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# THE INFLUENCE OF GEOPOLITICS AND REALISM ON CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC STUDIES

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## Introduction

Among the numerous sources of intellectual guidance employed by students and practitioners of strategy in international relations, few have been as influential as, and perhaps therefore more controversial than, geopolitics and realism. For that matter, both approaches could be argued to constitute the earliest and most long-lived of the conceptual frameworks utilized by those who have pursued statecraft; however, we would caution against a too-literal attempt to ascribe direct lineage of these established traditions to the ancients. For reasons that we argue in the next section, both geopolitics and realism can only be considered "modern," by which we mean that each is firmly rooted in the international strategic context as it has developed within the last century.

Not only that; each has been in recent years the subject of vigorous and searching reappraisal, on the part both of adherents and critics. Nor is there any reason to assume that either the scholarly or the policy significance of the two is likely to diminish in the coming decade. What we discern of late in the case of geopolitics is a resurgence of interest in a paradigm that was once so discredited (at least among Western strategic analysts) as to appear on the verge of extinction. Much different is the case of realism. At least since the end of the Second World War, and particularly in the United States, this approach (however interpreted) can only be deemed to represent analytical and policy-making orthodoxy. What is interesting about it during the past decade has been the attempt to reformulate it so as to provide continuing guidance both for

analysis and policy-making in a changing political and economic international environment.

Critics of the two approaches would, of course, dispute the value of the empirical or normative guidance that either could or should offer. To them, the very use of these frameworks, especially realism, has precluded the emergence of more imaginative and globally oriented approaches to a series of pressing problems, including that of the nuclear threat to human survival. And among more philosophically minded critics of recent directions in, for example, U.S. strategic doctrine, geopolitics and realism stand as ultimate sources and justifications of nuclear war-fighting fascinations--justifications whose logic is held to require nothing short of relentless, "power-maximizing" brinksmanship.[1]

While there is some merit in this charge, it is our view that the most striking aspect of the contemporary debate over geopolitics and realism, particularly the latter, is the degree to which they have been caricatured, not only by their critics but, ironically, also by many of those who claim to be adherents. It is our initial purpose in this essay to map out both of these concepts with the view to more fully identifying their historical and epistemological content. In addition, we seek to assess their contemporary and on-going relevance, both for analytical and policy-making ends. We conclude that if the case against them is not as strong as the critics make it out to be, neither is the argument in their behalf as well-developed as it could and should be if realism and geopolitics are going to continue to serve as helpful sources of insight into strategic studies and security policy-making. In the following two sections, we explore in turn the historical and conceptual foundations of contemporary geopolitics and

realism.

## Geopolitics: A Conceptual Analysis

Geopolitics, in an earlier era, would most assuredly have rated a position of some prominence among the topics deemed most worthy of study in university courses on security or strategy; indeed, an aspiring strategist of a generation or two ago would have had to go out of his or her way to avoid coming into contact with any number of required texts derived from one branch or other of the "geopolitical" school.[2] But with the passage of time it became rare to discover much respectful reference to geopolitics in any serious curriculum in strategic studies or international relations. Rarer still would have been an encounter with someone who actually considered himself or herself to be labouring in the vineyards of geopolitical theory. Among most contemporary students of international relations and of strategy, geopolitics seems not to have fully recovered from the fall from conceptual grace that occurred after 1945--even though before the fall, it had been as much, if not more, in fashion among students of international politics as are now such theoretical concerns as interdependence and regimes.[3] The causes of the fall are varied. The imperative of changing intellectual fashion is one, but not the most important, reason for the almost total abandonment of explicitly geopolitical analysis on the part of political scientists. Nor is the capture of geopolitics by political geographers anything other than a symptom, not a cause, of its abandonment by political scientists. There are several explanations of the demise, among which three strike us as being most worthy of note.

The first is that the method of approach we call geopolitics had

become tainted by association with the pre-World War II German "science" of Geopolitik--a pseudo-science that in some ways was similar to the geopolitics of leading British and American theorists like Mackinder, Mahan, Fairgrieve, and Spykman, but was fundamentally characterized by its normative stress on the necessity of German expansionism.[4] Indeed, the taint-by-association syndrome is apparently hard to discard, having dissuaded at least one scholar from situating his work on the assessment of world power plainly within the corpus of geopolitical writing. That scholar, Ray S. Cline, has noted that his decision to label his own approach "politectonics" was in large measure a function of there being no suitable concept now in use that better conveyed the shifting realities of the international power system, the subject of Cline's inquiry. Geopolitics could have suited his purposes, but unfortunately, it "fell into disrepute some time ago...."[5]

If some have shunned the concept primarily as a matter of etiquette, still more have refrained from employing it out of the conviction that it is simply too imprecise to serve as an effective tool for political analysis. To be sure, political scientists have long learned to live with the fact that ultimately theirs is a discipline whose concepts can never be submitted to the test of truth in any objective, certifiable form. We all are reminded, more often than is perhaps necessary, of the definitional problem that confronts us, but we do try to come to grips with this problem by adopting reasonably succinct operational definitions that are at minimum internally consistent within the arbitrary limits we establish for them. From this perspective, the primary drawback of geopolitics is that it is conceptually so broad that it can and does mean all things to all people.

That it is prone to manipulation by those who are most comfortable with deterministic theories and models is only an added deficiency, for the basic flaw is its ambitiousness. Once we have been told, as a frequently cited definition of the concept puts it, that geopolitics is "the study of political phenomena (1) in their spatial relationship and (2) in their relationship with, dependence upon, and influence on, earth as well as on all those cultural factors which constitute the subject matter of human geography (anthropogeography) broadly defined," what else is left to say?[6]

A third case made against geopolitics as a useful concept for analysis is that it is obsolete. According to this view, whatever merit geopolitical grand theory may have had in former years, in the nuclear age geopolitics is of diminished utility. Not only have spatial considerations (for example, being a maritime power as opposed to being a land-based power) been said to have undergone a reduction of importance in the post World-War II decades, but so even have other geographical phenomena such as the importance of raw materials as either a cause of war or as a means of carrying on a war.[7] The diminished-utility thesis has an obvious affinity with John Herz's well-known argument that the onset of the nuclear age constituted a "Great Divide" between international politics rooted in the concept of territoriality and one in which that concept has been stripped by technology of most of its meaning.[8] Although exponents of the diminished-utility perspective would not be prepared to argue that political implications of geography are irrelevant, the thrust of their critique leads them to concentrate upon other, non-geographical, factors as the primary variables in international politics.

What imprecision and the Nazis began, therefore, technological innovation kept in motion; and geopolitical hypotheses continued to lose

relevance during the 1950s and 1960s. To the extent that geopolitics ever had a contribution to make to the study of international politics, it did so as a result of the attention it drew to geographical factors that conditioned the way in which power and influence were distributed internationally. As the Sprouts argued, in what remains one of the most thoughtful analyses of geopolitics ever published, geography has tended to contribute to differential distribution patterns of power and influence in three major ways: 1) through the role of climate in the social, economic, and political development of nations; 2) through the part played by configuration in facilitating the adoption of particular kinds of military technologies; and 3) through the contribution that access to raw materials has made to a state's power capability.[9]

Writing more than a quarter century ago, the Sprouts were among a group of scholars who foresaw the obsolescence of geopolitical hypothesizing that attempted--as Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman had once done so notably--to link configuration with differential patterns of power and influence, and this because of "revolutionary" developments in the technology of warfare. In ways evocative of Herz, the Sprouts elaborated on the rapidly diminishing importance of territory in strategic affairs, a disappearance signifying that "the geographical layout of lands and seas and the configuration of the lands have lost much of the military-political value once attached to these factors."[10] Because of this, it followed, geopolitics would continue to lose utility as a conceptual apparatus for the study of strategic issues. It would become, or so it seemed, passé.

But something curious has happened to geopolitics in the past few years: it has refused to fade away. Indeed, it has made something of a

conceptual rebound lately. In truth, it never did disappear completely as a method of analysis and policy guidance; for as we shall argue below, despite its period of retreat in English-speaking parts of the strategic-studies community, it still retained vibrancy in certain Latin American settings, and in the past decade it has become de rigueur to many French-speaking strategic analysts. Moreover, even when few in the Anglo-American community were investigating the possibility of breathing new life into the concept, the word retained a certain liveliness, as if it actually meant something.

At least part of the recent resurgence of the concept must be attributable to the earlier return of the word to everyday usage. One scholar, Leslie Hepple, credits the frequency with which geopolitics was employed by Henry Kissinger, both while he was making American foreign policy and after he left government, for the re-emergence of the word's (if not the concept's) popularity among analysts of international politics and strategic studies.[11] For many who choose today to employ the word, its meaning is still not terribly precise; in fact, as it is most often used, it seems to have little to do with geography per se and more to do with relations between the superpowers--or, as in the case of some recent observers of U.S. foreign policy, with relations between one of the superpowers, the United States, and its Third World neighbours.[12] A celebrated attempt to employ the word in a purposeful manner came with Ronald Reagan's remarkable sua culpa speech of 4 March 1987, in which the President told the American public, by way of explaining how things could have gone so agley with the administration's Iran policy, that "I let my personal concern for the hostages spill over into the geo-political strategy..."[13] More recently, the head of the American Express Co. has

labelled the LDC debt burden a "geopolitical problem" for American foreign policy.[14]

Apart from the loose usage of geopolitics as a referent to superpower politics, there is another sense in which the term is used that explicitly endows it with policy relevance: as a substitute for, or embellishment of, realpolitik--if by the latter we mean the readiness to apply force in the pursuit of foreign-policy objectives that are rooted in an understanding of the "balance of power." In this context, geopolitics becomes a concept that lends itself first and foremost to the application of strategies intended to contain the expansionary thrust of the Soviet Union.[15] The leading contemporary theorist whose analysis can be situated within a geopolitical context linking geography explicitly with the balance of power is, of course, Colin Gray, who calls upon strategic-studies experts to root their premises firmly in geopolitical terrain, because the outward reach of the Soviet Union has meant, to Gray, that "the concepts contained in the classic literature of geopolitics were never so relevant to international political reality as they are today."[16] Preeminent among the classics Gray bids us to read (or re-read) is the book that developed the concept of "rimland," Spykman's seminal America's Strategy in World Politics.[17]

More relevant than terminological matters to the rekindling of theoretical interest in geopolitics have been changes in the international system itself, which have invested geography with a renewed political significance--and have tended to vitiate the Sprouts' prediction of a diminution of geographical contributions to international power differentials. The changes have been twofold. First were the portentous developments in the sphere of international political economy, especially

insofar as raw materials were concerned, which did so much to focus policy makers and policy analysts alike on the contribution that access to minerals could have on the power and influence of states. The two oil "crises" of the 1970s, and the cognate worries that consuming countries have demonstrated regarding their supply of nonfuel minerals (including, most recently, those coming from the Republic of South Africa) have led to a reassessment of the political significance of such geographical considerations as raw materials.[18]

The second and no less important change concerns the shifting impact of military technology upon geopolitical conceptualizations. It really did seem, when the Sprouts were pronouncing the impending demise of geopolitical hypothesizing in international relations, that the latest advances in the military arts, particularly those implicated in the rapid delivery of nuclear warheads by intercontinental ballistic missiles, were rendering footless theories or models that sought to demonstrate the importance of geography to international political outcomes. What could have been more liberating, from the point of view of undoing the bonds of geographical conditioning, than a weapons-delivery system that seemingly mocked geographical distance--and especially the territorial insulation it once conveyed, at least to certain states?[19] But the major problem with their argument that technology had radically changed the nature of the geopolitical enterprise was that the writers of a generation ago seriously underestimated the potential of technology to pose as its own best counterweight: in this, as in so many areas, it seems that the only sure statement to be made about technology is that it cuts both ways, and what it bestows in one instance it can remove in another, and vice versa.

## Realism: The Contested Richness of a Tradition

Much more recent an approach to strategy in international relations has been the hotly disputed concept of "realism." A self-conscious realism applied to statecraft and international relations theory is properly ascribed to a period beginning in the late 1930s, despite the persistent arguments of some commentators for an unbroken tradition in Western thought stretching back over two millennia.[20] The proponents of this realism certainly claimed precursors from among a cluster of thinkers and model practitioners, including Thucydides, Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Richelieu, Metternich, Hamilton, and Disraeli. Their conceptions, further, bear some relation to ideas that find expression at least contemporaneous with the emergence of territorially defined sovereign states from the political patchwork of feudal Europe and the exhaustion of religious wars: that of raison d'état, in which the survival of the state is its own justification and the stateman's first concern; and later, that of classical balance-of-power theory, with its implied preference for the multi-state system over the likely alternative of imperium, and its imperative to manage the system and preserve its leading members by means of diplomacy and limited war. The early realists' combined critique, however, was directed against a more contemporary target, which they identified derisively as "utopian idealism" or "liberal optimism."[21]

The idealism of the interwar period had envisioned a gradually evolving world community with a shared interest in peace, governed by the rule of law and the extension of democracy, and guided in its moral progress by principles needing only to be put forward in sufficiently persuasive terms. The creation of the League of Nations and the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, outlawing resort to war, represented the most

tangible signs of this progress. In turn, the combined force of the rise of fascism, the League's collapse and the outbreak of World War II served both to shatter this optimism--if not the urgency, for some, of remaking world politics around international institutions--and to prepare the ground for the challenge issued under the name of realism.

A properly nuanced, critical discussion of the many influential thinkers who contributed to this challenge cannot be attempted here.[22] What follows, instead, is a brief survey intended to illustrate the range of realist argument; for, as recently suggested, "political realism must be understood less as a coherent theoretical position in its own right than as the site of a great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes."[23] Its earliest proponents, Raymond Aron has argued, were united most of all by their desire to "think against," to puncture illusions and expose any sign of what appeared to them self-righteous "moralism."[24] Beyond this, they often disagreed, not only in their judgements about foreign policy and the character of the post-war world, but more fundamentally in their views about the nature of intellectual inquiry into human affairs and the possibilities of a science of politics. And in the hands of Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Herz, for example, political realism was ultimately a philosophical position articulated in relation to a larger tableau of Western thought, Christian theology, interpretations of history, and modern psychology. At this level, realism set itself against liberal assumptions that human beings were motivated, and should be defined, primarily by their capacity for independent reason. It followed that evil was not merely a primitive condition from which the species was emerging by the development of its "higher faculties." Rather, it was rooted in the

anxieties of finite human beings whose nature involved a richer complex of motives--to dominate, to gain security, to sympathize, and even to pursue, against self-interest, the ideal of unselfish love.[25] This realism, in sum, posited what Morgenthau called the "tragic sense of life" in a social world not susceptible of rational control on the model of natural science, and hence unable to extricate itself from the "perennial problems of politics" within and between groups.[26]

In relation to international politics, more specifically, realist arguments have ranged across as many as three levels: general theories about the nature of international politics as such; orientations toward foreign policy based on these precepts; and, treatments of the ethical dilemmas of statecraft.[27] At the first level, two different emphases can be discerned. One is captured in Morgenthau's assertion that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power."[28] The other finds a radical dichotomy between domestic and international politics, that is, between the realm of law and orderly governance and the realm of anarchy and the absence of any overarching authority able to adjudicate between conflicting sovereign states. By this latter emphasis, the unique character of international politics demands that states make provision for their own security, though in doing so they may heighten the anxiety of their neighbours. Ultimately, for Kenneth Waltz, among others, the cause of war is located in this "permissive" character.[29] These two emphases, it should be said, are not necessarily incompatible; both can often be found in post-war realists. Morgenthau, for example, could define all politics in terms of a struggle for power and still depict the international realm as that in which the customary restraints of law and ethics were, especially in the twentieth century, relatively impotent. As

well; realists generally have viewed the tendency toward a balancing of power as a restraint and source of order peculiar to international politics.

At the level of foreign policy, realism historically should be understood as fundamentally conservative in orientation, no less scornful of risky adventures than it is of the refusal to recognize the role of power in international politics. In the context of the post-war United States, thrust into a position of global power from which there was no retreat, many prominent realists counselled restraint and opposed the conduct of the Cold War as further evidence of an unhealthy self-righteousness and a propensity to justify policy by appeal to general principle. Thus the Truman Doctrine, with its promise to "free peoples everywhere," did not escape realist criticism. What realists such as Morgenthau and George Kennan advocated was a foreign policy based on "national interest" as opposed to any "ideological" desire to remake the world in the American image. Whatever problems exist in their claims for an objective core of national interest, or for a perspective that transcended ideology, their concern to distinguish vital from peripheral interests in foreign policy and to judge finite means carefully in relation to ends is clear.[30]

Realism urged a willingness to live in a world of diversity and balanced power, because absolute security was beyond reach and intervention in others' domestic affairs raised the prospect of over-extension. Given the increasingly destructive nature of war in an age of thermonuclear weapons and deeply rooted political divisions, and given the inherent difficulties of calculating and controlling the course of hostilities once

begun, the decision to utilize military force could not be taken lightly. Kennan's version of containment strategy downplayed military in favour of economic and political forms of pressure.[31] Morgenthau's analysis of the elements of national power emphasized, above all, the quality of diplomacy.[32] It might be argued that this preoccupation with diplomacy reveals a nostalgia for an irretrievable era, but it bespeaks something of post-war realism's search, even at the height of East-West tension, for negotiation and accommodation of interests short of war.

The question of whether there is more continuity than fundamental rupture between the above "classical" realism and those "realisms" that have gained prominence over the past decade cannot be settled here. To some extent, the answer depends on the weight placed on methodological considerations. Leading contemporary realists are less inclined to argue on philosophical or ethical grounds; typically, while they admit to inspiration from the post-war generation, they claim greater rigour and theoretical precision against the eclecticism and vague notions of power and interest bequeathed them. Regardless of whether this shift represents an advance or an impoverishment of realism, it is necessary to distinguish between its two main variants. For the sake of clarity, they can best be treated as "structural" and "neo"- realism.[33]

The former is identified most clearly with Theory of International Politics in which Kenneth Waltz seeks to isolate the interaction of sovereign units as a realm of inquiry irreducible to the sum of foreign policies, and to consider how this structure constrains and shapes the behaviour of states.[34] Perhaps the most important structural variable is the distribution of capabilities across units. While this model has numerous limitations, not least of which is its ahistorical character, it

insightfully conceives power not simply as control over outcome but also in terms of the measure to which an actor may adversely affect others and must otherwise be taken into account, apart from its own specific intentions. Structure constrains some states more than others. At the level of foreign policy, in turn, Stephen Krasner has adopted much of the structuralist argument to explain why the U.S. could afford the post-war "luxury" of an ideological anti-communism that failed with Vietnam to distinguish vital interests.[35]

Neo-realism, meanwhile, can be applied to arguments that the world painted by classical realism has changed in the direction of increasing economic interdependence, emerging non-state actors, and diminishing utility of military force, the latter owing both to its destructive potential and its inappropriateness for economic welfare goals.[36] While interdependence does not signal an end to power relations, and applies less readily to the East-West axis of world politics, power itself has become more elusive. This view is not inattentive to structural factors, namely a shift in relative capability away from the U.S., but also finds greater incentives for cooperation among western industrial countries in the management of the global economy. In this changed world, Richard Feinberg has argued, a "neo-realist" U.S. foreign policy would recognize the advantages afforded by the need for states to trade within the constraints of an approaching global economy, avoid counter-productive military intervention in the Third World, and in effect gain by doing less.[37]

If the revival of realism has led in diverse directions, then, it has also sparked a renewed critique within the context of the interparadigm debate over the supposed hegemony of realism in the post-war Western study

and practice of international politics--a debate that in no small degree has turned on a postulated American ethnocentrism.[38]

Realism and Geopolitics: Ethnocentric Approaches?

To deny a close identification between realism and the U.S. would be disingenuous. As the above survey suggests, that cluster of concepts comprising realism has been shaped significantly by questions posed for American foreign policy and addressed from a great-power view of international relations. But we ought not to push this argument too far, to the point where realism becomes simply a tool called into being to justify U.S. predominance. It remains an open question whether post-war American policy has reflected the triumph of realist ideas or rather their reduction to mere tough-mindedness about the communist threat, dressed up in the borrowed language of power and interest. In any case, realism from the outset has never been confined to the U.S., where its first proponents tended to be European emigrés. The argument might well be made for a British genesis, beginning with E. H. Carr and building through the late 1940s on the diverse work of George Schwartzenberger, Martin Wight, and Herbert Butterfield. The contributions of French writers from Aron to Pierre Hassner might also be noted. Overall, though the modes of realist argument do differ, and sometimes along national lines--with the British more inclined towards an historically rooted empiricism, and the French more amenable of late to structuralism--it is still possible to conceive of a single realist cluster, rather than a series of near-autonomous national traditions.

That realism historically has enjoyed little foothold in Canada might be attributed in part to a resolutely "voluntaristic" political culture

that has eschewed balance-of-power diplomacy for an emphasis on international institutions.[39] Structural realism, further, by confining its analysis to great powers, may be irrelevant to Canadian policy. But in recent years scholars increasingly have adopted neo-realist elements--relative U.S. decline, military stalemate, economic interdependence--to reposition Canada as a "principal power," in one expression, able to formulate and pursue its interests at least in selected (non-military) issue areas.[40] Notwithstanding this attribution of greater relative capability, neo-realist arguments are as likely to stress constraints in the international political economy as they are new opportunities. Perhaps more important, for the purposes of this paper, their primary focus is not security policy or strategy, except in the widest sense.

In the case of geopolitics, it is only with the greatest of difficulty that one could argue the existence of an American-centric bias, and this for two principal reasons. To begin with, there seems to be widespread acceptance for geopolitics of what is commonly denied for realism: that is, the European roots of the former are more easily and willingly conceded than are those same roots of the latter. To be sure, there have been prominent American theorists (none more prominent than Alfred Thayer Mahan) associated with the tradition of modern geopolitics; nevertheless, the indisputable fact is that geopolitics' pioneers stemmed primarily from European sources. Among the continental school of modern geopolitical theorists two names stand out: the German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), and the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922).[41] And even the Anglo-American school (to the extent one existed) was dominated by British and not American theorists, with names

such as Halford Mackinder and James Fairgrieve being among the leaders of this group. Indeed, to the extent that Mahan, the American, had an impact on the development of strategic thinking, it was much more pronounced in the U.K. than it was in the U.S.[42] Not only did geopolitics have its origins in European soil, but it also found in the pre-World War II years that soil to be its most fertile seedbed, to which the development of the Munich School of geopolitical theorizing in Hitlerian Germany bore dramatic, if unfortunate, witness.[43]

Since the end of the Second World War, geopolitical approaches to international politics and security have continued to attract a greater following outside the United States than inside, a situation that contrasts dramatically with that of realism's paradigmatic progression. Nowhere has geopolitics attained as much analytical and policy relevance as in Latin America.[44] As one source explains, "the concept of geopolitics is alive and well in Latin America, especially in those Southern Cone countries ... where the most prolific thinking and writing on geopolitics has taken place in the last thirty years."[45] Although there is no single Latin American geopolitical school, one can advance some general propositions concerning the utility of the perspective as it is employed by analysts and policy makers alike.

In the first instance, much of the Latin approach is congruent with the organicist theories of continental Europe, particularly those associated with the German tradition of Geopolitik. Notwithstanding disclaimers to the contrary, one can detect, mutatis mutandis, a continuity of theme linking the two traditions in terms of: a) their stress on the state as analogous to a living organism; b) the conceptualization of the "living frontier," an expression that has its indirect inspiration in both

organicism and the German doctrine of "living space" (or lebensraum); and c) an appreciation that there is no functional substitute for power and power projection in the competition between states, sometimes expressed in the vocabulary of "might-makes-right."[46] In addition to these conceptual affinities with an older, continental European understanding of geopolitics, there has been at least one major departure from those earlier conceptualizations--a departure that accounts for some of the vitality that geopolitics continues to enjoy in less bellicose circles in Latin America. This is the link between development and security, an area in which some of the more innovative recent geopolitical theorists have made their contributions.[47]

Latin America is not the only part of the world where geopolitics seems to be alive and well. France, as some observers have noted recently, has been experiencing a renaissance in geopolitical theorizing.[48] Although never either as pandemic or as deterministic as in neighbouring Germany earlier in this century, France's geopolitical school has itself had a lengthy tradition. Space does not permit us here to do other than note the breadth and richness of contemporary French geopolitics; nevertheless, we do wish to draw attention to the work of Yves Lacoste, an analyst who, much like the Sprouts a generation ago, cites configuration as one of the salient aspects of a contemporary policy-relevant geopolitics. Whether in some knowable "objective" sense or through the filtering process of images, configuration, to Lacoste, offers insights into the political significance of geography in perhaps its most critical context,"when states are making war or preparing to do so."[49]

Lacoste might also have added: when states are contemplating not just

the making, but also the deterring, of war. For it is in this last sense that one can think of an emerging geopolitics of relevance to Canada. As with realism, so too with geopolitics: one cannot speak seriously of a genuine Canadian school. That being said, recent developments in the technology of warfare have been investing Canadian land and airspace with an imputed geopolitical salience, at least insofar as the United States is concerned. Specifically, the allure of strategic defence of North America seems to have led, possibly only for the moment, to a rekindled appreciation in American strategic precincts of the value of access to Canadian geography for the purposes of enhancing U.S. physical security and strengthening the credibility of deterrence. One can overemphasize the extent to which Washington regards itself as being now or in the future dependent upon obtaining access to Canadian territorial assets; nevertheless, it seems that the late 1980s have witnessed a noteworthy geopolitical ascription to the Canadian north on a scale not seen since the initial post-World War II decade, when the manner bomber threat first rivetted the gaze of American strategic planners in a northerly direction.[50]

## Realism and Strategy in the Nuclear Age

The idea that an intimate relationship exists between realism and strategic studies, with the latter built on the main assumptions of the former, has achieved the status virtually of a commonplace among both strategists and critics.[51] Where realism, in essence, is said to posit an inescapable world of power relations among states coexisting within a context of anarchy, strategic studies concerns itself with the role and instruments of armed force in such a world, either in historical or policy-

oriented terms. This presumed intimacy, however, stands in need of qualification when considered in concrete historical and conceptual perspective. We have already noted the range of realist argument. Beyond this, it is important to recall the extent to which the academic and related civilian study of strategy in the post-war period has been built around individuals whose background lay not in international relations or diplomatic history, but rather in such fields as mathematics, physics, economics, and formal logic.[52] To be sure, the basic theoretical concepts from which they started--deterrence, balance, limited war, alliances-- were rooted in the traditional language of international relations. As well, the gap between realism and the strategic problems of the nuclear age was bridged directly in the writings of such prominent figures as Aron, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, and Michael Howard.

Among this latter group, however, and among many other post-war realists as well, there has existed a certain suspicion of or discomfort with the aspirations for a predictive science of strategy drawn from more quantitative disciplines and expressed, for example, in the probabilistic vocabulary of game-theoretical models. Some of this work, especially that of Thomas Schelling on bargaining, threats of force, and the manipulation of risk, has contributed significantly to the larger study of international relations since the nuclear revolution. With a few important exceptions, realists have been cautious of investing too much in modes of strategic analysis that rely on abstract models at the expense of political complexity, deny the inherently interpretive nature of the data, or focus on adversaries' military capabilities--partly because they seem susceptible of measurement--at the expense of a politically informed reading of

(Soviet) intentions. Instead, a good many realists could be expected to concur with Lawrence Feedman's judgement that such efforts at "formal" strategy tended increasingly to "place an extremely sophisticated technical analysis within a crude political framework."[53] In this vein, Hedley Bull has challenged, in a memorable phrase, excessive reliance on postulates about "the 'rational action' of a kind of 'strategic man,' a man who on further acquaintance reveals himself as a university professor of unusual intellectual subtlety."[54] Aron, too, has argued that game theory applied to strategy is "more dangerous than useful" when it gives the appearance of rigour to what is actually a false representation of the process of deliberation.[55] The periodic projection of strategies for "escalation dominance" along an ascending ladder of nuclear conflict--premised on the possibility of controlled, utilitarian calculation at each rung--would seem one manifestation of this danger.

It is true that much of contemporary realism has adopted from economics a similar sort of rational-choice methodology assuming utility-maximizing behaviour, which does separate it somewhat from those classical expressions that prefer to speak of statecraft, at its best, as a form of wisdom rooted in experience and historical learning--not a commodity evenly distributed. Within realism as a whole, however, there is an important strand whose regard for human nature does not allow such a complacent view of strategic rationality. Indeed, it sees deterrence as a precarious long-term proposition and, even when it allows a deterrent function to nuclear weapons, fears that they will come to be treated in conventional terms and thus used in conventional fashion. Contrary to the pervasive caricature, it is instructive to recall the difficulty of some prominent early realists in fully accepting a world dominated by the nuclear threat or, for that

matter, a strategic studies that discussed its subject in detached, abstract terms; and to argue that by expressing such doubt these individuals had ceased to speak as realists is to engage in sophistry. This difficulty is nowhere more evident than in Morgenthau, the often-acknowledged patriarch of realism, who expressed this existential despair, so reminiscent of Einstein's own familiar views:

> It would indeed be the height of thoughtless optimism to assume that something so absurd as a nuclear war cannot happen because it is so absurd. An age whose objective conditions of existence have been radically transformed by the possibility of nuclear death evades the need for a radical transformation of its thought and action by thinking and acting as though nothing of radical import had happened. This refusal to adapt thought and action to radically new conditions has spelled the doom of men and civilizations before. It is likely to do so again.[56]

If realism, then, can raise questions about the study of strategy abstracted from political considerations, it can also be said to assert--in the spirit of Clausewitz--the primacy of political ends over the means by which they are advanced in the practice of strategy. In this way, Michael Howard distinguishes insightfully between the concepts of deterrence and reassurance in the defence of Western Europe and argues that, whatever the technical, strategic logic for deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the early 1980s, public anxiety about the risks of war demanded an alternative response more capable of achieving a political consensus.[57] Card-carrying realists, of course, can be found on different sides of this and other issues. The point here is that beneath at least some realist arguments lies a genuinely Burkean concern that foreign policy enhance, not endanger, the health of the social organism. It is often forgotten that Morgenthau praises Burke--not Hobbes, as might be expected--as the "greatest depository of political wisdom in the English language."[58] The

greatest danger, from this view, is that "in fighting to defend a system of values one loses sight of the very values one is fighting to defend"; that the concern to save face, as in Vietnam, will mean "the price of our souls and our purpose as a nation"; or that "hoary incantations" such as the Monroe Doctrine or the domino theory--no less than the old liberal abstractions--will obscure a more careful definition of vital interests.[59] This realism, it follows, cannot accept that the study or practice of strategy is a value-free exercise. Questions of value, about the object of security policy, ultimately intrude into any evaluation of technical means. As Arnold Wolfers once put it, absolute security is unavailable, meaning that lesser "increments of security" must be paid for by the possible sacrifice of other values; thus, policy-making necessarily involves a weighing of values.[60]

The intent of the above argument is not to sanitize a strand of realism and set it against an intrinsically wicked strategic studies, but instead to draw attention to some critical questions derived from this view of international politics. At the same time, realism offers no escape from the problems of power politics even in a world wherein power has become more elusive. At best, taken as a whole, it contains a tension between accepting the world as it appears and seeing that it is changing. Particular powers may rise and fall in relative terms; enmity between them is not permanent, for interests may dictate otherwise; and, more fundamentally, the forms by which power is organized may be transformed over time. In keeping with this tension, realism's counsel for policy-makers has two sides. The predominant word is one of caution. While students of international politics may be able to discern the winds of change, statesmen cannot afford to base policy on future hopes.

International order remains the foremost concern, and the prudent pursuit of circumscribed national interests--regardless of its ethical limitations --is normally most conducive to such order. On the other hand, particularly when the political audience to which it speaks has swung from liberal optimism to an implacable Manichaeism, realism is capable of a more critical message. Accordingly, William Fox has suggested, the "real realist" for the 1980s may be the one who not only identifies constraints but also is "illuminating the margin of manipulable choice" available to policy-makers.[61]

## Conclusion

As has been said of the British Labour Party, so too can it be stated of both geopolitics and realism that they are broad churches. Perhaps the broadest of the two, or at least the most eclectic in both its method and its counsel, is geopolitics. This approach, despite the wishes of some, shows little sign of disappearing. Indeed, as we argued, it seems to be undergoing a revival of sorts, particularly among political geographers. But even political scientists, in the U.S. and elsewhere, have seen utility in a "geopolitical" mode of analysis, whether or not they might label it as such. To say this is far from the same as saying that there is an obvious single analytical coherence and policy prescription attached to contemporary geopolitics. On the one hand, there are strategic analysts who proffer a "geopolitical" assessment of contemporary security affairs that can only be situated near the bellicose pole of policy advice: indicative of this pole are those arguments that stress, often in the name of a new maritime strategy, the necessity of power projection to the

rimlands.[62] On the other hand, much of the contemporary thrust of geopolitics has been provided by political geographers, many of whom espouse alternative futures that reside near the irenic pole: among this cluster one finds theories redolent of post-World War II functionalist integration as well as of the interwar mission of some political geographers to make the map right for peace.[63]

Although not marked by as much of an interdisciplinary tug-of-war as geopolitics, realism itself contains a surprisingly varied menu of policy prescriptions. Illustrative of this normative diversity among self-identified realists is the fascinating if little-noted debate that has been conducted over the very meaning of the "national interest" (in a journal of the same name). This debate goes to the very core of realism's traditional problematique, namely inquiry into the nature of international political reality as the context within which foreign-policy advice must be rooted. One side of the debate stresses the prudential calculation of foreign policy as interpreted through the prism of interests; the other places what realists traditionally would brand as "ideology" within that category of interests, and advocates what many realists would deny--namely that the propagation abroad of (American) political values is a primary and legitimate end of statecraft, supportable if need be by military intervention.[64]

In their judgements, realists may indeed lean toward intervention or indifference, disarmament or rearmament, and this diversity is only partly attributable to differences in time and place. What distinguishes them as a group is the assertion that, ultimately, international politics is about power, conflicting interests and constraints upon foreign policy--the recognition of which is held to be at least the beginning of wisdom and,

paradoxically, the precondition of that moderation of conflict so often absent in the twentieth century.[65]

Ultimately, the lasting value to strategists of both geopolitics and realism inheres in the degree to which each approach can remain reasonably focused on its respective core concepts. Among these concepts, none is of greater continuing relevance than geopolitics' stress on the importance of geography to international capability differentials, and realism's insistence that the essence of statecraft is the prudential relationship of interests and means. These, it may be advanced, together constitute the very essence of strategy.

## Notes

[1]Conrad G. Brunk, "Realism, Deterrence, and the Nuclear Arms Race," in Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Michael Allen Fox and Leo Groarke (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), pp. 223-39.

[2]For an overview of modern geopolitical theory, see Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

[3]Indicative of geopolitics' flight from a portion of the academy are two recent and important works on strategic studies, each of which scarcely has a word to say about geopolitics. Indeed, in the case of the second book, which is a thoroughly revised edition of a 1940s classic, there has been an excision of an entire chapter on geopolitics, on the grounds that it is no longer of relevance. See Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987); and Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

[4]Two interesting studies of Geopolitik and its relationship to geopolitics, both written during World War II, are Andrew Gyorgy, Geopolitics: The New German Science, University of California Publications in International Relations, vol. 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944); and Johannes Mattern, Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, series 60, no. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942). A prewar, and more sympathetic, treatment of the work done by Karl Haushofer's Geopolitical Institute at Munich is provided in Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography, II," American Political Science Review 29 (December 1935): 960-64. Less sympathetic accounts of Haushofer's work can be found in Robert Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942); Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942); and Derwent Whittlesey, "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 388-411.

[5]Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment, 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drive (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 3.

[6]Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics," Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 (March 1960): 34.

[7]Harold J. Barnett, "The Changing Relation of Natural Resources to National Security," Economic Geography 34 (July 1958): 188-201.

[8]John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics 9 (July 1957): 473-93.

[9]Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Geography and International Politics in

an Era of Revolutionary Change," Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 (March 1960): 145-61.

[10]Ibid., p. 160.

[11]Leslie W. Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics," Political Geography Quarterly 5 (October 1986): S21-36.

[12]Good examples of the tendency to employ geopolitics as a code word for relations between (or with) the superpowers include Joseph L. Nogee and John Spanier, Peace Impossible - War Unlikely: The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1988); Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); James H. Wyllie, European Security in the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); and Xabier Gorostiaga, "Towards Alternative Policies for the Region," in Towards an Alternative for Central America and the Caribbean, ed. George Irvin and Xabier Gorostiaga (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 13-37.

[13]Quoted in "The Hatching of the Second Reagan Presidency," Economist, 7-13 March 1987, p. 31.

[14]James D. Robinson, 3d, "It's Time to Plan a Third-World Revival," New York Times, 28 August 1988, p. 3:3.

[15]John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). See especially his discussion of "geopolitical codes."

[16]Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977). Also see, by the same author, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986): "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America," National Interest, no. 4 (Summer 1986), pp. 24-36; and "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO," Naval War College Review 40 (Winter 1987): 8-19.

[17]Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942).

[18]David G. Haglund, "The New Geopolitics of Minerals: An Inquiry into the Changing Political Significance of Strategic Minerals," Political Geography Quarterly 5 (July 1986): 221-40. More recently, some analysts have resurrected climate as a geopolitical datum of potential significance to international relations. See Fen Osler Hampson, "The Climate for War," Peace & Security 3 (Autumn 1988): 8-9.

[19]For the relationship between insulation and foreign-policy role conceptions, see William Fox, "Geopolitics and International Relations," in On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, ed. Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 15-44.

[20]Robert Keohane, for example, suggests such continuity around three assumptions: 1) states as key units of analysis; 2) a struggle for power among states as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and 3) rational behaviour on the part of states. On the first count, it should be said that realists from Hans Morgenthau to Robert Gilpin have considered the modern state system a product of history, not a permanent reality. Moreover, even if one concedes parallels between the modern state system and that of the ancient Greek city-states, problems remain in classifying medieval Europe or the Roman empire preceding it. Presumably, by this account, the tradition of political realism did not die but had little to observe for centuries on end. On the third count, Keohane's apparent ascription of a circumscribed, instrumental notion of rationality to "realists" from Thucydides onward fails to appreciate fundamental changes in the conceptions of reason that have dominated Western thought in different epochs. See his "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 8.

[21]See, in particular, E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1946).

[22]The reader is referred to the essays in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics; Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987); and R. N. Berki, On Political Realism (London: Dent, 1981).

[23]R. B. J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," International Studies Quarterly 31 (June 1987): 67.

[24]Raymond Aron, Peace and War, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 596.

[25]Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932); Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

[26]Morgenthau, Scientific Man, pp. 123, 206. A much different note is sounded in Carr's interpretation of idealism and the realist reaction as necessary stages leading to a science of international relations, in Twenty Years' Crisis, pp. 1-10.

[27]Smith, Realist Thought, pp. 1-2.

[28]Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 13.

[29]Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). This dichotomy is also the

starting point for such major contributors as Aron and Hedley Bull, in the latter case in The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[30]Arnold Wolfers, another major realist of the early post-war period, argued for the inherently subjective character of the "national interest" in several of the essays collected in his Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). Aron, meanwhile, suggested that the real plurality of concrete foreign policy objectives--security, power, glory, the triumph of ideas--precluded any rational definition of national interest. See Peace and War, pp. 91-92.

[31]Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 25-53.

[32]Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 105.

[33]This application of the two labels does not square with Keohane's identification of Waltz as the paramount "neo-realist," but finds support elsewhere, for example, in Robert J. Lieber, No Common Power (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1988), pp. 13, 15, n. 25.

[34]Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).

[35]Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). As the title suggests, Krasner finds utility in the notion of "national interest," redefined somewhat to mean the empirically derived, persistent and broad policy objectives pursued, however successfully, by states.

[36]Among the most important contributions to this argument for a modified realism is Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

[37]Richard Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983).

[38]A useful overview is provided by Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," in International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, ed. Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 7-26. For the more specific argument that realism is an "American" approach, and is therefore inappropriate as a tool either for policy or theoretical purposes outside the U.S., see Axel Dorscht et al., "Canada's International Role and 'Realism'," International Perspectives, September/October 1986, pp. 6-9; and Axel Dorscht and Gregg Legare, "Foreign Policy Debate and 'Realism'," ibid., November/December 1986, pp. 7-10.

[39]John Kirton, "Realism and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," International Perspectives, January/February 1987, pp. 3-8.

[40]The fullest argument of this sort remains David Dewitt and John

Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983). Further evidence of the realist or neo-realist "infiltration" of Canadian scholarly work, if not foreign policy, is found, for instance, in: David Leyton-Brown and John Gerard Ruggie, "The North American Political Economy in the Global Context: An Analytical Framework," International Journal 42 (Winter 1986-87): 3-24; Denis Stairs and Gilbert Winham, eds., Canada and the International Political/Economic Environment vol. 28, Research Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); and from a somewhat different angle, the argument for a self-interested interpretation of Canadian foreign policy in Kim Richard Nossal, "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance," Canadian Journal of Political Science 21 (March 1988): 35-56.

[41]Russell H. Fifield and G. Etzel Pearcy, Geopolitics in Principle and Practice (Boston: Ginn, 1944).

[42]See, for Mahan's impact on naval strategy, Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret, pp. 444-77.

[43]Edmund A. Walsh,"Geopolitics and International Morals," in Compass of the World: A Symposium of Political Geography, ed. Hans W. Weigert and Viljalmur Stefansson (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 12-39.

[44]The single most comprehensive source for contemporary South American geopolitical thinking is Howard Taylor Pittman, "Geopolitics in the ABC Countries: A Comparison" (Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1981). The ABC countries are the states of the so-called Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. For a valuable discussion of the relationship between geopolitical theorizing and political conflict, see Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors (New York: Praeger, 1985).

[45]Jack Child, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 14, 2 (1979): 89.

[46]A good but by no means exhaustive sampling of the flavour of Latin American geopolitics can be found in: J.T. Briano, Geopolítica y Geoestrategía Americana (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1966); Armando Alonso Piñeiro, "El equilibrio geopolítico sudamericano," Estrategía 30 (September/October 1974): 62-71; Stephen M. Gorman, "Geopolitics and Peruvian Foreign Policy," Inter-American Economic Affairs 36 (Autumn 1982): 65-88; Judith Ewell, "The Development of Venezuelan Geopolitical Analysis since World War II," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 24 (August 1982): 295-320; (Gen.) Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geopolítica del Brasil, trans. Paulo Schilling (Mexico, D. F.: El Cid, 1978); Oliveros S. Ferreira, "La Geopolítica y el Ejercito Brasileño," Aportes, no. 12 (April 1969): 111-32; Philip L. Kelly, "Geopolitical Themes in the Writings of Gen. Carlos de Meira Mattos of Brazil," Journal of Latin American Studies 16 (November 1984): 439-61; and (Gen.) Juan E. Guglialmelli, Geopolítica del Cono Sur (Buenos Aires: El Cid, 1979).

[47]Child, "Geopolitical Thinking," p. 90.

[48]See John D. Young, "L'explication interthéorique en relations internationales: Quelques jalons pour une synthèse du réalisme structurel américain et de le géopolitique française contemporaine," Études internationales 18 (June 1987): 305-28.

[49]Yves Lacoste, "Geography and Foreign Policy," SAIS Review 4 (Summer/Fall 1984): 217.

[50]For an elaboration of this argument, see David G. Haglund, "Les missiles de croisière soviétiques aéroportés et la géopolitique de la défense aérienne de l'Amerique du Nord: Une nouvelle perspective du nord canadien," Études internationales 19 (June 1988): 245-72.

[51]Typical is John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions," in Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, by John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), especially pp. 9-12.

[52]See the excellent history in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

[53]Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 180. Michael MccGwire makes a similar judgement in "The Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence," in The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security, ed. Gwyn Prins (London: Chatto and Windus, 1984), p. 81.

[54]Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), p. 48.

[55]Aron, Peace and War, p. 777.

[56]Hans J. Morgenthau, "Death in the Nuclear Age," reprinted in Politics in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 24-25. See also George Kennan's collected essays in Nuclear Delusions (New York: Pantheon, 1982); and Hedley Bull, "Future Conditions of Strategic Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 160 (1980): 13-23.

[57]Michael Howard, "Deterrence, Consensus and Reassurance in the Defence of Europe," Adelphi Papers no. 184 (1983): 17-26.

[58]Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 133.

[59]Michael Howard, "The Strategic Approach to International Relations," reprinted in The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 46; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Mr. Nixon's Gamble Saving Face in Indochina," New Republic, 23 May 1970, p. 17; Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 365.

[60]Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Discord and Collaboration, p. 158.

[61]William T. R. Fox, "E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and

Revision," Review of International Studies 11 (1985): 14.

[62]See, for instance, Gray, Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era. But cf., for a critique of one "rimlands"-based policy advocacy, Jock A. Finlayson and David G. Haglund, "Whatever Happened to the Resource War?," Survival 29 (September/October 1987): 403-15.

[63]See Saul B. Cohen, "Asymmetrical States and Global Geopolitical Equilibrium," SAIS Review 4 (Summer/Fall 1984): 193-212; Idem, "American Foreign Policy for the Eighties," in Pluralism and Political Geography: People, Territory and States, ed. Nurit Kliot and Stanley Waterman (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 295-310; Patrick O'Sullivan, Geopolitics (New York: St. Martin's, 1986); and Isaiah Bowman, "Geography vs. Geopolitics," in Compass of the World, pp. 40-52.

[64]See Robert W. Tucker, "Isolation and Intervention," National Interest no. 1 (Fall 1985), pp. 16-25; and Charles Krauthammer, "Isolationism: A Riposte," ibid., no. 2 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 115-18.

[65]For a good example of realist analysis, even on the part of an author who might reject the label realist, see Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University, 1987).