

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY,
POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE:
THE NATURAL SELECTION OF REALISM

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Paper to be presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Hamilton, Ontario (June 1987). The author acknowledges with thanks research support from the Military and Strategic Studies Program of the Department of National Defence.

Introduction

The inter-paradigm debate currently in progress among IR specialists essentially involves the comparative merits of the contending perspectives' core organizing notions, with the general assumption being that these notions set parameters on the lines of inquiry that scholars follow in attempting to generate knowledge about the subject-matter of the field. Indeed, it is frequently asserted that prior paradigm choice largely defines the very scope of the observables analysts and theorists will seek to describe and explain. Given the finite resources available for the knowledge-building enterprise and the authentically existential stakes at issue in international affairs, it is entirely comprehensible why the professional and normative impetuses driving the present disciplinary dispute have engaged the attention of the field's practitioners.

This paper approaches the inter-paradigm debate from the vantage-point of political science and consequently evaluates the claims and existing products of the competing metatheoretical stances associated with each paradigmatic vision in function of that vantage-point. I will first indicate what I understand to be the essential features of "international political theory" since the principal criterion for paradigm selection resides in the assessment one makes of the comparative strengths of paradigms as potential constructs within integrated sets of abstract propositions, which when taken together seek to offer a formal explanation of one or more field phenomena. I next relate that evaluation to the major points of contention within IR that have crystallized in the current debates centering on paradigm legitimacy, and in doing so I make the case for the social-scientific credentials of realist thought by demonstrating why realism has remained the preeminent organizing framework for political scientists working in IR. In support of my defence of realism's viability as a

metatheoretical organizing framework for political inquiry, I conclude by integrating a sampling of recent French-language scholarship across a range of academic disciplines in order to demonstrate how paradigm reinforcement need not be sustained solely from within the disciplinary matrix formed by the leading proponents of the dominant perspective within a given field of inquiry.

My argument confronts the premises of the increasingly influential post-modernist deconstructionist thinking in IR, which holds that American structural realism has by some amorphous Habermasian process drawn on pluralist and radical critiques of postwar realist theorizing to produce the so-called "technical" knowledge of structural realism in such a manner as to strengthen discipline-wide normative adherence to its preferred ethnocentric set of paradigmatic assumptions.¹ This paper, in exploring how systematic empirical investigation, conducted beyond the confines of culturally--or professionally--mediated contexts of knowledge production, can provide renewed intellectual legitimacy to the dominant paradigm in international studies, focuses on a phenomenon that has often been overlooked by those sociologists of knowledge who analyze paradigm regeneration or shifts in the social sciences; as well, it introduces a new element to the prevailing argumentation of the inter-paradigm debate.² Simply put, Kuhn's diagnostics in this regard, which have been accredited by those who would promote paradigm profusion in IR,³ are inapplicable however one views the scientific status of the discipline. If IR is seen to be proto-scientific, it does not meet Kuhn's criteria for classification as a mature science and therefore falls outside the scope of his historiographical interpretation of scientific development.⁴ If on the other hand one does accept that IR encompasses substantive affinities with the processes and content of the established sciences, Kuhn is an exceedingly weak reed on which to build

legitimizing arguments for paradigmatic relativism, since his position has been effectively countered by historians and philosophers of mature science.⁵ In response to the prevailing outlook of many, which would "let a hundred paradigms bloom," this paper promotes the countervailing thesis that there is a full-blown scientific foundation to realist theorizing that is in the process of being reinforced at the margins of the discipline, that is, beyond the scope of what has been referred to as IR's "British-American intellectual condominium"⁶ --both in terms of language group and disciplinary focus.

Criteria for International Political Theory

The simplest and most direct means of comprehending the term "international political theory" is to disaggregate its three components, indicate what each signifies, and then recombine them in such a manner that the semantic content of the parts is not obscured. Thus, the first component, "international," encompasses the initial criterion of identification, namely that the field of inquiry does possess qualitative specificity both in relation to domestic politics and international economics, law or sociology. This point has been stressed many times before of course,⁷ but it is crucial to this discussion since its negation goes to the very core of the inter-paradigm debate. In a justly celebrated article written almost thirty years ago, Stanley Hoffmann gave pride of place to this criterion for the theory-building enterprise: "First, the field can be sufficiently isolated for analytical purposes. International relations take place in a milieu which has its own 'coherence and uniqueness', its rules of the game which differ sharply from the rules of domestic politics, its own perspective."⁸ Kal Holsti has usefully updated this counsel by emphasizing the basic distinction between diplomatic-strategic behaviour and international

commercial activity, and by placing the case for field distinctiveness in the context of current paradigm-centered contention within IR scholarship.⁹

The second component of "international political theory" also reduces to an issue of field autonomy. Acknowledgement that specifically political activity can be parcelled off from the matrix of human interaction patterns represents a necessary condition for undertaking the painstaking task of theory development. Over the course of this century, the progressive institutionalization and professionalization of political science within the academy, coupled with the sheer growth in the number of practitioners, has brought with it a kind of Parkinson's Law with respect to definitions of "politics."¹⁰ On the basis of his sustained and close study of the great works of political thought, encompassing a period of some 2500 years, William Bluhm has provided the following much-needed guidance: "Reduced to its universal elements, then, politics is a social process characterized by activity involving rivalry and cooperation in the exercise of power, and culminating in the making of decisions for a group."¹¹ The essentially-contested-concept¹² argument which is usually invoked against situating the core notion of power at (to borrow the late Hedley Bull's expression) "its central place in the theory of international relations"¹³ is untenable on a number of grounds, and need not obscure this discussion.¹⁴

Finally, "theory" refers to formalized abstraction within knowledge-generation processes, which when disaggregated or individualized denotes "a set of propositions that is not known to be true or to be false but believed to be somewhat plausible, potentially explanatory, relatively fundamental, and somewhat integrated."¹⁵ Plausible, explanatory and fundamental, but in respect to what? To real-world referents, such as they are, which are accessible to human observation or reason. Acceptance that empirical

inquiry can be conducted with sufficient objectivity for the attainment of "intersubjective consensus" in the testing of theoretical propositions and hypotheses remains the goal of cumulative theory development in any science, including the social sciences, but it is a convention of the scientific enterprise generally that theoretical advances can be accredited in the absence of unambiguous empirical support, since not every referent can be directly certified by observation.¹⁶ To take a rather simple example, an uncontrollable environmental variable such as a gust of wind may bring a falling object to a resting place on a surface higher than its original point of release without invalidating laws of gravitation and motion. Human voluntarism or error represents such an uncontrollable in international political theory. The enterprise of social-scientific theorizing seeks to identify those variables that set parameters on the range of human choice. As Harold Lasswell once commented, "the science of politics states conditions; the philosophy of politics justifies preferences."¹⁷ Posited conditions within a theoretical framework are not invalidated in principle by the lack of referential success of the theory's hypotheses. In environments of multiple conditioning variables and fortuitous events, theoretical propositions that adhere to the criteria of plausibility, explanation, coherence, and insight to fundamentals will continue to garner the support of the scientific community until some more compelling proposition-set, again measured by those criteria, is considered to contain greater explanatory potential.

To summarize then, international political theory as a semantic entity refers to internally related abstract propositions that refer in turn to a domain of intergroup relations of power that occur in an environment characterized by the absence of a monopoly of legitimized coercive force.¹⁸ The distinctiveness of

international relations as a field of study; the primacy of the political dimensions of that field; and, coherent abstraction from observables that allows for hypotheses that are verifiable in principle: all must obtain for us to speak of "international political theory" when categorizing the work of scholars who seek to explain structural regularities in world political behaviour.¹⁹

Realism in the Context of the Inter-Paradigm Debate

Only one intellectual tradition espousing a coherent set of paradigmatic assumptions can be said to have met these elementary criteria for viable theorizing consonant with the standard operating procedures of scientific inquiry. In the modern-day study of international relations, more particularly over the course of the four decades since its preeminence was established in the immediate postwar years, this tradition, worldview, school-of-thought, perspective or paradigm--however one chooses to identify the phenomenon--has been conventionally referred to by the generic term "realism." In a deceptively simple way, the repeated recourse to that term as a classificatory rubric merely reflects the fact that, as E.H. Carr noted, "theory does not (as the utopians assume)²⁰ create practice, but practice theory."²¹ Even though Carr's counsel remains relevant today, "seeing the world as it is" does not catch the fuller sense in which realism can be demarcated from its competitors. Some years ago, Robert W. Tucker made much the same observation, in commenting that "If a concern with reality, a commitment to see things as they actually are, is the principal mark of political realism, it is hardly a very distinctive one."²² While Tucker went on to offer a more refined interpretation of realism's specificity, in terms of a philosophical stance associated with situational ethics,²³ I will pursue Lasswell's dictum regarding the science of politics and advance the

argument that what does distinguish realist macrotheories from any existing alternatives--I stress macrotheories for they are the proof in the paradigm pudding--is their compliance with the precepts laid down for authentic theory-building by the mainstream perspective within the philosophy of science, which appropriately enough is referred to as "scientific realism."²⁴

These similar nomenclatures derive not from happenstance; rather they both identify substantively identical approaches to the purposes and methodology of theory construction and refinement as a critical component of the enterprise of modern science. The staying power of "scientific realism" in international political theory has been largely attributable to two seminal texts that have sought to present plausible yet parsimonious explanatory theories of international political activity commensurate with their respective author's commitment to specifically social-scientific theorizing: Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations²⁵ and Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics.²⁶ The acknowledged role of these texts as paradigmatic exemplars has been due in no small measure to their adherence to the criteria for international political theory outlined above. Indeed, since the publication of the first edition of Morgenthau's text in 1948, the influence of these and other theoretical formulations consistent with the realist paradigm has been so pervasive and compelling in the academy that the history of the field itself over the course of the last four decades is best seen as an ongoing endeavour to either refine or negate realism's fundamental propositions. The traditionalist-behavioralist contention that peaked in the late sixties was essentially a subset of a more encompassing intrarealist debate about the social scientific status of the field²⁷ which both preceded and transcended that particular juncture. The core issues of this protracted exchange address

questions relating, on the one hand, to the methodology of the realist "scientific research program" (as Imre Lakatos used the term)²⁸ and on the other, to the role and possibilities of formal theory, especially grand theory, within the discipline when approached from the angle of political science. All attempts to transcend realism or to supplant it from its position within IR as the principal paradigm for orienting disciplinary research programs have been obliged to either deny appeals to observables, deny the primacy of the political, or deny the specific nature of international relations.

Some alternatives to realist thinking would deny more than one of the defining elements of international political theory. Marxists, for instance, have made contributions to international theory primarily to the extent that they have abandoned their central tenets. As R. N. Berki has pointed out, despite Waltz's contention that "Marx and the Marxists represent the fullest development of the second image"²⁹ of international relations--that is, that they can be categorized as exemplars of those theorists who locate the predictive variables of the causes of war in the internal structure of states--the division of world society into states poses inherent problems, as yet unsurmounted, for Marxism's ultimate unified vision of humankind. Berki puts the theoretical dilemma in these terms: "the Marxian ideal of socialism appears either in the shape of hegemony, as the domination of strong nations over weak ones; in this case it is no longer tinged with the features of capitalism, but neither is it the realization of a higher human freedom. Or, it appears in the shape of a community of independent nations, in which case it may come to represent freedom and progress over capitalism proper, but remains a system still visibly bearing the birthmarks of capitalism."³⁰

The inevitable tensions generated by theory-resistant elements in Marxist analyses of international relations need not be laboured here. Nonetheless, reference to one recent example in the genre will serve to illustrate the extent of the problem. In his theoretical discussion of interstate conflict within the socialist world, a Yugoslavian scholar at IPSA's 13th World Congress reconciled a thoroughgoing realist analysis with Marxist precepts by somewhat disarmingly observing that "contemporary praxis" had been significantly different from that envisaged by socialist theory. It followed therefore, he concluded, that socialist theory had not been invalidated.³¹ Vendulka Kubáľková and Albert Cruickshank, with no mean propensity for understatement, note that "Marxism and international relations, as topics, do not blend easily."³² More accurately, Marxist thought rejects the autonomy of international relations, approaches politics by way of sociology and economics, and tortures empirical data beyond recognition by projecting it backwards and forwards along an extended diachronic continuum.³³ I make this point because it relates directly to one of the three poles of the current inter-paradigm debate in IR. This pole--variously categorized as globalism,³⁴ radical,³⁵ global-centric,³⁶ Marxist,³⁷ or structuralism,³⁸--informs research programs organized around the idea of dependency, including dependencia, centre-periphery analysis, and world-system analysis.³⁹ Paradigm proliferationists themselves have duly reported globalism's indebtedness to Marxist constructs. Sigler, for example, comments that "Much of this is inspired by Marxist thinking";⁴⁰ and Banks remarks that globalism's generic qualifier might also be any one of "dialectics," "Marxism," "social class theory" or "historical materialism."⁴¹ Further noting that this paradigm's general theory "is not a product of academic IR," Banks observes that globalism draws on "above all the historical materialism of Marx, Engels and subsequently

Lenin."⁴² Some of the antinomies that flow from paradigm-structured research programs and theorizing tributary to Marxian or materialist formulations have been usefully identified by Zolberg in particular.⁴³

If globalism's paradigmatic assumptions cannot sustain social-scientific research programs that focus on international politics as the real-world referent, what can be said of realism's other contemporary competitor, pluralism? This paradigm completes the realism-pluralism-globalism triad of the inter-paradigm debate and is sometimes referred to as the "world society" view in contradistinction to realism's informing vision of structured or ordered interstate anarchy. Rosenau, always at the ready with new typological nomenclature, refers to pluralism as the multi-centric approach,⁴⁴ to distinguish it from realism's state-centrism and globalism's obvious global-centrism in terms of the three approaches' respective substantive premises and methodological starting points. Pluralist attempts at macrotheory, for which Burton's major works have exercised the role of paradigmatic exemplars,⁴⁵ have taken on progressively sharper definition since the 1950s when Deutsch's pioneering work in integration theory and the modeling of decision-making networks in application of communications theory provided, in Lijphart's words, "the crucial philosophical impetus both for the assault on the traditional paradigm and for the construction of a comprehensive new paradigm."⁴⁶

Discussions of pluralism's informing assumptions can be found in the above-cited texts by Banks, Lijphart, Little, Rosenau, Vasquez, Viotti and Kauppi, and Burton. Often inchoately operationalized, pluralism advances such notions as these: that state wealth and welfare goals have attained salience in international politics, as have non-state actors; that a communitarian ethos has gained--or is on the verge of gaining--ascendancy in world politics (over

atomistic values) through the combined effects of technological change, the diminished legitimacy of the use of force, increased interdependence, and the permeability of territorially based state sovereignties; and, that voluntaristic process can and does transform structure. The paradigmatic prism through which its practitioners approach their research agendas and in conformity with which they frame and conduct their theorizing is still consolidating and comprises an imperfect amalgam of earlier or concurrently developing strands in the IR literature, including functionalism, communications theory and cybernetics, bureaucratic politics modeling, integration theory, game-theoretic models of cooperative interaction strategies, and transnationalist and complex-interdependence thinking.

Whatever conclusions one might draw about pluralism's macrotheoretical plausibility, explanatory power, fundamental insights, or internal cohesion, it is clearly the case that the directing assumptions of pluralist thinking predispose research programs conducted from that perspective to scepticism concerning the autonomy of IR, and they reject the primacy of its political dimensions, however defined. As a macrotheoretical enterprise, pluralism shows, as Sigler has noted, "the influence of much sociological thinking as opposed to that of political science ...".⁴⁷ In redefining the parameters of the field to allow scope for their theses, proponents of the world-society perspective confront major problems related to boundary definition and the distinctions that must be made between contingent and defining properties in theory construction. What a world-society approach gains in comprehensiveness it more than loses in parsimony, given that the variables included in the more encompassing reality to be explained merely accompany rather than identify the core activity within the field. Since there is a fundamental incommensurability between real-world observables and the

pluralists' paradigmatic premises, flagrant contradictions in their analyses must be accounted for as representing "paradoxes" in the field data. Pluralist macrotheory is rife with normative-empirical tension as a result of failure to establish field boundary limits. In one major contribution to the pluralist literature, Edward Morse devoted a concluding chapter to these basic antinomies, which were revealed when theory was juxtaposed with practice. I will cite only one of the pluralist "paradoxes" to demonstrate the crucial nature of the referencing flaws of this paradigm for viable explanatory theory:

Whether one looks at the security of the world as a whole, the growth in the global economy, the spread of ecological and environmental problems, the requirements of governments for resources and technology, or general social problems, national autonomy is everywhere on the decline and the need to rely on actions taken by others virtually universal. Yet the nation-state remains the major form of legitimate political organization capable of allocating resources within societies and of providing international order. It has been reaffirmed by the process of decolonization after World War II, by the growth of nationalism, and, certainly not least of all, by the emergence of nuclear deterrence. Here we find a basic paradox which seems to lie at the heart of contemporary international politics, where, at a time when the nation-state has appeared to be functionally obsolete, it has been reaffirmed by the same processes which would call for its transcendence... Foreign policy today, whether it is conducted by a great or lesser power, in a highly industrialized or relatively non-industrialized society, tends to reflect an almost inevitable gap between perceptions of what the world is and the actual structures of international relationships.⁴⁸

These kinds of so-called gaps and paradoxes between intra- and extra-field characteristics are actually supportive of one of the axioms of formal structuralist theory: existing structures are self-reinforcing to the point where they form a macrostructural interlock that is highly resistant to transformational change in system-level characteristics. Thus, whereas structural-realist theory can provide an explanation for systemic continuity or persistence in interaction patterns,⁴⁹ pluralist macrotheory, by contrast, tends to degenerate into exhortatory heuristics on the posited need for change in the

international system's ordering principles. For pluralist macrotheorists, when the "is" of international politics proves resistant to the "ought," the contradiction is ascribed to the myopia of policy makers, not to the deficiencies of the analysts' own metatheoretical premises. Pluralism's failure to account for actual international political relations is, as I have suggested earlier, rooted in its ontology (what is real?). Through its disregard for parsimony, it ensures its failure as an organizing paradigm for viable social scientific theorizing about international politics.

Nevertheless, its epistemological principles (how can we know?) as well as its normative message (what should we do?)⁵⁰ are not generically distinguishable from those of realism, although pluralism's holistic ontology does extend its epistemic--but not its normative--scope. Banks has caught the ontological distinctiveness of realism and pluralism as well as their epistemological and ethical resemblance: "In so far as the pluralist paradigm really is addressing itself to new questions about hitherto unemphasized relationships, then it is not disproving the realist paradigm. It is passing by, to engage in a separate conversation with the subject-matter."⁵¹ Yet, the "world-society" organizing construct has remained singularly infertile in generating any plausible explanatory theories of world politics. Even a sympathetically predisposed reviewer of what is touted by its editor as the first "complete description" of the world-society approach concluded that it contained "little indication of what avenues of research the new paradigm might point to, and still less of how it might deal with apparently awkward cases" and that "on the evidence offered here, [Burton's] humane approach to international relations cannot sustain the large claims that are made for it."⁵² In fact, when international political theory has been operationalized to provide central attention to world-society variables,

as for instance in Ashley's The Political Economy of War and Peace,⁵³ realist premises find confirmatory support. One can only conclude from the existing literature that the inclusion of non-essential variables reduces pluralism's macrotheoretical ambitions to mere pretensions, for as Phillips rightly notes in respect of theory construction: "The main problem is that not all the characteristics of an entity are defining characteristics--they may always be present, but their presence or absence may not influence the identity or characterization of the entity."⁵⁴

Just as functionalists were drawn inexorably to the subsystemic, that is to say the macrostructurally conditioned, for empirical evidentiary support, pluralists have focused on issues peripheral to the core interests of the principal actors in world politics.⁵⁵ The well-travelled path of retreat from international political theory to the domain of international law and organization is a persistent trait of the intellectual history of the various strands of pluralist thought and shows no signs of being abandoned.⁵⁶ Indeed, even after this mitigating process has been engaged and a more salient realist variable is integrated within pluralist theorizing, as for instance a crucial natural resource (oil) in Keohane's theory of hegemonic stability,⁵⁷ the finessing technique of "issue structuralism" is introduced to account for anomalies in hypothesis test results. This finesse enables pluralists to readily accept realism's paradigmatic assumptions when they do attempt to integrate variables that relate directly to the essential and enduring questions of international political theory: the structurally derived latent threat of organized violence and the role of political power in coping with that existential threat. Keohane himself has explained why this occurs: "The fixation of critics and reformers on the Realist theory of state action reflects the importance of this research tradition. In my

view, there is good reason for this. Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world politics because its focus on power, interests, and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject. Thus any approach to international relations has to incorporate, or at least come to grips with, key elements of Realist thinking. Even writers who are concerned principally with international institutions and rules, or analysts in the Marxist tradition, make use of some Realist premises. Since Realism builds on fundamental insights about world politics and state action, progress in the study of international relations requires that we seek to build on this core."⁵⁸ Clearly, when one scrutinizes the theoretical claims and operationalized empirical referencing of the three contending paradigms, one cannot but concur with Kal Holsti that no competing approach has succeeded in negating the absolute centrality of the realist research program to the field's ongoing agenda of investigation.⁵⁹

Although proponents of paradigmatic diversity readily acknowledge that previous debates in IR left realism's organizing premises intact, they advance the position that the current debate does represent a serious test for realism's paradigmatic integrity and, consequently, its legitimacy as an instrumental framework to guide worthwhile research programs within the profession. Two leading proliferationists can be cited to demonstrate how the legitimization of paradigmatic contention requires the delegitimization of realism and seeks to direct the field away from the animating concerns of an explicit political science focus. First, it is posited that control of the mechanisms of state sovereignty is a doubtful means for influencing the great issues of international order, security and resource allocation: "Like idealism before it, behavioralism never challenged the underlying realist paradigm; it focussed on research methods, as idealism had focussed on values and policy prescriptions. Both left

the crucial state-centric assumptions of realism in command. From about 1970 onward, the post-behavioural phase developed into a triangular 'inter-paradigm' debate which did focus on the assumption of a state-centric world. By 1980 realism was pitted against structuralism⁶⁰ and pluralism."⁶¹ That this assessment of state effectiveness would be greeted with surprise and possibly derision by CEOs of MNCs,⁶² not to mention seasoned veterans of supra- and transnational causes,⁶³ does not give pause to proliferationists as they follow up with concrete recommendations for the discipline: "no new projects guided by the realist paradigm should be permitted to occupy a large amount of the intellectual energy and financial resources of the field. Rather, more attention should be devoted to developing new paradigms; articulating and elaborating already existing paradigms, such as Marxism, issue politics and transnational relations; and collecting data and conducting research on hypotheses derived from these new paradigms."⁶⁴

Whereas the author of the last quotation, Vasquez, is sceptical that the realist paradigm can generate viable research programs, his assessment derives from his evaluation of the field's present status as a cumulative scientific enterprise and would surely be radically altered had he a different understanding of the function and criteria of theory in science.⁶⁵ A more vociferous element, however, has interjected itself into the inter-paradigm debate since the early 1980s, one that would ascribe to the scientific process itself an ideological role and motivating force that is at the service of specifically American interests in world politics.⁶⁶ Alternately targeting both Morgenthau and Waltz for their commitment to and belief in the emancipatory powers of scientific inquiry,⁶⁷ or absolving the overtly prescriptivist elements in Morgenthau's theorizing but condemning Waltz and Tucker (along with a

clutch of pluralists who are mistakenly identified as realists)⁶⁸ these proponents of "critical theory" find common cause in their assertion that the realist research program, particularly its most scientifically rigorous manifestations, is both a product and an instrument of American hegemony in global politics. For instance, Cox, who criticizes scientific realism from the perspective of historical materialism, reads into Waltz's theory "(1) the perspective of the United States as the preponderant of the two major powers in the system and consequently the sharing of a certain measure of responsibility for U.S. policy, and (2) the organization of argument around certain obligatory themes or debates, notably those of power versus morality and of science versus tradition." He then administers the ethnocentrism indictment: "The first of these is, to employ Waltz's language, a systemic conditioning of American thought. The second derives more from an explicitly American cultural process."⁶⁹

To take a further example, Ashley, adopting a stance tributary in large part to currents of postmodernist thought,⁷⁰ taxes Waltz, among others, with advancing "an ideology that anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics."⁷¹ This latter-day rendering of the "kill-the-messenger" reflex⁷² is accompanied by exegeses on the "studied parochialism of American international political discourse"⁷³ and links recent refinements in IR theory, for which Waltz's work is generally considered to have exercised predominant influence, to the historical moment at which "the United States' position of hegemony in the world economy [has been] called into question."⁷⁴

This self-styled critical "theory" is directly related to the current paradigm-focused contention in IR in that it advances the argument that realism's current revival has been predicated on its explicit "structuralist turn,"

especially in its macrotheory. More particularly, realist theoreticians are said to have employed concepts and reasoning techniques that were previously associated with a competing tradition of social thought, especially Althusser's structuralist reworking of Marxist thought. This depiction, when rendered in terms of the inter-paradigm debate, would have American scientific realists extracting explanatory constructs from a contending pole, globalism, in order to resolidify American hegemonic control over system-reinforcing dynamics. A similar message is conveyed by the misconceived classificatory scheme of the proliferationist-cum-critical theorist whereby pluralist eclectics (Keohane, Gilpin) are indiscriminately lumped with structural realists (Waltz, Tucker).⁷⁵ A residual effect of this generic confusion has been a general tendency within IR scholarship to assimilate the structural-realist research program with that of the more catholic variants of pluralist theory under the rubric of "neo-realism." Realist theoreticians who demonstrate scientific competence are thus included among purportedly Americano-centric scholars who are castigated as being "guided by a technical cognitive interest in coming to grips with objective laws so as to expand powers of technical control over an objectified reality."⁷⁶

So far, I have attempted to set out the defining characteristics of international political theory; identify and describe the essential elements of the inter-paradigm debate in terms of those characteristics; and indicate within the space constraints imposed by a short paper why realism is and should continue to be the primary operative paradigmatic framework for political scientists working in the field. I should now like to address what might be considered as a voguish depiction of scientific realism as an instrumental and parasitical⁷⁷ ideology of American power--a depiction I propose to counter by demonstrating how the fundamental organizing concepts (what Lakatos calls the

"hard core" of any scientific research program)⁷⁸ that decisively inform and direct realist inquiry have found evidentiary resonance in an intellectual culture with no overriding affinities for American interests in the world (indeed, often the converse) and no stake in issues touching upon the allocation of institutional resources that depend on the relative legitimacy of one or the other of the contending discipline-wide paradigmatic research programs.

In keeping with the terms of the debate that paradigm proliferationists have initiated and pursued with respect to realism's legitimacy as the principal framework for disciplinary inquiry, I will preface this overview of the main conclusions and findings of a sampling of recent French-language scholarship by setting out as succinctly as possible the core notions of its paradigmatic prism as they have been advanced in the two exemplar texts cited earlier, namely those of Morgenthau and Waltz:⁷⁹

- (1) international politics is group-centric behaviour and the most important collectives are sovereign states, the political relevance of which tend to increase proportional to their respective power capabilities;
- (2) the principal organizing mechanism of international politics is multiple co-existing centers of authoritative decision-making, or "state sovereignties";
- (3) the viability of a state's continued sovereign existence, that is, its survival or security, is the preeminent political objective pursued by authoritative state decision-makers; self-defined subsidiary political state interests will tend to be compatible with security interests, the more so the greater the context of a threat to state security;
- (4) political objectives will tend to override non-political objectives be they economic, ideological, ethical, religious, institutional or any other when the former are incompatible with the latter;
- (5) relative distribution of state power capabilities is the decisive arbiter of conflicting security objectives;
- (6) the co-existence of competing states tends to place limits on the pursuit of political objectives through the mutual balancing effects of opposed power capabilities.

Abstracted from their auxiliary hypotheses, initial conditions, contextual and cautionary provisos, here then are the basic premises about the nature of the field subject-matter that inform the realist research program. In strictest codified form they are usually rendered as: (1) state-centrism; (2) anarchy, or the principle of self-help; (3) the priority of survival and security values; (4) the primacy of the political in international relations; (5) relational power as the crucial outcome variable of political activity, or power arbitration; and, (6) power balancing not maximization as the finality of international political activity, primarily through the combined effects of (3) and (5).

Realism as Reflected in Recent French-language Analyses of World Politics

Realism's postulate of a state-centric world squarely confronts the respective market and class predicates of its paradigmatic contenders, pluralism and globalism. In its emphasis on the primacy of the political dimensions of state action, realism also opposes the mercantilist variants of pluralist analyses and microtheorizing, as well as the state-mediated economistic analyses of world patterns of dominance and dependency that have gained prominence within globalism as critical reworkings of orthodox Marxist constructs. These two propositions together, then, necessarily constitute the cornerstone of any analysis of source literatures designed to draw out transnational paradigmatic consistencies. I should perhaps stress here that this section of the paper simply seeks to demonstrate the vacuity of the antirealist argument from nationality by setting out the pervasive realist flavour of French-language analyses of international relations.⁸⁰ In any other context save the inter-paradigm debate this exercise would be, I realize, a mere commonplace.

Bearing in mind Bertrand de Jouvenel's theoretically fertile definition of political activity as that which is constructive, consolidative or conservative of human aggregates,⁸¹ it is clear that the effective focal point of politics overwhelmingly represented in recent French-language materials is located in the contest for the mechanisms of state sovereignty, in all three dimensions of de Jouvenel's categorization of the essence of the political. In its manifestations as a constructive phenomenon, the quite traditionalist emphasis within anticolonialist thought on national sovereignty, epitomized in the writings of Franz Fanon⁸² and Amilcar Cabral,⁸³ has been accredited by leading French analysts of development processes and revolutionary movements. For instance, in a series of analytic overviews and edited anthologies dealing with these questions Gérard Chaliand has repeatedly stressed the centrality of the goal of state sovereignty:

...above all, regardless of the social project, nationalism provides the deep ideological motivation for movements struggling against a foreign dominator;⁸⁴

modern nationalism will have a greater impact than any other ideology in making guerrillas less regional and local;⁸⁵

In political terms, independence has been first and foremost characterized by the construction of the State...The political balance-sheet of many independent countries reduces essentially to the construction of the State;⁸⁶

Regardless of the type of armed struggle that is examined, anticolonial as in Algeria, the first Indochina war, partisan warfare against a foreign invader as in Yugoslavia, guerrillas who do not fight for nominal independence such as the Huks in the Philippines or South-Vietnam, one can say that the common denominator is nationalism.⁸⁷

As reported in French-language political journals, this theme recurs regularly and is emphasized by indigenous anticolonialist leaderships still under the yoke of metropolitan France. For instance, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, leader of the Kanaks

of New Caledonia, has reiterated the crucial importance of acquiring the attributes of state sovereignty as a precondition for effective consolidative and conservative policies (to employ de Jovenel's terms again): "Sovereignty is the right to choose partners; independence is the power to manage the totality of the needs created by colonization through the existing system. Our unchanging objective is the restitution of the sovereignty of the Kanak people over their country--over themselves, over the land, over the substrata, over the air-space, over the sea, etc....You can't eat that, but as a principle it's important." Asked by his interviewer whether sovereignty was more important than independence, Tjibaou replied: "It is sovereignty that will entitle and empower us to negotiate interdependencies."⁸⁸

Just as peoples who are not enfranchised to participate effectively in world politics take as truth what pluralists and globalists deny or minimize, so do leaderships of the principal existing players in international political life. Evidence of this realist tenet is duly reported and commented on in French-language analyses. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, for example, has noted how Soviet acknowledgement that "the decisive factor in the destiny of peoples who tear themselves from colonialist vise-grips is precisely their sovereign existence, their capacity to alone choose the path to be followed" led Khrushchev to "separate domestic choices from the will to independence, the foundation of foreign policy" in extending support.⁸⁹ This political reasoning, Carrère d'Encausse observed, reflected the Soviet Union's own experience and set the framework for Khrushchev's approach to the non-aligned movement as well since "until a society has resolved definitely its sovereignty problems ... it cannot, without putting at risk its very existence, engage in games of social struggle".⁹⁰

If Carrère d'Encausse's observation captures the meaning of the core realist premises--the structuring effects of multiple sovereignties, the primacy of political logic, and the preeminence of survivalist ethics--so too do French interpretations of interstate conflict, which persists in cutting across the hypothetical group solidarities that are presupposed by schools of thought that would assign priority to ideological, economic, or sociological determinants in explaining world political rivalry and cooperation. Realist postulates have been reinforced, and those of contending paradigms called into question, in analyses of recent conflicts in which it is demonstrated that recourse to organized violence is predicated on perceptions of national interest and the principle of self-help. These precepts from the realist lexicon are revealed as the common denominators that infuse otherwise complex and heterogeneous equations with meaning whether the subject of investigation has been the Sino-Vietnamese and Kampuchean-Vietnamese dyads within the socialist world,⁹¹ the intra-Maghrebian contest between Morocco and Algeria,⁹² the protracted rending of the cohesive fabric of Islamic civilization in the Iraq-Iran war of attrition,⁹³ the adversarial relationship of Argentina and the United Kingdom,⁹⁴ or any other interstate conflict.⁹⁵ Moreover, the patterns of third-party support evidenced in these analyses of contemporary wars underwrite the proposition that state interest will let ethno-religious, ideological, or regionalist affinities take the hindmost when choices have to be made. The well-known Chilean logistic support for the U.K., and the U.S.S.R.'s military and economic assistance to Argentina's junta, are appropriately noted in terms of their political dimensions (that is, with specific reference to contexts of relational power).⁹⁶ Similarly, due note is taken of the Islamic world's quasi-passivity vis-à-vis the Afghani carnage, with the exception of arch-vulnerable Pakistan,⁹⁷

as well as the classic Sino-Soviet jockeying for regional equilibrium in South-East Asia.⁹⁸

Since further references to the state-centrism, power-arbitration, survivalist ethics and strategico-political balancing of international relations would make this section of the paper even more banal than required by the terms of the inter-paradigm debate, I will draw this survey to a conclusion by simply noting how jurists and economists in the French-speaking world have summarized the essential traits of the field. In his introduction to the course offered in the 1976-77 academic year by the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales de Paris dealing with Law of the Sea (LOS) issues, Guy de Lacharrière, a Judge on the ICJ, stressed the arduous yet demystifying analytical tasks that he was proposing his graduate students undertake that session. De Lacharrière was, in fact, advancing the bona fides of a metalegal approach to his subject-matter, that is to say a political understanding of international law as revealed in the ultimately equilibrated, reciprocated shocks generated by the collision of national interests in a world of finite power resources:

The principal argument in favour of a study of the law of the sea on the basis of national policies is necessarily predicated on the realism (emphasis in original) of this method: policies exist; law will be, or it will perhaps be... The very fact of the divergence of those policies, of the equilibrium existing in certain respects between them, or at least of the present incertitude as to the identity of the victors and scope of their victory, reveals this character of struggle between policies. International law may be a policy that has triumphed: we forget then its political origins, stressing instead its promotion to the status of law. However, when--as in the case of the law of the sea--the combat is in progress, the realist vision imposes itself for the moment: policies exist now, later we will speak of law.⁹⁹

After noting that this realist approach was but rarely attempted, in part because it was "very difficult," he observed that "more rare yet were those who authentically expressed national policies rather than the camouflage behind

which they were dissimulated"; nonetheless, "the very pervasiveness of political dynamics called for" such an approach.¹⁰⁰

As subsequent events demonstrated, the eminent jurist's epistemological instincts were proven to be sound indeed. In monitoring LOS negotiations, Gilles Chouraqui reported that the Conferences were characterized by an ongoing process in which "states evolved their positions from new perceptions of their interests"¹⁰¹ and Jacques Soppelsa noted that "strategic imperatives constantly dominated the debates."¹⁰² So much so that de Lacharrière could conclude his summary as rapporteur of the 1984 annual symposium of the French Association for International Law, which considered the results of the Third LOS Conference, in the following terms:

The great lesson of the Law of the Sea Conference remains that the will of states cannot be either forgotten or gotten around. International law is at present a negotiated law. There is every reason to accept that fact willingly and enthusiastically, excepting the cases of those who are partisans of restraints between states. Does sufficient time remain for improving this negotiation and rendering it compatible with the wishes expressed at the outset of the Conference? I am not sure that much time remains and express the hope that the negotiators, that is, the diplomats, begin to work promptly and act effectively. If they fail to show prompt effectiveness, differences will likely multiply -- and lead to the necessity of recourse to the two professions already mentioned: military seamen and judges.¹⁰³ In such an eventuality, might I suggest recourse to judges.

Echoing realism's emphasis on referential inclusiveness, its search after macro-images of world political relations, while stressing as have realist theoreticians the imperative of essentialist abstractions, a French economist has noted that: "It has become banal in the West to speak of the decline of states...Yet, never have they played a more important role in commercial exchanges, in world relations of every kind."¹⁰⁴ In developing his theoretical treatment of the international political economy along the lines of Keohane,

Nye, and Gilpin, Gilles Bertin indicated why mercantilist thought has proven so attractive to pluralist IR theorists: "The progressive degradation of the international system of payments, the renewal of nationalisms, the transformation in forms of exchange, and the increased tensions between actors in world economic life have sounded the end of a system in place since the Second World War. With it, it is perhaps also an explanatory scheme of international relationships constructed above all on a classical market vision that is being effaced at least in part."¹⁰⁵ While pluralists have been able to accommodate a number of realist precepts via issue structuralism or macrotheoretical eclecticism,¹⁰⁶ Marxist and Marxist-reactive globalist theorizing has remained singularly inept in its attempts to explain international political phenomena for, as Jean-Marie Domenach has pointed out: "for a century, reality has never ceased to belie Marxism. Marxism had blocked out politics, but politics carried it away; nationalism and the State have made it their instrument."¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

Structural realism is, as Keohane has recently noted, "at the center of contemporary international relations theory in the United States."¹⁰⁸ In setting out its affinities with theoretical development in scientific inquiry, this paper has sought to demonstrate why realist macrotheory has merited its status as the principal reference point for political scientists within IR, regardless of citizenship.¹⁰⁹ The root cause of pluralist and globalist theoretical paucity lies in their futile attempts to transpose their respective liberal economic and Marxist-inspired conceptualizations of international relations to a realm that in its essence is the political contrivance of multiple but territorially delimited

power-brokering sovereignties. Quite independently of any concern with the disciplinary angst that the inter-paradigm debate is supposed to have engendered within IR, Anthony Giddens has identified the gaping voids at the heart of the pluralist and globalist research programs. Reflecting on the problem of nation-states and violence, Giddens weighed the explanatory claims of economic liberalism and Marxism and declared them wanting: "In each case the state is seen primarily as a co-ordinating framework within which economic relations are carried on--in the one case expressing mechanisms of class domination, in the other as injecting morality and justice into the economic order. In order to associate the state with violence and territoriality, we have to turn to other sources."¹¹⁰ This, of course, is precisely the point at issue.

While I do not deny the usefulness of other perspectives for creative cross-referencing in meso- and microtheorizing, and for speculative historicist or futures studies (provided the structuring effects of system-wide political relations are kept in view), I have attempted here to show that in terms of international macrotheory the realist scientific research program has, at this point in the field's development, no credible competitors. For political scientists, the inter-paradigm debate is, at best, premature; at worst, particularly in its crusading antirealist manifestations, it reveals a tendency to a scholasticism that threatens to trivialize the field by turning its focus of inquiry inwards upon itself.

Notes

¹For instances of this genre, see Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," International Studies Quarterly (1981); 204-36; and R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," International Studies Quarterly (1987): 65-86.

²Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," in International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, ed. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1985), pp. 7-26; Ray Maghroori and Bennett Rambert, eds., Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); and, Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: Macmillan, 1987).

³Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," p. 11; Steve Smith, "The Location of International Relations as a Social Science," Paper presented at the Workshop on Paradigm Hegemony and International Relations in Canada, Carleton University, 9-11 October 1986, p. 7; Bahgat Korany, "Une, Deux, ou Quatre...Les Ecoles de Relations internationales," Etudes internationales, 15 (décembre 1984): 702; and John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 1-33.

⁴Kuhn is quite clear on this point: "In any case, there are many fields--I shall call them proto-sciences--in which practice does generate testable conclusions but which nonetheless resemble philosophy and the arts rather than the established sciences in their developmental patterns. I think, for example,...of many of the social sciences today....I conclude, in short, that the proto-sciences, like the arts and philosophy, lack some element which, in the mature sciences, permits the more obvious forms of progress. It is not, however, anything that a methodological prescription can provide....I claim no therapy to assist the transformation of a proto-science to a science, nor do I suppose that anything of the sort is to be had....Each of the currently established sciences has emerged from a previously more speculative branch of natural philosophy, medicine, or the crafts at some relatively well-defined period in the past. Other fields will surely experience the same transition in the future. Only after it occurs does progress become an obvious characteristic of a field. And only then do those prescriptions of mine which my critics decry come into play." Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 244-45.

⁵David Oldroyd, The Arch of Knowledge: An Introductory Study of the History of the Philosophy and Methodology of Science (New York: Methuen, 1986), pp. 320-27; and Frederick Suppe, "Afterword - 1977," in The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2d ed., ed. Frederick Suppe (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 615-730. Suppe summarizes my point as follows: "Underlying most contemporary work on the growth of scientific knowledge, as well as work on the nature of theories, explanation, intertheoretic reduction, and so on, is the basic assumption that science can and does yield knowledge descriptive of how the world really is, and that observational interaction between man and that world plays an important role in obtaining such knowledge. Thus a strong

commitment to both a metaphysical realism and an epistemological realism is characteristic of the new philosophy of science today, and such commitment virtually precludes 'sociological' views of knowledge such as are embraced by Kuhn and Feyerabend."

⁶K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 103.

⁷Rather than cite any number of English-speaking political scientists who have emphasized field specificity I will, in keeping with the thesis of this paper, refer readers to a Frenchman and an economist: Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1968), p. 28; and, Kenneth E. Boulding, The Impact of the Social Sciences (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. 53-77. In one of his last articles, Aron returned to this critical issue; see his essay, "La société internationale" in Raymond Aron, Les dernières années du siècle (Paris: Julliard, 1984), pp. 17-32.

⁸Stanley H. Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 421.

⁹⁹Holsti, Dividing Discipline, p. 9.

¹⁰The institutionalized search after novelty that characterizes the academic study of politics could be summarized epigrammatically as "definitions of politics expand to fill the available research and teaching positions." Some of the implications of this phenomenon as they relate to political theory are discussed in John S. Nelson, "Natures and Futures for Political Theory," in What Should Political Theory Be Now? ed. John S. Nelson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 3-15. This topsy-like growth in referencing terms is, as Morton Kaplan has noted, part of a larger "dons' game" within academia. Morton A. Kaplan, Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macro-system Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 176.

¹¹William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought & Modern Political Analysis, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 10.

¹²W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955/56): 167-98.

¹³Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969" in The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969, ed. Brian Porter (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 42.

¹⁴First, none of the three theses used to defend the "essentially contested concept" view perform that justificatory role. See Christine Swanton, "On the 'Essential Contestedness' of Political Concepts," Ethics 95 (July 1985): 811-27. Second, the power phenomenon expresses either "conformity to other-inspired choices" to use Dahl's phraseology (See Robert A. Dahl, "Power," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 12 (1968): 201-15. A can thus be said to have power over B where B's action in a context of conflicting wills reflects

A's will over what B would have chosen in the absence of A's will) or it can express a measure of relational capability which may or may not be mobilized by A to produce compliance on B's or any N-party's part, but which still works changes in the behaviour of B or N. In the most thorough review of the literature on the power concept currently available, Lane and Stenlund confirm that power may be either relational or the expression of capability. International political theory is concerned with the latter (power as means) in formulating a coherent set of explanans-propositions. It appeals to the former (power as outcome) for inferences in arriving at its proposition set and, as its explicandum, for testing, verification or confirmation (not proving beyond doubt). For a state-of-the-art analysis of the power concept, see Jan-Erik Lane and Hans Stenlund, "Power," in Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), pp. 317-402.

¹⁵Peter Achinstein, Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 129.

¹⁶Maurice N. Richter, Jr., The Autonomy of Science: A Historical and Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing, 1980), p. 19: "science involves an empirical emphasis on close observation and accurate description of nature, but also a quite different rational emphasis on conceptualizations which go far beyond the range of observed facts."

¹⁷Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: World Publishing, 1958), p. 13.

¹⁸Or, as Aron summarized the "specific trait" of international political relations, "the legitimacy and legality of recourse to armed force" on the part of the system's units. This is a given for international lawyers, as it was for the great precursors, including Grotius, Kant and Rousseau, but bears repeating amid the relativist cacophony of IR today. See Raymond Aron, "Qu'est-ce qu'une théorie des relations internationales?", in his Etudes politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp. 357-81.

¹⁹These are precisely the criteria that Morton Kaplan arrived at in determining how political scientists should approach IR: Morton A. Kaplan, "Is International Relations a Discipline?", Journal of Politics 23 (August 1961): 462-76, reprinted in Arend Lijphart, ed., World Politics: The Writings of Theorists and Practitioners, Classical and Modern (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), pp. 4-18, at p. 7. Kaplan was also explicit that international relations could not be reduced to a discipline other than political science (at p. 8). That position is implicit in this paper.

²⁰One could add critical "theorists" and historical materialists to update Carr's admonition.

²¹E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 63.

²²Robert W. Tucker, "Political Realism and Foreign Policy," World Politics 13 (April 1961): 461.

²³This is doubtless the most instructive approach to the explicit prescriptivist content of the Niebuhr-Morgenthau-Thompson school of realist normative thought. The nature of this moral philosophy is set out in Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966).

²⁴Jarrett Leplin has offered the following synthesis of realism in the philosophy of science (note his introductory caveat): "The following theses are characteristic realist claims no majority of which, even subjected to reasonable qualification, is likely to be endorsed by any avowed realist:

1. The best current scientific theories are at least approximately true.
2. The central terms of the best current theories are genuinely referential.
3. The approximate truth of a scientific theory is sufficient explanation of its predictive success.
4. The (approximate) truth of a scientific theory is the only possible explanation of its predictive success.
5. A scientific theory may be approximately true even if referentially unsuccessful.
6. The history of at least the mature sciences shows progressive approximation to a true account of the physical world.
7. The theoretical claims of scientific theories are to be read literally, and so read are definitively true or false.
8. Scientific theories make genuine, existential claims.
9. The predictive success of a theory is evidence for the referential success of its central terms.
10. Science aims at a literally true account of the physical world, and its success is to be reckoned by its progress toward achieving this aim.

What realists do share in common are the convictions that scientific change is, on balance, progressive and that science makes possible knowledge of the world beyond its accessible, empirical manifestations." Jarrett Leplin, "Introduction" in Scientific Realism, ed. Jarrett Leplin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 1-2. Leplin's summary description would apply to realists in IR who have constructed macrotheories. However, quantitative inductivism as practised by IR behavioralists is an antirealist approach to theory-building (in philosophy-of-science terms). That is why Morgenthau was so adamantly opposed to behavioralism; as he wrote repeatedly, "examination of the facts is not enough." Waltz is more agnostic with respect to rigorously positivistic empiricism, allowing for the possibility of confirmatory testing on the basis of strict observables, yet clearly a Kantian in his acceptance of unobservables within his set of theoretical constructs and in his allowance for non-predicted observables that flow from human voluntarism in practice. Both of the leading exemplar texts of modern realist thought, then, are expressions of "scientific realism" whether in terms of IR or philosophy-of-science classification. This point contradicts paradigm proliferationists who hold that realism should be abandoned because it is "independent of human subjectivity" in its positivism. See Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 281 (with regard to Waltz); and, Michael B. Dolan, "The Role of Graduate Education in Overthrowing Paradigms, or 'Doubt All Things!'," Draft Copy of a Paper presented at a Workshop on Paradigm Hegemony and International Relations in Canada, Carleton University, 9-11 October 1986, p. 14 (with regard to postwar realism). For a full discussion of the scientific-realist/positivist issue

that effectively dispenses with the proliferationist critique, see Paul M. Churchland and Clifford A. Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

²⁵Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

²⁶Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

²⁷A representative sampling of contributions to this exchange are included in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).

²⁸Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196.

²⁹Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 125.

³⁰R. N. Berki, "On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations," World Politics 24 (October 1971): 105.

³¹Radoslav Stojanovic, "National Interests, Socialism and Internationalism," 13.429 (Paris: IPSA World Congress, 15-20 July 1985).

³²Vendulka Kubáľková and Albert A. Cruikshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 1.

³³One of the tenets of Enlightenment thought, which has been carried forward in the social sciences of our era, was that "there are social laws just as there are physical laws, and that therefore the structure, procedure, and aims of the social sciences must resemble that of the physical sciences." See Robert Brown, The Nature of Social Laws: Machiavelli to Mill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 5. This claim, according to Brown, extends only to the search for laws of co-existing social variables: "The reason why these offer us more hope of success is simply that the social factors in question, being contemporaneous, have been less exposed over time to the differing influences of both social and environmental variables.... Our conclusion, then, must be that ... there can be, as a matter of fact, no laws of historical sequence or development, no strict and pure laws of social, political, or economic history." Ibid., p. 262. The point to be kept in mind here is the incommensurably greater relevance of the conditional provisos that must be included in theories about patterns of historical development in comparison with those required in explanatory proposition-sets about contemporaneous social phenomena. If the distinction between what Armstrong, among others, calls "iron" and "oaken" laws is kept firmly in view, iron laws being those that issue in exceptionless uniformities in controlled environments and oaken laws being those that remain context-conditioned even when verification is optimally controlled, it is clear that all currently advanced social scientific laws are oaken. See D. M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1983), pp. 147-50. It is one of the distinguishing features of realist theorizing to attach primary, but not exclusive, contextual importance to configurations of relative distributions of state power when setting conditioning provisos for the operationalization of verification procedures. Vasquez, in The Power of Power Politics: A Critique, misconstrues this point when he "tests" what he defines as realist hypotheses. For this reason among others his purported tests are off target. Kal Holsti has recognized the difficulties with Vasquez's conclusions as they are reflected in Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), but argues his case on the basis of countervailing evidence, not in terms of flaws in research design. See K. J. Holsti, "The Necrologists of International Relations," Canadian Journal of Political Science 28 (December 1985): 675-95. For an expert evaluation of what Michael Banks has called Vasquez's "devastating critique of realism," see William B. Moul, "Colouring by Numbers: Comments on a Quantitative Study of Quantitative Studies of International Politics," Review of International Studies 8 (1982): 129-33. Albert O. Hirschman discussed some of the limitations of paradigmatic thinking as a basis for positing laws of historical development or large-scale historical change in "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics 22 (April 1970): 329-43.

³⁴For example, see Holsti, Dividing Discipline, p. 7. It should be pointed out that Globalism Versus Realism (edited by Maghroori and Ramberg) employs the term globalism perversely to refer to pluralism.

³⁵See, for example, Richard Little, "Structuralism and Neo-Realism," in Light and Groom, International Relations, p. 83.

³⁶For example, see James N. Rosenau, "Order and Disorder in the Study of World Politics: Ten Essays in Search of Perspective," in Maghroori and Ramberg, Globalism Versus Realism, p. 3. In this masterfully concise introductory article to the volume, Rosenau corrects the editors' dichotomized understanding of the field literature while pointing out that the global-centric approach--what is referred to as globalism in this paper--"is peripheral to the main work in the field but ... does attract some adherents by virtue of its stress on economic variables."

³⁷For example, see Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p. 227.

³⁸For example, see Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," p. 17.

³⁹A succinct analysis and relevant working bibliography of globalist thinking is to be found in Chris Brown, "Development and Dependency," in Light and Groom, International Relations, pp. 60-73.

⁴⁰John Sigler, "The Concept of Neutrality in International Relations Theory," Paper presented at the Conference on Canada and Military Neutrality, Collège militaire royal, St-Jean, Québec, 10-12 April 1987, p. 27.

⁴¹Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," p. 17.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³ Aristide R. Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link," *World Politics* 33 (January 1981): 253-81. In this review article, Zolberg dispatches Wallerstein's *The Modern World System* to an apolitical netherworld: the world systemist's characterization was "not merely incomplete, but demonstrably wrong ... the explanation befits an outcome other than the one that in fact occurred ... these errors and distortions are specifically attributable to Wallerstein's systematic neglect of political structures and processes ... he exhibits a reductionist tendency, viewing political processes as epiphenomenal in relation to economic causation; a functionalist tendency, viewing particular political configurations as arising when needed by the system, ... or merely a tendency to consider political variables as givens--a pell-mell heap akin to residual error in the regression equations of conventional social science ... he is inexcusably negligent ... the neglect is flagrant at the level of general conceptualization, where careful scrutiny reveals a glaring theoretical void with respect to political life" (emphasis added).

⁴⁴ Rosenau, "Order and Disorder in the Study of World Politics," p. 3.

⁴⁵ See Michael Banks, ed., *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations* (London: Harvester Press, 1984). This account of the world-society paradigm is appropriately dedicated to Burton.

⁴⁶ Arend Lijphart, "Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations," in *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch*, ed. Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 233. In an acknowledged modern classic of group-identity analysis, Isaacs offered counterpoint to pluralist rhetoric with this decidedly jaundiced view of its assumptions as a basis for explanatory frameworks: "Karl Deutsch, notably, has tried to sort out the graspable, countable, measurable 'building blocks' of technology and communications that go into the making of a 'nation'. To this beacon, many of the tired and weary of academia have flocked in these years, only belatedly to find nestling among Deutsch's tidy formulas, diagrams, and tables, the same old ambiguities, elusive, subjective, uncontrollable as ever. They pollute the scientifically antiseptic precincts from which some thought they had finally been banished, or where, at least, it was thought they could simply be ignored.... The facts, past and present, seem to suggest that the formula whereby a 'tribe' or a 'people' does or does not become or remain a 'nation' depends mainly on the conditions of power or the lack of it, and the given political circumstances of the time" (emphasis added). Harold A. Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 174-75. Lévi-Strauss, arguably the world's premiere anthropologist, has also undermined the edifice of pluralism's functionalist heuristics as a reliable guide for seizing the essential dimensions of international politics. See, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss, "La politique étrangère d'une société primitive," *Politique étrangère*, Numéro spécial, Hors série, 1986, p. 94: "There are also some observations to be made regarding the category of 'foreigner'. The primitive mind possesses - and this is not moreover perhaps so exceptional - a common trait whereby a limit is always assigned to a human group. That limit may be quite extensive geographically (lointaine); it may also be very restricted. But the limits of the human group ... always reach a point at which people cease to participate in the essential

attributes of humanity." In contemporary terms, and again with an attention to the "is" rather than the "ought" or the "potentiality" of international political relations, Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe, pp. 171-204, provides a good survey supported by extensive bibliographical references, of the reasons why the state has remained, as Rupert Emerson once put it, "the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty" (emphasis added).

⁴⁷ Sigler, "The Concept of Neutrality in International Relations Theory," p. 23.
⁴⁸ Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 178-79.

⁴⁹ See, especially, Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and, Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

⁵⁰ I have employed Sigler's useful "What is real?-How can we know?-What should we do?" simplified formulations for the crucial ontological-epistemological-normative distinctions. See Sigler, "The Concept of Neutrality in International Relations Theory."

⁵¹ Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," p. 20.

⁵² Roderick Ogley, "Review of Banks, Conflict in World Society," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 14 (Spring 1985): 96-97.

⁵³ Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique (New York: Nichols Publishing, 1980). There is absolutely nothing in the data contained in this volume that affronts realism's paradigmatic assumptions. In the interpretation of the data, however, there are intimations of a structural determinism devoid of the restraining influence of human reason. The following extract, p. 340, provides one example of many in that vein: "this study suggests that some patterns and relationship at work in the system are pernicious; that the modern security problematique joins violence, exploitation, and inequality as interdependent parts of what it is; and that the dominant pattern of change is toward more intense violence, more exploitation, and deepening inequality on a widening but ultimately finite geographic compass."

⁵⁴ D. C. Phillips, Holistic Thought in Social Science (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 10.

⁵⁵ For example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). To operationalize the pluralist concept of complex interdependence (defining characteristics: absence of force; lack of hierarchy among issues; and, the presence of multiple channels of contact between societies), Keohane and Nye reported that they "deliberately chose a case--Canadian-American relations--that seemed most likely to fit the three ideal conditions of complex interdependence" while acknowledging that they did "not consider Canadian-American relations a typical case from which to generalize about world politics." (p. 165.) Unfortunately, despite this rather disarming admission, even in a seemingly atypical dyadic context, issues that go to the heart of

international political ordering principles, such as resource claims in the Beaufort Sea or conditions of transit through the Northwest Passage, are addressed via state channels, hierarchized in relation to other issues, and conditioned by indices of relative capabilities. Taking a cue from Gertrude Stein one could reasonably affirm that, like roses, all interstate dyads are essentially isomorphic, thorns and all. Aficionados of irreverent principles associated with researchmanship will recognize the functionalist-inspired core of pluralist ontology and epistemology as manifestations of, respectively: Hoare's Law of Large Problems--"Inside every large problem is a small problem struggling to get out"; and, Peter's Law of Substitution--"Look after the molehills and the mountains will look after themselves." Arthur Bloch, Murphy's Law and Other Reasons Why Things Go Wrong! (Los Angeles: Price/Stern/Sloan Publishers, 1982), pp. 50-54.

⁵⁶ Witness its current manifestation in regime theory and analysis. See, for example, International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Although a number of scholars associated with the realist tradition have become engaged in research on regimes, they have turned the key concept into a terminological catch-all making it in the process what Strange has designated "one more woolly concept that is a fertile source of discussion simply because people mean different things when they use it." Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," in *ibid.*, pp. 342-43.

⁵⁷ Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," ACIS Working Paper No. 22, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, March 1980. See also *Idem*, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 197. It should be pointed out that Keohane in fact predicates his two basic propositions not on realist thought at all but on two assertions, one by Gilpin and the other by Charles Kindleberger, from the pluralist literature. Indeed, the entire notion of hegemonic stability is not merely foreign but antithetical to postwar realism.

⁵⁸ Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington: American Political Science Association, 1983), p. 504.

⁵⁹ Holsti, "The Necrologists of International Relations."

⁶⁰ Banks employs the term "structuralism" for this pole of the inter-paradigm debate, rather than another more appropriate designation in the context, because he does not grant Waltz the status of a structuralist. However, some realist theorizing, including Waltz's Theory of International Politics, is clearly structuralist. See my analysis of this question in "L'explication interthéorique en relations internationales: Quelques jalons pour une synthèse du réalisme structurel américain et de la géopolitique française contemporaine," Etudes internationales 18 (forthcoming in June 1987).

⁶¹Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," p. 11.

⁶²For a thorough account of how patterns of political relations constrain the fate of MNCs, see Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

⁶³To instance the case of the UN Decade for Women Conference held in Copenhagen in July 1980, delegate consensus was undermined by the subordination of women's concerns to the foreign-policy objectives of particular states. In a report on those sessions, Georgina Ashworth provided instructive reflections on the relative margins of NGO maneuver when transnationalist goals are incompatible with state-accredited definitions of issues: "The intervention of the UN into the domestic realm has probably come to the bemusement of those governments that hold to or reinforce this conventional dichotomy ..[that the saviour of human rights may beat his wife with impunity].., and prefer the familiarity of external, state-to-state relations [even inimical ones] to the complexities of international social development. ... While the majority of delegates were female, their relationships to each other were predetermined by their own government's position on 'imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, racism, racial discrimination, apartheid, hegemonism, unjust economic relation'..." Georgina Ashworth, "The United Nations 'Women's Conference' and International Linkages in the Women's Movements," in Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, ed. Peter Willetts (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), p. 133.

⁶⁴Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, p. 227.

⁶⁵Further to the criticism in fn 33 above, Vasquez's entire argument for discarding realism is predicated on measures of the failure to falsify hypotheses. In The Power of Power Politics, p. 12, he writes: "Since a paradigm is used to produce theories, it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of a paradigm in terms of the corroborated hypotheses it produces. This is the basic criterion that will be used here to evaluate paradigms." This is an untenable premise: paradigms cannot be equated with theories; hypotheses derivative from explanatory theories are theory-specific. On this point, see Mario Bunge, Causality and Modern Science (New York: Dover Publications, 1979); and On Scientific Thinking, ed. Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty, and Clifford R. Mynatt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). Indeed, even if Vasquez's research design were well-conceived to the extent that he restricted the hypotheses to be corroborated to those that respected Morgenthau's (for it is only to the core premises of Politics Among Nations that he refers) context-specific conditions, his conclusions would still be problematic and of but marginal persuasiveness, for as Bunge has noted "...the identity in logical structure between prediction and explanation does not entail an identity in nature or kind; prediction is epistemologically not the same as description and explanation because, as everyone knows, prediction is usually affected by a peculiar uncertainty of its own..." and further..."To assert that prediction is the most important task of science--as positivists and pragmatists have held--shows a strange lack of acquaintance with the life of science." (Pp. 307, 311.)

⁶⁶ Other current strands of idealist thought in IR include the antirealist argument from values. (I refer to idealist and realist conceptions of scientific inquiry here: Idealism sees the external world as a creation of the mind; realism holds that externals exist independently of being thought. The terms, however, also meaningfully categorize approaches to the field.) See, for example, Richard W. Mansbach and Yale H. Ferguson, "Values and Paradigm Change: The Elusive Quest for International Relations Theory," Paper prepared for the 26th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, March 1985; and, Sigler, "The Concept of Neutrality in International Relations Theory," esp. pp. 1-4, and 13. Space limitations do not permit me to address the broader implications for the field that flow from arguing that all IR theorizing is value-laden. I will simply register here that it fundamentally misconceives the impact that prevailing climates of opinion have on scientific thinking and that its denial of scientific status to social inquiry is predicated on an erroneous appreciation of the contours of theoretical progress in the physical and biological sciences. For a helpful, brief overview of this question, see Edwin G. Boring, "The Dual Role of the Zeitgeist in Scientific Creativity," in The Validation of Scientific Theories, ed. Philipp G. Frank (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 187-98.

⁶⁷ Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 204-54.

⁶⁸ Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in *ibid.*, pp. 255-300.

⁶⁹ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," p. 240.

⁷⁰ For a good overview and analysis of postmodernism in social thought, see Arthur Kroker and David Cook, The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics (Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1986). Kroker, the founding editor of the Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, and Cook have written a masterful treatise that portrays postmodernist political analysis as being the junk food, Wrestlemania, and rock video of IR theory. For a salutary antidote to postmodernist thought, see Hans Blumenburg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).

⁷¹ Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," p. 258.

⁷² Alternatively known as the "Pirandello effect" in allusion to the theatrical device pioneered by Luigi Pirandello in which the actors, producers, and playwright associated with a stage-play engage the audience in a discussion of the subsequent plot-line. The contrivance of theatre-goer ("reader" in our context) disorientation is the objective of this maneuver. Ernest Gellner nicely summarizes the purposes of the tactical feint: "His plays ... are of course meant to induce bewilderment in the audience by undermining the comfortable separation of stage and auditorium, by compelling involvement by the spectator. The play, he seems to say, is not a spectacle but a predicament. So in observation of social reality--and this, it is claimed, distinguishes it from nature." Ernest Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 123.

⁷³Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," p. 259.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 256.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 256-57.

⁷⁶Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," p. 204. See also Steve Smith, "The Location of International Relations as a Social Science," p. 26.

⁷⁷Parasitical in the sense of living off competing paradigms: Marxist structuralism from globalism; and, economic thinking from pluralism. See Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," pp. 255-57.

⁷⁸Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," pp. 133-35.

⁷⁹Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1973 ed., pp. 5-11 passim; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 57-59 passim.

⁸⁰Even proliferationists acknowledge the preeminence of realist thought in France. See Marcel Merle, "Sur la 'problématique' de l'étude des relations internationales en France," Revue française de science politique 33 (juin 1983): 403-27.

⁸¹Bertrand de Jouvenel, "L'Essence de la Politique," Revue française de science politique 2 (octobre-décembre 1952): 646. This conceptualization is consistent with the manner in which realist theoreticians have formulated the structuring concept of power as indicated in fn 14 above.

⁸²See Gérard Mairet, Les doctrines du pouvoir, La formation de la pensée politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), pp. 262-68.

⁸³Amílcar Cabral, Unité et lutte, I: L'arme de la théorie (Paris: Maspero, 1975).

⁸⁴Gérard Chaliand, Terrorismes et guérillas, Techniques actuelles de la violence (Paris: Flammarion, 1985), p. 70.

⁸⁵Idem, Stratégies de la guérilla, Guerres révolutionnaires et contra-insurrections, Anthologie historique de la longue marche à nos jours (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), p. 28 (emphasis in original).

⁸⁶Idem, Les faubourgs de l'histoire, Tiers-mondismes et tiers-mondes (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1984), pp. 46-47 (emphasis in original).

⁸⁷Idem, Mythes révolutionnaires du tiers monde, Guérillas et socialismes (Paris: Seuil, 1979), p. 263 (emphasis in original).

⁸⁸T.M., "Entretien avec Jean-Marie Tjibaou," Les Temps Modernes, 41e année, no 464 (mars 1985), p. 1593.

⁸⁹ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Ni Paix Ni Guerre, Le nouvel Empire soviétique ou du bon usage de la détente (Paris: Flammarion, 1986), p. 19 (emphasis in original).

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

⁹¹ An English-language article dealing with these questions from the quite distinctive perspective of one of France's leading internationalists is Yves Lacoste, "Geography and Foreign Policy," SAIS Review 4 (Summer/Fall 1984): 213-27. Lacoste always stresses complexity in his analyses, but emphasizes that: "Like the international relations specialist, the geographer must first be interested in the most powerful form of organizing and mobilizing men, namely the state. As a territory having distinct borders within which a government -- a power structure -- controls and contains a population, the state is the geographic and political entity par excellence." (P. 224.)

⁹² Francois Gèze, Alfredo Valladao, and Yves Lacoste, eds., L'Etat du Monde, 1983, Annuaire économique et géopolitique mondial (Paris: Editions La Découverte/Maspero, 1983), pp. 272-79.

⁹³ Bernard Hourcade, "Iran: révolution islamique ou tiers-mondiste?", Hérodote, revue de géographie et de géopolitique, no 36 (janvier-mars 1985), pp. 138-58. "The evolution of Iran during five years of Islamic regime seems effectively to promote the renewed disassociation of Islam and politics when the specificity of Khomeinist philosophy was precisely the contrary..." (P. 139.)

⁹⁴ Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Géostratégie de l'Atlantique sud (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).

⁹⁵ For example, the structuring effects of bipolarity on conflict in Africa are clearly drawn in Gérard Chaliand, L'Enjeu africain, Géostratégies des puissances (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1984).

⁹⁶ Yves Lacoste, "La mer, quatre grands changements géopolitiques," Hérodote, revue de géographie et de géopolitique, no 32 (janvier-mars 1984), pp. 3-41.

⁹⁷ Bernard Expédit, "Les soviétiques en Afghanistan," in Chaliand, Stratégies de la guérilla, pp. 322-40.

⁹⁸ Georges Condomines, "Propos sur la complexité des problèmes de l'Asie du Sud-Est," Hérodote, no 21 (avril-juin 1981), pp. 14-30.

⁹⁹ Guy de Lacharrière, "Politiques nationales à l'égard du droit de la mer," in Cours et travaux, Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales de Paris: Droit de la Mer, ed. Charles Rousseau and Prosper Weil (Paris: Pedone, 1977), pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁰¹ Gilles Chouraqui, La mer confisquée, Un nouvel order océanique favorable aux riches? (Paris: Seuil, 1979), p. 132.

¹⁰²Jacques Soppelsa, Géographie des armements (Paris: Masson, 1980), p. 267. See also René Rodière and Martine Rémond-Gouilloud, La Mer, Droits des hommes ou Proie des Etats? (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1980).

¹⁰³Société Française pour le Droit International, Perspectives du Droit de la Mer à l'issue de la 3e Conférence des Nations Unies (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1984), p. 337.

¹⁰⁴Gilles Bertin, Les objectifs extérieurs des Etats (Paris: Economica, 1981), p. 6.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁶Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

¹⁰⁷Jean-Marie Domenach, Enquête sur les idées contemporaines (Paris: Seuil, 1981), p. 25.

¹⁰⁸Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," p. 511.

¹⁰⁹Nor need practitioners display Pavlovian responses to American interests in the world to operationalize realist premises. See, for example, Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1985); and, Jean-Paul Charnay et al., Le bonheur par l'empire ou le rêve d'Alexandre (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1982).

¹¹⁰Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modern Sociology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 168. See also *idem*, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985).