

EUFOR RD Congo
A Misunderstood Operation?

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The Queen's Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present number thirty-three in its *Martello Paper* series. The *Martello Papers* take their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario. They cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security.

The European Union (EU) is recognized for the effective use of soft power in its relationships with the rest of the world. Less appreciated has been the emergence, over the past decade, of its capacity to undertake various forms of conflict management through the use of military forces under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Along with more than a dozen civilian operations under the ESDP, the Europeans have mounted military missions in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the latter half of 2006 they returned to the DRC to assist the United Nations force there (MONUC) in providing a secure environment for the presidential and legislative elections in that troubled country.

Lt Col Helmut Fritsch, a Visiting Defence Fellow at the QCIR from the German armed forces provides here a detailed account of the background, planning, deployment and operations of EUFOR RD Congo. The multinational force, directed from Potsdam by a German Operations Commander and led in the field by a French Force Commander, was tasked to provide security for MONUC personnel and installations, as well as for Kinshasa airport and for Congolese citizens in immediate danger from the violence widely expected to accompany the elections. European forces in the DRC itself were backed up by a reserve force stationed in Gabon. While Fritsch

points to flaws in each phase of the mission, he leaves no doubt that it met its objectives. Despite threats, outbreaks of violence were few, and the elections proceeded about as well as could be expected.

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Charles C. Pentland
Director, QCIR
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1. Introduction

On 27 December 2005, the United Nations asked the European Union (EU) for European troops in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) during the upcoming elections. This request triggered intense political discussions within the European Union and within its member states.

The UN Security Council voted unanimously for the mission and issued *Resolution 1671* on 25 April 2006. Two days later the EU Council adopted the Joint Action on the European Union military operation in support of MONUC during the election process and thus embarked on Operation EUFOR RD Congo (*Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 116*, 2006, 98-101). The Council appointed the German Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck as Operation Commander and the French Major General Christian Dammay as Force Commander. The operation was launched on 12 June 2006. Simultaneously, the EU Operation Commander was authorized to release the activation order to execute the deployment of the forces and begin the mission (Council of the European Union, 2006a). The mission officially started with the first round of the parliamentary and presidential elections on 30 July 2006 for a period of four months (Security

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Many points of fact or interpretation in this paper are based on a series of not-for-attribution interviews with senior officials of the European Union and the German government and military.

Council, 2006) and ended on 30 November 2006. EUFOR RD Congo was the EU's 16th ESDP operation since 2003. Since Operation ARTEMIS was planned, prepared and executed by France acting merely as a framework nation, EUFOR RD Congo can be seen as the first real EU autonomous military operation in support of the United Nations.

This mission has been subject to numerous criticisms from journalists, politicians and scholars. For instance, Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations 1999 – 2004, argued in September 2006 that the mandated timeframe was too short; hence the duration of the operation should have been extended until after the inauguration of the new DRC government in January 2007. Furthermore, he demanded a more proactive stance, specifically an increased deployment of EUFOR RD Congo soldiers into Kinshasa in order to increase the number of available combat troops to at least 1000. Moreover, he argued for a more robust mandate for EUFOR RD Congo so that it could establish buffer zones between the conflicting factions, as EUFOR's patrolling was insufficient (Patten, 2006, 2).

Similarly, Rolf Clement, from Deutschlandfunk, Germany, argued in May 2006 that the operation was too small and too short. Thus the mission would be unable to effect lasting stability and fulfil the operation's mandate, harming the reputation of EU. He believed the operation to be politically questionable (Clement, 2006, 38).

In light of the evidence provided by first-hand accounts of the mission, it will be shown that the criticisms of Chris Patten and Rolf Clement with respect to size, mandate, and lastingness of EUFOR RD Congo are unfounded. The EU had good reasons to engage in a limited military operation. Despite the argument that the logical conduct of the ideal decision-making and planning process was virtually reversed, EUFOR RD Congo itself was a totally successful operation with few and minor flaws. Unfortunately, the mission was widely misunderstood by both the public and politicians, due to inadequate information campaigns by both EU and participating nations.

This study starts by giving some background information on the troubled history of the DRC as well as on the various regional and non-regional (e.g. MONUC) actors, while describing the security situation at the time of the EU involvement. Focusing on the political-strategic and military-strategic levels,¹ this paper intends to answer three questions:

¹ *Political-Strategic level:*

All EU councils, committees, etc., which are manned and run by politicians or plenipotentiaries and respective support elements.

- Why did the EU conduct the operation EUFOR RD Congo?
- Was the decision-making and planning process as well as the operation conducted properly?
- Did EUFOR RD Congo make a difference?

The first question will be answered by establishing and analysing different categories which are central to the conduct of the autonomous EU military operation. The theoretical basis, within the framework of the EU-Africa Policy and the CFSP/ESDP development will be analysed, followed by an examination of past and current projects of EU in DRC. Finally, the perspectives and interests of national actors and the EU will be studied. It can be shown that there were sound reasons for the EU and its member states to engage in this operation.

The response to the second question involves comparing the conditions, demands and objectives which were set by both the EU and the mandate with actual performance, both in the decision-making and planning process, as well as in the conduct of the operation, followed by an analysis of the lessons learned. It can be shown that the mission itself was successfully conducted according to the guidelines. Unfortunately, the mission was widely misunderstood both by the public at home and by several politicians.

EUFOR RD Congo did indeed make a difference. The impact of this mission will be addressed in the conclusion, along with some suggestions for future operations.

EUMC: European Union Military Committee. EUMC is the central military forum within the EU. It consists of the permanent military representatives from the member states, who meet at least weekly. Meetings of the member states' defence chiefs are conducted at least twice a year. EUMC's main task is to advise the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on military crisis management and to exercise military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. The EUMC chairman participates in meetings of the Council when defence matters are discussed.

EUMS: European Union Military Staff. The EUMS is the planning and supporting body for the EUMC. It is assigned to early warning alerts, conduct the assessment of a crisis and certain response capabilities and to develop Military Strategic Options. Although EUMS assists the EUMC, it is a department of the Council General Secretariat and is directly attached to the High Representative.

Military-Strategic level:

OHQ: Operations Headquarter. A static, out-of-area headquarters of the Operation Commander, responsible for building up, launching, sustaining and recovering an EU force.

2. *Background*

The Democratic Republic of Congo, located in Central Africa, is a vast country, slightly less than one quarter the landmass of the United States (CIA – US, 2006) or approximately the size of Western Europe. The DRC's size hinders centralized control of its territory from the capital Kinshasa. In addition, the DRC borders nine countries. The multitude of borders has furthered the exploitation of its immense economic resources (including diamonds, gold, silver, cobalt, copper, cadmium, coltane (used in manufacturing cellphones), uranium and timber) by rebel groups and neighbouring countries (Lang, 2004).²

The Congo was established in 1908 as a Belgian colony and hastily gained its independence (Deutscher Bundestag – Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2006) in June 1960 (BBC, 2007a). Its early years of independence were marked by political and social instability. The first President, Joseph Kasavubu, and his Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba were political rivals, which heavily impaired governance from the very beginning. After independence, DRC faced military insurgency (BBC, 2007b) and attempts at secession by its mineral-rich provinces of Katanga in the South and Kivu in the East of the country.

In November 1965, Colonel Joseph Mobutu seized power and declared himself president, renaming the country Zaire and naming himself Mobutu Sese Seko in 1971 (Deutscher Bundestag – Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2006). He retained his position for 32 years through several subsequent

² See also Appendix 1: Chronology: DRC 1908 – 2005.

sham elections, as well as through the use of brutal force and made “his” country synonymous with corruption. Furthermore, he systematically used Zaire’s mineral wealth to consolidate his power and co-opt potential rivals (International Crisis Group, 2007b).

After the end of the Cold War, Zaire ceased to interest the United States, and international economic aid began to wane. Mobutu was forced to announce democratic reforms (BBC, 2007b). He reluctantly agreed in 1991 to establish multiparty politics (International Crisis Group, 2007b). Despite the creation of a transition parliament, the old structures of power survived. Ethnic strife and economic decline were further aggravated when more than one million civilians fled from Rwanda into the Kivu region in the east in 1994. Amongst them were members of the Hutu militia (Interahamwe) responsible for the genocide committed on the Tutsi in Rwanda 1994. Rwanda feared a regeneration of these militias. Uganda, Burundi and Angola also felt their security endangered by Mobutu backed rebels operating from Zaire (Lang, 2004). The Banyamulenge-Tutsi, who had inhabited the province of South-Kivu for generations, were forced to leave Zaire in October 1996. Rwandan troops invaded the region to flush out the extremist Hutu militias (Deutscher Bundestag – Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2006) by destroying the refugee camps in Goma (North-Kivu) and Bukavu (South-Kivu). The multiethnic diversity within the DRC was not responsible for the conflict per se; rather, the export of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict from Rwanda caused the “First Congo War” (Lang, 2004). The war, in turn, strengthened the anti-Mobutu rebels *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo* (AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila. Supported by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola, they first seized the eastern part of Zaire and then quickly captured Kinshasa, toppling the Mobutu regime in May 1997. Laurent Kabila was installed as president and the country renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (Tull, 2006a, 74-75).

Laurent Kabila created a transitional government and announced parliamentary and presidential elections. Both Uganda and Rwanda, amongst others, expected the disarmament of the Interahamwe militias, who still lingered in the east of DRC and conducted guerrilla warfare against the Rwanda government. Laurent Kabila did not fulfil these expectations; hence in August 1998, supported by Uganda and Rwanda, a rebellion against Kabila began. It developed from civil war into the “Second Congo War” (Tull, 2006a, 76). Troops from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia supported Kabila, whereas Rwanda backed the rebel group *Rassemblement Congolais*

pour la Démocratie (RCD) which operated in the Kivu provinces. Uganda bolstered the *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (MLC), which was newly founded by Jean-Pierre Bemba in the North (Deutscher Bundestag – Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2006). In July 1999 the international community was successful in pushing through a ceasefire agreement, the *Lusaka Peace Accord*, which was signed by the DRC, Congolese armed rebel groups RCD and MLC (MLC signed in August 1999), Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (CIA – US, 2006). Unfortunately neither side seriously tried to implement the peace accord. Hence in 2000 the UN Security Council authorized a UN peacekeeping force of 5500 (UN Mission in DR Congo, MONUC) to monitor the ceasefire. Unfortunately, the fighting continued. All parties to the conflict acted like occupying powers, relentlessly exploiting the DRC's resources and committing human rights abuses. There were no public services such as security or education. The health care system was particularly overtaxed, which led to the death of approximately four million Congolese between 1998 and 2004. Indeed, the Second Congo War resulted in the most casualties of any war since World War II (Tull, 2006a, 78-79). As a result, it has been called the "First African World War" (Ehrhart, 2006b, 84).

In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by a bodyguard. Joseph Kabila succeeded his father as head of state (BBC, 2007a). He promised to cooperate with MONUC and to support the efforts for the "Innercongolese Dialogue." The meetings began in Addis Ababa on 15 October 2001, and ended unsuccessfully two days later. Further meetings followed in Sun City, 25 February 2002 and an agreement was finally signed 19 April 2002 (Breitwieser, 2006, 123). It took until the middle of 2002 before the first signs of peace became visible. On 30 July 2002 the presidents of DR Congo and Rwanda signed the *Pretoria Peace Accord* to work out the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in exchange for the demobilisation and disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels in DRC territory. On 6 September the *Luanda Peace Accord* formalized peace with Uganda. By the end of 2002, Rwanda and Uganda claimed full withdrawal, though proxies remained.

In response to international pressure, the *Accord Global et Inclusif* was signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002 by the national government, the MLC, the RCD, the domestic political opposition, representatives of civil society and the Mai Mai. The accord outlined five goals for the reconstruction of the country: termination of fighting, enforcement of state owned authority in the whole of DRC, national reconciliation, building up of national armed forces and the obligation to prepare and conduct democratic

elections (Breitwieser, 2006, 123). It marked the formal end of the Second Congo War. President Joseph Kabila signed a transitional constitution and a coalition government was set up under his lead on 18 July 2003. The government structure included four vice-presidents representing former rebel groups, and a political opposition party, amongst them the leaders of the RCD and MLC, Azarias Ruberwa and Jean-Pierre Bemba (Tull, 2006a, 78).

Despite the armistice, the DRC could not be fully stabilized between 2001 and 2003. In the border zone of the northeastern Ituri region towards Uganda and Rwanda, fights between the hostile ethnic groups of the Lendu and the Hema erupted in May 2003 (Deutscher Bundestag – Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2006), resulting in severe civilian casualties (Tull, 2006a, 79). Further civilian massacres occurred in Bunia during the summer of 2003, unhindered by 700 MONUC troops deployed to the region. As a result, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the first autonomous EU military crisis management operation, code-named ARTEMIS, which was conducted in accordance with the *UN Security Council Resolution 1484*. The European Council launched the operation on 12 June 2003. The UN Resolution authorised the deployment of an interim emergency multinational force to Bunia (Ituri region) until 1 September 2003. The European military force worked in close coordination with MONUC. It was aimed, *inter alia*, at contributing to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. France acted as the framework nation for the operation (Fritsch, 2006, 33).

Following this crisis, MONUC was increased to 10,800 troops and simultaneously the mission's mandate was strengthened in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Tull, 2006b, 91). In June 2004, MONUC suffered another severe setback as it failed to prevent the occupation of Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu, by renegade RCD rebels. This led to violent protests against MONUC in several cities. As result, the Security Council endorsed another increase in the number of troops to total 16 700 on 1 October 2004. The crisis also showed that the transitional government of the DRC was dysfunctional and therefore continuous international pressure was deemed necessary for a successful transitional process. The Security Council tasked MONUC to increase its support for the transitional government. *Resolution 1565* mandated the mission, in cooperation with the transitional government, to establish three joint commissions in order to push

forward the transition process in the following areas: preparation of the elections, rule of law and security sector reform (ibid, 92-93).

The democratic elections, which were to be held in the summer of 2005, were postponed, stalling the political transition process. Nevertheless, the new written constitution agreed upon by former warring factions was adopted by parliament in May 2005. Congolese voters backed the new constitution in a referendum in December 2005, paving the way for elections in 2006. On 18 February 2006, the new *Loi Fondamentale* came into force (Breitwieser, 2006, 124).

Secretary General Kofi Annan asked for an additional 2590 temporary augmentation troops during the election period. The Security Council repeatedly dismissed this request, endorsing instead the deployment of another 1140 blue-helmet troops and policemen for a limited time period. In addition, it decided in April 2006 to redeploy an infantry battalion and 50 military observers from the UN mission in Burundi into the DRC. The dismissal of the Secretary General's request for additional MONUC troops finally led to the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for EU troops in support of MONUC during the election process (Tull, 2006b, 92-93). On 27 December 2005 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations wrote his request to Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at that time the contact person for the EU presidency of the United Kingdom.

After years of war, the first free and democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 40 years began on 30 July 2006 with the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections. The conditions surrounding the elections were highly precarious: there was no state monopoly on the use of force, the strengthening of a national army was behind schedule, the police were only beginning their reform process, the judicial systems were still incapable and corrupt, and former warlords were running for political positions, although they should have been taken to court. While there is hardly an optimal time for elections, the DRC was suffering from a post-war dilemma: on the one hand the elections were the only chance for peace; on the other hand they placed the entire process in jeopardy (Böhm, 2006a).

The central element of the complex and multilayered conflict in the DRC was the struggle for leadership. The main contenders were the transitional President Joseph Kabila and his supporters, former RCD leader Azarias Ruberwa, and former MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, both of whom had

participated in the transitional government, along with the opposition party leaders. Simultaneously there were several other regional and local conflicts in the eastern part of DRC, which were only partially linked to the core contention in Kinshasa. The mighty in the east had no interest in the elections, because they feared to lose their sinecures (Schwabe, 2006).

Neighbouring countries Rwanda and Uganda also negatively influenced the election process, as both countries did not fully embrace democratic ideals (Ressler, 2006, 95; Molt, 2006, 81). Burundi, on the other hand, served as example for a positive transition process. The Republic of the Congo, Angola and South Africa also had a vested interest in stability within DRC. The African Union (AU), however, did not play a very significant political role in the transition process. The United States is one of the major stake holders of the peace process in DRC. Its political weight is essential for maintaining a balance between DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

Due to the above mentioned factors a general assessment of the security situation in DRC is difficult; moreover there are significant differences among regions within the country. Common to all parts of the DRC is a desperate economic and social situation, an almost completely collapsed administration and political system, corruption and organised crime (Ressler, 2006, 95). Security sector reform, which should lead to an integrated national army, is behind schedule (Ehrhart, 2006b, 85). In expectation of a new political order, all actors were trying to establish an optimal starting position. The various Congolese militias, as the beneficiaries of the suffering system, tried to prevent a new democratic political order and a stabilized DRC.

Geographically, there is an East-West division in security. On the one hand, large regions in the West are ignored by conflicting parties; therefore the security situation there is relatively calm. Nevertheless the situation is not considered stable due to the economic and social situation common to the whole of DRC. The situation in Kinshasa has its own peculiarities. In this city of six to eight million inhabitants, all decisive actors maintained their own security forces. These forces continued to leverage their influence on the new political order, despite respective agreements to the contrary. This implied a permanent danger of armed confrontation.

Another negative influence came from well-organized youth gangs, with a high potential for violence. These groups consisted of up to 1000 members, resisted governmental authority and controlled various districts in Kinshasa. On the other hand, large parts in the East faced constant armed quarrels, assaults and even massacres of the civilian population. The main

actors in Kinshasa tried to capitalize on these often ethnic militias by offering them logistical support (Ressler, 2006, 97-100).

In the months prior to the presidential and parliamentary elections, a significant increase in human rights violations was reported by MONUC. In particular, the police, secret service and army increasingly took brutal action against demonstrators. Also reported were violations of freedom of the press (*Spiegel Online*, 2006e).

Nevertheless 26 million of a 28 million electorate registered to vote. Thirty-three candidates ran for president and 9709 candidates competed for the 500 parliamentary seats (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006a, 8).

In summary, the overall situation in DRC in June 2006 was precarious, but improving. However without the commitment of the international community the country would have fallen back into chaos and civil war within a short time (Ehrhart, 2006b, 85).

3. Reasons for a Military EU Operation in the DRC

EU's Commitment in the DRC

Why did the EU support the DRC election process? There are several answers to this question. First, Europe has a historical connection to Africa and the DRC; second, there were policy considerations at play, as demonstrated in the EU Africa Policy, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its related European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); finally, key players maintained national interests in the DRC. Common to all of these reasons were economic, development and security goals.

Europe's relationship with Africa is deeply rooted in history and has gradually evolved into a firm partnership. Combined European activities in Africa began shortly after the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. At that time, plans for the creation of a customs union had been of central interest to the founding members of the EEC. France and Belgium, at that time still colonial powers, were particularly interested. This led to the creation of the European Development Fund (EDF), which enabled focused economic support of the colonial territories. With the independence of African countries in the 1960s, special economic privileges were granted to them by the European Community (EC). The first EC expansion brought in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, increasing the number of former colonial territories connected to the European Community.

Thus, in 1975, the *Lomé Agreement* was signed as an ambitious cooperative programme between nine (later 15) countries in the European Community and 71 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). It was based mainly on a system of one-sided tariff preferences which gave those countries access to the European market and special funds maintaining price stability in agricultural products and mining. Since the 1980s, the European states increasingly demanded compliance with human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance from their African partners in order to facilitate development and to indirectly increase European security (Grimm, 2006, 89-91).

The *Cotonou Agreement* succeeded the *Lomé Agreement* in June 2000, introducing changes and objectives while preserving the achievements of 25 years of ACP-EU cooperation. The *Cotonou Agreement* was revised in 2005. With an underlying objective to fight poverty, the agreement is based on five interdependent pillars. The pillars include: enhanced political dimension, increased participation, a more strategic and collaborative approach to poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships and improved financial cooperation (European Commission, 2007a). *Article Nine* states: "... democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development" (*Cotonou Agreement*, 2000). *Article 11* demands: "The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of the Partnership" (ibid, 2000). The DRC has ratified the agreement (Council of the European Union, 2007a) and belongs, according to *Annex VI* of the Agreement, to the "ACP least developed" states (*Cotonou Agreement*, 2000). In addition, the EU-Africa dialogue, or Cairo process, was launched in 2000 as a forum for political dialogue (European Commission, 2007b).

In conjunction with the EU's longstanding and consistent relationship with Africa and the DRC, there was also a strong policy framework which supported the overall mission of EUFOR RD CONGO. The UN request to support the UN peacekeeping force MONUC during the election period was in keeping with this historical legacy and policy commitment.

An important step was taken in December 2005, when the EU Member States and the European Commission agreed on a new *EU Strategy for Africa*. The *Strategy* provided a common, comprehensive, and coherent long-term action framework for all EU Member States and the European Commission to support Africa's efforts to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals. It was built around the themes of peace and security,

good governance, trade, and regional integration, and placed dialogue with the African Union and African countries at the centre of cooperation (European Commission, 2007c).

The *EU Strategy for Africa* played an important role in determining the EU's role in DRC. The political basis for EUFOR RD Congo is supported by the paragraph "Peace and Security" (Breitwieser, 2006, 125). It states that without peace there can be no lasting development. African leadership is important both to end conflict and for lasting peace and that the EU will "... provide direct support to ... UN efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions..." (Council of the European Union, 2005, 2). In addition, the paragraph "Human Rights and Governance" names "strong and efficient institutions" (ibid, 3) as prerequisites for successful development. Indeed, the *Strategy* was drawn up on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, which was presented in October 2005. Herein explicitly "...the establishment and strengthening of credible national institutions ... such as parliaments ..." (European Commission, 2005, 4) is stated. The document also acknowledges that "...democratic elections create legitimacy and stability..." and that the EU will "... support legitimate and effective governance ..." (ibid, 24) in order to address the problems of weak and ineffective governance.

The CFSP and ESDP also justified the conduct of EUFOR RD Congo. *Article 11* of the *Treaty on the European Union* defines the objectives of the CFSP. CFSP goals are "to preserve peace and strengthen international security," and "to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways," as well as "to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law..." (*Treaty of the European Union*, 2002, 13-14). These general objectives have been stated more precisely in the *European Security Strategy (ESS): A Secure Europe in a Better World* in December 2003. The EU defines itself as a global actor (*European Security Strategy*, 2003, 1) and names regional conflicts and failed states as two main threats of the 21st century (ibid, 4). In order to address these threats, it is necessary to foster democratic state structures (ibid, 6) through combination of a variety of means (ibid, 7; Ehrhart, 2006a, 3). The ESS also draws a direct connection between security and development; thus it is clearly more than a mere military defence strategy (Grimm, 2006, 92).

Creation of an international order based on effective multilateralism and strengthening the United Nations and equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities

and to act effectively is another European (ESS) priority (*European Security Strategy*, 2003, 9). “The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations” (ibid, 11). All in all, the ESS wants the EU to be more active, more coherent and more capable (ibid, 11). The ESS also directly addresses the DRC (ibid, 1,6) and Africa, underlining its special importance for the EU.

Between 1997 and 2004, the Council of the European Union adopted three common positions concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.³ The *Council Common Position* of 26 January 2004 states: “the EU shall ... improve its close cooperation with the UN.... The EU, notwithstanding its commitment to African ownership, shall remain prepared to become involved, whenever necessary, in crisis management in Africa with its own capabilities” (*Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 21*, 2004, 25).⁴ In a wider sense, *Article 10* also applies, especially in the context of the DRC, which demands that the EU shall “stand ready to support security sector reform within the framework of democratic principles, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, in particular in countries in transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace....” (ibid, 28)⁵

Following the *Common Position* and based on discussions in the different EU bodies, the *Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa* was developed in November 2004, which also supported the conduct of EUFOR RD Congo. The *Action Plan* states: “... based upon requests by the African partners, the EU stands ready to consider other forms of support that fall within the realm of ESDP. These may include training, the provision of equipment, operational support, and possibly even ESDP advisory or executive missions in the framework of African-led operations or United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations” (Council of the European Union, 2004a, 2).

³ See Official Journal of the European Union, Common Position 97/356/CFSP OJ L 153, 11 June 1997, p.1; Council Common Position 2001/374/CFSP OJ L 132, 15 May 2001, p. 3; Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP OJ L 21, 28 January 2004, p. 25.

⁴ Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP, *Article 1*, 2.

⁵ Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP, *Article 10*.

Previous missions conducted by the EU in the DRC under ESDP provide concrete examples of the EU's support for stability and transition in the country and of the close cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management situations. The 2003 ARTEMIS operation and the ongoing EUPOL Kinshasa⁶ and EUSEC RD Congo⁷ missions played an important role in helping to achieve the objectives of peace, development and stability as outlined in the *Cotonou Agreement* and the *EU Africa Strategy* (Council of the European Union, 2006g, 5-6). But the commitment to support peace and security extends beyond missions and support to operations. It also involves dedicated long term efforts to strengthen indigenous African capabilities to find continental solutions to African security challenges (Gyllensporre, 2006, 16).

The EU's engagement in DRC is also in line with its *Headline Goals*. As a logical outcome of the lessons learned during the Balkan conflicts and corresponding to the strategic imperative of the 1990s, the *Helsinki Headline Goal* (HHG 2003) seemed overly ambitious and inadequate in view of the strategic demands of the twenty-first century (Haine, 2006). Therefore, the *Headline Goal 2010* was endorsed by the European Council in Brussels, June 17–18, 2004. A wider spectrum of missions in addition to the “Petersberg Tasks”⁸ was defined, including joint disarmament operations, support of third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. A significant objective was the development of rapid response battlegroups to be fully operational (FOC) by the beginning of 2007. Even before the development of the battlegroup concept, however, a “bridging model” was discussed within the EU, through which difficult phases or gaps during UN operations could be addressed. Due to the fact that more than 80 percent of all UN missions take place on African soil, a close and implicit connection to the African continent was drawn (Schmidt, 2006, 72). According to the *Headline Goal 2010* the strengthening of the

⁶ In support of the transition process EUPOL Kinshasa provides assistance and guidance to the newly established Congolese Integrated Police Unit (IPU), which has been operational since March 2005.

See Council of the European Union, 2006l, 10.

⁷ EUSEC RD Congo provides advice and assistance for security sector reform and contributes to a successful integration of the Congolese army. See Council of the European Union, 2006l, 10.

⁸ *Petersberg Tasks*: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in the frame of crisis management, including peacemaking operations.

United Nations is a European priority and Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC serves as positive example of EU support for UN objectives (European Council, 2004, 5).

In December 2004, the European Council in Brussels approved the launch of the *Civilian Headline Goal 2008* process (Council of the European Union, 2004b, 20), the most important and visionary endeavour to improve the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities. According to the *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, ESDP civilian crisis management missions can be deployed autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations (Fritsch, 2006, 10). In this sense, the conduct of EUFOR RD Congo as a subsidiary operation is consistent with the mainly civilian effort of the European Union in the DRC.

The EU involvement is not singular in nature, but rather dependent on the coordinated action of EU institutions, member states, as well as the Council and Commission. Its overall support to the DRC transition was not merely limited to military support of MONUC during the election period. The EU also provided diplomatic, institutional as well as technical support (Council of the European Union, 2006g, 2).

During the last 20 years the European Community/Union has supported DRC with more than one billion euros of development aid (Winter, 2006a, 8). The Commission's indicative programme 2003–2007 aims to provide institution building, macro-economic support and to fight poverty. Since 2002, these priorities have been funded with about 750 million euros. With the next indicative programme for the period 2008–2013, the Commission aims to build on the election process with support for governance, judicial reform and security sector reform. The European Community's support for judicial and governance reform in the East of the DRC is central to establishing democratic and accountable institutions. The establishment of and support for the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) have helped to create a basis for modern and professional policing in the DRC. Support for military reform has also been essential, especially support for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process (Council of the European Union, 2006g, 3-4).

As of June 2006, the European Community supported the election process in the DRC with 149 million euros, the largest Community contribution to an election process. Together with 100 million euros of bilateral support provided by member states, almost 80 percent of the overall costs were covered. The EU also deployed a large Election Observation Mission (EOM). On the election days, over 250 observers were deployed across

the country. Additionally, the Commission is working on a number of projects that will help deliver a post-election democracy dividend for the citizens of the DRC, including key infrastructure projects and a large relief and development project in the East of the DRC (Council of the European Union, 2006g, 4).

Furthermore, the EU has been actively involved in the search for a lasting solution to conflicts in the African Great Lakes region. High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Louis Michel have played an important role in moving the transition process forward, navigating crucial junctures and mobilising international support. The EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, has been in regular contact with all key stakeholders on the ground since 1996, in close co-operation with the European Commission delegation in the DRC. The EU is also a member of the International Committee Accompanying the Transition (CIAT)⁹. In addition, the EU is in the process of preparing for more structured political dialogue with the newly elected DRC government under *Article 8* of the *Cotonou Agreement* (Council of the European Union, 2006g, 3).

Having addressed the historical foundations and policy provisions for the EU involvement in the DRC, closer attention will now be paid to the national interests of key players and interests of the EU itself in DRC.

Germany has a strong interest in a functional and capable UN (Wadle, 2006) and EU. Germany was a driving factor for the EU development policy as well as CFSP and ESDP. Hence the efficiency and credibility of European foreign policy is connected to a German military commitment, which in turn influences the efficiency and credibility of German foreign policy (Schmidt, 2006, 69). Germany's interest in the DRC is mainly humanitarian rather than economic in nature.¹⁰ In contrast to France and the United Kingdom, there are no conflicts between security policy, foreign policy and economic interests (Molt, 2006, 86). From the African perspective, Germany is often viewed as a "neutral power," as there is little memory of

⁹ The CIAT is composed of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, USA, France, Great Britain and Russia), South Africa, Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, Zambia, the African Union (Commission and Presidency), the European Union (Commission and Presidency) and MONUC.

¹⁰ Although German Federal Minister of Defence Jung sees economic benefits arising for Germany through EUFOR RD Congo (Spiegel Online, 2006j).

Germany as a colonial authority (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006k, 2). Moreover, the military commitment is in line with German ideals and underlines the credibility of German policy. Due to the lack of colonial or imperial interests, Germany was highly credible as the lead nation within EUFOR RD Congo (Kinzel, 2006, 4). Germany is also well positioned to advise and provide support in Africa.

France maintains a special relationship with its previous African colonies, and also to the DRC (Ehrhart, 2006b, 87). Indeed, the political initiative for Operation EUFOR RD Congo originated with France. France had a strong interest in an European military mission, but, due to its leadership with ARTEMIS, preferred to stay in the background (Schmidt, 2006, 70). The French government employed highly sophisticated diplomatic skills to convince Germany of the necessity of the mission (Clement, 2006, 37; Clement, 2007, 31; Ehrhart, 2007, 84). Through the *European Union Africa Policy*, France intended to demonstrate European independence from the United States. Thus, France supported EU autonomous participation in UN peacekeeping missions in order to underline its own special role in Africa (Molt, 2006, 83). Explicitly, France wanted EUFOR RD Congo in order to keep NATO out (Clement, 2006, 38).

Like France, the United Kingdom was also interested in safeguarding her reputation and protecting her influence in Africa. Unlike France, the UK has strong ties with the US (Molt, 2006, 83). Thus, the United Kingdom (and Italy) had a minimal role in EUFOR RD Congo due to other commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan (Clement, 2006, 38). Nevertheless, the UK has a strong interest in African nations. For instance, the British-French *Declaration of St. Malo* enabled the development of the ESDP and through a second declaration concluded at the same time, UK and France committed themselves to a closer cooperation in politics regarding Africa. Hence both countries view ESDP in close connection with Africa. Moreover, the Battlegroup concept, which originated in both countries, was explicitly applied to the African continent. Tony Blair, for example, declared “Africa must be “top priority” for new EU crisis forces” (Schmidt, 2006, 72).

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has increasingly taken an interest in the African continent. Indeed, since 9/11 Africa has been seen as one of the most important zones in the Global War on Terrorism. The new National Security Strategy allocates an increased geostrategic importance to Africa, especially with respect to resources and economy as

well as related Chinese activities on the continent. Prevention of failing states has priority over resource supply, poverty reduction and disease control (Molt, 2006, 82). After the events of 9/11 all G-8 countries have an increased interest in the stabilization of these states in Africa, which are volatile, fragile and not economically viable (ibid, 81). The commitment of the EU with EUFOR RD Congo in the DRC opened the door for the United States to speak in favour of a possible NATO engagement in Sudan (Clement, 2006, 38).

Bernd Weber argues in *Strategie und Technik*, that although the CFSP was developed as a common strategy to enable the EU to work cohesively, this concept has not met expectations and that a concept of European interests does not exist (Weber, 2006, 66). His criticism is carried too far, but it is true that the national interests of the EU member states are very different, the Member States continue to focus on their own interests, rather than trying to develop and support common interests. EU support of DRC is not merely a question of morals; rather it is in the EU's best interest. As long as the DRC remains unstable, refugees will continue to migrate into Europe (Winter, 2006a, 8). Moreover, the DRC, due to its size, location and vast resources is of significant importance to the EU. Without long-lasting stabilization and development in the DRC, progress and hopes in other parts of Africa are at risk (Solana, 2006b). A democratic and stable DRC will be a positive driving force behind the African continent (Solana, 2006a). Thus, the EU has strong interests in a democratic and stable DRC. Furthermore, the EU (and its member states) have an economic interest in a democratic and stable African continent (Weber, 2006, 66). Building on its previous commitments, the EU has promised full support for the comprehensive and inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC¹¹ on three levels: economic, political and security (Council of the European Union, 2006e, 18). All documents forming the political-theoretical framework for CFSP/ESDP and the EU Africa Policy indicate a military engagement of EU in support of the UN.

¹¹ Signed in Pretoria, 17 December 2002.

Summary and Assessment

The political-strategic reasons for an EU engagement in DRC can be summarized as follows:

- role and responsibility of Europe as a global actor;
- strengthening of ESDP in international crisis management, by proving that the EU is capable of planning and executing complex, multinational, and autonomous military operations;
- EU's interest in maintaining its credibility while creating its own defence identity;
- cooperation with the United Nations in the framework of an effective multilateralism according to the ESS;
- utmost importance of the elections for the transition process in the DRC;
- strategic importance of the DRC for Africa and the continent's positive development; and
- Europe's strategic interest in and its political co-responsibility for the successful termination of the DRC transition process as a neighbouring continent.

The European Security Strategy promises a more active, coherent and capable EU. Hence anything other than a positive decision for EUFOR RD Congo as part of the European comprehensive strategy and engagement would have damaged the EU's reputation and severely undermined its credibility. Thus, the decision to embark on EUFOR RD Congo fit logically into the political-theoretical EU framework, although it was also significantly driven by French national interests.

4. *EUFOR RD Congo: Decision-making and Planning, Conduct, and Lessons Learned*

Decision-making and Planning

The EU Crisis Management Operation Decision-making and Planning Process

All political and military ESDP bodies are housed in the second inter-governmental pillar of the EU. The *Council of the EU* is the main decision-making body, whereas the *European Council*, which brings together the heads of state and government of the EU member states and the president of the European Commission at least four times a year, makes major political decisions on the institutional and policy development of the EU (Geneva Centre for Security Policy/International Relations and Security Network (ISN), 2006)¹². The overall decision-making and planning process is characterized by consensus and the member states maintain continuous political and military control. ESDP is therefore a policy area highly influenced by national prerogatives. Hence, all important documents have to be endorsed by the Council (Brauß, 2006).

¹² All interviews not for attribution were conducted between November 2006 and March 2007, with persons who were involved in EUFOR RD Congo and had direct knowledge of the events.

The Crisis Response Strategic Planning Process for an EU Crisis Management Operation¹³ is initiated by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and should start as soon as an emerging crisis or a potential need for action is identified. The process generally consists of the following phases:


1. crisis build-up and development of a Crisis Management Concept,
2. development of Strategic Options,
3. operational Planning,
4. implementation (Briefing on EU Crisis Management and Interviews, 2006).

The first phase begins with the elaboration of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC or General Concept) at the political-strategic level. The CMC is worked out by the Council General Secretariat, jointly with other EU bodies. The European Military Staff (EUMS) contribute to all military aspects (Brauß, 2006), by producing and analysing general military options. The PSC discusses the draft CMC and requests advice on civilian concerns from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and on military concerns from the European Military Committee (EUMC). After the PSC has agreed on a CMC it is presented to the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (*Comité des Représentants Permanents*, COREPER) The COREPER discusses the CMC and makes a decision. The Council then approves the CMC (Briefing on EU Crisis Management and Interviews, 2006).

Once the CMC is endorsed, the PSC issues political guidance as appropriate and requests the EUMC to develop Military Strategic Options (MSO). The CIVCOM is directed to develop Police Strategic Options (PSO) as well as other Civilian Strategic Options (CSO) as deemed necessary. CIVCOM cooperates with the Council General Secretariat to develop and prioritise PSOs and CSOs. EUMS develops and prioritises MSOs, reviews military capabilities and gives advice to EUMC. The evaluated PSOs, CSOs and MSOs are then submitted to PSC by CIVCOM and EUMC. The Commission also presents its accompanying measures to PSC. PSC evaluates

¹³ The basis of *Military Strategic Planning for EU Crisis Management Operations* is the EU Concept for Military Strategic Planning from 25 September 2001 (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 14).

Figure 1: Crisis Response Strategic Planning Process for a Military EU Crisis Management Operation



all strategic options, taking into account the Commission's view. Then PSC forwards its draft decision on PSO, CSO and MSO to COREPER and Council for approval. The Council of the European Union formally decides on a Joint Action which codifies the mandate, its objectives, and financial arrangements (Briefing on EU Crisis Management and Interviews, 2006).

For legal reasons each ESDP operation needs a Council Joint Action, which includes the official appointment of the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and its Operations Headquarters (OHQ). A prerequisite for the Joint Action is the UN mandate. The Operations Commander should ideally participate in the development of the Crisis Management Concept from the very beginning and develop the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) simultaneously in order to increase the consistency of planning and to increase the ability to react (Brauß, 2006).

The Council tasks the PSC to initiate operational planning. On the basis of the Military Strategic Option (MSO) selected by the Council, a draft Initiating Military Directive (IMD) is prepared by the EUMS. This is submitted to the EUMC for consideration, advice and endorsement before it is presented to the PSC for approval. Next, the EUMC authorizes transmission of the IMD to the OpCdr. The IMD should normally provide a clear description of the political objectives and the envisaged military mission to contribute to these objectives and include any political limitations and assumptions that the OpCdr should take into account during development of his draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The OpCdr also considers any politically desirable supporting tasks that the Council has directed the EU's military forces to be prepared to take (Council of the European Union, 2006e, 17). The draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the draft Statement of Requirements (SOR or CJSOR (Combined Joint Statement of Requirements)) are developed by the Operations Commander and his military headquarters based on the IMD. The CONOPS translates the political objectives, guidelines and limitations from the CMC into military-strategic directives and is followed by an Operation Plan, which contains details of the execution of the operation (Brauß, 2006). EUMS provides an evaluation of the military CONOPS to EUMC. If necessary, the PSC also requests operational planning on a range of police and civilian measures. The Council General Secretariat develops a draft police and civilian CONOPS. CIVCOM and EUMC present the individual CONOPS, including their advice and recommendation to the PSC. The PSC agrees on the police, civilian and military CONOPS and submits them to the Council. The Council

of the European Union approves the CONOPS and tasks the PSC to develop the Operations Plan (OPLAN). Based on the CONOPS the OpCdr conducts the Force Generation Process during several force generation conferences. Upon request by the PSC, the OpCdr, supported by EUMS, works out a draft military OPLAN, including Rules of Engagement (RoE). The OpCdr prepares and presents a draft OPLAN and draft RoE to EUMC. EUMS evaluates these plans. Upon request by the PSC, the police and/or civilian Head of Mission (HoM), supported by the Council General Secretariat, work out their draft OPLAN and start the force generation process. PolHoM and/or CivHoM present the respective draft OPLAN to CIVCOM. CIVCOM and EUMC present the OPLANs to the PSC. The PSC agrees on a police and/or civilian and/or military OPLAN and submits them to the COREPER/Council. The Council approves the OPLANs and decides on the launch of the operation (Briefing on EU Crisis Management and Interviews, 2006). The Council decision to launch the operation is based on the report of the OpCdr/HoMs regarding feasibility of the operation with the provided troops/personnel and capabilities (Brauß, 2006).

EUFOR RD Congo – The Case Study

As the paper examines the political-strategic level and at the military-strategic level it will deliberately describe the sequence of events in a relatively detailed manner for two reasons: first, to show the complexity of such an operation; and second, to draw assessments and lessons learned for both levels. For a brief overview and summary of events refer to Appendix 2: Chronology: EUFOR RD Congo.

December/January/February Due to the short timeline of the election process, the UN Security Council did not want to expand the MONUC mandate, nor redefine the overall operation (Richter, 2006, 2). Hence a letter dated 27 December 2005 was sent from the United Nations' Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, to Jack Straw, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom (and acting EU president). He suggested that the EU give consideration to "...the possibility of making available a deterrent force that, if necessary, could be deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo during the electoral process.... This contribution could take the form of a suitably earmarked reserve force that could enhance MONUC's quick

reaction capabilities during or immediately after the electoral process” (Guéhenno, 2005).

The letter was not coordinated in advance with the EU (Jung, 2007), nor was it detailed enough. Thus there was urgent need for clarification. This initially resulted in a severe reluctance among the EU member states to make any solid commitments.

Allegedly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) request was launched by the French (Ehrhart, 2007, 84). France had an interest in the positive and dynamic development of the civilian ESDP component and wanted to foster a similar development for the military component. This would allow France to put its African interests under a European umbrella.

In its letter, the DPKO expressed its readiness to hold consultations with the institutions of the EU, “on the modalities for deployment of such a force, its location and the tasks it may be required to conduct” (Guéhenno, 2005). Initial discussions dealing with the request were held in Brussels on 11 and 12 January 2006. The DPKO, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, and military planners of the EU attempted to specify the UN request (Council of the European Union, 2006e, 17). Simultaneously, political discussions arose within individual EU member states.

Only Germany, France, Greece, Italy and United Kingdom were capable of providing an OHQ on the military-strategic level. Great Britain opted out because of its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Italy resisted due to its parliamentary elections. France showed resistance, because it did not want a repeat of ARTEMIS and Greece was still building up its OHQ capabilities. Thus, Germany was the only country remaining with the ability to provide an OHQ for the mission.

In the German parliament (the Bundestag), there was little interest in sending German troops to the DRC. At that time the elections in the DRC still were planned to take place on 18 June 2006; hence it was expected that a potential mission would take place between March and July. The two available EU battlegroups had only Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The Spanish-Italian battlegroup was specialized for amphibious operations and the German-French battlegroup was composed of 1500 German paratroopers and four French soldiers in the headquarters. It was specialized only for evacuation operations and did not meet the demand for multinationality. Public discussion about the possibility that German troops could face child soldiers aggravated the situation. Therefore, Germany

initially refused to take over the operation lead. Chancellor Merkel indicated that a deployment of the German battlegroup and a German leading role was not worth considering (Schlamp and Szandar, 2006, 26).

At their meeting in Blaesheim on 16 January 2006, Chancellor Merkel and President Chirac agreed that in case of a military operation, Germany and France would each contribute one third of the troops and that the rest had to be contributed by other countries. By the end of January 2006, German politicians increasingly indicated in speeches and interviews a shift in favour of German participation (Schneider, 2006, 6).

Under the lead of the Director of the Civilian/Military Cell of the EUMS, the German Brigadier General Heinrich Brauß, a “technical assessment mission” or fact-finding mission (Council of the European Union. 2006f, 20) visited MONUC between 30 January and 2 February 2006, “to refine the operational and logistical parameters” for the mission (Council of the European Union. 2006e, 17). Due to German reservations the Director was under immense pressure from both the EU and his German superiors (Schlamp and Szandar, 2006, 26).

The DRC and most probably MONUC were not part of the information exchange process between UN and EU at that time. Hence, the central focus of the technical assessment mission was to figure out what kind of support was needed by MONUC and to inform the EU member states’ ambassadors in the DRC, rather than a military fact-finding mission in the common sense. During the talks, realistic support demands and options were elaborated between MONUC and EU fact-finding mission members. At the same time, a second EU mission was sent to New York with 60 to 80 detailed questions and numerous and uncoordinated fact finding missions were conducted by many different actors (BMVg, 2007, 3).

The initial attempt to clarify the UN request was not done by the highest political levels, but delegated to lower echelons, which seemed to surprise MONUC. Therefore, some unattributed sources indicated that the UN request was motivated more by political reasons to test and foster UN-EU cooperation, rather than MONUC’s need for military support.

Moreover, it was determined that as a prerequisite for deterrence, credibility was pivotal. MONUC did not need support in the eastern part of the DRC, because its main troop contingents were already deployed to this region. Furthermore, Kinshasa was the political centre. This meant that the EU force had to be visible in Kinshasa in order to be a credible deterrent force. On this basis, the Council General Secretariat (mainly EUMS as part of the Council General Secretariat) developed a Crisis Management

Concept in the form of an option paper¹⁴ (Winter, 2006b, 2). This option paper provided the basis for continuing the Military Strategic Planning and formed the framework for subsequent Military Operational Planning (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 14). The option paper named three essential military tasks:

- reinforcement of MONUC to stabilise local crises, if and where required, and upon request;
- recovery of international personnel, if required; and
- securing the international N'Djili Airport in Kinshasa, if required or upon request (AFP (World Service), 2006).

The three options presented to accomplish these tasks differed in the number of troops (250 to about 400) and materiel, which would be directly deployed to Kinshasa. The rest of the maximum 2000 troops and material would be stationed outside DRC in Gabon and Europe (von Hammerstein, Schlamp, Szandar, and Thielke, 2006, 41; Winter, 2006b, 2).

The EU member states demanded a significant amount of information. As a result, a formal decision to initiate the Crisis Response Planning could not be obtained. Therefore a relatively detailed option paper had to be prepared. Military advice for a preferred option was given by EUMC to PSC in mid-February. However, the process was stopped by France and Germany on 20 February 2006, because it was not clear who would participate in the operation (Blechsmidt/Winter, 2006a, 5).

March On 6 March, after the EU Defence Ministers' Meeting in Innsbruck, an EU operation seemed likely (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006h, 7). German Federal Minister of Defence Jung confirmed his willingness to take over the lead of the mission with the following conditions: first, a commitment of all EU member states; second, a geographical concentration on Kinshasa as well as a time limitation of four months (taking into account legal and technical aspects, the presidential elections take about four months (Brauß, 2006)); third, consent from the Congolese Government; and fourth, a clear UN mandate for the mission. Initially, seventeen countries, including Great Britain and Italy, did not wish to participate. With the exception of Poland and Austria, EU member states made only

¹⁴ Basically the CMC and MSO steps were included in one Option Paper, which was presented on 9 February 2006.

general and non-binding assurances. Overextended militaries and sloppy preparation of the operation were named as reasons for their reluctance (Winter, 2006c, 1).

By mid-March communication problems and misjudgements led to discord between Brussels and Berlin. Germany wanted to see its demands fulfilled prior to making further commitments. It expected France to take charge of the force headquarters in Kinshasa and to contribute one third of the troops. The remaining third were to be contributed by other nations. These states, however, were not willing to make commitments until a concept of operations was elaborated. This could only be done by the assumed Operations Headquarters (OHQ), the OHQ at the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam, after a decision of the German Bundestag in favour of the operation. While Brussels reproached Germany for delaying the operation, Berlin accused SG/HR Solana of misjudging the political and legal situation in Germany. The German government expected Solana to organise the commitments of the other participating nations so that the government could easily approach the German parliament for the necessary mandate (Winter, 2006d, 6).

Meanwhile, France employed highly sophisticated diplomatic skills to convince Germany of the necessity to conduct the mission and utilized Germany's strong interest in a functioning, working and capable EU for its own interests. On March 14, During the fifth German-French Council of Ministers (Deutsch-Französischer Ministerrat) in Berlin, the French President and the German Chancellor addressed their preference for a European military mission (Schmidt, 2006, 71) and decided to search for further participants on their own (Blechschiidt and Winter, 2006a, 5). However, no clear approvable concept had been presented by the EU (Blechschiidt, 2006b, 6). In addition, it was not clear if planning of the operation in the OHQ without a parliamentary mandate would be allowed (Blechschiidt and Winter, 2006a, 5). The different perspectives of Germany and the EU on the process have been strikingly summarized in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*: "On the one hand the EU strategy is: We need to plan in order to decide what we want. The German government strategy, on the other hand is: First we have to know what we want before we can start to plan (translation by the author)." Finally, after long discussions, SG/HR Solana flew to Kinshasa in order to inform the president of the DRC and get his approval for a military EU mission (Blechschiidt and Winter, 2006b, 7). The harsh German critique of Solana during the early planning phase seems unjustified,

since the DRC government was continuously kept informed by the UN and by EUSR Aldo Ajello. On 19 March 2006, the President of the DRC agreed to the operation (Blechsmidt, 2006a, 6).

After intensive discussions within the EUMC and EUMC working groups, a Military Advice on the Option Paper was finalized mid-March 2006. "At that time the decision to activate the EU OHQ at Potsdam prior to an adoption of the Joint Action was prepared" (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 15).

The Option Paper was approved by the Council on 23 March 2006 as a Crisis Management General Concept. Thus, the planning process could continue based on the option paper, the conclusions of CIVCOM and with the advice of the EUMC (Council of the European Union, 2006f, 17).

Germany believed that no parliamentary mandate was necessary to activate the OHQ for planning purposes as there would be no armed employment of German military abroad. The Bundeswehr Operations Command (BwOpsCmd) OHQ Key Nucleus was activated on 23 March and on 29 March 2006 the multinational Primary Augmentees were summoned via their National Military Representatives to the EU. The first group arrived on 4 April, the second group on 12 April 2006 (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 12). On 28 March 2006, the Austrian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Council of the European Union, expressed in a letter to the General Secretariat of the UN the willingness to deploy a military mission (Schmidt, 2006, 71).

At the end of March, representatives of the OHQ and FHQ met in Potsdam to discuss the results of the first technical assessment mission. At the same time, the OHQ Planning team was officially formed (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 14). The Multinational Core Planning Team (MCPT) was also present in Potsdam to begin their planning. During the orientation stage, the planning team assessed the Option Paper and contributed to the drafting of the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) as external support to the planners in Brussels (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 18). Simultaneously, a Spanish observer team was present in Potsdam, keeping abreast of the developments and to consider a Spanish contribution. This resulted in Spain providing a highly mobile infantry company as the Force Capable of Immediate Reaction (FCIR) the spearhead of EUFOR manoeuvre elements on the ground (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 19).

Pressing time constraints led to the elaboration of only one CONOPS on the military strategic level (OHQ) and only one OPLAN on the operational level (FHQ) (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 18). Through cooperative

planning the work was divided between both HQs. Thus, a common understanding was ensured.

On 31 March 2006 a draft IMD was issued by the EUMS. Simultaneously, the process of preparing a CONOPS was initiated at the OHQ in Potsdam, Germany (Council of the European Union, 2006f, 17). The Liaison Officer of the EUMS in Potsdam played an important role in this process (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 19).

April Between 3–4 April, a (second) Joint Fact Finding Mission of personnel from EUMS and OHQ took place in the DRC. On 4 April 2006, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) named the possible operation EUFOR RD Congo and identified Germany as the framework nation providing the OHQ and France as providing the FHQ. Simultaneously, non-EU NATO member states were invited to participate in the operation (Council of the European Union, 2006f, 17).

The UN Security Council voted unanimously for the mission and issued *Resolution 1671* (2006) on 25 April 2006. Two days later the EU Council adopted the Joint Action on the European Union military operation in support of MONUC during the election process and voted in favour of Operation EUFOR RD Congo (*Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 116*, 2006, 98-101). The Council appointed the German Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck as Operation Commander and the French Major General Christian Dammay as Force Commander (Council of the European Union, 2006a). CONOPS and CJSOR were approved by the Council of the European Union on 28 April 2006.

The drafting of the OPLAN started at the end of April. After lengthy drafting sessions a first draft OPLAN was drawn up between the OHQ and FHQ (at that time still located in France) and presented at the beginning of May (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 19).

May In mid-May 2006, Franz-Josef Jung, the German Federal Minister of Defence, criticized the EU for its weak preparation of the Congo mission. Jung was particularly critical of the reluctance of EU members to make contributions and share the burden of the operation (*Spiegel Online*, 2006f). Jung now eased the strict time restraint of four months for the operation, as he spoke of four months of core-execution time plus six weeks for deployment and six weeks for redeployment. Additionally, the initial confinement of the German troops to Kinshasa proper was now extended to the “region of Kinshasa” (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006w, 4). The original constraint had presumably been incorporated in order to make parliamentary approval of

the mandate easier in light of the ongoing “child soldier discussion” in Germany. On 24 May, the German cabinet voted in favour of German participation in Operation EUFOR RD Congo as the framework nation (Schmidt, 2006, 71). The OPLAN and the RoE were agreed by the PSC on 23 May 2006 and approved by the Council of the European Union on 29 May 2006 (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006i, 6).

June On 1 June, the German parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of German participation in EUFOR RD Congo (Schmidt, 2006, 71). On 7 June 2006, during his visit to Kinshasa, Minister of Defence Jung asserted that the mission would have a maximum duration of four months; he stressed that “The troops will be home for Christmas” (*Süddeutsche.de*, 2006e). However, on 8 June 2006, Erkki Tuomioja, the Finnish minister of Foreign Affairs (and acting EU president), publicly discussed the possibility of a longer duration for EUFOR RD Congo (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006t, 5). On June 12, the Council formally agreed to the launching of EUFOR RD Congo and authorized the OpCdr “to release the activation order in order to execute the deployment of forces, prior to transfer of authority following their arrival in theatre, and start execution of the mission” (*Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 163*, 2006, 16).

The Logic and Concept Behind EUFOR RD Congo

The planning for EUFOR RD Congo was characterized from the outset by navigating the delicate balance between political objectives and constraints on the one hand and military requirements on the other hand. The political constraints had to be fulfilled while simultaneously ensuring MONUC could be effectively and readily supported militarily. Both aspects were pivotal for the credibility of the EU commitment. Credibility required multinational visibility of the EU in the DRC and, if necessary, timely availability of appropriate military capabilities in the country (Brauß, 2006). Although the EU-Battlegroup concept served as a theoretical starting point, EUFOR RD Congo did not employ this concept.

In its letter dated 27 December 2005, the UN had asked the EU to make “available a deterrent force that, if necessary, could be deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo during the electoral process” In addition, the UN requested “a suitably earmarked reserve force that could enhance MONUC’s quick reaction capabilities during or immediately after the electoral process” (Guéhenno, 2005). This had two implications for the operation: first, potential insurgents were to be deterred and second, the

reserve force could only assist MONUC during the electoral process and its immediate aftermath. The term “electoral process,” however, lacked a clear definition. Later it was specified to be four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections in the UN mandate (Security Council, 2006).

Subsequent political discussion showed that the EU member states would be willing to support an operation only if it were limited in scope, scale, size, application and duration. Consequently, there was a need to keep the potential tasks for EUFOR RD Congo limited as well, with a clear focus on the deterrence effect (Brauß, 2006). There was also a general understanding at the political level that any EU force should not exceed the size of a task force, including the required air and support assets¹⁵. Significant portions of the force were to remain on standby outside the DRC in order to underline the EU’s impartiality and to counter arguments that Europe supported Interim President Kabila.

MONUC’s military structure was divided into a combat division with approximately 14,000 troops deployed in the most challenging eastern provinces, and a brigade in Kinshasa with only 1,700 troops (MONUC, 2006). MONUC’s reserve force was already deployed to the south-east. Since MONUC declared that it did not need support in the eastern provinces, this region was dismissed in further EU analyses. In Kinshasa, however, MONUC was weak and just able to protect its own premises in times of unrest (Brauß, 2006).

Kinshasa was considered to be the strategic centre for the political process in general and the election process in particular. The phases between the two polls and after the second poll until the inauguration of the new president were considered critical. It was also believed that unrest in the provinces would not jeopardize the overall stability. Hence, the EU’s military presence primarily focussed on Kinshasa in order to accomplish the reassurance and preventative effects there with a sufficiently visible and credible Advance Element (Brauß, 2006). Moreover, the On Call Force could be rapidly launched, if required, ensuring military effectiveness. The footprint of the Advance Element could not be too big, in order to have a productive political effect.

¹⁵ The size of an EU-Battlegroup, approximately 1500 troops, seems to have served as reference.

The Advance Element, in coordination with MONUC, was tasked to plan, scout and prepare possible military missions for the direct support of MONUC for the protection of international personnel and for the protection of the international airport in Kinshasa. Thus, a series of contingency plans had to be developed. For such operations, the high-readiness Over the Horizon (OTH) On Call Force out of the French garrison in Libreville, Gabon would be employed, which had to be available in the DRC within hours. Even though it was expected that the elections would go well, the French-led EU-Battlegroup was held in standby as a Strategic Reserve Force in Europe (Brauß, 2006). However, any employment of the EU forces would be an autonomous EU decision.

Summary and Assessment

The EU had good reason to engage in a *limited* European military mission. First, the EU wanted to show its confidence in the DRC transformation process. Second, the EU understood that the main responsibility for security in the country rested with the Congolese government and the UN. Support was only requested for the duration of the electoral process. The military operation EUFOR RD Congo was only part of a comprehensive European approach to Africa in general and the DRC in particular. EUFOR RD Congo indicated the EU's determination to support the successful termination of the transition process in the DRC. Hence, the operation was primarily a political signal in the political centre, Kinshasa.

During the decision-making and planning process, a lack of leadership, coordination and coherence created tension. The EU presidency should have provided orientation, coordination and leadership, especially in critical phases. It should have taken over the political organisation of the necessary and crucial discussion process in Brussels and with the relevant member-state capitals. Moreover, there was a significant lack of coordinated public communication. Eventually it became apparent that the complex political-military nature of the mission and its value within the greater civil-military EU engagement in the DRC was difficult to communicate not only to the public and media but also to the parliaments and official staffs. The interdependence of a visible presence and, if necessary, phased availability with compelling and convincing military effectiveness was crucial for the understanding of the deterrent and reassurance function of EUFOR RD Congo in support of MONUC in the DRC (Brauß, 2006). The EU and its member states were not able to convincingly

communicate the logic behind EUFOR RD Congo and its objectives. Especially in Germany, public perceptions blocked an objective view of the strategic importance of the mission.

Despite the lack of public support, Germany was well-positioned to take a leading role in the mission. Germany was the only nation without a compelling argument against providing the OHQ. Moreover, Germany had provided a significant part of one of the two battlegroups. Hence, it was reasonable to expect a German leading role, even if the battlegroup was specialized only for evacuation operations and did not meet the demand for multinationalism.

The decision-making and planning process was characterized from the outset by political conditions set by Germany and supported by France. Prerequisites for involvement included a UN mandate, consent of the DRC government, a multinational EU force, and temperal and geographic limitations. From the beginning an *end date* and not an *end state* was the basis for planning. It was clear that the military mission was limited and part of the comprehensive EU commitment to the DRC. The challenge was to balance political constraints and military requirements, so that political and military risks remained capable and acceptable.

The logical conduct of the ideal decision-making and planning process was virtually reversed: sufficient troop contributions should be made before the endorsement of the political-strategic concept and approval to further develop this concept. The informal force generation process was difficult and time-consuming (Ehrhart, 2007, 84), because the Operations Commander, normally responsible for force generation, was not designated or appointed yet. The nations hesitated to make commitments without knowing the military tasks, but the military planning was put on hold. This led to a situation in which the EUMS, normally responsible for preparation of military advice on a political-strategic level, was forced to make tactical level assessments in order to identify required military capabilities. Germany blocked the OHQ's operational-tactical knowledge support because it was seen as a precommitment for a possible leadership function. This led to the impression that the process was deadlocked. The initial delay was compensated by flexible and cooperative planning at all leadership levels, in cooperation with the respective committees in Brussels and through the postponement of the first round of the elections.

Peter Schmidt offers a scientific explanation for the German behaviour. According to his "Two-World-Thesis" Brussels and the national governments represented two worlds divided. On a national level, decisions made

in Brussels were only hesitantly accepted, even if the government had actively participated in the decision-making process. Germany lacked a substantial parliamentary debate on the EU Africa Strategy and its consequences for Germany. The combination of weak German national interests, with the decision for a collective good and the fact that if a member state prepares for a mission, it more or less volunteers and other partners can easily opt out, almost logically led to the defensive, reactive behaviour of the German government. In the context of negotiations for troop contributions and taking over political, as well as military risks, member states try to minimize their own costs while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of the operation. This cost-benefit predicament is caused by the ATHENA¹⁶ mechanism, which requires that approximately 90 percent of the costs of a military EU operation have to be financed by the individual troop-contributing nation (Schmidt, 2006, 72-73).

¹⁶ “In February 2004, the Council of the European Union established a mechanism to administer the financing of common costs of operations having military or defence implications. This mechanism, called ATHENA, is managed under the authority of a Special Committee. ATHENA manages the common costs from the preparatory phase to the termination of each military operation. ATHENA has a permanent structure and the legal capacity. The Council Decision establishing ATHENA includes a list of common costs.

The Operation Commander is the authorising officer for the operation he commands. Where there is no Operation Commander, ATHENA’s administrator is the authorising officer. During the preparatory phase of an operation (i.e. before the Operation Commander is appointed), ATHENA finances the costs for transport and accommodation necessary for exploratory missions and preparations (in particular fact-finding missions) by military forces. As of the date when the Operation Commander is appointed, ATHENA finances most incremental costs for Operation, Force and Component Headquarters, as well as incremental costs for infrastructure, essential additional equipments and evacuation for persons in need of medical help (MEDEVAC).

Moreover, the Council of the European Union decides for each operation whether the transportation of the forces and their lodging will be financed in common. However, up to now these costs have never been financed in common. Finally, the Special Committee may decide that certain expenditures that do not figure on the list of common costs can be financed in common for a given operation, except for transport and lodging of the forces, which remain under the Council’s competence.

Given the restrictive definition of the list of common costs adopted by the Council of the EU so far, the ratio of costs financed in common to total incremental costs for an operation is small (less than 10 percent). The remainder of the expenditure is financed directly by Member States on the basis of the “costs lie where they fall” principle.

Participating States are the Member States of the European Union except Denmark (this country has opted out from actions with defence implications under the EU Treaty).

In accordance with the Treaty on European Union, contributions to ATHENA are based on a GNI-scale (Gross national income) of Member States” (EU Council Secretariat, 2006).

Doubtless, the concept for EUFOR RD Congo was based on the assessment that the election process would be generally successful with minimal disturbances. It was clear from the outset that risks would remain, but these risks were assessed as calculable, militarily controllable and politically acceptable. The fundamental basis for the mission was that the EU was autonomous in its decision to support the UN.

Rolf Clement's argument that the operation was unable to effect lasting stability in the DRC (Clement, 2006, 38) can be clearly refuted. In its role and task, EUFOR RD Congo significantly differed from previous EU or NATO missions. The objective of EUFOR was neither to stabilize the whole DRC nor to establish a benign environment within a separate area of responsibility. The exclusive goal was to provide a limited military contribution in support of MONUC and the election process. The main responsibility for security in the DRC rested primarily with the local security authorities and secondarily with MONUC. Only in situations where MONUC *needed* and *requested* support, did EUFOR RD Congo have to be quickly and effectively available (Brauß, 2006).

The Military Operation EUFOR RD Congo

The EUFOR RD Congo operation utilized flexible intermediate planning steps and methods, including cooperative planning. Therefore sharp distinctions cannot be made between decision-making and planning at the political-strategic level and the operational planning process at the military-strategic level. Indeed, many operational planning aspects have already been addressed.

In order to assess the conduct of the military operation, conditions, demands and objectives which were set by both the EU and the mandate will be compared with the actual performance during the mission.

Preparation

Officially the preparation phase started with the formal adoption of the Joint Action, the activation of the OHQ and the setting up of the FHQ and ended with the Council decision to launch the operation. Multinationalism is one of the governing principles for an EU crisis management operation. However this principle has to be carefully weighed against the requirements of military effectiveness.

For EUFOR RD Congo the following additional guidelines had to be taken into consideration:

- EUFOR RD Congo was not intended to substitute for or duplicate MONUC in any of its tasks;
- the OpCdr's Mission was to deploy an advance element to Kinshasa, with backup force on call, in order to provide timely and sufficient support to MONUC for those situations that were beyond its capacity (briefing/interview not for attribution);
- the Key Tasks of EUFOR RD Congo were the recovery of personnel in distress and protection of civilians, whereas MONUC's objective was the conduct of stabilization operations (briefing/interview not for attribution).

The Initiating Military Directive (IMD) identified following five Key Military Tasks:

- establish an advance element, including the FHQ, in Kinshasa;
- conduct military information operations in accordance with the information strategy and in close cooperation with MONUC HQ;
- be prepared to conduct personnel recovery of electoral agents, international observers and UN staff involved in the election (Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS)) and who are in imminent danger;
- be prepared to support MONUC stabilisation operations in specific geographical locations;
- be prepared to contribute to the protection of N'Djili airport;

and two Key Support Tasks:

- support MONUC, when appropriate, with intelligence;
- be prepared to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the DRC (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 20).

In this context it is important to note that the UN Security Council *Resolution 1671* required that decisions to engage EUFOR RD Congo¹⁷ be

¹⁷ “8. Decides that Eufor R.D.Congo is authorized to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, to carry out the following tasks, in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the United Nations:

taken by the European Union upon request by the Secretary General of the UN or, in emergency cases, in close consultation with MONUC. However in order for EUFOR “to support MONUC to stabilize a situation” a request by the Secretary General of the UN would have been necessary.¹⁸ Hence, MONUC was forced to make detailed requests for every individual case. The stabilization task lacked a detailed definition which provided sufficient flexibility from the military strategic perspective. Every request of the UN with respect to MONUC could be assessed individually by the EU and the OHQ. Moreover, this regulation prevented unclear (and more frequent) requests by MONUC and contributed to the overall mission success.

The only permanent military components of the EU structure are the EUMS and the EUMC. Thus, as an EU-led autonomous operation, EUFOR RD Congo had to utilize the command structure of involved nations. Germany provided the Operations Commander (OpCdr), the Operations Headquarters (OHQ), the core of the military chain of command (together with France) and contributed a significant amount of assets and capabilities to the operation. Normally, the responsibility to organise the OHQ effectively rests with the OpCdr. The OHQ and FHQ should be multinational (combined) and able to command and control operations in which elements of more than one service participate (joint). Hence, both have to be combined and joint. Moreover, the FHQ needs to be deployable within the required timeframe. The designated HQ provides the key nuclear staff and is reinforced both by multinational Primary Augmentees and Additional

(a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities;

(b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa;

(d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of Eufor R.D.Congo;

(e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger...”(United Nations Security Council Resolution S/Res/1671, 2006).

¹⁸ “9. Notes that decisions to engage Eufor R.D.Congo on the tasks mentioned in paragraph 8 above will be taken by the European Union upon a request by the Secretary-General, or in emergency cases, in close consultation with MONUC, to fulfil tasks mentioned in subparagraphs 8 (b), (c), (d) and (e);”(United Nations Security Council Resolution S/Res/1671, 2006).

Augmentees. Key Nuclear and Primary Augmentees form the multinational EU HQ Core Staff within five days of designation. With the core staff, the OHQ should be able to develop the draft CONOPS and draft OPLAN. Additional Augmentees join the OHQ within 20 days after designation as result of the Force Generation Process. Detailed advance preparations are made by the Parent HQ with respect to available facilities ready for occupation by the multinational staff and accommodation. Also, the provision of trained Primary Augmentees by all participating EU member states is crucial. An EU HQ should, in principle, consist of a command group and functional divisions as required, tailored to the mission. National military representation, National Liaison Teams and Liaison Officers (for non-EU contributing nations) should also be available. The selected OHQ should be able to plan on short notice for an operation.

As the involvement of the potential Operation Commander is paramount, an appropriate liaison team of the respective potential EU OHQ should be deployed to the EUMS or the EUMS should deploy a dedicated staff element to ensure close coordination between EUMS/EUMC and the potential framework nation. This assures that EU specific requirements are taken into account in subsequent national planning. Early involvement of the OpCdr with IMD drafting also helps to ensure full consistency between MSO, IMD and CONOPS.

The official activation of the OHQ in Potsdam, Germany took place on 23 March 2006. Approximately 50 personnel, including the OpCdr, emigrated from the Bundeswehr Operations Command into the OHQ EUFOR RD Congo and formed the OHQ nucleus. The double-hatted personnel from the Bundeswehr Operations Command were replaced nationally to ensure the continued operation of the National Command. On 29 March approximately 65 Primary Augmentees (PA) from the member nations were activated. These personnel are earmarked, constantly updated in a Primary Augmentee Database by EUMS, and have to report within 5 days after being summoned. The OpCdr has the right to tailor the size and function of his HQ to the mission. The OHQ was functional as a multinational headquarters by 12 April 2006. About 115 Additional Augmentees (AA) were created through the Force Generation process and joined the OHQ within 20 days after its designation (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 13). The first Force Generation Conference took place on 3 May 2006. Finally, by late April (PIZ EinsFüKdoBw, 2006) roughly 145 personnel from all military services formed the OHQ. All-in-all the appropriate EU concepts and documents worked for OHQ and FHQ manning, thus, no adjustments were necessary.

The Framework Nation concept also worked well. All OHQ branches were provided with the required qualifications on time for IOC and Full Operational Capability (FOC). A large fluctuation of OHQ personnel occurred throughout the operation (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 13). Problems only occurred during the generation of Additional Augmentees, so that adjustments in the ratio of Primary to Additional Augmentees in favour of PAs seemed to be advised.

Finally, 21 EU Member States plus Turkey and Switzerland¹⁹ were represented in the OHQ, with roughly 55 percent of personnel contributed by the parent nation Germany, and approximately 13 percent by France. In theatre, a total of 19 troop contribution nations, including Turkey and Switzerland, were present with about 2300 troops, the bulk of personnel contributed by France (approximately 43 percent) and Germany (approximately 33 percent) (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006; EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 27). Hence, the multinationalism requirement of any ESDP operation was clearly fulfilled. Moreover OHQ and FHQ were a combined and joint headquarters.

The OHQ was tailored to the mission and basically consisted of all necessary elements as demanded by the concepts: a command group and functional divisions (e.g. CJ1-CJ9, CJMed, Special Operations Forces Cell) were included as required. National military representation and cooperation was ensured. The EUMS deployed personnel to Potsdam and the OHQ deployed a liaison officer to the EUMS in order to ensure close coordination. The OHQ in Potsdam was able to plan on short notice for the operation. Nevertheless, the relatively late activation of the OHQ and the consequential late start to planning were not ideal. The appropriate and reasonable early involvement of the OpCdr in the planning process was not achieved, as his involvement started only at the end of March with his initially informal but binding nomination and the activation of his OHQ. The CONOPS was finished by mid-April, the OPLAN by mid-May. CONOPS and OPLAN had to be approved by the Council. Normally this would be a time consuming process, but both were finally approved on 27 April and 29 May 2006, respectively.

¹⁹ List of contributing nations to EUFOR RD Congo: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic*, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary*, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania*, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia*, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, as well as Turkey and Switzerland (as non EU members). *only OHQ.

Regular visits of the OHQ Command Group were conducted to the DRC and Gabon in order to ensure they had a sufficient grasp of the situation. Trust, as well as good and reliable relations, had to be established. For this reason, the OpCdr travelled with a tailored delegation about every month into theatre. There he executed a twofold program which addressed both political and military concerns (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 34). He normally spent one day taking care of the political aspects of the operation, such as talking to the political key players, and one day with his force. This gave him a very good understanding of the situation in the DRC and was very useful for developing good rapport and cooperation with his points of contact in Brussels. He explicitly praised his effective cooperation with the SG/HR (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006y, 6). According to Lieutenant General Viereck, one prerequisite for a successful operation was the united political and military course of action. Together with EUSR Aldo Ajello, Lieutenant General Viereck visited Kinshasa on 31 March, very shortly after activation of his HQ. EUSR Ajello was a decisive mediator (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006).

A single, identifiable and clear military chain of command is imperative for any military operation. The responsibility of establishing an effective command and control structure rests with the Framework Nation. The OpCdr is responsible for the overall command and control of the operation and for providing the military operational interface between the political-military level of the EU and the military chain of command. Flexible, clear and united command and control arrangements are crucial for any military operation. Within the EU, coherence and interaction should be achieved among all EU bodies, especially between the civilian actors and the military chain of command. Externally, coordination, interaction and cooperation should be established between the EU military force and international organisations, civilian authorities, non-governmental organisations and civilian population (Civil-Military Cooperation: CIMIC). At all levels links should be established to ensure coordination.

A clear liaison structure was developed for EUFOR RD Congo. The OpCdr was responsible for liaising with DPKO and the EUSR. The FCdr was responsible for liaising with MONUC, the authorities in Gabon and the DRC, the EU embassy in Kinshasa, with EUPOL, EUSEC, the EC delegation, International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the DRC, DRC churches, and third states in the DRC. Consequently, a sophisticated information and coordination organisation was established. Chaired by the Deputy FCdr the CCI (*Comité de*

Coordination et d'Information) met with representatives of all relevant parties to the transformation process.²⁰

Communications and Information Systems (CIS) provide seamless and interoperable support for all participants at all levels. They must be permanently available and able to handle classified information as required. General CIS requirements are: availability, sustainability, survivability, security, flexibility, interoperability and standardisation. The EU ensures communication links from the relevant EU bodies to the national planning capabilities and the provided military strategic OHQ. The Framework Nation should provide CIS infrastructure in the OHQ and support the command of the operation down to the FHQ and to other relevant authorities and/or organisations. The OpCdr is responsible for all aspects of planning, implementing and utilising CIS at the military strategic level. He has to ensure the required CIS planning for the operation especially for the military strategic, operational and tactical interfaces. The FHQ provides adequate command and CIS capabilities for command and control in theatre. All other CIS required to ensure the links at lower levels are the responsibility of the troop-contributing nations.

The OpCdr fulfilled his responsibilities for all aspects of planning, implementing and utilising CIS at the military strategic level. Germany, as Framework Nation, provided the required CIS infrastructure in the OHQ and supported the command of the operation down to the FHQ and to other relevant authorities and organisations. The CIS provided the necessary seamless and interoperable support for all participants at all levels. Availability, sustainability, survivability, security, flexibility, interoperability and standardisation were delivered as required. A single, identifiable and clear military chain of command with flexible, clear and united command and control arrangements was established.

The planning process of building up an EU-led force normally comprises three phases: identification, force generation/activation and deployment. These phases are distinct but interlinked activities within the overall planning process. The entire process at both political and military strategic levels has to be seen as a whole. Force identification and genera-

²⁰ CCI: EU Dep FCdr (Chair), UN Agencies, UN/MONUC, EU, International Observers, Local Authorities, Churches, GO/NGO, other relevant Civil Players, Security & Police Forces, DRC Government, Commission Electoral Independante. Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006 and interviews not for attribution.

tion is an iterative and repetitive process: military effectiveness and interoperability have to be taken into account.

EU procedures allow for consultations on possible participation in a mission between member states on the initiative of the candidate Framework Nation, prior to its designation by the Council. This shortens the force identification, generation/activation and deployment process, conducted under the primary responsibility of the OpCdr.

The preparatory force identification work of the EUMS is refined by the OpCdr, assisted by the EUMS, during the development of the CONOPS. Force generation and activation is ultimately a core responsibility of the OpCdr. The OpCdr, assisted by the EUMS, has to chair one or more Force Generation Conferences and develop the draft Status of Requirements (SOR). Although the responsibility for deployment rests with each of the participating states, the planning for force deployment requires early coordination and harmonisation, which falls under the auspices of the OpCdr.

Consultations on possible force contributions started between member states on the initiative of Germany and France, prior to the appointment of the OpCdr. The Force Generation Process could not follow the ideal steps and did not go smoothly (Ehrhart, 2007, 84). Individual member states were not able to finalize their individual decision-making processes in time. Despite the fact that a number of critical capabilities were not addressed by the participating nations, the first Force Generation Conference (FGC) on 3 May 2006 was deemed a success by the OHQ. The generation of strategic enablers, such as medical support (including rotary wing tactical Air MEDEVAC (medical evacuation)), tactical airlift rotary and tactical fixed wing transport aircraft was problematic. The availability of tactical airlift assets (rotary and fixed wing) was vital to EUFOR RD Congo. These key capabilities allowed for rapid manoeuvrability throughout the whole Area of Operations (AO) in a flexible and controlled manner (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 28). On the other hand, surplus commitments were made, which exceeded the expected number of personnel by approximately 400 (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 25). The second FGC was conducted on 10 May 2006, and further progress was made. However, despite direct appeals to member states, a number of critical shortfalls remained, especially tactical airlift rotary (including MEDEVAC) and tactical fixed wing aircraft stationed in theatre. Finally, Finland provided the important mobile surgeons and Switzerland also submitted an offer to provide two surgeons. After a rocky process, including numerous bilateral discussions, the

necessary commitments were pledged and the OHQ successfully filled the requirements (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 26-27).

To achieve the OpCdr's Mission and the related Key Military Tasks and Key Supporting Tasks, a Force Structure was developed:

- to provide visibility and credibility in order to ensure the required deterrence and reassurance effect, and
- to ensure necessary military effectiveness, so that the On Call Force could be rapidly launched if required.

In order to fulfil these functions, the Advance Element was required to remain aware of the current situation, gather information, assess situations, develop contingency plans and launch an effective and well coordinated public information campaign. The Advance Element was to include the force headquarters (FHQ), its own protection and logistic support as well as a quick reaction element and the necessary air support.

The Advance Element in Kinshasa included the multinational and joint FHQ (approximately 80 troops (*Loyal Magazin für Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006b)), with a French Staff Support Element (approximately 50 troops). Force Protection was provided by the Polish Military Police Company (approximately 100 troops). Germany and France provided the Communication Company (approximately 100 troops). The Spanish Infantry Company (approximately 100 troops) was the Force Capable of Immediate Reaction within the Advance Element. Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) was the task of the German ISTAR Company. With roughly 50 soldiers it provided human intelligence, signal intelligence, long range reconnaissance and imagery intelligence with a small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The Belgian UAV Company added an additional UAV capability with longer range and endurance. Germany provided two CH-53 helicopters to ensure air mobility and one CH-53 for medical evacuation capability within the District of Kinshasa (about 120 troops (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006a, 6)). Finally the medical support (Role 2²¹) was ensured by a German airmobile medical centre (tent version) with German medical personnel, reinforced by France, Poland and Finland

²¹ Role 1: Integral medical support of the troops. Role 2: Primary and damage control surgery capability, MEDEVAC and laboratory facilities. Role 3 and Role 4: Final treatment is a national responsibility, normally in home country.

(roughly 100 troops). The Psychological Operations Task Force (approximately 30 troops) which was in charge of producing handbills, posters, trifolds, the newspaper *La Pailotte*, radio spots, t-shirts and caps was a German-French contribution. Civil-Military Cooperation was done by three teams from Belgium, Germany and France (six soldiers in total) (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006; interview not for attributions). All in all this meant that initially there were roughly 800 troops in Kinshasa (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006n, 5; *IRINnews.org*, 2006b). Thus, with a minimal footprint all essential and necessary elements had been deployed to Kinshasa to satisfy the set requirements.

The On Call Force in Libreville, Gabon was primarily built around two Infantry Task Groups (with a reduced battalion size), one French and one German-Dutch. Communications were provided by France, and the Combat Service Support Element by Germany and France. Tactical air transport capabilities were contributed by France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Turkey and initially Greece with a total of seven (initially eight) C-160 / C-130 transport aircraft. Medical Support was provided by a German airmobile medical centre (Role 2, container version) reinforced by medical troops from Switzerland and the Netherlands (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006).

The composition of the about-1,300-troops-strong On Call Force included all capabilities necessary and required to fulfil the mission. The only potentially weak link was the air transport capabilities. With a calculated flying time from Libreville to Kinshasa of about 1:50 hours (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006) a deployment of the On Call Forces to Kinshasa would have been manageable. However, the longest preplanned deployment was from Gabon to Lumbumbashi, with a calculated 4:00 hours flight time. In this case, depending on the equipment required to transport and taking into consideration that MONUC via the SG of the UN had to file a request for support, a critical situation due to limited air transport capabilities was a possibility.

About 650 troops of the Advance Element and On Call Forces (excluding Special Forces) were infantry. That was about one third of the overall troop strength (excluding Special Forces), a relatively strong representation of land combat troops, calling into question Chris Patten's demand for more available combat troops (Patten, 2006, 2).

The main task of the Special Forces, which were based at a second location in Gabon, was recovery of Persons with Designated Special Status

(PDSS). Due to the confidential character of the forces and their mission, no details with regard to their deployment and operations are available.

If required French fighter aircraft and air to air refuelling capability were made available from a French airbase in Chad.

For the worst case scenario, the French-led EU-Battlegroup with roughly 1,500 troops (*IRINnews.org*, 2006b), was held in standby as a Strategic Reserve Force in Europe. For the employment of the German contribution to the Strategic Reserve Force no parliamentary mandate of the German Bundestag would have been necessary (*Sueddeutsche.de*, 2006c; see also EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 28-29).

Thus, the planned division of tasks, including immediate reaction within the DRC, short-notice reinforcement with the On-Call Force (OCF) in Gabon and deterrence and reinforcement from Europe with the Reserve at Strategic Level (RSL) could be executed as foreseen in the CONOPS with the available force setup (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 27).

Some of the forces had national restrictions and could not be deployed outside the district of Kinshasa. For instance, Germany (and the Netherlands, because these units were embedded in the German contribution) confined the employment of its forces (except OHQ and FHQ personnel) to the district of Kinshasa. This caused tensions between the On Call Forces, whose main function was emergency forces and the German forces, whose main function was evacuation operations (Schmidt, 2006, 76). The German constraints were mainly attributed to the difficult parliamentary decision-making process in Germany. This could have been interpreted as lack of solidarity. If EUFOR RD Congo were engaged in other parts of the DRC, a complicated system of rotations would have been necessary (Ehrhart, 2007, 84-85). Operational limitations were also set by Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, Greece and France, mainly with respect to the provided tactical air transport assets and/or medical support. For use of the Spanish infantry company outside Kinshasa, prior consent of the relevant Spanish authorities was required.

The OpCdr Lieutenant General Viereck had his particular interpretation of the term *caveats*. The limitations were well known from the beginning and could be taken into account for all further preparations. The operation was planned and conducted around these limitations. Moreover, the operation was only launched after he had confirmed the feasibility of the operation with the available troop contributions (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006; EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 28).

Lieutenant General Viereck stated at a press briefing in Brussels on 13 June 2006: “I have all the necessary forces, and we will be credible” (*IRIN*, 2006).

In June 2006, for the first time, the OHQ sent a multinational Coordinated Advance Team (CAT) into Libreville in order to conduct all preparatory measures prior to full operational capability of EUFOR RD Congo. The team consisted of personnel qualified to establish the prerequisites for the deployment of forces, such as contracting, engineering and infrastructure expertise. The CAT principle has proven successful, with multinationalism as its pivotal ingredient. Once FOC was reached, the CAT handed over its tasks and closed down its activities (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 41).

The first EUFOR RD Congo operational footprint in Kinshasa was the Pre-advanced Information Team (PIT). Its task was to launch a limited information campaign prior to the deployment of the advance party in order to create a positive atmosphere and to counter rumours as well as misinformation (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 28).

The Operation Commander’s choice of N’Dolo as the location of the FHQ was meant to heighten the force’s visibility. In addition, forces in the DRC had to be able to react immediately (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006). Therefore, the Advance Element was required to ensure necessary situational awareness, information gathering, coordination, situation assessment, advance planning and an effective and well coordinated public information campaign.

Regular exercises and reconnaissance in the area of operations supported EUFOR’s visibility. The credibility of EUFOR drew on three elements:

- the on-call Forces in Gabon,
- the Strategic Reserve in Europe and
- robust Rules of Engagement (RoE)²².

²² Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives to military commanders and forces that define the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner in which force, or other actions which might be construed as provocative, may, or may not, be applied. During an operation, the ROE apply to all EU forces at all times and in all places. National restrictions may apply. They do not affect the right to self-defence under national law. The authorisation of use of force is an essential part of the political guidance and strategic direction for any operation. Use of force should be limited to the extent necessary. The EU’s policy on the use of force does not affect the decision-making powers of national authorities in the exercise of full command over their armed forces. Use of force at the initiative of the EU

The aim was to reassure the population and to deter any potential spoilers (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006; EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 24-25).

The Area of Operations (AO) encompassed the whole DRC, but no operations were conducted by EUFOR in the four north-eastern provinces (both Kivus, Orientale and Maniema Provinces). However, the Area of Operation remained a huge one. Although Gabon was not part of the AO, it could be designated as the “Rear Area of the Operation,” where no operations were to be conducted (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006).

Outside Kinshasa, primary Points of Application (POA) were defined in Mbandaka, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, and Lumbumbashi. However, EUFOR RD Congo was also prepared to operate DRC wide – with the exception of the four provinces in the north east (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006).

Operational logistic planning has to be undertaken by the OpCdr. Troop-contributing nations are responsible for the support of their own forces assigned to an EU led operation. However, the most effective and cost-efficient employment will be achieved only if multinational logistic concepts and capabilities are applied as early as possible. Hence, the EU should seek to use multinational logistic structures and formations at the earliest opportunity and consider entering bilateral or multilateral agreements aimed at sharing logistical resources. In a multinational logistic organisation, the military commander must be given sufficient control over logistic resources dedicated to the multinational role. The most important logistical principles are: cooperation, coordination, flexibility, simplicity, timeliness, economy, synergy and standardisation. Strategic movement and transportation are integral aspects of military operations. There is a strong need for a coordinated approach between all troop-contributing nations for the shared and cooperative use of available assets. Troop-contributing nations control all aspects of their lines of communication unless they make other arrangements, taking into account the agreed operational priorities set out by the OpCdr. The EU operational command structure manages, rather than

led forces is stated in the mandate and is reflected in the ROE. The Council decision to launch an operation reflects the legal basis for the use of force. Any use of force by EU led military forces must be necessary and proportional. Military crisis management operations are guided by the principles of impartiality, consent of the parties and restraint. In general, every effort should be made to control the situation and achieve the overall objectives without the use of force. However commanders should be given a certain degree of flexibility.

controls, movement. Nevertheless, an EU Movement Coordination Centre (EUMCC) should be established at the OHQ.

The ultimate responsibility for logistical support rested with each troop-contributing nation. Hence, for EUFOR RD Congo's logistical personnel, the challenge was to coordinate among the nations in order to achieve an effective and economical approach. For real life support, fuel, lubricants, etc., a united approach was chosen. EUFOR RD Congo staff supported the nations in finding appropriate contractors. An EUMCC was established within the OHQ to coordinate transport. Thus the logistic principles: cooperation, coordination, flexibility, simplicity, timeliness, economy, synergy and standardisation were observed by EUFOR RD Congo as far as possible in preparation of the operation.

The aim of any military operation should be to provide a standard of medical care which is as close as possible to prevailing peacetime medical standards and follows the principle of "best medical practices". Medical care was also the ultimate responsibility of the troop-contributing nations. Medical support and care is expensive as well as personnel-intensive. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, medical care had to be ensured in Gabon as well as in Kinshasa, as well as at the Points of Application. Due to high national demands regarding medical care for its troops, Germany exercised a strong influence in this field. This resulted in an almost perfect medical organisation, as close as possible to prevailing peacetime medical standards, incorporating the principle of "best medical practices"²³.

Deployment

The distance between Libreville and Kinshasa created logistical challenges for the mission. Not only was there a need for strategic transportation, but it was also necessary to coordinate two deployment and redeployment operations. Support for the personnel in the Area of Operation and in Gabon as well as transportation and communication between the two areas was also required. Moreover, this meant there was a need for more personnel in support of EUFOR RD Congo and for force protection personnel in Gabon and DRC. Thus there was an increase in overall troop numbers from the 1500 troops initially discussed to about 2300 troops.

²³ For a detailed description of the medical support see EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 58-62.

A compromise had to be found between transport by ship and by aircraft. Distribution by plane is about ten times more expensive than by ship, but also much faster. Fortunately, additional time was gained when the election was delayed; thus, about 80–90 percent of the equipment could be sent by ship. The remaining equipment and troops travelled by air.

Matadi was intended to be used as the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD, or in this case, River Port of Debarkation). But due to the current of the Congo River this proved impossible. Instead it was decided to use Boma, which is about 70 km downstream and approximately 300 km away from Kinshasa. This necessitated an additional day of transport by truck to Kinshasa. Some lorries had been shipped from Europe and some were rented. Boma was also used by the United Nations and other organisations, which resulted in competition to hire port workers, lorries and so forth. Other problems arose from standards which differed from those of European harbours. Additional problems also arose in the areas of security as well as medical care.

In order to ensure early coordination and harmonisation an EUMCC was established within the OHQ. The EUMCC had only a coordinating function. The sole responsibility for the deployment and redeployment of troops and material rested with the individual troop-contributing nation. In order to reach a consensus, four conferences were held in Potsdam (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 37). In these conferences, nations informed the EUMCC of their plans. While the purpose was to coordinate efforts, in reality the conference functioned to minimize conflicts between nations, who were actually in competition for resources and support such as transportation. In this context coordination was more a sort of facilitation, by showing conflicting points and providing possible solutions, rather than achieving direct solutions. In addition, each nation had its own solution. Moreover, the nations were required to cover their own expenses; thus each preferred to find the cheapest solution, rather than the most efficient one. Therefore it was not easy to attain efficient solutions, but in most cases workable compromises could be achieved. Hence the EUMCC was only able to act in a facilitating role. The procedures and concepts were sufficient for this operation. For future operations however, better solutions to these inconsistencies would be prudent.

The deployment started on 15 June 2006 and finished on schedule on 27 July, with most of the material delivered within about five weeks. In total about 12,000 tons and roughly 2,300 troops were moved in a secure environment. The material of the Strategic Reserve stayed in Europe. Since the

employment of troops occurred in phases, first from Kinshasa and then from Gabon, this seemed feasible.

In Kinshasa, three EUFOR compounds were established for the Advance Element: Camp N'Dolo 1 and 2 at the Congolese Air Base of N'Dolo and Camp N'Djili at the Kinshasa International Airport. The On-Call Force was stationed in Libreville, and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) in Port Gentile, Gabon (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 43).

The camp in Kinshasa for roughly 800 troops was initially prepared by Belgian troops together with Congolese workers at the military airfield N'Dolo (*Loyal Magazin für Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006b, 6). Since no nation was willing to take over a logistical lead role, and given the limited troop size of EUFOR RD Congo (Glatz, 2007, 6), a Spanish contractor was hired by the EU administration for real life support for the troops in Kinshasa and Gabon (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 51). This contractor was 14 million Euros cheaper than other competitors. Problems, however, occurred, particularly during the deployment phase. Initially food service had to be provided by France in Kinshasa and by both Germany and France in Gabon. There were criticisms and complaints especially about the condition of the tents, the hygienic situation and the quality of the installation in Kinshasa and Libreville (Kirsch, 2006, 7; Clement, 2007, 32). Consequently, the French and Belgian Armies provided tents and containers with washrooms and toilets to ease the situation in Kinshasa. The OHQ confirmed these problems and was optimistic that a solution would be found before the start of the execution phase (*Welt Kompakt*, 2006a, 8). By mid-August a positive change could be seen in Kinshasa due to the outstanding French support and the dedication of German and other troops (Kirsch, 2006, 7).

Information Operations were of special importance during the deployment phase. A presentation day for high ranking officials was organized by EUFOR RD Congo to set out the principles of the mission on 20 July 2006. A Command Post Exercise was conducted to provide all organizations and HQs concerned with the opportunity to test and streamline the decision-making process between MONUC/UN and EUFOR/EU.

On 25 July, the German EUFOR RD Congo troops intercepted police forces and rioting demonstrators, and two EUFOR car windows were broken. This was an accident, rather than a direct assault on EUFOR troops (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006v, 6; *Spiegel Online*, 2006c). The Deputy FCdr Commodore Henning Bess described the situation in Kinshasa on 26 July as calm and clear (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006m, 6).

On 27 July riots, triggered by a fire in the camp of Jean-Pierre Bemba's followers, caused at least seven deaths (*Spiegel Online*, 2006b). One day later a bodyguard of Vice President Azarias Ruberwa was shot in Kinshasa (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006x) and three French soldiers were slightly injured as their convoy was attacked by hooligans during an information tour (*Zeit Online*, 2006a, b). On 28 July a Belgian EUFOR reconnaissance UAV was accidentally shot down on a test flight and crashed into a slum district. At least eight people were injured, four of whom were treated in the EUFOR medical care facility (*Loyal Magazin für Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006a, 33). This incident fostered initial distrust and scepticism regarding EUFOR RD Congo (*Zeit Online*, 2006b; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006b, 6) On the same day, during the final election rally of Jean-Pierre Bemba, at least four people were killed amid heavy riots (*Zeit Online*, 2006a).

Towards the end of the preparation and deployment phases, some air reconnaissance and other defensive air operations were conducted in DRC through French fighter aircraft and air to air refuelling capability available from a French airbase in Chad. These assets were also employed for reconnaissance missions during the execution phase on a case by case basis.

Finally, on 28 July, SG/HR Javier Solana wrote a letter to SG Kofi Annan, summarizing the agreements regarding the basic principles, operational capabilities, and procedures for engaging EUFOR RD Congo. The letter also highlighted other forms of support and assistance to be provided by EUFOR RD Congo, and the planning and coordination measures and support from MONUC to EUFOR.

The deployment phase was executed with only minor diversions and concluded on schedule (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 37). It ended with the declaration of Full Operational Capability on 29 July 2006. Transfer of Authority to the OpCdr was authorized by the troop-contributing nations upon arrival of the troops in theatre.

Execution

The execution phase started on 30 July 2006. It was determined that the first round of the elections would not result in any decision on the presidential elections, as no candidate was expected to win more than 50 percent of the votes cast. No major unrest was expected; hence EUFOR RD Congo initially remained in a highly visible monitoring role. Day and night patrols in Kinshasa were executed by the FCIR, and replenished by

reconnaissance and information operations assets (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 43).

Despite the fact that MONUC had done an outstanding job in preparing the elections, it was not well regarded in the DRC. This was mainly because it failed to stop the killing in eastern Congo and because its troops were party to violence against the civilians they were tasked to protect (Hartley, 2006).

Europeans in general and Germans in particular, have an excellent reputation in the DRC (Winter, 2006e, 3). Despite their legacy of colonialism, Belgians are also well regarded by the population. Under Belgium rule there was both exploitation and regeneration. Belgium is seen as the Congolese's home in Europe, bringing prosperity and culture to the DRC. France, on the other hand, is perceived as being connected to the Republic of the Congo and to the Central African Republic. Therefore, it is viewed with suspicion, despite its positive conduct of operation ARTEMIS. Thus, there was some scepticism concerning EUFOR RD Congo, and a thorough information campaign was integral to the operation (*Sueddeutsche.de*, 2006f). Local events can develop strategic significance in the DRC. It was important to build up and maintain the credibility of EUFOR RD Congo as an impartial force and to demonstrate non-partisanship. However, the interim president, Joseph Kabila, was allegedly favoured by some governments, particularly France, to become the president (Böhm, 2006a). Hence EUFOR RD Congo conducted a comprehensive and encompassing information campaign as part of the overall EU information strategy. This information campaign was very successful and contributed significantly to the overall mission success. In the beginning, the people were aggressive toward EUFOR because uniforms symbolized trouble, rape, corruption and violence. Eventually, EUFOR developed a very good reputation, which was proved by public opinion polls conducted on behalf of EUFOR. Another contributing factor was the deescalating behaviour of EUFOR troops.

The information campaign started not only with the preparation phase but continued throughout redeployment to the end of the mission. The information campaign concentrated on EUFOR RD Congo in particular, because it was not an offensive mission. During the mission, three approaches, namely Media, PsyOps (Psychological Operations) and CIMIC were coordinated by an InfoOps (Information Operations) Coordination Board at the OHQ and FHQ level.

During EUFOR RD, 90 percent of the campaign was performed by PsyOps. Posters, leaflets and trifold were produced, as well as a weekly

newsletter, *La Pailotte*. Also twice a week radio spots were produced. Novelty items like caps, t-shirts, and calendars were distributed to the population, the target audience of the campaign. Maximal use was made of local capabilities, such as radio stations and printers. Every day two Tactical Psychological Teams, composed of two to four soldiers, mingled with the population, engaged in face to face communication, and distributed the products. The mission had to be visible in order to be credible. With this comprehensive and encompassing information campaign, EUFOR RD Congo was able to maximize its presence with minimal troops. In the beginning there were only about 800 EUFOR troops in Kinshasa, but more than 60,000 copies of *La Pailotte* were distributed each week with a total readership of about 500,000, generating maximum visibility with a minimal footprint.

The goals of the information campaign changed throughout the different mission phases. During deployment it was important to inform the population about the deployment (when, where, what, and why). During the execution phase it was crucial to deter violence and to promote EUFOR action. During the redeployment it was important to inform the population that EU and EUFOR would not abandon the DRC and to explain the way ahead in order to foster support for the redeployment of material and troops. EUFOR was the first multinational mission to create a song and a music video with local musicians and local rhythm, showing EUFOR's capabilities and explaining the mission. The song and video were very popular and were broadcast on national TV and radio.

CIMIC assisted the information campaign in order to enhance force acceptance and develop force protection and monitor the Quick Impact Projects (QIP). These supported local schools by providing school desks and refurbishments. In addition, a shelter was provided for the main railway station in Kinshasa. Besides these activities, CIMIC liaised with a variety of IOs and NGOs. Unfortunately there was no EUMC CIMIC budget; therefore the Head of the EU delegation in Kinshasa agreed to fund EUFOR CIMIC projects within a budget of 100,000 euros. Additional national QIP were funded by Germany, France and Belgium. Poland and Italy distributed medical supplies. Despite the short duration of the mission, which is normally counterproductive to good CIMIC work, CIMIC made a quick and lasting contribution to the mission success. An unusual aspect was the dual CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation)/CMCO (Civil Military Coordination) role, which included cooperating with the civil actors in theatre, and a coordinating role exercised

with other EU actors (interview not for attribution; EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 57-58).

On 30 July 2006, the parliamentary and presidential elections took place. The elections were uneventful throughout the DRC, with a high degree of participation (*Spiegel Online*, 2006a). Only some minor incidents were reported. In Kasai province, seven poll stations were set on fire (*Sueddeutsche.de*, 2006d) and the opposition party, UDPS, called for a boycott of the elections (*Sueddeutsche.de*, 2006a). Some 1,700 international observers and 35,000 nationals observed the election process. In order to ensure transparency, 347,000 witnesses were stationed at polling sites and later monitored the compilation (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). Their assessment of the electoral conduct and counting was positive (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006g, 6). Only minor flaws were noted, but none was considered serious enough to affect the outcome of the elections (Sundaram, 2006b). Two days after the first polls, presidential candidate Azarias Ruberwa launched the first fraud accusations, but assured a peaceful protest (*IDS*, 2006, 5; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006g, 6). On election day, Congolese security forces and MONUC troops were visible on the streets. MONUC and EUFOR agreed on a low profile approach; thus EUFOR troops did not patrol the area, but stayed on standby in case of riots (*Sueddeutsche.de*, 2006a).

Between 8 and 16 August 2006, an operational rehearsal, *Operation 21*, was conducted. EUFOR RD Congo deployed troops to Katanga and established a temporary EUFOR detachment in order to heighten the visibility of EUFOR outside Kinshasa, deter any potential spoiler, demonstrate EUFOR's capabilities and practise cooperation with MONUC at one of the Points of Application (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 43-44). To avoid confusion, the FCdr informed the local authorities and key players in advance. To prepare the "battle-space" an intensive PsyOps campaign was conducted beforehand.

During the operation, the strategic and operational focal point shifted more and more to Kinshasa. Therefore larger deployment and training operations in the provinces were replaced by a smaller operational approach (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 44). In conjunction with MONUC, more than twenty Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams (OLRT), with up to 35 troops, were deployed to pre-identified coordinated Points of Application and to other pivotal locations, such as poll hubs. The objective was to establish contact with local authorities, to conduct reconnaissance and become familiar with the location, to refine current concepts of

operation and logistics and to update the lists of Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS). This altered approach to training and preparation helped to conserve EUFOR resources, especially the scarce tactical air transport assets. It was not only good preparation, but also an excellent means to facilitate the mission and contributed to stabilizing provincial security (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 44-45).

Pivotal incidents started on 20 August. Two hours before the announcement of the preliminary results of the first ballot, fire fights occurred in Kinshasa between Kabila's Republican Guards and Bemba's MLC bodyguards. Six people allegedly died. The fights were triggered by the arrival of police to intercept two of Bemba's television broadcasts. Fights spread rapidly to other MLC locations in Gombe, the pivotal district of Kinshasa. The Republican Guards deployed heavy equipment, including tanks. Clashes continued intermittently until midnight. Armoured vehicles patrolled the streets. EUFOR RD Congo was not initially asked to support and intervene.

Around midnight, the head of the independent electoral commission (CEI: *Commission Electorale Indépendante*), Abbé Apollinaire Muholengu Malumalu, announced the results under MONUC escort. Kabila achieved about 45 percent and Bemba roughly 20 percent of the votes. This result meant that Kabila and Bemba would compete on the final ballot (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006l, 8). The first round displayed a clearly divided country with the eastern part mainly supporting Kabila and the western part supporting Bemba. Other candidates made higher scores in the Bandundu and Kasai provinces.

Clashes and firefights, including employment of heavy weapons, continued on 21 August in the afternoon between both factions in Gombe. At about 1600h, while CIAT (*Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition*) ambassadors met with Bemba in his residence, Republican Guard troops with heavy weaponry, including tanks, made an attack. The ambassadors sought refuge in the basement. MLC troops tried to secure the residence. Although it was difficult to predict the attack on Bemba's residence, the clashes of the previous day should have signalled the need for a more forceful MONUC (and possibly EUFOR) deployment in the area around the presidential and vice-presidential residences (International Crisis Group, 2006, 5). The FCdr of EUFOR RD Congo was informed of the situation and realized that a delegation of the CIAT (including EU Ambassadors) were trapped in Bemba's residence. MONUC prepared to intervene with an Uruguayan company about half an hour later. Shortly

after, Bemba's helicopter was reported to be on fire in front of his residence. The Residences of General Numbi (Cdr N'Dolo) and General Kisambia (CHOD DRC FARDC) were attacked by MLC. FCdr EUFOR RD Congo Major General Damay, an operations expert with significant military credentials, decided to mediate together with MONUC between both factions. Both Force Commanders negotiated with General Kisambia and Bemba to achieve a ceasefire. Around 1730h the MONUC Uruguayan company and the EUFOR Forces Capable of Immediate Reaction, a Spanish company, were deployed to the area. MONUC forces occupied a buffer zone between the Republican Guards and Bemba's residence. At 1845h the fire exchange ended but the troops remained in their positions. At 1850h General Kisambia appeared on TV. He ordered all troops to return to their barracks (Sundaram, 2006a). The ambassadors were able to leave Bemba's residence under MONUC protection.

The accusation that EUFOR RD Congo reacted very late is not justified, because MONUC requested support only in the late afternoon of 21 August. Once requested, EUFOR RD Congo reacted appropriately and quickly. In cooperation with MONUC, the crisis was defused within a few hours.

EUFOR RD Congo Special Forces and the German/Dutch Task Group were ordered to Kinshasa immediately (*Sueddeutsche.de*, 2006b). All Task Force platoons had been in Kinshasa at least once for training and preparation. What the Special Forces did during the August incidents is classified and therefore not publicly known, but it can be assumed that they were in Kinshasa in sufficient numbers for employment if necessary. The German/Dutch Task Group secured the airport and MONUC forces were present in the Gombe district on 22 August 2006.

The above incidents allowed for a quick reaction of EUFOR RD Congo, because personnel recovery of Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) in imminent danger had to be conducted. In this case, the MONUC Commander could directly approach EUFOR without involving New York to ask for EU support and the EUFOR Force Commander could react without waiting for permission from Brussels via the OHQ (Hickmann, 2006, 7). EUFOR RD Congo could position itself as a mutually respected impartial authority from the perspective of both presidential candidates, thus increasing its credibility (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 44).

A Joint Declaration on Cessation of Fighting and Redeployment was not formally signed, but agreed to by the parties, and officially announced on the evening of 22 August. This declaration included the prerequisites needed for establishing the "High Commission", headed by UN SRSG

William Swing. According to the declaration, Bemba and Kabila had to withdraw their forces and return to the status quo. Furthermore, it was agreed that the Congolese Police would resume their regular duties. EUFOR participated in verification measures (Joint Verification Teams did reconnaissance missions three times a week (BMVg, 2006a, 10; EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 44)) to increase its visibility as independent from MONUC. No MONUC and EUFOR troops participated in “enforcement patrols” (Press Briefing FHQ, 23 October 2006). The European Union urged both candidates to conduct a positive campaign, in a spirit of reconciliation and national consensus. To this end, it asked them to agree and adhere to a code of conduct (Council of the European Union, 2006c, 9).

As a reaction to the situation in Kinshasa, MONUC deployed an additional company from Lumbumbashi to Kinshasa on 23 August 2006. From the military perspective, this meant additional stabilization forces for the situation in Kinshasa. The Council of the European Union noted that cooperation between the EU military operation EUFOR RD Congo and MONUC, together with the EU’s reinforced police mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), was instrumental in maintaining stability during the electoral process (Council of the European Union, 2006k).

On 8 September, the CEI released the results of the parliamentary elections, revealing that no single party gained the 251 seats needed to secure a majority. Kabila’s PPRD had won 111 seats, while Bemba’s MLC had won 64 seats (*IRINnews.org*, 2006a). On 14 September the final results of the first round of the presidential ballot were issued. Kabila received 44.81 percent, Bemba 20.01 percent and Gizenga 13.06 percent.

Jean-Pierre Bemba’s TV and radio station caught fire on 18 September, causing local unrest. Due to the firm stance of a small MONUC element backed by the visible presence of a EUFOR patrol, the security situation remained under control. Except for this incident, the security situation remained calm throughout September. However, an atmosphere of political tension was still present. Therefore, EUFOR RD Congo maintained continuous presence missions in Kinshasa (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 45).

During a meeting with Federal Minister of Defence Jung on 26 September Bemba expressed a desire for a prolonged stay of EUFOR RD Congo in the DRC until January. Jung, however, emphasized the German position that EUFOR should begin to leave the DRC by the end of November (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006o, 9).

Toward the second ballot and the approach of the end of the mission, political discussions and calls for a prolonging of the operation increased.

There was some discussion whether the inauguration of the president and its new government was still part of the electoral process, which had not been clearly defined. Strong international political pressure was put on the EU and EUFOR RD Congo to stay longer in the DRC and absorb all consequences connected to this decision (new UN mandate, new German parliamentary decision process and devise a new mandate). France in particular pushed to prolong the mission (Clement, 2007, 31). Despite this pressure, many troop-contributing governments, particularly Germany, but also the Netherlands and Spain insisted on a timely termination as initially mandated and planned (*Die Zeit*, 2006a). Conversely, the French FCdr Major General Damay did not believe in a timely termination, and stressed repeatedly that EUFOR RD Congo had to stay at least until after the inauguration of the new president scheduled for 10 December (Schmidt, 2006, 76; *Neues Deutschland*, 2006). These demands were immediately rejected by Federal Minister of Defence Jung (Kort, 2006, 1).

The August incidents influenced EUFOR and MONUC operations for the final ballot of the presidential elections on 29 October. The analysis was that the second and third week after election day and the announcement of the results would be a critical and decisive phase for EUFOR RD Congo (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 45). The EUFOR On Call Forces were almost completely deployed to Kinshasa, suggesting that Chris Patten's call for a more proactive stance and specifically increased deployment of EUFOR RD Congo soldiers into Kinshasa in order to increase the number of available combat troops was unnecessary (Patten, 2006, 2). From the beginning of November, EUFOR RD Congo and MONUC concentrated nearly all available troops in Kinshasa. During operation *Resolute Sentry* (7–30 November), the EUFOR On-Call Forces had been deployed to Kinshasa. Now all manoeuvre forces, conventional infantry forces and most of the special operation forces were present at the strategic focal point of Kinshasa. One infantry company and certain special forces assets stayed in Gabon in order to maintain some flexibility. In Kinshasa itself, the governmental and diplomatic quarter of Gombe was continuously monitored in close coordination with MONUC (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 46–7). At the beginning of November, roughly 1,200 (Perras, 2006a, 10) to 1300 (*Spiegel Online*, 2006j) EUFOR troops were deployed to Kinshasa. MONUC also adjusted its force composition in Kinshasa and its concept of operation and presence in the pivotal district of Gombe. From the beginning of November Gombe was divided between MONUC and EUFOR.

Prior to the announcement, EUFOR did some patrolling in preparation of a possible employment on request by MONUC. During their patrols, MONUC used armoured vehicles and trucks while the troops wore helmets and carried flak jackets. By contrast, EUFOR tried to appear deescalating, which meant smaller vehicles and no helmets. Very often EUFOR troops walked rather than drove during their Presence Missions. EUFOR troops and vehicles carried weapons, but in the most deescalating mode possible.

After the decisive engagement of MONUC and EUFOR in August and the adaptation of the daily conduct of operations, political tensions decreased in Kinshasa. Growing agreement between the two main camps could be observed. Nevertheless, some resentment and distrust remained between the camps.

On 29 October the final ballot of the presidential elections took place in a generally peaceful and orderly manner with very few incidents (Perras, 2006c, 7). Only 2 deaths were reported in the north (*Spiegel Online*, 2006d). EUFOR remained in a highly visible monitoring role, concentrating on Kinshasa (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 46). Due to inclement weather, there was a lower voter turnout for the second ballot (*Spiegel Online*, 2006j). The weather may have also resulted in the relatively calm situation, with no significant riots and violence (*Die Zeit*, 2006b). MONUC and EUFOR welcomed the peaceful course of the elections and praised the exemplary work of the independent electoral commission (BMVg, 2006b, 4). The final presidential ballot underlined EUFOR's reputation as an impartial force.

In early November the contenders issued a joint statement asking their supporters to remain calm and avoid violence and vowing not to challenge the outcome of the polls by force (Spokesman for the SG UN, 2006). Nevertheless, violence broke out in Kinshasa on 11 November, as the initial results of the final ballot were announced. The police took action against supporters of Jean-Pierre Bemba, who accused the acting president of massive electoral fraud during the final ballot. In total, four people died (*Welt Kompakt*, 2006b). During the clashes in Gombe, MONUC and EUFOR forces seized positions, monitored the scene, and were ready to act. Finally the Congolese National Police and FARDC were successful in containing the unrest and regaining control without any further assistance (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 47).

Bemba continued to question the result (*Spiegel Online*, 2006h), as his defeat became clearer (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006r, 9), despite the fact

that the ballot obviously was conducted properly and closely observed so that significant fraud would have become apparent (Perras, 2006b, 4). Eventually Kabila officially achieved 58.05 percent of the votes and Bemba 41.95 percent (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006p, 8). Bemba took legal action against the final results at the Supreme Court (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006c, 7). On 21 November fighting between the rival parties took place at the Supreme Court and MONUC had to intervene. “Although EUFOR was not requested to support MONUC ... the visible and determined posture of EUFOR troops close to the hot spot proved to be a strong back up for the MONUC QRF, ...” (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 48).

The Supreme Court had to confirm the final results by 30 November (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006s, 9). Dozens of Bemba’s militias had left Kinshasa by 24 November – a positive sign. Simultaneously, Bemba agreed to take only legal action against the results of the final ballots (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006e, 10). The Supreme Court rejected Bemba’s complaints. Thus the final result of presidential elections became incontestable on 27 November 2006 (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006d, 11). During the following day, isolated clashes occurred in Kinshasa, while heavily armed local army and police forces, along with MONUC forces, patrolled in the city. Meanwhile, EUFOR RD Congo forces were preparing for their redeployment beginning 1 December 2006 (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006f, 10) as the execution phase and the mandate ended on 30 November 2006 at midnight (Yacoubian and Mercado, 2006).

According to the OpCdr Lieutenant General Viereck, the Rules of Engagement, which were elaborated through OHQ and FHQ, were adequate. Also, the Force Concept proved useful (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006). EUFOR RD Congo was operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and had very precise RoE. They were “given authority from the highest level to open fire — but only under strict guidelines.” This meant using minimum force and only if absolutely necessary. Any action had to be carried out in proportion to the level of aggression (*IRINnews.org*, 2006b). The OpCdr and the FCdr were given the necessary flexibility to fulfil their tasks. In general, every effort was made to control the situation and achieve the overall objectives without the use of force. The reproach that the mandate was not sufficient and that EUFOR did not have enough troops in Kinshasa (*Zeit Online*, 2006c) is not justified.

The operational idea to use the least amount of interference necessary (principle of escalation) proved correct. EUFOR would only participate if

needed, after utilizing local authorities and MONUC. During the execution phase, however, it became obvious that EUFOR must not constrain its actual visibility in Kinshasa to N'Dolo. EUFOR reacted quickly to this insight and established "Presence Missions" in Kinshasa. The operational concept was continuously adapted to the requirements in close coordination with MONUC. The operation strongly relied on, and was accompanied by, extensive civilian measures.

Within 1000 km of Kinshasa, no troops with similar capabilities to EUFOR RD Congo were available. Reconnaissance assets were capable of gathering information both during the day and at night. EUFOR's good intelligence was required for the defensive and potentially escalatory approach of the mission. The employment of UAVs was crucial (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2006j, 8). The troops were well equipped, night combat capable, and air-mobile. Discipline was exemplary. From the outset, all participating troops were adequately trained and required to be prepared for all possible options.

Throughout the mission, and especially during the execution phase, the national military representation, National liaison teams, and liaison officers in the OHQ proved very useful. During the mission, liaison teams and officers from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden worked together in Potsdam (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 54). Flexible and beneficial arrangements with individual troop-contributing nations could be made through these elements, often on short notice. The national liaison teams from France and Belgium were explicitly commended for their pragmatic and helpful approach. Also, the established liaison organisation in DRC and the information exchange worked very well. The EU OHQ concept proved excellent, as all Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS) were personally known to the OpCdr in advance and the Primary Augmentees were well trained (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006).

From a logistical perspective the real life support worked without significant problems. Any problems which did occur were due to the individual contractors rather than the multinational approach. EUFOR RD Congo had outstanding medical support with excellent quality at its disposal. Germany provided 80 percent of the medical support troops (Sanitätsdienst der Bundeswehr, 2006).

The exemplary and excellent information campaign was continued also during the execution phase. The media response to the mission of EUFOR RD Congo was mainly positive (Clement, 2007, 31; Ehrhart, 2007, 83),

while underlining that EUFOR RD Congo had never been pushed toward its limits during the overall operation (Perras, 2006e, 4; Clement, 2007, 31). EUFOR RD Congo accomplished its mission.

Redeployment

The redeployment phase started on 1 December 2006. The main challenge was to conduct it in a secure and coordinated way. It was also a risky and crucial part of the operation, because there was a threat of riots. A failure of the redeployment could have meant a failure of the overall operation.

A redeployment of this scale was a novelty for the EU: Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia was much different in size and range, and Operation ARTEMIS was not a true multinational effort. The planning for the redeployment phase started in late August 2006 (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 37).

There was some inconsistency between the UN Security Council Resolution and the different Council-approved decision-making and planning documents of the European Union, which had consequences for the redeployment and the validity of the Rules of Engagement. The UN Security Council Resolution “authorizes, for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of EUFOR R.D.Congo in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Security Council, 2006). Whereas *Article 1* of the Council Joint Action states: “The European Union shall conduct a military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process...” *Article 15* calls for an end of the military operation “...four months after the date of the first round of elections in DRC” (*Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 116*, 2006, 98-101).

According to the OPLAN, a military operation consists of four phases: preparation, deployment, execution and redeployment. Thus there is an inconsistency between the two documents. Whereas the Council Joint Action, as legal basis for EUFOR RD Congo, addressed the overall military operation (including redeployment, although not explicitly stated), the UN Security Council Resolution addressed only the four-month execution phase of the military operation and “invites the European Union” in *Article 7* of the resolution “to take all appropriate steps with a view to the well-coordinated disengagement of its force following the completion of its mandate” (Security Council, 2006).

“Operation EUFOR RD Congo was successfully concluded on 30 November 2006” (Council of the European Union, 2006i) but at that point the redeployment had not yet occurred. Hence, the Council Joint Action and its decision to launch the operation (*Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 163*, 2006, 16) covered only the preparation, deployment and execution phases. There was a lack of consistency and coherence between the pivotal UN and EU documents pertaining to the operation, although it was clear from the outset that the UN mandate would end after four months.

The discussions around prolonging the mandate caused serious uncertainty and reluctance to make contingency plans until after the inauguration of the new president. France and Belgium were in favour of prolonging the mandate and the mission (Ehrhart, 2007, 85), whereas Germany, the Netherlands and Spain were against it.

Initially the OpCdr was granted Transfer of Authority (ToA) only until the end of the mandate at midnight 30 November 2006. At the Main Redeployment Conference, the OpCdr requested an expansion of ToA (Operational Control) until the troops left the DRC. This was easily granted.

Finally, after examination by EU legal services and agreed by the PSC, it became apparent that the RoEs were only linked to the UN mandated timeframe. There was no possibility of extending the RoEs. Thus there were no common RoEs available for the redeployment phase.

Article 7 of the UN resolution (Security Council, 2006) did not allow use of force as in the previous operation. The redeployment tasks did not coincide with the previous mission tasks. Therefore all previous RoE were deactivated on 1 December. The redeployment was conducted on the basis of the Council Joint Action of 27 April 2006 and the PSC approved the *Use of Force Policy for Redeployment*, which was limited to self-defence and force-protection measures. Hence, tough action in order to enforce necessary measures would have been prohibited during redeployment. The command and control structure was adapted and modified for the redeployment phase in order to ensure central and direct command and control of the multinational force at any time. If there had been incidents and violence in Kinshasa during the redeployment phase, it would have been the responsibility of the police (PNC), the Congolese army (FARDC) and MONUC to intervene (Yacoubian and Mercado, 2006).

The redeployment took less time than the deployment, due to the experience of the deployment phase. Moreover, taking things apart is easier and faster than putting them together and some materials and infrastructure

remained in DRC. A special Hand Over Team (HOT) was established and tasked to prepare and execute the handover of infrastructure used by EUFOR RD Congo to the owners or to local authorities in Libreville. They also monitored handover activities executed by FHQ personnel in Kinshasa (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 40).

Like the deployment, the redeployment was a national responsibility coordinated as much as possible by the EUMCC at the OHQ. Four redeployment conferences were held in Potsdam (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 40). Overall roughly 85 strategic redeployment transports were conducted. Most of these were executed by air, as only five were done by ship. The nations conducted about 25 land convoys with 15 to 20 vehicles each to the ports of Boma and Matadi. Due to the constraints of the German parliamentary mandate, (German troops could not conduct land convoys), the German material redeployment had to go by aircraft from Kinshasa to Libreville and from there by ship, causing additional (national) costs. In total, roughly 2300 troops and about 11 000 tons of material had to be redeployed.

The bulk of personnel redeployment was finished prior to Christmas, as promised by German government officials. The rest of the troops returned to their home countries on 10 January 2007. Only a very small number of troops remained (in order to monitor and conduct the final administrative and financial steps. All in all the redeployment phase went well without significant incidents or delays.

The redeployment phase was formally finished when all EU military forces, their related support, and national elements had departed from the AO. The HOT left theatre on 31 January 2007 (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 40). The Council of the European Union declared the official termination of the operation and simultaneously the deactivation of the OHQ in Potsdam, Germany on 27 February 2007.

Summary and Assessment

Operation EUFOR RD Congo was of a military-political, rather than purely military nature. The mandate was limited with respect to time, space and scope, and supplemented already-existing missions in the DRC (Baach, 2006). Strong political pressure rested on the military, especially on the Operation Commander Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck.

The mission had a clear multinational, European profile and demonstrated the functionality of ESDP. Strong political-military cohesion and

multinationalism was key to the success of the mission. In particular, the simultaneous appearance of political and military personnel in theatre was crucial to its success. In political issues, EUSR Ajello was always accompanied by Lieutenant General Viereck, and vice versa in military issues. This united political-military approach was applied both in advance of EUFOR RD Congo and during the operation itself. First came the political-military announcement and information, followed by an information campaign. Only after these were completed did the “boots appear on the ground” (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006).

The general objective of EUFOR RD Congo was not to reconstruct the DRC, but to foster democracy by securing the electoral process. The protection of EUFOR’s impartiality was paramount. This meant cushioning the existing interests of single troop-contributing nations. EUFOR RD Congo acted impartially, and tried to stay connected to the population. In this way it gained credibility and acted as a positive security factor in the DRC.

EUFOR RD Congo was the first military EU operation where an OHQ was successfully activated and employed according to EU concepts. The build-up went smoothly and the performance of the OHQ can rightly be compared to one of a standing headquarters. The EU OHQ concept is excellent (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006).

The organization of EUFOR into on-site forces in Kinshasa, highly mobile, rapidly deployable on call forces in Gabon, and a strategic reserve force in Europe offered adequate flexibility to conduct the operation successfully and adapt as the situation required. The force composition was appropriate, according to Lieutenant General Viereck, with sufficient forces in Kinshasa and a strong on call force. EUFOR’s key capabilities included its UAVs, as well as its unique day and night combat and anti-tank capability. The force fulfilled the minimum requirements of a responsible operation (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006). The OpCdr assessed the seconded ground and special operations forces as excellent, while the air forces were merely deemed satisfactory, due to limited availability. Despite the very pragmatic approach of the OpCdr regarding national caveats, they nevertheless posed a huge challenge to the conduct of daily operations. Nations should try to minimize their constraints, as this would provide the OpCdr with more flexibility and ease in planning and conducting operations. However, in an OpCdr’s

view, decisions were always made in the spirit of the operation, even where national command restrictions were in place (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006).

Operations were conducted appropriately in all situations, with adequate Rules of Engagement as required by EU concepts until the end of the execution phase. During the redeployment phase, the RoE could have proven problematic if serious incidents had occurred.

Deployment, logistical support and redeployment went well. A multinational approach proved to be successful. The logistical footprint was minimized. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement: for various reasons the plan to create a single-channel follow-on-support could not be realized. This challenging endeavour should be attempted in future operations (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 30).

Protection of human rights and gender issues were systematically addressed in all phases of the operation including the training for EUFOR RD Congo personnel (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 35/62).

EUFOR and MONUC represented two different approaches: EUFOR RD Congo demonstrated the determination of Europe to contribute to a peaceful election process, whereas MONUC represented a longer-duration stabilization operation (*INTRANET aktuell*, 2006). While the military component of EUFOR RD Congo was important in order to ensure a secure environment during the election process, the political message of the mission was paramount.

The mandated timeframe was not well-coordinated to optimally support the electoral and democratic process in the DRC. However, the responsibility for the peaceful conduct of this process rests primarily with local authorities which are supported by MONUC, other EU missions, other IOs and NGOs. Cooperation between MONUC and EUFOR proved excellent.

Strategic assumptions proved correct: the reinforced presence of EUFOR in Kinshasa was the key to peaceful elections. When stopping the August violence MONUC and EUFOR earned the recognition and support of the Congolese people. The prudent course of action during the August incidents fostered EUFOR's positive reputation. Opinion polls showed EUFOR was regarded positively by 84 percent of the population. Also EUFOR's deescalating behaviour and dress code during normal operations contributed to this positive standing (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006).

The European Union is capable of conducting a 2,000 troop-size operation worldwide and on short notice, with termination as scheduled. Multinationalism worked, although it was a demanding process (Interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006). However, the model of EUFOR RD Congo cannot and may not be transferred to other missions unconditionally. The basic conditions fostered the overall success of the operation.

EUFOR was a successful operation with only few and minor flaws. It conducted an excellent information operations campaign in DRC. Unfortunately, however, the mission was widely misunderstood by the public at home and by politicians. This was due to inadequate information campaigns by both the EU and participating nations.

Lessons Learned

At the political-strategic level policy, capability and structural/procedural lessons can be identified. From a policy perspective it has been shown that a prophylactic approach with a “sound moral position” (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 8), clear task, mission, and limited duration fosters external EU and ESDP credibility. This approach has also increased the willingness of member states to contribute resources to future (not necessarily only military) ESDP operations. In this respect, time restrictions can be positive, but delays and unexpected developments have to be taken into consideration when determining the timeframe, in order to avoid possible negative side effects as experienced towards the end of EUFOR RD Congo. It is wise to avoid determining an end-date too early. Short-term military operations during a crucial period of time to ensure stability and peace can make sense, but only if they are part of a broader long-term strategy (Wogau, 2007, 22). The political-military cohesion and multinationalism of the mission was key to its success. All players and representatives worked closely together on all levels (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 8). Moreover, a successful mission is guaranteed if the mission is seen as part of a policy agreed-to by all parties and with the assent of the local population. It is crucial to avoid the impression of an occupational force (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 7).

There seems to be a general consensus and understanding that the EU has to improve its operational capabilities (Jung, 2007). Since a strong EU operational capability is of utmost importance, it would be wise to establish

a permanent Operations Centre in order to improve the strategic planning capability within the EUMS, particularly during the early stages of a possible operation (interview not for attribution; Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 7).

From a structural-procedural perspective, this operation showed that an early strategic dialogue with consultations between the United Nations and European Union has to take place as soon as a crisis appears and before a request for support is launched. Structured political consultation, as well as a mutual understanding between the EU and UN, has to be enhanced through dialogue and exchange of information (BMVg, 2007, 5, 7).

Bureaucratic conflicts within the EU between the Council and the Commission, and between the European institutions and member states, must be resolved (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 7). Effective parliamentary control over ESDP operations also has to be ensured. The Council of the European Union decides on launch and termination, but there is no collective body of parliaments with the power to approve or end an ESDP mission. In order to ensure adequate parliamentary control, close cooperation between the European Parliament and the national parliaments has to be established (Wogau, 2007, 23).

Unexpected interference in the planning process by the two main troop-contributing nations also caused confusion. The desire of potential framework nations to contain the risk of being forced to conduct an operation almost alone is understandable. German internal political problems contributed to this interference. Consequently, the process should be reviewed. In future, a solid assessment of necessary military resources should be incorporated into the political-conceptual discussions. The OHQ should participate in this process from the very beginning.

At the military-strategic level operational, structural-procedural, as well as financial lessons can be identified. From an operational perspective, strict impartiality as well as unity of command and control is pivotal. Acceptance by the local people is important and can be supported by a social and human approach (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 8). A decisive and well equipped military force in combination with soft power tools is a precondition for success (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 8). National Liaison Teams and Liaison Officers proved very useful and valuable. It is therefore important to emphasize this aspect during the building up of OHQ and FHQ for future missions. Additionally, good intelligence is critical and the availability and employment of appropriate intelligence-gathering means is important. EUFOR RD Congo was the first ESDP operation to

integrate a gender perspective to a military operation. Incorporating this perspective proved very positive and might be a model for coming ESDP operations (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 63).

The process of eliminating or limiting caveats in future missions has to be contemplated (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 9). The main caveats and constraints were connected to the critical resource of air assets and their availability. Therefore, it seems prudent not only to demand a certain number of air assets, but also a sufficient number of flying hours or a guarantee of the availability of the dedicated assets by the troop-contributing nation.

Members of the CIMIC team must be part of the initial reconnaissance mission to the Area of Operation. This would enable early contact with key players, and provide an assessment of the infrastructure and living conditions of the local population. These are important in order to identify Quick Impact Projects and their respective financing, as well as determining the necessary CIMIC force. Moreover, a CIMIC element should be part of the initial deployment, in order to establish the appropriate liaison structure which would underline the main role of providing good civil-military coordination. Also, movement and transport expertise has to be integrated into the earliest part of the decision-making and planning process.

A short time-frame for the execution phase is a challenge, because shortly after the deployment has been finished, redeployment already has to be planned. According to current regulations, deployment and redeployment is a national responsibility, but what might work for the deployment is not necessarily suitable for the redeployment. Maximum multinationality for deployment and redeployment is advised.

The redeployment phase should be within the mandated time period and supported by an adequate mandate and RoE. The relevant basic documents of the UN and EU, like the Security Council Resolution and the Council Joint Action, have to be clear, coherent and consistent.

With a view to optimising resources and the effectiveness of multinational operations, measures to harmonize equipment should be promoted, so that interoperability is increased (Wogau, 2007, 23). EUFOR RD Congo also showed the need for more personnel that have a common operational experience (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 7-8). If future missions are supported by private contractors, it will be important to clarify the status and the protection of the personnel working for the contractors. (Wogau, 2007, 23).

The appointment of the Operation Commander at the earliest possible stage is desirable from a structural-procedural perspective in order to incorporate his military expertise into the political strategic decision-making and planning process. Additionally OHQ and FHQ should be activated simultaneously, in order to ensure point of contacts in both HQs as well as close coordination and cooperation. Procedures for OHQ and FHQ manning worked according to the respective EU concepts and documents, but the generation process for Additional Augmentees through the Force Generation Process was suboptimal. The response to additional requirements for specialist and experts was not always satisfactory; therefore, the inclusion of these specialist posts into the Primary Augmentee Database is desirable. For future commitments the OHQ structure should be planned with a larger number of Primary Augmentees, who should be nominated in advance by the nations. This could optimize efficiency and would require minimal Additional Augmentees.

With respect to EU–UN cooperation, both organizations should develop standard arrangements for early and comprehensive liaison in the planning and implementation phases of a joint engagement. Moreover, they should agree on a clear delineation of tasks and responsibilities, which would also allow for some flexibility. Furthermore, checklists, model arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) should be developed, particularly for logistics and administrative support. Information exchange, including arrangements for exchange of classified information with respective hardware, should also be developed. Mechanisms that allow for a structured exchange of lessons learned in the wake of a joint engagement should be established (BMVg, 2007, 7).

The following financial lessons can be identified: The CIMIC funding mechanism should be reexamined. The budget must reflect an integrated approach by a multinational force and not rely on national focuses.

Due to the obvious challenges in the field of transport coordination and contracting, it is necessary to find fair and universally acceptable solutions to enable a united approach in acquiring transportation. Ideally, troop-contributing nations should work together to delegate authority to acquire and contract services. But in cases where a common approach cannot be agreed upon, ATHENA²⁴ *Article 27* (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 55-56) also

²⁴ ATHENA. At http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=746&lang=EN&mode=g.

enables the fund to cover certain expenditures not included in the common costs in order to simplify contracting in theatre. The “nation-borne costs” are later billed to each respective nation. Thus, nations need not compete for in-country resources. Instead, a solution on a multinational level can be achieved, with better terms for all parties involved. An enhancement of this tool would help to improve the cost-efficiency of ESDP operations, and lower costs would encourage nations to participate. The ATHENA financial rules are a good start.

EUFOR RD Congo entered into approximately 200 contracts on behalf of the nations. Therefore it is important to have a financial advisor, in addition to the political, legal and gender advisors in the OHQ, who is familiar with all regulations and procedures in order to advise the OpCdr and its staff on contracting and budgeting (interview with Lieutenant General Karl-Heinz Viereck, 10 November 2006). CJ8 administrative and contracting capabilities and expertise have to be available at the OHQ level from the outset of activation.

5. Conclusion and Way Ahead

The arguments of Chris Patten (Patten, 2006, 2) and Rolf Clement (Clement, 2006, 38), with respect to the size, mandate and longevity of EUFOR RD Congo can be clearly refuted²⁵. A small troop footprint was deliberately chosen for Kinshasa, the mandate was Chapter VII and sufficient, and the end date of the mission was politically desired and not militarily decided. The mission was intended as only one contribution of a comprehensive, coherent and lasting EU approach for Africa and DRC. Hence, EUFOR fulfilled its tasks and achieved its objectives. If the political decision-making bodies explicitly define an *end date* and not an *end state* for a mission, it is not correct and not conducive to start a discussion later about an end state that has to be achieved. Africa plays an increasingly important role for Europe, and developments in Africa directly touch European interests. There were sound reasons for the EU and its member states to commit to EUFOR RD Congo.

EUFOR RD Congo was the first *autonomous* military operation in support of the UN. For the first time, Germany acted as the framework nation and also contributed the OpCdr as well as a significant number of troops. From an international perspective, this was a strategic step forward for both the EU and Germany (Brauß, 2006). EUFOR RD Congo can be seen as a striking example of the attempt to mobilize more intensely the

²⁵ All interviews not for attribution were conducted between November 2006 and March 2007 with persons who were involved in EUFOR RD Congo and had direct knowledge of the operation.

Europeans with their comparably high-quality capabilities for UN operations (*ibid.*). As DRC Ambassador Corneille Yambu-a-Ngoyi to the EU stated: “The mission was a success because the EU troops were seen as part of a collaborative political action and not as an occupying force” (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 10). EUFOR RD Congo was, with few exceptions, conducted successfully according to the guidelines set, however widely misunderstood by the public and politicians at home.

In recent years the EU has increasingly specified its general CFSP objectives outlined in *Article 11* of the *Treaty on the European Union* regarding the African continent (Ehrhart, 2006a, 3). Nevertheless, the EU only spends about 50 million euros annually for its CFSP. This will be increased to 80 million euros by 2013. However, if the EU wants to enlarge its international presence and contribute to international security, the member states increasingly have to pool their own means to finance foreign policy together (Grimm, 2006, 93). Africa has become a central test bed for CFSP. Now actions must follow words and documents, such as in the ESS and the EU Africa Strategy (*ibid.*, 93).

Political consensus on a potential mission was and is reached relatively easily, but the nations’ real willingness to contribute the necessary troops is the deciding factor. The EU must achieve a united perspective so that future engagements are perceived as a common task by all member states. This is the only way to send a credible political signal of unity in a potential crisis region.

Mechanisms must be developed that ensure consultations between the UN and EU before an official request is made by the United Nations. It is necessary to avoid uncertainty and confusion as observed during the early decision-making and preparation stages of EUFOR RD Congo.

As a leading member of the EU, Germany has not only endorsed the ESS, but actively took part in its elaboration. Germany also actively participated in the development of the EU Battlegroup concept, the Civilian-Military Cell and is currently pushing forward the creation of an EU Operations Centre. Each of these carries responsibilities and duties. Germany has a great national interest in a strong and capable EU. Hence, Germany has to be prepared for future EU demands and challenges. The concept of increasing the importance and dynamic of ESDP has to be understood within the German strategic community, because ESDP holds great challenges and great chances for Germany.

It is too early to identify and measure the results of EUFOR RD Congo, but nevertheless some general observations can already be drawn. What was the outcome of EUFOR RD Congo for the EU and the DRC?

EUFOR RD Congo strengthened the credibility of the EU and its ESDP in the world and fostered the transition process in DRC. The successful termination of the transition process sent a positive signal towards the African continent. A democratically elected new government is ruling now in Kinshasa, strengthening not only the DRC, but also the region and the continent.

EUFOR RD Congo was also a demonstration of EU unity, determination and ability to deploy troops over a strategic distance. The EU proved its ability to conduct an autonomous multinational operation out of area in Africa. A French General even rated the success of EUFOR RD Congo as starting point for European forces (Perras, 2006d, 4). EUFOR RD Congo also fostered EU–UN cooperation. This may also mean future demands by the UN for EU military crisis-management operations.

Even the enthusiasm about the mission is justified, it has to be expressed with caution. Peace in Kinshasa is only half of the task, as long as militias terrorize the eastern parts of the DRC. It will take more years to stabilize the country; therefore the four-month EUFOR mission has to be assessed within the overall context. It is only one episode within the whole drama, whose end will be determined by the African actors themselves (Perras, 2006d, 4). It remains to be seen whether militias and governors accept the results of the polls in the long run. It will also be crucial how the losers react and behave. Their integration will be the key. From this perspective it was not a surprise to read in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on 24 March 2007, that heavy fighting had erupted in Kinshasa. Allegedly, numerous soldiers and civilians were killed, as foreign embassies were attacked and looting, as well as firebombing, took place (Raupp, 2007, 10).

The successful completion of EUFOR RD Congo resulted in a somewhat more stable democracy. The military presence was an important political signal, but the high expectations and eager anticipation of the Congolese population for the elections and connected future progress must not be disappointed. A fully coordinated long-term effort to further stabilize and develop the DRC is needed. Security, stability, democracy and prosperity have to be continuously improved. The vote was not the culmination of the peace process, nor does it guarantee a stable democracy. State institutions have to become far more functional (Stearns and Wrong, 2006).

Moreover, the electoral process has to be completed through senatorial and local elections. It is important that a constructive relationship between the newly-elected democratic institutions develops, as well as well functioning relationships between central and regional levels of government (Council of the European Union, 2006d).

For the way ahead, three policy priorities should be pursued by the international community: diplomatic and political coordination, support to DRC's emerging institutions and securing all regions of the country (International Crisis Group, 2007a, 1-2). The international community must invest more in creating all other fundamentals of democracy with appropriate checks and balances: a genuine sense of governmental accountability, independent courts and most importantly, a strong parliament. The legislature's impact at the national and local level has to be strengthened. The courts must be given the salaries, infrastructure and resources necessary to do their job, and to resist and fight corruption. Last, but not least, the DRC's resources must be used to benefit the whole population (Stearns and Wrong, 2006).

The overarching challenge remains to integrate short term crisis-management activities into a longer-term strategy. Structural factors, such as governance, poverty, inequality, access and utilization of natural resources have to be addressed. Development cooperation and regional integration are crucial, complementary to traditional peace and security activities.

The UN and EU have to continue their commitment to the DRC in order to achieve lasting stabilization, through building up solid structures and authorities, while creating a positive image among the people. Africa is a strategic priority for Europe. The EU-Africa partnership has made a real breakthrough in the DRC. The EU emphasises African ownership and intends to take on a supportive role (Security & Defence Agenda, 2007, 7). In this respect, the EU should adopt a coherent, comprehensive, multifaceted, and long-term approach. In principle there is a consensus within the European Union that the further support and EU commitment to the DRC will mainly be of a civilian nature, and that support of Security Sector Reform is pivotal (Joint statement, 2006).

Appendix 1

Chronology: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 1908 - 2005

- 1908** Congo established as a Belgian colony.
- 1960** **June:** Congo gains independence
- 1965** **November:** Joseph Mobutu seizes power and declares himself president in a coup, renaming the country Zaire
- 1991** Mobutu reluctantly agrees to establish multiparty politics. Despite creation of a transition parliament, the old structures of power survive.
- 1994** Ethnic strife and economic decline are further aggravated when more than one million civilians flee from Rwanda into the Kivu region. Amongst them are members of the Hutu militia responsible for the genocide committed against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
- 1996** *First Congo War.* Tensions from the neighbouring Rwanda war and genocide spill over to Zaire. Rwandan Hutu militia forces, which had fled Rwanda following the establishment of a Tutsi-led government, had been using Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire as a basis for incursions against Rwanda. These Hutu militia forces soon ally with the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) to launch a campaign against Congolese ethnic Tutsis in eastern Zaire. In turn, these Tutsis form a militia to defend themselves against attacks. When the Zairian government begins to escalate its massacres in November 1996, the Tutsi militias erupt in

rebellion against Mobutu. The Tutsi militia are soon joined by various opposition groups and supported by several countries, including Rwanda and Uganda. This coalition, led by Laurent-Desiré Kabila, becomes known as the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL). The AFDL, now seeking the broader goal of ousting Mobutu, make significant military gains in early 1997 (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 6)

- 1997** Following failed peace talks between Mobutu and Kabila in May 1997, Mobutu goes to Morocco, where he dies in the same year, and Kabila marches unopposed to Kinshasa on 20 May 1997. Kabila names himself president, consolidates power around himself and the AFDL, and returns the name of the country to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EU OHQ Potsdam, 2007, 6). However he does not fulfil the expectations of Uganda and Rwanda.
- 1998 August:** Rebellion against Kabila supported by Uganda and Rwanda develops from a civil war into the *Second Congo War*.
- 1999 July:** The *Lusaka Peace Accord* is signed as ceasefire agreement. Unfortunately neither side seriously tries to implement it.
- 2000 February:** Security Council authorizes the expansion of the UN peacekeeping force MONUC to 5500 in order to monitor the ceasefire, but fighting continues.
- 2001 January:** Assassination of Laurent Kabila. Joseph Kabila succeeds his father as head of state.
- October:** Unsuccessful Intracongolese Dialogue meetings in Addis Ababa.
- 2002 April:** *Sun City Agreement* signed.
- July:** *Pretoria Peace Accord* signed between DRC and Rwanda.
- September:** *Luanda Peace Accord* signed between DRC and Uganda.
- December:** *Accord Global et Inclusif* signed in Pretoria, marking the formal end of the Second Congo War.
- 2003 May:** Fights between hostile ethnic groups erupt in the border zone of the Ituri region near Uganda. Further civilian massacres

occur in Bunia during the summer 2003, despite 700 MONUC troops deployed to the region.

June: First autonomous EU military crisis management operation ARTEMIS launched to Bunia in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484.

July: The UN Security Council increases MONUC's troops to 10 800.

September: Termination of ARTMEMIS.

2004 June: MONUC fails to prevent the occupation of Bukavu by renegade RCD rebels. This leads to violent protests against MONUC:

October: The UN Security Council endorses another increase of MONUC troops to 16,700.

2005 May: Adoption of the new DRC constitution by the parliament.

December: New constitution backed by Congolese voters in a referendum. Request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for EU troops in support of MONUC during the election process in the DRC.

Appendix 2

Chronology: EUFOR RD Congo

Dec 2005

27 Dec UN request for European troops in support of MONUC during upcoming elections in the DRC.

Jan 2006

11/12 Jan Initial discussions dealing with the request held in Brussels

16 Jan Meeting of Chancellor Merkel and President Chirac in Blaesheim: both agree that in case of a military operation, Germany and France would each contribute one third of the troops.

30 Jan EUMS Technical Assessment Mission/Fact Finding Mission visits MONUC (to 2 Feb).

Feb 2006

09 Feb Presentation of the Option Paper

21 Feb DRC electoral law passes and is implemented by 10 Mar.

Mar 2006

06 Mar Defence Ministers' Meeting in Innsbruck: German Federal Minister of Defence Jung confirms the German willingness to take over the lead under four conditions.

- 14 Mar** German-French Council of Ministers in Berlin: Chancellor Merkel and President Chirac address their preference for a European military mission.
- 19 Mar** President of DRC agrees to EUFOR RD Congo.

Preparation Phase:

- 23 Mar** Approval of the Option Paper by the Council of the EU. Activation of EU OHQ Key Nucleus.
- 28 Mar** EU expresses its willingness to deploy a military mission to DRC.
- 29 Mar** Activation of the multinational Primary Augmentees by the EU OHQ.
- 31 Mar** Draft Initiating Military Directive issued by EUMS. Simultaneously the process of preparing the CONOPS was initiated at the EU OHQ.

Apr 2006

- 03/04 Apr** EUMS/OHQ Joint Fact Finding Mission in DRC.
- 04 Apr** PSC identifies Germany as the framework nation providing the OHQ and France providing the FHQ and names the possible operation EUFOR RD Congo.
- 21 Apr** Members of the Council General Secretariat, the EUMS and the OHQ brief representatives of the United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) on the ongoing preparations.
- 25 Apr** UNSC Resolution 1671
- 27 Apr** Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP and CONOPS approval

May 2006

- 03 May** First Force Generation Conference
- 10 May** Second Force Generation Conference
- 23 May** OPLAN and RoE agreed by PSC.
- 24 May** German cabinet decision in favour of German participation. First Logistics Movement Conference

29 May OPLAN and RoE approved by the Council of the EU.

Jun 2006

01 Jun German Bundestag votes in favour of German participation in EUFOR RD Congo.

07 Jun Second Logistics Movement Conference

12 Jun Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP:
Launching of the operation

Deployment Phase:

15 Jun Start of deployment.

Jul 2006

27 Jul End of deployment.

29 Jul Full Operational Capability

Execution Phase:

30 Jul Official start of EUFOR RD Congo and first round of presidential and parliamentary elections.

Aug 2006

08-16 Aug Operational rehearsal conducted by EUFOR RD Congo.

20 Aug Kinshasa clashes between police and Bemba- supporters.

21 Aug Preliminary results of first round presidential elections.
Clashes continue in Kinshasa.

22 Aug Release of diplomats from Bemba residence

Sep 2006

14 Sep First round results published.

18 Sep Fire in Bemba TV-station.

Oct 2006

29 Oct Second round of presidential elections and provincial elections.

Nov 2006

- 11 Nov** Kinshasa clashes between Bemba-supporters and police.
19 Nov Second round presidential and provincial elections results
21 Nov Fire set on DRC Supreme Court of Justice.
27 Nov Confirmation of the results by DRC Supreme Court of Justice.
30 Nov End of Mandate.

Redeployment Phase:**Dec 2006**

- 01 Dec** Start of redeployment
06 Dec Inauguration of President Kabila without incident.

Jan 2007

- 10 Jan** Main body of EUFOR RD Congo redeployed

Feb 2007

- 27 Feb** Council Decision to repeal Joint Action
2006/319/CFSP
Deactivation of EU OHQ Potsdam.

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