

BALANCING ATLANTICIST AND CONTINENTAL
COMMITMENTS IN CANADIAN SECURITY POLICY:
FUTURE PROSPECTS IN LIGHT OF
CURRENT STRATEGIC TRENDS

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It has been an axiom of postwar Canadian security policy that multilateralism is a much preferred option when compared to an exclusively bilateral relationship with the United States. One need not command the diplomatic astuteness of a Metternich or a Palmerston to comprehend the rationale underlying the North American junior partner's search after political counterweights in its common security relationship with its guarantor. Even in dyadic partnerships cemented by shared liberal democratic values it can be taken as a given that a disproportionately weaker sovereign unit will seek to enlarge its margin of maneuver for the exercise of relative decisionmaking autonomy by exploiting the inevitable openings in the woof and warp of a contextual multilateralism.¹ Unilateralism--should it need to be said in the case of a country that cannot defend itself against conventional threats of any appreciable magnitude and that has renounced national nuclear deterrent capabilities--has not, to this point, been envisaged as a viable security option by responsible political authorities or by the vast majority of Canada's citizenry.²

When that ultimate multilateralist organ, the United Nations in its immediate postwar manifestation, was seen to be incapable of fulfilling the brave new hopes that the elite of Canada's diplomatic corps and their Liberal political masters had entertained for it, Canada's security managers devoted their talents and energies in assiduous pursuit of the

next best alternative, a more circumscribed multilateralism consistent with the terms of the U.N. Charter. The shift from a quasi-global collective security regime to a regional focus on collective defence is an oft-told tale of the "golden age" of Canadian middle-powermanship and forms part of the early postwar security folklore.³ It need not be elaborated on here, although it is worth recalling that both national-interest and world-order perspectives account for the adjustment in focus that attended Canada's active promotion of the North Atlantic concept and its implementation.

Both perspectives were indistinguishable for Canadian foreign policy decisionmakers during the founding period of the late 1940s in all matters relating to the central East-West balance. They remain so today as a recent governmental summary of Canada's international relations bears witness: "The government's objective is to strengthen Canada's security by undertaking and honouring NATO's commitments and participating actively in the councils of the Atlantic Alliance. Europe continues to be the world's most critical military region, and the inner-German border will remain the security 'fault-line' in East-West relations."⁴ The June 1987 Defence White Paper confirms that evaluation of Canadian national and international security interests.⁵

Beyond this fundamental starting point, and consistent with the world view that has informed debates on security issues in Canada over the last four decades, there are composite motives at play in the Canadian commitment to the Alliance. It might be recalled here that, in Swift's allegory, the first Lilliputians to discover Gulliver enlisted their fellows in order to emmesh their future ally and guarantor. The Lilliputians then collectively won Gulliver to their cause. The analogy is germane to this discussion, Gulliver's enlightened self-interest

notwithstanding. Perhaps more than anything else, Canadian policymakers have envisaged NATO as a device whereby American isolationist and interventionist tendencies alike could be moderated in promotion of what might be termed a "consistently responsible internationalism," in cooperation with like-minded European small and medium powers.⁶ This instrumentalist conception of the Alliance as a mechanism designed to ensure ongoing, yet ultimately constrained, U.S. engagement in European security affairs accounts in large part for the traditional Canadian emphasis on the political and economic dimensions of the NATO partnership, beginning with the early initiative to have a substantive non-military functionalist Article enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty.⁷ It is significant that this advancement of intra-Alliance political functionalism on Canada's part has been most pronounced at those times when NATO's primordial Atlanticist identity as a consensually ordered interstate defence and deterrent structure has been tangibly placed at risk. For instance, as the militarization of the Alliance proceeded in response to the Korean conflict, increasing thereby the saliency of raw power variables in relations between the ultimate guarantor and its European Allies, the Canadian representative to the North Atlantic Council, Lester Pearson, was mandated (along with Gaetano Martino of Italy and Halvard Lange of Norway) by the Alliance's political arm to report on ways of developing non-military cooperation among member states. The politically integrationist thrust and inwardly focused pluralism emphasized in the recommendations of these "Three Wise Men" in their 1956 Report⁸ eventually found outwardly directed expression in the 1967 Harmel Report.

The Harmel heuristic has, in turn, infused the strategic culture of

NATO-Europe and set the parameters of the East-West modus vivendi for the greater part of the two decades that have followed its formalization.⁹ Its integrity as a blueprint for managing the defence and deterrence component of the Alliance task, however, is now threatened as a number of strategically relevant trendlines have begun to coalesce in a manner that augurs ill for the interests of trans-Atlantic integrationists within NATO, Canadians above all. Before we set out the specific nature of these trends and analyze the probable Canadian responses as their effects on the Alliance are felt, we first turn to a consideration of the patterns in Canada's military contribution to NATO and the degree to which they reflect the country's search after balance in its force posture, in support of the preferred political option of functional Atlanticism on the one hand, and continental imperatives on the other.

Canada has two inseparable strategic imperatives derived from its geopolitical situation: to defend Canada, and to defend North America in cooperation with the United States. Beyond these two imperatives Canada has a number of strategic choices, the selection and execution of which depend upon many factors. Of these factors the military consideration (in the traditional sense of strategy, tactics, and logistics) has played a minor role. Canadian defence White Papers provide explicit statements and examples of Canada's political and military problems brought about by the tensions that develop from time to time between strategic imperatives and strategic choices.

A central tenet of Canadian defence concepts holds that Canada's only "survival interest" is the prevention of nuclear war between the super-powers. This concept is met by the policy of strategic deterrence and, in particular, by Canada's defence of strategic-deterrent arsenals in North

America, as well as by Canada's contributions to the conventional defence of Western Europe.

Other concepts, however, also frame Canada's system of defence. Canada views itself as a humanitarian nation with the will and the capability to intervene around the world in the name of "peace, order and good government." This self-perception gives substance to Canada's preference for collective security and its faith in the objectives of the United Nations. In addition, many Canadians also believe that Canada's interests are best served through the skilful deployment of its resources among all available channels--both multilateral and bilateral.¹⁰ Insofar as Canada's military efforts under UN and other peacekeeping auspices serve to keep Soviet and American interests apart, these efforts serve Canada's strategic imperatives. Where, however, the link is less explicit these missions may have more to do with altruism than with security needs.

Canada alone among lesser powers, because of its strategic imperatives and the strategic choices it has consistently made, is required to maintain several military capabilities and orientations at the same time. The Canadian Armed Forces (CF) have roles and tasks in North America, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Arctic Oceans, on the ground and in the air in NATO-Europe, and in various UN and other peacekeeping missions around the world. Each of these roles is performed under different concepts of operations that require varying force requirements, command structures, support arrangements, equipment, and training methods. There is in effect a significant centrifugal force at work drawing apart the strategic concept, coherence, and practical force structure of the CF that is given expression by the term "capabilities/commitments gap."

The defence of Canada in North America is conditioned by geography, the overwhelming capabilities of the United States, and by the implausibility of any direct military threat to Canada outside of a general nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Like most other administrators of Canadian public policy, defence planners faced first of all a problem of time, space, and scattered resources. Even in the relatively settled Prairie Provinces, wide areas of the country are uninhabited and not subject to any systematic surveillance. At the northern periphery in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon the country is practically deserted. Lines of communication are slender and usually by air. For example, to travel from Canada's major eastern military deployment base (Trenton, Ontario) to Frobisher Bay on Baffin Island takes six hours; that is, almost the equivalent time to travel from the same base to Florida. But even then one would still be below the Arctic Circle and many hours flying time from the northern edge of Canada's Arctic waters.

Canada has thousands of miles of coastline that varies from relatively placid, well-settled areas on the east and west coasts to remote uninhabited regions on both coasts and in the Arctic. Operating conditions in these areas are substantially different and call for various types of vessels and techniques. Finally, the scattered nature of Canadian communities and the federal Government's need to maintain a military presence in all regions (for natural disaster relief, if for no other reason) compels the CF to disperse its military formations across the country with all the obvious and expensive costs such decentralization entails.

U.S. security requirements bind Canada to American defence concepts and plans. There is no angst in Canada about the viability of America

"coupling" its strategic interests to those of Canada as there is between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance. To the contrary and despite what an objective reading of the historical record indicates,¹¹ many Canadians believe that the United States, in pursuit of its interests, does now and will continue to override Canadian sensitivities and interests if it feels American needs demand it. It is, however, a commonly held assumption in some American circles, as Colin Gray has noted, that "The case for a special defence relationship with Canada is so obvious as to require no discussion."¹²

Nevertheless, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King felt the need to state the obvious in 1938. At a meeting at Queen's University at Kingston, they set out the fundamental concepts that have underpinned Canadian/U.S. defence planning to this day. Their formal pledge of mutual assistance in security affairs produced a number of subsidiary bodies and defence contacts. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), for instance, was instituted to coordinate defence planning between the countries. Within the PJBD, the Military Cooperation Committee allows Canadian and American Forces to routinely plan and coordinate military operations and training in North America.

This entente and its bureaucratic offsprings influence the CF in several ways. In particular, they reinforce the need for units from all three Services to perform operations in various parts of Canada, mostly in the northwest and the Alaskan Highway system. This Pacific orientation stems from experiences of the Second World War but it also reflects the fact that, whereas the Atlantic region of North America falls more or less within the NATO purview, the Pacific regions are a "CANUS" problem alone.

The acceptance by Canada of the need to cooperate in the defence of North America is most obviously illustrated by the Canada/U.S. North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). From the days when it was first recognized that the air defence of North America would become a major undertaking the advantages of a joint command were also accepted. This appreciation led to the development in Canada of a particular air force structure whose main concern was NORAD and which became as a consequence relatively distinct from other elements of the CF.

The formation of NATO and its military requirements in Europe forced on Canadian politicians another fundamental choice: whether to send a Canadian expeditionary force overseas in peacetime. In the event, it was not a difficult decision and had the support of all political parties and a majority of the public. The decision was also made easier because Canada had a surplus of military equipment and, therefore, it seemed a relatively inexpensive proposition. For many Canadian officials and the public alike the deployment into Europe was also considered to be a temporary measure to be undertaken only long enough for Europeans to acquire the capability to defend themselves. As the years passed, however, experience demonstrated that to promote a cohesive multilateralism Canada's political, economic, and security interests required a permanent military role in Europe.

The part Canada should play in NATO-Europe and in the Atlantic is not as obvious to Canadians as it may be to the Americans, British, and continental Europeans. Notwithstanding that Canada was a major military power at the end of the Second World War, the political will to sustain that capability was not forthcoming after 1945. By choice therefore, Canada accepted an obviously limited military role in NATO and groomed its forces accordingly.

In the 1950s Canadian politicians and defence planners accepted the twin ideas of "forces-in-being" and "specialization" as the foundation for Canada's NATO commitment.¹³ The CF thus developed into three distinct Services of highly competent, technically advanced, but separate military forces. As a consequence both of the high cost of this professional force structure and the decline in defence budgets, the CF became ever smaller, dropping from approximately 120,000 in 1962 to 73,000 in 1972.

During the early days of NATO Canada made a significant combat contribution to the defence of Europe and continued to do so until the mid-1960s. In 1969 the Trudeau Government abruptly and arbitrarily halved Canada's standing military forces in Europe from some 10,500 to less than 5,000. This political choice to play an even more limited role in NATO and the concurrent decision to freeze defence spending in 1970 led inevitably to Canada becoming increasingly irrelevant to NATO's defence plans in Europe. This self-depreciation in turn called into question in Canada the worthiness of continuing the deployment at all.¹⁴

The UN, and especially the concept of peacekeeping, occupies a special place in the minds and hearts of Canadians by allowing them to demonstrate to themselves and to the rest of the world how disinterested national military forces could be used to enhance collective security. This image of self-sacrifice is still important in Canada despite evidence that peacekeeping may not be working and may never have had much real impact on world events. In any case, the CF must be prepared to react to requests for UN peacekeeping missions or, indeed, for peacekeeping under other auspices as well. This responsibility introduces an additional, if modest, complication to military planning and resource use.

Overriding these defence tasks and concepts has been the steady

erosion of the resources Canadian politicians have been willing to allocate to defence needs. This decline in expenditures coupled with high rates of inflation in defence costs has forced planners to choose between defence needs, capabilities, services and strategies. Indeed, much of Canada's recent defence history can be viewed as a struggle to maintain strategic imperatives and choices in the context of a persistent needs/resources imbalance.

Canadian politicians have sought several ingenious ways to alleviate the imbalance and its effects. In the post-Korea 1950s the approach was to trust in automatic alliance responses to Canadian needs and to encourage limited specialization within the CF. Ralph Campney, Minister of National Defence (MND) at the time, remarked that specialization was the "meaning of NATO...a great joint effort on the part of all for the protection of each." It "permits," in the Minister's words, each nation to specialize in roles it selects while depending on specialized help from allies in all other fields.¹⁵ The effect was that as the CF became increasingly professional and specialized to NATO tasking; they also became increasingly irrelevant to the territorial defence of Canada.

In the 1960s a new approach was adopted. Paul Hellyer became MND and his priorities were to streamline and modernize defence decision-making and to find within his already constrained budget more money for capital equipment. His solution was to reorganize the CF under one leader with one service; that is, to "unify" the three then separate Services. From this unification scheme Hellyer expected that "savings should accrue from unification to permit a goal of 25 percent of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment."¹⁶ Canada had, in his words "either to increase spending

or reorganize--the decision was to reorganize." The truth seems to be that Hellyer was only partly right--or, more accurately, wrong. If Canada was to maintain its defence commitments and the capability to fulfill them then he had to reorganize and increase spending. Under Hellyer's scheme, but faced with reduced budgets, the CF capabilities continued to dwindle, ironically at a time when NATO adopted (1967) its deterrence-enhancing strategic concept of "flexible response" that explicitly called for increased conventional forces and national policies of mobilization.¹⁷

Hellyer was not as interested in strategic concepts or foreign policy questions as he was with the internal organization of the CF.¹⁸ In his 1964 White Paper he tried to introduce an idea that would allow Canada to continue to participate in North American, NATO, and UN peacekeeping with reduced budgets and manpower. This concept involved creating "maximum flexibility in a mobile army force of two brigades with worldwide capabilities" (incidentally a proposal now resurrected and central to the New Democratic Party's defence policy.) The idea collapsed once its costs, strategic impracticalities, and wastes were realized. In fact, by 1971 the "mobile force" concept was reduced to one lightly equipped battalion.

These defence policies and constrained resources prompted decisions within the defence establishment that tended to orient the CF ever more towards NATO. The Navy was almost totally absorbed in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) activities and had little or no capability to operate in coastal waters or in the Arctic and the Pacific. The Army continued a shadow capability for national mobilization but was really concerned with mechanized operations on the European battlefield under nuclear conditions. All other Army home defence tasks were delegated to the Militia, which under Hellyer's plan had been relegated to the lowest rung in the defence

budget. Even UN missions were considered to be secondary duties. The Air Force continued its functional roles in transport and search and rescue but its main concern was to enhance its high-performance jet capability and its high-tech competence. It did so within NORAD, even though the air-breathing threat had diminished, and NATO, by continuing to develop a nuclear role. By 1967 this "elastic" defence policy with one end in Canada and the other in Europe was stretched to the limit by NATO's European demands and the Services' preference for them.

When Pierre Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968 his political agenda was oriented towards domestic concerns to which foreign and defence policies were to be made subservient.¹⁹ Trudeau rejected the postwar image of Canada as a middle power working primarily through the Western Alliance structure. As he put it himself in an address to Liberal Party supporters "...we had no defence policy...except that of NATO and our defence policy had determined all of our foreign policy. And we had no foreign policy except that which flowed from NATO."²⁰ Trudeau's brief (one-page) defence policy statement on 3 April 1969 signalled an intent to lessen the pull towards NATO and highlighted the Government's determination to reassert the domestic pole of defence policy. Trudeau set out four roles for the Canadian Forces which, while not new, did shuffle the so-called defence priorities. The defence of Canada was now to be first, North American defence second, and NATO third, followed by the UN peacekeeping role.

In 1970 Donald Macdonald became MND and introduced, within the Trudeau framework, yet another approach to balancing the defence needs/resources imbalance: he lowered the threat assessment. The defence White Paper, Defence in the 70s, painted a benign picture of the emerging world.

Détente was seen to be the controlling image in East-West relations; the Third World was developing a democratic outlook leading to increased stability; and, particularly important to Macdonald's own sentiments, Europe was considered rich enough to be able to see to its own defence needs. Drawing on this strategic framework, Macdonald confirmed Canada's plan to withdraw the major portion of its forces from Europe and to reorient defence planning in pursuit of Canadian sovereignty.²¹

Macdonald believed that no level of defence spending could be supported without first satisfying the competing social-welfare demands of the country. Accordingly, defence spending was drastically curtailed, the defence budget was frozen, and equipment programs stalled. Without a NATO plan to focus equipment requirements and starved for funds, CF capabilities continuously declined. Even programs oriented toward the Government's first defence priority, such as purchasing patrol aircraft for sovereignty surveillance, were halted.

Several public and private organizations, including the Conference of Defence Associations, attempted to reverse this trend. Interestingly enough, the main battle tank replacement program became the rallying point for this fight. The tank then in service, the British-made Centurion, had reached the end of its useful life by 1968. Programs to buy a new tank, underway when the White Paper was published, were terminated. The main contention was that equipment that was not relevant to Canada's defence would not be purchased. The tank project, however, was (and continues to be) the centrepiece of the Army's specialized role, to be able to wage mechanized warfare in Europe; without tanks, none of the Army's programs for mechanized operation made any sense. Ultimately, according to Army leaders, Canada would have a force of foot-bound soldiers with little more

sophistication than a home-town militia.

Fortunately for the Army, the Government was not able to withdraw completely from Europe, in large part due to Alliance (and especially German) protests, and it left a truncated "combat group" in Central Army Group Reserve. This group in turn provided the rationale to continue the tank program and with the support of NATO allies, officers and Canadian organizations the tank decision was reversed on 27 November 1975.²² This 1975 reversal marked all but the end of the Canadian-oriented defence policy of 1971; thenceforth, the NATO-pegged policy choice began slowly and unevenly to reassert itself.

Many factors contributed to this reversal of defence efforts. A heightened threat assessment, occasioned by the weakening of détente, was one important cause. The Government simply could not logically continue a policy that had little strategic credibility. European politicians continued to pressure the Canadian defence ministers and other national officials and to draw specific links between Canada's weak NATO stance and her European trading objectives. At home, political pressures continued to mount as the CF was seen to be literally falling apart on the road. National pride and a domestic outcry to improve Canada's defence capabilities began to exert a political influence.²³

In response to these pressures the Liberal governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s provided more funds for defence, but still not enough to repair dramatically the neglect of earlier years. The Government became progressively weaker for unrelated reasons but in the 1984 electoral campaign defence policy became an issue. The Progressive Conservatives played hard on the themes that the CF were in a shameful state and that the

country was a free-rider in NATO. These were telling criticisms that seem to have found broadly based support.

Following their election in September 1984 the Progressive Conservatives began to outline their defence policy in detail, the main elements of which appeared straightforward enough to ensure a consensus in Canada. In the first instance, the Government affirmed its fidelity to the NATO alliance and to North American defence.

During Prime Minister Mulroney's meeting with President Reagan at the "Shamrock Summit" held in Quebec City in March 1985, expression was given to Canada's new attitude. The NORAD agreement was renewed and the Prime Minister announced an immediate increase in Canada's forces stationed in Europe. Both these decisions were generally well received at home and abroad, as were follow-up statements of intent by ministers who visited Europe.

Within the defence establishment the preparation of a new White Paper on defence began in earnest, although the final emphasis of this policy process was not clear at the time. The early inclination that "fixing" the NATO commitments--reacting to the attraction of the European pole--would satisfy defence critics and the public was soon undercut by new pressures.

Canadian concerns for sovereignty in the Arctic came into conflict with other demands in that region. In particular, the need to modernize the North Warning System provided an issue for those who opposed the NORAD agreement on the grounds that it subordinated Canadian interests to American strategy. The growing American emphasis on the Strategic Defence Initiative aroused fears in some Canadian quarters that NORAD and other Canadian defence arrangements with the United States would involve Canada in destabilizing and war-threatening force postures. The new defence

policy thus had to contend with a political issue that had been dormant for many years, Arctic sovereignty.

Secondly, the renewed air threat in the North from ALCMs and SLCMs focused attention once again on the vulnerability of the long East-West fault-line in the Arctic. This tangible threat, whatever its potential, required a response from defence planners that had not been readily apparent in 1984.

Thirdly, the continued American reluctance to settle differences with Canada over the status of Arctic waters prompted renewed public demands for more Canadian "presence" in that region. The 1985 passage of the American Coast Guard ship "Polar Sea" through the Northwest Passage without prior Canadian authorization caused a serious political problem for the Government. Indeed, in the fall of 1986 a decidedly nationalistic conference entitled "True North Strong and Free?" rallied more than 5,000 delegates (including speakers from all political parties) who seemed to share the perception that American, not Soviet, encroachments on Canadian sovereignty constituted the country's biggest challenge in the north.

Finally, the rhetorical flourishes of the first Reagan Administration had given pause to those who previously had trusted American judgment in security affairs. NATO, rather than being seen as an organization dedicated to stability through deterrence, began to look to many to be an agent of overly serious American competitive strategies. This view was reinforced by "out-of-area" incidents in North Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America, with the result that new strains began to appear in the traditionally strong Canadian preferences for collective defence within the Atlantic Alliance.

Thus in the space of a few years the Canadian Progressive Conservative assumption that emphasizing and correcting Canada's NATO policy would be a sufficient defence policy for Canada faded. Clearly, the new White Paper would have to address both the pull of the NATO pole and the Canadian/North American pole simultaneously. To accomplish these two objectives with a defence program that was once again NATO-oriented and with little new money was to be a major challenge.

The Progressive Conservative White Paper on defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, was presented to the House of Commons on 5 June 1987. It is a significant Canadian policy document and, if it meets its declared intent, it will signal a change in Canada's system of defence. The paper confirms the Government's intention to reinforce, and some would say to re-establish, the notion that Canada will seek its security within the NATO structure. The paper explicitly rejects neutrality, non-alignment, and unilateralism. Furthermore, the statement rejects the "free-rider" concept in favour of attempts to make valued contributions to defence. "Canada," said Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence, has stated "...will be a partner with our Allies and not a dependent."²⁴

Moreover, the White Paper explicitly states that Canada in its own interests will make a reasonable contribution to North American defence, while emphasizing that the purpose of this commitment is to ensure broader scope for Canada's decision-making autonomy: "The Government is prepared to discuss all aspects of the defence of North America but we will not allow Canada's sovereignty to be compromised."²⁵ Clearly, the intended outcome of building an increased defence infrastructure at home is to defend against Soviet threats and to forestall American needs to make

intrusions into Canadian territory to counter those threats.

Underlying the practical defence measures outlined in the White Paper is a new strategic outlook that distinguishes this policy statement from the 1971 White Paper, as well as from Canadian left-nationalist political opinion.²⁶ The Soviet threat is clearly perceived and the alliance between Canada, the United States, and Europe is upheld on strategic, political, and ethical grounds. The defence policy statement underlies the decision that NATO must be reinforced (principally conventionally) and that troops maintained in Canada would be dedicated to the protection of sovereignty through military activities; previously, Governments had emphasized "national development" and "peacekeeping/collective security" as roles for Canadian Forces stationed in Canada.

Yet another major theme of the new defence policy is obvious in the title of the paper, Challenge and Commitment. Balancing defence needs with available resources has always been a problem for Canada, as indeed it is for most countries, including the United States. The Progressive Conservative policy attacked the problem directly by recognizing that the "commitments" to NATO and North America required continued support and modernization. The main approach chosen to balance these ongoing needs is to "rationalize" deployments and to generalize force structures and equipment. NATO deployments, therefore, are to be brought together in Central European Command, and equipment programs will be aimed at developing "general purpose" and flexible forces.

The decision to purchase 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines reveals the tensions within the defence policy environment and the desire for rationalization and flexibility. The projected SSN fleet is slated: to

provide for effective maritime defence in the three oceans surrounding Canada; to provide a Canadian under-ice surveillance and control capability; and, to provide a balanced mix of maritime forces for peacetime and wartime functions.²⁷ Taken together with planned improvements to surface and aircraft programs, Canada's Navy in the 1990s will be able to operate from three "platforms" that individually and together can serve Canada in an independent or allied context.

The same concepts are apparent in plans for the other services and the CF as a whole. The Air Force, through its current aircraft-modernization program, will develop more coherence than has previously been the case. The new CF-18 aircraft will be used in all combat roles in Canada and NATO, whereas previously three different aircraft met these roles. This rationalization, plus the fact that air squadrons can be quickly transferred from theatre to theatre, provides the Air Force with a multi-role/multi-theatre organization. Even though the cost of the CF-18 limited the number of aircraft that were purchased, the Air Force is convinced that the qualitative leap in performance of the CF-18 over the old models will enable them to meet Canada's defence commitments efficiently and effectively.

The Army is less easy to structure or equip for dual roles than are the other services. Tactics, vehicles and weapons, and organizations vary greatly in terms of the needs of NATO, home defence, and peacekeeping. The Army, therefore, will continue to evidence a more specialized force profile especially in its mechanized configuration in NATO-Europe. For this reason it is anticipated that the Army may continue to be the focus of criticism as being "irrelevant" to the defence of Canada.²⁸

This orientation is a major handicap for those who wish to maintain CF

in both Canada and Europe. Suggestions to withdraw troops from NATO and to leave the Alliance almost invariably focus on the Army commitment alone. These criticisms and tendencies will only be stifled when the relevance to Canada of the Army's European role can be convincingly explained to the public and when the Army is able to perform its European function in such a way as not to appear to overburden home defences. The public-education process remains essentially a political problem and is clearly recognized as such in the White Paper. The second aspect is more a military problem, and it too is central to the new defence policy.

Generally, Canada has met all its postwar defence tasking with professional forces-in-being. These quite finite troops have, of necessity, been so widely scattered to meet multiple commitments that none of the tasks could be accomplished credibly.²⁹ This all-too-obvious gap between commitments and capabilities helped spawn a domestic constituency determined to bring the troops home, to man the barracks as it were. Under the new policy, however, it was decided to make a serious attempt to move away from forces-in-being to a mobilization concept based on Reserve Forces. Specifically, these Reserves would be used to reinforce Regular Force units but especially to meet home and North American defence tasks. With the home defence thus assured by the Reserve Forces, it was assumed that pressures to bring the Regular Army home would subside. In a broader vision a "Total Force" of Regular and Reserve Army is perceived to be the only logical way to meet all the army's peacetime and wartime tasks in a truly flexible and credible way.

Should all these concepts and plans be realized, Canada would have in the future a "system of defence" radically different from that of today.

The CF would no longer be a strictly professional, force-in-being, single-shot organization. Neither would it be an inflexible, overly specialized force focused on single missions. Rather, the CF might develop into a modern and flexible general-purpose military force founded on a much more diverse and solidly constituted national consensus and mobilizable resource base.

The central theme of the 1987 White Paper on Defence and the major challenge facing those who will implement it is to provide for a Canadian system of national defence that is relatively independent of other states' defence objectives, yet to do this within an Alliance context. The pull on Canadian political commitments and the physical demands on the CF between the strategic imperative of North American defence and the strategic choice of sharing in European collective defence and UN collective security is growing increasingly inelastic. A new system of national defence must be developed that will increase Canada's military capabilities so as to allow some larger measure of political response to a changing military and political world. It would be a tragic irony, however, if Canadians came to believe that enhanced capabilities to act independently would enable them to abandon collective efforts in defence of shared values.

Conclusion

When one surveys the historical record of Canada's participation in the North Atlantic Alliance, the single most striking conclusion that surely must be noted is the inability of Canadian policymakers to appreciate the necessary linkages that obtain between military and political variables. How a nation might pursue an Atlanticist multilateralism with any hope for meaningful influence in the "widening

Atlantic" debate on the basis of an eroding or minimalist military contribution would confound the ablest diplomatic corps and political leadership. In the context of an emerging two-pillared Alliance structure, Canada's "chickens are now coming home to roost all at once," as one of the country's former Ambassadors to NATO has pointed out.³⁰ Whether one assesses trends in the arms-control process, defence technologies, West-West relations (in both their economic and strategico-political dimensions, including of course the Pacific SLOCs), strategic doctrines and contingency planning, or the North American political economy, all indicators point to a closer continental functionalism whatever the eventual structural overlay. While it has been a tenet of Canada's postwar security policy that a "dumbbell" or two-pillared Alliance configuration would be inimical to Canadian interests,³¹ the dumbbell will likely have to do in coming years.

As a truly junior partner in North American-based integrated strategic deterrent and defence systems Canada would be placed precisely where it has striven not to be for almost the entire bipolar era: identified with the global interests and agenda of the West's (and North's) leading power, and unable by that fact to give persuasive expression to its diligently managed self-image as a "helpful fixer" and "honest broker" in international security affairs. This, at core, is what will lend the coming debates in Canada their intensity, for it is the country's self-definition as a member of the international community of states that will be at stake. That Canada's variant of postwar internationalism had been rendered feasible in large part by a particular constellation of global, but ultimately Eurocentric, relations of power will be a bitter pill to swallow.

In this somewhat longer-term scenario, Canada's commitment to the Alliance will come under considerable stress and the domestic constituency for the neutrality option may well increase. Whether continentalism, a reinvigorated Atlanticism, or neutrality triumphs in the end remains an open question despite Canadians' undoubted commitment to liberal-democratic values and shared destinies. The final irony, of course, is that the eventual outcome will continue to be determined largely by factors external to Canada, such as major power interests and strategic doctrines, the East-West power equation, and the technological capabilities of deterrent weapons systems and warning and surveillance infrastructures. Yet a significant range of autonomous choice remains within the effective scope of domestic political will and the publication of the Defence White Paper has signaled the start of the first comprehensive national review of Canadian security policy since the Alliance's formation.

References

¹The multilateralist reflex is simply a variation on the theme of power balancing. It translates traditional concerns from adversarial eras into the modern idiom of intra-Alliance "defence against help." As one defence analyst has pointed out: "To create a Canadian nation in the face of major geographical, climatic, economic, and cultural obstacles has been an immense challenge, and the proximity of one of the most dynamic and powerful states the world has ever known has vastly complicated the problem. The implications of the continental imbalance for Canadian defence policy has been only one aspect of this continuing challenge in which the preservation of national confidence in the Canadian destiny as a viable and prosperous northern transcontinental state has been a primary concern. From French colonial times, Canadians have always sought an overseas counterbalance to offset the effects of the continental imbalance." Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977), p. 258.

²"Responsible" is employed here in the constitutional sense of democratically mandated governing parties. The social democratic New Democratic Party adopted a binding resolution at its 1985 Federal Convention that reads as follows: "Be it resolved that the New Democratic Party confirm its commitment to peace and disarmament by reaffirming its policy calling for Canadian withdrawal from NATO and other military alliances." "Resolutions Reference," *The New Democrats*, October 1986, p. 57, and 1987 Supplement. The NDP has fallen from first to third place in public opinion polls since the publication in July 1987 of its response to the White Paper; however, undecided voters still represent more than a quarter of all electors. In their parliamentary wing's official response to the Conservative Government's Defence White Paper, the social democrats reasserted that "Canada can now make a more effective contribution to peace and security outside of NATO." See Derek Blackburn, M.P., *Defence Critic, "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the Defence White Paper"* (Ottawa: The New Democrats, July 1987), p. 6. While the NDP has continued to assert its anti-NATO policy, including withdrawal from the Canada-U.S. North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), within the country, its Defence Critic has adopted a radically opposed stance when addressing Americans. Referring to the NDP official response to the White Paper, Blackburn claimed that "This paper is not neutralist, isolationist or passivist...We don't want to withdraw from NATO and NORAD...NATO is pretty sacrosanct [to Canadians]." Defense News, 24 August 1987, p. 10. At this point, it is simply too early to know whether the NDP is misleading Canadians or their ally.

³See, for example: Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO, 1946-1949 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959); Escott Reid, "Canada and the Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1949," in Freedom and Change: Essays in Honour of Lester B. Pearson, ed. Michael Fry (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp. 106-35; C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), esp. pp. 374-429; and, R. A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto: McClelland and

Stewart, 1971).

⁴Government of Canada, Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons (Ottawa: Supply and Services, December 1986), p. 12.

⁵Government of Canada, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1987), esp. pp. 9-22.

⁶One of the architects of Canadian postwar foreign policy, John Holmes, approaches this theme deftly in "Canada and the United States: The Relationship in Alliance and World Affairs" in his collection of articles, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), pp. 143-65.

⁷See John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of The Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 37-60.

⁸"Non-military Co-operation in NATO: Text of the Report of the Committee of Three," NATO Letter, 5 (Special Supplement to no. 1, 1 January 1957).

⁹In his capacity as Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the late Knut Frydenlund summarized the impact of the Harmel approach in the following terms: "It opened the way for the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany...It provided a framework for the important US-Soviet agreements on arms control and other issues affecting the relationship between the two superpowers concluded during the Nixon/Kissinger period, a process which was carried further during the Carter years. Even more important, it opened the way for the whole Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process and the negotiations on conventional arms reductions in Europe." See "Thirty Years of Political Cooperation," NATO Review 34 (December 1986): 4.

¹⁰Department of External Affairs, Statement 86/30, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at University of Toronto, 22 May 1986.

¹¹Instructive in this regard is: Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987).

¹²Colin S. Gray, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics and the Defence of the West (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986), p. 46.

¹³Douglas L. Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye, 1987), pp. 193-198.

¹⁴The Liberal White Paper on Defence, Defence in the 70s, concluded that Canada's European partners were able to provide for the conventional defence of Europe. The New Democratic Party statement on defence of July 1987 takes exactly the same view.

¹⁵Government of Canada, House of Commons, Canada's Defence, R. Campney, MND, Ottawa, 16 June 1955.

¹⁶Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 19.

¹⁷Bland, pp. 196-197. See also NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Services) pp. 139-140.

¹⁸Paul Martin, A Very Public Life 2 vols. (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985) 2: 499-500.

¹⁹Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision Making (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972).

²⁰Address by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, 12 April 1969, DEA S/S No. 69/8,

²¹Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971).

²²Statement in the House of Commons by the Minister of National Defence, 27 November 1975.

²³For example, see: Reports of the Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (4 vol.); DND, Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces, Final Report, Ottawa 15 March 1980; various Reports of the Conference of Defence Associations; Canada's Defence Policy: Capabilities versus Commitments, Business Council on National Issues, Ottawa, September 1984; and, Peter C. Newman, True North Not Strong and Free (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1983).

²⁴Statement in the House of Commons by the Minister of National Defence, 5 June 1987.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶One of the more intriguing ironies of defence debates in North America is the strange-bedfellow co-existence of the anti-NATO political left in Canada and the American neo-conservative critics. For a brief overview of both the isolationist and anti-American internationalist cases for withdrawal as they have been articulated in Canada, see: Jocelyn Coulon, "Another Path for Canada? The Politics of Neutralism," Peace and Security 2 (Spring 1987): 8-9; and, Leonard Johnson, "Canada, the United States, and the Western Alliance," in Roots of Peace: The Movement Against Militarism in Canada, eds. Eric Shragge, Ronald Babin and Jean-Guy Vaillancourt (Toronto: Between the Lines Publishing, 1986), pp. 19-25. A radically different Alliance is portrayed in Melvyn Krauss, How NATO Weakens the West (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Irving Kristol, "Does NATO Exist?," in his Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 236-47; and Angelo Codevilla, "American Soldiers in Europe: Hostages to Fortune," National

Interest, 8 (Summer 1987), pp. 89-93.

²⁷Notes for an address at Queen's University, 15 March 1988, by Captain (N) Wilfred Lund, Principal Submarine Advisor, Chief Submarine Acquisition Project, DND.

²⁸David Cox, "Where will Ottawa find the money? Canada's forces have big plans but paying the bill won't be easy," Globe and Mail (Toronto) 18 March 1988, p. A7.

²⁹George Lindsay, "Tasking, Multi-tasking, Over-tasking and the Matching of Commitments to Resources," (Ottawa: DND, April 1976).

³⁰John G. H. Halstead, "Foreword" in Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. x. See, as well, John Halstead, "The View from the Northwest Flank," Forum: Conference of Defence Associations 2 (May 1987): 11-14.

³¹John W. Holmes, "The Dumbbell Won't Do," Foreign Policy, 50 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-22.