

Unfair Play

Unfair Play

Cyprus, Turkey, Greece,
the UK and the EU

Costas Melakopides

Centre for International Relations, Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada

2006

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Melakopides, Costas

Unfair play : Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the EU /
Costas Melakopides.

(Martello papers, ISSN 1183-3661 ; 29)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-55339-096-2

1. Cyprus--History--Cyprus Crisis, 1974-, I. Queen's University
(Kingston, Ont.). Centre for International Relations II. Title. III. Series.

DS54.9.M443 2006 956.9304 C2006-900464-1

The Martello Papers

The Queen's University Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of security studies, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues relevant to contemporary international strategic relations.

On April 24, 2004, a referendum was held in Cyprus on the Annan Plan to resolve the dispute that has divided the island for over 40 years. To many outsiders the outcome seemed perverse: the inhabitants of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – the product of a 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation whose leaders had hitherto balked at all attempts at negotiated settlement – voted strongly in favour, while the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan by an equally large margin. The latter seemed, out of ignorance or spite, to have walked away from the last chance to achieve their – and the international community's – aim of reunifying the island before it entered the EU in May, 2004.

Costas Melakopides sets out to sift through the paradoxes and complexities of those events. Central to his analysis is a methodical deconstruction of the Annan Plan, whose provisions, he argues, run counter not just to Greek-Cypriot interests but to fundamental principles of international law. He portrays an international community acting less as a neutral arbiter than as a fixer, serving British needs with respect to bases, and American needs with respect to Turkey: keeping it on side over Iraq and getting it into the EU. Context explains a lot: Melakopides leads us through the tortuous processes by which Cyprus and Turkey have moved toward membership in the EU, the fate of their applications increasingly intertwined. He shows the Greek government of Costas Simitis attempting to square the diplomatic

circle by supporting Turkey's aspirations to membership, and the Turkish government seemingly incapable of responding constructively either over Cyprus or over other issues. If the Greek Cypriots found fault with the Annan Plan, they had every incentive to reject it and no reason not to, since "their" Cyprus was already assured of membership in the EU no matter what the outcome. An historic opportunity may have been lost here, but Melakopides shows why we should not have been surprised.

We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all *Martello Papers*, the views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of their services, the QCIR, or any of its supporting agencies.

Charles C. Pentland
Director, QCIR
January 2006

Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Recent Cypriot Historical Record and International Law	9
3. The Vicissitudes of Cyprus-EU Relations	19
4. Turkey's Strategic Ambitions and European Adventures on the Way to December 2004	31
5. Greece's Foreign Policy Conundrums	43
6. The Annan Plan and Its Discontents	53
7. Unfair Consequences, Ambiguous Implications	65
8. Stock-taking and Conclusions	73
Notes	89

1. Introduction

The present monograph is, in a sense, a sequel to my earlier Martello, *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative* (1996). The main impetus of that publication – submitted in November 1995 – was a feared military clash between Turkey and Greece, and the desire to submit tangible proposals for Greek-Turkish détente and reconciliation. That work argued that, given the insanity of any military confrontation between the two NATO allies, and in view of the rich availability of rational and fair means of conflict resolution, both the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus problem should be settled through the employment of legal tools. Hence the monograph proposed that, while the Aegean dispute should be settled by the International Court of Justice, the Cyprus problem should be handled on the basis of the numerous legal/political pronouncements and decisions of such international organizations as the European Union and the United Nations. Therefore, the serious Greek-Turkish crisis of January 1996 around the Imia islets confirmed the fears expressed in my Martello. On the other hand, it was deeply gratifying that the December 1999 Helsinki European Council’s proposals about the Aegean and even Cyprus were, arguably, akin to my suggestions.¹

In any event, a rare combination of rational policies and disastrous physical phenomena (the two earthquakes) led Greece and Turkey away from a military confrontation, after being at the brink at Imia. Beginning in 1999, they entered a period of partially substantial, if at times shaky, quasi-détente. As chapter 5 will show, the spring 1999 change of leadership in the Greek Foreign Ministry – when mild-mannered, “idealist” George A. Papandreou replaced tempestuous Theodoros Pangalos – in combination with the “seismic diplomacy” that followed the misery of the August-September

1999 earthquakes, ushered in a palpable easing of the two neighbours' pernicious tensions. In addition, the change of bilateral climate facilitated some important decisions, such as those contained in the Presidency Conclusions of Helsinki and the signing of a number of bilateral protocols and treaties.

Athens considers, and all Greek analysts agree, that Greece has worked diligently and consistently, especially after Helsinki, to support and promote Turkey's EU progress and bilateral détente. However, the aforementioned "climatic change" has not obliterated either Ankara's risky Aegean "revisionism" or its stubborn maximalism in Cyprus.² Thus, although a historic transformation of Turkey's political landscape occurred by its November 2002 parliamentary elections – when the pro-Islamic AK Party of Recep Tayyip Erdogan was victorious – Ankara's policy on Cyprus has remained essentially unchanged since the 1974 invasion, just as its stance in the Aegean follows the pattern it shaped that same year.³ This labyrinthine picture cries out for thorough investigation. For Ankara's manifold obligations towards Cyprus, Greece, and the EU have become more pronounced – and their fulfilment even more urgent – since at the December 2004 European Council Turkey attained the historic decision to start accession negotiations.

Arguably, the Aegean dispute may prove easier to handle, since the legal route was explicitly endorsed by the 1999 Helsinki Summit, should bilateral Greek-Turkish negotiations have proven fruitless by the end of 2004. The Cyprus case, however, is quite different. Although this issue has also been "Europeanized" since March 1995,⁴ the geopolitical map of the Eastern Mediterranean is far more convoluted, like the broader geo-strategic interests associated with it. Therefore, whereas the Aegean dispute will be confronted in this essay more schematically, the Cyprus conundrum constitutes a principal concern. Beyond the obvious "autonomous" interest that Cyprus attracts – intensified after the notorious referendum of 24 April 2004 – the resolution of its political problem will have far wider implications. Besides being a *sine qua non* condition for the ultimate "normalization" of the Greek-Turkish relationship and for Turkey's smooth relations with the EU, Cyprus constitutes a deeply disconcerting preoccupation of the Union, especially since the Republic's full accession on 1 May 2004.⁵

Now, the referendum on "the Annan plan" assumed historic significance for Cyprus and Turkey, as well as for Greece and the EU. Given, moreover, the direct and even passionate involvement of Washington and London in

both the referendum and the very making of the associated plan, it follows that the latter necessitates a closer reading and a brutally honest evaluation. Moreover, 18 months since the referendum, it has transpired that thorough knowledge of the Annan plan, and what it entailed, was entirely absent in most circles. Therefore, many explanations of why the Greek Cypriots' "No" reached a resounding 76%, whereas the Turkish Cypriots' "Yes" received 65%, were bound to be utterly defective.

The commonest "explanatory" generalization is disingenuous and simplistic; therefore, unfair and false. It asserts that the Greek Cypriots "rejected reunification" whereas the Turkish Cypriots "embraced" it.⁶ Even worse, this false major premise has been widely used towards two unwarranted "deductions": first, that the Greek Cypriots had to be "punished" for their vote and, second, that the Turkish Cypriots ought now to be "rewarded". This grand *non sequitur* has been propagated by the very circles that inspired and "marketed" the Annan plan. Hence this essay aims to establish, among other things, that these circles had been eager only to *get rid of* the Cyprus problem as against solving it functionally and fairly. For, given that President Tassos Papadopoulos had already signed the Treaty of Accession in April 2003, it is manifest that any solution of Cyprus' political problem should uphold the principles of International and European law and should respect the norms and values on which the Union is founded. Therefore, it may seem incomprehensible to the uninitiated that the Annan plan was meant, in fact, to digress from, and even to violate, such principles, values and norms.

This thesis – which is central to this essay – becomes less astonishing once those propagating the Annan Plan are identified and their self-regarding interests articulated. Chapters 6 and 7 will elaborate on this issue. Here, however, we may just sketch who was meant to gain what from the "Annan plan" affair, to help explain the Greek Cypriots' bitterness, London and Washington's immense frustration, and the UN Secretariat's initial fury. It will also account for one of Ankara's major anxieties after 17 December 2004 while introducing the EU's Cyprus-related dilemmas.

London and Washington had participated openly, from the start, in the very formulation of the plan that carried the SG's name. The UK's interests centred primarily on retaining the two post-colonial "Sovereign Base Areas", entrenched in the Republic since Cyprus' 1960 independence.⁷ Simultaneously, London extended unqualified support to Washington's eagerness to help Turkey get absolved from the legal condemnation and guilt flowing from the 1974 invasion and occupation of 37% of Cypriot

territory. Moreover, Washington has long been making abundantly clear its fervent interest in Turkey's EU accession. This accession, however, had confronted the Cyprus occupation as a formidable obstacle – until the Annan plan. In addition, Washington arguably favours Turkey's EU membership as another means to hold the Union under its aegis, decreasing its ability to attain the status of a veritable global power or become “the alternative superpower with a moral difference”.⁸ Finally, as regards Turkey, it is already clear that this plan was meant to facilitate EU accession, Turkey's cardinal foreign policy concern.

Numerous further “turcophile” features were contained in the latest “UN plan”. First, Ankara's repeated legal condemnations for the invasion and occupation were to be formally annulled by the plan, with the Greek Cypriot victims' consent. Second, this would have entailed that Turkey was no longer obliged to compensate even one more victim of the occupation beyond Ms Titina Loizidou.⁹ Third, thanks to the plan, Turkey would have a “right of intervention” in the new state, despite the manifest illegality of such a notion regarding any modern state, let alone a full member of the European Union. Fourth, Ankara would have acquired the status of a hegemonic power over the entire “United Cyprus Republic”, given the powers of immediate control over the “Turkish Cypriot Constituent State” and thanks to tens of thousands of illegal Turkish settlers, to be *legitimized* now as “Cypriot” citizens. And fifth, the attempted legitimization of such settlers by the Annan Plan amounted to forgiving what international law regards as a war crime.

It already follows that the plan carrying the Secretary General's name bordered on being an international legal, political, and ethical scandal. Therefore, it cannot be surprising that the Greek Cypriots found it unbearably lopsided, unworkable and unfair. As chapter 6 will show, their rejection of the plan had nothing to do with any rejection of reunification or with a refusal to cohabit and collaborate with the Turkish Cypriots. Their rejection was confined to a refusal to endorse *this particular plan*, in association with a rational and reasonable expectation: that the European Union owes them assistance for the construction of the proper conditions for a fair and viable reunification, under the Union's celebrated values, principles and norms enjoyed by all other Europeans. In other words, the Greek Cypriots desired then, and keep expecting, a *European solution for all Cypriots*.

For these reasons, this paper will revisit the Annan Plan and the April 2004 referendum. In addition, it will help expose the aforementioned undemocratic and immoral *non sequitur*, that the Greek Cypriots should be

“punished” for their (democratic) decision while the Turkish Cypriots should be “rewarded”, even in ways undermining the Republic’s sovereignty and its established rights. In fact, I hope to show that the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of a plan contradicting the EU’s principles, values and norms, constitutes an act of dignity and courage and, therefore, *deserves praise and recognition*. Finally, the discussion will investigate the best *modus operandi* required by a responsible EU. To this end, I will submit that the Union’s direct engagement is required by its established legal culture and its declared political values and ethical norms. But this engagement also constitutes the Union’s unique opportunity to score a major diplomatic victory where countless other international actors have failed. Needless to say, the *European* resolution of the Cyprus problem would serve Turkey’s own best needs. By the same token, therefore, it will entail the satisfaction of most interests of London, Washington, and of the EU itself.

Thus, the motivation behind the present essay transcends the need to set the record straight on the Cyprus-Turkey-Greece-EU “quartet”. It aims also to explain intriguing developments and submit modest predictions on probable outcomes. But it also intends to pronounce on the case of Cyprus from *the ethical point of view*. That is to say, the manner in which the Cypriots have been treated by the “international community”, primarily in connection with the Annan plan, provides irresistible material for a case study in international ethics. This entails *inter alia* a consideration of whether universally acknowledged principles and norms which form the subject-matter of ethics in IR have been violated or respected.¹⁰ Questions to be raised, for instance, include whether (primarily) the Greek Cypriots have been exposed to double standards, to hypocrisy, manipulation, the use of dirty “diplomatic” tricks, and corrupt methods of extracting the desired vote. Therefore, the discussion, in chapter 8, will also inquire whether Cyprus has been treated according to the EU’s professed axiological norms. Furthermore, explicit judgments are also required on whether, given its Cyprus policies, Turkey qualifies as a legitimate candidate for ultimate EU accession. Such questions and the forthcoming answers explain why this essay is entitled “Unfair Play”.

To anticipate, chapter 2 will review the Cyprus problem from the standpoint of international law, after sketching the recent historical record. This chapter will serve, first, to “place the author’s cards on the table” – in accordance with Gunnar Myrdal’s wise methodological advice¹¹ – and, second, to justify the self-consciously normative tone of the entire work.

Then, chapter 3 will recall the Republic of Cyprus' adventures on the way to accession since the publication of *Making Peace in Cyprus* and until the emergence of the "Annan plan". Chapter 4 will focus on Turkey, to address recent domestic developments in association with Ankara's foreign policy and strategic preoccupations, whereby the EU vocation emerged as the most rational goal. Chapter 5 will present Athens' sustained overtures to Turkey aiming at the establishment of new rules of conduct, for the immediate and ultimate benefit of the peoples of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. Concentrating initially on what I have termed "the Simitis doctrine"¹², it will be shown that, even before 1999 but especially since then, Athens laboured to establish détente and collaboration but failed to achieve Ankara's substantial reciprocity. Sadly, the same failure has marked Kostas Karamanlis' first 15 months in power, despite his adoption of his socialist predecessor's relevant policies. Then, chapter 6 will evaluate the Annan Plan and the April 2004 twin Cypriot referendum. Chapter 7 will demonstrate the further unethical involvement of some foreign powers, and some allied Greek Cypriot elites, in the aftermath of the referendum. The final chapter, after submitting insights into Turkey's *sui generis* political culture as a tool for deciphering Ankara's confusing policies towards Cyprus, Greece and the EU, will review proposals for the resolution of the Cyprus problem and the diffusion of the Greek-Turkish dispute. Here, the role of the European Union is expected to be salutary.

Methodologically, this work adopts the framework I introduced in *Making Peace in Cyprus*, that is, "Pragmatic Idealism". This framework combines the "Realist" preoccupation with the identification and comparison of various dimensions of power with the "Idealist" concerns for international law, international ethics, and the role and rules of international organizations. This synthesis further explains the work's "normative tone" which, I believe, is justified by the thesis that Realism typically abstains from the ethical evaluation of even grand political errors, just as it fails to condemn the serious ethical sins in IR.¹³ Any authentic Realist study of the travails of a small state, such as Cyprus, and of the prolonged, deep suffering of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is eager to remain "neutral" and "merely descriptive". Such neutrality is, of course, illusory. It is by now a methodological stereotype that, as a matter of fact and logic, Realism's "mere descriptiveness" masks a political *parti pris*. Indeed, Realism has failed – arrogantly and immorally – to take seriously the Cypriots' own point of view, their inalienable human rights, as well as the humane demands and expectations of the normative standpoint.

Contrariwise, “Idealist” studies of Cyprus and its problems tend to mesh with the post-modern school, as demonstrated by their excessive, if not exclusive, emphasis on “perceptions”, “narratives”, the “(mis-)understanding of the Other”, and so forth. The principal problem here, I submit, is this: their subjectivism entails the denial that the Cyprus problem is essentially an international relations issue and, for over three decades, a serious European Community/ Union problem as well. It follows that the Cyprus problem certainly involves “power-relations” and conflicting “geo-strategic interests”. Simultaneously, and beyond the European Union, it involves the United Nations, other international organizations (such as the Council of Europe), and international courts (such as the European Court of Human Rights). By implication, therefore, it involves both international ethics and international law.

Needless to say, the “pragmatic idealist” methodological synthesis should be judged by whether it ultimately avoids the sins and omissions of alternative methods and whether it helps pronounce on, and account for, most dimensions of the issues at hand.

2. *Recent Cypriot Historical Record and International Law*

A cardinal thesis of *Making Peace in Cyprus* (1996) was that, because any historical account of the Cyprus problem is generally affected by ideological, methodological, nationalistic, and other biases, it was wiser to rely primarily on the international community's consensual opinion on the problem, an opinion premised on the principles and norms of international law. It transpired that the "Hellenic" (i.e. Greek Cypriot and Greek) conception of the matter coincided with the international community's shared view, whereas the "Turkish" (i.e. Turkish Cypriot and the secessionist regime's) position was unique and isolated. To reach this conclusion it sufficed to review a succession of decisions and pronouncements by international organizations (primarily UN resolutions and EC/EU resolutions and decisions), by independent legal experts, and by the European Commission on Human Rights, which preceded the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

Now, remarkable changes have occurred during the last decade. On the one hand, Cyprus' legal case has been strengthened decisively by successive pronouncements of the ECHR and the Council of Europe. Turkey's condemnation for violating a host of fundamental human rights by the illegal occupation was reiterated in the *Loizidou v. Turkey* Case in 1996 and – as will be shown – has continued ever since. Moreover, the Republic of Cyprus' full accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 has profound political and legal implications. By verifying and confirming the validity of the Republic's legal and political argumentation, it exposed the prolonged, unethical sophistry of Ankara's anti-Republic campaigns. On the other hand,

the nexus of powerful – essentially geopolitical and geo-strategic – interests identified in chapter 1 was mobilized by 2002 via the Annan plan. These interests' twin goal was to “close”, instead of solving, the problem of Cyprus and to acquit Turkey in order to facilitate its EU prospects.

Inter alia, the identified circles disseminated notions and cultivated perceptions that favoured the anti-international law interpretations and rationalizations of the “Turkish side”. It should not be supposed, however, that this campaign was sparked by the Annan plan; it has been ongoing for years. Under the pretext of “citizens’ diplomacy”, “bi-communal rapprochement”, and “conflict resolution seminars and meetings”, it has long been attempting to undermine or bypass the legal framework established by the post-war global legal culture. In sum, this campaign aimed at “psychologizing” and de-legalizing the Cyprus problem so as to contradict its real nature, which is that of an essentially international relations issue.¹⁴

The campaign in question mobilised the skilful misrepresentation of the historical record, to the effect that what preceded the 1974 invasion was the “profound misery and insecurity” of the Turkish Cypriots caused by the “chauvinism” or “extreme nationalism” of the Greek Cypriots. It “followed” then that the invasion was an “understandable intervention”, which implied, in turn, that Ankara’s manifest responsibility and guilt could be whitewashed. Thus, it cannot be surprising that untutored observers, including numerous decision-makers, have laboured under inevitable confusion regarding the Cyprus problem. For knowledge of some at least solid historical facts, and of the consistent international condemnation of Turkey for its Cyprus actions, is either absent or not readily available.

Thus, I wish to adopt again a central argument of *Making Peace in Cyprus*; namely, that a lengthy historical account of Cyprus’ travails is not here necessary. I submit that, among other things, a vicious circle of accusations, counter-accusations, concocted “evidence”, misinformation and profound vested – foreign but also domestic – interests prevents both sides from being entirely liberated from fixed and dogmatic views. It is also widely known that, whereas Greek Cypriots insist on a pre-1960 and a post-1974 view of Cypriot history, Turkish Cypriots fasten on the inter-communal sins and crimes that preceded the invasion, but keep denying that it *was an invasion*. To be sure, I have long witnessed that the Greek side has been over-generous in admitting its own share of responsibility; I have witnessed no parallel admissions by the Turks. Thus, the “Cyprus problem” becomes “essentially contested”.

For one thing, there is a serious problem of time, since it is nearly impossible to decide *objectively* when historical responsibility should begin. In addition, disturbing further questions arise: Precisely how far goes the responsibility of numerous foreign centres? What is Britain's share of guilt? Should we start our historical account with the EOKA liberation struggle – when London populated the security forces by Turkish Cypriots so as to obtain an inter-communal conflict¹⁵ or extend our hermeneutic horizon to decades of Britain's colonial rule and the centuries of Ottoman occupation? Next, could one ignore the incontrovertible fact that, before the EOKA uprising, the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus were living in conditions of harmony and friendship? And as regards the externally imposed 1960 Cypriot Constitution, shall we agree that it was inherently dysfunctional (as the Greek Cypriots and most serious analysts attest) or adopt the contrary Turkish view? But the latter view cultivates the myth that the Greek Cypriots wanted the entire island to themselves. In truth, they only desired constitutional revisions for a workable state, whereas Ankara was always seeking opportunities to realize partition. One of them was provided by the crisis of 1964 that almost led to a military invasion but was prevented by Lyndon Johnson's well-known epistle to Ankara. The crisis, however, revealed Washington's own perception of Cyprus at that time. For in his 1982 memoir, former undersecretary of State, George Ball, was disarmingly honest: "Viewed from Washington, the issues were clear enough. Cyprus was a strategically important piece of real estate at issue between two NATO partners: Greece and Turkey. *We needed to keep it under NATO control.*"¹⁶

To be sure, from a crude *Realpolitik* standpoint, the golden opportunity for intervention was provided by the insane anti-Makarios coup engineered by the Greek Colonels in July 1974. Therefore, inescapable questions arise here regarding responsibility for (a) the rise of the Junta to power; (b) Washington's unmitigated and morally inexcusable support to the Colonels' dictatorship;¹⁷ and (c) for American and British inaction regarding both the forthcoming coup and the under-preparation-invasion.¹⁸ Evidently, this account need not be repeated here.¹⁹ Instead, it is important to familiarise the reader with historic apologies expressed in the late 90s to Cyprus and Greece by distinguished Americans. Thus, Richard Holbrooke's November 1997 statement, while visiting Cyprus, included the following: "American history in this area is not entirely clean. There are some things that previous American Administrations did in this area, particularly between the mid-1960s and 1974, which I think were shameful... There are

certain things that happened, that the United States should not have done". Holbrooke's honourable apology was later repeated almost verbatim: first, by US ambassador to Athens, Nicholas Burns; and second, by President Bill Clinton during his 1999 Athens visit.²⁰

Finally, *even if* we granted for the sake of argument, that the Greek majority was more responsible for the inter-communal fighting of the 1960s; and even add the acknowledged guilt of the Athens junta's coup that preceded Ankara's July-August 1974 "response", *it certainly does not follow* that Turkey's 1974 double invasion and the 31-year-long occupation can be justified and should be excused.

That is why, until the November 2002 emergence of the first Annan plan, the international community's cardinal institutions and organizations had rejected unanimously Turkey's rationalizations, as we see below. Telling were also typical responses to the second (August 1974) invasion by distinguished international media. They all knew that, following the first Turkish military intervention of 20-22 July, both the Athens junta and the Nicosia mini-junta had collapsed; that democracy had returned to both countries; and two rounds of negotiations had taken place among the interested parties.²¹ *The Times* of London and *The Economist* could not contain their anger at Turkey's resort to bloody war before exhausting the available political and legal means of crisis resolution. Thus, the British daily proposed two types of action which "the United States and the rest of the international community" should take against Turkey:

First, Turkey should be told that if she does not immediately accept the cease-fire proposed by the UN Security Council she will be regarded as the aggressor and will be denied any supply of arms or spare parts so long as her troops remain in Cyprus... Secondly, it must be made quite clear to the Turks that there is no question of their obtaining international recognition for any kind of de facto partition of Cyprus, still less for the annexation of it... and they must be told that international support for the rights of Greek Cypriots (including the right to the independence and unity of their country) will not be changed by any Turkish military victory. In the last resort the threat that faces Turkey is that of becoming an international outcast.²²

Equally austere was the *Economist's* editorial, under the title "Smash and Grab": "Somebody thought the Turks would be more reasonable, more willing to go on spinning words, more Anglo-American than they turned out to be. But then the chief lesson of this week's events is that when a country thinks its army can pull off a quick smash-and-grab it is liable to

leave the diplomats, and their fine adjustments, standing on the sidelines. It is the same lesson as the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia.”²³

Making Peace in Cyprus contains useful information on the tragedy of 1974. A few figures suffice to indicate the misery it caused. Next to far fewer Turkish Cypriot refugees, the cost of the operation on the Greek Cypriot side included: 6,000 dead; 180,000 refugees; 3,000 missing persons; and the appropriation by Turkey of around 70% of Cyprus’ productive resources.²⁴

For reasons such as the above, the interested reader is urged to familiarise herself or himself with alternative “narratives” of recent Cypriot history. Here, then, we may turn to the resolutions and pronouncements of the relevant international organizations and to the Cyprus-related decisions of international courts. This record and its implications demonstrate why Turkey’s attempted rationalizations of the invasion and the occupation collapsed.

International Law on the “Cyprus Problem”

In view of the international community’s anger at Turkey’s bloody invasion, Ankara resorted to rationalizations. However, the solid prohibition of the threat and use of force in inter-state relations is crystallized in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Moreover, no exception to this cardinal principle could absolve Turkey from transparent responsibility and guilt. Hence, Ankara was forced to employ “legal” sophistry and, to this end, mobilize foreign apologists or nationalist Turkish analysts. Turkey’s defence, then, has been premised primarily on (a) the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, but also (b) individual self-defence, and (c) humanitarian intervention.

Treaty of Guarantee. Bulent Ecevit, Turkish prime minister at the time of the invasion, called it a “peacekeeping operation”. Despite its banality, this statement has been used frequently by Turkish officials as a cliché in Ankara’s rationalizations. It was, however, rather astonishing to hear Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul employ the cliché on CyBC TV, as late as February 2005. Asked by a Cypriot journalist, “When will your occupation troops leave Cyprus?” he replied: “What occupation troops? Our troops are there because of international treaties.”²⁵

Mr Gul could only have referred to the Treaty of Guarantee, which was attached to the Republic’s Constitution. But, in truth, Article 4 of this treaty stipulated that, in case of a constitutional breach, consultations among the

three guarantors (UK, Turkey and Greece) should lead to concerted action. Failing this, each guarantor reserved the right “to take action *with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.*” It follows immediately that Turkey’s violation of Cypriot territorial integrity and full sovereignty for 31 years renders Turkey’s rationalization null and void. Moreover, the assertion that by “taking action” the treaty envisaged the use of *armed force* is fatally flawed. For if this were the case, the treaty itself would have been illicit *ab initio*. For Article 103 of the UN Charter states explicitly that, in case of conflict between UN Members’ obligations under the Charter and obligations under other agreements, “their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” In fact, this is a principal reason why distinguished Canadian law professor, R. St. J. Macdonald, has evaluated Ankara’s actions as clearly violating international law. He added that the present interpretation (i.e. the *ab initio* inapplicability of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee) is also “preferred by Guggenheim, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice, McNair, and Schwarzenberger”.²⁶

Could Turkey make a case by appealing to any exception to Article 2(4) provided by the Charter? The exceptions are only two: Article 51 on the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence”; and Article 53 about enforcement action based on a regional arrangement or agency. Now, according to Professor Macdonald, “[t]hat the 1974 invasion was not an ‘enforcement action’ within the meaning of Articles 52 and 53 is fairly obvious.” For whereas Article 53 necessitates submission to the Security Council, Turkey never made any such submission. Hence, before considering Article 51, Prof. Macdonald’s general conclusion is as follows: “Unless the invasion is justified under Article 51 of the Charter, in which case it would be legal independently of the terms of the treaty, it would contravene Article 2(4). Since the intervention does not fall within the Article 53 exception to Article 2(4), then, by virtue of Article 103, compliance with the Treaty of Guarantee would not save it from illegality.”²⁷

Individual Self-Defence. Two possible grounds for this exception are conceivable: (a) danger to the Turkish Cypriots; and (b) danger to Turkey itself. The former has been Ankara’s second favourite defence. However, the first trouble with it is that the Turkish Cypriots are not and were not, of course, its nationals. This fact suffices to render Turkey’s move illegal. Moreover, as Ian Brownlie has established, Article 51 cannot be stretched to protect *even nationals* outside one’s territorial jurisdiction.²⁸ Finally, Professor Rosalyn Higgins’ expert opinion on extraterritorial intervention is worth quoting:²⁹

Article 51 only allows the use of force in self-defence. Is rescuing one's nationals abroad really what is meant by self-defence? The case law indicates that to be rather doubtful...The case of Entebbe is on its own facts very much clearer...In those circumstances it seems to me there is at least a case to be made that an "in-and-out action" by a foreign state is lawful, and does not in any real sense infringe the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the state. (I appreciate that any brief intrusion is, at the formal level, really an infringement of the territorial sovereignty.)

Most of us regard the short-lived, "in-and-out", Israeli action at Entebbe as legally and morally permissible. And yet, the UN Secretary-General called it at the time "a flagrant aggression". Therefore, Turkey's occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory, which has lasted since 1974 and which *did not* cover Turkish nationals, must qualify as "flagrant aggression" *a fortiori*.

The second aspect of the self-defence claim – concerning Turkey's own security – produces an identical conclusion. Turkey should have demonstrated either an imminent danger in summer 1974 or the certainty of its being attacked in the future. In fact, Turkey never made any such claims; for they would be patently absurd. Hence Professor Macdonald concluded his analysis as follows: "[T]he facts are that Turkish Cypriots are not nationals of Turkey, and that Turkey was not in imminent danger of an armed attack as a result of the Greek coup d'état."³⁰ Needless to say, precisely the same applies to any notion of a "future attack" against Turkey by Cyprus or even by Cyprus and Greece combined. Anyone familiar with their foreign policies, and their military power as compared to Turkey's immediately understands why.

Humanitarian Intervention. With the possible – if controversial – exceptions of post-Cold War *multilateral* humanitarian interventions, international customary law on such operations has recognized as permissible only the multilateral confrontation of genocide, under two stringent conditions: multilateral action *and* proof of an impending extermination. Remarkably, Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia was condemned by the Security Council in January 1979 despite the barbarism perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime. Therefore, Ankara's 1974 invasion had again to be condemned *a fortiori*: it was clearly unilateral; and there existed not even a remote suspicion of "genocidal" inclinations by or against anyone.

Finally, Turkey's invasion contradicted the *sine qua non* condition of purity of motives, by trying to create and exploit a military *fait accompli*. In 1981, Professor McDonald put it thus:

It is inappropriate to invoke the right of humanitarian intervention in regard to the 1974 invasion: as an anticipatory action, the intervention was premature and of a nature and duration in excess of what might have been necessary to achieve its humanitarian objective...[I]t may lead to de facto secession of part of the state's territory, and for this reason alone it seems difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the prohibition of Article 2(4). The intervention appears to have become an occupation.³¹

It follows that, whereas the first intervention (in July) would be defensible had it aimed to restore the *status quo ante*, Turkey's second (August) invasion constitutes a "flagrant aggression": for it violated the cardinal norm of international law which prohibits the use of force; and no available exception can negate its illegality. Moreover, the aggression is *continuing* through the 31-year-old military occupation. Consequently, its toleration contradicts the fundamental norms of international law, which show contempt for the cynical exploitation of geo-strategic power and the illegal use of military force. In Cyprus' case, such cynicism is morally and legally unbearable: for it also violates the cardinal legal principle, *ex injuria jus non oritur*, that is, injustice does not create right.

Turkey's invasion/occupation of Cyprus also violated the time-honoured ethical principles of the Just War theory. These include the criteria regarding (a) a just cause, (b) the right intention, (c) war as a last resort, and (d) the principle of proportionality. Therefore, to excuse Ankara and to allow it to "profit" from its Cyprus actions, as against paying for them, would compound the immorality. Hence the decisions by the European Court of Human Rights in *Titina Loizidou v. Turkey* (1996 and 1998) and the fourth case of *Cyprus v. Turkey* (May 2001) are literally historic.³² Equally historic is Turkey's paying Ms Titina Loizidou 1,000,000 EUR in November 2003 as compensation for preventing her from exercising her right to enjoy her property in occupied Kerynia. Therefore, the demand by the Annan Plan³³ to wipe out Turkey's obligation to compensate all the other similar victims was legally and morally contemptible.

Such principles and norms of international law have constituted all along the central pillars of Athens' and Nicosia's policies toward Turkey. Moreover, the political implications of Turkey's established illegality have been highly costly. Among other things, Ankara's application for European Community accession was rejected in December 1989 in part because of its Cyprus guilt. As the relevant section of the Opinion put it, "At issue are the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations."³⁴

Universal was also the condemnation of the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the illicit regime of occupied Cyprus (“TRNC”). Beginning with the European Community, “...The Ten reiterate their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. They continue to regard the Government of President [Spyros] Kyprianou the sole legitimate Government of the Republic of Cyprus. They call upon all interested parties not to recognize [the UDI], which creates a very serious situation in the area”.³⁵

Equally important, Resolution 541 (1983) of the Security Council stated that it “...1. *Deplores* the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus; 2. *Considers* the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal; ...7. *Calls upon* all States not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus...” Then, six months later, SC Resolution 550 reiterated the condemnation in no uncertain terms. For it emphasized that the Security Council “...1 *Reaffirms* its resolution 541 (1983) and calls for its urgent and effective implementation. 2. *Condemns* all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal; 3. *Reiterates* the call upon all States not to recognize the purported state of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” set up by secessionist acts...; 4. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus;...”³⁶

In view of such accumulation of resolutions and decisions, U.S. Congressman, Donald M. Payne, lamented in 1998: “The Cyprus problem is neither unique nor complex. It is aggression by one state against another and a violation of basic norms of international law. A total of ninety-nine UN Security Council resolutions and thirteen General Assembly resolutions have been adopted urging an end to the occupation of Cyprus; none was enforced.”³⁷

The secessionist regime is still recognised only by Turkey. But it was elevated to “a constituent state” in the “Annan plan”. Therefore, the UN Secretariat prepared a plan that contradicted directly the organization’s countless resolutions on Cyprus – including SC Resolutions 541 and 550 – while also disregarding Article 2(4), one of the UN Charter’s cardinal norms and a foundational principle of the post-war global legal culture.

Finally, the latest decision on Cyprus (6 April 2005) of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the case *Myra Xenides-Aresti v Turkey*

is of critical importance, as it was issued after the April 2004 referenda. The Greek Cypriot woman lodged in 1999 her complaint against Turkey for the continuous violation of her property rights in occupied Famagusta. The Third Section of the Court ruled unanimously that her case is admissible and will therefore be heard. The Court's decision annulled Turkey's pleas on the inadmissibility of the Court. Perhaps the decision's most decisive points are three: (1) that properties in occupied Cyprus continue to belong to their owners, as determined by the title deeds issued by the Republic of Cyprus prior to the 1974 invasion; (2) that the equal status of the two communities in the negotiations "does not entail recognition of the 'TRNC' or confer statehood thereupon"; and (3) that the rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek Cypriots does not have "the legal consequence of bringing to an end the continuing violation of the displaced persons' rights".³⁸ Such clear reconfirmation of the conclusions of the Titina Loizidou case represents the solid legal vindication of the Republic, with immediate implications for the two cardinal issues: first, the real "essence" of the Cyprus problem; and second, the proper manner of its resolution.³⁹

3. *The Vicissitudes of Cyprus-EU Relations*

The Republic of Cyprus' relationship with the EC/EU dates from the 1970s: in 1972, it signed an association agreement with the EEC and, in 1987, a Customs Union Protocol. On 4 July 1990, Nicosia submitted a formal application for membership. Three years later (30 June 1993), the Republic of Cyprus received the Commission's favourable Opinion. Following the confirmation of its "eligibility" by successive European Councils, the Council's meeting of 6 March 1995 proved historic. With Athens now abandoning its commitment to a veto until Turkey removed its troops from Cyprus, the Council approved Turkey's own Customs Union; in addition, it committed the Union to begin membership negotiations with Cyprus (and Malta) six months after the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). *Prima facie*, the trade-off could usher in serious potential for détente between Turkey and Greece by establishing Athens' strategy of "Europeanizing" both Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem. This impression was hyper-optimistic, as proven both immediately and in the subsequent years.⁴⁰

In any event, the Council also invited the Commission to prepare proposals for a pre-accession strategy for the Republic and to organize "in consultation with the Government of Cyprus, the requisite contacts with the Turkish Cypriot Community, to inform it of the advantages of EU accession and allay its concerns about the prospect".⁴¹ Two years later, *Agenda 2000* confirmed the start of accession negotiations with Nicosia. Demonstrating the Union's legal/political commitments to the Republic, the document reiterated "The Union is determined to play a positive role in

bringing about a just and lasting settlement in accordance with the relevant United Nations Resolutions. The status quo is at odds with international law, threatens the stability of the island, the region (sic) and has implications for security".⁴²

Accession negotiations with Cyprus and five Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) began in March 1998. In November of that year, the first *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession* painted an optimistic picture of Cyprus' preparations for membership. Cyprus soon began to lead its fellow-candidates in terms of speed and sophistication in adapting to EU policies and in adopting, chapter after chapter, the *acquis communautaire*.

And yet, Cyprus' road to eventual membership was bumpy and convoluted. The continuing occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory betrayed Ankara's blackmail: to keep the island hostage until it satisfied its own EU ambitions. As for the Turkish Cypriots, the international community had long assessed the leadership of Rauf Denktash as obstinate, provocative, and dependent entirely on Turkey and its troops of occupation. Therefore, the EU post-1998 intentions raised an intriguing question: was Brussels sharing Nicosia's conviction that the accession negotiations would act as a "catalyst" for the resolution of the problem? Or was the Union cultivating Cypriot illusions about accession without the prior resolution?

The indications supporting the "sympathetic" hypothesis were strong enough. First, the Community/Union had never deviated from supporting the Republic as the only legitimate entity on the Island. We have already seen the repeated EC/EU resolutions, statements and declarations condemning the occupation and the 1983 UDI and calling for respect for the UN Security Council resolutions. Second, Brussels had recognised the special needs and aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots living in the underprivileged occupied part. In fact, fully aware of Ankara's and Denktash's blackmail it was constantly calling the Turkish Cypriots themselves to "appreciate" the benefits of accession.⁴³ Third, fully appreciative of Ankara's eagerness to enhance its own EU prospects, the Union could not disregard Turkey's Cyprus-related legal and political obligations.⁴⁴ Fourth, Brussels openly expressed its satisfaction with President Glafkos Clerides' March 1998 invitation to the Turkish Cypriots to participate in the Cypriot negotiating team, calling the invitation "fair and generous". And fifth, the "sympathetic" interpretation of EU intentions could point to Cyprus' smooth accession process, from the Opinion of 1993 to the March 1998 start of the negotiations to the November 1998 positive first *Regular Report*. There-

fore, by adding the Union's own special Cyprus representatives to work with UN mediators, it could be concluded that the EU was now acting as an honest broker.

The "sceptical" hypothesis, however, was not bereft of supporters. Premised on hard-nosed and pessimistic *Realpolitik* foundations, it was predicting that Cyprus' accession would falter unless preceded by a settlement. Support was drawn from a set of Turkey-friendly assumptions and the claim that Cyprus' political problem suffered from an inherent impasse.⁴⁵ It was thus suggested, first, that the Cyprus problem was a veritable diplomatic headache which the Union would be unwise to "import". Second, France, Italy and Germany had occasionally expressed reservations about Cyprus' accession before resolution, primarily for self-regarding (especially economic) reasons, and lest they "disappoint" Turkey. Finally, emphasizing Turkey's vast market and geo-strategic significance some concluded that the Union should not "alienate" it.

Now for the "sceptical" hypothesis to be verified, a number of conditions had to be met. That they were not, augured well for the Union's ethical core. But it is informative to revisit the logic of the "sceptical" thesis, since Cyprus' political problem is not yet resolved. To begin with, to verify that thesis presupposed that the Union would have to contradict its resolutions, declarations and decisions concerning the victimization of all Cypriots – Greek and Turkish alike – by Turkey's invasion and occupation. In other words, the Union would have to legitimize Ankara's blatant violation of international law instead of defending its ethical principles and legal norms. Moreover, the sceptical argumentation was flawed on many particular scores. First, far from "importing" the Cyprus problem into the Union, the problem was in fact long entrenched therein: for Britain and Greece have been EC/EU members themselves; Cyprus was an associate member since 1972; and Turkey has been aspiring to candidacy. Second, both the UN and the EC/EU have been explicitly committed to the thesis that "the status quo is unacceptable" and that the problem ought to, and could, be solved on the basis of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. Third, if it was manifest that the leader of the Turkish Cypriots – under Turkey's instructions – was deviously intransigent, it should follow that the Greek Cypriots should not be victimised yet again by Turkey. Fourth, it seemed unthinkable that Turkey, a mere applicant country, could be allowed to veto the accession of another country! Finally, the sceptical stance seemed to disregard Greece's explicit warning: if a veto were raised against Cyprus' legitimate and justified accession, Athens would be forced to block the

accession of the remaining candidates. To the Union's credit, the sceptical thesis was falsified and the Republic of Cyprus acceded formally on 1 May 2004. But the adventures surrounding this half-happy outcome need to be reviewed, in the rest of this chapter and in our discussion of the Annan plan (chapter 6).

Beginning with the Union's perception of the Republic's accession progress, we should note that the first (November 1998) Commission Report identified some sectors where further progress remained to be made in the alignment of Cypriot legislation with the *acquis* and in the Republic's capacity to apply it. But the Commission was amply satisfied regarding the small state's economic, administrative, and legislative commitment to handle the obligations associated with the first and the third Copenhagen criteria. On the issues of democratic institutions and human rights, it noted: "The institutions of the Republic of Cyprus, in the area controlled by its government, function smoothly."⁴⁶ On the judicial system, it stated: "Judges are generally of high quality and their integrity is high."⁴⁷ And the discussion on human rights began as follows: "The EU during the 52nd Session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 18 March-26 April 1996, stated that 'the status quo has a direct negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The division of the island is not acceptable and causes suffering to the population (...) We call for full respect of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots'."⁴⁸ This statement, which echoed the *leitmotiv* of the Republic's appeals to the international community since 1974, confirmed the validity of the sympathetic thesis, i.e. that the accession of the Republic should entail the fair and viable settlement for the benefit of all Cypriots.

As regards the Cypriot economy, the Report recognized its strength and sustained growth. It also noted that the occupied territory would be the major beneficiary: "Study of the economic situation of Cyprus confirms the view that not only would its accession to the Community create no insurmountable difficulties but, on the contrary, as long as it was carefully planned and backed by the appropriate policies, would bring about greater prosperity and, in particular, would help the north make up the economic ground on the south"⁴⁹.

To support its evaluation, the Commission Report commended the government's economic performance in such fields as agriculture, energy, and transport. For instance, it recognized that "Cyprus has turned into a major international shipping centre. It now has the fifth largest ship registry in the world with 2,800 ships (including yachts) and it is one of the largest

third-party ship management centres with more than 100 ship management and ship owning companies”.⁵⁰ The final conclusion on the economy gratified Nicosia: “In the economic field, developments since 1993 confirm that the Cyprus economy possesses the ability to adapt to the challenges posed by the adoption of the *acquis* and that the authorities appear committed to restoring a stable macroeconomic environment and a favourable business climate”.⁵¹ Therefore, the Report entailed that Cyprus had satisfied the second Copenhagen criterion. Additional indicators about the years 1993-1997 validated the Cypriot claim that, in the middle of the 1990s, Cyprus was one of the few European countries that fulfilled the Maastricht criteria.⁵²

It was transpiring, therefore, that Cyprus could soon satisfy all its pre-accession obligations to fulfil its accession goals, which were primarily political, psychological, cultural and security-related, the economic being only secondary. For accession could achieve what all multilateral diplomacy could not: the return of full sovereignty and legitimacy – through the departure of the occupation troops and the illegal settlers – as well as reunification, under conditions of guaranteed human rights, democracy, and the fundamental freedoms for all Cypriots.

And yet, neither Turkey nor Denktash would embrace such rational and fair goals. Ankara kept reiterating that the Cyprus problem “had been solved in 1974”; Denktash kept insisting that EU accession would be “disastrous” for the Turkish Cypriots! In addition, by rejecting the invitation to join the Cypriot negotiating team, he only confirmed the suspicion that his permanent goal was *taksim* (partition), confederation being for him either the best means to this end or second best. Hence in August 1998 Denktash submitted proposals for a *confederal* solution, in direct contradiction to the international community’s advice and position. That Denktash, under Ankara’s guidance, could keep ignoring the UN and the EU to undermine both Cyprus’ accession and its reunification, requires some explanation.

Denktash’s Roles

Rauf Denktash had never hidden his being a committed separatist: his life and times were a persistent and consistent struggle to achieve partition, so as to create a separate “state”, consisting only of “his people”, who would be “liberated” from Greek Cypriot power and influence. As Robert McDonald had concluded in his perceptive *Adelphi Paper*, back in 1988/89,

The principal stumbling block to a settlement is Denktash. His thinking is set in the mould of three decades ago. He professes to believe that the Greek Cypriots still seek *enosis* and, while he pays lip-service to the idea of confederation, basically remains the separatist he was when he helped found TMT in the 1950s. The occasional strictures which his administration has imposed on political opponents suggest the mentality of the *pasha*, rather than the democrat he believes himself to be. His rhetoric harps on the past. There is no evidence that he has derived any personal advantage from his activities but he must also be prey to the psychological factor that he has nothing to gain from a settlement.⁵³

This judgment was shared by both independent analysts and, increasingly, by the Turkish Cypriots themselves as we shall see. For instance, London's *Financial Times*, referring to the 1993 breakdown of UN-sponsored negotiations, concluded that Denktash was exclusively responsible: "The man who once campaigned under the slogan "partition or death" remains, in the eyes of the UK and other permanent members of the UN Security Council, the main obstacle to a settlement".⁵⁴ And on the occasion of the 1995 proposed trade-offs among EU-Greece-Turkey, the *Financial Times* was again blunt. Noting that the governments of the EU countries must listen to public opinion "which will not sympathize with Turkey when the news from there is mainly about human rights violations and the use of ruthless counter-terror against Kurdish separatist guerrillas...", the editorial added: "at present the perception in western Europe, as in the US and at the United Nations, is that the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Rauf Denktash, has become the main obstacle to a solution. Only Turkey has any leverage over him, and it is not surprising that Greece is trying to use the leverage over Turkey which EU membership gives it."⁵⁵

Ten years later, with Rauf Denktash's departure from the political limelight, some of the above judgements deserve reconsideration. *Inter alia*, it is now suggested widely by Turkish Cypriots that Denktash did benefit materially from the occupation regime.⁵⁶ Turkey, however, decided to abandon him, when the Erdogan government was forced to appear as assisting in the solution of the Cyprus problem for its own EU-related reasons – and in its own terms – via the Annan plan. Meanwhile, it was the Turkish Cypriots themselves who had first abandoned him, as proven in the December 2002-January 2003 massive demonstrations in occupied Nicosia. These occasions established beyond doubt that the Turkish Cypriots, in direct conflict with Denktash, were eager to endorse the "UN plan". For the plan was promising "EU membership" to a "reunified Cyprus". Therefore, what the Greek Cypriots had already locked by signing the Treaty of EU Acces-

sion on 13 April 2003, the Turkish Cypriots could only reach by endorsing the Annan plan over Denktash's fervent opposition. This was their first opportunity to break away from his regime and from Turkey's troops, and to enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Union. That is why their flags were exclusively the starred-blue EU flags, while their slogans consisted of "Baris" (Peace), "This land is Ours" (i.e. not Turkey's), and "Denktash Resign!".⁵⁷

Until then, Denktash's pariah regime was doggedly attempting to solidify itself, to gain recognition, and to constitute a bargaining chip in Turkey's grand strategy of EU accession. *Pazarlik* (i.e. oriental bargaining), will be proposed later as a useful analytic tool for a broader understanding of Turkish foreign policy methods. But *pazarlik*, permanently employed by Ankara and Denktash in Cypriot affairs, can explain in large measure Turkey's bold disregard of the international condemnation of the invasion, the occupation, and the unilaterally declared secession. But since *pazarlik* can also be a euphemism for blackmail, and since Turkey has not hesitated to use it (see chapter 7), it is irresistible to conclude that Ankara has used the Cyprus occupation for "strategic reasons" and to maximise its expected EU benefits.

Be that as it may, in December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, further historic decisions were taken about Cyprus and Turkey. First, Turkey was now elevated to candidate for membership. And second, Cyprus' travails seemed to be ending when the Presidency Conclusions declared: "The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors".⁵⁸

Although the last-quoted sentence raised suspicions that it might undermine the core statement, most observers, following the Simitis government, were highly optimistic: for them, it was simply a security clause, lest the Nicosia government rested on its laurels and evaded the responsibility to work diligently in future negotiations. What few in Cyprus and Greece doubted, however, was that Denktash, as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator, would keep employing his notorious antics.

Precisely this transpired. Rounds of proximity talks between President Clerides and Denktash were held, from July to November 2000, to no avail. Then, in September 2001, UNSG Kofi Annan called for the re-opening of negotiations. Although Clerides expressed his readiness to participate,

Denktash declined. So, in December 2001, a new diplomatic device was proposed: “dinner diplomacy” could bring the two old, and wily, negotiators around a different table. Hence they did exchange dinners at each other’s home and agreed to negotiate face-to-face by mid-January 2002. Mehmet Ali Birand, the high-profile Turkish journalist and author, visited Nicosia to cover this “dinner diplomacy”. Asked by his Greek Cypriot colleague, Costas Yennaris, to assess the development, Birand replied: “It is a great *pazarlik!*” And when Yennaris wondered why Denktash was refusing for over a year to negotiate, Birand retorted: “But *this, too, is part of pazarlik!*”⁵⁹

In five rounds of direct talks between 16 January and 26 September 2002, no progress could be made. But the UN had now acquired new momentum within this labyrinth, for reasons soon to be revealed. Thus, on 11 November 2002, the UNSG’s special envoy to Cyprus submitted what later came to be known as “Annan I”. This “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement” was accepted by the Greek Cypriots as a basis for negotiations. Denktash rejected it as such, despite its passionate embrace by the Turkish Cypriots.

With the Copenhagen European Council summit fast approaching, the UN Secretariat hastily produced a revised version of the “Annan plan”. The goal was to ascertain its endorsement so as to invite a “United Cyprus Republic” to join the EU during that summit. Hence the two communities’ leaders were also invited to attend. Denktash, yet again, declined the invitation, sending only a representative to the Danish capital. No agreement was reached again. So, the European Council of 12-13 December 2002 invited Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession in April 2003 in Athens and to join the Union on 1 May 2004. It also decided that Turkey was not ready for accession negotiations.

In the four months until the signing of the Treaty of Accession, further drama was in store. On 16 February 2003 – the day after world public opinion was named “the Second Superpower”⁶⁰ Presidential elections were held in Cyprus. After two five-year terms, and a number of successes, Glafkos Clerides, the veteran conservative leader, was defeated. The winner, from the first round, was Tassos Papadopoulos, another tested and respected politician, who represented the forces of the centre, the left and the centre-left. What distinguished further the two major candidates was that, as against Clerides’ readiness to sign the Annan plan almost unaltered, Papadopoulos advocated substantial changes. The people’s electoral verdict, therefore, clearly signalled that the Annan plan was causing disappointment and frustration.

Within days, Kofi Annan visited Cyprus again, 50 days before the Republic's signing of the Treaty of Accession, to submit yet another, or third, version of "his" plan. Once again, the new document was supposed to be "studied" by the parties and decided upon within days. For the negotiators of the two communities, accompanied by representatives from Ankara and Athens, would meet again for final talks – at The Hague, on 10-11 March – in order to agree that simultaneous referenda on approving the plan would be held on 30 March (i.e. 17 days before the Treaty of Accession). Needless to say, such haste to substitute a "United Cyprus Republic" for the universally recognised Republic of Cyprus, and such proximity (yet again) to another crucial EU date for the future of Cyprus, had rendered the entire affair even more disheartening and suspect.

In any event, the Hague meeting ended in another fiasco. The Greek Cypriot side was unhappy on many grounds. President Papadopoulos, elected on a platform of reservations vis-à-vis the plan, was now asked to approve it; all Greek Cypriot parties (except George Vassiliou's United Democrats) considered the plan as only a basis for negotiations, but negotiations had no chance of taking place; Denktash kept rejecting the plan even as a basis for negotiations, presumably expecting further changes in favour of his side; and Ankara, insisting that the plan was only a "reference document", had also objections on matters of security. And yet, the Greek Cypriot side – presumably counting on the declared Denktashian rejection – agreed, under certain conditions, to bring the Plan to a referendum. Denktash, again, disagreed. Hence Kofi Annan was forced to announce the collapse of the talks, blaming Denktash expressly for it.⁶¹

On 16 April 2003, President Papadopoulos, accompanied by Cypriot FM George Iakovou, signed in Athens the Treaty of Accession to the Union on behalf of the Republic. For all friends of Cyprus, this momentous event was well-deserved. Moreover, from now on, it had to be assumed that any revised Annan plan should be thoroughly overhauled to respect the Republic's new status. For Protocol 10 of the Treaty declared that the entire Republic of Cyprus will be a full EU member on 1 May 2004, while the *acquis communautaire* would be applied to the occupied territory upon solution of the political problem.

Denktash's Response

This historic event stimulated multifarious developments. Within a week, Denktash "counter-attacked", by announcing his regime's decision to lift

(albeit partially) the restrictions on crossing the “Green Line”. The decision was prompted by multiple motives: first, to show a more human face after the “bad press” he attracted following The Hague; second, to appease the Turkish Cypriot community which remained furious against him; and third, to inject welcome Greek Cypriot funds to the regime by persons eager to visit, after 29 years, their homes, birthplaces, and occupied properties.

One crucial implication was the complete falsification of one of Denktash’s central myths: viz., that Greeks and Turks of Cyprus cannot possibly live together. Actually, the opening of the barricades allowed great numbers of Cypriots from both communities to reunite socially, to search for old friends, and to do hundreds of thousands of visits without any friction whatsoever. Thus, just as Greeks and Turks from the mainlands had falsified the clichés of entrenched hostility through “citizens’ diplomacy” after the 1999 earthquakes, the same applies to the Cypriots, despite the prolonged agony and anger caused by the invasion and the occupation.⁶²

A week later, the government of the Republic announced a series of social and administrative measures to support the Turkish Cypriots. These measures – prepared already in view of the Accession Treaty – included, inter alia, medical and educational benefits, issuing of Cypriot passports and identity cards, and opening employment opportunities in the Republic’s free area. The Turkish Cypriots embraced immediately all these measures.

Now two changes in the political landscape had an immediate impact on the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem: first, the triumph of the AKP of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey’s 3 November 2002 national election; and second, the victory of Mehmet Ali Talat’s Republican Party in the “parliamentary” vote of the occupied territory on 14 December 2003. Erdogan had acknowledged the need to change Ankara’s Cyprus policy. Talat had long been an opponent of Denktash, a supporter of the Annan plan and, as a (former) left-winger, had cultivated warm relations with AKEL in the past. Talat’s rise meant the beginning of Denktash’s fall and further evidence that the Turkish Cypriots were consistent with their demonstrations’ slogans. Could the conditions for revitalised negotiations be now improved?

Operating on this assumption, but pressured also by domestic political opponents and external centres, President Papadopoulos decided to reactivate the process. On 17 December 2003, he addressed a letter to SG Annan expressing willingness to participate in another UN initiative. It remains

unclear whether President Papadopoulos' decision was preceded by any secret discussions with other capitals as well as the UN. It is, however, certain that an avalanche of crucial bilateral meetings started taking place within one month. They included an Annan-Erdogan meeting in Davos; a George W. Bush-Erdogan meeting in the White House; and a Bush-Annan White House meeting.

In retrospect, it is evident that these bilateral meetings determined both the *modus operandi* of Kofi Annan and the content of the subsequent versions of the plan. In sum, he reassumed his speedy manner of acting and the asphyxiating timetables imposed since November 2002. The result was the following history-making developments, which led to the 24 April 2004 twin Cypriot referenda:

- Kofi Annan invited the two Cypriot leaders to New York on 4 February 2004 to discuss another strict timetable for the solution of the problem, before Cyprus' full EU accession on 1 May.
- From 10-13 February, Papadopoulos, Denktash, and officials from Athens, London, Ankara, Washington, and the UN Secretariat agreed (under excruciating pressures) to pursue sustained negotiations in Nicosia, and, if need be, in Bürgenstock, near Lausanne.
- Should no agreement be reached by the end of March, Mr Annan declared his right to "exercise his discretion" and complete the remaining gaps in the plan, so that the twin referendum would be held on 24 April, one week before Cyprus' formal EU accession.
- Neither the Nicosia round of talks nor the Bürgenstock one could produce an agreement, despite the involvement of PMs Karamanlis and Erdogan. Hence, Kofi Annan, at midnight 31 March 2004, presented "Annan V", to be subjected to the April referenda.
- Impartial observers could see that "Annan V" was tailored to the interests and needs of Turkey, and satisfied its additional "demands" on behalf of itself and the Turkish Cypriots. It should be common knowledge by now that Mr Annan incorporated in his "V" 11 out of Tayyip Erdogan's 12 last-minute requests.⁶³
- In the twin referendum of 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriots rejected the "UN plan" by an overwhelming 75.8% majority. The Turkish Cypriots and the settlers approved it by 64.9%.
- According to Kofi Annan's letter of February 2004, one community's rejection of the plan would suffice to render it "null and void".
- On 1 May 2004, the European Union welcomed the ten new member-states, including the Republic of Cyprus.

Such was the Republic's excruciating voyage towards EU accession, helping to substantiate my thesis of an *Unfair Play*. Turkey's political blackmail, unceasing lawlessness and immorality were coupled with a few powers' unconscionable attempt to achieve the following: to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus, a UN and EU member state; to exculpate Turkey of its legal-political-economic obligations that follow from its human rights violations and associated actions; to serve, not the rights of the Cypriots, but the self-regarding interests of major powers and one superpower; and to do all this by *using* the United Nations, in violation of the organization's own values, principles and norms.

4. *Turkey's Strategic Ambitions and European Adventures on the Way to December 2004*

Fluidity and experimentation may best characterize Turkey's post-Cold War strategic ambitions. While the European vocation retained pride of place in Ankara's long-term orientation, there was frustration at "Europe's" continuous rejections. Thus, the Caucasus and Central Asia inspired complementary visions. They were associated, first, with Turkey's self-perception as a major regional power, a "producer of security", and (later) even "a pivotal state"; and second, with rising energy needs and rich commercial designs. In addition, experimentation and fluidity were also forced upon it by the cosmogonic post-Cold War changes in the "Eurasian" space, where the roles of Russia, the US and even Iran could give rise to indeterminate outcomes. Finally, it should be stressed that Ankara's pre-Erdogan "Eurasian" policy was different in degree, if not in kind, from its current one, if only because the AKP government has been at pains to mend some fences and to seek cooperation with *most* neighbours. Thus, this chapter will try to show why, after the partial failure of the Eastern experiment and the ultimate irresistibility of "Europe", the EU option became Turkey's best strategic bet.

The Grand Vision

In the early 1990s, Ankara's political and military elites appeared eager to assume the role of a major power. Their vision's idiosyncrasies were

revealed in grandiose declarations by leading political figures. For instance, the foremost architect of Turkey's relevant schemes, Turgut Ozal, had stated: "The 21st century will be a Turkish century".⁶⁴ Suleyman Demirel followed suit in March 1993: "A new continent called Eurasia has been born in this great geographic space that stretches from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. Eurasia is tantamount to the Turkic world".⁶⁵ In July 1992, Mr Demirel had already stated what Turkey was after in this "new continent": "relations of cooperation in all fields with our brothers, with whom we share the same blood, the same feelings, the same language and religion, the same past, the same history, and the same moral values."⁶⁶ And, to signal that Turkey's new focus in Transcaucasia and Central Asia did not imply abandonment of the European ambition, Suleyman Demirel (with a typical touch of national self-promotion) stated in Vienna, in June 1993: "Turkey has been close to Europe and the EC since 1957. We are interested in Europe, we share the same values. In the Caucasus and in Central Asia there live people with the same language, all of whom are our brothers and relatives. One cannot ignore them. It is necessary for Turkey to show its interest there. As a result of our central geographical position, we must be active in many regions."⁶⁷

In a 1994 essay, Professor Bahri Yilmaz of Bilkent University referred to repeated official pronouncements regarding Turkey's "historic opportunity from the Adriatic to the borders of China". He described them as "recurrent slogans" of the time and as "highly popular among Turkish politicians and the mass media."⁶⁸ A good example was provided by then Turkish Foreign Minister, Hikmet Cetin, in the Grand National Assembly. On 26 December 1991, Cetin declared that now his country was not "the peripheral country it used to be during the Cold War". Rather, "in the area that extends from the Atlantic to the Chinese border, Turkey is at the focal point of the most sensitive balances."⁶⁹ And, again in December 1991, a Foreign Ministry statement asserted "the Turkic republics are expecting assistance from Turkey, which they see as a model. We are determined to help them."⁷⁰

Precisely what was this "Turkish model"? According to Professor Yilmaz, it was a tripartite synthesis: "secularism in an Islamic society, a Western-style pluralistic-democratic system, and a free market economy."⁷¹ Even broader, however, were Turgut Ozal's ambitions, formulated in the late 80s. According to Professor Selim Deringil, the Ozalian "vision" was trans-regional and comprised the following: "Turkey as the only member of the 'European Club'; Turkey the leader of the Middle East in economic and

political terms; Turkey the leader of the Turkic peoples in a Soviet Union now in disintegration".⁷² From the perspective of 2005, such grandiose ambitions have not materialized, as the following sketch may help explain.

Turkey, the "Turkic Peoples", and Other Asian Ambitions

Turkey's relations with *Azerbaijan* have been its most successful in the entire region. President Ebulföz Elçibey, elected in June 1992, was "a strong advocate of the 'Turkish model' for Azerbaijan".⁷³ Beyond the political field, and as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turco-Azeri relations concern "the economy, trade, education, transportation, telecommunication, agriculture, social security, health, sports, culture, science, tourism, etc."⁷⁴

Primarily, however, the two countries have focused on the military field and the energy sector. Turkey has undertaken to improve its neighbour's military education system and to train Azerbaijani officers.⁷⁵ As regards the political economy of oil and gas, Turkey's interests have been twofold: first, the acquisition of Azeri natural gas, in the effort to confront the country's massive needs;⁷⁶ and second, Ankara has long aspired to form a bridge for the transport of Caspian carbohydrates to the Mediterranean. Therefore, the pipeline that brought Caspian oil from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in spring 2005 is enriching Turkey's strategic assets.

And yet, courting Azerbaijan has not been an unmixed blessing. As Professor Bülent Aras has argued, Ankara's entire policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia became "hostage to security relations with Azerbaijan" and, inter alia, "has led to unneeded friction with Russia".⁷⁷ Moreover, "Turkey's vague, Baku-based Caucasian and Central Asian policies have long centred on its rivalry with Iran and Russia. Ankara has pursued a security-first policy with a myopic focus on Iran and Russia as its principal enemies, thereby feeding and legitimating the "secure state" vision so pronounced during the Cold War".⁷⁸

Turkey's relations with Eduard Shevardnadze's *Georgia* were particularly assisted by the former president's pro-western policies and his perennial conflicts with Moscow. Ankara showed willingness to bring together Georgians and Abkhazians, encouraging the resolution of their problems. Turkey also pursued trade with and investments in Georgia, ranking first among Georgia's trade partners and second (after the US) among investors there. However, in 2001, bilateral trade had only reached \$121,7 million while investments were about \$55 million.⁷⁹ Finally, Ankara has

accompanied the aforementioned activities by providing “humanitarian aid” to Georgia, although the sum total for the decade of 1992 to 2001 was confined to around \$25 million.⁸⁰ Turkey’s ties with Georgia, therefore, revealed Ankara’s goal to cultivate a regional political presence and enhance its share in the politics of oil and gas.

Concerning *Armenia*, Ankara has not even diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Given Armenia’s sustained campaign for recognition of the Ottoman genocide and Turkey’s extreme pro-Azeri stance in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict, their relations remain hostile and include the closing of Turkey’s border with Armenia. Besides the genocide – which Turkey adamantly denies – Ankara accuses Armenia of having territorial claims on Turkey.⁸¹ Therefore, Ankara’s relations with Yerevan are victimized by Turkey’s nationalist denial in tandem with its criticised favouritism towards Azerbaijan. Improvement seems hard to envisage until both the Nagorno-Karabach dispute is resolved and the genocide issue is properly addressed. The latter, moreover, took new urgency with 3rd October 2005 approaching and the Armenian pressure groups re-energized worldwide but especially in Europe.

With the Central Asian Republics of *Kazakhstan*, *Kyrgyzstan*, *Tajikistan*, and *Turkmenistan*, Turkey tried to cultivate manifold interests. Establishing diplomatic relations immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara first embarked on developing cultural, educational and economic ties. The creation of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) in January 1992 sought to coordinate Turkey’s penetration. In addition, emphasis was placed on providing scholarships to Central Asian students, so that around 7,000 persons from the region were recently studying in Turkey.⁸² In trade, Turkey’s volume with the above-mentioned – plus *Mon-golia* and *Uzbekistan* – increased from \$145 million in 1992 to \$600 million in 2001. About 85% of this trade (around \$516 million) involved Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.⁸³ In addition, Turkish companies have been engaged in this vast area in numerous investment projects (primarily in construction).

However, Turkey’s ties with these former Soviet Republics could not match those they opted to maintain with the Russian Federation. The principal reasons appear as three: the substantial geographic distance separating them from Turkey; most of them have faced security threats, primarily from Islamic fundamentalists (hence only Russia has seemed capable to assist them); and substantial Russian minorities, constituting influential political-economic and socio-cultural bridges with Moscow, have remained in most Central Asian states.

Special difficulties were also encountered in Turkey's relations with post-soviet *Uzbekistan*. That these relations never flourished is explained in part by President Islam Karimov's own regional ambitions and his concomitant pro-Western stance. But as Shireen Hunter has recently noted, other reasons here at play included the fact that numerous Uzbek opposition figures sought refuge in Turkey in the early 90s, while panturkist Muhammad Salih was involved in the invasion of neighbouring Kyrgyzstan by Uzbek Islamic fundamentalists. As a consequence, "the Uzbek Government ordered the closing down of a number of Turkish schools and the relations between the two countries cooled substantially".⁸⁴

In retrospect, the Russian factor was responsible for the apparent failure of "Ozal's vision" in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Arguably, however, the failure also arose from Turkey's hyperbolic sense of self-importance in association with its financial difficulties and economic weakness. Moreover, Bahri Yilmaz had intimated that Turkey's whole Central Asia project revealed that strategic intentions did not match role-fulfilment capabilities.

Thus, except for a substantial cultural-educational penetration,⁸⁵ pre-Erdogan Ankara had overestimated the real ability of its "model" to be applied to the vast and unsettled Central Asian space and exaggerated the model's actual attractiveness. Consequently, and in view of Turkey's bumpy socio-economic development, its bouts of political instability and its uneasy combination of secularism and Islam, these republics have rather declined politely Ankara's persistent offers. In addition, Bulent Aras has noted that in the late 1990s "the leaders of the new republics have begun to see Turkey as a source of instability".⁸⁶ Accusations were aired in February 1999 by the Karimov government that four Turkish diplomats were involved in assassination attempts against Karimov himself, while some people had complained that year about involvement of Turkey's National Intelligence Agency (MIT) in elections in Karachay-Cerkeshia. "Whether or not these various charges were true", Aras concluded, "they reflect a changing attitude in a relationship formerly characterized by strongly sentimental ties".⁸⁷

Turkey, Russia and Iran

Turkey's intriguing relationship with Russia appears Janus-like. Clearly, mutual benefits derive from economic and commercial ties, as Russia is responsible for about 60% of Turkey's natural gas imports. With the construction of the Blue Stream Project, Russian supplies will reach about

80%.⁸⁸ In addition, Russia is currently Turkey's second-largest trading partner. And as Larrabee and Lesser noted, there is also a "vibrant 'suitcase trade'" between them, that "forms an important part of the unofficial Turkish economy..."⁸⁹ Simultaneously, Turkey has invested heavily in Russia, once again primarily in the construction sector.

And yet, both countries keep experiencing a number of "concerns". While Sabanci University Professor Ersin Kalaycioglu's statement, that Russia may still be "perceived as the historical foe" of Turkey,⁹⁰ seems hyperbolic, Ankara has felt uncomfortable with a number of recent Russian policies. They include its reassertion of influence in the Central Asian republics; its increasing ties with Iran; the broader Russo-Turkish competition in pipeline politics; and the Russian "intrusions" in the Transcaucasus. As regards the last one, Kalaycioglu has even called it a "potential conflict" that "could pit Turkey against Russia".⁹¹

This is a likely scenario which could drag Turkey into a protracted conflict which would lead to a severe drain on its resources, undermine the feeling of security in Turkey and rekindle ethnic nationalism and religiosity. Russia, which is perceived as the historical foe, when confronted would inflame not only nationalist but also religious feelings, including in Turkey. The Russian intrusions into Georgia (which are not welcomed by the Georgian Government) and in Armenia (solicited by the Armenian Government) are causing concern in Turkey. Any deeper intrusion by Russia, especially in Georgia, will cause alarm in Turkey and contribute to an increased sense of threat.

Meanwhile, Russia has expressed concerns and annoyance vis-à-vis Turkey in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. Pipeline politics is only one issue. And while it is unclear whether Moscow perceives Turkey as capable of effective antagonism, Ankara's ambitions are perceived as irritating intrusions in Russia's backyard. In addition, Moscow has voiced anger when pro-Chechen militants asserted in at least two dramatic occasions on Turkish territory their support for the Chechen rebels. To be sure, Tayyip Erdogan's recent official visit to Moscow – with a massive entourage of around 400 businessmen – aimed to transcend mere economic and commercial designs and strengthen his emerging foreign policy "activism". And yet, the visit's final political outcome has not appeared that impressive. For instance, despite Erdogan's valiant efforts, Moscow's crucial pro-Nicosia stance has not changed one iota. As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov assured Nicosia during his June 2005 official visit, Moscow remains a supporter of the Republic's rights in the Security Council.

The potential for a dramatic reshaping of the geopolitical map of Transcaucasia and Central Asia after 9/11 emerged both because of global mobilization against international terrorism and in view of this *sui generis* alliance between Washington and Moscow. These two dimensions may have also conspired against Turkey's strategic aspirations: the strengthening of Washington-Moscow relations manifestly affects the Russo-Turkish competition; and highly unexpected – if not previously inconceivable – military ties have developed between the US and Central Asian states on account of the 2001 Afghanistan War.

At this writing, and in view of the uproar caused by Seymour Hersh's January 2005 *New Yorker* article, "The Coming Wars", the scenario of Washington's preparedness to go beyond merely intimidating the Iranians cannot be ignored. But Washington may not need Ankara's direct assistance to handle this "rogue state". What it expects is Ankara being squarely "on its side" regarding Iran (and Syria), a fact that causes serious dilemmas to Turkish decision-makers. For, in yet another reversal of traditional Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East, Erdogan's Ankara is recently attempting to fortify a rapprochement with Tehran (and Damascus). After all, Turkey shares with Iran anxieties concerning both Iraq itself and the Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, it has proceeded to invest in that country and to sign agreements on natural gas and its transport to Europe, the latter in cooperation with Greece. Thus, Ankara's stance on Iran is more akin to the European Union's. However, as a Turkish expert has noted, Washington's Middle East policies cannot but affect Ankara's ultimate decisions, especially if Tehran were found guilty concerning its controversial nuclear programme.⁹²

Meanwhile, former President Mohammad Khatami continued his country's own regional politico-economic activism. For instance, on 18-19 June 2003, three presidents from neighbouring countries visited Tehran to sign a series of agreements. President Imomali Rachmonov of Tadjikistan, in a three-day official visit to Iran, was set on strengthening their bilateral ties, which have included agreements for the construction of transportation and energy-related networks. Among other things, Iran offered Tadjikistan \$5 million for the construction of a tunnel that would link the north and the south of the country.⁹³ Then on 18 June 2003, President Khatami met both Afghan President Hamid Karzai and President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to sign, inter alia, a memorandum of understanding for the construction of a major highway linking the three countries.⁹⁴ In any event, the Khatami administration's major success certainly was the understanding and broad cooperation it ascertained from Vladimir Putin's Moscow.

Turkey and the United States

The close and manifold US-Turkey ties, solidly built since the Truman Doctrine, have sometimes bordered on strategic interdependence. With the exception of the “trauma” of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 letter to Ismet Inonu about Cyprus, and the (short-lived) Congressional arms embargo after Turkey’s 1974 invasion,⁹⁵ the relationship was all but unquestioned. Moreover, it was strengthening progressively since the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and by Ozal’s decision to support Washington wholeheartedly during the 1991 Gulf War. Having thus accumulated tangible kudos and promoted their country as a “producer of security” and “pivotal state”, by the dawn of this century Ankara’s policy-makers could justifiably celebrate their “strategic partnership” with Washington. Moreover, Ankara became immediately available for Washington’s anti-terrorism campaign after September 11.

But the 1 March 2003 Grand National Assembly’s refusal to approve the use of Turkey’s territory by the US forces – so as to open a northern front in Iraq – caused deep anger in Washington. In fact, it affected the US perception of Turkish decision-making wisdom and even reliability. Even two months later, in an interview with *CNN Turk* (May 6-7), Paul Wolfowitz and former ambassador to Ankara Marc Grossman essentially advised Turkey: “We can tell you what the right thing for you is. Just do what we tell you”.⁹⁶ The ruling AK Party’s MPs felt bound to respect the deep anti-Iraq-war commitment of the overwhelming majority of the Turkish people.⁹⁷ For Washington, however, the damage done to its invasion plans was tremendous. The cooling of US-Turkish relations was marked and, despite concerted efforts by the Erdogan government to appease Washington, the prospects appeared just grim.⁹⁸ As Mehmet Ali Birand observed two months after the war’s supposed end,⁹⁹ “Turkey-US relations will never be the same...From now on there will be no more references to “strategic cooperation” or “strategic partnership” to which we had gotten used to (sic)... According to the US that was an empty phrase... They tended to see their relationship with Turkey more as “close cooperation”. Now all this is over.”

By January 2004, however, the Turco-American political landscape had undergone transformation. Erdogan succeeded, through his White House visit, in questioning Birand-like assessments. Cyprus played a critical role here: for soon after the Bush-Erdogan meeting, Kofi Annan restarted his “good offices mission” on Cyprus and extracted the February 2004 New York agreement.

Things were reversed again, however, in the months preceding Erdogan's second official encounter with George W. Bush in June 2005. The US administration's pro-Kurdish policy and the protracted Iraqi tragedy have caused rising anti-Americanism in Turkey. This anti-Americanism is communicated to Washington directly by the rhetoric of the country's ordinary people, the media and even politicians.¹⁰⁰ According to repeated Pew opinion research, Turkish anti-Americanism is now among the highest in the world.¹⁰¹ Ankara's strategic options are confusing, especially after the "traumatic" French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty. Hence, the question currently preoccupying Turkey is whether Ankara should keep its strategic eggs in the EU basket, asserting quasi-autonomy from Washington, or choose the cultivation of strong ties with both the EU and the US.¹⁰² Especially after spring 2005 saw the surfacing of obstacles to Turkey's smooth EU sailing, Ankara's elites may well do their best to revitalize the "strategic partnership" in tandem with commitment to the EU trajectory.

Turkey and Israel

Although long, the history of Turkey's ties with the Jewish state tends to be generally forgotten. As a Turkish analyst reminds us, "The foundation of Turkish-Israeli cooperation was laid during the visit of [...] Ben Gurion in the late fifties to Turkey, and a secret "Environment Pact" was signed between Israel, Iran and Turkey in 1958".¹⁰³

But it was after the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union that Turkey and Israel strengthened their *sui generis* relationship, whose goals transcended Israel's wish to enjoy Turkey's abundant water resources and the latter's decision to treat Israel as another source of military hardware. In addition, Ankara perceives Israel as a crucial lobby-ally in Washington while Israel savours the Turkish airspace to train its air force pilots. Thus, with the inevitable exception of the Erbakan period – when the former Islamic prime minister's ideology and rhetoric undermined Ankara's links with the Jewish state – Turkey and Israel have been collaborating in economic, military, defence and intelligence matters.

Among other things, there is a yearly Israeli-Turkish political dialogue, as well as a constant flow of official visits. Defence cooperation, the acquisition of weapons systems by Turkey, technology transfer to Turkey's defence industry, joint military exercises (with occasional American and Jordanian participation), the training of Israeli air force pilots in Turkey's air space, and collaboration of their secret services have all sustained a

special bilateral relationship. Unsurprisingly, their Arab and Muslim neighbours have been suspicious and concerned. Israel and Turkey, however, have adamantly refused any wrongdoing.

Simultaneously, the Israeli goal to import Turkish water has long been on the agenda. Suleyman Demirel first offered to export it in July 1999 and, in January 2001, delegations from the two countries began appropriate discussions. On 6 August 2002, Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Zeki Cakan, agreed that Israel will purchase 50 million cubic metres per annum for a period of 20 years.

Although the Ankara-Tel Aviv entente suffered another blow with Tayyip Erdogan's explosive statement that Israel is a "terrorist state", it has returned to an even keel after Erdogan's visit to Ariel Sharon followed by Abdullah Gul's visit to both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In any event, the Israeli connection could not satisfy most of Turkey's multifarious interests and idiosyncratic needs. Therefore, even a revitalized "strategic relationship" with the US together with the Turkey-Israel entente could not possibly compete with the EU's potential promises to Turkey.

The Way to "Europe"

With the over-ambitious "Eurasian" project ultimately failing to deliver significant goods and with the Helsinki summit finally delivering the candidate status, "Europe" became Turkey's favoured means of inclusion in "Western civilization". When the Europeans consented in late 1999 that Turkey could now qualify, most Turkish elites and people concluded that the EU is, after all, their most promising source of need-satisfaction and, therefore, Turkey's best (political, economic, cultural, and strategic) bet. Crucial seems to have been the conviction that only the EU can answer Turkey's deep-seated quest for "identity" and a sense of "belonging" (see chapter 8).

To reach this stage in EU-Turkish relations, however, the long and winding road contained many surprises for Turkey and many mutual disappointments, of which the following are the most remarkable. First, the September 1963 Ankara Agreement – which entered into force in December 1964 and envisaged Turkey's eventual full EEC membership – was suspended in January 1982 on account of the military coup of September 1980. The European Community's relations with Ankara were frozen. Second, on 27 March 1984, the Community's foreign ministers adopted a declaration calling on Ankara to rescind its recognition of the secessionist

Turkish Cypriot regime (unilaterally declared in November 1983) and to exert its influence on Denktash to revoke the illicit UDI. The declaration, therefore, contradicted Ankara's assertion that the Cyprus conflict was "inter-communal". Third, in September 1986 EC-Turkey relations were reactivated, so Ankara decided to apply for full EEC membership. The application was submitted in April 1987 but the Commission's *Avis* (issued on 18 December 1989) frustrated Turkey's hopes. Among other things, the Opinion observed "the human rights situation" and "the respect for the identity of minorities" had "not yet reached the level required in a democracy". This Section of the Opinion concluded:¹⁰⁴

Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would be incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute between Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in Cyprus, on which the European Council has just expressed its concern once again. At issue are the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

Fourth, while the EC-Turkey Customs Union came into effect on 1 January 1996, the Dublin European Council of July 1996 urged Turkey once again to observe the highest standards of human rights and to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the UN resolutions. Fifth, the European Council of December 1997 in Luxembourg excluded Turkey from the list of candidates that were to start accession negotiations in March 1998. Angry and frustrated, Ankara responded by the partial suspension of its dialogue with the Union. It also announced that it would proceed to integrate the regime of occupied Cyprus if the EU were to start accession negotiations with the Republic. Sixth, the Helsinki summit of December 1999 took the historic decisions concerning both Cyprus and Turkey that we have seen. Seventh, having noted Turkey's progress in implementing its pre-accession strategy (Nice summit, December 2000) and in complying with the political criteria (Laaken summit, December 2001), the December 2002 Copenhagen summit endorsed its enlargement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Cyprus and Malta but rejected Turkey's demand to get a date for the start of its own accession negotiations. Turkey only ascertained a date for the decision as to the start of negotiations: it was to be taken in December 2004. Eighth, during that summit – on 16-17 December in Brussels – the 25 consented that negotiations would start on 3 October 2005. But the Presidency Conclusions contained special provisions on Turkey's road to accession. *Inter alia*, they envisaged its continuous subjection to the 25's judgement on every chapter,

while also clarifying that the final outcome is not fixed. Ninth, during the May-June 2005 French and Dutch referenda, voters admitted that the prospect of Turkey's eventual accession played some part in their "no"s. Simultaneously, high-profile political elites in various EU countries, and even Brussels office-holders, began intimating that Turkey's eventual membership might be problematic, unpopular and counter-productive. Therefore, they suggested as fairer and more proper to warn Turkey about a probable failure to achieve full membership so that Ankara could consent to some form of "special relationship". And tenth, the disastrous ending of the June 2005 European Council harboured pessimistic probabilities for Turkey's EU future, as the EU's own "deep crisis" seemed the worst time to accommodate Turkey's "difficult candidacy". As Turkish analysts rushed to note, opponents of Turkish accession could now find numerous arguments to harden their stance so as to dampen Turkey's Euro-enthusiasm.¹⁰⁵

All these developments were taking place while Turkish nationalism was reaching new, disturbing heights. Besides anger at Washington for the aforementioned reasons, such nationalism was also fuelled by the sense that the EU was forcing excessive demands on Turkey. Frustration also sprang from the conviction that, since late 2001, the country had pursued conscientiously numerous domestic – legislative, economic, and political – changes in order to begin satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and to demonstrate elite and popular support for the European vocation. And especially since the national election of November 2002, there has been no doubt about the EU orientation and ambition of the Erdogan government. Despite the European public opinion's reservations, and notwithstanding our Introduction's "puzzles", it cannot be doubted that Erdogan's "Islamic-democratic" government has pursued numerous legislative and political initiatives to at least begin satisfying the Union's demands.

This mixed and uncertain picture reflects the apparent mood in Turkey in the summer of 2005. In Cyprus and Greece some are concerned that the post-1999 fervent support for Turkey's "Europeanization" might have been in vain. For, if Turkey's EU prospects have been hurt by recent developments while the country's political landscape appears rough and unsettled, the prospects for a solid Greek-Turkish *détente* and the fair solution of Cyprus' problem might be similarly hurt.

On the other hand, sophisticated Turkish analysts have rushed to express satisfaction with recent achievements in their country's efforts at democratization and modernization, materializing through EU encouragement.¹⁰⁶ As for the Cypriot and Greek concerns, my own considered assessment is presented in this essay's last chapter.

5. *Greece's Foreign Policy Conundrums*

The publication of *Making Peace in Cyprus* (1996) coincided with the assumption of Greek premiership by Costas Simitis. The successor to Andreas Papandreou was immediately confronted with the Imia crisis, as we have seen. Hence, he inherited the Cyprus problem in a sensitive phase and the Aegean dispute in a dramatic moment. In a short while, his particular foreign policy “philosophy” crystallised as distinct, at least in degree, from that of his distinguished predecessor. What I have called “Simitis’ doctrine” will be presented below together with its major successes and its cardinal weakness, after which we inquire whether the Karamanlis administration’s foreign policy during its early months in power has digressed from the Simitis line.

Greece’s major foreign policy interests and preoccupations from 1996 to 2005 will be discussed through questions such as the following: How rational was Greece’s handling of Turkey’s challenges in the Aegean and in Cyprus? Did the “Simitis doctrine” perhaps approximate appeasement? Is Kostas Karamanlis’ foreign policy conducted essentially along “Simitian” lines? And what have been the roles of Washington and the European Union in Greece’s handling of the affairs of the triangle, Cyprus-Turkey-Greece?

Turkey’s Twofold Challenge

Ankara’s manifold challenge to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean exploded *in tandem* with the invasion of Cyprus. The Aegean issues have caused

protracted friction in Greek-Turkish relations, sending them twice since 1974 to the brink of war. As shown in *Making Peace in Cyprus*, the troublesome issues have been raised exclusively by Turkey and, being rather familiar, they need not delay us presently beyond a minimalist description. Thus, Greece holds that the only matter that requires settlement is the delineation of the continental shelf between the two countries. It also insists that the Aegean Greek islands possess their own continental shelf, according to the established norms of the Law of the Sea. Turkey rejects Greece's latter thesis; it has not signed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; and it adds two more issues: (a) the size of Greece's airspace; and (b) the "militarization" of the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean. Finally, Greece has repeatedly proposed submission of the continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice. Turkey insists on "bilateral negotiations".

In *Making Peace in Cyprus*, I proposed submitting all alleged Aegean issues to the International Court of Justice. The Helsinki summit of December 1999 came to a similar decision: it proposed bilateral negotiations and, absent an agreement by the end of 2004, called for submitting the dispute to the ICJ. That date has elapsed but no such submission has occurred.

However, it is quite ominous that, in recent years, the violations of Greek airspace and the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) by Turkish military aircraft have shot up dramatically, both numerically and because they are regularly armed. These flights are supposed to demonstrate Ankara's "revisionist" demands, lest Greece transform the Sea into a "Greek lake". Turkey demands that Greece's airspace of 10 n. m. be reduced to 6 n. m., identical with its territorial waters. Greece retorts that the Aegean *status quo*, founded on solid treaties and conventions since the 1930s, was never challenged by Turkey until 1974. Moreover, Athens stresses that the new Law of the Sea legitimises Greece's right to extent its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles thereby consolidating identical limits in Greece's airspace. According to Athens, knowledge of the nuances of the issues – including its permanent proposal to determine judicially the Aegean continental shelf – proves Greece's good will. For it has refrained to date from declaring the 12n.m. limit and has insisted on the submission of the continental shelf issue to the ICJ. By contrast, Ankara has rejected ICJ submission, does not recognize the ICJ, insists on bilateral negotiations, while Turkey's Grand National Assembly has declared Greece's potential extension of its territorial waters a *casus belli*.

Turkish academic analysts have overwhelmingly supported Ankara's official line in the Aegean. Typical is Professor Suha Bölükbaşı's admission on the continental shelf: "The Greeks would like to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice, but the Turks feel that the Court might fail to pay adequate attention to the complexities of the issues and thus ignore Turkey's view that the dispute be treated as a special case".¹⁰⁷ Moreover, Bölükbaşı is quite revealing on Ankara's rejection of a judicial resolution:

For the Turks, the delimitation of the continental shelf through adjudication by the ICJ, and the settlement of the Cyprus dispute through an international conference are both undesirable; *they feel that the outcome in either case would be disadvantageous for Turkey*. Although Turkish public opinion is not as preoccupied with Turco-Greek issues as its Greek counterpart, Ankara would still have a hard time in selling to public opinion unfavourable continental shelf and Cyprus settlements reached through international conferences and adjudication.¹⁰⁸

Such arguments provide significant insights into essential differences in Greek and Turkish political culture. To be sure, Professor Bölükbaşı's essay was written in the early 1990s; since then, Turkey is becoming entangled in the EU's web of legal principles and associated norms which require Ankara's reorientation on the peaceful and legal resolution of border disputes. Therefore, this essay will not endorse a pessimistic outlook on the potential employment of legal/political tools for the resolution of both the Aegean dispute and Cyprus' own problem.

And yet, it is not surprising that most Greek political elites and opinion-makers have perceived Ankara's post-1974 Aegean "revisionism" as a euphemism for maximalist expansionism. To be sure, a minority of analysts opt for a low-key handling of these issues. They seem to be motivated either by (a) the sense that an EU-aspiring Turkey will soon be forced to adopt European norms and values or (b) the expectation that the domestic Turkish struggle between the militant "deep state" and modernizing elites will ultimately be won by the latter, or (c) both.¹⁰⁹ The trouble is that, in fact, Turkey intensified its provocative challenges after the Athens Olympics and even after receiving strong Greek support during the crucial December 2004 European Council. Moreover, beyond unannounced daily flights within the Athens FIR, Ankara sent, in spring 2005, armed military aircraft *over Greek islands* in the Central Aegean and has returned to stubborn violations of Greek territorial waters (again around Imia). Simultaneously, Ankara's attitude towards the Republic of Cyprus and the

resolution of its problem can be regarded as worsening as well. In addition to regular claims that the recent “Yes” of the Turkish Cypriots has presently absolved it of any further obligations to Cyprus, Turkey is continuing its campaign to “upgrade the status of the TRNC”. Most disturbing, it condones the commitment of further illicit acts in the occupied territory: from the uninterrupted arrival of thousands of illegal settlers to the massive building of new homes on the occupied Greek Cypriot properties. Meanwhile, all these data keep raising an intriguing question: Who are, in fact, making Ankara’s crucial foreign policy decisions? An answer will be provided in chapter 8.

Therefore, despite the progress in certain bilateral ties and a perceptible change of bilateral “climate” as against the pre-1999 Greek-Turkish Cold War, the Karamanlis government’s disappointment and frustration at Turkish behaviour in the Aegean and Cyprus surfaced in recent months. Thus, to appreciate the labyrinthine nature of current Greek-Turkish relations, we should survey briefly their recent evolution.

The “Simitis Doctrine”

The January 1996 episode at Imia islets prompted Athens’ decision to cultivate rapprochement with Turkey. Convinced that Ankara’s ongoing challenges and provocations could get out of control, the Simitis government pursued a tension-reducing and détente-building course. Coining the term “Simitis doctrine”¹¹⁰ seemed justified after Simitis’ *Weltanschauung* became evident. It was a rational synthesis akin to “pragmatic idealism”: on the one hand, international law, international ethics, solidarity with like-minded international actors and reliance on appropriate international organizations; on the other, a simultaneous commitment to “a strong Greece” (economically, politically, and diplomatically) and to a moderate deterrence.

During Simitis’ premiership (1996-2004), rapprochement with Turkey took pride of place in Greek foreign and security policy. Athens’ détente-building experiment – a clear departure from Andreas Papandreou’s assertive foreign policy style – was stimulated by the Imia shock but was sustained by a series of additional events. Thus, the capture of PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in the Greek Embassy in Kenya in early 1999 was an embarrassment for Athens, even though the actual involvement and responsibility of the Greek *government* was never established. However, one implication of the episode was the resignation of the foreign minister,

Theodoros Pangalos, an intelligent but highly controversial politician with a penchant for melodramatic, narcissistic and provocative rhetoric. His successor, George A. Papandreou, was mild-mannered, conciliatory, idealistic and, therefore, Pangalos' polar opposite. Young Papandreou's influence on the making of Greek foreign policy in the Simitis years can be taken for granted.¹¹¹

Soon after Papandreou assumed office, NATO's bombing of Serbia over Kosovo began. Confronted by possible Serbian partition, Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart, Ismael Cem, saw eye-to-eye: for just as Greece would never accept the partition of Cyprus, Turkey would resist a similar fate caused by or for the Kurds. This identity of interest and the alleged "good chemistry" between the two men could account for the hesitant dawn of a more benign phase in bilateral relations. Then, just as the December 2004 Asian tsunami caused indescribable misery and pain but also proved the reality of altruism, something analogous occurred between Turks and Greeks.

Devastating earthquakes, with over 15,000 dead, first hit Turkey and then Greece in August and September 1999. Immediately, a moving outpouring of affection by ordinary citizens signified popular eagerness to end the post-1974 Greco-Turkish Cold War. Beyond the ordinary people, this mental and behavioural change was sustained by politicians, local governors, NGOs, artists, intellectuals, academics, journalists, businessmen, and athletes. The Simitis government amplified on this "citizens' diplomacy" while foreign journalists and analysts, impressed by the exchange of deep humaneness, coined the term "seismic diplomacy", when Greek technical teams and loads of generous aid were rushed to help Turkey's victims, to be repeated later by the Turks.

Soon thereafter, during the European Council at Helsinki, and to the surprise of its EU colleagues, Greece was the warmest supporter of opening the Union's arms to Turkey. By then, the Greek government was expecting that, with established popular support and rational and ethical means, the progressive "Europeanization" of Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus should suffice to pacify Ankara's intransigence. Given that summit's Conclusions, mentioned twice already, "Helsinki" has been credited to Simitis by Greeks and Greek Cypriots alike.

In addition, however, Simitis' foreign policy was energetically activist in numerous fields. To begin with, it encouraged UN mediation while helping Cyprus's EU accession. Second, it took peace-making initiatives in the Balkans and the Middle East and performed peace-building operations from

the Balkans to Afghanistan. Third, it introduced generous support for Greek NGOs and supported foreign-aid campaigns. Fourth, the Simitis government should also be credited with the remarkable European Union Presidency which handled with aplomb the profound EU crisis caused by the American invasion of Iraq. Finally, the Simitis doctrine exhibited additional immediate and/or indirect successes, including Greece's entry in the European Monetary Union; unquestionably higher Greek prestige in Brussels; an impressive number of high-profile Greek officials in EU organs; and even Greece's triumphant 2004 election to the UN Security Council (completed under Karamanlis' premiership). Simitis' cardinal achievements, however, were his government's vital contribution to Cyprus' EU accession, his authentic commitment to Greek-Turkish rapprochement, and his manifold support of Turkey's EU orientation as the best means to establish Greek-Turkish-Cypriot détente and collaboration.

Simitis' Flaw

Such a shining foreign policy record was blemished, in my considered opinion, by Simitis' unfortunate decision to support the "Annan plan". Presumably because of bad counsel or some prior promises by/to UN and/or EU officials or just because of regrettable bad judgement, Simitis openly supported the Annan plan, which is criticised thoroughly in chapter 6. This serious flaw could hurt his place in Greek, and certainly in Greek Cypriot, history: for it might encourage the suspicion that the Republic's rights were being compromised. Having said that, it might also be argued that even his erroneous stance on the Annan plan confirms that Greek-Turkish détente was his cardinal goal.

Upon receiving "Annan I", the Simitis government's officials orchestrated its defence. Ministers and other officials who had long and passionately argued that international law held the key to Cypriot liberation, to the problem's resolution, and therefore, to Greek-Turkish détente, now emerged as fervent supporters of a plan that contradicted international law principles and ethical norms. Arguments to explain this flawed perspective will be provided in the next chapter and are applicable to Simitis and his entourage. Here, let us record that, days before the referenda of 24 April 2004, Simitis attempted to influence the Greek Cypriots' vote. In the form of eight rhetorical questions, he issued the following alarmist warnings about the catastrophic consequences of a Greek Cypriot "No": 1. "Will the Republic of Cyprus be able to continue seeking UN support?" 2. "Will

it be able to appeal to Security Council decisions (resolutions)?” 3. “Will Greece be able to obstruct Turkish accession on account of the Cyprus problem?” 4. “Will the EU accept the non-lifting of trade barriers to the occupied territory?” 5. “Will the international community continue to reject the recognition of the pseudo-state [the secessionist regime]?” 6. “If the partition is made permanent, won’t the plan’s territorial benefits be lost?” 7. “Will a partitioned Cyprus be the source of more dangers or not?” and 8. “Won’t our stance on Cyprus pre-judge negatively the European partners’ stance on other issues?”¹¹² That none of these “predictions” has since been verified made their rehearsal irresistible.

Simitis’ Legacy

In chapter 8, we will confirm the falsification of Simitis’ alarmism. Chapter 6 will show that the former PM’s intervention disregarded the Annan plan’s insurmountable problems. And yet, it is true that the difference in degree – albeit not in kind – in the post-1999 Greek-Turkish political climate is one product of the Simitis doctrine. Indeed, bilateral optimism frequently flourishes because of some positive verbal actions, promising exchanges of official visits, expanding “citizens’ diplomacy” and numerous “low politics” agreements in tourism, trade, fighting terrorism, environmental protection, and mutual assistance in natural disasters. Moreover, besides cultivating personal ties – such as Papandreou/Cem and Karamanlis/Erdogan – , tourism and trade between the two neighbours are expanding, while Caspian Sea natural gas will be transported to Western Europe via Turkey and Greece.¹¹³ Presumably, Athens considers appropriate the development of a *modus vivendi* with Ankara, whereby “high politics” issues would be handled far better once capitalization on the accumulated agreements can yield Greco-Turkish peace dividends.

And yet, it is hard to deny that solid détente will evade them as long as Turkey causes dogfights daily in the Aegean by violating the Athens Flight Information Region and Greek airspace, maintains the *casus belli* in the Aegean, entrenches itself in occupied Cyprus, refuses to remove its troops and to recognise *de jure* the Republic, and keeps expanding the illegal settlement of Cyprus by tens of thousands.¹¹⁴ Hence, the 1 March 2005 meeting of the Government Council on Foreign Policy and Defence (KYSEA), presided by PM Karamanlis, concluded that Greece should maintain its deterrence posture vis-a-vis Turkey, coupled with support for the security of the Republic of Cyprus.¹¹⁵

Arguably, therefore, Simitis' initiation of the post-1996 foreign policy experiment was reasonable, since the perpetuation of unmitigated Cold War was bound to cause disaster. The strategy of "Europeanizing" the bilateral relationship and the Cyprus problem was certainly rational, given Turkey's entrenched desire to accede to the EU. And yet, if the nature of the bilateral relationship borders on the schizophrenic; since the provocations in the Aegean have been deleterious and unending; and because Ankara's Cyprus policy is offensive to the EU's legal civilization and ethical culture – then, on the question of the validity of Athens' post-1996 strategy the jury is still out. Two additional considerations fortify this answer: first, EU-related developments in mid-2005 have made EU-Turkey relations exceedingly foggy; and second, Turkey's socio-political landscape appears increasingly murky. Moreover, the question of who are, after all, Ankara's *actual* foreign policy decision-makers seems all but unanswerable. In chapter 8, therefore, I will propose substituting "many Ankaras" for "Ankara", by analogy to the "many Turkeys" that other analysts seem to perceive.¹¹⁶

This provisional assessment of Greece's treatment of its Turkish problem applies also to the early period of Kostas Karamanlis' government. Despite some revisionist features – especially Athens' backing Nicosia more forcefully than the Simitis-Papandreou team – and notwithstanding PASOK's unfair criticism that Karamanlis' policy appears "disoriented" – I submit that Athens' stance on the convoluted issues at hand is marked by continuity rather than the opposite. This refers especially to supporting Turkey's EU orientation, although the present government is increasingly emphatic that any solution of the Cyprus problem should adhere to EU values and norms.

USA and EU

Finally, although this issue is characterized by protracted flux, Washington's and Brussels' influence on recent Greek foreign policy appears as follows. Washington clearly tended to favour Ankara until the "debacle" of 1 March 2003. Perceiving Greek-Turkish issues through blunt *Realpolitik* lenses, it ascribed far superior value to Turkey's geo-strategic significance; it exhibited "neutrality" towards Turkey's occupation of Cyprus; it adopted all but pro-Turkish positions in the Aegean dispute;¹¹⁷ and it has performed unethically regarding the "Annan plan", in cahoots with London. Thus, the 1999 "apologies" by Bill Clinton, Richard Holbrooke and Nicholas Burns

(see chapter 2) have proven that the undercurrents of “anti-Americanism” by Greek public opinion spring from disappointment and frustration at Washington’s perpetual errors and sins vis-à-vis post-war Greece.

However, during the early months of the second George W. Bush administration, notwithstanding the troubling recognition of FYROM as “Republic of Macedonia”,¹¹⁸ Washington may be reconsidering its bilateral relationship with Athens. Prime Minister Karamanlis’ White House visit in May 2005, following a successful prior visit of FM Petros Molyviatis to Condoleezza Rice, was marked by President Bush’s glowing description of Greece’s role in the Balkans and his repeated use of the term “strategic partner” about Greece. Athens’ subsequent enthusiasm – sufficient to cause consternation in left wing elites – may entail that the Greek PM received some US promises in exchange, for instance, for Athens’ support for – or at least “neutrality” on – American initiatives in Kosovo and the Middle East. This hypothesis is backed by the defensible presumption that Tayyip Erdogan’s subsequent visit to the White House (June 2005) failed to attain the level of Karamanlis’ assumed success.

As regards Brussels, the falsification of Simitis’ “predictions” constitutes a moral victory for the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union itself. Despite London’s orchestrated attempts – after the referendum – to back fully the desires and demands of Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership at the UN and the EU, Nicosia seems to be defusing the misperceptions of its motives and goals. Numerous EU organs and spokespersons have been increasingly adopting the Republic’s arguments about its rights, resisting the Turkish lobby’s propaganda regarding “upgrading the Turkish Cypriots’ status”, ending their “isolation”, “rewarding” them for their “yes”, etc. Nicosia has been showing that some Cyprus-related measures proposed by some in the EU contradict international law and the EU’s legal and moral culture and would only work in favour of *partition* as opposed to *reunification*.¹¹⁹ That is why statements by leading EU personalities (such as European Parliament President, Josep Borell), decisions by the Commission, and resolutions by the Parliament and its Foreign Relations Committee have sustained, after the referendum, the Republic’s positions, as will be shown in chapters 7 and 8. Therefore, here at last, one may perceive the makings of an *EU fair play* against some odds.

6. *The Annan Plan and Its Discontents*

The 24 April twin referendum was meant to endorse or reject the “Annan plan”. It is commonly known that “Annan V” exceeded 9,000 pages. Its convoluted character rendered often incomprehensible even the 181 pages available – at the end – only to English-reading voters. The plan was treated by its defenders as aiming at “the reunification of Cyprus”. In truth, its goals were far more intricate, but serving a variety of exogenous interests and needs. Equally regrettably, it was also “pushed” openly and crudely on the Cypriots as their “last chance before final partition”.

Given its elusive nature, and the haste of its imposition, the world is only recently coming to appreciate how suspiciously defective this plan is. Suffice it to indicate at the outset that the proposed “United Cyprus Republic” contradicted elementary principles and rules of international law, being also at odds with fundamental European norms and values: it literally forgave Turkey for its 1974 invasion and the ongoing, and legally condemned, occupation; it expected the Greek Cypriots – the primary but not exclusive victims of the invasion – to sustain economically the new entity; it called for its demilitarization, but permitted the stationing of foreign troops *ad infinitum*, giving them, moreover, “right of intervention”; it contained experimental constitutional-administrative arrangements, since, beyond the threat of perennial vetoes, it provided that, in all cases of political/economic/legal/etc deadlock, the ultimate decision-making authority was vested in the Supreme Court where the ultimate determining power was vested on three *foreign* judges; and it made, in fact, Turkey a strong

participant in the very running of the UCR, through legitimization of tens of thousands of illegal Turkish settlers.

Arguments for the “Yes” Side

Even its warmest Greek Cypriot proponents had conceded that the plan was “a painful compromise”. They insisted however that, “assuming good will”, it was bound to improve through EU membership. Also, echoing the plan’s foreign propagators, the Greek Cypriot advocates asserted that the following attributes made its endorsement necessary: (1) “Cypriot reunification” at long last; (2) eventual departure of most Turkish occupation troops; (3) return of about half the refugees to their abandoned homes under Greek Cypriot administration; and (4) eventual, even though partial and controversial, compensation for non-returning properties. Their strongest argument, however, was the constantly articulated “catastrophic consequences” of the “No”.

The proponents’ endorsability claims were sophisticated. They will be exposed below as misleading *petitio principii*. But beginning first with the alarmist threats, it should be stressed that they were massively orchestrated and passionately voiced to intimidate the voters. Therefore, they were morally outrageous. In addition, the “catastrophologists” revealed the submission of some Greek Cypriot elites – from political figures to media personalities to younger academics – to the overt or covert threats by self-serving foreign centres. These threats, echoed by Simitis’ own “predictions”, included alleged “certainties” such as these: after a No vote, Cyprus will be internationally “isolated”; this was “the last plan”; upon rejection of the Annan Plan, Cyprus would be “Euro-partitioned”; and the plan’s rejection would flood the Republic’s free territories with Turkish Cypriots, seeking freedom and human rights, and causing the consequent habitation of the “North” only by Turkish settlers. Thus, instead of protesting at such threats as politically unconscionable and morally unbearable, the plan’s supporters had succumbed to them. Hence, they were perceived as serving ultimately the vested interests of the foreign capitals that wished to attain the Cypriots’ Yes at all costs.

Needless to say, this author does not necessarily share the “fifth column” perception of the entire pro-Yes Greek Cypriot camp. After all, many of them – especially the older generation – were exhausted by the problem. Others could not appreciate the plan’s enormously negative implications. And still others suffered from what may be termed “the

author's complex": for a number of political figures – in Clerides' presidency and George Vassiliou's EDI party – had participated in the plan's drafting during the negotiations. It does not follow, however, that all Greek Cypriot elites were entirely innocent of unfair play. The autumn 2004 revelations concerning UNOPS' and USAID's generous financial support for individuals and groups campaigning for the Yes, both in Cyprus and in Greece, sufficed to expose numerous individuals as not above suspicion.¹²⁰

Turning to the supporters' major material expectations (the return of half the refugees and the property issue), the tragic irony is that for any of these to be fulfilled, two "heroic" assumptions were required: the *existence* of "good will" and, by implication, that the plan *could actually work*. Manifestly, both assumptions were at best unfounded or naive. For if the "UCR" was massively perceived by the Greek Cypriots as unbalanced, unfair and unworkable, it would follow that it was condemned *ab initio* to a brief life. In this case, of course, the implications would be colossal: the Republic of Cyprus would cease to exist whereas the illicitly occupied areas would have attained "legitimacy". It already follows that the entire operation was at best inherently risky and, at worst, deeply suspect.

As regards the remaining "benefits" – i.e., the phased departure of most Turkish troops and eventual "reunification" – far from being generous bonuses attached to a defective text, they are Turkey's manifest legal requirements and political duties. The Greek Cypriots at least do not forget that Turkey's invasion, the illegal occupation, and the massive violation of the fundamental human rights of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been explicitly and repeatedly condemned for over 30 years. Moreover, with Turkey awaiting the EU's December 2004 decision, it seemed scandalous that it could attain its "date" while occupying 37% of an EU member-state's territory. Thus, absent any guarantees whatsoever that this particular plan would work,¹²¹ the attempt to white-wash Turkey's Cyprus aggression was politically, legally and morally offensive. Finally, insult was added to injury by the plan's intention to obliterate Turkey's obligation to compensate the victims of the occupation. Indeed, few analysts mention that the plan included a "Letter to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe" by the "Co-Presidents", to the effect that all further cases against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights concerning Cypriot properties should be annulled. After asserting that "domestic remedy" for the solution of "*affected property*" questions is provided in the Foundation Agreement of the plan, the Letter was rendering "the United Cyprus Republic" solely responsible for these matters. It then added:¹²²

Moreover, pursuant to Article 37 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, we request the Court to strike out any proceeding currently before it concerning affected property in Cyprus, in order to allow the domestic mechanism, established to solve these cases, to proceed.

Therefore, the plan precluded tens of thousands of refugees from enjoying compensations analogous to Ms Titina Loizidou's. This was assessed by G/Cs and knowledgeable others as a veritable legal and ethical scandal.

Some Replies by the “No” Side

Even a schematic account of the No side's fears and concerns may explain why 76% of the Greek Cypriots rejected the offer. To begin with, foreign commentators hardly mentioned that around 75% of the Greek Cypriots who voted No had explained – in sophisticated exit-polls – that their primary worry with the plan was “*insecurity*”; the issues of *properties* and the *settlers* followed far behind.¹²³ It transpired that the insecurity's main sources were four: first, the presence of thousands of Turkish troops for up to 14 more years; second, the permission to allow 600 Turkish troops to remain in Cyprus *ad infinitum* (*i.e.* even after Turkey's assumed accession to the Union); third, the plan's granting to Turkey a “right of intervention” even within the Greek Cypriot constituent state; and fourth, the total absence of guarantees that the plan *will be actually implemented*. In view of the accumulated mistrust caused by the occupation by roughly 40,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus, recalling the unmitigated efforts by Ankara and Denktash to undermine all reunification initiatives, and given Turkey's rather fuzzy domestic political landscape, it cannot be surprising that the Greek Cypriots felt suspicious, fearful, and deeply insecure.

On 7 April 2004, President Tassos Papadopoulos addressed all Cypriots. He stressed that the Greek Cypriots were being asked to begin delivering immediately their part of the bargain – starting with the Republic's dissolution – whereas the Turkish side's obligation to deliver was extended over 15 years. He then proceeded to criticize the plan's manifest problems. The speech was immediately and viciously attacked, in the orchestrated effort to undermine Papadopoulos' credibility.¹²⁴ In fact, however, the speech expressed succinctly the primary fears and insecurities of the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots, whose opposition to the plan had long been hovering between 70-80%.¹²⁵ Moreover, President Papadopoulos did not “campaign” even once after this address. But he was politically and

morally forced to submit his opinion to all Cypriots, to the Greek Cypriot community, and to the world at large, given the referendum's *existential* significance for Cyprus.

Numerous additional grounds explain the Greek Cypriots' overwhelming "No". They derive primarily from the plan's *nonviable* or *unworkable* features, as manifested by its structural defects. First, the constitutional demand to form inter-communal majorities amounted essentially to giving the right of veto to the minority Turkish Cypriots. This minority constitutes around 12% of the legitimate Cypriot citizens: for the illegal settlers now outnumber the native Turkish Cypriots. As the 2003 Report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe revealed,¹²⁶

Despite the lack of consensus on the exact figures, all parties concerned admit that Turkish nationals have been systematically arriving in the northern part of the island. According to reliable estimates, their number currently amounts to 115 000...[The Turkish Cypriots'] number decreased from 118 000 in 1974 to an estimated 87 600 in 2001. In consequence, the settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population in the northern part of the island.

Therefore, such a minority, strengthened by the settlers who would become citizens of the "UCR" – in violation of the norm that such act is a war crime – was allowed by the plan to "discriminate" against the overwhelming Greek Cypriot majority. Bordering, therefore, on the tyranny of the minority, such provisions deepened the Greek Cypriots' sense of transparent injustice.

Second, in cases of inter-communal decision-making impasse, the plan appealed, as we mentioned, to the Supreme Court's three foreign judges. But then they would also be transformed to legislators and governors, thereby obliterating the elementary principle of the separation of powers. In the post-colonial history of the world, this is rather unprecedented. The Greek Cypriots found it offensive.

Third, most of the economic burden of running the new (crypto-confederal) entity would necessarily fall on the Greek Cypriots, whose present per capita income is calculated at around four times that of the Turkish Cypriots, while the GDP of the occupied territory is around 8% of the free territory's. This, too, seemed to the Greek Cypriots palpably unfair.

Fourth, the pivotal property issues were to be handled by a Property Board. This was a source of intense insecurity and frustration, if only because its time-horizon for compensations could reach 35 years. Moreover, its uncertain sources of funds and its obscure *modus operandi* did boggle

the ordinary citizen's mind. To him/her, the fair resolution of the property issues was the time-honoured and legally sanctioned way of the Western tradition of human rights: return to her/his property, coupled – as in the Loizidou case – with substantial compensation for the violation of the right to enjoy this property.¹²⁷

And fifth, despite disingenuous ambiguities, the plan had endorsed the legitimization of most of the illegal settlers from mainland Turkey. Now, for many reasons, these have long been in serious – social, economic, psychological and political – conflict with the genuine Turkish Cypriots, as noted also by the Jaakko Laakso Report:¹²⁸

The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed regions of Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population who tend to view them as a foreign element.

What is more, considering that all Greek Cypriots know that illegal settlement is an established war crime, suspicion and mistrust could be anticipated *a fortiori* among these settlers and the Greek Cypriots. After all, most of the settlers have occupied and exploited for years the homes and properties of the Republic's legitimate citizens.

There were, however, additional serious problems. So, on 7 June 2004, President Papadopoulos addressed a letter to Kofi Annan, complaining bitterly about the latter's report on his Cyprus mission. He accused it of factual inaccuracies, biased inferences, and numerous counterproductive suggestions. On the crucial issue of functionality, his letter includes this observation:

Functionality covers all the areas of the operation of the state and our concern for functionality was reflected in all of our proposals during the process covering, inter alia, federal legislation and its practical application, the Central Bank, fiscal and monetary policy, the curtailing of the various transitional periods, ensuring conformity with EU obligations, the administrative structure and function of the federal government, the decision-making process at all levels, the territorial aspect and the issue of missing persons.¹²⁹

On most of these issues, Nicosia did ask for substantial changes, which it never received. In fact, exercising his "discretionary power" to fill the plan's remaining gaps at Bürgenstock, Mr Annan endorsed all the demands raised by Turkish PM, Tayyip Erdogan. Given, then, that "Annan V" was even more unfair to the Greek Cypriots but entirely satisfactory to Turkey

and the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish media were immediately ecstatic and the Turkish Cypriots could not but vote in support for such a plan.

Procedural Sins

The Greek Cypriots might have overlooked some of the plan's substantive defects and anomalies, if they could somehow perceive the entire affair as *ultimately* just or fair. However, feeling manipulated and blackmailed by the whole process and by the very entourage of Mr Annan – especially by supercilious Alvaro de Soto – only deepened their sense of injustice. In this regard, the following data are most notable.

The timetable of the decisions expected on the earlier versions of the plan (until February 2003) was truly asphyxiating. This caused profound discontent. For, while the content of the highly technical plan was nearly incomprehensible to the average citizen, Mr Annan had first demanded agreements, followed by referenda, to be held only days before the Republic of Cyprus was to sign the Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003.

After that failed effort because of Rauf Denktash, the last negotiating round began with the 13 February 2004 New York agreement. But this agreement was also reached under unconscionable pressures. This fact solidified the conviction that the UN Secretariat, Washington and London were railroading the plan's unquestioned endorsement. Moreover, the agreement contained another unprecedented provision: that is, should no consensus be reached by the Cypriots themselves by the end of March 2004 – even assisted for a week by Ankara and Athens – the Secretary General himself would “exercise his discretion” and thus “fill in the remaining gaps”... This provision can be accused of violating the limits of the Secretary General's “good offices mission”.

Next, the new referenda were set for 24 April 2004, that is, only days before the Republic's formal EU Accession on May 1! In addition, the UN allowed the settlers to vote, obliterating any distinction between them and the native Turkish Cypriots. This entrenched the suspicion that the plan's authors had actually decided to “legitimize” most settlers by fiat. Finally, and most important, President Papadopoulos' proposals for functional improvements were utterly ignored by Alvaro de Soto.¹³⁰

Thus, some Greek Cypriot commentators and politicians suggested that “Annan V” was so inimical to their community's needs, and so contrary to international and EU principles and norms, that, besides serving alien interests, it was perhaps tailored to secure the Greek Cypriot No. In any

case, the entire procedure amounted to a travesty of a “free and democratic referendum”. Equally important, the UNSG’s invitation of February 2004 had stated explicitly that one No would render the entire affair null and void. Therefore, it is disheartening that, immediately after 24 April 2004, the Republic of Cyprus was subjected to unbearable pressures, while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots started enjoying unprecedented favours.

Further Legal Anomalies

The Greek Cypriots’ perception of thorough unfairness through manipulation sprung from additional legal errors and sins. As a matter of legal fact, the plan contradicted solid commitments of international law, the European Union’s legal culture, and its defining political values and norms, as the following examples demonstrate.

First, the orchestrated attempt to wipe out Turkey’s guilt and responsibility for the 1974 invasion would constitute serious injury to the EU’s prestige and a pernicious precedent for the global legal culture.

Second, the Greek Cypriots’ human rights were only partially and conditionally satisfied by the plan as regards, for instance, the right of all persons to return to their homes and properties; to be compensated for the loss of property enjoyment; unimpeded residence anywhere on the island; and the right to vote when residing in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. The partial and curtailed satisfaction of these human rights amounts, in fact, to a violation of those rights and of the EU’s treasured values and norms.

Third, we have recalled repeatedly the ECHR’s historic decisions in the *Loizidou v Turkey* case (1996 and 1998), which forced Ankara to pay, five years later, 1 million EUR to Ms Loizidou (November 2003). The plan, as we have shown, declared that all such cases must be abandoned. Therefore, Turkey would not be obliged to compensate any other of the 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees for the violation of the selfsame right. It followed that such compensation would have to be provided by the Greek Cypriot constituent state. In other words, the Greek Cypriots were being forced by this plan to compensate themselves!

Fourth, Article 100 (1) of the UN Charter appears violated, since it declares:

In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action

which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organisation.

Fifth, the unconscionable pressures applied to the Cypriot people and their President regarding both the plan and the referendum seem to constitute a clear violation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Of immediate relevance here is the spirit and letter of Articles 51 (“Coercion of a representative of a State”); 52 (“Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force”); and 53 (“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*)”).

Sixth, while the plan envisaged the demilitarization of the “UCR”, it sanctioned the presence of foreign troops with an “intervention right” in its territory. But it is clear that such a “right” was the root cause of the tragedy of 1974. Any interpretation to the effect that this right entails or permits the use of military force should be illegal *ab initio*, since it clearly contradicts Article 103 of the UN Charter (see again chapter 2). It follows, once again, that this “UN Plan” contradicted fundamental norms of international law, including even cardinal ones of the organisation’s own Charter.

Finally, many legal features of the “UCR” undermine the notion of sovereignty. Therefore, this entity would have amounted to a second or third-rate state and, as some commentators noted, a “satrapy of Turkey”. In any event, this experimentally concocted political entity could not have functioned as a *full*, not to mention an *equal*, EU member-state.

On the Authorship of the Annan Plan

Given the legal anomalies and political and moral contradictions embedded in this plan, the Greek Cypriots concluded that they confronted an apparent trap. Simultaneously, they were wondering precisely who would wish them such a fate and why. A fair answer is that the labyrinthine text was concocted primarily by “experts” serving the current “Cyprus agenda” of the Secretariat; and that they were all influenced or guided by policy-makers and diplomats from Washington and London, Lord David Hannay being a prime example. This was manifest in their open and direct involvement in all stages of this “good offices mission”. The self-regarding interests of these two capitals were – and still are – very hard to hide. They also suffice to explain the furious indignation with which they received the Greek Cypriots’ No.

On London’s part, these interests centre on legitimating the presence in Cyprus of the two British “Sovereign Bases”. Being equivalent to around

3% of the Republic's territory, they are a remnant of the colonial past. The strategic value and multidimensional role of these bases – as British and American listening-posts covering the Middle East and far beyond – are well-known. But the plan attempted to expand Britain's rights to Cyprus' territorial waters and arguably the associated continental shelf. It should therefore be recalled that, three years ago, deposits of petroleum and natural gas were located between Cyprus and Egypt. The authors performed almost surreptitiously their attempt to grant Britain further rights in Cyprus. The textual ambiguity deserves to be quoted in full: ¹³¹

The United Kingdom shall continue to enjoy complete and unimpeded access for any purpose whatsoever to the waters lying between the waters which the United Cyprus Republic shall not claim adjacent to the eastern part of the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area adjoining the sea (which part is marked on Map A with an area of 16.10 sq.km), and the waters which the United Cyprus Republic shall not claim adjacent to the western part of the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area adjoining the sea (which is marked on map A with an area of 5.01 sq.km).

The issue of the British bases has always troubled the Cypriot political class and the people. But it was thought, until very recently, that the Republic could not afford “to open another (diplomatic/legal) front” while the struggle for justice was lasting. And yet, upon discovering that the EU Constitutional Treaty had itself included a Declaration to the effect that the bases would be “British Sovereign Areas” *ad infinitum*, the House of Representatives, after voting in favour of the Constitutional Treaty, took another vote. It decided, this time unanimously, to declare that the UK has no sovereignty on the territory of the bases but only the right to use it for particular military purposes; to ask London to fulfill its relevant economic obligations to the Republic; to ask the Government to investigate the proper legal means to receive the rent owed by London; and to seek the final resolution of the issue in the framework of international law. Incidentally, the relevant report in distinguished Athens daily, *Eleftherotypia*, observed that this unanimous vote was certainly affected “by the hostile stance London maintains towards Cyprus in many forums”.¹³²

As for Washington, its persistent and manifold pressures on the Greek Cypriots to accept the plan were a causal extension of its long-term regional perceptions and strategic designs. Thus, beyond aiming to contribute to settling the “triangular” disputes of Turkey-Cyprus-Greece, the current US vision looked as follows. First, it aimed to score some “diplomatic victory” on the island, following especially the monumental catastrophe in

Iraq and the growing anti-Americanism especially in the Near – and Middle East. Second, the State Department has long been determined to help Turkey's EU accession. Therefore, it was necessary to help unload its heavy Cyprus-related legal, political and ethical burden. Third, were a "Cyprus constitutional model" to emerge, it might be "applied" to other countries in the region, in association with the Greater Middle East Project. And fourth, many observers endorse the Machiavellian hypothesis of the Trojan Horse: should Turkey, by ending *inter alia* its "Cyprus malaise", achieve eventually full EU membership, the US would increase substantially its power and influence over "New Europe" within the EU.

In this respect, few readers may know how Mr Richard Boucher was confronted by a journalist during a May 2004 State Department briefing:¹³³

Another disclosure on Cyprus. According to an article written by established Greek-American organization, to be published soon in a very well known American magazine, a full copy of which is in my possession, reveals the following: "Why then the consternation about the rejection of the Annan plan? Because the true purpose was not the claimed goal of reunifying the island, divided since the Turkish invasion of 1974, but the one stated by Mr. Daniel Fried, a senior State Department official. At a public meeting in Washington on June 26, 2003, in the presence of this writer and others, Mr Fried declared: 'When we were trying to persuade Turkey to allow the passage of our troops through its territory into Northern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives, several billion dollars in grants and loans, and Cyprus, in the form of the Annan plan.' When Turkey refused passage, the billions were dropped; however, the Annan plan survived, until it was dropped by the Cypriots on April 24th".

Finally, it is redundant to rehearse the manifold – legal, political, diplomatic, economic and strategic – benefits accruing to Turkey by the entire process – except one, which borders on international political, legal and moral deception: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots could only gain by the Annan project; therefore their endorsement was a forgone conclusion. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriots were being pressed to endorse what amounted to renewed victimization. Nonetheless, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots immediately began being variously "rewarded", while the Greeks remained under asphyxiating pressures.

This analysis should have conveyed the Greek Cypriots' melancholy and frustration. Once again, they discovered that others keep treating them as expendable pawns in heartless and unfair geopolitical games, because of their "strategic piece of real estate" (George Ball). They themselves,

however, have looked up to “Europe” as their political vocation and legal-moral salvation.

Simultaneously, the Turkish Cypriots, in their eagerness to join the EU, had obviously acted rationally by adopting the plan. First, it promised to liberate them progressively from Turkey’s occupation. Second, their “isolation” – imposed by the international community because of Turkey’s invasion/occupation – would end. Third, reunification would improve dramatically their sad living standards. And fourth, the Turkish Cypriot community’s accession to the EU would grant them the human rights they have long been denied.

By the same token, the Greek Cypriots’ final reason for rejecting the plan on 24 April 2004 was that the Republic of Cyprus’ EU accession was already locked by the 13 April 2003 Treaty of Accession, *to be formalised* on 1 May 2004. Why, then, most of them asked, should they endorse a transparently lopsided, unworkable, hence nonviable, and therefore unfair, plan when the EU should feel obliged to begin “rescuing” them after only a week?

To conclude, the plan suffered from grave political/administrative faults and deep legal pathology. Therefore, it should not have been proposed as a “solution” to the Cyprus problem. It follows – logically, legally, politically and ethically – that the Greek Cypriots had every right to reject it. It also follows that it is morally outrageous to try to “punish” them, since their decision was taken democratically and according to the very rules set for the entire affair. For Kofi Annan’s letter of February 2004 had been explicit: “Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved, it shall be null and void, and the commitments undertaken by the parties in resuming negotiations, including the submission to referenda, shall have no legal effect”.¹³⁴

7. *Unfair Consequences, Ambiguous Implications*

The unfairness of the Annan plan affair now established, it is also important to illustrate the survival of unfair means and ends against Cyprus *after* the referendum. But keeping in mind the size of the Republic, its numerically limited diplomatic tools, the fury of its detractors and the ingenious tools employed by the latter, it is remarkable that – at this writing – the positive perceptions of the country in the EU have predominated, in part because of a progressive appreciation of what the Annan plan really meant. That the EU is presently backing the Republic is crucial and telling. In any event, developments of historic proportions for the EU, with direct bearing on the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-EU “quartet”, have recently occurred. Therefore, their implications must be assessed.

Referendum Post Mortem

Our analysis to this point implies some immediate conclusions. First, the cynical project – promoted by Washington, Ankara and London – to “punish” the Greek Cypriots for their vote should be openly condemned. The Greek Cypriots essentially appealed to the pivotal “Western” – i.e. both North American and EU – principles and values (democracy, human rights, the rule of law) and to the elementary norms of international law, clearly acting with EU accession in mind. Therefore, since they resisted an *anti-European* scheme, it should follow that they *deserve to be rewarded* by the Union. As regards the Turkish Cypriots themselves (as against their leadership), they cannot fail to perceive that Nicosia’s insistence on changes to

the plan aim only at fair and functional improvements to render reunification solid and therefore viable. However, Talat, like Denktash, is himself entangled in Ankara's antics, as he depends primarily upon it.

Second, from the standpoint of blunt *Realpolitik* it may be understandable that some EU circles, just like the present UN Secretariat, desired to fix a drawn-out international problem in haste. But it is politically and ethically unconscionable that, during the Annan affair, the European Commission tolerated the aforementioned violations of the *acquis communautaire* and the manifest contradictions to cardinal axiological principles of Europe's Constitutional Treaty.

Primarily after Helsinki (December 1999), the EU relied too religiously on the UN's role, presumably counting on the latter's alleged "expertise" on the matter and also because it was eager to usher a "reunited Cyprus" into the Union. But Washington and London's asphyxiating pressures contributed to Brussels' being misled. However, if even part of my argument is valid, it should follow that the period of EU "neutrality" or "calculated ambiguity" is over, for the Republic is now a full and equal member-state.

Incidentally, should one rule out that some "Annanite" circles might have envisaged the permanent division of Cyprus after, and through, a Greek Cypriot No? Admittedly, such a hypothesis can use the (false) premise that the two communities cannot live together;¹³⁵ or the (falsified) premise that the Greek Cypriots do not desire reunification;¹³⁶ or the (untenable) thesis that no plan can succeed where the Annan plan has failed.¹³⁷ Since none of these premises is defensible, as demonstrated here, one should infer that any notion of a permanent Cypriot division would be premised on ruthless geopolitical designs contrary to the Cypriots' needs and the EU's real interests and values. Therefore, toleration of such cynical designs would constitute a paradigm of international illegality and immorality. Moreover, it would be fought by all political means by Nicosia, Athens, and many member-states. After all, if need be, Nicosia would be forced to take its case to the European Court of Justice. This, indeed, was threatened by Nicosia when, immediately after 24 April 2004, some intra-EU pressures, partly inspired by Washington, were initiated against the Republic.

The common, if disingenuous, ground used explicitly by some Washington and London officials was that the "status of the Turkish Cypriots should be upgraded". This was based on such premises as (1) "the Greek Cypriots rejected reunification", (2) "the Turkish Cypriots should not be isolated any longer" and (3) "they should be rewarded for their Yes". These premises are misleading or false. As we have shown, to falsify (1) suffice it

to recall (a) the errors and sins of the Annan plan and (b) the *actual reasons* given by the Greek Cypriots to explain their vote. As for (2), it banks on the false impression that the Republic of Cyprus has “isolated” its own citizens! But as already explained, the “isolation” results from the embargo imposed by the international community on the secessionist regime of the occupied territory, as necessitated by Turkey’s condemned invasion and occupation. In addition, we have also demonstrated the self-serving grounds of the Turkish Cypriots’ “Yes”. Therefore, it is absurd to hold that they should be “rewarded” for defending their interests – as if they could have done otherwise! Finally, it is crucial here to ask, *whom they are referring to* when they talk of “Turkish Cypriots”? Even though many still try to mislead, it is clear that by “Turkish Cypriots” one should only mean the “indigenous” ones. Otherwise, one ignores or condones the war crime of importing illegal settlers.

The pressures on the Republic took additional forms. A ruthless propaganda campaign – using the international press, the academic world and various high-profile “think-tanks” – attempted to discredit the Greek Cypriots and undermine President Papadopoulos.¹³⁸ A leading role here was assumed by Nikos Anastasiades, the leader of conservative party, DISY.¹³⁹ Simultaneously, there was widespread intimidation through constant talk of the Annan plan’s return, under a different “number” (say, “Annan 5,5”) and on the model of the Irish and Danish second EU referenda. Throughout these months, such was the communication among the local and external detractors that their assertions were couched in identical language. Moreover, while rising Turkish Cypriot political star, Mehmet Ali Talat was warmly welcomed by some Western capitals – in banal anti-Nicosia psychological warfare – Tassos Papadopoulos was being accused of (1) “causing” the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the plan and (2) not providing concrete proposals for the problem’s resolution. But as we have shown, (1) is clearly false: the Greek Cypriots became inimical to the plan *ab initio* when they sensed its real (including its submerged) nature. As for (2), Tassos Papadopoulos had immediately conveyed what Nicosia desires and deserves in his response to the Secretary General’s SC Report. In addition, if he was only *suggesting* the necessary requirements for a *fair* and *viable* settlement, this was because he argued that full revelations should only occur during the negotiations.

A primary goal of such unethical pressures was to force direct trade with Cyprus’ occupied territory. But this would contradict directly the Republic’s sovereignty. Another aim – orchestrated then and still pursued

by Washington – was to encourage direct flights from Europe and the US to the illegal airport of the secessionist and unrecognized regime. Once again, such proposals fly in the face of international law and Cypriot sovereignty. To the ethical credit of the European Union, at least during the Luxembourg Presidency, these efforts were opposed and resisted. But credit is also due to the Cyprus government. For, beyond keeping alive (since April 2003) the rich socio-economic and other measures to assist the legitimate Turkish Cypriots, it has submitted successive proposals to the Union in order to facilitate their legal trade, using the Republic's legitimate ports and airports.¹⁴⁰

Towards December 2004, Again

Meanwhile, the Commission's decisions on Turkey's accession prospects were set to be published on 6 October. Near that date, more adventures marked EU-Turkey relations and associated perceptions. First, the new Turkish Penal Code caused consternation by its proposal to penalize adultery. Mr Erdogan assured Europeans that the relevant article would be removed and kept his word. Ironically, the adultery issue was rather a red herring: other articles in the new TPC questioned seriously Turkey's alleged legislative revolution. For instance, Article 306 threatens with 3-10 years imprisonment any actions that oppose "basic national benefits", that is, "independence, territorial integrity, national security and the basic principles of Turkish democracy". Remarkably, this article contains specific examples: "propaganda regarding the departure of Turkish troops from Cyprus, endorsement of a [Cyprus] solution contrary to Turkey (sic), and propaganda regarding the subject of the Armenian genocide".¹⁴¹ The TPC case, therefore, is certainly not closed.

Secondly, prominent Europeans started questioning the wisdom of either granting Turkey the green light in December 2004 or giving assurances that negotiations *entail* full membership. Along with the reservations expressed by well-known Commissioners, and some important European politicians, President Jacques Chirac himself proposed that the ultimate decision on Turkish membership should rest on referenda. Suddenly, Turkey's membership became quite unpopular among many Europeans, especially after more precise estimates of the implied economic burdens.

Third, preparations were underway in Turkey for the envisaged (4-5 October 2004) Forum between EU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Ankara stubbornly insisted that the regime of occupied

Cyprus participate in the meeting under the name “Turkish Cypriot State”, that is, the name proposed by the rejected Annan Plan. While FM Abdullah Gül kept reassuring Brussels that Turkey’s insistence had “nothing to do with recognising” the (illegal) regime, the Dutch presidency was not convinced. Hence it called for the withdrawal of all EU participation in the Forum, causing its cancellation.

On the other hand, the months immediately preceding the December 2004 summit were gratifying for the Republic. Papadopoulos’ visits to numerous capitals of fellow-EU member-states were bearing fruits in tandem with the work of soft-spoken FM Iakovou and his energetic diplomatic staff. Thus, a series of statements and EU decisions about Cyprus falsified the “catastrophology” of the “Annanites”, intensifying optimism that the EU will, after all, honour its principles and norms. President of the European Parliament, Josep Borrell, was among the first who endorsed Papadopoulos’ exposé of Nicosia’s stance. After their Brussels meeting, Mr Borrell stated: “The solution proposed to the Cypriots could not have been that good; hence it was not accepted. We must listen to the Cypriots so as to find another solution, and the European Parliament is intensely involved in this effort.”¹⁴²

Secondly, the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) began debating the Regulation on economic assistance to the Turkish/Cypriot community since April 2004. Nicosia has supported from the outset all such assistance, to help reduce the yawning economic gap between the two sides. Nicosia insists, however, (1) that such assistance cannot bypass the legitimate Government; and (2) that no impression should be given that occupied Cyprus enjoys any “legitimate” authorities. Reportedly, the British representatives have antagonized Nicosia’s arguments persistently. COREPER, however, has been endorsing Nicosia’s theses to date, while Nicosia, in turn, has agreed from the outset to granting the Turkish Cypriots a 259 million Eur aid package.

Third, the Cyprus Government informed its EU interlocutors about the measures taken to “upgrade” the Turkish Cypriots’ quality of life. Since April 2003, in fact, it has extended generous social, medical, educational, economic and trade measures to assist them. It is not widely known, moreover, that, by spring 2005, over 6,000 Turkish Cypriots cross daily the barricades to work in the free territories while 1,000 of them have already joined the (left-wing) labour syndicate, PEO.¹⁴³ Additional relevant data (April 2003-March 2005) include the following: the Turkish Cypriots’ wages from the free territory amounted to 107 million Cyprus pounds; the

T/Cs have received from the Republic social security benefits of 18, 8 million CYP; medical coverage in public hospitals has cost an additional 4 million CYP; the Republic has been paying student tuition fees, which by September 2005 will amount to 2,4 million CYP; and since 1974, the Cyprus Electricity Authority has been providing free electricity to the occupied area to the tune of 150 million Cyprus pounds.¹⁴⁴ Thus, by emphasizing that no EU-sponsored measures should bypass the legitimate Cypriot government, Nicosia argues that it must protect the Republic's sovereignty and not strengthen the hand of Turkish Cypriot chauvinists. For, instead of helping reunification, measures that by-pass the Republic would be used to cement the division.

Now, the Commission's October 6 decisions on Turkey generated even contradictory readings of the final form of the EU-Turkey relationship and Cyprus' role in the process. Regarding the latter, Nicosia was displeased by the silence regarding the occupation troops on EU territory and Turkey's associated legal obligations. On the other hand, the recommendation that the accession negotiations take place in an Intergovernmental Conference, where unanimity is required, entailed that Nicosia's votes were becoming a *sine qua non*.

The Commission's proposals caused a fresh public discussion of the Republic's right to veto. This was also encouraged by Ankara's renewed intransigence and by the Turcoskeptic sentiments in some member-states following 6 October.¹⁴⁵ Greek Cypriot analysts and political figures argued openly that the Republic's justified and hard-won EU-status empowered it to claim the elementary rights that no European can doubt. These included the recognition of the Republic by Turkey; the beginning of the end of the occupation; the departure of most settlers; and the speedy start of fair negotiations premised on the European Union's principles, values and norms. Josep Borell's address to the Turkish Parliament provided additional support.¹⁴⁶

The very process of opening negotiations between the 25 member states and Turkey implies recognition of Cyprus. It is not possible to negotiate with someone that you don't recognise...I would suggest both to you and to the authorities in Nicosia that if the opening of negotiations in itself means recognition of Cyprus by Turkey, then, perhaps, there may be less of a political problem for both governments.

As the December 2004 summit approached, statements by leading political figures and the people's sentiments, captured through repeated opinion polls, favoured the use of Nicosia's veto.¹⁴⁷ As they put it, "if need

be”, the Republic should consider that “the veto is an option”. This, in fact, was the slogan of a popular, public political meeting held in Nicosia only days before the European Council. Given the mounting frustration caused by Ankara’s persistent refusal to recognise the Republic while expecting that Nicosia would vote in favour of Turkey, most people hoped that Cyprus, backed by like-minded member-states, could indeed raise its veto at that stage in EU-Turkey relations.

The December 2004 European Summit and Beyond

The results of the 16-17 December 2004 European Summit were a partial victory for Turkey. True, the “date” was highly conditional; and some conditions were highly disconcerting to Ankara. And yet, with Turkey closer than ever to fulfilling its dream of joining “Western civilisation”, Tayyip Erdogan was seemingly achieving his most treasured goal. Turkey’s media and most analysts celebrated the outcome with extended panegyrics.

The European Council’s results were not immediately satisfying for either Cyprus or Greece. I did witness that Greek Cypriots seemed nearly depressed for days, considering that the EU had let them down at a telling moment. While they noted their President’s warm thanks to Athens for its unbending assistance and support, they lamented the EU’s hesitation to satisfy Cyprus’ rights and legitimate claims by imposing appropriate conditions to Turkey. As regards Greek public opinion and media responses, Karamanlis’ talk of manifold success at Brussels sounded hyperbolic or misplaced. The EU’s evasion of tangible protection of the Republic of Cyprus stood at the heart of most mainland Greeks’ own disappointment.

And yet, this climate was defused rather quickly. Cypriot officials were re-mobilized for further visits to EU capitals and for intensified information campaigns. It was transpiring that the Cyprus problem’s “essence” was increasingly acknowledged and the real nature of the Annan plan was finally becoming known.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, Nicosia could now capitalise on the fact that, by resisting the troubling veto, it should be credited with respecting the EU’s penchant for conciliation. Simultaneously, Turkey’s diplomatic arrogance and political intransigence during the summit began irritating Europe’s public opinion, its media, and various political elites. Thus, Luxembourg FM Jean Ashelborn, described Erdogan’s Brussels behaviour as that of a “carpet buyer”: “He negotiated through (oriental) bargaining, leaving the store three times before buying the carpet”.¹⁴⁹ The Belgian daily, *Le Soir*, entitled its report on the summit, “Ankara bargained

until the end”; and its front-page article, “Turkey’s accession will pass through Cyprus”, argued that the extension of the Customs Union Protocol by Turkey “is but one stage before the *de jure* recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Ankara”.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s* commentary was entitled, “Tricks as in an oriental bazaar”, while a front-page article on some of the summits back-room dealings claimed that, “Turkey must recognize Cyprus”.¹⁵¹

With Turkey’s new elevated obligations and the EU’s heightened attention to Turkish developments, some events disheartened Europe’s public and its political classes on the way to the Constitutional Treaty referenda. Turkey’s prestige was deeply hurt by Turkish police’s bloody reaction to a women’s demonstration in early March 2005. Apart from condemnatory editorials in European media, a European Parliament report “warned Turkey to move quickly to assure the equality of women in society, saying this would be a key consideration in Ankara’s bid for European Union membership”.¹⁵² The sense was emerging simultaneously that Ankara had relaxed its preparatory EU commitments. European press reports indicated that the Turkish people were intensely irritated by “excessive EU demands”. In tandem with deepening anti-Americanism, due primarily (but not exclusively) to Iraq, the Turks were revealing lowered EU commitment and heightened nationalism.¹⁵³

Finally, the critical French and Dutch referenda and the disastrous European Council of June 2005 carried profound implications for Turkey’s EU trajectory. French and Dutch voters admitted that Turkey’s EU prospects had affected in part their “No”. In Brussels’ corridors of power and in some crucial capitals – headed by Paris – there was talk that all EU expansion may need to be halted, at least until settling the budgetary conundrum, and that Turkey’s own EU future was jeopardised.

While the EU was thus confronting serious dilemmas *vis-à-vis* Turkey, Ankara’s EU-related dilemmas are no less daunting. Meanwhile, the unfolding indeterminacy of Turkey’s EU prospects contained implications for Nicosia and Athens: for they have counted on Turkey’s “Europeanisation” to settle rationally and fairly the convoluted problems it keeps creating to them. Thus, although one should welcome Ankara’s adoption of some tension-reducing regional initiatives (coupled with domestic socio-economic and legislative improvements), Ankara’s manifest “schizophrenia” *vis-à-vis* Cyprus, Greece, and the EU remains disconcerting and confusing. This, therefore, requires a considered explanation before we embark on cautious predictions and modest policy prescriptions.

8. *Stock-taking and Conclusions*

This essay has tried to establish a number of principal theses. First, Turkey's Cyprus policy has been palpably illegal, as demonstrated through the norms of international law and the country's repeated and manifold condemnations by international courts and organizations. Second, Turkey's invasion and occupation of 37% of Cyprus is manifestly immoral. This was shown primarily by its violation of the norms of Just War theory, the incessant violation of the human rights and freedoms of all Cypriots, and the demonstration that Ankara has ignored the relevant international calls in its attempt to keep the Republic hostage to geopolitical – primarily EC/EU-related – ambitions. Third, since the mid-1990s, and certainly since 1999, Greece has been at pains to end the Greek-Turkish Cold War, to cultivate bilateral détente and collaboration and to support Turkey's EU vision by all means. Turkey's reciprocation has been minimal. Fourth, the protracted illegality of the occupation of Cyprus has constituted a thorn in the side of the global, and primarily the EU, legal culture, especially after Turkey's status was raised to that of a candidate for membership. Therefore, this occupation had to end and Cyprus' political problem had to be settled. However, fifth, the vehicle constructed by some for this resolution – i.e. the Annan plan – was manifestly inappropriate. Catering to the interests of various powers, but not the Cypriots themselves, the plan violated elementary norms of international and European law, as well as the principles and values of the European Union. Therefore, sixth, the Greek Cypriots were bound to reject that plan: for beyond being unworkable, unfair, and crudely imposed on them, it tried to exculpate Turkey and to legitimize the

illicit secessionist regime of occupied Cyprus. Seventh, the Greek Cypriots, moreover, envisaged that their already locked and hard-won EU membership will perforce engage the Union in resolving the country's problem via the very principles and norms of the EU. By the same token – and in view of the unconscionable threats to which they were exposed – the Greek Cypriots stood up for EU principles and values and should, therefore, be praised and rewarded for this fact. Finally, the European Council of December 2004, after considerable doubts and trepidation, “awarded” Turkey the prospect of starting accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. Applying some stringent terms for the negotiations' outcome while also minimizing the conditions for the negotiations' start, the Union expected that Ankara would extend its Customs Union Protocol so as to cover the Republic of Cyprus, as a necessary step towards “normalizing” the two countries' relations. However, the EU's double crisis of the first half of 2005 (concerning two referenda and the Union's budget) intensified two things: first, some EU elites' doubts about the wisdom of a more speedy expansion and, second, remarkable popular opposition to Turkey's particular accession.

Assuming this is an acceptable summary of this essay's established theses, this last chapter, before considering the emerging EU responses to Turkey, should discuss the latter's probable behaviour towards the Union, Cyprus, and Greece. Methodologically, this requires some insights on the sources and forces behind Turkey's foreign policy-making, in the spirit of Pragmatic Idealism (and even Social Constructivism). Thus, I will summarise characteristic features of Turkey's political culture affecting the principal tendencies of its foreign policy, before moving to predictions and prescriptions. It will transpire that Turkey's peculiar historical, geographic, demographic, socio-economic and cultural characteristics have informed an idiosyncratic political culture marked by a synthesis of contradictory attributes.¹⁵⁴ Inevitably, Turkish foreign policy exhibits analogous features, resulting in some confusing, and often confused, foreign policy behaviour.

Let me emphasize however that, since the November 2002 rise to power of the AKP, Turkey's political culture is undergoing some rapid changes, resulting mainly from sustained efforts at modernization and “Europeanization” fuelled primarily by the very EU prospects. These efforts have encouraged a trend of national self-criticism by political and economic elites and some serious opinion-makers. For instance, Professor Ayse Bugra of Bogazici University exemplifies impressively this trend. Interviewed

recently on EU-Turkey relations and associated issues, the Canada-educated economist concluded:¹⁵⁵

Turkey has to become a democratic country where the rule of law is respected in domestic and international relations. It has to lucidly address and deal with the injustices committed in the past and stop hiding behind the tactics suggested by short-sighted diplomats and mediocre experts in international relations. I think that a little more *concern for law and morality* would be more useful to promote our long-term interests than crude ideas about national interest. (emphasis added)

Professor Bugra's thesis is deeply gratifying for anyone envisaging its application towards solid Greco-Turkish détente and collaboration and the fair resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Evidently, it is too early to predict the extent and popularity of such earnest and wise "self-criticism". In any event, what follows aims at clarifying Turkey's foreign policy trends. It is also hoped that all well-intended evaluations of its foreign relations serve the substantive improvement of Turkey's relations within the "quartet".

A Sketch of Turkish Political Culture

Identity and Belonging. As we have seen, Turkey's elites and the public recently concluded that only the EU would satisfy the country's special needs for "identity" and "belonging". Turkey's "identity problem" – at the heart of all sophisticated Turkish analyses – is associated with its protracted search for a place and role in the world, its complex imperial past, and the traditionally antagonistic relations with many neighbours. Arguably, it also springs from prolonged frustration at the postponed integration in the EC/EU and at rejections of its – often excessive – "demands" from such organisations as the EU, NATO or the OIC. But Turkey's status as a state also remains confusing, its being Muslim and secular; developed, newly industrialising but in part "poverty-stricken"; and "democratic", but exhibiting curtailed freedoms, violated human rights, and the omnipresent "*pashas*". Consequently, with national self-perceptions being co-determined by the "Other", an odd psychological cycle is created by the simultaneous operation of both insecurity and pessimism and some grandiose nationalist, geopolitical, and geo-economic ambitions. Thus, an already blurred identity causes uncertainty, in part through recollecting past "stigmata".¹⁵⁶

Narcissism. National narcissism may be transmuted into excessive nationalist ambition as articulated by leading Turkish policymakers since the

early 90s. We have noted the unbounded visions for Turkey's role in the 21st century as expressed by Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, and others. Typical also was Bulent Ecevit and Ismael Cem's declaration in December 1999 that "Turkey will be a full member of the EU in three years."¹⁵⁷ Similarly, Cem's interview in the *TDN* in early 2002 was entitled: "Turkish model is paradigm of civilization."¹⁵⁸

Besides a long imperial history, probable sources of such boasting are Turkey's powerful military establishment; the over-65 million population; geo-economic prospects and rich natural resources; and the favouritism shown traditionally towards it by Washington, NATO and London. National self-confidence may explain why Turkish reactions to criticism by international actors (EU, UN, INGOs, or prominent individuals) can be vociferous. Turkish elites have tended to ascribe Western criticism to "ignorance", "confusion", and "cultural discrimination". Despite the welcome inroads of rational self-criticism in Turkey's recent political discourse, defensive narcissism is manifest in many Turkish elites' – including academics' – propensity to disregard international calls to respect the rule of law and the decisions of international courts and organizations. Consequently, subjective definitions and self-serving language are employed, instead of the precise political and proper legal terms. Mr Gül's statement about Turkey's occupation troops is a paradigm case. Similarly, Turkey and its media are alone in calling the Turkish Cypriot leader, "President of the TRNC", and the President of the Republic as "the leader of Greek Cyprus".

Aggressive Tendencies. Nationalism flowing from excessive self-confidence may slide into aggressive or hostile behaviour. Turkey has exhibited both against Armenia, Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Popular also is the use of "pride" and "honour" in Turkish policy-makers' discourse. Thus, Demirel once called Denktash "*karadae*", an ambiguous term that combines elements of honour, pride, macho-ism, and even bullying. Mr Denktash was flattered; he endorsed Demirel's honourific epithet about himself; and added: "The Turkish nation is *karadae*."¹⁵⁹ By implication, Ankara's external behaviour, shaped or influenced by chauvinists, can be "*karadae*" with all its denotations and connotations.

Karadae-like foreign policy has been employed by Ankara through indirect or immediate threats, intimidation of antagonists, and even blackmail of allies. Neighbours such as Armenia and Syria were exposed to Turkey's military threats not long ago. The same method was used regarding the S-300 surface-to-air missiles that Nicosia purchased from Moscow, but

Turkey's repeated threats against their installation forced Nicosia to cancel their deployment. Cyprus, of course, is victimised by Turkey's "karadae" policy ever since the 1974 invasion. But it took another direct form when Ankara threatened in June 2002 "to respond without limits" if the EU accepted the Republic as a member. While that threat did not materialize militarily, the Aegean *casus belli* remains in force together with the daily violations of the Athens FIR and Greece's national airspace. Hence Congressman Donald Payne protested recently: "In this geographic neighbourhood of perennial tensions that have lasted over half a century, a major U.S. ally, Turkey, seems always poised to seize every opportunity to cash in on emerging crises and to bully its neighbours."¹⁶⁰

Insecurity and Pessimism. And yet, the aforementioned aggressive features co-habit with bouts of pessimism and undercurrent insecurity. A principal source of the latter is the conviction that antagonists and enemies surround it. Probably associated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it was intensified by their choice of allies in WWI and by Ankara's controversial behaviour during WWII. Besides friction with neighbouring Arab and Muslim countries, Turkey also remembers its tensions and conflicts with Western states. As Professor Deringil noted regarding World War II: "Turkey came under severe criticism for its 'egotistic' foreign policy. The apparent contradiction between the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation with Britain and France (1939) and the Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact signed with Germany in 1941 was seen by the western allies as a sign of Turkey's unreliability. It was *this stigma of unreliability* that Turkey felt obliged to shake off in the post-war years."¹⁶¹

Progressively, Turkey's Cold War geopolitical importance minimised the effects of this "stigma". However, the EC's rejection of its application for accession was traumatic to Turkish self-esteem and self-perception, as were the additional EU rejections by pre-Helsinki summits. As for the dramatic developments following the spring 2005 French and Dutch referenda, they have caused widespread Turkish uncertainty and insecurity.¹⁶²

Turkey's military leadership has traditionally used "insecurity" to justify Turkey's colossal defence expenditures, though they seem irrational for the country's enormous socio-economic needs. In any case, Turkey's military expenditures have threatened its various neighbours, sustain regional arms races, and cause domestic socio-economic anxiety. But anxiety also derives from Turkey's variegated internal conflicts. The one between secularists and Islamists has had implications even for the nature of the Turkish state. The tragedy caused by the Kurdish uprising was bloody and

protracted. And in 2005, the convoluted crisis in post-Saddam northern Iraq generates ominous fears, since Ankara suspects Washington of tolerating the Iraq-based PKK guerrillas.

Moreover, the pre-Erdogan socio-economic malaise cultivated deep pessimism, resulting in a crisis of political legitimation. The magnitude of the national economic failure was captured succinctly by a *Hurriyet/TDN* columnist: “2001 has been very difficult for Turkey. She has witnessed the hardest economic crisis of the republic era. More than 1.5 million people have lost their jobs, 25-40,000 business enterprises have been closed down, and the economy has shrunk by around 8.5 percent overall.”¹⁶³ Hence insecurity fuelled a dramatic increase of social unrest, criminal and deviant behaviour, and suicides. Whereas, however, corruption was also recognised as a national disease, Erdogan’s more moderate Islamic AK party was being singled out as the promising cure.

Many individuals and groups handle insecurity through the vocal re-assertion of past achievements and the confident assertion of future glory. Neighbouring Greeks had also exemplified this problem. But Greece has long abandoned any appetite for “lost motherlands” and, for decades now, pursues a “conservative” foreign policy of respect for established borders and the norms of international law. Turkish leaders, however, do not shy away from grandiose geopolitical designs; and chauvinist rhetoric has resurfaced during the current re-emergence of intense Turkish nationalism.¹⁶⁴

Self-doubts and Confusion. Besides conflicting signals intended for domestic self-promotion, Ankara’s verbal and non-verbal foreign-policy actions frequently eye foreign consumption. Cyprus and Greece have been favourite targets. Contradictory signals, however, are not always meant to confuse; they can be themselves products of confusion. Thus, in 2002 I suggested that one of this confusion’s “major sources is that various decision-making ‘circles’ seem to act independently of other decision-making ‘centres’”.¹⁶⁵ Interestingly enough, Dr. Ülserver wrote in May 2005:

It seems that on international issues there are three parties in the country acting at the same time, with little coordination among themselves. The parties are: 1) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2) The military, on issues concerning its areas of specialization, i.e., Incirlik air base; and 3) The Office of the Prime Minister... The prime minister is responsible for facilitating coordination and also for ensuring that he works with more experienced people in his office.¹⁶⁶

This perception supports my proposed notion of “many Ankaras”. For it is widely acknowledged that Turkey’s “deep state” – composed of military

leaders, the entrenched bureaucracy and some more obscure power-centres – is often in disharmony with the ruling political leadership, especially the newcomers of pro-Islamic AKP. Thus, despite progressive improvements in recent months, the tension between the AKP government and the Kemalist *pashas* cannot (in mid – 2005) possibly be treated as resolved. Similarly, the conflict between “Europhiles” and “Euroskeptics” will survive in the currently uncertain EU climate. In fact, should Turkey’s accession negotiations start in October 2005, this conflict might deepen: for many Turks resent the “sacrifices” demanded by the Union and the negotiations – for an uncertain end – could last for 10-15 years. Furthermore, the ranks of “Kemalist” generals include Europhiles, Euroskeptics, and even improvisers. Thus, although the *pashas* now assert an EU commitment, powerful General İlhan Kılıç once declared that the EU is certainly not Turkey’s only strategic choice, for there are also Russia and Iran!¹⁶⁷

Pazarlık. Finally, I submit *pazarlık* or “oriental bargaining” as a useful device to comprehend the making of Turkey’s foreign policy. After all, if the political culture exhibits such contradictory features and decisions are taken by the “many Ankaras”, then the foreign policy output will inevitably contain fluidity, experimentation, and improvisation. Hence maximalist bargaining is employed in negotiating Turkish “demands”. Thus, Turkey’s fluid political-cultural mosaic is mirrored in a frequently confusing foreign policy. And while some of this material explains in part Erdoğan’s electoral success, it may also show why his own foreign policy is not yet cut off from its umbilical cord.

Finally, Turkish foreign policy is frequently confused. The recent record shows it and at least Dr. Ülserver thinks so: “It is my sincere view that the present Turkish government does not know where it stands in the international arena. It has contradicted itself on many occasions. A few weeks ago, I wrote that the government may even be considering pulling out of NATO. I had also written that because of its [Turkey’s] unpredictable acts, the United States is seeking “alternatives” in Romania, Bulgaria and Greece”.¹⁶⁸

The EU’s Turkish Problem

This mixed picture reflects a country with enormous assets – primarily economic potential and geo-strategic importance – but also inherent problems, such as socio-economic difficulties, democratic deficit, human rights violations, disregard of minorities’ freedoms, the entrenched political role

of the military, and a confusing foreign policy-making. This, then, contributes to explaining why some EU member-states are now voicing second thoughts on Turkey's EU future. The "proximate cause" of the reconsideration is the unpopularity of Turkey's accession as revealed by the spring 2005 French and Dutch referenda. However, we also noted that the unpopularity had surfaced upon the European Commission's announcement (in October 2004) that it supported the start of Turkey's ("open-ended") accession negotiations. At that time, while Turcophile circles were completing an orchestrated campaign to prove the manifest benefits of Turkey-in-Europe, Turcoskeptics were enumerating the prospect's negative implications.

Pro-accession arguments stressed primarily Turkey's strategic significance for Western interests; the concomitant need to "keep Turkey anchored in the West"; Turkey's economic potential together with the implied trade benefits for Europe; the need to strengthen further the EU's multicultural and multi-religious profile; and the EU's obligation to deliver on the long implied promises to Turkey. On the other hand, extreme Turcoskepticism always held that Muslim Turkey is too large, too poor and too un-European. In milder forms it is premised on fears that the economic burdens of Turkey's accession would be overwhelming; that the country's political-cultural profile – including its Muslim religion and its human rights record, – was "non-European", hence, "Turkey does not belong to the EU"; that its enormous population – probably exceeding 90 million by 2020 – would be the largest in the EU; and, consequently, that Turkey, a prospective newcomer, would dominate EU organs and institutions.

Well-known Turcoskeptic statements by established European statesmen, from Helmut Schmidt to Giscard d'Estaing, and repeated declarations by the German opposition, headed by Ms Angela Merkel, Austria's Chancellor Schussel, and many other Christian Democrat leaders, were mobilized by mid-2005. They contributed to doubting the wisdom of the December 2004 decision regarding 3/10. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 7, some EU personalities were already favouring an alternative Turkish candidacy: namely, since full membership could not be guaranteed as the negotiations' end-result, it would be "far more honest" to declare from the outset that Turkey's EU status should be a "privileged partnership".¹⁶⁹

Then, after a meandering delay to sign the extension of the Customs Union Protocol – so as to cover the ten new EU member-states – Ankara announced its signature on 29 July 2005. However, it submitted simultaneously a unilateral declaration that it does not recognize the Republic of

Cyprus. Ankara had long “threatened” this action. But it was widely hoped that it would abandon such a political and legal absurdity. For it is absurd (because self-contradictory) to refuse to recognize the Republic: first, it is a full member-state of the Union with which Turkey wishes to begin accession negotiations; second, President Papadopoulos had extended in December 2004 the Republic’s endorsement of Turkey’s future negotiations; and third, the Republic will be one of Turkey’s 25 “judges” at every step of the accession negotiations.

Whether due exclusively to deep annoyance at Ankara’s tactics, to Cartesian logic and moral principle, or also because of the popular French concerns over Turkey’s eventual membership, France’s new Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, immediately condemned Ankara’s behaviour as “inconceivable”. He then warned Turkey that it *cannot begin* accession negotiations unless it recognizes the Republic. President Jacques Chirac, the French Foreign Minister, and Nicholas Sarkozy all adopted de Villepin’s stance. A few days later, Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen followed suit, accompanied by the leaders of the German CDU and CSU.¹⁷⁰

All this suggested that Turkey’s (self-inflicted) EU difficulties were mounting again, with the start of its accession negotiations suddenly questioned. It now depended on the considered opinion of many member-states, to be revealed in COREPER discussions in late August and by the EU Foreign Ministers on 1-2 September 2005 near Cardiff. Thus, Turkey was now confronting a novel dilemma: either to be forced to recognize the Republic of Cyprus at least *de facto*; or to see its negotiations postponed *ad infinitum*. Therefore, the EU’s treatment of Turkey will depend, *au fond*, on Turkey’s selection of the most rational horns of its various dilemmas.

Turkey’s Dilemmas vis-a-vis the “Quartet”

Recapitulating Turkey’s relevant dilemmas, we may begin with the Union. The AKP government is clearly committed to full membership, rejecting out of court any other form of association. Simultaneously, it rejects the Republic’s recognition, claiming (1) that it has fulfilled its obligations through the Annan process and (2) that the recognition should await the final resolution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey, however, fully knows – just as the EU does – the aforementioned *contradictions* involved in this stance. Moreover, the EU has also begun to appreciate the disingenuousness of the claim that Turkey’s support of that plan has “exculpated” it vis-a-vis the Republic. As for a post-resolution recognition, this too is clearly

untenable: because that process might take a long time, if Turkey keeps refusing to handle the issue in an above-suspicion manner. In other words, having shown that Cyprus has been hostage to Turkey's designs for both a self-serving "solution" and towards extracting EU "benefits", it is probable that Turkish foreign policy-makers might try to exhaust all (maximalist, "pazarlik", etc.) devices to such ends.

Admittedly, the Erdogan government stands here between a rock and a hard place. For if it "sacrifices Cyprus" (as Turkish nationalists see it), this could be deeply unpopular domestically; if it foregoes the EU, this would be equally unpopular and – in the long term – highly irrational. In addition, with the EU in its present Turcoskeptical mood, some Turkish elites might insist on a wait-and-see posture at least concerning Cyprus and Greece.

On reflection, however, the above "dilemmas" are such only if perceived from a narrow Turco-centric perspective. More objectively, the dilemmas can be rationally defused. The crucial problem with the Turco-centric perspective is that, by fervently denying that the invasion and the occupation are illicit and immoral, it cultivated illusions among the Turkish people, and parts of the intelligentsia, the political elites and the opinion-makers. When the issue is viewed through the lens of international and European law, and the EU's political and legal culture, the case is radically distinct. Now it may be hard to expect that the Erdogan government will achieve a fast and honest review of the Cyprus issue in time for the desired reconsideration of its relevant stance. Far easier, therefore, is for the European Union and its member-states to give Turkey here a helping hand.

It thus transpires that Cyprus is one tough (though not the only) obstacle to Turkey's EU vocation – whatever form this may take. For once the Republic became a full EU member, and given the immoral fiasco of the Annan plan, it became legally and politically untenable for the EU that Turkey would continue occupying 37 percent of Cypriot territory, its being now *EU territory*. Therefore, except from the Turco-centric perspective, the recognition of the Republic by Turkey – unique in the world in refusing to do so – has finally emerged as a *sine qua non* for the continuation of Turkey's EU trajectory. And it should not be supposed that Ankara could "bargain" Cyprus' recognition for a solid promise of an ultimate full membership. For the EU is re-adjusting its Republic-related stance after the referendum; the recognition is being elevated, deontologically, to a logical, legal and political necessity; and the popularity of Turkey's full membership has been reduced remarkably. Therefore, whereas the

Republic's recognition is rendered a must for Ankara, Turkey's future EU status will hinge on numerous additional variables.

As regards Turkey's policies towards Greece, let us first recall their inherent ambiguity. On the one hand, a series of bilateral protocols and agreements continue to be signed; cooperation has expanded primarily in the sectors of tourism, banking and energy;¹⁷¹ Athens remains committed in its support of Turkey's EU candidacy and has extended Ankara appropriate technical assistance; diplomats from the two countries have pursued over 30 rounds of (inconclusive) bilateral meetings regarding the Aegean dispute; and "citizens' diplomacy" also seems alive and well.¹⁷²

On the other hand, we should recall Ankara's daily violation of the Greek national airspace and the Athens FIR, besides the *casus belli* declaration. Thus, instead of reciprocating for Greece's détente-building and unshakable support in the EU, Turkey is trying to attain its EU membership after revising the Aegean status quo according to its geopolitical desires. Moreover, since Greece is bound to defend the rights of the Republic, it cannot stand idly by while the occupation continues unabated, tens of thousands of new illegal settlers colonize northern Cyprus, and the illicit authorities of the occupied territory encourage the building of new homes on Greek Cypriot properties. In sum, Greek-Turkish détente cannot take reliable roots unless both the Aegean challenge and the Cyprus problem are addressed and resolved rationally and fairly. Here again the European Union's role emerges as potentially catalytic.

Post-referendum Cyprus Scenarios

Immediately following the twin Cypriot referendum, the aficionados of the Annan plan kept threatening its dramatic return, even without major changes. Washington and UN officials, in fact, insisted that "there is a plan for Cyprus: the Annan plan". Similarly, members of the Blair government kept stressing the same stance. Finally, Ankara and the new Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, tried feverishly to exploit the referendum result – using the *non sequitur* that those who voted "Yes" must be "rewarded" – and insisted that the Annan plan is here to stay.

The change of perceptions and attitudes about the Republic that we recorded earlier has encouraged the production of new scenarios. Here is a schematic review of these ideas in ascending order of rationality and hence desirability.

1. A first scenario flirted with the return of the Annan plan with some, essentially cosmetic, alterations. This “scenario” is being abandoned by its international supporters and, therefore, by its Greek Cypriot friends as well.¹⁷³ Given the manifest unpopularity of such an undemocratic idea, few Greek Cypriots would presently stand up in its defence: 18 months after the historic 76% against “Annan V”, even more resounding would be its new rejection.
2. Equally unpopular is another, albeit under-articulated, idea which may not even deserve the honourific term “scenario”. But, at the height of the pain and frustration caused after “Annan V” and the referendum, some Greek Cypriots aired the idea of solving the problem through some exchange of “land for splitting (for ever)”. In other words, exhausted by the dirty tricks of foreign “mediators” and the antics of the Turkish Cypriot political leadership, some people succumbed temporarily to the temptation of a permanent division in exchange for substantial territory. In any event, this idea is also being abandoned, especially after the realization both that the world increasingly appreciates what is here at stake and that the EU seems bound to support the Republic’s rights.
3. A more serious idea for resolution proposes that Greek and Turkish Cypriots should proceed through step-by-step moves or Confidence Building Measures, until the emergence of the right climate. Arguably, this is what is currently underway: more circulation of people across the Green Line, new openings in the latter, more Turkish Cypriots working in the free territories, occasional negotiations about assisting Turkish Cypriot trade under rational conditions, etc. Hence one observer has claimed that this “scenario” has been adopted by the Cypriot President himself.¹⁷⁴ In my view, however, this cannot be what Tassos Papadopoulos “has adopted”, if only because he confronts the provocative demeanour of Mehmet Ali Talat, whose transparent goal is not to resolve the problem and reunite Cyprus but rather to “upgrade the status” of the “TRNC”.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, Papadopoulos keeps cultivating CBMs, but works methodically for the problem’s functional and fair resolution. This, therefore, brings us to the two most promising scenarios.
4. According to the fourth set of ideas, the rational thing to do is to emulate, as it were, the German reunification model. Differences in degree aside, Cyprus could be reunified through the re-absorption of

the Turkish Cypriot community into the Republic's body politic. Needless to say, the reunification should take place with guaranteed human and civil rights for all Cypriots, in conditions of freedom, genuine cooperation and friendship, precluding the errors and sins of the convoluted past. After all, these errors and sins – committed in different ways by many – have taught all Cypriots valuable political, social and psychological lessons. To be sure, while this scenario will be welcomed by many native Turkish Cypriots and maybe most of the EU-oriented Turkish Cypriot youth, it would probably be opposed by their political elites, misled for years into supposing that Turkey will always defend their separatist or con-federal designs. Therefore, and once again, the Gordian knot under review entails that the best manner of untying it is an EU-backed comprehensive manner.

5. One difference between the fourth and the fifth scenarios seems to be that, whereas (4) articulates its cardinal theses, (5) may leave ample room for European Union initiatives. Thus, it is known that numerous Greek Cypriot and non-Cypriot political figures, constitutional experts, diplomats and other professionals have been working towards a viable and fair plan in answer to “Annan V”.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot majority – including its political elites, statesmen and intellectuals – voted “No” envisaging a “European solution” and what this entails. Therefore, while a Cypriot initiative can appeal to EU institutions and seek their advice and support, an EU initiative addressing Cyprus *in tandem* with the associated problems may be even wiser. This last point brings us to the concluding remarks of this Essay.

Concluding Observations

As 3 October is approaching, I venture to predict that, at the last minute, Turkey will be forced to withdraw its statement of non-recognition of Cyprus, given the relevant EU consensus being built as these lines are drawn (mid-August 2005). The Erdogan government would then have to persuade Turkish public opinion that its statement was a mere passing ploy and no face will really be lost. For, when all is said and done, (1) the entire world recognises only the Republic of Cyprus, except for Turkey; (2) international law and the principles of the EU regard the secessionist “TRNC” as just illicit, because the 1974 “intervention” was clearly an *invasion* (i.e. by definition an illegal operation); therefore, (3) the European Union will treat

as “inconceivable” – Dominique de Villepin’s term – that a candidate refuses to recognise a member of the club to which it wishes to belong; and (4) in any case, Nicosia can veto Turkey’s negotiations at numerous steps of the way, so better embark at “normalization” at the outset.

To be sure, Ankara will not withdraw the statement unless assured that the negotiations will in fact begin on 3/10. Turkey, I presume, will receive such an assurance. But it would be an assurance with a difference: for all the reasons discussed earlier, the EU will not be able to guarantee Turkey’s full membership, just as it could not on 17 December 2004. In any event, Turkey cannot afford to reject such “a deal”: in fact, this is precisely what was meant above by the term “ploy”. Moreover, Ankara will insist on confining itself to “merely *de facto*” recognition, saving the *de jure* for later. However, the resulting picture will have momentous implications.

Inter alia, the (de facto) recognition of Cyprus will entail the beginning of *normalization* of Cyprus-Turkey bilateral relations. This means that the revised Customs Union will allow Cypriot ships and planes to enter Turkish ports and airports, and vice versa. It will also mean that Turkey will cease vetoing Cyprus’ participation in numerous international organizations. In addition, of course, Turkey’s accession negotiations will be *judged* at every “chapter” by all 25 member-states. Therefore, Nicosia can be expected to demand the start of the departure of the troops of occupation and of the illegal settlers. If Ankara does not comply, Nicosia’s threat of a veto will succeed, assisted by like-minded member-states, in convincing Turkey to begin doing so.

In this manner, Turkey’s EU-propelled modernisation will continue unabated, resulting in manifold socio-economic, cultural and psychological benefits to its vast and ambitious population. *Ceteris paribus*, as the completion of the negotiations will be approaching in 10-12 years, a different European Union will be there to negotiate with a stronger Turkey a respectable and fair denouement. Meanwhile, Athens’ commitment to Turkey’s EU future would remain unaltered, as long as the Aegean dispute is settled by the International Court of Justice and the Cyprus problem is resolved along the lines of scenarios (4) or (5). For, inter alia, Turkey will soon have to be convinced that its Cyprus occupation is legally unbearable, politically counter-productive, and strategically redundant: Greece’s persistent détente-building and extension of genuine friendship should render entirely irrational any “fears” that Turkey might have entertained that it needed Cypriot territory to confront any “Hellenic threat”.

And now some parting words on two last actors. First, much in the above picture assumes that London can be convinced to take a new course vis-à-vis Cyprus and Turkey in the EU. Although this looks like a tall order, it can be argued that London's anti-Republic behaviour should be abandoned as being regrettably narrow-hearted, unfair, and counter-productive. Impartial observers may come to agree that the UK has sustained a drawn-out vendetta against the former colony and has been fixated on retaining its so-called "Sovereign Bases". This is the basic – *Realpolitik* – explanation of its ruthless response to the Cypriot struggle for independence, of its participation in imposing the unworkable 1960 Constitution, its essential "neutrality" during the Turkish invasion, its early opposition to Cypriot EU membership, its central part in the construction and "selling" of the Annan plan, its close assistance and advice to Washington for its pro-Turkey designs, and its transparent decision to make EU life difficult for the post-referendum Republic. This melancholy picture contradicts the Cypriots' affection for most things British; their profound respect for Britain's way of life, culture, education and civilisation; and their unceasing expectation that their problem should be solved through the principled assistance of one of the "guarantor powers".¹⁷⁷ In addition, London's policy may come to confront a "rebellious" Republic, as suggested by the recent unanimous parliamentary vote about the British bases. There is, however, a far more rational and civil course. That is, the UK could agree that the bases' current controversial status cannot last far longer.¹⁷⁸ In, say, 20 to 25 years, the bases should be handed either to the Republic or to the EU itself. If London consents to such a decent prospect, Nicosia may have to drop any other demands about the bases' past. As regards London's other fixation (concerning Turkey), the time may have come for the Blair government to see that, on this too, it may soon be isolated in the Union. Therefore, a change of course along the above-intimated lines may prove wiser for London's strategists and diplomats, uniquely qualified as they are for "trial and error" experimentation.

Finally, the EU is now ideally placed to assist the production of a fair and functional reunification plan for Cyprus in the emerging, entirely novel landscape. The formation of a group of impartial experts above any political suspicion could function as an ideal honest broker. And opinion research in occupied Cyprus – excluding the illegal settlers – could provide invaluable insights into the dreams of the legitimate Turkish /Cypriots. Manifestly, an EU success regarding Cypriot reunification will carry enormous and

immediate benefits for Greek-Turkish collaboration. If this is achieved, the resulting multidimensional triumph would strengthen EU diplomatic credibility and political respectability. At a time of “serious EU crisis” – as universally acknowledged after the June 2005 European Council – a success in Cyprus, by establishing fair play or *Moralpolitik* on the Island, will have positive ripple effects in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the Euro-Mediterranean project, and in Europe’s broader CFSP ambitions. In fact, it will contribute decisively to rendering the Union “the alternative superpower with a moral difference”.¹⁷⁹

Notes

1. See Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 1999, para. 4 and 9.
2. These issues are discussed in chapters 4-6.
3. The issue is discussed in chapter 5.
4. Arguably, this “Europeanization” began with the 6 March 1995 decision to “exchange” Turkey’s Customs Union with the start of Cyprus’ accession negotiations six months after the completion of the IGC.
5. The Treaty of Accession, signed on 13 April 2003 in Athens, determined that the Republic of Cyprus became one of the ten new EU member-states. Protocol Ten of the Treaty explains that, while the entire Republic is a Member, the occupation of the northern 37% of its territory temporarily suspends the application of the *acquis communautaire* therein until the problem’s resolution.
6. Even Nils Kadritzke, usually informed if not unbiased on Cypriot affairs, fell into hasty and facile pronouncements on the referendum. See his “Cyprus: saying no to the future”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2004, where he passionately attacked President Papadopoulos and what he called “Greek chauvinism”!
7. The territory of the British “Sovereign Base Areas” is excluded from EU jurisdiction. In essence, an additional 3% of the Island’s territory is also excluded from the application of the *acquis*.
8. See Costas Melakopides, “On the Mediterranean ‘Fuzzy Edge’ of the EU: The Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey”, *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.22, 2000, pp. 299-334.
9. See chapter 2 below, for the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Loizidou v. Turkey Case.
10. The relevant literature has been expanding by leaps and bounds during the last 30 years. One of the best collections of relevant essays is Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
11. The suggestion was one of Gunnar Myrdal’s wise theses in his classic *Objectivity in Social Research* (London: Duckworth, 1970).

12. I introduced the “doctrine” in the *Journal of European Integration*, op.cit.
13. For a full defence of this “thesis”, see Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998).
14. This crucial issue will be expanded in chapter 7.
15. Christopher Hitchens’ evidence here is overwhelming. See *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (London and New York: Verso, 1997). See also Van Coufoudakis, *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976) and B. O’Malley and I. Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).
16. George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), p.342, emphasis added.
17. See *Making Peace in Cyprus*, pp. 16-17, for detailed answers to (a) and (b).
18. The evidence that both were under execution has been provided in Christopher Hitchens, op.cit; Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Time Books, 1977) and Costas Melakopides, op.cit.
19. The reader is encouraged to consult the balanced and reliable accounts in the aforementioned books by Coufoudakis, Hitchens, O’Malley and Craig, Stern, as well as Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992).
20. For a longer quotation of Richard Holbrooke’s statement, see Andreas Theophanous, *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise* (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 2004), p.169.
21. The first round (25-30 July 2004) was held among the UK, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of Cypriot independence. The 9-14 August round included also the G/Cs and the T/Cs. My previous *Martello* provides relevant details.
22. *The Times*, editorial, 15 August 1974, p.13. See also *Making Peace in Cyprus*, pp.22-23.
23. *The Economist*, 17 August 1974, pp.11-12.
24. The 70% estimate was offered by *Strategic Survey 1974* (London:IISS, 1974), p.82n.
25. Abdullah Gul’s interview with Ms Soula Chatzikiyriakou, CyBC Evening News, 11 February 2005.
26. R.St.J. Macdonald, “International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus,” *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, 1981, p.15.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
28. Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), as dicussed by Macdonald, op.cit.
29. Rosalyn Higgins, “Intervention and International Law,” in Hedley Bull (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 38-39.
30. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 25.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
32. See Council of Europe, *Case of Loizidou v. Turkey*, European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, judgement 40/1193/435/514, 28 July 1998. As Andreas Theophanous

wrote, "By deciding that the denial of Loizidou's access to her property in northern Cyprus is 'a matter which fell within Turkey's jurisdiction,' the court in effect confirmed that the TRNC is a vassal state by describing it as 'subordinate [to Turkish] local administration.'" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, op. cit., p. 56.

33. See Ch.6 below.
34. *Europe/Docs*, no. 1589 (Luxembourg-Brussels: Agence Europe, 20 December 1989), p. 3.
35. *Bulletin of the European Communities* 16, no.11 (Brussels: General Secretariat, Commission of the European Communities, 1984): point 2.4.1, 68.
36. See the May 1984, UN SC Resolution 550.
37. Donald M. Payne, "The Cyprus Problem: A Need to Defend Principles," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1998). Mr Payne is Democrat of New Jersey.
38. See Cyprus News Agency, "Turkey responsible for human rights violations, Court confirms", 7 April 2005. The decision is available in the Court's website www.echr.coe.int
39. For the most thorough treatment of the Cyprus question from the International Law perspective, the reader is urged to consult Kypros Chrysostomides, *The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law* (Martinus Neijhoff, 2000).
40. Immediate disillusionment occurred when Turkey's FM declared that if the EU extended full membership to the Republic, Turkey would annex the occupied 37% of the Island!
41. Delegation of the European Commission to Cyprus, *The European Union and Cyprus*, 2nd. Rev. edition (1997) , p.32
42. Quoted in European Commission, *Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus' Progress towards Accession*, p. 4.
43. European Commission, *Commission Opinion on the Application of the Republic of Cyprus for Membership*, Com(93) 313 final.
44. We must recall that the ECHR had first pronounced on the Titina Loizidou Case in 1996, that is, a year after the historic 6 March 1995 Council decision (see Ch. 2) and two years before the start of Cyprus' accession negotiations.
45. A typical example of this stance is Neill Nugent, "Cyprus and the European Union: A Particularly Difficult Membership Application", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.2, no.3, Winter 1997.
46. First Regular Report, op. cit., p. 8.
47. Ibid., p. 9.
48. Ibid.
49. European Commission, *Regular Report*, op.cit., par.28, p.28.
50. Ibid., section 3.13, p.34.
51. Ibid., p. 40.
52. Such information is contained in Costas Melakopides, On the Mediterranean "Fuzzy Edge" of the EU: The Candidacies of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey", *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 22, no. 3, 2000.
53. Robert McDonald, *The Problem of Cyprus*, Adelphi Papers 234 (London: IISS, Winter 1988/89), p. 76.

54. *Financial Times* (London), 10/11 July 1993.
55. *Financial Times* (London), editorial, 2 February 1995.
56. Among other things, author's personal conversation with Turkish Cypriot businessmen visiting Ledra Palace, the main inter-communal meeting place under UN auspices at the Green Line, 30 May 2003.
57. For detailed accounts of these demonstrations, see Helena Smith, "Cyprus Turks turn against their leader", *The Guardian*, 19 December 2002; and Reuters, "'Enough, nobody believes you...'" Turkish Cypriot Rally Calls for Denktash to Quit", 27 December 2002.
58. Ibid., para. 9(b) .
59. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Interview, 5 December 2001.
60. On 15 February 2003, *The New York Times* introduced a term that is here to stay: "the World's Second Superpower"...The event has delighted all those who believe that International Ethics is going strong both as theory and as fact.
61. See Annan's Statement of 11 March at The Hague.
62. To be sure, numerous Greek Cypriots have refused to cross the "Green Line", because the occupation regime demands the show of passports or identity cards, expecting to gain... "statehood" via the "recognition" by the Republic's citizens!
63. See the Athens dailies *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea*, 28 March – 3/4 April 2004.
64. Bahri Yilmaz, "Turkey's New Role in International Politics", *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 45, no. 1, 1994, p.90.
65. Quoted in Costas Melakopides, *Making Peace in Cyprus: Time for A Comprehensive Initiative* (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1987), p. 78.
66. Melakopides, *ibid.*
67. Ibid., p. 78.
68. Bahri Yilmaz, *Aussenpolitik*, p. 90.
69. Melakopides, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
70. Ibid.
71. Yilmaz, *op.cit.*, p. 94.
72. Selim Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy since Ataturk", in Clement H. Dodd, ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p.6.
73. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Rand, 2003), p. 104.
74. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Relations With the Southern Caucasia States", Online (www.mfa.gov.tr).
75. Larrabee and Lesser, *op. cit.*, p. 105. They added (*ibid.*) that an Azerbaijani peace-keeping platoon formed part of the Turkish battalion in KFOR.
76. By agreements signed in 2001, Turkey would acquire 2 billion cubic metres of Azeri natural gas in 2004 with increases anticipated up to 2019. Larrabee and Lesser, *op.cit.*, p.105.
77. Bulent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1 No1 (Spring 2000), pp. 36 and 51.
78. Ibid., p. 36.

79. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Relations with the Southern Caucasus States", op. cit., p.3.
80. Ibid.
81. "Turkey's Relations with the Southern Caucasian States", op. cit., p. 2.
82. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Relations with the Central Asian Republics", p. 1.
83. Ibid.
84. Shireen Hunter, "Turkey, Central Asia and Caucasus: Ten Years After Independence", in Thanos Veremis and Thanos Dokos (eds.), *Contemporary Turkey: Society, Economy and Foreign Policy* (Athens: Papazissis, 2002), p. 500 (in Greek, my translation).
85. Bulent Aras describes well this role with its perceptible, if long-term, political implications, and emphasizes the energetic penetration of NGOs which, beyond high schools, have built even universities. Op.cit., pp. 43-50.
86. Bulent Aras, op..cit., p. 43.
87. Ibid., p. 44. As a caustic British observer noted in the mid-1990s, Turkey in Central Asia at the time, looked like the Uncle who, invited for a weekend, stays for over a month...
88. Larrabee and Lesser, op. cit., p. 113.
89. Ibid.
90. Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Turkey's choice: the road away from the European Union?" in Bertil Duner (ed.), *Turkey: the Road Ahead?* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 125.
91. Ibid.
92. See Bulent Aras' perceptive analysis, "Turkish-Iranian-Syrian Relations: Limits of Regional Politics in the Middle East", *PINR Report*, 7 February 2005.
93. "Towards Strengthening Iranian-Tadjikistan Relations", *Macedonian Press Agency* (www.mpa.gr) , 20 June 2003.
94. "Khatami, Karzai Hold Talks", *Iran Daily*, 19 June 2003, p. 1.
95. This issue is treated very satisfactorily in Chris Ioannides, *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (New York: Pella Publishing, 2001).
96. Quoted in Oktay Eksi, "The Gordian Knot", *Hurriyet*, (www. TurkishPress. com), 8 June 2005.
97. To be sure, as *The Economist* noted after Colin Powell's visit to Turkey on 2 April 2003, the US government also perceived the Turkish stance as "an attempt to raise the price of Turkish co-operation. Several reports suggested that Turkey wanted an aid package worth \$92 billion, a request which infuriated Americans". "Mending Fences", *The Economist*, 3 April 2003.
98. *The Economist's* own reading (on 3 April 2003) was both that "Turkey could find it has paid a high price for its earlier intransigence" and that "things are unlikely to be the same again". Ibid.
99. Mehmet Ali Birand, "In Washington the Wounds Are Still Open", *Turkish Daily News*, 10 June 2003.

100. For instance AKP MP, Javit Torun, called George W. Bush a “tyrant” in mid-June 2005, while a little earlier his AKP colleague, Mehmet Elkatmis, accused the US of committing “genocide in Iraq like they had done elsewhere in the past”. See “Bush, the Tyrant”, *Eleftherotypia*, 16/6/05.
101. *Eleftherotypia*, 25 June 2005.
102. Bulent Aras, for one, explicitly adopted this option in the aforementioned PINR Report (note 92).
103. Sadet Oruc, “Turkish-Israeli Ties on the Eve of the 21st Century”, *Turkish Daily News*, 2 December 1997.
104. *EuropelDocuments*, no. 1589 (Luxembourg-Brussels: Agence Europe, 20 December 1989, p. 3).
105. See www.Turkishpress.com during late June 2005 for telling editorials.
106. See, for example, the editorials of *Turkish Daily News* during the week after the June 2005 European Council.
107. Suha Bölükbasi, “The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects”, in *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, in Clement H. Dodd, ed. (The Eothen Press, 1992), p. 34.
108. *Ibid.*, p.50, emphasis added
109. Professor Theodore Couloumbis could safely be said to be Greece’s leading academic advocate of (c). He was also an adamant supporter of the Annan plan. However, as he argued in an August 2005 interview with this author, although he could recognise all along the plan’s weaknesses and drawbacks, he expected the plan to work ultimately “within this ‘greenhouse’ of democracy called European Union”.
110. Costas Melakopides, *Journal of European Integration*, op.cit., pp. 329-30.
111. Among the other influences on Costas Simitis’ defence and foreign policy, we must mention the late Yiannos Kranidiotis, Professor Christos Rozakis, Alex Rondos, and Simitis’ confidant, Nikos Themelis. Thus, the Simitis “doctrine” refers primarily to outcomes and not exclusively the sources.
112. Simitis’ rhetorical questions were raised in early April 2002. My translation comes from my article, “Annan Plan: the Achilles Heel of Simitis’ Foreign Policy”, *Phileleftheros* (Nicosia daily), 13 April 2004.
113. See *Macedonian Press Agency*, “The First Quantities of Gas from Turkey will be Delivered to Greece in 2007”, 29 June 2005 (www.mpa.gr)
114. Recent reliable information on the settlers suggested the following: they now number over 160,000; about 40,000 arrived illegally only in 2004; today, the native Turkish Cypriots are estimated at 87,600! See Costas Venizelos’ report, “*Political Sunday*”, *Phileleftheros*, 13 February 2005, p. 5.
115. “The KYSEA discussed National Defense Policy”, *Macedonian Press Agency*, 1 March 2005, www.mpa.gr
116. The clearest example of this tendency is James Pettifer, *The Turkish Labyrinth: Atatürk and the New Islam* (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1997).
117. A positive exception was Bill Clinton’s support of Athens after the Imia crisis: viz., that it should be settled at the ICJ. Incidentally, the *New York Times* editorial, “Aegean Tantrum” (3 February 1996), praised Simitis’ maturity and rationality and condemned Tansu Ciller’s arrogance and bellicosity exhibited during the crisis.

118. This recognition shocked the Greeks as it took place only hours after the November 2004 Republican electoral victory.
119. Moreover, many European opinion-makers have been noting increasingly the negative implications for the EU itself had the Annan plan been adopted. Inter alia, the T/C “constituent state” would have functioned as Turkey’s “lobby” in EU decision-making. Such a prospect might have found eager imitators in Baltic states’ Russian communities, in the Basque country of Spain, in Corsica, and so forth. I owe this point to Kostas Sasmatzoglou, Secretary of External Relations, European People’s Party, Brussels.
120. See the next chapter for the entire affair that exploded following President Papadopoulos’ statements in October 2004.
121. Left-wing AKEL, identifying a deep division among its members, called on the UN Security Council to offer relevant guarantees, so that it could support the plan. Such guarantees the UN Security Council refused to provide.
122. “Annan V”, Part A, “Foundation Agreement”, Annex IX, Attachment 3, “Letter to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe”, p.141.
123. One such sophisticated exit-poll was conducted by Nicosia’s TV Channel, *MEGA*.
124. Nils Kadritzke’s article contains a typical example.
125. For instance, Cypriot *ANTENNA* TV’s opinion poll on the “Annan IV”, conducted on 30 March 2004, revealed the following on the Greek Cypriot side: 74% rejected it; 4% were in favour; and 22% did not reply/did not know. See “Gallop: 74% of (Greek) Cypriots vote No”, *Eleftherotypia*, 31 March 2004.
126. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, *Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus*, Doc. 9799, 2 May 2003, Rapporteur Mr Jaakko Laakso (Finland), p. 2.
127. We should recall that Ms Loizidou’s compensation amounted to 1, 000, 000 EUR.
128. Jaakko Laakso Report, p. 2.
129. President Papadopoulos’s 7 June 2004 letter circulated as a UN document, being a reply to Kofi Annan’s Report on Cyprus (S/2004/437).
130. On Mr De Soto’s controversial, undiplomatic behaviour, see President Papadopoulos’ Reply to Kofi Annan’s Report.
131. See “Annan V”, Part C “Treaty on Matters Related to the New State of Affairs in Cyprus”, Annex II, “Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Establishment”, Article 5.3. Noteworthy is also the Protocol’s Article 8: “Any dispute about the interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be resolved by consultations and shall not be referred to any international tribunal or third party for settlement.” The “Annan Plan” can be found on the Web at www.cyprus-un-plan.org
132. *Eleftherotypia*, 2 July 2005.
133. U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington DC, May 26, 2004.
134. See the Letter in *The Cyprus Weekly*, February 6-12, 2004, p. 5. The same commitment was reiterated in the very text of “Annan V” (Annex IX: Coming into Being of the New State of Affairs): “Should the Foundation Agreement not be approved at the separate simultaneous referenda...it shall be null and void, and have no legal effect”.

135. This was falsified by the post-April 2003 (conditional) movement of most Cypriots across the Green Line and the tangible proofs of even friendly relations among them on a person-to-person basis.
136. This premise should collapse upon reflection on this essay's arguments and data.
137. This is untenable because the falsified assumptions of Annan V made its failure all but certain. Obviously, whether the EU initiative can succeed will depend upon its wisdom.
138. Brussels' CEPS and Michael Emerson emerged at the time as unqualified promoters of the Annan plan and among Papadopoulos' most vehement critics.
139. Anastasiades' most notorious actions included his letter to Pat Cox – accusing Papadopoulos of presiding over an “undemocratic” referendum – and his visit to PM Erdogan in Ankara while openly undermining the policies of the Cypriot president.
140. Mr Talat's consistent opposition to Nicosia's proposals has left no doubt that he aims at the “political upgrading” of the secessionist regime, as a bargaining chip in future negotiations.
141. Aris Abatzis' report in *Eleftherotypia*, 27 September 2004.
142. *Eleftherotypia*, 29 September 2004.
143. *Phileleftheros*, “Political Sunday”, 3 July 2005, interview with AKEL MP, Sotiroula Charalambous, p. 8.
144. *Phileleftheros*, 19 March 2005, based on data from the Cyprus News Agency. In July 2005, 1 EUR equalled 0,566 CYP.
145. In early October 2004, it was revealed that the European public was far more inimical to Turkey's EU membership than supposed hitherto. According to *L'Express*, only 26% of the French supported this membership, with 61% “categorically against”. *Macedonian Press Agency* (www.mpa.gr), 11 October 2004.
146. *Agence France Press*, “European Parliament chief pressures Turkey on Cyprus, reforms”, Ankara, 4 December 2004.
147. The relevant figures reached around 65% of those questioned.
148. For instance, FM George Iacovou and EMP Yiannakis Matsis repeatedly assured Nicosia audiences that Europeans lacked real knowledge of the Annan plan before the referendum.
149. Costas Moschonas, “Ankara Fox”, *Eleftherotypia*, 20 December 2004.
150. *Ibid.*
151. Pantelis Valassopoulos “Germany: Stance on Cyprus Disturbing”, *ibid.*
152. *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, “European Parliament demands Turkey move quickly on Women's rights”, 6 July 2005. The DPA article also mentioned that the Parliament “specifically urged Ankara to take steps to end violence against women and to improve educational opportunities for girls”. It was thus noted that “UNICEF estimates that up to 800,000 girls in Turkey are not enrolled in school each year either due to a lack of transportation or families forbidding their daughters from attending classes”.
153. See TDN Columnists and Editorial writers in March-April 2005.
154. For an earlier study of Turkey's political culture, before its recent changes that result from the influence of the EU on the Erdogan administration and the AKP's own worldview, see my “Turkish Political Culture and the Future of Greco-Turkish Rap-

- prochement”, in ELIAMEP Occasional Papers, no.6, 2002, published also on www.eliamep.gr
155. See the interview in Emine Kart, “Opposing EU on grounds of social policies is paradoxical”, *Turkish Daily News*, 26 June 2006.
 156. Cf. Selim Deringil, “Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk”, in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), 2-6.
 157. Quoted widely in the Turkish press (e.g. *TDN*) days after the 1999 Helsinki summit.
 158. *Turkish Daily News*, 7 January 2002.
 159. Niazi Kizilyurek, “Mumtaz Soysal: From Kemalism to Neoturkism,” in Couloumbis and Dokos (eds.), *Review of Defense and Foreign Policy 2001: Greece and the World, 2000-2001* (Athens: ELIAMEP-Parateretes, 2001), p. 62 (in Greek).
 160. Donald M. Payne, “Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: Bargaining with Law Breakers,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.14, no.1, (2003), p. 25.
 161. Deringil, op.cit., p. 2 (emphasis added).
 162. This is evident in the opinions of columnists in the major Turkish papers.
 163. Dr Cüneyt Ülsever, “Where Does Turkey Stand?”, *Turkish Daily News*, 22 January 2002.
 164. The recent problem has concerned Turkish commentators, such as columnists of the major newspapers. See, e.g., Cüneyt Ülsever, “This rising nationalism worries me!”, *TDN*, 12 April 2005.
 165. Costas Melakopides, “Simitis’ Doctrine, the EU’s Helsinki and the Future of the Greco-Turkish Rapprochement”, in George Critian Maior and Larry Watts (eds.), *Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization, Reform and Security* (Bucharest: Enciclopedica Publishing House, 2002), p. 276.
 166. Cüneyt Ülsever, “What’s to be done with Turkey’s ailing foreign relations?”, *TDN*, 17 May 2005.
 167. “A General Speaks his Mind,” *Economist*, 14 March 2002.
 168. Cüneyt Ülsever, “Where does Turkey stand in the international arena?”, *TDN*, 24 May 2005.
 169. Incidentally, this is the long-standing position of the European People’s Party, the largest trans-national political party of the EU.
 170. All these statements were made in the first days of August 2005.
 171. Erdogan and Karamanlis inaugurated the construction of the Turkey-Greece gas pipeline in late June 2005. The fact assumed panyceric proportions. Some celebrated it as further proof of established friendship; and international media welcomed it as a potential European relief with petroleum prices having become astronomical.
 172. A “cultural” item deserves to be added on this positive list. It refers to the outstanding success the Turkish TV serial, “The borders of Love”, enjoyed in Greece in the summer 2005. Marked by humour, human warmth, and a middle-brow plot about the love of a young Greek man and a young Turkish woman, the serial’s success might be ascribed both to its attractiveness and the fact that it assumed a self-critical stance on some Turkish social “customs” or “traditions” while also trying to abandon Turkish anti-Greek clichés. In any event, the phenomenal success of the programme deserves to be studied politically...

173. The most fervent proponents here were the G/C opposition parties, DISY and EDI, who were the plan's most vocal supporters from its very inception.
174. Makarios Droushiotis' repeated claim in *Eleftherotypia*, August 2005.
175. Needless to say, Talat acts in cahoots with Ankara, serving faithfully its aforementioned own goals. This fact causes further frustration to Athens, by revealing the two-track policy of the many Ankaras: while rhetorically committed to Greek-Turkish "friendship", they essentially employ maximalist, revisionist, etc. foreign policy tools.
176. Inter alia, these experts have included a group gathered at Athens' Panteion University in early December 2004 to expose the problems of "Annan V".
177. Nicosia's latest disappointments included, first, that Tony Blair's July 2005 apparent "promises" to Tassos Papadopoulos were falsified when Tayyip Erdogan visited London a few days later and, second, London's "understanding" for Ankara's declaration of non-recognition of Cyprus of 29 July.
178. I owe this point to a long conversation with Gen.(ret.) Leonidas Economopoulos, former Deputy Commander of the Cypriot National Guard, in Athens, 18 August 2005.
179. Costas Melakopides, in *Journal of European Integration*, op.cit.