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THE LOGIC OF PAPANDREOU'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Introduction

Recent critical responses to Andreas Papandreou's nationalist project have ranged from suspicion to alarmism. Dubbing him "populist," "erratic," "pro-Soviet," or "Anti-American," critics were not so long ago predicting that the socialist Premier would withdraw Greece from NATO, sever its EEC membership, remove U.S. bases from its soil, and commit a number of cognate sins. To take just two examples, Roy Macridis was predicating his sombre predictions on Papandreou's ideological profile and his party's radical self-definition;[1] while John Loulis argued that Papandreou's strategy exhibited "inconsistent and perplexing shifts," although essentially within a framework of "anti-American" sentiments and "pro-Soviet" inclinations.[2] Clearly, if the dire forecasts had come true, profound implications would have ensued, including the disintegration of NATO's Southern Flank, increased opportunities for the Soviets to isolate Turkey, and transformation of the Balkans once again into the "powder-keg" it used to be.

That none of these predictions have been fulfilled suggests that they might be founded on fallacies. Indeed, I shall argue that Papandreou's critics have oversimplified and hence distorted his world-view. Moreover, by personalizing their charges, they have ignored or minimized the strategic-historical considerations that have conditioned Papandreou's nationalist objectives. Greece confronts a serious security conundrum in terms of the perception of a sustained Turkish threat to its vital interests, coupled with the conviction that, for apparently geostrategic reasons, Turkey is being favoured over Greece in Washington's and NATO's calculations. Equally important, Greece has accumulated a series of convoluted grievances that have produced well-entrenched and palpable anti-Washington and anti-NATO attitudes. Panayote Dimitras reported recently that "only roughly one-fourth of the

public...approves of full NATO membership, has confidence in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe, supports keeping U.S. bases in Greece, or holds a favourable view of the United States."[3] With regard to the associated Greek-Turkish entanglement, he went on to note: "More than 90 percent of Greeks believe that Turkey threatens Greece."[4]

Greece's grievances (inherited by Papandreou's 1981 administration), are not unrelated to the Greeks' sense that the Cold War has never really been interrupted over their country since the March 1947 enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. More immediately, the overwhelming majority of Greeks have come to perceive and resent the following:

(1) that Washington at once tolerated, and then legitimated and supported, the 1967-1974 Colonels' dictatorship;

(2) that the July-August 1974 Turkish invasions of Cyprus were effectively permitted by the allies;

(3) that Turkey's occupation of nearly 40 percent of the Cyprus Republic continues unabated; and

(4) that the Turkish threat to Greece causes an irrational allocation of her limited resources to defence against another NATO member, thereby making nonsense of "allied unity" and NATO's Charter.

These schematic demurs regarding Papandreou's critics seem to suggest (though not to substantiate) the thesis that his nationalist logic may be highly plausible. Moreover, since the thesis reflects the widely shared attitudes of Greeks, it is arguable that Papandreou could not have resisted the tone of protestation and self-assertion he actually endorsed in intra-alliance relations. What does <u>not</u> follow is either that Papandreou merely responded to a set of irrational popular beliefs or that his alleged "radicalism" itself generated the

people's misperceptions.

To establish, therefore, non-mythological grounds for assessing Papandreou's foreign policy I propose to sketch, first, what I shall call "Greece's accumulated grievances," and second, Papandreou's world-view or system of political beliefs. The former will appeal to premises entrenched in current Greek political culture, and will draw upon judgments of American officials, analysts and commentators. The sketch of Papandreou's "operational code" will draw on some of his telling statements and actual decisions, from the mid-1960s to the present.

Papandreou's Foreign Policy and Greece's Grievances

Since the assumption of power by PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), Papandreou's foreign policy has aimed at four cardinal objectives: first, to demonstrate and cope with the Turkish threat to Greece; second, to upgrade the Greek status in the European Economic Community and NATO; third, to cleanse progressively Greek high policy (and the national psyche) from the legacy of over-dependence, the structural antecedents to the Colonels' regime, as well as the frustration and bitterness caused by allied passivity at Turkey's anti-Greek challenge; and fourth, to emphasize Greece's commitment to détente and its condemnation of unmitigated nuclearism. Now, although only the first three objectives reflect or entail correspondence with Greece's accumulated discontent, it would appear that the fourth does so by implication: for beyond corresponding to the perceptible Greek propensity towards East-West détente in Europe, it is also connected with the penchant for relative equidistance from both superpowers.[5] While we shall later return to the fourth objective, it is now necessary to survey the factual and/or perceptual grounds of 'anti-Americanism'

and 'anti-NATOism' in Greece, since they were bound to condition the diplomacy of Andreas Papandreou.

Washington and the Colonels

Disconcerting suggestions of American duplicity in the April 1967 coup d' etat have been propounded by a number of studies.[6] A strong thesis has emerged, arguing that the American services in Greece were unprepared to stop the Colonels' slide towards the suspension of the Constitution. A weaker thesis may well suspend judgment on this matter and confine its critique to the nature of the Greek-American relationship as it unfolded after the launching of a brutal and banal dictatorship. Needless to say, even the weaker thesis, on which I focus, may suffice to account for intense anti-Washington bitterness in Greece.

Not only was there a lack of explicit United States condemnation of the usurpation of power by the Colonels, but high-ranking military officials began immediately to praise the new regime; after General Goodpaster, then SACEUR, visited Athens and posed smiling next to dictator Papadopoulos for press photographs, another senior American Commander in Europe declared that the dictators had formed "the greatest government since Pericles." With the passing of months, Washington's policy towards Athens emerged as one of virtual endorsement and support. The policy was manifested in numerous ways:

To begin with, continuous and growing military assistance was extended to the Colonels. A temporary embargo of weapons stands as no real exception; beyond being too short-lived, it was confined to heavy armaments alone, and not to those necessary and perhaps sufficient for the regime's domestic purposes.

In addition, Washington exercised effective pressure on Belgium, Canada,

Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway to cease calling for the Colonels' expulsion from the Atlantic Alliance, although such an expulsion would have undermined them decisively at the initial stage of their rule.[7]

Negotiations with the Papadopoulos regime began in 1971 concerning the establishment of homeporting facilities for the Sixth Fleet. They were completed with impressive speed. On 1 September 1972, six American destroyers arrived at Phaleron, outside Athens, to symbolize Washington's endorsement of the vehemently anti-communist, and highly unpopular, regime.

All the while, a constant flow of NATO and American officials and dignitaries was performing a parallel legitimation function. Among the visitors to the Colonels were Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans, Donald Nixon (the President's brother), and Vice-President Spiro Agnew. Numerous statements by Washington officials demonstrated unambiguously the nature of American policy, to the consternation of the overwhelming majority of Greeks.

For instance, when fifty Congressmen addressed a letter to Assistant Secretary of State William B. Macomber, Jr., condemning the rationalizations of US policy in Greece by mid-1969, Macomber replied:

> On the one hand, we see an autocratic government denying basic civil liberties to the citizens of Greece...On the other hand, Greece is a NATO ally which has scrupulously fulfilled its treaty obligations. It is important to our strategic interests in the Mediterranean area and has extended full co-operation in this field. This, then, is the dilemma -- how to deal with an ally with whose internal order we disagree yet who is a loyal NATO partner working closely with the United States in furtherance of the purposes and obligations of the NATO Treaty.(8)

Commenting on the administration's grasp of the dilemma's wrong horn, Senator

J. William Fulbright lamented in September 1970: "We espouse high-sounding principles on the one hand, while dealing with dictators for military bases on the other. The administration might at least spare us the pain of its rhetoric and get on with the deal -- provided, of course, the price is right."[9] Equally revealing was Secretary Stans' remark about the presence of nine junta ministers and deputy ministers in his Athens audience in 1971: "It is a compliment to me and it is a compliment to the Government of the United States and to the wonderfully close relations that exist today between our two countries."[10] Finally, a Study Mission of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs observed after its January 1974 visit to Greece:

> Many Greeks, including many members of the last Parliament, hold the United States partially or entirely responsible for the Papadopoulos-Ioannides rule. The accuracy of that judgment is difficult to sustain by the normal kinds of proof. But it is equally difficult to disprove...The role of the United States in post-1967 Greece is a classic example of the consequences of military predominance in American foreign policy...The United States has become, in the eyes of an increasing number of Greek democrats, an instrument of their oppression...(11)

Allied Passivity on the Cyprus Tragedy

As documented in Laurence Stern's book The Wrong Horse (1977) and reiterated by Christopher Hitchens' Cyprus (1984), allied policy on Cyprus has consistently entailed the sacrifice of the Cypriots in the interests of incorporating the island's soil into NATO's orbit. Washington's policy towards the Republic of Cyprus (with its 80 percent ethnic Greek population) was remarkable for its persistence and the unsubtle style of its implementation. As former Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, put it in his memoirs,

> "Viewed from Washington, the issues were clear enough. Cyprus was a strategically important piece of real estate at issue between two NATO partners: Greece and Turkey. We needed to keep it under NATO control."(12)

The policy was first crystallized in the "Acheson plan" which proposed the essential partition of the island between Greece and Turkey and the ceding of the Greek island Kastelorizo to Turkey. When President Lyndon Johnson invited Premier George Papandreou to Washington in 1964, he demanded Greece's acceptance of the plan and threatened to cut NATO aid should Greece refuse to endorse it. Premier Papandreou, confronted by the threat, remarked that "in that case, Greece might have to rethink the advisability of belonging to NATO." Lyndon Johnson responded that "maybe Greece should rethink the value of a parliament which could not take the right decision." Greek Ambassador to Washington, Alexander Matsas, subsequently explained to the President that no Greek parliament could accept such a plan for "the Greek Constitution does not allow a Greek government to give away a Greek island." Johnson's reply was as follows:

> Then listen to me, Mr. Ambassador -- fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good...If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long.(13)

The Athens junta, which struck three years later, acted on similar premises. Proponents of Cypriot neutrality were resented for insisting on the island's independence and refusing to be used by either bloc as a strategic outpost. President Makarios, therefore, was portrayed in both Washington and Athens as "the red priest" and the "Castro of the Mediterranean." According to the Greek dictators, Makarios had to go. Undersecretary of State George Ball voiced an identical conclusion in 1969. During a Brookings Institution conference, Ball said in front of State Department officials: "That son of a bitch [Makarios] will have to be killed before anything happens in Cyprus."[14]

Washington, of course, knew Makarios' true colors as well as the repeated plots and assassination attempts against him.[15] In July and August 1974, moreover, the Nixon-Kissinger administration knew: (1) the junta's preparations for a new anti-Makarios coup; (2) Turkey's preparations for an invasion in response to this coup; (3) Turkey's preparations for a second invasion (a month later), should the Geneva negotiations fail; and (4) that these negotiations were bound to fail. At enormous long-term cost, the administration did nothing to prevent the coming tragedy, which only it could have prevented had it so wished.

Secretary Kissinger, through his secret telephone diplomacy and through the State Department's statements by his spokesman, Ambassador Anderson, arguably signaled his endorsement of Turkey's designs. Kissinger sent no telling warning to the Athens junta against the anti-Makarios coup, either through the American personnel in Athens or the Greek ambassador in Washington, although the junta's plot was common knowledge. Once the coup materialized, Kissinger did not condemn it. (In fact, he did not condemn even the reported assassination of Makarios.) Moreover, aware of the impending invasion by Turkish troops, he did not act to preclude it.

When the first invasion was underway, Ambassador to Athens Henry Tasca appealed to the Pentagon to deploy the Sixth Fleet to discourage the completion of the Turkish action. Kissinger intercepted the Tasca message, calling the idea "hysterical."[16] When the junta fell, thanks to its Cyprus debacle, a civilian government of national unity was installed in Greece. The Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee was then activated fully and Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriots began negotiations in Geneva. Secretary Kissinger did nothing to ensure the constitutional and territorial integrity of Cyprus: the

"Gunes Plan" submitted by Turkey in an ultimatum was, according to Turkish sources, written in collaboration with Secretary Kissinger.[17] Since the plan called for the effective partition of Cyprus, and was therefore unacceptable to Greece and the Greek-Cypriots, the collapse of the talks was ensured. So too was the second invasion. As though to make public Washington's endorsement, Ambassador Anderson stated on 13 August 1974: "We recognize the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them."[18] On 15 August, the second invasion of Cyprus was launched.

Christopher Hitchens' book ends thus: "Once the injustice has been set down and described, and called by its right name, acquiescence in it becomes impossible. That is why one writes about Cyprus in sorrow but more -- much more -- in anger."[19] Greece's anger was principally based on three grounds: first, the human cost of the crisis, which involved more than 180,000 refugees, 6,000 dead and 3,000 missing; second, Turkish exploitation of Greece's disorientation and weakness (caused by the dictatorship and its aftermath), to attack the essentially defenceless island; and third, the fact that the crisis had unfolded under Washington's implicit blessing, which solidified Greek conviction of American favouritism towards Ankara.

Turkey's Threat

This review of the first two grievances articulates some crucial perceptual/factual premises of Greece's post-1967 anti-NATOism and anti-Americanism. In sum, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots bitterly experienced their countries' role in Washington's strategic calculus. Maurice Goldbloom (Labor Information Officer of the US Economic Mission to Greece, from 1950 to 1951),

captured the definition of this role as follows: "With few exceptions, American policy in regard to Greece has been only incidentally a policy directed toward Greece. Rather, it has tended to be a more or less mechanical local application of a world-wide line, adopted for reasons often irrelevant to actual Greek circumstances...Greece was thought of primarily as a military base, equipped with an army, and only secondarily as a country inhabited by a people."[20]

Additional insult and injury, however, were being produced synchronically with the 1974 invasions, occupation and effective partition of Cyprus. While the Cyprus invasions demonstrated Turkey's willingness to use armed force in pursuing her regional designs, Turkey's challenge to Greece's sovereignty took substance in several ways.

1. An "Aegean dispute" emerged through the sudden introduction of Turkish claims and demands in the Aegean Sea, forcefully questioning the pre-1974 status quo. The challenge involved: (a) Turkey's denial of Greece's rights to the continental shelf of the Greek islands, although the 1958 Geneva Convention had clarified that islands are also entitled to a continental shelf; (b) Turkey's August 1974 unilateral bisection of the Aegean airspace violated the 1952 ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) agreement allocating the Aegean airspace to the Athens FIR (Flight Information Region) for all purposes of air traffic control; (c) constant violations, from 1974 onward, of Greece's previously unchallenged airspace of 10 nautical miles by Turkish military aircraft, which could, through miscalculation or intention, lead to armed conflict (when Greece replied that it might extend its territorial waters and airspace to 12 nautical miles, Turkey retorted that this would be a casus belli); and (d) the 1977-1980 Turkish vetoes of Greece's NATO re-integration, on grounds that the NATO operational control in the Aegean was unacceptable

(although long established by a NATO decision of 1957 and a SACEUR decision of 1964).

2. Turkey's policy of geostrategic revisionism (which Athens calls expansionism) was dramatized by numerous statements by Turkish military and political leaders. The following are self-explanatory: (a) Turkish Premier Irmak stated on 13 January 1975: "Half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so...We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked."[21] Six days later, Foreign Minister Essenbel declared: "The policy followed by the growing Turkey to safeguard its interest in the Aegean has to be different from the policy of the Turkey of 50 years ago...Turkey is not the Turkey of 1923 after the Lausanne treaty. It is a growing Turkey."[22] On 22 January 1975, Essenbel stated in the Turkish National Assembly: "In the Aegean we must necessarily follow a dynamic policy. Conditions today are different from those of 1923. Turkey has grown in strength...Cyprus is the first step toward the Aegean."[23] Thirty-three months later, in an interview to the Associated Press (14 October 1977) Premier Demirel declared: "I never say 'the Greek islands.' They are Aegean islands. The reason is that they never belonged to Greece in the past."[24]

3. In view of the growing probability of armed conflict, Greek Premier Karamanlis twice proposed a nonaggression pact to Turkey in April 1976 and May 1978. Premiers Ecevit and Demirel rejected both proposals.[25]

4. By 1975 Turkey had created an "Aegean Army", deployed across the Greek frontier islands. Reportedly a 120,000-man army, equipped with 120 landing craft, it contains select units of the Turkish Armed Forces and stands outside NATO's integrated command.[26]

Turkey's behaviour since the 1980 military coup has sustained Athens' conviction of an unabated threat: the Cyprus occupation continues to this day; Turkish military aircraft violate Greek airspace often in large formations; the Turkish Cypriots' "state", unilaterally declared in November 1983, was universally condemned except for its immediate recognition by Ankara; in December 1983, newly elected Premier Turgut Ozal suggested to British journalists not to use the term "Greek islands" but call them "Aegean islands" instead; and Greece has been forced to cancel allied exercises in the Aegean, or to abstain from them, because of Ankara's claim that the Greek island of Lemnos should be de-fortified, in spite of the 1936 Montreux Treaty which, in Athens' view, clearly legitimized defensive measures.

Policy Means and Ends

Policy makers and commentators in Athens have asserted that Washington's commitment to the militarization of Turkey (strengthened since the fall of the Shah, the Afghanistan invasion and the Middle East crises) intensifies the tangible threat to Greece when coupled with the above reading of events.[27] Athens finds it deeply disconcerting that, while Greece's (defensive) NATO reservations are vehemently attacked, Turkey is being treated as the West's enfant gaté, in spite of the Cyprus invasion and its solidified occupation, and despite the Turkish challenge to the sovereignty of Greece. In addition, Turkey's militarization by Washington is morally disturbing to Athens: while Ankara is the third largest recipient of US military and economic assistance (after Israel and Egypt), it has become the top recipient of Soviet aid outside the communist bloc. Having acquired $9.8 billion from the United States since the end of World War II, Turkey has also received $4.3 billion from the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe in the last thirty years.[28]

Papandreou's response has included reasoned protestation in allied forums, aimed at generating allied pressure to redress old NATO sins and current Turkish practices. Simultaneously, however, he has strengthened Greek military preparedness, intensified indigenous defence production and diversified the sources of Greek weapons acquisition, begun by the conservatives in the mid-1970s. At a time of thin economic cows, Greek defence expenditures more than doubled from 1980 to 1983, rising from 96,975 million drachmas to 212,768 million. This constitutes the highest NATO ratio in GDP terms (7.1 percent), higher even than that of the United States (6.9 percent).[29]

Simultaneously, Papandreou's "genuinely multidimensional" foreign policy has mobilized Greek diplomacy in numerous directions. Besides attempting to upgrade the status of Greek membership in the EEC (to protect Greece's developing economy from the competition of the northern European mega-corporations), Papandreou's government has cultivated harmonious relations with Greece's northern Balkan neighbors, Eastern Europe, the Soviets, and the Arabs. Intensified cultural and technical exchanges have accompanied numerous trade agreements. A new alumina plant to be constructed by the Soviets constitutes the largest foreign investment in Greece in years. Saudi Arabia now holds fourth place on the Greek export list, above the US and Britain. And Egypt, Algeria and the USSR are among the first ten importers of Greek agricultural and industrial goods.[30]

Papandreou's policy of a Greek role in Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean is consistent with his decades-old conception of Greek interests. That Greece is unburdened by a colonial legacy has facilitated this policy, as has the traditional Greek-Arab friendship. Additional support for Papandreou's

vision of Greece as an economic-political-cultural bridge between East and West and North and South is provided by his relative ideological autonomy (or relative equidistance) from the world views of both superpowers.

Demonstrations of this are contained in Papandreou's sustained opposition to the nuclear arms race. Genuinely fearing the slide toward nuclear annihilation,[31] he has participated since May 1984 in the initiative of six world leaders (from Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) calling for a nuclear freeze, a test ban and other measures to control the nuclear specter. In the autumn of 1983, he addressed joint letters, with Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, to Presidents Reagan and Andropov on a freeze of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In addition, influential politicians and opinion makers have been invited to Athens conferences on peace and nuclear arms control. Voicing profound Greek (and European) fears of nuclear omnicide, Papandreou has also dramatized his independent turn of mind on matters of universal import, consistently with his world view's moralist thrust.

However, for a policy premised essentially on reasoned protestation and nationalist self-assertion, it is remarkable that Papandreou has in fact entrenched Greece more deeply in the West than it was under the conservatives 12 years ago. Premier Karamanlis, protesting the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, withdrew Greece from NATO's integrated command structure in August 1974; he also closed down selected US military facilities and threatened to shut others; he reduced Greece's information contribution to NADGE (NATO Defense Ground Environment); and he annulled the homeporting agreement for the Sixth Fleet negotiated by the Papadopoulos regime and the Nixon administration. By contrast, the Papandreou government has substantially fulfilled its obligations within the Alliance: the 1983 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United

States renewed for five years the lease of the American military facilities in Greece; Papandreou has actively participated in EEC forums, seeking to advance the interests of Greece; and he has finalized gigantic (in Greek terms) contracts for the acquisition of 40 Mirage 2000 and 40 F-16 fighter aircraft, committing Greek defence and economy to a long-term dependence on French and American technology.

Three tentative conclusions thus emerge. The first is that Papandreou's four cardinal objectives (i.e. to deal with the Turkish threat, to upgrade Greece's international status, to redress over-dependence, and to work for détente) apparently cohere with his chosen means and are made mutually supportive. Secondly, the logic of Papandreou's NATO policy has confronted a veritable dilemma: whole-hearted participation in the Alliance is made untenable by Greece's grievances and Turkey's challenge. Unqualified membership would border on self-contradiction and national indignity as long as Greece perceives a serious threat from another NATO member. On the other hand, an exit from NATO is resisted -- in spite of public attitudes -- because it might encourage an intensified Turkish challenge. Therefore, a synthesis of nationalism and realism arises to account for Papandreou's alliance policy of qualified, or conditional, participation. Thirdly, some effects of his policies have become visible. Domestically, Papandreou's popularity remains impressive, as shown by opinion polls and elections results, despite continued economic difficulties. The articulation of the Turkish threat and Papandreou's defiant nationalism have raised public awareness of Greece's security conundrum, have implied that unity is paramount, and have provided symbolic liberation from the legacy of overdependence on foreign decision making centers. Thus, popular unity, army cohesion, and the harmony of the two, have been solidly premised on the

necessity for national strength, since any appearance of weakness might be exploited by Greece's perceived adversary. Pedagogy and therapy, as it were, have had two additional and apparently intended consequences: they have achieved a partial catharsis of the national psyche from the traumas associated with Greece's grievances; and they have also strengthened Papandreou's substantial hold on the loci of effective power.

The "Irritants"

Papandreou's critics and influential media, however, have taken pains to dramatize some "irritants" in Greek-US relations, in a manner that has distorted his ideological profile. They have stressed his objections to the economic boycott of Poland, his more cautious language concerning the tragedy of KAL Flight 007, and Greece's opting for a postponement of the Euromissiles deployment. But in assuming that such "irritants" prove Papandreou's "radicalism," they have begged the question.

Familiarity with both Greece's grievances and Papandreou's logic can account for these irritants. Fastening on *a priori* axioms about "allied unity", and resisting legitimate reservations and national qualifications, critics have ignored Papandreou's efforts to contain the radicalism of his party's fringe and to retain ideological independence when principles necessitate it. In an elaborate interview with *Le Monde* (23 November 1983),[32] Papandreou emphasized his condemnation of the Afghanistan invasion, the martial law in Poland, and the destruction of the airliner. He added: "We have simply endorsed a more nuanced attitude than others have done, and we have not been wrong, considering the Cold War climate and the propaganda campaign that were raging." He reiterated his motivation to contain the East-West antagonism

which, from Europe's perspective, had reached intimidating proportions by the end of 1983. In addition, Papandreou responded to the facile accusation of "pro-Sovietism" by stating inter alia:

> It would be contrary to our ethics and the values we defend to punish the Jaruselski government when some western powers provide economic and military support to numerous dictatorships, especially in Turkey, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and elsewhere. That we oppose the Cold War does not authorize one to accuse us of being pro-Soviet.

To be sure, the cacophonous phrase "metropolis of imperialism" was once used by Papandreou commenting on U.S. foreign policy. His critics isolated three words from a three-hour speech in a party congress and exaggerated their import. Addressing the May 1984 congress of PASOK, Papandreou succumbed to the temptation to appease his party's radical youth through rhetoric, having little else to show in terms of a revisionism of substance. It can be argued that, given a foreign policy tied to Greece's Western orientation, and given that Greece's grievances have made her western association inimical by definition to the radical rank and file, three words seemed a fair price to pay for internal party unity. It is also arguable that Papandreou's rhetoric during his first term in office was characterized by an unfortunate penchant for employing quasi-academic categories and the jargon of political economy in domestic political contexts--a legacy of his twenty-year long academic career. While the truth may rest on a double hypothesis, it may be acknowledged that Papandreou's hyperbolic and diplomatic faux pas jibes with the implications of some Democratic critiques of U.S. foreign policy, and certainly reflects the 1974 Study Mission's view (quoted earlier) which recognized "the military predominance in American foreign policy."

In sum, just as Papandreou's logic cannot be divorced from his principles, it

also cannot ignore the Greeks' social psychology, and the current political culture generated by Greece's accumulated grievances. At the close of his Le Monde interview, Papandreou referred to these grievances concluding: "We certainly are a source of irritation. But the Americans know very well that we are not in the opposite camp, that our notions of democratic socialism are in contradiction to the bureaucratic systems installed in the East."

Papandreou's World View

Nationalism, democratic socialism (akin to radical liberalism), adaptive realism and (romantic) moralism form the core of Papandreou's values. A brief review of his intellectual development in conjunction with its formative influences may now serve to clarify the nature of his values and beliefs.

Andreas Papandreou emigrated to the United States in 1939, when he was twenty. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard in economics, served in the U.S. Navy, and distinguished himself in academic life until 1959, when he returned to Greece. After the War, he first taught at Harvard and then at the universities of Minnesota, Northwestern, and California at Berkeley, where he was Department Chairman from 1956 to 1959. During these years, he became affiliated with the Democratic Party. As he wrote in his 1970 book, Democracy at Gunpoint, "while in Minnesota, two things of major importance happened to me. I married Margaret Chant. And I became involved in American politics. Adlai Stevenson's 1952 presidential campaign awakened in me all the feelings that I had kept carefully on ice for many years."[33] Papandreou became Chairman of the Minnesota Stevenson Forum Committee, promised to assist Hubert Humphrey's upcoming senatorial campaign, and later joined a board of economic advisers for California Governor Pat Brown.

On returning to Greece, he founded and headed an economic research center, until he was persuaded to enter Greek politics. Elected member of parliament and made minister in the 1964 liberal government of the Center Union, under his father George Papandreou, Andreas viewed Greece's problems through the philhellenic categories of the emigré technocrat and intellectual. Communicating his vision of an hellenic renaissance, he pointed to the causes of Greece's malaise: unbalanced socio-economic growth and political, administrative, and educational under-development were rooted in the policies of the Greek Establishment and its pliability to foreign penetration, which bordered at times on servility. The Palace, the Army, the indigenous economic oligarchy, and the unenlightened Right carried narrow self-interests and anachronistic values which favoured collaboration with external "protectors." The liaison perforce produced a profound national indignity. Foreign intervention since the Truman Doctrine had taken quasi-colonial forms in determining Greek society, economy, and life. In the mid-1960s, U.S. Embassy officials, the U.S. Military Mission, as well as CIA representatives were omnipresent in the country. Laughlin Campbell, Chief of the CIA Station, contributed to Papandreou's mature Greek experiences when he erupted: "Go tell your father that in Greece we get our way. We can do what we want--and stop at nothing."[34] In 1964 Andreas Papandreou escorted the Prime Minister to Washington and witnessed his father's confrontation with President Johnson over Cyprus. In 1965, young King Constantine, under the influence of his American advisers, forced the liberal government of George Papandreou to resign.

Andreas' 1966 newspaper article, "Our Course and Our Future: National Renaissance and Foreign Policy," crystallized his theoretical categories, elevating them to policy principles: sovereignty, rational planning, national

dignity, and realism. He contrasted his vision to the conservatives' penchant for serving imported interests and wrote: "Greece is a proud country. Its destiny is nobler and far greater than that envisaged by the Right -- Greece merely as the Florida of the Common Market."[35] He argued instead for a proudly nationalist, albeit realist, foreign policy for Greece, as both a dignified end and a means to democratic modernization:

> The primary and proper function of Greek foreign policy is to promote the interests of Greece and to implement Greek objectives and Greek ideals. We are aware, of course, that independence is not without its constraints; it is not to be confused with abandon. It carries with it grave responsibilities. But we insist that Greece be treated as a full ally and not as a satellite, whose foreign policy becomes subordinate to that of another nation...We will observe our alliances and execute our obligations. At the same time we claim our rights, as we must. Turkey is a prime example; it never found it difficult to exercise pressure for the promotion of its national interests, and on that account it gained more, not less, respect.(36)

This 1966 article encapsulated Papandreou's reformist-liberal commitment and his "goal to transform Greece, ultimately, into a major Mediterranean and European nation." He attracted however the wrath of the Establishment and the impatience of the "foreign factor," as his popularity was climbing, making virtually certain his party's electoral victory at the scheduled May 1967 election. A few weeks earlier, Andreas Papandreou delivered a speech at the Foreign Press Association in Athens, which included his view on the "deeper cause" of America's upheaval at the time:

> It is that America is not living up to American ideals. And it is felt mostly by the intellectuals and the young people who have come straight from the history books, who have been imbued with democratic principles...who have made a faith out of national independence, national integrity, national self-determination, and the equality of all peoples. For them the American presence in Vietnam is an error of the first degree, and the American involvement in the internal affairs of other nations intolerable...The disclosures that are going on now in America concerning the role of the CIA in foreign policy should

> leave no doubt as to what we mean when we insist that Greece should belong to the Greeks.(37)

Two U.S. Embassy officials had left the room after glancing at the distributed text of the speech. As Laurence Stern observed in The Wrong Horse: "Had the speech been uttered in the United States in the course of a presidential campaign or at a National Press Club luncheon, it would have passed without remark. But Athens was not as politically tolerant as Washington. In the eyes of some official Americans, Papandreou was seen as a traitor and renegade for making such speeches. He was challenging, after all, some of the basic premises of American policy in Greece."[38] Similarly, Stephen Rousseas noted that "for Greece's semi-feudal, Byzantine structure," Papandreou's world view was deemed by the conservatives as radical; in fact, "Andreas was regarded by the far Right as a dangerous communist." According to Rousseas, it was popular in mid-1960s Greece to link "the younger Papandreou with the late President Kennedy--as a man with style, intellect, and a program to get Greece moving again...It would have been more accurate, however, to have viewed him as having been caught in the unfortunate dilemma of being Robert Kennedy plus Hubert Humphrey rolled into one...Andreas' "radicalism," however, was nothing more than a mixture of the New Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society."[39]

The Colonels' coup d'etat of 21 April 1967 prevented the May elections. It thus provided dramatic confirmation of Papandreou's diagnosis of the Greek malaise. A new phase in his theoretical-political development necessarily began after eight months in prison and his exile, which took him to York University in Toronto. Papandreou produced three books from 1969 to 1972. Democracy at Gunpoint (1970) is a political memoir coupled with a political-economic-

historical analysis of post-World War II Greece. Written to settle Papandreou's accounts with his liberal consciousness, it remained essentially faithful to the axioms of the above-mentioned 1966 newspaper article. Then Man's Freedom (1970) and Paternalistic Capitalism (1972)[40] broadened his scope and commented on the unpalatable implications for small nations of the superpowers' global antagonism. Keeping in mind both the Greek dictatorship and the ill-fated Prague Spring, Papandreou reviewed the grounds for the quasi-autonomous hegemonic drive created by the two superpowers' military-industrial complexes. Addressing primarily academics (Man's Freedom reprints three lectures at Carnegie-Mellon University later expanded in Paternalistic Capitalism), Papandreou observed:

> Soviet bureaucratic socialism within its sphere of influence, the world of Soviet satellites, has proved to be repressive, authoritarian, and suppressive both of popular and national sovereignty. Historically, it is different from the US pattern in that it lacks the economic expansionism of the US military-industrial complex--the capitalist dynamic which, while propelling the world to new technological frontiers, is altering de profundis the structure of power, creating a new managerial-bureaucratic-militaristic elite which is beyond the reach of the traditional levers of political control. In the Soviet bloc, Russia's allies all fall in the category of satellites. They are dominated by it in a direct military, political, and economic fashion. But the pattern does show signs of changing. For Greece, a country that is European while partaking of the characteristics of the Third World, is a new type of experiment in intervention...Greece has become the first Banana Republic on the European Continent.(41)

Beginning to exhibit the bitterness of the exile, and the romantic and protesting tenor of the New Left's utopian humanism, Papandreou's writings of the early 1970s demonstrated his talent for independent syntheses. Just as diverse authors cohabited his footnotes (from Sweezy, Baran, and Marcuse, to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., John Kenneth Galbraith, and de Juvenel), his proposals for a more rational order combined democratic socialism (or radical reformism)

with a plea to recognize the rights of underprivileged states. His vision for these states stressed national dignity--as a sine qua non for self-respect--multipolarity as against bipolarity, and a new balance of power that would redress the inferiority of the South and the world's poor. Equidistance from both superpowers was entailed as a distant ideal, demonstrating that Papandreou's world view combines romantic moralism with a hard-nosed analysis of the implications of superpower militarism, expansionist capitalism and oppressive Soviet bureaucratism.

Papandreou returned to Greece and formed the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, when Greek democracy was restored in 1974 with the collapse of the dictatorship (under the weight of the Cyprus tragedy and the first Turkish invasion). PASOK's platforms for the 1974 and 1977 elections retained Papandreou's post-1967 quasi-radical categories, and responded to the massive disillusionment and anger with the perceived "betrayal" of Greece. Once again, his project alarmed conservative circles. To be sure, as it combined vision with protest, it intimated that Greece's recent vicissitudes might require opting for neutrality. This notion, however, was couched in terms of calculated ambiguity that were essentially futurological. Predicated on theoretical opposition to the two power-blocs, it cautiously hinged on their future dissolution: "A Europe of the People, a confederated Europe, which will include Western and Eastern countries, constitutes a vision that is desirable but also quite distant."[42] Employing national independence as a sine qua non for domestic development and national dignity, PASOK refused to supply specifics on severing Greece's western ties.

Proud nationalism was, therefore, coupled again with flexible realism. This realism moderated progressively PASOK's rhetoric, gaining momentum as the

party was approaching power. For instance, in the 1981 election manifesto, PASOK explicitly "recognize[d] that there will most probably be, within the procedures for the removal of the [American] bases, a transition period."[43] Similarly, while stressing Greece's Turkish (and the associated NATO) problem in view of the eastern threat, it emphasized that "PASOK will, in none of its steps and under no circumstance, allow the downgrading of the readiness of our Armed Forces to defend our country from any threat."[44] To wit, just as no removal of U.S. bases was ever concretely promised, no real Greek break with NATO was envisaged. Flexible realism, aimed at increasing Greece's negotiating leverage, had won the day.

It thus transpires that Papandreou's world view retained temporal consistency and internal coherence. Predicated on the values embedded in the 1966 article (and implied by Papandreou's association with the American Democratic Party in the 1950s) it issues in a principled, and elaborately constructed, analysis of Greece's idiosyncrasies and of global conundrums. Marrying the humanist and populist traditions of the Democratic Party with European democratic socialism and hellenic pride, it is subject to alarmist interpretations only by selective or partisan readings. The fallacies of Papandreou's critics may therefore be exposed by looking at his theoretical work, by reviewing his first term in office, and by linking his logic to the sui generis (for a European nation) historical and political realities of Greece.

Conclusion

My argument may be summarized as follows:

1. Papandreou's foreign policy is predicated on assertive nationalism and cautious realism. Aimed primarily at handling Greece's unique security predicament in NATO (i.e., the conviction and apparent reality of a threat to her vital interests by another ally), it also attempts to redress the deeply sensed grievances of the country and its people.

2. Even if one resisted the validity of these grievances taken as a set, they cannot be dismissed entirely, if only because they are entrenched as facts in Greek political culture, shared by the overwhelming majority of Greeks and manifested as anti-NATOism and anti-Americanism. Therefore, even if part of the Greek case is accepted as sound, it follows that Papandreou's logic emerges as politically valid.

3. Andreas Papandreou's "operational code" or world-view is the dialectical outcome of ideological-political values and beliefs tested and conditioned by Greece's historical vicissitudes, in which Papandreou himself has already participated decisively. Being a plausible synthesis of rational nationalism, adaptive realism, democratic socialism, and (quasi-romantic) moralism, his world view is far from "radical." Therefore the melodrama in his critics' charges appears as a product of partisan interpretations or overworked imaginations.

4. We may thus account for the occasional "irritants" in Papandreou's relations with Greece's allies by stressing the cathartic role they were apparently meant to play, their usefulness as means towards Papandreou's negotiating objectives, their consistency with his world-view, and their parallel role as points of nationalist reference, which also implies (but need not be identified with) their capacity to serve Papandreou's domestic aspirations.

It may now be added that, since Papandreou demonstrated a substantive commitment to the West - in spite of popular disillusionment and anger - and since even his rhetoric has been toned down after his second electoral victory of June 1985, the ball is now in the allied court. Should NATO and Washington continue to frustrate Greek sensibilities, by ignoring Turkey's challenge or by dubbing the Greek-Turkish dispute "bilateral" (in spite of its implications for the cohesion of the crucial Southern Flank), then intra-alliance tension might again be heightened, for two principal reasons: first, because of the Greek conviction that their rational and moral case is being sacrificed by Greece's allies thanks to an unconscionable favouritism towards Turkey, born of a current geostrategic fixation; and second, because economic difficulties in Greece might (albeit incorrectly) be ascribed exclusively to the absurdity of allocating astronomical expenditures to the defence from another NATO-member, and to the covert boycott of the Greek economy as a price for her defiant stance. In short, the perceived allied indifference to the Greek case might exacerbate the radicalization of the Greeks, making inevitable the radicalization of Greek foreign policy, as the (rational) response to massive anti-Washington frustration and the (less rational) search for exclusively exogenous scapegoats.

Conversely, understanding Papandreou's foreign policy as historically and socio-psychologically induced may well produce in Washington a decisive response. Given Papandreou's repeated gestures of moderation, reciprocation by Washington could begin moderating anti-NATO and anti-American bitterness. It is arguable that these attitudes will seriously recede once the U.S. and NATO recognize the Greek case as requiring "affirmative action." Thus, for instance, Washington's pressure on Ankara to remove its troops from Cyprus and accept explicitly the Aegean status quo are necessary, and may prove sufficient, to

effect a thaw in Greek-Turkish relations. Since the conflict in NATO's Southern Flank makes nonsense of "allied unity," such an American initiative would seem prudent and wise: for it could harmonize this flank, stabilize by implication the Greek and Turkish economies, and offer the Greeks an overdue indication that Moralpolitik is not exactly dead in intra-alliance calculations.

Footnotes

1. Roy C. Macridis, Greek Politics at a Crossroads: What Kind of Socialism? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984). See also Peter Duignan's Forward, ibid., p. viii.

2. John Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984/85): 375-91.

3. Panayote E. Dimitras, "Greece: A New Danger," Foreign Policy, no. 58 (Spring 1985) p. 137. Cf. NATO Rapporteur, Mona Rokke's, statement in November 1980 that "popular support for NATO in Greece is not running very high. In an opinion poll prior to re-entry, 58 percent...favoured Greek neutrality, and only 12 percent favoured Greek re-entry into NATO." North Atlantic Assembly, Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on the Southern Region on Greece, presented by Mrs. Mona Rokke (Norway), Rapporteur, NATO International Secretariat, November 1980, p. 9.

4. Dimitras, "Greece: A New Danger," p. 137.

5. Dimitras' polls may suffice to substantiate this assertion. See, especially, his claim that "the majority of the population is neutralist, opposing close ties with both East and West." Ibid.

6. See, for instance, Lawrence Stern, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy (New York: Time Books, 1977); Philip Deane, I Should Have Died (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976); Stephen Rousseas, The Death of a Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, 1967); and Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

7. Ambassador A.G. Xydis, "The Military Regime's Foreign Policy," in Greece Under Military Rule, ed. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972), pp. 195-96.

8. Quoted by Maurice Goldbloom, "United States Policy in Post-War Greece," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, Greece Under Military Rule, p. 257.

9. Ibid., p. 249.

10. Ibid., p. 252.

11. Controlling the Damage: US Policy Options for Greece. Report of a Study Mission to Greece, 18 to 21 January 1974, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 22 February 1974.

12. George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 342 (emphasis added).

13. Deane, I Should Have Died, pp. 113-14.

14. Stern, Wrong Horse, p. 84.

15. The material in this and the next paragraph is drawn from ibid., pp. 110-33; and from United States Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, 1975).

16. Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 180.

17. Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 96 and 102 (note 58).

18. Ibid., p. 96.

19. Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus (London: Quartet Books, 1984), p. 166.

20. Goldbloom, "United States Policy in Post-War Greece," pp. 228 (emphasis in original) and 234.

21. Quoted in Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Papers 155 (London: IISS, 1980), p. 39, note 16.

22. Ibid.

23. Threat in the Aegean, published by The Journalists' Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers (Athens, n.d.), p. 5.

24. Quoted in Ioannis Pesmazoglou, "Address on Greek Security," Survival (March-April 1980): 74.

25. Wilson, Aegean Dispute, p. 41, note 63.

26. Threat in the Aegean, p. 32.

27. Interviews, Athens, summers of 1983 and 1984, and January 1985.

28. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1984, pp. 110-11, and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, pp. 809 and 811. "By 1978 Turkey had become the largest non-communist recipient of Soviet aid": T.B. Millar, The East-West Strategic Balance (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 185.

29. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), p. 323.

30. To Vema (Athens) 8 April 1984, p. 51.

31. Nicos Alevras was Director of Programming, National Radio and Television in August, 1983. In a three-hour interview he conveyed the very arguments put forward in Andreas Papandreou's Le Monde interview of 23 November 1983 (see below).

32. Interview with Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, 23 November 1983, pp. 1 and 3.

33. Andreas G. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970), p. vii.

34. Ibid., p. 108.

35. Reprinted in Rousseas, Death of a Democracy, p. 171.

36. Ibid., pp. 169-70 and 176.

37. Ibid., pp. 183-84.

38. Stern, Wrong Horse, p. 30.

39. Rousseas, Death of a Democracy, pp. 17-18.

40. Andreas G. Papandreou, Man's Freedom (New York and London: Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1970); and Paternalistic Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972).

41. Papandreou, Man's Freedom, pp. 55-56.

42. Contract with the People: PASOK's Declaration of Policy (Athens: n.p., 1981), p. 36 (in Greek).

43. Ibid., p. 32.

44. Ibid.