

CANADA, THE "LESSONS" OF PEACEKEEPING,
and
CENTRAL AMERICA

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Introduction

Finance Minister Michael Wilson's budget of late April 1989 appears to have effectively gutted the White Paper on Defence that was tabled, with much fanfare and not a little controversy, by then-Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty on 5 June 1987.¹ Gone is the cornerstone of that defence-policy statement, the fleet of nuclear-propelled submarines, with no obvious replacement in sight to arrest the widespread obsolescence of the Canadian navy. Gone as well are additional long-range patrol aircraft, and replacement planes for CF-18s lost to attrition. Put on hold has been a series of ambitious plans to upgrade the militia and to enhance the capabilities of the Canadian land forces in Europe through the acquisition of new tanks. In addition, although this is hardly considered in the same negative light by defence bureaucrats, seven of the country's 45 military bases are to be closed, and a further seven to have their operations scaled down.²

When we survey the wreckage of the White Paper, one area of military activity stands out for not only having escaped the budget-cutter's attention, but for actually having been (faute de mieux, perhaps) enhanced in its symbolic importance. This has been the Canadian Forces' (CF) peacekeeping role. Admittedly, the resuscitation of peacekeeping was underway well before the budgetary tectonic plates began to shift and slide in ways that would prove so inimical to most elements of Perrin Beatty's defence agenda. And certainly the awarding of the 1988 Noble Peace Prize to the UN's peacekeepers--of whom none have been more prominent than

Canada---did nothing to tarnish the image of peacekeeping in Ottawa.³ This revival became nowhere more apparent than during the televised debate on defence during the autumn 1988 federal election campaign, when Beatty indicated that peacekeeping was an important--in his words "arguably the most important"--role the CF would have to perform in the future. Coming from the principal motivator of the 1987 White Paper, this was an astonishing claim, for one of the least venerated missions for the Forces indicated in that policy paper had been peacekeeping.

There were, it was indicated in Challenge and Commitment, a set of "lessons" that derived from Canada's previous and lengthy experience with peacekeeping. While by no means ruling out any subsequent peacekeeping undertakings for the Forces, Beatty's document stressed that in future several criteria would have to be satisfied before Canadian troops would again be sent on such assignments. In particular, the following were stipulated: whether there existed a clear and enforceable mandate for the mission; whether the contending sides could agree both to a ceasefire and to Canadian participation in the mission; whether the undertaking was adjudged to be in the long-term interests of peace and stability; whether the size of the force, and its composition, were both appropriate to the task at hand and likely not to damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canada's participating would jeopardize any other national commitments; whether there existed an independent and competent authority to whom the force could report and which would be capable of influencing the disputants; and whether participation was likely to be satisfactorily funded and supported in terms of logistics.⁴

Clearly, the Government was assuming that the past could and should

serve as a guide to policy in the present and future. In itself, this is hardly a problematical notion. Admittedly, it is far from self-evident what the "lessons of the past" really are, and it can not only be improvident but outright dangerous to misconstrue the contemporary and ongoing policy implications derivable from the analysis of prior experience.⁵ Nevertheless, it is equally ill-advised, and possibly even more dangerous, for policy makers to operate in an historical vacuum, on the assumption that what is past is past, and can never be prologue.⁶

Our objective in this paper is twofold. First, we seek to determine the source of the guiding criteria mentioned in the White Paper and other defence-policy documents. Did they originate as a result of far-sighted deductions on the part of gifted policy designers, endowed with preternatural powers of logical analysis? Or were they instead inductively arrived at as a result of the cumulative experience of previous peacekeeping efforts? Secondly, we seek to determine to what extent the criteria continue to serve as policy guides regarding the question of Canadian participation in a Central American peacekeeping force.

As of this writing, it appears likely not only that there will be an international peacekeeping mission in Central America, but that there will be Canadian participation in this mission. The roots of this international mission can be traced back to the historic accord signed at Guatemala City by the five Central American presidents in early August 1987. Labelled the "Esquipulas II" accord, this undertaking committed Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica to work for and achieve peace and democracy in the isthmus. Among the most relevant aspects of Esquipulas II, as it has developed, have been the provisions calling for a cessation of assistance to irregular forces and for the signatories not to allow

their territory to be used for the purposes of launching attacks on each other.⁷ A half year later, in April 1988, the five Central American foreign ministers asked Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and Spain--all members of NATO--to design a security verification system for the region. The three countries indicated their willingness to do this, but progress was impeded by the inability of the Central American countries to decide exactly what it was they wanted them to verify.

It would take nearly a year before the Central Americans could agree to request the Secretary General of the United Nations to dispatch a reconnaissance team to the region, a preliminary step that would likely be followed by the creation, by the Security Council, of a United Nations verification mission (ONUCA) for Central America.⁸ Dispatch of the reconnaissance mission, whose participants will include Canada, the FRG, and Spain, has been delayed by a Honduran reservation to the letter of request made by the five Central American countries to the Secretary General on 31 March of this year; the Hondurans want Nicaragua to withdraw the case it has brought before the International Court of Justice alleging Honduran violation of international law in the matter of its serving as a staging area for contra forays into Nicaragua. In the event, as appears likely, that this dispute can be resolved, the small (10- to 15-person) reconnaissance mission could get sent to the area by the middle of May. If all goes according to schedule, the Security Council could then approve the creation of ONUCA by late July of this year.

Although the ultimate composition of ONUCA remains to be determined, it would be surprising if Canada were not a participant. Given, therefore, the growing likelihood of an international security verification mission in

Central America, we deem it worthwhile to inquire whether the above-mentioned criteria continue to be of relevance to Canadian peacekeeping. Or have they, like so much else indicated in the White Paper, also been rendered irrelevant (albeit not for budgetary considerations)? This judgment we leave for later in our paper. Prior to establishing our conclusions in this regard, however, we will first pay a good deal of attention to Canada's historical experience with peacekeeping, so that we may determine not only the source but also the logic of the guiding criteria set down in the 1987 White Paper.⁹

We begin our examination with the first decade of the post-World War II era.

Tentative Beginning: The 1945-55 Decade

Though the United Nations' Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first major peacekeeping operation in the commonly understood sense of the term--i.e. as third-party neutral interposition by a substantial contingent--it was not the first involvement on the part of the UN in this type of activity. Prior to UNEF's creation in 1956, the UN had been involved in what we would call peacekeeping observation on several fronts. Examination of the period is useful, in that all of the problems that would later plague peacekeeping appeared in embryonic form during these years. The first significant UN effort was the force in the disputed Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, which was established in 1949. It was with UN Military Observer Group India Pakistan (UNMOGIP), as the Kashmir mission came to be known, that the principle of a mission chief appointed by the Secretary General and reporting directly to him was established. Moreover, those on his staff, and his corps of observers, were made directly responsible to the

new commander and not to their respective governments, as had previously been the case in peacekeeping efforts of the League of Nations and of earliest UN initiatives in this area. Though this command structure was never formally voted upon, it has been accepted ever since as the basis of UN activities.

UNMOGIP also broke new ground in terms of the techniques that peacekeepers must use in carrying out their duties. It quickly became apparent, for example, that the observers of a ceasefire line must have nothing to do with the diplomatic attempts to find a solution to the underlying problem. This was necessary as a means of insuring that the observer remained neutral, and retained the trust and respect of both sides. Thus, the separation of those who would come to be known as the peacekeepers (the soldiers on the disengagement line) and the peacemakers (the diplomats attempting to find a solution to the dispute) was accomplished early.¹⁰

The reasons for this crucial development had much to do with a feature of the disengagement agreement, namely a ceasefire, signed by India and Pakistan regarding the Kashmir on 29 July 1949. That agreement stipulated that the ceasefire would be entered into so long as it was expressly understood that its provisions would not prejudice the claims of either side in the region.¹¹ This provision, a necessity if an agreement was to be reached, became a feature of future peace observation and peacekeeping efforts, and clearly established the principle that UN Forces would enter a region only with the permission of the protagonists, and only to freeze or insulate a conflict, not to solve it by force.

In the meantime, the UN was taking steps that it hoped would reduce,

if not eliminate, its reliance upon national governments for the logistical requirements of peace observation forces. In October 1948 the General Assembly authorized the Secretariat to establish a world-wide communications network for use by UN groups in the field. Slightly over a year later, permission was received to establish a "Field Service" whose members would maintain and operate the communications network, and provide modest transportation and construction capabilities.¹²

These capabilities were soon tested, and found wanting, with the creation of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in what was then Palestine in 1948. When the truce established by the Security Council on 16 April 1948 went unheeded, a Truce Commission was established a week later. It was from this body that UNTSO was to spring, as the UN appointed mediator, Count Bernadotte, realized that he could not perform his duties without military observers. When the Security Council was finally able to obtain a truce, on 29 May 1948, the right of the Mediator to have access to military observers and advisors was made an integral part of the cease-fire document.¹³ In most important respects, UNTSO's operations and procedures mirrored those of UNMOGIP, only on a much greater scale of size and complexity.

As these two forces established themselves, it quickly became apparent that a truce could not be an end in itself. The truce had to either lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute or breakdown as the pressures of the situation would eventually overwhelm the delicate machinery of the truce.¹⁴ Thus, even before the formation of UNEF, the dangers of simply isolating a dispute, without necessarily solving it, were well understood.

Canada's relationship with peacekeeping during these formative years was hardly auspicious. Both UNMOGIP and UNTSO contained Canadian

participants, but this was only permitted by Ottawa with some reluctance, and official enthusiasm for the task was notably lacking. It seems clear that, with the breakup of the wartime superpower alliance, and increasing deadlock at the UN, Canadian diplomatic energies were being concentrated on the creation of a Western Alliance and the rebuilding of Western Europe.¹⁵

Canada's only other peace observation experience prior to 1956 came outside the auspices of the UN in South East Asia, with the establishment of the International Commissions of Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. Once again, Ottawa was reluctant to participate in these ventures, though it was persuaded to do so, however, because of Canada's suitability for the role of "Western" member of the troika system of command that included Poland, as "Eastern" member, and India as the neutral member. The official Press Release announcing Canada's acceptance of the role, released on 28 July 1954, warned Canadians not to expect "that the task we are undertaking will be either easy, or of short duration" and drew attention to Canada's dissatisfaction with the fact that the Commissions would not be under UN auspices.¹⁶ Experience would prove this reluctance to have been well founded, for arguments between ICSC members over what constituted violations, and how they should be reported, were a constant source of irritation and frustration, and Canada came away from the experience with a strong dislike of both extra-UN operations and the troika system of command.¹⁷

The Expansion of Peacekeeping: 1956-1966

Although the UN experience in Korea from 1950 to 1953 was not, properly considered, a peacekeeping initiative (and hence is beyond our

purview in this paper), it did have an impact on UNEF, one relating to the political command and control of the Mideastern force. In the Korean case, the Security Council resolution of 27 June 1950 had read only that "the members of the UN [shall] furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in that area."¹⁸ Secretary General Trygve Lie then prepared a draft resolution on Korea requesting that the U.S. assume command of such forces as were placed under the UN flag in pursuance of this Resolution. A part of the draft had recommended that an advisory committee be established to coordinate the war effort and, as Lie later admitted, "to promote continuing UN participation in, and supervision of, the military security action, of a more intimate and undistracted character than the Security Council could be expected to provide." Washington turned this proposal down, and, as the Korean war developed, it quickly became obvious that the military effort to assist the South was essentially going to be an American one under a UN flag.¹⁹

Determined that this should not happen when the Suez Crisis erupted in 1956, Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold contemplated his options, which were really only two. First, he could set up the force to be operated on the basis of an agreement between the interested parties, an idea with some merits. The most obvious of these was that the formula would have directly involved the disputants in the running of the force, and, hence, the supervision of the truce, thereby making the truce supervision mechanism an organic part of their policies towards the dispute. There was a major deficiency in this approach, however: Egypt's standing in the Arab world would have plummeted had it entered into a truce supervisory mechanism that conferred de facto recognition upon Israel by making Tel Aviv a partner in

the supervision of the truce.²⁰

The other option was to expand the already existing command model of UNTSO and UNMOGIP. This formula conferred upon the force commander the status of being the Secretary General's agent, and made the commander independent of the policies of any single government. An agreement on this formula was reached in the General Assembly on 6 November 1956.²¹ The overwhelming need to get personnel into the field quickly meant that the first commander and his initial contingents would be drawn from the already existing UNTSO structure.²² Perhaps the most interesting precedent set in the formation of the UNEF, however, was that concerning the subject of host-state assent. Ever since the Soviet Union ended its temporary boycott of Security Council meetings in mid 1950, the Security Council had remained paralyzed along East-West lines. This made it impossible to launch any sort of mission under Chapter VII of the Charter, which authorizes the Council to take action whenever international security is threatened.²³ To circumvent this potentially fatal constraint, the General Assembly had, on 3 November 1950, passed the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," which entitled the General Assembly to take the initiative in a crisis whenever the peace was threatened and the Security Council was deadlocked.²⁴ But as the General Assembly lacks even the limited coercive power of the Security Council, it could not order warring parties to disengage and accept a peacekeeping force. For this reason, it was essential that both parties consent to the positioning of a peacekeeping force between them.

The need for consent was to prove the undoing of the UNEF a decade later, and has presented peacekeeping with one of its most serious problems to date. Essentially, the need to obtain consent constitutes a de facto

ban on the use of force by peacekeepers, inasmuch as nobody will give an international force permission to enter one's own territory and use force against oneself; this in turn means that peacekeepers may only patrol a disputed border so long as the disputants agree to let them.²⁵ The situation became further complicated when the UN attempted to peacekeep in domestic disputes, as we shall see. In addition to being non-coercive, and requiring host-state consent, yet another condition was established for peacekeeping during the creation of the UNEF. This condition was the inadmissibility of a Great Power to contribute forces towards peacekeeping operations. As we noted, Dag Hammerskjold had no wish to surrender control of the force, as had happened in Korea. Moreover, the deadlock in the Security Council, and the fact that two of the Great Powers (France and Britain) were intimately involved in the crisis, made this condition a practical necessity if a force was to be launched with Egyptian consent. The final precedent-setting aspect arising from the speedy creation of UNEF concerned the financing of peacekeeping operations. Up to this point, peace observation forces had been financed from general dues to the UN. The unprecedented size of UNEF, coupled with the great haste and confusion that attended its erection, meant that the resulting structure lacked a formal funding arrangement; all members of the UN would be subsequently asked to pay into a special account from which the needs of the UNEF were to be met. As divisions later arose over the propriety of various peacekeeping operations, several UN members manifested their displeasure with such activities by withholding their contributions to the peacekeeping fund.

Canada was enthusiastically in the thick of setting up the UNEF, and many of the attitudes to peacekeeping later taken by the Canadian

Government were decisively shaped by the experience. Ottawa's interest in the crisis revolved around its fear that the British and the Americans would have a serious falling-out over the Suez. This would have wrecked the "North Atlantic Triangle," and shaken Canada's position in world affairs. There was also a secondary fear that the Commonwealth might break up over the issue.²⁶ For Canada, the formation of UNEF proved encouraging, but also frustrating.²⁷ The force was not the type Lester Pearson had been advocating since at least 1953.²⁸ Moreover, the controversy over the admission of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada was merely the public side of a very difficult series of negotiations between Ottawa, New York, and Cairo, which showed Nasser to have been intensely suspicious of the UNEF in general, and the Canadians in particular.²⁹ On the positive side, the beginnings of what would eventually become strong public support for the peacekeeping role could be glimpsed in Canada, even though many pro-British papers and groups castigated the Government for not fully supporting Britain as a matter of course. As well, some within the Government felt that a new and independent role for Canada had been opened up in international affairs.³⁰

How realistic was this latter assumption? Experience would later prove that while peacekeeping could and did provide domestic and international political benefit, it did not, in fact, constitute an independent policy role for Canada, whose peacekeeping forces were physically dependent upon at least one superpower (the U.S.) for their logistical existence, and upon both superpowers for their political existence. A prime result of the Suez experience for some Canadians, then, was to leave an impression of peacekeeping offering bold new policy vistas

for the country. Instead of serving to separate Canada from the East/West dispute, however, peacekeeping became an extension of Canada's role in that dispute insofar as it could only work when East and West agreed to allow it to, and the immediate protagonists requested it. This is not to decry the importance or usefulness of peacekeeping in certain circumstances. It is, however, to state that the next few years of Canadian peacekeeping policy would be based on rapidly developing public expectations of peacekeeping that would later prove impossible to satisfy. The subsequent backlash against the perceived "failure" of peacekeeping was, in reality, a backlash against impossible expectations that had not been fulfilled.

Suez was a turning point in Canada's association with peacekeeping. Prior to 1956 Ottawa had gone peacekeeping somewhat reluctantly, and the effort had never received much official or public notice, given that the main energy of the country's diplomats had been devoted to the creation of a postwar order based on collective defence, and the rebuilding of Europe in the face of the perceived Communist threat. By 1956 these objectives had been largely accomplished, and the time seemed propitious for new directions to be explored. Peacekeeping appeared to be one such new direction, and it would come to be embraced as such by an eager public over the next few years. In reality, however, peacekeeping was a relatively new wrinkle in the old game of Great Power politics, and Canada's interest in it devolved from its traditional interest in preserving international stability, and particularly the stability of Great Power relations.

Following the creation of the UNEF, the next major call for a peacekeeping force was heard in 1958, with the eruption of hostilities in Lebanon. The Lebanese Government, supported by the U.S., claimed that it was being undermined by internal agitators supplied and trained by the

United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria). The UAR vigorously denied the charge, and a force, the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), was established to verify its authenticity. The root of the problem was not really the smuggling of arms across the border, though there was undoubtedly a certain amount of that, but rather the unilateral decision of the Christian, "Pro-Western," President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, to amend the constitution so that he might serve for another six-year term, even though Lebanese law stipulated that he must step down. The Moslem half of the Lebanese population found this unacceptable and began agitating with some, small, assistance from the UAR. Chamoun refused to recognize publicly that the crisis had been of his own creation and instead blamed the unrest entirely on the UAR. In this, he was supported by both the U.S. and Britain, neither of which had many friends in the region.

On 11 June 1958 the Security Council called for the creation of an Observer Group to scrutinize Chamoun's claim, and Canada supported the motion. The first team of observers was made up of 10 men, including one Canadian, seconded from UNTSO. By 13 June these observers were conducting two-man jeep patrols around Beirut, and it was quickly concluded that 100 men with jeeps and light aircraft would be required to get the job done properly. On 16 June the Secretary General asked Ottawa for 10 more soldiers, who were sent within 48 hours. Though UNOGIL experienced some difficulty in patrolling all areas with equal thoroughness, because of factional jealousies, the group was able confidently to report, on 1 July and again on 17 July, that the extent of infiltration by the UAR had been very minor, and that most of the fighting was being done by various Lebanese factions.

The situation appeared well on the way to resolution when a violent revolution in Iraq on 14 July caused Chamoun to fear for the security of his own regime. At his request, U.S. Marines landed on 15 July. The arrival of American troops complicated the situation enormously, and placed the UN forces in an embarrassingly redundant position. Perhaps intimidated by the pressures that were rapidly building, however, Chamoun and the warring factions began to sort out their problems. With Chamoun's decision not to seek illegal re-election on 31 July, the crisis was resolved and the Americans prepared to leave. UNOGIL, which now took on the task of facilitating the withdrawal, was expanded, with a further 50 Canadians being sent in early September. By December 1958 the American withdrawal had been completed and UNOGIL was largely disbanded. The UNOGIL experience struck many Canadians as a positive one,³¹ but the fact remained that the force had only succeeded because both the Americans and the Lebanese had allowed it to, for reasons totally in their own interests.

The Congo Experience and the Funding Crisis

Things were not nearly so tidy when Canadian peacekeepers next took to the field, in the Congo. The Congo crisis, which began in July 1960, had its genesis in the slipshod manner through which the Belgians handed over independence to their former colony on 3 June.³² Given the haste of the transition, which was accomplished in just six months, and the near-total lack of Congolese nationals with the training to run a government, clashes between rival factions and tribes were predictable. The Belgian Government responded to these outbreaks by flying in troops to protect its remaining nationals and the mining interests they operated. The besieged Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, then appealed to the U.S. for military

assistance on 11 July. Eisenhower refused but advised Lumumba to contact the UN, and promised him support there. On 12 July, Lumumba appealed to New York and, in subsequent cables, made it clear that if assistance was not soon forthcoming he would turn elsewhere for help. This thinly veiled threat to approach the Soviet Union did not go unheeded either in New York or Washington.

The Congolese request came at an auspicious time for Secretary General Hammerskjold. He had been searching for a means of isolating Africa from the vicissitudes of the East-West rivalry, and he saw in the Congo an opportunity to use the UN as a buffer agency.³³ Whether Hammerskjold had anticipated a small cadre of observers who would assist the Congolese forces in restoring order within the Congo, is not clear. By 15 July, 1,200 UN troops were in the Congo, and less than a month later 15,000 were in place. It had been made clear at the outset that the UN troops were not in the Congo to "enforce any specific political situation," and that they would not "exercise any initiative in the use of armed force."³⁴ Nevertheless, the breakdown of order within the Congo, and the large number of factions at work, forced the UN troops to engage local forces, if only in self-defence, and such engagements soon gave the UN the appearance of having its own political agenda, which undoubtedly some of the African contingents did.

Canada's response to the UN request for assistance in setting up the Organisation des Nations Unies aux Congo (ONUC) was a guarded one. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker made little attempt to hide his lack of enthusiasm for the project, and, curiously enough, was soon being attacked by editorial opinion from across both the country and the political

spectrum.³⁵ Of particular embarrassment to the Government was the fact that great difficulties were experienced in preparing the required number of specialists for the job. These difficulties were most acute with respect to signallers, and they pointed to the fact that technically proficient nations, such as Canada, were going to have to play the specialist role if they were to engage in peacekeeping, as few other politically acceptable nations had the skills or the equipment. Peacekeeping was thus starting to become intensive in the very areas that cost the thinly stretched Canadian Forces most, skilled men and officers, while making relatively few demands for regular soldiers.

The embarrassment caused by these shortages, and the attendant delays in meeting UN requests, was compounded when Canadian troops in the Congo became victims of the deteriorating internal situation. In mid August a group of Canadians was beaten by an unruly group of Congolese soldiers. Several such incidents followed and, though no Canadians were killed, several were wounded, and several members of the ONUC were killed in the line of duty.³⁶ The difficulties of the situation notwithstanding, the Canadians performed valiant service in the Congo as they maintained an effective communications system under extremely primitive conditions and coordinated the air-transport system as well as being its major participants. Despite their sterling service, however, many Canadians came away from the Congo, when the force was disbanded in 1964, with a bitter taste in their mouths. They also came away with a determination to see that future forces would feature a clear and achievable mandate.

But if the Canadians were somewhat disillusioned with the Congo experience, that experience brought about a major crisis within the UN itself. The so-called "funding crisis" of the early 1960s was, in fact,

not about money, but was rather "a constitutional crisis wearing a financial disguise."³⁷ It was during this crisis that the inherent weaknesses of the UNEF formula were exposed; when the dust finally settled, the Uniting for Peace Resolution became a dead letter insofar as establishing peacekeeping forces was concerned. In future, authority would shift back to the Security Council. This was precisely the outcome that the originators of the funding crisis--France and U.S.S.R.--had sought, as their vetoes could once again be brought to bear on any future peacekeeping activities that did not mesh with their national objectives. The funding crisis had essentially been an effort by both France and the U.S.S.R., successfully as it turned out, to withhold paying their dues to the special account set up to fund peacekeeping operations under the 1956 UNEF formula. Both countries had taken exception to the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the vastly increased discretionary powers it conferred upon the Secretary General. They argued that the UN Charter was a treaty, and that any attempt to make it evolve, as the Uniting for Peace Resolution appeared to, was illegitimate.³⁸ The refusal of these two Great Powers to pay their shares of the steadily rising costs of peacekeeping, along with that of several lesser states who used the excuse to avoid paying their own dues, soon placed the financial security of the UN in peril.

Throughout the crisis, Canada sought to uphold the principle that all states should contribute to peacekeeping; at the same time, however, it refrained from championing this principle so seriously as to jeopardize the existence of the UN. Canada had always advocated frugality on the part of the UN, but had recognized in 1956 that UN funding procedures were more suited to decision making in conference under lengthy debate, and well in

advance of anticipated need, than to facilitating authorizations for peacekeeping operations under great stress and against critical deadlines. Though the UNEF funding formula was subsequently recognized as having been "a mistake," at the time Canada had defended it as having been the best possible expedient.³⁹

The funding crisis stretched from 1960 to 1965, and was never resolved. The International Court ruled, in 1963, that the recalcitrant states did have an obligation to contribute to the peacekeeping fund, but, in the absence of any method of compelling them to pay, the ruling had little effect.⁴⁰ The crisis reached a head in 1965, with the French and Soviets threatening to leave the UN if forced to pay. Though convinced the two should pay, Canada worked feverishly to prevent their withdrawal. A compromise of sorts was worked out, wherein the two sides agreed to disagree, and formed a committee to study the problem. The Committee of Thirty-Three, as it soon became known, languished for many years, but its existence did at least serve to enable all parties to say that the problem was "under study," thus sparing everyone the delicate task of actually resolving the issue.⁴¹ Effectively, however, the impasse meant that those states that supported peacekeeping were going to absorb the costs. While the U.S. paid the lion's share of the bills, Canada was hard hit, and its subsequent desire to see the funding formula for all future forces agreed to by all can be directly traced to this incident.

Although the UN was wracked by dissension over the funding issue during the early 1960s, the need for new peacekeeping forces continued, as did Canada's willingness to supply both men and material. Three relatively small and successful operations, of short duration, were created during these years, and Canada contributed to all of them. The UN Temporary

Executive Administration (UNTEA) assumed the administration of the Dutch colony of West New Guinea/West Java from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, when sovereignty was transferred to Indonesia. UNTEA was a different type of UN force in that it assumed absolute responsibility for all aspects of governance over the colony until the sovereignty transfer could be accomplished. In reality, UNTEA was a face-saving expedient, for the Indonesians were determined to absorb the colonies, and the Dutch could not prevent them doing so. UNTEA allowed the inevitable to be accomplished without violence, and with a modicum of dignity for the Dutch.

The UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) arose from a revolt in that feudal kingdom in September 1962. The royalist forces were supported by the Saudis, while the republicans received aid from the UAR. The superpowers threw their weight behind the two factions, and the makings of a complex and menacing international crisis were in place. Recognizing the inherent dangers of escalation, the UN, supported primarily by Great Britain and the United States, attempted to mediate. By April 1963, an agreement had been secured between all external parties to stop aiding the various factions, and to establish a 20-kilometre-wide buffer zone between Yemen and Saudi Arabia with UN observers to check compliance on both counts. Initial investigations revealed that approximately 200 men would be required, and a few light reconnaissance aircraft. By early June the Security Council had formally decided to establish such a force, with the Soviet Union and France agreeing to abstain from the vote on the understanding that the Saudis and the UAR would absorb the total costs of UNYOM between them. The forces existed until early September 1964, when the Secretary General concluded that the fighting had levelled off and was

no longer a threat to international security. In fact, sporadic fighting would continue for three more years until, in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Saudis and Egyptians agreed to stop fueling the Yemen war and work together against Israel.⁴³

The third small force, the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) existed from September 1965 to March 1966 and oversaw implementation of a ceasefire and phased withdrawal of troops from a disputed region on the India-Pakistan border. The force was commanded by a Canadian and included several Canadians drawn from other UN observer forces. It was largely successful in its aims, primarily because both India and Pakistan, as well as the superpowers (especially the Soviet Union) wanted it to succeed and were prepared to compromise to see that it did.⁴⁴

None of Canada's contributions to these small UN forces were particularly onerous.⁴⁵ In fact, the majority of the men and aircraft involved in each case had already been on loan to the UN in other areas, and were simply transferred with the permission of the Canadian Government. Life in the three locales was primitive, and few volunteered for a second tour of duty, but the Canadians did a creditable job in each case at very little cost, either political or financial, to Canada. Indeed, these operations, like those prior to the UNEF in 1956, were barely noticed by the Canadian people. Perhaps this was the result of the relative lack of drama in each case, but it might also have been due to the debate raging in Canada as to whether to accept nuclear warheads for previously procured weapons.

The Cyprus Conundrum

The next major peacekeeping effort came in Cyprus. The dispute

between Greek and Turk Cypriots was, literally, centuries old, but was heading for one of its periodic flareups in November 1963 when the Greek-Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, suspended the latest British negotiated constitution, and took all power unto himself. As Makarios was an avowed supporter of Cypriot union with Greece, the sizable Turkish minority on Cyprus reacted violently. The British, who maintained bases as well as a de facto proprietary interest in Cyprus, attempted to mediate. As the crisis worsened, they sought to establish a NATO peacekeeping force, which would have included a sizable Canadian contingent had London had its way. Makarios rejected the idea of a NATO force, as he feared losing control of his power base. The UN, he reasoned, offered much better prospects of his retaining a commanding influence over the situation, and a reluctant Britain was compelled to go before the Security Council on 18 February 1964.

The idea of a peacekeeping force was immediately put forward, with Canada touted as a major supplier of troops. For virtually the first time, however, the Canadian Government publicly stated that certain conditions would have to be met before Canada would participate. These conditions, explained to the House by Prime Minister Pearson on 19 February 1964, clearly indicate that Canada had learned from its UNEF, ONUC, and funding crisis experiences. The conditions were also the genesis of the guiding criteria that appeared in the 1987 White Paper. The Canadian Government, said Pearson, would have to be assured that the force was acceptable to both sides, and that the sides were willing accept a UN mediator as a part of the force. In effect, Ottawa was demanding that peacemaking become an integral part of peacekeeping. To back up his request, the Prime Minister

stated that Canada would not accept an open-ended mandate, and he mused about how the force would be paid for.⁴⁶ Though the government would subsequently march back from most of those positions, as the Cypriot situation deteriorated, their having been put forward at all indicated an increasing awareness in Ottawa of some of the pitfalls of peacekeeping.

Meanwhile, negotiations in New York were proceeding with difficulty. By early March, a peacekeeping force had been agreed to by all sides, but wrangling over its composition and functions was dragging on, and the fighting on Cyprus was escalating. The 12th and 13th of March were the crucial days, and it was none other than Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, who played the decisive role in cajolling the two sides to accept a workable mandate, and in rounding up other UN members to join the force.⁴⁷ Unfortunately for Martin, the give-and-take of these two days, and the extreme stress as the NATO and Commonwealth implications of extended hostilities on Cyprus became clear, meant that most of the conditions laid down by Pearson on 19 February were respected in a Pickwickian fashion only in the resulting mandate. In fairness to Martin, however, it might be asked what else the Canadian Government could have done, as simply letting the two sides fight it out, and inevitably draw in the Greeks and Turks, hardly looked to be a viable option.

The first Canadians arrived on 17 March, and within three weeks 1,150 men were on Cyprus, complete with heavy vehicles and a functioning headquarters. Though the Finns, Swedes, and Irish had also promised battalion-sized contingents, they did not arrive for a month and the Canadians were caught in the middle of some serious, if generally localized, fighting with few friends to assist them other than the British troops already on the island. As the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

gradually established itself, however, the situation stabilized. Unfortunately, the political will to find a solution to the Cypriot dispute was lacking, and it soon became apparent that the peacekeepers were simply "marking time" in Cyprus at great expense, and considerable strain to the thinly stretched Canadian forces. The frustrations produced by this seemingly interminable commitment would subsequently occasion much critical inquiry into Canada's involvement in peacekeeping.⁴⁸

A tangible result of the Cypriot case was the government's recognition that the ad hocary surrounding the creation of UNEF and UNFICYP should be avoided in future. Canada, and several like-minded smaller powers, began discussing ways of preparing for peacekeeping duties, but, though several conferences were held, little of a formal institutional nature was accomplished.⁴⁹ The reasons for the lack of progress were entirely political, and revolved around the same considerations as had stymied the UN's military committee from its first days. Put simply, neither of the superpowers, and few other states, were willing to see the UN evolve into a force in its own right, with the capability to intrude wherever it saw fit, and impose solutions. On the practical side, the "peacekeeping nations" could train their troops for peacekeeping duties unilaterally, share information on such training activities, and have special units earmarked for peacekeeping service on short notice, but the creation of a standing peacekeeping brigade remained as far away in 1966 as it had been in 1946.⁵⁰

The Bitter Years: 1967-1972

The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the nadir of international peacekeeping, even though, ironically, these years witnessed a massive

reorganization of the Canadian military--a reorganization justified, in part, by its utility in increasing Canada's peacekeeping ability. The plunge in peacekeeping's fortunes began with the expulsion of the UNEF by Egypt's President Nasser. Nasser's reasons for initiating hostilities in 1967 were many and varied, but can essentially be traced to three considerations: he was better equipped in 1967 than he had been in 1956; he expected (erroneously) Russian aid; and he felt that he would lose the leadership of the Arab world if he failed to act decisively against Israel.⁵¹ When Nasser summarily ordered the UNEF out of Egypt on 17 May 1967, he set in motion a sequence of events that led to war. Many have criticized Secretary General U Thant's rapid acquiescence in Nasser's order. There were several procedural devices, it has been pointed out, that could have enabled U Thant to hang on and possibly avert the war.⁵²

In U Thant's defence, however, it should be pointed out that the UNEF was not a Security Council creation but rather a child of the General Assembly, and was, accordingly, in a very weak position politically. Moreover, remaining on site after the decision to initiate hostilities had been firmly taken would have led to heavy UN casualties, as the UN forces were not equipped to survive once fighting had begun in earnest. Perhaps the most compelling justification for a speedy withdrawal, however, was the fact that remaining in Egypt after the expulsion order would have been a direct challenge to Egyptian sovereignty in the name of the UN. No matter what their view of the circumstances of this particular case, too many other UN members would have found themselves incapable of supporting such an overt challenge to the principle of sovereign statehood. As a result, general political confidence in the UN would have been seriously eroded over the long run.

As it had played a substantial role in setting up the UNEF, so too did Canada achieve noteworthiness in its demise. Initially, Paul Martin publicly disagreed with U Thant's actions, at least until Prime Minister Pearson indicated he understood and sympathized with the Secretary General's dilemma.⁵³ A great shock to Canada was Nasser's singling out of the Canadian contingent for special treatment during the withdrawal. On 27 May Ottawa learned that Nasser had specifically declared the Canadians personae non gratae and had ordered their expulsion within 48 hours. It may well have been that Nasser's traditional suspicion of the Canadians, combined with the fact that President Johnson had visited Ottawa the previous day and issued a joint statement with Pearson to the effect that the two governments regretted actions taken by Nasser, triggered this extraordinary expulsion order.⁵⁴ But it cannot also be forgotten that the Canadians provided the UNEF with most of its transport and maintenance facilities, and that getting rid of them first meant that the technical guts had been ripped out of the UNEF, thus rendering any chance of its remaining on site hopeless.

This incident points to a seemingly contradictory reality of peacekeeping: it is not necessarily a means of gaining influence in disputes. In fact, quite the reverse can often be the case, inasmuch as it is very difficult for a government first to field peacekeeping forces, which must be seen as absolutely impartial in order to be effective, and then to turn around and issue Delphic pronouncements about the wisdom of a given state's actions. Rather than guaranteeing influence over a situation, then, having one's forces as peacekeepers requires that a country practice a tremendous amount of diplomatic restraint about the

issue, lest one's impartiality be compromised. Moreover, setting oneself up as a prospective peacekeeper at large requires that one shut up about virtually everything, in order to be acceptable in the widest range of situations.

The demise of the UNEF was the major development in international peacekeeping during these years. Aside from the observer missions in the Kashmir (UNMOGIP) and the Mideast (UNTSO), the only other major peacekeeping force in the field was UNFICYP, which had achieved a tremendous amount of stability on Cyprus but was having no effect in bringing the two sides closer to a settlement.

Within Canada, the major structural changes in the armed forces called for in the 1964 White Paper on Defence were coming to fruition during this period.⁵⁵ Although the most visible and symbolic change was the introduction of the green uniform as a manifestation of unification, other important changes were taking place within the Canadian Forces. The 1964 White Paper had listed Canada's defence priorities as being:

(1) Forces for the direct protection of Canada that can be deployed as required; (2) forces-in-being as part of the deterrent in the European theatre; (3) maritime forces-in-being as a contribution to that deterrent; (4) forces-in-being for UN peacekeeping operations which would be included also in (1) above; (5) reserve forces and mobilization potential.

It then continued:

On the basis of this assessment, major expenditures in the next few years will be designed to: (a) re-equip the Army as a mobile force; (b) provide an adequate air and sea lift for its immediate deployment in an emergency; (c) acquire tactical aircraft; (d) maintain a relatively constant improvement of maritime anti-submarine capability.

The overall effect of the White Paper was to make peacekeeping appear to have been significantly upgraded as a priority by having the rest of the Forces conform to the requirement for lightly armed, but highly mobile,

troops. Clearly, the Government assumed that a high degree of compatibility existed between the requirements of national defence, NATO operations, and peacekeeping, and that the same equipment could be used for all three. The two major initiatives of this period were aimed at: 1) producing a highly mobile force, with an air-sea lift capability for rapid deployment outside of Canada; and 2) integrating the services so that redundancies could be eliminated and a greater pool of cross-trained specialists made available to fill any role on land, sea, or in the air.

Whether or not such a force would have been more effective on the European battlefield is a difficult question to answer. It is clear, however, that a force such as was envisaged in the 1964 White Paper would be ideally suited to the demands of peacekeeping. Not surprisingly, the White Paper argued that the need for peacekeepers was destined to grow substantially in the near future. For example, it assumed that Third World "instability will probably continue in the decade ahead" and called for containment measures that did not lend themselves to Great Power or Alliance action. "The peacekeeping responsibilities devolving upon the U.N. can be expected to grow correspondingly."⁵⁶

By the late 1960s, the ambitious defence program called for in the 1964 White Paper had been largely implemented, but the requirement for one of the major components of that program, peacekeeping forces, was on the wane. The demand for further peacekeeping operations in the Third World had not grown as expected, and indeed these operations had been discredited globally by the expulsion of UNEF, the seemingly never-ending Cyprus commitment, and the inability of the Committee of Thirty-Three to work out an acceptable funding formula. In the specific case of Canada, the UNEF expulsion raised serious questions about the country's future suitability

as a peacekeeper.⁵⁷

By the early 1970s, Ottawa's attitude towards peacekeeping once again underwent a change. This was reflected in the subsequent Defence White Paper, Defence in the 70s, which officially downgraded peacekeeping from an apparent tie for first place, to a distant last place as a defence priority. But, while peacekeeping was placed firmly behind Canadian defence, NORAD, and NATO as a priority, the level of resources committed to peacekeeping remained relatively unchanged. The Government made no move to withdraw from Cyprus, despite increased grumbling about the fact that no settlement loomed on the horizon, and continued to provide a standby contingent, immediately available and trained for peacekeeping duties, at UN request.⁵⁸ Perhaps more importantly, the overall thrust of the 1964 White Paper, a highly mobile and flexible military force able to provide the Government with the widest range of options, at the least possible cost, was retained in Defence in the 70s.

What had changed, then, were official attitudes towards peacekeeping rather than the Government's capability actually to undertake such missions if requested. Indeed, to the extent that the country's peacekeeping capability actually suffered, so too did all other aspects of the Canadian Forces, as a result of the Government's spending freeze of the early 1970s. The change in attitude, if not in capability, was occasioned by the Government's dissatisfaction with peacekeeping--a dissatisfaction created in large measure by the seemingly total disregard of the criteria enunciated by Pearson during the Cypriot crisis. These criteria were restated and strengthened in Defence in the 70s, whose drafters argued that "the scope for useful and effective peacekeeping activities now appears

more modest than it did earlier, despite the persistence of widespread violence in many parts of the world."⁵⁹ It seemed to many in the early 1970s, then, that peacekeeping had lost favour as a means of assisting in the transition from colonialism to independence. As that had constituted peacekeeping's *raison d'être* through the 1960s, the gradual demise of this activity was held to be inevitable.

Ironically, however, just as events had contradicted the assumptions made about peacekeeping in the 1964 White Paper, so too would they contradict the premises of Defence in the 70s. Peacekeeping, in fact, experienced something of a renaissance in the early to mid 1970s, finding a new niche as a means of balancing relationships in world trouble spots, perhaps thereby allowing *détente* to survive regional differences between the superpowers.⁶⁰

The major development in peacekeeping during the early 1970s was the creation of UNEF II in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. UNEF II seemed to herald a bright new day for peacekeeping, for the following reasons. It was established by a vote in the Security Council in which both the Soviets and Americans supported its creation. Its financing had been agreed upon prior to its taking to the field. Its mandate, in comparison with previous mandates, seemed clear. Finally, the force included East bloc representation in the form of a Polish contingent that was "twinning" with its Canadian counterpart to give it East/West balance.⁶¹

In effect, the precedents created by the UNEF II addressed many of the issues that had been languishing before the Committee of Thirty-Three for nearly a decade. Unfortunately, it soon became clear that neither the Soviets nor the French considered these precedents to be binding in any other situation. Instead, they insisted, their actions were based upon the

demands of the war, and they reserved the right to act in any way they deemed appropriate in future cases.

Despite these reservations, however, some permanent progress was made on the Committee of Thirty-Three in the early 1970s, which reflected a degree of compromise on the part of the Great Powers. The biggest advance was in the area of the definition of, and delineation of standard procedures for, peace observers. It is likely that this progress was the result of a recognition on the part of these Great Power blocs that such forces could prove useful in preventing the escalation of smaller wars that might drag them into unplanned confrontation, and thus jeopardize détente.

Canada played a significant role in UNEF II, and the experience proved that, although the Government intended to demonstrate its skepticism over many aspects of peacekeeping, specific requests would continue to be favourably considered if there appeared to be a significant chance that world stability might be jeopardized by hostilities. In other words, the downgrading of peacekeeping was largely a public relations gesture. The capability remained roughly the same, relative that is to the overall capability of the Canadian Forces (which was declining at the time), and the motives that had led the Government to first become involved in peacekeeping continued to retain validity.

While the experience of UNEF II was a relative success for Canada, however, its second experience in Southeast Asia was not. From the start Canada had been reluctant to participate in the proposed International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS). Ottawa remained dubious about peacekeeping efforts launched outside the auspices of the UN, and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, repeatedly

stressed that Canada required an effective reporting authority as a precondition of participation. After its earlier experiences in the region, Canada firmly believed that, to be effective, peacekeepers required an impartial body to which they could publicly report their findings. Indeed, as Canada's Ambassador to the ICCS would later state, the role of peacekeepers, and really their only deterrent, was to "blow the whistle" so that any violators could be judged in the court of world opinion.⁶² Sharp also stressed that Canada was not pleased with the idea that ICCS observers would work in multinational teams, on each of which there would be an Eastern and Western (Canada) member, and that these teams would have to achieve unanimity in order for the report to become official. In Canada's view, such an arrangement invited deadlock and, therefore, ineffectiveness.

The final ceasefire arrangement turned out to be most unsatisfactory from Canada's viewpoint. The reporting authority was weak, the principle of unanimity was enshrined in the agreement, and the observers were not granted automatic and speedy freedom of access to all areas in order to investigate quickly possible violations. Notwithstanding its lengthy list of criticisms, however, strong pressures existed on Canada to participate, lest the agreement fall apart.⁶³ Canada did commit its troops, and, in the initial days of the ICCS, the extent of their training and preparation rapidly became apparent as it was the Canadians who more or less single-handedly got the ICCS off the ground and operating under some very difficult conditions.⁶⁴ On a political level, Canada entered the ICCS with few illusions. In fact, its "open mouth" policy was specifically tailored to prod what Ottawa considered an ineffective organization into accountability, and to prepare the ground for withdrawal should the situation become untenable.⁶⁵

At first, the ICCS worked reasonably well, mainly as a result of there having been a common objective: supervision of prisoner transfers. Once these transfers had been accomplished, the list of shared objectives dwindled, and trouble became inevitable. Violations of the ceasefire were rife and tended to follow a clear pattern, with the Communists exerting strong pressure from the North and across the Laotian border. A basic difference of opinion among the ICCS members was evident, with the Canadians wishing to adhere to the letter of the agreement and report every ceasefire rigorously, and the two Communist members, Hungary and Poland, taking a more sanguine view of what could, and should, be accomplished, all the time using the unanimity principle to kill Canadian initiatives. Rhetorically, at least, the Eastern observers justified their stand by arguing that the force should not devote itself entirely to supervision as such, but should use its influence and prestige to nudge the parties towards a resolution of the basic political issues. While such lofty sentiments may have appeared beyond reproach, the fact that, in practice, they allowed the Communist Vietnamese forces to prepare for the final big push against the South with impunity was probably uppermost in the minds of the Hungarians and the Poles. Canada's position, as Ambassador Gauvin made clear with increasing stridency, was that it was not the job of the ICCS to effect an evolution of the Paris Peace Accords, but simply to see that they were adhered to by all, and to alert the world if they were not. Any attempt on the part of the ICCS, Gauvin repeatedly stressed, to enter the political fray would call into question the impartiality of the observers.⁶⁶

As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, and, incidentally, as the

American withdrawal proceeded, the Canadian "open mouth" widened, much to the dismay of the country's ICCS partners. Finally, in the late spring of 1973, Sharp announced that he would not renew Canadian participation in the ICCS if improvements were not made within two months.⁶⁷ These improvements did not occur, and in the summer of 1973 Canada officially ended its participation in the ICCS.⁶⁸ While it might be thought that Canada's participation on the ICCS was an entirely negative experience, such was not the case. In the first place, some valuable experience was acquired. Specifically, Canada came away from Vietnam with four basic criteria that would be applied to future peace observation activities outside the purview of the UN. These were: 1) a political will must be clearly demonstrated on both sides to make such forces work; 2) the force must exist in support of a viable peace process; 3) an independent, higher authority must exist to whom the force could report regularly and publicly and which could take care of logistical and financial matters as they arose, and; 4) the unanimity principle had to be waived.⁶⁹

Canada's participation in a recent international peacekeeping force, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was created in 1978, was brief. It was obvious that UNIFIL had no clear mandate and that Lebanon was in such a chaotic state that there were no stable factions with whom to work. The comparisons with the Congo were overpowering, and Ottawa made clear that it wanted no part in the exercise.⁷⁰ Because the Americans were determined to get a peacekeeping force, in order to keep the Camp David process alive, UNIFIL was established, and Canada was persuaded to briefly assist in setting the force up.⁷¹ The Government's decision not to participate in UNIFIL on an ongoing basis appears to have been a wise one, in view of that operation's tragic and bloody history, and is also evidence

that the evolving criteria for participation in peacekeeping ventures had reached such a level of maturity that the Government felt it could say no for some very sound reasons.

During the past year, Ottawa has committed Canadian peacekeeping troops to three further missions, the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), and the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. As of this writing, there are now some 1,200 members of the Canadian Forces assigned to eight different peacekeeping missions, clear evidence that peacekeeping has once again become seen as a good thing for the CF to engage its limited resources in.

Conclusion: The Historical Record and Its Relevance in Central America

One "lesson" of peacekeeping--although it never did make it into the list of criteria published in the Defence White Paper of 1987 (or that of any other year)--is that this activity can effectively serve the interests of the Canadian Forces. That it can and does also serve broader Canadian foreign policy interests is also true, but as the inquiry in this paper is on the perspective of DND, it might be well to dwell upon some of the attractions of peacekeeping from the point of view of Canadian defence planners. The first of these attractions must be that peacekeeping provides invaluable training for the Forces; operationally, the advantages of peacekeeping are simply that it supplies the most realistic form of preparation available to Canada's soldiers, short of actual battlefield conditions. If John Dewey was correct in observing that "you learn by doing," then it is obvious the CF have been able to avail themselves of

peacekeeping to move up the learning curve in several areas of military activity. This applies most directly, of course, to the army (and those elements of the reserves that have been recently given peacekeeping assignments).

A second major advantage of peacekeeping is that it provides an element of legitimacy to the CF and to the Department of National Defence in an era when many Canadians (and citizens of other countries) are beginning to question the need for and methods of military forces. With reductions in East/West tension occasioning what could become rather fundamental reassessments of the traditional pole of Canadian defence policy, namely the commitment to the defence of Europe, peacekeeping serves to remind the public that military establishments continue to remain relevant for Canadian and international security interests. It is striking that in some constituencies with a passionate concern for human rights and development, and therefore a pronounced distaste for the rationale and instruments of more "traditional" defence interests of the postwar era, there is an appreciation for the potential contribution that Canada's military can make to the task of managing conflict in the Third World. Simply put, the Canadian Forces can and do reap a harvest of goodwill among elements in this country (e.g. church groups) who are usually not particularly well disposed toward the Department of National Defence. As one Canadian policy advocate involved in the Central American issue recently observed, in an approving if jocular manner, there seemed to be developing a "military-ecclesiastical complex" on the question of Canada's Central American interests and policies.⁷²

Symptomatic of the recent renewed interest in peacekeeping on the part of the Department of National Defence is the message that Chief of the

Defence Staff, Gen. Paul Manson, sent to members of the CF in the aftermath of the April budget announcement. Given the austerity that was going to affect so many of the capital projects indicated in the 1987 White Paper, the CDS informed those under his command that while certain undertakings might have to be scaled down (such as the acquisition of a three-ocean navy), others would be unaffected by fiscal stringency. Among the latter was peacekeeping, the emphasis upon which, in Manson's words, was going to be "greater than ever."⁷³

This is perhaps not surprising, but it does reflect a rather different assessment, as we have indicated, of the merits of peacekeeping from that indicated in the 1987 White Paper. Keeping this in mind, the final question we seek to answer, with particular reference to ONUCA, is: to what extent have the 1987 criteria been adhered to in the decision to involve Canada in the reconnaissance mission to Central America, and in its possible (and likely) participation in ONUCA? It seems to us that most, but by no means all of the criteria have been satisfied. It also seems to us that the criteria that have not, and possibly cannot, be met have been disregarded. And this further suggests that, as has happened in the past, Ottawa has been prepared to go against some of the "counsels" of experience--as it were, disregard the "lessons of the past"--when it has seen fit to do so.

There is nothing necessarily wrong with this, as there are any number of occasions when caution probably should be thrown to the winds for the sake of achieving outcomes that would otherwise be unattainable. And Central America appears at the moment to have reached a stage where some outcomes might indeed be rendered slightly less impossible of achievement

as a result of certain states taking some small gambles. In this respect Canada appears to be acting wisely in taking the small gamble of committing peacekeeping resources to the Esquipulas II process. But at the same time it is useful that we be reminded of those elements of previous experience with peacekeeping that are likely to present ONUCA with its most fundamental challenges.

Of most of the criteria identified in Challenge and Commitment it can be said that their fulfillment is reasonably at hand. Illustratively, now that the Bush administration has come out in support of the Esquipulas process it hardly appears likely that Canadian peacekeeping done to further that process will damage Canadian relations with the U.S.; in this respect alone, there has been a fundamental difference from the situation prevailing under the Reagan administration. And with the UN taking an active leadership role in the creation of the observer mission, the basal condition that has long dominated Canadian concern--that there be an independent and competent reporting authority--also appears to be met.

There are two criteria, however, that are not fulfilled. The mandate of the mission is far from clear. Although it will, for political reasons, probably be necessary that ONUCA have a presence in all five Central American signatories to the Esquipulas accord, the reality is that most of the observers will occupy themselves with verifying that no aid is being given to the region's irregular forces, and that territory of one state is not being used for launching attacks on territory of another. This will mean that the bulk of ONUCA's observers would probably be operating near the Honduran/Nicaraguan border region, with some lesser observing/verification capabilities being deployed on Nicaragua's border with Costa Rica, and perhaps in the Gulf of Fonseca.⁷⁴

The other problematical criterion is that all sides agree to a ceasefire. If interpreted to mean simply that all signatories consent to a ceasefire, then this criterion appears easy to meet--indeed, as long as the Sandinistas maintain their ceasefire, it already has been met. But if interpreted to mean that all parties, including the irregular contras and FMLN, observe a ceasefire, then the situation looks much more complicated. And being complicated, it would also contain certain dangers for any Canadian peacekeeping mission sent to the region.

Weighed against the possible risks, however, the possible benefits seem great. But it is important that this peacekeeping effort not be oversold in the way some earlier ones were (especially UNEF I); for it must be reemphasized that peacekeeping and peace enforcing (or peace making) are not one and the same. The most that can be hoped for from ONUCA is that it will bring a modicum of respite for one part of Central America. ONUCA will have very little to say about the domestic conflict in Guatemala, and will hardly be of great relevance to that in El Salvador. Where it can make a difference is in calming the international tensions that have flared as a result of the ability of the contras to avail themselves of the territory of Honduras and, to a lesser degree, Costa Rica.

Notes

¹Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1987).

²Unclassified briefing notes, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 29 April 1989.

³Arthur Max, "Nobel Prize Is Awarded to UN Forces," Globe and Mail (Toronto), 30 September 1988, p. A1.

⁴Challenge and Commitment, p. 24.

⁵On the negative consequences of imputing an inappropriate "lesson" to past events, see Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

⁶A pioneering effort to introduce public policy analysis to appropriate methods for utilizing history is Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).

⁷The text of the Esquipilas II accord can be found in Central America Report, 14 August 1987.

⁸ONUCA is the Spanish acronym for Grupo de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en America Central.

⁹A useful source for Canadian peacekeeping efforts worldwide is Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau & Wayne, 1987).

¹⁰A thorough discussion of the establishment and early operations of UNMOGIP may be found in S. Courie, "The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," International Organization 9 (1955): 19-31.

¹¹Clause 2 of the cease-fire reads: "The meetings [to establish the cease-fire line] will be for military purposes; political issues will not be considered....They [the meetings] will be conducted without prejudice to negotiations concerning the truce agreement." The full cease-fire agreement is contained in R. Higgins, United Nations' Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. 2: Asia (London: Oxford Press, 1970), pp. 334-37.

¹²The Communication Network and Field Service were established by, respectively, General Assembly Resolution 231 (III) of 8 October 1948 and General Assembly Resolution 279 (IV) of 29 November 1949. Unfortunately, though these were good beginnings, they would never be built upon because of the East-West deadlock in the Secretariat's Military Staff Committee, which ensured that the type of Standing UN Force envisaged in the Charter could never be created.

¹³Higgins, United Nations' Peacekeeping, vol.1, pp. 12-15.

¹⁴This fact was well understood during the early years of peace observation. See, for example, P. Mohon, "Problems of Truce Supervision," International Conciliation, no. 478 (February 1952), p. 62.

¹⁵Jack L. Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper, A Survey of Canada's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Lindsay, Ontario: John Dyll Ltd., 1968), pp. 98-100, 107; and Rod B. Byers, "Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy: Ambivalence and Uncertainty," Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 132.

¹⁶Department of External Affairs Press Release 43, 28 July 1954. Essentially, Canada regretted the fact that an impartial reporting authority was not being created.

¹⁷For more on Canada's experiences in the ICSC, see: P. Dai, "Canada's Role in the ICSC in Cambodia," Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 8 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1970), pp. 307-23; Idem, "Canada's Role in the ICSC in Laos," Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 10 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972), pp. 235-60; and John W. Holmes, "Techniques of Peacekeeping in Asia," in China and the Peace of Asia, ed. Alistair Buchan (London: Chatto & Windess, 1965), pp. 231-49.

¹⁸Quoted in M. Cohen, "The U.N.E.F.: A Preliminary View," International Journal 12 (Spring 1957): 112.

¹⁹Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 332-34.

²⁰The implications of this formula are well discussed in Leland M. Goodrich and E. R. Gabriella, "The UNEF," International Organization 11 (Summer 1957): 423.

²¹See General Assembly Resolution A/3302, 6 November 1956, cited in *ibid.*

²²The great difficulties faced by the UNEF during its initial months are admirably discussed by its first commander, General E. L. M. Burns, in Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto: Clarke & Irwin, 1962).

²³See Cohen, "The U.N.E.F.: A Preliminary View," and A. Sheikh, "UN Peacekeeping Forces: A Reappraisal of Relevant Charter Provisions," Revue belge de droit internationale 7, 2 (1971): 469-504.

²⁴See General Assembly Resolution 377/v, 3 November 1950.

²⁵The difficulties and strains imposed upon peacekeepers by the need to obtain consent are very well discussed in M. H. Gagnon, "Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent," International Organization 21

(Autumn 1967): 812-36. See also, J. I. Garvey, "UN Peacekeeping and Host State Consent," American Journal of International Law 64 (April 1970): 241-69.

²⁶James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, 1955-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 187-89.

²⁷G. Spry, "Canada, the UNEF and the Commonwealth," International Affairs 33 (July 1957): 289-300.

²⁸Pearson repeated his 1953 suggestion that a permanent standby UN Force be established in his 1957 article, "A Force for the UN," Foreign Affairs 35 (April 1957): 395-404.

²⁹As John Holmes would later put it, "Even though Arabs and Asians on the whole welcomed the expedition of UNEF in 1956, it was necessary to argue hard to convince them that this was not just a scheme to bring back the old Imperialism under a new flag. The problem of Canadian diplomats during that strenuous period was to persuade the Arabs on the one hand that they were not acting merely as agents of what the Arabs considered to be sinister British intentions, and to persuade the British on the other hand that UNEF could carry out more effectively the mission of pacification and protection which they had taken upon themselves." John W. Holmes, "The United Nations in the Congo," International Journal 16 (Winter 1960/61): 5-6.

³⁰For a somewhat disenchanted discussion of the high hopes raised in Canada by the UNEF experience, see Jack L. Granatstein, "Canada and Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality," Canadian Forum 54 (August 1974): 14-19.

³¹See, for example, the Globe and Mail editorial of 21 July 1958. For more on UNOGIL itself, see G. L. Curtis, "The U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon," International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964): 738-65.

³²For background to the Congo crisis, see Holmes, "United Nations in the Congo"; and W. Joshua, "Belgium's Role in the UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo," Orbis 11 (Summer 1967): 3-19.

³³As Holmes later said: "It would be misleading to imply that Hammarskjold welcomed the crisis in the Congo, but he did accept the challenge with enthusiasm. This was the opportunity he had been waiting for to expand the positive function of the UN as a force for progress beyond the wrath of the cold war." See Holmes, "United Nations in the Congo," pp. 7-8.

³⁴Hammarskjold's instructions quoted in Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 23.

³⁵The breadth and strength of the opinion is summarized in Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper," pp. 153-56.

³⁶See Holmes, Joshua, Lefever, and Granatstein. See also Lincoln Bloomfield, "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and

End of ONUC," International Organization 17 (1963): 376-89.

³⁷Quoted from P. V. Bishop, "Canada's Policy on the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations," International Journal 20 (Autumn 1965): 463-83.

³⁸Two succinct, but excellent, summations of the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the funding crisis are C. W. Keigly, "The Uniting for Peace Resolution," International Review of History and Political Science 8 (February 1971): 33-46; and N. J. Padelford, "Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis," International Organization 19 (Summer 1965): 444-62. See also J. J. Combs, "France and UN Peacekeeping," International Organization 21 (Spring 1967): 307-25; and R. Weiner, "The USSR and UN Peacekeeping," Orbis (Fall 1969): 914-30.

³⁹Bishop, "Canada's Policy."

⁴⁰The Court's ruling was not without qualifications. See L. Gross, "Expenses of the UN for Peacekeeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice," International Organization 17 (1963): 1-35.

⁴¹By the early 1970s, it had been concluded that the Committee of Thirty-Three was performing its job of allowing the financing crisis to be circumvented admirably, even if it was not having any appreciable impact on resolving the underlying dispute. See, for example, S. M. Finger, "Breaking the Deadlock on UN Peacekeeping," Orbis 17 (Summer 1973): 385-404; M. Goldblatt, "The Long Frustrating Quest for a Peacekeeping Formula," International Perspectives, July/August 1972, pp. 13-18; and Poelin Dai, "Canada's Policy on the Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations," Canadian Yearbook of International Law 12 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1974): 186-210.

⁴²For more on UNTEA see, A. M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the UN (London: Stevens & Sons, 1960); P. W. van der Veur, "The UN in West Siam," International Organization 1 (1964): 53-73; and Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper," pp. 165-67.

⁴³More on UNYOM may be found in Gen. C. von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (London: Cassell, 1960), chap. 28; and Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper," pp. 167-69.

⁴⁴UNIPOM's activities are summarized in Robert W. Reford, "UNIPOM: Success of a Mission," International Journal 27 (Summer 1972): 405-23.

⁴⁵In addition to the Commander and a small group of observers for UNIPOM, Canada contributed two Otter aircraft to UNTEA and two Caribous and three Otters to UNYOM, plus air and ground crews.

⁴⁶Pearson's comments may be found in House of Commons, Canada, Hansard, 19 February 1964.

⁴⁷As one observer later put it: "It is generally conceded, that in a period of great international tension it was Canada's Secretary of State

for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, who saved the peace." J. K. Gordon, "The UN in Cyprus," International Journal 19 (Summer 1964): 340.

⁴⁸See, for example, Major K. C. Eyre, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping: Conclusions Drawn from Personal Experiences in Cyprus in the Tragic Summer of 1974," Canadian Defence Quarterly 12 (Summer 1982): 31-36; Gen. (Ret'd) E. M. D. Leslie, "The Success and Failure of UNFICYP," International Perspectives, November/December 1974, pp. 13-16. For negative assessments of the utility of the Cypriot exercise, see L. Col. Y. H. Allen, "The Future of Peacekeeping for Canada," Canadian Defence Quarterly 8 (Summer 1978): 30-37; F. S. Manor, "The Case Against Peacekeeping," International Perspectives, July/August 1977, pp. 28-32; and John Gellner, "Does International Peacekeeping Have Any Future?" International Perspectives, September/October 1973, pp. 23-26.

⁴⁹Typical of these conferences was the one held in Ottawa in February 1964. See LCol. B. Eggo, "The Ottawa Conference on UN Peacekeeping Forces," Disarmament (Paris), no. 8 (December 1965), pp. 21-26.

⁵⁰International efforts to train peacekeepers are summarized in MGen. I. J. Rikhye, "Preparation and Training of UN Peacekeeping Forces," Adelphi Paper, no. 9 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964). For an overview of efforts in Canada, see R. B. Tackaberry, "Organizing and Training Peacekeeping Forces: The Canadian View," International Journal 22 (Spring 1967): 195-209. Some theoretical work was done on the requirements of a standing UN Force, but, while it was concluded that the technical problems were not insurmountable, the political problems were. See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Political Conditions for an International Police Force," International Organization 17 (1963): 393-403; and Capt. C. E. Beattie, "The Feasibility of a Permanent UN Police Force," Snowy Owl: The Canadian Army Staff College Journal (1959-61), pp. 33-39.

⁵¹This explanation is put forward in E. L. M. Burns, "The Withdrawal of the UNEF and the Future of Peacekeeping," International Journal 23 (Winter 1967-68): 1-17.

⁵²For a summation of the options that might have been available to U Thant, see *ibid.*; and Maxwell Cohen, "The Demise of the UNEF," International Journal 23 (Winter 1967-68): 18-51.

⁵³See Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper," p. 139.

⁵⁴Canada's difficulties are admirably summarized in W. A. B. Douglas, "Canada and the Withdrawal of the UNEF," Canadian Defence Quarterly 2 (Winter 1972/73): 45-53.

⁵⁵For a good analysis of the 1964 White Paper, one that contrasts it with the two subsequent (1971 and 1987) White Papers, see Douglas L. Bland, "Controlling the Defense Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defense and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence," Defense Analysis 5 (1989): 3-17. "

⁵⁶ This and previous quotes taken from Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence, 1964 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964). Essentially, the White Paper was arguing that responses to international violence must be on a graduated scale, that massive reaction on the part of the superpowers to a local disturbance would be inappropriate, and that states such as Canada had a role to play in containing violence at the lower end of the scale. An almost identical argument is enthusiastically made in A. M. Taylor, "Canada's Role in Peacekeeping," Air Force College Journal (Canada) (1964), pp. 25-32.

⁵⁷ A particularly scathing example of the questioning may be found in A. Preston, "Canada at the Crossroads of 'Peacekeeping'," Yearbook of the United Service Institution of India 99 (April/June 1969): 153-59.

⁵⁸ See, for example, the Minister of National Defence's 1975 statement to the House that "the structure of the Canadian Armed Forces will provide up to 2,000 personnel to be available for U.N. peacekeeping purposes at any one time." Quoted in Byers, "Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy," p. 137.

⁵⁹ Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971).

⁶⁰ In a very real sense, thus, the idea that peacekeeping was reborn in the early 1970s is wrong, because it never really died. What died in the late sixties were a lot of unrealistic expectations. Peacekeeping itself retained its original, and limited utility. This argument is persuasively made by Henry Wiseman, "Has New Life Been Breathed into UN Peacekeeping?" Canadian Defence Quarterly 5 (Summer 1975): 22-28.

⁶¹ The pressures and precedents surrounding the creation of UNEF II are summarized in E. L. M. Burns, "Guidelines for UNEF II," International Perspectives, March/April 1974, pp. 36-41; M. Harbottle, "UNEF II - A Step Forward in Peacekeeping," Journal of RUSI for Defence Studies 119 (September 1974): 544-53; and N. A. Pelcovits, "UN Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict," Orbis 19 (Spring 1975): 156-65.

⁶² Quoted in Poelin Dai, "Canada's Reluctant Participation in the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam," Canadian Yearbook of International Law 11 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973): 244-57.

⁶³ These pressures are summarized in *ibid.* The concerns of the Canadian Government during the Paris peace talks are outlined in "Weighing a New Peacekeeping Role in Vietnam," International Perspectives, January/February 1973, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁴ The work done by the Canadians in getting the ICCS going virtually by themselves is outlined in Col. D. G. Loomis, "An Expedition to Vietnam: The Military Component of the Canadian Delegation (MCCD) 1973," Canadian Defence Quarterly 3 (Spring 1974): 35-40; and Team ICCS LORE (Vietnam), "Canadian Land Ordinance Engineers in Vietnam, 1973," Canadian Defence Quarterly 5 (Summer 1975): 45-51; *ibid.*, (Winter 1975): 39-40.

⁶⁵ See William Dobell, "A Sow's Ear in Vietnam," International Journal 29 (Summer 1974): 356-92.

⁶⁶ M. Gauvin, "An Ambassador's View of the ICCS Limits," International Perspectives, May/June 1973, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁷ See Sharp's statement in "Canada Extends its Trial Period in Vietnam," International Perspectives, May/June 1973, pp. 14-16.

⁶⁸ See "Withdrawal from Vietnam Supervisory Role," International Perspectives, July/August 1973, pp. 30-31.

⁶⁹ See Loomis, "An Expedition to Vietnam."

⁷⁰ This comparison is specifically made and discussed in: A. James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The UN in Lebanon, 1978-1982," International Journal 38 (Autumn 1983): 613-34; Ramesh Thakur, "International Peacekeeping: The UN Interim Force in Lebanon," Australian Outlook 35 (August 1981): 181-90; N. J. Weinburger, "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon," Middle-East Journal 37 (Summer 1983): 341-69; and Henry Wiseman, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon," International Perspectives, January/February 1979, pp. 3-7.

⁷¹ For details of Canada's contribution, see Wiseman, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon"; and Poelin Dai, "The UN Interim Force in Lebanon and Canadian Participation," Canadian Yearbook of International Law 17 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979): 304-13.

⁷² For this expression I am indebted to Michael Czerny, S. J., Director of the Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice.

⁷³ Unclassified message from the Chief of the Defence Staff to personnel of the Canadian Forces, 27 April 1989.

⁷⁴ For a good technical discussion of the problems associated with verifying the Esquipulas Accord, see H. P. Klepak, "Verification of a Central America Peace Accord," Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper no. 2 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, 1989).