Crisis to Catalyst: The Strategic Effects of the Somalia Affair on the Canadian Armed Forces

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Errors are mine alone.

Acronyms

ADM	Assistant Deputy Minister
CA	Canadian Army
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CAR	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CJFS	Canadian Joint Force Somalia
CPAC	Canadian Public Affairs Channel
CO	Commanding Officer
DGPA	Director General Public Affairs
DND	Department of National Defence
JAG	Judge Advocate General
MND	Minister of National Defence
MP	Military Police
MMC	Minister's Monitoring Committee
MRL	Media Response Line
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PM	Prime Minister
ROE	Rules-of-Engagement
SILT	Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
VCDS	Vice Chief of Defence Staff

Figure

Map

Section 1

Introduction

In 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) (roughly analogous to a US Army Ranger battalion) deployed to Somalia as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF).[1] Tactical incidents in Somalia triggered a strategic crisis that was fundamentally mishandled by the extant strategic leadership (political and military), forming a catalyst for significant strategic and institutional effects that continue to impact both Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to this day. Leadership and ethical failings, predominantly by officers, were central to the Somalia Affair and combined to generate the most significant crisis in the Canadian civil-military relationship since the 1968 unification of the CAF.

The Canadian civil-military relationship had experienced tension before, but the Somalia Affair was unique in that the damage it caused began during the conduct of a peace support operation, as opposed to strategic decisions or actions undertaken during wartime, or at a time of heightened international tensions – like the Cuban missile crisis.[2] As Douglas Bland observed in 1996 in discussing the events in Somalia and the Canadian civil-military relationship, "Recent events [the Somalia Affair] have exposed the problem, but they are only the current manifestation of weaknesses long resident in the structure of

1. The Canadian Airborne Regiment was the sole airborne unit in the Canadian Army (CA), and was actually only of battalion size. Unique in the CA, the Regiment was actually a composite formed of members from each of Canada's three Regular Force infantry regiments; each with their own sub-unit sized "Commando." The regular force infantry regiments which contributed infantry to the Regiment were The Royal Canadian Regiment (3 Commando), The Royal 22nd Regiment (or "Van Doos" who formed 1 Commando) and Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 Commando). Most regiments train their own personnel once they have completed Basic Training; the Canadian Airborne Regiment was different in that all members took their basic infantry training at another regiment's Battle School and served time with their parent regiment before joining the Canadian Airborne Regiment. For a comprehensive treatment of the Regiment's organization and history see Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski, *In Search of Pegasus: The Canadian Airborne Experience 1942-1999* (St Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell, 2001), 101–214.

2. Examples of previous crisis in the Canadian civil-military relationship include the two conscription crises during the First and Second World Wars, and the actions of the Royal Canadian Navy during the Cuban Missile Crisis when they deployed in contravention of the orders of the Diefenbaker Government.

Figure 1.1

The Elements of the Somalia Affair



the defence establishment."[3] Separately, he also described the relationship as "floundering and uncertain."[4]

Taking place between July 1992 and June 1997, the Affair was comprised of six elements as shown in Figure 1.

As important as the elements are, it is the accrued strategic effects that continue to give the Affair its heightened importance. Noted strategic theorist and scholar Colin Gray has defined strategic effect as "meaning an influence on the course of political events…" and separately as "the cumulative and sequential impact of strategic performance upon the course of events."[5] The intent herein is to explore both the Somalia Affair and its strategic effects.

Using the events themselves, Canadian doctrine, and academic theory, it will be shown that the Somalia Affair ruptured Canadian civil-military relations, adversely impacted the professional autonomy of the military, and forced an unprecedented evolution of the Canadian officer corps. Proceeding seriatim, the extant scholarship will be reviewed, as it forms the basis for the

3. Douglas L. Bland, "The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces: A Troubled Relationship," in *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-military Relations? Proceedings of the Second Annual Conflict Studies Workshop, Held at the University of New Brunswick, October 1995*, eds. David Anderson Charters and J. Brent Wilson (Fredericton, NB: Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1996), 19.
4. Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters Centre for Decision: a Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Services, 1997), 47.
5. Colin Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 30 and 169. For the purposes of this monograph, both definitions are relevant.

subsequent narrative of the events. Each of the elements will then be detailed, enabling observation of the leadership and ethical failings which generated the strategic effects. Focus will then turn to the principle strategic effects and their continued impact on the CAF and the society it serves. In conclusion, several implications will be discussed.

Literature Review

There is a small body of literature that covers the events that have become known as the Somalia Affair. Interestingly, some of these works appeared before the government's commission of inquiry into the events were even completed, which has been sporadically built upon in the intervening twenty years.[6] Almost all works written since 1997 have benefited from the multi-volume report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, which forms the single best primary source for one attempting to understand the deployment and its repercussions.[7] Examining the literature covering the Affair, it is possible to see both trends and omissions.

The first group of authors are individuals who played a role in the aftermath of the Somalia mission, or who wished to establish a dominant narrative while events were still fresh in the mind of the Canadian public. Their body of writing aids in establishing details of events, as well as judgements of the moment, but can lack long-term perspective. The best example is retired Major-General Dan Loomis's *The Somalia Affair*.[8] Comprehensive in scope, replete with extracts from primary source material and relevant government documents and written by a former officer who understood the environment about which he was writing, it is an excellent resource. Sadly, it is restricted to the time period in which it was written and cannot offer commentary or insight on effects post-1997.

A risk with literature of this nature, however, is that it can also be seen as self-serving, or profiting from the role that the author held immediately prior to his or her writing, as exemplified by Somalia Commissioner Peter Desbarats's *Somalia Cover-Up: A Commissioner's Journal*.[9] While a relevant perspective

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6. While the Canadian Armed Forces have never published an official history of its operations in Somalia, a "journal," more akin to a yearbook, was produced in 1994 in what can be construed as an attempt to establish an initial narrative. It is completely lacking in its treatment of any of the negative incidents or scandals which occurred during the operation and is of extremely limited value beyond capturing the most basic of details. See Ron Pupetz, editor, *In the Line of Duty: The Canadian Joint Forces in Somalia 1992-1993* (Ottawa: National Defence, 1994).

7. Peter Desbarats, Justice Gilles Letourneau and Justice Robert Rutherford, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Executive Summary and 5 vols*. (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997). Throughout this work, I will refer to instances where the source has been used as "*SCR*" for Somalia Commission Report.

8. Dan Loomis, *The Somalia Affair: Reflections in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: DGL Publications, 1996).

9. Peter Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-Up: A Commissioner's Journal* (Toronto: McClelland &

on the commissioner's time on the Somalia Commission, the book is noteworthy as an attempt to justify the Commission's actions throughout its existence, and its distrust of Canadian political leadership of the period.[10] Canadian historian David Bercuson's *Significant Incident*, written immediately following the author's role in the drafting of a separate report now referred to as "*The Young Report*," provides a second example.[11] Despite the title, and its indication that the book will be about the incidents in Somalia, fully two thirds of the book is devoted to a history lesson on the Canadian Army (CA) and its experiences in Germany and Bosnia. It does not offer much in the way of understanding of the Affair or its effects.

The second visible trend is demonstrated by works which attempted to understand specific aspects of the events; sociologist Donna Winslow, for example, developed an impressive body of work attempting to understand and describe the socio-cultural aspects of the deployment and its fall-out.[12] This type of study is helpful in examining a given aspect of the mission, offering insights that can be placed in a broader context. It is primarily here where the writings continue to expand with more detailed analysis now available on the long and short-term effects which followed the conclusion of the Somalia Affair.[13]

Last, are writings more recently published which are harder to characterize. Some use the Affair as evidence, in a sometimes over-generalized fashion, to explain aspects of the Canadian Civil-Military Relationship (CMR). Jack Granatstein's *Who Killed the Canadian Military* is an example of this.[14] The seven pages he devoted to the incident in Somalia were a selective accounting of the facts that aimed to portray weak generals kowtowing to a Prime Minister (PM) who was more than willing to send the troops on yet another peacekeeping mission.[15] Others, like Charles Oliviero, used the Affair, or elements of it,

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Stewart, 1997).

10. As shown by his suggestion that his telephone calls were being recorded and monitored from the time he had been appointed to the Commission. Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-Up*, 327–328.

11. David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996). *The Young Report* will be explained later in this work.

12. Professor Donna Winslow has studied and written extensively on the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the Somalia mission. A full list of sources consulted is in the bibliography, however interested parties can refer to her "Between Dream and Reality: the Canadian Mission to Somalia," in *Peace Operations Between Peace and War: Four Studies*, edited by Erwind A. Schmidt 11 (September 1998): 37–58, "Rites of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne," *Armed Forces & Society*, Volume 25, Number 3, Spring 1999 (1999): 429–457, or "Canadian Society and Its Army," *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2003-2004 (2004): 11–24.

13. Three examples of this nature of scholarship are Grant Dawson, *"Here is Hell:" Canada's Engagement in Somalia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015), and Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats an White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

14. J. L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004).

15. Ibid, 152–159.

to debate the overall success or failure of the Somalia mission.[16] Peter Kasurak provides a third type of recently published work, contextualizing the Somalia Affair in a broader narrative tracing the history of the CA over the latter-half of the twentieth century. His *A National Force* is the most useful of the recently published works, and an indispensable resource.[17]

As broad as the extant scholarship is, there are some substantial omissions, beyond the obvious lack of an official military history. In the first instance, there are almost no autobiographical memoirs from senior Canadian military leaders or civilian decision makers from that time. Noting the number of defence ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) who played a role in the Affair and its outcomes, the lack of direct accounts from decision makers of the period forms a significant gap. The exceptions to this are the memoirs of former prime ministers Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, and Kim Campbell.[18]

Ironically, existing first-hand accounts are of limited utility to the overall study of the Affair. Inevitably they have been produced by junior soldiers, and the occasional Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, and while they do explain the soldier's perspective, they do not offer much in the way of explanation of strategic level decision-making or information flow.[19] The most notable account in this regard is Trooper Kyle Brown's *Scapegoat*, which arguably suffers from appreciable bias, given his court-martial and conviction.[20] Unsurprisingly, given how the mission is generally perceived, no senior military officer, CDS, his Vice (VCDS), or staff principle from that time period, and indeed no officers from the Regiment itself, have written an account of their actions from that time.

A second area where extant writings are lacking is international scholarship. Aside from Canadian authors, almost no one else is writing about the Canadian role in United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) I or II, or Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Where Canadian participation is chronicled, it is in passing, and rarely is a specific comment made of the incidents which triggered and played such a significant role in the evolution of the CAF.

This work adds to the existing body of knowledge, by filling in some of the

16. Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Charles S. Oliviero, "Operation "Deliverance": International Success or Domestic Failure?" *Canadian Military Journal*, Summer 2001 (2001): 51–58.
17. Peter Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
18. Kim Campbell, *Time and Chance: The Political Memoirs of Canada's First Woman Prime Minister* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1996). Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister* (Toronto: Vintage, 2007). Brian Mulroney, *Memoirs: 1939-1993* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007).
19. See Rui Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man: Inside the Canadian Airborne Regiment* (Calgary: Bunker to Bunker, 2000). This is arguably one of the best personal accounts of the actions on the ground, though it is notably light on the events of 16 March 1993 specifically.
20. Peter Worthington and Kyle Brown, *Scapegoat: How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown* (Toronto: Seal Books, 1997). The bias is evident from the opening epigram alone, wherein Motaigne's "Soldiers ought more to fear their generals than their enemy" is quoted.

missing pieces. In particular it addresses the events themselves and the inquiry that followed, which came to be known as the Somalia Affair, placing them in the institutional and national context. Further, it addresses how the repercussions of the Somalia Affair ultimately served as a catalyst for change, ultimately reshaping the officer corps of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Section 2

The Decision and Preparations

The initial decision by the United Nations (UN) to undertake a military mission in Somalia had its genesis in the humanitarian disaster engulfing the country in the summer of 1992. A civil war led to the destruction of much of the country's agricultural base. This in turn created an escalating, increasingly dire, humanitarian emergency, with widespread famine in the rural areas of the country, "skyrocketing" food prices, and a growing refugee crisis – all playing out before international media.[1]

The first response was Operation Provide Relief, a humanitarian airlift sanctioned by the UN on 26 July 1992 intended to of alleviate the threat of widespread famine.[2] It did not work. Armed groups of "technicals" prevented the effective distribution of aid, and meant that another solution was required – one that would sort through the chaos and get the relief supplies to those in need.[3]

The situation forced a reluctant UN to plan UNOSOM I. Rather than traditional peacekeeping, the mission was intended to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; a first effort to use military forces to operate in the humanitarian space.[4] The mission would never actually commence in the face of a financial crisis and a general reluctance by UN member-states to contribute forces.[5] During initial planning, however, the Canadian Government signaled its willingness to deploy troops, and selected the Canadian Airborne Regiment.[6]

On 5 September 1992, the Regiment received the formal warning order for

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1. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). p. 22–24.
2. Ibid, 22–24.
3. The term "technical" had its origins in Somalia during the early 1990s and refers to "technical assistance grants" which were used to fund private security guards and drivers for the UN. Over time the usage expanded and referred both to armed men and the vehicles that they used regardless of whether they were providing security or reveling in its absence. See Ravi Somaiya, "Why Rebel Groups Love the Toyota Hilux" in *Newsweek*, 14 October 2010 (http://www.newsweek.com/why-rebel-groups-love-toyota-hilux-74195 accessed 5 November 2016).
4. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 17.
5. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 17 and 26.
6. Oliviero, "Operation 'Deliverance,'" 52.

participation in Operation Cordon, and began training for the intended mission – "to secure the port of Bossasso…in order to permit the flow of relief supplies."[7] Canada's decisions to support UNOSOM I and to send the Regiment both warrant comment. First, there was no stated strategic interest involved, beyond a desire to support a multi-lateral UN effort, which mandated participation in UNOSOM I. An argument can be made that humanitarian aspects of the mission meshed with Canadian national values, but the decision was actually resultant from a combination of media pressure on Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, his desire to "pursue Canada's interest in multi-lateralism and human rights," and to reinforce the Canada-United States relationship.[8] This was a clear case of Canada practicing "contribution warfare," or more accurately "contribution operations," obtaining strategic credibility with its most significant ally at seemingly minimal cost.[9]

On 28 July 1992, the CDS, General John de Chastelain, and the Acting VCDS, Lieutenant-General Kent Foster, agreed that the Regiment "would be well suited for the assignment."[10] The unit was the designated UN standby force previously earmarked by the CA should a need for it arise, and it had already undergone training in desert operations after being previously ordered to be prepared to undertake operations to support a UN referendum in the Western Sahara.[11] It was assumed to be highly trained, and more than ready for the tasks it was about to undertake.[12] Finally and no less importantly, in examining the context of the times, there were limited options available to the CA.

Throughout the fall of 1992, while strategic deliberations continued regarding the practicalities and resourcing of UNOSOM I, the Regiment prepared for its assigned mission. Three aspects of this period merit comment: the emergence of disciplinary problems within the unit itself, the relief of its commanding officer after less than six months in command, and the decision by the UN to cancel UNOSOM I.

Disciplinary issues are an omni-present element in most military organizations. However, while the Airborne Regiment underwent its training, two particularly worrisome incidents occurred. On the night of 2 October, following the conclusion of the week's training, service pyrotechnics were illegally fired by members of the Regiment, near the junior ranks club at a "Happy Hour."

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7. Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 23–24. Cordon was the Canadian name applied to the Canadian operation in support of UNOSOM I.
8. *Dawson, Here is Hell*, 3.
9. "Contribution Warfare" is the idea of a nation contributing forces to another nation, or alliance, without a clear strategic goal or national interest, but where mutual strategic and national interests and values align to make participation worthwhile. Colonel J. H. Vance, "Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign" in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives, Context and Concepts*, edited by Allen English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Lawrence M. Hickey, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 280–281.
10. Dawson, *Here is Hell*, 59.
11. The mission to the Western Sahara was subsequently cancelled.
12. Dawson, *Here is Hell*, 102–103.

The same night, the unit Duty Sergeant's vehicle was burned outside of the unit's main duty building, in what can be construed as a direct challenge to legitimate authority.[13]

The use of group punishment by the unit's chain-of-command, rather than resolving the issue, served to exacerbate it; the response ultimately failed to identify the perpetrators.[14] More disturbing, the chain-of-command above unit and formation level either did not consider these incidents indicative of a poor state of discipline within the unit, or were uninformed of the actual situation. Brigadier Ernie Beno, Commander of the Special Service Force to which the Regiment was subordinate, considered the matter to be indicative of problems with the senior leadership within the unit.[15] The Army Commander, Lieutenant-General J. C. Gervais, remained seemingly unaware of the situation.[16] That these incidents were not viewed as being "major concerns" is itself a telling statement on the perception of the state of discipline within the CA at that time.[17]

Less than three weeks later, the CO of the Regiment was replaced.[18] While reasons were not announced at the time to the Regiment's soldiers, in the aftermath of the Somalia Affair it became apparent that his formation commander, Brigadier Beno, had lost confidence in Morneault's ability to lead the unit.[19] According to David Bercuson, Beno's first choice for Morneault's replacement was not accepted by the system, with the Royal 22nd Regiment making an argument that it was still their turn to command the CAR; Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu was then selected to succeed Morneault.[20] The new CO who would lead the Regiment throughout the mission in Somalia, immediately "concentrated on getting his unit militarily ready for Somalia."[21] Throughout the remainder of October and November 1992, the unit continued its administrative and training preparations, as well as undergoing yet another reorganization to incorporate reservists, plus other specialized attachments.[22] The preparations

13. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 205–206. Note, the text used by Loomis is actually a synopsis from the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Morneault for the de Faye Inquiry. This vehicle burning has also been reported as being of the Duty Officer's vehicle. I have opted for Loomis's account given that it is based on the CO's testimony.
14. For a good perspective, see Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man,* 25–26.
15. Dawson, *Here is Hell,* 128.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid, 133.
18. Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 29.
19. Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 29 and Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 222. The relief of Lieutenant-Colonel Morneault is explored in great detail by Dan Loomis, and was centred on his reaction to the events of 2 October, the inadequacy of the measures that he took to ascertain who the guilty parties were, the idea of leaving one sub-unit from the CAR behind from the deployment, and his approach to integrating reservists into the unit before it deployed. For further detail see Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 205–232.
20. Bercuson, 226–227.
21. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 233.
22. Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 29–30 and Dawson, *Here is Hell*, 130. The unit had undergone a previous re-organization in June 1992 concurrent to the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Morneault as commanding officer, when it had "downsized" and

were interrupted on 2 December when the UN suspended UNOSOM I.[23]

The realities of organizing the mission, and its perceived lack of utility forced its suspension; only Canada had agreed to provide troops, and the selected region was actually free of famine.[24] Concurrently the United States was forming a separate organization – UNITAF – to conduct operations in the south of Somalia where there was actually a need for military support.[25] Following bilateral discussions between Prime Minister Mulroney and President George Bush, Canada committed to support UNITAF with the Canadian Airborne Regiment, as part of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS).[26]

The effects of the change in mission character cannot be overstated. While UNOSOM I was intended to operate under a Chapter VI mandate, referring to the UN Charter, wherein force can be used in self-defence, UNITAF was given sanction under Chapter VII. This allowed force to be used to impose peace. The differences between the two were, and are, profound and should have impacted on training, organizing, and equipping the unit, as well as the mindset of those engaged in the activity.[27] This never happened; it was simply too late to change without delaying the deployment.

By mid-December training within the Regiment had been concluded, regardless of the fact that rules-of-engagement (ROE) had yet to be issued or trained on, the mission had fundamentally changed (although still under UN auspices), and the geographical location had yet to be fully determined. As the members of the unit began to deploy, major equipment was already enroute to the Horn of Africa.

Deployment and Actions in Somalia

After deploying into Somalia, near Baledogle (approximately 85 kilometers to the north of Mogadishu), the lead elements of the Regiment established a staging area before they launched into Belet Huen to establish the camp where they would live and operate from for the next six months.[28] The main body of the Regiment joined them there between 27 and 31 December 1992, beginning operations immediately thereafter.[29]

Initially the unit secured the local area and built their camp; their reception

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adopted a fairly standard Canadian Infantry Battalion structure, as opposed to its designed Regimental structure, as directed by the Canadian Army. The additional elements were a squadron of combat engineers, an armored squadron from the Royal Canadian Dragoons, and a mortar platoon from the Royal Canadian Regiment.

23. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 235.
24. Dawson, *Here is Hell*, 110 & 114.
25. Ibid, 114.
26. Ibid, 114–116.
27. Oliviero, "Operation 'Deliverance,'" 52.
28. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair,* 329. There are multiple different spellings of "Belet Huen." These include Belet Uen and Beledweyne. For consistency I will use Belet Huen throughout (unless otherwise noted).
29. Ibid.

Map 2.1

Political Map of Somalia

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/somalia-political-map.htm accessed 27 March 2017.

by the local population quickly became sub-optimal. As Colonel Serge Labbé, the overall Commander for CFJS, reported to NDHQ on 9 January 1993, "the mood in Belet Uen [sic] has changed. In essence, the honeymoon is over."[30] In response, the Regiment made a concerted effort to win them over, with "hearts and minds" considerations seemingly omnipresent in all the Regiment's activities.[31]

The intent was to gain the respect of the local population for the unit and what it was bringing the local populace – a secure environment which would in turn allow for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work freely in the humanitarian space.[32] Using a combination of day and night vehicle and foot patrols, the Regiment quickly made an impression on the Somalis.[33] In addition to these types of framework activities, the troops conducted tasks which soldiers working in Bosnia and, later, Afghanistan would find very familiar – working to re-establish a viable police force, providing medical support, repairing and opening a schoolhouse.[34] By the third week of February, while living and working in unforgiving climatic and physical conditions, the area was largely secure. However, there were frustrations.

Looting became a prominent issue in the mind of the commanding officer and, consequently, throughout the unit.[35] In the words of the Somalia Commission, "[b]y March 1993, thievery had become a constant, growing annoyance for the Canadian troops at Belet Huen [sic]."[36] The near-complete absence of legitimate Somali authorities in the area, who could have assumed responsibility for any apprehended looters, posed an additional challenge.[37] Those who were captured or detained were handled in an inconsistent fashion across the Regiment, usually being turned over to local tribal authorities, who in turn almost universally released them.[38] The annoyance caused by looting directly contributed to the two tactical incidents central to the Affair.

On 4 March 1993, the Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon undertook the task of providing additional security to the Engineer compound on their camp.[39] Seven men from the platoon established overwatch positions around the compound after laying out "bait" for the potential-looters to steal.[40] That night, one Somali was killed, while a second was wounded; both men, unarmed save for a ritual knife, had been shot while running away – they had not gotten close to

30. Dawson, Here is Hell, 149.
31. Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 64–65 and Dawson, *Here is Hell,* 149–151.
32. Dawson, *Here is Hell*, 150.
33. Ibid, 151.
34. Bercuson, Significant Incident, 232.
35. Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 64-69; Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 233–235; Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 471–473. Bercuson classified the looting as "endemic."
36. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1060.
37. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 471–475.
38. Ibid.
39. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1062.
40. Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 236.

the bait left out for them.[41] The Regimental Surgeon Major Barry Armstrong, while not a trained pathologist, concluded that the dead man had been killed execution style – a report subsequently refuted by a pathologist from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police – but which the later Somalia Commission could "neither endorse or rule-out."[42] The use of force in this instance was governed by ROE that the Regiment's Commanding Officer had modified of his own volition – in violation to the formal orders which stated that "Only the CDS will approve changes to…ROE."[43]

There were problems with the ROE from the mission's beginnings.[44] Initially prepared in NDHQ, they were approved by both the CDS and the MND on 11 December 1992, before being sent to Colonel Labbé for onward dissemination.[45] Pre-deployment training had concluded and consequently no members of the Regiment received training on the ROE while they were in Canada.[46] Once in theater, orders concerning the ROE were issued by the CO to his immediate subordinates for further transmittal, resulting in divergent instructions of various standards and content. There was no universal understanding of the precise ROE that all soldiers were expected to follow, including the idea of "hostile intent."[47] Adding to the confusion, after the initial issue of the ROE, conflicting versions of a "soldier's card" were produced with the intent of clarifying how the ROE were to be applied.[48] The confusion was compounded on 28 January 1993, when Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu told his orders group that "deadly force could be used against Somalis found inside Canadian compounds or absconding with Canadian kit," regardless of whether or not they were armed."[49]

As a result of the incident on 4 March, the CO initiated a "CO's investigation" (under pressure from Colonel Labbé), using the Regiment's Intelligence Officer – Captain Paul Hope.[50] The objectivity of the investigation was questionable; a junior officer of the unit was to judge the direction issued by

41. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1062–1063 and 1081.
42. Dawson, *Here is Hell*, 156.
43. In January 1993, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu passed orders to his command that "they could shoot at thieves under certain circumstances." *SCR*, Vol 5, 1061 and Vol 1, 295. This was, in Mathieu's words "not a change in the Rules of Engagement, but rather a clarification…" Ibid, 1116. His direction served to muddy the waters as to what the ROE actually were, and was not passed throughout the CAR by his various sub-unit commanders. Formal orders stating the policy on who could change the ROE, and the process for doing so, may be found at Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 650.
44. A full copy of the ROE, as issued by NDHQ, and then subsequently distributed by CJFS is available in Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 643–663.
45. *SCR*, Vol 2, 654.
46. Ibid, 655.
47. Ibid, 656–658.
48. Ibid. The CAR needed ROE cards in both English and French as it was a bilingual unit. There were both wording and translation errors on the various versions.
49. Ibid, 659. An "orders group" is the Canadian term for the group of subordinate officers and NCOs to which a commander will issue his orders for further transmission to their own subordinates.
50. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1108.

his own CO – specifically Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu's modifications to the ROE.[51] Later the investigation would be judged as being part of a "cover-up" intended to "avoid bad publicity."[52] That the perception of a cover-up grew was a combination of shoddy reporting up the chain-of-command, efforts of Major Armstrong to energize his superiors to take action, and a six-week delay before Canadian Military Police were deployed to properly investigate the incident.[53] On 8 March 1993, the Commanding Officer rescinded his "clarification" to the ROE but the damage was already done.[54] A week later, the second major incident occurred.

On 16 March 1993, with the events of 4 March still fresh, 2 Commando maintained its task of guarding any individuals seized by the Regiment's patrols.[55] Their Commander, Major Anthony Seward, gave orders that day that would "light the match" of the Somalia Affair. At his morning orders group he instructed his subordinate commanders that they were to "capture and abuse" any infiltrators.[56] At his later court-martial, Major Steward claimed that he said "I don't care if you abuse them but I want those infiltrators captured…Abuse them if you have to. I do not want weapons used. I do not want gunfire."[57] While this order was not passed throughout the Commando, elements of Four Platoon did receive the direction.[58] Sergeant Mark Boland passed the order to his section, slated for guard duty that night; his fellow section commanders within the platoon chose not to disseminate the abuse order to their men.[59]

That night Shidane Arone was captured within an abandoned American compound beside the Canadian lines; he was moved in good condition to a bunker where Master Corporal Clayton Matchee took responsibility for him.[60] While the events of that night are confused, and will likely never be correctly detailed in their entirety, what is known is that for approximately three hours, Master Corporal Matchee and, to a lesser degree, Private Kyle Brown severely beat and tortured their prisoner to the point that he was repeatedly rendered

51. Ibid, 1109.
52. Ibid, 1126.
53. Ibid, 1126–1127. Military Police investigators were not part of the original organization for the mission and had to be deployed from Canada.
54. Ibid, 1062 and Vol 1, 296. The source states that the "change was not well communicated and implemented throughout the CARBG."
55. *SCR*, Vol 1, 319.
56. Ibid. The Somalia Inquiry never actually heard testimony on this topic as it was ordered to shut down before they actually covered these events. They included a synopsis of the events taken from the courts martial of those involved, and it is from this synopsis that this section has been drawn.
57. Ibid.
58. *SCR*, Vol 1, 320. A "section" is roughly equivalent to an American infantry squad. Each platoon has three sections, a weapons detachment and a platoon headquarters. Sergeants Lloyd and Hillier refused to pass this direction on, demonstrating exactly the type of leadership that warrants emulation. In fact Hillier told his troops not to abuse anyone, and Lloyd threatened to jail any of his troops that were caught abusing prisoners.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid, 320–321.

unconscious. At one point Sergeant Boland stopped in at the bunker and told his two subordinates "I don't care what you do, just don't kill the guy."[61] When he left the beatings continued, with the two men taking photographs of their efforts. While this was going on, a number of other Canadian soldiers passed the bunker; no one made an effort to stop the torture taking place.[62] At some point after midnight Arone was dead; the next morning two Master Corporals, Gliasson and Alair, reported the incident to the CO.[63]

Concurrently, the body of Mr. Arone was turned over to Somali authorities at the Belet Huen Hospital and Captain Michael Sox reported the death-in-custody to the local Somali police force.[64] In parallel, an initial report was sent by the Regiment, through CJFS, to NDHQ in Ottawa reporting the death of a prisoner.[65] Additionally, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu ordered yet another CO's Investigation.[66] The next day (18 March 1993), Brown confessed the events of the night of the 16th to Major Seward.[67] The Regiment then augmented their initial report, reported that there was evidence of a possible criminal act related to Arone's death, and requested an MP investigation team and legal support.[68]

On 19 March, following his arrest for the murder of Shidane Arone, Master Corporal Matchee attempted to hang himself in the bunker serving as his cell.[69] A visiting Canadian reporter, Jim Day of the Pembroke *Daily Observer*, witnessed the unconscious Matchee being carried off on a stretcher. The sight of Matchee being taken away triggered a "brief press conference" where the visit party was briefed by Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu explaining little more than that the individual they had seen had been in military custody.[70] This impromptu press conference would have unexpectedly far-reaching effects.

Similarly, the interaction between NDHQ, CFJS and the media (detailing that Canadian soldiers had caused Arone's death) was not particularly adroit. While normal process is for a decision on media releases to be taken either by the force in theater or by NDHQ, there does not appear to have been one issued from the CAF. In this instance, there was a press release issued by the UNITAF Joint Information Bureau (JIB) on 18 March that was ignored or missed by Canadian national media outlets.[71] Canadian media only received information from NDHQ on 30 March 1993 after raising questions based on Jim Day's reporting; Canadian military authorities did nothing to communicate the story in Canada.[72] This delay also contributed to perceptions of a cover-up.

61. Ibid, 321.
62. Ibid, 322–323.
63. *SCR*, Vol 1, 324.
64. Worthington and Brown, *Scapegoat*, 137.
65. Worthington and Brown, *Scapegoat*, 144–145.
66. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 512.
67. Worthington and Brown, *Scapegoat*, 145–146.
68. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 512.
69. *SCR*, Vol 1, 325.
70. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 566.
71. Ibid, 512.
72. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 512.

Inconsistencies between official reporting and other published accounts, like those of former-Presidential Envoy Ambassador Robert Oakley, simply added to the suspicion that a cover-up had taken place.[73]

Allegations of Cover-Up and Redeployment

Prior to delving into the basis for the perception that there was a cover-up taking place, it is worth revisiting the Canadian national political context in the spring of 1993, concurrent to the events in Somalia taking place, as the political dynamic would play a seminal role in the unfolding of the Somalia Affair. On 24 February 1993, Prime Minister Mulroney announced his intent to resign.[74] Almost immediately, speculation began as to who the next PM would be. One of the first contenders to campaign for the role was Minister of National Defence (MND) Kim Campbell, which resulted in actions by DND being subjected to a level of scrutiny that departmental senior leaders had not previously witnessed.[75] It also meant that every action, or inaction, in Somalia would be questioned as to possible political motives. As Campbell later wrote:

> My position as a strong candidate made it irresistible for opposition members and members of the media to suggest that I wasn't paying enough attention to these events [then unfolding in Somalia] or was trying to downplay them, even cover them up to avoid controversy that might affect my campaign.[76]

When Campbell's Deputy Minister, Robert Fowler, passed direction to DND for its personnel to maintain a "low profile," the situation was exacerbated, as NDHQ attempted unsuccessfully to control and manage the flow of information to the media.[77] As the media received differing versions of what had happened on the ground, faith in the military's ability to manage events was chipped away.[78]

The first public hint that something was amiss came when Jim Day returned to Pembroke and wrote a story for the Pembroke *Daily Observer*, outlining what he had seen on 19 March.[79] That the CO had relatively quickly requested an MP investigative team be dispatched to Somalia to conduct a criminal in-

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73. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 74. Oakley wrote "The deliberate, brutal mistreatment of Somalis in Belet Weyne [sic] in spring 1993 by a small group of Canadian soldiers did not become known until after the unit had returned to Canada."
74. Mulroney, *Memoirs*, 980–982.
75. Campbell, *Time and Chance*, 253–258.
76. Ibid, 257.
77. Campbell, *Time and Chance*, 257.
78. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1126–1141. While the Somalia Commission is quite detailed, it simply refers to NDHQ as conducting the effort to control information, mentioning both the Chief of Defence Staff and the Vice Chief on different occasions, but neglecting to say specifically who was passing the direction. While important, it is less of an issue than the fact that the perception of a cover-up was created.
79. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 566–568

vestigation was largely irrelevant to the public and the media; they saw a two-week delay between the incident and being informed of its occurrence.[80] The delay set rumors flying and the media abuzz, asking questions as to who knew what, and when they became aware of the incident.[81] The story, and subsequent reports, drew a level of attention and suspicion that had not been seen by the Regiment or NDHQ before, including questions in Parliament as to what the MND knew and "why she [was] hiding it from Parliament."[82] It was only the beginning.

On 22 April 1993, the Canadian Press reported on the incident of 4 March using a letter from an unnamed soldier to his wife; the author was actually Major Armstrong, the Regiment's surgeon.[83] The letter was explosive and stated that members of the Regiment had "shot two Somalis in the back" and that "There's a big racist thing going on here."[84] That day the MND announced that a formal inquiry, later to be known as the "de Faye Inquiry," would take place to investigate the actions of the Regiment, and subsequently returned to Ottawa from a campaign trip to face ever-growing criticism from the press and Parliament.[85] It was also at this point that a formal MP investigation was ordered into the 4 March incident – five weeks after the events had taken place.[86] This delay, in conjunction with Armstrong's assertions, only augmented the public perception that there was a cover-up.

In Somalia, the Regiment closed down its mission. There was never an intent for Canada to participate beyond the UNITAF mandate, and while the UN stood-up UNOSOM II to assume its duties, Canadian troops redeployed with their equipment to Mogadishu and returned to Canada.[87] Prior to returning home, the members of the Regiment were issued instructions detailing how to cope with the media storm then in progress. The contents articulated the environment that they were headed into and framed the interactions that were to come, completely misreading the events that would follow, and how they would register with Canadians:

> [T]he vast majority of thinking Canadians, the Department of National Defence and your families are proud of your accomplishments…You must remember that negative, irresponsible journalism generated, for the most part by the misinformed who have never been to Somalia, was propagated for reasons beyond our control and will very quickly [lose] the public interest…The international community recognizes your accomplishments [and] when the dust has settled, even the few who have

80. *SCR*, Vol 1, 326.
81. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 567.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid, 567–568. The letter had been released by Major Armstrong.
84. Ibid.
85. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 568. The inquiry was named after the General who was responsible for leading it.
86. *SCR*, Vol 1, 331–332.
87. Ibid, 332–334.

> been [misled] by the sensationalist journalism will realize and acknowledge the truly valiant mission you have accomplished in Somalia.[88]

Suspicion, coupled with leadership failures, overshadowed anything that the mission had achieved. The incidents of 4 and 16 March, the manner they were dealt by military authorities in theater and in NDHQ, the reporting chain through to the MND, and the seemingly inexplicable delays in sending military police to investigate the deaths, combined to make discussion of the relative merits of the mission irrelevant. While the Regiment redeployed, Kim Campbell won her campaign to lead the Conservative Party, and shortly thereafter was named Prime Minister.[89]

88. Ibid, 334.
89. Campbell, *Time and Chance*, 301–304.

Section 3

Back in Canada

The de Faye Inquiry and Courts-Martial

Major-General Tom de Faye and his team began their work before the redeployment of the Regiment to Canada. Their mandate was to investigate "the leadership, discipline, operations, actions and procedures" of the Regiment. Additionally, latitude was given to investigate "the Battle Group's antecedents in Canada and higher headquarters in Somalia prior to and during its employment in Somalia."[1] Almost immediately a jurisdictional issue arose – how to deal with potential criminal acts and those already under Military Police investigations. This caused the then-CDS, Admiral John Anderson, to order that the board-of-inquiry (BOI) be split into two phases. Phase 1 was to deal with anything under the inquiry's mandate that was not under investigation or other legal proceedings; Phase 2 would address any remaining issues once the BOI was informed by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) that "all court proceedings or investigations by the MP had been completed."[2] Concurrently with Phase 1, the MP disciplinary investigations would continue with disciplinary proceedings taking place as appropriate.

After approximately ten weeks, on 19 July 1993, the de Faye BOI released its initial report.[3] While its findings were important, addressing a large number of issues that had been experienced during the preparatory and deployment phases, the credibility of the board, and the processes it used were questionable. The inquiry was hampered by its structure, rules put in place that limited the evidence that could be collected, and the ability of the team to probe evidentiary veracity.[4] Admiral Anderson's public announcement of the findings was received by the media with disbelief and skepticism; he attempted to

1. *SCR*, Vol 1, 341.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, 342.
4. *SCR*, Vol 1, 342. Rules of evidence did not apply, those giving evidence were not subject to cross-examination, and civilians with relevant information could only be invited to co-operate vice being compelled to testify.

portray the incidents as "isolated," but the gathered media did not accept the findings put before them.

As then-Colonel Rick Hillier later described, "The credibility of the [de Faye] Board of Inquiry took a beating, and, along with it, so did the entire Canadian Forces." In the aftermath of the announcement, the first demands for a public inquiry were heard.[5] DND's response to the challenges that Somalia issues posed was to establish "the Somalia Working Group," in September 1993 under the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) for Policy and Communications, Major-General Jean Boyle. The group was charged with coordinating DND's response to Somalia related issues, and in particular "advising the MND, CDS and DM [Deputy Minister] on future actions to be taken."[6] Politically, the dynamics of the Affair changed in October when Kim Campbell and the Conservatives were defeated in a landslide victory for the Liberal party under Jean Chrétien, who subsequently appointed David Collenette as MND.[7] That December, Admiral Anderson retired – to be replaced as CDS by General John de Chastelain.[8]

Concurrent with preparation and release of the de Faye report, disciplinary investigations and subsequent courts-martial took place, keeping the incidents in Somalia in full view of the Canadian public between 1993 and 1996.[9] The potential inconsistencies between the courts-martial and the content of the de Faye report posed a significant risk to the credibility of the CAF. Major-General Jean Boyle, in his capacity as head of the Somalia Working Group, initially raised this fact in October 1993 after reviewing the de Faye Report.[10] While public interest continued through the spring of 1994, owing to the ongoing courts-martial, Boyle wrote an "after-action report" with the intent of highlighting unresolved problems to the CDS, where the risks were clearly articulated. As the Somalia Commission wrote in their final report, Boyle's report warned that:

> much of the confidential information that had been severed from the [de Faye] report before it was released to the public would eventually become publicly available through the testimony at the courts martial of

5. Hillier, *A Soldier First*, 121–122.
6. *SCR*, Vol 1, 346–347, and Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 49.
7. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 49.
8. Hillier, *A Soldier First*, 122. As Rick Hillier notes, the choice of General de Chastelain as CDS is an interesting one. He had been CDS during the lead up to the mission in Somalia, after which he was appointed as the Canadian Ambassador to the United States. Bringing him back for a second tour as CDS was without precedent, and is noteworthy for the fact that it shows the intense desire to bring the Somalia Affair under control, using a senior leader who had weathered other difficult crises before. Further, it is demonstrative of the perceived lack of faith by the Canadian Government in the senior military leadership within the Canadian Armed Forces at that time to deal with the situation appropriately.
9. Kasurak, *A National Force,* 267. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 513 also refers.
10. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 576. Note, there is a discrepancy in the scholarship as scholars Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley have dated this incident as occurring in September 1993 (Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 49).

> soldiers involved in incidents in Somalia… there were weaknesses and… significant discrepancies in the de Faye board's findings and recommendations… some of the de Faye board's conclusions… did not appear to be borne out by the testimony actually heard… leadership problems reached up the chain of command to Command CFJS. He referred to documents that indicated "direct attempts to cover up facts behind the 4 March incident, which will no doubt be brought to light during court proceedings. Also the 16 March incident reveals a blatant attempt at the officer level to 'cover up' this incident. This will probably become public knowledge… and will seriously attack the credibility of the 'officer corps.'"[11]

In retrospect, it seems obvious that the courts-martial would inform the Canadian public, and its soldiers, as to what had occurred in Somalia. While it seems incredible that Boyle's warning was required, it bears remembering that the evolving media environment was a new phenomenon and no other Canadian deployment had ever experienced similar scrutiny. Of equal importance to the information that would become public knowledge however, were the conduct and outcomes of the trials themselves. With Master Corporal Matchee found incapable of standing trial as a result of his attempted suicide and associated permanent brain damage, the first individual to be tried was Private Kyle Brown.[12]

While the particulars of the trials are beyond the scope of this paper, three salient points warrant mention. The first point is that the trials kept the Regiment, and negative aspects of their actions in Somalia, in the public consciousness throughout 1994. News reports first generated interest in the mission, and as the incidents of March 1993 emerged, the media reported on developments as they occurred.[13] Second, the trials themselves contributed to a distrust of the military justice system primarily because only Private Brown was found guilty of torture and manslaughter – receiving a sentence of imprisonment for five years and dismissal with disgrace from the CAF.[14] This distrust existed both in the public at large and, equally important, within the rank and file of the Canadian military. Lastly, the outcomes themselves raised suspicion as they seemed to conform to a pattern wherein the higher the rank of the accused, the less likely that there would be a finding of guilt, and where culpability was

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11. *SCR*, Vol 1, 348–349.
12. Chris Madsen, *Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 145. *SCR*, Vol 1, 336 also refers. Matchee has never recovered to the point of being able to stand trial for his actions.
13. See for example: "Canadian Soldiers Under Investigation," *Prime Time News*, originally broadcast April 2, 1993, accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/canadian-soldiers-under-investigation, "Somalia Affair: The Whistleblower," *Prime Time News*, originally broadcast May 5, 1993, accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/somalia-affair-the-whistleblower and "The Sentencing of Private Kyle Brown," *Prime Time News*, originally broadcast March 18, 1994, accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/the-sentencing-of-private-kyle-brown.
14. *SCR*, Vol 1, 336.

determined, the lighter the sentence. This is readily evident in the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu was repeatedly found not guilty on the charge of negligent performance of a military duty, and Major Seward – who gave the order to abuse intruders – initially received a "severe reprimand" as sentence for his crime.[15]

Collectively, the trials eroded the Canadian public's, and its soldier's, beliefs that the CAF was able to effectively police itself or deal with wrongdoing in a fair and appropriate manner. Ominously, the trials created a perception among Canadian soldiers that they alone were being held accountable. As Peter Worthington and Kyle Brown wrote:

> it seemed that in the Canadian military justice system obeying an unlawful order was a greater crime than giving an unlawful order. Ironically, the effect of the courts martial, rather than restoring public confidence in the military, was to further undermine it. Where was the accountability of senior ranks?[16]

The courts-martial triggered the next event of the Affair. In early November, following the conclusion of the court-martial of Private David Brocklebank, the publication ban on the "trophy photos," taken by Brown and Matchee, was lifted. While the photographs had been described by various media outlets, no member of the Canadian public had actually seen the photos.[17] The response was immediate and visceral, increasing the pressure on the new Liberal government to act.[18] Subsequently, Major Armstrong asserted he had been directed to "destroy evidence that showed Canadian soldiers had mistreated Somalis."[19] The Canadian government's hand was now forced by public disgust. On 17 November 1994 in one of his first acts as the new MND, in response to ever-growing public outcry, David Collenette announced that there would be a public inquiry into the events in Somalia involving the Airborne Regiment.[20]

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15. Ibid, 337 & 339–340. Note, Mathieu underwent two separate courts martial as his first acquittal resulted in an appeal by the Crown which then resulted in a second trial, wherein he was acquitted a second time. Seward's original sentence was also appealed by the Prosecution which resulted in the more severe sentence of three month's detention and subsequent dismissal from the CAF.
16. Worthington and Brown, *Scapegoat*, 214 and 216.
17. Photos are available at "The Canadian Airborne Regiment's Somalia Affair, 20 Years Later," *Edmonton* Sun, last modified March 16, 2013, accessed January 19, 2017. http://www.edmontonsun.com/2013/03/15/the-canadian-airborne-Regiments-somali-affair-20-years-later.
18. Martha Armstrong, "A Tale of Two Videos: Media Event, Moral Panic and the Canadian Airborne Regiment," (Master's Thesis, McGill University, 1997), 26–28.
19. Armstrong, "A Tale of Two Videos," 27.
20. "1994: Somalia Inquiry to Investigate Canadian Military Scandal," *Prime Time News*, originally broadcast November 17, 1994, accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/1994-somalia-inquiry-to-investigate-canadian-military-scandal.

Video Release and Disbandment

Scott Taylor, a journalist and former Canadian soldier, had observed the fallout and periodically commented in editorials of *Esprit de Corps* magazine in 1994. At some point, Taylor acquired a copy of a videotape made by the soldiers of 2 Commando while in Somalia: a video in which Private Brown could be seen behaving in a normal, and markedly quiet manner when compared against the displays of bravado and commentary of his fellow paratroopers. Underestimating how the video could be interpreted and distressed by the injustice to which he viewed Brown as being subjected, he arranged to share the video with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).[21] Sections from the tape were aired on the nightly news on 15 January 1995.[22]

A media frenzy erupted followed the airing. Images of a black-faced Canadian soldier, racial slurs, and overt racism were what the Canadian public saw and took away from the three-minute clip on the nightly news. As Martha Armstrong described the situation, "The next day, the story was everywhere, and not as Taylor had envisioned. The soldiers' racist and violent comments were the focus…[rather than] absolving Brown and exposing the military's leadership failings."[23] Worse was to come.

Within days, existence of a second video became known. Filmed during an initiation ceremony that took place before the Regiment had deployed to Somalia, it depicted "a group of drunken soldiers from 1 Commando vomiting, eating something indistinguishable and vomiting again, doing push-ups, and urinating on other soldiers."[24] Contents from the video were broadcast nationally on 18 January 1995. Repercussions were swift. The Canadian public was both disgusted and angry; DND was "mortified" and immediately launched an investigation.[25] Politically, the reaction was without precedent in Canadian military history.

On 24 January 1995, Minister Collenette announced, against the advice of the CDS, that the Regiment would be disbanded.[26] The rationale was predominantly political, but included ethical and cultural factors as well – the leadership failures were anathema to Canadian values. As historian Dan Loomis

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21. Worthington and Brown, *Scapegoat*, 241–243. Scholar Martha Armstrong describes the events leading up to the video's release slightly differently. Armstrong, "A Tale of Two Videos," 28–29.
22. "Rampant Racism in the Airborne Regiment," *Sunday Report,* originally broadcast January 15, 1995, accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/rampant-racism-in-the-airborne-Regiment. There is discrepancy within secondary sources as to when the first video was shown, with scholars David Bercuson, Bernd Horn, and Bill Bentley stating that it was aired in early 1994. This is not borne out by the CBC archives which state unequivocally that it aired on January 15, 1995. This is also reinforced by the timeline established by Martha Armstrong, as well as that detailed by Worthington and Brown.
23. Armstrong, "A Tale of Two Videos," 30.
24. Ibid.
25. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 611.
26. *SCR*, Vol 1, 350.

noted, "Any credibility the [Regiment] may have been left with was lost in the eyes of the public along with its political leadership. This spelled the end of the [Regiment]."[27] This point was reinforced by Louise Frechette, the DM for National Defence at the time, who, in an interview with Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, stated:

> The Government finally got fed up. They were beat up daily [with regard to the Canadian Airborne Regiment] therefore they decided to disband the Regiment. Basically it was a question of why keep something that you can't get a handle on – it's a deep hole. It was a political decision to change the conversation.[28]

Six weeks later on 5 March 1995, in Petawawa Ontario, the Regiment conducted its final parade, laid-up its colours in the Regiment's museum and ceased to exist as a unit in the CA.[29] The combination of the events in Somalia, the public courts-martial and their seeming injustice, vivid photographs, and revolting videos overwhelmed anything positive that the unit had accomplished, either in Somalia or throughout its short history. Two weeks later the next stage of the Somalia Affair began, when Minister Collenette established what would become popularly known as the "Somalia Commission" or the "Somalia Inquiry."[30] The CAF had completely lost control of the situation, and the litany of leadership and ethical failings – at all levels – were about to be publicly dissected.

The Somalia Commission and The Young Report

On 20 March 1995, the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia was established by the Canadian Government.[31] Its three original members were Judge Gilles Letourneau, journalist Peter Desbarats, and Ambassador Anne-Marie Doyle. Doyle was subsequently replaced by Judge Robert Rutherford when it became known that Doyle was a personal acquaintance of Robert Fowler – former DM for DND.[32] Originally anticipating a duration of nine months, the inquiry lasted over two years, with its final report only being released on 30 June 1997.[33] The Commission's mandate was

27. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 612.
28. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 50.
29. The most personal account of the conduct of the disbandment ceremonies can be found in Amaral, *Eat Your Weakest Man*, 103–107.
30. The original intent was for the second part of the de Faye Board of Inquiry to take place once the courts martial had taken concluded. This was overtaken by events, as at the time of the disbandment of the CAR, there was still one trial to complete, as well as number of appeals to run their course. In standing up the Somalia Commission, the second part of the de Faye BOI was replaced.
31. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1503–1507 provides a copy of the original Order-in-Council, P.C. 1995-442, 20 March 1995.
32. Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-Up*, 17.
33. Ibid, 7 and *SCR*, Vol 1, Frontspiece.

significant and broad, with their terms of reference stating that they were to

> inquire into and report on the chain of command system, leadership within the chain of command, discipline, operations, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect to the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia and…matters related to the pre-deployment, in-theatre and post-deployment phases of the Somalia deployment.[34]

The Commission began by organizing into three broad components, each with its own tasks that aimed to meet the goals specified in the terms of reference – investigation, research and hearings.[35] The investigative component's goal was to sort through over 150,000 documents and interview "hundreds of potential witnesses" in an effort to ascertain a factual basis on which to judge events and decisions.[36] The research component, working largely behind the scenes, undertook "an exhaustive comparative assessment of rules and policies affecting military operations and decision making."[37] The third, most visible component, was the conduct of public hearings, where witnesses were interviewed and questioned on the testimony that they provided.[38] For many Canadians, only this last component generated interest, with excerpts of testimony being aired on nightly news broadcasts, and almost continual live coverage available on the Canadian Public Affairs Channel (CPAC).[39]

Public hearings began in October 1995 and lasted until March 1997, with 116 witnesses testifying.[40] For over fifteen months the Commission attempted to sort through the diverse elements of the Somalia Affair, working to understand the CAF and the situation which led to the Commission's initiation. Historian Peter Kasurak has described the hearings as "often confrontational, with commissioners clearly concerned the department was withholding evidence or even being dishonest in its representations."[41] For its part, members of the military chain-of-command were concerned that an obvious bias was evident on the part of the commissioners, with a degree of contempt for the military leadership.[42] This was definitively demonstrated during the testimony of then-

34. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1503.
35. *SCR*, Vol 1, 3.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. *SCR*, Vol 1, 3–4.
39. CPAC is a privately funded television channel intended to inform Canadians on matters concerning "Parliament, politics and public affairs." See http://www.cpac.ca/en/about-cpac/.
40. Procedural hearings began in late May 1995, with evidentiary hearings beginning in June of that year. *SCR*, Vol 1, xxxii & 3; Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-Up*, 290–293.
41. Kasurak, *A National Force*, 268-269. General Boyle's assumption of the position of CDS will be dealt with later in this piece.
42. Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-Up*, 60-61. As an example, Brigadier General Beno attempted to legally disqualify Judge Létourneau from his position as commissioner.

CDS General Boyle.[43]

While much has been written on the perceived bias and hostility with which the Commission treated some witnesses, acting more like a criminal court than an inquiry, it is several activities internal to the CAF and DND that merit comment here.[44] Given the volume of documents required for the Commission to complete its task, an imperative existed for an agency within DND empowered to respond to, and to coordinate with, the Commission.[45] In response the Department created the Somalia Inquiry Liaison Team (SILT), which worked for the Associate ADM (Policy & Communications) – Major-General Boyle.[46] From the outset, the working relationship between the SILT and the Commission was poor; perceptions by the Commission of the SILT's intransigence and/or incompetence made it worse.[47] As the Commission wrote in their final report:

> It is clear that rather than assisting with the timely flow of information to our Inquiry, DND adopted a strategic approach to deal with the Inquiry and engaged in a tactical operation to delay or deny the disclosure of relevant information to us and consequently to the Canadian public.[48]

Two significant issues directly affected the relationship between the Commission and the SILT, and by extension the CAF. The first was that documents were missing, in many cases incomplete, and poorly organized. As an example, one need only refer to the thirty-three different operational logs that were missing from the record.[49] In not being able to provide the documents, or reasonable explanations as to why they were missing, the relationship between the SILT and the Commission was adversely impacted. Further, the missing and disorganized documents meant that the Commission was not properly prepared to conduct the ongoing public hearings.

The second issue is more disturbing – the modification and destruction of documents related to incidents in Somalia. In the first instance, documented proof exists that after receiving a request for information from a CBC reporter, Major-General Boyle took the conscious decision to alter original documents – specifically to remove comments and sensitive background information.[50] As well, to deny further requests for information from reporters, documents were retitled; what had been "Response to Queries" (RTQs), were renamed "Media

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43. Hillier, *A Soldier First*, 125.
44. Commenting on the Commission's leadership, Jack Granatstein described it as "sputtering and splenetic." Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 157.
45. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1200.
46. Ibid, 1201.
47. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 51 and *SCR*, Vol 5, 1200.
48. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1242.
49. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 590-591. An operational log is a record of radio and important verbal conversations, as well as a record of any correspondence which is received by or distributed by a given headquarters.
50. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1236–1241.

Response Lines" (MRLs). When the media used access to information protocols requesting RTQs on a given subject they were then informed that none existed.[51] Additionally, there is documented evidence of attempted destruction of documents related to the Somalia Incident; specifically, those that would reveal that the RTQs had been modified before their release to the media.[52] The relationship, and trust, between the public, the media, and the Commission on one hand, and the CAF on the other, continued to erode owing to a demonstrated inability to exercise leadership in an ethical fashion.

In December 1995, General de Chastelain retired from the CAF, being replaced by newly-promoted General Boyle.[53] Handling the Somalia Affair would define his time as Canada's senior military officer. On 9 April 1996, he shut down all training and operations across the CAF, ordering a detailed search for missing documents.[54] In mid-August he testified in front of the Commission and admitted that he, and his staff, had attempted to mislead the media. Further, in a complete abrogation of responsibility, he attempted to pass the blame for this effort onto his staff.[55] On 4 October 1996, the MND, David Collenette, resigned his post as a result of non-Somalia Affair related activities and was replaced by Doug Young.[56] Collenette was followed four days later by General Boyle, who was replaced by Vice-Admiral Larry Murray; Boyle had lasted nine months.[57]

The new MND and the Liberal Government were running out of patience for the Commission to complete its task. The investigation into the provision and manipulation of documents was never envisioned and it was having negative effects, including an ever-growing cost – then over $15 million.[58] On 10 January 1997, the Government informed the Commission that their latest request for additional time to complete their work was denied and that they would be expected to submit their final report by 30 June of that year.[59] This immediately limited the scope of the inquiry, and curtailed any efforts to investigate the circumstances of the Affair at the national or strategic levels. While the Commission completed its work, Minister Young took another, complementary, approach.

First, Young created a "Special Advisory Group" to examine both military justice and MP investigation services. Comprised of three distinguished individuals, it submitted its report in mid-March 1997, making thirty-five recom-

51. Ibid, 1237–1239.
52. Ibid, 1230–1236.
53. Desbarats, Somalia Cover-Up, 349.
54. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1222. The search resulted in 39,000 documents being dispatched to the Commission, many of them duplicates of information that they had already received.
55. "Somalia Affair: Mea Culpa," *The National,* originally broadcast August 14, 1996, accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/somalia-affair-mea-culpa.
56. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 51.
57. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 51–52.
58. Ibid, 51.
59. *SCR*, Vol 5, 1407.

mendations as to how to improve Canada's military justice system.[60] Separately, Young examined broader military reform.

Using the services of four noted Canadian academics, Albert Legault, Jack Granatstein, Desmond Morton, and David Bercuson, he began creating his own report with the goal of shaping the evolution of the CAF before the Somalia Commission would finish their work. The focus of his efforts was on leadership development and enhancing intellectual capacity within the CAF. These efforts reflected his belief that the crux of the problems within the CAF, and the officer corps in particular, stemmed from a lack of education which affected the ability of the CAF to be attuned to the larger society it served.[61] By the end of March 1997, Young had completed his work and submitted it to the Prime Minister. Containing sixty-five recommendations, "*The Young Report*" would energize and guide the evolution of the CAF over the coming years.[62] Three months later, the Somalia Commission submitted its report to the Canadian government. Its 1,500 pages included 157 recommendations, many of which would be implemented to a greater or lesser degree.[63] However, the primary driver for change was ultimately *The Young Report*.

With the delivery of the two reports the Somalia Affair concluded. Vice-Admiral Murray acted as CDS for less time than General Boyle.[64] His own markedly defiant testimony to the Commission tainted him politically, and he was subsequently removed from the position in the summer of 1997.[65] Doug Young, who had expected to be able to push his reforms through the CAF after the Affair had ended, lost his seat in the federal election that spring. He was replaced by Art Eggelton as MND, who then oversaw the implementation of the reforms proposed by *The Young Report*.[66]

60. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 53.
61. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 53–54.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid, 52.
64. He was actually formally appointed as "Acting CDS."
65. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 58–59.
66. Ibid.

Section 4

The Effects

On Effects

Possessing an understanding of elements of the Somalia Affair, it is worth revisiting the central argument of this monograph. Specifically, the tactical events in Somalia in 1993 triggered a strategic crisis that was fundamentally mishandled by the extant strategic leadership, creating significant strategic and institutional effects which commenced during the Somalia Affair, and continue to impact both Canada and the CAF to this day. These effects include the rupturing of the civil-military relationship, a loss of professional autonomy, and the forced evolution of the Canadian officer corps.

Prior to discussing each effect, it is necessary to address four points. The first is to reiterate that the Canadian civil-military relationship throughout the twentieth century, and in particular in the Army during the period post-reunification in 1967, was tension-filled. This has been ably described by Peter Kasurak, who wrote "The history of the Canadian Army and the state during the last half of the twentieth century is… mainly a story of a troubled relationship."[1]

Second, that the operating context of the CA throughout the 1990s impacted the effects generated by the Affair. Thus, while it is asserted that the effects which are described below were caused by the Somalia Affair, it is also accepted that the context in which the events took place played a role in the generation of the effects. While a complete examination of this context is beyond the scope of this monograph, note must be made that elements of the CA were consistently deployed on peace enforcement operations throughout the Affair's duration, where other scandals occasionally took place. However, these scandals did not result in either public inquiries or formal, mandated changes to the Canadian military; it was solely the Somalia Affair which led to public investigation and governmental intervention.

Third, there were other effects beyond those at the strategic level. At the tactical level, many changes were mandated as a direct result of either the

1. Kasurak, *A National Force*, 293.

pre-deployment training undergone by the Regiment, or by their actions while deployed in Somalia. Examples include the revision of detainee handling procedures and training, formalized training on and use of ROE, as well as the inclusion of MPs in the organizational structure of overseas task forces. While these effects are all extremely important and continue to be elements of pre-deployment training and overseas operations, they are not the subject of this study.

Lastly there is the frequently-asked question of whether or not the Regiment achieved the effect originally desired by the Canadian government by deploying the Regiment to Somalia with UNITAF. Other authors, like Charles Oliviero, have dealt with the question at some length, but the fact is that the question is moot. The effectiveness of the mission, and that while deployed the Regiment brought stability to a portion of Somalia, was completely overshadowed by the Affair and the actions of leaders at all levels when confronted by "significant incidents" at the tactical level. The strategic effects were not caused by the Regiment's operational effectiveness; they were resultant from how the chain-of-command both in Somalia and in Ottawa reacted to the tactical crisis and all that followed. It is these effects that must now be examined.

The Rupturing of the Civil-Military Relationship

To demonstrate the effects of the Somalia Affair on the Canadian civil-military relationship, it is important to first understand several aspects of it. First, as a theoretical foundation, the CAF use the works of Samuel Huntington and, to a much lesser degree, Morris Janowitz.[2] This is an interesting dynamic; Canadian doctrine is reliant on these two authors despite the fact that both were writing primarily for an American audience, which used conscripted forces, and at a time when the primary issue was control of the military during an anticipated nuclear exchange. While one can, and likely should, question the overall relevance of these theories in a Canadian context, they remain in use today, with their key point being that "the essential function of the military profession is the ordered application of military force in defence of the state and its interests."[3]

Huntington's two stated imperatives, "functional" and "societal," within the civil-military relationship are of fundamental import. The functional imperative is the ability of the military to deal with the threats to which its society is

2. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 45. The foundational works are Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glance: The Free Press, 1960). Canadian doctrine is reliant on these two authors despite the fact that both were writing primarily for an American audience, which used conscripted forces, and at a time when the primary issue was control of the military during an anticipated nuclear exchange.
3. Canadian Forces, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Academy, 2003), 7.

exposed, while the societal imperative refers to the need for a nation's military to reflect the "social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society" – in plain terms, the need for a military to reflect the social dynamic of the nation it serves.[4] An appropriate balance between the two, enables both effective military function and the maintenance of societal support.[5]

Of equal importance is the means to exercise civilian control of the military, as expressed in Huntington's twin ideas of "subjective" and "objective" control.[6] Subjective control is the use of governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional form to effect control of a nation's military. By contrast, objective control is when a nation seeks to maximize the professionalism within the military to ensure that it acts in an apolitical fashion, subservient to legitimate civilian authorities. Historically, the military profession has been the most significant proponent of objective control.[7] While appearing rather binary, this can be better conceived as a spectrum with subjective and objective control at the extremes, while the actual means being used to control the military lie somewhere between.

Canadian scholarship also bears on this discussion. Douglas Bland put forward a "unified theory" of civil-military relations, wherein he states that "civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers."[8] Implicit in Bland's model is the argument that "civil control is a dynamic process susceptible to changing ideas, values, circumstances, issues, and personalities and to the stresses of crises and war [or operations]."[9]

Christopher Ankersen has also developed a model of the civil-military relationship, framed in Clausewitzian terms, making used of the trinity formed between the military, the government, and the people.[10] A dynamic model which sees the trinity in a constant interplay, where relative power in the relationship varies by context and history, it views "legitimacy" as central to the issues of civil-military relations; with the "the establishment and maintenance of this legitimacy" being the principle challenge.[11] Legitimacy, using the work of Gianfranco Poggi, is said to exist when an actor is "supported by the society's shared values and beliefs, underwritten by moral consensus."[12] Ankersen's model sees legitimacy as being the product of acting in accord "with the prevailing political discourse," institutionalization, and history.[13]

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4. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, 80–84.
7. Ibid, 83–84.
8. Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*. Volume 26, Number 1, Fall 1999 (1999): 9.
9. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," 10.
10. Christopher Ankersen, *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation: Canada in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 51–70.
11. Ibid, 51 & 60.
12. As cited in ibid, 59.
13. Ibid, 65.

Doctrinally, the CAF views three parties to the relationship in addition to the military: the society being served, the government, and the public servants which assist in managing the military on the government's behalf on a daily basis.[14] It is interesting to note that this breakdown was not mentioned in previous articulations on the topic of civil-military relations within the CA, and does not make mention of the media.[15]

All the aforementioned ideas were directly impacted by the Somalia Affair, either while it was ongoing or in the subsequent aftermath. In the first instance, as the Somalia Commission conducted its task of investigating the actions of the Regiment, it was readily evident that the public did not support the manner in which the Regiment had conducted its activities. The societal imperatives detailed by Huntington were not respected and the tendency by some troops to disregard these imperatives shocked Canadian society. Their actions, and the fact that they ran contrary to the perceived history of the Canadian military as that of peacekeeper, a central Canadian myth, resulted in a loss of legitimacy. As Jack Granatstein wrote:

> The gung-ho, macho style of the Canadian Airborne seemed profoundly un-Canadian and the public, Parliament, and media saw this discrepancy at once. Our boys, carrying our values, were running amok…The Canadian way of war – and peacekeeping – did not encompass tattoos, Confederate flags, and racial sneers and killings.[16]

Second, and more importantly, there was a pronounced shift away from objective control and commensurate adoption of far more subjective, or external, controls on the CAF. This was apparent during several distinct periods in the Somalia Affair. The first example is the very establishment of a public commission to investigate the events in Somalia and their background. Devoid of a representative from the military profession, the organization and conduct of the Somalia Commission provides evidence that neither the political level nor the public in general trusted the military to deal with the crisis in an appropriate manner. This is further reinforced in the act of reinstalling former-CDS General de Chastelain, after his appointment as ambassador to the United States. Regardless of the rationale articulated at the time, it showed that the Canadian government did not trust any of the senior leaders then in the CAF to fittingly respond to the Affair. It also demonstrated a shift in the civil-military relationship where more power was assumed by the political side of the relationship.

The third, and most telling, demonstration of the move towards subjective

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14. *Duty with Honour*, 41.
15. See for example *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee* published immediately following the conclusion of the Somalia Affair in 1998. Its half page on civil-military relations, page 110, focusses solely on the fact that senior military leaders share the responsibility for defence policy with their political masters and may resign if they feel that their moral or professional values are in conflict with a proposed policy. It is separately acknowledged on the same page that the public may also play a role in defence matters.
16. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*, 157.

control, is seen in the actions which followed the delivery of the Report of the Somalia Inquiry, and the production of *The Young Report*. Rather than trust the military to carry out reforms as ordered, the new MND took the unprecedented step of establishing the Minister's Monitoring Committee (MMC) to ensure that the military leadership carried out the recommendations as directed.[17] This committee met and worked until 2003. It is not overstatement to argue that this was the nadir of the Canadian civil-military relationship in the post-unification era, and it directly impacted the conception of the Canadian military profession itself.

Finally, returning to the Canadian conception of its civil-military relationship, it is clear that this set of relationships was ruptured by the Somalia Affair – notwithstanding whether Canada had ever really enjoyed a productive, fruitful civil-military relationship in the era following the unification of the Canadian Forces.[18] As Peter Kasurak has argued, the Affair "undermined, if not completely destroyed, public confidence in the senior leadership of the army and of the Canadian Forces as whole."[19] The loss of legitimacy was significant and would result in further effects.

Loss of Professional Autonomy

In exactly the same manner as the Canadian military conceives of the civil-military relationship in the terms first articulated by Huntington and Janowitz, its concept of the military profession is based on the models articulated by those two scholars. The second set of effects from the Somalia Affair was a crisis within the military profession itself; specifically, a loss of professional autonomy and the ability to self-regulate, coupled with a perceived lack of accountability. Here it is again helpful to first examine how the Canadian military profession defines itself doctrinally – particularly as the doctrine was written in the aftermath of the Somalia Affair.

Canada's Army strikes a "Huntingtonian" tone. It states that the three principle attributes of a profession are responsibility, expertise, and corporateness with its provision for self-regulation of matters internal to the profession – to include discipline, standards, and procedures.[20] Similarly *Duty with Honour* reflects the same attributes, although the idea of "corporateness" was replaced with the twin ideas of "identity" and "military ethos."[21] Conspicuous for its near absence is the idea of self-regulation, or professional autonomy. This is, in itself, an indication of the loss of professional autonomy in regulating matters internal to the profession, lost by the Canadian military during the Somalia Affair.[22]

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17. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 59–61.
18. Kasurak, *A National Force*, 6–8.
19. Ibid, 267.
20. *Canada's Army*, 31–32.
21. *Duty with Honour*, 7.
22. Ibid, 22 & 39. There are only three references to this idea within the publication. The

Instead, *Duty with Honour* makes the point that there is "rightful and actual authority over technical military matters" which is taken to include "doctrine, the professional development of its members, discipline, military personnel policy, and the internal organization of units and other entities of the armed forces."[23] Further, it details the idea that:

> Legitimacy in the eyes of the government and Canadian society is largely contingent on the application of the military ethos and the structure it gives the other attributes of the military profession, but this affords the profession considerable scope for self-regulation to ensure professional effectiveness.[24]

Most striking is how *Duty with Honour* tackles the idea of professional military autonomy at the strategic level. After asserting that the military possesses a "high degree of autonomy at the tactical and operational levels," the document argues that owing to the nature of the strategic level, with its requirements for "further collaboration and integration at the civil-military interface," and the existence of a "dynamic relationship," that strict differentiation between the civil and military components is impossible.[25] The granting of professional autonomy or strictly military control, over any aspect of the strategic realm of operations, is not envisioned in the Canadian context.

Re-examining the events of the Somalia Affair, the evidence of a loss of professional autonomy, or the ability to self-regulate, is manifest. Again, the initiation of the Somalia Inquiry in the face of the shortcomings of the de Faye BOI is a clear example of where the military profession was not trusted to police itself and determine what went wrong. The disbandment of the Regiment, over the objections of the CDS, is evidence that the Canadian military profession did not possess the requisite credibility to maintain the practice of self-regulation. This lack of credibility, and its accompanying loss of legitimacy, can be traced to the manner by which the disciplinary processes related to the incidents in Somalia were carried out, and their reporting within the Canadian media. Further, the disciplinarily trials of those members charged for their actions in Somalia and their outcomes, with few found guilty and "light" punishments, directly contributed to a justifiable belief in a lack of accountability within the military.

Another second order effect was the creation of a divide between the offi-

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second instance is a text box in a diagram explaining the civil-military relationship. Of note here is the fact that the military side of the house is detailed as having "Professional autonomy and self-regulation" while the civil side maintains the responsibility for the "Relationship to Canadian Society and Policy Control." This represents an internal contradiction to the stated description of the civil-military relationship within the publication itself.

23. Ibid, 40–41.

24. Ibid, 22. Note the stated intent of self-regulation is to ensure professional effectiveness. It is not to ensure legitimacy or credibility with the other parties to the civil-military relationship.

25. Ibid, 41.

cers and soldiers of the CAF. A perception was created that the more junior the accused was, the more likely the individual would be found guilty, and the more severe the sentence that would be pronounced. When these events were reported in the media, it reinforced the idea that senior officers were only concerned about themselves, and were more than willing to pass the blame to their subordinates. As Douglas Bland wrote:

> When… the courts-martial handed harsher punishments to soldiers than to their officers and when senior officers excused their behavior and dodged responsibility for the state of the units involved, a deep schism opened between officers and soldiers. The crisis in command came to mean a failure in leadership caused by an abandonment of military values.[26]

The perception of the split was reinforced during the conduct of the Somalia Inquiry, after the trials had been completed, when then-CDS General Jean Boyle testified at the Inquiry and abrogated responsibility for the actions of members of his staff. His demonstrated lack of professional accountability was disheartening and did nothing to bridge the gap between the soldiers and their officers.

Recognizing these issues, Doug Young, the last MND during the Somalia Affair, took action that in itself is both a manifestation of the loss of military control over the evolution of its profession, and one of the positive legacies of the Somalia Affair. With the publication of *The Young Report*, the civilian side of DND both asserted control over the profession of arms, and directed how its officer corps would evolve.

The Evolution of Canada's Officer Corps

Reading the contents of *The Young Report* twenty years after its release, one is struck by the insight and vision for the future that it contains. After watching the Somalia Affair unfold for four years, it would not have been surprising to see a more punitive tone in the Canadian Government's response. Instead, Minister Young offered a vision for the future that would see the CAF and its officers evolve to meet the challenges posed by a post-Cold War paradigm, and ultimately help build the foundation for success required at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Doug Young was extremely clear in articulating his intent to his staff, stating "We are not going to wait for the Commission of Inquiry [the Somali Commission] to table its report to set in train the kinds of reform that we think are necessary inside the Canadian Forces."[27] While the creation of the report has

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26. Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters Centre for Decision: a Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Services, 1997), 51.
27. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 53.

already been detailed, it is worth reinforcing that each of Young's advisors saw a common theme in the role of education to enable the officer corps of the future to cope with the ever-more sophisticated demands of its profession.[28] All four were absolutely unified in their view that "the officer corps was undereducated and out of touch with Canadian society."[29]

The Young Report contained a hundred recommendations on all manner of topics affecting the CAF, with a pronounced focus on the military justice system, education, ethics and values, and leadership.[30] In the last three spheres, Young directly shaped the evolution of the Canadian officer corps.

For the first time a university degree was made a mandatory requirement for all those who wished to be commissioned within the Canadian Forces.[31] Additionally, the whole scope of professional education was to be reviewed, placing pronounced emphasis on "values, ethics, and leadership skills."[32] This was to commence with undergraduate programs at the Royal Military College, and continue throughout an officer's career. Additionally, the military component of DND was charged with producing a formal statement of "values and beliefs" that was to become part of all "training programs, professional development activities and performance assessments."[33]

Young's rationale for the reforms, and his pronounced emphasis on education, related to three inter-related ideas. The first was a belief that officers needed to be "suitably trained and educated" if they were to "continue to reflect the social make-up and values of their country" and be "able to evolve in concert with the broader Canadian society."[34] The second was a belief that the changing context of "Canadian life" and "global security" demanded a "redefinition of the military ethos as well as significant changes in training, education, professional development and the care of members of the forces."[35] Lastly, Young saw that there was a "need to ensure that the officer corps remains well-con-

28. Kasurak, *A National Force,* 273.
29. Kasurak, *A National Force,* 273. While this was the view articulated by Doug Young, there does not seem to have been a single study done that examined the educational levels of those actually involved in either the CAR or handling the efects of the Somalia Affair at NDHQ. Many of the key officers were in fact university educated at the Royal Military College. Thus, it can be argued that while the stance taken on university education was beneficial, it remains debatable as to whether the lack of a university education actually had any effect on how officers carried out their duties. It is equally plausible, but harder to quantify, that the manner by which they had been encultured during the Cold War played an equal or greater role in their ability to respond to events, or to connect with Canadians.
30. *Young Report*, 45–57. The initial reforms to the military justice system have been covered in detail by Chris Madsen in his book *Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999). While the recommendations were significant and fundamentally changed the fashion by which military justice is carried out within the CAF, they will not be covered in this monograph.
31. Ibid, 42. The sole exception to this being those that were to be commissioned from the ranks.
32. Ibid, 42 and 43.
33. Ibid, 41.
34. *Young Report*, 12.
35. Ibid, 14.

nected with Canadian society and the day-to-day reality of public concerns."[36] Young's articulation echoes the language of Huntington, and reaffirmed that the CAF needed to respect the societal imperatives which are foundational to the civil-military relationship.

The imposition of the requirement for an under-graduate degree as an entry requirement into the officer corps is not without criticism. In the first instance, the requirement disregards the fact that many of the officers involved in the Somalia Affair did in fact possess at least an undergraduate degree. This brings into question Young's assertion that possession of a degree would enable a connection to broader Canadian society. Second, the failures of leadership which were displayed during the Somalia Affair were just that; they were not owing to a lack of education, but rather failures of ethics and necessary judgement required to meet the demands inherent in belonging to the military profession. Lastly, by leaving the requirement in broad terms, without articulating the type of degrees to be obtained, an argument may be made that officers are entering the CAF with degrees that are of questionable utility to the military profession. Thus, while the value of undergraduate education is largely self-evident, its necessity and the manner by which it is being applied are perhaps less obvious.

While the civilian imposition of these reforms on the CAF may be viewed as an example of subjective control over the Canadian military by its political masters, the judgements on the reforms themselves have generally been positive. Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley have ably chronicled the challenges faced in carrying out the reforms, as well as the institutional intransigence that needed to be overcome.[37] Their judgement is that the reforms have yet to take permanent hold within the officer corps, and that the emphasis on education is "once again in question."[38] Whether the evolution of the officer corps will continue as conceived by Doug Young remains to be seen.

36. Ibid, 15.
37. Horn and Bentley, *Forced to Change*, 97-115.
38. Ibid, 119.

Section 5

Conclusion

Implications for the Future

The elements of the Somalia Affair and the resultant strategic effects clearly demonstrate the catalyst for the reforms undertaken in the latter half of the 1990s, and perhaps to a lesser degree to the present day. The root source of the reforms was initially a series of tactical incidents that were subsequently mishandled by the strategic leadership within the Canadian military, which then resulted in a very public inquiry, and one of the most significant crises in the Canadian civil-military relationship in the country's history. That this catalyst led directly to significant reforms within the Canadian military profession is commendable, but work remains.

The rupture of the Canadian civil-military relationship demonstrated that there were, and are, weaknesses with the model that Canada is currently using as the basis for its doctrine. Samuel Huntington's theory on civil-military relations was written for a time and circumstance that does not precisely fit the post-Cold War/post-Afghanistan CAF. There are other models of civil-military relations, like the works of Douglas Bland and Christopher Ankersen, and the Canadian military needs to ensure that the model it is using is appropriate to the Canadian dynamic.[1] To do otherwise is to risk the vital societal connection between a military and the nation it serves in the event that the chosen model creates false expectations in the minds of strategic leaders.

The importance of the civil-military relationship has only been reinforced in the current era. Certainly, this has been recognized by the CAF as it is has navigated multiple crisis (of a completely different nature) involving some of its most senior leaders. Evidence of this can be seen in the creation of a new command, Chief Professional Conduct and Culture, and their ongoing efforts to shape the cultural transformation of the CAF in line with broader Canadian values and norms.

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1. Peter Feaver has also put forward a model which has some currency among students of civil-military relations (including Horn and Bentley). See Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2003).

While the stand-up of this organization was not itself the product of the reforms envisioned, or not mandated by the Somalia Affair, it can be best viewed as an attempt to preserve and enhance institutional credibility – with the Canadian government in particular, but also with the Canadian people. Leaders within the CAF have clearly recognized that loss of credibility with either will marginalize the CAF and limit its utility both at home and abroad.

The civil-military relationship continues to demand attention, however. The ongoing challenge that the CAF is living in recruiting sufficient members to its ranks could be an indication that the relationship between the institution and Canada's citizens is lacking; it could indicate other things as well. Canadians need to see and understand the purpose that the CAF fills. They need to trust that the institution will meet its duty in a professional, transparent fashion that both manifests and builds respect, both inside its ranks and with the broader country.

Doctrinally, the CAF has worked to quantify, and publish its ethos, with the recently released *Trusted to Serve*. This update to *Canada's Army* and *Duty With Honour* is a positive step and is reflective of the fact that in the intervening years since those two documents were published, Canadian society has evolved, the CAF have been at war in Afghanistan and on all manner of operations in locations as diverse as the Ukraine, the Middle-East, and the Baltics. The tactical level leaders on all these operations were themselves the product of many of Young's reforms.

However, it is important to recognize that these doctrinal foundations need to be dynamic, and continually deliberately revised. *Trusted to Serve*, and its companion, *Fighting Spirit*, must always describe a vision of the military profession, and the Canadian civil-military relationship, that is accurate. Future additions to the CAF's doctrinal basis should address the question of professional self-regulation and the dynamic of the civil-military relationship, in particular.

The maintenance of institutional legitimacy remains absolutely essential. The CAF must continue to reinforce the basic standards for entry into the officer corps, by continuing the practice of demanding an undergraduate degree for all officers as a pre-requisite. However, merely obtaining a degree is insufficient. Continuing professional military education needs to be further enhanced with a pronounced emphasis placed on leadership and ethics; the central role of "character" addressed in *Trusted to Serve*. Similarly, the need for senior officers to become more politically aware, and understand how their society is evolving, warrants further effort. Misreading political and societal imperatives for transparency, or lacking institutional agility, are errors that the CAF can ill-afford.

In the over thirty years since the beginning of the Somalia Affair the world has not become a safer place. Recent history has seen international involvement in Afghanistan dramatically end, and the re-emergence of the Taliban as the defacto government. Separately, in the spring of 2022 we witnessed Rus-

sia's continuation of their attacks against Ukraine, originally began in 2014, but since expanded by an outright invasion of Ukraine and an attempt to topple its legitimate government. Further, we could point to events in Gaza and the wider Middle East, as well as tensions on the Korean Peninsula. These events, while important in themselves, point to the need for the CAF to continue its evolution so that it remains a credible partner, able to adjust to the complexity and dynamism of the contemporary world.

The Somalia Affair is a cautionary tale for what can happen if strategic leaders respond to a crisis or incident using a model wholly unsuited for the situation which they face. Strategic leaders during the Somalia Affair received their enculturation in a Cold War paradigm that seems to have prized protection of reputations over transparency. They did not act as though they had an obligation to inform the public, or the government which they served when faced with what rapidly proved to be a strategic crisis. Transparency must be considered one of the fundamental attributes of the military profession, enabling the civil-military relationship to function in atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. To do otherwise risks a loss of professional autonomy, and a resurgence of subjective control over the Canadian profession of arms.

There remains much work to be done.

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