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THE POWER OF MORAL SANCTION: TOWARD A MODEST PLACE FOR RELIGION IN THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY

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Introduction: Should Religion Matter in Foreign-Policy Making?

Since the early 1980s, for reasons not unrelated to the initial bellicosity of the Reagan presidency, ecclesiastical bodies on either side of the Atlantic have issued numerous statements on the morality of nuclear deterrence.[1] These statements--generally critical, if not unequivocally condemnatory--have generated a corresponding flurry of articles in journals devoted to international politics, security and foreign policy.[2] Much of this analysis has been directed at the U.S. Catholic bishops' 1983 pastoral letter,[3] whose interim, "strictly conditioned" moral acceptance of deterrence has served as a benchmark for other American denominational statements, and encouraged national Catholic hierarchies in Western Europe to speak to the question. That this analysis, in turn, has tended to challenge the bishops' letter on both moral and prudential grounds is perhaps less noteworthy than that it has been rendered at all. Even this relatively modest smattering of published attention represents a marked departure from what can fairly be described as the virtual neglect of religion as a factor in foreign policy and international relations, with the possible exception of the Middle East and Islam.[4] And yet it is not clear from the same analyses what has changed to make the positions of religious leaders and groups worthy of attention.

The answer does not lie merely in the undeniably more assertive, autonomous and often critical stance which such groups have adopted on

questions of war and peace. Nor is it sufficient justification to cite the resulting apprehensions of western governments, notably the Reagan administration, which before taking office had identified the churches as a possible source of opposition, and which, over the two-year draft process culminating in the Catholic bishops' letter, appealed directly to the hierarchy, lay Catholics and the Vatican, seeking to modify its message.[5] References to increased religious activism or to the evident apprehensions of governments serve not so much to justify as simply to recast the central questions before us. Why is it that governments--in what is widely regarded as a secular age, no less--should be concerned by ecclesiastical positions and actions? How ought students of foreign policy and politics generally to think about this concern, real or imagined, when the literature we have offers little conceptual guidance? If religious influence can help to undermine public support, for example, for nuclear deterrence policy, as has been suggested,[6] is it also capable of undergirding foreign policy, even if the scholars who have raised the former prospect have been less interested in the latter possibility? What is the nature and extent of this influence? Whence does it derive its force? And, in what sense should it be distinguished from other influences on foreign policy?

The following paper constitutes an exploratory response to these questions. Though its aim is to point in the direction of broad themes within which the relation of religion to foreign policy can be further examined, its immediate focus is the United States and, in particular, the recent influence of the Catholic hierarchy in that country. This narrower focus is based on at least two assumptions. First, the nature and extent of religious influence is determined partly by the distinct historical political cultures of national societies, as well as by the theological, institutional and social character of religious groups in

those national settings. Thus any observations I make below relating specifically to the U.S. and to the evolving position of the Catholic bishops to foreign policy need not apply in other contexts, or even to other American religious bodies; at the least, the transportability of my analysis, in all of its particularities, should not be presumed in advance of more extensive examination of those other contexts. Second, there is sufficient cultural commonality, nevertheless, if only among western liberal democratic societies, that the research themes and questions raised in this paper appear relevant beyond its immediate focus.

The paper, then, will proceed in the following fashion. First, it will attempt a critical survey of the literature's meagre treatment of religion and U.S. foreign policy, and will suggest several possible reasons for what is deemed neglect or inadequacy. Second, it will relate this inadequacy to that of the broader range of political and social theory, which in its major traditions can provide little help in answering the questions set out in this paper, insofar as that theorizing can be reduced essentially to one of two themes: that, whatever institutional force religion commanded in feudal society, increasing secularization has rendered it, at best, a private and thus a politically irrelevant matter; or, that religion functions still, in some measure, either to contribute to social cohesion or, conversely, to manufacture consent for a dominant class, produce social quiescence and otherwise obscure conditions of exploitation. While one can readily identify historical examples where religion has played such a functional role, and I will touch briefly on some of these in my analysis, it is less clear how these approaches would account for institutional religion's continued political relevance and, as in the case of the U.S. Catholic bishops, its increasing willingness to issue statements and take

actions which appear effectively and genuinely oppositional. At the same time, this overview can equip us with certain insights and concepts--including that of social legitimacy--valuable to any subsequent exploration of the relation of religion to foreign policy.

Third, proceeding primarily on the terrain of moral legitimacy, as it will be defined, the paper will sketch out a tentative framework within which the questions set out above might be considered. Essentially, the proposition to be argued here can be outlined as follows. All nation-states embody moral claims attesting to their "rightness," which are nowhere more evident than in relation to their security and in war time, when citizens or subjects are asked to kill and to risk their own lives for the sake of their respective nation-states. In the American context, moreover, such claims traditionally have been both more overt and more overtly religious than would seem the case in other western liberal societies. Generally, however, the need to justify the resort to military force has become increasingly significant in the latter half of the 20th century. In this respect, for reasons I shall enumerate below, institutional religion may yet possess some power of moral sanction--although its extent should not be overstated--which can either assist or, should sanction be denied, constrain the execution of foreign policy. Insofar as this is the case, ecclesiastical statements and actions would appear to merit greater interest.

Foreign-Policy Analysis and Religion: Contending Approaches

The assertion that religion does not occupy a significant place in book-length treatments of contemporary American foreign policy can be verified simply by surveying the indices of any sampling of works. Many make no mention of religion or related subjects.[7] Others contain only short and typically

unsatisfactory references essentially of two types: broad descriptive generalizations, and citations of polling data comparing public attitudes on foreign policy issues across lines of religious affiliation.

Typical of the first type is the sweeping and, though perhaps accurate, largely unsupported observation made three decades ago by Gabriel Almond:[8]

> The great majority of church organizations in the United States adhere to the foreign policy consensus. Thus the organizations representative of Protestant and Catholic opinion in the field of foreign policy--the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Catholic Association for International Peace--have consistently supported most of the foreign policy steps taken since the end of the war. However, the policies of both of these organizations are influenced by Christian pacifist attitudes which sometimes lead them to minimize military security considerations.

Almond, however, does not explain why it is important that the church organizations cited had adhered to this consensus or, conversely, may be unduly influenced by pacifist sentiment. Presumably they have some impact on foreign policy, if only indirectly in influencing the views of congregants.

Somewhat similarly, Ralph Levering's more recent examination of the American public and foreign policy notes, for example, that pacifism was strong in the 1930s among religious leaders who had become disillusioned with the results of World War I; that Protestant organizations such as the Federal Council of Churches played a "major role" in enhancing domestic support for the United Nations; and, that fundamentalist Christian leaders were strongly anti-communist through the 1950s.[9] If his descriptive sweep is somewhat broader than that of Almond, Levering nonetheless is no clearer as to why it should matter that religious leaders and organizations have taken such positions.

The same conceptual inadequacy can be found also in those more critical accounts of U.S. foreign policy which discuss religion. Richard Barnet, writing during the Vietnam War and attempting to locate the "roots of war" in what

amounts to a pervasive military-industrial complex extending into the universities and other social institutions, identifies the churches as having played some indirect role in shaping voter attitudes in support of the staunchly anti-Soviet foreign policy of the post-war period.[10] Barnet contends that this has been most true of the Catholic hierarchy, though changes in the church--including the papacy of John XXIII and the replacement of a generation of bishops in the U.S.--had left it "no longer a monolith, and that promised to have a profound effect on American foreign policy."[11] This promised effect, however, receives no further elaboration, despite its implication that religion is not unimportant to foreign policy. Barnet also delineates several strands within American Protestantism, from anti-communism to the "remnants" of 1930s pacifism. But he, too, does not explain what is significant about the fact that church organizations and leaders reflect these different positions, apart from their presumed influence on congregants who are also voters.

The second type of reference to religion involves the occasional citation of public opinion research comparing foreign policy attitudes of U.S. Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Such research, insofar as it exists at all, no doubt reflects the orientation of a generation of social scientists. Its worth, however, generally is limited not least because of the methodological problem, for example, of grouping together all Protestants in a single category or of assuming in each case a uniform level of religious commitment. The results, more importantly, tend not to be accompanied by any sustained analysis identifying a relationship between adherents' attitudes and the moral teaching of the communities to which they belong, and between these attitudes and American policy. In one case, it is simply stated that churchgoers of all denominations generally hold more rigid and antagonistic positions toward the

Soviet Union than do those without formal religious affiliation.[12] In another case, poll results are cited to the effect that Catholics have tended to be more "internationalist" than Protestants but less so than Jews, though at the same time they were most supportive of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.[13]

Perhaps the exception among accounts of this nature is Alfred Hero's book-length discussion of survey results over three decades, which also tentatively addresses questions concerning the influence of the churches' moral teaching on both adherents and policy makers.[14] He provides compelling evidence that church members, on the whole, are poorly informed about, and need not hold views corresponding to, the statements made by their respective denominational organizations. Writing in the early 1970s, he also suggests, in the absence of any "systematic empirical study," that churches have had only a minimal impact on foreign policy. Levering is even more skeptical of claims about the importance of religion in the formation of foreign policy attitudes--when measured against such variables as education, media use, ethnic and party affiliation--to the point where he challenges the utility of conducting survey research to explore it.[15] As has been suggested, however, while he evidently still deems certain activities or attitudes attributed to religious organizations worthy of mention, he offers no alternative conceptual tools by which they might be studied and ultimately understood.

Thus, prior to the small flurry of attention to religion in the 1980s--in relation primarily to the arms race and secondarily to U.S. policy in Central America[16]--the subject was either neglected entirely or treated in the unsatisfactory manner outlined above. Before turning to what justifications are suggested in the more recent literature, it would be helpful to consider some reasons for what is presented here as the unwarranted inattention to religion as

a factor in U.S. foreign policy. It should be conceded at the outset that such inattention has extended far beyond the focus of this paper. Scholarly inquiry into the links between religion and politics generally has been rare. The reasons for this, no doubt, are manifold, but seemingly are bound up with what Robert Bellah has called "the problem of untangling the analysis of religion from the analysis of the problems intellectuals have with religion."[17] Somewhat similarly, the editor of the Journal of International Affairs introduced a recent special issue on religion and politics in various settings with this observation:[18]

> Despite the obvious connection between these two decisive forces in human history, scholars until quite recently have been loath to subject them to serious theoretical, or even descriptive, analysis. Perhaps they have been afraid of losing their "objectivity" or of sullying their scientific models with such "impure" variables as religion.... The secular orientation of the majority of scholars naturally leads them to give short shrift to the problems of a world in which religion plays a far greater role than in the lives of the researchers....
>
> For whatever reasons, remarkably little has been published in political science journals examining the role of religion in politics, especially in international relations.

Upon looking more directly at U.S. foreign policy it is possible to identify other specific reasons for this claimed inattention in the prevailing conceptual paradigms through which it is studied (although these reasons, too, can be interpreted more as effect than as cause). This is not the place to undertake a comprehensive survey of the many and conflicting paradigms available. Even a skeletal outline, however, is sufficient to demonstrate how religion is not easily fitted into existing explanatory frameworks, and to suggest that the adoption of the assumptions embodied by any of them could serve to preclude the consideration of certain dimensions of what relationship may exist.

I begin with the "realist" or "statist" paradigm,[19] whose basic assumptions about the disjunction of domestic and foreign policy spheres, and about the

perceived necessity of enhancing national security and interest in an anarchic world system, have occupied a prominent position in the post-war literature. There are, of course, numerous rather different "realisms." It can nonetheless be said for our purposes that such models have reflected a certain unease in accommodating those diverse factors--including religion--sometimes lumped together as "domestic sources" of foreign policy, at least once allowances are made for the roles of Congress and bureaucratic decision-makers.

There are two dimensions to this unease. The first is methodological, in the sense of a commitment to some conception of the state as primary unit of analysis, albeit as an abstraction, which can be regarded meaningfully as a unitary actor in international politics. Greater consideration is given to the external environment, to the interaction of states, in the formation of foreign policy. Correspondingly, there is a tendency to treat domestic variables--economic, geographic and even psychological--to the extent they contribute to, or detract from, "national power."[20]

The second dimension is best described as normative. Though the view that religious groups and leaders, as such, should have no place in the debate over foreign policy cannot be confined to proponents of any one model--and is, in the American context, overlaid with concerns for church-state separation--this argument has been made most strongly by those associated with post-war realism. It encompasses at least two themes. One involves doubts about the technical competence of religious leaders in issues of foreign policy. Hence Kenneth Thompson, for example, a scholar of avowed religious conviction, can approvingly quote another, British historian Herbert Butterfield, to the effect that the complexities of international affairs are confusing enough to the statesman and diplomat; and, moreover, that "it isn't the function of religion or

the church to solve the problems of diplomacy."[21] The second theme involves a perceived tendency towards moral absolutism that, should it determine foreign policy, would result in either crusading righteousness or isolationist purity, and perhaps in a fitful lurching between these two extremes.[22] The point here is not that realist or statist approaches are inherently amoral; even the necessities of state are not devoid of moral claims concerning the protection of national populations or the preservation of widely shared values.[23] Instead, it is that even the more sensitive of these approaches are deeply suspicious of "moralism" in its many guises, religious and otherwise, because of its supposed adverse effect on the "rational" pursuit of national interest. If within this paradigm there is some implicit or explicit acknowledgement of the force of religious or moral sentiment, either as a potential constraint or as a source of social cohesion,[24] this recognition generally has not been accompanied by deeper inquiry into the relation of religion to U.S. foreign policy.

The second paradigm, which can be called "pluralist" or "liberal," would appear on the surface more accommodating of religious groups as potential forces in the making of foreign policy, understood as the outcome of the same competition of organized interests over allocation of scarce resources as is said to operate in the domestic sphere. Indeed, leaving aside all judgments about pluralist conceptions in general, it is possible to cite examples where religious groups have functioned in a manner akin to that of other so-called interest groups, and where some attention has been accorded in the foreign policy literature. The activity of certain Jewish groups concerning U.S. policy toward Israel and the Middle East is perhaps the most prominent such example.[25] The Catholic hierarchy's opposition in the 1950s to U.S. acceptance of the political status quo in Eastern Europe can also be viewed, in part, as a reflection of

institutional interests. There is, however, as Robert Matthews has suggested, a sense in which religious groups, their statements and activities are not treated adequately in this sort of conceptual model:[26]

> Is the church a lobbyist or a prophet? ... Does the academic definition of interest groups fit the case of the churches? I do not think it does entirely.... [I]n contrast to other interest groups the churches are not tied to concrete material interests. Their demands may come in concrete forms, but they are based on spiritual, moral, and ethical values which put the church in conflict with the government, which tends to ignore ethical or moral questions in favour of pragmatic solutions to specific problems. As well, the principal function of churches has not been to engage in socio-political activity.

This sense of conceptual inadequacy appears most acutely in the case of ecclesiastical statements on war, peace and nuclear deterrence, or on human rights abroad. If those responsible are judged nonetheless to be engaged in the pursuit of defined policy goals within a competitive pluralist framework, their interest is perhaps more aptly described as a qualitatively different "moral interest." This conceptual inadequacy may mean, in turn, that some dimensions of religious activity--perhaps the most significant ones--are left unexamined in the study of foreign policy.

The third paradigm encompasses the range of Marxist and, more generally, so-called "radical revisionist" interpretations of 20th-century U.S. foreign policy as arising out of the needs of domestic capital for access to markets, investment opportunity or raw materials--in short, a world shaped for its optimum benefit, whether indirectly or as the result of more direct class control of the state. While such approaches may differ over the reformability of American policy, short of wholesale domestic change, they share a preoccupation with economic variables. Nonetheless, there remains room for an ancillary discussion of religion as contributing to the ideological cohesion of a dominant class or elite group,[27] justifying the existing social order and even

serving as an agent of state policy in penetrating other societies.[28] I argue below that there is more truth to some of these claims than is often recognized. And yet, as I will also argue, presumptions about the inherently conservative character of institutional religion pervading much of this paradigm appear to have precluded closer and more differentiated analysis of the subject, and of the potential oppositional elements contained within it.

In summary, the collective judgment of analysts of American foreign policy, at least by inference, has been that religion has not constituted an important influence meriting their attention. About this two observations might be made. First, religious organizations of many different orientations have not been similarly persuaded. This is the case for both the para-church fundamentalist movements supplying direct aid to anti-Sandinista forces in Central America,[29] and the inter-faith coalitions and denominational leaders urging nuclear disarmament, global redistribution of resources and an end to U.S. support for repressive regimes abroad. (The Reagan administration, too, as noted, has also remained unconvinced of this supposed irrelevancy.)

Second, the recent attention in the literature to ecclesiastical statements on nuclear deterrence surprisingly has offered little indication of what has changed to make the activity of religious groups worthy of inquiry. In the case of the Catholic bishops' letter, typically, one commentator stated simply that "a message sent to fifty million American Catholics by their spiritual leaders is not to be taken lightly by those in or aspiring to positions of power and influence."[30] While there may be some truth in this somewhat ambiguous claim, it again assumes a close connection between church teaching and adherents' opinions, and conceives the statement's contribution to the foreign policy debate as mainly indirect, that is, deflected through a particular religious

community. Because the bishops have been making statements on foreign policy issues throughout this century, moreover, it is not clear why previous pastoral messages should have been viewed less seriously. The implication is that ecclesiastical statements and actions have become matters of concern to policy makers, and of interest to scholars, to the extent that they represent a break from whatever domestic foreign policy consensus remains in the post-Vietnam era.

A less prominent, but ultimately more promising, justification suggests a broader public role for the churches in national life. It begins from the premise that "from its very origins, the United States has claimed a belief in a unique ethical foundation.... The persuasion runs deep that America carries a moral banner into battle." Historically, moreover, with few exceptions, religious groups have "accepted and propagated" this premise by supporting "the nation's readiness to engage in war" to protect professed fundamental values.[31] Similarly, it is suggested that "the churches represent the public conscience,"[32] having somehow shared in its creation and nurture. This dimension lies near the centre of what will be discussed later in this paper. It is in this sense that we ought to interpret the concern that the bishops' letter, for example, will serve to undermine the moral legitimacy of, and necessary public "faith" in, nuclear deterrence. Insofar as this position can be sustained, it also implies that the converse is equally true. In other words, if the Catholic bishops, in this case, have the power to help undermine a central feature of U.S. foreign policy, might they also possess a certain capacity--extending beyond their own religious community--to justify it? If so, this begs inquiry into the source and extent of this claimed power of sanction.

The Historical Debate Over Religion and Society

It was the fourth-century Roman Emperor, Constantine, who acted on the insight that the Christian religionq should not be persecuted, but could be embraced and redirected formally toward the service of the more temporal ends of the empire. However sincere his personal conversion may have been, his actions marked a profound institutional revolution for the Church, whose acceptance of this privileged status has, in the 20th century, and especially in light of the acquiescence of most Christians in Hitler's Germany, been increasingly criticized by theologians as nothing short of capitulation.[33] This paper cannot recount sixteen centuries of ecclesiastical history, much less judge such contentious issues as how extensively Christianity was actually embraced first by the barbarian tribes and then by the feudal serfs of Europe. That the papacy exercised a good deal of temporal power throughout much of this time, however, is beyond question. As a major landowner, as a mediator of disputes within the "international caste" of feudal nobles, and as, in the Crusades, the patron of large-scale war, the Church was intimately bound up in the prevailing order.[34] That its doctrines provided some measure of common moral vocabulary across the European continent--if primarily among the nobility, for whom they served partly as justification--would seem equally apparent, even to those present-day commentators who are most skeptical about suggestions of a dominant, legitimating ideology.[35]

The Church's temporal power, however, was already in decline when the last hopes of a European Christendom were dashed first by the Hundred Years' War--evidence of the Church's failure to constrain conflict, and a reflection of the rise of strong territorial monarchs--and then by the Reformation. Yet it would be a mistake to imply that the Christian religion had become politically

irrelevant. The outcome of the Reformation was a "nationalization" of the dominant Protestant branch in particular northern European jurisdictions, whether through a convergence of interests as with Lutheranism and a number of German principalities, or through the direct creation of a "national Church" for purposes of state as in England under Henry VIII. In turning, moreover, to the two political theorists typically identified with the origins of the so-called modern era, Machiavelli and Hobbes, neither of whom is remembered for theological and moral orthodoxy, this sense of the continued significance of religion is reaffirmed. Machiavelli advised his prince that appearances of piety should not be dispensed with, and that religious sentiment could indeed be harnessed for his secular ambitions. While Christianity's emphasis on humility inhibited the development of warlike virtues, it could still be invoked to call soldiers to sacrifice their lives in war.[36] Hobbes, meanwhile, weighed the relative virtues of several possible models of church polity on the basis of how they either contributed to or detracted from the strength of the state.[37]

As the outlines of contemporary social science emerged in the 19th and early 20th centuries, so too did different interpretations of the social role of religion. Much of this, admittedly, will be unfamiliar ground for the student of foreign policy and I can do nothing more than introduce these interpretations here. What they share is the assertion of an historically important, if diminishing place for religion in relation to social order and political power.

From Karl Marx's scattered writings on the subject, first, at least three, perhaps conflicting, views of religion have been discerned.[38] First, religion is but a "reflex of the real world" and, as such, a source of alienation which enslaves its naturally sovereign human creators. Second, it represents an aspect of ideology, "consciously manipulated by the dominant class to control the

dominated class," or less directly producing social acquiescence by instructing adherents to accept their earthly lot in exchange for the promise of heavenly rewards. Third, it corresponds in its particular forms to different modes of material production. Thus Protestantism, with its abstract individualism and its replacement of "servitude through devotion" with an internalized "servitude through conviction,"[39] is in some sense derived from changed material conditions as the most suitable form of religion for early capitalism. Other interpreters of Marx's writing, no doubt, would want to supplement this list or to qualify some of its strands, perhaps to include a recognition of religion's palliative or even progressive roles at specific historical junctures, such as the 16th-century German Peasants' War.[40] Ultimately, however, all religion is understood as a socially conservative force, standing against the achievement of communism.

In Max Weber's more extensive and systematic study of religion, one also finds substantial attention to the relationship between emergent capitalism and Protestantism. For Weber, contrary to Marx, it was the "Protestant ethic" of "this-worldly asceticism" that was an essential precondition for the development of an economic system marked by the hitherto irrational notion that private wealth should be accumulated for the purpose of reinvestment rather than personal enjoyment.[41] But Weber's interest in this subject extends far beyond Protestantism to an account of the social origins of religion generally. He discusses major world religions in terms of the "need for an ethical interpretation of the 'meaning' of the distribution of fortunes among men"--a need that is said to have arisen as religion became increasingly rational as opposed to magical.[42] Thus all religion embodies an explanation of suffering, of evil, which is appropriated differently across the social strata. Those who

possess privilege or power tend to construct their "status-legend" in terms of a "special mission" derived from "something beyond themselves, ... a 'task' placed before them by God."[43] The disadvantaged tend to find their consolation in "the belief that the unjust are well off in this world only because hell is reserved for them later"; this belief may or may not be a mask for resentment. Although Weber cautions repeatedly that the character of a religion is not simply a reflection of a stratum's material interests, that religious doctrines, once formulated, have a life of their own, he can be read as no less a functionalist than Marx.[44]

At the same time, Weber is considerably more attentive to the contents of doctrine and moral teaching and to their manifestation in diverse forms of religious expression and organization cutting across social strata. He also discerns points of genuine tension between the demands of religion and of modern economic or political life, between the "ethic of ultimate ends" found in Christ's teaching and the "ethic of responsibility" which requires statesmen to "resist evil by force."[45] Though small groups historically have opted for the former ethic, the major Protestant traditions, as well as Catholicism, have chosen to wrestle with the moral problems of politics, and generally have "absolutely legitimated the state as a divine institution and hence violence as a means." Lutheranism, most notably, "relieved the individual of the ethical responsibility for war and transferred it to the authorities"; Calvinism, moreover, "knew principled violence as a means of defending the faith."[46]

In this sort of differentiation, Weber follows his intellectual associate, Ernst Troeltsch, who divided Christianity into "Church," "sect" and "mystical" types and distinguished the social teaching of each on the basis of its outlook on "the world." Whereas the sect is marked by its voluntarism, internal

discipline and tendency towards withdrawal, the Church--of which Roman Catholicism is the closest approximation--"is able to receive the masses and adjust itself to the world," and indeed, will have depended on the state's power to compel adherence.[47] Correspondingly, the teachings of the Church type embody ethical demands which are less rigorous and hence more easily accommodated to the purposes of state, most importantly in the sphere of warfare.

Where Marx and Engels, Weber and Troeltsch again converge in their positions, along with Emile Durkheim, is in their assumption that religion would occupy an increasingly insignificant place in social relations. For Marx and Engels, Christian ideas had "succumbed" to rationalism in the 18th century; for the proletariat, "law, morality, religion" had been revealed as "bourgeois prejudices."[48] Weber referred repeatedly to the "disenchantment of the world" in the face of an ever-advancing routinization and depersonalization of rational bureaucratic life.[49] Troeltsch, too, observed that the Church was "losing its hold on the spiritual life of the nation" and that the ideas of the modern world were increasingly irreconcilable with even the most accommodating religious teaching.[50] Durkheim, finally, who might be considered the first to theorize formally about the latent functions of religion in giving social cohesion to so-called primitive societies, also viewed religion as "virtually defunct" in more complex societies, where its functions were assumed by other agencies or else rendered irrelevant by the social interdependence which the division of labour naturally generated.[51]

Among more contemporary interpretations of the social role of religion, one finds the same dominant themes identified above: on one hand, advancing secularization; and, on the other hand, at least a latent functionalism of

diminishing importance. On the Marxist side, the claim is made that the treatment of religion "has not advanced much beyond the insubstantial commentary of Marx, Engels and Kautsky."[52] Although one should not overstate the similarities between such major 20th-century theorists as Antonio Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas and Louis Althusser--each concerned to rescue Marxism from rigid economic determinism--their respective analyses of religion are restricted mainly to the Church's ideological or cultural monopoly in pre-capitalist society.[53] For Althusser, the Church's functions have devolved to other "ideological state apparatuses"--education and the mass media--which, as a whole, constitute that relatively autonomous domain where "the ruling ideology is heavily concentrated" but which can also be the "site of class struggle." Where religion contributes to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production is chiefly in its reminders that "man is only ashes" and that he must love his neighbour "to the extent of turning the other cheek"; the result is passivity and obedience.[54]

Ralph Miliband, meanwhile, provides an account of the generally conservative role of religion in advanced capitalism--at least in the U.S. and Britain--which is somewhat more extensive than those of the above theorists, yet which is less clear as to why it should matter.[55] He refers to the

> scarcely disputable and presumably not unimportant fact that organized religion, in most of its major manifestations, has played a profoundly "functional" and "integrative" role in regard to the prevailing economic and social systems, and with some Kulturkampf exceptions, to the state which has defended the social order....
>
> It would not be unfair to suggest that the reason why the churches in advanced capitalist countries have been so willing to serve and support the state is not, or not so much, because of its "democratic" character, but because the governments which have represented it have had an ideological and political bias broadly congruent with that of the churches themselves.

Thus the churches have had little difficulty "in blessing the state's enterprises, including its wars, preparations for wars, colonial expeditions and internal repression."[56] Public life is marked by "suffused religiosity"; both church and state seek to foster habits of obedience.

To the extent that this interpretation has been challenged by those discerning of or engaged in a recent "widespread rapprochement between religion and the left"[57]--nourished by aspects of liberation theology--it has been in the direction of two essential themes: that religion, too, has become a site of class struggle and thus contains revolutionary elements; but that in its institutional manifestations it is inextricably bound to and dependent legally and financially on the established order. Further, the churches are said to disseminate "ideologies that strengthen and homogenize the civil consensus, and in other ways legitimate the capitalist social order," not least by clinging to the idea of "interclassism."[58]

Elsewhere in the contemporary literature, specifically in its treatment of the persistence of religious belief, there is another theme reflected most in the writings of mainstream sociologists such as Peter Berger and, to a degree, of the so-called critical Marxists of the Frankfurt School. In essence, it is that religious belief has not disappeared in modern liberal society but rather has been "privatized," and thus rendered publicly irrelevant, while political issues correspondingly are posed increasingly as mere matters of technical "problem-solving."[59] That religious belief has not disappeared entirely is viewed as evidence of the failure of liberal capitalist ideology, atomistic and subjective in character, to construct its own moral ethos which gives meaning to everyday experiences and to the "basic risks of existence"--chiefly suffering and death--within some larger reality.

At this point it is helpful to introduce Berger's definition of legitimation: "socially objectified 'knowledge' that serves to explain and justify the social order."[60] This knowledge has both cognitive and normative dimensions; it defines the nature of reality and the moral duties of individuals within it. Religion, historically, has been so effective a means of legitimating social institutions because it can confer on them "an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference."[61] This power has particular importance, moreover,[62]

> whenever a society must motivate its members to kill or to risk their lives.... Thus the "official" exercise of violence, be it in war or in the administration of capital punishment, is almost invariably accompanied by religious symbolizations. In these cases religious legitimation has the already discussed "gain" of allowing the individual to differentiate between his "real self" (which is afraid or has scruples) and his self qua role carrier (warrior, hangman, and what not...). Killing under the auspices of the legitimate authorities has, for this reason, been accompanied from ancient times to today by religious paraphernalia and ritualism. Men go to war and men are put to death amid prayers, blessings, and incantations.

At present, however, despite religion's lingering presence in "public rhetoric," it is no longer capable of fulfilling its "classical task" of constructing a common framework of meaning. It is, for Berger, precisely the "segregation of religion within the private sphere" that is "quite 'functional' for the maintenance of a highly rationalized order of modern economic and political institutions."[63] Religion, in other words, is now functional by its public impotence.

Similarly, a continental sociologist of religion has commented, "social and political activities no longer need religious legitimation. Religion has become just one social factor among others in a context where secularization, tolerance, and the separation of church and state have resulted in religious pluralism."[64] Religious accounts of reality and morality compete with secular ones, and at that are widely ignored. Indeed, it has been argued that when

church leaders "wish to pronounce on social affairs they rely neither on revelation nor on holy writ. They set up commissions, often with considerable reliance on the advice of sociologists."[65] Their authority, too, is deemed to rest primarily in the arguments they can marshall within the current boundaries of what constitutes rational knowledge.

To conclude the foregoing survey, at once lengthy and yet an admittedly skeletal discussion of a diverse group of theorists, one might again note its two underlying emphases: institutional religion as functional support, directly or otherwise, of the established order; or as increasingly stripped of whatever social force it once wielded by a process of secularization. For some theorists, these themes are essentially combined; for others, one is stressed against the other. Where Miliband, for example, declares that religion continues to play a "presumably not unimportant" role vis-à-vis the state and its wars, Berger and others assert that religion is no longer capable of giving the same sanction to social institutions historically assigned to it. If the former leaves room for the possibility that organized religion could play a more critical social role, he neither expects such a development nor examines how it might occur. As for those closer to the Weberian tradition, we might question whether their secularization thesis is exaggerated, even in terms of their own analyses. Berger, for instance, notes the lingering presence of religious vocabulary in public rhetoric, above all in reference to the state's exercise of violence. Another of the sociologists cited above suggests, persuasively, that because of the close historical linkages in the West between religion and morality, a result of the Christian emphasis on sin, "the remnants of religion are, if receding, as yet still in evidence."[66]

The best evidence for such remnants may well exist in the domain of international politics, in the form of the just-war tradition, whose numerous criteria--among them, discrimination between combatants and non-combatants --are still influential among those who do not share its foundations of Christian theology and natural law philosophy.[67] If religion did not persist in the form even of such moral remnants or, on the other hand, if it was linked inextricably to the prevailing social order, one could not hope to explain why the statement of a religious hierarchy--Catholic, no less--should, in the 1980s and in a pluralistic society, have drawn so much public attention and provoked so much concern from both the Reagan administration and what can be called the mainstream foreign policy community.[68] It is to the task of constructing an explanation that this paper now turns.

Religion, Legitimacy, and International Relations

The concept of legitimacy is used abundantly, if not uniformly, by students of politics in discussing "that aspect of authority which refers to entitlement."[69] Although there is little definitional consensus beyond this, it remains the case, as William Connolly has written, that the "issue of legitimacy reaches into every corner of modernity and each claim to resolve it definitively eventually encounters a series of vocal counterclaims."[70] In a sense, the preoccupation with legitimacy belongs to the modern era; it is intimately linked with the understanding that the political order is of human construction and, as such, is not immutable. All claims are contestable and eventually are contested: "The celebration of will, central to the self-definition of modernity, helps to generate these cries, but it also thins out the epistemic and moral ground available to respond to them."[71] There is no necessary agreement as to what

constitutes knowledge and moral authority at any time, no "ultimately valid ontological status" to be conferred by appeal to a transcendent frame of reference, as in Berger's discussion of pre-modern religion. Consequently, perhaps, current social scientific conceptions of legitimacy have stressed the dimension of popular belief concerning the appropriateness--or at least the inevitability--of a particular political order, against such more traditional external standards as custom or natural law. Thus, it is argued that legitimacy is reduced to either acceptance or acquiescence.[72] Alternatively, Jürgen Habermas would extend the concept beyond popular belief, or "engineered consent," to include participation in political and economic structures as well as the increased material rewards gained thereby.[73] In this formulation, how people behave is more crucial than what they believe. Discipline, the reverse side of social order, is the underlying concern, although Habermas remains convinced of the possibility of a consensually based and thus authentically legitimate polity.

In this paper, it is possible only to point to some issues involved in the idea of legitimacy, not to resolve them. It is sufficient here to restate the minimal definition of legitimacy as "that aspect of authority which refers to entitlement," and to give attention to two additional dimensions: its contested character and its moral overtones, insofar as claims are made as to the rightness of a particular order, its stated objectives and the means by which they are pursued. There can be little doubt of the salience of each dimension for international relations and foreign policy. As war became, in the early 19th century, increasingly a matter of mass mobilization involving entire national societies,[74] as well as the object of liberal suspicions traceable to the Enlightenment,[75] the need for popular justification likewise became more acute.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the unprecedented destructiveness of wars in the 20th century, this need has become even more intense. As Robert W. Tucker has observed,[76]

> The change in man's attitude toward war finds a still more striking reflection in the wearying insistence with which governments today condemn war as a means of settling international differences and profess their devotion to peace... These efforts, it seems plausible to assume, would not be made if they did not reflect the ever-increasing importance of public opinion, both domestic and foreign, and the requirements normally imposed by opinion. Accordingly, when force is threatened or employed, the justification attending its threat or use is a matter of no small importance.

The concern for justification, for legitimacy, is reflected doubtless in the advocacy for international law--the secularized version of the Christian just-war doctrine, itself revived and revised in Catholic teaching during this century--as an external, rational authority by which national claims could be mediated and resort to war defended. Whatever the influence of international law on the behaviour of states, this dimension does not exhaust the moral claims advanced in support of foreign policy. Perhaps more important are the appeals to traditional national symbols, claimed values, the "public good," and the like. There is, as E. H. Carr among others has observed, a clear self-serving element in such appeals made by a "privileged group" as if they represented the interests of society at large.[77] The meanings of such symbols and values, however, are not fixed for all time; they constitute the terrain on which legitimacy may be contested. In their construction, dissemination and on-going interpretation, further, and in their more concrete application to national preparations for war and projection of power abroad, a modest historical and contemporary place can be identified for religion, despite the public irrelevance attributed to it by many of the social theorists surveyed. Certainly, this would

seem the case in the American experience, to which the balance of this analysis is directed.

The Religious Element in U.S. Foreign Policy

The construction of a response to the narrower question set in this paper--how to understand the seeming impact of the U.S. Catholic bishops' letter on war and peace--requires reference to two promising dimensions for further inquiry into the relationship of religion to foreign policy generally. The first dimension has already been suggested; it involves the conferrence or denial of some measure of moral legitimacy with regard to national policy, and requires that closer scrutiny be given to the moral claims embodied in the American polity. The second dimension is that of religious groups as transnational actors, as is most evidently the case for the Catholic Church. Though this transnationality is now commonly mentioned,[78] it is seldom examined further in terms of the opposing tugs it presents in addressing issues of national policy.

Earlier in this paper, in summarizing the justifications stated by those analyzing recent ecclesiastical statements on deterrence, I noted a less prominent theme, emphasizing traditional American claims to a "unique ethical foundation," and suggesting that the churches had shared in and propagated this premise, and somehow continue to represent "the public conscience." While one might be skeptical about this latter assertion, not least because of the widening gap between the churches themselves in their positions on various social issues, there is nonetheless much to sustain the larger theme. Historically, claims for American "exceptionalism" have been heavily infused with religious content. If church and state have been formally separated and if religion thus has been

rendered a private affair, it remains the case that religious language--at some lowest common denominator of "God," however he/she is conceived[79]--persists in much of public life, in inaugural addresses and in presidential prayer breakfasts. The phrase, "shining city upon a hill," biblical in its origins and applied with hope to America by a 17th-century Puritan preacher,[80] expressed the belief that the new society was morally superior to the corrupt "Old World" regimes from which its citizens had come, that it was a "chosen, covenanted nation that would serve as an active model for the earthly construction of Christ's millenial rule."[81] Both this phrase and the underlying sense of a saving mission to the world have remained in public currency, notably in the utterances of the two most recent, and otherwise much different, presidents.[82] Space does not allow a proper evaluation of the contributions of the so-called "civil religion" thesis in its many formulations.[83] It can be said, however, that this public religiosity, while distanced somewhat from its initially overt Calvinism, cannot be detached entirely from organized religion. In some measure, "American public values ... depend upon the belief commitments that are nurtured by church and synagogue."[84] And, if the covenantal idea implies that God's blessing will be withdrawn if the nation fails to live up to its unique calling--hence sustaining a critical tradition with regard to the same values, as was manifested during the Vietnam War[85]--it has more often meant the opposite: a "militantly patriotic American church and chaplaincy."[86]

This tradition of religious sanction for the nation's wars can be identified at several levels, from the provision of chaplains for military endeavours to the statements of leaders, associating sacred symbols with national objectives. In terms of the former, chaplains have been characterized as having still an important social control function, "justifying the military way to uncertain

recruits," and, most importantly, helping to "resolve conflicts over killing."[87] In spite of traditional concerns about separation of church and state, the military chaplaincy is a state-maintained institution; the courts generally have rejected constitutional challenges related to it and to such associated practices as compulsory worship attendance for cadets--enforced until 1973--on the grounds that "government action in the sphere of religion is valid only if it serves a secular purpose."[88]

At a broader level of religious sanction, the announced support of mainstream religious leaders, and of local clergy, in times of war has been virtually automatic throughout much of American history, and its importance should not be discounted in military recruitment or in enhancing public willingness to accept the sacrifices involved, much less in justifying the decision to go to war. It might be argued that the crusading tendency, most evident in the Spanish-American War and World War I,[89] has both reflected and contributed to what has been described as the "American way of war," that is, the pattern of reluctant entry and, once engaged, the pursuit of nothing short of total victory.[90] If the disillusioning experience of World War I served to temper clerical enthusiasm for World War II, it did not preclude the casting of the subsequent bipolar world in religious terms:[91]

> Consciously or subconsciously, with or without governmental stimuli, the patriotism of this "nation with the soul of a church" was aroused. Being a church member and speaking favorably of religion became a means of affirming the "American way of life," especially since the U.S.S.R. and its Communist allies were formally committed to atheism.

In the Cold War context, moreover, the Catholic bishops came to represent "probably the biggest hawks in our skies."[92] As leaders of an immigrant Catholic community long regarded with nativist suspicion in Protestant America, because of a supposed greater loyalty to Rome, they had developed a protective

tradition of "public spiritedness" in support of the nation in war and crisis. In the post-war period, they could without conflict combine the Vatican's strong condemnations of Soviet communism as the "undisputed greatest enemy of the Church" with support for the objectives of U.S. containment policy. From the premise that "democracy's bulwark is religion," they urged constant vigilance in a 1945 statement against what they described as the "cleverly organized and directed opposition of Marxian totalitarianism."[93] Under the de facto leadership of Francis Cardinal Spellman, a regular visitor to the White House who in his 1965 Christmas message to U.S. troops in Vietnam declared that "less than victory is inconceivable," the bishops did not withdraw their support for American involvement until 1971, long after most major denominational bodies and many individual Catholics had begun actively condemning it.[94]

This brief sketch of ecclesiastical and particularly Catholic support for U.S. military endeavours necessarily simplifies what is properly a much more complex story, although even what is recounted above represents more than can be found in virtually all studies of American foreign policy. Nor does such a sketch demonstrate adequately how the military chaplaincy and the former crusading orientation of religious leaders, now widely repudiated, have influenced and given sanction to policy in specific instances. The purpose here was to propose what is a promising dimension for further research, when anecdotal evidence suggests that religious blessing is still desired. When, in particular, the rationale for the U.S. nuclear arsenal and accompanying strategic doctrine is presented by John Foster Dulles or Ronald Reagan in terms of defending, against an atheistic "evil empire," not merely a nation but equally the religious and moral tradition--and destiny--assigned to it, it matters whether the churches endorse such claims.

Interestingly, when the Reagan administration proved unable to alter the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter to its satisfaction, the president addressed a more amenable group of evangelical Christian leaders and solicited their aid in challenging those, above all in the churches, "who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority."[95] Soon after, Rev. Jerry Falwell was briefed by National Security Council staff and met with Reagan to discuss ways of presenting the president's message to the public.[96] On the other side, the Catholic bishops too are conscious that their blessing is desired.[97] While this recognition itself represents some degree of leverage, it might be speculated further that, given the loss of any sense of theological consensus in a once-dominant American Protestantism, the bishops have emerged as the most authoritative religious voice in American society; and, that despite the moral fragmentation discussed earlier in this paper, they have managed in their 1983 letter to appeal to whatever remnants of "Judeo-Christian" morality persist in the culture, even as "common sense." (Indeed, it has been suggested that the letter presented Reagan himself with a profound dilemma and thus made him readier to seize upon the Strategic Defense Initiative as a "moral deus ex machina."[98]) While the above speculations imply a surface plausibility, we could not sustain them without additional inquiry.

It can be suggested, however, that the U.S. hierarchy also wields some measure of power simply because it commands the institutional resources to communicate its positions. One should be careful not to overstate this point. While pastoral messages may be read, in part, in Catholic churches across the country and otherwise excerpted and commented on in Catholic periodicals, as well as in the public media, one ought not to assume a uniform interpretation of them at the local level, much less a widespread familiarity with their contents.

The caution against any necessary correspondence between church teaching and members' political opinions should also be recalled. Yet, relative to other organizations, the Catholic hierarchy has advantages in the nation-wide communications network and the financial means available to it in disseminating its statements on policy issues.

Insofar, then, as it can be shown that religious sanction is not insignificant for U.S. foreign policy, the second dimension I have noted--religious organizations as transnational actors--should gain in importance. I cannot explore even tentatively in this paper all of the possible implications of this transnational character. My concern lies more narrowly with its effect at the level of foreign policy. In this respect, the bishops' letter is especially illuminating as a product of shifts within the larger Church over the span of a quarter-century.[99] Notwithstanding the current dispute over authority, the Church has embarked since the Second Vatican Council, institutionally and doctrinally, on a course of separating itself from close association with temporal authority. It has articulated its own mission and sense of responsibility for the "entire human family," and has declared that its survival does not lie in "privileges conferred by civil authority," that indeed it is prepared to use them if "their use raises doubts about the sincerity" of its witness.[100] The transnational character of the Catholic Church seems now to stand powerfully against its manipulation for the purpose of justifying national or class interests. It is possible, of course, to point to national examples where the Catholic hierarchy has not yet begun to operate according to this new standard. It can also be argued, however, as in the case of the American bishops, that the teaching of the universal Church can be influential in producing a transformation of position at the national level. Most notably, the U.S.

hierarchy's staunch anti-communism became increasingly difficult to sustain after Pope John XXIII issued his encyclical, Pacem in Terris, and otherwise initiated the Vatican's pursuit of peaceful co-existence with Eastern Europe in the early 1960s.[101] In the 1983 letter on deterrence, too, the influence of papal teaching is everywhere apparent; its strictly conditioned, interim acceptance essentially reflects the position of the current pope, while also giving it more specific application. It would be an obvious exaggeration to depict a diverse group of almost 300 bishops as thoroughly internationalist in outlook, however much it has changed within a generation. Nor is it true that current Catholic teaching denies the legitimacy of developing distinct national perspectives, much less of providing for national defence. In practice, however, the national and international expressions of the Church's experience would seem to interact in tension, in such a way as to relativize increasingly the merits of any set of political and economic arrangements. Here again one might venture a speculative proposition that those American ecclesiastical bodies now willing to criticize the direction of foreign and defence policy are also those with transnational affiliations, whether intradenominationally or in an organization such as the World Council of Churches. Conversely, those religious communities most supportive of a militarily reassertive foreign policy look, on the strength of impressionistic evidence, to be disproportionately of the independent, fundamentalist variety. Such speculation again requires further inquiry, extending to related theological factors and to the recognition of other complexities. Among the latter is the possibility that while transnational affiliation may provide access to a point of reference beyond the society to which a religious body would speak in moral terms, perhaps resulting in a more critical perspective, it may also mean that at some point the message given

diminishes in effect insofar as the national allegiance of its source can be questioned.

Conclusion

Having argued, on one hand, that the past and present place of religion in American foreign policy is larger than has been accorded in the literature, but that, on the other hand, it cannot be reduced in the 1980s to that of an automatic dispenser of whatever moral legitimacy it can still confer, I must immediately qualify my account in two senses. First, the suspicion remains that some, perhaps much, of what is asserted above is peculiar to the American context, in which the moral claims embodied in the polity are more overt and more overtly religious. It is not clear to what extent the discussion can be extended to other Western liberal societies, although presumably the same need for moral justification and the same questions relating to the transnationality of religious communities would be present. (It is instructive here to recall the animosity between the British government and the Church of England over whether a memorial service following the Falklands War should stress victory or repentance.)

Second, while the sanction of organized religion may once have been crucial in the West and may still be crucial elsewhere, it obviously cannot be described as such in present-day American society. There has been no significant shift away from nuclear weapons as a direct consequence of stated ecclesiastical doubt and condemnation. Such statements are directed to an audience composed of individuals among whom there is little consensus as to what constitutes moral authority, and for whom the costs of adherence to stated moral demands will be assessed against other perceived goods or necessities, personal and national.

And yet, if religious sanction is no longer crucial, if it no longer emerges from a framework of socially objectified knowledge, as Berger would have it, it would be a mistake to conclude that its force has been dissipated completely. The problem of justification persists, and in the absence of new authorities, religious leaders remain to some extent the interpreters of morality. Commenting on the deterrence debate, The Economist noted:[102]

> In any debate involving moral issues even hardened agnostics cock an ear in the church's direction: if a bishop picks up an issue and gives his support on one side of it, that issue and that side are, in the current jargon, "respectabilized."

Thus defenders and critics of deterrence argue over the interpretation of the bishops' letter; policy makers quote selectively from Pope John Paul II to justify the possession of nuclear weapons,[103] while peace activists cite, wherever possible, the endorsement of religious leaders and organizations. That such support, such respectability, is still coveted poses a challenge to the assumptions that have caused us to neglect religious institutions and ideas as having no place, or no interesting place, in the analysis of foreign policy and international relations.

Notes

[1]Useful summaries and analyses of the many recent ecclesiastical statements issued in the U.S. and Europe, including Eastern Europe, can be found in the following works: Donald L. Davidson, Nuclear Weapons and the American Churches: Ethical Positions on Modern Warfare (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); Manfred R. Hamm, "The European Church and Arms Control," Orbis 27 (1983): 543-54; Mark Heirman, "Bishops' Conferences on War and Peace in 1983," Cross Currents 33 (1983): 275-88; Francis X. Winters, "Nuclear Deterrence Morality: Atlantic Community Bishops in Tension," Theological Studies 43 (1982): 428-46.

[2]An incomplete list of articles dealing either with the U.S. Catholic bishops' letter specifically, or with religious groups and nuclear deterrence generally, would include the following: Donald L. Davidson, "Religious Strategists: The Churches and Nuclear Weapons," Parameters 13 (December 1983): 19-29; Samuel Kim, "The U.S. Catholic Bishops and the Nuclear Crisis," Journal of Peace Research 22 (1985): 321-33; William V. O'Brien, "The Bishops' Unfinished Business," Comparative Strategy 5 (1985): 105-33; Susan Moller Okin, "Taking the Bishops Seriously," World Politics 36 (1984): 527-54; Keith B. Payne, "The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons," Orbis 27 (1983): 535-43; Bruce Russett, "Ethical Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence," International Security 8 (Spring 1984): 36-54; and, L. Bruce van Voorst, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence," Foreign Affairs 61 (Spring 1983): 827-52. In addition to the Davidson book cited above, several volumes by scholars with interest in U.S. foreign policy have also been addressed at least partly to recent ecclesiastical positions on deterrence. They include: James Dougherty, The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1984); Robert W. Tucker, The Nuclear Debate: Deterrence and the Lapse of Faith (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1985); and, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986).

[3]The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1983). That this letter has served as a benchmark for others is indicated, for instance, in the 1986 letter issued by the Council of Bishops of a large U.S. Protestant denomination, the United Methodist Church, under the title, "In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just Peace." The letter both acknowledges its indebtedness to the Catholic bishops and implicitly challenges their conditional acceptance by stating a "clear and unconditioned no" to nuclear weapons and to deterrence, even as a temporary measure.

[4]The standard work among Western scholars is Adeed Dawisha, ed., Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984). Significantly, even this work is of recent vintage and no doubt was inspired largely by the Iranian Revolution. See also Roger Savory, "'The added touch': Ithna 'Ashan Shi'ism as a factor in the foreign policy of Iran," International Journal 41 (1985-86): 402-23.

[5]This pressure included a visit to the Pope from White House emissary Gen. Vernon Walters as well as correspondence from senior Administration officials to the bishops' drafting committee. President Reagan himself spoke indirectly against the thrust of preliminary drafts in a speech to a national Knights of

Columbus convention. These efforts are recounted in Jim Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), pp. 105-106, 118-19.

[6]See especially Tucker, The Nuclear Debate, pp. 47-55.

[7]This is true, for example, of the widely used undergraduate text, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). As well, no mention is made of religious actors in the otherwise comprehensive The Making of American Soviet Policy, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). Religion is also virtually neglected, inexcusably, in Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987).

[8]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 179. In all Almond devotes four pages to religious organizations (pp. 179-82). Elsewhere, he makes the sweeping accusation that "academic and religious elites" have become "bearers of moral wishful thinking" in the field of foreign policy, and as such may adversely influence the next generation (p. 242).

[9]Ralph B. Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-78 (New York: William Morrow, 1978), pp. 49, 87, 109.

[10]Richard Barnet, The Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Atheneum Books, Penguin, 1972), pp. 323-26.

[11]Ibid., p. 326.

[12]Milton J. Rosenberg, "Attitude Change in Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era," Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 157.

[13]Barry Hughes, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1978), pp. 45-47.

[14]Alfred O. Hero, Jr., American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy: Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937-69 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973), especially pp. 194-206. One of Hero's underlying concerns is to consider how churches might more effectively educate their own members and influence policy makers.

[15]Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, p. 27. Cf. a recent study suggesting that one-quarter of Americans, according to a large-scale survey, see the U.S.-Soviet conflict in "religious" terms; that is, they comprehend the Soviets mainly as a threat to basic moral and religious values, over which a war--even a nuclear war--will have to be fought. Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, "The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R.," Foreign Affairs 63 (Fall 1984): 33-46. We might, however, question the imprecision of "religion" as a label for this view, given that other Americans may well hold different positions equally out of religious conviction.

[16]Ronald Libby, "Listen to the Bishops," Foreign Policy, no. 52 (Fall 1983), pp. 78-95. See also the brief mention of churches in relation to the arms race and Central America in Bernard C. Cohen, "The Influence of Special Interest Groups and Mass Media on Security Policy in the United States," in Perspectives on American Foreign Policy, eds. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 235.

[17]Robert Bellah, "Introduction," in Religion and America: Spiritual Life in a Secular Age, ed. Mary Douglas and Steven Tipton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. x.

[18]Joshua Katz, "Editor's Foreward," Journal of International Affairs 6:2 (1982-83): iii. (The emphasis is mine.) In recent years, several other journals have acknowledged this neglect and sought to correct it by devoting entire issues or parts thereof to matters of religion and politics. These include the International Journal, which included articles on Vatican diplomacy, World Council of Churches activity in southern Africa, and religion and Arab nationalism in its summer 1979 issue (vol. 34:3); and the American critical marxist journal Telos (No. 58, Winter 1983-84). These bursts of attention, however, stand out very much as exceptions within the broader span of literature in the discipline.

[19]Readers will recognize my use, in essence, of the categories set out by Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), especially pp. 5-34. By this, I do not wish to imply anything more than a claim as to their classificatory value. A further word should be said here in anticipation of possible objections to the use of the labels, "realist" and "statist," virtually as synonyms, and hence to what may be perceived as the careless blurring of distinct levels of analysis. I would respond that realism does not allow for such a neat separation in that the very character of the international system is presumed to impose the most fundamental necessities--and constraints--on the foreign policies of nation-states.

[20]This point is made by Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 224. See for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 80-108.

[21]Kenneth Thompson, Morality and Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), p. 147. Thompson has been among the most prolific writers on such questions within what is sometimes called the "Christian realist" approach, traced to Reinhold Niebuhr, and articulated in recent decades in the publications of the Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA). If there is any core theme in this approach, it is that general moral principles are relevant in foreign policy and international affairs, but that their application will be relative or situational, and that such judgments should be made by morally sensitive specialists, not clerics. See also Thompson's Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959); and the collection of CRIA essays published under his editorship, Moral Dimensions of American Foreign Policy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984). Another expression of this view is found in Norman

Hill, The New Democracy in Foreign Policy Making (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), p. 97.

[22]See, e.g., Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions," American Political Science Review 44 (1950): 833-54. It is further evidence in support of my interpretation that in one book-length discussion of U.S. foreign policy, the only index reference to religion is as a subheading under "moralism." The reference is to the Monroe Doctrine's claimed indebtedness to a clergyman who preached American responsibility to give leadership to the rest of the world. Gene E. Rainey, Patterns of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975), p. 31.

[23]Robert Gilpin, typically, contends that realism does not deny the existence of such other objectives as beauty, truth and goodness, but considers that these cannot be achieved or maintained in the absence of some measure of security. "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," International Organization 38 (Spring 1984): 290.

[24]See, e.g., John Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1973).

[25]Among the best of such analyses, which looks at the activity of both Jewish and conservative Christian organizations and concludes that their effect on U.S. policy has been minimal, despite widespread beliefs to the contrary, is Steven L. Spiegel, "Religious Components of U.S. Middle East Policy," Journal of International Affairs 36 (1982-83): 235-46. The promotion of pro-Israeli policy by Jewish groups and voters in general is also mentioned--sometimes under the heading of "ethnic" rather than "religious" influences--in such general studies as Hughes, Domestic Context, pp. 178-79; Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, p. 100; and, George Quester, American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 116-17.

[26]"The Churches and Canadian Policy Towards Human Rights," in Church and States: The Christian Churches and Canadian Foreign Policy, Proceedings of a Consultation, Toronto, 28 September 1982, ed. Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982), p. 3.

[27]This is the essence of C. Wright Mills' argument, although it is not directed specifically at U.S. foreign policy. He identifies most members of inter-connected business, military and other "elites" as Protestants of either Episcopalian or Presbyterian affiliation. The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 60, 127-28, 192.

[28]Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, noting the role of Christian missionaries in "historical and current practice of western expansion," cite several cases where American church workers and aid agencies in Southeast Asia provided information either "intentionally or casually" to the Central Intelligence Agency or U.S. military personnel. Chomsky and Herman, however, also refer to the "cries of protest" raised by other church workers abroad about the effects of American activity, and allegedly ignored by the mainstream press. See The Political Economy of Human Rights (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979),

Vol. I, pp. 122-23, 388 n.73; Vol. II, pp. 88-95, 329 n.67. See also William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (New York: Dell, 1972), pp. 61-62.

[29]Vicki Kemper, "In the Name of Relief," Sojourners, October 1985, pp. 12-20.

[30]Okin, "Taking the Bishops Seriously," p. 527. A similar justification is advanced by Davidson, who argues that because religious denominations have "by far the largest number of constituents" among organizations involved in the deterrence debate, their positions, at least potentially, "represent the most powerful influence on moral opinion in the United States." Nuclear Weapons and the American Churches, p. xi.

[31]van Voorst, pp. 827-28.

[32]Davidson, "Religious Strategists," p. 26.

[33]Among the many critiques of this sort, the following sample is drawn from a diversity of confessional backgrounds: James Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross: A Theology of Revolution and Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1968), esp. chap. 8; Walter G. Muelder, "Pacifism and the World Council of Churches," in War or Peace? The Search for New Answers, ed. Thomas Shannon (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1980), pp. 153-68; Jacques Ellul, The Subversion of Christianity, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdman's, 1986); John H. Yoder, The Original Revolution (Scottdale, PA.: Herald Press, 1971), especially pp. 52-84.

[34]Richard Preston, Sydney Wise and Herman Werner, Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and its Inter-relationship with Western Society, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 73-77. See also the two volumes by James T. Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[35]Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), pp. 70-71.

[36]The Prince, trans. Luigi Picci, rev. E. R. P. Vincent (New York: Modern Library, 1950), esp. chap. 18, pp. 63-66.

[37]Eldon J. Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," History of Political Thought 3 (1982): 215-43. We ought not to forget Rousseau, who asserted in The Social Contract that no state was ever founded without a religious base, but that Christianity--the "religion of the priest"--destroys social unity and hence is unsuited for the polity he proposes (Book IV, Ch. 8).

[38]Abercrombie, et al., Dominant Ideology, pp. 60-62. The authors suggest tht the first and third claims are inconsistent: religion cannot be the foremost example of alienation in capitalism and, at the same time, increasingly less prevalent. Logically, they suggest, as alienation inevitably increases, so too should Protestantism. See also Delos B. McKown, The Classical Marxist

Critiques of Religion (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 10-12. Cf. Arthur McGovern, Marxism: An American Christian Perspective (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1980).

[39]Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 60. The emphasis is Marx's.

[40]Ibid., p. 61; Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Tucker, pp. 684-85. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity (London: Duckworth, 1968), p. 103. We might recall here that Marx's oft-quoted reference to religion as "opium of the people" was preceded by a more neglected sentence describing religion as the "sigh of the oppressed creature,... the soul of soulless conditions." Critique of Hegel," p. 54. Similar references do not appear in his later work.

[41]Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

[42]Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in From Max Weber, trans. and ed., H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 275; pp. 269-98.

[43]Ibid., pp. 276-77.

[44]Abercrombie et al., Dominant Ideology, p. 34.

[45]Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, pp. 119-21.

[46]Ibid., p. 124.

[47]Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 2 vols., trans. Olive Wyon (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), especially pp. 993-98. See also his broader discussion of Church-type religion as an agent of social control in the interest of the established order (pp. 328-82).

[48]Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in Tucker, pp. 482, 489.

[49]From Max Weber, pp. 155, 350-51.

[50]Troeltsch, Social Teaching, p. 1008.

[51]Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 6. Durkheim's major work in this respect is The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. J. W. Swain (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).

[52]Abercrombie et al., Dominant Ideology, p. 65.

[53]Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 143-44; Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey

Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 17; Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1974). Each of these three theorists, it might be noted, lived in societies where Protestantism had not flourished and where the prevailing Catholicism had a notably conservative character.

[54] Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 140-46.

[55] Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Winfield and Nicholson, 1969), pp. 181, 184.

[56] Ibid., pp. 184-85.

[57] The quotation is from the Preface to a special issue of the Monthly Review devoted to religion (July-August 1984, p. 2). In the same issue, see also Cornel West, "Religion and the Left: An Introduction," pp. 9-19; and Kathleen Schultz, "An Analysis of the Christian Left in the United States," pp. 56-71.

[58] Schultz, "Analysis of the Christian Left," pp. 58-59, 65. Schultz, however, appears to confuse her argument by citing examples of transformation precisely at the level of the institution: Vatican II, papal and national or regional episcopal statements (pp. 62-63). A more convincing, if briefer, statement of this variety is found in David Gross, Patrick Murray and Paul Piccone, "Introduction," Telos No. 58 (Winter 1983-84): 2. Their argument is that while religion in its subjective dimension is an essential part of being human, its institutional forms tend to reflect social relations predominant at the time of their formation. Thus while they are conservative they can also be emancipatory "in the age of one-dimensionality brought about by the universalization of the commodity form," insofar as they can provide "shelter against the prevailing winds of homogenization."

[59] Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967); Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective, pp. 27-52; Jürgen Habermas, The Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1976), especially pp. 77-80.

[60] Berger, Sacred Canopy, pp. 29-30.

[61] Ibid., p. 33.

[62] Ibid., p. 44. Lest the impression be left of Berger as a functionalist in a Parsonian sense, we should note his claim that "religion appears in history both as a world-maintaining and as a world-shaking force"; it can remove as well as grant sanction (p. 100).

[63] Ibid., p. 134.

[64] Richard van Dülmen, "The History of Religion as Social Science," Telos No. 58 (Winter 1983-84): 23.

[65] Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective, p. 170.

[66]Ibid., p. 88. Similarly, Habermas argues that religious morality has been reduced to "bourgeois common sense" (Legitimation Crisis, p. 80).

[67]See, for example, the recommendations in Nye, Nuclear Ethics; and the broader appeal to the just-war tradition by Hedley Bull, "Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory," World Politics 31 (1978-79): 588-99.

[68]We might ask the same sort of question about the widespread interest in the bishops' more recent pastoral letter on the American economy, issued in final form in November 1986: "Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the Economy," Origins 16 (1986-87): 409-55. When the bishops announced plans to prepare such a letter, a "Lay Commission" of conservative Catholics, including former Treasury Secretary William Simon and former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, was formed to issue a response. The bishops' committee, meanwhile, heard from Nobel laureate economists, congressional staff and labour representatives. More than theological fidelity was deemed at stake. Regarding interest in the pastoral letter on war and peace, we might note the prominent media attention given to successive drafts, including periodic front-page coverage in leading newspapers such as the New York Times and a cover story in Time, 29 November 1982.

[69]John H. Schaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Legitimacy and the State, ed. William Connolly (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 109.

[70]William Connolly, "Introduction: Legitimacy and Modernity," in Connolly, Legitimacy and the State, p. 1.

[71]Ibid., p. 11. On the poverty of contemporary moral debate, or at least the impossibility of finding a "rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture," see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

[72]Schaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State," p. 109. In the same volume see William Connolly, "The Dilemma of Legitimacy," pp. 222-49. Together, Connolly and Schaar identify the association of legitimacy with popular belief across a wide spectrum of political theorists, including Seymour Lipset, Daniel Bell, Theodore Lowi and James O'Connor.

[73]Jürgen Habermas, "Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism," in Connolly, Legitimacy and the State, pp. 134-55.

[74]William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[75]This evolution is helpfully charted in Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1978).

[76]Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, and Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 196. (Tucker wrote the chapter from which this quotation is taken.) Tucker is among the few students of international politics to have sustained an interest in the religious dimensions of the justification of force. See his previously cited recent work, The Nuclear

Debate, and the essay he wrote in the mid-1960s, "Just War and Vatican Council II: A Critique," reprinted in Thompson, Moral Dimensions of American Foreign Policy, pp. 239-82.

[77]E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 80.

[78]An exception is Ivan Vallier, "The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor," International Organization 25 (1971): 479-502.

[79]It was President Eisenhower who in 1954 declared that "our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith--and I don't care what it is." Quoted in George Lipsitz, "'The Drum Major Instinct': American Religion since 1945," Telos no. 58 (Winter 1983-84), p. 101. See also John F. Wilson, Public Religion in American Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979). Of course, the idea that religion is essential to American democracy is at least as old as de Tocqueville. He observed more than a century ago that, while religion has no direct place in U.S. government, it is the "first of their political institutions," because it restrains competitive individualism and otherwise supports the values which sustain a democratic society. Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1969), p. 232.

[80]Rev. John Winthrop, from a lengthier quotation in M. Darroll Bryant, "America as God's Kingdom," in Jürgen Moltmann, et al., Religion and Political Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 56. See also Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956). We should not, of course, forget the explicitly secular variant of this same exceptionalist tradition, expressed by Tom Paine as follows: "We have it in our power to begin the world again."

[81]Clarence Abercrombie, The Military Chaplain (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 36. See also Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millenial Role (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. xii-x, 53-54; and, Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 80.

[82]See Tami R. Davis and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," Foreign Policy, No. 66 (Spring 1977), pp. 20-38.

[83]On politics and "civil religion" in the U.S., see, in addition to the works cited above, Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., American Civil Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), especially the essays by Robert Bellah, Will Herberg and Sidney Mead; and, George Armstrong Kelly, Politics and Religious Consciousness (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984).

[84]Richard John Neuhaus, "The War, the Churches and Civil Religion," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 387 (1970): 138.

[85]Ibid., pp. 128-40. The same recognition of the "priestly" and "prophetic" possibilities of civil religion is found in most of its proponents.

[86]Abercrombie, Military Chaplain, p. 87.

[87]Lawrence B. Radine, The Taming of the Troops: Social Control in the United States Army (Westport, Conn., and London: Greenwood, 1977), p. 70. Cf. Abercrombie, who suggests that commanding officers are willing to use religion to legitimate military service, but that this legitimation is indirect: it is not so much a matter of chaplains stressing obedience as giving soldiers the "spiritual strength" to endure hardship (Military Chaplain, p. 74). See also Waldo Burchard, "Role Conflicts of Military Chaplains," American Sociological Review 19 (1954): 528-35; and, John Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 201-204.

[88]Leo Pfeffer, "What Hath God Wrought to Caesar: The Church as a Self-Interest Interest Group," Journal of Church and State 13 (1971): 101. See also Abercrombie, Military Chaplain, pp. 17-20.

[89]On the "crusading spirit" of most churches in World War I, see Ray Abrams, Preachers Present Arms (Philadelphia: Round Table, 1933). This spirit, of course, was not peculiar to the U.S. Michael Howard, among others, has noted the emotional fusion of religion and romantic nationalism in World War I throughout Western Europe, "War and the Nation-State," Daedalus 108 (1979): 103.

[90]Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960).

[91]Ahlstrom, Religious History, pp. 951-52.

[92]Dorothy Dohen, Nationalism and American Catholicism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 140. A similar judgment of the bishops' "superpatriotic" character is found in James Hennesey, American Catholics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 126.

[93]"On World Peace," quoted in Anson Phelps Stokes, Church and State in the United States, Vol. 3 (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), pp. 356-57. The impression should not be left that the Catholic hierarchy was alone in supporting the American position in the Cold War in such terms. It was John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's secretary of state, who was chairman of the Protestant Federal Council of Churches' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace during World War II, and who in his subsequent position both rallied Protestant support and gave his own interpretation of the Cold War as essentially a moral struggle. See Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982), pp. 187-91, 299-304.

[94]Quoted in David J. O'Brien, "American Catholic Opposition to the Vietnam War: A Preliminary Assessment," in War or Peace? The Search for New Answers, ed. Thomas Shannon (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1980), p. 126. The hierarchy's formal 1971 withdrawal of support for the war is found in "Resolution on Southeast Asia," reprinted in In the Name of Peace: Collective

Journal of International Affairs 36 (1982-83): 247-55; and, John S. Conway, "Vatican diplomacy today: the legacy of Paul VI," International Journal 34 (1978-79): 457-74.

[102]"The Pain of Being a Christian in a Nuclear World," The Economist, 5 February 1983, p. 19. Note the similar judgment by Duncan Forrester, "The Theological Task," in Ethics and Defence, ed. Howard Davis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 23.

[103]See for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Strategic Implications of Thou Shalt Not Kill," America 154 (1986): 445-49.

Statements of the United States Catholic Bishops on War and Peace, 1919-80 (Washington: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1983), pp. 59-62.

[95]Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention, National Association of Evangelicals," 8 March 1983, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 19 (1983): 369. It was in the same speech that Reagan made his "evil empire" reference to the Soviet Union.

[96]Haynes Johnson, "A Preacher for 'Peace through Strength,' or, Maybe, the Bomb," Washington Post, 3 April 1983, p. A3.

[97]Presenting the second draft of the pastoral letter to the bishops' 1982 annual meeting, the chairman of the drafting committee, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, stated: "The questions of foreign policy and defense policy are core issues for any state. But defense and foreign poicy raise moral questions of the highest order: problems of taking human life, protecting human rights, judging the policy of one's nation by the criteria of social justice are all central concerns of Catholic moral teaching today. The state seeks support; it is the church's responsibility to see to it that the state's request is measured in moral terms" (Origins 12 (1982-83): 398).

[98]Bruce Russett, "Star Wars: A Moral Mirage," Commonweal 113 (1986): 211. Russett's judgment relies on journalistic accounts. It might be countered here that the sensitivity of Reagan and his administration to the bishops' letter can be explained in terms of the peculiar character of this presidency, notably its claims to represent traditional, religious values. Although there may be some merit in this argument--we would be hard-pressed to imagine Richard Nixon being similarly struck by moral qualms upon reading it--it is less apparent that another administration would have had no concern about the letter, that the influence of religion and the bishops in this case can be reduced to the idiosyncrasies of a president. Even Nixon, we might remember, had his "court preacher" in Billy Graham, who prayed at presidential prayer breakfasts and was regularly seen to be consulted about affairs of state. See Richard V. Pierard, "Billy Graham and the Presidency," Journal of Church and State 22 (1980): 107-27; Paul F. Boller, Jr., "Religion and the U.S. Presidency," Journal of Church and State 21 (1979): 5-21.

[99]I have discussed elsewhere at greater length the influence on the letter of recent shifts in Catholic teaching and the tensions involved in balancing ethical responsibility for humanity with some account of national purposes in addressing issues of foreign policy. "Weapons Without A Cause? Nuclear Deterrence and the Soviet Threat in the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Just-War Framework," Occasional Paper no. 13 (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, February 1987).

[100]Gaudium et Spes ("Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World") in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott (Piscataway, N.J.: New Century, 1966), #76.

[101]The best account of this reorientation is Hansjakob Stehle, Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917-79, trans. Sandra Smith (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981). See also Dennis Dunn, "The Vatican's Ostpolitik,"