Must NATO Fail?

Theories, Myths, and Policy Dilemmas

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Introduction

Thinking about NATO has a way, for me at least, of triggering two reactions. The first is a sense of déjà vu. NATO, we are reminded, is now in "crisis," but it is very difficult to identify a period, even during the Cold War, when NATO was not either pulling out of or heading into a crisis, and perhaps one of the most apt comments ever made about the Alliance was that of an unnamed former American secretary of defence, whom François Heisbourg recorded as asking, "When has NATO ever been in array?"[1] The second reaction is a sense of perplexity. How is one to reconcile the conflicting images of an alliance that is at one and the same time held to be so feckless and lacking in credibility as to risk disappearing altogether yet somehow manages to attract a lineup of potential members stretching around the bloc, and has even been said by its critics to be aggressively menacing the post-Cold War order in Europe through the prospect of its "reckless" expansion? The reactions bring to mind what Yogi Berra said about a once-favourite nightspot: "no one goes there anymore, it's too crowded."

As this is being written, it is the latter image, of an expansive and presumably robust NATO, that predominates. It is well to remember, however, that less than a year ago, in November 1994,

the Alliance experienced what some observers were calling its most disruptive rift ever, over the Clinton administration's decision to follow Congress' instructions and cease enforcing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia. Congress had voted in the summer of 1994 to stop funding American enforcement efforts in the event that the Bosnian Serbs did not accept, by mid-November, a peace settlement being brokered by the five-state "Contact Group" (the US, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany). Even so, the United States would continue to abide by the embargo, although its ships and aircraft doing patrol duty would no longer enforce it.[2]

The practical consequences of the US action remained open to dispute. Administration officials sought to reassure America's allies, many of whom regarded the decision with grave suspicion, by noting that the new policy would not apply to certain categories of weaponry; for instance, air-to-air, air-to-ground, anti-aircraft, and anti-ship missiles, as well as weapons of mass destruction would continue to be banned. But to some in Europe (and in Ottawa), the administration's decision looked to complicate an already messy "peace process," with potentially lethal consequences for those countries with forces deployed to Bosnia as part of the United Nations effort to supply humanitarian relief. Not only would their troops become hostage to possible Serb retaliation, but NATO itself looked to be a casualty of the Yugoslav fighting, now that it became clear that what was really preventing forceful action against the Serbs was not an allegedly pusillanimous UN, but rather a serious split within the Alliance

itself.[3]

It so looked to a variety of observers, from a myriad of perspectives. Euro-enthusiasts, convinced of the long-term untenability of the American guarantee of their security, almost rejoiced in what they took to be both a unilateral American recanting of obligations and an unprecedented opportunity to build the long-awaited (by some) European pillar of defence. Frederick Bonnart, for one, was certain that Congressional hardheads would do nothing to help the wretched in Bosnia, but a great deal to wreck the Alliance, in confirming the suspicions of many Europeans that the US was out to dominate NATO, and would consequently drive the European allies toward that ever-closer defence and security cooperation so tantalizingly promised in the Maastricht Treaty. Richard Cohen also pointed to Congress, a body he saw sadly, if accurately, reflecting an American mood to have done with complex issues in faraway spots like the Balkans. "Bosnia," he concluded, "is lost and so probably is NATO."[4]

Others, focussing not on Congress but casting blame more widely upon Europeans and North Americans alike, came to the same sombre conclusion about the Alliance. Especially as the Bosnian Serb offensive of late November against the Bihac "safe haven" seemed to foretell the impending demise of it and other UN-protected towns, to say nothing of the collapse of the Bosnian government itself, disgust welled on the part of many writers convinced that the West and its agents, prominent among them NATO, had been nothing short of morally delinquent in failing to halt

aggression in the Balkans when they might have. To some, analogies with the appeasement policies of the status quo powers during the 1930s proved irresistible.[5] By December, a consensus among Western policymakers seemed to be shaping to the effect that the Bosnian Serbs would win their war, and that NATO had better prepare both to learn the requisite "lessons" thereof and to plan to extricate, if the need arose, the UN Protection Forces.

We now realize how premature were Western leaders' expectations of the imminent death of Bosnia. As this is being written, both the Croatian army and its Bosnian counterpart have taken the offensive against local Serb forces that had got used to occupying other people's lands. In particular, the ease with which the rejuvenated Croatian army reclaimed western Slavonia in early May 1995 suggested that the vaunted Serb "juggernaut" might be in decline, not only in Croatia but in neighbouring Bosnia as well.[6] Much depends on the willingess, or ability, of the regular Serbian army to refrain from coming to the rescue of the Serb fighters in the two republics, and few observers would be rash enough to expect a Bosnian government "victory" if by that term is understood the wresting of control from Serb hands of all of Bosnia; by most reckonings, the Bosnian government cannot realistically hope to reclaim all or even most of the Serb conquests, currently comprising some 70 percent of the republic's territory.[7] But the point remains, that Bosnia's fate is more uncertain than it had seemed a half-year before. And while NATO can hardly take any credit for this turn of events, the improvement of the Bosnian

government's position has gone a ways toward muting the moral outrage that was being directed at it in late 1994.

Other factors can also account for the relative improvement in NATO's stature, even if its record in the Balkans has arguably been only slightly less inept than that of such other institutions as the European Union, the Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations. Among these other factors, the Russian onslaught against Chechnya during the winter of 1995 did much to breathe new life into NATO's longer-term prospects. But it would be wise to avoid placing too much weight on topical events in assessing those prospects; instead, it might be better to concentrate on the underlying trends within the transatlantic relationship that have seemed to many to be harbingers of tough times to come for the Alliance.

Structural Realism and the Myth of NATO's Necessary Demise

By far the most significant such trend has been the demise of the bipolar age of superpower competition known to most as the Cold War, but to a few as the Long Peace.[8] For those who doubt the Alliance's long-term viability, the ending of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union provide the necessary and sufficient basis for answering in the affirmative the question, Must NATO fail? This was the message that one long-time student of the Alliance, and self-described atlanticist, Christoph Bertram, brought in late October 1994 to the 40th general assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, whose members had gathered in The

Hague to ponder whether NATO was "on track" for the coming century. Describing the conference theme as little more than "wishful thinking," Bertram went on to say that not only was NATO decidedly off track, it was in "deep, enduring crisis, and may not even reach the end of the decade." The trouble was twofold. First, the old threat, the one that gave life and unity to the Alliance, had disappeared, leaving in its place new threats such as that exemplified by Yugoslavia, which were by definition divisive. Second, there was a deplorable and general absence of leadership everywhere in the Alliance. And while he was not prepared to pronounce the Alliance down for the count, Bertram's bleak analysis of its situation was compelling enough to lead all but the most faint of mind to grasp the seriousness of the challenge.[9]

By concentrating on the causal aspect of a vanished Soviet threat, Bertram was placing himself among the ranks of many contemporary NATO watchers, who like the character in Molière's comedy have been speaking prose without knowing it. In this case, the "prose" is a variant of international-relations theory known as "structural" (sometimes annoyingly called "neo- ") realism.[10] To be sure, sombre forecasts of NATO's future were hardly unknown in the years and months prior to the November crisis that so many pundits argue has been NATO's coup de grace, and if it took Bosnia and the November crisis to unleash a torrent of NATO obituaries, it should not be assumed that the Alliance was lacking for those willing to prophesy its demise in some indeterminate future. As Simon Serfaty phrased it so well, the "déjà dit of dissolution is

stated now with renewed and unprecedented vigor. Abandoned by the enemy that gave it birth and ensured its cohesion, NATO looked trivial and unhinged even before Bosnia seemed to provide a burial site."[11]

Significantly, much of the NATO-is-dying analysis stemmed directly from structural-realist theory, and though it may be inaccurate to claim as many do that this variant of realism has a conceptual stranglehold on international-relations theorizing, it can nevertheless be said to be possessed of some intellectual influence. Thus, when Kenneth Waltz pronounced, late in 1993, that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are," many could agree, for what, in light both of theory and empirical reality, was the purpose of an alliance without, as Waltz put it, a "worthy opponent"?[12] Josef Joffe expressed the same thought in different words, when he observed that if "you take away its enemy, you will begin to see an alliance looking like a plant without water."[13]

In what follows in this and the next section of this article, I attempt to apply international-relations theory (and not just its structural-realist variant) to an explication of the question, Must NATO fail? I do not mean to suggest that professed theoreticians have a particular monopoly either on understanding or on prediction, and I have a certain degree of sympathy with those policymakers who, when forced from time to time to dip into the offerings of some of the more rococo theoreticians of international relations, come away from the experience more inclined toward drinking than thinking. All this being said, theory must have a

role, and an indispensable one, in any inquiry into the future of the Alliance. It must have this role for the reasons I hinted at above. We cannot help theorizing, if we seek to understand, and it is vain to pretend otherwise. Moreover, even if theory's best test comes not in the realm of prediction but in that of understanding, we are bound to theorize if we are determined to say anything even half-intelligent about that great unknown domain, the future, and this irrespective of whether we claim to "predict" or merely to "forecast."[14] And on the matter of predicting NATO's future, no theory can match in parsimony structural realism, even if, as we shall see in the next section, a host of contending theories, including even classical realism, offer grounds for believing that NATO might just endure, even without an enemy.

Structural realism can be characterized by a concentration upon the following assumptions: that anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system; that states are everywhere motivated to assure their security as their paramount objective; that self-help is the preferred, and in some cases only, policy injunction; that conflict rather than "cooperation" between states is the norm; and, perhaps most importantly for this discussion, that bipolar balances of power are stable and conducive to peace, while multipolar balances are unstable and conducive to war. In general, and in light of this catalogue not without reason, structural realists are today inclined toward pessimism--although it must be said that a case can be made that not all structural realists are so inclined.[15] But whether inclined or not to

pessimism, it does seem as if structural realists are inclined to determinism, even though few would admit this, seeking refuge instead in kindler, gentler constructs such as conditioning, or probablism.

Curiously, it was their determinism that made structural realists such optimists regarding NATO's prospects from the coign of vantage of the 1980s. Then, and notwithstanding such Alliance spats as those occurring over pipelines, Central America, Libya, arcane acronyms such as FOTL[16], and the sempiternal burden-sharing issue, structural realism's message was a soothing one, perhaps best conveyed by Glenn Snyder, writing 11 years ago: "It follows that those who see NATO's current crisis as heralding its collapse tend to confuse cause and effect. Although the disagreements have arisen from a variety of proximate causes, they persist largely because the Alliance cannot break up."[17]

For the structural realists, what structure gives, it also takes away, and this explains their current pessimism about NATO's prospects. It is not simply that the allies lack the common foe once required to assure their common action; it is that the demise of bipolarity guarantees, by definition, the rise of new challengers in the eternal struggle for international power and influence. In this struggle, there can be no reason to exclude, and every reason to expect, at least some of the rising challengers springing from the ranks of the quondam allies. Waltz, for instance, envisages three likely rivals to the United States, and two come from the list of America's current allies: Germany (or a

future West European federation), Japan, and China.[18] As yet another structural realist, Christopher Layne, explains it, international relations consists in the "same damn things over and over again: war, great power security and economic competitions, the rise and fall of great powers, and the formation and dissolution of alliances."[19]

In fairness, it must be said that some structural realists are unhappy with the claim that NATO must either dissolve or become moribund; these theorists, however, are in the minority among structural realists. One such writer is Charles Glaser, who like John Mearsheimer and Waltz thinks there is an inexorable logic impelling Germany toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, now that the bipolar balance of the Cold War era has dissipated.[20] Where Glaser differs from both Mearsheimer and Waltz is in his not wishing what the two of them either desire or can accept with equanimity, namely Germans getting the bomb; for Glaser, there is a bona fide, structural-realist reason for NATO to continue to exist, and that is to provide a security guarantee for Germany sufficiently compelling to ward off the country's postulated nuclear temptation.[21]

The Other Theorists and NATO's Survivability

If a consensus (though not unanimity) characterizes the structural-realist perspective on NATO in the absence of an enemy, eclecticism is the word that best captures the predictive compass of contrasting theories of international relations. By this I mean

that the scholars are divided, although it is possible to identify numerous theorists, from a variety of perspectives, who will tell you that there is absolutely no reason why NATO must disappear simply because its Cold War antagonist did. Not only is there such a divergence of outlook on the question presented in this article's title, but there is also a variation in the "levels of analysis" employed by those seeking to provide an answer. Of course, some of structural realism's most persuasive critics on the NATO issue can be located at the same "systemic" level of analysis; indeed, some of them are even systemic-level realists!

In this group one finds, for instance, writers of a realist bent who seek to account for system change by referring to the relationship between system leaders ("hegemons") and their challengers. Like structural realists, these analysts are focussed upon the balance of power; unlike structural realists, however, they are primarily interested in why and how systems change, and with what consequences. They see change as a resultant of the dynamic of uneven growth as between nations; and for the most celebrated of these writers, Robert Gilpin, the consequences of change are profound, usually entailing major-power war.[22]

But as William Wohlforth has recently explained, realists inclined toward hegemony theory these days need not sound as lugubrious as their contemporary structuralist colleagues, for if it is true that hegemony theorists used to focus upon rising challengers, and were therefore inattentive to the implications of collapsing challengers, they now know better. In short, says

Wohlforth, the collapse of the Soviet Union has been an unalloyed good to those who once worried about systemic change producing a great-power war: "[o]nce Soviet power began to decline relative to the United States and its allies, it should have been evident that, absent a reversal of fortunes, no hegemonic war was in the offing. Soviet decline reaffirmed rather than reversed the existing hierarchy of world politics."[23]

It follows, to realists of this stripe, that the Soviet collapse, far from sounding the death knell of the Alliance, as the structuralists would have it, can actually be good for NATO. It is good because system change triggers the phenomenon known as "bandwagoning," through which states spurred by the perception of opportunity seek to align themselves with the state or coalition of states held to be in the ascendant, thus capable of bestowing favour and support upon those who seek to clamber aboard the wagon. On this version, the current enthusiasm for NATO being evinced by former adversaries in the Warsaw Treaty Organization has less to do with their fear of Russian aggression and more to do with their desire to be included within the institutional embrace of the winning West. Writes Randall Schweller, "[o]ne of the primary motivations for bandwagoning is to share in the spoils of victory. When profit rather than security drives alliance choices, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to climb aboard the bandwagon; they do so willingly."[24]

Other system-level theorists join the realists above in providing support for the survivability of NATO. For the purposes

of this article, I shall call them "institutionalists," although it is not uncommon to see them referred to as "neo-institutionalists" or "neoliberals."[25] Nor, for that matter, is it uncommon to find institutions being treated synonymously with "regimes" or "multilateralism." However we might describe them, institutionalists appear to accept that systemic factors can and do intervene in the affairs of states so as to mitigate the consequences of anarchy for international behaviour: outcomes, in other words, are something other than the aggregation of the interests and actions of individual states. They are resultants that, to one degree or other (and here the institutionalists differ among themselves), have been shaped or conditioned by "intervening variables" at the level of the international system. Those variables might take the form of international organizations (e.g., NATO), of international law, or of the mutual expectation of reciprocity in the creation, application and maintenance of principles, norms, and rules (i.e., regimes). For the institutionalist, what is most important is the conviction that institutions matter, and that they enable the international system to "transcend" the otherwise bleak dictates of the doctrine of "self-help."[26]

All of this is anathema to structural realists such as John Mearsheimer, who argues that "[w]hat is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior."[27] Admittedly, institutions can be instruments of states; but it is best not to confuse effect and

cause. To Mearsheimer, NATO is a case in point: it did not keep the peace in the post-1949 period, the bipolar balance of power did. NATO was, at best, epiphenomenal, "essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat."[28]

To this kind of claim institutionalists respond with the counterargument that institutions do not necessarily have to acccomplish their ends by "independent effects" (though they may); they play a useful role in mitigating the adverse consequences of anarchy and in promoting cooperation both by serving to constitute ideas and values and acting as clearing-houses for their exchange. In these roles, institutionalists say, defensive alliances are no less important than other organizations. Indeed, as the international system becomes characterized by multipolarity in the post-Cold War era, NATO is argued by some to assume more not less importance as a means of rendering intentions more predictable, and thus minimizing the tendency of European states (even Western European ones) to revert to a "nationalization" of defence policy. In the words of Michael Brenner, NATO "should be viewed as an evolving civic community whose pacific relations are the institutionalized norm rather than the calculated preference of states."[29]

Any discussion of intention must soon lead to a discussion of perceptions, and it because of this logical progression that the ostensibly systemic-level of analysis constituted by "institutionalism" inevitably yields to subsystemic (or "second-image") analyses. This is no less true in the case of NATO than in

any other.[30] At the subsystemic level focussing upon states and their domestic societies, two kinds of claims have been made for NATO's enduring viability. The first relates to what has become known as "democratic peace theory" (or, d.p.t.); the second relates to a rather contrasting perspective, namely classical realism, which unlike its theoretical homologue structural realism, is reasonably if not uniformly congenial to the case for NATO's enduring viability.

Democratic peace theory makes two claims of relevance to the future of NATO. The milder of these claims simply maintains that democracies do not go to war against each other, or even threaten to do so. From this it follows that NATO cannot fall apart, or at least that it will not fall apart because of the reasons adduced by structural realists, namely the regrettable but necessary implications of balancing behaviour in a multipolar world. NATO may, according to this milder version, lapse into desuetude--for who needs an alliance to keep the peace between liberal democracies?--but it will not shatter into rival blocs of the order foreseen, say, by Conor Cruise O'Brien, who argues that the emerging strategic fault line in Europe will be the Rhine River, as the Western allies of the two world wars once again find themselves, sometime early in the coming century, uniting to combat the threat of a powerful Germany.[31]

The stronger of the d.p.t. contentions is that not only does democracy predispose the Western allies to peace, it predisposes them to alliance as well. According to this view, NATO is more

than a marriage of security convenience between partners possessed of interest-based reasons for cooperation; it is a community of shared values. As such, it can be expected to persist, even if the leadership functions once performed by the United States might attenuate. Notes Mark Boyer, "[w]hatever the motivation for the American role in the formation of the postwar Western alliance system, it is a fair bet that the values engendered in Western cooperation in security affairs will be maintained in the years ahead, based on the assumption that these values have become internalized in the systems of Western alliance nations."[32]

As one would expect, structural realists are, in the main, resistant to the blandishments of democratic peace theory. How could they not be, given their emphasis on the necessity for balancing behaviour to characterize life in an anarchy constituted by security-seeking states?[33] Classical realists, on the other hand, are less dogmatic about democratic peace theory. Certainly, this variant of realism shelters analysts who outdo even the structuralists when it comes to debunking d.p.t. Consider, in this regard, Owen Harries, editor of the National Interest, who has argued (not in his own journal) that "the West" is an artificial construction that required a large, collectively perceived threat to be brought into being; in the absence of threat, no common values can be expected to hold it together, and NATO itself runs the risk of dissolution if it heads off, Quixote-like, in quest of new missions and mandates in the post-Cold War world.[34] But other classical realists, even and especially those associated with the

National Interest, have reminded us that (structural) realists can be their own worst enemies at times, no more so than when they seek to deny that war has all but vanished as a means of conflict-resolution between democracies.[35]

What these classical realists stress is not anarchy, but raison d'état, as the motivating force in world politics. Theirs is a less-deterministic vision of international politics than that provided by structuralism, one in which the identification and operationalization of the "national interest" serves to animate statecraft. Clearly, and notwithstanding a predilection for seeking "first causes" in a flawed human nature, classical realism offers more scope for voluntarism than does structural realism.[36] And while there exists no classical-realist party line on NATO's survivability, it is logical to deduce from classical-realist premises that NATO can endure if important states want it to. With equal logic, of course, the opposite deduction can obtain.

This is why it is so important to reiterate that no theory-based prediction regarding NATO can be sufficiently compelling to foreclose the current debate. Theory may be, as I have argued, necessary for policy analysis; at least it is impossible to imagine an atheorectical policy analysis that could be worthwhile. But theory, and not just structural-realist theory, should never be thought to be possessed of predictive power. It will have done its job if it has helped us to understand. NATO may "fail," though it need not. Whether it does will have much to do with how it resolves its two most urgent policy issues, relating respectively

to the Balkans and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization states.

NATO in Bosnia: Myth and Dilemma

NATO may have been able to weather its November crisis over Bosnia, but it is far from being extricated from a Balkans dilemma that increasingly reminds observers of a "quagmire," suggestive as that imagery is and must be of the American Vietnam experience.[37] Things may yet go very bad for the Alliance in the Balkans, either because it participates in a rescue mission of UN troops that misfires with great loss of life both of UN and NATO personnel, or because its active intervention increasingly places it at odds with a Serbian community that Russia decides cannot be abandoned. Absent these two possible outcomes, however, and it is likely that NATO can live with whatever damage to its "credibility" must attend its general inability to resolve the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.

One myth regarding Bosnia needs to be dispelled, and that is that the fighting there has opened up a major "transatlantic" fissure. This, let it be recalled, was the claim of many who prophesied the impending demise of the Alliance during the November crisis. In reality, while Bosnia did have the effect of sowing discord among the Western allies, it did not do so on any "transatlantic" basis, save in the sense that some European countries were displeased with the actions of one North American ally. The other North American ally, Canada, happened to side in November 1994 with the British and French on the question of the US

nonenforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo, just as it has consistently supported British and French reluctance to approve air strikes or other energetic measures that might indicate a UN abandonment of impartiality in the Bosnian conflict, and in so doing imperil those UN forces attempting to provide humanitarian assistance on the ground. This is not to claim a unity of purpose between Canada, Britain, and France, for such does not exist; but it is to highlight the meaningless of conceiving of the divergences over Bosnia in "transatlantic" terms.

There is another, perhaps more important, reason to resist the view that Bosnia has rent the Alliance along transoceanic lines: Germany, arguably the most important of the Western European countries today, was largely silent during the November crisis, with cause. First, as a conspicuous absentee from the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, Germany was hardly in a position to exercise any hortative leadership role, whether in praising or condemning certain of its allies. Secondly, many Germans are aware that a current of Western opinion holds Bonn responsible for having touched off the carnage in the former Yugoslavia by pushing for early recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia during a moment at the end of 1991 when neither the European Community nor the Bush administration had accepted as inevitable the breakup of Yugoslavia. Finally, on the crisis in the Balkans, the German position is, with some nuances, closer to the American one than it is to the British, French, and Canadian position.

If NATO's credibility is not on the line in Bosnia, and if the

danger of a transatlantic rupture has been exaggerated, does it follow that the Alliance's Balkans dilemma is no dilemma at all? It does not, because Bosnia symbolizes the kind of post-Cold War security puzzle that can be expected to become more common in future. What makes Bosnia so important for the Alliance is that it suggests that, on matters held by European allies to be of critical importance, the United States might choose to limit its participation, mainly because it has decided that none of its "vital" interests are at stake. During the Cold War, the US and its allies could and did differ on the relative assessment of interests, but usually these differences arose over problems in the Third World (e.g., Suez, Vietnam, Central America), not in Europe.

Admittedly, the Western Europeans can be faulted for practically inviting Washington to absent itself from the Yugoslav drama in its early days, and by extension from the security affairs of Europe. Was there ever, in retrospect, a more lamentable European utterance on the meaning of Yugoslavia than EC Commission president Jacques Delors' peremptory comment of mid-1991, that "we do not interfere in American affairs; we trust that America will not interfere in European affairs"?[38] But Washington was eager enough to take up the invitation, and to this day neither the administration nor Congress can be said to have reached the conclusion that Bosnia is of such importance to America that US ground forces need to be involved in resolving the conflict there. To many in Congress at least, Bosnia <u>is</u> a European problem best left to the Europeans.

Ultimately, the meaning of Bosnia for the Alliance is that it poses the problem of how NATO can or should act if the US is not prepared to exercise leadership. For so long the Europeans could accept that on the great issues of the day in Europe, the US would lead. This is no longer the case, and if it presents the Alliance with a challenge, as it does, it need not follow that the challenge is insurmountable. For some years there has been talk, on both sides of the Atlantic, about a new strategic "bargain," one that both reflected and enshrined a reequilibration of burdens and risks on the part of the allies. Although the vision of a "European pillar" of NATO is at least three decades old, it has only been since the Alliance's Brussels summit of January 1994 that unequivocal blessing has been bestowed upon the concept by the member states, especially the US.

Supposedly, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) idea is to represent NATO's deus ex machina, permitting the European allies to avail themselves of NATO assets even in those European crises from which Washington chooses to abstain. To date, progress on developing the CJTF has been slow or nonexistent. However, one consequence of the events that attended NATO's airstrike against a Bosnian Serb ammunition dump outside of Pale in late May 1995, triggering as it did the seizure as hostages of hundreds of UN soldiers, has been the creation of a European crisis-intervention force to protect UN forces. This force, sprearheaded by France and Britain, will consist of two brigades--the British 24th Airmobile Brigade of 5,000 troops and a new multinational force made up of

British, French, and Dutch soldiers--and it could serve as a test of the workability of the CJTF. The US, for its part, has indicated it would be prepared to provide needed logistical assistance, but no troops.[39] If the new force proves effective in the Yugoslavian context, it might serve as a model for CJTF initiatives in future crises such as that in Yugoslavia.

For the Yugoslav crisis demonstrates not that America and Europe must go their separate ways; rather, it illustrates what might occur if a common assessment of threat is not possible to achieve. Washington, unwilling to deploy ground forces save to rescue the UNPROFOR contingents in Bosnia, has made it clear to the European allies that it regards the fighting there to be of more moment to them than to it. It is not merely that Washington has decided it lacked either the world-order or humanitarian interests to propel it to deploy ground forces; it is that Washington has apparently not figured out what should be the salience of its European-order interests in the post-Cold War era. What has been said of the US can also be said of Canada, notwithstanding the latter's ground forces in Yugoslavia: in both North American countries there has been under way a reassessment of the degree to which grand stategy could or should continue to be Eurocentric in focus, as it was in the period of East-West rivalry.[40]

In and of itself, that (North) American reassessment need not imply bad things for NATO; indeed, if there is to be any good coming out of the Bosnian tragedy for the Alliance, it could well inhere in the impulsion it gives to the erection of a viable

European pillar of the Alliance.

NATO's Inclusion Dilemma

The Alliance's other dilemma with an eastern provenance is a greater problem than even the Bosnian question, for if anything holds the potential for sundering their bonds, it is the prospect of allies falling out over the consequences of NATO's expansion into countries once part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Much has been said and written for and against the idea of NATO's expansion--or at least its expansion at this time--and while one can overstate the point, there is nevertheless an unavoidable linkage between Yugoslavia and the expansion issue. Two claims have been made for the need for early expansion that are rooted in Balkans soil. The first, and less important, claim is that NATO's "credibility" is on the line, now that the Alliance has performed so ineptly in Bosnia; NATO, it is held, needs a victory on the enlargement issue to recoup its losses in the Balkans.[41]

More important is the argument that NATO's expansion eastward is a means of reaffirming American interest in Europe, thereby reassuring the allies that even if the US does not deem its Balkans interest to be "vital," it continues to hold Europe to be a major element in its grand strategy. In other words, NATO's expansion can become a means of reassuring key allies, Germany above all, that the United States wishes to remain involved in European security, and to do so in a broader Europe than that which served to anchor America's security policy during the Cold War.[42]

Typically, two reasons are advanced to make the case for NATO expansion. One is to contain a resurgent Russia. The other is to promote stability in Central and Eastern Europe. In general, those who support the first rationale wish to keep NATO as a collective-defence entity whose primary job is to safeguard the current allies plus a few new allies thought capable of being "producers" and not just "consumers" of security. Those who incline toward the second rationale can include analysts desirous of transforming NATO into a pan-European collective-security entity.[43]

Also typically, there is a tendency for debate on the two positions to dichotomize into mutually exclusive propositions, such that one either argues that Russia is contained best by its exclusion from the expansionary process, or that it is brought into the new, transformed, NATO at some future date.[44] For the moment at least, and until such time as such an approach is shown to be unworkable, Alliance leaders are operating on the assumption that NATO can be enlarged without either including or alienating Russia. This is to be accomplished by reliance upon NATO's Partnership for Peace as well as upon some special, yet to be defined, relationship between NATO and Russia, one that conveys the impression and possibly even the reality of Russia having a consultative role in European security forums without according it an actual voice in, and veto over, NATO decisionmaking.[45]

Russia has made it clear that it opposes any NATO expansion that does not include it. NATO has indicated it chooses not to have Russia as a member, although the United States sees no point

in saying so explicitly. At this juncture, a couple of observations can be made. The first is that NATO's enlargement will take place with a velocity approaching the glacial. The current year will be occupied by a study over the "hows" and "whys" of NATO expansion, the results of which are to be disseminated within NATO circles by the end of 1995. In 1996, NATO will study the "who" and "when" of enlargement, and it is anyone's guess what the outcome of this second phase will be. Most likely, NATO will not expand for at least five years.

With this in mind, the second observation is that Russian inability to adjust to an enlarged NATO should not be taken as a given. Although Moscow continues publicly to warn against NATO's adding new members, Russia also decided in late May 1995 to proceed with the next (delayed) stage in its participation in the PFP by signing onto an Individual Partnership Program (IPP), as well as a special additional document calling for an "enhanced dialogue" with NATO that exceeds the scope of the agreements NATO has already concluded with its Partnership members.[46]

It may yet turn out, and it certainly reflects the preferences of the Clinton administeration, that Russia after the Cold War can be "contained" in the same manner as Germany was following the Second World War, namely by a policy of inclusion intended to obviate a recurrence of the problems associated with the failed policies toward Weimar Germany adopted by the victors of the First World War. Much will depend upon the allies maintaining unity on NATO Ostpolitik, and if there is good news for the time being it is

that the US and Germany seem to be in basic agreement on the strategy of inclusion. But much will also depend on the Russians, as they ponder how best to react to a NATO that is going to expand.

Russians will develop their policy toward NATO expansion in a manner intended to enhance Russian interests--or will do so, on the presumption that "rational acting" will characterize Russia's NATO policy in the coming years to the same degree as it has in the past few years. Moscow would seem to have three main options from which to choose. The first is to acquiesce in limited NATO expansion, in exchange for which it would be compensated by the best possible side deal with Western countries. Such an arrangement would feature a recognition that Russia is too big and powerful to be in NATO, and in fact that Russia's interest would be better served by its being out of NATO, with which a special, sui generis, partnership could be developed.

A second option would be for Russia to try to prevent NATO from having an institutional monopoly over European security. This could be achieved, for example, by enhancing the effectiveness of the OSCE, which would somehow become endowed with greater rsponsibility for pan-European security matters. That this option might seem unrealistic to Western observers is no reason to imagine that it would not seem a rational choice to Russian policymakers.

A third option would be to adopt a confrontational stance, and move explicitly toward the redivision of Europe, only doing so in a way that places the onus of division upon NATO, for having decided expansion must occur. If it followed this path, Russia

would be expected to move to consolidate its (smaller) part of Europe, and to impose its will more consistently upon members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Effectively, Moscow would declare a Monroe Doctrine of its own for the "near abroad," an entity that would at minimum include Ukraine and Belarus.

None of the above options can be excluded a priori. It is sometimes erroneously assumed that it is simply anti-Westerners in Russia who oppose NATO's expansion. It is true that some of the voices raised most strenuously in the debate have been those of conservative Russians bent on believing that NATO is out to steal a march on Russia militarily; this apparently is the suspicion of the country's military leadership. Perhaps more important in the long term are those Russians who focus on the political not military meaning of an enlarged NATO: for them, what is significant is the fact of exclusion; to them, being out of NATO is tantamount to being out of Europe. It is no suprise to find Russian liberals endorsing NATO enlargement only on the condition that Russia, too, join.

Conclusion

NATO can solve its inclusion dilemma, but it will require a lot of effort and commitment, and a bit of luck. The worst thing that might happen would be for major fault lines to develop on this issue, ones that separated the US from Germany and some of the other European allies. Intuitively, however, it is hard to see how Washington could be isolated on NATO Ostpolitik simultaneously from

Bonn/Berlin and from Paris and London. It could be expected that whatever distanced the US from Germany would be compensated by a rapprochement between the US and Britain and France.

It is less difficult to imagine a continued diminution in the degree and meaning of the American "commitment" to European security, and this notwithstanding the regular, almost ritualistic, recitations by US officials that their country's participation in European security affairs is an eternal constant, and should be regarded as such.[47]

It has been my argument in these pages, at times made implicitly, that NATO is not destined to "fail." By the same token, it is not destined to succeed; whether it does will continue to be dependent upon policy elites in important countries who understand that the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance constitutes the most compelling "national interest" from the point of view of their country's security. Ultimately, NATO's future health will require enough of the Alliance's burdens to be shifted to the Europeans, without in the process triggering an even greater American retrenchment, whether out of pique or out of a conviction that the Europeans can look after European security entirely on their own.

Endnotes

1. Quoted in François Heisbourg, "Europe/Etats-Unis: le couplage stratégique menacé," Politique étrangère 52 (Spring 1987): 111-12. Also see Robert Hunter's pithy observation, made as NATO was about to celebrate the conclusion of its fourth decade, that the Alliance "had had about as many crises as birthdays." Robert Hunter, "Will the United States Remain a European Power?" Survival 30 (May/June 1988): 210.

2. Bradley Graham and William Drozdiak, "Bosnia Hails Arms Ban Shift by U.S.," Washington Post, 12 November 1994, pp. A1, A21.

3. George Graham, Laura Silber, and Chrystia Freeland, "US Move to Ease Bosnia Arms Ban Angers NATO Allies," Financial Times (London), 12-13 November 1994, p. 1. For the argument that it was UN incompetence, not divisions within NATO itself, that "severely damaged the credibility" of the Alliance in Bosnia, see Bob Dole, "Shaping America's Global Future," Foreign Policy, no. 98 (Spring 1995), p. 37.

4. Frederick Bonnart, "America Strikes a Body Blow to the Trans-Atlantic Security Alliance," International Herald Tribune, 14 November 1994, p. 8; Richard Cohen, "Bosnia's Cause Is Lost and So, Probably, Is NATO," ibid., 30 November 1994, p. 4.

5. Brian Beedham, "Bosnia Fiasco: Western Hypocrisy and Failure of Will," International Herald Tribune, 28 November 1994, p. 4; Anthony Lewis, "NATO Discredited by Its Members," ibid., 29 November 1994, p. 4; Stanley Hoffmann, "Appeasement Again: Like Ethiopia, Like Czechoslovakia," ibid., 6 December 1994, p. 6.

6. Roger Cohen, "For Serbs, a Reckoning," New York Times, 14 May 1995, p. E3.

7. Andrew Bair, "Which End-Game in Bosnia?" INSS Strategic Forum, no. 16 (January 1995).

8. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security 10 (Spring 1986): 99-142.

9. Christoph Bertram, "NATO On Track for the 21st Century?" an address to the 40th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, The Hague, 26 October 1994 (mimeo), p. 3.

10. I say "annoyingly" because "neo-realism" began life as a category for describing something far different from the "structural realism" of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer; when first used by political scientists in the early 1980s, neorealism emphasized that the old means of getting one's way, which depended

upon an ultima ratio of military force, were ceding place in an increasingly "interdependent" world to new power resources such as commercial and financial prowess. In other words, neorealism in its original use applied more to the theoretical proclivities of the critics of Waltz than to Waltz himself. Today, such is the power of misapplied labels consistently misapplied that one easily risks being dismissed as a crank if one insists on the original usage. But for instances of the original usage, see Richard Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to US Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983); David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983); and Robert Lieber, No Common Power (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1988).

11. Simon Serfaty, "Half Before Europe, Half Past NATO," Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring 1995): 50.

12. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (Fall 1993): 75.

13. Josef Joffe, "Die NATO und Nostradamus," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 February 1995, p. 4.

14. John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17 (Winter 1992/93): 5-58.

15. For an interesting, if ultimately unpersuasive, claim that structural realists may today be classified (at least some of them) among the optimists, see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.

16. This stood for "Follow-on-to-Lance," a short-range nuclear missile once thought absolutely necessary by many policymakers in NATO countries if the Alliance was to survive; needless to say, few today seem to recall, or care, whether the acronym stood for a weapon or a cough-drop.

17. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984): 461-95.

18. Waltz, "Emerging Structure of International Politics," p. 50.

19. Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 10.

20. For their arguments concerning Germany and nuclear weapons, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Emerging Structure of International Politics." Also see the exchange between Waltz and Elizabeth Pond, who dismisses the claim that logic impells Germany toward the

acquisition of nuclear weapons: "Correspondence: International Politics, Viewed from the Ground," International Security 19 (Summer 1994): 195-99.

21. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 85. This invoking of structural realism to confute structural-realism's predictions for NATO is also apparent in an earlier piece by Glaser, "Why NATO Is Still the Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe," International Security 18 (Summer 1993): 5-50.

22. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

23. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 99.

24. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19 (Summer 1994): 79. An alternative, and perhaps more commonly accepted, usage of bandwagoning holds it to consist in aligning oneself with the source of danger, not of opportunity; for that usage, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 19-21.

25. See Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (Autumn 1993): 3-43.

26. Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," International Security 19 (Summer 1994): 119.

27. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95): 47.

28. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

29. Michael Brenner, "The Multilateral Moment," in Multilateralism and Western Strategy, ed. Michael Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), p. 8. Also see Jaap de Wilde, "Reversal in the International System? The Long Peace Debate in the Present," Working Papers 21/1994 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1994), pp. 8-9; and John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly 109 (Winter 1994-95): 777.

30. Robert G. Kaufman, "A Two-Level Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy," Security Studies 3 (Summer 1994): 678-79.

31. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Future of 'the West'," National Interest, no. 30 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 3-10.

32. Mark A. Boyer, International Cooperation and Public Goods: Opportunities for the Western Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 121.

33. For structural-realist critiques of d.p.t., see Layne, "Kant or Cant." Also of interest, though not necessarily part of the structural-realist assault on d.p.t., is David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 50-86.

34. Owen Harries, "The Collapse of 'The West'," Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993): 41-53. For a similar stress on the democracies' dependence upon their own negation to flourish, see François Furet, "Europe After Utopianism," Journal of Democracy 6 (January 1995): 79-89.

35. Robert W. Tucker, "Realism and the New Consensus," National Interest, no. 30 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 33-36.

36. Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?" National Interest, no. 30 (Winter 1992/93), p. 21.

37. "A Balkan Quagmire Beckons," Economist, 3 June 1995, pp. 41-42; R. W. Apple, Jr., "How the World Makes Bosnia Safe for War," New York Times, 4 June 1995, pp. 4:1, 6.

38. Quoted in Noel Malcolm, "The Case Against 'Europe'," Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995): 68.

39. John Darnton, "NATO Members Agree on 2 Special Forces," New York Times, 4 June 1995, p. 14.

40. For a critique of the US position in the former Yugoslavia, see Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "America and Bosnia," National Interest, no. 33 (Fall 1993), pp. 14-27. In the Canadian case, recent government statements have made it clear both that "the principal responsibility for European defence must lie with the Europeans themselves," and that rather than the Alliance, it is the United Nations that "continues to be the key vehicle for pursuing Canada's global security objectives." The respective sources for these quotes are Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), p. 35; and Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World (Ottawa, 1995), p. 27.

41. For the linkage between Bosnia and NATO enlargement, see Dana H. Allin, "Can Containment Work Again?" Survival 37 (Spring 1995): 54; Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," ibid., pp. 7-8; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74 (January/February 1995): 27.

42. See "Christopher Urges Enhanced Ties Between U.S. and Europe," US Embassy (Ottawa), Text, 5 June 1995. This is the text of a major policy address given by the secretary of state, Warren Christopher, in Madrid on 2 June 1995. The address was titled "Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for th 21st Century."

43. For a discussion of the two positions, see Joseph Lepgold, "The Next Step Toward a More Secure Europe," Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (December 1994): 7-26.

44. Coral Bell, "Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia," Journal of Strategic Studies 17 (December 1994): 27-41.

45. Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1995): 38-51; Robert E. Hunter, "Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe," NATO Review 43 (May 1995): 3-8.

46. "NATO Lauds Russia on Security Pact," International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1995, p. 7. Although Russia signed the Presentation Document of the PFP in July 1994, it delayed signing the IPP to demonstrate its opposition to NATO enlargement.

47. See, for such a claim, Holbrooke, "America, A European Power."