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ECOWAS AND THE DEMOCRATIC IMPERATIVE

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Introduction

The outbreak of the Liberian civil conflict in 1990 and the subsequent involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[1] in different, and sometimes contradictory capacities as mediators, peace-keepers and peace-enforcers, have raised some concerns about the legality of interventions by regional organizations in matters of collective security,[2] and the ability of such organizations to deal effectively with the complexities of collective security.[3] Although these are important areas of concern, they are, however, fundamentally reactive, and do not provide a firm basis for addressing the relatively unattractive area of preventive diplomacy.

The objective of this paper is to supplement the burgeoning research interest in regional collective security structures by focusing on what I postulate to be the principal lesson of the Liberian conflict, namely the need to democratize political processes in ECOWAS states.[4] Consequently, following the long history of research on the subject, I hypothesize that a pluralistic-participatory political system will be less likely to generate the Liberia-type conflicts that have made West Africa the most unstable region in Africa.[5] I shall argue that as a rapidly consolidating regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) may serve as a vehicle for regional peace by advancing democracy within the subregion.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first discusses the theoretical linkage between regime type and the outbreak of violent conflict in international politics. In this section, I shall emphasize the need to redirect our focus from inter-state conflicts towards intra-state

or "state control" conflicts which have become the most pervasive form of conflict since the expansion of the international state-system after World War II. This section will be followed by a more empirical discussion of the causes of the Liberian conflict. In this section, I depart from previous studies by locating the principal source of the conflict not in the simple dichotomy between "native" and "Americo-Liberians," but in political repression which became increasingly manifest during the Tolbert era, and was taken to a level of absurdity during the decade-long military dictatorship of Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. The third section focuses on the phased internationalization of the conflict, from third party states to ECOWAS and the United Nations. The concluding section examines the ways by which ECOWAS may be transformed into an instrument of democratization in West Africa. I shall argue in this section for a principled and coordinated involvement in this process by major international actors, such as the United Nations, European Union and the United States, whose activities and influence bear heavily on developments within the ECOWAS subregion.

The Problem of Focus in Studying the Causes of War

It has been observed that "[w]ithin the politics of power and security, war represents the most intense form of competition."[6] Not surprisingly, locating the cause of war has been the subject of intense scholarly controversy before and since Kenneth Waltz's formulation of three "images" of international conflict in his Man, the State and War.[7] To be sure, Waltz exacerbated the controversy, not by his quick dismissal of classical explanations based on perceptions of human nature (the First Image), but by his attack on the "Second Image" liberal proposition that democracies promote international peace because "[d]emocracy is preeminently the

peaceful form of the state."[8] In criticizing this view, Waltz explained that:

> The import of our criticism of liberal theories, however, is that no prescription for international relations written entirely in terms of the second image can be valid, that the approach itself is faulty. Our criticisms of the liberals apply to all theories that would rely on the generalization of one pattern of state and society to bring peace to the world.[9]

Obviously, Waltz's criticism did not discriminate between the two strands of "society-level" theories of war: the structural Marxist-Leninist view which argues that wars arise from the inherent logic of capitalism towards material inequalities among social classes;[10] and the superstructural liberal view (commonly associated with Kant, Bentham and other philosophers of the Enlightenment) which argues that European wars resulted primarily from the imperatives of absolutist political structures which divested political power from the very people who ultimately bore the brunt of war.[11]

In the context of the Cold War during which the free world was locked by the mid-twentieth century in a political as well as moral struggle for ascendancy with the "evil" communist empire, it was bad politics and bad scholarship to argue that liberal democracy and communism were both guilty of the "original sin" of international politics: war-making. By contending that "[t]he influence to be assigned to the internal structure of states in attempting to solve the war-peace equation cannot be determined until the significance of the international environment has been determined"--a project he undertook two decades later[12]--Waltz's structural realism departed significantly from the dominant Niebuhr-Morgenthau "moral-purpose-of-the-state/national-interest" brand of realism, thereby serving

to expose him even further to the neoliberal theoretical backlash that followed.[13]

However, several decades since the publication of Man, the State and War, during which communist and democratic states engaged in proxy wars while preparing for the big war which never came, younger generations of students interested in the causes of war have shared Waltz's conclusion regarding the weaknesses of the second image. In a recent assessment of democracy and war-making, Robert Latham concluded that:

> Islands of liberal democratic peace have not only waged war on non-democracies, they have also been responsible for--and are uniquely successful at generating--high levels of global militarisation in, and conflict among, non-democratic states, conditions that help undermine the successful spread of liberal democracy in the long-term.[14]

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the consequent transformation of world politics, it has become "politically correct" to address such second-image issues in world politics. The disappearance of the iron curtain has revealed the nakedness of the Emperor, and has shown that communism is truly bad. Democracy has been declared a universal value, the property of all mankind.[15] But along with this discovery has re-emerged the age-old problem of the second image as well as the first and third images; namely, the postulation of international conflict as the dependent variable. The study of war in world politics is still geared towards inter-state conflicts--a byproduct of both the dominant great power politics as well as the intellectual hegemony within the discipline.[16] As has recently been observed, however, such "emphasis on major wars tends to overshadow the persistence of localized and domestic conflicts, some of which threatened the very survival of some of the regional actors."[17] The implosion of the Soviet Union has added to the international state-system new entrants

which, like their Afro-Asian counterparts since decolonization, will be (and are being) confronted with the pressures of anarchy emanating mainly (but not exclusively) from within.[18] Throughout the Cold War, "state control conflicts"--that is, "civil wars related to states' failures to forge a minimum national consensus and to meet basic needs"[19]--in the new states accounted for more than two-thirds of all the wars that took place in the international system. In Africa, for instance, aside from the Ogaden conflict involving Somalia and Ethiopia, the brief infantry war between Uganda and Tanzania in the late 1970s, and a few notable exceptions, virtually all wars fought south of the Sahara during the Cold War were internal.

Since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of such conflicts has multiplied in Africa and elsewhere in the southern hemisphere and parts of eastern Europe. According to a recent report published by Ploughshares Monitor, 35 cases of "armed conflicts" were recorded in 1993, each of which resulted in "at least 1000 combat deaths"--a figure higher than total Allied casualties during the Gulf War.[20] Furthermore, according to the report, "virtually all [of these] wars are civil wars related to states' failures to forge a minimum national consensus and to meet basic human needs."[21] To the extent, therefore, that such intra-state or "state control" conflicts have been the dominant form of war in the recent history of international politics, there is need to redirect our theoretical focus towards an understanding of the causes of the real wars currently being waged within states around the world with increasing savagery and lethality. The Liberian conflict which has captured global attention since 1989 is one such war, and it is to this conflict that I now turn.

The Origins of the Liberian Conflict

As in all wars, the causes of the Liberian conflict may be safely categorized into two: remote and immediate. To provide causal explanations, historians and many social scientists have been quick to emphasize the antecedent factors to conflicts. Students of Liberian politics agree that since the founding of the Republic of Liberia by emancipated African-American slaves in 1847, that country had been governed by an exclusivist oligarchy imbued with an utterly immodest sense of purpose: la mission civilisatrice.[22] According to David Wippman, this group:

> [t]he Americo-Liberians recreated the social hierarchy they had experienced in the ante-bellum South [of the United States], but with themselves as the socially dominant, landowning class. They considered the indigenous population primitive and uncivilized, and treated it as little more than an abundant source of forced labor.[23]

This view has also been shared by other scholars, such as W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, who has argued that as long as the "hegemony" of this privileged "settler oligarchy" lasted, they wielded "a monopoly of power over a majority of indigenous peoples, with the same paternalistic contempt as most of the other colonial governments in Africa."[24] Ofuatey-Kodjoe further elaborated, rather pejoratively, that the primary objective of the

> 'settler oligarchy' of repatriates, which although internally afflicted by mulatto/black and other frictions, was to maintain its domination over the indigenous population. Not surprisingly, this system [was] maintained by extreme economic exploitation including forced and slave labor and brutal repression of the indigenous peoples. In this pattern of repression, the repatriates used a policy of 'divide and rule'[and] a policy of recruiting armed forces along ethnic lines and deploying them to brutalize other ethnic groups.[25]

Notwithstanding the blatantly pejorative terminology of the description, Ofuatey-Kodjoe is stressing the reality of existence in pre-1980 Liberia--a situation which was by no means unique to it. That situation was and is the widespread existence in Liberia and Black Africa

of black-on-black oppression. It is so ruthless and spiteful in its character that it has been labeled in the literature as "black imperialism" or "black colonialism."[26] In Liberia, black-on-black oppression was viewed differently because the oppressors were emigrees, or more particularly, emigrees from "white" America.[27] "For more than 130 years," argues Wippman, "the Americo-Liberians dominated the country's political, economic, and social life, even though they constituted only about 5 percent of the population."[28]

Indeed, between Edward Blyden, the Liberian patriarch, and William Tubman who reigned for three decades, from 1944 until his death in 1971, the ship of the Liberian state was captained by Americo-Liberians, and it sailed reasonably smoothly without major social upheavals. The poverty and illiteracy of the mass of the population (mainly but not exclusively the "natives") was significantly ameliorated by social programs introduced shortly after World War II by President Tubman to integrate the native population into the mainstream of Liberia's political economy. The result was that by the early 1960s there had emerged a corps of educated natives who began the upward ascent on the socio-economic ladder. In this arena, the native elites found themselves in stiff competition for power and wealth with their relatively more established, defintely better connected Americo-Liberian counterparts. As is the case elsewhere in Africa, the struggle for socio-economic space by élites took on a national character as each group returned to its social base for support. For the Americo-Liberian elite, the constituency was made up of societies, lodges and fraternities, such as the Free Masons, while the kinship/ethnic groups served as a natural constituency for the native Liberian élite.

As long as the economy remained strong, the shocks emanating from the widening socio-economic cleavages were easily absorbed by the Liberian body politic. However, by the early 1970s the Liberian economy suffered from two major sources of economic shock. The first was the steep rise in oil prices which forced a diversion of government revenue from other areas of national life to the all-important energy sector. As was the case with many economies at the time, social programs were the hardest hit, and this merely deepened already existing social cleavages and animosities in Liberia. The second was the political and economic crises of the United States--Liberia's principal benefactor. The war in Indochina (Vietnam) and the oil crisis combined greatly to accelerate American political and economic decline in world politics. This weakness hampered its ability to bankroll such client states as Liberia. Worse still, for Liberia, in the face of diminishing state resources, official corruption--hardly a new phenomenon in Liberia and West Africa--increased in both scale and intensity. All these served to hasten popular (that is, native) disillusionment with the state (that is, Americo-Liberians).

William Tolbert, the last of the Americo-Liberian presidents, inherited from Tubman in 1971 a highly corrupt and manifestly nepotistic state apparatus. However, unlike his predecessors, he was saddled with a rapidly deteriorating national and global economy and a mounting socio-economic tension originating from below--thanks mainly to Tubman's educational reform which had resulted in the emergence of an articulate native middle class. Unable to "bribe" the awakened natives, led by their rising middle class, and unable to control the arrogance and waste of his fellow Americo-Liberian élites, Tolbert resorted to the use of force to

exert his authority. His state security agents harassed and arrested the top hierarchy of the increasingly demanding native élites as well as members of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy who could not submit themselves to his rule.

The infamous "Rice Riots" which took place in Monrovia at the beginning of 1980 symbolized the crystallization of popular discontent with the Tolbert regime. Under increased financial pressures, following yet another oil crisis which had been orchestrated by the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf, the Tolbert government discontinued state subsidization of rice, the staple food of Liberia's elites as well as the powerful urban poor. The resulting increases in price of rice and other consumer products touched off a series of mass riots in Monrovia. The government's reaction was a swift crackdown on the rioters and their (perceived) instigators, and the resolution of the latter to go back to the streets. It is this repressively discordant environment that provided the impetus for the native members of the presidential guard, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, to stage a coup d'état on 12 April 1980. Doe and his fellow mutineers achieved instant success by assassinating President Tolbert and other prominent members of his cabinet minutes before their departure for the Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

In the absence of any organized resistance by the Americo-Liberian élite, Doe and his group embarked upon a mission to shred the Americo-Liberian oligarchy, thereby forcing many of them into exile in the United States.[29] It was Doe's ill-fated attempt to supplant Americo-Liberian imperialism with its native-Liberian version or, as it later turned out, "Khran-imperialism,"[30] that resulted in the series of conflicts which

metamorphosed into a full-blown civil war by 1990.

By most accounts, Doe's accession to power was marked by extreme and bizarre acts of brutality, violence and blood-bath. Aside from his gruesome murder of President William Tolbert, Doe and his cohorts displayed an unusual appetite for murder. In a series of televised executions carried out during the early days of the regime, the Doe government "shot thirteen of the country's most prominent politicians" in Monrovia's public beach. These executions, which have been described by one eyewitness as "an episode of extreme barbarity and bloodlust by soldiers driven wild with hatred,"[31] inaugurated "a decade of brutal and arbitrary exercise of power" and an escalating cycle of violence.[32]

Because of his obsession with "shredding" or "eliminating" whatever remained of the Americo-Liberian political élites, Doe became increasingly addicted to violence and repression as he embarked upon an unlimited quest for personal power. The resulting opposition from elements within the government and army, as well as civic organizations, only served to fuel his fear of insecurity. As the various incidents of abortive coups demonstrate, the more insecure President Doe felt or became, the more violence he unleashed against his real or imagined "enemies," and the more the latter resorted to even higher levels of violence in a desperate effort to oust him from power. All these events reached a turning point in 1985 following Doe's ill-advised move to "civilianize" his dictatorship by "rigging" himself and his political party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), to electoral victory.[33] The vociferous opposition that came from political parties, religious and civil rights groups, and the overwhelming public outcry against such blatant violation of the electoral

process by the Doe government, provided further ammunition for Brigadier-General Thomas Quiwonkpa--a fellow native Liberian and Doe's estranged second-in-command in the defunct ruling People's Redemption Council--to stage what later amounted to a very costly abortive coup d'état in November 1985. In the aftermath of that coup, General Quiwonkpa was killed and, consistent with the government's notoriety for barbarity, the General's badly mutilated body was gleefully paraded around the streets of Monrovia by troops loyal to President Doe. Furthermore, relates Wippman, Doe's fellow native Krahn soldiers "took immediate reprisals against Quiwonkpa's ethnic group, the Gios, and against a closely related group, the Manos. Hundreds were executed after being subjected to 'blood-curdling brutality'."[34]

Thereafter, all hell broke loose in Liberia as Doe became more determined than ever to crush not only the remnants of the Americo-Liberian élites but also indigenous segments of the population who were not Krahn and were opposed to his maniacal dictatorship. For this purpose, he employed "all sorts of measures," the foremost among which were:

> the banning of political parties and associations; the purging and summary execution of many high officials in his government suspected of being too influential; and increasing dependence on a top hierarchy of people in the armed forces (AFL), the Executive Mansion Guard (EMG), and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU), all belonging to his Krahn ethnic group.[35]

By the end of December 1989, Doe had clearly outlived his welcome and usefulness. His army, exhausted, demoralized and badly depleted after a decade of senseless and unguarded pursuit of real and imaginary enemies, was no longer in a position to contain, let alone repel, an insurrection launched from the northern Nimba towns of Khanple and Butuo by a couple

hundred "ill-trained recruits, many of them in their early teens," belonging to Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).[36] In fact, that "two [government] army battalions dispatched from Monrovia with mortars and artilleries" in the early phase of the insurrection could not contain a small group of "200 and mostly local Gio tribesmen [who barely made] hit-and-run attacks on small villages" in Nimba county,[37] clearly attests to the professional and material bankruptcy of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the government resorted instead to senseless acts of mini-genocide against defenceless and vulnerable members of the civil population, as was grotesquely illustrated by the July 1990 massacre of refuge-seeking women and children in the premises of a Lutheran church in the outskirts of Monrovia.[38]

By mid-1990, what began as a hit-and-run attack against government forces by Charles Taylor's guerrillas had metamorphosed into a well-coordinated full-scale traditional military assault on Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia. Every minute territorial gain by rebel forces translated into a major loss for President Doe, and this made him even more desperate. By 23 July, Taylor's forces had "burst into the centre of Monrovia," thereby leaving President Doe "a virtual prisoner in his sea-front [presidential] mansion."[39] Unable to leave the presidential mansion--not only because of his encirclement by rebel troops, but also because his own "Krahn bodyguards [had refused] to let him [leave] unless their collective safety was guaranteed"--the embattled president dragged Liberia into a peculiar form of politico-military stalemate in which the rebels had a virtual territorial control over the country but no political authority, whilst the

president who no longer had a territory still represented the political "authority" within the state![40]

Two days after he had ordered the expulsion of Colonel David Staley, head of the US military mission to Liberia, for allegedly "aiding the rebels,"[41] President Doe invited ECOWAS to intervene, thus setting the stage for what is now a prolonged multinational peacebuilding project. In a letter dated 14 July 1990 and addressed to the Chairman, Council of Ministers of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, the beleaguered president wrote:

> Right now in the suburbs of Monrovia thousands have been displaced by the NPFL Forces, homes have been destroyed, hundreds slaughtered. I am therefore concerned that the fighting could accelerate in Monrovia and thus inflame the suffering of the people of Liberia. Consistent with my oath of office to protect and defend the Government and people of Liberia, I can not countenance Taylor's continued mission to destroy Liberia and its inhabitants only because of his inordinate greed to become President.
>
> It is therefore my sincere hope that in order to avert the wanton destruction of lives and properties and further forestall the reign of terror, I wish to call on your Honourable Body to take note of my personal concerns and the collective wishes of the people of Liberia, and to assist in finding a constitutional and reasonable resolution of the crisis in our Country as soon as possible. Particularly, it would seem most expedient at this time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to assure a peaceful transitional environment.[42]

International Institutions, the Liberian Conflict and the theme of Democracy

Three hierarchies of international institutions have been involved in mediating the Liberian conflict. They are the regional (ECOWAS), continental (OAU) and the universal (UN). The first and by the far the most extensive involvement came from ECOWAS which is also the closest of the three institutions to the source of conflict. The Community's involvement in the crisis came barely six months after the initial outbreak of violence

between rebel guerrillas belonging to Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and government troops. This is as much a record as it is a puzzle, especially considering that the Community is hardly cohesive and that it suffers from glaring resource limitations. Put differently, we might ask: What accounts for the quick intervention by ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict? I shall put forward three explanations based on the following factors:

a) External pressure for some form of action by Liberia's neighbours.

b) The fear of region-wide insecurity or the domino theory.

c) The politics of regional state power and ascendancy or the hegemony theory.

When the Liberian conflict came to global attention in the summer of 1990, the international community was concentrating on a much larger problem in the Gulf. Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait was more in conformity with the traditional problem of international politics than the stalled civil war then raging on in Liberia. Besides, the former was more appealing to the dominant geo-strategic paradigm than the latter. The United States which, as Liberia's longtime benefactor, would be crucial to any international initiative in Liberia, was too busy assembling an allied coalition in the Gulf to be bothered with Liberia.

It was not until the massacre of refuge-seeking children and women in the premises of the Lutheran church in Monrovia that the Liberian crisis aroused the interest of the American media which began to propagate a theory of genocide. Until then, the US government had been content with taking minimal ad hoc measures, such as the occasional secondment of military advisers to the government of Samuel Doe. In the face of the

closure of embassies in Monrovia and media reports of mounting refugee problems, widespread acts of genocide and the complete breakdown of law and order in Liberia, the US government sought a way of delegating responsibility for the restoration of some semblance of order to Liberia's neighbours. It was widely perceived in West Africa that because of America's preoccupation with the liberation of Kuwait, it could not fully commit itself either to unilateral or collective action for the restoration of law and order in Liberia. The swift evacuation of US citizens by the Marines confirmed this view as well as the worst fear of many West African leaders: the post-Cold War marginalization of Africa. According to one West African diplomat: "at that point we knew we had to do it [i.e. intervene in Liberia] all by ourselves to save our brothers and sisters."[43]

Another factor was the widespread fear within the ruling circles in West Africa that the Liberian crisis was a harbinger of "the coming anarchy," engineered by "disgruntled elements" within the society. In the context of an acute sense of regime insecurity, it was widely feared that the success of Taylor's rebellion would encourage West African dissidents to embark upon guerrilla warfare against the many kleptocratic-autocratic regimes that have held sway in the sub-region. In fact, many Nigerian foreign policy bureaucrats whom I interviewed in July 1993 saw Charles Taylor's revolt and his successful recruitment of a significant number of "disgruntled" nationals of other ECOWAS states, such as Nigeria, as a forerunner of "the coming anarchy."[44] According to them, Taylor's insurgency was a "carefully orchestrated" plan to "de-stabilize" the entire West African subregion. In Lagos, suspicions were rife that Taylor's recruits included some military personnel who had been declared "wanted

persons" in Nigeria as a result of their alleged role in an unsuccessful coup attempt to topple the government of General Ibrahim Babangida in 1990. For this reason in particular, intelligence reports reaching Lagos of Libyan support to Taylor, both in terms of training and equipment, readily struck a raw nerve in government and security circles, and helped to elevate the Liberian crisis to a national security issue par excellence in Nigeria.

Related to this is the is the view that the crisis in Liberia had led to a massive inflow of returnee nationals and refugees into neighbouring states, which are, themselves, already saddled with severe economic and social problems. According to General Emmanuel Erskine, the conflict had generated sufficient refugee problems for its neighbours to warrant an immediate international intervention.[45] Dr. Obed Asamoah, Ghana's Foreign Minister, similarly emphasized the need for immediate intervention by the regional body in order to avert a potential refugee crisis in the subregion. According to him:

> We [i.e. Liberia's ECOWAS neighbours] do not have to look at the interest of warring factions alone but also at the interests of the neighbouring countries. So many countries have been saddled with refugees. Are they to continue to carry this burden because one particular faction in Liberia wants to carry out its ambition?[46]

For Asamoah and others, an immediate intervention to stabilize Liberia would stop the refugee inflow and relieve neighbouring states from the economic and social burden arising from the war.

The third major factor accounting for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is tied to the regional politics of state ascendancy or hegemony. Not unlike other regions of the world, West African international relations have been characterized by the age-old game played by nations: balance of

power politics. As a central feature of West African diplomacy, balance of power has thrived upon the wide variation in size and capability among the state-actors. Using such traditional indicators of power as demography and GNP, it is easy to emerge with a classification of West African states that ranges from the "tiny" Togo to the "giant" Nigeria.[47] The existence of such capability asymmetry has been reinforced somewhat by the linguistic divide between anglophone and francophone states. The combination of these forces has produced a pattern of inter-state politics distinguished by a strong perception (and sometimes reality) of Nigerian (quest for) regional dominance, and a concerted effort by some of the region's francophone states to check such ambition. Put simply, therefore, the politics of ECOWAS is the politics of balance of power between Nigeria (and the anglophone states) on the one hand, and Côte d'Ivoire/Senegal (and the francophone states), on the other. For this reason, Ivoirien and Burkinabé material and diplomatic support for Charles Taylor's insurgency was viewed in Lagos and Accra as an attempt by Côte d'Ivoire to establish a political bridgehead in an exclusive anglophone domain. And that being the case, it had to be thwarted. Thenceforth, the Liberian conflict also became an arena for the politics of regional hegemony and counter-hegemony, with ECOWAS as the key instrument and democracy as the principal theme--a situation which was only reinforced by the involvement of the United Nations.

Democracy: The Theme of Intervention

It is interesting that central to all peace initiatives undertaken in Liberia to date has been an emphasis on reconstructing Liberian democracy. The idea of democracy as the primary condition for peaceful relations

amongst Liberians has been the kernel of the ECOWAS mediation since the early phases of the intervention. In his reacting to growing domestic and international concern regarding Nigeria and ECOWAS's immediate and long-term objectives in Liberia, Foreign Minister Rilwanu Lukman of Nigeria declared that the goal of the intervention was "to help the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions."[48] Thereafter, it became obvious that the ECOWAS project was not about peacekeeping; it was and has remained a peacebuilding project. For this reason, therefore, the military strategy which was driven mainly by the necessities of peace-enforcement, essentially became (as it should be) a function of the political objective. Since the landing of ECOWAS troops in Liberia on 24 August 1990, the purpose of the military mission has been defined as securing an enabling environment for the reconstitution of the Liberian state through democratic means. This objective dates back to the early phases of the Community's mediation.[49]

The first official ECOWAS response to the Liberian crisis came at the end of the May 1990 Summit meeting in Banjul, The Gambia. This followed the abrupt suspension of the mediation process initiated by the Liberian Inter-Faith mission. To be sure, some individual ECOWAS states had meddled in the conflict during its early phases. As I said earlier, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso provided operational bases and transit points to the NPFL, while Nigeria initially displayed sympathy towards Monrovia's efforts to contain the rebellion. Although a non-ECOWAS state, Libya was also involved as the principal supplier of arms to the rebel factions (and was also consulted formally by ECOWAS about its Peace Plan). By mid-1990, these uncoordinated and non-institutionalized forms of intervention had only

succeeded in boxing Liberia into a politico-military stalemate which merely served the reign of anarchy over the civilian population. Therefore, the primary objective of the ECOWAS intervention was to break through the stalemate and institute a political mechanism for the resolution of the conflict. This was achieved at the May Summit of the Community in Banjul, The Gambia. At this meeting, the leaders adopted a Nigerian proposal to establish a "Standing Mediation Committee to settle dispute and conflict situations within the Community."[50] This Committee comprised the Gambia (Chairman), Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. Its inaugural mandate was to examine "the nature" of the Liberian conflict, determine "the parties involved," and initiate a process of mediation. Thenceforth, the SMC became the ECOWAS equivalent of the United Nations Security Council mutatis mutandis.

The Summit of the SMC in August 1990 produced the blueprint of what is now the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia. This Plan, which forms the basis of all international mediation efforts to date, states that the parties to the conflict shall:[51]

> a) cease all activities of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as all acts of violence;
>
> b) surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG);
>
> c) refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials;
>
> d) refrain, pending the establishment of an Interim Government for the governance of Liberia until a new government is set up as a result of democratically conducted elections, from any activity which might prejudice the establishment of such Interim Government or the holding of general and presidential elections;
>
> e) release all political prisoners and prisoners of war;

f) respect, unless otherwise suspended to facilitate the administration of the country by the Interim Government, the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia adopted on 6th January 1986;

g) fully cooperate with the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for the effective maintenance of the ceasefire and the restoration of law and order.

One of the first moves made by the SMC was the recognition that Doe's dictatorship stood in the way of peace in Liberia. Its solution was to replace the Doe government with an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) whose members will be chosen by a congress of representatives drawn from a broad spectrum of the Liberian society. To this end, ECOWAS convened a national conference of Liberian political parties and associational groups which took place in Banjul between 27-31 August 1990. It was at this conference that Dr. Amos Sawyer, the exiled leader of the Liberian People's Party and founder of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), and Bishop Ronald Riggs of the Lutheran Church of Liberia, respectively were elected President and Vice-President of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). IGNU's mandate was to return Liberia to "normalcy" and democratic rule within twelve months.

The formation of an interim government by ECOWAS was swiftly denounced by the NPFL as an unnecessary imposition on the Liberian people. To fight ECOWAS on the moral ground of democracy, Taylor also constituted his own government in Gbarnga (the rebel stronghold), and quickly announced plans to hold general elections to establish a "legitimate" government for Liberia.[52] Unwilling to be left out in the democratic bandwagon, Prince Yormie Johnson, the leader of the splinter Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) argued that he was for democracy, but one which excluded Charles Taylor from vying for the presidency. His neo-Platonic

argument was that "the gun that liberates should not rule" because "government is not an experiment but a scientific operation reserved for those with the requisite talent and competence."[53] At the core of every peace initiative in Liberia since the unveiling of the ECOWAS Peace Plan in 1990 has been an explicit emphasis on democratic elections, and the caliber of those men and women who may or may not participate in them.

The theme of democracy assumed even greater salience with the intensification of the struggle between ECOWAS state-actors for the international limelight. The inauguration of the Committee of Five, under the leadership of the president of Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, accentuated the democratic theme as the struggle for international recognition assumed a linguistic character. Like the Peace Plan which was produced by the anglophone-dominated SMC, the various accords that emanated from the Yamoussoukro series of meetings also harped on the democratic theme. Indeed, the Yamoussoukro plan went even further by requesting "the assistance of the [Atlanta-based] International Negotiation Network (INN) in monitoring the electoral process in Liberia."[54]

The issue of democratic elections in Liberia also became the central subject of the ECOWAS summit held in Abuja, Nigeria, barely one month after the signing of the Yamoussoukro I Accord by Liberia's warring factions on 30 June 1991. According to the Summit's final communiqué:

> The Authority stressed the need for the Five-member Committee to ensure a proper environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections; such environment [should] include the effective supervision and control of the armed forces belonging to each of the parties, the facilitation of the repatriation and resettlement of Liberian refugees prior to the elections, and the effective restoration of [the] conditions necessary to guarantee free movement of persons and unfettered campaigning by the political parties. Considering that the elections are envisaged to be held within a

> period of six months, the Authority requested the Committee of Five to do everything possible to expedite the creation of the necessary conditions.[55]

In an attempt to execute this mandate, ECOMOG troops were drawn into one of the most intensive battles with NPFL forces in what was code-named "Operation Octopus." This provided the atmosphere for greater involvement by the United Nations, beginning with the Security Council Resolution 788 which placed an arms embargo on the NPFL.

The appointment of Trevor Gordon-Sommers in November 1992 as the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General facilitated the involvement of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the planning and negotiations for peace in Liberia. This resulted in greater transparency and confidence in the Liberian peace process. This phase of international mediation produced the Geneva-Cotonou Accord which, like previous initiatives, underscored the need to create a proper atmosphere conducive to the holding of free, fair and democratic elections in Liberia. Despite several threats to its implementation, the Geneva-Cotonou agreement, which has been supplemented and reinforced with the "Triple 7 Agreement" of February 1994, has held remarkably well. The newly constituted transitional government which replaced the Interim Government has committed itself to completing the peace process with general and presidential elections in September 1994.

Conclusion: ECOWAS as a Potential Instrument for the Spread of Democracy in West Africa

The ECOWAS experience in Liberia provides an interesting, indeed intriguing, case study of a regional initiative to resuscitate national democratic institutions. Clearly, there is a disjuncture between the authoritarian character of ECOWAS states and their democratic mission in

Liberia. As W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe has contended:

> the notion that a group of states headed by military dictatorships [may] intervene in another state in order to establish a democratic regime is grotesque. And the notion that these states can in fact achieve that objective by the application of outside force may be only an exercise in wishful thinking.[56]

This leaves us with two types of problems. The first, which can be easily surmised, is the oddity of the situation in which, it has been observed, "three out of the five principal actors in the ECOWAS initiative are military dictators who overthrew democratically elected governments in coups."[57] It would indeed be awkward for such actors to be responsible for the enthronement of democracy in Liberia. The second problem rests on the question of ability or practicability. Here, the question is: Notwithstanding the oddity of the situation, can such actors deliver? For Ofuatey-Kodjoe, they cannot. And herein lies the dilemma, for there are neither theoretical nor empirical reasons to presume that a group of such manifestly dictatorial states <u>cannot</u> act to install democracy. It would appear that under certain conditions, such as persistent international pressures, increased pressures from below or sheer exhaustion (as was the case in Latin America), authoritarian regimes could become democratic midwives.

The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia generated a lot of apprehensions in West Africa concerning the unity of the Community. Among the pessimists, it was feared that the intervention will further polarize and eventually break up the fledgling union. Such fears easily regenerated the academic debate over the possibilities and limits of combining the "political" and "technical" aspects of regional integration. By contrast, optimists emphasized that the intervention will force member-states to close ranks

and evolve a common policy on Liberia. The lessons learned from this experience would eventually "spill-over," as it were, to other areas of common concern. Put simply, the intervention will furnish ECOWAS with the much-needed political ingredients for economic integration. In the words of Dr. Abass Bundu, the former Executive Secretary and frontline optimist: "out of the Liberian crisis will emerge an ECOWAS more determined, more purposeful and more resilient; indeed a beacon that illumines Africa's latent capacity to solve its own problems in furtherance of African unity and aspirations."[58] That was four years ago. Today, President Abdou Diouf of Senegal--the de facto leader of francophone-ECOWAS since the death of President Houphouet-Boigny--is affirming the indivisibility of ECOWAS. In his words:

> whereas our various countries have, with great difficulty, been trying individually to solve their problems, today we are condemned to unite in our efforts to overcome the obstacles to our development. Let us consume ECOWAS goods.[59]

The recent abolition of CEAO, the formidable francophone arch-rival to ECOWAS, is further evidence of the deepening of ECOWAS integration since the Liberian intervention. What, then, are the chances that ECOWAS would seize this momentum to become the engine of regional democracy?

Ten years before the outbreak of the conflict that tore Liberia apart, some ECOWAS leaders were contemplating possible courses of collective action to deny Master Sergeant Doe the recognition he sought as the "legitimate" president of Liberia. The extreme barbarity and bloodlust that characterized Doe's seizure of power in 1980 were a source of concern to the relatively democratic leaders of Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Of these, Nigeria's President Shehu Shagari--who had only

been elected the preceding year after a fragile transition from a 13-year military dictatorship--saw the Doe coup as potentially destabilizing for his country and the subregion. His plan was to isolate Doe and deny him the ultimate prize; namely, the occupancy of Liberia's seat in ECOWAS, OAU and the United Nations. He turned back Bacchus Matthews' team at the airport--a delegation which had been sent by Doe to seek Nigeria's assistance and recognition. And a few weeks later, Doe himself was denied permission to land in Lagos to attend a meeting of ECOWAS. Indeed, it was the recognition of the Doe government by the United States that forced the Nigerian and Ivoirien governments to abandon their resistance and recognize the Doe government.[60] In this particular instance, had Shagari and Houphouet-Boigny been supported or encouraged by the United States, Doe might have been denied the coveted prize of African leadership: a seat in ECOWAS, OAU and UN summits. His government would have been isolated and the Shagari policy of imposing severe economic sanctions on governments such as Doe's might have prevented the decade of abuse that produced the current Liberian crisis and a costly multinational intervention. It could also have discouraged the teeming corps of potential Does in the armed forces of many West African states.

Essentially, therefore, the denial of recognition by regional institutions, such as ECOWAS, is one way of discouraging the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Undoubtedly, this approach assumes that such isolation will be supported by other international actors as well. Current systemic changes have made this assumption plausible. With the end of the Cold War, the Liberias, the Nigerias and the Togos of the world-system have ceased to command the geo-strategic attention of the world's great powers

in any significant way (that is, if they ever did). Coupled with worldwide movement towards political pluralism, there is an even greater chance for securing international support for a regional solution to the primary cause of conflict in Africa: authoritarianism and political exclusivity.

The second approach which has been mooted in West Africa is to institutionalize democratic norms as requisite conditions for continued membership in ECOWAS. This was the brainchild of Dr. Abass Bundu, whose tenure as the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS coincided with region-wide demands for greater popular participation in national politics. Bundu's proposal for the revision of the ECOWAS treaty includes a provision for a Community Parliament whose members will be directly elected by the people. Such provisions will certainly encourage democratic movements within the region. This would have the effect of internationalizing national (now ECOWAS) politicians. The resulting immunity and status would be an incentive for defending and promoting national political pluralism. But, as the Nigerian experience has shown, the success of this approach will depend on the active support of the international community. In this regard, I suggest that the European Union which is linked to ECOWAS through the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states could exercise greater influence than it has in the past. By maintaining a credible threat of excluding non-democratic institutions from the aid benefits of the Lomé Convention, the European Union could become a crucial force in moving ECOWAS states away from authoritarian practices which have generated most of the conflicts in the subregion.

To sum up, I started out in this paper with two objectives in mind. The first was to suggest the need for students of international politics to

re-examine our focus on inter-state conflicts. Such conflicts are important; indeed some of them have had the most drastic impact on world politics. However, the recent history of international politics shows that such conflicts have occurred only rarely. The most pervasive forms of conflict which have affected the majority of the world's population since the end of World War II have been intra-state or "state control" conflicts. Examining such conflicts, as I have done in West Africa, reveals the salience of modes of governance as the causal variable in explaining the outbreak of conflict within the weakest regions of the international state-system. My interest lies not so much in the generalizability of any theory that may emerge from the study of such conflicts as in practical solutions to this problem which has reduced much of West Africa to a state of nature.

My second objective was to outline the possibility for using a rapidly consolidating ECOWAS as an institutional apparatus for improving political governance within the subregion. In this regard, I am aware that my emphasis on external institutional support--including the application of such levers as the denial of recognition--will be prone to nationalist criticisms of interference, interventionism or neo-colonialism. However, in the three decades since independence, the same argument has been used by powerful politicians and militocrats--from Nkrumah through Eyadema to Strasser and Abacha--to wreak upon the population a level of physical and material abuse unmatched by one century of European colonialism. Lacking, therefore, the basic institutions of accountability and restraint which democracies have been known to provide, Liberia and much of West Africa have lived up to Kant's prediction that rulers in a non-republican setting could easily resolve on conflict within or between states "as on a pleasure

party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it" and an international community which is also ever ready to accept.[61] At fifty, the United Nations can alter this course of international behavior by significantly increasing the political and economic costs of such indulgences.

Notes

[1]Established in 1975 to promote regional trading, ECOWAS is a multi-linguistic (anglophone, francophone and lusophone) regional organization comprising sixteen West African states: Cape Verdé, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

[2]Cf. Timothy Akinola Aguda (1990), "The Legal Framework of the ECOWAS Community: Its Problems and Perspective," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ghana Bar Association held in Accra, October, excerpted in The Guardian (Lagos), 21 November, pp. 23-24; Richard Akinjide (1990/91), "ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberian Imbroglio: Legal Issues," West Africa, 24 December 1990-6 January 1991, pp. 3090-3091; W. Ofuatey Kodjoe (1993), "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," Paper presented at a Workshop on Multilateral Organizations and the Amelioration of Ethnic Conflicts, held at the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City University of New York, New York, 14 May, esp. pp. 27-29; Tom Farer (1993), "The Role of Regional Organizations in International Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Legal, Political and Military Problems," in W. Kühne, ed. Internationales Umfeld, Sicherheitsinteressen und Nationale Planung der Bundesrepublik. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, pp. 171-88; and Anthony Ofodile (1994), "The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention," Draft manuscript for Columbia Journal of International Law (forthcoming), pp. 1-40.

[3]James O.C. Jonah (1993), "ECOMOG: A Successful Example of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping by a Regional Organization in the Third World," in W. Kühne, ed., Internationales Umfeld, pp. 197-217; S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss (1992), "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," Security Studies 2(1), 1992, pp. 6-37.

[4]In this paper I use the concept "democracy" to refer to an inclusive and participatory government run by civilians on the basis of the rule of law.

[5]According to a study by Pat McGowan and Thomas Johnson, West Africa was found to be the "region par excellence of the military coup d'état" in Africa. See their "African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," The Journal of Modern African Studies 22(4), 1984, p. 649; and "Sixty Coups in Thirty Years—Further Evidence Regarding African Military Coups d'État," The Journal of Modern African Studies 24(3), 1986, pp. 539-546.

[6]Patrick James (1990), "The Causes of War: How Does the Structure of the System Affect International Conflict?," in David G. Haglund and Michael Hawes, eds. World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 38.

[7]Kenneth Waltz (1959), Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press.

[8]K. Waltz (1959), Man, the State and War, p. 101; and Immanuel Kant (1914), Eternal Peace and Other International Essays. Trans. by W. Hastie. Boston: The World Peace Foundation. For recent analyses, cf. E. Weede (1984), "Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(4), pp. 649-664; Michael Doyle (1986), "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80(4), pp. 1151-1169; and Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali (1989), "Regime Type and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33(1), pp. 3-35.

[9]K. Waltz (1959), Man, the State and War, p. 122.

[10]Cf. V.I. Lenin (1917/1939), Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers; John Hobson (1902/38), Imperialism: A Study. Third Edition. London: George Allen and Unwin; and Joseph Schumpeter (1919/1951), Imperialism and Social Classes. Trans. by H. Norden. New York: Augustus Kelley.

[11]See esp. Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace. For an excellent discussion of this and other aspects of the theory, see Jack S. Levy (1988), "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Phillip E. Tetlock, et al., eds. Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 209-333; and K. Waltz (1959), Man, the State and War, esp. Chap. 4.

[12]Kenneth Waltz (1959), Man, the State and War, p. 123. See also his Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wessley, 1979.

[13]Cf. Reinhold Neibuhr (1947), Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; and Hans Morgenthau (1948), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf. Some of the most prominent neoliberal criticism of Realism in general and structural realism, in particular, include Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1977), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.; John Ruggie (1983), "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen Krasner, ed. International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, pp. 195-231; Joseph Grieco (1990), Cooperation Among Nations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Robert Keohane, ed. (1986), Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1988), "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40, pp. 235-251; and Andrew Moravcsik (1992), "Liberalism and International Relations Theory." Cambridge, Mass.: The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Working Paper No. 92-6.

[14]Robert Latham (1993), "Democracy and War-Making," p. 139.

[15]This was the underlying philosophy for Mikhail Gorbachev's political reforms in the defunct Soviet Union. For details, see his Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York: Harper and Row, 1987. For a wider perspective, cf. Joshua Moravchik (1990), Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute; Theodore Sorensen (1990), "Rethinking National Security," Foreign Affairs 69(3), pp. 1-18; Graham Allison and G. Treverton, eds. (1992), Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order. New York: W.W. Norton, for the Council on Foreign Relations.

[16]For a brilliant, authoritative and nuanced discussion of these issues, see Stanley Hoffmann (1977), "An American Social Science: International Relations," Daedalus 106(3), pp. 41-60.

[17]Hari Singh (1993), "Prospects for Regional Stability in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22(2), pp. 279-300. In this regard, see comparative studies of the problem of insecurity in the Third World, esp. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1986), "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis," Journal of Modern African Studies 24(1), pp. 1-31; Nicole Ball (1988), Security and Economy in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mohammed Ayoob (1991), "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics 43(2), pp. 257-83; and Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl Kessler, eds. (1991), Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

[18]See, among others, Caroline Thomas (1987), In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Barry Buzan (1988), "People, States and Fear: National Security Problem in the Third World," in Edward Azaar and C. Moon, eds., National Security in the Third World: The Management of External Threats. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishers; and Brian Job, ed. (1992), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

[19]Ploughshares Monitor 14(4), December 1993, reproduced in Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace Studies 26(1), February 1994, p. 114.

[20]Ibid., pp. 113-14.

[21]Ibid., p. 114.

[22]See, among others, J. Gus Liebenow (1969), Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Jacob F. Ajayi and Michael Crowther, eds. (1973), History of West Africa. 1 Volume. New York: Columbia University Press; Monday Akpan (1973), "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia, 1841-1964," Canadian Journal of African Studies 7(2), pp. 217-36; Christian Cassell (1979), Liberia: History of the First African Republic. New York: Fountainhead; G.S. Boley (1983), Liberia: The Rise and Fall of the First Republic. London: Macmillan Press; Y. Gershoni (1985), Black Colonialism: The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press; and D.E. Dunn and S.B. Tarr (1988), Liberia: A National Polity in Transition. Metuchwen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press.

[23]David Wippman (1994), "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in Lori Fisler Damrosch, ed. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 160.

[24]W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1993), "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts," p. 5.

[25]Ibid., p. 7.

[26]Monday Akpan (1973), "Black Imperialism," pp. 217-36; Yekutiel Gershoni (1985), Black Colonialism.

[27]My position is that black-on-black oppression is neither historically unique as a phenomenon, nor a phenomenon that is historically unique to Liberia. The lack of respect for the other individual is pervasive among Africa's multi-ethnic states. In Mauritania, for instance, dark-skinned nationals have been known to suffer discrimination from their Arab colleagues. They have been viewed as inferior, and have been subjected to insults and physical torture by Arab Mauritanians. In Ghana, as in Nigeria, Hausa-Fulani populations are widely regarded as socially inferior. While this phenomenon has been diminishing in Nigeria due to the political and increasingly economic ascendancy of this group, in Ghana the "Pepe" (as they are often called) still represents the worst case of socio-cultural, intellectual and economic underclass.

[28]David Wippman (1994), "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," p. 160.

[29]Cf. J. Gus Liebenow (1969), Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege; his Liberia: The Quest for Democracy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987; and Amos Sawyer (1987), "Effective Immediately: Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980-1986: A Personal Perspective." Bremen: Liberia Working Group Papers, No. 5.

[30]Doe belongs to the Krahn tribe which, like the Americo-Liberian community, constitutes about four percent of Liberia's population. For details, see David Wippman (1994), "Enforcing the Peace," p. 162.

[31]Brian Silk, quoted in West Africa, 28 April 1980, p. 762. See also E. John Inegbedion (1994), "ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective," in Timothy Shaw and Julius Okolo, eds., The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 224; Claude Welch, Jr. (1990), "The Military Factor in West Africa," pp. 168-9.

[32]David Wippman (1994), "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," p. 161.

[33]The details of Doe's bizarre plots to manipulate the electoral process in order to hang on to power are contained in a widely publicized confidential memorandum which was written by John Rancy, his Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. See West Africa, 23 March 1984, p. 864.

[34]David Wippman (1994), "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," p. 162. See also W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1993), "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict," p. 9; and Christopher Clapham (1994), "Liberia," in Timothy Shaw and Julius Okolo, eds., The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS, esp. pp. 75-6.

[35]W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1993), "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict," pp. 4-5.

[36]David Wippman (1994), "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," p. 163.

[37]Africa Research Bulletin, 15 February 1990, p. 9557.

[38]Ibid., 15 August 1990, p. 9774. To be sure, rebel forces are also guilty of similarly bizarre episodes of mass murder in Liberia. The point I am making, however, is that if "government" is also the purveyor of societal ethics and morality, then whoever purports to represent it must be ethically and morally responsible, notwithstanding any claims of provocation. This is the essence of ethical arguments in international politics. For details, see among others, Charles Beitz (1979), "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics," International Organization 33(3), pp. 405-24; and his more elaborate study: Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[39]Africa Research Bulletin, 15 August 1990, p. 9772

[40]This stalemate was extended even further by the surprising inability of the rebel forces to overrun Doe and his guards who were only yards away. One plausible explanation for this puzzle is that the rift within the rebel forces had widened by the time they approached the presidential mansion in Monrovia. Fundamental differences over the division of the spoils of war may have induced Taylor's NPFL and Johnson's INPFL to concentrate on denying each other victory rather than overrunning what was left of Doe's thin defence perimeter. Prince Yormie Johnson had broken away from Charles Taylor in February 1990, taking with him about 7,000 loyalists. For details, see The Guardian (London) 9 July 1990; The

Independent (London) 20 and 31 July 1990; Daily Telegraph (London) 30 July 1990; and Africa Research Bulletin, 15 August 1990, pp. 9773-4;

[41]Africa Research Bulletin, 15 August 1990, p. 9772

[42]President Samuel Kanyon Doe, letter dated 14 July 1990, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States 21, 1992, p. 6.

[43]Personal interview with Mr. Thaddeus Dan Hart, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria, 28 July 1993.

[44]This phrase is borrowed from Robert Kaplan's sensational article: "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-76.

[45]Emmanuel Erskine (1991), "Peacekeeping," Africa Forum 1(1), p. 27.

[46]Dr. Obed Asamoah, quoted in the People's Daily Graphic (Accra), 23 August 1990, p. 1.

[47]See Clement E. Adibe (1994), "ECOWAS in Comparative Perspective," in Timothy M. Shaw and Julius E. Okolo, eds. The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS, pp. 187-217.

[48]Rilwanu Lukman, quoted in Ibrahim Gambari (1991), Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional Integration: The Case of ECOWAS. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, p. 132.

[49]Community soldiers went into Liberia as part of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group which I shall hereafter refer to as ECOMOG. For an insightful, even if biased, account of the politico-military aspects of the early phase of the ECOMOG operation, see Nkem Agetua (1992), Operation Liberty: The Story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro. Lagos: Hona Communications Limited.

[50]Contact 2(3), November 1990, p. 6 (emphasis mine).

[51]ECOWAS (1990), Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for Liberia, pp. 3-4, also reproduced in the Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States 21, 1992, pp. 6-8.

[52]James Butty (1991), "A Year of Terror," West Africa, 7-13 January, p. 3151.

[53]Prince Yormie Johnson (1991), The Gun that Liberates Should Not Rule. Monrovia: Herald Publication, Inc., p. 7.

[54]Nnamdi Obasi (1992), "The Negotiation Process," in Margaret A. Vogt, ed., The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping. Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Company, p. 191.

[55]Quoted in Ibid., p. 192. It was also at this meeting that the leaders adopted the ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles, which includes respect for democratic rights.

[56]W. Ofuatey Kodjoe (1993), "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts," p. 45.

[57]Anthony Ofodile (1994), "The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention," p. 19.

[58]Dr. Abass Bundu (1990), "ECOWAS and the Challenge of the Liberian Crisis," Contact 2(3), November 1990, p. 3.

[59]President Abdou Diouf, quoted in West Africa, 16-22 May 1994, p. 861.

[60]David Wippman has argued that US recognition and eventual bankrolling of the Doe regime was "motivated by strategic interests, such as the availability of refueling facilities and telecommunications relay stations, and by a desire to preempt Soviet influence." See his "Enforcing the Peace," p. 162.

[61]Immanuel Kant, quoted in Michael Doyle (1983), "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, p. 229.