afghanistan – Lessons Learned," *Canadian Military Journal* 13, No. 2 (Spring 2013): 16.

^{10.} Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 365.

terrorist groups, organized crime gangs, and armed irregulars. Empowered by globalization and accessible science and technology, many of the latter are increasingly transnational in character, and ever more powerful. The threat potential is especially disturbing and has come to fruition most recently through the establishment of the proto-state generated ISIS/ISIL (also known as *Daesh*) along with the turbulence this produced regionally and globally. Indeed, the transnational character of these disintegrating forces may provide a degree of anonymity that makes detection and deterrence difficult – if not impossible. It also prompts thoughts on the continued relevancy of the Westphalian system.

The Peace of Westphalia, from which the Westphalian world order derives its name, was the result of the violence of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). This conflict involved most of Europe and its destructiveness and loss of life surpassed that of even the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453) and would not be seen again until the French Revolutionary – Napoleonic Wars (1796–1815). In his seminal work *War in European History* British military historian Sir Michael Howard graphically described the actions of warring mercenary forces during the Thirty Years War: It was a period in which warfare seemed to escape from rational control; to cease indeed to be "war" in the sense of politically motivated use of force by generally recognized, and to degenerate instead into universal, anarchic, and self-perpetuating violence. 12

The significance of the Peace of Westphalia is that it confirmed sovereign powers and created a new political order in central Europe, the Westphalian system. It was an arrangement based on the coexistence of independent states, defined by shared language and culture, and who possessed roughly equivalent strength. This balance of power system became the underlying principle of European order. It created a politi-

^{11.} See John Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1985); Franklin D. Margiotta, ed., Brassey's Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography, with a forward by John Keegan (Washington: Brassey's, Incorporated, 1994; reprint 2000); and, Desmond Seward, The Hundred Years War: The English in France 1337-1453 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1978; reprint New York: Penguin Putnam Incorporated, 1999).

^{12.} Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976; reprint 1990), 37.

cal philosophy known as *raison d'état*. This viewpoint provided for the primacy of the state and allowed the state to pursue any means in order to ensure its well-being. Furthermore, it was believed that the pursuit of individual national interests by various states would have the net effect of defusing inter-state antagonism and maintaining the balance of power between those nations. As part of this concept a bias against meddling in other's affairs, particularly those that were domestic, was established. With the expansion of European empires and influence outside the Old World, these Westphalian ideas, particularly the notion of the sovereign state, came to underpin the world order and international law and indeed shaped Cold War UN peacekeeping, particularly ideas of gaining the consent of belligerents prior to an intervention.¹³

At the same time Kissinger acknowledged that other views of world order existed adjacent to Westphalian philosophy. He suggested that Russia, China, and Islamic countries, as well as the New World, developed perspectives concerning the international system predicated on their circumstances and historical development. These cultural, political, and religious views sometimes put them at odds with the Westphalian system.¹⁴

His ideas are similar to those advocated by American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his seminal *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Huntington explains that in the postmodern age global politics are multi-polar and multi-dimensional and that conflicts would occur between major civilizations along cultural fault lines. Huntington suggests, like Kissinger, that the balance of power is changing; however, he attributes this to the rise of non-western civilizations, particularly Chinese and Islamic, all of whom have grouped themselves according to shared cultural values. These are in addition to the first two, Latin American, African, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. Preventing a war of civilizations will be contingent on world leaders embrac-

^{13.} Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 1–48; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 21, 58–59, 65, and 806; and, Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976; reprint 1990), 30.

^{14.} Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 2–8.

ing the multicivilizational nature of the global community.¹⁵

Despite all of these arguments about increasing turmoil and conflict within the international system, there are those like political scientist and economist Francis Fukuyama, in *The End of History and the Last Man*, who suggested with the collapse of the Soviet Union that the developed world had developed a consensus, based on liberal ideology, free market ideas, and the demise of communism that had in effect ended the basis of violent conflict. Fukuyama later tempered this theory with acknowledgement that culture and economics could not be separated and that culturally determined values within a global context contribute to stability. Fukuyama later tempered the separated and that culturally determined values within a global context contribute to stability.

More pessimistic and at odds with Fukuyama are the ideas of international relations theorist John Mearsheimer who believed that states will maximize power above other considerations. Those that believe security competition and war have been diminished are mistaken and states still desire power and will compete to advance their own interests in that domain. Mearsheimer proposed that (1) the international system and the great power politics which are its characteristics are defined by the actions of states in an anarchic system, (2) that great states have offensive military capacity, (3) nations can never be sure if other nations are hostile to them, (4) great powers value their continuance in the world order, and (5) states are rational actors who are able to design strategies that will ensure their survival.¹⁸

Opposing Mearsheimer is Kenneth Waltz who, in the *Theory of International Politics*, argues states will seek to maximize security over power. Therefore, with regards to power, states will often satisfice, once reaching a threshold level of power and security and become highly invested in maintaining the *status quo*. These nations will still seek power when

^{15.} Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1996), 19–21 and 27–28.

^{16.} See Frances Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1992).

^{17.} See Frances Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

^{18.} See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Morton and Company, 2001).

available, just not at the expense of security.¹⁹

One might argue that the ideas advanced by scholars like Fukuyama, Mearsheimer, and Walz, amongst others, are outdated as they focus solely on nation-states, except they continue to inform current perspectives on international relations and should be considered in this continuing peacekeeping discourse. However, as highlighted in the chapters of this book, particularly Dorn and Londey, recent decades have seen a diminishment of the importance of Westphalian system as a framework for international action. Kissinger suggests that the original rise of European concepts of international relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries based on balance of power relationships is similar to the challenges of today. A failing world order has created a number of states that follow their own interests without any commonly accepted philosophy of international relations. One could also argue that Kissinger's remarks also pertain to the activities of non-state actors. Regardless of perspective, the balance of power framework and international order established by the interaction between states has been diminished. Resultantly, the peacekeeping paradigms shaped by the Second World War and solidified by the bipolar world of the Cold War are of limited use in defining relationships within the international order during the postmodern age. The relevant question posed by Kissinger in Diplomacy "...is whether the maintenance of the international system be produced by conscious design, or whether it will grow out of a series of tests of strength." He then partially answered that query by suggesting in World Order that equilibrium in the international system is reached by consensus concerning shared values. That agreement reinforces world order and lessens conflict.²⁰

In addition to acting in the common interest these prevailing theories of international relations suggest that the evolving world system is not monolithic, but regionalized, which needs to be taken into account when dealing with global issues pertaining to conflict resolution. Due to these different regional civilizations, varied cultures will have differ-

^{19.} See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1979).

^{20.} Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 76–77. Quote from page 77.

ent perspectives on international roles, activities, and outcomes. Power and security will continue play an important role in the relationships between nations and provide impetus for actions within the global system. Importantly, in the twenty-first century states need co-exist or accommodate non-states in balance of power arrangements. These ideas need be taken into account when examining the foundation of the paradigm shift needed within the context of the world order to establish effective peacekeeping. This includes the UN working by, with, and through others to establish an effective peace. Interestingly, Michael Holm points out that seeming disconnect between American public sentiments supporting peacekeeping and the contradictory actions of United States governments vis-à-vis the UN. US political objectives with regards to their national interests at times shaped the manifestation of peacekeeping, like the UN involvement in Korea, 1950 onwards. This in turn, influenced the involvement of other nations, particularly middle powers, like Canada and Australia who wish to remain relevant in US-led alliances and regionally. Additionally, Holm's writing highlights the need of the UN to gain and maintain the support of governmental authorities, particularly those who form the Security Council.

Indeed, Michael Holm's analysis of American ideals versus national interest prompts thought on the nature of similar debates in other countries. Despite the contradictions implicit in the contrast of values versus realpolitik, Holm views this incongruity as reconcilable. He believes the movement away from Chapter VI peacekeeping, and towards UN Chapter VII peace enforcement, will create the impetus for the United States to participate in UN peacekeeping operations more fully.²¹ This shift was

^{21.} Under Chapter VI, United Nations forces are deployed once negotiation, mediation or arbitration have led to some form of agreement and the parties to the conflict agree to allow the United Nations to deploy military forces to monitor the agreement. Chapter VII missions have a different purpose. They are intended to impose or enforce peace, either by military, non-military actions or combination of the two instruments. The purpose of a Chapter VII mission is the restoration of international peace and security. The key difference is that Chapter VI calls for the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means while Chapter VII calls for the resolution of conflicts by the threat of or use of military force. United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations" (1945), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf, 8–11.

a result of deleterious UN mission outcomes in the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia during the 1990s. Exploring the underpinnings of American perspectives upon peace operations highlight the trauma caused by the unsuccessful UN endeavours during that decade and western debate as to the relevancy and efficaciousness of the UN as an organization. In some ways, at the time, these events seemed to be a reprise of the failures that surrounded the demise of the League of Nations over fifty years earlier and contributed to the onset of the Second World War. In the context of a changing world order this examination of the United States provides perspectives on the sentiments of other western powers.²²

These 1990s missions failed disastrously because the UN tried to solve complex situations or emergencies using traditional Chapter VI peace-keeping methods when Chapter VII peace enforcement would have been more appropriate. As a result, the international community recognized that the limitations imposed by traditional peacekeeping methods would not solve these emerging post–Cold War conflicts and Chapter VII mandates became the norm. However, because of these disasters it is evident that the United Nations, and as Holm indicates, contributing nations, have become less inclined to intervene without appropriate Chapter VII mandates.²³

These failed missions also birthed a new role for the UN – to establish and maintain standards for, and supervision of, the protection of global human rights. This idea aligns with the evolving world order as it acknowledges that intervention is necessary in failed and failing states to protect individuals. It recognizes that individual sovereignty is more important than state sovereignty. Ideas concerning the "Responsibility to Protect," commonly known as "R2P," and the Brahimi Report have come to the fore.²⁴ Important for future peacekeeping, R2P promotes the

^{22.} For context regarding the League of Nations as well as the impact of the 1990s on the UN see Alex J Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, *Understanding Peace-keeping*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 71–120.

^{23.} Howard G. Coombs, "The Evolution of Peace Support Operations – A Canadian Perspective," (History 380 "Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement" lecture presented at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario during the 2013/2014 Academic Year), slide 24.

^{24.} See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),

idea of "human security" as primary within peace missions. This focuses on privileging the security of individuals, groups, and societies through a combination of military and non-military means.²⁵ This view enables a broader conceptualization of what constitutes security and allows for the recognition of the interlinkages between peace, development, and human rights. This is of critical importance given that individuals of diverse genders and ages experience conflict differently. Additionally, the concept of human security goes far beyond the previously held idea of state-focused security that utilized military means primarily to address military threats and is more in keeping with the contemporary nature of peacekeeping using a multifaceted approach with a variety of coordinated means. Originally advocated in United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report 1994," this report was the first to elaborate on previously held state-based conceptual security approaches: "Human security is people-centred. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or in peace."26 For Canada this has meant the implementation of a more nuanced whole of government approach to peacekeeping.²⁷

Ideas of human security were furthered during Canada's activities in Afghanistan between 2002–2014. The resultant Canadian efforts to build coordinated inter-departmental whole of government activities in Af-

[&]quot;Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty - The Responsibility to Protect", Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, December 2001, available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; and United Nations, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (17 August 2000) available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305.

^{25.} Gregory MacCallion, *National Versus Human Security: Australian and Canadian Military Interventions*, (Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2019), 2.

^{26.} United Nations, United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report 1994," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), available at hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr 1994 en complete nostats.pdf, 23.

^{27.} Cited in Gregory MacCallion, *National Versus Human Security: Australian and Canadian Military Interventions*, (Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2019), 22.

ghanistan evolved in conjunction with the growth of the NATO mission, national debate and at the end of the combat mission in Kandahar during 2011. While this discussion and the record it generated is wide-ranging and contains much of value, points for immediate importance for future whole of government practices can be derived from this collaboration. Of all this discussion, the importance of intra-government contact, understanding and collaboration prior to such missions is critical in order to achieve human security objectives. This need was emphasized by Kimberly Unterganschnigg, who led the joint lessons learned cell in the final year of the Canadian military mission in Kandahar: "Interdepartmental civilian-military cooperation was essential to address the broad scope of security, governance, reconstruction, and development activities that were undertaken ... in the final year of Canada's involvement in Kandahar." While not in the peacekeeping framework envisioned by Dorn, it delivers on the imperatives put forward by Holm.

To realize ideas of human security the approaches taken to modern peacekeeping are inclusive to organizations and methods beyond normal professional military skills, or those required for general purpose combat. Some examples of these specialized considerations are further explored chapters by Larouche, the Coombs' and Nisia-Pepra. Ariane Larouche argues for the need for implementation and utilization of gender perspectives during peacekeeping and other peace interventions with the goal of constructing an inclusive and lasting peace. In the following chapter, Howard and Lindsay Coombs explore the evolution of peacekeeping training from a Canadian perspective and offer considerations regarding the treatment and rehabilitation of child soldiers, which is just one of the specialized challenges needing consideration during peacekeeping and other operations. The volume's final author, Kofi Nsia-Pepra, considers implications pertaining to the increasing use of force to protect civilians during peacekeeping missions. Nsia-Pepra believes that the complexity of modern peacekeeping with its R2P obligations necessitates serious con-

^{28.} Kimberley Unterganschnigg, "Canada's Whole of Government Mission in Afghanistan – Lessons Learned," *Canadian Military Journal* 13, No. 2 (Spring 2013):16.

sideration of the best way to the implement the use of force. Only in this fashion can the human security objectives of these interventions be achieved.

These chapters lead one to examine the nuances of providing this necessary human security, which can be manifold, dependent upon the environment. The UN Millennium Development Goals project represents an attempt to address the influences destructive to human security. These include all dimensions of poverty – income, hunger, disease, need for housing, and being excluded. They also encourage gender equality, education, and maintaining ecological balance. The Goals are inclusive to basic human rights, health, education, shelter, and security. Work has been ongoing since these objectives were first articulated in 2000 with a degree of positive results. Despite that, progress has not been uniform across the world or by goal. Since 2007 a Millennium Development Goal Support team integrated under the United Nations Development Program has shepherded efforts to attain these goals, as well as interacted with the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.²⁹

Peace researcher John G. Cockell over two decades past offered four observations for creating sustainable development, all which arose from the turbulence of the 1990s. He linked these parameters for peacebuilding to the requirement for human security. These observations remain as relevant today as when first broached – perhaps even more so. Cockell suggested that it was necessary to first focus on the root causes of violence, then be attentive to context-specificity, as well as sustainability, and then create mobilization of indigenous resources.³⁰

Cockell examined human security along four broad thrust lines and lays out the focal points within each of these zones. The importance of these ideas is that they contribute to the structural transformation needed for a society to grapple with its issues and promote sustainable peacebuilding. Human security includes (1) political stability and governance,

^{29.} United Nations, "Millennium Project"; internet, available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/index.htm, accessed 07 September 2015.

^{30.} John G. Cockell, "Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace," in Michael Pugh, ed., *Regeneration Of War-Torn Societies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 20–26.

inclusive to all aspects of good government and governance, (2) community and societal stability, addressing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of warring factions, return of displaced persons, refugees and evacuees, as well as reconciliation and dialogue, (3) personal security and human rights, which advocates rule of law, effective and legitimate policing and security forces, human rights, in addition to demining and related education, and (4) economic security, encompassing youth employment, development programs, economic reconstruction and/or rehabilitation, and reforms to promote socioeconomic equity.³¹

Given all this the natural conclusion is that conflict prevention through utilizing a broader conception of peacebuilding to enhance necessary social resilience prior to crisis may provide a more effective solution than examining only post-conflict contexts of peace.³² While understanding there may be a security role, recent trends with military-led interventions in conflict and post-conflict environments to re-establish security, development, and governance has shown difficulties with that concept. While acknowledging that any outside intervention may have a security component a different paradigm of peacebuilding is needed. Creating an understanding of societal shocks or stresses through analysis and addressing the issues so generated by providing for human security as advocated by Cockell, and contextualizing it within these ideas, particularly

^{31.} John G. Cockell, "Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace," in Michael Pugh, ed., *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 24–26.

^{32.} The idea of social resilience is a central premise in research by professors David Last and Fahim Youssofzai. It argues that the capacity of societies, and from that nations, to withstand crises like disease, environmental disasters, and social, economic or political turbulence can be strengthened and made more "resilient" prior to these events. See David Last and Fahim Youssofzai, "A Framework to Approach Social Resilience" (paper presented for Reuven Gal, Panel on National Resilience, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, Illinois, 21–23 October 2011). It is also central to current research such as that by Norwegian peace and conflict studies researcher Gunhild Gjørv who advocates enhancing societal resilience to deal with security threats forming part of a "continuum of insecurity" that must be addressed as it enhances and initiates existing weakness and vulnerabilities within society. See Gunhild Gjørv, "Coronavirus, invisible threats and preparing for resilience", NATO Review (20 May 2020), available at https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/05/20/coronavirus-invisible-threats-and-preparing-for-resilience/index.html.

sustainable indigenous ownership of the process, will greatly assist with formulating ideas towards the establishment of a timely and pre-emptive peace. While not explicitly covered in this manuscript, ideas of establishing human security in a fashion that preempts conflict are a subject worthy of detailed scrutiny.

Also, one can argue that westerners have come to depend on technological solutions to the problems of conflict. But as it has been identified in the past and is further elucidated in this book, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the fundamental nature of war revolves around people and ideas. Regardless of numerous and increasingly rapid developments taking place, several things will remain constant. Most notable is the fact that there will always be a human dimension to conflict (i.e., a clash of wills). Evidently, peacekeeping will continue to occur and, moreover, will continue to be characterized by a number of enduring factors. These factors include, but are not limited to: (1) there will always be violence and the necessity to take risk; (2) chance, uncertainty, and chaos, will continue to be present in peacekeeping interventions; (3) there will always be the need for continual adaptation and change; (4) constraints of various types, from national interest to humanitarian imperatives, will dictate how the international community will respond to future conflicts; and, (5) the UN and other organizations will change how peacekeeping is mandated, organized, and conducted to match the constantly changing security environment.

However, it would be remiss not to mention the role of technology in producing change. While not specifically addressed by any of the chapter authors, ongoing technological shifts will continue to produce changes in organizations and policy. Given the fact that policy forms the basis of interventions, form will follow function and organizations will evolve based upon peacekeeping policy. Implications of technological advancements remain somewhat murky, yet one could pose the argument that peacekeeping is and will continue to be a responsive intervention, and conflicts will be primarily ethnic, religious, and internal to developing, failed, and failing states. They will not be characterized by force on force, but force on weakness in order to gain the advantage. Moreover,

the environment of these peacekeeping missions will become increasingly urbanized and require special skills, organizations, technology, and doctrine. As well, the actors involved in these conflict settings will use unconventional means and, as a result of easy access to technology, these will be highly destructive.

Beyond this, state failure, resource scarcity, and demographic pressures will continue to generate humanitarian crises and complex emergencies – especially in the developing world. Throughout, one is likely to see increased sensitivity to human suffering among western publics (a product of globalization). In the last decades, western concerns over asymmetric attack – particularly by non-state actors – have prompted greater emphasis on domestic security and consequently non-military and military roles are becoming increasingly blurred. Accordingly, peacekeeping engagements may become more regional, coalition-based, involving "ad hoc groupings," and from a desire to generate regional stability, or to re-purpose a phrase of the early 2000s – "coalitions of the willing."

To elaborate upon this, peacekeeping operations will take place in joint, multinational and multiagency environments, with numerous friendly or neutral state and non-state actors. The military component will not always be the lead agency in any intervention. Leaders of a multitude of military and non-military organizations will face the dilemma of creating shared intent and common purpose amongst these diffused groups. For example, as part of its whole of government approach, the Canadian Armed Forces must establish strong connections with other government agencies to address the modern dilemmas of post-conflict environments.

This type of comprehensive security framework has a possible variety of benefits for peacekeeping including the fact that it creates possibilities such as increased funding for development and diplomacy, decreased reliance on the military, and decreased conflict between development, diplomacy, and defence personnel in crisis situations. However, this security model is not without its downfalls; it brings dangers such as increased politicization and militarization of development and diplomacy programs. While this is not an insurmountable barrier to address, it is

one that must be carefully thought through, particularly from a UN perspective.

Ultimately, to succeed in peacekeeping endeavours, these forces will require both government and non-governmental agencies to operate simultaneously to achieve the desired outcomes. We need to understand the *why* of war in order to ensure that we accurately implement *how* we aim to achieve strategic goals. To solve conflicts, we need more than a military solution. Clausewitz reinforces this idea with his musing that, "...war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means...the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." This expression applies equally well to twenty-first century peacekeeping.

Furthermore, after reading the chapters contained in this book it is evident that the violence of conflict disconnected from the stratagems required for the establishment of a lasting peace result in nothing more than a temporary cessation of hostilities or absence of war, but not a true peace.³⁴ One can discern that this idea, came to fruition at the dawn of the twenty-first century, when viewing the results of western-led military interventions in places like Afghanistan and Iraq (2003), and later Libya (2011). Even military activities designed to promote stability like the United Nations missions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia, as well as Rwanda were unsuccessful. Additionally, at the time of writing, the limited achievements of coalition military operations against networked transnational organizations, like ISIS/ISIL and regional military operations against smaller but similar groups such as Boko Haram, in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon, highlight the need for a re-examination of the assumptions, which have been guiding peacekeeping interventions in failed and failing states and not creating a lasting and durable peace. Not to mention the recent events in Afghanistan.

^{33.} Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86–87.

^{34.} J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1961), 76.

In order to suggest ideas that may assist in formulating an approach to create reduce strife it is necessary to examine the origins of the international system, particularly how the global community in general, and western nations in particular, view the international order. Arising from this is a look at contemporary and future sources of conflict and justification for intervention in failed and failing states. Along with that one must review the role of organizations, nations, and the politics commonly associated with the idea of maintaining world order. Following, it is necessary to understand how western countries, which normally form the framework for such interventions, comprehend conflict and concomitant ideas of victory or defeat. Finally, it will be necessary to look at the impact of these western security preferences in pre- and post-conflict peacebuilding. All of this highlights the need for a perspective on intervention that aims to increase human security in these problem regions. As part of this analysis the roles of states, non-state actors, regional and international organizations, as well as that of individuals, in building the capacity for resiliency in weak states will be considered. In total, this effort will provide ideas and practices that can form the basis for a postmodern conceptualization of encouraging and sustaining peace. This book provides some ideas for this discussion.

In any case, moving forward western states will remain averse to large, protracted, and costly peacekeeping efforts – particularly when such interventions are not driven by core national interests. This will prove challenging to create peacekeeping missions that have significant contributions from these nations. At the same time, effective UN peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century require robust forces and capabilities able to operate in a sustained fashion. These military forces need to be matched with corresponding non-military initiatives and funding packages that allow for the construction of peaceful institutions upon a foundation formed by military intervention. While proposals and programs, such as the Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations, are laudable, they can only be truly effective as part of establishing the underpinnings of a durable and lasting peace.³⁵ If Canada wishes to be tak-

^{35.} This proposal, named after Canadian women's rights pioneer Elsie MacGill

en seriously internationally and within the UN it will have to "put skin in the game." To be perceived as a team member, instead of a bystander spectating from the sidelines, Canada and other western countries must reconsider their involvement in peacekeeping. Only by providing the necessary military forces or capabilities, coupled with supporting non-military activities, will the tangible dilemmas posed by war-torn regions be resolved. In order to accomplish that modern reality, relevant perspectives on twenty-first century peacekeeping, must be clearly developed and defined from historical antecedents, understood in current contexts, and considered by all who desire the creation of a stable and long-term peace.

^{(1905-1980),} is aimed at creating new ways to assist UN states and others to integrate larger numbers of women effectively and meaningfully in peace operations. Canada, Prime Minister, "Canada Bolsters Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection Measures - Vancouver, British Columbia - November 15, 2017," available at https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/11/15/canada-bolsters-peacekeeping-and-civil-ian-protection-measures.

Contributors

Kevin Brushett is an Associate Professor and the Department Head of History at the Royal Military College of Canada. He teaches in the fields of modern Canadian and American political, social, and diplomatic history. Dr Brushett's research focuses on the relationship between civil society organizations and the state in Canada in the latter half of the 20th century. He is currently finalizing a book on the Company of Young Canadians (*The Uncomfortable Few: The Company of Young Canadians and the Politics of Youth 1965-1975*).

Michael K. Carroll is Chair, Department of Humanities and Associate Professor, History, MacEwan University, located in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. He is a 20th century diplomatic historian with expertise on Canadian and American foreign relations, United Nations peacekeeping, and Canadian history. He is co-editor (with Greg Donaghy) of From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective (University of Calgary Press, 2016) and author of Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1967 (UBC Press, 2009). When not mired in administrative responsibilities he is working on a study of Canada's involvement in the International Control Commissions in Indochina.

Howard G. Coombs is an Associate Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and the Deputy Director of the Queen's University Centre for International and Defence Policy, both located in Kingston, Ontario. He is also a part-time Canadian Army reservist with the Office of the Chief of Reserves, located at the Canadian Armed Forces National De-

fence Headquarters. Coombs received his PhD in Military History from Queen's University. His research interests are Canadian professional military education, in addition to Canadian military operations and training.

Lindsay M. Coombs at the time of writing was a graduate student in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University and a Graduate Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy. Her research interests include the Canadian Armed Forces, child soldiers, women in security and defence, and defence policy. She is now working as a Policy Officer with the Canadian Department of Defence.

Magali Deleuze is an Associate Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada. She completed her PhD in history at the University of Montreal in 1999. Her doctoral thesis explored the reaction of Quebec intellectuals to the Algerian War (1954-1964). Her current research interests lie in Canadian external relations particularly the international history of Canada - Quebec since 1945, the post-colonial wars, the history of peace-keeping since Antiquity and a new field on "Applied" Military History.

Walter A. Dorn is a Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada and the Canadian Forces College. He teaches officers in the Joint Command and Staff Programme, including on peace operations, and serves as Academic Coordinator for the National Security Programme. He has also served in UN missions and as Technology Innovation Expert at UN headquarters, examining ways to improve the way UN peacekeeping makes use of modern technology.

Marie-Michèle Doucet is an Assistant Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada. She teaches social European history, international relations history of the first half of the 20th century as well as many specialized classes in history of genocide and women's history. She completed her PhD in history in 2016 at the University of Montreal under the supervision of Professor Carl Bouchard. Her main field of research are European peace movements after the First World War, as well as women's roles and places in early 20th century European society. She also has many publications on the topic of women and the Armenian

genocide. Dr Doucet is the French editor for the journal Intersections (formerly the CHA Bulletin) for the Canadian Historical Association.

Michael Holm is a Senior Lecturer Social Sciences at Boston University. His main fields of research and publications are the history of United States external relations, particularly the international history of the Cold War, the history of foreign aid, human rights, and American political ideology. He is the author of *The Marshall Plan: A New Deal for Europe* (Routledge, 2016) and co-editor of the forthcoming *How Democracy Survives: Global Challenges in the Anthropocene* (Routledge, 2022).

Ariane Larouche has completed a master's degree in Political Science from the School of Political Studies of the University of Ottawa in 2017. Her main field of research included politics of collective memory and national identity, particularly in post-communist states, and gender-based perspective in policy analysis. She is currently working as a policy analyst for the federal government.

Peter Londey is an Honorary Lecturer in the School of History, Australian National University (Canberra). His academic training (at the University of New England and at Monash University) was in Classics and ancient history, and he had lengthy periods teaching Classics at the Australian National University. In between for 17 years he was a senior historian at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, and amid many other activities wrote on and curated exhibitions about Australia's role in multinational peacekeeping.

Kofi Nsia-Pepra, is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio Northern University and the author of *UN Robust Peacekeeping: Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars*. He is also a former officer in the Ghanaian military and UN peacekeeper during the Rwandan genocide and the Sierra Leonean civil war. It was through his combat experience that Kofi developed his diplomacy and conflict resolution skills. After serving his nation and the international community, he pursued a master's degree in Human Rights Law from the University of Essex in the U.K. and a PhD in Political Science from Wayne State University in Michigan.



2017 represented the 60th anniversary of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lester B. Pearson, then Canada's Secretary of External Affairs and later Prime Minister, for his crucial role in organizing the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to help resolve the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. Pearson's role in deploying peacekeepers to resolve the conflict was not only a crucial turning point in the institutionalization of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, but it also began the long and proud history of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) of providing support to peace operations ever since. Equally important was the electoral promises of Justin Trudeau's Liberal government to recommit Canada to a UN peacekeeping role after a decline in support during the governments of Stephen Harper and Paul Martin. For many Canadians, Trudeau's aspirational catch phrase "We're back!" led to a belief that their armed forces would reassume their traditional "Blue Helmet" roles in UN operations, including the deployment of Canadian soldiers to conflict regions. Indeed, Canada's "return to peacekeeping" came at a time when many were beginning to reflect on peacekeeping's future both in Canada and beyond, including the newly elected UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres who worried that the UN was "underperforming in conflict prevention, in peace operations, and in efforts to sustain peace."

Centre for International and Defence Policy

Robert Sutherland Hall, 403 Queen's University Kingston, ON K7L 1B4 CANADA

1.613.533.2381

cidp@queens.ca www.queensu.ca/cidp

ISSN: 1183-3661

ISBN: 978-1-55339-662-8

