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# ATLANTICISM WITHOUT THE WALL:

# TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION AND THE

# TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE

by

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In December 1989, in the midst of the most extraordinary few months in European life in four decades, American Secretary of State James Baker went to Berlin to speak about a "new era for Europe." Baker evoked the now familiar image of a "new architecture" whose purpose would be first to overcome the division of Europe and second to "bridge the Atlantic Ocean" as "America's security--politically, militarily and economically remains linked to Europe's security. " He concluded with a vision of the creation of "a new Europe on the basis of a new Atlanticism."[1]

In that speech Baker was suggesting how Canada and the United States should respond to one aspect of the changing global context: the transformation of Europe. There are two symbols of this transformation; one being the whole complex of processes we call "1992", and the other being the collapse of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989. Important as these events are, there is no reason why either must necessarily lead to a transformation of Europe's transatlantic relations, but there has nevertheless been incessant discussion of the need for North America to remain involved in Europe. Baker used "Atlanticism" as if it were a term that all would understand, and whatever it is, he thought that a new one was both possible and desirable. It is my contention that a "new" Atlanticism is not needed, although as with any social institution, the one we have should never be taken for granted. I attempt to show that institutions are not simply formal organizations with treaties and buildings, but the social practices and conventions that underly the organizations.[2] As an institution, Atlanticism is an organizing principle that helps us to see a pattern in a set of shared expectations among the participating countries.

Explanations of cooperation among the North Atlantic countries often stress the importance of American hegemony or the perception of threat (that is, the fear of war with the Soviet Union), or both. Another type of explanation holds that institutions shape outcomes in world politics. The framework employed in this paper depends on integration theory and liberal institutionalism, themselves largely focussed on institution building among the countries of the North Atlantic since the end of the Second World War.[3] There has been a never-ending series of suggestions from the great and the good, from scholars and politicians, on how cooperation between states might be organized within the North Atlantic area. This joint effort has influenced not only the contemporary rhetoric of policymakers, but the intellectual framework in which scholars understand what policymakers are saying. This is the enduring problematique of "Atlanticism".

In Berlin, Baker said that "the United States and Canada share Europe's neighborhood." The symbol for the broader community or civilization of which North America is a part is a unifying geographic feature, one that facilitates transportation and thus communication. The countries of the Atlantic community are extraordinarily interconnected.[4] Early Canadian development was only possible because of the ease with which bulky staples such as timber and wheat could be transported from the heart of the continent to European markets, while ships returning to Québec could easily carry immigrants. As late as the early 1960s, it was suggested that in transportation terms, New York was still closer to London than to Denver.[5] Now ubiquitous jet travel has changed this equation, at least for the movement of people, if not goods. Modern telecommunications render location irrelevant, but the old patterns of communication and shared expectations persist, as does the lasting legacy of shared culture and

languages, and our common understanding of what we mean when we speak about the Atlantic community.

This paper attends more to institutions than to organizations, but some discussion of what is meant by "Atlantic organizations" will help to clarify the meaning of the term "Atlanticism". The list of Atlantic organizations must include not only NATO, but also the OECD, IMF, World Bank, and the GATT, along with the annual Economic Summits. I justify including international economic institutions with such wide membership because many have Atlantic origins, and are still dominated by the Atlantic countries. The only non-Atlantic country that is a significant member of these organizations is Japan, but, as Henry Kissinger said in 1973: "the Atlantic community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise."[6] The Japanese self-perception has been moving in this direction. While the immediate post-war "Yoshida doctrine" placed Japan firmly under the American security umbrella, it was not until the late 1970s that the Ohira government came to describe Japan as "a member of the Western Alliance." In the early 1980s, the Nakasone government went further, explicitly linking Japanese security with European security.[7] Atlanticism has a geographic base, but it is most significantly a social institution.

The Washington Treaty of 1949 (establishing the North Atlantic alliance) is often thought to be the first manifestation of Atlanticism, but its roots lie in the Washington Treaty of 1871 (which dealt with boundaries, fisheries and the Alabama claim). Brebner argues that with this treaty, Britain recognized the United States as a major power, and he detected in it "glimmerings of what was to prove a common outlook on world

politics." Canadians learned from the treaty negotiations that they were a minor power, but they also learned the importance of the North Atlantic Triangle. "Anglo-American understanding was henceforth to be," Brebner concluded, "the cardinal principle of Canadian foreign policy, for if Great Britain and the United States began to pull in opposite directions the vulnerable Dominion of Canada was bound to be the first casualty."[8] While Atlanticism is generally used in this paper as a descriptive term, it has frequently been normative as well for Canadians.

**THE ORIGINS OF ATLANTICISM**

The Allies emerged from the war believing that the civilization which they understood to have been saved was centred on the Atlantic. As Walter Lippmann put it during the war, "the Atlantic Ocean is not the frontier between Europe and the Americas. It is the inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another by geography, history and vital necessity."[9] Twice this century instability in Europe had caused a general conflagration. Prosperity had to be achieved and the peace had to be kept, this time. The roots of Atlanticism may be deep, but the institution was forged in the crucible of the Second World War.

Security has many dimensions, including economic and environmental, but the avoidance of war is fundamental. Of the many possible sources of war, we need consider only two for purposes of this discussion. The first is the possibility of war between the advanced capitalist countries and the socialist countries, otherwise simplified as war between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. The occasion of this paper is the now widespread belief that this source of war is increasingly improbable. The second possibility is war, either military or commercial, among the advanced

capitalist countries. It is hard to consider this second possibility, however, without considering its interrelationship with the first.

Realists claim that "balance of threat" is a sufficient explanation for alliance creation and maintenance. The countries allied with the U.S. have seen the Soviet Union as the greater threat, and thus have worked together.[10] Must the declining perception of threat lead to a decline in alliance cohesion?[11] What happens to American foreign policy without the Cold War to provide its "clarifying logic"?[12] Will we soon miss the Cold War?[13] Do we face commercial or military war among the allies? It is in this context that Baker sees a need for a "new" Atlanticism.

There are two familiar propositions about the international economic system that bear repeating and disentanglement. The first proposition is that order in world politics is created by one dominant power.[14] The "theory of hegemonic stability" thus predicts that "international regimes" have been dependent on American hegemony for their creation and maintenance. The second proposition is that American leadership, along with the necessary economic concessions to its old and new allies, was stimulated by the Soviet threat. This second proposition seems to offer a better account of the apparent anomaly that American hegemony was excercised in the late forties but not in the early thirties. It follows from both propositions that if American leadership was stimulated by the Soviet threat, then the absence of the threat, and of hegemony, could have serious implications for the international economy.

Realists rightly recall that the growing perception of a Soviet threat, especially after the winter of 1946-47, did much to spur the Americans to assume the concrete burdens of leadership. But if the regimes

quickly began to be used for strategic purposes, one should not be confused into thinking that the original purposes of the regimes were strategic. American economic objectives in the immediate post-war era, and since, are trivialised if they are reduced to simple support of alliance objectives. The post-war world was outlined in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, and began to take shape in the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944 and the Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO), negotiated between 1946 and 1948. The international economic regimes were based on the liberal belief that the depression had been made worse, and the Second World War partly caused, by the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the thirties. Cooperation may thus have been a response to a threat, but it was not fear of the nuclear "Third World War" but fear of a repeat of the Second World War that animated the Atlanticist creators of the post-war organizations.

The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, to take one example, appeals to notions of an Atlantic community in the preamble, while Article 2 of the Treaty commits the parties not only to "strengthening their free institutions" for they also agree to seek to "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and [...] encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."[15] It is legitimate to ask whether notions of community should be seen as nothing more than attempts to justify the Alliance, or whether the Canadian drafters of Article 2 were right to see the Alliance as an essential part of something more important.[16] One of those Canadians, Escott Reid, emphasises the importance of remembering that the creation of a military structure for the Alliance was a response to the Korean war. "With these developments," he recalled, "the chances of the North Atlantic alliance providing a starting point for the economic and political unification of the North Atlantic community became remote."[17]

While this judgement of hindsight might explain why until recently Article 2 was largely forgotten, it is perhaps too harsh on Atlanticism. A better statement of Atlanticism might be the conclusion of the report of Lester Pearson and two colleagues who were asked in 1956 to look into the prospects for "greater unity within the Atlantic Community." The Three Wise Men concluded that "North Atlantic political and economic cooperation, [...] let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such cooperation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best."[18]

Despite the functional wisdom of that statement, an active and impatient interest in Atlantic integration has been nearly continuous since the war. In Kingston in September 1948, in his first public speech as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson spoke about the prospects for an alliance, and made it clear that the wartime practice of major decisions being made by the U.S. and the U.K. was not acceptable in peace: "If obligations and resources are to be shared, it is obvious that some sort of constitutional machinery must be established under which each participating country will have a fair share in determining the policies of all which will affect all."[19] The scholars who talk of integration, and the officials and politicians who dream of "Atlantic Community", have been grappling with this problem of interdependence for over forty years.

The problem of how to manage Atlantic interdependence pressed even during the period of greatest American predominance, but by the early 1960s, it seemed acute. At that time worry about the state of the Alliance

was common, with good reason. De Gaulle had introduced genuine discord into transatlantic relationships. Advances in nuclear technology, and in Soviet capabilities, had changed strategic assumptions. In 1958, most European currencies had again become convertible, but by 1961, the Bretton Woods system was already showing signs of strain and the European Common Market was gaining strength. "The real cause of disarray", wrote an American, "is that Atlantic institutions are... technologically obsolete because NATO was not built to deal with nuclear and missile weapon systems, and archaic because the postwar structure of leadership failed to keep pace with the buoyant European economies and a miraculous rebirth of the continent's self-confidence."[20] A former British official, drawing inspiration from the processes of integration then under way in the EEC, concluded that "the partnership of the Atlantic nations cannot get where it wants simply by the established processes of cooperation and negotiation.... A new way has to be found: a new organization, institution or commission...."[21] Others thought that even though fear alone held the alliance together some form of federalism was important, not least because common political institutions were appropriate to the management of so terrible a weapon as the nuclear deterrent.[22]

For many Americans, beginning with the journalist Clarence Streit in Union Now (1939), federalism, so familiar in their own experience, provided an appealing route to Atlantic integration. Indeed the comparison with the American union was often made explicitly. These ideas were always popular in the United States Congress, beginning in 1949 when Senator Estes Kefauver introduced a resolution calling for the creation of an Atlantic union, and continuing into the 1970s. They perhaps reached an apogee of sorts in 1960 when Congress created a citizens committee, ultimately

chaired by Christian Herter and Will Clayton, to meet with their counterparts in other NATO countries to explore ways of strengthening the alliance and the Atlantic community. The result was the Declaration of Paris of January 1962, a naïve call to governments "to draw up plans within two years for the creation of an Atlantic Community suitably organised to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era."[23]

In June 1962, Jean Monnet and his associates issued a call for a partnership between a united Europe and the United States. This partnership of equals "must not be merely economic. It is necessary that it should rapidly extend to the military and political spheres."[24] The response from President Kennedy, which gave the interest in Atlantic integration new credibility and momentum, was his famous "Declaration of Interdependence" of July 4, 1962 in which he said "that we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago."[25] Kennedy did not advocate the creation of new institutions. Rather, one of the instruments to be used for the creation of this Atlantic partnership was the generous provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which made possible the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT. The Round was seen as contributing to the goal of achieving Western European unity and economic strength, in part for strategic reasons.[26]

The Kennedy Round was one in a series of accommodations to the implicit and explicit discrimination that is part of the EEC, a problem that seemed particularly serious in 1962. The possibility of British

admission, and the new Common Agricultural Policy then taking shape, created the prospect (and the threat) of a larger, stronger and more restrictive common market. The most ambitious objective of the Trade Expansion Act, therefore, was a tariff reduction of up to 50% on those goods in which the EC and the U.S. accounted for 80% of non-communist world trade. Movement toward Atlantic free trade was not realized in the Kennedy Round, for de Gaulle blocked British entry, thereby making it impossible to reach the 80% threshold.[27]

The Atlantic idea has always differed from country to country. One American, attempting a contrast with "Europeanism", said of 'Atlanticism' that it "holds that the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance under U.S. leadership takes precedence over the cohesion of any smaller grouping with the Western World."[28] It is difficult to sort out the origins and meaning of such terms as Atlantic Union, Atlantic Community, Atlantic Partnership and Atlantic Alliance.[29] The terms Community (which implied a widening of the economic integration of the European Economic Community to a broader area) and community (which implied shared values and aspirations) are particularly troublesome. Partnership implied a bilateral (EC/US) rather than a multilateral approach to problem solving and institution building. Knowing this American tendency, Europeans were never keen on Atlantic federalist ideas, however much they debated those issues within Europe--federalism gives a voice to the small, but power to the large, and they thought the hegemon was quite powerful enough. Community and partnership had greater resonance. Canada preferred the functional principle which saw integration as a means to capture Americans in a multilateral framework. John Holmes was a frequent participant in the public debate of these issues. He favoured consultation within the

Alliance, but he was particularly vehement in his condemnation of "twin pillar ideas". The dilemma about NATO, he said, "is in the first place a dilemma about its shape--whether it should be regarded as round, triangular, like a dumbbell, two billiard balls, or a cactus. ... While it is true that the dumbbell is now a joke, nothing has stopped both Europeans and Americans from talking about 'Europe' and 'America' as if they were parallel entities."[30] An informal functional approach allowed for a calculus of relative power and influence that differed with the issue under consideration.

The expression of Atlanticist ideas is again fashionable at the beginning of the 1990s, as will be seen below, but one of the last overt expositions of explicit Atlanticism was Henry Kissinger's 1973 "Year of Europe" speech, always now referred to as 'ill-fated'. Kissinger, then President Nixon's assistant for National Security Affairs, took a realist view of cooperation. "Our challenge," he said, "is whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw a new purpose from shared positive aspirations." Kissinger understood, however, that "the political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other." He recalled the imagery of partnership and proposed "a new Atlantic charter."[31]

The interest in institutionalization did not disappear in the 1970s. In the new era of détente, the collapse of Bretton Woods brought West-West conflicts over money and trade to the fore. Sectoral institutions were thought unable to handle these problems and so some thought a new EC/US institution was needed. In one suggestion "NATO would be but one element of

a larger structure in the institutionalization of the transatlantic order."[32] The eventual institutional response to the economic disarray attendant on the collapse of the Bretton Woods system was the beginning of the annual Economic Summits. Some people in the early seventies clearly saw the Summits as a successor to earlier ideas about new institutions in the Atlantic,[33] and they must certainly be seen as a response to declining hegemony.

Whichever side one takes in the declinism debate,[34] we have to acknowledge that no one country now has either structural or hegemonic power in the system but, while the threat is clearly no longer an effective stimulus, international economic cooperation still takes place. It would be as futile now as it has been during the past forty years to think that the Atlantic community can easily be given organizational form. But if institutions shape world politics, then continuing cooperation can be taken as evidence of Atlanticism.

**ATLANTICISM AND THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Scholars have been as interested in the health of the Atlantic community as policymakers. It was the possibility of war among the capitalist countries that was of concern to Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in the 1950s when they undertook the studies summarized in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Deutsch saw integration not as a desirable thing in itself but as a tool: the policy objective was the avoidance of war. Nevertheless, he, in common with other liberals, thought that greater integration had beneficial effects on political and social life.[35] Deutsch and his colleagues concluded that the creation of "security communities", defined as a group of people who have become "integrated", was the most effective

possibility of avoiding war. There are serious difficulties with the use of security community as a precise term, but it is a helpful way to think about Atlanticism. Deutsch stressed the attainment of a "sense of community" including institutions and practices strong enough to ensure dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. He thought that the most probable form of integration within the "North Atlantic Area" was a "pluralistic" security community (implying the legal independence of separate governments). Policy prescriptions included both efforts to increase "mutual responsiveness" (of countries and elites to other countries) and a greater range of mutual transactions (through various forms of trade liberalisation). He wanted more and stronger links of social communications, and thought greater mobility of persons essential.[36] Deutsch's categories should not be used in a vain attempt at a precise determination of whether the Atlantic community has become a pluralistic security community, but we can certainly claim that what has been created, perhaps by American hegemony, is "stable peace."

Deutsch's work on integration, and that of the scholars who attempted to understand the integration of Europe, laid the foundations for contemporary theorizing about international regimes and "complex interdependence".[37] Notions of stable peace and security communities are related to the idea of a "complex interdependence" one dimension of which is the minor role of military force.[38] "Western Europe, North America and Japan form a zone of complex interdependence," according to Robert Keohane: "power is an important element in relationships among these states ... but this power does not derive from the use or threat of force toward one another. Complex interdependence exemplifies the role of expectations and

conventions in world politics...."[39] The avoidance of severe conflict is dependent not only on our shared expectations, but on our mutual understanding or perception of the issues at stake.

What must be emphasized about stable peace is that it is separate from "containment". That is, while it may have been necessary to the success of containment, and the liberalization of the economic regimes may have been necessary to containment, stable peace and liberalization are also necessary to each other. Did policymakers perceive these linkages? Such linkages certainly animated the Canadians who fought for Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Discussion of economic relationships through the prism of the Alliance tends to miss the dynamic of the relationships thus exaggerating all the swings and roundabouts as if each shift in comparative advantage, each occasion of politicised response to rising or falling technological predominance were a crisis in Alliance relations. There is, has been, and will continue to be economic discord in the transatlantic relationship, but we create institutions in situations where conflict is likely, not where harmony is prevalent.

What kind of institution is Atlanticism? Robert Keohane defines institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (both formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations." They can assume one of three forms--formal intergovernmental or cross-national non-governmental organizations, international regimes, and conventions. Atlanticism is analagous to a convention, a category he says comprises "informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings, that shape the expectations of actors. They enable actors to understand one another and, without explicit rules, to coordinate their behaviour."[40] Atlanticism has become part of the language of communication

among the group of countries that consider themselves to be members of the Atlantic community. It is a conceptual creation about the interaction between countries; it is not a concrete entity. Atlanticism is based on shared norms, but norms do not "exist": norms are not "variables", nor do they "cause" anything, although they may somehow guide or influence behaviour. They are always an expression of some idea of order and predictability, of formalized preferences for a particular "world order."[41] (Whether one claims that the norms of Atlanticism reflect the values of "European civilization" or some such mystifying abstraction, or that they probably reflect the desires of the preeminent state in the post war system, the United States, does not alter my argument.)

We observe an institution when we observe a regularity or pattern in world politics. That statement need not create an assumption, however, that merely counting instances of interconnectedness will suffice to demonstrate a significant regularity. Institutions such as Atlanticism reflect the choices made by a community and cannot be understood without considering their purposes. This point is illustrated by Lon Fuller's discussion of "organization by reciprocity" which, he says, "occurs in its simplest form when A and B come together in such a way that A gains from B something worth more to him than that which he gives to B, and B makes a similar reciprocal gain." Achieving the gains of reciprocity for a multitude rather than for just two partners is complicated--the closest analogy would be to the organized mutual reciprocity of a market, but international regimes seem analagous, given that Fuller goes on to say that "some of the most important and complex systems of order we know have come into existence, not by a single act of creation, but through the cumulative effect of

countless purposive directions of human effort. Examples of such systems are language, economic markets, scientific theory, the common law, and on a homelier plane, a footpath through a woodland. These are sometimes referred to as cases of 'spontaneous order,' but this expression is objectionable in implying that they have come into existence without purposive human effort."[42]

In international relations, we most often think of reciprocity in the context of the trade regime. The GATT codifies the norms and principles of the reciprocal understandings that exist among the trading partners, but we should not confuse the attempt to codify with the reciprocal relationship itself. To return to Fuller's metaphor, people walk where they will, even when an attempt is made to pave paths. It is a mistake, when discussing the trade regime, to see derogations from the rules as things which necessarily endanger the regime, because we know that the participants decide among themselves whether something should be interpreted as a breach.[43] That is, when confronted with a "recalcitrant fact", we can adjust our understanding to accord with the new perception.[44] What matters is that we believe that the norms and principles have meaning and importance, and that we act accordingly. The existence of isolated counterfactuals does not endanger the edifice.

The edifice of Atlanticism is just such a mixture of beliefs and knowledge (all human constructs) about language, geography, history, and culture. It is not "true", nor does it "exist", and yet clearly we interpret the world in terms of a deep commitment to Atlanticism. Frequent attempts over the past four decades to reify Atlanticism into a new organization have failed, but it continues to shape how we respond to events. The institutions of security and economic cooperation reflect a

shared normative understanding of how we should live together, an understanding that is not dependent on the Berlin Wall.

**CONTEMPORARY ATLANTICISM**

It should now be possible to use this conception of Atlanticism as the framework for an initial attempt to understand the rhetoric and the events of the immediate "post post-war" period. Some contend that Atlanticism's day has passed. William Pfaff writes that "West European nations have less in common with the United States than 40 years of slogans about the free world and Atlantic civilization suggest.... It has been taken for granted that no alternative has existed to intimate transatlantic political and military relationship, such as we have known since the 1940s. But alternatives have existed, and they exist today."[45] The alternative view is exemplified by Hans Van Den Broek, the Netherlands foreign minister. Speaking in Ottawa in February 1990, he referred to Canada and the United States as "those two European powers who geographically speaking lie on a different continent, but form in the political and cultural sense an integral part of the community of European nations."[46] Similarly Atlanticist premises are inherent in the judgement that "There is now an exciting opportunity to redefine the purposes of the Atlantic partnership" in the areas of military security, economic cooperation, the environment, and world development.[47] The times may be exciting, but there is a great deal of continuity in these ideas.

There are striking parallels between our current situation and the early sixties, which seems to have been a particularly rich period for writing about integration in the Atlantic community. The wave was initially

stimulated by the Treaty of Rome. After five years of growth, the European Community was taking a new step in integration, with the Common Agricultural Policy. The Kennedy Round had been launched in large part to renegotiate transatlantic commercial policy. As always, there were stresses in NATO. Today we also face a new acceleration in European integration, and we have the Uruguay Round which, if used properly, can ensure that transatlantic commercial arrangements continue to develop. (As in the Kennedy Round, agricultural trade was at the heart of the negotiation.[48]) Among politicians, British leaders are still suspected of being anti-Europe when they say, as Margaret Thatcher did in her Bruges speech in September 1988, that the bedrock of British policy was the Atlantic community.[49] And once again, an American President uses "partnership" as a dominant theme of his foreign policy.

The Reagan Administration never really recovered from the transatlantic ill feeling engendered by the Soviet pipeline fiasco, but with the end of the controversy over financial services reciprocity, George Bush was able to create a warmer atmosphere. Given the history of Atlanticism in the sixties, it was remarkable that he was flanked by François Mitterand when he spoke about American policy towards Europe at Boston University on May 21, 1989. Bush signalled the change from Reagan's policy when he indicated his support for European integration, and he called for new forms of transatlantic cooperation and partnership. Both themes have been repeated and amplified since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In his now famous speech to the Berlin Press Club in December 1989, James Baker said that NATO will remain North America's primary link with Europe, but the European Community is already an economic pillar of the transatlantic relationship. As part of his new Atlanticism he proposed

"that the United States and the European Community work together to achieve, whether it's in treaty, or some other form, a significantly strengthened set of institutional and consultative links."[50]

There are some obvious problems with these ideas. There is a faint echo here of Kissinger--who in the Year of Europe speech implied that European interests were regional, in contrast to America's global responsibilities. Kennedy's Grand Design and the Year of Europe were similar in that the US treated EC members as if they comprised a single nation state.[51] The problem with all such enthusiasms is that they assume a "Europe" that does not yet exist. Economic and Monetary Union may lead to political union, as some leaders seem to hope, but for the moment the European Community has only limited foreign policy competence. The institutional link with European Political Cooperation is still weak, even if the Single European Act mandates some consolidation. The strengthening of the Community requires that economic, trade, political and security issues be considered together, but the need has still not called forth the mechanisms. The EC-US link is largely a trade link; although it is increasingly political, it does not encompass NATO's responsibilities for security.[52]

Baker did acknowledge that discussion of his ideas should not interfere with the 1992 process, which allowed the Germans to respond by urging the United States and Canada to make a joint declaration for transatlantic partnership including political, economic, technological and cultural aspects. As if to emphasize the German dimension of current American preoccupations, the official British response was a call for an intensification of the use of existing machinery and institutions. So far

there had been informal agreement for more formal and regular (semi-annual) meetings at Foreign Minister and Head of Government level; recently this was formalized in a new agreement, but a full treaty must wait until after the EC has sorted out questions of its political competence. Canada did not react directly to the Baker speech, although Joe Clark said that he was "attracted" by the German proposal for a Declaration re-affirming the trans-Atlantic relationship. Canada remains strongly committed to NATO (with a greater political role) and to enhanced cooperation with the EC, but does not see the need for a new "partnership," although Canada, we now know, will participate in the new arrangements.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall led not to fissures in the Alliance but to intensified American support for European integration. The assertion that 1992 is essential to bind a united Germany to the West is another old liberal integrationist idea that has resurfaced: the original Coal and Steel Community was launched as a way first of promoting the reconciliation of France and Germany. The intent behind the Treaty of Rome was to use economic means to political objectives, which, *inter alia*, included not only liberal ideas on the avoidance of war but also the need to stand up to and cooperate as an equal with the United States. Now it is thought that Germany must be anchored to the west with all possible financial, trade, military and security links. "Partnership" is not simply an old idea, nor is it a simple replacement for the old "special relationship", even in its most recent incarnation: Reagan's use of Margaret Thatcher as a surrogate for the hard work of relations with the rest of Europe. Rather, it is code for what cannot be said. German unification has led inevitably to a resumption of full sovereignty, which remains a frightening prospect for some. By stressing the need for German integration in Europe, and then

American partnership with all of Europe, the United States signalled that they remain linked to Europe, whatever happens, and that America will stay involved in the German question.[53] Atlanticism remains the bedrock.

Canada has always supported European integration, and has always been cool to Atlantic partnership. While Canada's formal response to the transformation of Europe may have been slow in coming, it has in the end been a thoughtful adjustment of traditional Canadian themes and concerns to new circumstances.[54] The response begins with Joe Clark's rejection of all suggestions that Canada's future is exclusively in North America or Asia:

> Canada is a European nation. Our two founding peoples are rooted there and millions of other Canadians owe their origins to the great cultures of Europe. Our values are, historically, European values. ... Our economic prosperity is based on a global economic system which requires peace for prosperity. Threats to that peace are threats to our prosperity. Two bloody wars this century have taught Canadians that security at home is meaningless without security in Europe.[55]

Canada seems to want to refurbish relations with the EC, and has been working to give NATO a stronger political role, but the essential element of Clark's vision of the new Europe, "the drawing board for the new European architecture", is the CSCE process. He has made a number of proposals for expanding its mandate and changing the way it operates, including regular Summits and Ministerial meetings. There should be a "CSCE Assembly" for parliamentarians, he says, and there may be a place for a permament CSCE economic forum, supplementing the OECD. In presenting these liberal ideas about how to build stable peace he is well within the mainstream of contemporary Atlanticism.[56]

John Crosbie has similarly Atlanticist views, seeing the importance of prosperity for peace. He told the Bonn CSCE conference on economic cooperation that Canada sees East and West joined not only in the existing

multilateral bodies--the GATT, the IMF, the World Bank, with an important role for the OECD--but also in the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and a revitalised CSCE. If the transformation of Europe is to lead to a more stable and prosperous world, it has to be accomplished in a multilateral context.[57] "In fact," Crosbie has said, "one of the most useful roles Canada can play in fostering Soviet development lies in developing the proper multilateral framework."[58]

One of the things that marks the Atlantic community is the acceptance of liberalism, not least in neo-classical economics. The custodian of Atlanticist economic orthodoxy is the OECD, which has created a special department to organize cooperation with central/eastern European countries "engaged in fundamental reforms." All of those countries, including the USSR (but not Romania) have established some links with the Secretariat, and Czechoslovakia has even applied to join. (The OECD's role as custodian of orthodoxy is also reinforced by its expanding contacts with what are now called the Dynamic Asian Economies--South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.) Membership in the OECD, which will no doubt grow quickly, is now seen as dependent not simply on relative wealth, but on having a market economy and a pluralist democracy. OECD ministers in May 1990 confirmed "the objective of integrating the reforming countries into the international economic system."[59] The negotiations on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have similarly emphasized the political and normative goals in its eligibility rules and the intent to lend only to the private sector. It too is designed to integrate the east into the regimes.[60]

Nobody yet knows how the transition in Eastern Europe will be managed, nor what the costs will be, although the bill for German unification alone is

proving to be enormous. Reconstruction in the east will have effects throughout the system. Put differently, some of the adjustment costs in eastern Europe, and Germany, are going to be externalized to the rest of the world. Many developing countries are justly worried about this prospect, but the equanimity with which such things can be said is striking. The staggering degree of interdependence or economic integration in the OECD area is taken as a commonplace, as is the ability of powerful international institutions to contain the stresses implied by such an adjustment process. The countries of the Atlantic community will need to keep trying to adjust their competitive interests in, for example, multilateral trade negotiations, so that they can keep on getting rich together. As they said at the Houston Summit, the rich countries should assist those "Central and Eastern European nations that are firmly committed to economic and political reform."[61] Stresses there will be, and occasional lapses from the rules, but discord does not endanger Atlanticism.

Atlanticism as an institution is robust. In the summer of 1990, when the air was full of "post-war" imagery, people recalled that the real challenge after a war is winning the peace. Allies must not turn to fighting each other, and they must treat the vanquished generously. If Atlanticism had been called into being by the Berlin Wall, we would be right to be concerned, but it was not, and Atlantic organizations are thus not dependent on the wall, and there is no reason to expect that they will not prove equal to the challenges of this post war era, as they did the last.

**PROSPECTS FOR ATLANTICISM**

In his conclusion Deutsch urged greater use of the economic and social potential of NATO, and welcomed "the greater political possibilities that might come from new organs of consultation and decision...". He thought that making NATO "more than a military alliance", and moving at least some members closer to integration "may be one of the most effective ways to advance the development of political community in the North Atlantic area, and to contribute to the eventual abolition of war."[62] He would no doubt approve of the Agreement at the July 1990 NATO Summit "to enhance the political component of our alliance as provided by Article 2."[63]

There has been much talk about the new architecture of European security now that the old blocs are said to be irrelevant. Collective security is understood to have failed when it was tried by the League of Nations, while NATO's mix of nuclear deterrent and agreement to come to each other's defence if attacked is thought to have been successful. This perception has led to a call for either a new pan-European organization that would resemble NATO, or for NATO to be expanded to cover the whole of Europe. Leaders at the NATO Summit, who envisaged a "Europe whole and free," said that "the Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War." This idea is consistent with the thinking of those who see an enhanced CSCE as central to the new architecture, but neither NATO, nor the OECD, nor the CSCE, nor any other international organization embodies the Atlantic security community in and of itself. The organizations serve as useful symbols and agents, but it is the institution of Atlanticism that animates the security community.

The transformation of Europe does not diminish the Atlantic community. The integration of some (those belonging to the EC) has always been encouraged. Much more important, a new group of countries, one that has been excluded for a generation, now wants to participate. The norms and principles of Atlanticism seem secure. Democracy, constitutionalism, and liberal economics are the catchwords of the hour. East-West confrontation has become a sideshow to the real story, the economic integration of the West. The East is being taught how Atlanticism works through, for example, the OECD, the World Bank and the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In this way, the zone of stable peace, the security community, may be strengthened, and may be expanded to include all of Europe. Atlanticism without the Berlin Wall is free to expand, to be the dominant social institution in world politics, or at least in the politics of the North. The Gulf crisis that began in August 1990 is one of the two events (the other being the staggering cost of German unification) that have collectively dampened the 'Europhoria' of the first half of 1990. European helplessness and American verve have been a pointed reminder that, so far, only Europe has been transformed, rather than all of world politics.

Atlanticism is likely to remain a central theme in Canadian foreign policy, not only with respect to a changing global context, but in relations with the United States as well. In a recent speech Joe Clark contended that far from worrying about an "independent" foreign policy, Canadians should be pleased with the extent to which Washington's approach to foreign policy is becoming more Canadian. An illustration of Clark's point came during George Bush's press conference with Mikhail Gorbachev in June 1990. In answer to a question about whether there was still a threat that justified NATO, Bush said that "Under Article II [sic] of the NATO

Treaty, there is language, put in there, I'm told, by Lester Pearson years ago that provides a broader than military assignment for NATO."[64] Joe Clark also said that our associations with our European allies (and many of our other associations in the world) are important not only in pursuit of tangible economic or political interests, for they also reflect "a desire for the flexibility which is essential for a smaller power whose next-door neighbour is a superpower."[65] Despite the transformation of Europe, Canada will continue to attempt to use the old world to redress the balance of the new.

Notes

[1]"Secretary of State Baker Outlines Blueprint for New Era in Europe," Berlin Press Club, 12 December 1989.

[2]Discerning readers might detect an implicit "Foucauldian" tone in my argument. For an attempt to use Foucault explicitly, see James F. Keeley, "Towards a Foucauldian Analysis of Regimes," International Organization 44:1 (Winter 1990), 83-105.

[3]See Charles C. Pentland, "Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions: Approaches to International Order," in David G. Haglund and Michael K. Hawes (eds.), World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), 173-196.

[4] Interested readers should see the charts on contemporary investment, trade, migration and so on in the section on the "shrinking Atlantic" in Brian Beedham, "A new flag: a Survey of Defence and the Democracies," The Economist, 1 September 1990, 9.

[5] William Bunge, cited in Roy I. Wolfe, Transportation and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), 19.

[6]Henry A. Kissinger, "The Year of Europe, speech made at New York, 23 April 1973," Department of State Bulletin LXVIII:1768 (14 May 1973), 593-98.

[7]Takashi Inoguchi, "The Ideas and Structures of Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead with Caution," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (eds.), The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 40-1.

[8]John Bartlett Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: the Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 202-4.

[9]Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), 135, quoted in Gerhard Mally, Interdependence: The European-American Connection in the Global Context (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1976), 125.

[10] Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[11] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 126.

[12] Charles William Maynes, "America Without the Cold War," Foreign Policy no. 78 (Spring 1990), 5.

[13] John J. Mearsheimer, "Why we will soon miss the Cold War," The Atlantic (August 1990), 35-50.

[14] Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[15] NATO Facts and Figures, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984) 264.

[16] The way in which NATO was seen by Canadians to be embedded in larger conceptions than an alliance is shown in my "Article 2 Revisited: Canada, Security and Transatlantic Economic Cooperation," in Michael K. Hawes and Joel Sokolsky (eds.), North American Perspectives on European Security (New York: Mellen, 1990), 306-10. For a discussion of how the justification of the alliance has been closely tied to conceptions of an Atlantic community, see Roger Epp, "On Justifying the Alliance: Canada, NATO and World Order," in the same volume, 98.

[17] Escott Reid, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance 1948-49," in J.L. Granatstein (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1986), 179.

[18] John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis (eds.), Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson Volume Two, 1948-1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 96.

[19] Monro and Inglis, Mike, 53.

[20] Frank Munk, Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership or Community? (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), 2. Munk's answer was to propose a federalist Atlantic Community.

[21] Lord Franks, "Cooperation Is Not Enough," Foreign Affairs 41:1 (1962), 35.

[22] Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958).

[23] Christian Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community (New York: Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963).

[24] Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Joint Declaration of June 26, 1962, quoted in Gerhard Mally, "Proposals for Integrating the Atlantic Community," Orbis IX:2 (Summer 1965), 381.

[25] President John F. Kennedy, "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership", speech made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 4 July 1962, Department of State Bulletin, (23 July 1962), 131-33.

[26] Dean Rusk, "Trade and the Atlantic Partnership," Department of State Bulletin LI: 1327 (30 November 1964), 766-771.

[27]The idea of Atlantic free trade has been mooted frequently since the end of the war by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. H. Edward English, Transatlantic Economic Community: Canadian Perspectives (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 26.

[28]Gerhard Mally, Interdependence: The European-American Connection in the Global Context (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1976), 109.

[29]See Elliot R. Goodman, The Fate of the Atlantic Community (New York: Praeger, 1975), and Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, "The Atlantic Community--A Conceptual History," in Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.), Atlantic Community in Crisis: A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 3-29.

[30]John Holmes, "Fearful Symmetry: The Dilemmas of Consultation and Coordination in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," International Organization 22:4 (Fall 1968), 822-3; John Holmes, "The Dumbbell Won't Do," Foreign Policy no. 50 (Spring 1983), 3-22.

[31]Henry A. Kissinger, "The Year of Europe," speech made at New York, 23 April 1973, Department of State Bulletin LXVIII:1768 (14 May 1973), 593-98.

[32]Johan Holst, "NATO, the European Community and the Transatlantic Order," in Richard Mayne (ed.), The New Atlantic Challenge (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 272-73.

[33]Max Kohnstamm, "Institutions for Interdependence," in Mayne, The New Atlantic Challenge, 355-364.

[34]Paul Kennedy, "Fin-de-Siècle America," New York Review of Books 37:11 (28 June 1990), 31-40.

[35]Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957/1968). The very integration that Deutsch admired in North America was opposed by Canadian economic nationalists, who tried to use foreign policy to resist. See Kim Richard Nossal, "Economic Nationalism and Continental Integration: Assumptions Arguments and Advocacies," in Stairs, Denis and Gilbert R. Winham (eds.), The Politics of Canada's Economic Relationship with the United States, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985). See also C.C. Pentland, "Domestic and External Dimensions of Economic Policy: Canada's Third Option," in Wolfram F. Hanreider (ed.), Economic Issues and the Atlantic Community (New York: Praeger, 1982), 139-162.

[36]Many liberal Atlanticists participated in what Joseph Nye calls "sociological Liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts on national attitudes and definitions of interests." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40:2 (January 1988), 246. (Thus the 1962 Declaration of Paris [see above] recommended a NATO Parliamentarian's conference, youth exchanges, and such things as encouragement of language studies.)

[37]This debt is explicitly acknowledged in the "Afterword" of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence Second Edition (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 247.

[38]Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, Chapter 2. The other dimensions (pp.24-25) are multiple channels of contact and the absence of hierarchy among issues. The former is obviously of importance to Atlanticism.

[39]Robert O. Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 9.

[40] Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism," 2-4.

[41]Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: a state of the art on the art of the state," International Organization 40:4 (Autumn 1986), 763, 768. Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics 32:3 (April 1980), 368, 374, 398.

[42] Lon L. Fuller, "Freedom--A Suggested Analysis," Harvard Law Review 68:8 (June 1955), 1305-25. I owe this reference, and that to Quine below, to Rod Macdonald.

[43]John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," in Krasner, International Regimes.

[44]Willard Van Orman Quine, "Two dogmas of empiricisim," Chapter Two of From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays Second Edition, revised (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961).

[45]William Pfaff, Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), quoted in Ian Davidson "The ghost of past truths," Financial Times 1 June 1989.

[46]Quoted in John Cruickshank, "Keeping a foot in Europe," The Globe and Mail, 16 February 1990, A7. Broek is here used as an exemplar of the many Europeans, including Genscher, who have expressed a desire for Canada to remain involved in Europe.

[47]Martin Lees, "The Impact of Europe 1992 on the Atlantic Partnership," The Washington Quarterly 12:4 (Autumn 1989), 171-182.

[48]This idea can be found in Robert D. Hormats, "Redefining Europe and the Atlantic Link," Foreign Affairs 68:4 (Fall 1989), 71-91.

[49]The Economist 24 June 1989.

[50] "Secretary of State Baker Seeks Exploration of New Fora for Cooperation" (remarks to EC Commissioners, Brussels), 15 December 1989.

[51]Roy H. Ginsburg, "US-EC Relations," in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 268.

[52]These issues are discussed in the section on external perspectives of Lodge, The European Community and the Challenge of the Future.

[53]See for example "The thing across the water," The Economist, 24 February 1990, 21-22; and Peter Riddell and Lionel Barber, "US seeks closer links with EC to counter instability," Financial Times, 17 November 1989, 26.

[54]Canadian policy was set out in two speeches by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at McGill University on 5 February 1990 and at Humber College on 26 May 1990.

[55]McGill University speech.

[56]Clark was far from being a follower of other western leaders on this point. His speech to the UN in September 1989 reflected the themes that have since emerged in the western response to the transformation of Europe. He emphasized the importance of the shared values underlying NATO (an old Canadian theme) and how those values are coming to be shared in the east. He saw building peace in classic liberal terms.

[57]"Notes for a Speech by the Minister for International Trade, John C. Crosbie, at the CSCE Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe", Bonn, FRG, 10 April 1990.

[58]"Notes for a Speech by the Minister for International Trade, John C. Crosbie, at the 'Getting Down to Business in the USSR Seminar'", Toronto, 19 February 1990.

[59]"Storming the Bastille," The Economist, 3 March 1990, p.66. Peter Norman, "OECD's new lease of life," Financial Times, June 4, 1990, p.24; Communiqué, Meeting of the Council of the OECD at Ministerial Level, (PRESS/A(90)32,; Paris, 31 May 1990), 2.

[60]There is a useful discussion of how difficult this task will be in Robert D. Hormats, "The economic consequences of the peace--1989," Survival XXXI:6 (November/December 1989), 484-499. On the private sector limitations placed on Soviet loans, see Peter Riddell, "Moscow may face stiff EBRD loan limits," Financial Times, 10 May 1990, 10.

[61]Houston Economic Declaration, 11 July 1990, para. 34.

[62]Deutsch Political Community, 203.

[63] NATO, "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," NATO Review 38:4 (August 1990), 32-3.

[64]"News Conference of President Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, June 3, 1990," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 26:22 (4 June 1990), 881.

[65]"Canada in the World: Foreign Policy in the New Era", Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, on the Occasion of the 66th Meeting of the Canadian-American Committee of the C.D. Howe Institute, Ottawa, 13 September 1990.