

CANADA AND THE FUTURE
OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

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The Martello Papers

This monograph, written by LCol David L. Bashow, offers an insider's candid perspective on Canadian defence and security policy at century's end. The author is a Canadian Air Force officer who has been posted as a Visiting Defence Fellow to the Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) during the 1996-98 academic years. LCol Bashow's analysis of "Canada and the Future of Collective Defence" is the nineteenth in the QCIR's *Martello Papers* series covering a variety of issues in national and international security.

Although there have been several recent studies written on Canada's evolving defence and security policy, this one differs in that its focus is the country's two major collective-defence commitments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Typically, commentators on Canada's policy tend to contrast its collective-defence commitments against other possible security dispensations, whether those be of the ideal type of collective security, or of some conceptual halfway house, such as cooperative security. Not infrequent, of late, have also been discussions of Canadian policy predicated upon such a broadened definition of security as to leave little if any place for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces in the framing, articulation, and prosecution of that policy.

While sensitive to the fundamental changes that have so affected the international system since the ending of the Cold War, LCol Bashow does not share the view that both of the military arrangements inherited from the collective-defence era have become irrelevant. But he does worry that one of them, NATO, is becoming less useful for Canada due to growing uncertainty about its mandate and, with expansion, its future membership. By contrast, and to a degree unusual in defence circles, he advocates a continued Canadian involvement with NORAD even while arguing that the country's continuing commitment to NATO may require serious reexamination. Typically, those who question the value to Canada of NATO are also likely to raise the same query, *a fortiori*, about NORAD.

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As is the case with all *Martello Papers*, the views expressed are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the QCIR or any of its supporting agencies.

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David L. Bashow
1998

1. Introduction: Past Defence Policies

Since the end of the Second World War, Canada's defence policy has been primarily founded upon security partnerships for collective defence, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). As well there have been active military commitments and arms-control initiatives with other world forums, such as the United Nations (UN). Today a world on the brink of the Third Millennium has witnessed significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the end of the Cold War has removed the spectre of global thermonuclear annihilation and has also brought closure to various regional conflicts, there can be no doubt that the relative stability of the superpower stand-off has been exchanged for different and equally demanding security challenges. Canada must now decide whether it wants to remain an established and constructive middle power in international security affairs, and if so will need to reaffirm a national defence policy appropriate to its national interests.

It is my aim in this monograph to review briefly previous major trends in Canadian defence policy, articulate the most recent global and regional security challenges within the context of the country's national interests, examine the linkage between foreign policy and defence policy, and review both the NORAD and NATO collective-defence agreements in terms of their relevance to Canada's interests.

Canadians are loved unconditionally around the globe. The British love us because we toast the Queen. The Irish love us because we don't really mean it. Germans love us because we were worthy adversaries and Italians love us because they all have relatives living in Canada. The Russians love us because we can play hockey, and the French? The French think we are quite stupid, but they tolerate us because we are polite.¹

Canada is highly regarded as a good international citizen, and with just cause. Over the years, the country has made contributions to international security far beyond what might be logically expected from a state with its population base and its apparent self-interests and economic resources. Historically a militia “citizen-soldier” land for the first 70 years following Confederation, Canada’s defence mandate was inextricably linked to that of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth. The generally submissive nature of Canada’s relationship to Great Britain would irreversibly change through the carnage of the First World War. It has been said that Canada truly became an independent nation at Vimy Ridge during the period 9-14 April 1917, when more than 10,000 Canadian casualties were suffered and four Victoria Crosses won in battle. With nearly 61,000 war dead overall, the country felt it had justifiably earned the right to relative autonomy from Great Britain in foreign policy decisions. On 11 December 1931, Canada signed the Statute of Westminster, which granted all the former colonies of the “old” empire full legal freedom except in those areas where they chose to remain subordinate. This manifested itself in Canada’s independent declaration of war on Germany on 10 September 1939, a full week after Great Britain, and was reinforced throughout the war by Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s dogged determination that Canada would have a measure of relative autonomy from Britain in the prosecution of the war. In spite of these demands for recognition of independence, Canada was a willing participant in the war effort, contributing manpower and matériel vastly out of proportion to its stature as a middle power. One could argue it was this disproportionate contribution to the allied war effort that prompted unreasonable expectations from a postwar world of participation by Canada in international affairs. One could also argue that Canada concomitantly acquired an unrealistic impression of its own relative importance as a middle power in the postwar period. Nonetheless, Canada had irrevocably placed behind it the “little Canada” self-image, which “focused on internal, domestic issues and downplayed policies and roles that would bring it onto the world stage.”²

In fact, Canada enthusiastically donned the new-found mantle of world citizenship, becoming a charter member of the UN at San Francisco in 1945, NATO in 1949, and NORAD in 1958. The emerging and dominant theme of subsequent defence policies would be partnership in Eurocentric collective-defence agreements, with broader international and continental spillovers. During the early years of the Cold War, Canada was disproportionately represented in Europe by a full air division and a well-equipped mechanized brigade group, as well as by substantial numbers of warships dedicated to the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission on behalf of the alliance. As the Cold War dragged on, Canadian defence priorities changed, but were primarily characterized by progressively more involvement in UN peacekeeping duties, reductions to the European commitment, and a realignment of the North American air-defence commitment, based upon the evolving and changing strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Canada's location on the flight path of any Soviet bombers intent on attacking the American heartland gave the country a special geostrategic significance and imposed unavoidable responsibilities, especially those associated with the maintenance of the US Strategic Air Command's deterrent credibility, in an era before ICBMs had rendered that challenge of declining relevance. It was often lost on the country's allies, especially the Europeans, that only the United States, within NATO, had assumed security commitments whose geographic extent surpassed Canada's own commitments.³

When the USSR ceased to exist in 1991, the 1987 defence white paper, already battered by the fiscal realities of the 1989 budget, became quickly obsolete, even though that white paper would have brought a significant and much needed capital investment in new equipment for a defence establishment that was itself rapidly approaching operational obsolescence. Eager to cash in on what, in its case, was a largely nonexistent peace dividend,⁴ Canada was quick to withdraw the vast majority of its armed forces stationed in Europe, and enthusiastically cooperated with the United States to reduce further the alert commitment to the North American continent.

Notes

1. Douglas O'Neil, "The Maple Leaf Forever," *Leisure World*, October/November 1996, p. 57.
2. University of New Brunswick Workshop, *Defence Policy for a New Century* (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick Press, 1994), p. 5.
3. Rod B. Byers, *Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Challenges*, Adelphi Papers 214 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), p. 9. Also see William T.R. Fox, *A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 122-23.
4. Canadian defence spending had already been significantly restructured downwards during the last half of the Cold War.

2. *Present Security Setting*

The Global Situation

To what kind of world does Canada belong on the threshold of the Third Millennium? US President George Bush explicitly acknowledged the hope for a new era of global stability and peace during the Gulf War of 1991 when he publicly presented his concept of an emerging New World Order.¹ However, the wishful thinking of the American president in the wake of that conflict has been short lived. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have “eliminated the threat of a massive nuclear confrontation, but we still live in a dangerous, unstable world.” Estimates suggest that “by the end of the 1990s, 32 nations will have ballistic missile programs and concomitant nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare capabilities. Cruise missiles — inexpensive, portable and difficult to detect — remain a particularly worrisome threat. Sales and smuggling of material used in the manufacture of nuclear devices are increasing.... [W]orld radicalism and ultranationalism now beg expression on a largely hitherto immune North American continent.”²

Indeed, Robert D. Kaplan paints a particularly alarming and admittedly extremist view of a world gone mad, fraught with “environmental chaos, the collapse of state systems, a tidal wave of refugees, global pandering, and a Third World ravaged by wars of brigandage.”³ While Kaplan’s view may be unduly pessimistic, there can be no doubt that the relative utopia foreseen by President Bush is a pipe dream, and there are significant geopolitical trends emerging that support this assertion. First, the power and influence of nation-states, which have dominated world politics for more than three hundred years, are rapidly eroding. While the most obvious example of this trend is the former Soviet Union (FSU), similar examples can be found from the Balkans to the Third World. There are many causes for these unparalleled developments, including particularly assertive nationalism manifested in extreme separatist credos; widespread degradation of the

environment, which results in a mass exodus from rural areas to urban centres; and a general decline in national competency brought about by external forces, which may include foreign states, interest groups, or such regional economic alliances as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU).

The dissolution of existing states may result in the creation of additional ones (Slovakia, the Czech Republic), the entire disappearance of an existing state structure (Somalia, Lebanon), or concomitant war between disputatious factions, and a migratory shift of refugees (Rwanda, Zaire).⁴ Nondemocratic regimes have been a somewhat paradoxical result of the termination of the Cold War. Religious fundamentalism and assertive nationalism are both at core anti-democratic. In countries with a tentative hold on democratic forms of government, demographic, ethnic, social, economic, and environmental problems have all combined to erode dangerously the fragile democratic power structures. The current status of Russian democratic development is particularly worrisome. In many cases the populace, frustrated and embittered by a lack of tangible progress promised by democratic reform, are turning to extremist leadership and solutions. When the state structures survive, the resultant authoritarian controls are often characterized by widespread state terror and human-rights violations, and more conflicts with neighbouring lands.

The Regional-National Situation

What has all this to do with Canada and, more specifically, Canadian defence policy? To seek answers to this question, the University of New Brunswick's Centre for Conflict Studies organized, in October 1995, a broad workshop consisting of academics; regular, reserve, and retired military personnel; civil servants; and graduate students to deliberate on what was perceived as a crisis in command in the Canadian Forces. Discussion involved a number of diverse geopolitical factors within which Canadian civil-military relations are situated in a very complex and turbulent world situation including:

- pressure on the state system, particularly federated states, and parallel rises of tribalism;
- the decline of traditional ideologies, both political and religious;
- the growth of transitional industries and financial institutions;
- the continuing chaos of decolonization;
- seemingly uncontrollable population growth;
- the need to shift from unrestrained energy use to conservation, with parallel demand for cleaner, non-polluting fuels;
- shortages of food and water in many areas;
- deterioration of the world climate;

- the influence of the media in politics, especially through instant coverage of crises;
- the political influence of special interest groups, particularly those with modern, well-established communications systems at their disposal and with the ability to mobilize quickly widespread response to an incident or policy; and
- declining humanitarianism.⁵

Due to its geographic insularity, mature democratic processes, relative wealth, and variety of functioning institutions, Canada enjoys relative freedom from the aforementioned global chaos. This is not to say, however, that the country does not have security concerns. Perhaps the most predominant security challenge facing any civilized state is the protection of its sovereign territory. This is a particularly daunting task for Canada given its enormous land mass. Since actual invasion of the land mass — absent the extreme unlikelihood of an American invasion — is virtually nonexistent, aerospace and maritime sovereignty protection become the only realistic subsets of that larger mandate, though land forces are frequently required for other focused taskings, such as aid of the civil power, within the country. While Canada now lives in an era of minimal immediate threat, its military needs to be able to regenerate a credible air defence, should a new or reemergent threat develop. Even though North America is in many ways protected by its geographical isolation, other threats to national interests may emerge.

Just what are Canada's national interests? In addition to the safekeeping of territorial sovereignty there are other, less tangible concerns. Preservation of national democratic institutions is certainly a national priority. So, too, is preservation of Canadian social values embodied in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and of livelihoods, a fundamental interest. Closely related to the national interests are national concerns, which in many ways shape both foreign and defence policies. Issues related to the economy carry a great deal of weight, and centre around the need to reduce the national debt while simultaneously promoting economic growth, maintaining at least the most important social programs, and keeping personal and corporate taxes at acceptable levels.⁶ While the relative weighting of national concerns may vary over time, the preservation of sovereignty will remain constant and may well require national armed forces to effect. "This will require the military to retain the capacity to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance and restoration of public order, and relief from civil disasters and emergencies, and to ensure adequate surveillance of Canada's jurisdictional boundaries."⁷

What of other specific security concerns in the regional and national context? At least one of these is directly related to Canada's increasing role as a good international citizen. Canada is, at present, one of a select few states possessing armed forces of a sufficient calibre (in terms of professionalism and skilled use of advanced technologies) capable of participating in coalition operations vital to the world economy or to global stability. The necessary use of force during such operations gives rise to the possibility of terrorist reprisal actions, possibly even

on Canadian soil. Robert W. Gordon of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) argues that Canada “will continue to face a serious threat from terrorism for the foreseeable future.”⁸ Canada is a country of immigrants that has evolved into a multicultural and multiethnic society, but it plays host to a small minority of extremists who are using it as a base to launch grievances against “homeland” governments. “This is achieved by carrying out attacks on foreign missions, personnel and symbolic targets (airlines) here in Canada, and by using Canada as a staging area for attacks overseas, as well as a source of fund raising and ordnance supply.”⁹ As a general rule, Canadian experience with terrorism emanates largely from conflict or discontent originating outside Canada. Gordon suggests that Canada will continue to feel strong reverberations from these pressure points, and the key future trends will include: (i) nationalism and separatism as primary motivators for terrorism; (ii) continued Islamic and other religious extremism; (iii) declining left-wing extremism and increasing right-wing extremism; and (iv) ongoing state-sponsorship of centres of terrorism. As border controls are tightened in Europe, Canada may come to be seen as a safe haven for terrorists as well as a place for planning terrorist actions.

In the past, terrorists were often nationalists and anarchists, extremists of the left and right. But in the future, they may be solitary actors or members of groups of like-minded people working in very small clusters, whose ideologies are likely to be even more aberrant than those of larger groups. These terrorists working alone or in very small groups will be difficult to detect. Society has become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism in which the destructive power of both the individual terrorist and terrorism as a tactic are greatly increased.

In general, the North American perspective on terrorism, and in particular that of Canada, has remained dangerously complacent. There were 428 documented terrorist incidents in Canada between 1960 and 1989,¹⁰ international terrorist acts are increasing with alarming frequency, and the potential for domestically originated terrorism is also on the rise. The primary causes for this latter phenomenon include an increasing distrust of the federal government, a minuscule portion of the most radical separatist element in Quebec becoming more militant as frustration grows,¹¹ and an escalating battle between the federal government and native leaders over aboriginal right to self-government.

US intelligence experts believe that aviation is likely to remain an alternative target for terrorists well into the future, and American concerns can be legitimately mirrored for Canada. “Protecting civil aviation against a terrorist attack is now an urgent national issue. The 1988 terrorist bombing of PanAm 103, which killed 270 people, and the more recent explosion of TWA Flight 800, have shaken the public’s confidence in the safety and security of air travel.”¹² Couple this particular area of concern with the unprecedented proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and it does not require much imagination to visualize a scenario in which perpetrators armed with WMDs and the will to use them could create a disaster of unprecedented scale in North American airspace, and do so

with very little advance warning. Considering the present mobility and availability of WMDs, such a nightmare script is regrettably not confined to Hollywood. With further respect to specific sources, “terrorism by religious fanatics and groups manipulating religion, especially Islam, for political purposes, continued to dominate international terrorism in 1996. Organized groups such as Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad ... remained active and dangerous. And free-lance, transitional terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan and are backed by international terrorist financiers such as the Saudi dissident Usama Bin Ladin, are a growing factor.”¹³ The US State Department has said that Iran remains the top state sponsor of terrorism, while Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria also remain on its list as active state sponsors.¹⁴

Another enormous dramatic security concern for North America is the burgeoning trade in illegal narcotics, which eats away at the economic well-being and the productivity of the continent. In May 1997, the White House special appointee on drugs, General Barry McCaffrey, stated that “in his opinion, narco trafficking had replaced the evil Soviet Empire as the world’s greatest threat: the dominant national security threat in this hemisphere for the decades to come [is] not Russian missiles, but those illegal drugs.”¹⁵

It is now estimated that 70 percent of the cocaine and other illegal drugs consumed in the United States (and by extension, Canada) are channeled through Mexican drug cartels.¹⁶ In 1991 heroin seizures in Canada represented a 60-percent increase over the previous year, and the rising trend continues.¹⁷ Aerial transportation of these illegal substances is one highly viable method of delivery, and this activity has well-defined air-sovereignty implications. Drug cartels have already proven they are highly capable, innovative, and possessed of seemingly unlimited resources, therefore presenting a particularly difficult challenge to continental security.

In sum, Canada’s neighbourhood — and indeed its own territory — faces security challenges of a new, perhaps more complex, nature as the century draws to a close. How will those officials responsible for developing a policy for coping with these challenges respond? Although many of its security problems will have features radically different from those confronted during the Cold War era, the future agenda will, as I will argue in chapters 3 and 4, be one that will have interesting implications for the country’s Cold War collective-defence institutions, NORAD and NATO.

Notes

1. Bush felt that old enemies would now live peacefully in mutual cooperation, and global stability would be ensured by a revitalized, proactive, and effective United Nations.
2. David L. Bashow, "The Changing Face of NORAD," *Proceedings*, November 1995, p. 61.
3. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 44-76.
4. University of New Brunswick Workshop, *Defence Policy for a New Century* (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick Press, 1994), p. 2.
5. University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies, *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?* (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick Press, 1996) p. 58.
6. University of New Brunswick Workshop, *Defence Policy for a New Century*, p. 4.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
8. Robert W. Gordon, "Terrorism: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," in *Canada and the World: Non-Traditional Security Threats* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 73.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
10. Solicitor General of Canada, "Terrorism in Canada — 1960-1989" (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990), p. 16.
11. William Johnson, "Eye of the Storm," *Financial Post*, 6 December 1996, p. 9.
12. United States, GAO *Report on Aviation Security*, GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD96-237, 08/01/96, pp. 3-4. It should, however, be noted that the TWA crash appears to have resulted from mechanical failure, not terrorism.
13. Philip C. Wilcox Jr., "Patterns of Global Terrorism," US Department of State, Washington, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996report.html>, p. 1.
14. *USA Today* Washington, 4 May 1997, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/ncs12/htm>
15. Elizabeth Palmer, *CBC World Report*, Tuesday, 6 May 1997.
16. M. Moore and J.W. Anderson, "Mexico and U.S.: Close, Yet Distant," *Washington Post* Foreign Service, Monday 5 May 1997, p. A14.
17. James G. Stewart, "Intelligence Analysis of Transitional Crime: Assessing Canadian Preparedness," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 16 (Spring 1996):92.

3. *The Case for NORAD*

Historically, Canadian defence policy often seems to have been formed in a vacuum because of a lack of consensus between external and domestic priorities. Furthermore, defence policy appears to be excessively influenced by federal budgets and regional economies, with little regard for long-term fiscal planning and stability. Former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau often expressed concern vis-à-vis the relative order of foreign and defence policy: “It is a false perspective to have a military alliance determine your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy which determines your military policy.”¹ “In such a situation, there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the natural order of policymaking.”² Foreign and defence policy should, as much as possible, be developed in concert with each other, based upon national interests and concerns. Some elements of defence policy will undoubtedly need to be developed in tandem with foreign policy, but defence policy should *never* be developed in isolation from or in contradiction to foreign policy. However, in fairness, many defence problems have been generated due to unrealistic demands made by foreign affairs decisions or influence. Examples of this include inadequate consultation and awareness by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) of military requirements and capabilities with respect to UN deployments to Somalia, Bosnia, and most recently, Zaire. Therefore, one might suggest that the onus is upon the government to provide the country with a foreign policy that accurately reflects national interests and concerns, and to resist the temptation to make ill-thought-out wholesale changes, or to accept policy taskings that the country’s armed forces cannot realistically enforce. As well, the government should review, for relevance, foreign policies that are either hamstrung by traditional alliances or are at loggerheads with new or emerging national interests.

Background and Current Operations

On 28 March 1996, the US secretary of state and the Canadian minister of foreign affairs signed the most recent iteration of the NORAD agreement, marking the eighth time it has been renewed or extended since its official inception in 1958. This agreement assigns two very broad responsibilities to NORAD: aerospace warning and aerospace control for the North American continent. Today's world is a far different place than that of 1954 when senior military officials from Canada and the United States first met to lay the groundwork for the command. Over the years, NORAD has evolved to meet the changing threat. In the early days, NORAD assumed a purely air-defence mission using thousands of interceptors to counter a massive Soviet manned bomber fleet. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the intercontinental ballistic missile/sea-launched ballistic missile threats assumed primary importance and, in keeping with the new nuclear deterrence objective, the mission priority changed to warning and attack characterization, upon which a retaliatory strike could be based. Subsequently, the reemergence of the air-breathing threat in the form of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles led to sweeping changes under the North American Air Defence Modernization Agreement (NAADM) of 1985. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, NORAD was quick off the mark to reassess its legitimacy in the new geopolitical situation, to eliminate unnecessary infrastructure wherever possible, and to explore innovative and cost-effective ways to maintain a combat capability geared to rapid regeneration, should circumstances dictate.

As a command mandate, in 1998, the protection of air sovereignty is paramount. In NORAD's case, the mission is focused on being able to find and control any violator of the airspace of North America, but protection of air sovereignty is a critical responsibility for any sovereign nation. In peacetime, air-sovereignty force structure acts as a foundation for an air-defence posture, should it be required. One objective in ascendance does not mean others are any less valid. Rather, NORAD operates across a continuum spanning world situations from peace, to crisis, to war. Today there is little threat to North America. The command therefore emphasizes the air-sovereignty objective, with deterrence through warning and assessment remaining valid and necessary. To cease warning under today's largely indecipherable circumstances would be irresponsible, although the possibility of attack remains remote. An atmospheric mass attack is even less likely. NORAD places its emphasis on maintaining the necessary infrastructure to be able to regenerate a credible air defence in the event a new or reemergent threat appears.

One might ask, given the geographic insularity of the North American continent, does North America really require an air-sovereignty capability? If so, are not other agencies such as Transport Canada and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) already performing the task? Surveillance and control are two essential elements of air sovereignty. The FAA and Transport Canada are

responsible for managing air traffic; they do not have the capabilities to *control* intruders. Air sovereignty contributes to deterrence and geopolitical stability, and may simply help identify unknown aircraft; however, it can encompass “times of increased tension and the Command could actually engage in limited conflict under the air sovereignty banner short of defending against a mass attack.” Unknown targets “could merely be an aircraft with a flight plan deviation ... it could be an illegal drug trafficker or someone bent on other forms of harm to the continent.” A state needs to maintain sovereignty of its airspace. “Our current reduced alert posture provides air sovereignty protection day in and day out, and also maintains the skeleton infrastructure for complete regeneration, should it be needed.”

The aerospace warning mission includes “the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation and warning of attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other Commands.”³ The methodology of detection is a robust surveillance system coupled with a sophisticated communications network that detects and identifies all approaching aerospace objects. The object is then assessed for threat potential to the continent, and if so deemed, is reported as such to the National Command Authority of the United States and the Government of Canada. One should note that this system is fully capable of providing ballistic missile warning to Canadian and allied service people deployed on operations around the globe. In fact, the system was used to dramatic good effect during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

The air-sovereignty mission entails fighter aircraft on some form of continuous alert in all three command regions all day, every day.⁴ However, given the reduced strategic threat to North America at present, NORAD has developed an innovative policy of Flexible Alert, whereby only a fraction of the total alert force is on duty at any given time, though the total force must be capable of regeneration to full strength on very short notice. Accordingly, the command has delegated to the region commanders the authority to relax their alert posture based on the air-sovereignty threat situation, thereby saving taxpayers significant operating costs. This allows the regional commanders to focus on a specific threat, to graduate the alert posture by bringing more aircraft up on alert, or to have aircraft on a reduced alert posture. This decentralized execution defers to the local commander’s expertise and knowledge, preserves the infrastructure against a future threat, and is an efficient use of scarce resources in times of declining military budgets.

Future Interests

There are downstream command interests, the pursuit of which appear logical and sensible under present and anticipated world conditions, as articulated by General Joseph W. Ashy, commander-in-chief NORAD:

For now, world political, geographical, and technical realities seem to afford us a degree of safety from ballistic missile attack upon our soil. Nevertheless, we must not ignore future threats to our continent, as the capabilities of potential enemies improve. In addition both our deployed forces and allies are threatened now... We should continue to develop defensive systems based on present, as well as anticipated, threats. First, we must field a ballistic missile defense system to deal with the theater threat. This threat is real today and will remain so for the foreseeable future.⁵

Canada has followed with interest the evolution of American defence policy and strategy with respect to ballistic missile defence (BMD), particularly that which emphasizes ground- and sea-based theatre missile defence systems. The 1994 Canadian defence white paper contains several statements pertaining directly to BMD. In that document, Canada acknowledges the commitment of the American government to adhere to the strict interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the even broader commitment to the deployment of a missile defence capability that “enhances global stability and is consistent with existing arms control agreements.”⁶ The paper suggests that Canada’s role in this initiative will focus on research and consultation with like-minded countries, but that a more extensive commitment would have to be “cost effective and affordable, make an unambiguous contribution to Canada’s defence needs, and build on missions the Forces already perform.”⁷ Along with exploring BMD options that focus on research, the need to capitalize upon existing Canadian capabilities in communications and surveillance was emphasized.

Since the release of the white paper, the BMD issue has gained greater impetus in the United States, and is taking on additional meaning for NORAD. BGen D.W. Bartram, vice-commander of the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre (CMOC) in Colorado Springs, emphasizes the high priority of BMD. He believes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is real and threatening and that there is no defence against missile attack on North America. “Two scenarios create plausible threats ... an accidental or unauthorized launch from a currently nuclear-capable state, or an intentional attack from a rogue nation or terrorist group that obtains this technology through proliferation. The present US government position is that a BMD system will either be ABM treaty compliant, or the Treaty will be amended and the system will be compliant with the amended Treaty.”⁸ Deployments under the treaty are limited to a single site of one hundred interceptors, no mobile land-, sea-, or space-based components, and no BMD deployment outside US territory. The concept of operations for BMD expects that NORAD will be supported by US Space Command (USSPACECOM). Canadian politicians will make decisions about Canadian involvement in BMD development.

Bartram further stated that the BMD concept of operations is based on the assumption that the command and control of BMD operations will be integrated with existing systems at Cheyenne Mountain, which would call for centralized command and control by NORAD and decentralized execution by USSPACECOM forces.⁹ On 12 January 1995, the Canadian chief of defence staff, General John

de Chastelain, announced that Canada was interested in working with the United States toward some form of regional missile defence, citing the need to protect specific areas from attack by rogue actors as opposed to the old Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which Canada felt at the time would be destabilizing due to blanket protection of the entire North American continent. Others have echoed the general's sentiments: "The idea now is to protect smaller areas against short-range ballistic missiles such as the Scuds that Iraq used during the war in the Persian Gulf. Patriot missiles had limited success stopping Scuds. The kind of missile now being discussed could be transported to conflict zones and would likely depend on a space-based warning system," notes George Lands of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Further, he maintains that the development of such a weapon would not contravene the ABM treaty. That compact bans interceptors capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles, but not interceptors of shorter-range missiles.¹⁰

Canadian officials have also expressed some public interest in participating in a missile defence system for North America. Daniel Bon, of the Department of National Defence (DND), stated in 1995 that Canada was actively engaged in dialogue with American, British, French, and Italian antimissile experts with respect to the contribution Canada could make to a North American system. However, he emphasized the embryonic nature of the BMD initiative and that Canadian participation would have to be extremely cost-effective in the areas of surveillance and communications, further suggesting that "the main focus for any Canadian work on such a system would be for potential use with the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) system."¹¹

The NORAD/USSPACECOM BMD mission is logical and well-articulated, with the highest priority being given to the protection of troops deployed worldwide. Most recently, the Helsinki agreement of 21 March 1997, signed by US President Clinton and President Yeltsin of Russia, recognized the fundamental significance of the ABM treaty in strengthening strategic stability and international security, and agreed to prevent circumvention of it and to enhance its viability. The necessity for having effective theatre missile defence (TMD) systems was emphasized and a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and TMD systems was found.¹² The statement also affirmed that the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on ABM/TMD demarcation had been completed with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems, and the two presidents instructed their experts to reach an agreement as soon as possible on higher-velocity TMD systems. Also, agreement was reached on the most highly critical elements of these systems.¹³ This agreement on kinetics represents a major breakthrough and a triumph for diplomacy over confrontational rhetoric, demonstrating promising cooperation — at least in this select area of mutual interest — between the United States and Russia. In another encouraging development, the BMD issue is rapidly becoming more bipartisan within the US

government. On 24 April 1997, Republican Congressman Benjamin Gilman introduced the *European Security Act* of 1997, which promotes not only NATO enlargement but “authorizes a program of ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia to be carried out by the Department of Defense. This program is authorized to include American-Russian cooperation regarding early warning of ballistic missile launches from such rogue states as Iran and North Korea, and cooperative research, development, testing and production of technology and systems for ballistic missile defense.”¹⁴ Collectively, these recent initiatives represent significant progress with respect to the TMD/BMD issue, and NORAD/USSPACECOM is still considered the lead continental agency for the operation and control of such systems.

Bilaterally, this issue is gaining momentum. The suggestion has been made that Canada and the United States could participate in BMD development through the Canadian contribution of “niche” technologies, among other things. Military-to-military contacts have already taken place, but a political decision on the issue will soon be required. In a recent briefing to NORAD senior staff, Command planners suggested that a formal decision to proceed could form the basis for an amendment to the NORAD agreement.¹⁵ Also, as an adjunct of BMD, Canadian planners view the cruise missile (CM) threat in related terms, and have suggested that additional opportunities for Canadian participation may exist in this field. In February 1995, Daniel Bon reiterated that NORAD was working vigorously on the cruise missile problem and that Command was hopeful that some of the programs being developed for BMD would also have a counter cruise-missile capability. The use of existing systems is particularly attractive to Canada. Bon remarked that the country is unable to commit extensive capital funds to this arena. To that end, he suggested that Canada would like to make some use of its present Air Defence Antitank System (ADATS) in the construction of a defensive umbrella for deployed Canadian and allied troops, and further stated that the ADATS system, while designed to destroy low-flying aircraft, might well offer protection against cruise missiles.¹⁶

As part of the movement to reduce the proliferating threat from ballistic missiles, shared global warning initiatives and the use of space to promote global stability are also appealing as a bilateral initiative. Early warning information leads to counterproliferation efforts by removing the incentives for weapons of mass destruction, along with providing a stabilizing influence in crisis situations. Such an initiative could be an extension of NORAD’s Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment capability and the procedures for detecting and characterizing missile launches could serve as a cornerstone for alerting participants. This initiative would not constitute a ballistic missile defence system.

Perhaps one of the most attractive and pragmatic aspects of a globally cooperative warning initiative is that the operating costs would be shared by all participating states, thereby minimizing the fiscal burden for individual adherents. Further, the

technological foundation for such a system is a proven entity, the existing NORAD-USSPACECOM capability. Expansion and modification to suit global needs are not impossible tasks. In fact, such an initiative has already received tacit recognition in the closing paragraph of the Helsinki Statement:

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, *inter alia*, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.¹⁷

Linkage to National Interests

NORAD derives its current relevance from the white paper and the 1996 Canadian Defence Planning Document, in which defending Canada and North America in cooperation with the United States is presented as Canada's principal defence role. NORAD is singled out for particular mention with respect to protecting, in partnership with the United States, the Canadian approaches to the continent. The importance of protecting aerospace sovereignty within this mandated role has already been discussed, but two specific subsets of the sovereignty protection task — counterdrug and counterterrorist operations — merit some further comment. Counterdrug activities by NORAD have already enjoyed success in both countries, and periods of relative inactivity with respect to apprehension of airborne infiltrators should not be regarded as failures. Often, reduced aerial illicit drug activity merely means that drug traffickers are turning to alternative forms of delivery, and further, it is impossible to imagine how much greater the flow of illicit aerial drug trafficking would be without the protectionist NORAD fence.

Counterterrorist activities also form a significant part of the sovereignty mandate. Terrorist activities are unfortunately on the rise in North America, particularly as both states' national interests become increasingly global. However, NORAD possesses robust and sophisticated warning and intelligence architecture and, working in concert with other intelligence agencies and national crisis action response teams, provides a formidable hedge against future threats.

One of the most frequently voiced American objections to the existence of NORAD is that it does not make allowance for unilateral air defence action by the United States, if such actions are required. This is simply not the case. In 1987, US Element NORAD (USELEMNORAD)¹⁸ was conceived as a vehicle for providing US forces to NORAD (since no such vehicle existed after the disbandment of Air Defense Command in 1978), as a vehicle for taking unilateral US action as necessary (e.g., action against or precipitated by Cuba), and finally as a method for the CJCS to task commander-in-chief NORAD (CINCNORAD) with American policy and document review that could affect or be affected by the bilateral NORAD operation.¹⁹ While this separate organizational structure provides the

United States with considerable latitude for unilateral military activity, it tacitly recognizes that the US and Canada have a fundamental difference of opinion in foreign policy with respect to Cuba, and while the two “agree to disagree” on this issue, the relative geographical proximity of the two countries means that the United States needs to be able to take unilateral defensive action as required. Canada possesses under “Canadian Element NORAD” unilateral rights of action in the NORAD agreement as well. However, even in a crisis situation such as that generated by the actions of the Brothers to the Rescue Cuban exile group against the Castro regime on 24 February 1996 and the subsequent shooting down of two of the group’s aircraft, the bilateral command relationship remained operationally intact and effective, even though other US military formations were employed in a unilateral manner in the area. That the shared, bilateral nature of the NORAD operation remained constant throughout this event, even though it was subjected to close scrutiny from senior officials of both Canada and the United States, is a resounding endorsement of the wisdom and legitimacy of the current command arrangement.

There are other accrued benefits to both the US and Canada conducting the continental air-defence mission within the framework of NORAD. First, if the command were not to be continued, some form of cooperative working relationship for air defence would have to be entered into, unless the United States wished to maintain a purely autonomous strategic defence capability. If the latter were the case, it would entail providing some form of option, undoubtedly expensive, to replace the Early Warning radars and aircraft Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), which are located for the most part on Canadian soil. It would also entail active manning of the entire 4,000-mile northern frontier of the continental United States, an act made unnecessary by the current agreement. Also likely would be a costly buyout or replacement of extensive Canadian infrastructure investment in the various headquarters and command centres, not to mention termination of the annual Canadian share of the operating costs of the Command in perpetuity. From the Canadian point of view, the infrastructure costs of “going it alone” would be prohibitive.

One of the most highly significant and yet largely intangible benefits achieved by NORAD is the considerable goodwill it generates between the two countries, demonstrating the long-term ability of the United States to live and work harmoniously with a geographical neighbour. It represents a model of cooperation, and the Canada-US border is the world’s longest undefended frontier.

Considerable economic benefits arise from the sharing of air-defence technology. Savings can be realized from dividing necessary research tasks between both countries, through efforts “coordinated by NORAD, and then both nations could potentially benefit from the commercialization of such research. Applications include search-and-rescue technology, commercial aviation control, broadcasting, and so forth. Other parts of the Air Defence Initiative²⁰ that hold commercial promise include rapid information processing and complex systems networking.”²¹

Thus, NORAD is one collective-defence arrangement that is very much in Canada's national interests to maintain and nurture. If the command were not continued, other less formal cooperative arrangements might be workable, but they would most certainly be less effective and more costly than the current one. While accounting procedures vary from country to country, NORAD is exceptionally good fiscal value when measured by any economic yardstick. The United States Air National Guard (ANG) is the Department of Defense agency charged with the air defence of the continental United States, a mandate it performs with ten fighter squadrons on an annual budget of US\$252 million.²² Canada contributes roughly C\$316 million²³ annually to NORAD — approximately one-tenth of the total annual Command operating budget and roughly 3 percent of the Canadian defence budget. This means that the US Department of Defense funds the remaining US\$2.7 billion in annual operating costs, consisting largely of charges not associated with ANG operating expenses and the use of regular US Air Force infrastructure. However, this sum still only constitutes approximately 1 percent of the entire US military budget authorization of US\$255.1 billion for Fiscal Year 1997. Deterrence of potential intruders or attackers is more credible and efficient when surveillance, warning, and control of North American aerospace are cooperative, bilateral activities. Air defence, in the highly unlikely event of a full-scale attack, is also significantly more effective as a joint venture. To the European NATO allies, NORAD represents a self-contained defence capability and a model of bilateral cooperation well worth emulating. It is a unified and highly effective North American pillar of the alliance, and though it is seldom articulated, it represents a self-contained defence capability for the largest single portion of NATO's membership land mass, one that places virtually no military demands for assistance upon the European members of the alliance. The associated costs to each country for maintaining the command are minimal; decisions on spending levels for aerospace defence operations are national decisions separate from continuation of NORAD as a command responsible for orchestrating these activities. Surveillance and control operations are significantly less costly for each country when costs and responsibilities are shared, primarily because there is no need for surveillance or control of the Canada-United States border. Finally, bilateral NORAD provides a legitimacy of solidarity for TMD and a limited BMD system for the continent, based on a mature, proven warning architecture that is readily available. Also NORAD's logical involvement in the development of a cooperative global warning system would contribute to overall counter-proliferation efforts by sharing accrued information with states possessing a strong retaliatory capability, and in promoting international stability by potentially providing technical support for arms-control verification procedures.

Notes

1. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, address to a dinner of the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, 12 April 1969.
2. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "The Strategy of Suffocation," an address delivered in New York, 26 May 1978.
3. Brigadier-General D.W. Bartram, "NORAD Briefing," *National Network News*, 4,1 (1997):27.
4. These command regions are the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR), the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR), and the Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR).
5. General Joseph W. Ashy, "Testimony to US Senate Armed Services Committee," 23 February 1995, p. 5.
6. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), p. 25.
7. Ibid.
8. Bartram, "NORAD Briefing," p. 28.
9. Ibid., p. 28.
10. *Globe and Mail*, 13 January 1995, p. A3.
11. This Week (editorial), *Defense News* 30 January-5 February 1995, p. 3. (Hereafter cited as Bon editorial.)
12. Specifically, "both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability. Theater missile systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other... The scale of deployment — in number and geographic scope — of TMD systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side." Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Helsinki, Finland, 21 March 1997, p. 1. (Hereafter cited as Joint Statement.)
13. "The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec. The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5000 km. *The sides will not develop, test or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.* The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs." Ibid., p. 2.
14. USIS Washington File, "Rep. Gilman Introduces 'European Security Act'," 25 April 1997, pp. 1-2.
15. NORAD Briefing to Senior Staff, NORAD HQ, 9 January 1997, p. 10.
16. Bon editorial.
17. Joint Statement, p. 3.

18. *Mission - US Element, North America Aerospace Command (USELEMNORAD)*. Support the NORAD mission as outlined in the current NORAD agreement and its Terms of Reference. Should it become necessary to employ US aerospace forces unilaterally as a supported or supporting command, USELEMNORAD forces will perform aerospace control operations to defend the continental United States, Alaska, and other areas as directed. NJ5P, NORAD HQ, 2 May 1997.
19. Since NORAD is a bilateral organization, without the existence of USELEMNORAD, CJCS would have no formal authority to task CINCNORAD or his command directly for any reason whatsoever. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel D.W. Ward, NJ5PS, NORAD HQ, 2 May 1997.
20. The Air Defence Initiative was an ambitious command rationalization and expansion proposal made obsolete by the ending of the Cold War. However, many of its tenets are legitimate and viable.
21. David S. Sorensen, "The Future of the North American Air Defense System," in *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation*, ed. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), p. 281.
22. Interview with Colonel Philip E. Thornton, First Air Force Financial Manager, Tyndall AFB, Florida, 7 May 1997.
23. These costs are broken down as follows: Headquarters facilities and command and control structures, C\$31.5 million; aerospace surveillance activities (missile warning and space surveillance), C\$15.5 million; aerospace surveillance (ground-based systems), C\$77.6 million; airspace control (aircraft operations and training), C\$163.5 million; and capital projects associated with NORAD activities, C\$41.8 million. Speaking notes for minister of national defence for debate in the House of Commons on "NORAD Renewal — The Security Dimensions," 8 March 1996, Annex A.

4. *NATO: An Alliance Searching for a Raison d'être?*

As a security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's existence was fundamental to the peace and well-being of Western Europe and the transatlantic allies during the Cold War. However, cataclysmic changes have occurred in Europe since 25 December 1991, when the hammer-and-sickle last flew above the Kremlin walls in Moscow. Is the alliance now without purpose, or worse? Is it, in attempting to justify its own existence, recreating a Europe divided into hostile, antagonistic armed camps? The newly articulated policy of membership enlargement has found many zealous supporters, but there are also profound and disturbing questions associated with the policy. The question of enlargement needs to be examined in depth.

Background

In order to appreciate fully NATO's current *raison d'être* in the emerging international order, it is important to understand the overreaching concept of a united Europe — that is, an indigenous European entity possessing its own “constitution, government, currency, foreign policy and army.”¹ Noel Malcolm suggests that the driving force for this united European state originated with a handful of politicians in France and Germany “who decided that a supranational enterprise might solve the problem of Franco-German rivalry” and fill the power vacuum brought about by the end of the Cold War. The subsequent Maastricht treaty, which created the original European Union of 12 countries (now 15) was signed in 1992, and eventually came into force in November 1993. Based on a functionalist doctrine, this methodology of unification has resulted in widespread measures with the eventual goal of full economic union. It has created dominant state elites

within Europe, allowing Germany to “flood member states with its exports” and “giving France an elaborate system of protection for its agriculture.” Within the European Union (EU), enormous state subsidies have become common practice, distorting the market in favour of large, established cooperatives, and a “leveling up” process has occurred, in which the standards and costs of industry have been linked to Germany’s high levels. These policies damage the economies of poorer countries because high labour costs and industrial products costs are being imposed upon them. Malcolm further argues that this “leveling up” will eventually make European goods uncompetitive on the global market.

Some of these measures are inspired, no doubt, by concern for the plight of the poorest workers in the Community’s southern member states. But the general aim of the policy is clearly to protect the high-labor-cost economies (above all, Germany) from competitors employing cheaper labor. In the short or medium term, this policy will damage the economies of the poorer countries, which will have artificially high labor costs imposed on them. In the long term, it will harm Germany, too, by reducing its incentive to adapt to worldwide competition.

Malcolm views a European parliament as being totally unrealistic, in which *national* politicians will seek to maximize only spending projects that bring benefits to their own countries, and suggests that this is a recipe not only for quantum leaps in spending, but also for extremely muddled policymaking. He then warns that this type of politics fosters growth in political corruption and a revival of nationalist hostilities and sentiments “in a system where power has been taken from national governments and transferred to European bodies in which, by definition, the majority vote will always lie in the hands of foreigners, such nationalist thinking will acquire an undeniable logic.”² The emerging Eastern European democracies have already grown frustrated by the lack of European markets for their goods, and feel a need to become EU members in order to survive. However, the rules for EU membership are extremely stringent, and are, therefore, at the moment woefully out of reach for these new aspirants. Meanwhile, the established and influential members, such as Germany and France, conversely see the new democracies as rich new markets for themselves.

Notwithstanding the importance of the EU, it is NATO that remains the kingpin of European security. Theoretically now in a mode of cooperation rather than confrontation with its former enemies, these “openings to the east” are embodied in the recently inaugurated Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),³ including the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, along with the participants in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) — a cooperative military program between NATO and EAPC nations. PfP “is working to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance. It offers participating states the possibility of strengthening

their relations with NATO in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities.”⁴ The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) now includes all 54 states of Central, Western, and Eastern Europe, along with the former Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada.⁵ It acts as a conflict prevention/resolution agency, particularly within the former Soviet Union, and also as a custodian for core values, such as economic and legal freedoms, and human rights. It is also a self-declared regional security arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which actively encourages the establishment of regional security institutions, formally designating NATO as a “peacekeeping and peacemaking arm.”⁶ The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), a French initiative, is another attempt to promote greater European political unity, while the Western European Union (WEU) has become the European pillar of NATO and the embodiment of a strengthened European defence identity, driven by the idea that the United States military presence in Europe would diminish as the Soviet threat receded. A Franco-German Eurocorps — since joined by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain — has been formed as the nucleus of a European army under the WEU. Peacekeeping and humanitarian and crisis-management tasks have been identified as areas of operation, and it is prepared to operate separately from NATO in these areas on the occasions when the United States and Canada may not wish to act.

From an economic vantage point, membership in NATO is being brought forward as the carrot used to focus the emerging democracies in their transition to market societies. While most Europeans ultimately want them to realize their goal of membership in the EU, the criteria for Union membership are so stringent that this eventuality is but a distant hope, even for the most advanced of the emerging countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Including these countries would require vast and complex changes in EU policies and regulatory bodies — changes that could not be made without cost to some of the powerful and influential current members.

The NATO Alternative

In some ways, NATO membership enlargement has already obtained a curious legitimacy. The NACC and PfP were created in response to pressure from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) emerging democracies for security ties to the West, and NATO, sensing a severe downward trend in demand for its capabilities with the end of the Cold War, was only too happy to oblige. However, both the pressures from the east for closer familial ties with the alliance and NATO’s search for a role in the new Europe and out of area developed lives of their own. NATO faced a dilemma between collective defence and collective security. The question was whether to expand eastward as a collective-defence organization,

responding to Central and Eastern Europe but ignoring Moscow, or to embrace a collective-security role for the whole of Europe, building on the NACC and in cooperation with the PfP participants, but falling short of NATO membership. "If NATO membership is open to all, how can NATO avoid diluting its capacity for collective defence, but if NATO membership is not open to all, how can it avoid the perception that those excluded are potential enemies? In the last analysis it has to be asked whether a new security regime for the whole of Europe can be constructed *with* or *against* Russia."⁷ NATO has *partially* resolved the dilemma by opting to enlarge.

Who have been the primary catalysts for enlargement? The process seems to have started in Germany in March 1993, when the German defence minister, Volker Rühle, proposed opening NATO membership to the new democracies, a proposal that did not enjoy widespread support.⁸ Germany's national interests are directly tied to the well-being of the emerging democracies. The country benefits by exporting both wealth and political values to Eastern Europe, thereby stabilizing the area, stemming the tide of immigration to its own territory, and enhancing opportunities for German industry — already the largest investor and exporter to the emerging democracies. The foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, had earlier proposed using the NACC as the primary vehicle for integrating the Visegrad states, a proposal made in response to President Lech Walesa of Poland and Czech President Vaclav Havel's expressions of interest in joining NATO. Rühle's stridency was not shared by Chancellor Kohl, who cautiously sided with his foreign affairs minister, particularly after Boris Yeltsin publicly announced his strong opposition to any enlargement of NATO. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Bush administration had maintained a neutral silence on the enlargement issue, an example that President Clinton initially followed. However, some of the emerging Central European countries — notably Poland — kept up the political pressure and the Clinton administration rapidly became divided over the issue. For example, security advisor Anthony Lake was most receptive to enlargement, while the Pentagon opposed a quick decision, voicing concern that new military commitments should not be undertaken when both the defence budget and the US military presence in Europe were being reduced.⁹ In October 1993, the special presidential advisor on the successor states of the Soviet Union, Strobe Talbott, declared that

if NATO was enlarged the three most democratically developed states — Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — were the membership candidates which could be considered most, whereas Russia and the Ukraine could not be taken into account for many years to come. A new dividing line would be created in Europe, adding fuel to fears in Moscow that NATO wanted to contain and isolate Russia. What is more, membership of the Visegrad states would intensify Ukrainian concern about being excluded.¹⁰

The Clinton administration then came to the conclusion that a "middle-of-the-road," compromise position had to be found between the desire of the CEE states

to join NATO, and consideration for Russia's concerns. Partnership for Peace was thus articulated as a concept at this time by the Pentagon. While this new organization would be formally created by NATO in January 1994, the concept was roundly criticized by powerful and influential opponents at the outset, notably Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who both felt that it was an inadequate substitute for enlargement. Also, the Polish American Congress ensured that the White House was bombarded with letters demanding Poland's admission to NATO. Further, the Republicans in Congress found the issue of enlargement a timely vehicle for criticizing the administration's "Russia first" policy.

Meanwhile, in France, reactions to the creation of the NACC had been unenthusiastic. From the outset, the French have been suspicious of American hegemony in Europe and have attempted to develop a distinctively European pillar of defence for Europe, one that would serve as a hedge against future shock, and brusque reversals in US foreign policy.¹¹ France, therefore, wanted the WEU — not NATO — to be the vehicle of enlargement, citing grave concerns over a watering down of NATO's Article 5 and the resurrection of a bipolar environment in Europe. Furthermore, it did not want to give Russia the pretext of transforming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a competitive, bipolar organization. Defence minister François Léotard was very cryptic in his support of a European security solution: "To knock at NATO's door is to knock at America's, to demand an American guarantee. That may be understandable, but it is not how we see things. We want the demand for security to come to Europe, hence our proposal of association with the WEU."¹²

NATO's Brussels summit of January 1994 established the PfP, seen both to assuage the emerging democracies and enshrine the principle of eventual enlargement eastward, though deadlines for aspiration to future membership were kept vague.¹³ PfP and *eventual* enlargement were regarded by France as protracted and low risk, and seemed to hold the promise of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). After this summit, François Mitterrand publicly admitted that the CEE states had the right to join a defensive organization, be it the WEU or NATO. Thus, without public debate or serious study of the issues, the NATO ministers had met and essentially given carte blanche to the emerging democracies for alliance enlargement.

In Canada, this was done without any input from the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee, significant in that the latter constituted a major foreign policy review with the opportunity to present its findings to the government. The committee would ultimately advise *against* supporting enlargement.¹⁴ In the period after the 1994 Brussels summit, the official Canadian position appears to have been to give full backing to enlargement, since reneging on a promise, no matter how ill-advisedly tendered, would appear to constitute unacceptably bad manners of statecraft. However, it should be emphasized that enlargement was still felt by the Canadian and other NATO governments to be a very long-term and low-risk venture, one that was not yet being treated with any degree of concern or urgency by the alliance. That would soon change.

In January 1994, in Prague, Lake urged Clinton to state that the admission of new members to NATO was “no longer a question of whether, but of when and how.”¹⁵ That spring, Strobe Talbott, now in the capacity of deputy secretary of state, also commented publicly to this effect. For the benefit of the Republicans in Congress, he tried to blunt the accusation that he was too soft on Russia and thus give the Congressional Republicans cause to use the issue against the president. Essentially contradicting his earlier position, he now declared that he had favoured a gradual enlargement of the alliance right from the outset, but had concerns over what approach should be used. However, the real enlargement catalyst occurred in July, when Clinton visited Warsaw. There he remarked to a journalist that a timetable for NATO membership enlargement was to be formulated, and that Poland was a likely candidate.

This was interpreted by the supporters of enlargement in the administration as the green light for taking concrete steps. Richard Holbrooke, who moved to Washington in September 1994 from Bonn, took up the issue and fostered the discussion. The Defense Department adopted a reserved position. In autumn 1994, these misgivings were taken into account insofar as new members were now expected to be militarily integrated in an appropriate form. A twin-track approach would address the objections of those who feared negative effects on the relationship with Russia. Accordingly, the main aim would be to institutionalize relations between NATO and Russia, for example, in the form of a “Standing Consultative Committee.” The about turn of the Clinton administration induced by domestic policy factors came as a surprise for European allies, who had only just adjusted to the PfP.

A Debate over Enlargement Takes Shape

It has been frequently remarked that the Clinton administration does not have a vision with respect to foreign policy, but that is not entirely true. There are certain consistencies, although admittedly there are also glaring inconsistencies. Two common themes have been the president’s propensity for playing to domestic constituencies in his foreign policy decisions, and his attempts to open new markets for US industry.¹⁶ However, Clinton’s unilateral declaration in Warsaw caught NATO off guard, and appears to have been the starting pistol in a headlong race to enlargement. One reason for Clinton’s about face was an attempt to win the votes of Americans whose ethnic roots could be traced to Central Europe. His announcement was greeted with annoyance by many Western European members of NATO, who were prepared for the PfP. As well,

it infuriated the Russians, especially Russian democrats, who believed that it was based on the assumption — which was indeed widely shared among its proponents in Central Europe and the West — that its democratic experiment would inevitably fail and Russia would revert to threatening its neighbors. The Clinton administration, however, had adopted policies based on the opposite view, committing itself to

the success of Russian democracy. NATO expansion, therefore, not only jeopardized the American interest in the peaceful integration of Russia into Europe and the international community, it also contradicted Clinton's own Russia policy.¹⁷

The Warsaw declaration had actually been precipitated by Polish foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski's success in persuading Lake and key members of Clinton's administration that the newly instituted PfP was "too small a step in the right direction." Within two months of the Warsaw declaration, Richard Holbrooke had been given the mandate to press for full and rapid NATO enlargement.¹⁸ By October a national security strategy had also been articulated, highlighting *containment* of rogue or "backlash" states with covert weapons of mass destruction capabilities and *enlargement* of the number of democracies worldwide.

Individual rationales on the benefits accruing from enlargement varied within the administration. Some, such as Talbot, viewed the prospect of NATO membership as a spur to further democratic reform in the CEE states, as well as a vehicle for the peaceful settlement of their mutual conflicts. Others, such as Holbrooke, concentrated on the American geopolitical perspective: that interstate conflicts and a resurgence of historical rivalries had tended to jeopardize stability in Europe, and that the continued engagement of the United States remained essential. Holbrooke thought that Central Europe was a most probable flash point, and if conflicts were to spread from there, the entire region could be placed in peril. "From this viewpoint, the enlargement of NATO is primarily attributable to the interest of the USA in a continuation of its role as a European power, not to any desire for the 'neo-containment' of Russia."¹⁹

Nonetheless, many in Moscow do view NATO enlargement as a continuation of the Cold War policy of counterbalance and containment. Nor was that all. It must be realized that the United States had much to gain economically, given the potential new markets in the CEE states, especially those in need of significant armed forces modernization. Remarks made by Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr. to officials of 19 grassroots organizations representing more than 22 million Americans of Central and Eastern European heritage are noteworthy in helping to understand US motivations with respect to enlargement:

The potential for trade and investment between the US and Eastern and Central Europe is enormous.... we must push for the designation of additional NATO members, making clear that the US does not accept an implicit or explicit Russian veto over new NATO members — including former Soviet Republics, whether in the Baltics, the Caucasus or the heartland of the Central European plain.... While international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) have played a major role in supporting the reforms in East and Central Europe, direct US support will build bilateral relations, help open markets and areas for investment, and encourage governments in these states to take the necessary but often politically unpopular steps towards economic reforms. Any further reductions in FSA and SEED programs would undermine these reform efforts and allow Russia to re-exert its influence over these emerging independent states.... American policies and investment can make a critical difference in promoting US

security which we all value as our foremost consideration. But US policies can also serve to open and expand investment opportunities for our products and services, while honoring our commitments to long-term allies, strengthening the ties with our new international partners and promoting our values of democracy, human rights and free markets.... One of the key instruments for advancing these lofty goals is through the US Agency for International Development — USAID.... By the year 2000, four out of five consumers will live in emerging countries. USAID's programs are helping these people become America's next generation of consumers, trading partners and allies.²⁰

In fact, ferocious competition between Europe and the US for arms sales could threaten to undermine the military foundation of the alliance, and the concomitant ability of NATO's member states to fight together with compatible weaponry.²¹ By mid-April 1997, European NATO members had rallied around a ground-station initial approach to acquire a common airborne ground surveillance (AGS) system for the alliance. If this approach is adopted, it would likely delay a decision on the more expensive airborne portion of the system, allowing the top European competitor time to catch up with the US entry, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). "Danish and Dutch officials told *Defense News* their governments are supporting the ground-stations-first option only because they do not want to be pushed into a hasty purchasing decision by Washington."²²

A cynic could also argue that the whole confrontational dynamic generated by the enlargement issue is nothing more than an attempt to create a definable threat in order to justify a still massive US military infrastructure in general, and the 100,000 soldier commitment to Europe in particular. This may not be so far-fetched, since the Clinton administration has had a great deal of difficulty articulating foreign policy in a world bereft of a cogent, global threat. It is interesting to note that prior to the Warsaw visit, the US public declaration of a position on NATO enlargement was essentially one of indifference. However, the Warsaw declaration, viewed by some as nothing more than partisan politics and an attempt to garner votes by Clinton, dramatically changed the impetus of events in Germany as well. There, by the autumn of 1994, Volker Rühle and Klaus Kinkel were openly at loggerheads over the issue, while Chancellor Kohl generally kept a cautious distance when Rühle staunchly pressed for early enlargement. Kinkel felt that this move would create a new division in Europe, upset Russia, and isolate both Ukraine and the Baltic states. The foreign minister felt that enlargement should be combined with a strengthening of the CSCE and the admittance of new members to the WEU and the EC. With the support of the chancellor, Kinkel included these ideas in agreements the governing parties had to negotiate after the October 1994 federal election. However, "the impact of Kinkel's caution within the federal government was quickly undone by heavy pressure from the Clinton administration."²³

Bonn quickly decided to back the US perspective, but demanded that Washington accept an "explicit coupling between NATO and EU expansion,"²⁴ a condition upon which Kohl would later soften. For his part, Rühle seemed to be motivated

by a perceived military vulnerability in Germany's eastern region and a growing disillusionment over Western Europe's ability to take decisive military action on its own, typified by inaction in the former Yugoslavia until the Americans took charge. Thus, it appears clear that it is the United States providing the real impetus to NATO enlargement, even though many argue the need for American troops in Europe is much reduced, if not eliminated altogether.

Allen Sens, commenting on future courses for American defence policy, foresees a tendency to fall back and consolidate from global commitments generally. He feels that by the year 2000, the US military will start to feel the effects of budget cuts made in the mid-1990s: "The United States must resist the temptation to maintain broad and far-reaching security commitments as its capacity to uphold these commitments erodes ... American policy makers would be unwise to find themselves at the end of the decade with the same global military obligations they possessed at the beginning of it."²⁵

Others echo these sentiments, particularly with respect to Europe. George Kennan observed in 1993 that "the time for the stationing of American forces on European soil has passed, ... the ones stationed there should be withdrawn, as soon as this is conveniently possible." Kennan argued that this would not mean the end of NATO, though he did express hope for an eventual European security architecture in which the Americans were *not* members. Ronald Steel enlarged on this theme by stating that NATO's problem is that changes in world politics have gone beyond its logic. In defending Western Europe against the Soviet Union, the cost was over \$100 billion a year. Those costs remain, while there no longer seemed to be an enemy. It is not in the interests of either Europe or the US to maintain an outdated dependency. "The Europeans will not behave responsibly until they are obliged to exercise responsibility. They have the means to do so. What Europeans have lacked is the will. And that is because they have had little need to develop it."²⁶

The next major event associated with enlargement was the release of the NATO study on the process in September 1995. Again, this underscores a curious disjointedness in the alliance's plans, whereby study of the issue appears to have followed a decision to implement it. At any rate, this study concluded that NATO should enlarge; countries would be invited to join on a case-by-case basis; the process was not to endanger the existing collective-defence function of the alliance; the process must contribute to European stability; and no country outside the alliance was to have veto power over it.²⁷ Newcomers would need to ensure "the accessibility of NATO forces to new member's territory for reinforcement, exercises, crisis management and, if applicable, stationing." It also confirmed the supreme security guarantee of the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance to any new member, which "would be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention as set forth in the Strategic Concept."²⁸ The release of the study was greeted

with considerable disquiet by Moscow, which “emphatically opposed the prospect of a strong military alliance with a potential capability of being directed against Russia advancing to its entire western border.”²⁹

Germany and France attempted to redress the issue of dependence upon the United States by signing a bilateral agreement on a common defence concept in Nuremberg in December 1996. This brought another interesting dimension to developments, the possibility of German inputs to French nuclear policy. Kohl hastened to qualify that portion of the agreement as pertaining only to “a dialogue over nuclear deterrence in connection with European defense policies ... This does not concern possession or having access [to French nuclear weapons].”³⁰ However, the outspoken Rühle — interviewed on 29 January 1997 by German television — fueled controversy (and perhaps Russian anxiety) by stating that “for the first time, France has signed an agreement in which it gives the priority to the nuclear defence of NATO.”³¹ In the most basic clause of this agreement, one can sense the fundamental fear of Russia, which still (at least publicly) fuels some NATO actions. With respect to nuclear guarantees, this clause states “that Europe’s strategic defence must be guaranteed by NATO, above all, by America. France’s own nuclear deterrent, like Britain’s, is cast as a supplement, whose role Germany pledges for the first time to discuss with the French.”³²

The arguments in favour of enlargement are well known, but centre around the alliance’s ability to promote stability by acting “as a buffer against interstate conflict, intrastate conflict, and social unrest by assisting in the suppression of ethnic disputes and the growth of nationalism, while providing the political, and to a lesser extent, economic assistance required to consolidate democracy, market oriented forces and social stability.”³³ In fairness to the proponents of enlargement, the elements of the process, if successfully implemented, will force membership aspirants to: resolve their political differences with neighbouring states prior to joining NATO; rationalize their armed forces, essentially demanding restructuring that emphasizes defensive capabilities and crisis management (i.e., deployment) capabilities; sort out their civil-military relationships; and thoroughly democratize their societies.

The Russian Factor

The number of opponents to enlargement increased as the debate began to intensify. Prominent and highly influential among them has been Sam Nunn, who argues that “somebody had better be able to explain to the American people why, or at least why now.”³⁴ Enlargement, he feared, would be widely misunderstood in Russia, further promoting nationalism there. Other prominent opponents included Michael Mandelbaum, Ted Galen Carpenter, Owen Harries, Michael Brown, and George F. Kennan. As the last-named explained it:

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry.³⁵

Eurasia harbours a welter of paranoias, which like most paranoias, have some basis in reality. One of the most overriding and yet basic is the Central and Eastern European paranoia that demands protection from a nuclear umbrella as a counter to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. While it is true that Russia still possesses a formidable stockpile of nuclear weapons, there is no rational reason for extending the nuclear umbrella any closer to Russia's borders; conversely, the rhetoric associated with the nuclear guarantees being offered through enlargement and an outmoded NATO Strategic Concept is actually destabilizing, and runs contrary to the declared NATO mandate of promoting stability. The emerging democracies of Eastern Europe have a pathological distrust of Russia's intentions, along with ill-concealed hard feelings toward it. In many ways, the distrust defies rational thought yet fuels a new bipolarism, rather than building bridges for future cooperation with Russia. A spontaneous remark from then Czech prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, during a visit to Canada is very telling in this regard: "For any Czech who lived through 40 years of Communism, the Soviet occupation of 1968 and the subsequent years, that our membership in NATO is even discussed in Russia is such an unacceptable offense that we almost don't want to think about it."³⁶ Also, comments from Hungarian officials such as LGen Ferenc Vegh, chief of defence, Kalman Kulcsar, director of Hungary's Institute of Political Sciences, and diplomat Istvan Gyarmati are typical examples of this attitude. Vegh stated that there is "no immediate threat" to Hungary from Russia, but that the "ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity" of the Russian situation does make it a potential threat. Istvan Gyarmati, a career diplomat and one of the architects of Hungary's NATO policy, agreed that Russia is weak and said the West should not be threatened by Russia's concerns. There continues, however, to be a worry that Russia will recover as a great power. "Russia didn't resign from its ideas of being a great power. They are now in a bad situation, but they have a lot of resources," Kulesar said. "I think they will return as a great power and they should be taken into account on a global level." When that happens, he wants to be on the right side of the dividing line, safely in NATO's orbit. "We don't want to risk anything more."³⁷

Perhaps the greatest paranoia of all is the xenophobic paranoia Russia displays in her actions to counter the enlargement initiatives of NATO. The NATO members and the emerging democracies have been rather shortsighted in attempting to understand Russia's fears of encirclement and encroachment, particularly when

the enlargement process is largely being driven by those from whom it has had the most to fear historically.

Over 70,000 towns and villages were completely laid to waste. Tens of thousands of new industrial projects were totally and irrecoverably destroyed. It can only be estimated how many Russians, soldiers and civilians as well, died on that Eastern Front. It is fairly certain that at least 25 million were killed. All documents point to the fact that nearly 12 percent of the total Soviet population was eliminated.³⁸

Though Russia's fears may not be rational, they are profound and deep-rooted. American scholar Stephen Cimbala notes that Western integration, as viewed by Russians under the present geopolitical circumstances, is not likely to be very transparent. Moscow may well see a darker conspiracy in NATO's actions where none exists. "But Russia's misperceptions of NATO intentions are especially dangerous now, when Russia is militarily weak, democratically insecure, and encumbered by historical *Zeitgeist* of encirclement from north, west, and south."³⁹

Part of this lack of understanding on the part of the West is manifested in the roughshod, provocative, and insensitive rhetoric often used by dignitaries when addressing the issue of enlargement. While Western politicians and statesmen have emphasized the need not to humiliate Russia, they have often proceeded to do just that. US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, appears to have already gone out of her way to assume a confrontational stance with the Russians: "It would not be in our interest to delay or derail enlargement in response to the claims of some Russians that this constitutes an offensive act. Doing so would only encourage the worst political tendencies in Moscow. It would send a message that confrontation with the West pays off."⁴⁰ It is not, therefore, surprising that some Russians view Albright with considerable suspicion: "The Moscow press has painted Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 'as a hard-line Cold Warrior determined to keep Russia divided and weak,' ... citing *Izvestiya*, *Rossiyskiye vesti*, *RIA*, and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*."⁴¹

In fairness to NATO and in spite of some alarming inconsistencies in associated rhetoric, the alliance has, by and large, insisted upon a membership-enlargement process and a future *modus operandi* that entails a special and cooperative working relationship with Russia. To that end, the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security* between NATO and the Russian federation was signed by President Yeltsin and NATO leaders in Paris on 27 May 1997. This Act "reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples, and defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia."⁴²

This accord is an encouraging attempt to recognize Russia's importance and to acknowledge its status. Through the Council, Russia will have the opportunity to cooperate with NATO on a wide range of issues, but it *will not* provide Moscow

with a veto, nor will Russia be a full partner of NATO. On the other hand, it will not be shut out of NATO decisions that affect its interests.⁴³ In the final analysis, however, it concedes very little of substance to Russia in terms of binding guarantees from the alliance, which would still be free to send nuclear weapons and reinforcements to new member states if it fears a military threat in the region. Furthermore, while the alliance tends to be excessively self-congratulatory in this deal struck with Yeltsin, the Founding Act has not been received with unfettered enthusiasm by all Russian officials:

Nevertheless, not all Russians treat NATO enlargement so blithely as Mr. Yeltsin. Although the Duma, the lower house of Russia's parliament, does not have to approve the new agreement, it will demand its say, and impotence will make it all the angrier. The Communists and populists who dominate it will condemn any accord with NATO, whatever its contents. The government's task will be damage limitation — dissuading the Duma from accusing the president of treachery, and thwarting motions of no confidence.⁴⁴

The combination of humiliation and suspicions inflamed by rhetoric is a dangerous one, particularly in a land undergoing a leadership crisis and having a very fragile toe hold on the democratization of its own political institutions and drive toward a market economy. One must surmise, based on his longer term health prospects, that Yeltsin's days are certainly numbered, and most of his envisaged successors are much more nationalistically inclined: "The early favorite would be Alexander Lebed, an authoritarian and unsophisticated ex-general who confirmed his position as Russia's most popular politician when he single-handedly ended the war in Chechnya last year.... a Lebed victory would frighten many people inside as well as outside Russia. Untutored in diplomacy and economics, he would be capable of almost anything. His natural allies would be the authoritarian right and the reactionary left, including much of the Communist Party."⁴⁵

In point of fact, Alexander Lebed, who has been uncharacteristically quiet with respect to NATO enlargement of late, was one of those in Russia most publicly angered by the Founding Act.⁴⁶ Raymond L. Garthoff, of the Brookings Institution, feels that NATO enlargement instituted as a hedge against negative policy changes in Russia could risk *contributing* to such changes. He does not foresee a danger of precipitous military action by Russia as a counterreaction to NATO expansion, but rather a diminished confidence in the West and a significant weakening in the ranks of those Russians favourably disposed to cooperation with the West. He suggests that the first casualty would probably be Russian ratification of START II — with reduced prospects for further strategic arms control, including the conventional arms limitation initiatives, the CFE talks. "At worst, Russia would become not a rampaging bear but an isolated nuclear fortress, with little incentive to contribute to the security of a perceived hostile world — for example, by responsible policies of restraint in arms sales and nuclear nonproliferation. This would be a heavy price for expanding NATO."⁴⁷

Not that Russian suspicions are inflamed solely by rhetoric and impressions of increasing isolation by the alliance. Russia has a legitimate expectation of respect as a major power, not treatment as a second-class world citizen. These expectations include the honouring of promises made. In an article in 1996, Conrad Namiesniowski argued that it is Moscow's preoccupation with both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concepts of international balance of power that drives much of the Russian rhetoric with respect to NATO enlargement. The ruling and influential elite still recall that at the end of the Second World War, America was prepared to accept a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe — provided it kept the doors of commerce open. Equally if not more important is that they recall Gorbachev agreeing to the unification of Germany in return for "assurances that NATO forces would not be stationed in the eastern part of the new Germany. Many of them argue that by extension this could apply anywhere east of Germany as well."⁴⁸

Russian concerns about what they see as ever-increasing US global hegemony have led them to cement new ties in unlikely places. The 23 April 1997 signing of a joint declaration with China, pledging "to seek a multipolar world with no one country dominating the international order" is one example.⁴⁹ This diplomatic move may also have been negotiated in counterpoint to American diplomatic excursions into China the month before by Vice President Gore and a team of visiting diplomats. This trade mission has been extensively seen as yet another disquieting trend in US foreign policy, where market-driven forces may be out-flanking moral considerations, as may also be the case in Central and Eastern Europe.⁵⁰

The Baltic States and Ukraine have made no secret of their respective wishes to join NATO. The republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia have been lobbying hard and consistently for membership. On 26 May 1997, their respective presidents jointly reaffirmed the aspirations of the Baltic states for early membership in the alliance. They have stated their belief that a stable and democratic continent can only be attained through the maintenance of indivisible security and free choice in security arrangements. They expressed their firm conviction that full Baltic state membership in NATO would enable them to attain those objectives.

However, the Baltic states do not have widespread support for their cause, for several reasons. Most established NATO members do not view the Baltic as an area of vital Western strategic interest, and the resolve to commit to Article 5 is muted at best. Russian sensitivities must also be taken into account, given the strategic significance of the Baltic littoral, checking access to St. Petersburg and separating the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad from the main portion of the Russian federation. Some Russian commentators have "categorically stated that Moscow will not accept Baltic membership in NATO and that it would take countermeasures to prevent it. Few in the West are eager to challenge Moscow on this issue."⁵¹ These thorny issues are magnified by the defensibility problems of

geography, small size, and proximity of Russian military power, as well as the disputes with Russian minorities, especially since Russian national security doctrine accords a high priority to protection of Russian minorities beyond the federation's current borders. In spite of these serious concerns, on 11 June 1997 the United States approved a bill that would (eventually) open the NATO door to all Eastern and Central European countries. This bill would also add Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania to those eligible for US assistance in preparing for membership.⁵²

Ukraine has been lobbying intensely both in the NATO and the Russian camps. Specifically, it has been seeking a bilateral deal with the alliance similar to that between NATO and Russia, "but with a friendlier twist, to preserve its national prestige as a sovereign power and keep nuclear weapons from being deployed in neighboring Poland and Hungary."⁵³ Consequently, Ukraine is participating in more exercises under the NATO PfP program than any other country. The "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership" between NATO and Ukraine was signed during the July 1997 summit in Madrid.⁵⁴

Russia, however, views Ukraine as a buffer between Eastern Europe and itself, and approximately 22 percent of the population of 52 million are ethnic Russians. On 30 May 1997 Yeltsin signed an historic 21-year friendship accord with Ukraine, which acknowledged its independence from Moscow and provided a 21-year lease on the use of part of Sevastopol by the Russian Black Sea fleet. This move theoretically allows Russia to reinforce its economic links with Ukraine, "while keeping the neighbor integrated in a Russia-dominated bloc."⁵⁵ In a preliminary pact to the Charter, initialed with NATO on 29 May, the right of consultation with the alliance was given to Ukraine, if it feels externally threatened. This seems to be a somewhat hollow gesture on the part of NATO, since the right of consultation already exists for PfP member states. As for Ukraine NATO membership, the accord with Moscow has put that issue on hold for at least a decade. After that waiting period, in the view of most experts, it would still take many years before Ukraine could fulfill the mandated prerequisite criteria for membership, particularly those related to the economy and demonstrated civilian control of the defence ministry. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in yet another demonstration of Cold War logic aimed at containing Russia while it is down, has observed that if Ukraine does become serious about NATO, "this pressure will force Russia to come to grips with the post-Cold War world and put aside thoughts of reasserting control over Ukraine. 'It would have the effect of convincing the Russians that their imperialist era is over'."⁵⁶ However, given Russian concerns and Ukrainian sensitivities about evolving into a buffer zone, the best way to enhance Ukraine's security under the present geopolitical conditions might well be continued high-level participation in an expanded PfP program.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that certain elements associated with NATO expansion have met with great success, notably (and in spite of its exceptionally premature condemnation by naysayers) the Partnership for Peace program

and its adjunct missions. Particularly when viewed in the context of the joint and combined operations in Bosnia, PfP has proven able to fill gaps in the inchoate security arrangement in Europe and to soothe the concerns of accession candidates who seek endorsement for their wish to be part of Europe. PfP was the mechanism that facilitated NATO's peace force in Bosnia. PfP has been very effective in achieving a number of its declared objectives. By virtue of enhanced cooperation, the level of transparency to other countries has been greatly increased, and the promotion of interoperability has been markedly successful. This level of interoperability was amply demonstrated in December 1995, with the establishment of the multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia, under unified command and control and composed of units from both NATO and non-NATO nations, to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the Dayton peace agreement. This mission, code-named Operation Joint Endeavour, was NATO-led, under the political direction and control of the North Atlantic Council, and resulted in NATO and PfP forces (including Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine) working productively and successfully side-by-side in a very complex peacekeeping operation. By 18 February 1996, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was able to report the completion of initial IFOR deployment. In all, 32 states had taken part, with approximately 50,000 troops provided by NATO members and 10,000 by others.⁵⁷

In December 1996, it was agreed that a continued international military presence was required in the region, and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1088, which created a military Stabilization Force (SFOR) to be deployed in Bosnia for an additional 18 months. With an initial strength of 31,000 troops, SFOR would concentrate on stabilizing the environment, deterring or preventing a resumption of hostilities, consolidating IFOR's achievements, and promoting a climate in which the peace process could move forward, as well as providing selective support to civilian organizations.⁵⁸ Operation Joint Guard, the SFOR deployment, with just months left in its mandate, has preserved the IFOR achievement but much remains to be done "to create a secure environment for managed refugee returns and for the installation of elected officials in targeted areas, as well as for reconstruction projects."⁵⁹ Joint Guard is tangible proof that NATO and PfP forces have the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area for operations directed under the authority of the UN Security Council.

Financial Issues

The alliance has imposed some extremely comprehensive and economically demanding military standardization stipulations for membership, but until very recently NATO has done no comprehensive, realistic cost analysis. This is something that should have been addressed from the outset, particularly given the economic realities of global military downsizing. The most basic questions remain

to be asked, and answered, and this largely appears due to the inability of the alliance's members to agree *specifically* on what should be standardized, beyond vague notions of command and control, search and rescue, air-defence identification, mapping, and logistics. If this illogical sequence of geopolitical problem-solving appears confusing to the lay observer, it is evident as well in the hierarchy of the alliance. Secretary General Javier Solana's remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on 19 September 1996 suggest even he is patently unsure where enlargement is leading: "The pieces of the puzzle are coming together, and soon the big picture will become clear ... The enlargement of NATO is inevitable.... in this new Europe, sovereign states are free to choose their alignments and ... they are not subject to the old pattern spheres of influence. NATO's opening to the East is thus an indispensable step to transcend finally the artificial boundaries of Cold War Europe."⁶⁰

A commentary in *Defense News* reinforces concerns over the seemingly illogical planning path of the membership-enlargement process:

Leaders such as German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and US President Bill Clinton apparently plan to expand first and answer these questions later. That would be a fatal mistake.... An elementary step in the process is the vote by each legislative body of the 16 Alliance nations to approve expansion. All must vote in favor before any new nation can be admitted. The legislators will be tough and demanding. Advocates of expansion had best shelve their heartfelt appeals for support of democratic ideals and START putting some facts on the table. The dearth of information characteristic of the discussion today is ample reason to vote down expansion.⁶¹

The costing issue deserves further discussion, since military spending is declining globally. All of the emerging democracies, including the Visegrad Three, are experiencing economic difficulties associated with the costs of modernization and enlargement. In the Czech Republic, where at least seven state banks collapsed in 1996 alone, banking scandals have dominated economic and business news throughout the country,⁶² and provide concern that the Czechs might become economically overextended by the additional burden of funding enlargement. Hungary has seen its military budget decline by nearly 50 percent since the late 1980s, a situation incompatible with the country's requirement to revamp its armed forces to meet NATO needs and expectations.⁶³ Graham Fraser reported in *The Globe and Mail* in February 1997 that the CIA had identified companies in Poland, Slovenia, and Bulgaria that were suspected of selling arms to countries classified by the US as sponsors of terrorism. Poland is said to have sent five shipments of T-72 tanks to Iran; Bulgaria was selling to Sudan; and Slovenia was stopped from supplying M-60 tanks to Iran. MiG-29 aircraft batteries from Bulgaria were destined for Iraq and another Bulgarian company was suspected of selling 15 tonnes of explosives to North Korea. The accuracy of these reports was neither confirmed nor denied by the CIA.⁶⁴

Against this backdrop, the emerging democracies have spent nowhere near what is required for military standardization and modernization. Major studies on

the costs of enlargement have been produced in, respectively, the United States, the United Kingdom, and by NATO. All are significantly speculative due to the lack of guidance from the alliance itself on specific requirements. The first two (of three) American studies were done by the Rand Corporation and the US Congressional Budget Office, and these put the costs for enlargement over approximately ten years in a very broad range between US\$42 billion and US\$125 billion. The third American report pegs anticipated enlargement costs at between \$27 billion and \$35 billion between 1997 and 2009, still not-inconsiderable sums that will have to be shared between existing NATO members and new aspirants. However, the most recent US study needs to be treated with healthy scepticism for a number of reasons:

- the study is an official document prepared by the US administration for the purpose of wooing Congress into supporting NATO enlargement, thus the lower numbers are suspect from the outset;
- the costing figures and the rationale for determining them are vague at best, with even the basic mathematics not standing up to cursory scrutiny;
- the report is not restricted to costing information, but is full of pro-enlargement rhetoric, and the conclusions reached are optimistic at best;
- the analysis is very “US-centric,” in that it promotes or touts the American standard as the baseline capability upon which the rest of Europe must model itself, which may well be a rather heavy-handed attempt to legitimize US military marketing downstream; and
- the authors of the report do not commit themselves to stating how many aspirants were being considered for NATO membership, making the funding baseline very suspect.⁶⁶

As mentioned, this report appears to be a “sales pitch” to both the House and the Senate. Approval of the latter will have to be secured prior to overall US approval for new NATO members, by a two-thirds majority. This may prove to be a difficult task, since there are already extremely powerful and influential people in the government vehemently opposed to NATO enlargement, and public debate on the issue is as yet embryonic. Jeremy D. Rosner argues that:

The first danger sign is that congressional opinion on the issue is still very much in the formative states. In one of the discussions we convened, a group of members of Congress estimated that only five to ten percent of their colleagues had likely thought about the question in great depth. One congressman in our discussion in September said he could not recall which way he had voted on the enlargement resolution in July (he had voted for it). Moreover, participants in these discussions noted that the enlargement resolutions involved only general expressions of support, small amounts of money, and little political risk. They were, in a sense, “free” votes, and some believed that the lopsided tallies on the measures need to be discounted somewhat as a result.⁶⁷

While there is no consensus on enlargement costs in the United States, there are even more divergent opinions on the other side of the Atlantic. The US Department of Defense (DOD) assumes that membership will demand substantial funding from the newcomers for equipment standardization and modernization. Also, the DOD has assumed that NATO will pay for the installation of expensive new command and control links and other common infrastructure elements. "The Report to Congress on Enlargement of NATO said it will cost European allies \$12 billion to upgrade their own forces from a posture of static defence to an expeditionary force. That sum does not include another \$7 billion the European allies would have to pay into NATO's common infrastructure fund, and a similar contribution of \$2 billion from the United States."⁶⁸ NATO by contrast has done its own financial study, in which it took a decidedly minimalist approach. This study, made public by Secretary General Solana in Portugal on 29 May 1997, submits that NATO will spend only \$5 billion in the first ten years after initial expansion. This figure covers only the direct costs to NATO infrastructure and administrative budgets, and is supported by some but not all NATO members.

Britain is conducting a separate assessment of the costs of expansion, and warns that cost effectiveness will be a major factor in deciding on new members. In Washington, the UK defence secretary, George Robertson, said, "establishing that [it] is not going to be a huge cost is obviously one of the things we in Britain are bothered about."⁶⁹ The Americans have several concerns with the European financial position. While US study results vary widely, all agree that the cost will represent an extremely heavy burden on the economies of candidate countries, and since current members will be obliged to defend any new members under attack, this ability to protect needs to be upgraded. The US has already begun assisting prospective new members with money and military equipment, but even this assistance in the form of loans and grants may still be too high a cost to the NATO aspirants. Both US and NATO officials have acknowledged that the financial disparity issue needs to be resolved soon.

A US diplomat put it even more bluntly. "We've laid it on the line about costs to our allies ... They're low-balling the cost and that's not acceptable." "We have no problem with the DOD's estimate. We can support it but it creates problems for others, such as the French and Germans," a Dutch diplomat said May 30. "What lies behind it all, of course, is the fear that America may be leading us toward a new debate on overall burden-sharing within the Alliance. We all know what the mood is in Congress these days."⁷⁰

At present, the United States shoulders about a quarter of NATO's total budget, and fears that the ultimate cost to the US taxpayer may be much higher. Western European allies are unlikely to contribute to modernization of the militaries of the new members, considering the deep and recent cuts in their own defence budgets. Furthermore, the lack of solidarity among the current NATO members has not gone unnoticed by the aspirants.

One of the most tangibly destabilizing effects of the enlargement issue is its potential impact on various arms-control treaties, and concerns for the future of START and CFE agreements are also becoming widespread. On 15 May 1997, the head of the Russia's national security council, Ivan Rybkin, said that NATO's decision to expand had made Russian parliamentary (Duma) ratification of the so-called START II treaty "almost impossible." Failure to ratify this already negotiated accord, which would slash both US and Russian nuclear warheads by more than 60 percent, would be a major setback for the Clinton administration. Further, this administration has insisted it will not proceed with START III, which would cut by another third START II levels of nuclear warheads, until START II has been ratified. Rybkin said that such a preponderance of Duma deputies were so antagonistic to the recent NATO-Russia accord that further arms-reduction negotiations may have to wait for years. "Specialists said a Russian refusal to ratify START II would almost certainly prompt the United States to delay arms cuts, putting both sides in the awkward position of retaining Cold War-size arsenals.... This is going to put the whole arms control process in question," said Spurgeon Keeny, president of the Arms Control Association.⁷¹ Alexi Pushkov, director of foreign affairs for Russian public television, also has concerns for the creation of new military tensions, and feels that these setbacks could cause a reciprocal reaction in Congress that would lead to the collapse of arms-control and -reduction agreements reached over the last ten years. While Russia's economy remains weak, there will not be an extensive new arms race. However, by conserving their nuclear arsenals, the two countries may enter an area of heightened strategic insecurity.

Since the Russia-NATO accord does not essentially restrict NATO deployments in any potentially new alliance members from the former East bloc, Russia will be looking for additional concessions pushing down the caps on offensive military equipment when the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks resume in Vienna. Russia wants new CFE subceilings on weaponry in Central Europe, and most NATO members, including the US, have been sympathetic to these calls for more changes, which could compensate for the eastward expansion of NATO territory. However, the Central European NATO aspirants, such as Poland, harbour deep suspicions in this area, since they would probably have to implement further military cuts to assuage Russian concerns. Current Russian conventional forces capabilities led to a rather disturbing declaration by Foreign Minister Primakov in May 1997 that "Russia would be the first to use a nuclear weapon if we are subjected to an attack and are unable to curb it." In fact, the Russian defence minister, Igor Sergeyev, is a former head of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. Mikhail Gerasyov, deputy director of the USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, said in May 1997 that he was confident Sergeyev would "effectively cooperate with the Americans to work out a mutual mechanism of nuclear arms control." Gerasyov also said that the Strategic Rocket Forces are now the only branch of the armed forces capable of defending Russia from attack, since the conventional services

are in a pathetic state of readiness. This explains why Moscow has rethought its Cold War pledge against first use of nuclear weapons. He said that the declaration “partially (a first-strike concept) connects with the eastward NATO expansion and our (conventional) weakness to stop any serious outside aggression.”⁷²

The Wrangle over Initial Membership

The enlargement issue was becoming a divisive element in mid-1997, within both the alliance membership and the emerging democracies. With respect to the latter, no matter how diplomatically rejection notices are couched, the tranche system of admission is in effect a class system that by its very nature will create rancour with those who fall short of the acceptance criteria. One should note that even Secretary General Solana’s invitation list with respect to enlargement, which for so long referred to “three or four” first tranche candidates, was amended in early 1997 to read “one or more countries.”⁷³ In yet another reversal, throughout the spring of 1997, the phrase “four or five” with respect to the number of first tranche aspirants became *de rigueur*, when Romania and Slovenia gained support as initial membership candidates. Finally, on 12 June 1997, the White House announced that the United States would support only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary for the first wave of NATO enlargement, and that settled the issue.

This unilateral declaration, which appeared to preempt the terms of reference for the enlargement debate scheduled for the Madrid summit in July, was an attempt by the administration to ease approval for the first tranche by the US Senate, since limiting the initial list would “reduce costs and make military coordination easier.”⁷⁴ Italy and France, who favoured early acceptance of Slovenia and Romania, were clearly upset by this unilateral declaration, though Great Britain concurred with the US “short list.” Canada also favoured a broader initial enlargement that included Romania, Slovenia, and (apparently, if the prime minister is to be believed) Slovakia, even though there are at present serious doubts about Slovakia’s commitment to democracy. However, it was the French who were the most upset by what they perceived as the unilateral nature of the US decision. There have been other NATO issues that have brought the French and the Americans into forceful disagreement, notably the French demand that NATO’s southern command be led by a European. However, the Americans have categorically rejected this demand, since it would effectively subordinate the Sixth Fleet to a multinational agency. Other alliance observers suggest that France is just making one of its periodic historical attempts to play a more important role in global affairs than it actually merits. “It’s absurd that on this issue the French have been trying to behave like a superpower,” remarked a Western diplomat. “There is only one superpower in this alliance.” Added another NATO diplomat: “I’ve never been convinced that the French were going to die in the ditch for the Romanians.”⁷⁵

This demonstration of divisiveness certainly provides additional grist to the mill of alliance detractors, who maintain that NATO has been in a state of total disarray over the enlargement issue. Furthermore, as the July Madrid summit approached, the rhetoric became more strident and presumptuous from the first tranche countries. The comments of Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszowiec of Poland to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 21 February 1997 provided insight as to Poland's expectations:

I do not need to conceal that Poland expects to be among nations which in a few months will be invited to begin accession negotiations with NATO. I believe that we have earned the right to openly express this expression. We have earned it through over seven years of intensive efforts to turn Poland into a truly democratic country, to build a working market economy, to base our relations with all our neighbours on the principles of good-neighbourhood and peaceful cooperation, to thoroughly reform our standards. Today, a few months before the Madrid Summit, I am proud to say that Poland fully meets all criteria of NATO membership.⁷⁶

While the financial and membership aspects of enlargement are at least controversial, so is the very essence of the Article 5 guarantee. This collective-defence mandate depends upon the unanimity of NATO members committing themselves, if necessary, to war against the aggressor upon any given member. Article 5 solidarity among existing members has never been tested, thus the proclaimed resolve of the aspirants is, at least to this point, highly dubious. None seem broadly to grasp that Article 5 is still the security linchpin of NATO, and that acceptance of its responsibilities, whether or not the issues are in the interests of the individual members, is a solemn duty and not a debatable point. Government representatives have seriously underestimated the public lack of enthusiasm for membership in NATO elsewhere than in Poland. The basic problem may be lack of legislative leadership.

In spite of vehement protestations to the contrary and clearly stated prerequisite requirements for membership, even the most favoured of the aspirants bring increased potential for external conflict. Their acceptance by the people of the established member states of the alliance may be a particularly hard sell if they are not prepared, through resounding national majorities, to accept for themselves both the rights and the solemn obligations contained in Article 5. It is still not clear if any of the current NATO members are willing to risk the lives of their own people to defend countries from the former Soviet empire from external threats. Today's member states cannot reasonably be expected to extend the unlimited liability clause of native sons and daughters to potential combat situations brought about by new members whose various geopolitical concerns may not be in the remotest consonance with the security interests of the other alliance members. The concept of unlimited liability is well understood by military personnel, who accept this mandate in soldiering for their homeland. However, it falls squarely on the shoulders of the politicians, diplomats, and businessmen who are the national leaders to ensure that liability is not extended in a cavalier or reckless manner, since they are unlikely to bear the most dreadful consequences of their actions.

Yet another potential problem associated with NATO membership enlargement is the further extension of decision by consensus. This process, which often consists of negotiation through appeasement and bartering to the lowest common denominator, already frequently results in policy decisions that can become diluted to the point of ineffectiveness, or extremely expensive concessions deemed necessary to secure consensus. In fact, there have been NATO committee sessions where national posturing and agendas greatly exacerbated productive discourse and effective decisionmaking. A classic (and recent) example concerned command infrastructure realignment initiatives. The main issues were: creation of a smaller, subregional command structure for NATO's southern flank; redefinition of responsibilities between major command posts in Naples, Italy, and Mons, Belgium; and redeployment of personnel and assets at posts that were closed.⁷⁷ Also, what are supposedly new *NATO* headquarters facilities in Denmark, Spain, Italy, and Greece are in fact new *national* facilities posing as NATO establishments, with construction and operation funded from alliance instead of national coffers. Though this travesty is currently under review, it is symptomatic of the enormous national interests at play as NATO tries to cut down the number of regional command sites from 65 to 25. To date, this is actually proving to be more — not less — expensive.⁷⁸ It seems inconceivable that problems of this nature will lessen with expanded membership.

By helping the former satellites of Eastern Europe transform themselves into pluralistic market democracies via membership in the military/political alliance rather than through the seemingly more appropriate economic/political agencies, including unfettered support in ancillary entities such as OSCE, EAPC, and an expanded PfP, it would appear that NATO will risk progressively alienating the greatest Eurasian national power in terms of size and power potential. It may well jeopardize, if not scuttle, the progress of START II and START III, to say nothing of the modified CFE treaty, saddle the emerging eastern democracies and the existing NATO family with an as yet unquantifiable debt burden for military standardization, and further destabilize the area by extending the NATO nuclear umbrella that much closer to the Russian federation. It may also provide additional rationale for fueling Russian security paranoia and playing into the hands of potential nationalistic successors to Boris Yeltsin, driving the Russians further from the Western allies in an attempt to seek solace and support from others, such as China. Further, the alliance must deal with the problems the emerging democracies bring with them in membership, but which have been somewhat downplayed; expand the consensus problem manifested in the right of veto, a serious problem in the present membership, to an unknown number of aspirants who possess a plethora of predetermined prejudices and self-serving interests; and finally, extend the unlimited liability clause inherent in the Article 5 guarantees. Given this litany of issues, the road to NATO enlargement is fraught with grave, complex, and compelling risks.

Notes

1. Noel Malcolm, "The Case Against Europe," in *Foreign Affairs Agenda 1996: Critical Issues in Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 147.
2. This and the quotes above are found in *ibid.*, pp. 150, 154, 158.
3. The EAPC, inaugurated at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997, replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), formed nearly seven years ago, as a forum for European solidarity and growth.
4. "Background on the Partnership for Peace," *Defence Matters*, 1,9 (1996):16.
5. John G.H. Halstead, *European Security: What's in it for Canada?* Occasional Paper no. 54 (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), p. 4.
6. On 2-3 December 1996, the Lisbon summit of the OSCE adopted a Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century, reaffirming OSCE principles, setting out an agenda for those drafting the security model, and foreseeing possible development of a Charter on European Security. The declaration also reaffirmed the importance of the CFE treaty, and welcomed the decision by treaty members to adapt it to a changing security environment in Europe. Background Brief on "OSCE: A Chronology of 21 Years" (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, April 1997), p. 9.
7. Halstead, *European Security*, p. 6.
8. Reinhard Wolf, "The Doubtful Mover: Germany and NATO Expansion," in *Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), p. 204.
9. Peter Rudolf, "The USA and NATO Enlargement," *Aussenpolitik* 47,4 (1996):340.
10. Quoted in *ibid.*
11. Pascal Boniface, "NATO's Enlargement, France's Dilemma," in *Will NATO Go East?*, p. 186.
12. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 190.
13. "Along with offering participating nations the opportunity to strengthen their relations with NATO in accordance with their individual interests and capabilities, it already provides a measure of realistic collective security in that NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Twenty-seven nations have thus far elected to join PfP and the current member states are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Special aims of PfP include: facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; ensuring democratic control of defence forces; maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of

the OSCE; developing cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.” *NATO at a Glance — A Factual Survey of Issues and Challenges Facing the Alliance at the End of the 1990s* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1996), p. 33.

14. Paul Buteux, Michel Fortmann, and Pierre Martin, “Canada and the Expansion of NATO: A Study of Élite Attitudes and Public Opinion,” in *Will NATO Go East?*, p. 150.
15. Rudolf, “USA and NATO Enlargement,” p. 341
16. Europe is already the largest US trading “partner,” with the two blocs doing over US\$400 billion of business each year on foreign investments of US\$600 billion. *Economist*, 31 May 1997, p. 47. In terms of country-to-country trade, however, Canada *by far* is the largest US “partner.”
17. Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” in *Foreign Affairs Agenda 1996*, p. 89.
18. Douglas T. Stuart, “Symbol and (Very Little) Substance in the US Debate Over NATO Enlargement,” in *Will NATO Go East?*, p. 121.
19. Rudolf, “USA and NATO Enlargement,” p. 343.
20. Pallone Address at Central and East Europe Conference in *USIS Washington File*, 2 May 1997, <http://www.usia.gov/current/news/topic/intrel/97043002.wpo>
21. “The growing rift between the United States and Europe on defense trade is leading to fears that NATO’s integrated military command will be weakened in combat by weapon incompatibilities, according to senior NATO officials. It also is hampering joint NATO arms programs that could save dwindling national resources. Several experts say that already is happening. Arguments about the sharing of industrial benefits still are hampering the implementation of an integrated Air Command and Control System, first broached more than 15 years ago and delayed a full decade due to the squabble. The system is designed to control the airspace over NATO countries. The industrial benefits discord also has led to European delay tactics on major common defense projects for NATO, such as the purchase of a NATO-owned and operated airborne battlefield ground surveillance capability much desired by NATO military commanders. Political cooperation is diminished relative to only a few years ago, officials say. This is despite some recent successes such as expected agreement by NATO arms czars to jointly pursue missile defense technologies. NATO arms procurement chiefs were scheduled on April 15 to review a paper on trans-Atlantic defense trade issues by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, consisting of leading NATO industrialists. However, the paper never was completed because of an outbreak of mutual recrimination over protectionism between the group’s US and European members. Alarmed, senior NATO officials are trying to reverse the trend.” Brooks Tigner, “Arms Competition Rips at NATO’s Military Fabric,” *Defense News* 12,17 (1997):1.

22. Brooks Tigner, "Europeans Outmaneuver Americans with AGS Idea," *Defense News* 12,17 (1997):1.
23. Wolf, "Doubtful Mover," p. 204.
24. Ibid.
25. Allen Sens, "United States Security Policy in the 1990s," in *Can America Remain Committed?: U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s*, ed. David G. Haglund (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 45.
26. Both Kennan and Steel quoted in Stuart, "Symbol and Substance," p. 118.
27. Roman Jakobow, "Canada and Security Concerns in Europe," in *Canada's Strategic Interests in the New Europe*, ed. Jim Hanson and Susan McNish (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 35.
28. Study on NATO Enlargement, *PPNN Issue Review*, 10 February 1997, p. 2.
29. Ibid.
30. Giovanni de Briganti, "Franco-German Defense Concept Lacks Substance," *Defense News* 12,5 (1997):26.
31. Ibid., p. 24.
32. *Economist*, 8 February 1997, p. 53.
33. Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion," *International Journal* 50 (Autumn 1995):681.
34. Quoted in Stuart, "Symbol and Substance," p. 136.
35. George F. Kennan, "NATO — A Fateful Error", *New York Times*, 5 February 1997, p. A23.
36. Juliet O'Neill, "Czech PM Wins Canadian Support for NATO Membership Quest," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 February 1997, p. A7.
37. Alan Freeman, "Hungary Looks to Solidify Identity as Western Nation," *Globe and Mail*, 10 February 1997, p. 24.
38. S.L. Mayer, *The Russian War Machine, 1917-1945* (London: Chartwell, 1977), p. 244.
39. Stephen Cimbala, "Regarding NATO Extension," at sjc2@psu.edu, 2/13/97.
40. Madeleine Albright, "Enlarging NATO — Why Bigger is Better," *Economist*, 15 February 1997, p. 23.
41. J. Michael Waller, "American Foreign Policy Council," *Russia Reform Monitor*, no. 230, 18 February 1997, p. 3.
42. The two signatories pledged to work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states, including through the strengthening of the OSCE. Specifically, this means reinforcing its role in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation. It clearly reaffirms the subservience of the OSCE as a regional security arrangement to the UN Security Council. Relations are to be based on a shared commitment to the following principles: "development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and

of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area; acknowledgment of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security; refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act; respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents; mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines; prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles; support, in a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE." The mechanism for consultation and cooperation will be a Permanent Joint Council, extraordinary meetings of which will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. Text of Founding Act, scheinwe@hq.NATO.int, 5/27/97, pp. 1-5.

43. "An Important Accord with Russia," *Globe and Mail*, 16 May 1997, p. A18.
44. "A New European Order," *Economist*, 17 May 1997, p. 56.
45. "Leaderless Russia," *Economist*, 18 January 1997, p. 48.
46. "Russia's nationalist politicians reacted angrily to President Boris Yeltsin's pact with NATO, saying it amounted to 'capitulation.' His former security chief, Alexander Lebed, said Russia's reputation abroad had been destroyed and the agreement demonstrated the 'complete failure of Yeltsin and his regime.... The agreement's contents exposes the total collapse of Russian politics, economics and its military policy as led by today's regime,' Gen. Lebed wrote in *Izvestia*. 'It shows that our country is so weak that we do not have any arguments left to counter the unbridled expansion of the West.' He disagreed with statements that the Paris accord does away with the divisions created in Yalta ... Sergei Baburin, deputy speaker of the lower house and chairman of the anti-NATO commission called the expansion the 'most serious foreign policy defeat ... will eventually pose the gravest outside threat to Russia since 1945,' he wrote in *Pravda*." "Russia's Reputation Destroyed - Nationalists Blast NATO Pact," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 May 1997, p. A7, reprinted from *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 27 May 1997.
47. Raymond L. Gartoff, "Expanding NATO — But Diminishing Security for All," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 1997.
48. Conrad Namiesniowski, "Russia: What Kind of Future?" *Commentary* 69 (1996):10.
49. "Some are pushing toward a world with one center," said Yeltsin, obviously referring to the United States, after the signing. "We want the world to be multipolar, to have several focal points. These will be the basis for a new world order." "China, Russia Sign Pact," *CNN World News*, 23 April 1997, p. 1, <http://www.cnn.com/world/9704/23/russia.china>.

50. "President Clinton has been able to bully the Russians into accepting NATO expansion only because they are too weak even to maintain the rhetoric of obstruction. This, of course, raises the question of why they need to be contained in the first place. All the while, of course, China continues its relentless economic march. ...If a great power's potential for trouble is judged on the basis of a combination of its capabilities and intentions, China can only be rated a graver threat than Russia. The United States has virtually no military forces left in the Philippines and has reduced its presence in Japan. Washington diplomats have already begun murmuring that if and when Korean unification takes place, American troops will not be able to stay in Korea, since China will object. Thus if the Clinton Administration's policies are successful, 10 years from now a large, well-equipped American-led force will be in place on the central plains of Europe, fully capable of deterring a paralyzed Russia. Meanwhile, American military power and political influence will have been steadily shrunk in East Asia, the site of the rise of the world's next great power. Perhaps each policy on its own terms might seem plausible, but taken together the two add up to a global grand strategy that is topsy-turvy." Fareed Zakaria, "Let's Get Our Superpowers Straight," *New York Times*, 27 March 1997, p. A21.
51. Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," *Survival* 38 (Summer 1996):124.
52. David Briscoe, "Senators Push for Slovenia in NATO," *CNN All Politics*, 12 June 1997, p. 1, <http://allpolitics.com/1997/06/12/congress>.
53. Jeff Erlich, "Ukraine May Seek NATO Membership," *Defense News* 12,21 (1997):8.
54. "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine," *NATO Review* 45 (July-August 1997):5-6.
55. Geoffrey York, "Ukraine to Achieve Full Independence," *Globe and Mail*, 30 May 1997, p. A1.
56. Quoted in Erlich, "Ukraine May Seek NATO Membership," p. 8.
57. NATO/SFOR Fact Sheet, 20 December 1996, scheurwe@hq.NATO.int, 12/24/96, p. 3.
58. Canada provided approximately 1,000 troops to IFOR, and an additional 1,200 to SFOR, making the latter Canada's largest peacekeeping commitment, the core of which is an infantry battalion group. "Canada's Largest Peacekeeping Commitment," *D-Net Canadian Forces in Action*, <http://www.dnd.ca/dcds/missions/sfor,o5/30/97>, p. 1.
59. Address by Secretary Madeleine Albright to North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997, wdehaar@VNET3.VUB.AC.BE, 6/3/97, p. 11.
60. Javier Solana, "NATO: Shaping Up For the Future," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 26,2 (1996):6.
61. "NATO's Tough Questions," *Defense News* 12,23 (1997):44.
62. Ben Slay, "Banking Scandals Send Political Reverberations," *Transitions* 2,22 (1996):41.
63. Sharon Denny and Brooks Tigner, "Hungary Sees First Increase Since 1989," *Defense News* 11,46 (1996):3.

64. Graham Fraser, "Canada Defence Costs to Jump," *Globe and Mail*, 25 February 1997, p. A1.
65. Ibid.
66. US Department of State, "Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," Washington, 24 February 1997, wdehaar@VNET3.AC.BE, 2/26/97.
67. Jeremy D. Rosner, "Will Congress Back Admitting New Members?" *NATO Review*, January 1997, pp. 12-14.
68. Brooks Tigner, "New NATO Rift Threatens to Erode Support," *Defense News* 12,22 (1997):34.
69. Theresa Hitchens and Charles Miller, "Britain Performs Cost Analysis of NATO Expansion," *Defense News* 12,23 (1997):30.
70. Tigner, "New NATO Rift," p. 34.
71. Michael Gordon, "NATO Deal Could Hurt Russia's Chances for Arms Treaty," *New York Times*, reprinted in the *Victoria Times-Colonist*, 16 May 1997, p. D11.
72. Pyotr Yudin, "Tougher Sergyev Will Face Same Woes as Rodionov," *Defense News* 12,23 (1997):28.
73. Javier Solana, "Shaping NATO for the 21st Century," *NATO Review* 45 (January-February 1997):3.
74. Alan Freeman, "US Position on NATO Rankles European Allies," *Globe and Mail*, 14 June 1997, p. A17.
75. Quoted in *ibid*.
76. Scheurwe@hq.nato.int 2/21/97.
77. "Hurdles Loom for Reform of NATO's Commands," *Defense News* 12,22 (1997):2.
78. Interview with Capt. (N) E. Lehre, Director of NATO Policy, NDHQ Ottawa, 4 June 1997.

5. *Conclusion: Canada and the Evolving Alliance*

What is Canada's stake in NATO? How important is the alliance to it? It is often claimed that one of the most compelling reasons for Canada's continued support of NATO is its Eurocentrism.¹ But does this remain an accurate reflection of the situation today? When Canada joined the alliance as a founder in 1949, that action was a natural expression of what was then a truly Eurocentric country, based upon disproportionate contributions in two global conflicts, close Commonwealth ties to Britain, a host of trade dealings with the European continent, and what were at the time essentially European demographics of population. However, the demographic nature of the country has changed considerably.

Declining birth rates, coupled with a great deal of immigration from non-European lands, have dramatically changed the ethnic composition of Canada. For example, in 1971, 82 percent of Canadians were of Western European lineage, but by 1991 that figure had dropped to 49 percent. While European immigrants had constituted 46 percent of all arrivals in 1974, they represented only 15 percent of the influx in 1994, Asians constituting 68 percent of the newcomers that year. To take this point even further, close to half of the Canadian population with Western European roots is francophone, a constituency that, in general, has demonstrated no particular or sustained support for European security since Confederation. Furthermore, 70 percent of the Canadian population has been born since 1945, a fact that in its own right is erasing a lot of the collective memory of ties to the European continent.

Economically as well as demographically, the country is changing. With respect to trade and commerce, Canada has long been a North American regional entity, as exemplified by the North American Free Trade Agreement. In fact, Canadian goods and services exported to the United States are 13 times greater than those exported to Europe,² while on the other side of the ledger, Canada is embroiled

in significant trade disputes with the EU, particularly over agricultural products. As well, the increasing trade between Canada and the Asia-Pacific region is growing at a rate faster than the Canada-Europe trade, although the economic instabilities that developed in Asia late in 1997 may moderate the tendency for more Canadian trade to occur with that continent.³

Nevertheless, support for the alliance remains significant, though recent polls suggest it is far from being widespread. Canadians actually appear to have a rather limited awareness and knowledge about NATO and Canada's role within it, though Canada's membership in the alliance meets with general approval.⁴ However, given that only four out of ten could name NATO without prompting, it is highly unlikely that the vast majority of Canadians understand the extremely serious ramifications associated with the extension to additional countries of the Article 5 security guarantees. In another recent survey, Canadians were asked how likely they would be to accept the admission of Eastern European countries into the alliance. Only slightly more than two in five of those polled were in favour (42 percent), nearly as many (38 percent) were neutral about the new admissions, and 14 percent were likely to reject the enlargement initiatives.⁵

Nor do Canada's 1994 defence white paper and downstream departmental planning guidance documents accord NATO operations the high priority they justifiably received during the Cold War years. In fact, the 1996 Canadian Defence Planning Document, the practical policy basis for the planning, programming, and operations of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, relegates NATO to a share of its third of three principal defence roles, namely "contributing to international peace and security." Specifically: "Current Canadian defence policy states that Canadian Forces will participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state."⁶

This official policy document also elaborates upon what must be viewed as an emerging theme in Canadian foreign and defence policies, the broadening of global relations for Canada, including to the former eastern bloc countries: "In addition to traditional US and NATO participation, Canadian defence policy articulates Canada's commitment to support other multilateral security organizations (such as the OSCE in Europe) and to work for peace and stability everywhere in the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America. Canada is particularly interested in helping to promote the democratic control of armed forces, and bilateral defence contacts with countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Asia-Pacific region."⁷

Thus, for reasons of demographics, economics, and foreign policy/defence policy codification, Canada in the latter half of the 1990s can legitimately claim to be a North American country with truly global interests, including those of Europe, though not a country whose paramount security concerns and national interests centre on Europe. Nevertheless, Canada remains an enthusiastic supporter and a significant and often underrated contributor to NATO in its current configuration. In terms of expenditures, Canada ranks ninth in the alliance in

overall defence spending, though specific contributions such as the ongoing 1,200-person commitment to SFOR merit noting. Canada ranks sixth and fifth respectively in infrastructure costs contributions and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) spending.⁸ It should also be highlighted that these O&M costs do not include those incurred for the defence of North America, such as the annual bill for NORAD and the maritime patrol of sovereign waters, for which both Canada and the United States do not receive adequate recognition in NATO councils. Canada is also the third-largest contributor to the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEW), which has provided yeoman service in operations ranging from the Persian Gulf War of 1991 to current duties over Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Guard. Certainly Canada is a strong proponent of the crisis management and deployment operations elements of NATO, missions very much in consonance with the country's declared global interests, and in terms of immediate reaction (IR) forces, Canada possesses a degree of credibility enjoyed by very few. In fact, with battalion-size response commitments both to northern Norway and northeastern Turkey, Canada has a more significant deployment commitment than many of the alliance members.

In short, Canada's contributions to the alliance are significant for a country with a substantial debt burden and the attendant need to practice fiscal restraint. It has become apparent that, regardless of which cost-study figures are used, enlargement will imply some cost to Canada and the rest of the current NATO membership. Depending on which cost estimate one uses, Canada's portion would amount to approximately 6 percent of the total, or between \$6 million and \$59 million a year for 10 years.⁹ Naturally, as membership increases further, so too will the incremental costs to Canada. To put the high estimate in practical terms, it equates to an additional purchase for the Air Force of approximately 40 new CF-18 fighter aircraft, a not-inconsiderable investment for *any* country. In terms of potential nonfiscal costs, it may be very difficult for Canadians to rationalize expanded Article 5 commitments in Europe. The need for collective defence against the clearly defined threat of the Cold War was one thing, but a pragmatist might well ask what burning concern *in terms of the national interest* is it of Canada if unresolvable disputes over minorities occur between Hungary and Romania? It is potential conflict scenarios such as this that would in all probability be a "tough sell" to the Canadian public at large.

The Next Phase of Enlargement

Given the wide body of dissenting views toward NATO enlargement, one might surmise that if ever a time existed for maintaining the status quo, that is, maintaining the alliance at its present membership level, that time is now. That time also is past. Three new aspirants were invited to join NATO during the Madrid summit in July 1997, and Canada has already ratified the accession protocols for

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. While this initial expansion may well be a good thing for European security in the long term if handled correctly, in the headlong rush to embrace enlargement members must ensure, through the most stringent scrutiny, that the first tranche fulfill all the mandated prerequisites for membership. This will require ironclad demonstrations of resolve on the part of the current membership, particularly in the establishment of democratic control of the military and guarantees of fiscal responsibility.

The CEE countries are in the throes of an expensive and frequently turbulent transformation to market economies. NATO membership may force them to shift their focus from economic development to military spending of questionable priority, which could waste scarce economic resources and impede political stability. Any excessive defence spending by the first tranche countries would seem to work at odds with Canada's foreign policy "white paper" of 1995, which warned against excessive spending on arms.¹⁰ At the same time, however, the current members will want to ensure that aspirants do not renege on their responsibilities, which would then fall as additional burdens on those current members.¹¹ To that end, and since this alliance is primarily a European one, benefiting Europeans, the European members will need to demonstrate more willingness to share financial burdens with North America than has been demonstrated thus far. And NATO will need to hold the line at first tranche membership (assuming they meet all the prerequisites) while it pauses to take a much broader view of the future.

In the near term, the OSCE, EAPC, and the expanded PfP concept may be the best security-extending vehicles available. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, an American initiative designed to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and to provide a political dimension to the Partnership for Peace program, was inaugurated at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997. This new forum, which contains social, military, economic, and political elements, is open to membership from any country in Eurasia that wishes to join, including Russia, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and the entire present NATO and PfP membership roster. The EAPC merges the consultative dimensions of the NACC with the practical cooperative elements of PfP, giving it an expanded decisionmaking role by inviting the membership to participate to an increased extent in the work of selected NATO committees, developing bilateral agreements between NATO and the individual member states, and using the resulting council as a periodic forum for consultation about the specific security concerns of the individual members.

Specifically, the EAPC will be the venue where PfP members can help shape the missions, such as IFOR and SFOR, that the partnership undertakes together. "It will harmonize our defense planning. It is where we will consult together on arms control and proliferation, terrorism, civil emergency and disaster relief, and the full range of peace-support operations. It will help ensure that NATO's Partners are at the table when we plan our joint efforts — and on the ground when we implement them. It will be a place not just for those who aspire to membership in NATO but for those who choose not to. And it will complement our common

efforts in the OSCE.”¹² This new forum, working closely with the OSCE, will focus alliance efforts on preventing conflict and shaping common responses to contingency operations, which will occur from time to time. It can build on the work of the NACC by providing an overarching framework for political and security consultations, as well as for enhanced cooperation under PfP.¹³

The success of the partnership has confounded those sceptics who hastily wrote off PfP as a “feeble attempt” to avoid taking tough decisions on NATO enlargement. NATO-led IFOR, involving the active participation of more than a dozen partner states, underscored the validity of a permanent framework for extensive military cooperation with the alliance, and has also served to assuage aspirant members not offered NATO membership as part of the first tranche.

If the enlargement process is not to undermine the Partnership as a framework for collective military action at “NATO Plus,” then some aspects of the programme need to be extended once the selection of candidates begins in earnest. At the same time, cooperation with all partners will have to be deepened substantially. So far as such a deepening could lead to the blurring of the hitherto clear distinction between allies and partners, it is not without risks. However, the importance of an enduring framework of military cooperation for the entire Euro-Atlantic area is great enough to warrant a major evolution in the status and character of the programme. In theatrical terms, PfP is set to move from the understudy of enlargement to its counterpart.¹⁴

To that end, NATO prepared an advanced version of the partnership, known as PfP Plus, for the Madrid summit. Far from being a consolation prize to enlargement, PfP Plus will probably provide some right of co-decision on “setting general goals for civil-military relations, democratic control of armed forces and defense policy and strategy.”¹⁵ It will also be much more specific in setting out objectives for preparation of PfP member armed forces for participation in NATO-led multinational operations, and will delineate conditions for release of classified technical documentation in order “to support the credibility of the envisaged enhancement of PfP.”¹⁶ As was the case with PfP itself, the degree and pace of participation would be up to the individually participating countries, and though NATO cannot provide ironclad security guarantees to nonmembers, it does already provide the venue of special consultation in the event of a developing threat to a partner.¹⁷ A security partnership could blossom that might eventually become as important a forum for the development of Eurasian security policy as the current North Atlantic Council.¹⁸

This concept is being treated with refreshing enthusiasm in many quarters. Prime Minister Wodzimierz Cimoszewicz had kind words to say about both the EAPC and a concomitant broadening of PfP during a recent address to the permanent session of the North Atlantic Council:

The IFOR and SFOR operations have proven the significance of the Partnership programme for peace and security on our continent. They have also demonstrated a need to redefine the relations between the Allies and Partners. We have welcomed NATO's bold decisions to deepen and broaden the PfP programme. We have supported

the idea to establish the Atlantic Partnership Council from the very onset of this initiative. We are eager to work, together with NATO members and Partners, on an early implementation of this initiative. We believe that the Madrid Summit would be a most appropriate forum to launch it. In our view, whatever form the APC eventually assumes, it must provide a rich and diversified menu of both military and political activities, to accommodate the different aspirations and interests of the Partner countries. The diversity of political relations between NATO and its Partners will become a fact of life the very moment Russia and Ukraine — which we hope will join the APC — sign their accords with NATO. We believe that other Partners should also be afforded — in the APC framework — an opportunity to shape their political relations with the Alliance according to their specific needs.¹⁹

The proposed building upon the success of Partnership for Peace is a very important element. Secretary General Solana recently articulated some ideas for PfP enhancement and reinforcement, which could logically be tailored into the mandate of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. He stated that one of the core elements of PfP is the principle of self-differentiation and that through individual partnership programs (IPPs), the degree of cooperation can be tailored to each country's needs, wishes, and capabilities. However, Solana maintains that enhancing PfP in the political field is a vital initiative, and along with strengthening both dialogue and crisis-management activities, partners need to become more deeply involved in the decisionmaking process in order to gain more individual influence and understanding with respect to specific PfP programs.²⁰

Solana has also praised PfP's operations in the area of peace support, as well as related exercise activity and cooperation in training. This element of PfP activities appears to be a good thing, as long as it operates as an *adjunct of* and not a *replacement for* the United Nations. The relative success of both the IFOR and SFOR operations tends to bear this out. However, the peacekeeping element of PfP or a replacement organ needs to be placed within a manageable priority list of activities for the emerging democracies, since such activities can serve as an economic distraction for them if they are not properly managed. Their stability will be secured more quickly and will be more permanent if it is achieved through mutual trade and economic prosperity. In order to help these developing nations along, NATO must not allow them to become heavily burdened with out-of-area operations until they have had a chance to restructure their own national armed forces, and tend properly to their other priority economic needs.

All meritorious initiatives need nurturing, however, and the aforementioned forums are no exception. At present, the EAPC is being viewed as a *parallel* development to NATO membership enlargement. Instead, it should be embraced as a *substitute* for it, with additional expansion of the alliance being shelved indefinitely. Some would argue that this is heresy, since promises have already been made to "second tranche" aspirants. However, the enlargement initiative was an illegitimate birth from the outset, since the planning and approval sequencing has defied all logic and natural order, and it has progressed with seemingly complete disregard for destabilizing consequences. As noted in the previous chapter, George

F. Kennan remarked in late 1996 that the impression was left that NATO would expand right up to Russia's borders. He emphasized that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era."²¹

In many ways, the haste on NATO enlargement is reminiscent of the haste with which German reunification was effected. Though unquestionably an overall success while still in its early stages, many mistakes have also been made, most due to the short-notice collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, and the concomitant lack of planning time. No such excuse exists for NATO today. Emerging democracies will be disappointed and may complain if alternatives to enlargement are tabled, but their shift to democratic governance and pluralistic market economies is probably too far advanced for reversal. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and PfP Plus have the potential to level the playing field among all the emerging democracies, Russia included, and begin again the bridge-building process in Eurasia that has been damaged by the enlargement dialogue to date. Anything less may seriously undermine the credibility and cohesiveness of the alliance.

As a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, being able to perceive viable alternatives to the further expansion of NATO, Russia would have less reason to distrust Brussels and would be much more inclined to honour the modified CFE agreement, ratify START II, and work toward START III. It would also help defuse resurgent nationalism in Russia before it has a chance to acquire widespread expression. For the emerging democracies, force modernization could be brought into realistic focus. In a patently more benign geopolitical environment, modernization could proceed at any given state's comfort level, and international standardization could be accomplished only where necessary for cooperative operations, that is, in areas where common sense and practicalities dictate, allowing the emerging democracies to concentrate their scarce resources on more meaningful and essential national interests, such as strengthening their individual economies, improving the environment, and enhancing their industrial, agricultural, and educational bases. NATO and its new partners could then concentrate on internal reform and pursue, *with careful consideration of the many interconnecting issues*, the future of European security. That may well include NATO's eventual replacement by another security organization, one that better represented the region and did not carry with it all of NATO's obsolete provocational "baggage," such as the Article 5 collective-defence clause, the unlimited veto power inherent in decision by consensus, and the destabilizing and provocative nuclear umbrella. Good ideas abound, so why should the West continue on a collision course with a Russia that poses no threat? One interesting long-term option for some CEE states might be "to adopt the principle of neutrality that has helped Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland to become havens of peace and prosperity. Neutrality means that a state may not join in an alliance or permit foreign bases on its soil."²²

Canada is in a position to provide some credible influence to the enlargement debate as it progresses — through its position as a contributing middle power and a transatlantic member of the alliance that has no serious leadership claim at stake, nor potentially extensive markets for military hardware. There are enough unanswered questions associated with the enlargement initiative to warrant at least a more moderate and reasoned pace of activity. Should NATO continue its impulse in pursuing additional enlargement at any cost, Canada should, at the very least, engage in broad, full-scale public debate to decide if it is still in the Canadian national interests to remain as a full member within the alliance, as opposed to seeking a less-committed member status or even to opt for total withdrawal — an unlikely option and probably not in the country's best interest.

Canada will enter the 21st century with two longstanding collective-defence commitments, of differing importance to it. NORAD is a germane, fiscally responsible undertaking, control of continental airspace being much more effective and efficient when done as a cooperative undertaking. Various areas of mutual interest, such as global warning of ballistic-missile launches, surveillance of space, and research and development of ballistic-missile defence systems represent potential areas for expanding bilateral cooperation. However, NATO is another matter. This alliance, so relevant during the Cold War, could end up generating a destabilizing influence in the very global region it is sworn to protect, all because of membership enlargement initiatives that appear to defy logic. Reasonable alternatives to these initiatives need to be tabled and considered. And Canada needs to consider seriously if it is still in its best interests to continue membership as a full partner in NATO.

Notes

1. See, for instance, Anthony F. Burger, "Does Canada Support NATO Enlargement?" speech given at Queen's University's Centre for International Relations, Kingston, 6 February 1997.
2. Great Britain is now Canada's third-largest trading partner after the United States and Japan, and by far Canada's largest market in Europe. Britain's total investment in Canada of £8 billion constitutes 40 percent of all European investment in Canada. While Canada remains committed to and undoubtedly benefits from the NATO European connection, significantly more economic benefit derives from ties with forums such as the OSCE, the G7/8 (G7 plus Russia), and the Commonwealth. Also Canada, strongly supported by Britain, has recently reached agreement with the EU on an EU/Canada Action Plan, which provides a good framework for cooperation on a wide range of issues. In short, the direct economic benefits to Canada of full NATO membership as they relate to trade with Europe are difficult to quantify, but probably minimal, since even without Canadian participation in NATO, most Canada/Europe trade would probably continue. Background Brief on Transatlantic Relations (London: British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 1997), p. 2.

3. Daryl Copeland, "The Pacific Century: What's in it for Canada?" *Behind the Headlines* 54,3 (1997):2.
4. In one particular survey, seven of ten Canadians reported that Canada's role in NATO is either very important (30 percent) or somewhat important (41 percent). Among Canadians who either had a lot or a fair amount of knowledge on the subject, nearly nine out of ten report that Canada's role in NATO is very important (51 percent) or somewhat important (36 percent). Barbara Waruszynski, "Canada's Role in NATO and NORAD," in *Defence Matters*, Aug/Sept 1997, at http://www.dnd.Canada/menu/dmatters/public_e.htm
5. Barbara Waruszynski, "Determining the Canadian Pulse on Defence Matters," in *Defence Matters* 2, 5 (July 1996):15.
6. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canadian Defence Planning Document," (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996), p. 1, para 2; p. 3, para 2.1.3.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 4, para 2.1.3.
8. Interview with Capt. (N) E. Lehre, Director of NATO Policy, NDHQ Ottawa, 4 June 1997.
9. Graham Fraser, "Canada's Defence Costs to Jump," *Globe and Mail*, 25 February 1997, p. D7; Brooks Tigner, "U.S. Drops NATO Cost Estimate," *Defense News* 13, 7 (1998):1, 42.
10. "In particular, Canada will seek concerted action with others to influence governments which spend large sums on arms rather than on education and housing for their people. To that end, the Government will offer support for demobilization of military personnel, as well as training for civilian roles such as police activities, in order to assist societies which are committed to reducing military spending and reconstructing civil society." Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada in the World* (Ottawa, 1995), p. 33.
11. The financial stability and near-term economic expectations of even the most solvent of the emerging democracies are not that encouraging. Nor has the transition of civil-military relations been smoothly effected; it bears very close downstream scrutiny and further Western assistance in order to ensure success: "The process of establishing civilian control has been further aggravated by a chronic lack of civilian expertise in defence matters and of independent strategic communities in the region. These factors pose a challenge to Western interests in rethinking policies aimed at promoting transparency and civilianisation of defence decision-making in Central Europe.... As the reforms of civil-military relations have been stalled and/or subsequently 'forfeited' to other political considerations, a new wave of Western support focusing on training civilians is urgently required for genuine civilianisation and democratisation of Central European defence policy.... Many of the current reforms in Central Europe are becoming distorted. Establishing truly democratic civil-military relations in Central Europe is clearly at risk in the mid to long term." Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk*, Adelphi Paper no. 306 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 79.
12. Comments by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Inaugural Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, wdehaar@VNET3.VUB.AC.BE, 6/3/97, p. 4.

13. Final communiqué of Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997, scheurwe@nc3a.NATO.int, 5/29/97, p. 2.
14. Michael Rühle and Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace after NATO Enlargement," *European Security* 5,4 (1996):527.
15. Brooks Tigner, "Former East Bloc Wants More Say In PfP," *Defense News* 12,13 (1997):4.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
17. Rühle and Williams, "Partnership for Peace after NATO," p. 527.
18. Burger, "Does Canada Support NATO Enlargement?"
19. His Excellency Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Address to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 21 February 1997, Scheurwe@hq.nato.int.
20. Javier Solana, "An Open NATO," *NATO Review* 44, 6 (November 1996):15.
21. George F. Kennan, "NATO — A Fateful Error," *New York Times*, 5 February 1997, p. A23.
22. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "An Alternative to NATO Expansion," *International Journal* 70,2 (1997):357.

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