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# PARIAH STATES AND THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

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## Introduction

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1968) involved the extension of international law to one of the most dangerous prospects in international politics, a potentially uninhibited nuclear arms race. As part of the price for controlling horizontal proliferation, the nuclear weapon state authors of the treaty (the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union) agreed to undertake negotiations on "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...." (Art.VI). The signal weakness of the NPT lies in the failure of the nuclear weapons states to live up to their side of the bargain. The NPT may be interpreted as an attempt to legitimize its authors' nuclear weapons dominance. The treaty may also inadvertently contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons, for a commodity which is so hard to relinquish may be thought by those who do not possess it to be all the more desirable. Nuclear weapons bring prestige and, their custodians argue, an increment of security.

Aside from its unfairness, the NPT has two obvious weaknesses. First, not all of the nuclear powers are participants in it. China, France, India, Israel and Pakistan are non-signatories. Each of these states either has a nuclear arsenal, or is capable of producing one in short order. Second, the NPT is demonstrably an ineffective instrument in discouraging the development of nuclear weapons. The evidence suggests that ten countries made a direct or indirect contribution to the programme undertaken by Pakistan.[1] Seven of these countries had signed the NPT. Of the thirteen countries which appear to have made a direct or indirect contribution to Israel's nuclear weapons programme, eight had signed the NPT.[2] If the NPT were to strengthen its existing regime of "safeguards", through which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors compliance with the treaty, the traffic would not cease. Rather it would make unconventional transfers more important. As a leading scholar in the field of nuclear weapons proliferation, Leonard Spector, observed "A netherworld of covert dealings in nuclear technology and materials has existed since the dawn of the atomic age."[3] The NPT possesses at most a nuisance value for a state bent on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Despite the inadequacy of the NPT, the most likely stimulus to nuclear proliferation lies elsewhere. As Richard Betts has pointed out, nuclear dominoes will not necessarily fall from the top down, but from the middle

sideways or the middle up, as a result of regional rivalries in the Third World.[4] The well-documented Libyan decision to underwrite the Pakistani nuclear weapons development programme is a case in point.[5] It was a reaction to the nuclear weapons capability of Israel and of India. A recent, though unsubstantiated, report in the Israeli press of co-operation between Iran, Syria and Libya to develop nuclear weapons must also be seen in the context of Israel's capability.[6] The destruction in 1981 of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor suggests that Israel had no illusions about its neighbour's intentions. Israel prefers a regional nuclear weapons monopoly to mutual nuclear deterrence.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the threat to the nuclear peace posed by some of the new nuclear weapons states. This threat is obscured by the concern for the maintenance of mutual assured destruction between the superpowers and by the reticence of the new nuclear weapons states to advertise their capability. Not all of these states pose the same degree of threat. It is probably greatest among the so-called "pariah" or "outcast" states; that is, states from whom international legitimacy is withdrawn. One consequence of the diplomatic isolation of a pariah state is a crumbling of its alliances and of the expectation that other states will defend it. A pariah state must be capable of self-defence, from what is seen as the coordinated activities of its external and internal enemies. Where technically feasible, pariahs are likely to be attracted to the nuclear weapons option -- as a deterrent, as a weapon of last resort, or even as a useful extension of conventional weapons. If the literature on pariahs and on deviant behaviour is any guide, it is probable that a pariah state is less subject to restraints on its behaviour than states whose membership of international society is not in doubt.

There is, as I shall argue in the next section, debate as to the actual number of pariah states. I believe that there are now two pariahs, South Africa and Israel. It is, however, a floating world. Spain was, for a period after 1945, treated as a pariah state by the United Nations. Some states, like Taiwan, teeter on its edge. Other states may become pariahs -- if they commit the offences attributed to South Africa and Israel or if the criteria used to assign pariah status evolves further. What is significant about the present small population of pariah states is that they are at the centre of two of the great crises in contemporary international

politics, one in which the element of military power may yet be a decisive factor.

The idea of a pariah state

In the original Tamil a "pariah" was an individual of low social status, or a social outcast. The use of the word pariah to describe states pursuing policies of which there is widespread disapproval is a product of the 1970's. It was even felt that pariah states might form their own bloc, a "Fifth" or "Sixth World."[7] Candidates included Israel, the shah's Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, military dictatorships in South and Central America and, of course, South Africa. The South African leader, John Vorster, encouraged this speculation when, following a visit to Israel in 1976, he promised to develop economic co-operation between South Africa and other like-minded anti-communist states.[8] One purpose was to temper South Africa's deepening sense of isolation. Evidence for this new set of linkages is not hard to find. The most significant of them is the Israeli export trade in military equipment, of which South Africa was the major customer.[9] Global Israeli exports of military equipment climbed from $50 million in 1975 to $1.2 billion in 1980.[10] The typical customer for Israeli arms, according to the author of a recent report out of Tel Aviv University, "is most likely to be a non-western country with a defence-conscious government, rightist in orientation, in which the military is either the actual or proximate locus of power."[11] There are many states with these particular qualities. They provided Israel with an opportunity to develop a niche in the conventional arms market. It seeks and appears to have won Washington's grudging assent to supply weapons to countries in which the United States faced a political dilemma.[12] The markets that Israel identified were those in which American diplomatic inhibitions overcame its strategic interest. Israel, for example, supplied small arms to the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and fighter aircraft to Argentina at the time of the Falkland Islands conflict (1982).[13] This arms trade niche had economic benefits, but political costs for Israel. It reinforced its identification as a pariah state.

In practice, there is no clearly defined "world" of pariah states. There are three objections to the idea. First, it is widely assumed that pariah states have an especially close trading relationship, particularly in military equipment, that sets them apart from other states. In the case

of the conventional arms trade, however, Israeli exports are significant only if they are taken out of the context of the global trade in arms. Israeli arms sales accounted for only 2.0 percent of total world arms transfers in 1981.[14] Israel was a significant supplier of weapons to South Africa, but Britain is accused of being that country's main source -- despite Britain's participation in the United Nations arms embargo.[15] Bulgaria is another source of weapons for South Africa.[16] Second, membership in this world of pariahs is unstable. Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua have, through the electoral process, abstracted themselves from it, though they were uncertain candidates in the first place. Iran, after the fall of the shah, joined the international chorus of criticism of its erstwhile partners, Israel and South Africa. Even in this case, however, boundaries are confused by reports of Israeli and South African military assistance to the Iranian war effort.[17] Third, as the vilification of particular pariahs, like South Africa, has intensified, other states wish to publicly distance themselves from the offender. This is a message of the voting patterns on South Africa in the United Nations and of the loss of its formal diplomatic ties. A recent study suggests that South Africa exchanges ambassadors with fewer than twenty states.[18] Centrifugal forces overcome the centripetal ones. Pariah states exist, but they do not form a substantial brotherhood.

Recent studies have down-sized the pariah grouping to Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and, perhaps, South Korea.[19] The next host of the Summer Olympics can no longer be considered a member of the group. Robert Harkavy suggested a set of five characteristics which identify a pariah state. The first characteristic, a "small and weak nation" is not a persuasive one. Neither Israel nor South Africa are regarded as weak by their neighbours. A second characteristic, "precarious...sources of conventional arms supply" also presents problems. Israel and South Africa now have highly developed armaments industries. Another characteristic, a "nation faced with adversaries having solid support from a major power whose support it cannot match" is not particularly helpful. Many observers regard United States support of Israel as "solid." Two other characteristics are more to the point: "a nation whose national origins and legitimacy...is presently questioned," and "poor diplomatic leverage."[20] This latter characteristic, however, is a consequence, not a cause, of what has been called pariahtude. Of the five characteristics cited by Harkavy, "legitimacy" appears to be

the most persuasive one. It should be noted, in passing, that there are two dimensions to legitimacy: internal and international. If pariahtude were conferred on states lacking internal legitimacy, the population of pariahs would be much greater than it is today. Were genocidal regimes, for example, to be added to the list, there might be a genuine Fifth World of pariahs. Clearly, the international community is acting as though the only meaningful dimension of legitimacy is the international one. While acknowledging the offences committed by pariah states it is, surely, essential for students of politics to recognize the arbitrariness of the classification.

In practice, decisions about bestowing pariah status have been democratised and universalised, in what is becoming the legislative forum of the General Assembly of the United Nations. A state falls into pariahtude if it offends the prevailing norm of international legitimacy, characterised by Martin Wight as "the collective judgment of international society about rightful membership of the family of nations."[21] Every age seems to affirm the idea in its own way. In the twentieth century, international legitimacy was attached to the "popular" principle of national self-determination and transformed from a political assertion into a legal right.[22] The latest manifestation of international legitimacy, first noted by Ali Mazrui, is a refinement of the principle of national self-determination. Mazrui called it "racial sovereignty."[23]

In Wight's view, this principle contained two elements: "firstly, the right of the majority within the frontiers prevailing at the given moment, and secondly the right of territorial vicinity."[24] In the wake of the burgeoning Third World membership of the United Nations and the promotion of human rights as a primary objective of the Organization, South Africa found itself caught on the wrong side of an evolving principle of international legitimacy. Its failure to endorse majoritarianism ensures that it will remain a pariah state. The principle of territorial vicinity is more complicated and controversial. It appears in the recent Anglo-Irish Accord which, in giving the Irish Republic a role in the government of Northern Ireland, ignores the wishes of the majority population within the province. Territorial vicinity asserts that the equation necessary for majority rule can, if necessary, be found in the population outside of the disputed territory. There is no need to apply this aspect of international legitimacy to South Africa, but it may be applied to Israel or to Taiwan.

The Palestinian diaspora in 1948 ensured a Jewish majority within the borders of Israel. The idea of territorial vicinity, on the other hand, reinvigorated a claim that might otherwise have disappeared: the right of the Palestinian people to national self-determination. The Palestinian or, if necessary, the Arab population in the vicinity of the Jewish state constitutes part of the arithmetic of majoritarianism. A recent resolution of the General Assembly emphasized, for example, "the right of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty and control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities." It also reaffirmed their right to restitution and full compensation by Israel.[25] Territorial vicinity plays a large part in Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Not only did Taiwan lose its seat in the United Nations as the representative of China (1971), but the United States also withdrew its diplomatic recognition (1978) in deference to China's claim.

The passage to pariah status depends upon the consent of the great majority of states to enforce isolation: diplomatic, strategic, economic and, perhaps, social. Attempts are occasionally made by the great powers to legislate pariah status, in the expectation or hope that other states will follow. It will not work. The League powers attempted to create pariahs of Germany and of the Soviet Union. The delinquents reacted by cancelling their mutual enmities at Rapallo (1922). This "unholy alliance" foreshadowed the re-establishment of diplomatic relations on a broader front. Even the People's Republic of China, which found itself ostracized by both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as excluded from participation in the United Nations, avoided pariahtude by maintaining its contacts in the Third World. Reacting to recent terrorist violence in Europe, the United States sought to lay the blame on the Libyan regime of Colonel Qaddafi. President Reagan called the terrorist acts "criminal outrages by an outlaw regime.... We have urged repeatedly that the world community act decisively and in concert.... Qaddafi deserves to be treated as a pariah in the world community."[26] Most states in Western Europe and in the Arab world refuse to follow the American lead, even if they privately agree with its indictment. The United States has had an even longer experience of attempting, and failing, to make global pariahs out of Cuba and Nicaragua. Great powers can only attempt to brake a state's descent into pariahtude. The rearguard action fought by Britain at the

Commonwealth Conference in the Bahamas (1985) and the American policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa area cases in point. In practice great powers find it difficult to resist majority opinion. It was, for example, the permanent members of the Security Council who, in 1977, sought to strengthen the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa.[27] They subsequently established a committee to report on its implementation.[28]

The "world" of pariah states envisaged by scholars in the 1970's was a chimera. A core of three states retains the pariah label: Israel, South Africa and Taiwan. It is necessary, however, to qualify Taiwan's membership of this grouping. The withdrawal of international legitimacy from Israel and South Africa was accompanied by a heightening of tension and violence. Unlike Israel and South Africa, Taiwan did not face the challenge of a domestic liberation movement with powerful external support. The PLO and the ANC elicit the understanding of many of the members of the United Nations for the violence committed in the name of just change. The threat to the survival of Taiwan comes only from the outside -- a threat that is, at least temporarily, defused. As part of its rapprochement with the United States, China made a significant concession to Taiwan when it renounced the use of force as the means for achieving the absorption of the territory into the People's Republic.[29] This partial lifting of the threat to its survival probably influenced Taiwan's defence policy. The CIA had earlier reported that Taiwan's "present course probably is leading it to the development of nuclear weapons."[30] Spector now writes (1985) that, "there is no evidence of a reawakening of the Taiwanese nuclear weapons program of the early 1970's."[31] As pressure from the United States failed to persuade Israel or South Africa to abandon their nuclear weapons programmes, it is reasonable to assume that something other than American opposition persuaded Taiwan to alter course. The likely explanation lies in the changing perception of the threat to its survival. We are left, therefore, with two pariah states, Israel and South Africa, and the growing conviction in the United Nations that they form a latter-day "unholy alliance."

The intent behind the isolation of South Africa is to enforce desired political change. White South Africa has reacted in two ways. It has encouraged modest reform of the apartheid regime, widely interpreted in the outside world as almost entirely cosmetic. It has also begun to organize

its defences against what it sees as the "total onslaught" conducted against South Africa by the Soviet Union and its allies. Moscow is the scapegoat for the Republic's distress. The 1982 White Paper on Defence observed that "The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA.... This onslaught is supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as trade unions and even certain church organizations and leaders."[32] South Africa is retreating into a siege or laager mentality.

The inconstancy of great power guarantees to South Africa or to Taiwan, cannot be lost on Israel. In response to the erosion of external support, I. L. Horowitz sees a possibility that Israel might retreat into a "nationalized ghetto."[33] The United States is committed to Israel, but it is not bound by treaty or pact to come to its defence. The invasion of Lebanon (1982) damaged Israel's links with the West, including the United States. Increasing recognition that Israel is a nuclear weapons state may damage them further. A pariah state armed with nuclear weapons poses one of the great future problems of international politics.

## The nuclear weapons status of Israel and South Africa

Israel was first suspected of possessing nuclear weapons in 1968. If this suspicion were correct, the decision to develop them must have been taken years earlier. Its spokesmen constantly suggested that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The Americans and the British were, of course, the nuclear pioneers in the region. At the same time, Israel let it be known that, if provoked, it was capable of producing nuclear weapons in short order.[34] This policy of "deliberate ambiguity" worked. A group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the U.N. reported in 1982 that Israel had the capacity to manufacture and to deliver nuclear weapons. They were, however, "unable to conclude definitively whether or not Israel is at present in the possession of nuclear weapons".[35] Despite the considerable evidence that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal, some scholars persist in addressing the nuclearization of Israel as if it remained an hypothetical issue. Their caution is understandable. Israel has not advertised its capability by a publicly announced nuclear weapons test. It is also possible that scholars may not wish to recognize the evidence of Israeli nuclear weapons capabil-

ity, perhaps out of sensitivity to the unpredictable consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation in the region.[36]

The obfuscation of the government of Israel on the issue is related to the fact that it is addressing three audiences — domestic, the Arab world and the United States. The Israeli public was reminded in 1973 of the country's vulnerability to defeat in a conventional war. These fears have not been assuaged. In many of the conventional measures of military capability Syria has recently overtaken Israel.[37] If the deterrent effect of a nuclear capability reassures the Israeli public, it is also intended as a warning to the Arab world. Israel has occasionally advertised its nuclear weapons status, through the repetition of rumour or public enquiries about the availability of equipment.[38] Israel wishes its enemies to suspect that if deterrence fails it might, like Samson, be able to carry them down with it. Finally, Israel must avoid alienating the United States, which is committed to the non-proliferation regime. The interests of both countries are served by the pretense that Israel does not possess nuclear weapons. By avoiding the issue they can avoid a crisis in their relationship. It is clear that an elaborate game of deception is being played. Israel wishes some states to believe that it might possess nuclear weapons and other states to believe that it does not.

There is no doubt, observed the former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke, that Israel possesses nuclear weapons.[39] The studies recently issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1984 and 1985) trace in considerable detail the history of the Israeli programme.[40] The relevant issues are those of the size of their nuclear arsenal and the means available to deliver it. The author of one recent study, Paul Pry, placed the number of Israel's A-bombs as of January 1984, at between eleven and forty-one,[41] while Spector (1985) states that "the consensus of most published analyses is that Israel possesses between twenty and twenty-five Nagasaki (20-kiloton) devices".[42] Cordesman, on the other hand, puts the figure much higher. He suggested (July 1985) that Israel has one hundred nuclear warheads that it can deliver by fighters alone.[43] From the evidence currently available, the conservative figures are more persuasive. Israel can add at least one or two warheads a year to its stockpile.[44]

Most Israeli combat aircraft (530 out of 680) are capable of carrying a nuclear bomb. Their combat radius varies between 500 and 1,200 kilo-

meters,[45] though if sent on one-way missions or if they were re-fueled in the air Israeli aircraft could reach all Arab capitals. They could even reach the Soviet Union. Israel has long had a missile capability, useful both in a battlefield context and in a wider theatre of operations. It possesses, for example, twelve dual-capable (conventional or nuclear warhead) Lance missiles, which were purchased from the United States. The Lance is a mobile, battlefield weapon, with a range of about 100 kilometers. It is not renowned for its accuracy, which is to say that its utility is a function of its yield. The latest evidence suggests that Israel has the technical capability to down-size its nuclear warheads to the point (about 400 kilograms) where they could be carried by the Lance.[46]

Israel also possesses a theatre missile, the Jericho, which it developed in conjunction with France in the 1960's. The same criticism can be levelled at the Jericho as can be levelled at the Lance. Pry writes that "Jericho shall miss its aim half the time by 1,000 meters and so is too inaccurate to be militarily useful unless it carries an atomic payload."[47] If Israel has managed to convert its Lance missiles to a nuclear capability, it will also have succeeded in converting the Jericho. There were reports in 1985 of a radical transformation in Israel's missile capability. The Washington-based trade paper Aerospace Daily reported, in an unusually precise way, the deployment of the Jericho II missile. It stated that the missiles are "based in the Negev Desert and Golan Heights and are said to be installed on erector-launcher trucks.... The Jericho II features an inertial guidance system that sources said was tested in unpopulated areas of northeast Iran in the mid-to-late-1970's.... Range of the solid propellant Jericho II with its nuclear payload is thought to be 700 kilometers".[48] Shortly thereafter it was reported by the author of the Aerospace Daily report, Richard Sale, that the warhead for the missile weighed about 100 kilograms.[49] Israel did not deny the existence of the missile,[50] and a former Iranian Defence Minister, Hassan Toufanian, subsequently confirmed that the missile tests took place in his country.[51]

South Africa announced that it could produce an atomic bomb in 1974, although the first hints that it might wish to develop the bomb occurred nearly a decade earlier.[52] The key step was the ability to enrich uranium, one of South Africa's great natural resources, to the level required for a nuclear explosion. In a speech to Parliament in July 1970, Prime Minister Vorster declared that South Africa had "succeeded in developing a new pro-

cess for uranium enrichment," one that was "unique in its concept."[53] This "jet nozzle" process was subsequently improved through consultation with commercial interests in the Federal Republic of Germany, which were in possession of a similar technology.[54] Full-scale uranium enrichment began in 1977. Spector suggests that by mid-1985 South Africa could have produced enough enriched uranium for "9 to 15 weapons."[55] If, as reported, the People's Republic of China helped South Africa short-circuit the enrichment process by supplying its enrichment facility with low-enriched uranium in 1981 the warhead total could be raised to 30.[56]

Two incidents encouraged the speculation that South Africa had embarked on a nuclear weapons programme. In August 1977 a Soviet satellite observed preparations for a nuclear test in the Kalahari desert. The Soviets alerted the United States, which confirmed the sighting. The superpowers, together with Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, applied immediate diplomatic pressure on South Africa to dismantle the test site. South Africa ceased its preparations and dismantled the site in December 1977.[57] The second incident occurred on 22 September 1979 and became known as the "Vela incident," after the United States satellite which had successfully recorded on 41 previous occasions the characteristic double flash of light of a nuclear test. The signal was detected over the South Atlantic, but no country admitted responsibility for conducting a test in the area. A commission set up by U.S. President Carter to investigate the event concluded that the signal was "probably not from a nuclear explosion." It suggested instead a "zoo event," such as "the impact of a small meteoroid on the satellite."[58] The report did not close the case. Another group of U.S. experts in the Naval Research Laboratory, whose evidence may not have been considered by the Presidential commission, concluded that a nuclear test had taken place.[59] The Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations suggested that the lack of "persuasive corroborative evidence may reflect not that no explosion occurred but that some country tested a nuclear device but went to great pains to cover its tracks."[60]

The Kalahari and Vela incidents raise a further important issue: the possibility of collaboration between South Africa and Israel. Both countries have shown an interest in developing nuclear weapons and they both face problems of acquiring either the raw materials or the components necessary for the completion of their programmes. Israel, in particular,

has resorted to subterfuge and theft.[61] Robert Harkavy writes that "The seemingly natural complementarity of nuclear capabilities between Israel and South Africa is apparent: Israel has bomb design capability, delivery systems, and Dimona [a research reactor capable of producing the other explosive material, plutonium, and excluded by Israel from IAEA safeguards]; South Africa has raw uranium, the nozzle process, a steel industry and vast spaces for testing."[62] Stimulated in part by their pariah status, speculation has occurred about South Africa as the location or the springboard for the testing of Israeli weapons.

The investigative reporting of a British journalist, James Adams, seems to have had an especial impact on the United Nations and reinforced the pariah status of Israel and South Africa.[63] Adams' main charge is that Israel used South African facilities to test a nuclear warhead for a battlefield weapon, the 155 mm. howitzer,[64] and that this was the source of the Vela "flash".[65] While field armies might wish this particular capability, it is highly unlikely that Israel has so miniaturized its nuclear warhead design that it can fit into the 6 inch diameter available to it. Nuclear capability does not begin with small warheads; it ends with them. There is, however, another explanation for the Vela incident, one that is potentially even more ominous. It is hypothesized by some authorities that the explosion was the "trigger" device for a thermonuclear, that is, a hydrogen, bomb test.[66] Indeed, two Israeli journalists, Eli Teicher and Ami Dor-On, have stated that Israel possesses the hydrogen bomb, a claim whose credibility is questioned by U.S. military experts.[67] In a manuscript submitted to the Israeli censors in 1980, Teicher and Dor-On also alleged that South Africa helped Israel conduct a nuclear test in 1979.[68] Despite the fact that the manuscript was written as a novel and despite the fact that Israel has moved steadily toward open public debate on its nuclear capabilities,[69] the manuscript was suppressed. The journalists were reportedly threatened with life imprisonment should they publish.[70] Adams' study of the incident concludes with a more cautious judgement. He writes that he had "been told categorically by very senior members of Israel's intelligence community that the explosion was not an Israeli bomb. What is admitted is that there was a nuclear explosion and that Israel has helped South Africa develop its nuclear programme by supplying both personnel and nuclear technology."[71]

It is likely that South Africa possesses nuclear weapons -- though its policy, like that of Israel, is deliberately ambiguous.[72] The means of delivery are not as diverse as those available to Israel. 83 of South Africa's 356 combat aircraft are capable of delivering a nuclear bomb over a combat radius of nearly 1800 kilometers.[73] The initial impulse to acquire a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been prestige.[74] As South Africa's international isolation deepens it is likely that considerations of security will displace the earlier justification for developing a nuclear arsenal.

Pariah states and the nuclear threat

The idea of a pariah state will likely remain part of the literature on international politics. There is, however, a conceptual problem with the use of the word "pariah", though it is not widely recognized. It originally implied a status which was ascribed and, thus, was inescapable. In international politics, by contrast, pariah status is achieved, or earned. Zimbabwe is not a pariah state. Its antecedent, Rhodesia, was a pariah, offending precisely those canons of international legitimacy which have now caught up with South Africa and Israel. If they were prepared to bear the costs, South Africa and Israel could be re-admitted to full membership of international society.[75] A more useful word than pariah is that of "deviant", which is a status which can be acquired and, with difficulty, shed. Deviance also opens up a window on the sociological literature, through which we can better understand the processes at work in this sector of the study of international politics. The one objection to thinking of states in these terms is that much of the literature on deviance is concerned with individuals or small groups. States are, however, actors. They project identities and interests in a social milieu we choose to call international society. If there is a difference between deviance in small groups and deviant or pariah states, it is probably one of degree rather than one of kind. In any event, I believe that it is useful to draw an analogy between deviance in society and pariahs in international politics.

Deviance, says the sociologist Edwin Schur, is "a political phenomenon -- in the broadest sense of the term".[76] It involves relationships of power between what are sometimes called "moral entrepreneurs" or "moral crusaders"[77] and those who assume the mantle or label, of deviant. In the case under review here, deviance is defined by majority opinion in the

United Nations. In what is now regarded as a classic statement on the labelling theory of deviance, Howard Becker (1963) wrote that,

> social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an "offender". The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label.[78]

It bears repeating that South Africa and Israel were not always regarded as pariah states. They are the legatees of a pattern of behaviour that was widely practiced until only a few decades ago, one that was the subject of self-congratulation rather than admonishment. Further, it should also be recognized that, however objectionable the racial practices of pariah states, the moral crusade which accompanies contemporary pariahtude deflects attention from other substantial offences against human rights.

The sociological literature on deviance directs one to two observations about international politics: to the existence of international society and to the consequences of labelling and isolation. Deviant acts help a society to define itself, by establishing the boundary between acceptable, socially conforming behaviour and unacceptable, socially-nonconforming behaviour. The deviant advertises the location of these boundaries to the other members of society.[79] Deviant behaviour also reinforces the social consensus, by providing opportunities for the upstanding majority to participate in a chorus of outrage. The contribution made by deviants to the maintenance of society is not a recent discovery. Plotinus, apparently, thought it an ancient idea.[80] In the words of an heir to this train of thought, Emile Durkheim, "crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them".[81] Durkheim believed that not only must every society have its quota of deviants but, if by some quirk they did not exist, they would have to be invented.[82] Pariah states probably serve these boundary-maintaining functions for international society.

The existence of pariah states should, however, be a matter of grave concern, especially as they appear to be armed with nuclear weapons. Of the deviant behaviour of individuals, Becker observed that, "apprehension for one deviant act exposes a person to the likelihood that he will be

regarded as deviant or undesirable in other respects". He continued, "Treating a person as though he were generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-fulfilling prophecy...one tends to be cut-off, after being identified as deviant from participation in more conventional groups...."[83] Likewise, we see how pariah states in committing a specific offence are regarded as generally deviant. Attempts are made to evict them from international organizations and to deprive them of diplomatic recognition. These acts can be self-defeating. South Africa, for example, was ejected in 1977 from the board of directors of the IAEA and has not since participated in the General Conference of the Organization.[84] The IAEA has a mandate to deter the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is difficult to see how punishing South Africa within the IAEA contributes to this end. Suffice it to note that a pariah state's ties with international society are severely curtailed. Their sense of insecurity and vulnerability is exacerbated. More important, they are set free to design strategies which will ensure their survival in a hostile world.

Many justifications have been presented for Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.[85] It has, for example, been argued by Fuad Jabber and more recently repeated by Shai Feldman that nuclear weapons would deter Arab states from attacking Israel.[86] Feldman believes that, on two conditions, Israel should abandon its policy of ambiguity and make its nuclear posture explicit. These conditions are, first, that Israel should wait until its Arab opponents have nuclear weapons and, second, that it should be prepared to make significant territorial concessions to them.[87] Feldman also believes that nuclear weapons would be "likely to reduce the dangers involved in the creation of an independent Palestinian state."[88] If these optimistic projections were borne-out, Israel would have resolved its other great problem--the increasing human and economic cost of conventional war. As a percentage of its population of Jews, Israel's 3,500 dead during the brief period of the Yom Kippur War (1973) represents about 5 times the number of American dead during the entire Vietnam War.

The attraction of nuclear weapons for Israel does not ultimately lie in the hope that it will induce conciliatory behaviour in its opponents. The relative deterioration in Israel's conventional military capability makes nuclear weapons an asset that might have to be used as a last resort. Nuclear weapons are thought necessary for the survival of the state. In the absence of a domestic consensus (revealed in the mutual bitterness

found inside its coalition government) Israel will find it difficult, perhaps impossible, to make territorial concessions to the Palestinians. As the collapse of the peace process (February 1986) indicates, Arab states may also find it impossible to reach that minimal level of consensus necessary for them to negotiate peace with Israel. The only way to change the status quo will be through force. Israel's deteriorating security situation and the bankruptcy of the peace process is accompanied by a hardening of attitudes on all sides. The most recent contribution of Robert Harkavy (1986) to the debate over Israel's nuclear strategy betrays this aspect of the problem. On the one hand, he senses that the Arabs "desperately require vengeance. Israel is riding the proverbial tiger!"[89] On the other hand, Harkavy reacts vehemently to Israel's ostracism. He writes,

> Quite simply stated, my view is that the relentlessly hysterical level of opprobrium and anti-Semitic hatred directed at Israel by most of the world's nations (best exemplified by the interminable verbal onslaught within the United Nations and other international forums) over the past decades completely erases or negates any possible moral obligation that Israel might otherwise hold toward the remainder of mankind. As applied to the possession or use of nuclear weapons, this means that the criterion of Israeli survival must vastly outweigh other putatively moral or legal concerns. Israel owes the so-called international community nothing. The latter deserves nothing.[90]

This statement exemplifies the likely reaction of a state shunned by international society to its deteriorating security situation.

South Africa's security situation also markedly deteriorated in the 1970's, in the aftermath of de-colonisation in the region and the collapse of its claim to Namibia. These developments were accompanied by the erosion of American and British military and political support, a process which has continued unabated for a decade. Superimposed on these changes is the dramatic deterioration in South Africa's internal security situation, as blacks move from acquiescence in to violent protest against their exploitation.

Many informed observers doubted the utility of a nuclear arsenal for white South Africa, bearing in mind their understanding of the threat posed to the regime. Nuclear weapons are not, for example, a cost effective way of dispersing guerillas. It was suggested that the utility of nuclear weapons is largely political, what Richard Betts (1979) called a "diplo-

matic bomb." Betts felt that the "threat" to develop nuclear weapons was one that the South African government could use "in exchange for reciprocal favours" from the West.[91] The favour that South Africa sought above all else was the re-absorption of the country into the orbit of Western security. It was not forthcoming. Unlike Taiwan, South Africa did not abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. Spector writes, in the most recent comment on the subject, that there is "evidence that from mid-1984 to mid-1985 Pretoria may have quietly initiated an effort to expand its nuclear-weapons production capability."[92]

Western observers have not yet had time to adjust to one significant development in South Africa's relations with its neighbours that bears a striking parallel to that of Israel--the relative decline in its margin of conventional military superiority over its front-line opponents.[93] The reality of South Africa's security situation is moving rapidly to converge with Pretoria's perception of the threat it faces. In the government's view, white South Africa is a victim of a conspiracy orchestrated by the Soviet Union, in the presence of which the West has capitulated. Against this "total onslaught" the government has invented a "total national strategy," which forms part of the 1982 Defence White Paper. This strategy anticipates that the regime may have to use all possible means to defend itself.[94] In the face of a growing insurgency, the temptation of South Africa's external enemies to chip away at the laager must assuredly grow. The prospect that South Africa might actually find a military use for a nuclear weapon is much greater today than it was five years ago. If South Africa were to succeed in converting its long-range battlefield weapon, the G-5 and G-6 155 mm. howitzer to a nuclear capability it would have succeeded in lowering the threshold at which nuclear weapons became militarily useful.[95] South Africa may yet become, in the words of one of its newspapers, "the maverick bull in the nuclear herd."[96] As Iraq's repeated use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran demonstrates, states in desperate straits will use desperate means to ensure their survival.

## Conclusion

The pariah label is intended to symbolise international society's disapproval of the policies pursued by Israel and South Africa. It appears to have unanticipated consequences. First, it probably reinforces the collective paranoia of pariah states. They feel themselves victims of a

world that does not appreciate the special circumstances of their origins, or their strategic value to the West. Above all, there is bitter resentment at the challenge to their legitimacy. Second, ostracism is intended to act as a lever to induce desired political change. It has the opposite effect -- at least in the short-run -- for ostracism encourages self-reliance. There is little doubt that Israel and South Africa were prompted to nuclear weapons status by their pariahtude. Nuclear weapons possession will reinforce their pariah status. Third, the isolation of the pariah state means that it is released from the bonds of restraint. Much has been made in the social sciences of the importance of "cross-cutting ties" in restraining confrontation and violence.[97] This understanding has even been extended to the relations of the superpowers.[98] By placing pariah states on the outer edge of international society they have inadvertently been placed beyond its influence. There is, then, to the South African and Israeli situations an especially dangerous quality. J. E. Spence observes that "involved as they are in life and death conflicts, the incentive to use such [nuclear] weapons would seem to me to be much greater than they were in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States."[99] Unlike the superpowers, moreover, pariah states cannot afford to adopt second-strike postures. The Israelis and South Africans must place a premium "on striking first and destroying your enemy before he does the same to you."[100] In attempting to resolve one problem international society has created another and bigger one.

## Footnotes

1. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Random House, 1984), 74-78, 86-87 and 100-102.

2. Spector, ibid., 117-148, Paul Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal (Westview Press, 1984), 5-38.

3. Leonard Spector, The New Nuclear Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Random House, 1985), 17.

4. Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Non-Proliferation", Foreign Policy, no. 26 (Spring 1977), 164.

5. Spector (1984), 77-78, 151 and 153-156.

6. Ha-aretz (9 September 1985).

7. Robert E. Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", Orbis, vol. 21, no. 3 (1977) 623-624. On the subject of the confusion as to whether this new world of pariahs was the fifth or sixth, see International Affairs Bulletin, South African Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 2, no. 1 (1978), 41-42.

8. Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Search for Security Since the Second World War", South African Institute of International Affairs (September 1978), 13.

9. It is estimated that between 1975 and 1979 South Africa imported $447 million dollars of military equipment from Israel. Sipri, World Armaments and Disarmaments, Sipi Yearbook 1980 (Taylor and Francis, 1980), 86. South African imports of weapons fell drastically from 1980 as that country developed its indigenous capabilities. See Sipri Yearbook 1984, 212-213.

10. Sipri figures, cited in Aharon Klieman, "Israel's Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects", Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, no 24 (February 1984), 13-14.

11. Klieman, ibid., 40.

12. See the comments by Ya' acov Meridor, Prime Minister Begin's Special Assistant for Economic Co-operation, cited in Esther Howard, "Israel: The Sorcerer's Apprentice", in The Arms Race in the Middle East, Merip Reports, no. 112 (February 1983), 22.

13. Israel Shahak, Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression (The Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982), 15-19; Stephanie G. Neuman, "Third World Arms Production and the Global Arms Transfer System", in J.E. Katz (ed.), Arms Production in Developing Countries (Lexington Books, 1984), 35.

14. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie S. Neuman, "Israel", in J.E. Katz (ed), Ibid., 203.

15. "How Britain Arms Apartheid" (London: The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1985).

16. Peter Durish, Observer News Service, reported in The Globe and Mail (1 May 1984), 8.

17. International Herald Tribune (24 August 1981 and 19 March 1984); also Sipri Yearbook, 1984, 198.

18. Efraim Inbar, Outcast Countries in the World Community, Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 21, book 2 (University of Denver, 1985) 4.

19. Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah states and nuclear proliferation", International Organization, vol. 35, no. 1 (Winter 1981) 136.

20. Harkavy, ibid., 136.

21. Martin Wight, "International Legitimacy", in Wight, Systems of States, ed. by H. Bull (Leicester University Press, 1977), 153.

22. In the Western Sahara case, the International Court of Justice concluded that the constant re-affirmation of UNGA resolutions on national self-determination had transformed a political principle into a legal right. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion (1975), ICJ, Rep. 12.

23. Ali Mazrui, cited in Wight, op. cit., 168.

24. Wight, ibid., 168.

25. UNGA Resolution 35/144 (19 December 1983).

26. President Reagan news conference, 7 January 1986, reported in The New York Times (8 January 1986), A6.

27. UNSC Resolution 418 (4 November 1977).

28. UNSC Resolution 421 (9 December 1977).

29. Sipri Yearbook, 1983, 274.

30. Cited in Spector (1985), 272.

31. Spector, ibid., 85.

32. Cited in Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power", Bradlow Series, no. 1. The South African Institute of International Affairs (August 1983), 4.

33. Irving Louis Horowitz, "From Pariah People to Pariah Nation: Jews, Israelis and the Third World" in M. Curtis and S.A. Gitelson, (eds.), Israel in the Third World (Transaction Books, 1976), 362.

34. Spector (1984), 117; Pry, op. cit., 29.

35. Report of the Secretary-General, "Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament", Disarmament Study Series No. 6, United Nations (1982), A/36/431, 22.

36. See Louis Rene Beres (ed.), Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (Lexington Books 1986), especially the Introduction.

37. Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Implications of Current Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance", paper delivered to the Tenth Annual Symposium Center for Contemporary Arab Studies of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (26 April 1985).

38. George Quester writes that "Israeli agents in the United States openly enquired whether the F-4's they were purchasing could be fitted with bomb racks suitable for nuclear weapons." George H. Quester, "Israel", in Jed C. Snyder and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Limiting Nuclear Proliferation (Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), 45. In May, 1985 Israel broadcast in Arabic reports originating in the United States about its new missile capability. Spector (1985), 140.

39. Paul Warnke, "Newsnight", BBC 2 (11 July 1985).

40. Spector (1984), 117-148; and Spector (1985), 136-152.

41. Pry, op. cit., 77.

42. Spector (1985), 138.

43. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Newsnight", BBC 2 (11 July 1985).

44. Spector (1985), 138.

45. Spector (1985), 151; The Military Balance, 1985-1986 (International Institute for Strategic Studies), 77.

46. Pry, op. cit., 94.

47. Pry, ibid., 92.

48. Aerospace Daily, Washington, D.C. (1 May 1985), 5.

49. Spector (1985), 139.

50. Christian Science Monitor (23 May 1985), 3.

51. The Globe and Mail (3 February 1986), A9.

52. Spector (1984), 282 and 288.

53. Cited in Report of the Secretary-General, "South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field", Disarmament Study Series, no. 2, United Nations (1981), 8.

54. Report of the Secretary-General, ibid., 8-10; James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (Quartet Books, 1984), 175-179.

55. Spector (1985), 217.

56. Spector, ibid., 218.

57. Spector (1984), 291-294; also Report of the Secretary-General, South Africa's plan...", 29-31.

58. Cited in Report of the Secretary-General, "South Africa's plan...", 32.

59. Spector (1985), 313, ft. 11.

60. Report of the Secretary-General, "South Africa's plan...", 33.

61. The latest incident to surface was the smuggling of our 800 nuclear bomb triggers, known as krytons, from the United States to Israel between 1979 and 1980. See Spector (1985), 41-44.

62. Robert Harkavy, "The Imperative to Survive" in L.R. Beres, op. cit., 112.

63. See the Special Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, on "Recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa" (5 November 1984), Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 22A (A/39/22/Add. 1), 4.

64. Adams, op. cit., 38-71.

65. Adams, ibid., 194.

66. See Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa," in Snyder and Wells (eds.), op. cit., 156.

67. Pry, op. cit., 76.

68. CBS News (21 February 1980).

69. George H. Quester, "Israel," op. cit., 51.

70. International Herald Tribune (31 March 1980).

71. Adams, op. cit., 195. Italics in original.

72. Report of the Secretary-General, "South Africa's plan...", 28-29.

73. Spector (1985), 229; The Military Balance, 1985-1986 (International Institute for Strategic Studies), 106.

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75. It must be recognized, however, that an element in the opposition to Israel comes not from an objection to the policies the state pursues, but from traditional anti-semitism. See, for example, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Keter Publishing House, 1972), especially 176-177.

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84. David Fischer, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Western Europe's Influence on South Africa", Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document, No. 6 (February 1985), 28.

85. Robert E. Harkavy, Spectre of a Middle East Holocaust: The Strategic and Diplomatic Implications of the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 14, book 4 (University of Denver, 1977), 57-59.

86. Fuad Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present option and future strategies (Chatto and Windus, 1971), 141-144; Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980's (Columbia University Press, 1982), 4, 237.

87. Feldman, ibid., 5-6.

88. Feldman, ibid., 140-141.

89. Robert E. Harkavy, "The Imperative to Survive"; in L.R. Beres, op. cit., 99.

90. Harkavy, ibid., 101-102. Emphasis added.

91. Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa", International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 1979), 107. Emphasis in original.

92. Spector (1985), 216-217.

93. Spector, ibid., 219-220.

94. Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa," in Snyder and Wells (eds.), op. cit., 161-175.

95. A South African newspaper reported that "The US is said to have a projectile which can carry a nuclear warhead and the G5 projectile could no doubt be adapted to do the same. But Marais [the head of Armscor, the South African armaments conglomerate] says the present projectiles cannot do so and no developments of this kind are contemplated in terms of government's stated policy." Financial Mail (17 September 1982), 1357. The inhibition, however, is technical, not political.

96. Cited in Jaster, op. cit., 168.

97. Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (Blackwell, 1955), 23; Arthur F. Bentley (ed.), The Process of Government (Harvard University Press, 1967), 206.

98. Richard Rosecrance, "Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered," Adelphi Paper, No. 116 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1975), 37.

99. J. E. Spence, "International Problems of Nuclear Proliferation and the South African Position", occasional paper, The South African Institute of International Affairs (July 1980), 7.

100. J. E. Spence, ibid., 7.