

Centre for International Relations Occasional Paper no. 23

THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES

OF A NEUTRAL CANADA

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September 1987

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the conference on Canada and Military Neutrality, sponsored by the College Militaire Royal de St-Jean and Etudes et Recherches Internationales et Strategiques (ERIS), Universite de Montreal, 10-12 April 1987.

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## Introduction

A prominent American specialist in international relations has recently observed that "the best way to respond to inadequate strategic thinking is not simply with moralistic indignation but with better consequential analysis."<sup>1</sup> With Joseph Nye's advice in mind, I shall seek in this paper to address some of the military consequences for Canada of a policy of neutrality, for it is my contention that advocacies of neutrality for Canada do indeed betray inadequacy of strategic conceptualization.

Building a practical defence policy upon such an ambiguous conceptual foundation as neutrality presents problems of both definition and objective. Strictly speaking, neutrality is a legal concept that only has relevance once a conflict has begun. As a peacetime strategy one is forced to ask of it, In respect of what or whom is it intended? How, for instance, should governments determine how much defence is "enough"? How would governments measure success? These questions, of course, are not limited in application to neutrality alone but are instructive in the sense that neutrality does not solve the problems of defence administration. Rather, it may only compound them.

The first problem in assessing the military consequences of a neutral Canada is to find some approach that would provide a relatively stable platform for a force model. Fortunately, the concept of neutrality has attracted much attention over the years from scholars, politicians, and lawyers--attention that has provided a body of "rules, duties and responsibilities" for neutrals and belligerents in most circumstances. Even though it is acknowledged that there are no iron laws of neutrality, the understandings and expectations about what neutrals and belligerents should do in peace and war provide a strong clue as to what is necessary in the

way of force structure, and it is to these that we turn in our search for insight into the likely military consequences of a neutral Canada.

### Rules of Neutrality

A state that remains neutral in an armed conflict has a large number of legal rights and duties.<sup>2</sup> Reduced to essentials, a neutral is obligated to take all practicable measures to maintain its independence and to prevent one party to a conflict from directing operations against another party from or through neutral territory. Neutral territory includes land, internal waters, territorial seas and air space. It does not include outer space over its land mass. A neutral must take all practicable measures to prevent the air, land or sea forces of one party to a conflict from using neutral territory as a base of operations. It must also take all practical measures to prevent military aircraft and weapons, such as cruise missiles, of a party to a conflict from flying through its airspace, and land forces from crossing its territory. Under certain circumstances, warships may pass through the territorial seas of a neutral but, as a general statement, submarines must be surfaced on passage.

A state that is engaged in an armed conflict does, however, have the right to use force in self defence. In a hypothetical example of a Russian attack on the United States through Canadian airspace, it is, at the least, debatable whether or not the United States would be legally obligated to wait for Russian aircraft to cross the American border before committing its aircraft to combat. There are numerous cases in which states involved in an armed conflict have made incursions into neutral states using self defence as their legal rationale. These incursions are most likely to

occur when the neutral has been unable effectively to implement its neutrality obligations.

In order to illustrate some of the military consequences of neutrality I shall construct a hypothetical model based on the general conditions and assumptions derived from the preceding interpretation of the customs and rules of neutrality. The central assumptions of my model are the following:

- a. Canada would be an armed neutral;
- b. Canada would be required to maintain surveillance and control of its territorial land, air, and sea spaces in peace and war in order to deny their use to actual and potential belligerents;
- c. Canada's capabilities to maintain surveillance and control would have to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of real and potential belligerents in peace and war; and
- d. Given that Canada has some 26 million healthy, well-educated people, is one of the richest countries in the world, and would have no external obligations, it is assumed that other nations would expect Canada to maintain a vigorous defence of its neutrality. Any other policy would be viewed as an abandonment of its responsibilities as a neutral and an invitation to belligerents to take self-defence measures in Canadian territory.

Neutrality, therefore, requires a Canadian strategy of deterrence to convince nations not only that Canada can defend itself but also to assure belligerents that their enemies could not take advantage of our neutrality. To paraphrase David Cox's description of the essential requirement of an

effective policy for Canadian national sovereignty, what will be important to a neutral Canada is not what we think the Russians or the Americans will do, it is what the Americans think the Russians could do in Canada and what the Russians think the Americans could do in Canada.<sup>3</sup>

#### Force Structure: Army

The construction of a comprehensive force structure for any circumstance is a highly technical and complex business. Planners must not only construct obvious front-line units and equipment but must identify and quantify their immense supporting infrastructures.

In a short paper all the interactive implications of building an essentially unique Canadian Armed Forces (CF) under a concept of armed neutrality cannot be considered. It is possible, however, to address the major responsibilities and consequences of such a policy and draw from these inferences other support and infrastructure changes, beginning with the Army.

Three major defence needs have always influenced the structure of the Canadian Army. First, under the terms of the Constitution Act 1867, the federal government has sole responsibility for the defence of Canada. Provinces, on rejecting the "states" militia model of the United States, insisted, however, that they have unimpeded recourse to armed assistance if they need it. Under the National Defence Act provinces have the right to request armed forces directly from the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) who must respond to such requests. The responsibility of the CDS to provide for "Aid of the Civil Power" must be accounted for in any force structure

of the CF. Our history indicates that duties arising from this responsibility fall largely on formed army units.<sup>4</sup>

Second, Canada, even simply to display sovereignty, always requires an Army capable of conducting land force defence operations in all parts of the country. The organization and equipment of such forces depends upon assessments of threats. Since at least 1926, these have been restricted to the low end of the so-called "spectrum of conflict" and have only called for light scaled units. But our present operational assumptions might change if we believed that Canada as a neutral country must once again treat the United States as a threat.

The third factor conditioning the Army's structure has always been derived from Canada's sensible desire to fight wars when necessary as far from our shores as possible. Thus, the Canadian Army has always had a decidedly expeditionary focus. It is proposed by some that this need be replaced by a neutral home-based concept of operations. On the surface it might appear that relieving the Army of its NATO and U.N. tasks would free up a great amount of resources to meet this new responsibility. This, however, would not likely be the case, because all three needs are now met concurrently by the same units. Except for troops actually deployed in Europe, there is no independent expeditionary force that could be disbanded without impairing the Army's ability to meet its first two responsibilities. In a neutral Canada the Army's present functions would actually have to be increased, and it would also have to provide significant support to the Air Force and the Navy.

The following examples of tasks and missions the Army would be required to continue to perform may help to illustrate the force structure the Army would need to serve a neutral Canada. Aid to the Civil Powers and

Assistance to Civil Authorities would continue, at least at current levels. It is extremely unlikely, for instance, that the one operational formation in western Canada could be disbanded without comment from regional premiers. To do so would remove all soldiers west of London, Ontario. Similarly, it is not likely that the one Francophone brigade and the only operational formation east of the Ottawa River could be disbanded. Central Canada, that is Ontario, has at present some 5,000 soldiers scattered across an area as large as western Europe. Simply being prepared for contingencies that arise from time to time at the prisons in Kingston, Ontario, requires the stationing in that area of a battalion-size unit. Consequently, there seems little reason to believe that significant Army reductions could be made in any part of Canada.

The active air defence of Canada will be needed in peace and war. Since, however, airfields and aircraft are fragile things, often the best way to disable aircraft is to disable the airfields that support them. The defence of airfields, therefore, would become a major Army task. Each airfield in the North and South would require at least a peacetime skeleton force of 200 men and an additional air-defence battery of approximately 100 men. These units could presumably be filled out by the Militia during a crisis.

Near coasts and in territorial waters one main rule is that ships may travel through neutral waters or even remain in ports for up to 24 hours. After that time they must leave or be captured and interned by the neutral. The Army would have a coastal defence role to play in support of the Navy.

As a deterrent, and as a demonstration of our intent to enforce our neutrality, a defence system on each coast and at major ports would be

needed. These systems, likely based on ground-to-air and ground-to-sea missiles, would require the development of several coastal defence regiments. Sweden, for example, has an elaborate coastal defence system based on five brigades of artillery to meet their small-scale problems. Norway has 30 fortresses, and some 50 artillery, mine, and torpedo batteries.<sup>5</sup>

In this regard, the St. Lawrence Seaway represents a unique problem. Certainly the use of the Seaway by American naval vessels in wartime would not impress the Soviets. The movement of merchant vessels destined for Europe would likewise also be discouraged. How would Canada address this problem? Certainly it would have to insist on some type of enforced inspection facility to control shipping on the St. Lawrence. Fortunately, the Citadel in Quebec is still in good shape and could, with modification, again serve our defence purposes.

What about the Great Lakes? Is the inland transportation of war materiel through the various locks a violation of the rules of neutrality? More soldiers might be required to guard these facilities as well.

Besides its responsibilities to the Navy and the Air Force the Army's more traditional functions of controlling our territories would remain. Currently, this need is only partly addressed by Canada's limited air mobile and air delivered (para) units. Nevertheless, the threat from raids is not too credible today given the enormous logistic problem the Soviets would face in launching such raids, and the large capacity of our American allies to assist us if we asked them.

As a neutral country, however, Canada may face new challenges. Canadian fears of an American land grab would have to be taken seriously not only by novelists but also by the Government. Therefore, it should be

anticipated that the Army would respond to this challenge with two major undertakings.

First, the Army would increase its air-mobile and air-delivered capabilities. Even at light scales this requirement has many subordinate consequences for training, organization, infrastructure, and aircraft. Second, a northern base, long desired by some strategists, would become even more significant as a training and staging base for army patrols in Northern Canada.

Alaska would present an interesting problem for a neutral Canada. Certainly the Soviets would expect us in peace and war to restrict the transportation of all warlike materiel and supplies to and from Alaska through our territory. One must assume that we would establish a "land and be inspected" program to be enforced in peacetime by the Canadian Air Force.

In a crisis all transportation and communication between the continental United States and Alaska through Canadian territories would have to be closed and with military strength if necessary. We, however, should anticipate that the Americans might try to force open the Alaska Highway. It would be a major Canadian Army objective to deter them from such action. The establishment of a combat engineer brigade on the Alaska Highway with orders to deny the road to the Americans should ensure that it would never be available to them (or us, of course). The Americans could create an escorted air bridge to Alaska if they became convinced that the highway would be unusable and we might have to develop additional air defences against such an intrusion.

No Army units would be allocated for U.N. peacekeeping duties. This model reflects the Swiss view that membership in the U.N. is inconsistent

with the responsibilities of neutrals and, therefore, no Canadian peace-keeping capabilities are required. If, however, Canadians accepted a less ideal policy of neutrality than the Swiss then additional troops would be required for peacekeeping duties.

Neutrality would not reduce the need for a Militia in Canada. At least one would expect them during exercises and in crisis to perform specific roles such as home guards, civil defence agents, and reinforcements. A revitalized Militia would, of course, require stronger Regular Force Army cadre assistance and training.

The equipment needs of this new Army would change the present "Capital Equipment Program." Essentially, it would entail changing the Program objectives from maintaining general purpose forces to supporting lightly scaled units. The CF would likely let present stocks of tanks, self-propelled artillery, armoured personnel carriers and their support equipments and supplies run down. In fact, since we do not manufacture any of these things, Canada may not have many other options. Besides, to strengthen our neutrality, Canada might want to develop further its own arms industry.

The new Army structure would require increases to some present equipments and the development or purchase of new ones. For example, additional purchases of all-terrain type vehicles, like the Volvo B202, would be necessary. We would require a major re-equipment of air-defence systems, and the development of coastal artillery. More surveillance systems would also be needed. Air portable and air base defence forces would require more equipment and transport aircraft to support them. To this list must be added the need to construct and maintain new infrastructures in the

North and elsewhere in Canada for troops returning from Europe.

Force Structure: Air Force

According to the Encyclopedia of Public International Law the air rules for a neutral are strict:

A neutral's failure adequately to protect its airspace militarily or diplomatically can be regarded by a belligerent prejudiced thereby as a breach of the neutral's duties. The belligerent can then protest, claim war damages for resultant harm and, if a serious threat faces it from the neutral's airspace through violations of it by the belligerent's opponent, it can justify corrective military action as a measure of self-defence; depending on the scale of the threat, this could transmute that airspace into part of the region of war.

This legal interpretation presents serious consequences for Canada and calls up a particularly sophisticated Air Force structure. First, Canada would be required to develop or acquire a comprehensive air-space surveillance and control system covering the entire country. Second, we would have to acquire, deploy, and maintain aircraft to conduct intercept duties and to force, by one means or another, intruders to land. Third, as we move very rapidly into the era of cruise missiles, the CF would require the capability to detect, intercept and, if necessary, destroy their carriers. Finally, the CF would have to intercept and destroy any missiles crossing our territory en route to American or Soviet targets.

The aim must be to demonstrate a high level of competence to detect and intercept intruding vehicles. To convince both Soviet and American leaders that Canadian neutral territory would not be used as a covered approach by one against the other, an outwardly facing surveillance barrier would be needed. Also, an internal air-space surveillance and control system would have to be designed, constructed, and put into operation.

The northern edge of a complete peripheral air control system would presumably be available to Canada; that is, the North Warning System (NWS). The purchase of the whole system would cost approximately \$6 billion today.

The NWS issue is complicated because the NWS will not be in operation until 1992. Any earlier hint that Canada would become neutral would surely cause the American government to reconsider its plans and as a result it may construct a U.S.-based and -controlled system elsewhere and with other technologies. In that case, Canada would have to develop and construct an NWS independently and likely without access to U.S. technology, materiel, instruments, technicians, or industries. Certainly, we could not expect American help in this project.

There is at present no Canadian warning network across the southern or coastal parts of the country but one would be needed to demonstrate our neutrality to the Soviet Union. Civilian systems in place and planned for the future are secondary radars that are designed to control "compliant" air traffic but not to identify unauthorized flights or to facilitate interceptions. The Department of Transportation system, because of technical difficulties, cannot be converted to an air-defence role. A replacement of the Pinetree Line with primary radars would be required.

The requirements of neutrality would necessitate a significant increase in Canada's interceptor aircraft fleet. At its height in 1960 the active air defence of North America involved close to 3,000 interceptors, including 200 Canadian aircraft. These aircraft were supported by approximately 90 BOMARC and NIKE surface-to-air missile formations, some of which were deployed in Canada. Today Canada has only 36 aircraft dedicated to North American active air defence.

It is estimated that to give some semblance of air-space control several new air-defence bases would be required. Today we have only two such stations: Cold Lake, Alberta, and Bagotville, Quebec. New air-defence stations, for example, would be required at Goose Bay, Labrador; Summerside, P.E.I.; Trenton, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan; Comox, British Columbia; in the Central Yukon; and at five locations in the far North. Obviously, all these airfields would require additional infrastructure to conduct sustained operations. As for aircraft, it can be assumed that a minimum of 20 aircraft at each base, or a total of 280 interceptor aircraft, would be needed. To this total must be added 12 as a training and maintenance reserve. In all an estimated 156 additional CF-18s would be needed for the Air Force.

Obtaining these additional aircraft would be the major difficulty facing this program. The cost of the extra 156 aircraft, approximately \$5.5 billion in 1987 funds, may not be acceptable. We may also have difficulty in obtaining these aircraft from the present sources, especially if the Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the United States was terminated.

In addition to these costs there would be significant new infrastructure costs to support increased peripheral deployments. In this model existing air stations have been used where possible but even these would have only limited capability to accept full-time fighter squadrons. The new Yukon and five northern airfields would have to be developed from scratch.

The Air Force of a neutral Canada would have to continue many of today's tasks. Search and rescue, transportation, training, and other

surveillance duties of land and sea spaces would have to continue with some, like training, at increased rates.

Canada would have no need to transport personnel and equipment overseas in support of NATO or the U.N. The CF, therefore, could reconfigure its 707 long-range transport fleet to meet other needs. Five aircraft, for example, could be freed to provide the frames for airborne refuelers to support the internal transit of fighter aircraft. It is estimated that four AWACS 707 aircraft plus two 707 command aircraft would be needed. These requirements would prompt a net increase of six 707s for the CF for air-space control in peace and war to supplement our transition ground radar stationed and to meet threats developing from cruise missiles.

Our medium-range transport fleet today is based on 26 C130 aircraft and an assortment of lesser machines. The Senate Defence Committee recommended in 1986 that the present Hercules C130 fleet be increased from 26 to 45 C130 in the "medium term." But the need for these aircraft for international service in support of NATO and the U.N. would be significantly reduced in this model.

There might, however, still be some requirement for international support to foreign aid and disaster relief. There would be a major increase in air-transport requirements inside Canada to support Army airborne and air mobile units and to resupply northern airfields. It is estimated that a neutral Canada, therefore, would require 35 aircraft. This increase of nine C130 would cost \$.3 billion (1987) and with this cost, of course, would come the usual increases in overhead and infrastructure.

Force Structure: Navy

Neutrality at sea is a complex business. It involves the consideration of all aspects of sea usage including innocent passage, mercantile traffic, rights of inspection, control and surveillance as well as defence of territorial waters. Related to these aspects is the concern for ports and harbours and shore facilities.

Essentially, Canada would be required to ensure that our territorial waters remain free for use by all nations within the limits of the laws and customs of the sea. The rules of neutrality allow the passage of belligerents' ships through neutral waters. They must not, however, stay in neutral waters for more than 24 hours or take on materiel that could benefit them in operations. Vessels that do remain in neutral waters for more than 24 hours must be interned by the neutral power. Simply stated, Canada would be required to ensure that military forces of other nations could not use Canadian waters for the purposes of waging war.

These requirements raise unique problems for Canada. Our coasts are vast, well-sheltered, unpopulated and, therefore, hard to control. These factors call for the maintenance of a modern naval force capable of operation in all our territorial waters. Certainly Canadians would have to assume that our competence in sea control, as in the air, would have to be demonstrated and would likely be frequently tested by the U.S. and USSR. Sweden, for example, facing far fewer technical difficulties than Canada, has been notably ineffectual in enforcing its own coastal sovereignty.

One way to control access ways and major ports might be to use coastal batteries. But remote areas would require naval vessels, submarines, and attack aircraft for these purposes. How would we cope with special vessels such as nuclear-powered submarines? Without a similar capability this is a

very difficult question, one that might best be left to the proponents of neutrality to ponder.

Inland waterways that we share with the United States are another difficulty. The status of the Rush-Bagot Treaty and the Great Lakes, the St-Lawrence Seaway, and the control of shipping in the Straits of Juan de Fuca may be subjects for new negotiations. The degree to which we could control waters that are of vital interest to the U.S. would surely provide a pretext for the USSR to pressure our defence policies and take advantage of Canada's neutrality.

It would be a mistake to assume that withdrawal from the NATO collective-defence arrangements would necessarily free naval resources for application to other defence responsibilities. The Canadian Navy under current NATO planning is by and large responsible for the defence of Canadian waters but it is common for critics to point out Canada's inadequacies in its NATO role as well as in the Arctic and Pacific territorial waters. These weaknesses are only overcome by our collective defence arrangements, but as a neutral, Canada's present naval force of 26 surface combatants, three submarines, and 18 long-range patrol aircraft would reassure neither the U.S. nor the USSR that our waters were free of the other's forces. To attempt to be neutral with the present fleet would likely invite intervention from both.

#### Financial Balances

Ultimately, a policy of neutrality must address the question of costs and the balancing of Canada's present military capabilities against what would be needed for a reoriented defence force. Table I depicts the

present defence budget broken down by "activities." It is also broken down into the three main votes; that is, Personnel Years (PY), Operation and Maintenance (O&M), and Capital expenditures. It is a "net" figure that reflects the fact that DND is not completely a not-for-profit organization. Revenue comes into the Department from housing rentals, sale of meals, and certain other returns.

Table II illustrates the budget by percentages of activities. The point to note is that the discretionary budget lies almost entirely within the Capital-expenditure area. O&M tends to move with PY and Capital, so the only way to get more Capital out of this budget (without a discrete budget increase, of course) is to cut personnel and major capabilities. In this discussion it is important to acknowledge the low percentage spent on CF in Europe: 9.2% of the total budget. Table III gives a more precise breakdown of PY allocations.<sup>6</sup>

Almost every unit in Canada is double- or triple-tasked for duties in Canada, and with NATO or the U.N. Therefore, cutting costs directed to one mission does not necessarily provide undiminished funds for other missions. For example withdrawing from NATO would only free troops and capabilities actually deployed in Europe for those missions. More important, of the approximately one billion dollars spent on that activity, very little would be "saved" for new activities since more than 60 percent of that budget is spent for personnel salaries and the operation of equipment. Only by withdrawing the troops and disbanding them and storing their equipment would any saving accrue to Canada. However, in most cases neutrality would require Canada to redirect its efforts from NATO tasks to Canadian defence tasks in new regions.

Defence planners estimate that withdrawing and demobilizing Canadian troops now stationed in Europe might save some \$30 billion over the next 15 years.<sup>7</sup> But under neutrality there would be little possibility for disbanding these military units. Quite the contrary, we would have to increase the strength of the CF to protect our neutrality. There are not enough capabilities or costs going to NATO now to allow us to meet our requirements for neutrality simply by transferring our forces from one region to another.

Tables IV, V, and VI provide an outline of some of the comparative force requirements both under the current collective-defence posture and on the assumption of neutrality as I have modelled it.

Finally, Table VII highlights some representative costs that would have to be met if Canada attempted to change strategies today. The allocation of O&M and PY funds to activities would change but the net effect would be a significant increase in defence spending.

These figures are in "accountant costs"; that is, they reflect fairly accurately costs for the people and real assets involved in this proposal. What is not considered here are what might be termed the intangible and lost opportunity costs to Canada and the CF if a policy of neutrality is adopted. Insofar as defence policy affects many aspects and issues in Canadian society a decision on strategic choices should not be made from budgetary concerns alone.

To support a policy of neutrality, defence spending might have to be maintained at five to six percent of the GNP (an increase of two or three percent and a great deal more during the transition phases). That represents an increase in resources that might well be spent on other things. National defence always necessitates a trade-off between guns and butter,

but insofar as neutrality does not bring about any increase in the security already available through collective-defence arrangements, resources spent on neutrality represent a real waste and a loss of other opportunities.<sup>8</sup>

The present alliance system provides the CF, and thereby Canada, with significant returns that could not be available in a condition of neutrality. Military arts and sciences are rapidly changing. It is almost impossible for Canada, with a small defence budget and limited operational scope to keep up with the practical application of these changes. Each year Canadian and allied units visit each other's bases and take part in joint exercises. These cross-border mutual training arrangements save Canada millions of dollars annually and provide unequalled opportunities for Canadian service personnel to profit from our allies' experiences.

The Air Force conducts numerous exchange visits and joint training exercises with allies. The Maple Flag series of air combat exercises could not possibly achieve the same high standard if it were not for special equipments and challenges introduced by allies' aircraft. At Goose Bay, Labrador, Canadian air crews are exposed to the different techniques and equipments of British, American, German, and Dutch air forces. These experiences could not be duplicated in isolation.

At sea, Canadian crews and commanders are continually challenged and trained in cooperation with allied navies. We regularly exercise in the waters off allied coasts and use their training areas and facilities. Many of the highly sophisticated equipments and tactics of our potential foes cannot be duplicated for training purposes in Canada but we can gain experiences of them when we work with larger navies. These experiences would be lost to us as neutrals with the inevitable degradation of our

military capabilities.

Of course, our land and air commitments in Europe provide the most important and cost effective training grounds for the CF. Large-formation exercises using all the latest equipments and tactical concepts are common in Europe. By taking part in these exercises our soldiers and airmen, and especially our officers, gain experiences that are simply not available to them elsewhere.

Some might argue that the experiences gained from allies in a NATO context would be irrelevant to a neutral Canadian defence force. That, of course, is a narrow and incorrect assessment. Operational effectiveness is an important measure in any capabilities analysis. Certainly our inability to learn in friendly competition with others would degrade our operational effectiveness and this deficiency would soon be noticed by the U.S. and USSR. Closed in and isolated, the competence of the CF would wither away. It would be akin to a situation in which Canadian academics were never allowed to participate in foreign seminars or experimental projects but, rather, were forced to sit at home and discover everything by themselves.

No military force is of much value if it lacks intelligence upon which to base its plans and structure. A neutral Canada would have no immediate sources of military intelligence. Today Canada depends to a large extent on intelligence gained through NATO and from the U.S. and other allies, but, these sources would all be closed if Canada were neutral. Canada would be faced with either acting dumb or paying enormous sums to establish an independent intelligence network.

Neutrality would affect other aspects of our security as well. Canada's defence sharing agreements would be closed down and access to NATO, American, British and Australian defence consultations would be

curtailed. All contacts with NATO and European defence agencies, industrial, scientific, and defence organizations would cease. All bilateral contacts on defence matters with the U.S., such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, would be cancelled and all our defence-related treaties and arrangements with the U.S. and all NATO nations would have to be renegotiated.

One way out of the dilemma caused by a policy of neutrality that we were unwilling or unable to pay for would, of course, be to substitute nuclear defence for conventional defence. Presumably a strategy based on nuclear deterrence could work as well for a neutral Canada as it has for Canada in a collective-defence alliance.

Canada has the expertise and the materiel to construct both the nuclear warheads and the delivery systems it would require. To be sure, there would be some obvious political difficulties with such a strategy. We would have to develop a nuclear-release strategy (MAD or Flexible Response) that would be credible to those who might intrude into our territories. Domestic difficulties may arise when the government attempted to establish a testing area within Canada. A nuclear strategy for a neutral Canada might seem inappropriate to many. Nevertheless in the interests of completeness it is a policy option that must be looked at carefully, particularly as some non-aligned states, such as India, have flirted with similar ideas.

## Conclusion

In order to provide a realistic framework for the discussion of neutrality in Canada and to establish a base line for a defence force model, a criterion based on the "rules and obligations" for neutrals must be established. That criterion has four main points:

- a. Canada would be an armed neutral;
- b. Canada would survey and control its territory so as to deny its use to belligerents;
- c. Canada's capabilities to control its territory would have to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of belligerents in peace and war; and
- d. Any neglect of Canada's responsibilities under the rules of neutrality would invite belligerents to take self-defence measures in Canada.

The final consequences of a military plan or defence policy can only be discovered by answering the following two questions: Will the policy work as a deterrent in peacetime and as a defence in conflict? Will Canada in the end be more secure in peace and war under conditions of neutrality than it has been under conditions of collective defence? In my view, the answer to both questions is no. No official should ever be allowed to propose policies without having to answer one further question: How shall this policy be implemented and what are its likely outcomes?

It remains to be seen when and how the proponents of neutrality propose that Canada should announce its new defence posture. Less uncertain, however, is that any attempt to enforce neutrality without the capabilities to do so would only invite challenges to it, and failures to

meet these might well invite either armed intrusion or international ridicule, or both. If Canada declared that neutrality would be effective as soon as it acquired the capabilities, what would prevent the materiel suppliers of the present CF foreclosing on Canada immediately? In any case, building a neutral force structure would take at least ten to twenty years to accomplish.

Perhaps, Canada could secretly plan to become neutral, acquire the means over a number of years and then pop the surprise on its allies. Some obvious impediments to such an approach occur: it might be difficult for Ottawa to keep such plans secret, and allies in any event might wonder where all the new defence spending was going. How, indeed, could one manage an alliance and a neutral policy at one and the same time? Finally, how could Canada expect the world to stand still for ten to twenty years while it prepared its plans?

There is no way to implement a strategy of neutrality in the absence of capabilities. But even if sufficient capabilities were somehow acquired, there would remain the further question of whether neutrality would be a morally correct strategy for Canada? In the title of his film sketch on neutrality, Gwynn Dyer captured the essential problem for neutrals, "It is Harder than it Looks." For Canada, however, he understated the problem; not only would it be hard, it would also be more costly than collective defence, deceptive to Canadians, ineffective as strategy, and immoral insofar as it abandoned allies to fight for Canadian values.

Notes

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Nye, Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Most interpretations of "duties and roles" are drawn from the Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt (Munich: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law). Assistance in interpretation was provided by the Judge Advocate General, the Canadian Armed Forces, Ottawa.

<sup>3</sup> Testimony of Professor David Cox, Queen's University, Kingston, to the House of Commons, Sub-Committee on External Affairs and Defence, Minutes 8 March 1984, p. 3:33.

<sup>4</sup> Canada. National Defence Act, Section 236.

<sup>5</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1985-86 (London: IISS, 1985).

<sup>6</sup> Tables I, II and III are taken from DND Defence Estimates 1986-87.

<sup>7</sup> Interviews DND, Ottawa, April 1987.

<sup>8</sup> For a comparison of neutralists' defence spending as a percentage of GNP see Sweden, Austria, Switzerland. Source IISS Military Balance 1985-86.

TABLE I  
**NET ALLOCATIONS**  
 DEFENCE ACTIVITIES  
 1987-88




TABLE II  
NET ALLOCATIONS

TYPES OF EXPENDITURES

1987-88




TABLE III

NET ALLOCATIONS  
DEFENCE ACTIVITIES  
1987-88

	PYs	Net \$(000)
Maritime Forces	18,107	2,199,727
Land Forces in Canada	25,129	1,526,426
Air Forces in Canada	30,354	2,776,175
Canadian Forces in Europe	7,171	950,044
Communications Services	4,794	398,432
Personnel Support	19,226	1,314,575
Materiel Support	10,601	652,476
Policy Direction and Management	<u>4,271</u>	<u>522,145</u>
Totals	119,653	10,340,000

TABLE IV

## ARMY FORCE MODEL

FORMATIONS/EQUIPMENTS	CURRENT	NEUTRALITY MODEL
WEST	1 CBG	1 CBG
EAST	5 CBG	5 CBG
	CTC	CTC
NATO	4 CBMG	0
NORTH	0	ARCTIC BASE
AIR FIELD DEFENCE BATTALION	0	12
COASTAL DEFENCE BATTERY	0	5
ENGINEERING REGIMENTS	4	7
AIRBORNE REGIMENTS	1	3
MILITIA	24,000(+/-)	40,000(+/-)
TANKS	114	0
APG	961	144
AVGP	460	900
ARTY - SP	50	0
- AIR PORTABLE	12	72
- LLAD (bty)	3	13
- COASTAL (bty)	0	5

TABLE V  
AIR FORCE MODEL

EQUIPMENT	CURRENT	NEUTRALITY MODEL
AIR SPACE CONTROL		
NORTH	NWS (Projected)	NWS
SOUTH	0	SWS
INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT	136	292
INTERCEPTOR AIR STATIONS	2	14
CC130 (Hercules)	26	35
CF137 (707)		
TRANSPORT	5	0
AWACS	0	4
C <sup>3</sup>	0	2
REFUELLERS	0	5

TABLE VI  
MARITIME FORCE MODEL

EQUIPMENT	CURRENT	NEUTRALITY
SURFACE	26	35
SUBMARINES	3	10 - 12
LRPA	18	36
MINESWEEPER/HUNTER	0	9 - 13

TABLE VII  
TYPICAL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES  
TO ATTAIN NEUTRALITY

(Fiscal Year 1986/87 Billions of Dollars)

	CAPITAL COSTS	TEN YEAR OPERATING COSTS
NORTH WARNING SYSTEM	\$ 1.0	\$ 0.7
SOUTH WARNING SYSTEM	?	?
ARCTIC AIR BASE	0.8	0.3
9 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	0.3	0.2
4 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT	1.2	0.3
156 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT	6.3	3.3
11 LOW LEVEL AIR DEFENCE BATTERIES	2.3	1.0
12 FRIGATES	6.7	1.4
7 SUBMARINES	2.5	0.3
35,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL	---	13.5

Notes to Table VII:

1. General. All costs are a very rough-order-of-magnitude and should be used accordingly. They represent added costs to DND of increasing the force by the elements shown.
2. Source of Procurement. For most of the elements listed, the capital cost is based on procurement from NATO allies (primarily U.S.). Should Canada become neutral, procurement costs could increase and the availability might decrease.
3. Operating Costs. Only the last element (35,000 military personnel) includes personnel costs.
4. North Warning System. These costs represent the U.S. share that we would absorb if Canada went along on this project.
5. Arctic Air Base. This would be an air base that would accommodate two fighter squadrons and a population of approximately 2,200 personnel.