

Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy
And Women, Peace and Security Norms

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1. Introduction

In October 2000, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security acknowledged that conflict and post-conflict situations disproportionately impact women and girls, and that women have an important perspective to contribute to international peace and security (United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, n.d.). Canada was a proud member of the UN Security Council at the time of the Resolution's passage, helping to shepherd the Resolution through the chamber and advocate for human security issues (Barnes 2011). Since its passage, Resolution 1325 has sparked a significant shift in the treatment of women in international roles, with countries throughout the world reconsidering their policies on gender and security (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). International organizations such as NATO have attempted to impart norms from the Resolution to their member states, with NATO noting in its 2018 action plan of the Resolution, "NATO and its partners recognise the disproportionate impact conflict and post-conflict situations have on women and girls, as outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security... While at the same time recognising that women's participation in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict situations is critical for the restoration of lasting peace." (Hutchinson et al. 2018, 10) Yet, by 2015 in the updated NATO report on Resolution 1325's implementation, studies demonstrated that while countries had increased reporting on women in their militaries and established gender awareness training, military

sexual assault remains a substantial problem dissuading women from joining international security efforts, and women participate in both NATO states' militaries and officer corps at low rates (Hutchinson et al. 2018). This is to the detriment of global peace processes: when women are included in peacebuilding, there is a 35% increase in an agreement lasting at least 15 years (Lindborg 2017). NATO country militaries must do more to incorporate gender perspectives.

Canada is a fascinating case study on the policy implementation of the global women, peace and security (WPS) movement. The country is engaged in shaping international norms on WPS and it is only the second country in the world to adopt an officially "feminist" foreign policy. Canada scores in the top half of almost all NATO indicators of women's rights and representation. Indeed, Canada is essentially a best-case scenario for WPS: if Canada can't do it, no state can. However, Canada struggles with fully upholding its promise in some WPS areas. Integrating women in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), as well as in all levels of government and policymaking institutions, is not only important for equality, but also to improve policy effectiveness (von Hlatky 2014). Recently, Canada has attempted to bring military gender awareness to greater light with Operation (Op) HONOUR, which seeks to eliminate sexual violence in the CAF, though many have disputed the operation's effectiveness (English 2016). More action is necessary to improve gender perspective incorporation and training in Canada. Since Canada is a key member of NATO and other international organizations, if Canada has gaps in its implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, it is likely that other states have similar problems, making Canada an interesting test case for NATO states on WPS policy implementation. In short, it is challenging for Canada to be simultaneously a global WPS leader and actively working to improve the gaps in its own implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

This paper investigates the question, "Is Canada's implementation of a feminist foreign policy aligning with international WPS standards, and why might a gap have emerged between the two?" Specifically, I investigate Canadian feminist foreign policy as a case study of the larger NATO membership's implementation of gender mainstreaming, since NATO transmits gender policy norms in the international arena.

Though there have been many studies on the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 and many further studies on gender in Canadian security, Canada in a 1325 context, or Canada and NATO, the study of 1325 via gap analysis of the ideal implementation of 1325 in Canada and the on the ground reality is an unutilized approach (see, for example, de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015a; Hutchinson et al. 2018; Greco and von Hlatky 2018). Understanding the gap is the first step for scholars and practitioners to learn to bridge the divide between current and goal policy.

I argue that Canada's implementation of its feminist foreign policy does not align with international gender norms like UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions for four reasons. These are interrelated yet pose distinct problems for the government to address to improve its implementation of the Resolution: static and harmful military culture, uneven access to inconsistent gender training, policy methodology problems, and insufficient numbers of women in critical roles. The last two of these reasons is itself an issue that UNSCR 1325 calls nations to address, demonstrating the inherent connections between challenges in the gender and security space. Testing three hypotheses throughout this paper affirms these findings.

This paper contains five chapters. In this introductory chapter, I provide information on Canada's feminist foreign policy, international gender norms, and how this paper will evaluate the argument described above. Second, I outline how Canada has to date implemented international gender norms. Third, I describe the gap between international gender goals and their implementation in Canada. Fourth, I analyze the five main sources of the gap established in section three, and note that the reduction of this gap must occur through the resolution of one or more of these intersecting issues. Finally, I present my conclusions and areas for future research.

The introductory chapter itself contains eight parts. First, I outline the basic principles and documents of the feminist foreign policy. Second, I provide information about UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, as well as NATO's role in addressing the resolutions. Third, I explain Canada's role in implementing UNSCR 1325. Fourth, I outline relevant bodies of literature and point to a gap in the literature calling for increased research that this policy report strives to fill. Fifth, I note the methodology for the remainder of the research in the paper. Sixth, I identify potential limitations of this research. Seventh, I highlight the

definitions of key terms for the study of gender mainstreaming in international security. Finally, I offer concluding remarks and next steps.

Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy

In 2017, Canada announced that its foreign policy would be explicitly “feminist,” following a review process lasting approximately one year. With such a policy, Canada is actively focusing not only on how it can improve domestic women’s rights, but how its foreign policy can be a source of global women’s rights improvement. Minister of International Development and La Francophonie Marie-Claude Bibeau (Lib): Compton—Stanstead summarized the review process in Hansard 142 on February 16, 2017:

Mr. Speaker, 15,000 people participated in [the policy review] consultations and most of them were Canadian. I personally participated in nine consultation sessions and round tables here in Canada. I had help from my parliamentary secretary. Many department officials participated in the round tables. All of our partner organizations participated and contributed. They submitted hundreds of briefs. We mostly heard from Canadians. I am pleased to tell the House that women and girls are going to be the focus of our new policy. (Bibeau 2017a)

But what is a feminist foreign policy? A policy, that as Minister Bibeau notes, “focuses on women and girls,” is not enough to constitute a doctrine. In its “Handbook: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy,” Sweden defines its feminist foreign policy as “applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the whole foreign policy agenda.” (Government Offices of Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2019, 9) Canadian Government policymakers have generally held that Canada’s feminist foreign policy is a comprehensive agenda advancing women’s rights across the globe, since as activists discussed during Canada’s 2018 G7 Presidency meeting on Women’s rights, “all issues are feminist issues.” (W7 2018) Key agenda items for Canada that policymakers strive to improve or advance with a foreign policy that emphasizes gender issues and equality include climate change, peace and security, sexual and reproductive health, and violence prevention (Woroniuk 2019; Trudeau 2018; Ho 2018). However, there is not a mo-

nopoly on what feminism means, and many individuals and groups believe that a country with a robust, armed defence policy is acting in a manner mutually exclusive with a feminist agenda (Thompson and Asquith 2018). Nevertheless, Canada is striving to integrate a notion of feminism and advancing gender equality into the totality of its foreign policy. As Stéfanie von Hlatky notes, this requires “integrating the mentality of gender equality in [not only] the programming and policy that Canada deploys abroad, but also the actors that are the country’s representatives,” with diverse policymakers who contribute to policies highlighting diversity (Ho 2018).

There are three texts that are generally considered to make up the doctrine of the feminist foreign policy, the 2017–2022 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP), the Feminist International Assistance Plan (FIAP), and the defence strategy’s discussion of gender. The C-NAP on WPS details implementation plans and priorities. Areas of focus include increasing the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, resolution, and statebuilding, gender equality and empowerment, ending impunity for sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, meeting the specific needs of women and girls in humanitarian settings including sexual and reproductive health, and increasing women’s participation in peace operations (Government of Canada 2017). With the goal of supporting global efforts to eradicate poverty by promoting the rights of women and girls, Canada’s 2017 FIAP commits almost all foreign aid Canada distributes to be in some way connected to gender, focusing on programs that will involve local organizations (Global Affairs Canada 2017). Under the policy, 15% of bilateral Canadian aid dollars will be dedicated directly to advancing gender equality and quality of life for women and girls by 2021–2022. Additionally, Global Affairs Canada commits to investing no less than 80% of bilateral international development assistance in initiatives across development sectors from climate action to human security that increase gender integration and empowerment (Global Affairs Canada 2017). This is a significant departure from as recently as 2015–2016, when only 2.4% of Canadian aid was explicitly directed toward gender equality (Global Affairs Canada 2017). Canada also emphasizes that the decision to intervene abroad militarily will be guided by 1325’s impulse to consider the needs of women and girls in conflict situations.

The 2016 Chief of Defence Staff's Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations emphasizes a military perspective for preventing sexual abuse, exploitation, and violence, protecting civilians, and expanding gender-based training, alongside increasingly involving women in conflict reconciliation processes (Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada 2016). This has resulted in heightened focus on recruiting women and diverse candidates to the CAF in an effort to reach a critical mass of 25% women in the forces by 2025–2026, a goal set by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to comply with the Employment Equity Act, though the country has stagnated in working towards this goal (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018a; Capuano 2017). The CAF has many programs to assist women, families, and diverse members within the profession of arms, such as family leave and single parent support policies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). Canada uses an analytical process called Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) to help the government perform analyses, determining if its policies are gender inclusive, and GBA+ has been incorporated into a wide range of programs and trainings connected to the WPS agenda (Status of Women Canada 2018). With Prime Minister Trudeau's gender equal cabinet and almost 50% women in the Senate, Canada's federal government also reflects a nation committed to improving the status of women (Catalyst 2019).

There are several other related documents that are connected to the feminist foreign policy and are important for its full implementation, which generally relate to the improvement of gender mainstreaming in some branch of the Canadian government or Canada's participation in international gender mainstreaming efforts. For example, while Op HONOUR is not technically part of the feminist foreign policy since it is an internal policy within the CAF aimed at reducing military sexual assault, it is relevant to the discussion of the feminist foreign policy since it is hard for Canada to advocate for norms abroad that it is not meeting at home (Government of Canada 2018a). Another example is the Elsie Initiative, a major Canadian gender and foreign policy effort that is an extension of one of the three major documents. The program seeks to increase gender perspectives and participation in peacekeeping on a global scale by providing international training and funding for uni-

formed women in peacekeeping roles, as well as researching best practices and forming a community of likeminded states (Government of Canada 2018b).

Thus, Canada's feminist foreign policy is a doctrine with a murky definition, though several specific policy branches and sub-branches are emerging from its yet-to-be-fully-defined waters. Though what it means for a government to be feminist is something that Canada is still very much investigating, this has not prevented Canada from attempting to craft policies grounded in the idea that women and girls are key to global security and economic prosperity, if not also addressing some more political rights (Thompson and Asquith 2018). Canada cannot accomplish such feminist goals abroad without simultaneously tending to the calls of feminist policy at home, hence the importance of correlate policies like Op HONOUR. Feminism is about more than just meeting the lowest level on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, but the government of Canada is actively engaged in policymaking to protect some of the globe's most vulnerable citizens, a promising start.

UNSCR 1325 and the Related Resolutions: Gender Mainstreaming in Context

While the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 in 2000, it was part of a series of UN policy changes toward increased gender equality, and has since been followed by seven additional resolutions and action plans on the status of women. NATO has taken significant steps after the Resolution's passage to incorporate its recommendations into Alliance doctrine and member state policies. Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 outline these international gender norms, noting what UNSCR 1325 is and how it relates to NATO members.

What is UNSCR 1325?

The history of gender mainstreaming in international security organizations spans roughly seventy years to the founding of the United Nations in 1948, with Article 1 of the UN Charter stating, "To achieve international co-operation...in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction

as to race, sex, language, or religion.” The UN quickly established the “Commission on the Status of Women” and ensured gender neutral language in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the intervening years, the UN continued significant advocacy for women’s rights (United Nations, n.d.). However, the passage of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 escalated the pace of norm creation on women’s integration in all realms of international security. Introduced by Namibian representative to the Security Council Ms. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, UNSCR 1325 recognized two main areas of concern: women’s roles in conflict and women’s roles in shaping peace processes (Kennedy 2016, 1052–1072). The Resolution was passed unanimously after two days of debate and support from international women’s civil society organizations (Kennedy 2016). UNSCR 1325 is supported by four principle pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery, all of which contribute to the aim of promoting women’s rights and involving women in the global peace and security process (Kennedy 2016).

The core background belief that drives Resolution 1325 is that armed conflict often disproportionately impacts women and children, and that women ought to play a more sizeable role in “building, consolidating and maintaining peace and security.” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2015) Approximately 90% of global conflict casualties are civilians, and 70% of these are women and children, with further harm frequently experienced by survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2015). Indeed, conflict related sexual and gender based violence (CRSGBV) is sometimes used as a deliberate tactic to subdue opposition; it is a military threat and war crime usually targeted at women (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 2015). The harms of conflict often fall disproportionately to these vulnerable populations due to loss of basic services, education, and economic opportunities, rendering being a woman sometimes more dangerous than being a soldier (Rasmussen 2014). Additionally, these conflicts often persist in part because peace talks collapse, agreements are ignored, and continuing to fight seems simpler than negotiating. Women frequently do not get a chance to participate in peace processes and make their voices heard (Rasmussen 2014). Resolution 1325 aims to make the views of half the population increasingly present in international security, improving global peace processes, reducing

the harm of women's experiences in conflict, lessening the destructive impact of CRSGBV, increasing female participation in international organizations and state militaries, and expanding representation in all the halls of government where key decisions are made (Rasmussen 2014). The Resolution proclaims to a global audience that women have unique skills to bring to the negotiating table, battlefield, and international parliaments, helping to solve the greatest challenges, if only their perspectives are included (Rasmussen 2014). Lieutenant Colonel Keirsten Kennedy, a US Army Judge Advocate General assigned as a NATO Legal Advisor, summarizes the provisions of 1325:

The resolution contains eighteen action sentences, wherein the UN "urges," "encourages," "further urges," "requests," "emphasizes," etc. Interestingly, the resolution appears to have two purposes: first, to include women in the peace process; and second, to protect women from an "inordinate impact on women" in war. The first four of the resolution's eighteen action paragraphs deal with—to greatly paraphrase—employing more women at senior levels of member states' governments and other decision-making entities. The Security Council "[urges] Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict..." Additionally, the Secretary-General should "appoint more women as special representatives and envoys..." Paragraphs five through eight propose gender perspective training on the "protection, rights, and special needs of women" affected by conflict. From the ninth paragraph onward, it is clear that the women the resolution is referring to are women within the region of conflict; specifically, women who should be protected from the effects of that conflict. This is important to note and understand because UNSCR 1325 attempts to address two areas involving women: essentially, women's advancement in the workplace (paragraphs 1-4) as well as protection of women in war-torn countries (paragraphs nine and onward). As a result of this dual aim, nations and organizations have struggled to fully implement UNSCR 1325 (both to employ more women and to protect women from conflict) (Kennedy 2016).

Thus, while there are clear directives in UNSCR 1325 for member states, they point in two disparate directions for achieving the same goal: the integration of gender perspectives across all levels of conflict resolution and prevention. Furthermore, UNSCR 1325-related policies have tended to take on two different tasks that are related but call for distinct solutions. These policies follow the split between the impor-

tance of “representation,” that women improve operational effectiveness in their home militaries and governments, and “diversity,” that women are key to peace and security on the ground in conflict and during reconciliation processes.

In the eighteen years following 1325, the UN has passed seven additional resolutions on gender and security, which address specific areas of concern for women in regions of conflict and securitization. These include Security Council Resolutions 1820 (2008, elaborates on 1325, emphasizes response to sexual violence as an act of war), 1888 (2009, elaborates on 1820, a Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict to lead eradication efforts), 1889 (2009, requests the establishment of indicators for 1325 implementation, calls for action to increase the role of women in peace processes), 1960 (2010, calls for increased monitoring and reporting of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence), 2106 (2013, preventing impunity for sexual violence in conflict), 2122 (2013, calls for increased women’s participation and leadership in preventing and resolving conflicts), and 2242 (2015, calls for assessing and reviewing WPS implementation strategies) (United States Institute of Peace 2018; United States Department of State, n.d.). In 2015, the UN published a major report detailing the current global status of UNSCR 1325 and related resolution implementation. Both Canada and NATO were mentioned as spotlight successes, yet there is still far to go to fully implement the policies.

What is the Role of NATO Regarding UNSCR 1325?

Gender is an important focus of NATO’s cooperation with other international organizations like the UN, and it strives to implement the recommended policies, promoting gender equality (Gottemoeller 2017). NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller, the first female to hold the position, has noted that NATO alliance members agree that integrating a gender perspective will contribute to NATO’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security, producing a more modern and responsive Alliance (Gottemoeller 2017). In the July 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration announcing the updated official Alliance doctrine, NATO officially endorsed the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, stating, “NATO and its partners are

committed to showing the leadership required to promote the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions. Today we have endorsed our renewed WPS policy and action plan, which are integral to NATO's three core tasks. Gender mainstreaming and increased representation of women in NATO civilian and military structures and in Allied and partner forces improve our effectiveness and contribute to a more modern, agile, ready, and responsive Alliance." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018)

The history of women in NATO dates back more than 50 years. The first official Alliance conference on the role of women in NATO forces took place in 1961, organized by women within the Alliance who wanted to seek opportunities for women in the armed forces. A formal Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (formerly CWINF, since 2009 called the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, the NCGP) was recognized in 1976 (Hutchinson et al. 2018; Gottemoeller 2017). Separately, in 1998 the Office of Women in the NATO Forces was created, which is now called the Office of the Gender Advisor, a key player in NATO gender mainstreaming (Gottemoeller 2017). Correspondingly, since 2000, NATO has increased its gender mainstreaming efforts. The 2002 NATO Prague Summit directed the International Staff (IS) to study and recommend avenues for gender balance in the International Military Staff (IMS). These efforts contributed to the 2007 adoption of the first NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) "Policy on Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security." (Hutchinson et al. 2018) This policy was the first overall framework within the Alliance for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, engaging with each of the four pillars of the original Resolution, providing conceptual language for policies, and centralizing the role and value ascribed to women in the Alliance (Hurley 2017). In 2008 the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the primary NATO decision-making body, requested a strategy for implementing 1325 from NATO Strategic Command, leading to the 2009 policy document Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (Bi-SCD 40-1) on integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives into NATO command and operational structure. This marked the official integration of the Resolution into NATO doctrine, rendering upholding 1325 and its related resolutions obligatory for the Alliance (Hutchinson et al.

2018; Hurley 2017). 2010 brought the first result-oriented action plan regarding NATO's implementation of 1325 and the related WPS Security Council resolutions, with updates expected every two years (Kennedy 2016).

Three major changes occurred in 2012. First, the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) was established to provide gender training for military operations. Second, Mari Skåre was appointed as the Secretary General's first Special Representative on Women, Peace, and Security, a post that signified the importance of WPS as a growing practice area within international security (Rasmussen 2014). Third, Bi-SCD 40-1 was significantly updated and revised (Hurley 2017; Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013). 2013 and 2014 brought revisions, updates, and progress reports for NATO's 1325 action plans and implementation strategies. In 2015, the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 prompted several updates to NATO's gender mainstreaming agenda. NATO adopted new military guidelines on the prevention of and response to conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence focusing equally on prevention, protection and women's participation (Hutchinson 2018). Furthermore, it developed a gender functional planning guide for Allied Command Operations (ACO) and it wrote a new gender education training package for member nations (Hutchinson 2018). Since then, NATO has continued revising action plans and guides, collecting national reports from member states, and documenting views of the gender perspective in the NATO command structure (Hutchinson 2018). While member states have improved gender parity and mainstreaming in recent years, they still have a long way to go. Alliance members presented mixed statistics as of the last major standardized review of all member states and thirteen partner nations in 2016 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). The latest NATO/EAPC action plan on UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions was released in October 2018, which stated:

The integration of gender and the inclusion of women's voices in all aspects of NATO's work is an essential factor in the success of peace and security. The newly endorsed Policy takes this into account and builds on a framework of 3 I's: Integration- making sure that gender equality is considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices; Inclusive-

ness- promoting an increased representation of women across NATO and in national forces to enhance operational effectiveness and success; and Integrity- enhancing accountability with the intent to increase awareness and implementation of the WPS agenda in accordance with international frameworks. NATO, Allies and partner nations seek to contribute and commit to the implementation of the UNSCRs on WPS by integrating this Policy throughout civilian and military structures. (Hutchinson et al. 2018a)

This newest policy, which, like past iterations included input from NATO partner countries like Australia, Japan, the UAE, and others, indicates the onward march of NATO's gender mainstreaming practices, continually evolving to meet emerging challenges (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018b). A detailed implementation plan for the new policy is expected in 2019.

This new implementation plan will be an important step to assess implementation indicators. Past implementation plans for 1325 from NATO have included measures like, "Number of events, declarations etc. addressing Women, Peace and Security priorities," and, "Number and role of local coordinating mechanisms between NATO and international organizations." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014a) These numerically driven indicators do not always capture the full picture of gender mainstreaming and may artificially drive states to produce numerical and institutional results, rather than true gender equality.

NATO is relevant to a discussion of the Canadian implementation of international gender norms because it helps coordinate gender mainstreaming policies across all member states, including Canada, impacting national policy. According to the UN's 15-year anniversary report on Resolution 1325, regional policies like those advanced by NATO "provide opportunities to share limited resources and build on neighbors' experiences, often in similar historical, cultural, and socio-economic contexts," as well as sharing lessons learned and best practices (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). Through repeated policy cycles, the organization adopts a minimum baseline policy, which member states will eventually adopt into national policy, ultimately evolving militaries as a whole (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2012).

Furthermore, NATO articulated in its 2018 Action Plan that "The primary responsibility for the implementation of the [WPS] agenda

rests with nations. However, NATO as a political and military alliance contributes to the implementation by systematically integrating gender perspectives into planning and execution of operations, training, exercises, and policies, as well as dialogue and partnerships.” (Hutchinson et al. 2018, 10) Despite this warning that states are in part on their own regarding gender policy implementation, NATO encourages member states to create 1325-related policies, working toward gender awareness in Alliance crisis-management and peace-support operations, as well as within their own military and security institutions (Hutchinson et al. 2018; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018b). NATO facilitates the adoption of 1325 doctrine on a member state-level with each member adopting a national action plan or NAP (Kennedy 2016). Countries that have NAPs tend to have more active and accountable parliaments regarding the implementation of international gender norms (Reeves 2013). Indeed, because NAPs have measures and reporting mechanisms with a global outlook and deal with a wide range of issues like facilitating gender balance in security, humanitarian assistance, development, and diplomacy, a study of Parliaments from NATO countries found that NAPs were the most effective tool for achieving a wide range of objectives mentioned in UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions (Reeves 2013). NATO and member state policies are mutually reinforcing once implemented, and policies often originate with NATO before member states adopt them (Hutchinson et al. 2018; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2018b). Furthermore, in recent years, NATO itself has made significant advancements in implementing gender mainstreaming policy, raising awareness of 1325 and its related resolutions, taking steps to increase the integration of WPS into Alliance doctrine, and improving training and other programs to spread knowledge about gender mainstreaming (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014b). These norms set at NATO have historically affected member state policies. In 1999 only 26% of NATO members reported equal armed forces enlistment processes for men and women. By 2013, this had increased to 93%. Similarly, in 2002 only 11% of members mentioned gender training in national reports to NATO. This rose to 75% in 2013 (Figueroa et al. 2015). NATO’s influential characteristics regarding gender policy thus demonstrate that NATO doctrine is important to studying one of the Alliance’s key members, Canada.

In an April 2017 speech at a WPS conference at the University of San Diego, Deputy Secretary General Gottemoeller summarized the two basic goals of the NATO action plan on WPS for the 29 member states and 26 partners: “First, to reduce barriers for active and meaningful participation of women in our own structures, in all NATO and national levels. And, second, to integrate gender perspectives in our daily work – that is to say, gender mainstreaming.” (Gottemoeller 2017) With these two goals, she noted that NATO strives to make gender analysis a basic skill and tool for every civilian and military security provider, rather than an end in itself, a “tick-the-box exercise.” (Gottemoeller 2017) According to Deputy Secretary General Gottemoeller, gender analysis, inclusion, and increased women’s participation are strategies for the execution of NATO’s mandate to avert conflict and secure the peace. Indeed, 1325-connected policies often emphasize the important role women play on the battlefield in areas men cannot go or men are less operationally effective, including speaking with local women in conflict-affected areas, serving as a battlefield medic or linguist, or possessing other cultural, social, or expert skills (Rasmussen 2014). However, these roles are often emphasized at the expense of advocating for gender mainstreaming as an end in itself. Following through on these aims will require the constant evolution of tools, training, and best practices for different situations and audiences, ensuring objectives connected to UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions are met.

What is Canada’s Role Regarding International Gender Norms?

In 1968, Canada became the third NATO member state to accept women into its armed forces (Figueroa et al. 2015). Since that time, Canada has been a world leader in gender equality in all fields, including the defence establishment. Furthermore, Canada is considered “the founder of multiculturalism as a formal government policy,” and values multiculturalism in decision-making. Some peer countries do not hold the same deep-seated values or are shifting their views on this topic, rendering it an important site of change and analysis on gender and diversity issues (Reitz, Breton, Dion, and Dion 2009; Winter 2015). However, though Canada has a strong diversity and women’s rights record and

chairs the UN Group of Friends of 1325, it still has a long way to go for full implementation of the WPS resolutions. Despite being an early leader in women's rights and arguing for the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Canada did not have a National Action Plan to implement the Resolution until 2010, in large part due to delays by the Harper government over the wording surrounding gender equality (Tiessen 2015, 84–100). In the Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP) for 2017–2022, the federal government writes,

DND/CAF are committed to being a strong partner with Global Affairs Canada in putting women and girls at the centre of Government of Canada efforts to prevent and resolve conflict. Integrating United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and embedding gender perspectives into our policies, training/education and operations are moral and operational imperatives that will contribute to a culture of respect internally and increase DND/CAF effectiveness as it delivers on its mandate. (Government of Canada 2017b)

Thus, the Government of Canada across multiple key agencies is clearly committed to the implementation of the Resolution, and continuing efforts to improve its actions. As both a UN member and NATO member, as well as a country that places high national value on equality, Canada's role regarding 1325 is to implement the Resolution as fully as possible within its borders, and if possible, around the globe. According to the Resolution, member state implementation entails:

- (a) Ensur[ing] increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; (United Nations 2000)
- (b) Increase[ing] their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies; (United Nations 2000)
- (c) Emphasiz[ing] the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relat-

ing to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions; (United Nations 2000)

(d) Provisions that refer to “all parties” of UNSCR 1325

Some of the “all parties” obligations that apply to member states include considering a gender perspective in all peace negotiations, respecting international law as it relates to women and girls, taking special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence particularly during situations of armed conflict, prosecuting those responsible for war crimes against women and girls, and considering the various needs of women and girls when planning for disarmament and reintegration (United Nations 2000). Canada’s obligations regarding the other WPS resolutions are similar, with more specific language regarding the subject of that individual resolution. When appropriate in later sections, language from the other resolutions regarding member state obligations will be cited.

Canada is uniquely important to study regarding international gender norm implementation for several reasons. First, Canada is a global leader on women’s rights issues, though measures of equal participation indicate that Canada has not reached gender parity on key issues, demonstrating that Canada has both the political environment for improvement on women’s rights and room to grow. For example, the Freedom House 2018 Freedom in the World study scored Canada with overall 99/100 possible points on all measures of civic, personal, and political freedoms, including 16/16 on both measures associated with women’s rights: “personal autonomy and individual rights” and “political pluralism and participation.” (Freedom House 2018) In contrast, the World Economic Forum (WEF) scores Canada 35th globally on its ranking of international gender gaps, in between Luxembourg and Cape Verde (CBC 2016). If current trends continue, women in Canada will not reach economic parity with men for 170 years, since Canada has only closed 73.1% of the gender gap (CBC 2016). The contrast between these two scores from the WEF and Freedom House demonstrates the importance of Canada as a case study for the gap between 1325 implementation and the letter of the Resolution, since Canada has the political environment to improve.

Second, Canada's status as one of only two countries with an officially feminist foreign policy renders it a unique case study. Third, Canada is a key member of NATO, and its influence is felt throughout the alliance. It is above average among NATO members on most measures of implementing UNSCR 1325 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). If Canada has particular gaps in its implementation of the Resolution, it is likely that a) other NATO members have similar problems and b) Canada's acknowledgement and later redress of these gaps would be helpful to the Alliance and broader international community. Thus, not only is Canada a crucial case study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, but it has an important role to play in shaping the global conversation on women's rights as a key part of foreign policy. Canada's role regarding 1325 is to implement the Resolution to the best of its ability as a member of the UN and NATO, and as a nation that has explicitly committed itself to upholding women's rights around the globe.

The Existing Literature

There are two distinct bodies of literature that are important to consider for this paper: that of the Canadian foreign policy perspective on gender, and that of NATO-connected scholarship on UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. This section will review both literatures separately, and then draw conclusions about the gaps in the literature.

Canadian Foreign Policy Literature on Gender

Scholarship on Canadian foreign policy falls into four main camps around feminist foreign policy. The first group of scholars, writing before the official passage of "the" feminist foreign policy in 2017, engage with classic international relations paradigms to discuss the increased inclusion of women in security. Some discuss how gender equality has long been a part of Canadian foreign policy aims and Canada's high value on a human security perspective of international relations (see, for example, Nuruzzaman 2006; Swiss 2012). However, these scholars such as Claire Turenne Sjolander point to inconsistencies in Canada's implementation of its stated objectives, failing to uphold its purported gender-friendly paradigm of international relations (see, for example

Sjolander 2005; Keeble and Smith 2001).

The second camp, writing both before and after the passage of the official feminist foreign policy, take a critical theory approach to Canadian foreign policy. Broadly, they argue that a feminist lens of policy-making is improperly adopted when gender is operationalized in militarized contexts. Tiessen and Carrier point out that explicitly feminist critiques of mainstream Canadian foreign policy perspectives emerged in the 1990s, rooted in both critical theory and traditional IR scholarship. Authors such as Deborah Stienstra and Sandra Whitworth began to question how classical understanding of foreign policy devalued female-aligned individuals, institutions, and programs (see, for example, Tiessen and Carrier 2015; Stienstra 1995; Whitworth 1995). While scholars in this camp are not necessarily pacifists, some, such as Alison Howell, argue that Canada's discourse on equality and liberalism masks violent harms Canada has committed abroad in its own interest, in contrast to true feminist ideals of self-determination (Howell 2005, 49–69). Indeed, these scholars argue that a feminist foreign policy ought to decentralize militarism and elevate local women's voices, among other issues across a rich Canadian foreign policy tradition of feminist international relations (see, for example, George and Shepherd 2016; Arat-Koc 2005; Black and Smith 2014). Such scholars comment on Canadian hypocrisy under both the Harper and Trudeau governments, arguing that they elevate feminism and gender equality in name only without action truly reflective of feminist ideals. These scholars often draw upon other disciplines like geography, philosophy, and anthropology to further their analysis (see, for example, Hyndman 2000; Cox 1981; Tiessen and Carrier 2015).

The third camp, writing after the 2017 feminist foreign policy, are government personnel who articulate the goals and vision of the policy. Speeches and Hansard testimony from Ministers such as Chrystia Freeland and Marie-Claude Bibeau provide clarification about government aims in this area, alongside official government reports, policies, and directives (see, for example, Bibeau 2017b; Freeland 2018; Freeland 2017).

Finally, there are scholars and practitioners from a broad range of perspectives writing in the aftermath of the 2017 feminist foreign policy, who criticize and suggest updates to various aspects of the policy,

though they largely accept its fundamental premises (see, for example, Momani 2019). These individuals are distinct from those in camp two, since they do not take the critical theory approach arguing that the construction of Canada as a liberal nation supporting women's rights neglects histories of colonialism, legitimizes violence, and perpetuates western views of womanhood (Howell 2005). They are distinct from those in group three since they are not government personnel. For example, in a perspective shared by others, Rafia Zakaria (2019) argues that Canada's focus on economic empowerment and investment as a means toward gender equality belies the structural political impediments to freedom from oppression; an "add women and stir" approach does not work without corresponding political efforts. Individuals affiliated with the Women, Peace, and Security Network-Canada such as Margaret Capelazo and Diana Sarosi argue that Canada's national action plan on WPS, a key document implementing the feminist foreign policy, lacks operational and budget specificity, creating significant policy gaps (see, for example, Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2018). Other Canadians affiliated with NGOs, universities, and media outlets make similar critiques, while also often working with the government of Canada to improve the policy (see, for example, Pittman 2017; Tuckey 2017; Tiessen and Swan 2018; Pulfer and McDonald 2017).

NATO-Connected Scholarship on International Gender Policy

Like any major policy doctrine, scholars have spent significant verbiage commenting on and critiquing UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, and in particular NATO's implementation of the resolutions. This section explores the range of scholarly criticism of NATO's 1325 doctrine and implementation. While there are many scholarly commentaries on NATO and 1325, this section chooses to focus on the criticisms to better understand gaps in the policies. While these scholars and this section will primarily use the phrase "UNSCR 1325," as a whole, they are also referring to the related resolutions, and global WPS efforts, using the first of the resolutions as a moniker for the lot. The critiques of international WPS implementation primarily fall into two camps. First, that NATO doctrine essentializes gender in a variety of ways, misunderstanding its actual meaning and application. Second, the critiques indicate that NATO doctrine has not been effective at curtailing harms

to women's rights.

First, perhaps the most common refrain in academic criticism of NATO's implementation of Resolution 1325 is that the way its doctrine treats the word "gender" is mistaken and harmful. Authors have described this phenomenon in different ways. Katharine Wright (2016) presents an important article that engages several views on the topic. She argues that NATO is an institution that teaches the international community about gender, yet the way it disseminates information on UNSCR 1325 is still as a part of institutional hegemonic masculinity, or a culture that has continually built upon masculine norms subordinating women. Wright uses author Cynthia Enloe's characterization of a "Gender regime" to describe NATO, defining it as "the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all organisational structures and at the same time are unique to each organisational context," indicating that NATO has a particular way of implementing gender mainstreaming, meriting individual study (Wright 2016). This is important because it situates NATO as a unique point of analysis for gender mainstreaming, particularly since as a trans-Atlantic military alliance it is a site of gendered value transfer. Wright traces three elements of NATO's 1325 policy in terms of "gender" definition and the feminist perspective. First, she argues that NATO adopted UNSCR 1325 in part due to feminist organizing within the Alliance. Despite their hard work bringing about change in the Alliance, "femocrats" face challenges being taken seriously even when they have an institutional mandate to carry out the WPS agenda. Other personnel sometimes view 1325 as a job of female NATO administrators rather than a broader goal. Femocrats are tasked with the emotional labor of advocating for the importance of women in security positions, as well as their official policy implementation positions, isolating these individuals from support within NATO and outside feminist activists who are not a part of the Alliance and see it as a masculinist institution (Wright 2016).

Second, Wright examines the member state view of 1325 and how even though states find 1325 to be a useful diplomatic tool, the Resolution is seen as distinct from the main NATO agenda, in part due to the partnership with EAPC for its implementation. This signaled 1325 could be separate from the Alliance's main NATO-specific goals. She elaborates,

The perception of UNSCR 1325 as an issue which is additional, rather than integral to NATO's core identity as a defensive institution, has been exacerbated through the overrepresentation of women in posts responsible for delivering on UNSCR 1325, particularly given that a number of these women have no previous experience of, or expertise on the issue (NATO Official, 2014). The implication of women being perceived by extension of their gender as a natural fit for a role working on gender results in the framing of gender as synonymous with women. This performative reproduction of gender (Zalewski, 2010: 24) serves to reinforce, rather than challenge existing gender relations (an essential strategy for transformative change within organisations) (Cockburn, 2010: 143). In part, this is a reflection of a weakness within UNSCR 1325 itself, which has framed gender as synonymous with women (Shepherd, 2008: 171). That NATO's adoption of UNSCR 1325 has not sought to challenge the logic within the Resolution is to be expected and demonstrates a hindrance to realising transformative agendas in international security institutions. (Wright 2016)

Wright's observations in this paragraph mirror that of a vast scholarship on 1325, often unconnected to NATO, which argues that a problem with the Resolution is that it equates the word "gender" with the word "woman," which is reductive and contributes to men not buying into helping alleviate the harms the Resolution discusses (see, for example, Hurley 2017; Kennedy 2016; George and Shepherd 2016; Hermoso and Sugawara 2016). Hurley (2017) interviewed senior NATO personnel and found that there was consistent "misunderstanding or conflation of 'gender' with 'women'; of 'gender mainstreaming' with 'equal opportunities,'" and that the word "women" itself was a signifier of so many other things, within NATO particularly problem solving on women's rights. This allowed men to not buy into assisting with these operations, even though gender discrimination and abuse impacts both men and women. Framing 1325 as a women's issue within NATO places the burden of solving the problem on women without institutional support from men, which reproduces and essentializes negative gender stereotypes, a key problem with NATO's gendered implementation (Wright 2016). Some women at NATO feel like they need a man on their committee or in a leadership role advocating for gender equality to add credibility to their argument, reifying traditional gendered power dynamics. It is perceived that men would not be interested in listening to only "female stuff," and would instead listen to a man talking about

women's operational effectiveness (Hurley 2017).

Finally, Wright (2016, 351) examines the "impact that framing UNSCR 1325 as 'added value' to NATO has had on the transformative potential of the Resolution," and determined that the phrasing of female bodies as possessors of added value to a mission can be harmful. This can manifest in several ways. It separates WPS from the core agenda of the Alliance, rather than being an integral and fundamental part of the military as NATO claims. Wright elaborates that, based on the WPS education system NATO has developed, gender is given a secondary, "added" role. She writes, "The central role of Sweden – a NATO partner [rather than member] – can be seen to symbolise the separation of the WPS agenda from NATO and the Alliance's core purpose as a defence organisation. It has also helped shaped [sic] a very particular understanding of the value of UNSCR 1325 for the Alliance," as operational and separate (Wright 2016, 356). Apart from the primary education mechanism outsourced to a partner country, Wright (2016, 357) comments that Bi-SCD 40-1's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2009) military argument for the utility of 1325 because of "successful force generation by mobilizing additional resources...the importance of women in the military forces of the Alliance [because of] the influence they can have in all stages of conflict or crisis...[and] to enhance the effectiveness of NATO-led operations and missions in order to ensure Alliance success," was focused solely on the operational benefits of women and increasing percentages of women in the military, which can "undermin[e] the transformative potential of integrating a gender perspective, by creating an expectation that women will bring diversity with them." (Wright 2016, 351)

Many authors echo this point and argue that the expectation that women's presence will inherently diversify and bring new talents to the military can be harmful to women in armed service, because an essential part of military training is minimization of individuality, so women are trained to blend in yet expected to stand out and perform unique tasks, while also being questioned about why they cannot perform some tasks a man might be able to, a substantial double bind (see, for example, Hurley 2017). Wright (2016, 352) summarizes these author's remarks, closing, "The integration of women into NATO forces for instrumental purposes therefore supports, rather than challenges,

the existing gender regime and reinforces existing gender binaries. Again, it indicates the possibility that UNSCR 1325 can be co-opted to support existing agendas, rather than (solely) to support transformative change." Some officers interviewed for Matthew Hurley's (2017) research may ascribe to women in the military "'soft' female competencies that included listening and compromise," these perceptions essentialize women, rather than solely point to positive attributes. This restricts women's agency and promotes, according to Hurley "unrealistic assumptions of what women can achieve or should be expected to achieve (and leaves the role of men largely unexamined); women are transferred from simply victims to super-heroines." (411)

Other authors develop similar themes to Wright in her criticism of NATO's interpretation of Resolution 1325. Matthew Hurley (2018a) describes how the narratives and stories told by NATO about gender are not detailed, only cite successful examples of mainstreaming, and result in "gender," "women," and "security," rendered into "political and problematic" signifier words that are essentialized and reductive rather than developing an organizational agenda to support women in the military (436–437). In an earlier article, Hurley also argues that NATO's implementation of the 1325 mission has been feminized, negatively impacting the men working toward gender equality and the achievement of Resolution goals. He writes, "perceived gender transgressions are policed and controlled via trivialization and feminization; and...conceptualizations of masculinist protection and credibility can reinforce pre-existing gender relations, rather than challenge them." (Hurley 2018b, 74) Hurley's commentary illuminates how gender trivialization negatively impacts men and women, a recurring theme in scholarship. A 2017 contribution from Hurley also discusses how since gender mainstreaming is inherently retroactive, exposing and correcting flaws in existing institutions, one must constantly "negotiate" and "accommodate" preconceived masculinities since there are engrained norms in place at longstanding institutions (Hurley 2017). While he notes that this struggle can be productive, since it makes gendered inequalities visible, it does not correct for hegemonic masculinity (Hurley 2017). Some authors, including Hurley (2017), discuss how NATO implementation emphasizes the gendered vision of woman as victim, offering protection through a stereotyped lens. Other authors, including Nicola

Pratt analyze the imperialist implications of 1325. She writes,

We should not read this as a positive step toward the transformation of the lives of women (and men) in conflict zones... this reconceptualization of gender occurs through a reinscription of racial–sexual boundaries, evocative of the political economy of imperialism... Understanding the significance of race and sexuality in the conceptualization of gender has implications for transnational feminist praxis and its ability to construct a counter-hegemonic project to transform the dominant structures of power that give rise to war, conflict, insecurity, and injustice. (Pratt 2013, 772)

Pratt thus highlights the perspective that UNSCR 1325 was primarily written by powerful, western men about providing gendered security for brown women in the global south. She argues that this reifies culturally dominant systems of oppression and visions of “the other” across gender, class, race, and sexual lines (Pratt 2013). Nicole George and Laura Shepherd (2016) further this argument, noting that the 1325 agenda can be interpreted as an imperialist view of both gender and military operations, imposing western gender norms and western military ideals on the global south. Scholars also articulated that this argument was prominent in their thoughts about 1325 at a November 2018 conference in Montreal on gender in international relations (comments given under Chatham House Rules).

While the authors presented in this section offer criticism of NATO and UNSCR 1325, particularly in terms of the interpretation of “gender” itself, reading the non-NATO perspectives on this issue help to understand means of improving the implementation of policies related to 1325. Best practices on the Resolution can evolve from renewed attention to language surrounding gender and identity.

Second, an additional source of scholarly critique of NATO’s treatment of UNSCR 1325 stems from its implementation of doctrine, or rather the lack thereof. These authors more closely reflect some of the internal NATO criticisms of 1325 doctrine, which generally argue that existing NATO doctrine is fine, but that it is not acted upon. Authors George and Shepherd (2016) comment on the transmission of 1325 and related Resolution aims into NAPs. While the authors praise the rise of NAPs overseen by regional bodies like NATO, they comment that only 11 of the 54 countries with NAPs in 2014 had budgets to support the policies they advanced (George and Shepherd 2016, 298). George and

Shepherd (2016, 299) point to additional difficulties with NAP transmission and implementation, indicating that the documents need to consider local histories, contexts, and traditions, stating, "Clearly, local articulations of WPS policy require more than a simple 'copy and paste' approach that mechanically reproduces a global policy manuscript," but at the same time "We might also consider if – and how far – localised efforts to formulate 'useful' WPS policy stretch, creatively reinterpret, or potentially misinterpret, the aims and goals of this framework." This is a particular concern given that some NAPs have turned away from the anti-militarist sentiment that inspired the 1325 movement, losing progressive potential and "mould[ing] to harmonise with the goals of the liberal statebuilding orthodoxy that has informed recent conflict stabilisation interventions." (George and Shepherd 2016, 300)

Hurley engages with this topic as well. He argues that because NATO couples UNSCR 1325 with its role as a security and stability provider, it becomes a part of NATO's "corporate identity," which does not allow for full mainstreaming, noting, "In this (re)framing, UNSCR 1325 is moved from a disruptive policy – one that exposes deficiencies – to a natural extension of NATO's values, identity and purpose, and a tool to enhance alliance success. In this sense, UNSCR 1325 becomes a supplement – not a disruption – to NATO's pre-existing, organisational objectives and gender relations; and this has implications for the ways in which increased women's involvement – and female agency – is conceived." (Hurley 2017, 409) Viewed through this lens, NATO cannot be adequately implementing 1325 because it shifts the intended meaning of the Resolution.

Laura Shepherd (2016) takes a different approach to the topic of 1325 implementation. She argues that the way the Resolution is being implemented by most states with public national action plans is to "make war safe for women" rather than to encourage demilitarization, the original feminist intent behind UNSCR's passage in 2000. Instead, Shepherd claims that the resolution is normalizing war, and is reinforcing one idea of the Resolution, that it only deals with conflict overseas and not within the armed forces and governments of the states implementing the national action plans. Consequently, Shepherd (2016) argues that the NAPs are a failed form of implementing UNSCR 1325. Furthermore, Shepherd cited Miller et al.'s 2014 study of NAPs, which

analyzed 15 elements of the plans and their impact on implementation. Miller et al. found that,

The location of the NAP within the domestic political structure seems to be significant, for example. According to another study, minority world NAPs tend to be located in departments or ministries associated with foreign affairs, while majority world NAPs tend to be driven by ministries responsible for gender equality. The ownership of the NAP within government will determine its focus (domestic or foreign-policy focused) and its level of influence (national women's machineries are typically lacking the resources and political status in many conflict-affected countries to strongly attract genuine political interest and funding). (Shepherd 2016, 325)

In conjunction with the feminist politics of peace and the government turn toward use of 1325 to increase a different kind of militarization, Miller et al. and Shepherd's arguments find that funding and attention orientation of implementation toward war abroad rather than peace and equality at home impact proper use of the Resolution. The goal of UNSCR 1325 is not to "make war safe for women."

This second group of criticism is simultaneously easier and harder than the first group to apply to a reframing of policy implementation on UNSCR 1325 for both NATO and member state national action plans. On the one hand, NATO and member states could recommit to the explicit implementation of Resolution goals, and in particular locally appropriate and focused policies. However, the inherent structure of NATO as a "corporate" and male-created entity is an intractable issue.

The Literature Gap

A gap in the literature that this paper seeks to address is the policy divide between Canada's feminist foreign policy and international WPS goals. As demonstrated by the presentation of two distinct bodies of literature that are relevant to this paper, some authors discuss how Canada strives to be a global WPS leader, others talk about the feminist foreign policy, and still others emphasize norming documents like UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, but there is not currently a discussion in the literature linking the implementation or failure to implement certain elements of the Canadian feminist foreign policy to an international WPS agenda. The literatures exist as separate bodies

that do not engage with each other. A “command f” search within the first group for the phrase “1325” will yield as few results as a search for the word “Canada” in the second. More research is warranted on why countries have experienced difficulty implementing the international WPS agenda, a research gap that unites the Canadian foreign policy and international WPS scholarship. These two literatures must be combined to produce an improved understanding for Canada about its efforts to participate in the global WPS movement, both at home and abroad, helping to answer the research question, “Is Canada’s implementation of a feminist foreign policy aligning with international WPS standards, and why might a gap have emerged between the two?”

Hypotheses

Based on the joint literature analysis of Canadian foreign policy and international WPS scholarship, this paper presents three hypotheses explaining the implementation gap between Canada’s feminist foreign policy and international norms such as UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

Hypothesis 1: The more specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable a Canadian policy program’s doctrine is, the smaller gap it will have with global WPS norms.

Hypothesis 2: The more an organizational culture is welcoming of women, the smaller the gap a program will have with global WPS norms.

Hypothesis 3: The more a country actively strives to transmit global WPS norms to its policymakers, civil servants, and soldiers, the smaller the gap it will have with global WPS norms.

Each of the hypotheses may help to explain a different reason why there is divergence between Canada’s implementation of its feminist foreign policy and international gender norms.

Methodology

To analyze the implementation of Canada's feminist foreign policy and why it might differ from international WPS goals, I use "gap analysis methodology," which reviews the current status of a policy and its distance from the policy ideal to understand what has yet to be accomplished. A non-Canadian foreign policy example helps explain how this method works. Imagine a bakery is preparing some cupcakes from its own recipe, and its recipe is an attempt to live up to the national championship winning cupcake. Gap analysis methodology would analyze the actual cupcake made from the bakery's recipe and the bakery's recipe itself, in contrast with the national recipe, the platonic ideal of a cupcake, to understand the gap between the bakery and the national cupcake.

Applied to Canada's feminist foreign policy, I collect data from Canadian government documents, scholarly commentary on Canadian policy, international gender policy norm-setting documents such as UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, and international organization recommendations, later analyzing these documents to understand where Canadian feminist foreign policy is now in contrast with an international conception of gender mainstreaming. This paper's structural organization is established to best analyze the gap. The chapters follow by addressing the current status of Canadian feminist foreign policy in terms of positive compliance with international norms. Then, I address Canadian policy divergence with these international standards. These two sections help to understand the contours of the gap. Finally, I analyze why this gap between international aims and domestic output is occurring.

To obtain a better sense of the depth of the gap between Canada's feminist foreign policy and international gender norms and test the aforementioned hypotheses, each policy area will be scored on a 1–5 scale according to compliance with international gender norms. This scale is relatively similar to the achievement scale used by the Department of National Defence in its 2017–2018 progress report on the C-NAP for WPS implementation (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b). I define norms in this instance as an obligation for member states or "all parties" under UNSCR

1325 and the related resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, and 2242), since they are the internationally agreed upon standards for gender policy. I utilize the line or lines from UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions most appropriate to judge the implementation of each policy. Full implementation is defined as a state taking proactive, strong, and thoughtful measures to meet the obligation. For example, there is a member state obligation listed in UNSCR 1325 of "Increase[ing] their voluntary financial...support for gender-sensitive training efforts." A state that appropriated some additional funds to training would not necessarily meet the spirit of what is outlined in the resolution, failing the "fullness" test, but a state that appropriated additional funding, sought out best practices for new training methods, and aggressively strove to train personnel would meet the standard of full implementation. To ensure proper scoring across resolutions, and since several of the WPS resolutions internally reference prior commitments within each other, I created an index thematically grouping all member state obligations, which is available as a chart in annex to this paper. The categories of member state and all parties obligations referenced across all eight resolutions are represented in decision-making, training, disarmament and countering extremism, adjusting sanctions, NAP creation and monitoring/evaluation, local development and post-conflict needs, ending impunity for crimes against women and girls, international law, and sexual violence prevention and awareness. The scale for assessing each policy area is as follows:

5. Virtually all significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability
4. Between 95% and 75% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability
3. Between 74% and 50% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability
2. Between 49% and 25% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability
1. Less than 25% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability

A qualitative version of those same scores is as follows:

5. Virtually full implementation to the best of the state's ability
4. Almost full implementation to the best of the state's ability
3. Majority implemented though below full implementation to the best of the state's ability
2. Below full implementation to the best of the state's ability
1. Significantly below full implementation to the best of the state's ability or no attempt to implement

In each section evaluating policies, there is a chart listing the resolution, obligation text, assessment of implementation, and score on the above scale for that measure of Canada's feminist foreign policy. Chapters 2 and 3 are scored somewhat differently. In chapter 2, scores are presented based on doctrinal text or the positive spin on a policy's implementation. In chapter 3, policies are scored not based on what the text says, but based on the reality of the situation and implementation in practice. This helps to better understand the actual implementation gap between Canada's feminist foreign policy and international WPS norms. It is one thing to have a great doctrine on paper, which scores well across member state obligations in UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, it is another to implement such policies in practice or have those doctrines stand up to rigorous scholarly critique.

Since this paper deals primarily with qualitative data but the scale is quantitative so as to help more accurately describe the contours and depth of the policy gap, some estimations will be made about percentages, based on the amount of effort or lack thereof by the government to implement a particular policy in accordance with international norms. When implementing the coding scheme, to ensure another person would come to the same conclusions, I provide ample contextual information before listing coded values, noting why I made judgement calls in each cell of an evaluative chart, in addition to the analysis contained in each section. This evaluation mechanism is only for individual policies but looking at the results of many policies can help to better understand the implementation gap. However, a limitation of this research is that I was the only coder, and this code could not be tested for intercoder reliability. As such, the code I use here should be read as a framework for understanding the depth of the gap between Canada's feminist foreign policy and the WPS resolutions, rather than as scientific

as it could be had the code been tested among other users or been able to be more specific under the time and resource constraints presented. Despite these limitations, the evaluation mechanism still helps to codify understanding of the extent to which Canada's feminist foreign policy upholds member state obligations under the WPS resolutions.

Limitations

There are five primary limitations to this research. First, the word "gender" presents inherent limitations and exclusions, so while I must make language choices, here I offer a statement of inclusion. This paper will commonly use the word "women" to refer to all individuals who either self-identify or present as a woman, female, or femme. Furthermore, while this paper uses the rhetoric of "women," I mean the term to be as inclusive as possible of both cisgender and trans* identities. Trans women are women, and this paper recognizes that gender is a spectrum. Additionally, this paper recognizes the specific oppression faced by non-binary individuals and trans* folks in international security spaces, and understands that their experiences may be different to what is described in these pages. Further research on this issue is warranted.

Second, this paper does not engage at length with the ways that queer, racial, and indigenous identities affect the women described in these pages, focusing primarily on gender as a lens for analysis. Identity is not based on one attribute, but this paper does focus on one particular aspect of identity. Future studies should expand this research outward.

Third, the sources used in this study are limited to those accessible to the author at time of writing, which included knowledge derived from academic conferences, news media sources, think tank information, Canadian government data, international organization data, and unclassified NATO documents. While many documents analyzed were primary sources, no one-on-one interviews were conducted. Furthermore, many relevant documents on this paper's subject matter are classified strategic plans and were thus inaccessible for consideration.

Fourth, this paper seeks to use a quantitative evaluative mechanism

for primarily qualitative data, meaning that estimations must be made to convert data. This is a drawback inherent to creating such an evaluative mechanism, and care has been taken to prevent inaccuracies.

Finally, this paper uses a significant amount of data and contains many statistics, but these numbers present some limitations. Gender policies are often so new that many programs do not have significant data supporting them, and the data that does exist is often not well collected or well tested. This does not appear to be an issue in Canada or at NATO, but I raise the point in the interest of disclosure. There are other areas in the paper with no statistics cited where such information would be useful, but in these cases the data does not yet exist or it was not yet accessible in a public manner. Additionally, at several points in this paper, there are different statistics cited referring to the same concept. These statistics may reflect citations from slightly different years or methods of counting, but all fall within a percentage point of each other. While there may be other limitations in this paper's findings, these four areas encompass the broad expanse of research impediments to writing this paper.

Definitions

The definitions provided below are utilized throughout this paper and are important to understanding the research that follows.

Gender: "Gender refers to the socially constructed characteristics of women and men – such as norms, roles and relationships of and between groups of women and men. It varies from society to society and can be changed. While most people are born either male or female, they are taught appropriate norms and behaviours – including how they should interact with others of the same or opposite sex within households, communities[,] and work places. When individuals or groups do not "fit" established gender norms they often face stigma, discriminatory practices or social exclusion – all of which adversely affect health. It is important to be sensitive to different identities that do not necessarily fit into binary male or female sex categories." (World Health Organization, n.d.)

Gender analysis: The systematic gathering and examination of in-

formation on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand inequities based on gender. It could also be understood as “methods used to understand the relationship between men and women in the context of the society.” (de Jong et al. 2015b, 24) Examples of gender analysis include taking into account the different security concerns of men and women, community power relations, division of humanitarian support resources, and how social status changes in war (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 2015).

Gender balance: NATO defines the term as within a 60:40 ratio toward one gender or the other (Hurley 2017).

Gender equality: “The equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men, and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born female or male.” (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b, 24)

Gender mainstreaming: NATO directives state that gender mainstreaming is “a strategy to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and program in all areas and at all levels.” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017) The 1325 Scorecard Project, supported by NATO and several civil society organizations, goes further, and adds to the end of the official NATO definition “in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of women and men are taken into account in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres. This will lead to that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.” (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b, 24)

Integration of gender perspective: “A way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources. In ACO and ACT activities it is used synonymously with implementing the requests of UNSCR 1325, related resolutions, as well as directives emanating from NATO...More fundamentally, implementing a gender perspective is done by adapting action following a ‘gender analysis.’” (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015, 24)

Sex: “The permanent and immutable biological characteristics com-

mon to individuals in all societies and cultures.” (Kennedy 2016, 1061)

Sexual or gender-based exploitation: “Includes, at a minimum, taking advantage of the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, as well as threat of use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to obtain the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of such exploitation.” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017)

Sexual Violence: “When the perpetrator commits an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or cause such person or persons to engage in an act of sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.” (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b, 24)

Conclusion and Next Steps

This chapter has presented introductory information about Canada’s feminist foreign policy, UNSCR 1235 and the related resolutions, the roles of NATO and Canada in implementing international gender norms, the topic literature and the gap in the literature that this paper fills, research methodology, the paper’s limitations, and key definitions needed to understand the remaining chapters. In the following chapters, the ways that Canada does and does not uphold international gender norms will be explored in detail, followed by analysis of why that divergence is occurring. Finally, the paper considers areas for future research, notably, how the gap between implementation and Resolution goals has broad implications.

2. The Canadian Government's Implementation of International Gender Norms

As the chair of the global group of Friends of 1325, the second country in the world to announce a feminist foreign policy, and a member of international organizations committed to gender equity, Canada appears committed to the implementation of international gender norms. Canada is proud of recent steps it has taken to be a global leader on women, peace, and security (WPS). A component of Canada's G7 leadership was advocating for increased funding and awareness for WPS issues, including action on 1325 and the related resolutions, in part because, "Advancing gender equality is the most effective approach to eradicating extreme poverty and building a more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous world." Global Affairs Canada 2018 Furthermore, Canada has taken recent policy steps for improving the status of women in international security spaces. The Elsie Initiative increases women's participation in peacekeeping operations, a step Canada is taking to ensure gender perspectives are heard in peace processes. If Canada receives a seat on the UN Security Council as some policymakers currently advocate, expanding the Elsie Initiative globally could be something Canada would push for on one of its chair turns (Global Affairs Canada 2018). Still, these recent positive developments and group memberships do not make up a complete national gender policy. This

chapter explores whether Canada's enthusiasm for global WPS norms aligns with its feminist foreign policy as currently implemented. First, Canada's position in the global context of 1325 and related resolution implementation is presented. Second, six different broad areas of UNSCR 1325 implementation by the Canadian government are introduced. Rather than critiquing these policies' implementation, this section focuses on more positive aspects of the status quo, leaving a more specific discussion of flaws and the explicit policy gaps to chapter 3. Finally, the overall status of Canadian UNSCR 1325 implementation is analyzed for correspondence with this paper's hypotheses and next steps are presented.

Note that parts of this chapter beginning in section 2.2 with the discussion of specific program areas will use the quantitative evaluative mechanism described in the introduction to categorize the strength of various policies. However, the scores assigned in this chapter may differ from the scores assigned to the same sections in chapter 3, since different aspects of the broad level programming will be discussed. These different scores help provide comparative context for Canada's fulfillment of international gender norms.

Canada in Global 1235 Implementation Context

Canada was featured in a 2013 survey by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly explaining how it implements UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. It reported that Global Affairs Canada (GAC) was the leading agency for WPS in the country. GAC is responsible for monitoring and reporting WPS progress, as well as analyzing both the quantitative and qualitative data associated with WPS targets and indicators (Reeves 2013). The survey notes that UNSCR 1325 calls all actors involved in peace operations to "adopt a gender perspective...[which] entails identifying ways in which gender affects people's experience of conflict and conflict resolution strategies, and carrying out activities in a way that takes these different experiences into account." (Reeves


2013) Canada's national action plan on WPS (C-NAP) does this by monitoring the "number of departmental international security policy frameworks that integrate the promotion and protection of women's and girls' human rights in a manner which incorporates an analysis of the differential impact of conflict on women and girls." (Government of Canada 2017b)

Canada is either close to the median or above the NATO average for most measures of UNSCR 1325 implementation, though it is occasionally among the top performers. The 2016 Summary of National Reports (SNR) of NATO member states provides crucial data about Canada in reference to other NATO countries regarding UNSCR 1325 implementation. Figure 2.1, taken from the SNR, contrasts Canada's 15.1% female armed forces with other NATO countries and the NATO average (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016):

While Canada was above the NATO average, it was not in the top few countries for representation of women in the armed forc-

Figure 2.1

Women Active Duty Military Personnel, NATO Members (2016)




Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives." 10.

es, and it is not close to its goal of 25% representation of women (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018a). Despite not being a top five scorer in female representation, according to the data shown in Figure 2.2, Canada is among the NATO countries with the highest percentage of female applicants for armed forces positions, at 28.4%. Partner states are in a lighter color, while NATO members are the darker color (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016).

Ultimately, 20.3% of women are successfully recruited to the Canadian forces, the 7th highest success rate among NATO members and the partner states that participated in the SNR. The top three were Greece, the Czech Republic, and Australia (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). With 14.7% women in the reserve forces, Canada is above the NATO and partner country average of 10% female reservists, but significantly lower than the highest country, Albania (35.3%), and again, far from its gener-

Figure 2.2

Female Applications as Percentage of Total Applications, NATO Members and Partners (2016)




Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives." 13.

al benchmark aim of 25% (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 deal with yearly retention in NATO countries. The first of the charts shows what percentage of women left the forces in 2016, while the second chart proportionally compares the rates of men and women leaving. Overall, more men leave the armed forces each year, and in Canada this occurs at a rate of 6.8% more men than women (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016).

Canada does not have explicit retention policies for women, though they do have significant retention programs for all force members. These programs are detailed in a later section. Though not explicitly classified as retention programs, the SNR emphasizes the importance of networks supporting women in the military for retaining qualified female service members (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). Canada's Defence Women's Advisory Organization (DWAOW) is one such group. Though it is not an organization exclusive to women, it is an organization

Figure 2.3


Percentage of Women Exiting the Military, NATO Members and Partners (2016)



Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives." 15.

Figure 2.4

Retention Rates, NATO Members and Partners (2016)



Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives." 15.

where women come to provide advice and feedback to DND and the CAF on policy to ensure that women's voices on their employment status and rights are heard in the organization (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018a). The 2016 SNR included the important practice that the NATO member states that are more successful when dealing with gender have networks designed to support women in the military, since networking and mentoring are emphasized as crucial to a member's success (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). Thus, Canada's networking and mentoring efforts are vital.

Figure 2.5, from the 2013 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report contrasts Canada at that time against some peer countries (Reeves 2013).

As is demonstrated from the chart, Canada was on par with

Figure 2.5

Adopted NAP Content (Selected NATO Members)

	Exec. institutions	Targets and indicators	Women in nat. institutions	Gender balance & perspective	Training and sensitisation (internal)	Training and sensitisation (external)	Cooperation with NATO members	Support of CSOs
Belgium	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Canada	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Croatia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓
France	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Germany	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Italy	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Norway	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Portugal	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	N/A	✓
Spain	✓	✓	✓	±	±	±	±	✓
UK	-	±	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Key	Respondent checked:
✓	Yes
-	No
±	Both yes and no
N/A	Neither yes or no

Source: Reeves, Audrey. 2013. "Involvement of Parliaments in Advancing the 'Women, Peace and Security' Agenda in NATO Member Countries: A Survey by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly." *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*, 19.

all the highest achieving countries on WPS issues, and exceeded the Policies implemented by some others. However, just because Canada has the tools to check these boxes on paper does not mean that the institutions function in practice or are sufficiently utilized by the Canadian government. A more thorough analysis of policy implementation is needed to understand Canada's relationship to UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda, which is presented in the sections below.

International Gender Norms in Canadian Policy

There are five primary documents or individual policies that address International Gender Norms in Canada's feminist foreign policy: the national action plan (C-NAP), the Chief of the Defence Staff Directive on the implementation of 1325 and WPS, the CAF Diversity Strategy, the DND program "Defence Champions for Gender, Diversity and Inclusion," and the Op HONOUR order (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019; Government of Canada 2018a; Government of Canada 2017b; Government of Canada 2017c; Chief of the Defence Staff 2016a; von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019). All of these policies and documents are important to understanding how Canada currently implements UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. However, this paper takes a slightly broader view of the implementation of the global WPS agenda than the document list alone. The paper focuses less on individual documents and more on the policy areas surrounding those policy directives in correspondence with the goals for member states under UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. As follows, this report considers six Canadian policy areas related to the feminist foreign policy or directly articulated as part of the feminist foreign policy that address implementing the WPS resolutions' directives for member states. These are the policy documents most closely entwined with the feminist foreign policy itself, Canada's broad adoption of Gender Based Analysis + (GBA+) throughout government, delivery of gender training, representation of women in the military, representation of women in Parliament and other government institutions. Each of these areas contributes to gender parity in decision-making at home and the rights of women and girls in conflict situations abroad, addressing both issues of representation and diversity in leadership and problem solving.

The C-NAP, FIAP, and Defence Doctrine: Feminist Foreign Policy Outlined

Officially launching in 2017, Canada's "feminist" foreign policy is the second in the world, behind Sweden. As articulated by Marie-Claude Bibeau, the Minister of International Development and La Francophonie (Lib): Compton—Stanstead in Hansard 216 on September 26, 2017, Canada participated in extensive consultation with civil society organizations, interest groups, academics, policymakers, and others across the globe and in the country about how to best implement the policy and the role that Canada could play in shaping global women's rights. She stated:

I can say that Canada was asked to provide three things: leadership, a good policy, and, naturally, money, with which I absolutely agree. There are different ways to provide leadership for the values that we protect such as human rights, the rights of women and girls, and sexual and reproductive health. I would even add climate change. We provide leadership in these three very important areas. Second, we need to have a good policy, specifically a feminist policy. Our objective is to always focus on poverty reduction or elimination, based on the goals of sustainable development. The best way to achieve this is to use a feminist approach and to enhance the power of women and girls. Third, we must give more money to international aid. In addition to official development assistance, this is one of the areas that I will pay more attention to. I agree that we could give more, but it is important to look for new partners, both Canadian and private sector partners and also partners from other countries that are not inclined to donate. Therefore, we must use Canada's contribution and leadership to do more and to attract more money.

Earlier in Hansard 179 on May 17, 2017 she outlined a few more areas of focus including sexual assault prevention and maternal and child healthcare, summarizing,

We carefully reviewed all of the input we received and summarized what we heard in an online report last December. I can summarize this report in less than 10 words, in three points: human dignity, building local capacity, and focus on women and girls.

These consultations strengthened our willingness to adopt a feminist approach in development.

After laying out the broad feminist foreign policy in Parliament, Canada acted upon its new doctrine, with incorporation of the policy in the C-NAP on Women, Peace, and Security for 2017–2022 (C-NAP) and the Feminist International Assistance Policy. The C-NAP summarizes:

Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (Action Plan) is integral to Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy that includes its Feminist International Assistance Policy and Defence Policy. This policy is based on the evidence that the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women and girls is the most effective approach for Canada to reduce poverty, and build a more inclusive, peaceful and prosperous world. Global Affairs Canada will strengthen its own capacity through a reinforced collaboration with civil society, a stronger and more coherent strategic leadership across the department, and by expanding training on gender analysis and options for addressing WPS issues in its work. (Government of Canada 2017b)

The C-NAP lists three priorities for GAC that are key parts of the obligations of member states under the WPS resolutions. First, Canada will support local women's organizations in countries where it intervenes in any capacity, through programming that will increase access to sexual and reproductive health services and expand access to justice for sexual assault and gender-based violence survivors. Second, Canada will advocate for women to be participants in peace negotiations in conflict-affected areas, for zero tolerance for sexual exploitation by peacekeepers of local individuals, and for increased presence of women in international governance bodies like the UN and NATO. Third, Canada will improve its foreign policy-making institutions by training personnel about WPS in conflict, increasing collaboration with civil society stakeholders, and utilizing GBA+ when making operational and policy decisions (Government of Canada 2017b). Thus, the C-NAP contains measures which will help improve gender balance in overseas peace operations, as well as other projects regarding diplomacy and development (Reeves 2013).

The decision to intervene abroad under the feminist foreign policy is supposed to be guided by UNSCR 1325's impulse to protect the needs of women and girls in conflict situations. The DND/CAF section of the C-NAP indicates that Canada has prioritized implementing the 2016 Chief of Defence Staff Directive on the Integration of UNSCR 1325 in CAF Operations, Planning and Policy, which "places special emphasis on supporting operations and includes the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the protection of civilians, as well as enhanced training, education and leadership to support the five Action Plan objectives from a military perspective." (Government of Canada 2017b, 7) Beyond the directive, the CAF and DND are charged by the C-NAP with implementing a foreign policy that increases the "meaningful" participation of women in all stages of conflict resolution, promotes women's rights, meets women's specific humanitarian needs including sexual rights, and "Strengthen[s] the capacity of peace operations to advance the WPS agenda; including by deploying more women and fully embedding the WPS agenda into CAF operations and police deployments." (Government of Canada 2017b, 6) The relatively recent 2017–2018 progress report for DND implementation of the C-NAP points to five themes the organization is using to ground WPS norm implementation, governance, training and education, accountability, recruitment and retention, and integration into operations. The report indicates a baseline for each area, specific actions taken over the past year to improve WPS implementation in that area, and measure(s) to understand how much change has taken place (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b, 6). Across all indicators Canada demonstrated progress, but noted some setbacks, and some continued, unaddressed problems that are explored more in depth in other sections (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b).

Canada's current defence policy entitled "Strong Secure Engaged" includes the word "gender" forty times, most concentrated in chapter 1, "Well-Supported, Diverse, Resilient People and Families," chapter 6, "A New Canadian Approach to Defence:

Anticipate. Adapt. Act,” and Annex C, “Gender-Based Analysis Plus and the Defence Policy Review.” (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b). Chapter 1 examines Canada’s efforts to have “a military that looks like Canada,” which will be explored in greater depth in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4. In chapter 1, the CAF describes efforts taken and that it will undertake to build a defence team that is more operationally effective by reflecting Canadian diversity, including gender diversity, and that “The Canadian Armed Forces is committed to gender equality and providing a work environment where women are welcomed, supported and respected.” (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b, 21) The chapter also discusses preventing gender-based violence and improving family services in the Canadian Military, since Canada cannot be a global leader in international gender policy and women’s rights if it does not care for its servicewomen at home (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b).

In chapter 6, “A New Canadian Approach to Defence: Anticipate. Adapt. Act,” the CAF summarizes the basic principles of UNSCR 1325, notes that it is regarded as a leader of military gender integration, and states,

The Canadian Armed Forces will continue to integrate gender perspectives into the analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of all operations. These efforts are built upon UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent Resolutions. Incorporating gender perspectives into the preparation, conduct, and evaluation of missions enables the Canadian Armed Forces to increase operational effectiveness and enhance understanding of the challenges faced by populations at risk in areas of armed conflict or natural disaster (Government of Canada 2017c, 85).

Here, the CAF does not specify any new policies, instead reiterating its earlier stated commitments to international gender norms and its role as a world leader.

Annex C goes into detail about how GBA+ played a role in crafting the entirety of the new doctrine, with significant expert

input, roundtables with relevant serving government personnel, and internal assessments such as working with Status of Women Canada to apply a GBA+ lens to the policy text. The Annex then maps how those discussions translated into actual policy, specifically noting that the sections on "Recruitment, Training, and Retention," "Leveraging Canada's Diversity," the reduction of harmful behaviors through policies like Op HONOUR, initiatives to support health concerns, and initiatives to support military families were all impacted by gender-based reviews. Furthermore, the Annex highlights how Canadian evaluation of the global security environment strives to understand the root causes of conflict, which often exacerbate existing global inequalities. Overall, the CAF emphasizes that a diverse and inclusive force at home will help the defence team to better engage with its commitment to advance and implement the WPS agenda as "laid out in the United Nations Security Council's landmark Resolution 1325, and subsequent related resolutions...Further, the policy includes a commitment to continue to integrate gender perspectives into the analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of all Canadian Armed Forces operations." (Government of Canada 2017c, 85)

The 2017 Feminist International Assistance Policy, as described in chapter 1, is perhaps the most specific international assistance policy in the world, targeting the eradication of poverty through the improvement of the equality, opportunities, and rights of women and girls, depending on how one measures specificity. If measuring by financial commitments as a percentage of humanitarian spending, Canada is making a bold move through its FIAP. By 2021–2022, Canada has promised to raise aid spending connected to gender to approximately 95% of total bilateral aid: 15% directly toward gender-based programming and policy areas, and 80% of aid spending to initiatives across development sectors that increase gender empowerment in a variety of ways (Global Affairs Canada 2017). The FIAP works across five development areas beyond the core area of "gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls," each with semi-specific policies outlined, including the promotion of human dignity

(health, education, etc.), fostering “growth that works for everyone” (economic action), environment and climate action, building inclusive governance, and strengthening peace and security (Global Affairs Canada 2017).

Sweden also includes mainstreaming of humanitarian assistance in its feminist foreign policy, noting in its “Handbook: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy” that, “Gender equality is a thematic focus of the Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance decided on by the Government in 2016. The framework establishes that all Swedish development cooperation shall be gender mainstreamed.” (Government Offices of Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019, 75) However, in its international assistance policy, it continues to assert that a gendered lens to humanitarian aid is important, (“The Government is increasing its focus on gender equality by taking gender equality aspects into account throughout its development cooperation”), without articulating funding levels for gender-related policies, though it is later far more specific about individual feminist humanitarian goals than Canada (Löfven et al. 2016, 15). Canada’s FIAP includes more targeted and clearly articulated funding as a percentage of overall humanitarian spending, but somewhat less specific policy directives than Sweden. Thus, despite some policy articulation setbacks, the FIAP is a strong and advanced policy for engaging with international gender norms.

Canada has recently implemented policies that align with promises across these doctrines. Two prominent examples illustrate feminist foreign policy decision-making in action. First, launched in 2017 at the Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in Vancouver, the Elsie Initiative seeks to increase gender perspectives and the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping on a global scale, since no one country can conduct peacekeeping operations alone (Government of Canada 2018b). Under the policy, Canada is providing technical assistance and training to Ghana and Zambia to address barriers women face in joining peace operations, launching a global fund for uniformed women in peacekeeping roles, delivering assistance to select UN missions to help support increased women’s participation, researching peacekeep-

ing best practices, and building a contact group of likeminded states, among other tasks (Government of Canada 2018b).

Second, Canada used its 2018 G7 presidency to advance the importance of the unique positionality of women and girls in conflict. One way that Canada carried out this policy prioritization was by hosting the first ever global summit of female foreign ministers on September 20–21, 2018 in Montreal. As of March 2019, there are around thirty women who hold the “top diplomat” job in their countries (Thompson and Asquith 2018). Topics at the summit included international security, diversity, and combatting sexual and gender-based violence. In her opening remarks at the conference, Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland emphasized the importance of their work at the summit, particularly boosting female participation in peacekeeping and conflict negotiations, stating: “I think we all know that prosperity and peace and security are more likely in places where women, and all people in our societies, can actively participate in political life.” (Lowrie 2018) The meeting also featured some male attendees such as Japan’s Foreign Minister, demonstrating the wide reach, inclusivity, and importance of the meeting. It generated global conversation and policy ideas for feminist international relations in line with UNSCR 1325.

How do these primary Canadian Feminist Foreign policy texts stand up to evaluation using the metric established in chapter 1? Elements of many of the WPS resolutions are relevant in assessing these doctrines, so the most specific ones have been listed below and assessed for their degree of implementation based on the analysis above. The chart below pulls the most relevant obligations from the WPS resolutions, assesses in brief whether that obligation is being met, and scores Canada using the scale in chapter 1. For reference, the scale is:

5. Virtually all significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state’s ability
4. Between 95% and 75% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state’s ability
3. Between 74% and 50% significant particulars are imple-

mented to the best of the state's ability

2. Between 49% and 25% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability
1. Less than 25% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability

Since this is perhaps the broadest section of WPS resolution implementation, more sections of the resolutions may be relevant to the texts than those listed here. Furthermore, since this is the broadest section, many diverse areas of policy from the WPS resolutions are relevant to evaluating these doctrines. Since this section focuses on policy and doctrine text, scores are given for attempt to implement in doctrine, rather than in policy practice, which is the assessment goal of chapter 3. Various resolutions duplicate what others have said, and in those instances I list the earlier resolution's iteration of the sentiment. This list (Table 2.1), however, provides an accurate snapshot of the degree of resolutional implementation.

As can be seen from the chart, the doctrinal texts of Canada's feminist foreign policy aspire to correspond with vast swaths of the WPS resolutions. Additionally, even in the areas that are not explicitly mentioned anywhere across the doctrinal texts, similar policy issues are often addressed, or Canada's policy stance on the issues can be implicitly discerned based on the doctrines, hence why they all receive a score of a 2 rather than a 1. While the Canadian doctrines do not comply in every instance or mention all parts of obligations, there is an explicit attempt to be in line with international norms.

GBA+, The GBA+ Champion, and the Diversity Strategy

To implement UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions throughout the Canadian government, particularly in the military and foreign affairs spaces, Canada uses a policy called Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+), which helps the government perform policy analyses, determining if actions are gender inclusive. GBA+

... text continued on page 62

Table 2.1

Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines
1888	"Recognizing that the promotion and empowerment of women and that support for women's organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect."	4, the doctrines strive to engage local groups
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, Strong Secure Engaged strives to engage with this
2122	"Recognizes the continuing need to increase women's participation and the consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conflict peacebuilding, and in this regard, the Council: Encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women's leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP

Table 2.1, continued
Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2242	"Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP
1325	"Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants."	3, the doctrinal aims of the FIAP address this, but are not as explicit
1325	"Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls."	2, only mentioned in an example

Table 2.1, continued

Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2242	"Calls for the greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering-violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue throughout the activities within their respective mandates, including within country - specific assessments and reports, recommendations made to Member States, facilitating technical assistance to Member States, and briefings to the Council, encourages the CTC and CTED to hold further consultations with women and women's organizations to help inform their work, and further encourages the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to take the same approach in activities within its mandate"	2, mentioned only in passing
2242	"Encourages empowering women, including through capacity-building efforts, as appropriate, to participate in the design and implementation of efforts related to the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit transfer, and the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and calls upon Member States, United Nations entities, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations to take into consideration the specific impact of conflict and post-conflict environments on women's and girls' security, mobility, education, economic activity and opportunities, to mitigate the risk of women from becoming active players in the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons."	2, not explicitly mentioned anywhere
1820	"Affirms its intention, when establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions regimes, to take into consideration the appropriateness of targeted and graduated measures against parties to situations of armed conflict who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict."	2, not explicitly mentioned anywhere

Table 2.1, continued
Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2242, sim in 2122	"Welcomes the efforts of Member States to implement resolution 1325, including the development of national action plans, further welcomes the increase in national action plans in recent years, and calls upon Member States to further integrate the women, peace and security agenda into their strategic plans such as national actions plans and other planning frameworks, with sufficient resources, including implementation of relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, through broad consultation, including with civil society, in particular women's organizations, calls upon countries with national action plans to provide an update on the progress made in their implementation and review during the annual Security Council Open Debates on Women, Peace and Security, further welcomes the efforts of regional organizations to implement resolution 1325, including through the adoption of regional frameworks, and encourages them to pursue further implementation."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines
1325, sim in 1889	"Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000."	3, not substantially discussed though present
1325	"Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary"	4, political systems are not a main aim in the FIAP and C-NAP but receive attention

Table 2.1, continued

Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
1889 dif than above bc fund- ing	"Urges Member States, United Nations bodies, donors and civil society to ensure that women's empowerment is taken into account during post-conflict needs assessments and planning, and factored into subsequent funding disbursements and programme activities, including through developing transparent analysis and tracking of funds allocated for addressing women's needs in the post-conflict phase."	3, monitoring and evaluation protocol is not as thoroughly addressed in the text though still mentioned
1889	"Encourages Member States in post-conflict situations, in consultation with civil society, including women's organizations, to specify in detail women and girls' needs and priorities and design concrete strategies, in accordance with their legal systems, to address those needs and priorities, which cover inter alia support for greater physical security and better socio-economic conditions, through education, income generating activities, access to basic services, in particular health services, including sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights and mental health, gender-responsive law enforcement and access to justice, as well as enhancing capacity to engage in public decision-making at all levels."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP
1889	"Urges Member States, United Nations bodies and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to take all feasible measures to ensure women and girls' equal access to education in post-conflict situations, given the vital role of education in the promotion of women's participation in post-conflict decision-making."	4, education is not a main aim in the FIAP and C-NAP but receives attention

Table 2.1, continued
Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2122	"Recognizing the importance of Member States and United Nations entities seeking to ensure humanitarian aid and funding includes provision for the full range of medical, legal, psychosocial and livelihood services to women affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations, and noting the need for access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health services, including regarding pregnancies resulting from rape, without discrimination."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP
2122	"Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP
2242	"Encourages Member States to increase their funding on women, peace and security including through more aid in conflict and post-conflict situations for programmes that further gender equality and women's empowerment, as well as through support to civil society, and to support countries in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including through capacity-building, in their implementation of women, peace and security resolutions, calls for increased international development cooperation related to women's empowerment and gender equality and invites aid providers to track the gender focus of aid contributions."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP
1325, sim in 1888	"Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter

Table 2.1, continued

Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
1888	"Urges all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence committed by civilians or by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice, and that civilian superiors and military commanders, in accordance with international humanitarian law, use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence, including by combating impunity."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction
2122, sim in 2242, 1960, 2106	"Calls upon Member States to comply with their relevant obligations to end to impunity and to thoroughly investigate and prosecute persons responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law; and further notes that the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern against women and girls has been strengthened through the work of the International Criminal Court, ad hoc and mixed tribunals, as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter
1888	"Encourages States, relevant United Nations entities and civil society, as appropriate, to provide assistance in close cooperation with national authorities to build national capacity in the judicial and law enforcement systems in situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict."	4, this is a primary FIAP doctrinal aim
1325, sim in 1820, 1888, 1889, 2242	"Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter

Table 2.1, continued
Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
1820, sim in 1325, 1888, 2106	"Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction
1960	"Calls upon parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, inter alia, issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction
2106	"Notes the link between sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and HIV infection, and the disproportionate burden of HIV and AIDS on women and girls as a persistent obstacle and challenge to gender equality; and urges United Nations entities, Member States and donors to support the development and strengthening of capacities of national health systems and civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls living with or affected by HIV and AIDS in armed conflict and post-conflict situations."	3, limited conversation, though discussed

Table 2.1, continued

Canada's Foreign Policy and WPS Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch 2
2106	"Encourages Member States and donors to support national and international programs that assist victims of sexual violence such as the Trust Fund for Victims established by the Rome Statute and its implementing partners; and requests the relevant United Nations entities to increase allocation of resources for the coordination of gender-based violence response and service provision."	3, limited conversation, though discussed

Source: Author's compilation.

is integral to the feminist foreign policy. Status of Women Canada, the organization tasked with its implementation, defines GBA+ as:

An analytical process used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and non-binary people may experience policies, programs and initiatives. The “plus” in GBA+ acknowledges that GBA goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences. We all have multiple identity factors that intersect to make us who we are; GBA+ also considers many other identity factors, like race, ethnicity, religion, age, and mental or physical disability. (Status of Women Canada 2018)

The government of Canada believes that GBA+ is everyone’s responsibility, and has made GBA+ training tools publicly available on its website, in addition to extensive resources for its employees. Status of Women Canada has noted, “The Government of Canada has been committed to using GBA+ in the development of policies, programs and legislation since 1995. It provides federal officials with the means to continually improve their work and attain better results for Canadians by being more responsive to specific needs and circumstances.” (Status of Women Canada 2018b) However, it is notable that the implementation of GBA+ has been in Status of Women Canada, which deals largely with domestic issues, while the implementation of the C-NAP on WPS and most other doctrines considered as part of the feminist foreign policy have been conducted through GAC, with the two occurring largely in isolation. The use of GBA+, particularly by the defence establishment, has been a bridge between the bureaucracies and policy areas. Indeed, in “Strong Secure Engaged”, there is an entire section on the use of GBA+ as a means of recognizing the policy needs of both Canadian DND and CAF personnel, as well as the needs of individuals Canadians may encounter abroad. The doctrine states that it will “Integrate Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) in all defence activities across the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence, from the design and implementation of programs and services that support our personnel, to equipment procurement and

operational planning,” which includes training and educating forces about incorporating gender equality as a matter of general policy (Government of Canada 2017c, 23). Furthermore, the Department is even more explicit about the connection between GBA+, feminist foreign policy, and international gender norms when referring to how the GBA+ deals with evaluation of DND interaction with international situations:

The Defence team also recognizes that conflict, natural disasters, and humanitarian crises affect people differently. Accordingly, the Defence team is integrating GBA+ into the planning and execution of operations as a means to both improve operational effectiveness and meet the needs of those who are disproportionately affected by conflict and crisis. This includes the establishment of military gender advisor positions who will advise on gender in operational planning and doctrine, and modeling the value of diversity, inclusion and gender equality when working with other nations. Working to implement and advance the Women, Peace and Security agenda laid out in the United Nations Security Council's landmark Resolution 1325 and subsequent related resolutions, will be an important aspect of Canada's international military engagement, including our renewed commitment to United Nations peacekeeping (Government of Canada 2017c, 24).

Thus, at least in written the “Strong Secure Engaged” defence policy, Canada is committed to international gender norms as a matter of defence policy. Canada has an individual in many government agencies whose title is “GBA+ Champion.” This person's job description is to bring intersectional analysis to their department (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 2018). After a GBA+ Champion was placed at DND, gender analysis reached more areas of the department (Advisory Group for Canada's National Action Plan 2018). The gender staff at DND appears to be robust and conduct significant intersectional analysis (Advisory Group for Canada's National Action Plan 2018). However, the work of GBA+ in DND is still trickling through the Department and not all personnel are equally committed, so the government is working to address this moving forward.

While GBA+ goes beyond gender and considers other identity

factors, it is the primary tool used in Canada to ensure that the perspective found in international gender norming documents like the WPS resolutions are incorporated into policies at home and abroad, such as the feminist foreign policy. The 2017–2022 C-NAP on Gender-Based Analysis provides the current status of GBA+ implementation in Canada:

In 2015, the Government renewed its commitment to GBA, including by mandating the Minister of Status of Women to, as an overarching goal, ensure government policy, legislation, and regulations are sensitive to the different impacts that decisions can have on men and women. The Fall 2015 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, “Implementing Gender-based Analysis,” released in February 2016, pointed to the need to do more to fully implement GBA as a rigorous practice across government. It recommended that Status of Women Canada (SWC), the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) work with all federal departments and agencies to identify the barriers to implementing GBA, and to periodically assess and report on progress. It further recommended that SWC assess the resources it needs to deliver on its GBA mandate. (Status of Women Canada 2016)

This kind of analysis is crucial, since as UNSCR 1325 recognizes, women and children are the vast majority of those adversely affected by conflict and that because of “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.” (United Nations 2000)

One example of the utility of GBA+ is how the CAF handles the physical needs of female-identifying members of the armed forces. The Canadian Government requires GBA+ regarding facilities and equipment, ensuring women’s needs are met appropriately in the military. Canada ensures that women have adequate equipment designed and tested specifically for their bodies, as well as housing and bathroom facilities designated for their use (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). This consideration allows women in the CAF the ability to perform at their

best, and makes women feel more welcome in their own spaces in the force.

Additionally, GBA+ can be crucial to mission success. During Operation REASSURANCE, an exercise with NATO allies to provide vital training to partners in Poland and Latvia, GBA+ proved useful for catching and preventing possible areas of gender-based harm during the operation. In one instance, the surgeon for the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group realized that he had access to sexual assault kits, but that he was the only person qualified to administer the corresponding tests. Employing GBA+ methodology, he realized that this could make some individuals uncomfortable and less likely to come forward and seek medical attention if assaulted. Consequently, he trained male and female healthcare personnel to use the kits, ensuring that there was increased access to medical care in the battle group that supports and respects all service members (MacLean and Straatsma 2018).

Furthermore, GBA+ helps to understand why having women on the ground as part of a deployed team during an operation can be so crucial. For example, in Afghanistan, for Canada to engage with all societal groups, properly assessing security threats, mixed gender teams are necessary, since in the traditional culture, Afghans may only talk to strangers of the same gender. Stéphanie von Hlatky elaborates:

While Afghan men take up arms and fight on the battlefield, women and children stay back home but face security risks that are ignored if there are no female soldiers on site to respond to community-level security concerns. NATO allies deployed female engagement teams that were created to do just that. This strategy paid off and showcased what women can bring to the fight...For the military to be at its strongest, it should recruit from the most diverse pool of applicants. The CAF have an interest in making military careers more attractive to women. (von Hlatky 2014)

This consideration of the security risks faced by Afghan women and children, combined with the fact that they will likely be significantly more comfortable engaging with a CAF member

who is female-presenting indicates the importance of GBA+ and the multiple identity factors that can impact security operations.

The importance of identity is also present in Canada's new diversity strategy, a part of feminist foreign policy. Announced in 2017 by General Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff, the strategy's goal is to have the military increasingly reflect Canadian society, which is far more diverse than the current composition of the military. This requires recruiting and retaining people of color, indigenous people, LGBTQ individuals, and women. Alan Okros, a professor at the Canadian Forces College, noted in June 2017, "This idea that people with different views, different experiences, different skill sets are going to make the military stronger has been kind of coalescing and coming together for about a year and a half... This isn't a luxury, this isn't social engineering, this isn't political maneuvering or political correctness. This is now an operational requirement." (Berthiaume 2017) Indeed, the strategy calls for reviewing the most mundane areas of military life, from uniforms and ceremonies to meals to see if they are exclusive to particular communities (Berthiaume 2017). Not all members of the armed forces support the strategy, including some members of leadership, however, the top brass is charging forward with the plan. The head of the Navy, Vice Admiral Ron Lloyd noted, "In order to be successful in the future, we need to be able to recruit from the entire population." (Berthiaume 2017) The strategy is still at the planning phase and not yet fully implemented, following a combination of budget cuts and distrust of the armed forces among some Canadian communities due to histories of mistreatment and the legacy of sexual assault (Berthiaume 2017). However, the CAF is working on solutions.

The strategy is the latest in a series of CAF policies on diversity and inclusivity in the military. Furthermore, the diversity strategy is also being used to help increase the size of the military to the largest it has been since the end of the Cold War, an increase of 3,500 regular force members and 1,500 reservists (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018c, 4). However, as the CAF makes this policy shift, it is actively attempting to comply with GBA+ and international gen-

der policy norms. A statement from the CAF and DND explains:

Through our comprehensive Diversity Strategy and Action Plan, we will build a Defence Team comprised of people with new perspectives and a broader range of cultural, linguistic, gender, age, and other unique attributes. This will contribute directly to our efforts to develop a deeper understanding of our increasingly complex world and to respond effectively to the challenges it presents. We will ensure the integration of GBA+ in all defence activities through the support of a newly created National Defence joint responsibility centre, which will provide: training; expertise; process and systems alignment; and oversight, monitoring and reporting. We are committed to providing a working environment for defence civilians and military personnel that fosters a workplace free of harassment and discrimination, and characterized by mutual trust, support and respect for the dignity of every person in the workplace. (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018c, 4)

The DND and CAF's language mirrors the WPS resolution directives for member states to increase access to WPS training, to prevent gender-based harassment, and to expand the roles of women in decision-making bodies. The new strategy includes a broad range of services that can be provided to troops such as civilian transition assistance, expanded operational roles for reserves that may be more attractive to diverse CAF candidates, and institutional competence in LGBTQ issues and needs in a military context (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018d). In making these changes, the CAF leadership hopes to address some of the ingrained "warrior culture" that has prevented those who do not instinctively fit into the dominant military culture from joining the armed forces. However, the CAF hopes that all members will take ownership of the diversity strategy, not just senior leaders (Heer 2017). GBA+ is present in all of these policy decisions and in the evolution of CAF recruitment strategy. Furthermore, CAF personnel cite UNSCR 1325 in justifying the urgency of the diversity strategy, demonstrating the Resolution's connection to shaping CAF policy (Heer 2017).

To evaluate the broad policy doctrine of GBA+ and the Diversity Strategy, this paper uses the evaluation metric established in chapter 1 and the same chart as in section 2.2.1, using parts of the resolutions most relevant to the particular doctrine. Since GBA+ is such a wide spanning policy, it could be construed as falling under almost any of the directives for member states under UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Consequently, this chart (Table 2.2) pulls a cross section of resolutorial obligations and assesses how the doctrine of GBA+ scores on the established 1–5 scale in a range of situations.

The chart demonstrates that GBA+ is acting across a wide range of policy areas since it calls the government of Canada to investigate the intersection of gender and other identities in almost all implemented policies. The doctrine is useful for helping to understand a range of feminist foreign policy intersections with the global WPS agenda.

Gender Training in Canada

Pursuant to the call in UNSCR 1325 that member states, “Increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies,” Canada has worked hard to increase its gender training in recent years (Rodrigues 2017; United Nations 2000). Furthermore, it would be deeply challenging to implement a feminist foreign policy without government and military personnel trained to implement such an agenda. In 2016, the Chief of the Defence Staff announced a policy that required all CAF personnel to take online GBA+ introductory training. These changes were made in the CAF in consultation with the WPS Network Canada (WPSN-C) and other civil society organizations (Rodrigues 2017; The Maple Leaf 2017). The

... text continued on page 73

Table 2.2

Canada's GBA+ and Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures
1889	"Urges Member States, international and regional organisations to take further measures to improve women's participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, including by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes, through inter alia promoting women's leadership and capacity to engage in aid management and planning, supporting women's organizations, and countering negative societal attitudes about women's capacity to participate equally."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures
1888	"Recognizing that the promotion and empowerment of women and that support for women's organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect."	5, GBA+ actively strives to ensure this support

Table 2.2, continued
Canada's GBA+ and Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
2242	"Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures
1325	"Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures

Table 2.2, continued

Canada's GBA+ and Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
1888, sim in 1960, 2106, 2122	"Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law."	5, GBA+ actively strives to ensure the rights of citizens
1325	"Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to craft such special measures
1820	"Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures
1960, sim in 1888	"Reaffirming the importance for States, with the support of the international community, to increase access to health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and socio-economic reintegration services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas, and taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to undertake such measures

Table 2.2, continued
Canada's GBA+ and Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Ch 2. Score
2106	"Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and other women and peace and security commitments in its own work and, in this regard, expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women's participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding and to address sexual violence in conflict, including, inter alia, in the establishment and review of peacekeeping and political mandates, public statements, country visits, fact-finding missions, international commissions of inquiry, consultations with regional bodies and in the work of relevant Security Council sanctions committees."	3, GBA+ provides the spirit of this obligation, but some monitoring and evaluation gaps

Source: Author's compilation.

word “training” is mentioned 101 times in the implementation plan for the 2017–2022 C-NAP on WPS, indicating its importance to Canada (Government of Canada 2017b). Below, the Canadian government summarizes the basic gender and diversity training taken by all members of the armed forces:

Basic Diversity Training is given as part of basic training for both officers and non-commissioned members and more advanced training is provided on advanced leadership qualification courses. The curriculum's components include sessions on CF personal conduct policies such as harassment prevention and resolution, personal conduct and relationships, sexual misconduct, and sexual harassment. All CF members learn that sexual misconduct and sexual harassment are not tolerated and that a CF member who engages in sexual misconduct is liable to disciplinary and administrative action, including release from the military. Prior to deployment to an operational theatre, CF personal [sic] receive specific training on the CF Code of Conduct, human rights, ethics and individual conduct, gender differences, and culture. This training includes instruction on the protection of women and children and other vulnerable populations during conflict. (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2012)

However, training extends beyond these programs. In total, Canada has eleven different gender related training programs ranging from online training, to different training for several levels of officer corps members, to programs at staff colleges for officers seeking a broad, increased education on diversity and GBA+ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). However, there are six primary ways a diverse group of CAF and DND members get trained on gender perspectives: rapid GBA+ online training, senior officer professional military education (PME) at staff colleges, gender focal point (GFP) training on the civilian side of DND, participation in courses at the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM), work at the Peace Support training Centre, and “Training Needs Analysis,” which teaches officers to look at case studies using the gender perspective. Canada is currently thinking about expanding PME on gender to more different kinds of officers, particularly in the “J” functions. There

is generally much more buy-in on the civilian side of gender education than in the military, and there is also more buy-in for operationally including gender perspectives than in wider, more long-term strategic planning. Canada is working to bring a version of the NCGM inside the country to train more individuals, particularly in intersectional analysis since the NCGM focuses specifically on gender (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019).

Additionally, Canada discussed gender-related training at length in its report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. It participates in the “gender project” at the Norwegian Defence University College, which provides higher level WPS training (Reeves 2013). Collaboration among civil society organizations and governing bodies is a focus of the Parliamentary Assembly report, and the Canadian memo to the Assembly discussed the role of these organizations in creating its training. The C-NAP on WPS emphasizes how Canadian civil society organizations helped shape the feminist foreign policy, along with implementing and monitoring Resolution goals. The C-NAP goes even further regarding the importance of international collaboration, another area analyzed by the Parliamentary Assembly. The C-NAP cites how the international community is key to enforcing its codes of conduct and zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations (Reeves 2013). Thus, as is seen from the rapid expansion of training programming, Canada is striving to bring its policies in this area in line with the international norms outlined in UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

Just as in the previous two sections, gender training’s current, broad implementation in Canadian feminist foreign policy is assessed through the evaluation metric of the 1–5 scale from not at all implemented to fully implemented. Since gender training is a more specific area, these directives for member states from the WPS resolutions are all specific to training. Scores in Table 2.3 are given based on Canada’s doctrinal attempts at training.

These scores demonstrate mixed results for Canada. While some training programs present strong starts on first evaluation, Canada has a long way to go for full implementation of the WPS

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Table 2.3

Canadian Gender Training and Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on strong training doctrine and intent
1325	"Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies."	4, based on strong training doctrine and intent
1820	"Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians."	3, Peace-support Training Center has some of this programming
1820	"Urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel."	3, good pre-deployment offerings, though limited quality training once in theater

Table 2.3, continued
Canadian Gender Training and Resolution Engagement Scores

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
2122	"Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular the United Nations predeployment scenario-based training on prevention of sexual and gender-based violence."	5, the Elsie Initiative is almost exactly what the WPS resolutions call for here
1888	"Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence, including measures such as, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence and vetting candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associated with serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including sexual violence."	4, Canada tries extremely hard in this regard

Source: Author's compilation.

resolution obligations under training. This is perhaps more notable than in the first two categories since it is more specific and discernable what Canada is doing on each line item, yet still an important finding.

Increasing the Presence of Women in the CAF

In UNSCR 1325, UN member states are called to “Ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.” (United Nations 2000) One of the primary places this must occur to ensure all of the WPS resolutions are implemented within Canada is in the CAF. While Canada does not have a quota system for men or women when recruiting for the CAF, Canada is actively attempting to raise the number of women in the CAF from about 15% to 25%, a goal mentioned throughout feminist foreign policy doctrine (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018a; Scoppio 2009). CAF leadership strives to meet this 25% goal through a 1% increase annually over 10 years, with recruitment policies under the Diversity Strategy that are increasingly welcoming to women (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018c). Twenty-five percent is not an arbitrary target for women in the military. The CAF conducted a study of women’s participation in the armed forces and found that 15% was considered “tokenism,” 25% was a “critical mass,” and 35% was a “minority population.” (English 2016) The study found that until the “critical mass” was reached, welcoming cultural change was unlikely to occur (English 2016). However, even setting 25% women as a critical mass goal may be a number decided upon based on limited scientific backing. When asked at a conference why 25% women was the CAF’s particular numerical goal, statisticians could not provide specific evidence that 25% was a meaningful number (English 2019). With the WPS UN resolutions indicating that member states should prioritize welcoming environments

for women in spaces of power, this is an important goal for the CAF. Furthermore, an increase in women holding leadership roles in the CAF will provide more diverse perspectives during operational planning. Perhaps this will lead to increasingly considering the harmful effects of conflict on women and girls abroad, another key reason international gender norms call on Canada to prioritize this increase.


All roles in the CAF are open to women, including combat roles (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2019b). The Directorate of Human Rights and Diversity (DHRD) is responsible for ensuring CAF representation goals are met, despite no quota system, and also for ensuring that all CAF policies are implemented in accordance with the employment equity guidelines (Capuano 2017). Figures 2.6 and 2.7, taken from the SNR, break down the 15.1% average of women in the CAF across services and genders, as well as display Canada's distribution of armed forces members across services, genders, and ranks (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016).

Canada has the same enlistment requirements, including the physical fitness test, for both men and women. However, there are significantly more successful male applicants than female applicants in Canada. Only 18% of female applicants are successfully recruited to the CAF, while 32% of men are successfully recruited, which further entrenches the gender imbalance in the military, since women are already applying in smaller numbers (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016). This gap ultimately manifests in gender disparities in the officer corps. Figure 2.8 highlights the distribution of men and women by rank in Canada, indicating that proportionally fewer women are in the highest-ranking positions (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016).

The CAF does regular voluntary exit surveys of men and women leaving the military. Individuals are asked why they decided to leave the CAF and a separate CAF HR database tracks other, possibly correlated measures, such as release type. Retention studies also use focus groups of men and women in "some occupations where gender is known to be a factor." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016, 68) The results of all of these dif-

Figure 2.6

Canadian Armed Forces Male and Female Personnel Distribution



Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives." 65.

Figure 2.7

Canadian Armed Forces Men and Women on Active Duty and Operations

All Active Duty Military Personnel		
Service	Men	Women
Army	47,5%	7,0%
Air Force	23,6%	5,3%
Navy	13,8%	2,8%
Total	84,9%	15,1%
Ranks	Men	Women
OF 6 and above	0,20%	0,08%
OF 3-5	8,10%	8,52%
OF 1-2	15,60%	20,48%
OR 5-9	35,30%	35,44%
OR 1-4	40,80%	35,48%

All Operations		
Service	Men	Women
Army	52,1%	5,2%
Air Force	20,8%	3,8%
Navy	15,5%	2,7%
Total	88,3%	11,7%
Ranks	Men	Women
OF 6 and above	0,50%	0,00%
OF 3-5	10,03%	13,29%
OF 1-2	13,96%	31,01%
OR 5-9	37,12%	29,75%
OR 1-4	38,38%	25,95%

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. "Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives." 70.

Figure 2.8

Canadian Armed Forces Distribution of Men and Women by Rank



Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. “Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.” 67.

ferent means of study found that the most frequently cited reasons for release for men in the armed forces during calendar year 2016 were “voluntary,” “medical,” and “service completion,” in that order, with “voluntary” by far the highest. For women in the same period the results were “medical,” then “voluntary,” and finally “service completion,” in that order, with “service completion” far less common than the other two (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016, 68). A 2012 gender comparative analysis from the CAF on reasons why people left the armed forces within five years of joining further analyzed this data, and found that women cited “retirement and eligibility for pension benefits, followed by geographic stability, job dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction with postings, seeking more meaningful and satisfying work, dissatisfaction with career progression, family issues, and seeking a better salary,” as reasons why they left the CAF (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016, 68). In contrast, in the same study, men did not note family issues at all as reasons why they had left, and cited “geographic stability, followed by job dissatisfaction, re-

tirement and eligibility for pension benefits, dissatisfaction with postings, seeking more meaningful and satisfying work, seeking a better salary, dissatisfaction with career progression and seeking a better job." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016, 68)

In addition to mentorship and networking, other crucial elements to retention are strong family leave and work-life balance policies. Pregnant mothers in the CAF are given temporary employment limitations to reduce any risk to the fetus. As of 2016, Canada allowed a total of fifty weeks of parental leave in the CAF: mothers receive fifteen weeks of maternity leave immediately after the baby is born or if a child is adopted, and an additional thirty-five weeks of leave is available for both parents and transferable between the mother and father, which helps retain qualified men and women in the armed forces (Government of Canada 2018c; Government of Canada 2018d). There are no programs that support part time CAF employment in the Regular Forces, though part time work is available in the reserves and flexible work hours can be arranged. Additionally, there are special programs that can assist parents when both are in the armed forces. For example, the Family Care Plan and Military Family Resource Centers work to provide eligible servicemembers with appropriate childcare and a plan to provide for their families in the event of an emergency. Childcare is available at significant subsidies or through vouchers. Additional services support single parents, divorced parents, or widows and widowers (see, for example, CAF Connection National Morale and Welfare Services, n.d.(a); CAF Connection National Morale and Welfare Services, n.d.(b); Government of Canada 2019; Canadian Armed Forces 2018a; CAF Connection National Morale and Welfare Services, n.d.(c); Canadian Armed Forces 2018b).

Women and non-binary individuals are unlikely to remain in the CAF or have positive sentiments toward the CAF if they experience sexual harassment or assault while in the military. Unfortunately, this is a problem in the CAF, though one that the feminist foreign policy seeks to address. Canada is implementing policies to deal with this sexual harassment and abuse. August 2015 saw Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Jonathan Vance

launch Op HONOUR to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behavior (HISB) in the armed forces. Op HONOUR follows the “Deschamps Report” in March 2015, which reviewed sexual assault and harassment in the CAF and found pervasive issues preventing women from feeling safe and welcome, including but not limited to lack of leadership buy-in to solving sexual harassment and a military culture hostile to women and LGBTQ members (Deschamps 2015). Indeed, the problems addressed by Op HONOUR are so pervasive that a 2016 Statistics Canada survey commissioned by CDS Vance found nearly one thousand members of the military reported that they had been sexually assaulted in the past year alone. This alarming rate is much higher than the rate of sexual assault among the Canadian population as a whole and was calculated after the first stages of Op HONOUR had already gone into effect. Women were four times more likely than men to be the victims of sexual assault in the CAF, and more than 27% of all women in the CAF say they have been assaulted at least once, and more commonly by those more senior than them in rank (Galloway 2017). Since 2017, Op HONOUR and the CAF Diversity Strategy have often been referred to together, incorporating the fight against sexual violence with the overall goal of recruiting a more diverse force (see, for example, Government of Canada 2019b).

The DND notes that Op HONOUR is based on two principles: “every man and woman who serves their country deserves to be treated with dignity and respect – anything less is simply unacceptable [and] any attitudes or behaviours which undermine the camaraderie, cohesion and confidence of serving members threatens the CAF’s long-term operational success.” (Government of Canada 2018a) As follows, the policy is pitched as a military mission to support victims of assault, as well as to address the root causes of violence. The policy is meant to evolve as targets are reached. However, a clear action plan and timeline have not yet been written. Yet, a report by General Vance outlines the immediate goals of the operation as of March 2016:

Policy development must commence with the immediate development and promulgation of clear, correct and precise terminology for HISB and associated subjects. This will be followed by the development of a unified, coherent policy using plain language. Concurrent to the work on policies and terminology will be the promulgation of new training material. (Chief of the Defence Staff 2016)

Op HONOUR is supposed to involve the whole of the CAF, but specifically uses the “Strategic Response Team – Sexual Misconduct” to coordinate policy, training and responses to incidents. Canada’s gender training programs incorporate the prevention of sexual harassment, and the CAF has completed a whole military “Training Needs Analysis” of all programs related to HISB, resulting in the development of the “Operation HONOUR Leadership Toolbox” of references, templates and key documents.” (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2016a, 9; Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2016b) In addition to formal institutions like training and legal reporting structures, the CAF provides access to chaplains and medical professionals who are trained in handling sexual assault. There were significant reports of inappropriate sexual behavior committed against both men and women in 2016 that were directed to the Sexual Misconduct Response Center (SMRC), a new entity under Op HONOUR that “is the first-ever dedicated independent support centre for CAF members. The SMRC has been established to provide victims the option of reaching out for information or support without automatically triggering formal reporting and the subsequent investigative and judicial processes that may follow.” (Government of Canada 2018a) The SMRC is a significant step forward for CAF members. However, many women do not come forward because they fear the consequences of speaking up. Op HONOUR is hoping to change this lack of reporting (Galloway 2017). With the listed end state of Op HONOUR as “when all CAF members are able to perform their duties in an environment free of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour and are able to fully enjoy the support of an institution that fosters mutual trust, respect,

honour, and dignity,” the CAF has a long way to go (Government of Canada 2016). Still, Canada’s effort in this area is notable, and Op HONOUR combined with the Diversity Strategy may serve to reduce the instance of sexual assault in the CAF in line with the WPS resolutions’ calls to reduce sexual violence.

Again, this section utilizes the evaluation metric of the 1–5 scale and the charts to assess implementation of the WPS resolutions regarding gender in the military (Table 2.4). These WPS resolution obligations are notable because while they are specific to women in the military, they are not all at first glance about improving the lives and quantity of women in member states’ domestic military institutions. Still, these resolution line items obligations are relevant since they all in various ways deal with increasing the presence and status of women in the armed forces through means as diverse as recruitment and sexual assault prevention.

The chart in this section demonstrates that Canada is making a concerted effort to improve the status of women in the military both at home and abroad in compliance with the WPS resolutions. While there are still significant problems with Canada’s implementation of the resolutions, doctrine is being implemented to address these issues.

Increasing the Presence of Women in Parliament and Government Ministries

With international gender norms emphasizing the participation of women in all spaces where important international decisions are being made, it is necessary to analyze the status of Canada’s governmental gender parity. Canada has made significant strides in government gender parity in recent years, in line not just with feminist foreign policy, but with a government ideology of gender equality. In November 2015, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau appointed the country’s first ever gender-balanced Cabinet, with female Members of Parliament taking on signifi-

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Table 2.4

Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of WPS Resolution Obligations

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, <i>inter alia</i> , to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on stated goals and attempts
2122	"Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular the United Nations predeployment scenario-based training on prevention of sexual and gender-based violence."	4, based on stated goals and attempts
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF

Table 2.4, continued
Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of WPS Resolution Obligations

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1888	"Urges all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence committed by civilians or by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice, and that civilian superiors and military commanders, in accordance with international humanitarian law, use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence, including by combating impunity."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF
1888, sim in 1960, 2106, 2122	"Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF
1325	"Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF
1820	"Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF

Table 2.4, continued

Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of WPS Resolution Obligations

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1888	"Urges States to undertake comprehensive legal and judicial reforms, as appropriate, in conformity with international law, without delay and with a view to bringing perpetrators of sexual violence in conflicts to justice and to ensuring that survivors have access to justice, are treated with dignity throughout the justice process and are protected and receive redress for their suffering."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF
1960, sim in 1888	"Reaffirming the importance for States, with the support of the international community, to increase access to health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and socio-economic reintegration services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas, and taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF, but the CAF also tries to do this abroad
1960	"Calls upon parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, inter alia, issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF, but the CAF also tries to do this abroad

Table 2.4, continued
Canadian Armed Forces Implementation of WPS Resolution Obligations

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
2106	"Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and other women and peace and security commitments in its own work and, in this regard, expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women's participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding and to address sexual violence in conflict, including, inter alia, in the establishment and review of peacekeeping and political mandates, public statements, country visits, fact-finding missions, international commissions of inquiry, consultations with regional bodies and in the work of relevant Security Council sanctions committees."	3, based on stated goals and attempts

Source: Author's compilation.

cant roles such as Minister of International Trade and Minister of Environment and Climate Change. Few other countries have women with such significant executive power, who guide their portfolios, in part, with a gender perspective (Krook 2012; Annesley and Franceschet 2015). Furthermore, the Senate is nearly 50% women. Though the Senate is far less powerful than the House of Commons and is appointed rather than elected, this is still an important achievement (Catalyst 2019). The University of Waterloo annually prepares the Canadian Index of Wellbeing, and describes why gender representation in government is so important for Canada:

Men and women are equally represented in the population and, as such, should be equally represented in the democratic decision-making process. Equal representation creates conditions for issues to be raised and addressed that effect [sic] quality of life for both men and women. It also allows all Canadians to see themselves adequately reflected in the House of Commons, which encourages further participation by women in the political process – a group that is traditionally under-represented. (University of Waterloo, n.d.)

Indeed, while representation at the ministerial level has expanded, itself helping to meet a goal advanced by the WPS resolutions and perhaps assisting to implement several other resolutional aims, the House of Commons lags behind. As of 2018, women comprise 26.9% or a bit more than a quarter of the seats in the House of Commons, yet women are 51% of the population (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018; Samara Centre for Democracy 2017). Nancy Peckford, Director of Equal Voice, a non-partisan civil society group that seeks to increase the number of women in Parliament, explains why this lack of representation is particularly problematic in the House of Commons for representing the needs of Canadians and achieving the kinds of policy changes called for by international gender norms:

Study after study has underscored that the presence of women matters – in both shifting the political culture and in enabling more inclusive public policy discussions. Does it mean that wom-

en all espouse the same beliefs? Absolutely not. But when 75 percent of Members of Parliament are men, it is nearly impossible for the remaining 25 percent to always do justice to the diversity and depth of women's views and experiences. (Peckford 2013)

Cultural problems in Parliament remain that prevent women from wanting to seek office, such as old boys' networks and lack of family care facilities. Some women are deterred from seeking office because of these systemic issues. Yet with each passing year, the rate of women running for office, winning, and serving in Parliament is increasing. Civil society organizations like Equal Voice play a considerable role in Canadian society in helping to alleviate these challenges (CBC, n.d.; Equal Voice, n.d.).

Provincial governments are also improving in their gender representation. In 2019, the percentage of women in provincial and territory governments is represented in Table 2.5 (Prince Edward Island Coalition for Women in Government 2019).

Thus, many of the most populous provinces are making strides far ahead of the national government for gender representation in their legislatures. While there is more work to be done in all provinces, these encouraging signs signal that Canada is working toward reducing the gender gap in government by encouraging women to run for office, volunteer on campaigns, and get involved politically in their communities in a variety of ways.

Evaluating Canada's women in political decision-making for compliance with WPS international norms, we again turn to the chapter 1 evaluation metric and the 1–5 scale. The resolutional obligations relevant to women in political decision-making were generally those relevant to the presence of women in overall political life, participating in the decision-making and policy planning processes of a nation (Table 2.6).

Canada scores well in women in politics measures. From the gender equal cabinet to an ever rising percentage of women in politics, the Canadian government is striving to include women in all the rooms where decisions are being made.

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Table 2.5

Provincial Governments and Gender Representation

Rank among Provinces and Territories	Province or Territory	Percentage of Women in the Legislature
1	Ontario	39.5%
2	British Columbia	39%
3	Yukon	37%
4	Alberta	33.3%
4	Nova Scotia	33.3%
6	Quebec	30.4%
7	Saskatchewan	26.2%
8	Newfoundland and Labrador	25%
9	Manitoba	24.5%
10	New Brunswick	22%
11	Prince Edward Island	18.5%
12	Northwest Territories	10.5%
13	Nunavut	9%

Source: Prince Edward Island Coalition for Women in Government. 2019. "How does PEI Compare." *Prince Edward Island Coalition for Women in Government*. 2019. Accessed 13 April 2020. <https://www.peiwomeningovernment.ca/>.

Table 2.6

Canadian Women in Political Decision-Making and Compliance with WPS International Norms

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	4, due to ever-increasing political representation and some key female decision-makers
1888	"Urges the Secretary General, Member States and the heads of regional organizations to take measures to increase the representation of women in mediation processes and decision-making processes with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding."	4, due to the key placement of female decision-makers and intent to fulfil this obligation
2242	"Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants."	4, regarding the domestic / international body inclusion section of this WPS obligation

Source: Author's compilation.

Incorporation of GENADs and GFPs

Gender Advisors, or GENADs, are a key part of gender mainstreaming doctrine in the WPS resolutions, and are particularly emphasized as a part of NATO's gender mainstreaming process. As follows, Canada has adopted GENADs into their feminist foreign policy infrastructure. Some member state militaries have already added GENAD appointments into their own armed forces and others are contemplating the policy shift. Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1 describes the role of a GENAD as ensuring that gender is considered in operational planning (Hurley 2017; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017). In addition to GENADs, NATO defines a Gender Focal Point or GFP as a "position that supports the Commander in implementing directives and procedures with a gender perspective." (Hurley 2017) The role is described in detail in the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) Gender Functional Planning Guide, and is below the GENAD in hierarchy. The guide elaborates, "GFPs are to facilitate gender mainstreaming into the daily work. As such, GFPs support and enable a professional and functional network throughout the HQ or, when duly authorised, the command, to maintain dialogue, liaison and coordination on the integration of gender perspectives." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017, 20)

As of 2016, Canada had three trained GENADs. However, they had not deployed any GENADs by that time. This is in contrast to other NATO members that have trained significantly more GENADs and deployed the advisors, as depicted in Figure 2.9, taken from the SNR (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2016).

Despite the lack of trained GENADs, Canada has achieved some success in this area. Since December 2016, all named missions have had a GFP, with individual GFPs spread all the way from the strategic to the tactical level. Furthermore, one GENAD was deployed with a mission by November 2017 (Rodrigues 2017). Thus, Canada is making progress in using GENADs and GFPs to introduce further gender perspectives into its operations, making this international norm a part of feminist foreign policy. The perspective and methodology necessary to implement UN-

Figure 2.9

Gender Advisers in the Armed Forces, 2016

Gender advisers in the armed forces in 2016			
NATO members nations	Trained Gender Advisors in the Armed Forces	Gender Advisors deployed in 2016	Gender Advisors deployed so far
Belgium	16	0	0
Bulgaria	4	1	2
Canada	3	0	0
Croatia	6	2	4
Czech Republic	1	0	0
Denmark	5	0	0
France	7	0	0
Hungary	30	0	0
Iceland*	2	2	1
Italy	170	1	4
Lithuania	2	0	0
Luxembourg	2	0	0
Netherlands	12	2	12
Norway	22	0	12
Poland	9	0	0
Portugal	10	0	0
Romania	1	0	0
Slovenia	6	0	0
Spain	230	15	35
Turkey	5	2	5
UK	8	8	8
USA	2	2	2
Total	553	35	85
* Gender advisor in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan			

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. “Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.” 34.

SCR 1325 and the related resolutions in Canada is expanding to more spaces in the CAF and DND, ensuring women's voices are heard and considered in conflict.

Again, text from the WPS resolutions regarding Gender Advisors is consulted using the chapter 1 evaluation mechanism to determine the extent to which Canada is complying with international WPS norms. These resolutional obligations are all highly specific to the presence of gender advisors, indicating the importance of GENADs in the eyes of the international community. Canada's compliance with the norms is evaluated on the 1–5 scale, with 5 as full implementation (Table 2.7).

Notably, Canada performs poorly in this specific area of WPS international norm implementation. Canada is open to GENADs and actively would like to have more hence why in one category it scores a three, but even on paper it is not doing much to have GENADs actively engaged in decision-making or on deployed missions. These resolution obligations point to individual, measurable, and highly actionable tasks for Canada, yet Canada's feminist foreign policy is not in compliance, unusual for the country which scores so highly in other areas.

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Table 2.7

Canada's Compliance with WPS Resolutions Regarding GENADs

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1960	"Welcomes the work of gender advisers; looks forward to the appointment of more women protection advisers to peacekeeping missions, in accordance with resolution 1888 (2009); notes their potential contribution in the framework of the monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements to be established pursuant to OP8 of the present resolution."	3, Canada welcomes a growing GENAD presence, but current numbers are low
2106	"Calls for the further deployment of Women Protection Advisors (WPA) in accordance with resolution 1888 to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security and calls upon the Secretary General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the planning and review of each United Nations peacekeeping and political mission, and to ensure that these experts are adequately trained and deployed in a timely manner; and recognizes the role of UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict in facilitating coordinated responses of relevant peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights, political and security actors and emphasizes the need for enhanced coordination, information sharing, analysis, response planning and implementation across these sectors."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, only one ever deployed
2106	"Recognizes the distinct role of Gender Advisors in ensuring that gender perspectives are mainstreamed in policies, planning and implementation by all mission elements; calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to deploy Gender Advisors to the relevant United Nations peacekeeping and political missions as well as humanitarian operations and to ensure comprehensive gender training of all relevant peacekeeping and civilian personnel."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used

Table 2.7, continued

Canada's Compliance with WPS Resolutions Regarding GENADs

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2
1888	"Decides to include specific provisions, as appropriate, for the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including, on a case-by-case basis, the identification of women's protection advisers (WPAs) among gender advisers and human rights protection units, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used

Source: Author's compilation

The Overall Canadian 1325 Landscape: Hypothesis Analysis and Next Steps

The 1325 Scorecard, a joint project of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program, Women in International Security, and the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, assesses member states' overall performance on implementing UNSCR 1325 within their armed forces (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b). The report found disturbing trends for NATO members as a whole, noting:

Unfortunately, at the national level the implementation of these policies has lagged. Our research shows that national implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the armed forces of NATO allies is generally ad-hoc and unsystematic. Many civilian and military personnel remain unfamiliar with the principles underlying UNSCR 1325 and its follow-on resolutions—most commonly referred to as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, and unfamiliar as well with NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, Rev. 1 (Bi-SCD 40-1). For many soldiers gender perspectives remain

foreign concepts and gender analyses do not come naturally. The transformational potential of UNSCR 1325 and the true integration of gender perspectives in conflict analyses has still not become the norm in many NATO member and partner states. (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015b, 2)

However, Canada's score on the report exceeded the overall NATO members' implementation of UNSCR 1325, particularly in the "national will" category, and somewhat less so in the "monitoring and evaluation" and "institutional policy and practice" areas. The Scorecard found strong results in overall national will to implement UNSCR 1325 through the existence of major national policy documents like the C-NAP on WPS. Furthermore, Canada exhibits strong commitment to protecting vulnerable groups like victims of sexual assault and exploitation, broad pre-deployment training on gender, and its leadership is generally committed to improving the experience of women in the armed forces (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015c). The 1325 Scorecard noted that Canada was weaker on some indicators, including budget allocation, consistent monitoring and reporting, specific policy planning, further gender training beyond the pre-deployment stage, GENAD deployment, and preventing HISB within its own military. Indeed, it noted, "[positive aspects] said, the women, peace and security framework is far from being mainstreamed within Canadian foreign and defense policy," though Canada's doctrinal texts and intentions were very strong (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015a).

The results from the 1325 Scorecard Project are largely in line with this chapter's findings across the evaluative mechanism and when analyzed through the lens of the paper's hypotheses. Indeed, plugging the evaluative mechanism results into the three hypotheses demonstrates the veracity of each projection:

Hypothesis 1: The more specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable a Canadian policy program's doctrine is, the smaller gap it will have with global WPS norms.

The only section that deals with finances as explicitly part of a feminist foreign policy agenda is the doctrinal texts in 2.2.1, and the evaluative scores for budgeting are generally around 3s

and 4s, indicating qualitatively “almost full implementation to the best of the state’s ability” or “majority implemented though below full implementation to the best of the state’s ability.” Other sections such as CAF programming for family and women’s inclusivity also require appropriations, but the funding is not as significantly discussed in the main policy documents. However, measurement and evaluation obligations score lower across all policy areas, around 2s and 3s, indicating occasional values “below full implementation to the best of the state’s ability.” As follows, fiscal appropriations and measurable aims appear to correspond with a reasonably sized gap with global WPS norms, affirming the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The more an organizational culture is welcoming of women, the smaller the gap a program will have with global WPS norms.

Canada scores tremendously well in all resolution obligations demonstrating intention to change policy across doctrinal areas, primarily 4s and 5s showing full implementation. This may be a good proxy for a shifting organizational culture, and if so, the veracity of this hypothesis is reflected in the evaluation mechanism data. The narrative accounts are slightly more gray than the scores themselves, demonstrating areas of weakness, but as a whole, Canada shows a small gap with WPS norms in this area, reflecting the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: The more a country actively strives to transmit global WPS norms to its policymakers, civil servants, and soldiers, the smaller the gap it will have with global WPS norms.

As can be seen from the evaluative mechanism, Canada strives to transmit WPS norms to policymakers et al. through training, expanding the presence of women in the CAF and government, and policy doctrine changes. Adding together all scores in this chapter and calculating an average provides a proxy for understanding the overall “active striving” of a country, and Canada scores a 3.55. Consequently, Canada appears to affirm the hypothesis that there is a smaller WPS gap by taking active measures to inform its personnel about WPS issues.

While all three hypotheses are affirmed by Canada's doctrinal texts and on face, positive implementation of the WPS resolutions, it is distinctly possible that the hypotheses could either not be affirmed when examined in a different light in chapter 3, or be affirmed for other reasons. Further investigation in the next chapter is warranted to determine the full veracity of the hypotheses.

This chapter has highlighted the current state of Canadian feminist foreign policy on, and its intersection with, UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, largely emphasizing what it has done right to try to address the ways that foreign policy and decision-making have historically excluded women. Specifically, this chapter evaluated Canadian implementation of international WPS norms in six areas: feminist foreign policy, GBA+, gender training, CAF recruitment, women in government, and GENAD/GFP development. In contrast, the next chapter elaborates on the weak points described above by the 1325 Scorecard, where Canada has not yet achieved full implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Successful development of bold policy ideas like the 2017 feminist foreign policy have not yet led to operational gender mainstreaming. Chapter 3 demonstrates where these gaps are in Canadian feminist foreign policy implementation.

3. The Gap Between Resolution Goals and Implementation in Canada

Marriët Schuurman, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in the Office of the Secretary General made three primary recommendations for best practices in international gender policy following her years of service in NATO. She noted first that as many female staff and GENADs of all genders should be deployed as possible (Schuurman 2015, 2). Second, she emphasized the importance of “the further integration of a gender perspective in military assessments, intelligence, planning, operations and reporting,” though this is not a best practice so much as it is an area where best practices need to continue to develop for policy improvement (Schuurman 2015, 2). Indeed, Schuurman notes that this is more a change in mindset than policy (2015, 2). Third, she highlighted local women as crucially important to mission success, and that they should be increasingly consulted (Schuurman 2015, 2). She concluded that it is not only important to implement the principles of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions that involve improvement in international operations, but to address deep gender disparities at home. Schuurman (2015, 1) stated:

When we are no longer mainly concerned with exporting peace and security but are also forced to rethink how we protect peace and security at home, in our own countries and region; how we defend the principles on which our peace and security is based:

individual freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law; how we safeguard a Europe [NATO] at peace, whole and free.

Canada's feminist foreign policy appears to have implementation gaps in all three areas Schuurman emphasizes. This section explores many ways Canada's feminist foreign policy has not yet fully implemented global WPS norms across the same six categories as chapter 2: the policy documents most closely entwined with the feminist foreign policy, GBA+, gender training, CAF recruitment, women in government, and GENAD/GPF development. Unlike chapter 2, this paper is much more explicit about parts of the policies that are divergent from global WPS norms, so while it will use the same evaluative mechanism, the scores in this section are resultingly much lower, drawing a contrast that is later explored in chapter 4. Indeed, the section ends by offering hypothesis analysis comparing and contrasting the evaluation metrics in chapters 2 and 3, concluding thoughts, and next steps for the paper resulting from this split.

The C-NAP, FIAP, and Defence Doctrine: Feminist Foreign Policy Outlined

There are four kinds of gaps with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions in Canada's implementation of the primary feminist foreign policy planning documents, the National Action Plan on WPS (C-NAP), the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), and the defence policy "Strong Secure Engaged." First, budget appropriations for the C-NAP, FIAP, and certain aspects of "Strong Secure Engaged" have not always been specific or directed toward the kinds of programs activists acknowledge as the most helpful for advancing UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Commenting on the C-NAP for WPS, Diana Sarosi of the Women, Peace, and Security Network-Canada (WPSN-C) notes that the 2017–2022 C-NAP is an exciting improvement over past iterations of the document because it puts women's groups at the forefront of the response to conflict prevention and resolution by directing 15% of peace and security funding directly to

programs that target women and gender while channeling 80% toward foreign policy programs that “integrate” gender by 2021. However, she was critical of Canada’s budgeting in its feminist foreign policy as a whole, noting it was a missed opportunity, creating a policy gap:

While the additional funding for gender programming is welcome, it is disappointing that the action plan fails to commit dedicated funding for women’s organizations in conflict settings. Grassroots women’s organizations play a unique and widespread role in conflict prevention and response. It is critical that this important work is supported, politically and financially...It is therefore disappointing that both the C-NAP and [Feminist International Assistance Policy or] FIAP were announced without any dedicated and additional resources to ensure impact and success. This lack of resources does not bode well for a government that touts itself as a feminist foreign policy champion. Canada’s defence policy came with an investment of \$60 billion dollars. Increased resourcing of the C-NAP and [Feminist International Assistance Policy] would ensure greater impact in tackling the root causes of conflict and violence. An investment in the C-NAP and FIAP will lay the foundation for a more stable and peaceful world. (Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2018)

Without specific funding to implement the many individual policy directives in the C-NAP and the line items in the FIAP, Canada cannot fulfill its obligations as a party to UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Increased funding to women’s groups is crucial, but without appropriate budgeting to implement these appropriations, the policy will go nowhere. Additionally, an overall criticism of “Strong Secure Engaged” is its lack of funding clarity regarding individual policies, but this is specifically true of the gender connected policies outlined in the document (Vuvetic 2017). Indeed, a detailed analysis of the new spending dictated in “Strong Secure Engaged” was not optimistic on Canada’s overall ability to meet new spending goals, and at no point mentions specific spending on gender-connected policies other than mentioning the broad category of “personnel.” (Perry 2018) It has yet to be seen if the gender-related policies

introduced in “Strong Secure Engaged” will permanently take hold in the Canadian military, but as of spring 2019, further specific, implementable, and funded action could be taken.

Second, Canada’s conception of feminist international assistance is sometimes vague and inconsistent. In her article commenting on the FIAP and C-NAP, Margaret Capelazo, another member of WPSN-C, discusses the same financial targets mentioned by Sarosi. She criticizes the documents’ budgeting, but for a different reason than her colleague: only one part of the FIAP budget references gender-based humanitarian programming, in contrast to line items for targeted programming on sexual and gender-based violence that generates more buzz. This is a policy dilemma because WPS work is about more than just preventing sexual assault and assuring reproductive health needs are met: women’s rights are human rights and span a wide range of humanitarian problems. Furthermore, Capelazo argues that the policy is not clear about what gender equality actually means in humanitarian interventions:

With the goal of having “80% of global humanitarian assistance funding partly or fully [integrating] gender equality by 2021,” target 1.3 is GAC’s only result specifically related to humanitarian programming. The target talks about supporting GAC’s partners to improve their humanitarian program quality, which is critical, but it does not set results that describe what fully integrating gender equality practically looks like in a humanitarian context. Although more concerned with [sexual and gender-based violence] and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), targets 1.5 and 1.6 are more descriptive of good humanitarian work... These are the only two targets to include wording or activity descriptions that clearly distinguish between working in fragile development or in humanitarian contexts. (Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2018, 20)

Canada should not equate solutions to sexual and gender-based violence with improvement in global women’s rights more broadly as outlined by UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Humanitarian assistance targeting women’s rights alleviation includes economic solutions, education, healthcare, and

a wide range of other policies not as thoroughly addressed in Canada's feminist foreign policy plans. Furthermore, specific policy directives like those in targets 1.5 and 1.6 are important and missing in other parts of the documents. Indeed, as Sarosi notes regarding the C-NAP, Canada's humanitarian and military priorities sometimes do not correspond on gendered lines, creating policy gaps and inconsistencies:

Canada must do more to ensure coherence across aid, diplomacy, trade and defence. Canadian arms exports to Saudi Arabia have increased by 47% in 2016. The Saudi led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen is causing a humanitarian disaster. Millions of women and children are at the brink of starvation. A key pillar of the WPS agenda is the prevention of conflict, which includes de-militarization, tackling root causes and strengthening non-violent conflict resolution. The focus of the new C-NAP on achieving sustainable peace, by eliminating the structural inequalities that lead to conflict and strengthening society's ability to resolve conflict peacefully, needs to be prioritized. (Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2018, 17)

The conflict in Yemen is an example of how the WPS resolutions clarify that violence often has a disproportionate impact on women and girls. Hunger is a gendered issue, as is sexual assault, and closing an implementation gap in Canadian feminist foreign policy requires addressing this inconsistency.

Third, Canada is not fully including women's perspectives in foreign missions, an explicit aim of the feminist foreign policy articulated in the C-NAP that is echoed in international norming documents on WPS. When implementing gender mainstreaming in the armed forces' overseas operations, as well as when conducting foreign policy decision-making at home, mixed-gender policy team composition and female leadership of some operations is crucial. Yet, this is rarely accomplished, preventing all aspects of gender mainstreaming from occurring both from a Canadian representation perspective, as well as with respect to the specific and diverse needs of women and girls in conflict zones. It is important to encourage women to participate in operations abroad to ensure that their perspective is heard and that they

have equal opportunity to participate in the mission. Beyond the benefits of equality on the domestic side of the mission, many members of the defence establishment believe the presence of female personnel can make operations more efficacious (von Hlatky and Shoemaker 2017; von Hlatky 2014). There are several recent examples where women forces have been instrumental at improving security outcomes that are often inaccessible to male soldiers or peacekeepers, such as speaking with female ISIS refugees, training Afghan women police officers, and combatting Russian gender discriminatory propaganda in Latvia. NATO reviews have found that Female Engagement Teams like those established during the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan would be helpful across countries and missions, as well as further identifying local women as key actors for mission success (Schoorman 2015).

However, Canada has yet to fully operationalize this aim because most teams do not include women or include few women. The CAF notes on its official DND/CAF Website:

Just under 500 Canadian soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen are currently serving with task forces deployed on expeditionary operations by Canadian Joint Operations Command. Although the CAF do not keep track of the gender of deployed personnel, it is safe to assume that eligible women are likely to be serving on the majority of our missions...With respect to women serving in 'front line' roles, it is safe to assume that women currently serve in the majority of CAF missions. For example, during Canada's ten-year combat mission in Afghanistan, Operation Athena, serving women represented about 10 per cent of CAF members, and have assumed front line roles in several occupations including combat arms. (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018a)

These numbers get more specific in other sections of the CAF website, where it is noted that "By the end of 2017, there were 12 women at the General and Flag Officer ranks in the CAF, a record high with four in each service. The number of women in senior NCM ranks also rose to 57 Chief Warrant Officers and Chief Petty Officers 1st Class," yet there are vastly dispro-

portionately more men in leadership roles, particularly in those positions critical to foreign policy decision-making (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2019b). Furthermore, as of January 2018 there were 14,434 total female-identifying members of the CAF of 93,578 total, for 15.3%, slightly higher than the SNR's number of 15.1% gathered two years earlier (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2019b). It is challenging to get a precise number of CAF members currently deployed, but estimates are around 3,600, with the approximately 500 deployed women at 13.8% of the force abroad (Canada Department of Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2019c; Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2014). The DND progress report on the C-NAP is specific about high level officer deployment, stating that "129 senior women were deployed on operations, which equates to 9.1% of all CAF expeditionary deployments." (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b, 17)

The rhetoric of "safe to assume" from the CAF regarding women's overall deployment rate indicates a problem of implementation regarding integrating female personnel when deployed. The explicit note that the CAF does not track the gender of deployed personnel is itself an implementation gap for a feminist foreign policy in line with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, which call for increased monitoring and evaluation. Additionally, since most women in the CAF serve in the same roles, just because they are deployed "on the majority of [CAF] missions" does not mean they are visible on most teams, which would allow for increased sharing of gender perspectives. These gaps must be addressed for Canada to truly implement a feminist foreign policy from a military perspective.

Fourth, the specified implementation activities, as well as the measurement and evaluation mechanisms with most of these doctrines are unclear and hard to pursue or track. Notably, in the DND portion of the C-NAP, there are implementation activities as wide ranging as "Encourage gender focal points to seek gender training and education," "Monitor career progression of

women in the CAF," "Ensure appropriate representation on the Interdepartmental Committee on GBA+," and "Support the participation and leadership of women in delivering peace and security efforts." (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b) These are abstract action items that a bureaucracy as far reaching as DND may have trouble directing to specific implementation channels. Indeed, the means of measuring whether these vague action items have been implemented are themselves vague, with indicators that are sometimes like putting a square peg into a round hole. Many indicators in the DND section of the C-NAP and the follow up DND progress report are about the "number of X" who have done a particular task or whether a certain box has been checked such as the completion of an annual survey, alongside more even less clear indicators like, "Track recommendations made by CAF UNSCR 1325 Implementation Working Group." It's hard to measure and evaluate coherence with international norms, and harder still to assess cultural organizational change that has become more welcoming of women, but these indicators are not garnering the full scope of transformation (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b).

Table 3.1 uses the same 1–5 scale from chapter 1 as implemented in chapter 2, assessing how Canada has to date met member state obligations as defined by international gender norms. A five is the equivalent of full implementation and a one is less than 25 percent implementation. However, while chapter 2 assessed doctrine and the spirit of policy intentions, chapter 3 assesses policies as they are in practice. Consequently, there are some significant differences in the scores presented in chapters 2 and 3.

The three gaps in budgeting, humanitarian planning, and military and team composition all present implementation flaws in Canada's feminist foreign policy that are borne out across scores for chapter 3, drawing contrast with chapter 2. While Canada talks the talk better than almost any other country, its actual targeted implementation thus far has not met goals. Doctrine

... text continued on page 120

Table 3.1

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines	3, women are present in most rooms where decisions are being made, but that doesn't mean they are being heard or are many of those present
1888	"Recognizing that the promotion and empowerment of women and that support for women's organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect."	4, the doctrines strive to engage local groups	3, recognition is present, actualization is the next step
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, Strong Secure Engaged strives to engage with this	2, women are very few of those deployed

Table 3.1, continued
Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2122	“Recognizes the continuing need to increase women’s participation and the consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conflict peacebuilding, and in this regard, the Council: Encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women’s leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society.”	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP	3, aims are present, but budgeting concerns conflict with this goal

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2242	"Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP	3, aims are present, but budgeting concerns conflict with this goal
1325	"Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants."	3, the doctrinal aims of the FIAP address this, but not as explicit	3, the aims of the FIAP in practice address this, but not as explicit

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	"Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls."	2, only mentioned in an example	2, only mentioned in an example
2242	"Calls for the greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering-violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue throughout the activities within their respective mandates, including within country - specific assessments and reports, recommendations made to Member States, facilitating technical assistance to Member States, and briefings to the Council, encourages the CTC and CTED to hold further consultations with women and women's organizations to help inform their work, and further encourages the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to take the same approach in activities within its mandate"	2, mentioned only in passing	2, mentioned only in passing
2242	"Encourages empowering women, including through capacity-building efforts, as appropriate, to participate in the design and implementation of efforts related to the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit transfer, and the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and calls upon Member States, United Nations entities, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations to take into consideration the specific impact of conflict and post-conflict environments on women's and girls' security, mobility, education, economic activity and opportunities, to mitigate the risk of women from becoming active players in the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons."	2, not explicitly mentioned anywhere	2, not explicitly mentioned anywhere

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1820	"Affirms its intention, when establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions regimes, to take into consideration the appropriateness of targeted and graduated measures against parties to situations of armed conflict who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict."	2, not explicitly mentioned anywhere	2, not explicitly mentioned anywhere
2242, sim in 2122	"Welcomes the efforts of Member States to implement resolution 1325, including the development of national action plans, further welcomes the increase in national action plans in recent years, and calls upon Member States to further integrate the women, peace and security agenda into their strategic plans such as national actions plans and other planning frameworks, with sufficient resources, including implementation of relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, through broad consultation, including with civil society, in particular women's organizations, calls upon countries with national action plans to provide an update on the progress made in their implementation and review during the annual Security Council Open Debates on Women, Peace and Security, further welcomes the efforts of regional organizations to implement resolution 1325, including through the adoption of regional frameworks, and encourages them to pursue further implementation."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines	3, Canada is falling short on the "sufficient resources" section of this obligation, as well as constant monitoring and evaluation
1325, sim in 1889	"Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000."	3, not substantially discussed though present	3, not substantially discussed though present

Table 3.1, continued
Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	<p>"Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary"</p>	4, political systems are not a main aim in the FIAP and C-NAP but receive attention	3, such policies do not have implementation plans in the texts,
1889 dif than above bc fund- ing	<p>"Urges Member States, United Nations bodies, donors and civil society to ensure that women's empowerment is taken into account during post-conflict needs assessments and planning, and factored into subsequent funding disbursements and programme activities, including through developing transparent analysis and tracking of funds allocated for addressing women's needs in the post-conflict phase."</p>	3, monitoring and evaluation protocol is not as thoroughly addressed in the text though still mentioned	2, there are consistent monitoring and evaluation issues

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1889	"Encourages Member States in post-conflict situations, in consultation with civil society, including women's organizations, to specify in detail women and girls' needs and priorities and design concrete strategies, in accordance with their legal systems, to address those needs and priorities, which cover inter alia support for greater physical security and better socio-economic conditions, through education, income-generating activities, access to basic services, in particular health services, including sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights and mental health, gender-responsive law enforcement and access to justice, as well as enhancing capacity to engage in public decision-making at all levels."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP	3, aims are present, but budgeting concerns conflict with this goal
1889	"Urges Member States, United Nations bodies and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to take all feasible measures to ensure women and girls' equal access to education in post-conflict situations, given the vital role of education in the promotion of women's participation in post-conflict decision-making."	4, education is not a main aim in the FIAP and C-NAP but receives attention	3, Canada focuses primarily on other kinds of issues
2122	"Recognizing the importance of Member States and United Nations entities seeking to ensure humanitarian aid and funding includes provision for the full range of medical, legal, psychosocial and livelihood services to women affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations, and noting the need for access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health services, including regarding pregnancies resulting from rape, without discrimination."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP	4, in practice, this is the main kind of gender based programming the FIAP is working to implement, could improve but is strong

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2122	"Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP	3, aims are present, but budgeting concerns conflict with this goal
2242	"Encourages Member States to increase their funding on women, peace and security including through more aid in conflict and post-conflict situations for programmes that further gender equality and women's empowerment, as well as through support to civil society, and to support countries in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including through capacity-building, in their implementation of women, peace and security resolutions, calls for increased international development and cooperation related to women's empowerment and gender equality and invites aid providers to track the gender focus of aid contributions."	5, these are the clear aims across the stated doctrines, particularly the FIAP	3, aims are present, but budgeting concerns conflict with this goal
1325, sim in 1888	"Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1888	"Urges all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence committed by civilians or by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice, and that civilian superiors and military commanders, in accordance with international humanitarian law, use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence, including by combating impunity."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction
2122, 2242, 1960, 2106	"Calls upon Member States to comply with their relevant obligations to end to impunity and to thoroughly investigate and prosecute persons responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law; and further notes that the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern against women and girls has been strengthened through the work of the International Criminal Court, ad hoc and mixed tribunals, as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter
1888	"Encourages States, relevant United Nations entities and civil society, as appropriate, to provide assistance in close cooperation with national authorities to build national capacity in the judicial and law enforcement systems in situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict."	4, this is a primary FIAP doctrinal aim	3, less coordination with other national govts than in the aim

Table 3.1, continued
Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 2242	"Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court."	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter	3, not mentioned at length in these doctrinal texts, though Canada is a strong supporter
1820, 1325, 1888, 2106	"Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction

Table 3.1, continued

Canada and Gender Norm Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1960	"Calls upon parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, <i>inter alia</i> , issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable."	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FIAP move in this direction
2106	"Notes the link between sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and HIV infection, and the disproportionate burden of HIV and AIDS on women and girls as a persistent obstacle and challenge to gender equality; and urges United Nations entities, Member States and donors to support the development and strengthening of capacities of national health systems and civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls living with or affected by HIV and AIDS in armed conflict and post-conflict situations."	3, limited conversation, though discussed	3, limited conversation, though discussed
2106	"Encourages Member States and donors to support national and international programs that assist victims of sexual violence such as the Trust Fund for Victims established by the Rome Statute and its implementing partners; and requests the relevant United Nations entities to increase allocation of resources for the coordination of gender-based violence response and service provision."	3, limited conversation, though discussed	3, limited conversation, though discussed

Source: Author's compilation.

is stronger as a whole than implementation. Notably, however, there are some WPS resolution aims that were exactly the same in chapters 2 and 3, but these were ones that Canada is either midway through implementing or does not explicitly mention. Canada has not yet achieved a feminist foreign policy doctrine fully aligned with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, though it has made significant strides.

GBA+, GBA+ Champions, and the Diversity Strategy

Canada's GBA+ program complies with the mentality necessary for implementing international gender norms, appointing GBA+ Champions throughout bureaucratic institutions is helpful for gender mainstreaming, and the diversity strategy is a step forward for a more culturally sensitive CAF. However, gaps remain in fully achieving WPS resolution goals for member states in areas these solutions seek to address. Three broad problems with Canadian action regarding GBA+ and its related reforms are that the programs are not sufficiently swift, monitored, or specific. The 1325 Reset Report, a NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) project analyzing member states' national action plans delivered to the NATO Committee for Gender Policy (NCGP) from 1999–2013, finds that NAPs should be as specific as possible, including budgeting for the armed forces and other implementing entities, creating monitoring procedures, and writing roadmaps and timelines. Swift and decisive action has generally worked better than slow study, which led to lost opportunities (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018b). While Canada's GBA+ Action Plan and the Diversity Strategy do not comprise the entirety of the C-NAP for WPS, they are important components of seeing the UNSCR 1325 and related resolution aims fulfilled. Yet, scholars broadly criticize the Canadian NAP for its lack of coordinated and measurable goals, reading like it addresses "low hanging fruit" addressing the "what" and numerical goals, but not necessarily the "how" for implementing solutions (Government of Canada 2017b; Wom-

en, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2018). Canada's 2018 Budget was described as a "Gender Budget," and policymakers used GBA+ to develop many line items, yet activists noted that it missed important policies crucial to developing a more inclusive Canada, such as better paid parental leave and child care (Bezan-son 2018). Indeed, GBA+ is described as an "analytical tool" but a tool is only useful if a) all appropriate personnel know how to use it, b) there's enough funding for the tool to go around, and c) the tool is sufficiently direct as to prompt cultural change (Government of Canada 2017b). This has not yet occurred in Canada.

The Diversity Strategy in particular is a source of a gap in UN-SCR 1325 and related resolution implementation vs. ideals. While GBA+, when used, can be highly effective, and GBA+ champions, when in place, can cause some change in their various agencies, the CAF has struggled with the Diversity Strategy (see, for example, Graney 2018). The Diversity Strategy is part of Canada's "Strong Secure Engaged" defence policy, and articulates a vision of a CAF that more closely reflects Canadian society, with appropriate support and recruitment policies in place to match this shift in the forces (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2018e). However, just by saying that the CAF will be more welcoming to diversity does not make it true. The CAF has a persistent warrior culture that has become more pronounced since Canada's participation in Afghanistan, turning a nation of peacekeepers into a nation of military traditionalists. It's hard for culture to change rapidly in any organization, let alone one as complex and fractured as the CAF (English 2015). The Diversity Strategy has the support of CAF top brass regarding the kinds of GBA+ changes it would implement, but it will take more buy-in and more specific effort to effect change (Government of Canada 2017c; Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Force 2018d). Full implementation of the Diversity Strategy would help to close the gap between international gender norms and Canada's feminist foreign policy. Table 3.2 evaluates some of these findings against member state obligations in the WPS resolutions, using the 1–5 scale:

... text continued on page 127

Table 3.2

Canada and the Diversity Strategy: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures	2, occurring in aim, has not changed at all in practice
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures	3, occurring to some degree in practice but not to extent of aim
1889	"Urges Member States, international and regional organizations to take further measures to improve women's participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, including by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes, through inter alia promoting women's leadership and capacity to engage in aid management and planning, supporting women's organizations, and countering negative societal attitudes about women's capacity to participate equally."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures	3, occurring to some degree in practice but not to extent of aim
1888	"Recognizing that the promotion and empowerment of women and that support for women's organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect."	5, GBA+ actively strives to ensure this support	4, Canada recognizes this almost universally

Table 3.2, continued

Canada and the Diversity Strategy: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2242	<p>“Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women’s meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties’ delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women’s participation and strategies for women’s effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants.”</p>	<p>4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures</p>	<p>3, occurring to some degree in practice but not to extent of aim</p>

Table 3.2, continued
Canada and the Diversity Strategy: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	"Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, <i>inter alia</i> (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures	3, occurring to some degree in practice but not to extent of aim
1888, sim in 1960, 2106, 2122	"Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law."	5, GBA+ actively strives to ensure the rights of citizens	4, there are human rights challenges inside Canada too, but Canada strives to improve
1325	"Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to craft such special measures	4, prevention of gender-based violence is perhaps Canada's most clearly stated/implemented goal in feminist FP action

Table 3.2, continued

Canada and the Diversity Strategy: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1820	"Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to encourage undertaking such measures	2, Canada is striving to deploy more female peacekeepers and be a leader here, but deployments are stagnant even with the Elsie initiative.
1960, sim in 1888	"Reaffirming the importance for States, with the support of the international community, to increase access to health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and socio-economic reintegration services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas, and taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities."	4, GBA+ provides the platform to undertake such measures	3, Strong Secure Engaged and some of the FLAP move in this direction, in line with GBA+, though far to go

Table 3.2, continued
Canada and the Diversity Strategy: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2106	"Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and other women and peace and security commitments in its own work and, in this regard, expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women's participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding and to address sexual violence in conflict, including, inter alia, in the establishment and review of peacekeeping and political mandates, public statements, country visits, fact-finding missions, international commissions of inquiry, consultations with regional bodies and in the work of relevant Security Council sanctions committees."	3, GBA+ provides the spirit of this obligation, but some monitoring and evaluation gaps	2, there are significant challenges with monitoring and evaluation across departments

Source: Author's compilation.

While chapter 2 found that GBA+ was highly compliant with the WPS resolutions, this chapter finds more divergence. This is because of implementation flaws. Canada is working toward upholding the promise of GBA+ rather than accepting GBA+ as fully implemented on face. The doctrine of GBA+ is perhaps exactly what UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions strive to see in countries across the globe. However, Canada must still work out the kinks of how manifestations of GBA+ work in practice as a part of the feminist foreign policy to fully meet the member state ideals of international WPS norms.

Gender Training in Canada

Training for government and military personnel is mentioned across the WPS resolutions as a crucial component of successful gender mainstreaming: how can personnel execute a policy they do not understand? Thus far, Canada has shown a valiant effort at starting to mainstream gender into training for a variety of personnel as part of the feminist foreign policy. However there have been gaps in the actualization of training. Notably, while Canada has strong pre-deployment training on gender perspectives, particularly for peace officers and for others receiving training from the Canadian Peace Support Training Center, the 1325 Scorecard Project's report on Canada found that, "General training at junior, mid, and senior levels in the CAF does not incorporate a gender perspective on conflict, indicating that Canada is not yet committed to integrating this perspective into the general outlook of its armed forces." (de Jonge Oudraat et al. 2015a; Government of Canada 2017b) Thus, while Canada provides strong training at some points in a servicemember's career, it does not yet have the capacity to reach all servicemembers or reinforce training as scholarship evolves, which prevents knowledge gaps from being filled.

NATO reviews of gender policy typically recommend mandatory training beyond the "check-the-box" level, which is sometimes described as what is going on in Canada through GBA+

training, particularly with pre-deployment training, despite Canada's strong record in that area. NATO recommendations include training for commanders on "doctrines, policy context and content, and...the ability to provide leadership. Staff should learn what tools can [be] used to implement the principles of UNSCR 1325 and [NATO] Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1." (Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013, 23) Indeed, gender training could be made a requirement in Canada for rank advancement, and senior leadership could be held accountable for gender goals like those in Bi-SCD 40-1 through regular reporting (Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013). However, these policies do not currently exist in Canada, and their absence is a gap in the infrastructure of gender mainstreaming training. The CAF noted in the C-NAP on WPS implementation plan that:

Most deploying CAF members are now required to complete online gender perspective courses provided by NATO. Moreover, the Status of Women Canada GBA+ course is now mandatory for key organizations and planners within the CAF (and will be mandatory for all CAF members by 2018). Finally, a review of the CAF Professional Military Education system is underway to ensure GBA+ is embedded in the CAF training from the beginning of a member's career. (Government of Canada 2017b, 9)

Yet, as currently presented, the online course is akin to the previously mentioned "check-the-box" exercise that does not fully convey to personnel the importance of GBA+. Furthermore, armed forces members have been confused by four areas of the higher level GBA+ training mentioned in the C-NAP on WPS. First, there is conceptual confusion, with lack of adequate coverage of gender concepts in the military, relevant theories, or useful frameworks. Service members often do not understand what they are being asked to apply. Second, there is rationale confusion. The explained rationale for gender mainstreaming is sometimes incomplete, the presented narrative for applying gender perspectives or incorporating diverse worldviews in conducting military activities is not well articulated. Third, there are areas of cultural confusion, with threats to personal identity often present in these difficult conversations. Fourth, there may ultimately be confusion in application

of GBA+ in the field even if all other areas are grasped, since there is a gap between theoretical understanding and policy objectives (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019). After all of these concerns, there is still fear that GBA+ is becoming an institutional box to check with superficial analyses. Furthermore, there is apprehension that the GENAD framework for operations may not provide the right feedback loop for the CAF, since there is a lack of framework for the responsibilities of gender advisory positions in the military (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019).

Beyond domestic training programs, Canada is sometimes beholden to NATO for gaining slots in gender training at the Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) in Sweden, which only offers GENAD training for all NATO member countries twice a year (Swedish Armed Forces 2018; Shoemaker 2017). Indeed, as of summer 2017, only about 10 Canadians had NATO GENAD certification. This prevents the country from training more GENADs through official, NATO-sanctioned means, as well as training other personnel who might benefit from an in-depth training. Yet, Canada does not have a permanent course in the country that provides tailored gender training for its own personnel to avoid slot limitations at the NCGM, that would allow civilian personnel to participate, or that would ensure local concerns are present in the training (Dufour 2017). The creation of such a course would fill a significant gap in Canada's training infrastructure, as well as possibly lead to an increase in the number of GENADs in the country and deployed with missions, contributing to the closure of another gap between the feminist foreign policy and the WPS resolutions.

Canada is trying to get its gender training right, as close as possible in line with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, and its implementation targets in the C-NAP on WPS align with these aspirations (Government of Canada 2017b). However, Canada has some adjustments to make to its training programs before it is fully prepared to implement international gender mainstreaming norms in its feminist foreign policy. Table 3.3 addresses the depth of the gap between WPS obligations and Canadian implementation of gender training using the 1–5 evaluation scoring

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Table 3.3
Canada's Gender Training and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on strong training doctrine and intent	3, high quality training not always available, few women peacekeepers
1325	"Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies."	4, based on strong training doctrine and intent	3, high quality training not always available
1820	"Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians."	3, Peace-support Training Center has some of this programming	2, need to expand high-quality offerings

Table 3.3, continued

Canada's Gender Training and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1820	"Urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel."	3, good pre-deployment offerings, though limited quality training once in theater	2, need to expand high-quality offerings
2122	"Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular the United Nations predeployment scenario-based training on prevention of sexual and gender-based violence."	5, the Elsie Initiative is almost exactly what the WPS resolutions call for here	2, Canada is striving to deploy more female peacekeepers and be a leader here, but deployments are stagnant even with the Elsie initiative.
1888	"Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence, including measures such as, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence and vetting candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associated with serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including sexual violence."	4, Canada tries extremely hard in this regard	3, Canada's strong efforts would be even stronger if they were conveyed in a different manner during training

Source: Author's compilation.

and providing the chapter 2 scores for context.

The high degree of specificity from UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions regarding training helps highlight the implementation flaws in Canada's feminist foreign policy. While, as the chapter 2 scores demonstrate, doctrine on training is mostly strong in Canada, the implementation of this doctrine has not yet aligned with international gender norms. All relevant personnel are not fully trained on gender mainstreaming, and personnel who are trained exhibit knowledge gaps or fail to implement their knowledge. More work is necessary in this area to comply fully with the WPS resolutions.

Increasing the Presence of Women in the CAF

Both because of the feminist foreign policy and because the country places high value in equal rights, Canada has strong support programming for increasing the presence of women in the CAF and encourages the presence of women in its ranks. Yet, Canada has encountered stagnation and roadblocks in actualizing these goals under UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. This has posed an issue for the CAF on two levels. First, the CAF has been unable to raise the percentage of women in the armed forces over many recent years, demonstrating a possible commitment gap. Second, there is a persistent cultural problem in the CAF, with masculine, "warrior culture" pervading the thinking of all levels of the military (English 2016). This will be explored in increased detail in chapter 4 due to its importance in explaining the overall gap between feminist foreign policy expectation and implementation for UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. This section primarily explores the first of the two problems for the CAF, how women have not joined its ranks over a sustained period of years due to flaws in leadership, marketing practices, recruitment tactics, family policies, sexual assault prevention, and assistance for veteran transition. A comparison to the policies of the Australian Defence Force is useful for demonstrating the gaps in the CAF's implementation of the WPS resolutions.

It is notable that 50% of all women in the CAF are employed in 6% of practice areas, indicating potential employment limitations or lack of understanding of options. One of the most significant barriers to women joining the CAF is a lack of knowledge and information, and the most cited reason for women choosing not to join the CAF is feeling unqualified. Notably, women often don't think they meet the requirements for the CAF even if they do. The pool of women likely to consider a career in the CAF triples if they discover their civilian career maps to a career in the CAF. Additionally, while women surveyed see the benefits of a CAF career as "job security, benefits, and opportunities for advancement/growth," they see the drawbacks as "physical risk, geographical instability w/postings, work-life conflict, and negative work environment." (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019) Women who go to the CAF recruiting website are far more likely than men to choose the CAF job if they could live in one place for longer and not engage in combat. By advertising about the benefits of joining the armed forces while taking steps to mitigate the drawbacks that more sharply impact women, Canada can do more to reach its goal of 25% women in the armed forces. Currently, recruitment strategies underutilize social media (Khan and Hardy 2018). A whole pool of qualified applicants, many of them female, do not apply to join the CAF due to lack of knowledge. Targeted social media campaigns would lessen this knowledge gap.

Though men and women had similarly positive feelings about the CAF recruitment process, one study found that female visible minorities feel like they receive less information from recruiters than other groups, leading to gaps between expectations and reality once they enter the CAF. Indeed, the expectation/reality gap is one of the main reasons women prematurely leave the CAF, particularly regarding issues like flexibility, work life balance, salary, and family support. Communicating to women exactly what will occur once they enter the forces is key to retention. Furthermore, once women apply to the CAF, DND must figure out how to keep them in the forces. DND noticed that women were slightly more likely to drop out of the regular

officer training program (ROTP) so they did a study about why this was the case. One prominent issue was that women were slightly less likely than men to be assigned to their first choice of occupation. Correcting this problem could be another solution to attrition and women's low presence in the CAF. Women and men have similar attrition rates, with one out of seven leaving in the first year, but with fewer women in the CAF to begin with, it is important to ensure that there are advancement opportunities for women, that appropriate information is always given, and that personal support is offered (Khan and Hardy 2018).

Some of the gaps in Canada's feminist foreign policy regarding an inclusive military are further clarified by examining Australia, which has experienced success in improving its military's gender policies in recent years. By 2023 they aim for 25% female representation in the Australian Defence Forces (ADF), and have already seen gains in their current numbers, which average 15% across services as of 2015, the same amount as Canada, though they have seen their numbers rise faster (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). This increase and commitment is possible because of specific best practices that the ADF has already initiated. Some of their policies include flexible work arrangements, commanders actively ensuring members make use of their benefits, use of GENADs at the highest levels of command, diverse promotion boards, no gender restrictions in any service categories, and flexible career paths for caregivers. The Air Force is the first military organization in the world to be accredited as "Breastfeeding Friendly." Two of the most important changes include improving the pipelines into service and strengthening access to leadership roles. First, the ADF uses women in prominent advertising campaigns, including in books read by schoolchildren, highlighting female members as youth role models. Second, in the ADF "in all career development opportunities, the percentage of women participating must always be equal to the percentage of women in the selection pool that is being considered," which has led to more female senior staff (Coomaraswamy et al. 2015). Australia's implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions is not a panacea, and it has certainly had difficulties particularly

when acting in line with international gender norms on peacekeeping missions, notably as the leader of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Solomon Islands (Westendorf 2013). Despite this, Australia does appear to be more successful than other similar countries at implementing the Resolution at home.

While ideas from Australia are not universally transferable, they are extremely helpful for understanding what a peer country like Canada can do to improve its implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, and furthermore, studying the ADF helps clarify the extent to which the Canadian feminist foreign policy has not yet reached full implementation of the WPS resolutions. Across the government, defence establishment, and military, women need tools to lean on while pregnant or mothering young children, such as possible changes in duties or flex-work time, institutional resources like childcare and service-co location with a spouse, and maternity leave. Providing these resources encourages more women to take armed service jobs and stay in these roles with higher satisfaction for longer durations (Westendorf 2013). Canada has strong policies in these areas, but they can always be reevaluated for increased inclusivity.

Other studies have also shown how Australia is a source of best practices for developing policy in line with international gender norms. While it is an official NATO document and Australia is not a NATO member, the UNSCR 1325 Reload endorses Australia's tactics for implementing the Resolution, noting, "Australia provides an excellent case study for NATO members because the ADF has been able to achieve a significant cultural change and has accelerated efforts to increase the representation of women in its three Services." (Figuerola et al. 2015) Figure 3.1 captures Australia's principles for gender mainstreaming, and how they were implemented.

Australia utilized the feedback system above, driven by an increasingly diverse pipeline of leaders after forwarding an initial action plan in 2009 and opening all combat roles to women in 2011. However, a major motivation to increase the pace of change was the 2012 release of Australian Sex Discrimination Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick's "Review into the Treatment

Figure 3.1

Australia's Principles for Gender Mainstreaming

Source: Figueroa, Cristina, et al. "UNSCR 1325 Reload. An Analysis of Annual National Reports to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives from 1999-2013: Policies, Recruitment, Retention, and Operations." *The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme*, June 1, 2015, 33.

of Women in the Australian Defence Force," and the acceptance and implementation of her 21 major recommendations as part of the ADF's "Pathway to Change: Evolving our Culture, A Strategy for Cultural Change and Reinforcement." (Figueroa et al. 2015) One notable finding of the review was that,

Increasing the participation of women is not just about making up numbers [of fewer people joining armed forces generally]. It is also about increasing the quality of operational outcomes for the ADF. As the research from the civilian workforce shows, drawing a workforce from a narrow segment of the population leaves any organisation at a disadvantage in an increasing complex and fast-paced world. Recruitment by the ADF from a wider demographic—one reflected more accurately across many civilian industries—was therefore critical. (Figueroa et al. 2015, 33)

Indeed, there is a dual focus on representation and operational capability as an organization. The ADF is committed to their diverse leadership because they believe that presenting women with more opportunities through targeted recruiting, training, welcoming of different skills, and pipelines for flexible schedules, as well as zero tolerance and accountability for sexism and harassment, will lead to increased operational effectiveness. More broadly, the ADF believes taking this problem seriously is the right thing to do (Figueroa et al. 2015). The CAF is moving in this direction with new policies like the Diversity Strategy and fuller implementation of GBA+, but can stand to improve. Indeed, the contrast between the ADF reception of the Broderick Report and the initial 2015 CAF action on the similar Deschamps Report, as described in further detail below, highlights Canada's gap both with its peer Australia and with the WPS resolutions as a whole.

Beyond retention and leadership issues, sexual assault in the CAF is not being adequately combatted by current policies; Op HONOUR is ineffective. This is crucial to the actualization of feminist foreign policy. Preventing sexual assault is mentioned throughout the WPS resolutions not only in the context of policing the actions of perpetrators in distant lands, but in reducing sexual assault at home and particularly in the military, a key agent of foreign policy. Op HONOUR is part of a historical trend of broad policies related to cultural change in the CAF including activities in the 1990s in the CAF responding to the 1989 Canadian Human Rights tribunal ruling requiring full gender integration by 1999, as well as the recent Diversity Strategy. Op HONOUR has not been successfully implemented for at least five reasons (Vivian 1998; Government of Canada 2017c). First, there is a lack of understanding of patterns of cultural change in the CAF. The initial impetus for Op HONOUR was in part Justice Marie Deschamps's 2015 external review of sexual assault in the CAF, which contained ten recommendations to align CAF culture more closely with broader Canadian culture, since the CAF's role is to defend Canadians and Canadian values (Government of Canada 2017b). However, in implementing Op HONOUR, the armed forces continue to use the same approaches as previous

failed CAF attempts at reducing harmful and inappropriate sexual behavior (HISB) without innovation or addressing underlying systemic issues. Furthermore, CAF officials have sometimes attempted to apply civilian or foreign military cultural change models to the CAF through Op HONOUR, which are incompatible with Canadian models of cultural change. Second, and correspondingly, the CAF continues to have a sexualized “warrior culture” among armed forces members. It is nearly impossible to eliminate HISB while still “upholding the warrior ethos.” (Brewster 2019; English 2016) Third, there is a “resource-mission mismatch,” between HISB elimination and the efforts Canada is taking to achieve it. There is a fear of a “check-the-box” mentality with prevention and training not taken seriously or done rigorously enough to ensure the message is learned. Fourth, there is an ineffective recruiting and retention system that feeds the HISB cycle. It is unlikely that the CAF will reach the desired 25% goal of women in the armed forces on the current timeline, continuing the limited pipeline of women in leadership positions and the lack of a critical mass of women in the CAF. Fifth, the reward and promotion system in the CAF is counterproductive. Rather than promoting those who spark effective change or policies that work, the promotion system rewards change for change’s sake. Culture change programs like Op HONOUR are measured by their inputs not outputs, so officers are incentivized to create new systems to get promoted, rather than making existing programs more effective or tackling outcome issues (English 2016).

Consequently, Op HONOUR has not made significant progress (English 2016). The policy is becoming institutionalized despite its lack of accomplishments. Indeed, the Vice Chief of the Defence staff was supposed to have a strategy for Op HONOUR in September 2015, which still has not occurred. Such a policy failure might have been avoided if there had been more of a systematic, overarching strategy for implementation of WPS goals in the CAF. This suggests that a policy that pays increased attention to underlying systemic and cultural issues is needed, with rewards for actual improvements rather than the creation of new policies (English 2016). Judge Marie Deschamps noted in

May 2018 that “not a lot of progress has been made,” regarding Op HONOUR (Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence 2018). By February 2019, seven of Judge Deschamp’s original ten recommendations for the CAF still had not been achieved four years after Op HONOUR’s initial implementation (Brewster 2019). DND’s report that included this update found that while awareness of zero tolerance for sexual harassment has risen, personnel were experiencing “subject matter fatigue,” growing frustrated with the repetition of the same content about sexual assault for several years (Brewster 2019). Consequently, without some change in how policy is reaching members of the armed forces or a shift in tactics, Op HONOUR seems poised for failure, impacting the overall implementation of feminist foreign policy goals. It is much harder to implement other policy changes within the military with the specter of sexual assault and policy failure.

Furthermore, the transition to veteran status deepens the gender gap between men’s and women’s experiences of the military. Veteran programs are a major source of gender disparities, and an important area to improve for full mainstreaming. Female-identifying veterans note that as a result of their efforts to acclimatize to male military culture, they are at odds with civilian culture upon veteran transition. Studies have shown that the Canadian military claims to be gender neutral but is not: gender neutral in the military is the universality of the male experience, and an instrumentalization of the female experience. Women are less likely to report an easy adjustment to civilian life than male servicemembers, have a lower rate of labor force participation even though they hold military occupations that map well onto civilian jobs, are more likely to be engaged in unpaid caregiving, and are more likely to experience a steeper decline in income (Eichler 2016; Tam-Seto and English 2019; von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019). Additionally, female-identifying veterans are more likely to have physical trauma, including but not limited to sexual trauma, PTSD, and homelessness. What can explain these differential outcomes for male and female veterans? Since women often work in service arms, their roles are typically low-

er paying, which results in a lower pension and different representation in the highest levels of the military. The Canadian government must incorporate eliminating these disparities into its idea of a feminist foreign policy in addition to policies for female-identifying persons still in the armed forces (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019).

The CAF has made many positive changes in recent years. Even the implementation of Op HONOUR following the Deschamps Report in 2015 sent a signal that victims of sexual assault in the CAF were seen by their institution, despite the policy's many flaws in practice. However, policies that look nice on paper are not enough to fill the gap between Canada's current implementation of the WPS resolutions through its feminist foreign policy and the obligations of a member states under the resolutions. The following chart contrasts the WPS obligations for member states regarding women in the armed forces between the doctrinal outline in chapter 2 and the on the ground reality in chapter 3. Table 3.4 employs the now familiar five-point scale, with five as near full implementation and one as less than 25%.

As can be seen from the chart, Canada's feminist foreign policy results are mixed regarding women in the military. When it comes to some issues, like contributing peacekeepers, encouraging role-creation for female decisionmakers, or working to protect the rights of women abroad, Canada is trying hard but stagnating. In some areas, Canada's stagnation is actively harmful, like on its inability to reduce sexual assault in its ranks. The obligation from UNSCR 1888 "Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law," is notable. Canada is a global leader on human rights and civil liberties, yet it is failing to preserve the rights of some of those very individuals who protect the rights of others.

... text continued on page 146

Table 3.4

Canadian Women in the Armed Forces and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1960	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on stated goals and attempts	2, women are very few of those deployed, stagnation has set in
2122	"Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular the United Nations predeployment scenario-based training on prevention of sexual and gender-based violence."	4, based on stated goals and attempts	2, women are very few of those deployed in peacekeeping settings too, training success is mixed
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF	2, very few women in leadership in the CAF

Table 3.4, continued

Canadian Women in the Armed Forces and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1888	"Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF	2, women are very few of those deployed in peacekeeping settings too, training success is mixed
1888	"Urges all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence committed by civilians or by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice, and that civilian superiors and military commanders, in accordance with international humanitarian law, use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence, including by combating impunity."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF	2, Op Honour is not effective. There are significant problems in the CAF with sexual violence.
1888, sim in 1960, 2106, 2122	"Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF	2, Op Honour is not effective. There are significant problems in the CAF with sexual violence.

Table 3.4, continued

Canadian Women in the Armed Forces and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	"Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF	2, Op Honour is not effective. There are significant problems in the CAF with sexual violence. However, the CAF strives to protect those it encounters abroad from armed conflict.
1820	"Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police."	4, based on stated goals and attempts in the CAF	2, women are very few of those deployed in peacekeeping settings
1888	"Urges States to undertake comprehensive legal and judicial reforms, as appropriate, in conformity with international law, without delay and with a view to bringing perpetrators of sexual violence in conflicts to justice and to ensuring that survivors have access to justice, are treated with dignity throughout the justice process and are protected and receive redress for their suffering."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF	2, Op Honour is not effective. There are significant problems in the CAF with sexual violence.

Table 3.4, continued

Canadian Women in the Armed Forces and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1960, sim in 1888	"Reaffirming the importance for States, with the support of the international community, to increase access to health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and socio-economic reintegration services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas, and taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF, but the CAF also tries to do this abroad	2, Op Honour is not effective. There are significant problems in the CAF with sexual violence. However, the CAF strives to protect those it encounters abroad from armed conflict.
1960	"Calls upon parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, inter alia, issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable."	3, Op Honour is trying to enforce human rights protections w/in the CAF, but the CAF also tries to do this abroad	2, Op Honour is not effective. There are significant problems in the CAF with sexual violence. However, the CAF strives to protect those it encounters abroad from armed conflict.

Table 3.4, continued

Canadian Women in the Armed Forces and WPS Obligations: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2106	"Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and other women and peace and security commitments in its own work and, in this regard, expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women's participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding and to address sexual violence in conflict, including, <i>inter alia</i> , in the establishment and review of peacekeeping and political mandates, public statements, country visits, fact-finding missions, international commissions of inquiry, consultations with regional bodies and in the work of relevant Security Council sanctions committees."	3, based on stated goals and attempts	2, monitoring and evaluation is a weak area in CAF implementation of WPS aims

Source: Author's compilation.

Increasing the Presence of Women in Parliament and Government Ministries

Recently, Canada has been on an upward trajectory for gender inclusive and representative governance, particularly since the Trudeau government took power in 2015. However, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union ranking of global national governing bodies, Canada scores 59th of 188 countries for percentage of women in the legislature, at 26.9% as of December 2018. The study focused on the primary legislative body of each country, in Canada's case, the House of Commons (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018). While the top one-third of countries is good, it is not outstanding. As outlined in chapter 2, a robust presence for women in all levels of government and executive ministries is key to representative democracy. While domestic women's representation in government is not explicitly a foreign policy aim, it has a direct impact on the foreign policy ultimately created by the state, contributing to feminist foreign policy goals.

Canada has some official policies and plans for increasing the representation of women in government, like a February 2018 \$500,000 investment by Status of Women Canada in women's civic participation in Montréal. The grant was provided to the program MTElles that,

...is a 36-month project which will focus on improving women's civic participation in municipal development initiatives in Montréal. The project's leaders will consult with municipal and community stakeholders, including Montréal's borough roundtables, to develop participative strategies for government engagement that encourage women's civic involvement. Barriers will be examined and solutions will be identified and piloted to allow stakeholders to address the realities women face in Montréal when engaging in municipal development efforts. Opportunities that offer women residents of all ages and backgrounds the chance to influence urban and local development will be developed and tested. (Canon and Waugh 2018)

The MTElles program is a good example of a country choos-

ing to invest in women. However, while Status of Women Canada will nationally share the results of these practices after the study period, this does not constitute a nation-wide effort. Indeed, women in governance programs mostly arise through civil society organizations, they are local, and they are relatively small dollar. Large, nationally funded programs do not exist to facilitate women's representation. Without similar programs in all provinces addressing federal and local issues or a national organization, a gap remains.

While gender quotas do not exist in Canadian politics, the NDP and Liberal Party both set gender targets within their own ranks, a step toward progress (CBC, n.d.). Despite targets, a gap emerges when women do not file into the pipeline toward government service; a target is meaningless if you don't know the people who can help you meet it. The targets depend on the ability of the party to recruit, which is harder if those in power, typically men, do not have women in their networks. Consequently, men are often recruited to fill the slots of other departing men. Former Member of Parliament and Deputy Prime Minister Sheila Copps elaborates, "People try to replicate themselves and their social circle is usually very like-minded. I probably recruited more women in my time because it's human nature," indicating in part that when more women are involved in the recruitment process, more women run for office (CBC, n.d.). Women also tend to be less confident about running for office for a number of reasons, including lack of role models, sexist culture, sexual harassment, and the unclear pipeline to power. Many women do not want to be "tokenized" in politics and instead choose other avenues for activism (CBC, n.d.). The recruitment gap in politics has spillover effects, preventing women from being in the room for important policy discussions impacting all Canadians and people around the world, including on issues relating to UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

As a result, civil society organizations are picking up much of the slack for the government, helping to encourage women to run for office on all sides of the political spectrum, and making their voices heard. Equal Voice, Ask Her, and PoliticsNow are

three organizations striving to create a “trickle up” effect, fostering women candidates who will ultimately reach Ottawa, provincial governments, or city councils and effect change, closing the gender gap (see, for example, Equal Voice, n.d.; Ask Her, n.d.; Politics Now, n.d.). As follows, the Canadian government could be doing more in partnership with these civil society organizations and with Status of Women Canada to close the implementation gap with international gender norms via women’s representation in government. Table 3.5 uses the 1–5 scale to examine the precise depth of the gap, contrasting WPS resolution texts’ scores in chapters 2 and 3.

The chart demonstrates that while Canada is moving in a positive direction with female decisionmakers, particularly with such high level female personnel in the cabinet, there is not gender parity throughout government, influencing the feminist foreign policy and Canada’s ability to cohere with the WPS resolutions.

Incorporation of GENADs and GFPs

GENADs are an important tool in the overall implementation of WPS goals as outlined in several of the WPS resolutions and NATO directives for member states (United Nations 2000; NATO Allied Command Transformation 2016). The presence of highly trained GENADs and GFPs helps with mainstreaming, ensuring a gender perspective is heard. There is a gap between the use of GENADs in Canadian feminist foreign policy and the ideal distribution of these personnel according to international gender norms. As noted in chapter 2, Canada has only three total GENADs, and only one has ever been deployed (Rodrigues 2017). Though the CAF is “work[ing] with partner nations to seek additional opportunities to deploy gender advisors,” the current status of CAF GENAD development is inconsistent with the NATO and UNSCR 1325 and related resolution aim of GENADs participating in broader strategic dialogue and operational planning within member states (Government of Canada 2017b).

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Table 3.5

Women's Representation in Canadian Leadership: Doctrine and Practice Score Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1325	"Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."	4, due to ever-increasing political representation and some key female decision-makers	3, Canada could be taking more national, active steps to implement this WPS aim
1888	"Urges the Secretary General, Member States and the heads of regional organizations to take measures to increase the representation of women in mediation processes and decision-making processes with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding."	4, due to the key placement of female decision-makers and intent to fulfil this obligation	3, Canada could be taking more national, active steps to implement this WPS aim

Table 3.5, continued

Women's Representation in Canadian Leadership: Doctrine and Practice Score Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2242	"Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants."	4, regarding the domestic / international body inclusion section of this WPS obligation	3, Canada could be taking more national, active steps to implement this WPS aim (regarding the domestic / international body inclusion section of this WPS obligation)

Source: Author's compilation.

A further dilemma with the implementation of gender mainstreaming regarding GENADs and GFPs in Canada is that their integration on teams depends heavily on the personality and goals of their chain of command. Furthermore, GENADs are less useful if only consulted near the end of a policy deliberation, they need to be part of more long-term policy discussions. NATO has found that the rate of change for women in the armed forces will increase if leadership at all levels of national governance is committed to increased representation; buy-in is essential (NATO Allied Command Transformation, n.d.; von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019; Shoemaker 2017). GENADs are prevented from fully doing their jobs due to leadership reluctance, which itself is a result of a lack of gender mainstreaming, since the people in leadership have not necessarily been exposed to sufficient gender training or more individuals discussing gender at different levels of an operation. Indeed, NATO studies have found that WPS resolution progress would be more rapidly achieved by establishing an increase of GENAD and GFP posts within different commands, using “gender enablers” in operations (Schuurman 2015). By doing so, it would be significantly easier to implement gender mainstreaming without gaps in GENAD and GFP placement throughout the chain of command. These individuals help form feminist foreign policy infrastructure that has previously been successful in other countries (Schuurman 2015).

Canada has only a few GENADs who are not constantly connected to the larger GENAD community via a network of conferences or practice sharing mechanisms. Some international organizations such as NATO, the EU, OSCE, and the AU hold conferences for GENADs to share best practices and get to know one another, which helps foster information sharing and a sense of community (von Hlatky and Lacoursière 2019). The absence of this practice in Canada through either a weekly phone call or a community gathering of all GENADs and related personnel is a policy gap, since the international organizations find the meetings beneficial to spreading best practices, building a network, and expanding solidarity. Until more Canadian GENADs and GFPs are integrated into the chain of command and have in-

creased institutional backing within the CAF and DND, the gap with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions will remain. The following chart is the last to implement the 1–5 scale to address the depth of the gap between Canada’s feminist foreign policy in a given area, in this instance GENAD/GFP usage, and international gender norms. Table 3.6 again contrasts the doctrine as described in chapter 2 and its implementation as noted here in chapter 3.

The final chart is notable for the exact correspondence between chapters 2 and 3: both demonstrate Canada’s significant implementation flaws regarding GENADS. While Canada aspires to improve its GENAD usage as a means of furthering its feminist foreign policy, in practice this has not happened for many years. The WPS resolutions are explicit about GENAD usage, more so than in other areas of gender mainstreaming, yet Canada is not yet in compliance, a significant gap with international gender norms.

Hypothesis Analysis, Concluding Thoughts, and Next Steps

This chapter has demonstrated that across six different areas, feminist foreign policy doctrinal texts, GBA+, gender training, CAF recruitment, women in government, and GENAD/GPF development, Canada’s feminist foreign policy has implementation gaps with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. Across all six areas, the gaps do not appear for lack of positive intent on behalf of the Canadian government. Rather, they stem from a lack of specificity and direction for those carrying out the policy goals, which has manifested in further problems. In one area, the CAF’s failure to more rapidly achieve its target 25% women could be seen as linked to the lack of widespread gender training that is understood and internalized by CAF and government personnel. This one policy area has many implications, highlighting the interconnected gap between Canada’s policies and international gender norm goals. For example, if leaders crafting

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Table 3.6

Canada's GENADs/GFPs and International Gender Norms: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
1960	"Welcomes the work of gender advisers; looks forward to the appointment of more women protection advisers to peacekeeping missions, in accordance with resolution 1888 (2009); notes their potential contribution in the framework of the monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements to be established pursuant to OP8 of the present resolution."	3, Canada welcomes a growing GENAD presence, but current numbers are low	3, Canada welcomes a growing GENAD presence, but current numbers are low
2106	"Calls for the further deployment of Women Protection Advisors (WPA) in accordance with resolution 1888 to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security and calls upon the Secretary General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the planning and review of each United Nations peacekeeping and political mission, and to ensure that these experts are adequately trained and deployed in a timely manner; and recognizes the role of UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict in facilitating coordinated responses of relevant peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights, political and security actors and emphasizes the need for enhanced coordination, information sharing, analysis, response planning and implementation across these sectors."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, only one ever deployed	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, only one ever deployed

Table 3.6, continued
Canada's GENADs/GFPs and International Gender Norms: Doctrine and Practice Comparison

Res.	Text of obligation	Score Ch. 2	Score Ch. 3
2106	"Recognizes the distinct role of Gender Advisors in ensuring that gender perspectives are mainstreamed in policies, planning and implementation by all mission elements; calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to deploy Gender Advisors to the relevant United Nations peacekeeping and political missions as well as humanitarian operations and to ensure comprehensive gender training of all relevant peacekeeping and civilian personnel."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used
1888	"Decides to include specific provisions, as appropriate, for the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including, on a case-by-case basis, the identification of women's protection advisers (WPAs) among gender advisers and human rights protection units, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation."	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used	2, based on current stated doctrine and usage, they have an important role but not often used

Source: Author's compilation.

recruitment strategies are not fully trained to understand GBA+ and the unique reasons women might or might not join the CAF, it is harder to devise effective implementation plans. The gaps in each of the six fields may in fact be the same gaps manifesting in different ways.

Hypothesis analysis confirms the finding that feminist foreign policy has not yet fully complied with the member state expectations in the WPS resolutions. In chapter 2, this paper found significant positive correspondence with the hypotheses. It is notable then that in the hypothesis analysis below, high correspondence with the hypotheses is also found, but on the opposite end of the hypothesis from what was described in chapter 2:

Hypothesis 1: The more specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable a Canadian policy program's doctrine is, the smaller gap it will have with global WPS norms.

Some of the widest gaps emerged with global WPS norms in areas having to do with measurement and fiscal specificity. In any instance where the WPS resolutions called for measurement and evaluation, Canada had done so in either doctrine only, or was attempting to measure through means that were not capturing the full view of the situation. Furthermore, many of the clearest critiques of Canadian feminist foreign policy doctrine are about finances. Canada does not clearly appropriate funding to many aspects of the feminist foreign policy, and when it does, budgeting is only in a few select areas. Consequently, gaps emerge with global WPS norms. Such gaps correspond with the prediction of hypothesis 1, but in inverse, since there is a larger gap when a Canadian program has a doctrine that is not as specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable. Chapters 2 and 3 represent both ends of the spectrum affirming hypothesis 1, demonstrating the importance of these goals in gaps with global WPS norms.

Hypothesis 2: The more an organizational culture is welcoming of women, the smaller the gap a program will have with global WPS norms.

While GBA+ helps Canada to create both a domestic and a feminist foreign policy agenda across departments that is wel-

coming of women, the GBA+ method and ideology have not yet fully permeated the government of Canada. Specifically, as hard as the CAF has recently tried to integrate women, the culture of the CAF is still hostile to women, even compared to peer countries like Australia. This prevents Canada from meeting many WPS resolution goals, from preventing sexual assault, to deploying more women, and certainly prevents women from being in rooms where decisions are being made. Thus, hypothesis two is affirmed in chapter 3 in the inverse manner as chapter 2, since there is a larger gap with global WPS norms when organizational culture is less welcoming of women.

Hypothesis 3: The more a country actively strives to transmit global WPS norms to its policymakers, civil servants, and soldiers, the smaller the gap it will have global WPS norms.

In chapter 2, compliance with “actively striving” to transmit norms was calculated by taking the average of all scores, a 3.55, and determining that this number indicated that Canada was generally working toward having a small gap with global WPS norms. In chapter 3, the average of all scores is 2.65, significantly lower (0.90), indicating affirmation of the hypothesis yet in a different manner than chapter 2. In chapter 3, a larger gap is demonstrated and less active striving is reflected by the average score, demonstrating continued correspondence with the hypothesis, phrased in its inverse. Furthermore, at various points chapter 3 captures how training programs don’t reach everyone or aren’t effective, individuals who transmit policy like GENADs and GFPs are not often accessible or present, and GBA+ policies are not always implemented. Direct implementation is needed for results.

As can be seen from evaluation charts in both chapters 2 and 3, there is a gap between Canada’s feminist foreign policy and international gender norms, and analyzing these three hypotheses can explain some of that gap. However, though the hypothesis analysis conducted here and in chapter 2 explains much of the contours of the gap between the feminist foreign policy and the WPS resolutions, chapter 4 conducts further hypothesis analy-

sis, studying four additional explanations that correspond with these hypotheses. The chapter seeks to understand why Canada has not achieved feminist foreign policy implementation across all six areas that is more consistent with its obligations under UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. In chapter 4, four causes for these gaps that span all six policy areas and further explain the causal mechanism for the hypotheses are discussed: the culture of the CAF, the policy methodology in Canadian gender mainstreaming documents, the presence of women in leadership roles across the CAF and relevant government bodies, and training accessibility. By studying these causes for the gap, policy-makers will ultimately be better able to implement gender mainstreaming in line with the WPS resolutions.

4. Why the Gap?

UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions outline specific obligations for member states, including representation of women at all levels of policymaking, application of a gender perspective to conflict and peace negotiations, increased support and financing for gender training and corresponding resources, and emphasizing the disproportionate harms to women and girls in conflict zones, including sexual violence. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that while Canada has a series of excellent programs to support gender mainstreaming across its military and defence sectors, there is far to go for Canada to fully meet these WPS resolution member state obligations.

This chapter analyzes the current size of that gap between implementation and goal. Chapters 2 and 3 addressed the hypotheses, with chapter 2 noting positive compliance with the hypothesis and chapter 3 following the hypotheses in the other direction. However, chapter 4 looks at four causal mechanisms for the gap between Canadian feminist foreign policy and the WPS resolutions outside of the hypotheses, yet in line with the hypotheses' predictions. By understanding the gap, policymakers can assess how to create new policies moving toward closing the divide. This is a crucial step that is often missing in analysis. Frequently, there is awareness of a gap, but not awareness of the contours of the gap. The chapter is divided into five sections to better understand this phenomenon. Each of four factors that contribute to the gap in policy implementation is assessed and analyzed in a

section. These are the culture of the CAF, the policy methodology in Canadian gender mainstreaming documents, the presence of women in leadership roles across the CAF and relevant government bodies, and the accessibility of training. Finally, chapter conclusions and next steps for the paper are presented.

CAF Culture

Perhaps the single biggest impediment to further strides toward the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions in Canadian feminist foreign policy is cultural resistance in the CAF. The CAF has historically struggled with efforts to change its culture, as well as experienced challenges in the recent past during the “rape epidemic” of the late 1990s. At that time, education and training programs aimed at preventing sexual assault in the military did not have their desired effect (Bruyee 2017; English 2016). Allan English, a leading scholar on culture in the Canadian military, provides a definition of culture from organizational behavior literature to guide understanding of this issue, stating that culture is, “the values, attitudes and beliefs which provide people with a common way of interpreting events.” He elaborates that no organizational culture is static, is always part of other larger cultures and can always shift in response to various societal pressures (English 2004, 15). While there is no one definition of Canadian military culture, since the CAF is made up of so many different sub-groups and has changed significantly over time, many scholars choose to narrow their focus to the prevailing culture in the CAF, the dominant Army culture, so this paper makes the same choice in line with the literature (McKay and Swift 2012; English 2011). Scholar Peter Kasurak notes that there are two recent views of CAF culture: “traditionalist,” which focuses on the “warrior ethos” and “fighting spirit” of the military and “modernist,” which focuses on a CAF more in line with the rest of Canadian society, engaged in broad national security policy (Kasurak 2011, 96–97). For UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions to be successfully implemented in Canada, it

would be extremely helpful if the modernist culture prevailed.

However, while some aspects of modernist culture appear to preside over culture in the CAF, with one study finding that the CAF had advantages over US troops in coalition operations because CAF culture fostered collaboration and was self-deprecating, multicultural, and highly competent, traditionalist culture is not gone from Canada (Sharpe and English 2006). There are several aspects of CAF military culture that render the organization resistant to change, and in particular change welcoming increased women to the forces, gender mainstreaming in operational policy, and women in higher levels of leadership. A 2015 annex to the "Canadian Army Integrated Performance Strategy" entitled "Concepts of the Canadian Army Warrior Culture" codified the historically male view of a warrior as important to the modern CAF (Canadian Army Integrated Performance Strategy 2015). Studies have found a prominent, traditional "warrior ethos" in Canada, and policy measures will be necessary to achieve culture change in this area, closing the gap with international gender norms (Deschamps 2015).

There are several primary reasons why the warrior culture contributes to a WPS resolution implementation gap in Canadian feminist foreign policy. First, the mindset of the CAF is to deal with items of operational importance above all else, and gender-based issues are often shunted to the side, viewed as less pressing than other matters. Allan English elaborates on how CAF operational culture has historically taken precedence over making changes that would shape the force into a more welcoming environment for women:

As General Vance stated in a recent article, a major reason for past failures in addressing the problems of inappropriate sexual behaviour in the CAF over the past 25 years has been the lack of accurate data concerning ongoing change programs. While certainly true, a more compelling reason for the failures may be that, as he acknowledged, operations take priority over "non-operational imperatives," and since at least the early-1990s operational priorities have consistently derailed initiatives like Operation Honour. Furthermore, much of the education related to ethics and

the profession of arms implemented post-1998 has been curtailed or reduced due to budget cuts, undermining Operation Honour's call to "enhance education and training" related to sexual harassment and assault. (English 2016)

Thus, the CAF's focus on operational procedures before other policy initiatives may have held back important changes for women over the past 20 years. This is not just about Op HONOUR. Rather, a larger series of changes that may have made the CAF more welcoming to women were not taken, a missed opportunity. This is seen as a "teeth-versus-tail" problem: resources are funneled toward what the military deems essential, the CAF's operational "teeth," which can be at the expense of support functions, the "tail." (Gebicke and Magid 2010; Wells 2011; Schwartz 2012) While outwardly this may make sense, missions are a priority, such operations may have been even more successful if conducted by, led by, or planned by an increasingly diverse group of individuals, demonstrating the importance of culture change initiatives to operational success. As Stéfanie von Hlatky and Meaghan Shoemaker have noted, "Although adding more women will not result in immediate and transformative changes in the way the CAF does business, research has shown that diverse teams work better." (von Hlatky and Shoemaker 2017) Policies to support women and families in the CAF should not take a backseat: they help the overall organization achieve its goals (Eichler 2016). Furthermore, the CAF cannot exist as a successful organization without both teeth and a tail. For example, programs like enhanced data collection are important performance enablers, without which the military would be less successful (Campbell and Velasco 2002; Brooks 2012). Still, the "bureaucratization" of the military is seen as an impediment by many to operational success, so military tasks that are not expressly phrased as operational, like gender mainstreaming, face resistance, creating a UNSCR 1325 and related resolution implementation gap (English 2004).

Second, in the post-9/11 era, CAF contact with the American military has heightened focus on operational masculinity, rather than Canada's historic role as a peacekeeper, a shift that has

contributed to a military culture less welcoming to women (English 2015). This process did not occur overnight. Historically, Canada's soldiers were largely invisible to the public. However, recent years have seen a significant change in military visibility, with soldiers marching in the open and public praise for the CAF. Some argue that baby boomers are responsible for this shift: as they become older, they are becoming more conservative, and growing more appreciative of the military, particularly in light of 9/11 (Valpy 2018). However, 9/11 is not the only factor in this equation. Since the shame of the 1993 Somalia affair when Canadian forces beat a Somali teenager to death and leadership attempted a coverup, the CAF has participated in a number of operations that have publicly bolstered its image, such as assisting with the Saguenay River flood disaster, the Kosovo bombing, and the war in Afghanistan (Capstick 2016; Sedra 2011). Sociologist Trevor Harrison has argued that because of Canada's small population, the death of soldiers in Afghanistan felt personal, and tied the nation more closely to the military (Valpy 2018). Furthermore, Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff from 2005 to 2008, connected the military to Canadian nationalism and elevated the status of the CAF as "warriors." (Fremeth 2010)

While outwardly General Hillier's work helped shift the perception of the military in Canada to increased public acceptance of combat after decades with a peacekeeper identity, his work within the military shifted its culture increasingly toward the warrior ideal (Lane 2017). Michael Valpy of *The Globe and Mail* elaborates on the connections between this identity transition and the CAF connection to the US military:

Mr. Hillier has rejected suggestions that he and other officers are creating a Canadian military culture that looks increasingly American. Yet as University of Lethbridge's Prof. Harrison points out, many of them have gone to Fort Hood, Tex., for training and served with U.S. military units, inching Canada toward an integrated officer corps. (Valpy 2018)

Furthermore, within the US military, there has been a recent push toward American military culture above American civilian

culture, “emphasizing truth, duty, and honour,” which would have impacted Canadian troops stationed alongside their American peers, transmitting the ideals of the warrior culture (Valpy 2018). Additionally, while General Hillier was Chief of the Defence Staff, he actively sought to replace what he saw as a bureaucratic and managerial culture with a warrior culture that he thought was more fitting for fighting in Afghanistan. This culture, in turn, was hyper-masculine and while it is not solely focused on combat efficiency, it emphasizes the ideal warrior, a man (Taber 2009; Fremeth 2010; Gosselin 2015). UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions are significantly more challenging to implement as part of Canadian feminist foreign policy when the current ideals of the armed forces are both a) a being influenced by outside groups emphasizing masculine warrior culture and b) deviating from historic peacekeeping norms that are perhaps more welcoming to women.

Third, the warrior culture of the military is overwhelmingly masculine and sexualized, and contributes to an atmosphere where sexual assault is tolerated. Changing CAF culture to be more welcoming to women and to facilitate the implementation of WPS resolution-appropriate policies is challenging regardless of the context. However, the CAF culture currently emphasizes the idea of the masculine warrior, in contrast to the goals of the feminist foreign policy and international gender norms (Eichler 2016). While General Hillier’s promotion of warrior culture in Afghanistan contributed to this cultural development, it has a longer history. In the 1990s, some groups within the US military promoted hypermasculinity, in part to justify the exclusion of LGBTQ individuals from the troops, as well as to limit the role of women in the forces. As follows, this culture reinforced gender stereotypes that included the sexualization of women and LGBTQ members of the military. The CAF has recently emulated this hyper-masculine warrior culture, and as Nancy Taber (2018, 105) has noted, “There must be a deconstruction of the concepts of militarized masculinities and femininities, as well as of how they are performed and valued...This calls for the CAF’s warrior narrative itself to be problematized, not just for members to re-

spect each other. It is a long-term project and is one that should have begun years ago.” Indeed, when Judge Marie Deschamps first published her report on sexual assault in the CAF in 2015, the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time, Tom Lawson, argued that Deschamps’s conclusion that sexual harassment was part of CAF culture was incorrect (Canada Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2015). Deschamps’s findings about sexualized culture were not trivial. She found that the CAF culture was:

...characterized by the frequent use of swear words and highly degrading expressions that reference women’s bodies, sexual jokes, innuendos, discriminatory comments with respect to the abilities of women, and unwelcome sexual touching. Cumulatively, such conduct creates an environment that is hostile to women and LGBTQ members, and is conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault. (Deschamps 2015)

It was not until the second official CAF response to the Deschamps Report by Lawson’s successor, General Jonathan Vance that Deschamps’s conclusions were taken seriously enough to merit a policy response with Op HONOUR’s “mission” to change the acknowledged “sexualized culture” in the CAF (Chief of the Defence Staff 2015). Yet, even in Op HONOUR, there are not clear details about how to achieve culture change, decrease sexual violence, and welcome women in the military. Notably, the “mission” is supposed to be leadership driven, and leaders should receive training on HHSB prevention and handling sexual assault cases, yet the chain of command can be a part of the problem in the first place, and there are not details on how this specific kind of training will work (Deschamps 2015). In the past when the CAF has operationally prioritized cultural shifts and integrating diverse voices, it has achieved some success, such as at the end of the 1990s, suggesting that this cultural problem is neither intractable nor permanent (Taber 2017). However, such steps must be taken again for policies like Op HONOUR to work, lest the gap remains between Canada’s feminist foreign policy and full implementation of international gender norms through the WPS

UN resolutions. One can't achieve gender mainstreaming across policy if to do so is mutually exclusive with the dominant organizational culture.

The CAF is not the only department within the Canadian government that needs to create new policies or modify old ones in order to implement the member state obligations of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. However, it is an important one, since the resolutions primarily deal with gender in conflict situations and the CAF is the spear of the Canadian government in conflict. If such an important institution has a persistent impediment to gender mainstreaming, its culture that tacitly tolerates sexual harassment, hyper-masculinity, and a warrior ideal that excludes women, Canada cannot fully close the gap and implement the Resolution. The current culture of the CAF makes women less likely to join, less likely to stay, and less likely to make it up the leadership ranks. Some of the higher aims of the WPS resolutions, like women involved in all peace negotiations can't occur if these lower level cultural problems are not fixed. Allan English summarizes the overarching difficulty of cultural shift:

Changing an organization's culture can be difficult, however, because assumptions – the deepest level of culture – are unconscious, and it also means that they are frequently “nonconfrontable and nondebatable.” Moreover, culture is often deeply ingrained, and the behavioural norms that manifest the culture are well learned; therefore, members must unlearn the old norms before they can learn new ones. As a result, cultures generally change slowly, with change usually measured over years and decades. (English 2015, 125)

Thus, CAF cultural resistance to inclusive change may pose a consistent impediment to gender policy success in the Canadian defence and foreign policy establishment. While to some extent the “warrior culture” will likely be a part of any military, some form of cultural shift or accommodation to render women part of the definition of warrior will be necessary to close the gap with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

The challenges of cultural change outlined here in Section 4.1

are directly in line with hypothesis two, and explain why various aspects of the hypothesis are affirmed in chapters 2 and 3. Hypothesis two states “the more an organizational culture is welcoming of women, the smaller the gap a program will have with global WPS norms.” While, as chapter 2 points out, Canadian foreign policy outwardly has a feminist dynamic and doctrine, as chapter 3 elaborates, there are serious reasons to doubt this has made its way to implemented practice. The analysis here in chapter 4 explains the dynamic of organizational culture change operating in the background to the detriment of the WPS agenda.

Gender Mainstreaming Policy Methodology

There are several methodological flaws contributing to a gap in the feminist foreign policy implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions vs. the ideal member state. Policy methodology affects policy implementation, and is often the root of a problem. There are four categories of methodology flaws that are linked to this gap: the strategies employed by the policies, the structure of CAF promotions, specificity and budget issues, and the conflation of “women” and “gender.” The latter is a broad methodology issue impacting much of 1325-connected policy across the globe.

First, gender mainstreaming and related issues, like sexual assault prevention, are challenging programs to implement that require creative and non-linear solutions, yet many policies surrounding these issues treat them like they are problems that can be solved with classical, military linear thinking. Allan English studies culture change operations in the military, and notes that the methodology for implementing gender-based programming like Op HONOUR has been linear, which is not how the issue actually manifests. He writes:

The biggest shortcoming of “Operation Honour,” in my view, is its methodology. Like previous CAF culture initiatives, it is a linear plan trying to address a “wicked” social problem. As a variant of the standard military Operational Planning Process (OPP),

Operation Honour is designed to address “difficult” problems that are linear in nature and that can be addressed by a step-by-step solution process. However, parts of the current CAF culture change challenge are what are called “wicked” problems, that is social or cultural problems which must be addressed in a non-linear fashion due to incomplete or contradictory knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, and the interconnected nature of these problems with other problems. Therefore, Operation Honour’s step-by-step, four phase “conduct of operations” culminating in a static “end state” is not conducive to addressing complex “wicked” problems like culture change, that by definition is fluid with no fixed end state. (English 2016)

Op HONOUR is not the only policy like this, and while Allan English does not explicitly apply his work to UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, Op HONOUR is a program directly connected to Canada’s attempt to implement the resolutions and to the feminist foreign policy. Indeed, the implementation aims of the C-NAP on WPS for 2017–2022 are written in yearly stages with goals to be achieved by certain dates in succession, which in some instances does not comply with the suggested nonlinear structure for cultural problems (Government of Canada 2017b). A policy methodology appropriate for the cultural context of the issues these plans seek to address would help to close the gap between Canada’s feminist foreign policy implementation and the WPS resolutions.

Second, for members of the military to get promoted, they often continually reinvent the proverbial policy wheel, which is inefficient and does not create long-term solutions. The CAF promotion system rewards change for the sake of change, which has created a series of policies that are continuously replaced before they are seen through, not well implemented, and insufficiently well thought out. Policies related to gender mainstreaming such as the diversity strategy and Op HONOUR are examples of this phenomenon. Allan English explains how the promotion system works regarding the creation of new programs:

The CAF’s reward system encourages haste in starting some sort of activity on a project over deliberate planning. During their two

to three year tenure in command positions, leaders must demonstrate that they have initiated change, but rarely are they held accountable for those change initiatives that fail because they have moved on to other positions – often promoted for their initial “energy” in getting something started. The current reward system also encourages every new leader to produce their own “vision” and strategy for change or innovation, which, as often as not, disrupts whatever change process is underway. There is no incentive to review an ongoing or previous change to assess its relevance, rather than start anew. (English 2016)

This problem has been studied specifically in the context of gender integration, and it was found that the CAF’s annual performance evaluations did not sufficiently reward efforts to mainstream gender (English 2016). Thus, there is a gap in CAF implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions as part of the feminist foreign policy in part because the structure of the CAF promotion system inherently cannot close the gap if leadership must reinvent the wheel every few years. The posting cycle also exacerbates this problem. Since personnel are constantly moved around every few years, there is a lack of institutional knowledge about what has worked or been tried before in a given unit, ensuring that efforts to change gender policies or continue successful ones will be disrupted (English 2016). Furthermore, the posting cycle and the incentive to create new policies for promotions prevents succession planning. Some CAF personnel have suggested that all organizational policy change must take place on three-year cycles to be completed by one leader. However, this prevents policy continuity, true integrated change, and long-term strategic planning (English 2016).

Third, and related to the problems caused by promotion incentives, many gender policies in Canada lack specificity and clear budgeting. The “what” of policies is apparent, but the “how” is often lacking (English 2016). Lack of specificity and budget problems are apparent in several policies already described in this paper, such as criticism of the 2017–2022 C-NAP’s implementation plan by individuals from WPSN-C like Diana Sarosi and Margaret Capelazo in Section 3.1 who describe how the report lacks a

specific budget, as well as a policy plan with specifics beyond repeated use of buzzwords (Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2018). However, the C-NAP is not the only 1325-connected policy in Canada that has this same methodological issue. Allan English describes how lack of specificity manifests within Op HONOUR:

Culture change is only mentioned twice in the document, but it is supposed to be “leadership-driven” and leaders are to receive “clear direction and training” on “how to better direct and effect culture change throughout the institution.” As of yet, no concrete details have been given about the specifics of the change leaders are to initiate or how they might address the source of inappropriate sexual behaviour in the CAF, the underlying sexualized culture of the CAF. (English 2016)

Without a direct plan or budgeting like in the case of the C-NAP, it is unclear how personnel should implement a broad policy. This leads to stagnant progress on initiatives like Op HONOUR, failing to advance toward a Canadian foreign policy establishment more welcoming to women. The lack of a specific process also makes the methodology of gender mainstreaming less measurable and transparent, further increasing the difficulty of policy transformation (English 2016). UNSCR 1325 is a many-pronged resolution, engaging with a diverse range of issues for women in international security. Expanding the roles of women in the CAF, increasing security for women in conflict zones, and broadening consideration of women’s needs in international agreements are just some of the goals of the WPS resolutions.

Finally, a possible cause of the feminist foreign policy gap with 1325 and the related resolutions comes from the methodological stereotyping of women as inhabiting certain roles in the foreign policy establishment. On the ground, a challenge with implementing Resolution 1325 at NATO is that “gender” and “women” are conflated, leading to a gap between “operational stuff” and “female stuff.” Within the Alliance, individuals tasked with implementing Resolution 1325 have developed ways around this problem (Kennedy 2016). Lieutenant Colonel Keirsten Kennedy,

a scholar of UNSCR 1325, presents one interview with an individual whose strategy for 1325 implementation at NATO is interesting:

Here [at NATO] we are also about gender awareness, why is it important for operations and not only female stuff, because female stuff they are not interested in. They are interested in operational issues, so you make the link . . . I think it is important that we deliver something that is of interest to them . . . how to implement it [gender] in the operational planning process that is something that is sexy for them, the operational thing. (Kennedy 2016)

For this individual, she had to sell gender as operationally useful in order to garner male buy-in to the program. It is true that women's presence can provide operations with important and operationally helpful perspectives, but using this fact as the only selling point demeans women's experiences. Similarly, having "male champions" promoting gender mainstreaming to other men since hypothetically that is the only reason a man will listen reinforces the idea that men don't want women in positions of authority (Kennedy 2016). It is important to know that these practices are occurring in order to take what is good about them to use in true best practices. For example, one can have mixed gender teams delivering information. Additionally, one can mention women's capacity-building potential. Yet, this shouldn't be emphasized at the expense of equality and representation. This isn't just a methodological flaw at NATO, it is present in Canadian decision-making around gender as well (von Hlatky 2014).

All four methodological impediments to the implementation of international gender norms in Canada's feminist foreign policy further affirm hypothesis one, which states, "the more specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable a Canadian policy program's doctrine is, the smaller gap it will have with global WPS norms." The methodological issues outlined above contributing to the feminist foreign policy gap with the WPS resolutions are all contributing factors to why the policies are not as specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable as they ideally could be, among other issues. Without methodological improvement, gaps will persist.

Visible Women in Leadership

While Canada has been steadily increasing its women in leadership in Parliament, notably in Prime Minister Trudeau's gender equal Cabinet, and there has been a slow increase in women in the legislature, the presence of women in the CAF and particularly in CAF leadership roles is both minute and slow to change. This poses a significant problem for the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. As Allan English describes, "A critical component of changing culture through demographic change is altering the composition of the leadership cadre, because leader selection and development systems are key to successful culture change, in that 'like tends to promote like' in the officer hierarchy." (English 2016)

Notably, the CAF has not fostered women in the pipeline to leadership to help change this culture. The percentage of new female recruits in the CAF regular force and primary reserve was the same in 2015 as it was in 1998, 15%, while the percentage of women in basic training dropped from 16% to 13% in the three years between 2008 and 2011 (English 2016). Officer candidates have become increasingly male in recent years as well, falling from 23% women to 17% women between 2004 and 2015. As of 2015, only 5% of general officers and 4.5% of senior appointments were female, in contrast to 9.6% in 2007 (English 2016). One of the main sources of female officers, the Royal Military College of Canada, has also seen a decrease in the proportion of women cadets, with enrollment of female students declining from around 27% of the student body in 1999 to 18% in 2013 (English 2016). Sexual harassment as a "rite of passage" and "sexual assault an ever-present risk" were cited as perhaps the primary reasons for this decline (Deschamps 2015).

The chain of command is responsible for fostering future leaders and implementing the full gambit of gender policies, in addition to running missions. However, among female troops there is broad lack of trust in the chain of command to effect change in areas related to the WPS resolutions, particularly the prevention of sexual harassment. This is a significant feminist policy hurdle.

Judge Marie Deschamps elaborates in her comprehensive 2015 report on the CAF:

Underlying all of these reasons is a clear lack of trust in the chain of command, deep scepticism that the system will be responsive to complaints of sexual harassment, and a lack of confidence that leaders will do anything to prevent the negative impact of harassment on members. Interviewees deplored the lack of accountability of those in the chain of command who are responsible for supporting members and protecting their well-being. Too many participants expressed the view that the chain of command is mostly interested in protecting itself from the negative effect of a complaint on the reputation of leaders in the unit, and is less concerned with protecting the well-being of complainants. These difficulties translate into a leadership problem. (Deschamps 2015)

Op HONOUR has thus far not successfully addressed these problems, demonstrating a continued leadership challenge (Taber 2017). Leadership within the chain of command is key to fostering buy-in for organization-wide initiatives. Yet, as Stéfanie von Hlatky and Meaghan Shoemaker elaborate, “broad-based buy-in [for diversity strategies in the military] has proven elusive in the past. Even if no formal professional barriers remain, there is still organizational resistance to women’s presence in non-traditional roles, such as combat. And women are still disproportionately affected by sexual misconduct, as a recent survey showed. Discriminatory and sexist attitudes, thus, persist.” (von Hlatky and Shoemaker 2014) Studies show that even if most people buy into a system, a small number of toxic leaders can have a “disproportionately negative effect on their organization.” (English 2017) Since some of the harmful attitudes and behavior toward women in the military come from within the chain of command and there is already deep mistrust of top-down culture change programs in the military, there is significant skepticism of some of the leadership implementing gender policy in the CAF (English 2017). Thus, the current, largely male leadership is perpetuating stagnation in gender policy implementation in the armed forces, since buy-in has not fully occurred. Challenges attracting and retaining more women in visible positions of leadership in the

CAF is a crucial gap in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions in Canadian feminist foreign policy.

This gap is unlikely to vanish any time soon without policy changes. Women are less likely than men to join the CAF in the first place, so substantial targeted recruitment would be necessary. The CAF already has some of the world's best parental-leave policies, but could always improve its assistance programs, particularly for single parents and those with young children. Since joining the military is hard on any family, with frequent moves and time away from loved ones, policies to help lighten these burdens might also help to close the gender gap in the military and therefore work towards closing the overall UNSCR 1325-connected implementation gap. Women are also often held back from promotions since parental leave time doesn't count toward advancement. Women are disproportionately the primary caregiver taking leave in a family, further impacting the lack of women in the leadership pipeline (von Hlatky and Shoemaker 2014). The WPS resolutions call for women to take part in all places where decisions are being made, but even with the excellence of some CAF policies, that is not currently occurring in the highest levels of leadership.

In Parliament and in provincial governments, Canada is moving toward progress, with an increasing number of female legislators. However, as noted in Section 3.5, women still feel higher barriers to entry than men for running for office, with challenges raising money, meeting party elites who might encourage them to run, and feeling confident enough to run in the first place (CBC, n.d.). Once in office, female parliamentarians often feel that there is an "old boys club" culture, which can be sexist and exclusive (CBC, n.d.). Efforts at ameliorating these problems, along with perhaps more radical steps in recruitment and expectations for gender-diverse candidates from political parties are necessary to close the gap with Canadian women's leadership in government and international gender norms. While men can be wonderful advocates for gender mainstreaming, women's voices in the legislature are crucial to ensure that the perspective of women on all matter of issues, particularly those related to defence, security,

and international affairs, are heard (University of Waterloo, n.d.).

All three hypotheses are variously affirmed by the importance of female leadership. Hypothesis one discusses the importance of strong policy planning via measurability and sound fiscal planning to reduce gaps with global WPS norms, but the ability to do that in part depends on who is in the room making such decisions in the first place; women offer important decision-making perspectives on feminist foreign policy. This is similar to how the lack of women in leadership is connected to the affirmation of hypothesis three, about actively striving to transmit WPS norms to policymakers. Unfortunately, women have often become the primary messengers for the WPS agenda, and without sufficient individuals in positions of power, there could be fewer individuals “actively striving” for WPS, contributing to an implementation gap. Finally, hypothesis two deals with organizational cultures that welcome women, indicating that those that do are more likely to have a small WPS norm gap. Indeed, the lack of women in leadership articulated here in Section 4.3 contributes to challenges in organizational culture, a cause for the widening of the WPS implementation gap.

Training Accessibility

Unlike in some other policy areas, where an implementation flaw may be just that, challenges with training can pose a systemic gender mainstreaming issue in Canada. Training allows all actors to better implement the feminist foreign policy, as well as to understand why it is important that they participate in the project of gender mainstreaming through UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. As described in Section 3.3, Canada has gaps in the actualization of its gender training programs, notably in terms of *all* members of government and the armed forces being able to access high quality training, as opposed to online only, “check-the-box” type training.

Training given briefly online to all as a “check-the-box” exercise does not provide sufficient nuanced understanding to be

considered as part of adopting a gendered perspective under the WPS resolutions. The training that is accessible to many personnel, like SHARP, was deemed a “failure” by some academics and practitioners because it did not provide personnel with tools to advance in the ranks and its teachings were often ignored (English 2016). In contrast, a two-week GENAD training in Sweden is very high quality and provides all necessary information about being a good gender advocate, but it is accessible to only a few Canadians a year. Since this training is unavailable to most, it is not particularly helpful at advancing overall national 1325 goals, despite its high quality (Swedish Armed Forces 2018).

Training is one of the primary sources of buy-in for gender policy. Yet, even when personnel attend standard professional military education (PME) with gender as the subject, for example, at the Canadian Forces College, there is not typically a “how” section, teaching the implementation of the transformation strategy (English 2016). This gap, along with the failure to connect PME to policy continuity and succession planning contributes to a lack of buy-in among senior leadership for feminist foreign policy as a whole and policies connected to the WPS resolutions in particular. Moreover, there is a perception that experience in the field is more useful and valued than PME. Some senior officers do not want to spend several months at the Canadian Forces College, for example, when they could be gaining operational experience, which would be more heavily rewarded by the military through both the promotion system and the “warrior culture.” (English 2015) PME is one of the main occasions for extensive gender education, and if it is not a priority among the officer corps, particularly in terms of the promotion system, then there are structural impediments to learning about UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

Without both civilian and military personnel being consistently provided with access to high quality gender training, preferably in person, Canada’s implementation of feminist foreign policy grounded in international gender norms will suffer (Banna 2014; Muilenburg and Berge 2005; Perry, Kulik, and Schmidtke 1998). All policy implementation is predicated upon personnel

understanding both the “how” and “why” of what they are doing, which is not possible without strong training programs fostering buy-in. To close the feminist foreign policy gap with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions, Canada must improve the accessibility of its best training programs.

Problems with training implementation offer further evidence confirming hypothesis three, “the more a country actively strives to transmit global WPS norms to its policymakers, civil servants, and soldiers, the smaller the gap it will have with global WPS norms.” Training is the primary means by which a state transmits internal norms to the individuals who will implement and carry out top level policy decisions. Without a training program that adequately conveys the norms the state hopes all policy-implementing individuals understand, it has not reached a level of active striving that will lead to a small gap with the WPS resolutions, in line with the analysis of hypothesis three in chapter 3.

Conclusion and Next Steps

Canada is a global women’s rights leader. It has led the charge for international human rights of all kinds, with writer Nicholas Kristof recently noting that Canada was, “emerging as a moral leader of the free world,” stepping up when no other country is in a position to guide the liberal world order (Kristof 2019). However, despite Canada’s well-deserved praise for its significant reforms, policies with their spirit in the right place, and national attention on issues of equality, gaps remain between Canada’s feminist foreign policy and the ideal UN member state’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions.

These gaps are in four main areas. First, the culture of the CAF is premised upon an outdated warrior culture, which is hostile to women and challenging to shift. Second, gender mainstreaming policy is often harmfully tied to military promotions, policy methodology is not specific, and gender mainstreaming does not receive a line item budget, posing significant implementation challenges. Furthermore, scholars criticize policy methodology

surrounding UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions for the characterization of women in conflict. Third, in the CAF but also in Parliament and provincial governments, there are insufficient women in leadership serving as role models and who can break down the aforementioned problematic culture. Finally, strong gender training programs are not accessible to all personnel, many of whom only receive “check-the-box” style training programs.

Further hypothesis analysis in chapter 4 confirms the hypothesis analysis conducted in chapters 2 and 3. While chapters 2 and 3 focused on hypothesis analysis via the results of the evaluative mechanism, this chapter has studied the hypotheses in the context of other possible causes of the gap between Canada’s implementation of its feminist foreign policy and the WPS UN resolutions. These four additional factors related directly to the causal mechanisms studied in the hypotheses, adding additional explanatory force.

Knowledge of the gap is useful for policymakers to formulate future feminist foreign policy best practices. Without understanding why Canada has not yet successfully achieved full implementation of the WPS resolutions via the feminist foreign policy, it is impossible to create adequate solutions to these problems. In the following chapter this paper offers avenues for future research, policy implications, and overall conclusions.

5. Conclusion

Canada is a world leader on women's rights. Yet even world leaders can improve their practices, particularly in terms of gender-based foreign and military policy. This paper investigated the question "Is Canada's implementation of a feminist foreign policy aligning with international WPS standards, and why might a gap have emerged between the two?" UN resolutions dealing with WPS issues serve as a proxy measure for international gender standards in this paper's analysis. Studying a coding mechanism of UN member state obligations in contrast to feminist foreign policy doctrine and implementation found some misalignment between Canada and international norms. Furthermore, Canada's feminist foreign policy implementation gap with the women, peace, and security resolutions stems from cultural issues within its defence establishment that remains hostile to women, uneven access to gender training, policy methodology problems, and insufficient women in leadership. Still, Canada's official feminist foreign policy is a major step toward UNSCR 1325 goals, and allows the country a platform to improve its implementation of the WPS resolutions in a manner that few other states possess. Additionally, Canada's policies for women and families in the armed forces are more flexible than in most nations, there is currently a gender-equal Cabinet, and GBA+ is an excellent methodology that is increasingly applied to policies across the country. A gap with UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions remains, but if any country can one day fully implement the resolutions, it is Canada.

This paper evaluated the gap between Canada's feminist foreign policy and the WPS resolutions across four previous chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the paper's topic literature, methodology, and structure. Chapter 2 outlines the doctrinal status of Canadian feminist foreign policy, as well as positive aspects of implementation. Chapter 3 highlights implementation flaws between the feminist foreign policy and international gender norms. Finally, chapter 4 analyzes the main sources of the gap identified in chapters 2 and 3.

In both chapters 2 and 3, an evaluation mechanism using qualitative coding was applied to better understand the contours of the gap between Canadian feminist foreign policy and UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions. The code scored Canada using a one to five scale on almost all member state obligations contained in the eight WPS resolutions. Those obligations not scored had almost the same wording as another resolution that was scored. A five reflected "virtually all significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability," while a one represented, "less than 25% significant particulars are implemented to the best of the state's ability." Canada's average score in chapter 2 was 3.55 while in chapter 3 Canada scored an average of 2.65. These scores reflect that on face, Canada's feminist foreign policy doctrine is strong and attempts to comply with international gender norms, but in practice, there are significant gaps.

Indeed, throughout this paper, three hypotheses were tested to assess why a gap might be occurring between Canada's feminist foreign policy and the WPS resolutions. The hypotheses considered that "specific, fiscally appropriated, and measurable" policy, an organizational culture that welcomed women, and making a proactive effort to transmit norms to policymaking and policy implementing personnel would all contribute to a smaller gap with global WPS norms. Both the explicit text of the hypotheses as well as their inverses, that when the conditions they describe are not met then there is a larger gap, are affirmed in the paper. In addition, chapter 4 provides further causal analysis, studying additional reasons for the gap, all of which fall under the hypotheses and further exemplify their explanatory force.

Future research on Canada's implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions through feminist foreign policy should focus on deriving new best practices based on the gaps identified in this paper, as well as taking best practices from other countries and international organizations and applying them to the Canadian context. One research project based on this paper could investigate the best reforms to professional military education (PME) to ensure officer buy-in to gender mainstreaming policy. PME is a source of understanding and motivation for officers who have taken the training, so small changes to PME could have large benefits. Another research project could study specific recruitment tools targeted at raising the 15% of women currently in the CAF to the 25% goal. This is particularly important work because other studies have shown that cultural change does not occur without a critical mass, so this may be a precursor to larger steps filling the gap. While there are some existing research projects about what kind of advertisements for the CAF are most effective at reaching women, a project with a larger scope is better suited to meet this challenge. Research on these and other projects is ripe for exploration. Canada should work on methods to improve its gender training programs, in particular expanding in-person, detailed training to more personnel. Flaws in the delivery of training may be the root cause of some of the other gaps in UNSCR 1325 and related resolution implementation. Additionally, future research on feminist foreign policy could build upon the evaluation mechanism established in this paper. Conducting some of the same research on this data, but using a more clearly established codebook and several coders could more finely tune where the gaps are in feminist foreign policy implementation, helping Canada to even more specifically improve its policies by extending this exercise.

Notably, there are several member state obligations in the UN resolutions that are not addressed at all in Canadian feminist foreign policy doctrine, or are addressed only in passing. Such obligations include considering gender when making decisions about economic sanctions and in conducting land mine clearance. Canada scored a "two" on fulfilling these obligations,

since while some other policy area may address that international gender policy aim or that such an aim is implicitly addressed, there was either no or limited lip service paid to these obligations considered important by the international community. Another area of future research for policymakers would be to consider how Canada could better fulfill its obligations to implement these goals, either through explicit inclusion in existing doctrine or new policymaking.

Apart from new research projects, there are several steps Canada could implement more quickly to close the gap between feminist foreign policy and 1325 and the related resolutions. Promotions in the CAF ought to be separated from the creation of programming related to gender mainstreaming, since this prevents policies from having a long lasting, monitored impact. Additionally, future policy proposals ought to be more specific in terms of individual goals and budgeting. This will allow those implementing the policies a fuller understanding of exactly what they are trying to achieve. These best practices are by no means exhaustive, they provide only a small sampling of the changes Canada could make to improve its feminist foreign policy and close the international gender norm implementation gap.

A wider debate in the academic literature on the WPS resolutions that is yet to be resolved is the contrast between a more “operational” conversation about women in international security versus a more “rights” or “parity” approach. The “operational” perspective argues that the most important women’s contribution to foreign policy is improving operations. Arguing the “operational” side of the debate, Robert Egnell of the Swedish Defence University and the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security studied why the Swedish military has been relatively successful at integrating a gender perspective in its military. He found that “militaries are usually unsympathetic to a rights-based argument that the integration of women and gender perspectives in military organizations is the right thing to do.” (Kennedy 2016) Instead, he argues that a best practice for WPS advocates is seeking buy-in from military commanders before making wide changes, and points to the argument that

“the [1325] implementation process serves to strengthen the military in its constant pursuit of maximal effectiveness at its core tasks,” as persuasive with military institutionalists, since their main goal is to defend against military threats (Kennedy 2016). In contrast, scholars Jocelyn Hermoso and Carmen Sugawara argue that the proper implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions cannot occur without a focus on true gender equality and a renewed commitment to genuine gender mainstreaming. They note:

If UNSCR 1325 is to create some tangible gains in terms of gender equality, honing and clarifying the definition of gender mainstreaming would be useful. It is thus key for the NAPs to broaden their understanding of gender mainstreaming to include...An analysis of how gender differences in particular social or cultural contexts influence how people experience conflict. A process of conflict resolution that incorporates the perspectives of women, men, and transgender people on how gender norms perpetuating a culture of conflict and impunity can be challenged. (Hermoso and Sugawara 2016)

According to Hermoso and Sugawara (2016), these framing ideas shape the direction in which states and international organizations should move to advance their policies. They note that three ideas underpin these points: “the capability approach, the parity of participation, and the ideal of androgyny.” (Hermoso and Sugawara 2016, 74) International organizations and states have thus far emphasized the “the capability approach,” or the idea that women operationally enhance missions, over the importance of equal decision-making opportunities or “parity,” as well as the “ideal of androgyny,” that “socialization is based on natural ability, reasonable expectation, and choice rather than on sexual differences.” (Hermoso and Sugawara 2016, 74) Based on this analysis, a best practice for implementing UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions as part of a feminist foreign policy will weave together the idea that women’s utility in operations is important, but it must be accompanied by disrupting traditional male and female sexualized tasks and spaces throughout government, allowing for equity to take hold. For Hermoso and

Sugawara (2016), it is particularly important that best practices for Resolution 1325 allow women to equally collaborate in spaces that were previously exclusive to men, notably peace planning, local governance building, and operational strategizing, which are referenced throughout the WPS resolutions. It is unclear which of these two camps, the “operational” school or the “rights” school, has previously been more successful at implementing policy change to improve the status of women in international affairs. Addressing this question has implications both for closing Canada’s feminist foreign policy gap with the WPS resolutions and for international implementation of similar goals and policies. Further research should investigate both perspectives, addressing how different ways of viewing UNSCR 1325 and the related resolutions may yield distinct results for feminist foreign policy.

Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland has stated, “We all know that prosperity, peace and security are more likely in places where women and all people in our societies can actively participate in political life and where the fundamental rights of all people are respected.” (Freeland 2018) Canada is well aware of the importance of women’s rights and implementing UNSCR 1325 and the related women, peace, and security resolutions. There is far to go, but the road behind is longer than the path left to travel.

Annex: Women, Peace, and Security UN Resolution Member State Obligations

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
Representation in decision-making	1325	Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;	
	1888	Recognizing that the promotion and empowerment of women and that support for women’s organizations and networks are essential in the consolidation of peace to promote the equal and full participation of women and encouraging Member States, donors, and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to provide support in this respect;	
	1888	Urges the Secretary General, Member States and the heads of regional organizations to take measures to increase the representation of women in mediation processes and decision-making processes with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1888	Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities;	
	1889	Urges Member States, international and regional organisations to take further measures to improve women's participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, including by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes, through inter alia promoting women's leadership and capacity to engage in aid management and planning, supporting women's organizations, and countering negative societal attitudes about women's capacity to participate equally;	
	1960	Welcomes the work of gender advisers; looks forward to the appointment of more women protection advisers to peacekeeping missions, in accordance with resolution 1888 (2009); notes their potential contribution in the framework of the monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements to be established pursuant to OP8 of the present resolution;	about GENADs notably
	1960	Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2106	Calls for the further deployment of Women Protection Advisors (WPA) in accordance with resolution 1888 to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security and calls upon the Secretary General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the planning and review of each United Nations peacekeeping and political mission, and to ensure that these experts are adequately trained and deployed in a timely manner; and recognizes the role of UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict in facilitating coordinated responses of relevant peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights, political and security actors and emphasizes the need for enhanced coordination, information sharing, analysis, response planning and implementation across these sectors;	there's another reference to WPAs in a different section
	2106	Recognizes the distinct role of Gender Advisors in ensuring that gender perspectives are mainstreamed in policies, planning and implementation by all mission elements; calls upon the Secretary-General to continue to deploy Gender Advisors to the relevant United Nations peacekeeping and political missions as well as humanitarian operations and to ensure comprehensive gender training of all relevant peacekeeping and civilian personnel;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2122	Recognizes the continuing need to increase women's participation and the consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conflict peacebuilding, and in this regard, the Council: Encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women's leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society;	
	2122	Encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the percentage of women military and police in deployments to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and further encourages troop- and police-contributing countries to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities, and relevant United Nations entities to make available appropriate guidance or training modules, including in particular the United Nations predeployment scenario-based training on prevention of sexual and gender-based violence;	also about training

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	<p>Urges Member States, in light of the High-level Review, to assess strategies and resourcing in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, reiterates its call for Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, and resolution of conflict, encourages those supporting peace processes to facilitate women's meaningful inclusion in negotiating parties' delegations to peace talks, calls upon donor countries to provide financial and technical assistance to women involved in peace processes, including training in mediation, advocacy, and technical areas of negotiation, as well as providing support and training to mediators and technical teams on the impact of women's participation and strategies for women's effective inclusion, further encourages the meaningful participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, as appropriate, including donor conferences to help ensure gender considerations are integrated in the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programmes, and encourages the hosts of such meetings to give due consideration to facilitating a cross representation of civil society participants;</p>	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
Training	1325	Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;	
	1325	Obligations that apply to member states include considering a gender perspective in all peace negotiations;	
	1820	Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Council to help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians;	
	1820	Urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel	
Disarmament and Countering Extremism	1325	Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1325	Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls;	
	1889	Calls upon all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to take into account particular needs of women and girls associated with armed forces and armed groups and their children, and provide for their full access to these programmes;	
	2106	Noting the provision in the Arms Trade Treaty that exporting States Parties shall take into account the risk of covered conventional arms or items being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children;	
	2122	Urges Member States and United Nations entities, to ensure women's full and meaningful participation in efforts to combat and eradicate the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	<p>Calls for the greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering-violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue throughout the activities within their respective mandates, including within country - specific assessments and reports, recommendations made to Member States, facilitating technical assistance to Member States, and briefings to the Council, encourages the CTC and CTED to hold further consultations with women and women's organizations to help inform their work, and further encourages the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to take the same approach in activities within its mandate;</p>	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	<p>Urges Member States and requests relevant United Nations entities, including CTED within its existing mandate and in collaboration with UN-Women, to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women's human rights and women's organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses, and to ensure United Nations monitoring and assessment mechanisms and processes mandated to prevent and respond to violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, have the necessary gender expertise to fulfil their mandates, including relevant sanctions experts groups and bodies established to conduct fact finding and criminal investigations;</p>	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	<p>Urges Member States and the United Nations system to ensure the participation and leadership of women and women's organizations in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, including through countering incitement to commit terrorist acts, creating counter narratives and other appropriate interventions, and building their capacity to do so effectively, and further to address, including by the empowerment of women, youth, religious and cultural leaders, the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, consistent with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy — A/RES/60/288, welcomes the increasing focus on inclusive upstream prevention efforts and encourages the forthcoming Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to integrate women's participation, leadership and empowerment as core to the United Nation's strategy and responses, calls for adequate financing in this regard and for an increased amount, within the funding of the UN for counterterrorism and countering violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, to be committed to projects which address gender dimensions including women's empowerment;</p>	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	Encourages empowering women, including through capacity-building efforts, as appropriate, to participate in the design and implementation of efforts related to the prevention, combating and eradication of the illicit transfer, and the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, and calls upon Member States, United Nations entities, intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations to take into consideration the specific impact of conflict and post-conflict environments on women's and girls' security, mobility, education, economic activity and opportunities, to mitigate the risk of women from becoming active players in the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons;	
Adjusting Sanctions	1820	Affirms its intention, when establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions regimes, to take into consideration the appropriateness of targeted and graduated measures against parties to situations of armed conflict who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict;	
Continue with 1325 implementation, NAPs and monitoring and reporting	1889	Welcoming the efforts of Member States in implementing its resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, including the development of national action plans, and encouraging Member States to continue to pursue such implementation;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1889	Encouraging relevant actors to organize events during 2009-2010 at the global, regional and national levels to increase awareness about resolution 1325 (2000), including ministerial events, to renew commitments to “Women and peace and security”, and to identify ways to address remaining and new challenges in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) in the future;	
	2106	Recognizes the need for more timely, objective, accurate and reliable information as a basis for prevention and response and requests the Secretary General and relevant United Nations entities to accelerate the establishment and implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict related sexual violence, including rape in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict and other situations relevant to the implementation of resolution 1888 (2009), as appropriate, and taking into account the specificity of each country;	
	2122	Welcoming the efforts of Member States, and recognizing the efforts of regional and subregional organizations, in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent women, peace and security resolutions at the regional, national and local levels, including the development of action plans and implementation frameworks, and encouraging Member States to continue to pursue such implementation, including through strengthened monitoring, evaluation and coordination;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2122	Recognizes the need for consistent implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in its own work and intends to focus more attention on women's leadership and participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, including by monitoring progress in implementation, and addressing challenges linked to the lack and quality of information and analysis on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peacebuilding and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution;	
	2122	Recognizes the need for timely information and analysis on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peacebuilding and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution for situations on the Council's agenda	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2122	Reiterates its intention to convene a High-level Review in 2015 to assess progress at the global, regional and national levels in implementing resolution 1325 (2000), renew commitments, and address obstacles and constraints that have emerged in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000); further recognizes with concern that without a significant implementation shift, women and women's perspectives will continue to be underrepresented in conflict prevention, resolution, protection and peacebuilding for the foreseeable future, and as such encourages those Member States, regional organizations as appropriate, and United Nations entities who have developed frameworks and plans to support the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) to start reviewing existing implementation plans and targets, and for Member States to assess and accelerate progress and prepare to formulate new targets, in time for the 2015 High-level Review;	
	2242	Affirming the primary role of Member States to implement fully the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security, and the important complementary role of United Nations entities and regional organizations;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	<p>Recognizing the significance of the fifteen-year anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000), the progress made as well as the opportunity and need for far greater implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, remaining deeply concerned by the frequent under-representation of women in many formal processes and bodies related to the maintenance of international peace and security, the relatively low number of women in senior positions in political, peace and security - related national, regional and international institutions, the lack of adequate gender sensitive humanitarian responses and support for women's leadership roles in these settings, insufficient financing for women, peace and security, and the resulting detrimental impact on the maintenance of international peace and security;</p>	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	Welcomes the efforts of Member States to implement resolution 1325, including the development of national action plans, further welcomes the increase in national action plans in recent years, and calls upon Member States to further integrate the women, peace and security agenda into their strategic plans such as national action plans and other planning frameworks, with sufficient resources, including implementation of relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, through broad consultation, including with civil society, in particular women's organizations, calls upon countries with national action plans to provide an update on the progress made in their implementation and review during the annual Security Council Open Debates on Women, Peace and Security, further welcomes the efforts of regional organizations to implement resolution 1325, including through the adoption of regional frameworks, and encourages them to pursue further implementation;	
Local development and post-conflict needs	1325	Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;	
	1325	Invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1325	Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, <i>inter alia</i> (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;	
	1820	Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to victims of sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations;	
	1889	Urges Member States to ensure gender mainstreaming in all post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery processes and sectors;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1889	Urges Member States, United Nations bodies, donors and civil society to ensure that women's empowerment is taken into account during post-conflict needs assessments and planning, and factored into subsequent funding disbursements and programme activities, including through developing transparent analysis and tracking of funds allocated for addressing women's needs in the post-conflict phase;	
	1889	Encourages Member States in post-conflict situations, in consultation with civil society, including women's organizations, to specify in detail women and girls' needs and priorities and design concrete strategies, in accordance with their legal systems, to address those needs and priorities, which cover inter alia support for greater physical security and better socio-economic conditions, through education, income generating activities, access to basic services, in particular health services, including sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights and mental health, gender-responsive law enforcement and access to justice, as well as enhancing capacity to engage in public decision-making at all levels;	
	1889	Urges Member States, United Nations bodies and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to take all feasible measures to ensure women and girls' equal access to education in post-conflict situations, given the vital role of education in the promotion of women's participation in post-conflict decision-making;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1889	Calls upon all parties to armed conflicts to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and ensure the protection of all civilians inhabiting such camps, in particular women and girls, from all forms of violence, including rape and other sexual violence, and to ensure full, unimpeded and secure humanitarian access to them;	
	2122	Recognizing the importance of Member States and United Nations entities seeking to ensure humanitarian aid and funding, includes provision for the full range of medical, legal, psychosocial and livelihood services to women affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations, and noting the need for access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health services, including regarding pregnancies resulting from rape, without discrimination;	
	2122	Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2242	Encourages Member States to increase their funding on women, peace and security including through more aid in conflict and post-conflict situations for programmes that further gender equality and women's empowerment, as well as through support to civil society, and to support countries in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including through capacity-building, in their implementation of women, peace and security resolutions, calls for increased international development cooperation related to women's empowerment and gender equality and invites aid providers to track the gender focus of aid contributions;	
	2242	Calls upon Member States, the United Nations, and other relevant actors to ensure due consideration is given to the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the process and outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2016, further recognizes the importance of integrating gender considerations across humanitarian programming by seeking to ensure the provision of access to protection and the full range of medical, legal and psychosocial and livelihood services, without discrimination, and through ensuring women and women's groups can participate meaningfully and are supported to be leaders in humanitarian action, and urges the Secretary-General to strengthen leadership and political will at all levels on this issue and ensure accountability to existing humanitarian frameworks related to women's empowerment and gender equality which contribute to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
Ending impunity	1325	Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;	
	1820	Sexual violence as an act of war is a war crime;	
	1820	Calls upon Member States to comply with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal access to justice, and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation;	
	1888	Recalling the responsibilities of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes perpetrated against civilians, and in this regard, noting with concern that only limited numbers of perpetrators of sexual violence have been brought to justice, while recognizing that in conflict and in post-conflict situations national justice systems may be significantly weakened;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1888	Urges all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence committed by civilians or by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the alleged perpetrators brought to justice, and that civilian superiors and military commanders, in accordance with international humanitarian law, use their authority and powers to prevent sexual violence, including by combating impunity;	
	1888	Encourages States, relevant United Nations entities and civil society, as appropriate, to provide assistance in close cooperation with national authorities to build national capacity in the judicial and law enforcement systems in situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict;	
	1960	Recalling the responsibilities of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other egregious crimes perpetrated against civilians and, in this regard, noting with concern that only limited numbers of perpetrators of sexual violence have been brought to justice, while recognizing that in conflict and in post-conflict situations national justice systems may be significantly weakened;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2106	Notes that sexual violence can constitute a crime against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide; further recalls that rape and other forms of serious sexual violence in armed conflict are war crimes; calls upon Member States to comply with their relevant obligations to continue to fight impunity by investigating and prosecuting those subject to their jurisdiction who are responsible for such crimes; encourages Member States to include the full range of crimes of sexual violence in national penal legislation to enable prosecutions for such acts; recognizes that effective investigation and documentation of sexual violence in armed conflict is instrumental both in bringing perpetrators to justice and ensuring access to justice for survivors;	
	2106	Encourages concerned Member States to draw upon the expertise of the United Nations Team of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1888 (2009) as appropriate to strengthen the rule of law and the capacity of civilian and military justice systems to address sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations as part of broader efforts to strengthen institutional safeguards against impunity;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2122	Calls upon Member States to comply with their relevant obligations to end to impunity and to thoroughly investigate and prosecute persons responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law; and further notes that the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern against women and girls has been strengthened through the work of the International Criminal Court, ad hoc and mixed tribunals, as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals;	
	2242	Urges Member States to strengthen access to justice for women in conflict and post-conflict situations, including through the prompt investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as reparation for victims as appropriate, notes that the fight against impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern committed against women and girls has been strengthened through the work of the International Criminal Court, ad hoc and mixed tribunals, as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals and reiterates its intention to continue forcefully to fight impunity and uphold accountability with appropriate means;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
International Law	1325	Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;	
	1820	Reaffirming also the obligations of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Optional Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols thereto, and urging states that have not yet done so to consider ratifying or acceding to them;	
	1888	Reaffirming the obligations of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Optional Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols thereto, and urging states that have not yet done so to consider ratifying or acceding to them;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1888	Stressing the necessity for all States and non-State parties to conflicts to comply fully with their obligations under applicable international law, including the prohibition on all forms of sexual violence;	
	1888	Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law;	
	1888	Reiterating its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, in this connection, its commitment to continue to address the widespread impact of armed conflict on civilians, including with regard to sexual violence;	
	1889	Reiterates its call for all parties in armed conflicts to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls;	
	1960	Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction as provided for by international law;	
	2106	Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction as provided for by international law; and reaffirming that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of civilians;	
	2106	Recalling the inclusion of a range of sexual violence offences in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
Sexual violence prevention and awareness	2122	Recognizing that States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction as provided for by international law, and reaffirming that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of civilians;	
	2242	Reaffirming the obligations of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Optional Protocol thereto and urging States that have not yet done so to consider ratifying or acceding to it, further noting General Recommendation 30 of the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on Women and Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Situations;	
	2242	Reaffirming the obligations of States and all parties to armed conflict to comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable, and the need to end all violations of international humanitarian law and all violations and abuses of human rights;	
	1325	Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1820	Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety;	
	1820	Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police;	also about increasing women's presence

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1888	Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence, including measures such as, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence and vetting candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associated with serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including sexual violence;	
	1888	Urges States to undertake comprehensive legal and judicial reforms, as appropriate, in conformity with international law, without delay and with a view to bringing perpetrators of sexual violence in conflicts to justice and to ensuring that survivors have access to justice, are treated with dignity throughout the justice process and are protected and receive redress for their suffering;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1888	Decides to include specific provisions, as appropriate, for the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including, on a case-by-case basis, the identification of women's protection advisers (WPAs) among gender advisers and human rights protection units, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of WPAs are systematically assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation;	
	1888	Encourages States, with the support of the international community, to increase access to health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance and socio-economic reintegration services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas;	
	1960	Reaffirming the importance for States, with the support of the international community, to increase access to health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and socio-economic reintegration services for victims of sexual violence, in particular in rural areas, and taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	1960	Calls upon parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, inter alia, issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable;	
	2106	Recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and other women and peace and security commitments in its own work and, in this regard, expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women's participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding and to address sexual violence in conflict, including, inter alia, in the establishment and review of peacekeeping and political mandates, public statements, country visits, fact-finding missions, international commissions of inquiry, consultations with regional bodies and in the work of relevant Security Council sanctions committees;	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2106	<p>Reiterates the importance of addressing sexual violence in armed conflict whenever relevant, in mediation efforts, ceasefires and peace agreements; requests the Secretary-General, Member States and regional organizations, where appropriate, to ensure that mediators and envoys, in situations where it is used as a method or tactic of war, or as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, engage on sexual violence issues, including with women, civil society, including women's organizations and survivors of sexual violence, and ensure that such concerns are reflected in specific provisions of peace agreements, including those related to security arrangements and transitional justice mechanisms; urges the inclusion of sexual violence in the definition of acts prohibited by ceasefires and in provisions for ceasefire monitoring; stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes;</p>	

Type of issue	Resolution	Text	Notes
	2106	Recognizing the importance of providing timely assistance to survivors of sexual violence, urges United Nations entities and donors to provide non-discriminatory and comprehensive health services, including sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial, legal, and livelihood support and other multi-sectoral services for survivors of sexual violence, taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities; calls for support to national institutions and local civil society networks in increasing resources and strengthening capacities to provide the abovementioned services to survivors of sexual violence; encourages Member States and donors to support national and international programs that assist victims of sexual violence such as the Trust Fund for Victims established by the Rome Statute and its implementing partners; and requests the relevant United Nations entities to increase allocation of resources for the coordination of gender-based violence response and service provision;	
	2106	Notes the link between sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and HIV infection, and the disproportionate burden of HIV and AIDS on women and girls as a persistent obstacle and challenge to gender equality; and urges United Nations entities, Member States and donors to support the development and strengthening of capacities of national health systems and civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to women and girls living with or affected by HIV and AIDS in armed conflict and post-conflict situations.	this is a unique section

Source: Author's compilation.

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Biography

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Prior to law school, Blatt spent the 2018-2019 year as the Fulbright Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy. At the CIDP, she worked as a research assistant for Professor Stéphanie von Hlatky on a variety of projects dealing with the intersection of international security and gender. She also pursued independent research focusing on NATO's gender mainstreaming efforts and related best practices in Canada. Blatt graduated from Dartmouth College in June 2018, where she earned her degree summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, and with high honors in her government major.

Outside of her time at Dartmouth, Blatt interned in the Office of U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, served as a Campaign Fellow for Hillary for America, and worked as a research intern at the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Blatt has published research on the 2007 Iraq troop surge in *Parameters: The U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, the American military's top peer-reviewed, professional journal.

