

WHAT NATO FOR CANADA?

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Edited by
David G. Haglund

With a Foreword by Roman Jakobow

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The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the twenty-third in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

This volume represents the fruits of a workshop organized by the QCIR in late June 2000, the purpose of which was to stimulate discussion about the future of Canadian involvement in the Atlantic alliance. We would like to express our gratitude to the Department of National Defence, both for the project support extended for this initiative by the Directorate of Strategic Analysis and for the ongoing program support offered through its Security and Defence Forum. As well, David Haglund would like to acknowledge with thanks Irwin Publishing for permission to draw upon some materials included in his recent monograph, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*; Stephen Walt similarly expresses his appreciation to the editors of *The National Interest*, for allowing him to use material previously published in that journal.

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David G. Haglund
Director, QCIR

Joel J. Sokolsky
Senior Fellow, QCIR

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Foreword

The future of the Atlantic alliance is an important issue for European and North American security. The question of Canada's relationship with this community of democratic states is also important.

Two things provided the impetus for the reexamination of these questions. One is simply the need for the Department of National Defence continuously to monitor significant developments in the external security environment and to adjust policies, strategies, organizations, and forces accordingly. The other is the related work on international institutions undertaken by the government-wide Global Challenges and Opportunities Network. It is widely recognized that there has been a dramatic increase in the demands being made upon all international institutions. Not only are they facing complex challenges, but there are many new actors involved as well as difficult horizontal linkages to be considered. Not surprisingly, NATO, as an institution, is also under stress.

NATO came into existence in early April 1949 under the menacing shadow of Soviet power and endured to witness the dissolution of its enemy in late December 1991. In the ensuing years, the alliance faced an existential crisis, which it survived by undergoing a radical and constructive adaptation to the new global security realities. At the April 1999 Washington summit celebrating NATO's fiftieth anniversary, the allied heads of state welcomed three new members — Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic — to the alliance, maintained solidarity on Kosovo, and approved several initiatives designed to prepare the alliance for the twenty-first century. Central among these initiatives was the new strategic concept, which reaffirmed the alliance's core function in terms of collective defence and its role as the transatlantic security forum for consultation and cooperation. It also set out new directions to be pursued by the alliance in support of greater stability in Europe through enlargement to its east, the forging of partnerships with former adversaries, and the conduct of crisis-management operations "in and around" Europe. The transformation of NATO thus remains a work in progress.

The Department of National Defence asked the Queen's Centre for International Relations to undertake an independent inquiry into the broad agenda being pursued by NATO while it seeks effectively to meet the challenges of the new millennium and to provide security for years to come. To ensure a diversity of perspectives, an international team of researchers — American, British, Canadian, and Russian — was formed and the following chapters present the results of their inquiry.

None of the key policy areas examined is particularly new, but they are all fundamental issues that will likely be part of the security debate for a long time. The first involves Europe's old but recently revived aspirations for a more autonomous "pillar" of defence — known as the European security and defence identity (ESDI) in North America and as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in Europe. The second is the alliance's adaptation to the new "fundamental tasks," that is, the shift of emphasis from the collective defence of its own territory to its ability to deal with conflicts on Europe's periphery. The third relates to the possible further enlargement of the alliance from the current nineteen members.

Each of these three areas of concern has implications for Canada, which are considered in an attempt to determine if the Canadian rapprochement with NATO during the 1990s will persist.

Although this study was undertaken to meet the needs of defence policymakers, we hope that it will stimulate reflection and discussion within a wider audience — government, the academic community, and the Canadian public. Finally, we owe much gratitude to David Haglund for the leadership demonstrated during this research project and to him and Joel Sokolsky, Pavel Baev, Neil MacFarlane, and Stephen Walt for their scholarly contributions.

Roman Jakubow
Director of Strategic Analysis
National Defence Headquarters

1. Canada and the Atlantic Alliance: An Introduction and Overview

David G. Haglund

Introduction

This overview is intended to provide context for the following chapters, all of which in their various ways — directly or indirectly — address this volume’s theme of Canada and its future relationship to the Atlantic alliance. To do this I engage in analysis of historical as well as contemporary aspects of the Canada-NATO experience. As will be seen, this experience has been a variable one, and the only safe generalization to make is that Canada has alternated between periods of relative attachment to and detachment from the central security agenda of its leading allies.¹

I will argue that as the 1990s drew to an end, Canada was in a phase in which the alliance had become revalued as an element of grand strategy; indeed, to hear it said by the country’s foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, the “new” NATO was positioning itself to become a most useful means of advancing Canada’s “human security” agenda.² Certainly Canada’s outsized participation in Operation Allied Force, coupled with repeated justifications of the war against Serbia on human security grounds, indicated how much importance was being accorded the alliance as the twentieth century closed — not something one would have expected a decade previously.³

Can the recent revaluation of NATO in Canadian strategy be expected to persist? To attempt to answer this will be a chief objective of this volume, and will frame the discussion of my concluding chapter, which builds upon (even if not always agreeing with) the analyses of the four chapters authored by Joel Sokolsky, Pavel Baev, Neil MacFarlane, and Stephen Walt. Those chapters deal, respectively,

with the evolution of Canadian peacekeeping (away from the UN and more toward NATO and “coalitions of the willing”), the orientation of Russia toward the alliance, the implications for Canada of a more cohesive European “pillar” of defence, and the American debate on NATO’s future.

Canada and the Formation of NATO: Also Present at the Creation

In the fifty-one years since the signing of the Washington treaty memories have become clouded about the origins of the Atlantic alliance, regrettably not only in the United States.⁴ Many observers, including not a few in Canada, seem to regard NATO as an American-designed mechanism for the accomplishment of one aim only, the containment of Soviet expansionary communism. They are wrong on two counts. The alliance was something into which a reluctant US had to be drawn, and its purposes have from the outset transcended the goal, however essential, of providing collective defence to Western Europe and North America.

To read some of the latest American scholarship on NATO’s founding, however, not only was America “ready, aye, ready” to forge a multilateral security arrangement with other Western states in the late 1940s, but such an arrangement was virtually dictated by concern for the preservation of gains made in the *domestic* political-economic arena. All politics, an Irish-American speaker of the House of Representatives once intoned, is local, and for the newest wave of American multilateralists, so apparently was NATO! No doubt the “new multilateralists” realize there were other countries around at the time of NATO’s birth, but these appear to have had no part in the obstetrics.

In the words of the doyen of the new multilateralism, John Ruggie, what eventuated in the postwar Atlantic world — i.e., the elaboration and spread of a web of multilateral organizations at whose centre was the alliance — was “less the fact of American *hegemony* ... than it was the fact of *American* hegemony.” Or, as two other scholars put the same self-centred thought, the “overall political character of the West is really an extension of the political character of the United States.”⁵

It would serve no purpose to seek to minimize or deny the indispensable American contribution to the construction of postwar atlanticism. Nevertheless, there were others present at the creation of that order, for reasons related both to their security needs and their political-ideological convictions. Canada was prominent among the small group of states that forged postwar atlanticism. The story has been told often enough, although evidently not recently enough. Suffice it to recall that after the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948, London and Ottawa began to redouble their efforts to entice Washington into tripartite discussions that might lead to a multilateral, collective-defence scheme intended to enhance Western security and promote Western values. Already in November 1947 the three capitals had begun exploratory talks, in secret, about alternative security arrangements

to the United Nations, by now seen to be entering a period of paralysis engendered by the rapidly emerging Cold War.

US attitudes, especially in Congress, toward a robust multilateral defence scheme were nothing if not lukewarm, notwithstanding the later reconstruction of those attitudes by today's new multilateralists. Outside pressure from respected countries — and at the time Britain and Canada were America's chief and perhaps only security partners — was needed to convince Congress that if it authorized such a radical departure from America's historic policy of peacetime aloofness from the European balance of power, it would not be left doing all the work single-handedly.

Intergovernmental discussions between Canada, Britain, and the United States resumed in Washington on 22 March 1948 — discussions that would eventually involve France, the Benelux countries, and Norway, and would result in the treaty signed on 4 April 1949 creating the alliance, whose charter members would include all the above plus Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy. A month after the initiation of the tripartite talks, Louis St. Laurent, secretary of state for external affairs and soon to be prime minister of Canada, addressed the House of Commons in a wide-ranging review of world affairs. St. Laurent's speech of 29 April 1948 was important, not only for its impact on Parliament but also for its effect on Congress.⁶

What transpired in February in Czechoslovakia, said St. Laurent, should come as a dire warning to democratic governments throughout the West. The "lesson is that it is impossible to co-operate with communists. They do not want co-operation. They want domination." Thus they must be resisted, but to do this required much more unity of purpose than the democracies had heretofore demonstrated. Because collective security under the United Nations looked to be becoming a will-o'-the-wisp, an alternative means of achieving security needed to be developed.

Canada had a special role in that development, he continued. What was required was the creation of an association of all free states in the West, linking North America with the five signatories (the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) of the Brussels treaty of 17 March 1948. Why not, he suggested, transform that new arrangement into a North Atlantic collective-defence mechanism that would not transcend the United Nations, but would instead be fully compatible with the charter's provisions for regional self-defence under article 51?

Canada would more than play its part to bring into being an "overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force," St. Laurent promised. "In the circumstances of the present the organization of collective defence in this way is the most effective guarantee of peace."⁷ These themes would be restated throughout 1948 by him and other Canadian policymakers crusading for an Atlantic community. Significantly, even though the explicit purpose of this community was to be collective defence, its furtherance would require a combination of political and economic, as well as military, means.

The latter would eventually be realized through the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its attendant military commitments and institutional arrangements. The former were prefigured in Canada's successful attempt to endow the alliance with a charter obligation to work toward political and economic community-building — an obligation found primarily in the Washington treaty's "Canadian" article (article 2), and also in article 4, enjoining the members to take seriously the requirement of consultation on important matters.

In later years, it would be objected that NATO concentrated almost exclusively upon its military role, relegating to a decidedly lower order of priority those matters of a political and economic nature held to be indispensable to the task of community-building. The charge had merit during the Cold War, for understandable reasons. But in the post-Cold War years we began to witness the resurfacing of some of the concomitant ideas circulating at the time of the alliance's construction, so that increasingly NATO came to reflect much of the idealism associated with the vision its Canadian promoters had of atlanticism a half-century before. I return to this point later; for the moment, let us trace the evolution of Canadian attitudes toward, and participation in, the collective-defence efforts of the Atlantic alliance during its first four decades.

The Canadian NATO Neurosis

In many ways, Canada's relationship with NATO has to be understood as a continuation of the country's longstanding relationship with Europe, and in the first instance of its historic relationship with Great Britain. This is to say that it has been a complicated relationship, one for which the qualifier "neurotic" seems hardly out of place.⁸ Britain (the early equivalent, along with France, of "Europe" in Canadian identity) was both the source of great comfort as well as the potential (if unintentional) inflictor of enormous pain. It was a source of comfort, initially as the generator of much that was good and distinct about Canadian existence and identity, later as a valued European "counterweight" to the ever-increasing American influence upon Canada. But Britain/Europe could also be a source of risk and of danger — danger made so manifest in the country's costly participation in two world wars.

Canada, although a North American country, was born very much a European one, and remained so well into the twentieth century. Europe gave it its early identity and sustenance, ensuring its survival as a polity distinct from the United States, and it was through participating in European wars that the young country was able to stake out claims both to sovereign status and international influence. But the cost of such international attainments was high, in lives destroyed abroad, and in serious political fissures at home.

After the First World War, Canada's political class (especially, but not only, the Liberals) would increasingly emphasize the country's North American identity,

and as was the case with its neighbour to the south, with whom economic exchanges were multiplying, Canada developed an outlook and a policy on international relations (and on Europe) that could only be labelled “isolationist.” After that Second World War, a new historical “lesson” was absorbed by both Canada and the United States. Their security, it was now held, was inseparable from that of the Western Europeans. Whereas before the watchword had been “no commitments,” now it became “commitment” — to a military alliance with the Europeans, and to the grander vision of an Atlantic community of shared values and interests.

It was a commitment the likes of which peacetime Canada had never known before, and to which the postwar generation of policymakers in that “golden age” of diplomacy gave the full measure of their considerable talents. For the first time in more than half a century, Canadian leaders could apply the country’s energies to an international security undertaking without fear of sowing discord at home between English and French. Not only this, but the building of the Atlantic alliance was an unparalleled opportunity to marry American power to Canadian interests, in such a way that enhanced the latter’s security and political influence in the broader world.

Although in later years the image of Canada as the alliance’s “odd man out” became a staple of discourse, at the outset Canada was actively engaged in both the defence of Western Europe and the projection of an atlanticist vision. Memories appear to have dimmed not only regarding Canada’s part in the creation of NATO; they also seem foggy in respect of the country’s actual military contribution to European security during the early years of the alliance. As one of the very few countries to have emerged from the Second World War strengthened economically, and as one of the world’s ranking military powers, Canada was seen to have an obligation to the defence of Western Europe that surpassed even the obligation of the Europeans, for whom defending themselves and their immediate neighbourhood was about all one could ask in the alliance’s first decade; for Canada and even more so for the United States, responsibilities were greater, entailing not only (or even chiefly) defending themselves, but rather extending that defence to the allies.

In the jargon of the interwar years, Canadians and, *a fortiori*, Americans had become “producers” of security, and the Europeans were “consumers.” Only this time, the North Americans knew their duty. For Canada this would mean, by the time the Cold War buildup set in motion by the Korean War had peaked, unprecedented peacetime defence budgets, sustaining a military presence in Europe that had great political and operational significance. By 1953 Canada was allocating more than 8 percent of its GDP to defence spending, a massive increase from 1947’s 1.4 percent. During the Korean War’s final year, Canada’s defence/GDP ratio stood fourth highest in NATO, and its defence budget of nearly \$2 billion accounted for 45 percent of all federal spending. (Today, defence outlays are equal to 1.2 percent of GDP, and the defence budget is about 6 percent of total federal

spending; moreover, Canada's defence/GDP ratio remains what it has been for more than two decades, one of the alliance's lowest.)

As did the US under a different name, Canada operated a Mutual Aid Program for Europe, through which were made available to Great Britain top-of-the-line F-86 Sabre jets. Moreover, and more importantly, Canada from 1951 on would deploy in Europe a well-equipped brigade group and an even more well-endowed air division, whose strength would eventually reach twelve squadrons, totalling 240 aircraft. For a time during the later phases of the conflict in Korea, the RCAF would be flying more advanced fighters than even the USAF in the European theatre, prompting one American general to remark of the 1953 military effort in that theatre: "Canada [was] responsible for the biggest contribution ... to the expansion of West European air defence."⁹

All of this would be a far cry from the later years of the Cold War, when Canada would typically be cited not for its military contribution to European defence but for its virtual absence from the "Central Front." What happened? At least three factors can be invoked to account for the change. The first and perhaps most important one was that it simply became too expensive for Canada to try to sustain a robust military contribution to European defence, all the more so as it was also having to assume responsibilities for the air defence of the North American continent, in close partnership with the US. Canada's location on the flight path of any Soviet bombers intent on attacking the American heartland gave the country a special geostrategic significance and imposed unavoidable responsibilities, especially those associated with the maintenance of the US Strategic Air Command's deterrent credibility, in an era before ICBMs had rendered that challenge of declining relevance. It was often lost on the country's allies, especially the Europeans, that only the United States, within NATO, had assumed security commitments whose geographic extent surpassed Canada's own commitments.

The second source of Canada's diminishing relative contribution to Western European security had more to do with policy perspectives than with budgetary outlays. As I noted above, Canadian visions of NATO at the time it was being formed betrayed a conviction that the alliance had to be about much more than defence — a conviction that was demonstrated by Ottawa's dogged insistence on having article 2 included in the Washington treaty, calling upon the allies to constitute themselves into a community whose goals involved political and economic, as well as military, cooperation. As it turned out, article 2 remained during the Cold War very much a dead letter, and even the Canadian contribution to the alliance took nearly exclusive military form.

Nevertheless, Canadian security policymakers would continue to entertain the aspiration that NATO must have a considerable political vocation, and that it should seek even to foster cooperative relations with its Cold War adversary. No one at the time had developed the labels "common" or "cooperative" security, but it is clear that Canada was in the vanguard in trying to get NATO more committed to détente. The first NATO foreign minister to visit Moscow had been a Canadian,

Lester B. Pearson, in 1955, prompting Germany's ambassador to Ottawa, Herbert Siegfried, to report that Ottawa's European policy was "remarkably naive."¹⁰ Three years later, another European would issue a more colourful, though equally unflattering, judgement: Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO's secretary general, quipped (in private, he thought) during a 1958 visit to Ottawa that the Canadians had become "the Yugoslavs of NATO."¹¹

But it would be Pierre Trudeau who took Ottawa's assessment of NATO to another plane altogether, "singularizing" Canada within the alliance in his belief in the effectiveness of minimal deterrence at a time when the other allies were trying to enhance the credibility of extended deterrence, and telling Canadians that "one of the most compelling reasons" to stay in NATO inhered in the alliance's usefulness as a means of pursuing *détente*.¹²

The third source of Canada's lessened commitment to the defence of Western Europe resulted from the belief that the Europeans, as they recovered from the war, would be able to do more for their own defence, and therefore should do more. This conviction mingled with a related belief on the part of some Canadians (usually policy intellectuals on the left) that attention to Europe and its "needs" was depriving Canada of the ability to focus its limited resources on parts of the world where the case for assistance was even greater — and the entitlement more justified. This perception of a jaded and selfish Western Europe arose at a time when, because of the Vietnam War, some Canadians were prepared to conclude that NATO was itself complicit in misplaced interventionism if not aggression, leading them to demand that Canada withdraw from the alliance altogether.

Pro-neutrality sentiment never made great inroads among the Canadian public, and the one federal party that did as a matter of principle advocate Canada's leaving NATO, the New Democrats, could hardly be said to have benefitted from the advocacy. But if Canada did not "go neutral," it certainly looked, especially with the advent of the Trudeau government in 1968, as if NATO was to be deemphasized in the country's grand strategy. Trudeau himself promised as much in an important speech in Calgary in April 1969, when he asked whether it made any sense for NATO to continue to determine the country's defence policy, and for the latter to determine the country's foreign policy? He kept this promise.

Ever since the Trudeau years, Canada's perspective on the defence of the Western Europeans remained relatively constant, up to and beyond the ending of the Cold War. Membership in the alliance would be periodically reaffirmed, but so too would be reaffirmed the country's aversion to regarding atlanticism as simply an alternative way of saying "the defence of Western Europe." And always, there was a lack of desire (and means) to continue paying for as much of a military effort as the allies would have liked Canada to make. There would, it is true, be moments, in the mid 1970s and again, in the late 1980s, when Canadian governments would sound and act as if they were willing to make an enhanced contribution to Western Europe's defence (sometimes for reasons having little to do with defence *per se*), but in the end other priorities would prevail, rendering the decision

to withdraw Canada's stationed forces from Germany a relatively easy one to reach in 1992.

By the early 1990s, then, it looked as if what John Holmes had prophesied twenty years earlier was about to come true: for Canada, the "triangular Atlantic community [was] nearing the end of a long death."¹³ What he meant was that a combination of factors related both to the alliance and to the broader state of political and economic relations within the North Atlantic Triangle was pointing in the direction of one inescapable conclusion: the ocean that separated Canada from Europe was widening.

Then something surprising occurred. NATO not only refused to disappear once its erstwhile foe had, but Canada came to have a renewed appreciation of the merits of the alliance.

The Enduring NATO, from Collective Defence to ...?

One of the most significant geopolitical ironies of the post-Cold War era has been the enduring centrality of NATO to transatlantic security; like the bunny in the battery commercial, it just refuses to disappear. NATO's persistence certainly came as a surprise to policymakers in Ottawa, who at the start of the previous decade were imagining (and they were hardly alone in this) that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the OSCE) was going to emerge as the central "architectural" element in European security. Instead, NATO has remained the most relevant of the contemporary security institutions — if anything, even more relevant than it was during the waning years of the Cold War. In so remaining, NATO has forced a reconsideration in the assessment made by various allies as to its ongoing utility for their interests. One often thinks of France as being the ally to have undertaken the most serious recalibration of interest vis-à-vis the alliance.¹⁴ Canada has also been in the midst of such a reconsideration; for it, the enduring NATO has become an endearing NATO.

Some NATO-watchers have predicted that the alliance would die because its historic adversary had, a theme stressed in Stephen Walt's chapter.¹⁵ That prospect accounts for a good measure of the alliance's bid to re-invent itself, for policymakers in important NATO precincts have not been oblivious of the historical record, namely that no alliance has ever shown itself capable of long outlasting the disappearance of its adversary. For those who would reform NATO, the fact that there is no compelling requirement for collective defence in an era of no (great-power) threat need hardly prove fatal, for if the alliance could be transformed, it would be saved.

The existential quest began with the alliance's London summit of July 1990, which resulted in what at the time looked to be an extraordinary declaration of intent to reach out to the recent adversaries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization

(WTO), and in so doing transform NATO from a predominantly military into an increasingly political organization, whose new mandate would stress cooperating with, not containing, the east. That was the relatively easy part of the alliance's transformatory quest, even if its logical sequel tended to be an initiative, NATO enlargement, fraught with complexities for the West's relations with Russia (the topic of Pavel Baev's chapter).

Much more difficult, however, would be the donning of a second component of "cooperative security," namely attempting to serve as a manager — to some, even, "solver" — of conflict on Europe's periphery, which from the early 1990s on has meant its southeastern periphery. Whatever else the 1990s' warfare in the former Yugoslavia accomplished, it has brought closure, for the moment at least, to the existential issue of the alliance's claim to survivability; for some time to come, NATO will be able to espouse a logical, defensible, unavoidable, and exceedingly complicated vocation as a conflict-management entity in Europe's most troubled neighbourhood, the Balkans. What Trotsky once said about war — "you may not be interested in it, but it is interested in you" — can with justice be rephrased to express the degree to which NATO had become captured by the Balkans during the course of the decade of the 1990s.

As noted above, ten years ago, many NATO watchers were far from certain that the alliance would continue to matter much to a Europe that was obviously shaking off the rigidities and animosities of the Cold War. Today, very few express doubt about whether NATO still has a job to do. Today the question is no longer, *is* there a role for the alliance? Instead, it is, *can* the allies continue to function as the world's most effective security grouping, in light of the nature of operations expected to be undertaken by the "new" NATO? Far from certain is the manner in which the transatlantic allies will prosecute, either as a whole or through those components known as "coalitions of the willing," their future agenda of regional or even global security. Question marks hang over three major policy areas, none of which are particularly new, but all of which have taken on greater poignancy as a result of last year's war with Serbia.

The first concerns the topic of Neil MacFarlane's chapter, the decades'-old aspiration for a more autonomous European "pillar" of defence, in the past few years often referred to in North America as the European security and defence identity (ESDI), and in Europe as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).¹⁶ The second involves the qualitative expansion of the alliance, which has since 1990 been transforming itself from an organization whose job was said to be exclusively collective defence, into an entity that spends a great deal of energy pursuing a security objective leagues removed from the earlier task of protecting member states from direct invasion of their territory. And the third relates to the quantitative expansion of the alliance, from a grouping of sixteen states at the Cold War's end to one now comprising nineteen members and pledged to keep the "door open" to even more.

Can the Rapprochement Last?

These three areas of concern bring us to the contemplation of Canada's future relationship with the alliance, which will be my task in the concluding chapter. There, I will try to determine whether the Canadian rapprochement with NATO of the 1990s can be expected to persist. If not, will we once more witness a desire on the part of Canadian policymakers to distance Canada from security involvements with the allies (or at least the *European* allies, given that the country's current strategic planning seems to presuppose a deepening of military integration with the US)?¹⁷

If the past is any guide, Canadian commitment to NATO's activities — even to the more “political” agenda of the “new” NATO — can be expected to wax and wane depending upon a) the costs and risks associated with such commitment, b) the degree of voice Canada gets in exchange for the effort it contributes, and c) the extent to which NATO and the allies are congruent with and useful for the attainment of broader Canadian security interests (this last being the topic of Joel Sokolsky's chapter).

Before turning to the Sokolsky chapter, it might be useful to draw this overview chapter to an end by reflecting upon Neil MacFarlane's reminder that some analysts (MacFarlane cites Peter Katzenstein) consider Canada to have the world's first “post-modern” grand strategy. It would take more time (and good humour) than any of us possesses to plumb the depths of the “post-modern” phenomenon, and all that I can do here is to note that there seem to be three ways in which “post-modernism” and Canadian grand strategy can become entangled with each other.

First, post-modernism can be held to be synonymous with a “post-Westphalian” system, the latter meaning an order in which the balance of power has become obsolete as a means of preserving peace within the group (as in, say, the Atlantic “security community”). In this context, post-modern really means post-balancing, and it is applied to only a portion of the planet, with lands and peoples located outside the contemporary Western “zone of peace” being relegated either to the modern or, worse, pre-modern worlds, with all the sorrows and tribulations such status connotes.

Secondly, and flowing directly from the above, post-modernism conjures up leadership potential for countries that may not otherwise be militarily well-endowed or “powerful” in the conventional sense, and this on the basis of its elevating effect upon ideas and ideals as power assets (otherwise known as *Idealpolitik*) — above all, on the basis of something called “soft power.” One of the most contentious debates in contemporary Canadian strategy rages over the ability of Canada to rely upon soft power — held to be the power to attract not compel others, and to do so through one's values and ability to communicate them — at the expense of investing in “harder” assets, such as military forces, or even economic assistance.

Currently, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade seems convinced that Canada does possess and can employ soft power. Department officials may be correct. But to the extent they are, it is worth stressing that Canada's power to attract inheres in its geopolitical setting as well as in the ideals it seeks to promulgate, and both are a function of atlanticism, with the latter (the ideals) being preeminently the old North Atlantic Triangle set, namely democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. To the extent that contemporary Canadian "peacebuilding" and "human security" are concentrated upon the promotion of those values, as both appear to be, they stand for nothing so much as the *projection* — not the rejection — of the *Idealpolitik* embedded in atlanticism.

Thirdly, and no less importantly, post-modernism's impact upon strategy can be traced to developments within Western societies, in particular to the rise of a "politics of identity" that seeks to "empower" groups and even individuals. Just as NATO's evolution has made it a more congenial alliance for Canada, so has Canadian society's own evolution, paradoxically, made coalition-building a more important objective of Canadian defence policy. The burden of the post-modern contention is that societies such as Canada, the United States, and parts of Western Europe are becoming characterized not only by the rise of identity politics, but also by a turning inward on the part of publics (even if not their leaders) who are ever more attentive to their rights, comforts, and "entitlements," and less impressed by any obligations and responsibilities they might have.¹⁸

Even were cooperative security to possess no other affinity with post-modernism, there would still exist the shared aspiration — and it is a very important one — of reducing the burden that grand strategy imposes upon domestic society. Barry Buzan and the late Gerald Segal imaginatively likened foreign policy in the West's post-modern societies to a beverage that is, strangely, much beloved by Americans: "lite" beer. What the beverage and the policy have in common is that they are both insipid. On those rare occasions when something stronger is needed in the realm of strategy, post-modern states "by their nature" will act only with others, in coalitions of the willing. "This means," argue Buzan and Segal, that "military credibility requires standing coalitions. Thankfully, such a coalition, with standard operating procedures, already exists in the form of NATO. Because the United States, and to some extent even Britain, conducts exercises with other countries outside NATO ... the NATO net is spread even wider."¹⁹

Post-Westphalianism, soft power, and the desire to minimize burdens coupled with the zeal to preserve coalitions — all were pulling Canada back, during the previous decade, to its atlanticist centre of strategic gravity. As with the Bermuda Triangle of fable, the North Atlantic Triangle proved to be an entity from which escape was not that easy. Canada certainly did not end the twentieth century as a "European" country. It remained, however, very much an atlanticist one. Whether that atlanticist security agenda will or can continue to be advanced through the

Atlantic alliance, however, must remain an open question, the answer to which will depend upon the resolution of the debates discussed in the following four chapters.

Notes

1. For a good review of the cyclical nature of the Canada-NATO relationship, see Erika Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).
2. Lloyd Axworthy, "NATO's New Security Vocation," *NATO Review* 47 (Winter 1999): 8-11. On the issue of NATO's "transformation" and its implications, see David G. Haglund, ed., *New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, in cooperation with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000).
3. Canada's small air force was quite active during the bombing campaign, flying only slightly fewer strike sorties than two much larger European allies, France and Britain, and a good deal more than any other European ally, including Germany. Needless to say, the US conducted the lion's share of the attacks. See David L. Bashow et al., "Mission Ready: Canada's Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign," *Canadian Military Journal* 1 (Spring 2000): 55-61.
4. This historical overview borrows from my *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End*, *Contemporary Affairs* 4 (Toronto: CHIA/ Irwin, 2000).
5. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization* 46 (Summer 1992): 567-68; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Logic of the West," *World Policy Journal* 10 (Winter 1993/94): 20-21. Also see Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," *International Organization* 46 (Summer 1992): 633-80. But for a rebuttal of the claim that America's "multilateral" geopolitical soul was being externalized through the founding of the alliance, see Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: America's Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
6. For the impact of St. Laurent's tireless crusade for an Atlantic alliance, see Robert A. Spencer, "Triangle into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO," in *Ten Years of NATO: Four Articles by Couve de Murville, Lester B. Pearson, Robert A. Spencer, Michael Barkway* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1959), pp. 9-20; and John Bartlet Brebner, "A Changing North Atlantic Triangle," *International Journal* 3 (Autumn 1948): 309-19.
7. *Hansard*, 29 April 1948, pp. 3438-50.
8. See Norman Hillmer, "The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O. D. Skelton," in *Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship*, ed. Peter Lyon (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 61-84.

9. Quoted in David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (but not for Very Long)," in *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, ed. John English and Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), pp. 104-5.
10. Quoted in Roy Rempel, *Counterweights: The Failure of Canada's German and European Policy, 1955-1995* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), pp. 40-41.
11. Quoted in Peter C. Dobell, *Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era* (London: Oxford University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), p. 31.
12. See Paul Buteux, "NATO and the Evolution of Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, ed. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), pp. 162-63; and Tom Keating and Larry Pratt, *Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1988), pp. 36-37. On Canada's ambiguous stance regarding extended deterrence, see Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada's Cold War Nuclear Experience," in *Pondering NATO's Nuclear Options: Gambits for a Post-Westphalian World*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Queen's Quarterly Press, 1999), pp. 107-24.
13. Quoted in Kim Richard Nossal, "A European Nation? The Life and Times of Atlanticism in Canada," in *Making a Difference?*, pp. 85-87.
14. See the chapters by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Change By Rapprochement? Astérix's Quarrel with the New Roman Empire," and by Michel Fortmann and Hélène Viau, "A Model Ally? France and the US During the Kosovo Crisis of 1998-99," in *The France-US Leadership Race: Closely Watched Allies*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Queen's Quarterly Press, 2000), pp. 63-86, and 87-110.
15. For the claim that NATO actually *has* expired, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 5-41. "I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War's end and ultimately to disappear. In a basic sense, the expectation has been borne out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee ..." (p. 19).
16. Antonio Missiroli, *CFSP, Defence and Flexibility*, Chaillot Papers 38 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, February 2000).
17. See David G. Haglund, "Strategy 2020 and the Question of 'Continentalism,'" a paper presented to the policy consultation of the Security and Defence Forum, on the theme of Canada-US security issues, held in conjunction with the Queen's University Centre for International Relations annual spring conference on security, Kingston, 15/16 June 2000.
18. Particularly obligations and responsibilities outside their borders; see Pascal Boniface, *The Will to Powerlessness: Reflections on Our Global Age* (Kingston: Queen's Quarterly Press, 1999).
19. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "The Rise of 'Lite' Powers: A Strategy for the Postmodern State," *World Policy Journal* 13 (Fall 1996): 8-9.

2. *Over There With Uncle Sam: Peacekeeping, the “Trans-European Bargain,” and the Canadian Forces*

*Joel J. Sokolsky*¹

Introduction: From UN “Blue” to NATO “Green”

In December 1997, the *Globe and Mail* ran an article on Canada’s “shrinking peacekeeping role.” It noted that the 250 Canadian Forces (CF) soldiers on various United Nations operations represented the lowest level since Lester Pearson won the Noble Peace Prize forty years earlier. It also mentioned, parenthetically, that there were 1,300 Canadian troops in Bosnia. According to the *Globe*, these forces did not count because they were “part of a NATO rather than UN force.”²

Since then, the imbalance between Canada’s UN and NATO peacekeeping commitments has become even more pronounced. As of 1 June 2000, there were some 2,756 CF personnel on overseas operations. Of these, 1,596 were with the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and another 522 served with the alliance’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). In support of NATO operations in the Balkans, Canada deployed 118 personnel with the allied air forces at Aviano, Italy. If the 225-strong ship’s company of *HMCS Fredericton* sailing with NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) is added, it means that 93 percent of all CF personnel overseas were deployed in support of NATO and its new peacekeeping operations.³ In addition, Canada has continued to maintain a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, where *HMCS Calgary* is deployed. Only some 220 personnel, 190 of these on the Golan Heights and the remainder in small contingents of fewer than ten, are assigned to various UN activities.⁴

The imbalance is even more telling when it is considered that the CF has deployed to the NATO operations its most advanced equipment: CF-18 aircraft, Coyote reconnaissance vehicles, Leopard main battle tanks, and the patrol frigates. In comparison with NATO's other middle powers, such as Belgium and Spain, Canada has a higher percentage of its available forces outside its borders, 6 percent as opposed to an average of 2 percent.⁵ While the prime minister might declare that “[g]enerally speaking, we are very reluctant to join an intervention that is not under the umbrella of the UN,”⁶ the reality is otherwise.

The discrepancy between the UN “blue helmet” commitments and the US-organized and -led NATO “green helmet” commitment tells the whole story of international peacekeeping in the 1990s and highlights what had happened to this quintessentially Canadian (and supposedly un-American) role for the CF. It also tells the story of what has happened to Canada's relationship to NATO and the American role in the alliance. In the 1990s, Canada has been “over there” — the classic over there, Europe — with Uncle Sam.

This chapter argues that three closely related factors have contributed to this phenomenon, which was hardly foreseen when the Cold War ended over a decade ago. First, there has been the “Americanization” of peacekeeping, especially with regard to NATO and its activities in Eastern Europe. Second, there is the new “trans-European” bargain, which has become the core of Washington's policy toward NATO. Through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the US has transformed the alliance into a collective security organization that utilizes this new American-style peacekeeping. Indeed, PfP might as well stand for the “partnership for peacekeeping,” or maybe even the “pretense for power-projection.”

The third factor accounting for the overwhelming NATO emphasis in CF operations is directly related to the previous two. As stated explicitly in “Strategy 2020,” the Canadian Forces have made interoperability with the US the central focus of doctrine and force development. This has reinforced the importance of the alliance, in its new guise, for the country's defence policy.

Thus the irony: when the post-Cold War era began, NATO's salience for Canada seemed to be on the decline, while UN peacekeeping was clearly on the ascendancy. But that very emphasis upon peacekeeping has brought Canada full-circle back to the NATO-dominated defence policies, and especially force structure decisions, that so characterized the Cold War. By transforming the alliance into a trans-European bargain one of whose major components is a vigorous peacekeeping role for NATO and its new partners, Washington has again made NATO a major determinant of Canadian defence policy and a key element in bilateral defence relations.

Canada and the Americanization of Peacekeeping in the 1990s⁷

At the beginning of the 1990s, the “Canadianization” of US defence policy seemed to be at hand as the UN, with considerable American support, launched a series of

peacekeeping operations that in a few years saw nearly 80,000 blue helmets being deployed from Cambodia to the former Yugoslavia.⁸ With American global security interests contracting and with the Security Council now able to reach a consensus more easily, peacekeeping offered Washington the prospect that the UN would be able to respond to regional crises and civil strife without the need to deploy US forces. The UN also undertook to intervene in countries on humanitarian grounds in response to starvation or atrocities brought on by these internal struggles. Despite some early successes, it soon became clear that UN peacekeeping forces were not able to deal with all situations. In contrast to Cold War peacekeeping operations, the blue helmets were now being sent to areas where the fighting had not stopped, where in fact there was “no peace to keep.”⁹ UN forces soon became bogged down in Somalia and at serious risk in Yugoslavia.

This led to a new variation in UN peace efforts. Rather than sending in lightly armed multinational forces under UN command, the Security Council authorized a coalition of states, usually led by the US, to intervene more forcefully in civil conflicts and impose a peace or at least a cease-fire. Such was the approach in Haiti, as well as with the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and the follow-on SFOR sent into Bosnia after the US-brokered Dayton accords. This new, more muscular, peacekeeping very much reflected a shift in American policies. The earlier enthusiasm for peacekeeping evident in the Bush administration, and initially under President Clinton, was replaced by a growing opposition, especially in Congress, to the UN and peacekeeping operations. Even though the American troops killed in Somalia had not been under UN command, many in Congress blamed the UN for the debacle and peacekeeping became a lightning rod for opposition to a Clinton administration foreign policy that seemed to place too much trust in the world body.

In the spring of 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) set out strict conditions for American participation in UN operations and for US support. More importantly, PDD-25 made it clear that if international action were required and American troops were to be involved, then Washington would lead the operation under a UN mandate but not under UN command and administration. It was not so much that the US was not paying its peacekeeping assessments (though it was not); it was rather that Washington was taking steps to make sure that peacekeeping would be done the American way or not at all.

As the decade wore on, the number of peacekeeping missions declined. By mid 1996, there were just 26,000 troops wearing blue helmets in UN operations.¹⁰ At the same time, the US, working through NATO and other “coalitions of the willing,” took the lead in implementing those UN mandates it had helped sponsor that were consistent with American policies and interests. It did appear that this approach was more effective in certain circumstances, for example in Bosnia and Haiti. For Canada, it was this “Americanization” of peacekeeping, not opposition to it by the US, that had the most profound impact.

Ottawa had supported Washington in the Gulf War, diplomatically and with forces. But it also eagerly welcomed the renaissance of UN peacekeeping in the

early 1990s. Within a few years, nearly 5,000 CF personnel were abroad, mostly in the former Yugoslavia, but with small numbers dispatched to Latin America and Cambodia. All of this reflected the longstanding Canadian desire to play an active role in international security affairs as well as a distinctively Canadian one. The 1994 white paper on defence stressed the importance of contributing to international security efforts and responding to humanitarian disasters. It stated that the CF would also maintain a global combat capability. With cuts to the defence budget and personnel, it became increasingly difficult to argue that Canada had anywhere near such a capability. Indeed, the heavy peacekeeping demands of the early 1990s had greatly strained the country's armed forces.

Even as Canada was increasing its contribution to UN efforts in the early 1990s, it was also taking part in NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia. From the beginning allied, including American, forces were supporting the efforts of the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). Canada endorsed these allied efforts and the CF was involved in them. For example, the navy participated in NATO's maritime enforcement of the UN arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea. On the ground it was becoming evident that, despite helping to avoid even more widespread fighting and atrocities, UNPROFOR was not succeeding. Indeed the force could not even protect itself. Canadian troops were threatened and in some cases taken hostage. While concerned about the deteriorating situation, Ottawa also worried about American calls for attacks on Serb forces lest they put UNPROFOR in greater danger. By the summer of 1995, the government was looking forward to withdrawing the CF. Then came the NATO air strikes and the Dayton accords, followed by the decision to deploy IFOR. After some hesitation, Canada agreed to contribute troops to the NATO force, and these remain in place nearly a half-decade later. In a similar fashion Ottawa, which had early on taken the diplomatic lead in pressing for UN action against the military government of Haiti, eventually endorsed and then participated in the American-sponsored intervention.

Canada made a major commitment to IFOR and the follow-on SFOR, supplying one of the largest national contingents, in excess of 1,200 troops, as well as continuing deployment of a ship to the NATO naval force in the Adriatic. In addition, to the extent that SFOR now focused on post-conflict resolution and a wide variety of nonmilitary activities to assist the population, the commitment was fully consistent with Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's "human security" agenda.

Indeed, the Americanization of peacekeeping was made possible in part because (*pace* the popular view) when it comes to being able to implement a human security agenda, nobody does it better than Uncle Sam. Despite the oft-repeated proud slogan of the US military that its chief purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars, or General Colin Powell's reminder that he commanded the American army not the Salvation Army, or John Hillen's warning to allies that "superpowers don't do windows," what characterized the 1990s was the extent to which America intervened militarily in support of what can only be described as a human security agenda.¹¹

In many ways, the US military is better suited to promote this agenda than the CF. It can draw upon the nonmilitary skills of its large reserve forces who bring to these operations expertise in a wide variety of civil-support functions, such as those needed for peace-building and postconflict restoration. For example, within SFOR a combined joint civil-military cooperation (CJCMIC) organization was established to provide the link between military and civilian organizations operating in theatre. This was staffed by active and reserve civil affairs personnel from contributing countries. The 352nd civil affairs command from Riverdale, Maryland, deployed its headquarters element to Sarajevo along with the 360th brigade to support the CJCMIC.¹²

Kosovo represented the apogee of the Americanization of peacekeeping in the 1990s and thus a major departure for Canada. Although the operation could be justified on moral grounds and was consistent with the tenets of human security, the fact remained this was a war against a sovereign country without a UN mandate. Ottawa readily mounted up to join this latest American-led posse. Indeed, Canada staged its largest overseas combat operation since the Korean War.

In the Kosovo air campaign, "Canadian pilots flew 682 combat sorties, or nearly 10% of the missions against fixed targets —and they led half the strike packages they took part in," and Canada was "among only five countries delivering precision guided munitions."¹³ In all, some 1,400 personnel deployed to KFOR including an infantry battle group, a reconnaissance squadron, a tactical helicopter squadron, and an engineer contingent. In the spring of 2000, Ottawa decided to consolidate its Balkan presence in Bosnia where a Canadian major general assumed command of the Multinational Division Southwest, a region comprising 45 percent of the total SFOR area.¹⁴

To be sure, neither Canada nor the US has entirely abandoned UN peacekeeping. For example, in both Yugoslavia and Haiti, UN operations were mounted after or in conjunction with the American-led interventions. And some modest reforms have been made at UN headquarters to improve the organization's capacity to deploy and sustain peacekeeping operations. More sweeping changes, such as entailed in the Canadian suggestion for a greater multilateral stand-by capability, have received little US support. A recent report to the secretary general by a panel of experts calls for larger, more technologically sophisticated and readily available UN forces able to intervene quickly and to take sides in conflicts. This can only be done with NATO's, and especially with America's, assistance. Thus although Canada has endorsed the report, with so much of the Western (including its own) energies now committed to allied peacekeeping, and with declining defence budgets and force levels in most NATO countries, substantive support for a more vigorous UN effort seems unlikely.

As result of the Americanization of peacekeeping in the 1990s, the CF has been engaged in a number of near-war operations, armed interventions, and follow-on military occupations alongside American forces. It would appear that with the defence of North America, mainly through the North American Aerospace

Defence Command (NORAD), and the defence of Western Europe, through NATO, declining in relative importance, the focus of bilateral defence relations has shifted to what used to be called “out of area.”

From Washington’s standpoint, Canada has been a welcomed contributor to NATO and other more vigorous peacekeeping operations the US has organized and led. Admittedly, the Canadian contributions have been small in comparison to what the US can deploy. Although in a “unipolar world” the US may not need the Canadian contribution from a military standpoint, politically it is important to involve other allies such as Canada. While the most the CF has often been able to send has been a ground unit of about one thousand, a squadron of six aircraft, or a single ship, this level of support does compare favourably with that of other smaller allies. In addition, the CF brings to these operations an acknowledged professionalism and the ability to work closely with the Americans that is the result of years of allied cooperation.

This was not what the end of the Cold War was supposed to have wrought. Surprisingly, there has been little public comment in Canada about this turn of events. Whereas as recently as the 1980s any hint of Canadian support for US intervention abroad would bring immediate protests from “peace groups” and compel the government to word carefully its response to the American action, Canadian deployments to IFOR, Haiti, and especially KFOR occasioned no such domestic unease. To the contrary, there was widespread public support for the war against Serbia.

The significant trends in peacekeeping during the 1990s have highlighted in the post-Cold War era what has been a persistent duality in Canadian foreign and defence policy since the Second World War: the desire to play a more independent and distinct role through the UN *and* a strong instinct to join the US and other traditional allies when unified Western action was being organized.¹⁵ Each element is the result of Ottawa’s determination to remain active in international security affairs. During the Cold War, when it came to having to choose between the UN or some other multilateral umbrella, and NATO, Ottawa invariably sided with its traditional allies in the latter. This has continued to be the case in the post-Cold War era. In part it is the result of the changing nature of peacekeeping. Were Canada to remain in the forefront of this activity, then it had no choice but to participate in the American-sponsored, NATO-based “new peacekeeping.” But it is also the result of the very fact that NATO has become what international political theorists say it cannot be, a collective defence organization *and* a collective security organization. And this is the direct result of a new international bargain that has come to characterize the alliance.

The United States and the “Trans-European Bargain”

Flexible response was not simply the official name given to NATO’s strategy adopted in 1967; it was, in a profound sense, the way the alliance approached all

its seemingly intractable and inherently contradictory problems of a strategic and, above all, political nature. True to the messy nature of democratic governance itself, this collection of democracies managed to surprise and confound its critics and attain victory in the Cold War by adopting a series of initiatives that placed political compromise above military and strategic orthodoxy and intellectual rigour. The end result was that the allies stayed allied and in doing so, achieved ultimate victory in the Cold War. The same approach has been followed in the post-Cold War era, and this accounts for the continued centrality of the alliance in European and global security.

The alliance was quick to respond to the breath-taking fall of the Warsaw pact and then the Soviet Union itself. Beginning in the early 1990s, it revised its strategic concepts and subsequently its very organization and structure. Most importantly, it immediately reached out eastward. A North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created to bring old adversaries as well as neutrals into the consultative process. Special agreements were concluded with Ukraine and with Russia. The alliance became involved in the new peacekeeping and peace enforcement of the 1990s. Most importantly, there was a push to expand, culminating in the admission of three new members: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.

This is not to say all has gone smoothly, especially on the matter of enlargement, which on the one hand extends the alliance's efforts to project stability eastward while at the same time raises new concerns in Moscow. Then there is the matter of whether in extending its membership eastward the alliance can truly guarantee the security of new members. Whether the US has in fact extended its deterrent umbrella over these countries, or whether "extended deterrence" is simply made more intractable, must remain an open question. True to its historic methodology of flexibility, the alliance has not paused to resolve these complications, but rather has adopted a range of other initiatives to cope with them in the hope that in the post-Cold War era, as in the period that preceded, stability will be its own reward and all will be well in the end.

The most important of these other initiatives is the Partnership for Peace, which has been viewed as a halfway measure between membership and exclusion from NATO. This may be the case. But given the difficulties of further expansion, PfP provides a mechanism for involvement of more than thirty countries in European security through a web of military exchanges and exercises. It may be said that whereas NATO remains a collective defence organization, PfP's thrust is collective or cooperative security. In theory, it may not be possible for the alliance to be both. In practice, however, it *is* both, largely because of PfP.

The major reason for this is the fact that PfP has been championed by the US. In essence, this program has provided Washington with a multilateral institutional framework for the further extension of American influence in Europe in a way that diminishes the importance of the older, and especially smaller, Western European allies. It resembles in some ways the old transatlantic bargain, whereby the US guaranteed the security of Western Europe. In this new trans-European

bargain, American links to the former Warsaw pact members and Soviet republics extend directly across Western Europe, so that they now constitute the core of the new NATO, at least insofar as concerns the US.

The emphasis placed by Washington upon cultivating relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), north and south, may be viewed as consistent with overall American national security policy, which is to dominate its own region and to oppose the emergence of hegemons in other regions. It is in line with what Michael Mastanduno has described as the American effort to “preserve the unipolar moment” in Europe through engagement.¹⁶ But this raises the question of why America wishes to preserve and extend its influence in European security by fostering NATO expansion to the east. Two related rationales suggest themselves.

First, Washington shares with the countries closest to Russia fear of the unknown and uncertainty. The Americans no doubt hope that Russia will evolve into a liberal democracy that eschews any revival of hegemonic aspirations along its western border. Much of American diplomacy and a good deal of money is directed at trying to promote this benign future. Yet, should the domestic situation in Russia deteriorate, as Pavel Baev’s chapter suggests it might, and should an anti-American government come to power, the firmer Washington’s relations with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are, the better the chances of deterring recklessness in Moscow. The US is also interested in preventing miscalculation on the part of the countries in the region. In the meantime, Washington will, as critics in Russia surmise, be in a position to hold in check Russian influence in the region. America’s close relations with Ukraine, for example, are meant “to counter any expansion of Russian power.”¹⁷

The second reason for Washington’s eastward thrust is that the Americans do not fully trust the Western European governments, either individually or collectively, to manage European security in the east, especially in a manner fully consistent with American interests. The record of the 1990s in the Balkans speaks for itself. Only by involving itself directly in the affairs of the east, using NATO as a justification both externally and domestically (for the purposes of public and Congressional opinion), can the US assure itself that further ethnic strife can be avoided.

Some scholars, notably Samuel Huntington and Harvey Sapolsky, have argued that all problems in the world are not America’s, and have called for the US to let others sort out their own messes. According to Huntington, the “fact that things are going wrong in many places in the world is unfortunate, but does not mean that the United States has either an interest in or the responsibility for correcting them.”¹⁸ As for Sapolsky and his colleagues, perhaps it is true that on their own America’s allies would choose policies not to Washington’s liking; however, “accepting that reality is key to the strategy of restraint; the United States need not manage every crisis in the world. America’s preferences should not dictate its allies’ affairs. As long as no outcome can threaten the core American interests of

security and prosperity, the United States can afford to accept the solutions of powers whose interests are directly engaged.”¹⁹

Huntington regards Washington’s efforts to impose its solutions on regional problems as guaranteed to lead to the gradual alienation of its allies, leaving America a “lonely superpower.” He concedes, though, that “[h]ealthy cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom.”²⁰ To this extent, the new trans-European bargain can be seen as part of an American effort to sustain the relevance of the old transatlantic bargain. At the same time, the shift of America’s focus to the east is having an impact on the character of the alliance.

For the older members, NATO remains a collective defence organization. But given the absence of any kind of threat to Western Europe and the inability of the Western Europeans to develop any common policy toward the east, it is not surprising that the links now binding America to Europe run over and around these countries. Even the admission to the alliance of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic may be viewed as less the accession of these states to NATO and more the formalization of their security ties to the US. To be sure, the Western European allies and Canada are deeply engaged in the PfP process. Moreover, they are also concerned about the relationship between the countries of the east and the European security and defence identity (ESDI) and the European Union (EU). At the same time, the allies have not been entirely reassured by US policy toward Europe. In the early 1990s, Washington complained about the Europeans not doing enough in Yugoslavia, while the US refused to send ground forces to support UN efforts. The American reluctance to sustain casualties and Congress’ guarded support for IFOR and KFOR do not inspire complete confidence in long-term leadership from Washington.

The Western European governments also argue that they have taken the lead in supplying economic assistance to modernize the economic infrastructure of the CEE countries and that it is the US that is not carrying its appropriate share of this burden. Because of this, they resent the influence the Americans exercise over CEE governments, implicitly conveying the message that ties to Washington are more important than those to the EU or NATO Europe.²¹ Despite these complaints, the Western Europeans have been more or less compelled to go along with Washington’s eastward push, or else risk undoing what remains of the transatlantic bargain.

All of this points to what Coral Bell has called the “pretense of concert” in American national security policy during the post-Cold War era.

In a sense, the post-World War II “institutionalization” of diplomacy — through the UN, NATO, the G-7, the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, the OSCE and so on — has more or less imposed that strategy on policymakers. Resolutions must get through the Security Council and consensus must be sought in other organizations to “legitimate” the policies that are deemed to be in the U.S. national interest. Of course, the policies could be followed without seeking their legitimation by the “international

community,” but the advantages of securing it are worth the diplomatic labor it takes. A resolution or consensus eases consciences both in America and abroad, and helps protect U.S. allies from their respective critics at home (though not in Washington, of course).²²

The dominant position of the US provides a favourable climate in terms of broader public opinion, but in a peculiar fashion. As Stephen Walt explains, “US preponderance and the state of public opinion are inextricably linked. Americans are not interested in foreign policy because they recognize how favourable the current situation is. So they elected a president who promised to spend less time on the phone with foreign leaders and more time on domestic issues, and they elected a Congress whose disdain for foreign affairs is almost gleeful.”²³

The operation of the trans-European bargain can be glimpsed by looking at NATO’s new “northern flank” and the security relations now developing within the north and between that region and the alliance.²⁴ The ultimate aim of developing a web of relations intended to secure NATO’s new northern flank (which now encompasses the other two Scandinavian countries and the Baltic republics) is less to enmesh the north into a new European security framework, whether through the ESDI or the EU, and more to solidify the ties that bind it to Washington through NATO.

For the Baltic states especially, PfP is viewed as a “stepping stone toward the ultimate vehicle for providing ... security and stability, namely full NATO membership.”²⁵ As the Lithuanian foreign minister explains:

The Baltic region is an integral part of Europe and of the newly emerging European security structure. We remain optimistic regarding our prospects for membership in the European Union ... and NATO, which in turn acts a catalyst for further reform and for regional cooperation initiatives.²⁶

For its part, the US government has adopted what the undersecretary of state, Strobe Talbott, has called an “open door language” policy toward Baltic membership, indicating “in the strongest possible terms” that the Baltic states are “not only eligible for membership” in the alliance but that they are making “very real and concrete progress in that direction.”²⁷ While the “open door” is language couched in terms to reassure Russia, it is evident that American moves are partly a reaction to Baltic concerns about the direction of Moscow’s policy toward the region.

Elsewhere, in Europe’s southeast, American-led NATO involvement in dealing with the devastating troubles of the former Yugoslavia constitutes the most important manifestation of the trans-European character of the alliance; Washington has reached out to this region, pulling its older Western European allies with it.

With regard to this new trans-European bargain I have been describing, Canada is in a somewhat different situation from that of the US. For Ottawa, the old (transatlantic) bargain provided the security in Europe it sought and did so without compelling Canadians to choose between their American and European allies.

Although extended deterrence placed Canada at risk, by bolstering the transatlantic ties it ultimately fostered a stable strategic environment where war seemed less likely and thus made Canada more secure. It did this without imposing high demands for conventional forces. Moreover, the politics of the alliance, with its formal equality of participation, offered Ottawa a seat at the most important international table consistent with its aspirations toward middle powermanship. Finally, there was the hoped for, though not always achieved, counterweight objective, with the Western European allies being looked upon to counter the influence of the US on Canadian defence policy.²⁸

Though the new dispensation may offer less scope for counterweight dreaming, the trans-European bargain can offer advantages to Canada, nonetheless. Its overwhelming political character accords with Ottawa's longstanding desire to obtain maximum participation at minimal cost in defence expenditure. Thus while their military forces left Germany in 1994, Canadians remained active participants in the new NATO's eastward thrust, as well as in the panoply of alliance political activities. As with the US, there is for Canada also a sense now that ties to European security extend through Western Europe to the emerging CEE democracies. Ottawa, for example has cultivated a special relationship with Ukraine and is assisting in educating officers and defence officials from many countries in democratic civil-military relations.

At the same time, the new trans-European bargain, to the extent that it has generally diminished the role of the older Western European allies and enhanced the already dominant role of the US, has certainly raised new questions about NATO's serving as a counterweight to American influence on Canadian defence policy. This has been exacerbated by the apparent inability of the Western Europeans to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe on their own. Thus Canada finds itself caught between an EU to which it does not belong and that has proven ineffective in promoting stability in Europe on its own, and a "unipolar" superpower that believes it must step in to sort out the mess.

Ottawa may share some of the Europeans' lack of confidence in the consistency of American leadership, as well as their concern over Washington's desire to avoid military casualties. Nevertheless, Canada has found itself, just as have the older Western European allies, being pulled along by the American emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, in part because of Washington's efforts to accentuate NATO's eastern vocation, the Canadian Forces have been on active duty in Europe almost continually since the end of the Cold War. At the start of a new century, the CF has nearly as many personnel deployed in Europe as it had when the Cold War ended a decade previously. More importantly, and unlike the Cold War deployments in Europe, the CF has been involved during the 1990s in actual military operations, increasingly so as the decade wore on. Not surprisingly, therefore, being able to operate with its NATO allies, especially the US, has again become the focal point of military planning.

“With the Best”: Interoperability as Strategy

The 1994 white paper on defence declared that the CF must be prepared to “fight with the best against the best.” After half a decade of intensive operations in South-eastern Europe it may not be clear who the opposing best is, but it is clear whom the CF wishes to fight alongside. In “Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020,” this is made explicit. The CF must strengthen its “military to military relationships with our principal allies ensuring interoperable, forces, doctrine and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence).” In particular it calls for expansion of the “joint and combined exercise program to include all environments and exchanges with US.”²⁹

Given the record of the post-Cold War decade, which saw the CF deploy abroad along with the US and its principal allies in a host of UN and especially NATO operations, this approach is the only one that makes sense for the CF. Interoperability is the direct military consequence of accepting unipolarity or at least American dominance. Since 1989 Washington, in Brian Urquhart’s words, has been rounding up various posses and more and more countries have been jumping on the bandwagon. The PfP, as noted above, is a prime example of this. Interoperability, moreover, is fully consistent with supporting the human security agenda, given that the bulk of those deployments have been for humanitarian reasons. Interoperability with the US has become, for the moment at least, the logical defence posture for a foreign policy that stresses human security.

There is no doubt that the combination of the Americanization of peacekeeping and the trans-European character of NATO with its own PfP peacekeeping emphasis has provided the CF with the *raison d’être* it has been seeking since 1989. It has supplied the geostrategic rationale for maintaining an armed forces dedicated to more than simply domestic roles and constabulary or classical peacekeeping duties. With NATO now assuming a collective security mission in Europe through an emphasis upon the very kind of “vigorous” peacekeeping that NATO’s members are reluctant to provide to the UN, the Canadian Forces can make a politically compelling case for the retention of an overseas combat expeditionary capability. It is not a question of numbers, whether of personnel or equipment, but of structuring the forces to continue to be able to make a contribution to NATO’s new role, as they did during the Cold War. But now, the CF has an even stronger case to make for combat-capable forces able to support NATO.

For most of our history the problem of how to maintain, let alone structure, the capability of armed forces has been the central preoccupation of the professional military, especially in peacetime. Reflecting upon his experience in Canada in the 1860s when he was despatched to organize the Canadian militia against Fenian raids, Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley noted that while Canadians were a splendid race that made first-rate soldiers, the “Ottawa Ministers, so like our own in this respect, make no effective preparation for a campaign that might never come

off by the purchase of those stores and munitions without which not even the smallest fighting body can suddenly be placed in the field.”³⁰

It is not surprising that the tempo of Canadian involvement in NATO operations has resuscitated the old burdensharing complaint, exacerbated this time by the interoperability thrust. In a speech last year on bilateral relations, the US ambassador to Canada urged Ottawa to continue to sustain the “world’s most unique security partnership.” One of the requirements for doing this, in the US view, is that Canada increase its defence spending.³¹ Joseph Jockel bluntly suggests that the downsizing of Canadian army units from brigades to battle groups makes them “unfit for combat” alongside American allies.³²

British analyst Richard Sharpe, editor of *Jane’s Fighting Ships*, pointing to the 23-percent cut in defence spending over the last four years and to the fact that Canada now ranks 133rd (out of the 185 UN countries) in defence spending as a share of gross domestic product, has declared that Canada’s military is “losing its heart because of severe under funding and the ‘political myopia’ of the federal government.”³³ Even NATO’s secretary general, Lord Robertson, has gotten into the act, using the occasion of a meeting of allied defence ministers in Toronto to admonish Ottawa for its poor record on defence spending and advising it to allocate its budgetary surplus to the military.³⁴

It would, however, be fundamentally misleading to claim that history is simply repeating itself, with Ottawa again failing to appreciate strategic and military realities. Today’s situation is unique in a way that makes the current size and structure of the CF both logical and dangerous at the same time. In the past, for example the interwar period, Canadian governments, while not wishing to spend a great deal on defence, also followed a policy of avoiding commitments abroad. To this extent, there was no so-called “commitment-capability” gap, because while capabilities might have been few, so were the immediate commitments. In the Cold War, Canada assumed specific commitments and in that contest’s early years did build up the capabilities to meet them. As the Cold War progressed, the size and capabilities of the CF declined and thus the gap emerged.

But there was always a measure of subjectivity (indeed unreality) about this gap, which made it easy and understandable for political leaders largely to ignore it. This was due to the nature of the international strategic environment, specifically the centrality of nuclear weapons and the overall Western goal of containment and deterrence. In the nuclear age who could say with certainty what was necessary to maintain the strategic balance, much less to “win” a war that few believed anyone actually could win? How important were conventional forces, especially those of middle powers like Canada, in the presence of the larger forces of allies and atomic weapons? If Canada had deployed double the number of Leopard tanks it did in the mid 1970s, would NATO have stood a better chance of holding back the Soviets? How many Canadian City-class frigates were needed to secure the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) to Europe? If Canada had closed the gap,

as the 1987 white paper on defence promised to do, would the country have been any safer?

Of course, to Canadians the building and the structuring of the forces were intended to serve a variety of significant national interests and purposes. By responding to allied strategies and needs, they were meant primarily as political symbols and played an important role in fostering Western solidarity, so crucial for containment and deterrence. The maintenance of the CF, especially their forward basing in Germany, was widely viewed as a means of securing Ottawa's seat at the table. Thus even incremental measures to narrow the gap, such as the mid-1970s' equipment purchases, had some utility. And the CF had to be concerned with the operational effectiveness of the forces deployed to fulfill commitments. But overall, it did not really matter how the forces might have performed in combat because deep down few, especially Canada's political leaders, expected the kind of protracted conventional war for which Canada raised and structured most of its forces in the Cold War.

In the current post-Cold War era of peace, the CF is said to be facing yet another commitment-capability gap that needs to be addressed by force building or restructuring, or both. But this gap is different. As in the past, the capabilities of the CF are being altered by budget cutbacks and personnel reductions. Yet unlike in a number of previous periods of peace, there is the widespread view, especially among the political élite, that not only does Canada have security interests at risk abroad, but that Ottawa needs to take an active international role in addressing these.

Canadians and their government still have that old "internationalist itch" that can sometimes only be scratched by despatching expeditionary forces. But unlike during the Cold War, this internationalist bent can and does result now in the actual use of the CF in operations in which armed force, of varying degrees, has to be applied. In other words, there is today a real gap: the commitments are not to some theoretical never-to-be implemented allied warfighting strategy in Europe or in the skies of North America, but to all-too-real conflicts in a host of dangerous places around the world.

And when the CF gets sent to dangerous places it is more than likely to be as part of US-led multilateral operations designed to promote Western interests and/or values, sometimes outside the North American/NATO Europe area. Whether these operations are called "peacekeeping" or are given some other name, they are essentially forms of armed intervention and limited war often followed by military occupation of the target region or country. When the CF is asked to go abroad, the decision will depend upon a combination of domestic and foreign considerations prevailing at the moment. The most important external factor will be the extent of the multilateral effort. If the operation is led by the US and involving most of our Western allies (the countries that still really count for us) Canadian participation will be more likely than not.

In this situation, it really does matter if there is a gap between the ability of the CF to perform its roles, and thus support the foreign policy objectives of government, and the specific commitments Ottawa makes. It is the drastic budget reductions and continued real commitments abroad that make the current gap seem to some to be so serious and which place a premium on finding the proper force structure. What this means, broadly, is that if Canada is going to contribute to NATO it must have interoperable forces — interoperable in a way that it did not have it the Cold War when interoperability was not expected to be important beyond a few days, or maybe even hours. But what does this mean in specific terms?

Assessing Canadian Capability in an Alliance Context

The report by a ministerial committee monitoring change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces noted that the CF does have the capability to contribute to the foreign policy objectives of the government when Ottawa decides to make a commitment. The Kosovo operations are cited as evidence of this.³⁵

At sea, the navy today is in better shape than it has been for more than two decades. The *City*-class frigates do need helicopters, but they have seen wide service on behalf of the UN, NATO, and multilateral coalitions in the last few years. Helping to maintain embargos that may be of little practical value may be questionable. On the one hand, it is often not a particularly dangerous role, although it does require a high degree of maritime sophistication. Above all, this role constitutes the very kind of niche activity that well suits Canadian capabilities and is in direct support of foreign policy objectives.

There is also the old, and still valid, argument that naval forces can be used to support domestic sovereignty protection roles as well as broader overseas commitments. Here, the new fleet of maritime coastal defence vessels and *Upholder* submarines will be useful. Domestic search and rescue operations will benefit from the new land-based Cormorant helicopters. The revival of the Sea King replacement program should further enhance maritime capabilities. Maritime forces could become a liability should a high operations tempo and associated maintenance costs degrade training and lead to some ships being mothballed.

Similarly, it may be necessary to put more CF-18s into storage if funds are not forthcoming, or if a tradeoff has to be made between fighters and transport aircraft. A small residual role still exists for fighters, in support of NORAD. In terms of useful capabilities for overseas operations, again the recent performance in the Kosovo campaign, where the CF-18s employed new laser guided munitions, suggests that even in small numbers, they can perform credible and useful military roles in support of foreign policy objectives. The limits to Canadian fighter air-

combat capability may reduce the country's ability to contribute rapidly to the air dimensions of some operations, but other countries, principally the United States, can presumably deploy greater numbers of sophisticated aircraft if needed.

The burden of overseas deployments has fallen most heavily upon the army, which has been strained in the past decade. It is probably the case that it no longer possesses a capability for heavy-armour combat overseas. The Leopard tanks, even with improvements, are fading and there remains the problem of strategic lift. Although several Leopards did serve in Kosovo in a noncombat capacity, it may well be that in narrowing its capabilities, Canada will simply have to exclude the prospect of being able to send heavy expeditionary forces. That said, the introduction of new wheeled vehicles, such as the LAV 3, should afford the army a greater ability to deploy lighter, yet well-armed, forces to combat. Recent peace-enforcement activities would seem to suggest that such forces, even in small numbers and when attached to larger allied units, can play useful roles. Indeed, the performance of the Canadian Coyote reconnaissance vehicle in Kosovo has drawn praise and not a little envy from other allies for its advanced electronic capabilities, which are uniquely suited to the mission there.³⁶

In terms of numbers, expectations that Canada can deploy brigade-size units need to be seriously tempered, unless the lead times for such deployments were to be extended considerably. Barring that possibility, it would seem that units of battalion strength (i.e., approximately a thousand troops) represent the upper limit of the possible. At the same time, provided the forces are adequately supported and well-integrated into larger units, there remain a range of roles at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, which these units have performed and can continue to perform. These include what has been called "classical peacekeeping," for which there will always be some demand.

On paper, the Department of National Defence is still committed to maintaining the capability to deploy a "vanguard contingency force" and a "main contingency force" anywhere in the world.³⁷ The vanguard force would have up to 4,000 personnel and be ready to go within three weeks. This force could include all, some, or one of the following: two ships, one battle group (with approximately 1,200 troops), one infantry battalion group (with approximately 1,000 troops), one squadron of CF-18s, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, and a communications element and headquarters element of up to 800 personnel including medical and support elements. Such forces could be sustained indefinitely with troop rotations and logistic support.

The main contingency force (MCF) would have up to 10,000 personnel at any one time (including the vanguard force). This force would have a joint task force headquarters and "as single units or in combination, *one or more* of the following elements":

- a maritime task group, consisting of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates, or submarines), and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support (five Sea Kings and six Auroras);

- three separate battle groups or a brigade group (with combat support and combat service support) of up to 6,456 personnel, with 54 tanks, 24 155-mm guns, 12 ADATS, 642 APCs, 1,600 vehicles, and 24 Griffon helicopters;
- an infantry battalion group (with approximately 1,000 personnel) with six 105-mm guns and 325 vehicles;
- a wing of 24 fighter aircraft (with appropriate support); and
- a squadron of tactical transport aircraft with 8 CC/KC-130s and 793 personnel.

A planning study conducted by the office of the vice chief of the defence staff noted that the vanguard elements could be prepared to deploy within twenty-one days, while the MCF would take ninety days.³⁸ The study looked at an initial deployment of six months, “including 60 days of ‘combat’ at average consumption/casualty rates,” with the remainder of the six months at “‘operations other than war’ rates.” On this basis, the study concluded that the CF is “capable of generating the major combat equipments, material, and personnel for the MCF described in the White Paper,” and that personnel requirements “should be within the capability of the Regular Force.” It further noted that the MCF could be sustained for a period of six months given existing stocks and personnel levels.

Problems arise with regard to deployment. DND planning does not specify a particular location, which complicated assessments of deployment. It was concluded, nevertheless, that “[a]ssuming use of maximum available transport aircraft,” the deployment of the vanguard forces “might take up to 73 days,” but the CF does not have the aircrews to sustain this usage. For the MCF, deployment would take up to ninety-five days, “assuming the availability of charter ships and aircraft.” Canada would have to rely upon allied countries or civil charter for deployment. Given a shortfall in deployment capabilities, “it could take up to six months from a decision to deploy to put the full MCF into a theatre. Also, it is not possible to deploy all the Vanguard or MCF elements simultaneously. These would have to be phased in an order of priority.”

Given the uncertainties of deployment, and the unanswered questions of sustainment beyond six months, the study summarized the government’s approach to the commitments of the 1994 white paper as a “policy that is squarely based in the traditions of the government party which sponsors it.” Paraphrasing Mackenzie King, we can interpret this to mean: “If necessary a commitment to a military capability, but not necessarily a capability to make a military commitment.”

Conclusion: How Much Is Just Enough?

The current policy is very much in the Canadian tradition of asking *not* “How much is enough?” but rather, “How much is just enough?” What is the minimal level of forces that need to be maintained so as enable Canada to participate in

multilateral operations overseas? From the government's perspective, the current level is probably just about right. To be sure, the CF is probably not able to deploy its presently maintained forces as quickly as the military would like to all parts of the world where the government might send them.

Yet, is this really a problem, one that needs to be rectified by significant increases in spending on air and sea lift capability, especially for NATO operations? The answer surely is no. It may well be that some crises will require the rapid deployment of international forces from outside the region. However, in these instances Canada will simply have to say that it cannot get there quickly with its vanguard and MCF units, but that, given time, it can mount and deploy a useful contribution. There is no rule that says that the CF must "absolutely, positively have to get there overnight." The record of the 1990s suggests that it does take time for Western governments to make decisions on interventions, especially of ground troops. In the meantime, those states that are closer, or who can get there quickly, such as the US, Britain, or France would have to employ their comparative advantages in deployment. The fact is, the contingencies for which Ottawa will be asked to contribute forces are all overseas, and few countries in the world, even among the group of seven major industrial states, have the capabilities for rapid intercontinental intervention.

The Kosovo operations showed that given sufficient warning, the army can move overseas with vehicles and integrated helicopter units. The Edmonton-based Lord Strathcona's Horse was the second NATO force to enter Kosovo and the Pristina area after the British:

Less than 72 hours after rolling hundreds of military vehicles and containers off a freighter in Greece, the Strathcona's were already spying on Russian peacekeepers and Serbian armoured units around Kosovo's only airport... Some 24 hours after that, a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade that is supposed to specialize in quick deployments arrived in country.³⁹

The CF can perform a variety of important niche roles in the context of allied and coalition operations that support Canadian foreign policy objectives. If this is so, then the so-called gap narrows even further and the current force structure does not appear to be that deficient. If, as well, it is recognized that such roles are not to be taken lightly or dismissed as "window washing" because of an unrealistic desire always to play in the big leagues and "fight with the best against the best" in high-intensity combat against forces of equal size and sophistication, then the current force structure simply cannot and should not be dismissed as inadequate for the country's "real" needs.

Nor is that all. It is also important to maintain a comparative perspective. Charlie Brown was wont to say about Snoopy that "he's not much of a dog, but then again, who is?" The same might be said of militaries: there really are not many countries in today's world capable of projecting power — especially land power — overseas. Only the US can do this globally. Even within NATO, only France and

Britain (and perhaps soon, Germany) have the ability and willingness to do so, and even so, the capability (and willingness?) remains mainly restricted to the European theatre. Compared to the rest of the alliance, Canada's capabilities, and its willingness to use them as evidenced by the record of the first post-Cold War decade, stand up rather well. Ottawa has been prepared to assume a fair share of the burden of the new NATO, perhaps even *more* than its share given that Canada is not a European country.

When it comes to Canada's future in NATO, the question is not, as Joseph Jockel puts it, one of "soft power and hard choices." The decisions facing the government are not terribly difficult ones. The prime minister and the cabinet are aware the public will not accept major increases in defence spending and that Canada's allies, including the US, will accept whatever contributions Ottawa can make. Canada, along with other allies of comparable size, does not have the resources to keep pace with the US in the gamut of technologies associated with the "revolution in military affairs." Yet as the president of the US Army War College recently admonished, "trust, not technology, sustains coalitions."⁴⁰

What most needs doing is to maintain the existing capabilities with some modest improvements here and there, and continue to participate in coalitions to the extent one is able. Given the multifaceted nature of current operations, with their mixture of advanced weapons and lighter forces, there will likely be many roles for the CF to perform. Thus far, no Canadian contribution has been spurned by a coalition partner. Government decisions may only be hard on those who have to carry them out, should too many missions be undertaken and should insufficient capabilities be deployed to specific commitments. Given the nature of the new NATO, Ottawa does have a measure of discretion. Thus the CF can indeed operate "with the best," in part because the operations in which it will take part within the new NATO will not be against the "best."

Whether or not the alliance will remain for Canada, in David Haglund's phrase, the "NATO of its dreams,"⁴¹ it can be argued that for the Canadian Forces at least, allied trends have been more than they could have dreamed of in the early 1990s. In the post-Cold War era, Canada is once again over there in Europe, indeed in parts of Europe where it has never gone before. The CF have been performing a wide variety of peacekeeping roles consistent with the alliance's seemingly oxymoronic transformation into both a collective defence and a collective security organization. In many ways the new trans-European character of the security bargain suits Ottawa quite well. It is consistent both with its desire to remain engaged (but not excessively and expensively so) in European security and with its human security agenda. This combination has provided Canada's military with a solid and politically acceptable justification to remain a force primarily dedicated to overseas combat, via expeditionary roles assumed in concert with the US. This does not mean the military will get all it thinks it needs. But it does mean that what it receives will allow it to be where it now wants most to be — over there with Uncle Sam.

Notes

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3. Selective Engagement and Permanent Crisis: Entering the Second Decade of NATO-Russia Relations

Pavel K. Baev

Introduction: From Post-Cold War to Post-Kosovo Europe

There is an old NATO bromide about the rubber stamp that had known many years of use at the alliance's Brussels headquarters during the Cold War. The stamp read, "At this crucial moment for the Alliance..." For the decade of the 1990s, an equally useful stamp would have been one carrying the words: "At this crucial juncture in NATO-Russia relations..." If such had existed, it would certainly have received a workout during the past few years. The end of the decade witnessed a particularly low point in the trajectory of the NATO-Russia relationship, with the alliance's formal enlargement ceremony coinciding with its air war in Yugoslavia. Since mid 1999, however, the relative stabilization in Kosovo and the smooth transition of power in Russia have opened certain possibilities for improvement, which policymakers on both sides are eager to grasp; for these officials, the shadow of Chechnya appears to be neither long nor dark.

The central methodological problem posed by any examination of the future trajectory of NATO-Russia relations is that it does not and cannot possess any precise formula or internal logic. Calculating the balance of forces that has caused a particular twist in the trajectory can be an exciting analytical task, but the analyst's excitement must always be tempered by the recognition of the essential unpredictability of the undertaking. To be sure, this problem is hardly unique to the study of NATO-Russia relations. Accordingly, the best one can hope to do is

to outline certain frameworks that might assist our thinking about the next phase in relations between Russia and the West.

My point of departure for this exercise is the massive shift in the very foundation of European security system that occurred at the end of the 1990s. This shift has nothing to do with the much abused cliché, the “end of the millennium.” Nor can it be reduced to the resonance from the Kosovo war. Nevertheless, the simplest way to indicate the shift is to distinguish between “post-Cold War Europe” and “post-Kosovo Europe.” The combined effect of the introduction of the euro and “securitization” of the EU, NATO enlargement and engagement in the Balkans, the second Chechen war, and the transition of power in Russia has been to impart a new quality to all of the key security-related interactions in Europe. As yet, this new quality defies definition, but it does render obsolete and irrelevant most habitual theoretical schemes and analytic instruments.

Taking as a given the above-noted qualitative shift in European security, this chapter proceeds into the uncharted territory of the future from the conviction that there is absolutely no need to revisit the experience of the 1990s; this has been done elsewhere.¹ As such, this chapter is largely an exercise in future-gazing, in which, after an initial discussion of personalities, four “scenarios” are developed. The first is a middle-of-the-road assessment, in which it is assumed that major current trends in NATO-Russian transformations continue uninterrupted. This scenario may be no more probable than three others I introduce, which examine the possible impact of various disturbances, but its more detailed analysis at least allows us to skip redundant explanations further on, in the other three scenarios.

Putin and Friends

Because personality has played such an important part in shaping Russian-NATO relations, I would be remiss if I did not begin with some discussion of this factor. Indeed, many Western analysts emphasize the decisive role of President Boris Yeltsin in achieving compromise with NATO in spring 1997,² while the strong drive towards NATO enlargement during the second Clinton administration was largely generated by powerful individuals, especially the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright.³

Personal factors might play a rather different role in the early years of this new century. Vladimir Putin — unlike Boris Yeltsin, for whom “hugging” appeared to be a tremendously important exercise — does not believe in personal ties with Western counterparts. While eager to use his professional “recruiting” skills, Putin perceives gatherings in the “leaders’ club” not in terms of confidence and trust, but of horse-trading and outsmarting.⁴

What makes Putin’s behaviour even more rigid is the deep shadow of Chechnya: unlike Yeltsin, he has taken full personal responsibility for launching and waging

the war, and cannot shift it down the line even after the electoral usefulness of this “technology” has expired. Therefore every mild criticism of “indiscriminate and excessive use of force” immediately acquires personal character, making Putin defensive and emotional.

For all his excessive concentration on this local conflict, Putin — unlike his immediate predecessors, but somewhat like Yury Andropov — does not have a feeling for Russia’s deep periphery (*glubinka*); neither does he cherish any of the Eurasian ideas that Evgeny Primakov holds so dear. Putin is essentially a man from St. Petersburg, traditionally the most westward looking city in Russia. The idea of Russia belonging to Europe is beyond question for him, but this natural focus on Europe does not make him a “Westernizer.”

Putin’s top priority remains restoring Russia’s “greatness” through building up its “power” in the most traditional geopolitical sense. To most of Russia’s political élite (with the possible exception of those coming from or working for major energy companies), states remain the central actors in the international arena, while the scale of European integration is hugely underestimated. Putin’s mental map — very much like Yeltsin’s, only without extravaganza — is drawn primarily along state borders, and the EU remains an odd superstructure with uncertain profile. NATO is perceived very much as an instrument of US domination over Europe, and the intensity of the ongoing transatlantic restructuring is not understood, though the temptation to play on intra-allied controversies is certainly there. The intention to resume “normal” relations with NATO may be genuine, but it does not extend much further than maintaining dialogue over balances of interests in various hot spots: the “why not?” speculations about Russia joining NATO in some indefinite perspective are just public-relations exercises. In fact, no “mature partnership” is in the cards.

On the Western side, changes in the personality variable are generally leading to the conclusion that Russia matters less. The first post-Cold War generation of leaders in European states seems not to have the preconception of Russia’s “greatness” (measured by the scales of political influence and security challenges) so typical, for instance, of the former German chancellor, Helmut Kohl. Tony Blair’s impromptu “befriending” session with Putin is a tactical maneuver that could not quite disguise the lack of real interest in the UK in building “special ties” with Moscow.⁵ The EU bureaucracy led by Chris Patten and Javier Solana aspires towards building from scratch a common foreign and security policy (or “identity”), and has neither the tradition of prioritizing Russia nor a pool of relevant expertise for doing so.

Perhaps the picture is otherwise across the Atlantic, where the 2000 presidential elections might make a difference? Indeed, Al Gore has acquired a considerable experience in doing business with Russia and if elected could be expected to be much more attentive to, and understanding of, forthcoming troubles there. However, with the Bank of New York scandal in the autumn of 1999, and more generally because of the numerous obligations of the election campaign, Gore finds his

Russia expertise to be more of a liability than an asset, linking him to a series of failures in the design and implementation of reforms. While Gore's rival, George W. Bush, would in all likelihood care very little about things Russian once in the White House, a President Gore would have to distance himself from every engagement that might be potentially incriminating. Generally, the departure of Boris Yeltsin signifies that the time for the compassionate experts like Strobe Talbott has passed, and that of such "sleek and steely" Realpolitikers as Condoleezza Rice has arrived.⁶

Proceeding and Muddling-Through: The Central Scenario

The near-term scenario introduced at the start of this chapter is one that deliberately ignores the possibility of any major surprises (thus goes very much against the empirical grain of the 1990s) and postulates a relatively smooth development of major current trends. The first of these involves the ongoing reconstitution of the alliance, discussed in other chapters of this volume. The second trend, upon which my own chapter focuses, concerns the evolving political situation in Russia, and in particular the recent recentralizing tendency.

The transition of power in Russia through the election of a new parliament in December 1999 and a new president in March 2000 has created a situation that has features pertaining both to greater stability as well as to new security challenges. The immediate perspectives are determined by a characteristic discrepancy between the macroeconomic and macropolitical trends.

In the economic area, against many expectations, significant growth was achieved in 1999 and has continued into 2000, while state finances have appeared to be healthy and external debt has been duly serviced.⁷ This owes not to any drastic adjustment measures taken after the August 1998 financial meltdown (there were none),⁸ but rather to the weak ruble and strong oil prices, which together have propped up domestic production and the budget. The draft economic programs for the first Putin presidency (incomplete and contradictory as they are at the moment of this writing) seek to build on this strong performance and achieve stable growth of 5 to 7 percent annually. However, the foundation for such a "tigeresque" recovery is in fact quite shaky; global oil prices in particular could become a major spoiler (as they did in the first half of 1998).⁹ Putin's economic team counts on the short memory of risk-takers among international investors, who are expected to come in droves once the first steps of a new package of liberal reforms are implemented.

In the political area, the major (if not the only) priority now is strengthening the system of central control, modeled very much on the organization of the KGB in the Brezhnev-Andropov era. The easiest part of this task is achieving better integration of the central government, making it into a functioning body and departing from Yeltsin's practice of playing the presidential administration against

the government, thereby instrumentalizing squabbling and infighting within the central bureaucracy and enabling the president to play the role of arbiter. A more difficult part is to cut some “oligarchs” down to size and generally keep big business from pushing its interests too high on the political agenda, watching most closely the Gazprom empire and the ambitious oil companies. Perhaps the most difficult task is to reestablish control over the provinces, placing the governors and republican presidents on a short leash and reversing the dangerous trend of regionalism. Immediately after taking office, Putin introduced a series of decrees and draft legislation to that end, but the main battles still lie ahead.¹⁰

There is an obvious incompatibility between the liberal economic agenda and the authoritarian political tendencies of Putin’s leadership, and the frequent references to South Korean and Chilean “models” cannot diminish this. The expectations of Putin’s team are that rigid political stability will provide for better market conditions and predictability; thus, foreign investors will be able to forgive the inevitable curtailing of democratic reforms. However, authoritarian methods of political control generally belong to the pre-globalization era and can hardly provide much stability for modern societies.¹¹ Besides this weak point in macropolitical design, there is also the Chechen problem.

What had been started as an “electoral war” refused to go away as its political usefulness was exhausted. This local war has escalated to the level of existential conflict, becoming not just a test of credibility for Putin’s leadership but a matter of Russia’s integrity and even survival. Society has accepted the war as a point of departure for the ambitious project of restoring Russia’s “greatness” and rebuilding its power. The apparent deadlock in fighting threatens not only to deplete military capabilities but also to erode the whole system of rigid central control. Any sign of defeat could trigger a massive backlash in the regions against Putin’s recentralization.

Uncertain Partnership and Crisis Management

These personality factors and basic trends foretell a generally stable pattern of NATO-Russia relations, with occasional peaks and valleys. Unlike the paradoxical ways of the late 1990s, when productive cooperation developed behind the cloak of hostile rhetoric, the early years of this decade (whatever we end up calling them) will most probably see more balanced and engaging presentations, yet a rather uncertain partnership.

On the Russian side, the key problem would be to keep Chechnya off the Atlantic agenda. Weathering spurts of criticism, Moscow can try to play the US against the Europeans (as well as less critical Europeans, like the UK, against the others), reversing the old Cold War games. Arms control could become a key instrument for resolving this problem, and Russia could try to demonstrate its commitment to the revised CFE, perhaps even taking new steps in troop

withdrawals from Georgia and Transdniestria. Moscow is interested in developing an intensive bilateral dialogue with the US on arms control, exploiting various American strategic rationales for downplaying Chechnya. The most controversial area here would be strategic defence, and Russia, while bargaining hard for every compromise, might also try to play on European doubts.¹² These maneuverings inside NATO would require much diplomatic dexterity, but double and triple intrigue might generally become a trademark of the Putin-Ivanov foreign policy.¹³

On the NATO side, the key problem would be enlargement. Continuing engagement in the Balkans and complicated transatlantic rebalancing will not only lead to but perhaps even necessitate a two- to three-years pause in this process.¹⁴ It would certainly be impossible (as well as undesirable) to close NATO's doors, but the "go-slow" approach provides for focussing political efforts on the priority issues, avoiding unnecessary complications, and keeping Russia on board.¹⁵ At the same time, it is obvious that NATO-centred political frameworks built during the 1990s are not quite sufficient for the qualitatively new situation in Europe — much the same way as the NACC, invented in 1991 for handling NATO relations with the USSR, was never able to play a central role during the 1990s. For one thing, the nine states who now advocate a "big bang" enlargement¹⁶ would require some institutionalization of their status, which might help in further postponing the "second wave" for a few years.

As far as Russia is concerned, some new forms of interaction might usefully complement the Founding Act, which both sides now view as a rather inadequate compromise.¹⁷ An area in which some new frameworks, perhaps under the umbrella of the Permanent Joint Council, might be particularly helpful is the Balkans, where both sides have an interest in upgrading cooperation. On the Russian side, a typical feature of the engagement in the Balkans during the 1990s was a gap between foreign policy, which oscillated between supporting and opposing the West, and defence policy, which dealt with the nuts and bolts of joint operations with NATO partners. That gap was not necessarily a bad thing, since it facilitated the isolating of Russian battalions from the quarrels of the Contact Group. But now, in the more vertically integrated style of Putin's leadership, Moscow would probably want a better link between its major efforts.

For its part, NATO is interested in increasing Russia's military contribution to the operations in the Balkans and in keeping its political initiatives in concert with Western strategy. To achieve the latter, the alliance needs to create some permanent political structure with Russia as a full-time participant. Many allies, Canada among them, had reservations about decisionmaking in the Contact Group and would probably object to its recreation; but the alternative would be to count on new "Chernomyrdin-miracles" (which to all intents and purposes helped NATO to achieve its victory in Kosovo), and these may be in short supply. Having Russia on board would be a major capacity-building means of handling the brewing crises in Macedonia and Montenegro.

As far as Russia's military contribution is concerned, and in light of a nearly impeccable ledger with IFOR/SFOR and KFOR, NATO could be interested in bringing more Russian battalions to the Balkans. One key problem here would be money, particularly since the Russian military will increasingly feel the financial burden of Chechnya, to say nothing of having to find the funds to try to raise the *Kursk*.¹⁸ Paying the bills for deploying Russian paratroopers might look odd in NATO accounts, but it would make much more practical sense than financing many PfP exercises, rich in symbolism but deliberately low on content.

Besides the Balkans, one potential crisis that offers the prospect of NATO-Russia cooperation under this first scenario is Belarus. The unashamedly authoritarian regime there appears more solid than it really is, and the possibility of a violent crisis driven by the deep economic depression and triggered by the increasingly radicalized opposition is quite high.¹⁹ Moscow would be inclined to assume the role of the dominant external power and "security provider," but its close ties with President Lukashenko might make it difficult for it to intervene unilaterally. Putin's leadership wants to strengthen the alliance with Belarus further, but shows no intention of rushing into any sort of "reunification" project, and recognizes the Belarus leader as a liability.²⁰ The trio of concerned neighbours — Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine — might be interested in involving NATO in setting a political framework for handling this crisis. And Moscow might find it useful to accept NATO monitoring of and even limited participation in a Russian-organized operation (in a way, reversing the current pattern of KFOR).

Overall, NATO-Russia relations under this scenario would remain tense and controversial but sufficiently constructive to allow for joint efforts in managing conflicts in the Balkans and, possibly, also in Eastern Europe. The major vulnerability of the scenario I have just outlined in these two sections is its deliberate lack of dynamism and its "eventlessness." Suffice to say that during the 1990s we can hardly find a year that was *not* marked by a major event significantly reshaping NATO-Russia relations. Quite often such major events overlapped (e.g., the sharp internal crisis in Russia in the second half of 1998 and the first escalation of the Kosovo crisis), and 1999 saw at least four such overlaps: the Kosovo war, the deployment of KFOR with Russian participation, the Chechen war, and the ascent of Putin. While future cataclysms are unpredictable by definition, three rather probable options can be identified as diverging avenues from the intersection I have just finished mapping.

Alternative Future I: NATO Accepts Defeat in Kosovo

The main feature of this scenario is NATO's failure to keep the situation in Kosovo under control through sustained deployment of a significant grouping of forces. Different chains of events might lead to this outcome (for instance, a few US

casualties could decisively shift Congress in favour of a very short deadline for continued American participation; elections in Kosovo could bring to power politicians with direct links to organized crime; or Europeans could discover that the burden of deployment in Kosovo actually impeded implementation of their plans for building “rapid reaction forces”). The impact of KFOR’s abrupt withdrawal would be hugely destabilizing. However, two damage-limitation channels might prevent a massive Balkan disaster.

First, it would by no means be impossible to limit the negative regional effect of a fiasco in Kosovo. The main task would be to isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina from the new seat of conflict (as was done during the war in the spring of 1999) and to maintain and even strengthen SFOR. The second major task would be to engage Serbia (especially without Milosevic) in the process of setting some political frameworks for handling this conflict from some distance, perhaps aiming at the least problematical partition of Kosovo. The third task would be to keep Macedonia from slipping into internal conflict along ethno-political cleavages, and this task would also require Serbian involvement, along with that of other concerned neighbours.

The second damage-limitation channel runs toward Moscow and requires keeping Russia on board of the refocused Western Balkan policy. While the Russian military remains bitterly critical of the Kosovo war and keeps complaining about KFOR’s activities,²¹ it most probably would refrain from direct actions aimed at undermining the operation. Moscow might express deep satisfaction with a potential NATO fiasco,²² but would remain interested in retaining its role in the Balkans. In addition to participation (possibly even augmented) in SFOR, Russia could play a constructive part in engaging Serbia and in preventing a new conflict in Macedonia (together with its traditional friends, Bulgaria and Greece).

Generally, the alliance might conclude that the outcome of the peace operation in Kosovo — unlike the absolutely vital need for success during the military campaign — is not that crucial for its credibility, and can by no means be construed as an issue of its survival. The responsibility for the failure could and would be shared by other international bodies, first of these being the EU with its ill-constructed Balkan stability pact. The UN could also be held up as a traditional scapegoat. NATO might even find that getting rid of the Kosovo burden makes it easier to address other security problems, as well as freeing up resources to restructure its forces and mechanisms.

At the same time, this failure might increase strains in transatlantic relations and heighten the uncertainty regarding the US commitment to European security. One possible way to address this problem and reengage the US would be to put on a faster track the NATO enlargement process. Accepting Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania as new members could help in compensating for a Kosovo fiasco and in containing regional instability. But it would hardly be possible to keep the Baltic states (particularly Lithuania) out of this “second wave”; their leadership is already

now undertaking serious pro-Atlantic public-relations efforts, focussing particularly on the “Russian threat.”²³

The near-term perspective of “Atlanticization” of the Baltic states is guaranteed to increase tensions in NATO-Russia relations. Russian officials since early 2000 have been sending persistent signals that NATO enlargement in this direction is absolutely unacceptable, and that President Putin, unlike his predecessor, would not stage a meaningless public scandal but come equipped with “real counter-measures.”²⁴ Such signals may turn out to be entirely misleading. Putin indeed is not interested in any noisy quarrels leading to unsatisfactory compromises, but neither is he interested in any confrontation with NATO. The latter is certainly a partner he understands best (or, at least, believes he understands) and with which he wants to bargain, promoting Russia’s interests and prestige. Both in his thinking and in his practical approaches Putin remains a politician more from the era of détente than from that of partnership.²⁵ So he will try to make a better deal on the “second wave” of NATO enlargement than Yeltsin did on the first one, or, for that matter, than Gorbachev did on German reunification.

Overall, this scenario leads towards restructured and strained, but nevertheless constructive, relations between NATO and Russia; one important condition for this to happen is for the situation in Russia to remain stable and controllable by the centre. The following two scenarios examine possible disturbances short of a total catastrophe.

Alternative Future II: Russia Goes for a Victory in Chechnya

The smouldering conflict in Chechnya remains a major potential source of instability, threatening any day to escalate from low-intensity fighting to near defeat for Russia. While the Russian army has learned certain lessons from the defeat in the 1994-96 war (improved tactics, better operational coordination, strengthened logistics),²⁶ the current deadlock resembles all too closely the situation in the summer of 1996. The general staff does not have a winning strategy against the combination of mountain and urban guerrillas, but has a sufficiently clear understanding that the army, even supported by the interior ministry and other “power structures,” does not have the stomach for prolonged warfare. That is why the high command by mid 2000 had increased the pressure on Putin to find a way to end the conflict.²⁷

A compromise political solution, while possible in principle, does not sit well given the existential character of this war; public opinion might turn decisively against Putin — and for him such a shift would be much more damaging than for Yeltsin, especially now that the president’s image has been weakened by the submarine disaster. The new leadership in Moscow has deliberately and demonstratively blocked any potential channels for negotiations. It has also decided

against (unlike in 1995 and 1996) allocating any significant resources to reconstruction programs, which besides being a burden on the budget, are hardly popular. It does not take much insight to see that the Kremlin strictly rules out any possibility of letting Chechnya go, or accepting a face-saving compromise to cover its failure.

The main line of this scenario leads toward the proposition that a military victory in Chechnya is indeed possible; it is not a figment of imagination of the general staff, frustrated by the current deadlock.²⁸ The objective for such a victory would be the systematic destruction of the middle part of Chechnya, between the River Terek and the mountains, in which narrow belt are concentrated all the republic's urban centres; in addition to their liquidation, the decisive victory would require killing about 100,000 people (mostly men), or some 20 percent of the current population. This could be achieved by unrestricted application of deadly military force, including "carpet" bombing by long-range aviation. Multilayer mining of the key mountain valleys would restrict the maneuver of the remaining rebel groups. Russian forces would then solidly control lowland Chechnya to the north of the Terek.

While such a Stalinist victory is indeed achievable, its regional impact could be much more destabilizing than that of both Chechen wars. Ingushetia would have to accept some 250,000 refugees and could become a new base for terrorist groupings; Dagestan might slip into a quagmire of various ethnic conflicts; Georgia quite possibly will face new troubles with its secessionist provinces. Therefore, Russia would have to reorient and broaden its military efforts from Chechnya to other parts of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus as well. Besides the fundamental issue of resources, Moscow would have to deal with the foreign policy repercussions and interactions with NATO in particular.

While the alliance has been remarkably cautious so far in its reaction to the second Chechen war, leaving it to the EU and the Council of Europe to threaten sanctions (unconvincing as those threats have been),²⁹ Russia's massive violation of human rights, bordering on genocide, would force NATO to cut some ties and freeze some contacts. Moscow, quite possibly, could show high sensitivity and seriously overreact, pushing the escalation of a new crisis in its relations with NATO, which might spread into the arms control area.

The worst consequences can be expected if this scenario develops in combination with the previous one: i.e., if Russia attempts to crush Chechnya and NATO accepts failure in and withdraws from Kosovo. An angry Moscow might then attempt to undermine the alliance's damage-limitation efforts in the Balkans (by cancelling its participation in SFOR and giving more direct military support to Serbia). And if NATO indeed goes for another round of rapid expansion, including the Baltic states, Russia's reaction (despite all Putin's Eurocentrism and pragmatism) could be dangerously inadequate, involving, for instance, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad.

Alternative Future III: Recentralization Backfires

The main feature of this scenario is Putin's failure to strengthen the system of central political control both horizontally (over the regions) and vertically (through various state bureaucracies). While Putin arrived in office with a loose but demanding mandate to rebuild a "strong state," his core federal initiatives so far remain unconvincing, while the series of his mistakes (e.g., the abandonment of allies on the right in the Union of Rightist Forces, the alienation of liberal media through the arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky, and the *Kursk* fiasco) approaches a "critical mass." Putin's success depends all too directly upon his being able to project the image of a strong leader, but the lack of reliable supporting political structures can easily convert this image into a phantom political asset.³⁰ Putin is strong only to the extent that most other political actors believe him to be, and the public mood can shift rapidly, as the events of August 2000 demonstrated. Putin's overreliance on "power structures" cannot quite compensate for the lack of political machinery.

In this fluid situation, any combination of such negative factors as bad news from Chechnya, a drop in oil prices, delays or rejections of crucial legislation, a minor regional *Fronde*, or a new top-level corruption scandal, could suddenly explode the whole recentralization project. Regional élites, who supported Putin up to the point of his election, have by now grown worried about his authoritarian and counter-federalist ambitions, and they could turn decisively against him if the weakness of central power is revealed. Putin's instrument of choice for meeting such a challenge would be the FSB and other power structures, but the regional barons have acquired sufficient control over various elements of the latter in their respective domains to counter this.³¹ The outcome of this regional revolt might be a deep crisis within the central government, while some peripheral regions might even pursue the secessionist option.

Repercussions for NATO-Russia relations will inevitably be deep and sharp, in this event. During an early stage of this crisis, Putin might try to provoke a confrontation with the alliance as means of checking domestic disorder and introducing a new rallying point, much the same way as Yeltsin did during the Kosovo war. Belarus might serve as a useful target for such a confrontation, one with which President Lukashenko would be all too happy to play along.

At a more advanced stage of the crisis, one particularly troublesome point could be Kaliningrad. For many years (including during the period of troop withdrawals from Germany and the Baltic states) this was a heavily militarized area, a kind of "garrison oblast." By now, however, most military units have been reduced to skeleton formations, and the infrastructure has deteriorated beyond repair. Political structures in Kaliningrad are essentially controlled by organized crime, while the population is disheartened by central neglect and disappointed in the lack of any progress, especially when contrasted with the situation in neighbouring (and

unsympathetic) countries. The notion of breaking loose from Moscow's rule might suddenly prove popular and powerful, while for the central authorities it would be quite difficult to counter. Even were NATO bending every effort to stay away from this crisis, Moscow still might try to play on military-strategic threats, ascribing "Atlantic intrigue" to German, Polish, and even Lithuanian policies.

Potentially even more devastating consequences might appear in northwestern Russia, particularly on the Kola Peninsula. While regional separatism is hardly much of a threat here, deterioration of the massive military infrastructure, involving hundreds of nuclear warheads and other nuclear-related assets, objectively constitutes a source of unacceptable risks. Falling morale and discipline in naval units exponentially increases the risks of technological incidents, which might escalate to the level of catastrophe. And this brings back the spectre of mutinies, which so haunted the Russian navy during the early years of the twentieth century.³² Chaotic developments in Murmansk oblast could necessitate NATO military interventions in various formats, from "search-and-rescue" to actions aimed at securing nuclear installations, on Moscow's invitation or possibly even against its will.

Conclusion

The balance of opportunities and risks in the near-term perspectives of NATO-Russia relations shifts heavily toward the latter. That is the bad news conveyed in this chapter. The good news is that opportunities, while limited, are nevertheless constructive: these involve primarily cooperation in conflict management in the Balkans. But the risks are multiple and include broad destabilization in the Caucasus with a new chain reaction of conflicts (similar to the one in 1991-92), violent internal crisis in Belarus, political confrontation over the next round of NATO enlargement, perhaps complicated by secessionist tendencies in Kaliningrad, technological catastrophes in the Kola Peninsula involving nuclear assets and naval mutinies in the Northern Fleet. This risk assessment requires more attention and resources than the alliance could possibly mobilize.

Notes

1. One of the most comprehensive attempts to analyze NATO-Russia relations is Richard Kugler, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). Also see David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1998). Among the most useful journal articles are Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," *International Affairs* 73 (October 1997): 695-719; Ronald Asmus and Stephen Larrabee, "NATO and the Have-Nots: Reassurance after Enlargement," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (November/December 1996): 13-31; and Derek Averre, "NATO Expansion and Russian National Interests," *European Security*

- 7 (Spring 1998): 10-54. Among Russian experts, see Alexei Arbatov, "NATO and Russia," *Security Dialogue* (June 1995): 135-46; and Dmitri Trenin, "NATO: How to Avoid Confrontation," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, no. 7 (1995), pp. 29-37. The monograph *Russia, NATO i Novaya Arkhitektura Bezopasnosti v Evrope* ("Russia, NATO and New Security Architecture in Europe"), edited by A. Makarichev, Nizhni Novgorod University (1998) is useful. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy has produced several reports on this issue; see, for one, "Russia and NATO," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 21 June 1995.
2. Leon Aron gives Yeltsin credit for "masterfully" splitting the élite opposition, while Coit Blacker reminds us that Yeltsin in fact "undermined the bargaining position of his own foreign minister." See their chapters in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).
 3. See Yost, *NATO Transformed*, pp. 109-10.
 4. William Safire saw one positive feature of the June 2000 summit between the American and Russian presidents: "Mr. Clinton's demeanor remained coolly correct, and Americans can at least be thankful for that." In fact, this no-nonsense tone was set by the host. See William Safire, "Clinton's Mistake at the Kremlin," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 June 2000.
 5. An editorial in the *Times* ("Dance with a Stranger," 17 April 2000) questioned Blair's "anxiety to steal a march on Bonn, Paris and Washington," and an editorial in the *Guardian* ("To London Without Love," 17 April 2000) recommended that "we should stick to a cool and united European line."
 6. See Ed Vulliamy, "The Iron Lady Behind Bush's New Cold War," *Guardian*, 26 September 1999; and Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000): 45-62.
 7. See Yuri Petrov, "Economic Recovery: At Whose Expenses and in Whose Interests?" *Ekonomika i Zhizn*, no. 21 (2000). (English version in *Johnson's Russia List*, no. 4362, 12 June 2000.)
 8. For a detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of that economic catastrophe, see the article by the newly appointed presidential adviser, Andrei Illarionov, "Myths and Lessons of the August Crisis," published in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, www.polit.ru, 16 April, 26 April 2000.
 9. For an insightful critique of current economic blueprints, see Boris Fedorov, "No More 'Help' for Russia, Please," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 8 June 2000.
 10. For sharp comments in the Russian media, see Galina Kovalskaya, "Division of Land," *Itogi*, no. 21, 26 May 2000; and Marina Volkova and Sergei Sergievsky, "The Kremlin Wants to Change the State," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 May 2000.
 11. See the editorial "Dictatorship Will Destroy the Country," *Obshchaya Gazeta*, 26 May 2000.
 12. See Pavel Baev, "Deadly Decisions," *The World Today*, June 2000, pp. 9-11.
 13. For a good overview of the cautious rapprochement in spring 2000, see Vadim Solovyov, "NATO and Russia Open a New Page in Cooperation," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, 2 June 2000.

14. See Roland Dannreuther, "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russia Relations," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999-2000): 145-64.
15. One astute commentator has recently argued that if Russia "is to have any hope of delaying the further expansion of NATO — which would be good for most Europeans, and not just Russia — it must work hard in Europe to show it can be a genuine long-term partner." Jonathan Steele, "Empty Encounters," *Guardian*, 2 June 2000.
16. This idea was proclaimed at a meeting of foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in Vilnius. See William Drozdiak, "9 NATO Candidates Pledge to Join in a 'Big Bang' Bid," *International Herald Tribune*, 20-21 May 2000.
17. Dmitri Trenin, arguing for a fresh look at the Founding Act, points out that it "was neither fundamentally flawed nor necessarily doomed — it desperately needed carefully calculated strategies and a healthy dose of luck to succeed over time." Dmitri Trenin, "Russia-NATO Relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces," *NATO Review* 48 (Spring/Summer 2000): 19-22, quote at p. 19.
18. On the costs of Chechnya, see Mark Galeotti, "Costs of the Chechen War," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 12 (January 2000): 8-9. On the underfunding of the navy and new Kursk-related expenditures, see Evgeni Pakhomov, "We Are in One Boat," *Itogi*, no. 34, 23 August 2000; and Evgeni Kuznetsov, "The Barents Sea: The Kursk on the Bottom," *Russki Zhurnal*, www.russ.ru/politics, 22 August 2000.
19. For a good presentation of several perspectives, see *Belorussiya na Pereputye: V Poiskakh Mezhdunarodnoi Identichnosti* ["Belarus at a Crossroads: In Search of International Identity"] (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1998).
20. During his first visit to Belarus in April 2000, President Putin downplayed security cooperation and placed the emphasis on settling economic accounts, much to Lukashenko's disappointment. See Aleksandr Golts and Dmitri Pinsker, "Nothing Personal. Strictly Business," *Itogi*, no. 17, 26 April 2000.
21. Chief of Russia's General Staff Kvashnin and Defence Minister Sergeev, visiting NATO headquarters respectively in May and June 2000, pressed forward their criticism of KFOR routines and ultimate aims. See Igor Korotchenko, "Cooperation Will Go in Stages," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 June 2000.
22. Russian media delivered a barrage of critical comments on the first anniversary of the ending of the war and the deployment of KFOR, reporting particularly on the limited effectiveness of NATO air strikes. See, for instance, Vladimir Katin, "NATO's Big Bluff," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 May 2000. The weekly *Itogi* dedicated a special issue to Kosovo and the Balkans (no. 24, 15 June 2000).
23. A good example is the strong statement about the possibility of Russian military attack against the Baltic states, which "by implication will be an attack on NATO," by Latvia's president, Vike-Freiberga, on 30 April 2000. See *RFE/RL Newswire*, 3 May 2000.
24. See "Russian Experts Warn of Tension With NATO Over Baltic," in *Johnson's Russia List*, no. 4353, 8 June 2000.
25. See Dmitri Gliniski Vassiliev, "The Views of the Russian Elite toward NATO Membership," PONARS Memo no. 126, May 2000, Harvard University.

26. For a professional but self-congratulatory evaluation, see Vladimir Bochkarev and Vladimir Komoltsev, "Russian Mountain Storm," *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, no. 7, 25 February 2000. For a more balanced evaluation, see Michael Orr, "Second Time Lucky? Evaluating Russian Performance in the Second Chechen War," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 March 2000, pp. 32-36.
27. General Troshev, commander of Russian forces in Chechnya, made a public statement in this regard in early June 2000. See Elizabeth Piper, "Russian Commander Calls for End to Chechen War," *Johnson's Russia List*, no. 4350, 6 June 2000.
28. For my more elaborate analysis of this option see Pavel Baev, "Will Russia Go for a Military Victory in Chechnya?" PONARS Memo no. 107, February 2000, Harvard University.
29. See Sarah E. Mendelson, "Explaining the International Community's Response to the War in Chechnya," PONARS Memo no. 143, April 2000, Harvard University.
30. Gleb Pavlovsky, one of the new Kremlin insiders, points out that breaking up of the old Yeltsin political system was not compensated for by the building up of new political structures, with the result being that the empty space got filled by various myths and "phantom wars." See "Gleb Pavlovsky: All Procedural Processes Are Under Question," www.polit.ru, 14 June 2000.
31. On the process of creeping disintegration of power structures, see Pavel Baev, "Why Are the Russian Power Structures Falling Apart so Slowly?" *Perspectives*, no. 13 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 91-104.
32. See Pavel Baev, "Opportunities and Challenges for Russia in the Nordic-Baltic Region," a paper presented at a conference organized by the Moris Curiel Center for International Studies, Tel Aviv University, 3-5 April 2000.

4. *Canada and the “European Pillar” of Defence*

S. Neil MacFarlane

Introduction

“The decisions taken at Cologne and Helsinki signal a clear departure from the EU’s long tradition of politico-strategic non-existence.”¹

Canadian security and defence planners and decisionmakers face a number of profound (and related) challenges at the beginning of the twenty-first century. One is evidence of increasing American unilateralism on continental defence issues (e.g., national missile defence, or NMD). This trend in American policy carries some risk of derogating Canadian sovereignty and notably Canada’s control over its own defence. For reasons discussed further below, this apparent evolution in US policy makes Canada’s transatlantic connection all the more important to Canada.

Yet American policy may also contribute to a decoupling of North America from Europe, given that the mooted limited defensive shield would not protect the European allies, and given also the considerable European unhappiness with the potential implications of NMD, should it go ahead after the November 2000 presidential election, for the strategic arms control regime. As William Pfaff put the point recently in a description of the annual workshop of the Council for the United States and Italy, the Europeans “expressed, at best, bafflement at Washington’s determination to go ahead with this program, whose technical feasibility and actual tactical utility have yet to be demonstrated, and which risks destroying existing arms control arrangements and launching a new race for counter-measures.”²

Further decoupling concerns emanate from the increasing focus in US defence planning on the Asian theatre and on “rogue states,” and a corresponding deemphasis on European and transatlantic defence tasks in such documents as Joint Vision 2020, a document that “captures in a nutshell the U.S. military’s quiet shift away from its traditional focus on Europe.”³ In the sphere of international trade meanwhile, there is deepening tension between the US and the European Union over the latter’s failure to accept WTO dispute settlement rulings in favour of the US on bananas and the US imposition of trade sanctions in response, and over US export promotion through offshore Foreign Sales Corporations. The row over the presidency of the IMF was also indicative of deepening transatlantic tensions.

Similar risks of decoupling, thereby undermining the fundamental assumptions of Canada’s transatlantic security policy, may arise as a result of the gradual development of an EU defence identity and policy, and associated developments such as the apparent regional consolidation of European and North American defence industries. It is with the latter that this chapter is chiefly concerned. In particular, my objective here is to examine the implications of the evolution in EU thinking and policy on security and defence policy for Canada’s transatlantic alliance relations. This chapter begins with an account of the evolution of EU perspectives on defence from Maastricht (late 1991) to Helsinki (late 1999). It then discusses the obstacles to the realization of this ambitious multilateral agenda in security, before turning to a consideration of the evidence for the emergence in practice of a common policy. Finally, it addresses the implications of these developments for Canada and provides a modest set of policy recommendations.

Evolution of Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy in the EU

The place to start is with the Maastricht treaty of 1991, which institutionalized the EU’s commitment to five objectives related to foreign policy: safeguarding the fundamental values and common interests, and the independence and integrity of the Union; strengthening the security of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting international cooperation; and promoting and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

This grand project languished in the half-decade between the Maastricht intergovernment conference (IGC) and the Amsterdam one, largely because the major EU states differed fundamentally on the extent to which they sought to empower the Union and the Commission in the realm of foreign policy.⁴ Great Britain (under the Conservative Major government) was unwilling to see the Union mature into a potential disruptor of transatlantic relations. France was much more positive on European cooperation, although it was unclear just how much of its own autonomy it cared to surrender to a joint structure. Germany lay rather

quietly somewhere in between for much of the period, seeking to sustain good relations with both its Anglo-Saxon and French partners.

Toward the end of the period there was, however, evidence of movement, largely in response to specific problems. In 1995, for example, the UK and France cooperated in the establishment of a Bosnia rapid reaction force, and in October of that year, John Major and Jacques Chirac agreed on closer consultation on nuclear issues, while France and Germany also moved towards closer defence cooperation through the establishment of a joint arms agency in Bonn and an agreement on the development of reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, the period as a whole was one of active parallel discussion within NATO of the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTF) — that is to say, operations by coalitions of alliance members using NATO logistical assets and outside the normal chain of command.⁵ This was supplemented by a Franco-British initiative (the “deputies’ proposal”), whereby European officers in NATO (including the deputy SACEUR) would be double-hatted, also having WEU command responsibilities and permitting WEU use of NATO structure to mount military operations under European auspices.

Nonetheless, it was abundantly clear that the various players remained far apart on the broader issue of institutionalization of multilateral cooperation in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Germany and some smaller members wanted decisions on nondefence issues taken by majority vote; the UK and France disagreed. The Commission sought a larger role; the UK and France preferred foreign policy issues to remain at the intergovernmental level. France wanted the WEU brought in to the EU; the UK wanted it separate. The UK sought to ensure that European security identity remained within the NATO alliance; France was more ambivalent. And so it went.

Not surprisingly, the Amsterdam IGC and the provisions of the resulting treaty dealing with CFSP were underwhelming. The Amsterdam treaty brought the WEU Petersberg principles under the EU mantle within the CFSP context and gave the EU the authority to oversee the implementation of these principles by the WEU. An accompanying protocol deepened the relationship between the two organizations, but it remained significantly short of absorption (an issue that was left open). The treaty also created a new instrument, the “common strategy,” allowing some potential for implementation by majority vote in limited circumstances while also providing for “constructive abstention” by those states that did not wish to be bound to participate in actions based on the strategy. Amsterdam also provided for the appointment of a high representative for CFSP issues, who would also act as the secretary general of the Council of Ministers, and established a CFSP policy planning unit.⁶ The provisions limiting majority voting, the provision for abstention from implementation,⁷ and the reluctance to absorb the WEU all suggested that the EU remained far from developing an effective institutional structure for common action on foreign and defence issues.

This reluctance stemmed in considerable measure from differences in perspective between the UK and French governments. These in turn reflected not only the Major government's susceptibility to "euro-skepticism," but also the lingering influence of longstanding disagreement over the role of the US and NATO in European security and defence.

These obstacles appear to have evaporated in late 1998. In October and November of that year, Tony Blair made major statements on European defence, complaining of deficiencies in Europe's ability to mount autonomous military action and calling for substantial EU reform in the defence and security area. In December 1998, Blair met with Jacques Chirac in the Breton port of Saint-Malo and issued a joint declaration calling for the "full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP" including the "responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP."⁸

They also reiterated, however, their mutual commitment to the collective defence provisions set out in article 5 of the Washington and Brussels treaties. They conceived of this new policy as a contribution to the "vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance," but specified the need for the Union to be able to "take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged."

The declaration included several changes in phraseology that marked a significant development from the CJTF discussions in NATO. Notably, in discussing the relations between European operations and NATO, the leaders departed from the standard (CJTF) formulation of "separable but not separate," speaking instead of "autonomous but not separate" operations, and adjusted the standing formula of "avoiding duplication" to "avoiding unnecessary duplication."⁹

The Saint-Malo declaration was greeted as evidence of a fundamental change in British perspectives on European defence and as evidence of the profound shift in British policy towards the EU ostensibly favoured by the new Labour government. To the extent that, historically, British opposition had constituted a significant impediment to the creation of a meaningful European security and defence identity, this appeared to represent a fundamental shift in the structure of European security. As one analyst put it: "The St. Malo Declaration appeared to bridge at one stroke both the difficulties that the British have had with the EU and those the French have had with NATO since the 1960s."¹⁰ The British followed their bilateral initiative with the French by seeking an understanding with the new German government on the need to add meat to the bones of a European security identity.

The Kosovo crisis accelerated the process, which was carried forward dramatically in June 1999 with the Cologne European Council declaration "On Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence," in which EU members asserted that the Union "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." They went on to commit themselves to the development

of "more effective European military capabilities," acknowledging that this involved a sustained defence effort and "notably the reinforcement of our capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control."¹¹ This was followed by a second Anglo-French summit at the end of November 1999. Here, the two governments again produced a joint declaration on defence noting that the Kosovo crisis had reinforced their conviction regarding the need for European states to increase their defence capabilities to permit effective EU-led operations "as well as playing their full role in Alliance operations." The two governments called for the upcoming Helsinki summit to take decisive steps to develop an autonomous EU capacity for military action in situations where the alliance as a whole did not engage and to endorse the UK-French proposal on the role and composition of an EU military committee and military staff. The particular focus was on Petersberg tasks of crisis management.¹²

The declaration differed from previous documents in its specificity (e.g., the call for the development of a capacity for sixty-day deployment up to corps level — 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers — with associated air and naval support for up to one year; and the strengthening of European airlift capability), in the Anglo-French offer of specific national resources (e.g., the UK's permanent joint headquarters and France's centre operational interarmées as command options for such deployments) for EU actions, and in their drafting of specific bilateral agreements (e.g., the agreement on logistics "which will include arrangements by which we can draw on each other's assets to help deploy rapidly in a crisis"). This was supplemented by enthusiastic endorsement of the consolidation of the European defence industry, and of the harmonization of future defence equipment requirements.¹³

This process culminated at the Helsinki summit of the European Council in December 1999. Here the Council endorsed the Anglo-French recommendations, agreeing to the "headline goal" of establishing by 2003 a 50,000- to 60,000-strong force to be deployable within sixty days and sustainable in the field for up to a year and capable of addressing the full range of Petersberg tasks and, importantly for Canada, calling for the development of arrangements allowing non-EU European NATO member states "and other interested states" to "contribute to EU military crisis management." The Helsinki declaration also underlined the necessity of modalities for consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the EU and NATO in this field.¹⁴ Since Helsinki, the EU has established a number of interim bodies to carry planning forward and in preparation for a pledging conference to be held at the end of 2000 where member states will commit forces to the joint mechanism.

In short, there appeared to be evidence in 1998-2000 of a growing impetus towards the creation of an effective and autonomous European security identity. This was informed not only by a desire that the EU should "play its full role on the international stage," but by an awareness that there might be occasions in which European institutions and states would wish to respond to crises in

circumstances where the US and NATO did not want to come to the party, and, further, an understanding that many in the US resented what they perceived to be European unwillingness to manage their security affairs and the consequent Europeans' dependence on America to pull their chestnuts out of the fire as arguably happened in the former Yugoslavia.

These developments have differing implications for at least five categories of state actor involved in European security: those that are members of both the EU and NATO; those that are members of the EU but not of NATO (i.e., Austria, Ireland, and Sweden); those that are members of NATO but not of the EU (i.e., Canada, the US, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), those that are members of neither but want to be (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltics, and various CIS states); and those that are members of neither and have no obvious desire to become so (the Russian Federation, Belarus).

Obstacles to ESDP

All of this said, there is good reason to doubt just how far this process of integration in the security sphere is likely to go. There remain significant disagreements among the key players. With regard to Kosovo, for example, Britain and France disagreed over American preferences for target sets in the air war and on the role of the UN Security Council. In both instances, Britain leaned toward the American position. More generally, there is apparently less than complete agreement between Britain and France over whether a European standing army is envisaged or whether we are talking about looser forms of integration, whether the functions of autonomous European forces will be limited to crisis management (as envisaged in the Helsinki declaration) or will extend to collective defence, the nature of consultation with the US and NATO over the autonomous use of European forces that are otherwise earmarked for NATO, and whether the focus should be on institution-building or capability-building. These differences reflect in part British sensitivity to American reaction to the process of defining Europe's security personality. They also reflect a certain political skepticism in London over European institutions in general.

British sensitivity to American reactions is also evident in the area of defence procurement. From 1998 to 2000, it was clear that British opinion remained somewhat divided over the extent to which European defence industry consolidation should be seen as a complement to, or a substitute for, transatlantic cooperation in weapons development and procurement. This tension has been particularly evident recently in the deliberations over air-to-air missiles that are to be mounted on the Eurofighter. The US pushed strongly for British participation in the development of Raytheon's AMRAAM (AIM-120); the alternative was an all-European Meteor being developed by a consortium involving BAe and Lagardère (Matra/BAe Dynamics). The US push for collaboration on AMRAAM reflects the political

pressure placed on Prime Minister Blair by President Clinton who wrote in August 1999 that he believed that transatlantic defence industrial cooperation was "essential to ensuring the continued interoperability of Alliance armed forces."¹⁵

In both these respects, one could be forgiven for the conclusion that, although Britain is more interested than it was in the past in exploring the potential for European defence cooperation, it remained far from choosing Europe if that choice implied significant risks in its defence relationship with the US. To the extent that this was so, then the potential for further deepening of this cooperation depends strongly on the nature of the American response to it.

Before commenting further on this point, I need to mention three additional factors that ostensibly limit the potential dimensions for the emergence of a robust European defence identity. One is that there is little indication that the Europeans involved are willing to invest the substantial amounts of money necessary for the creation of autonomous force-projection capability. The declaratory positions generally recognize the need for substantial new investment; defence budgeting decisions reflect something different: a varying degree of willingness to invest in defence, on the part of leading allies. For instance, during the last half of the 1990s British and American defence spending remained fairly steady in nominal terms, while France and Germany displayed significant reductions over time. In part this reflects the desire to realize the peace dividend, if belatedly. As of 1999, the US was spending around 3.2 percent of its GDP on defence, and Europe as a whole was committing about 2.1 percent, with the UK on the high end at 2.9 percent, France at 2.5 percent, and Germany at 1.5 percent.¹⁶

Arguably, there is considerable scope for greater bang for fewer bucks, given the existing structures of both French and German armed forces and of defence procurement. Military reform in the French and German cases may produce smaller and more capable forces that are better suited to the Petersberg tasks (see below). Professionalization and downsizing through the abandonment of conscription will produce savings, particularly in training and in the elimination of unnecessary infrastructure. However, there are obviously limits to such savings. And, despite the potential for efficiency gains, it is worth remembering that Britain — the major European power that has gone furthest in streamlining and professionalizing its forces and in preparation for force-projection roles — spends a higher proportion of its GDP on defence than its two counterparts, France and Germany.

As Nicole Gnesotto put it recently,

Overall it is of course for the Union less a matter of dramatically raising defence budgets than of allocating available resources in a different way. But since the defence expenditure of European nations varies widely, it is hard to see how the credibility of military forces can be maintained without more or less painful efforts in the end being taken by all of them.¹⁷

On the whole, there seems to be little budgetary will to close the technological gap between European and American forces so evident in the Kosovo operation. One could extend the point to ask where the money to put together the independent

European capability envisaged in the latest Franco-British summit declaration is to come from. Without the spending, particularly in the areas of strategic lift and intelligence, it is unclear how the capability will emerge.

Second, one must ask whence the challenges to which ESDP is a response are likely to come. As the Kosovo case has demonstrated, these challenges give impetus to cooperation among European states in this field. As George Robertson put it in Bremen in May 1999: "in Kosovo we have all come face to face with the European future, and it is frightening." But is Kosovo the "European future"? An absence of such challenges may cause the impetus to dissipate.

When the Petersberg tasks were formulated, Europe thought it was facing a transitional East that was melting down into a morass of ethnically based civil conflict. Eight years later, the picture looks somewhat different. In the immediate proximity of EU Europe, the remaining potential for civil violence is concentrated in Kosovo, Bosnia, and (prospectively) Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia itself. There appears to be little potential for interstate or civil violence of a magnitude that might occasion a crisis response elsewhere in Central Europe. The northern tier has been integrated into NATO and appears to be on its way towards EU membership. The rest of Southeastern Europe does not have the same potential for violence that characterizes the former Yugoslavia. There is some doubt whether a European crisis response under ESDP would be forthcoming beyond Central and Southeastern Europe. This raises the awkward question: where is this new crisis-response capability to be used? And in stressing the need for such capability, are British and French statesmen responding to a perception of the political situation in Central Europe that is no longer valid?

As for potential European collective defence missions, it remains extremely difficult to envisage the emergence of substantial aggressive threats to Europe, given the current distribution of power in the regional subsystem. This is related to the collapse of Russian power. It may also reflect what some see as the stabilizing effect of durable unipolarity.¹⁸ Moreover, currently envisaged European defence cooperation — if implemented — will be far short of the capability necessary for collective defence.¹⁹

Third, the institutions and decisionmaking structures associated with ESDP are cumbersome and heavily bureaucratized. The amendments (1997) to the treaty on European Union dealing with CFSP provide for a decisionmaking structure that is intergovernmental rather than supranational. So as not to be hamstrung by the need for consensus, qualified majority voting is contemplated. However, if a member wishes to block a qualified majority vote on grounds of national interest, the issue is referred to the full European Council, where unanimity is the rule. Moreover, qualified majority voting does not apply to decisions "having military or defence implications."²⁰ The fact that enlargement will bring in a reasonably large group of states with equal voting rights and with diverse views on European defence is likely to complicate matters further.²¹

This does not bode well for rapid reaction to crises. Again, Gnesotto poses the problem well:

the CFSP mechanisms are not necessarily best suited to achieving a consensus among fifteen — soon more — member countries. What purpose would a European force serve if the unanimity rule that applies to CFSP elaboration prevented the Union from making any decisions?... It is difficult to see how the Union will be able to continue to evade the question of the way it makes decisions on foreign policy issues, in other words of the conditions under which its military instruments are to be used.²²

Underlying all of this, for many of us living in Europe, there is a certain unreality to the apparent deepening of security cooperation in the larger context of evolving relations among the three states. Western Europe has achieved levels of cooperation — if not collective identity — far beyond what might reasonably have been envisaged in 1945 or 1957. That said, substantial potential for identity-based constraints on the process of integration remains. Security integration engages the most sensitive aspects of identity. Progress in this direction presumes a degree of closure in the broader identity conflicts of states that pursue it. The last few months provide ample evidence that these issues remain unresolved. The heat of the dispute between Britain and France over beef was felt in every British supermarket. The behaviour of the French on this question raised legitimate doubts in the minds of many citizens of Britain about French reliability as a partner. One is also struck in this context by the recent — and hugely popular — French production of *Joan of Arc* (Luc Besson). As one (British) reviewer commented:

the weight of the blame for her brutal trial and death falls squarely on the English. It's English ruffians who burn, pillage and rape — and gobble like neanderthal cannibals while gloating on the carnage. Later, the Duke of Bedford snarls: “Torture the bitch.” Yet the trial records, some of the fullest extant for a medieval figure, show that of the more than 100 assessors who attended the protracted ecclesiastical trial in Rouen and finally condemned Joan for heresy, only eight were English-born, and, of those, only three heard the evidence on more than three occasions. The heroine of French resistance was, unfortunately, destroyed by her own warring compatriots in the University of Paris and by the Burgundian supporters of the English cause.²³

The lingering identity tensions in Franco-German relations are evident in the raft of French publications in the past three years warning of the implications of recrudescing German power, and especially in the ruminations of France's interior minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, about Germany's Nazi reflexes when he was confronted with Joschka Fischer's vision of a federal Europe.²⁴ Clearly, we remain a long way away from the emergence of the kind of cohesive identity that generally underpins the use of force by states.

Evidence of the Emergence of a Common Policy

The previous section probably reflects my own deep skepticism about close multilateral cooperation in the realm of security and defence. It may be overly

pessimistic. Indeed, it is striking in this context just how committed senior British civilian defence officials seem to be to the project in private conversation, and this notwithstanding their continuing squabbles with the French. These officials really appear to believe that their future lies in this direction, largely because of growing doubts about the long-term course of US foreign policy and about the sustainability of the Euro-American link in its present form. They also clearly believe that there is substantial potential for the use of European capabilities well out of area, as in African crises such as that in Sierra Leone.²⁵

In a larger sense, there may be something in the rather lugubrious proposition that the ESDP “is condemned to succeed.” Considerable political and bureaucratic capital has been invested. Retreat is difficult, given the personal engagement of key European political leaders and the unacceptable effects of retreat on the credibility of the European project as a whole.

And indeed, despite all of the obstacles, the real movement towards actualizing a European security identity in policy and force structure and in capability is striking. To revisit the area of defence industry and procurement, despite British reservations, the late 1990s witnessed a significant deepening of cooperation among EU members, during a period characterized by a substantial consolidation of European defence industries.²⁶ In this respect, the British dithering over the choice of missiles with which to arm their Eurofighters (discussed above) ended in the spring of 2000 when — despite intense American pressure — Blair chose the European Meteor. Britain has also chosen to procure a European transport aircraft, the Airbus A400M.

There is also evidence of increasing coordination between Germany, France, and the UK on defence issues. The three governments have joined in adopting positions that conflict with the US on a number of important issues — among them the question of humanitarian aid to Serbia after Kosovo, national missile defence and the possible revision of the ABM treaty, and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).²⁷ This too suggests a coalescence of a European security identity at variance with US perspectives. The interim bodies of the ESDP are now in operation in Brussels and, as noted above, the member states have agreed to a pledging conference in late 2000 at which they will indicate what forces they can put at the disposal of the EU as the Union moves towards the 2003 headline goal.

In this context, the recently released Weizsäcker report on German military reform gives some real prospect that the numbers of personnel necessary to sustain a corps size force in the field will be forthcoming. In the context of a cut of 100,000 from current levels, drastic reduction in the numbers of conscripts, and the transition to a largely professional mobile military, Germany intends to make the single largest contribution to the European force, offering 40,000 fully professional soldiers (with an 80,000-strong reserve). Before one gets completely carried away, however, it is not clear whether these reforms will clear the Bundestag, and how the government intends to pay the substantial cost of this reform and associated

procurement of transport, intelligence capability, and firepower, although it is probably true that the force reduction "will reduce the overhead costs of a bloated force structure."²⁸ That said, the ESDP fits well within Joschka Fischer's and Gerhard Schröder's vision of a federalizing Europe, so perhaps the resources will be found. Evidence of German seriousness should have a kick-back effect, encouraging more ambitious commitments by other major European states.

In short, there does appear to be meaningful momentum in the process.

Implications for Canada's Transatlantic Links

Despite the rather ritualistic statements of Canadian leaders that they support the development of European defence and security capabilities, these developments pose some serious questions for Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Canadian statements on the issue betray a certain defensiveness.

Before getting into details, it is perhaps worthwhile to step back and ask just how relevant the transatlantic commitment is to Canadian security (as opposed to security policy). In terms of traditional conceptions of security, the answer is: not very. The article 5 "security guarantee" is irrelevant. The one state that might threaten Canada's security is too big for us to do anything about. It is also a member of the alliance that provides the guarantee. And, finally, it is implausible that that state would actually attempt to coerce Canada in military terms. It is a long way from arguing over the marketing of beer and softwood lumber or over subsidies to filmmakers to the use of force in anger.

There are no other obvious physical threats to Canada that NATO might be of any particular utility in addressing. If there were, the US would address them anyway. The trend in defence spending in Canada's budget suggests that both Canadian governments and Canadian publics understand this, the rhetoric notwithstanding.

Given that this is so, one might expect Canadian policymakers and the élite of defence and foreign policy analysts and civil servants to view the phenomenon of ESDP with equanimity, particularly since there remains some legitimate doubt, as I have intimated, whether the idea will be translated into real capability. Moreover, the projected capability is rather diminutive and it will take a long time to come into being. It strains the imagination to define scenarios where rapid EU joint action under ESDP might be forthcoming. In situations that were sufficiently compelling to occasion a European consensus on concerted action, I suspect the Europeans would be highly reluctant to act without the reassuring presence of the US (and Canada). As Frederick Bonnart pointed out recently, "a force [of the contemplated size] could only take on a limited peace-enforcement operation. It would not be able, unaided, to undertake a Kosovo-size intervention."²⁹ And it is difficult for me to envisage a situation of this type in which the US and Canada would not participate, anyway.

Despite all of this, it is obvious that the emergence of ESDI/ESDP has disturbed that thin layer of Canadians who think about security and defence policy. The Canadian materials I have seen, although somewhat ritualistically supporting the development of the EU initiative and raising the possibility of Canadian participation in EU crisis responses, display several common characteristics. First is a somewhat Shakespearean protestation of Canada's deep and concrete commitment to European security. This begins with an account of Canada's engagement in World Wars I and II, and continues through the Cold War. The emphasis is on the sacrifices made by Canada in behalf of the Europeans. Then the continuing Canadian engagement in peace support operations from UNPROFOR through IFOR and SFOR to Operation Allied Force (where Canada flew nearly 10 percent of the strike sorties and, unlike a number of other allies, demonstrated a significant capacity to interoperate with US units) and KFOR is stressed.

A second common theme is the stress on the primacy of NATO's role in collective defence and as the preferred organization for crisis response. NATO should have the "right of first refusal." In those cases where the alliance as a whole eschews crisis response, the release of any logistical and other assets to the EU must be a consensus matter. A third characteristic of Canadian statements is sensitivity to the possible development of a European "caucus" within the alliance,³⁰ and an insistence that no informal decisionmaking groups be permitted to emerge within NATO. And finally, common to most comment on the subject is an insistence on the need for a formalized Canadian-EU consultative mechanism on security and defence to complement the 1996 Joint Canada-EU Action Plan.

The puzzle is how one explains this deep Canadian elite sensitivity to a development that does not, in any obvious way, impinge significantly on Canada's security interests narrowly defined. At the risk of sounding "post-modern" (in my defence, I note here that Peter Katzenstein observed a few years ago that Canada had the world's first post-modern foreign policy), the answer, I think, lies in the area of identity. Canada does not have a security problem in the traditional sense of the term; it has an identity problem. It occupies a space that adjoins the largest global economy and the only global power. Given the characteristics of the US, this is not a bad thing. It means that we do not need to take defence seriously as a society, and, for better or worse, we do not. It does mean that we are particularly sensitive to having our lives run by the Americans. Canada's security policy is not a response to threats as much as it is part of an effort to deal with the obvious geographical and cultural fact that maintaining autonomy and flexibility in the face of this friendly and multifaceted embrace is deeply problematical, particularly since our partner shows no sensitivity whatsoever to the problems that its sheer size and power create for us.

Traditionally, we have attempted to manage this issue by developing transatlantic ties to balance the otherwise overwhelming asymmetry of the bilateral relationship. Having a few others on board dilutes the obvious inequality of the Canadian relationship with the US. Foreign policy elites have been socialized

into this necessity for the past fifty years. Moreover, NATO's viability, and being in NATO, satisfy what Arnold Wolfers once referred to as "milieu goals" for Canada. Without the connection to Europe hitherto embodied in NATO, we would apparently be a very junior partner of the US in security affairs, which constitute an important element of the fabric of foreign policy. Being a member gives us a seat at the table. This may not produce much in concrete terms. But it is perceived to enhance Canada's status in the councils of the euro-atlantic community and to distinguish us from the US. In this context, the development of ESDI/ESDP is profoundly threatening to the conventional wisdom of this élite and to the objective of sustaining a distinct Canadian identity in international relations.

At this stage, it is worth underlining the intimate link in Canadian security thinking between ESDP and NMD. In this instance, many Canadian policymakers see a North American security future in which — whether Canadians like it or not, and whether they participate or not — they are going to be dragged along in a continental security project over which they have no influence and no control. While Americans worry about inadvertent decoupling, we worry about involuntary coupling. This is the nightmare that NATO has traditionally served to dispel. The combination of challenges to Canada's traditional approach to the identity aspects of security policy is profoundly disconcerting.

Beyond general questions of identity differentiation there are also bureaucratic political considerations relevant here. Those who advocate Canada's European and alliance vocation in foreign policy are under increasing challenge from other elements of the bureaucracy who wish to redefine the country's security directions along more innovative lines (e.g., Foreign Minister Axworthy's focus on "human security," the discourse on peacebuilding, etc.).³¹ A weakening of the transatlantic security link would greatly weaken the rationale for resisting this truly post-modern security agenda. In this context, phenomena such as ESDP may be threatening the position of the atlanticist contingent within the Canadian domestic debate.

The fundamental question in assessing the meaning of ESDP in Canadian security policy lies in what is being secured by Canadian security policy. I suspect the problem is that it is a particular traditional understanding of Canadian identity that is being secured by our association with NATO. This explains the obvious discomfort in Canadian policy circles despite the relatively minor material stakes involved. It is somewhat ironic in this context that the Canadian response to the problem that ESDP creates for our security identity has pushed us into adopting a posture that is largely indistinguishable from that of the US in ongoing discussions of transatlanticism.

American ambivalence over the coalescence of an autonomous ESDI and policy is evident, as the chapter by Stephen Walt makes clear. On the one hand, such a development might ease tensions over burdensharing. It would also reduce Americans' resentment at having to bail Europe out of situations where American security interests were not obviously engaged, as a result of Europe's incapacity to handle

its own problems. On the other hand, at the very least, American policymakers oppose versions of ESDI that might dilute NATO's capabilities and cohesion, "subtracting value" from the alliance. And there appears to be a clear preference in Washington for the principle that autonomous European actions — particularly those requiring NATO resources — require approval by NATO. In the area of defence industry cooperation, while favouring European consolidation, Americans are nervous about its potential effects on transatlantic cooperation in this field, as well as on US access to European markets.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Although the reservations of Canadian policymakers regarding ESDP are understandable, they perhaps do not do sufficient justice to the ways in which the emergence of a credible European intervention capability may serve both broader Canadian foreign policy objectives and Canada's identity concerns. In the first place, one of the key deficiencies in the pursuit of peace and human security has been the reliance of the international community on US capability where heavier forces are required for intervention. The US has proven to be distinctly reluctant to deploy its forces in harm's way. The development of an autonomous EU capability may go some distance towards resolving this issue, not least since key European states such as Britain and France clearly have a different view of risk and cost in such operations. To the extent that Canada is committed to a policy of international responsibility for human security, this is good news.

Second, if the major identity concern in Canadian security policy is balancing the asymmetrical relationship with the US with other relationships that allow us to assert an independent personality and to enhance status in international relations, then it is not entirely clear that such objectives are best served solely in the context of an alliance relationship where the US is so clearly the dominant partner. The Europeans appear to be open in principle to the evolution of separate relationships with non-European NATO members. Canada has capacities to bring to the table that could be useful in the Petersberg missions contemplated by the EU. The development of partnerships with a more autonomous European security mechanism might provide a useful supplement to more traditional strategies of balancing through NATO.

These observations lead to a few policy recommendations. To the extent that we seek to explore the potential of these developments, it probably makes sense to distance ourselves (gently) from the US position and to adopt a less skeptical tone in official discourse on ESDP. Echoing Washington is probably not the best way to be taken seriously in Brussels. This would be combined with continuing advocacy of a robust mechanism for EU-Canada dialogue on security issues. Secondly, the extent to which Canada wishes to be taken seriously in such a dialogue depends importantly on what it can bring to the table in terms of concrete force

capability. For this reason, meaningful relations with an emergent EU security structure are predicated to an important extent on continuing Canadian force modernization and the increased spending that goes with this. Third, it makes sense to explore with the EU how to design efficient and transparent institutional linkages with other organizations with human security and peace support functions and of which Canada is a member. The focus thus far has been on NATO-EU mechanisms. The same case can be made for strengthening EU-UN and EU-OSCE links.

Notes

1. Nicole Gnesotto, prefatory remarks in Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, Chaillot Papers 39 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. v.
2. William Pfaff, "America's Infatuation with Missile Defence Baffles Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 June 2000, p. 10.
3. Thomas Ricks, "Changing Winds of U.S. Defense Strategy," *International Herald Tribune*, 27-28 May 2000, p. 1.
4. The most significant initiative during this period in the area of European defence collaboration was the founding, in 1992, of the Franco-German Eurocorps. This generated strong opposition from a US worried over the degree to which the corps might displace NATO and undermine domestic support for continuing American involvement in Europe. See David G. Haglund, "Who's Afraid of Franco-German Military Cooperation?" *European Security* 2 (Winter 1993): 612-30.
5. The CJTF concept was approved at the January 1994 Brussels NATO summit, and envisaged the dual use of NATO forces and structures for alliance operations and for WEU initiatives, allowing the European allies to undertake missions with forces that were "separable but not separate" from NATO in the context of a European security and defence identity (ESDI).
6. For a good summary of the institutional development of the CFSP, see European Commission, Department of External Relations, "CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy," http://europa.eu.int/com/external_relations/cfsp, 1999. Also see Alexander Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force: The Politics of Sequencing, Autonomy and Ready Access," a paper presented to the annual conference of the DND Security and Defence Forum, Ottawa, April 2000.
7. Qualified majority votes cannot be taken in the CFM when a member state signals its intention to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by such a vote. In such circumstances, the CFM can, by qualified majority, request that the European Council (of heads of state and government) take the issue up for decision by unanimity. More importantly for our purposes, however, decisions relating to defence and military matters are not subject to qualified majority vote.
8. UK Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), "Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo France, 3-4 December 1998," <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

9. Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force."
10. Anne Deighton, "The European Union and Kosovo: Towards the Glass Ceiling," a paper presented to the conference Allied Force or Forced Allies: Alliance Politics in Canada and Europe from the End of the Cold War to Kosovo, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 30 September-1 October 1999, p. 8.
11. "European Council Declaration: On Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence," 4 June 1999, <http://europa.eu.int>.
12. The Petersberg missions are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. See "Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration," Bonn, 19 June 1992, <http://www.weu.int/eng/comm92-petersberg.htm>.
13. UK Government, FCO, "Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence, Anglo-French Summit, Thursday, 25 November 1999," <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.
14. "Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December, 1999, Presidency Conclusions," <http://europa.eu.int>.
15. Cited in Alexander Nicoll, "Missiles: US to Offer UK Deal," *Financial Times*, 13 September 1999.
16. See the relevant annual issues of *The Military Balance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995-2000).
17. Nicole Gnesotto, "European Defence: 2000 and Beyond," *Institute for Security Studies Newsletter*, no. 28 (January 2000), p. 1.
18. William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24 (Summer 1999): 5-41.
19. John Keegan, "The US Is Not Amused by Our Redundant Military Gestures," *Daily Telegraph*, 6 December 1999.
20. For an excellent example of the difficulty that the Commission itself has in explaining these procedures clearly, see "How Is the CFSP Implemented?" at <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=eng>.
21. Peter Schmidt, "Where's the *Boeuf*? Political Rhetoric and Reality in the EU's Decisions to Develop a Common Security and Defence Policy," in *The France-US Leadership Race: Closely Watched Allies*, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Queen's Quarterly Press, 2000), p. 131.
22. Gnesotto, "European Defence."
23. Marina Warner, "Maid of Honour," *Observer Review*, 28 November 1999, p. 7.
24. Charles Trueheart, "French Official Stirs Old Animisities," *International Herald Tribune*, 23 May 2000, pp. 1, 6.
25. I hasten to add that I remain somewhat skeptical here. The European states find it hard enough to agree on European missions, let alone extra-European ones! The case of Albania is illustrative: here Italy had to mount an ad hoc coalition operation because its European allies were unable to agree on a WEU mission. See Ettore Greco, *Delegating Peace Operations: Improvisation and Innovation in Georgia and Albania* (New York: UN Association of the United States, 1998).

26. For a good summary account of the emergence of two groups (BAE Systems and EADS), see Burkard Schmitt, "EADC Is Dead – Long Live EADS!" *Institute for Security Studies Newsletter*, no. 28 (January 2000).
27. In this latter context, see Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schröder, "The Test Ban Treaty Needs American Ratification," *International Herald Tribune*, 9-10 October 1999.
28. François Heisbourg, "Germany Points the Way to a Strong Self-Sufficiency," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 2000, p. 8.
29. Frederick Bonnart, "U.S. Starts to Fret over EU Military Independence," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 2000, p. 8.
30. I confess that this seems rather quixotic. Article 19 of the Consolidated Treaty on European Union states that: "Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions."
31. In this context, it is striking just how little play is given to NATO in the recent DND Report on Plans and Capabilities. See Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *National Defence: Plans and Priorities – 2000* (Ottawa, 2000).

5. *NATO's Fragile Future*

Stephen M. Walt

Introduction: The Past as Prologue¹

Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are fond of describing NATO as the most successful alliance in modern history. Who can blame them? The transatlantic partnership between Europe and America brought peace to a war-torn continent, overcame the Soviet challenge, and provided a safe haven in which to nurture European political and economic integration. Security ties between Europe and America also facilitated transatlantic cooperation on a host of other issues, and helped foster a remarkable period of material prosperity.

Given these achievements, it is hardly surprising that few voices now call for an end to the alliance, even though its original *raison d'être* has evaporated. Indeed, NATO continues to display remarkable signs of life: it has expanded to include three new members, developed a new strategic concept to guide its force planning in the post-Cold War era, and revised its doctrinal procedures and institutional arrangements to reflect the momentous changes that have occurred since 1989. After an embarrassing period of vacillation, NATO helped bring the bloody war in Bosnia to a halt (at least for the moment), and just last year, NATO waged a successful military campaign to halt Serbia's repression in Kosovo. At first glance, therefore, the transatlantic partnership seems to be confounding the widespread belief that alliances are bound to dissolve once the threat that brought them together is gone.²

Unfortunately, these events mask a more troubling reality. Although energetic diplomacy has kept transatlantic security ties intact thus far, deep structural forces are already beginning to pull Europe and America apart. Instead of becoming the core of an expanding security community, united by liberal values, free markets, and strong international institutions, the "transatlantic partnership" that fought

and won the Cold War is already showing unmistakable signs of strain. No matter how many new states join NATO and no matter how many solemn reaffirmations emerge from the endless parade of NATO summits, the highwater mark of transatlantic security cooperation is past.

The reasons are not difficult to discern. For decades, the partnership between Europe and the US was held together by three unifying forces. The first and most important was the Soviet threat, which gave Western Europe and America ample reason to cooperate. The second was America's economic stake in Europe, which reinforced its strategic interest in European prosperity. The third source of unity was the generation of European and American élites whose personal backgrounds and life experiences left them strongly committed to the idea of an Atlantic community.

All three unifying forces are either gone or eroding, and there is little hope of resurrecting them. NATO's formal structure may remain intact (and the alliance may keep busy by adding new members), but Americans and Europeans should no longer base their foreign and military policies on the presumption of close security cooperation. This is so because, to a large extent, the entire idea of an "Atlantic community" has rested on America's willingness to commit its military power to defend its European allies. When considering whether this arrangement has a future, therefore, we should start by asking when and why the commitment arose in the first place.

Prior to the twentieth century, the US remained aloof from conflicts outside the Western hemisphere. Since becoming a great power, however, it has taken on major overseas commitments on three occasions. The first was World War I, the second was World War II, and the third was the Cold War. The common thread in each of these commitments was the fear that another great power was about to establish hegemony in Europe or Asia.

It is worth remembering that the US did not intervene in the world wars until it became clear that the Eurasian powers were unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. The US let the other powers bear most of the costs of their competition, and emerged from each of these conflicts in much better shape than the other great powers.³

This self-interested policy may not have been good for the Europeans or Asians, but it wasn't all that bad for the Americans. Instead of letting its allies free-ride on it, as they have done since 1949, the US spent the first part of the century free-riding on them. Earlier and more extensive US involvement might have prevented these conflicts, but such efforts might well have failed (and at far higher cost to America). Similarly, the US fully intended to withdraw its forces from Europe after World War II, and agreed to leave troops there only when it became clear that the European powers were in no position to stand up to the Soviet Union. Yet American leaders never envisioned the permanent deployment of their troops, and actively looked for a way to bring them home throughout the 1950s.⁴

These episodes suggest that the US has been willing to sustain costly military commitments outside the Western hemisphere only when another great power

threatened to establish hegemony in Europe or Asia. Europe faces no comparable threat today, and there is not even a credible threat on the horizon. Whatever America's forces are doing in Europe, they are not there to protect its wealthy and stable allies from external aggression.⁵

No Threat, No Alliance

Western Europe and the United States were brought together by the raw power of the Soviet Union, its geographic proximity to Europe, its large, offensively oriented military forces, and its open commitment to spreading world revolution.⁶ Because the Europeans were loathe to sacrifice their independence and the US was loathe to let any single power dominate the entire Eurasian landmass, the industrial democracies of Europe and North America had ample reason to downplay their differences in order to preserve a common front.⁷

The disappearance of the Soviet threat has eliminated this overriding common interest, and though Europe and America still share some common goals, these objectives are nowhere near as significant as containing the Soviet Union was. The US and Europe are separated by geography, language, historical experience, and relative capabilities, and the American interest in Europe is neither as obvious nor as significant now that there is no potential hegemon perched on NATO's doorstep.⁸ The absence of a powerful enemy is to be welcomed, of course, and it would be foolish — and dangerous — to conjure up new foes merely to keep the West together. Inevitably, however, this fundamental shift in the landscape of world politics is already having adverse effects on the transatlantic partnership.

First, conflicts of interest are becoming more visible and significant. The sad history of the Bosnian conflict offers eloquent testimony to the growing divisions between Europe and America, and only the realization that NATO might collapse brought a belated commitment on common action. America's European allies rejected the policy of "dual containment" in the Persian Gulf, and — with the partial exception of Great Britain — are no longer willing to endorse US policy toward Iraq. Europe and America also hold profoundly different views on the Middle East peace process and the proper approach to Castro's Cuba. NATO was able to achieve and sustain a fragile consensus during the war over Kosovo, but divisions within the alliance limited its military effectiveness and the aftermath of the conflict has left deep resentments on both sides of the Atlantic. Europeans question the strategic judgement of US leaders, while taking full notice of America's reluctance to put its own forces at risk. For their part, American politicians increasingly resent having (once again) to bail out their European allies in a region that is not a vital US interest.⁹ Moreover, the persistent bloodletting within Kosovo casts further doubt on whether the entire operation was well-conceived in the first place. And insofar as preserving regional peace has become NATO's main mission, its inability to devise a workable solution in the Balkans calls its own self-proclaimed rationale into question.

Second, these differences reflect an even more fundamental conflict of interest between the US and its European allies. Although some Europeans have long resented Washington's predominant role, their doubts were always suppressed by the more imminent danger posed by the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union is gone, however, the threat from America's preponderant power looms much larger in the eyes of many European élites. Although the threat is mitigated by America's geographic isolation from Europe, leading European politicians are acutely conscious of the dangers posed by unchecked US power. France's foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, has routinely warned of America's "hyperpuissance" and declared that a central aim of French foreign policy was to "make the world of tomorrow composed of several poles, not just one." German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has expressed similar concerns, declaring that the danger of US unilateralism is "undeniable."¹⁰

To be sure, Europeans do not regard the United States as the same sort of threat that the Soviet Union was, if only because the US has neither the desire nor the capacity physically to conquer the continent. But they do worry that the US casts too large a shadow over the other major powers and is too willing to throw its weight around. Not surprisingly, therefore, even America's closest allies would like to put a leash on their more powerful partner.

Third, the lack of a common foe exacerbates the familiar problem of credibility. So long as Soviet forces stood on the Elbe, the US had an obvious interest in keeping Western Europe independent of Soviet control. Although it was occasionally necessary to make symbolic gestures to reaffirm the US commitment, what made these gestures credible was the underlying American interest in European independence. Now that there is no real threat, however, its allies have real grounds to question America's staying power. It can hardly be reassuring, for example, that the US entry into Bosnia was accompanied by open handwringing in Congress, by repeated reminders that the involvement would be of limited duration, and by an all-too-visible reluctance to risk even trivial US casualties. No matter how often or how eloquently the president or his senior advisors reaffirm the US commitment, Europeans now have ample reason to doubt it.

Fourth, the collapse of the Soviet Union has given each of these states a wider array of options. During the Cold War, the rigid logic of bipolarity limited choices on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which meant there was remarkably little debate about the fundamentals of Western grand strategy. Europeans had no choice but to rely on the US and defer to its wishes and the US had little choice but to protect them. Thus, isolationism was utterly discredited in America, and a truly independent foreign and military policy was never seriously considered in Germany.

The possibilities are much wider now. Options that were once ignored are being openly proposed, possibilities that were previously rejected can be reconsidered, and seemingly sacrosanct commitments can be reexamined. This new latitude is itself an important development, because we can never be sure what a country will conclude once an issue is finally opened up to new ideas.

Europeans and Americans are increasingly willing to consider new ways to obtain security, which means that seemingly immutable institutions — including NATO — may evolve rapidly and unpredictably.¹¹

All of these divisive elements are evident in Europe's recent decision to build up its own military capability. The decisive break occurred at an Anglo-French summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998, which called for the European Union to "play its full role on the international stage" and committed the EU to acquire "appropriate structures and a capacity for ... strategic planning," as well as "suitable military means" to conduct its own foreign policy.¹² This process intensified after the war in Kosovo demonstrated that Europe could not even handle a minor power like Serbia without relying primarily on US military might.

So long as Europe remains dependent on American military power, its leaders will have less influence over how NATO's assets are used. True, NATO's European members can shape allied strategy at the margins (as they did during the Kosovo campaign), but Washington can veto virtually any operation and retains predominant influence over where, when, and how NATO forces will fight. This situation has made Europe's leaders increasingly uncomfortable, and they are now formally committed to developing the independent capacity to maintain a force of 60,000 troops in the field for a period of one year. One may question whether the Europeans will achieve even this modest goal, but the decision illustrates Europe's growing dissatisfaction with its subordinate role.¹³

If Europe does become stronger and more cohesive, however, it will have even less need for US support and even less reason to listen to US advice. And once Europe stops doing what Americans want, their willingness to subsidize Europe's security will vanish. European officials have repeatedly declared that a stronger and more cohesive Europe will not jeopardize transatlantic cooperation, but they have yet to explain how this particular circle can be squared.

These sources of strain are not a big secret; if anything, the constant reaffirmations of transatlantic solidarity actually betray the widespread (if rarely spoken) recognition that the alliance can no longer be taken for granted. The key point, however, is that these stresses are not due to a failure of will, vision, or political skill on the part of NATO's present leaders. Rather, they are a direct consequence of the Soviet collapse, which removed the single most important cause of transatlantic security cooperation. This does not mean that NATO will collapse next week, of course, but the sources of unity are weaker than before.

Eroding Economic Glue

During NATO'S heyday, economic ties between Europe and America helped reinforce the overriding strategic rationale. US policymakers recognized that Europe's economic recovery would bolster America's own economic growth and strengthen the Western alliance as a whole. Europe was also an important trading

partner and a substantial target for US foreign investment, although its stake in Europe was still a relatively small share of the US economy.¹⁴

This source of unity is of declining importance as well. Asia surpassed Europe as the main target of US trade in 1983, and America's trade with Asia is now more than one and a half times larger than its trade with Europe.¹⁵ US direct foreign investment in Europe is still larger than investment in Asia, but the gap has begun to close. In either case, the sums involved are too small to have a decisive impact on US security commitments.¹⁶

The shift in US foreign economic activity has been accompanied by a simultaneous trend towards *regionalization*.¹⁷ This trend is also reflected by renewed progress towards European integration, beginning with the Single European Act in 1986 and proceeding through the Maastricht treaty in 1991 and the debut of European monetary union in 1999. A similar tendency may be observed on the other side of the Atlantic as well, most notably in the 1992 North American free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

These developments threaten transatlantic ties in at least two ways. First, although economic connections do not determine security commitments, the shift in economic activity from Europe to Asia will inevitably lead US policymakers to devote more energy and attention to the latter. Major security challenges are more likely to arise in Asia as well, which is why former Secretary of State Warren Christopher took office warning against an overly "Euro-centric" foreign policy.¹⁸ Because time and resources are finite, these trends herald an inevitable decline in the level of attention devoted to Europe.

It is no accident that President Clinton went all-out to obtain Congressional approval for China's entry into the World Trade Organization, while proposals for a "transatlantic free trade association" have languished throughout his administration. Although area specialists and bureau chiefs will continue to keep watch on their appointed regions, high-level officials will devote less time, less energy and most importantly, less political capital to an area whose relative importance is declining. European leaders may try to fight this trend, but they will eventually react by paying less attention to Washington. The inevitable result will be an erosion in transatlantic cohesion.

Second, the expansion of the European Union is bound to create further tensions between Europe and America. NATO expansion and European political and monetary union have been described as mutually supportive initiatives, which will bring new and old democracies together in an expanding liberal order. These initiatives *may* be compatible within Europe itself, but a stronger EU will place new strains on Europe's ties with the United States. Economic and monetary union will make Europe a more formidable economic rival, and a single European currency could eventually rival the dollar's position as the principal international reserve currency. Thus, an expanded European Union will eliminate some of the fiscal advantages the US has long derived from its privileged position in the international financial system and create new conflicts over the management of the international economic order.¹⁹

US-European relations remain troubled by recurring trade disputes, and these tensions are likely to grow if Europe becomes more powerful economically and more cohesive politically, especially once America's economy eventually slows down.²⁰ Europe's political integration will eventually eliminate any need for a residual US military presence, and when that happens, European deference to US wishes will evaporate. Moreover, the structural shifts that are pulling America and Europe apart will be reinforced by domestic developments on both sides of the Atlantic. These developments will be difficult if not impossible to reverse, further weakening the glue that has kept the transatlantic partnership together for the past four decades.

Demographic Shifts and Generational Change

The US traces its origins to European civilization, and many Americans still have ancestral ties there. These common historic and cultural ties are sometimes invoked to justify current commitments, and to explain why the country remains deeply interested in European affairs. If nothing else, ancestral ties explain why Polish-Americans have been among the most fervent supporters of NATO expansion.

Yet this source of transatlantic solidarity is often overstated. The original settlers and founding fathers were not exactly *loyal* Europeans, and many of the immigrants who populated North America did not harbour affectionate sentiments toward their former homes. Cultural and ethnic ties between Europe and America did not prevent the US from staying out of Europe's conflicts during the nineteenth century, and they did not make America's leaders eager to enter either world war. Indeed, the US "melting pot" may have reinforced its traditional isolationism, by making it more difficult for Washington to take a firm position against any individual European state.

Moreover, to the extent that ethnic or cultural ties did reinforce an American interest in Europe, their impact is probably diminishing. Not only is the percentage of US citizens of European origin declining, but the main waves of European immigration occurred several generations ago and assimilation and intermarriage have diluted the sense of affinity with the "old country."²¹ More recent immigrants from Asia or Latin America are likelier to retain these cultural affinities and to hold strong views about US policy toward their homelands.

Furthermore, the past four decades have witnessed a profound westward shift in the US population. In 1950, approximately 27 percent of Americans lived in the northeast, while the west contained a mere 13.7 percent. In 1995, by contrast, the latter had grown to 21.9 percent of the US population while the former had fallen to 19.6 percent. The US Bureau of the Census also predicts that the fastest growing states in the period 1993-2020 will be Nevada, Hawaii, California, and Washington; California (already the most populous state in the country) is expected

to add another 16 million residents by 2020.²² Thus, the centre of gravity of the US population is shifting steadily westwards, which could also encourage a gradual shift in geopolitical focus.

The third and most important trend is generational change. We are now witnessing the swan song of the generation for whom the Depression, World War II, and the early Cold War were defining historical events.²³ The people who built NATO were East Coast internationalists with strong personal and professional ties to Europe: men like Dean Acheson, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Paul Nitze, and John Foster Dulles. This generation cut its teeth on conflict in Europe, and the transatlantic partnership was perhaps their most enduring professional legacy.

These figures are now gone, and the successor generations have grown up with very different memories and associations. Watching “Saving Private Ryan” is no substitute for having lived through the real thing, and the familiar litanies of transatlantic partnership will not resonate as loudly for the cohort that is now moving into key think tanks, government ministries, and legislative seats. The Cold War partnership between Europe and America will have even less meaning for those now in high school or college, or for children for whom the Cold War itself will be a distant historical episode.²⁴ Subsequent generations may recognize the value of transatlantic cooperation and try to preserve it, but it will never kindle the same reflexive emotional response that it did for their parents and grandparents.

Taken together, these forces will make it more difficult to sustain the level of elite consensus that characterized US foreign policy during the heyday of the Atlantic alliance. Instead of being guided by an elite group of East Coast internationalists, committed to Europe by family backgrounds, personal experiences, and professional affiliations, US foreign policy will be shaped by a diverse group whose ethnic characteristics, geographic points of reference, and personal experiences will not grant Europe pride of place.

A similar process is occurring across the Atlantic, of course. The post-World War II generation was accustomed to following the US lead, both because they were dependent on US protection and because the war had shattered Europe’s self-confidence. These handicaps will not shackle the next generation of European leaders, who are going to be much less willing to follow Uncle Sam wherever he points. It is already clear, for example, that German leaders like Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer no longer feel hobbled by a sense of post-World War II guilt and are eager to occupy what they see as Germany’s rightful place as “a great power in Europe.”²⁵ The ascendance of a new generation of leaders does not sound a death knell for the alliance, but preserving it will certainly be more difficult.

Hegemony on the Cheap?

Is there any evidence of these trends already? On the one hand, US elites and mass publics continue to support an “internationalist” foreign policy, and have

soundly endorsed NATO's eastward expansion.²⁶ Americans continue to see Europe as an important interest and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic apparently retain a high regard for one another.²⁷ Perhaps most important, US public opinion has given qualified support for NATO's efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, at least so far.

On the other hand, there is growing evidence of a declining willingness to engage in costly overseas commitments. Although 65 percent of Americans still believe the US should take "an active part" in world affairs (at least when the alternative response is "staying out"), their support wanes when this role might entail real sacrifices.²⁸ Support for the US deployment to Bosnia, for example, was clearly predicated in the assumption that this would not cost American lives.²⁹ A similar reluctance to bear any burden also explains why the Clinton administration kept lowering the estimated cost of NATO expansion as ratification approached. Americans may favour expanding NATO, but not if it is going to cost them very much.

To be sure, Americans still want to retain military superiority, but support for the country's current level of defence expenditure is unlikely to survive the generational changes noted earlier and the fiscal constraints that loom ahead.³⁰ Barring the rise of a major and direct threat to the country's security (and it is becoming increasingly difficult to locate one), US military power will continue to erode. And with that decline will come even greater reluctance to engage in potentially dangerous international activities.

To reiterate: wartime alliances rarely survive the enemy's defeat. Given this expectation, NATO is already something of an anomaly. Its members remain committed to mutual defence even though the threat that brought them together has vanished, and are trying to sustain a high level of policy coordination even though their interests and goals are gradually diverging. NATO has redefined its mission and is in the process of taking on new members, a process that has been strongly endorsed by the American Congress and people. And after forty years of successful inactivity, the alliance has also taken on demanding peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, in the latter case involving an intense air war.

These events would seem to cast doubt on the gloomy prognosis advanced in this chapter. If the divisive forces identified herein are present and growing, then what explains the persistence of the transatlantic ideal? Why is the US apparently willing to maintain or expand its world-girdling array of security commitments, and why did NATO agree to go to war in the Balkans? I believe three factors are responsible.

First, the end of the Cold War left America in an unprecedented position of preeminence. Victorious great powers typically try to mould postwar worlds to suit their own interests and ideals, and the US is not the sort of country that would pass up such an opportunity. Not every foreign policy élite gets a chance to remake the world in its own image, and the energetic internationalists in the Clinton administration were especially vulnerable to this sort of temptation. Americans

like telling themselves that they are the “one indispensable power” — to use Madeleine Albright’s self-flattering phrase — and it even seems appropriate when the US economy is booming and when one has at one’s disposal the enormous military establishment acquired during the Cold War.

Second, the Atlantic alliance is heavily bureaucratized, and no organization goes out of business quickly or willingly. We would not create NATO now if it did not already exist, but keeping it going seems easier and less risky than letting it collapse.

Third, the US is able to extend these new commitments because other states have been only too happy to free-ride on its protection. Why should the Europeans do the heavy lifting when Uncle Sam is still willing to do most of the work? Why would Poland or Hungary *not* want the prospect of US protection, even if it is a guarantee that Americans would never really want to honour? The US remains Europe’s ideal ally, not least because it is an ocean away and does not threaten to subjugate them. Although its allies do resent America’s highhandedness and seek to rein in its occasional enthusiasms, for the most part they have been letting it have its way.

Given these conditions, one can envision an optimistic scenario in which the transatlantic partnership holds together and gradually expands, peace deepens, and prosperity grows. In this scenario, NATO does not in fact have to do much of anything, so nobody in the US minds, and everything is copacetic. This is precisely the vision that the Clinton administration has been counting on: expanding the alliance prevents conflict throughout Europe and the US never has to pay any real costs at all.

Unfortunately, this strategy is unlikely to weather the various challenges that lie ahead. If the US economy slows or goes into recession — as it eventually will — support for overseas commitments is likely to shrink. When one of these commitments eventually costs lives — as in Somalia — skeptics will begin to ask whether US vital interests are really at stake. And as discussed above, America’s European allies are becoming less and less willing to accept the role of junior partners. This is partly because they no longer need the US as much as they did when the Red Army stood on Western Europe’s doorstep, but also because they realize that America’s promises are not worth as much as they once were. Although few Europeans are eager to see the US withdraw, they are starting to hedge against this very real possibility.

Most importantly, the passage of time will bring European and American differences into sharper relief. Consider the implications of China’s continued rise. If China does emerge as a true great power in the next century, the US is likely to take steps to contain its influence. Such a policy will require allies in Asia and the Pacific, but the European states are less concerned by China’s rise and have less to contribute to addressing it. (Indeed, a revitalized Russia would be a more useful ally against a rising China, which is another reason why Washington should take care not to humiliate Moscow by expanding NATO ever eastwards.)

Conclusion

The above example illustrates the fundamental problem once again: shorn of an overarching threat to focus the mind and compel Western unity, the US and its traditional European partners will have less and less reason to agree. Although they retain certain common interests and will undoubtedly continue to cooperate on a variety of issues, consensus will neither be as significant nor as automatic in the future as it was in the past.

Instead, the Atlantic alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing robust and youthful as it grows older and ever more infirm. The Washington treaty may remain in force, the various ministerial meetings may continue to issue optimistic communiqués, and the NATO bureaucracy may keep the NATO webpage up and running, provided the alliance is not asked actually to do anything. The danger is that NATO will be dead before anyone notices, and we will discover the corpse only at the awkward moment when we expect it to show signs of life.

So what is to be done? The first step is to accept that US and European interests are gradually diverging. Instead of expecting a common front on each and every issue, Europe and America will be better off allowing each other to be more independent. Presumptions of unity will disappoint both sides and create a higher risk of a disruptive backlash whenever serious disputes do arise. Lowering expectations may also alleviate concerns about credibility, for if the US and Europe learn not to expect unanimity, they will be less likely to view the inevitable disagreements as evidence of a fading commitment.

The second step is to stop placing ever-larger burdens on NATO's already overloaded agenda. Instead of trying to keep the alliance together by adding members and missions, the focus should be on goals that are relatively easy to meet. The minimum goal should be a token US presence in Europe — to keep the link alive and to discourage intra-European security competition — and the preservation of strong consultative mechanisms between Europe and the US. The goal should be to ensure that Europe and America continued to see the other as reliable partners when common problems arise and to ensure that mechanisms for common action are in place should they be needed.³¹

Finally, where does this leave Canada? As the other non-European member of the alliance, Canada occupies a unique position within NATO. Just as various European states have used America's presence in Europe to ensure that no European power was able to dominate the continent, Canada has used NATO's European members to dilute American dominance in the Western hemisphere. But if Europe and the US are beginning to drift apart, then this will leave Canada isolated with its large and sometimes boisterous neighbour. In the short term, therefore, Canada's best strategy is to serve as an intermediary between the US and Europe, so as to prolong the transatlantic structures to the maximum extent. In the long term, however, Canada must prepare for the day when it must cope with US power

largely on its own. The good news is that US power is unlikely to be a malevolent force in Canadian affairs, although it is certain to require awkward adjustments from time to time.³²

The waning of transatlantic partnership is no reason to rejoice. NATO was a great source of stability during the Cold War, and its existence helped manage the potentially dangerous interregnum that followed the collapse of the Soviet empire. But nothing is permanent in international affairs, and NATO's past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. Instead of mindlessly extending guarantees to every potential trouble spot, and instead of basing their foreign policies on a presumption of permanent partnership, it is time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement. It is going to happen anyway, and wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history, rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle against them.

Notes

1. This paper draws upon research previously published in "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," *National Interest*, no. 54 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 3-11; and "The Precarious Partnership: America and Europe in a New Era," in *Atlantic Security: Contending Visions*, ed. Charles A. Kupchan (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations/Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
2. See Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996): 445-75.
3. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of America's Continental Commitment," in *No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe*, ed. Geir Lundestad, (New York: Macmillan, 1998); and Idem, *Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, forthcoming).
4. See Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
5. Some experts justify keeping troops in Europe by referring to the danger of a resurgent Russia, but this justification is increasingly hollow. Germany's GNP is almost twice as large as Russia's, and NATO's European members spend more than three times what Russia spends on defence. See *The Military Balance 1999-2000* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).
6. As Christoph Bertram has noted, "the fear of Soviet power pressed Western Europe and the United States into a cohesive form for half a century." He also predicts that "the appearance of cohesion will be short-lived" now that the Soviet threat is gone. See his *Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 87
7. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. chap. 8.
8. Policymakers who are fond of proclaiming that "America is a European country" need to spend a few minutes perusing an atlas. America is many things, but is quite

clearly *not* located in Europe. For typical examples of this sort of propaganda, which is routinely invoked to justify the US commitment, see Richard Holbrooke, "America: A European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (March/April 1995): 38-51. Not surprisingly, new NATO members such as Poland are especially eager to preserve the US role. As a senior Polish official recently put it: "We simply don't believe that Europe without the United States is safe . . . If this century has taught us anything, it's that Europe and America are one strategic space." Quoted in Steven Erlanger, "Poland Is Pressed to Choose Between Europe and U.S.," *New York Times*, 4 June 2000, p. A6.

9. As one Republican Congressman, Dana Rohrabacher, commented in May 1999, the Europeans "have suckered us in again. If Kosovo is so important, the alliance can step forward and take over." Quoted in Guy Gugliotta, "Why Capitol Hill Gives Mixed Signals on War," *Washington Post*, 9 May 1999, p. A22. A year later, the Senate narrowly rejected a bill that would have cut off funds for the American deployment in Kosovo, offering a clearer sign of its displeasure over the seemingly open-ended commitment there.
10. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "NATO at 50: With Nations at Odds, Is It a Misalliance?" *New York Times*, 15 February 1999, p. A7. Or in the words of one French academic, America "does what it wants. Through NATO it directs European affairs. Before we could say we were on America's side. Not now. There is no counterbalance." Michel Winock, quoted in "More Vehemently than Ever, Europeans are Scorning the United States," *New York Times*, 9 April 2000, pp. A1, A8.
11. Not surprisingly, serious proposals for a more independent US grand strategy have become more visible since the end of the Cold War. Examples include Eric C. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Eugene Gholtz, Daryl Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997): 5-48.
12. "Statement on European Defence," Joint Statement by the British and French governments, Saint-Malo, France, 4 December 1998. For background and analysis, see Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Lainé, and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defence Capability," *Survival* 41 (Spring 1999): 20-40.
13. See Anne Swardson, "EU to Form European Military Force," *Washington Post*, 12 December 1999, p. A41; and Peter Norman, "EU Edges Closer to Defence Policy," *Financial Times*, 12 February 2000.
14. In 1960, US direct investment in Europe was only 1.2 percent of gross domestic product, and the return on that investment amounted to only \$397 million (compared to a total GDP of \$526 billion). See *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962* (Washington: US Bureau of the Census, 1963).
15. In 1996, total trade with Europe was approximately \$311 billion, while trade with Asia was nearly \$525 billion. Europe purchased 23 percent of US exports, while Asia purchased over 32 percent. See *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1997* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1996).
16. In 1990, US direct investment in Europe was roughly \$214 billion, while investment in Asia was roughly \$64 billion. By 1994, investment in Asia had grown to \$108 billion while investment in Europe was about \$300 billion. *International Direct*

- Investment Statistics Yearbook, 1996* (Paris: OECD, 1996); *International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1995* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1994).
17. See Jeffrey T. Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997), pp. 112-13, 229.
 18. One might even argue that the debacle in Bosnia was a godsend for Europhiles, because it forced the Clinton administration to pay more attention to Europe than it otherwise would have done.
 19. See C. Fred Bergsten, *Weak Dollar, Strong Euro? The International Impact of EMU* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1998).
 20. For a pessimistic summary of US-European trade relations, see Peter W. Rodman, *Drifting Apart: Trends in U.S.-European Relations* (Washington: Nixon Center, 1999), pp. 21-24.
 21. The proportion of US citizens of European origin will decline from 80 percent in 1980 to 64 percent in 2020, while the share of Hispanics will rise from 6 percent to 15 percent, and of Asians from 2 percent to 7 percent. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994* (Washington: US Bureau of the Census, 1994), p. 18.
 22. See *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996*; and *Population Profile of the United States 1995*, Current Population Reports, Special Studies Series P23-189 (Washington: US Department of Commerce, 1995).
 23. In the last two presidential elections, decorated World War II veterans were defeated by a man born *after* the war and who had avoided military service. This is a far cry from the days when military service was virtually obligatory for national office, and when a former SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) could serve two terms as president.
 24. A first-year university student today was only four years old when Gorbachev began the policy of *glasnost*, and only nine when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Such events as World War II, the Berlin Airlift, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the SALT talks will be ancient history for the next generation of foreign policy élites.
 25. See "A New German Assertiveness on Its Foreign Policy Stance," *New York Times*, 12 September 1999, p. A8; and Rodman, *Drifting Apart*, pp. 75-76.
 26. See Ole R. Holsti, "Continuity and Change in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Opinion Leaders," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, September 1997.
 27. In a 1996 Louis Harris poll, the proportion of US respondents describing a particular state as either a "close ally" or "friendly" were as follows: Canada, 90 percent; Great Britain, 89 percent; France, 68 percent; and Germany, 66 percent. See Survey Research Consultants International, *Index to International Public Opinion, 1996-97* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 227.
 28. Foreign policy issues are increasingly seen as among the least important problems facing the nation, and there is clear support for reducing intelligence gathering, defence spending, and economic and military aid to other countries. According to a 1999 survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, when Americans are asked to identify two or three problems facing the nation, foreign policy issues do not even make the top five responses. When asked to identify two or three foreign

- policy problems, the most frequent response (at 21 percent) was “don’t know.” Support for traditional overseas commitments was also at an all-time low in this survey. See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
29. In October 1995, for example, the Gallup Poll reported that 69 percent of respondents supported the US deployment to Bosnia (with 29 percent opposed), *assuming* that no American lives would be lost. When asked to assume that the mission would lead to twenty-five US deaths, however, only 31 percent of the respondents supported deployment and 64 percent were opposed.
 30. In 1998, US defence expenditures alone were roughly one-third of the world total. America spent 55 percent more than NATO Europe combined, nearly five times more than Russia, eight times more than Germany, and seven times more than China or Japan. Put differently, the US spent more than the next six countries combined, and four of those six are its formal allies! Military superiority is a good thing, but too much of a good thing is hard for anyone to sustain. On the fiscal constraints that will limit defence expenditures in the years ahead, see Cindy Williams and Jennifer Lind, “Can We Afford a Revolution in Military Affairs?” *Breakthroughs* 8 (Spring 1999).
 31. This may also require revising the existing strategic concept, which commits NATO to preserve peace and stability in and around NATO territory, even if NATO countries are not under attack. For a general discussion of the desirability of the sort of “minimal NATO” prescribed here, see Michael Brown, “Minimalist NATO: A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench,” *Foreign Affairs* 78 (May/June 1999): 204-18.
 32. As former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously remarked, being America’s neighbour “is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or even tempered is the beast ... one is affected by every twitch and grunt.” Quoted in Louis Turner, *Invisible Empires* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 166.

6. *Conclusion and Policy Implications*

David G. Haglund

For more than half a century, NATO has been a presence in Canadian grand strategy. At times, it has loomed so large as to be seen by some Canadians as capable of dictating the country's foreign and defence policies. At other moments, its shadow has receded so far as to raise among the country's allies deep concern about its ongoing "commitment" to their security. Rarely has the relationship between Canada and the alliance been without some elements of controversy, even though it is true that Canadian publics have tended to remain rather favourably disposed to NATO, and do so today.

Thus any policymaker or political actor in Canada would do well to resist the temptation (if that is what it is) to argue for a dissolution of the country's alliance bonds. Neutrality has never been a saleable electoral commodity in the post-Second World War period, as the federal New Democrats were reminded time and again during the 1970s and 1980s, with no apparent effect on their learning curve. Nor does the current phase of Canadian foreign policy, characterized as it is by an abiding concern for "human security," suggest that the alliance has become irrelevant to Canadian purposes. As some of the chapters of this volume have argued, the contrary is rather the case. Does this mean, however, that future governments in Ottawa should decree that, in the case of NATO policy, the best rule remains "noli me tangere"?

Hardly. In the first place, as all the contributors have argued, changes in the structure and perhaps even content of international politics have rendered change for the alliance a necessity not a luxury, and it follows that with NATO in a constant state of evolution, prudent policymakers must similarly regularly adjust the alliance's relationship to and meaning for the "national interest." This is the case

for Canada no less than for any other ally, even if policy élites in this country might give the appearance of being more allergic to interest-based calculations than their counterparts elsewhere in the alliance.

Apart from the fact that the public seems to like membership in NATO, why should Ottawa want to continue a linkage with a security organization some claim has been rendered obsolescent by the passing of its former historic adversary? In the shortest answer, it should want this because the linkage advances at a reasonably affordable cost a set of interests (including those political interests we might call “values”) that Canada wishes to defend and promote. To be sure, should that security organization become so “obsolescent” as to be virtually useless, then a different calculus might emerge, even in a country such as Canada, which is an inveterate joiner of clubs, and rarely if ever leaves those to which it has acceded. Feckless international organizations, whatever their residual worth as “networking” institutions, may become both expensive and dangerous, and attentiveness to cost and risk should always be a first priority for policymakers.

Thus the point of departure for this concluding essay is to ask whether NATO has arrived at the stage of being too much bother, because in imposing danger and expense it goes against the strategic culture of a country that, blessed in its geographic setting, has developed an abiding preference for minimization of costly commitments to the security of others (notwithstanding much rhetoric to the contrary)? It might seem that an alliance that has recently gone to war for the first time in its existence is an alliance that looks like becoming just such a bother, because whatever else war does, it surely extracts a hefty price in terms of emotional and physical resources. Yet the conflict with Serbia in the spring of 1999 was a reasonably easy one for Ottawa and the Canadian public to digest ethically, and the costs of waging the war were well within the government’s capacity to bear, even on the part of a Canadian Forces that had been downsizing relentlessly for several years.

It is true that some elements of the air force were on the verge of being overstretched by the war effort; withal, the country’s military managed to come across as an effective contributor to a common cause held to be worthwhile, and to do so without having to incur any casualties. Moreover, a grateful government rewarded the military and the Department of National Defence with the first real increases in years in defence spending, thereby lessening (though hardly eliminating) the concerns felt about retention of combat capability. On the evidence, at least in the short term, of the war with Serbia, we should conclude that being an ally can be very worthwhile indeed, and that Canada and its military, to use the well-known phrase, can do well by doing good.

This recent experience, measured against the backdrop of an alliance that has clearly been evolving in a manner consistent with long-term Canadian political preferences, would seem to ratify expectations that the status quo is a healthy one, insofar as concerns Canada and NATO. Thus, if one purpose of this volume is to contribute to policy development in the light of an impending federal election

and future defence review, it might be possible to conclude that alliance relations constitute a domain of policy that warrants little review, and no change.

To so conclude, however, would be premature, and likely foolish, for there are developments in international security that really do suggest that the status quo may be untenable. The developments can be lumped into three categories, discussed variously in the pages of this book. The three categories relate to the alliance's structure, its purpose, and its size. I address these here in reverse order.

How large NATO should become has been a question that has preoccupied policymakers in Ottawa as elsewhere since the mid 1990s. Initially, it seemed as if the consensus in Ottawa was against any expansion (or, as it more strategically correct to call it, enlargement) of the Atlantic alliance, but by the time of the July 1997 Madrid summit, Ottawa had come around to plumping for an enlargement more capacious than that being championed by the United States and, more discreetly, by Germany. The Canadian preference (for bringing in five — and during a brief moment of confusion, six — new members) did not prevail. Has that preference been abandoned? Or should we query whether, if the preference made sense during the first “tranche” of enlargement, it should continue to make sense today, and tomorrow?

Should Canadian policymakers, in their upcoming defence review, continue to promote the cause of robust enlargement? Here the answer must be a qualified one, of “yes” and “no.” If “robust” expansion means bringing in new allies from the southeastern corner of Europe, then a good case can and should be made in Ottawa for the extension of membership at least to Slovenia, and possibly Slovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The argument for doing so would rest on the political and strategic utility of further expansion, the former because of the connection thought to exist between membership in NATO and a heightened probability of internal democratic stability, and the latter inhering in the recognition that NATO will increasingly be a Balkans-focussed entity charged with managing regional security as best it can. Having new allies in the neighbourhood should render easier the chore of regional pacification.

If robust expansion really means *robust* expansion of a collective-defence entity to those parts of Europe professing fear of Russia, then Ottawa should refrain from supporting such a second tranche. We now know what some doubted back in the mid 1990s: that it is possible to have a larger NATO without fundamentally alienating Russia. This does not mean Russia approves of the expansion that has occurred, for it does not; but it does suggest that the doom-and-gloom prophesies of certain analysts need to be discounted. It hardly follows, however, that because Russia can accept some expansion it can swallow *all* expansion; and alliance leaders would be wise to refrain from the provocation that adding the Baltic states would constitute — unless, of course, it were accompanied by an invitation for membership to Russia itself.

Expanding to the southeast in Europe is a signal that NATO wants to contain disorder; taking in the Baltics is a signal that it intends to contain Russia. The

latter would constitute a commitment that Canada would not want to make, and that if it made would hardly wish to honour if doing so meant a dangerous reversal in a pattern of relations with Russia that, Pavel Baev reminds us, has become reasonably (though not excessively) “cooperative.”

This brings us to a second factor of change, the purpose of the alliance. NATO’s charter mandate, as is well known, is collective defence. It is equally well known that it possesses no great-power foe against whom such defence appears now to be needed. Some see this absence as a guarantee of the declining utility of the alliance; Stephen Walt is in this group, and there is logic as well as the weight of historical evidence to buttress this “structural-realist” expectation. But the expectation applies to a future that cannot, by the very nature of things, be observable to anyone. Whatever else the future may be, it never is “foreseeable,” if that adjective is to possess any meaning.

Were Ottawa decisionmakers to be enamoured of structural realism, they should wish the speedy demise of the alliance, and begin making designs for advancing Canadian interests through alternative means (which for American structural realists seems to require building up martial capability, with the only feasible short-term option for Canada being to acquire nuclear weapons). But that kind of “structural realism” seems singularly unrealistic in the Canadian case, and in any event that kind of structural realism has no adherents in Ottawa decisionmaking circles. But “realism” of a different sort abounds, and is reflected in the recognition that NATO *has*, as Joel Sokolsky argues, been evolving, *pace* the theoreticians, into something more than just a collective-defence entity, and that that evolution has been congruent with, and supportive of, the promotion of a Canadian strategic agenda that does make sense to Ottawa decisionmakers.

The implication here is that Canada will or should want to do what it can to continue the progression of the alliance along the path of cooperative security. If this is so, Canada will desire for its own reasons to promote the “trans-European” bargain through the mechanisms associated with the alliance’s Partnership for Peace. It will want to continue to foster a relationship with Ukraine that some describe as “special.” Since cooperative security under PFP auspices focuses on the twin goals of dialogue and conflict management, core initiatives in this respect will continue to be found in the areas of civil-military relations and peacekeeping. These are areas of alliance activity that appeal to Canadian strategic-cultural sensibilities, and are also areas in which it can be maintained the country does have some comparative advantage.

This leads to the last item of the trio: the debate over NATO’s structure and its potential impact on Canada. More than at any time in recent decades, there exists a conviction that a more integrated Western European defence entity — variously referred to as the European security and defence identity (ESDI), the European security and defence policy (ESDP), the European “pillar” of defence, or simply the “Europe of defence” — will be achieved. If achieved, the implications for

Canada's alliance interests, being potentially vast, would demand a policy response. But what are those implications expected to be?

At one extreme, they can be regarded as sinister, in squeezing Canada out of its comfortable position of being part of a multilateral grouping that relies upon consensual decisionmaking. In this view, Canada enjoys within NATO much the same status that the "Permanent Five" members of the UN Security Council enjoy within the world body: it can veto any initiative of which it disapproves. That, at least, is the theory; the reality, somewhat different, is congruent with a certain "constructivist" understanding of political action in which outcomes are seen to reflect a pattern of interaction in which are melded the interests of various partners and are deployed the same actors' varying "discursive" capabilities ("soft power" figuring prominently among that set). The fear is that a more coherent European defence entity will alter in a manner unfavourable to Canadian interests the consensual culture of the alliance, effectively depriving Canada of voice and constraining its room for maneuver. It will, in other words, strip it of some of its soft power.

Yet there is scope for a decidedly different reading of ESDI's meaning for Canada, one that stresses the contribution that a more coherent European effort can make to the common good. On this reading of events, the Europe of defence will be beneficial for Canada as it will enhance the security of all allies, and do so in way that presumably shifts more of the burden for European security onto the shoulders of the Europeans themselves, which is where Ottawa has for some time preferred to see it come to rest.

Additional considerations enter into the discussion. A Europe of defence, say some, will result in a widening of the Atlantic, even if such is not intended by anyone, and this on the basis of the argument that interests expand in rough proportion to any increase in capability. Thus a stronger Europe will find its interests and identity altering even if that is not its desire, and the alteration will inevitably be in a direction that sets Europe on a divergent course from that of the United States, raising for Canada a need to make a choice it would prefer not to make.

This prospect cannot help evoking yet again the hoary "counterweight" argument in Canadian alliance policy, one to which both Neil MacFarlane (approvingly) and Joel Sokolsky (less approvingly) make reference in their chapters. Can Ottawa somehow manipulate the course of events so as to maximize its security and its political autonomy (*vis-à-vis* the US, presumably) in light of the impending alteration of the structure of transatlantic security?

MacFarlane even suggests that Canada might wish to make a military contribution toward the new European security dispensation in crises from which the US chooses to abstain, for reasons additional to any counterweight longings. Attractive as the prospect may be in some respects (as in the case of human-security initiatives requiring a robust force presence in the absence of the kind of "vital interest" traditionally required to prod America to action), there is also a disquieting

sense of *déjà vu* occasioned by this vision. Let it be recalled that in the twentieth century's two world wars Canada *did* indeed play such a role in European security, during crises from whose resolution America tried — between 1914 and 1917, and again between 1939 and 1941 — to remain aloof. The experience was not generally a positive for Canada, nor was the two North American countries' relative separation on the vital issues of European security a factor that contributed to a healthy relationship between them.

In the end, Canada's policy toward the evolving NATO cannot be shaped independently from its policy toward defence cooperation with the United States. For reasons adduced in the paragraph immediately above, Canada has sought to be involved, as Joel Sokolsky puts it, with Uncle Sam when it must go "over there." A corollary of this, not addressed in the Sokolsky chapter, is that Canada has appreciated that an *allied* America — i.e., to other Western states as well as to Canada — was likely to be the most multilaterally inclined America one could expect to have. In this regard, NATO has always made sense as a vehicle for providing at least some access into the shaping of the *American* national interest. In Lord Ismay's famous phraseology, NATO has been good not only because it kept the Russians out and the Germans down, but because it got the Americans mixed up in the security affairs of other, reasonably like-minded, states. In a word, NATO constrained America's own room for maneuver, and that was seen as being good for Canadian interests both in Europe and, more to the point, on the North American continent.

It is possible to imagine other vehicles capable of enabling America to find its multilateral "geopolitical soul"; at the outset, the UN was itself intended to be just such a mechanism. But it soon ceased to be, and in the security realm only NATO continues to hold out the prospect of binding American might in a way that advances its interests along with those of Canada (and other allies). Only NATO, for the time being, makes the US the kind of multilateral agent that Canada prefers it to be and that many American unilateralists wish it were not. In the preference structure of the latter, as Stephen Walt claims, NATO has become more of a liability than an asset to America.

Assume Walt is correct: is there any reason to think that Canada can somehow make a difference in restoring American confidence in the alliance (on the presumption such confidence is waning)? If not, then it would appear that for Canada as well, albeit for radically different reasons, the alliance would have lost much of its validity, in which case the argument against withdrawal would similarly have lost much of its persuasiveness. It is possible, albeit difficult, to imagine that an America in a NATO-less world would be more inclined than is today's America toward mutually beneficial defence collaboration with Canada, featuring as it must a heightened degree of genuine consultation, which would be a *sine qua non* for palatable continentalism from Canada's point of view. But why should the US in a NATO-less world be more willing to consult meaningfully with Canada than today's America has been?

Canada may, in the not too distant future, find itself having to answer that question. For the moment, greater practical utility might attach to a policy review intended to enable Canada to do what it can (which may be more than is sometimes thought) to preserve the alliance structure most congenial to its European and, even more importantly, world-order interests. In what would such a congenial structure consist? We have already glimpsed some of its features. It would be an alliance in which the trans-European bargain compensated for whatever fissiparous tendencies were being unleashed, no matter how inadvertently, by the Europe of defence. It would be an alliance geared more toward the projection of cooperative security and Canadian world-order interests, and less dedicated to the more narrow task of defending Western Europeans against an unknown adversary (even if the unknown lurks within Western Europe itself). It would be an alliance that continues to matter to Americans. And, because the defence of “Europe” cannot be allowed to become for the Canada of the early twenty-first century what it was for the Canada of the early twentieth century, it would be an alliance that imposes the fewest possible risks and the lowest cost upon a country that no longer does or should regard itself as a “European power.”

NATO membership continues to make sense for Canada, but not because it is the means of ensuring the security of the Western Europeans. It is good for Canada that Western Europe remain what it has been for half a century, a “zone of peace.” But if that were all that NATO entailed, it would become increasingly difficult to understand why a middle-ranking North American power whose ethnic composition grows less and less European should see itself as being perpetually charged with the responsibility to look after the security needs of the rich and sometimes large European democracies. This would be so even if the Europeans actually understood the true extent of the Canadian involvement in the security affairs of their continent. Generally, however, the Europeans do not, and seem still to believe that Canada somehow “left” Europe militarily — this notwithstanding that the same proportion of the country’s military remained deployed in Europe a decade after the Cold War’s ending as was there while that contest was still being waged.

Many things are worth fighting for, and some are even worth dying for. But preserving (or, in this case, resuscitating) a “counterweight” that has rarely been anything other than metaphysical is a cause for neither. Nor, let it be emphasized, can it be the explanation for, much less a justification of, Canada’s ongoing involvement in NATO.

Contributors

Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and editor of *Security Dialogue*.

David G. Haglund is director of the Centre for International Relations and professor of political studies at Queen's University.

S. Neil MacFarlane is Lester B. Pearson professor of international relations and director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford.

Joel J. Sokolsky is professor of political science and acting dean of arts at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Stephen Walt is professor of international relations at the Kennedy School, Harvard University.

