Darfur: Reflections on the Crisis and the Responses
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2009
Queen’s University’s Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security. This *Martello Paper* brings together seven original papers based on presentations at a workshop on Darfur held at Queen’s University on March 17, 2007 and sponsored by the Centre for International Relations and the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance project.

For more than five years, international concern with the humanitarian crisis in western Sudan has paralleled that with the armed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. While in the latter two cases robust intervention overthrowing brutal regimes was succeeded by a difficult international presence with uncertain prospects, in the case of Darfur the difficulty and uncertainty are up front, and a robust, decisive intervention remains unlikely.

Why has this been so? In different ways, these papers underline the paradoxes that Darfur poses for the international community in general and for Canada in particular. First, while it seems a case tailor-made for the Responsibility to Protect as enunciated in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, it has proved a non-starter even for the compromised version of the doctrine adopted by the United Nations in 2005. Second, beyond purely humanitarian concerns, the very considerations that render international action urgent – the regional spillover to Chad and the unstable Horn of Africa, the stakes for the UN, the EU and African security organizations, and the usual great-power rivalries – also serve to hobble it.
Third, while the Afghanistan mission was brought to Canadians by
government and the military without a lot of public involvement, Darfur
is a relatively “popular” international cause driven by civil society and the
media. It appeals to Canadians who regret the recent decline of Africa among
Canadian priorities and who see Darfur as a “purer” form of humanitarian
intervention than Afghanistan. On the other hand, the more that Canadi-
ans learn of its complexities, not to mention the diplomatic and logistical
requisites of a large-scale intervention there, the more Darfur may come to
look like another Afghanistan, not an alternative to it.

We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the
Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre
to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and
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Charles C. Pentland
Director, QCIR
July 2009
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Section I
The Crisis
1. Introduction

J. Andrew Grant

Introduction

The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is by nature a political one. The Darfur conflict has been largely portrayed in the international media in simplified, ahistoric terms with readily identifiable perpetrators and victims. Yet, this obscures the politicization of identity surrounding who is ‘Arab’ and who is ‘African’ (or ‘Black’), the multi-group competition over scarce land resources since the late-1930s, and regional conflict in and around Sudan. Against this backdrop, one must also consider the ramifications of elite competition within the political classes of Khartoum and the transition from a bipolar international system to one that is arguably unipolar and whose predominant power is waging a ‘War on Terror’. The Darfur crisis exhibits the characteristics of the so-called ‘new wars’ envisioned by scholars such as Mary Kaldor (2007) and Mark Duffield (2001), and draws attention to the importance of understanding emerging ‘regionalisms’, regional linkages, and processes (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003; Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003; Boås et al., 2005) at both the cross-border and sub-regional levels.

Few observers deny the existence of a humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Estimates of the number of deaths in the region since the crisis began in early 2003 range from 200,000 to 450,000.\(^1\) An additional 2.7 million individuals have been displaced by the violence in Darfur (Reeves, 2008; Reeves, 2007).

1. For an interesting discussion of the debates concerning the estimates of deaths in Darfur since 2003, see Eric Reeves (2007).
Holmes, 2007, 5). Armed groups and militias from all sides of the conflict have perpetrated hundreds – perhaps thousands – of reported and unreported acts of sexual violence against women and girls in Darfur since 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2008, 10-11). Given the complexity of the crisis and the most recent response by the international community – that is, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007 which established the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – this chapter attempts to place primacy on the political aspects of the situation in Darfur. Indeed, the incorporation of political deliberation has the best chance of instigating positive change. This is not meant to privilege politics over morality. Moral considerations, whether acknowledged or not, underpin myriad humanistic appeals ranging from peace-keeping to addressing genocide and other war crimes. It follows that moral considerations emerge in several of the chapters in this edited volume.

This chapter begins by tracing the roots of the Darfur crisis and examines the sluggish response by the international community. Next, the question of whether the Darfur crisis should be considered genocide is addressed. This supplies the reader with a preliminary introduction to the various issues and themes that are elaborated upon by the contributors to the edited monograph. The penultimate section of the chapter also provides a preview of the substantive aspects of subsequent chapters. The chapter concludes by assessing the prospects for peace in Darfur under the purview of UNAMID.

The Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur

Many reports cite February 2003 as the beginning of the present crisis in Darfur, which coincides with Khartoum’s decision to use the Janjaweed to respond to an uprising by the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in the region. It should be noted that the Sudanese government employed what are now referred to as Janjaweed militias as early as the 1990s (de Waal, 2007a; Prunier, 2005; Flint and de Waal, 2005). However,
numerous episodes of violent conflict in the Darfur region have been recorded over the past 70 years. These conflicts, both relatively large and small, have been based on disagreements over access to various natural resources, such as sources of water or grazing lands for cattle. The practice of ‘cattle-raiding’ and related banditry also led to the outbreak of violent conflict among the groups living in the region. These conflicts did not escalate to full-fledged rebellions, for they were defused by either group leaders using traditional methods of compensation and reconciliation or governing authorities through mediation.

The primary ingredient leading to the severity (and indeed complexity) of the present crisis in Darfur is the politicization of ethnicity in Sudan, which may be traced to the colonial era under the British. The British practice of decentralization via traditional authorities in Africa was implemented in Sudan. In the late 1910s, colonial administrators began to modify Sudan’s “existing political systems and structures based on flexible kinship, thereby creating the prevailing political reality of today” (Manger, 2007, 11). Ethnicity – which at the best of times connotes troublesome allusions to racial purity – became further politicized in Sudan beginning in the 1920s and intensified in the 1940s through its use as a unifying device by nationalist movements and nascent political parties in the north (Barakat, 1993; Manger, 2007). By the 1960s, similar rhetoric was employed by Sudanese groups in the south and to a lesser degree in the east and west. While the politicization of ethnicity served to unify some, it excluded others.

By the late 1980s, the combination of sustained drought and nearly two decades of top-down land redistribution initiatives by the government of Sudan fomented animosities in the Darfur region. Large-scale battles between ‘Arabs’ and various ‘African’ tribal groups in Darfur erupted in 1987, 1994, 1996, and 2003. Khartoum continued to undermine customary land-use practices and redistribute lands in order to compensate ‘Arab’ groups for assisting the central government in its struggles against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south and rebellious ‘African tribes’ in the west.

Operating as proxies of the Sudanese government in its battle against the SLM/A and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Janjaweed militias are known to have conducted a brutal campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleansing in Darfur. Throughout April and May 2003, SLM/A-JEM forces scored a series of military victories against government forces, capturing military assets such as aircraft, weapons, and ammunition as well as government soldiers (Flint and de Waal, 2005). With the international
community focused on Sudan’s military as part of the government’s negotiations with the SPLM/A in the southern part of the country, the Janjaweed militias served as Khartoum’s best option for reprisals disguised as counter-insurgents.

The Sudanese government was also being watched by the United States. The George W. Bush Administration was keen on keeping tabs on Khartoum due to its growing oil sales to and arms purchases from China. Furthermore, the ‘Christian Right’, which comprised an important part of the Republican base of domestic political support for the Bush Administration, coordinated lobbying efforts for action against the country in order to protect Christian groups living in Sudan (Huliaras, 2006). In 2004, these two factors contributed to Colin Powell’s famous statement that the crisis in Darfur was a case of genocide. Despite the surprisingly unequivocal stance by the US government on the genocide issue, the international community could not muster such bold wording. By mid-2004, the African Union (AU) agreed to deploy some 5,700 troops and 1,400 police officers to Darfur. Although initially created to oversee the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end the long-running civil war between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in the south, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) began to provide logistical support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2006. Although UNMIS provided much-needed assistance, AMIS remained ill-equipped – not to mention only having roughly 7,000 personnel to patrol an area that covers about 500,000 square kilometres and is home to as many as 6 million people.

In April 2004, the world commemorated the tenth anniversary of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and lamented its failure to intervene. Distracted perhaps by the weight of re-examining the circumstances surrounding the death of approximately 800,000 Rwandans over roughly 100 days, much of the international community was oblivious to the growing death toll in the Darfur region of Sudan that would reach 40,000 by year’s end. Although the pace of the bloodshed has been slower than in Rwanda, the international community has watched nonetheless, largely as bystanders, while the total number of casualties in Darfur has increased more than ten-fold, to as high as 450,000. In May 2008, JEM forces had marched on the outskirts of Khartoum (to the suburb of Omdurman) and battled the Sudanese armed forces. After the JEM rebels faltered in their efforts to capture Khartoum,

5. See also the contributors to Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (2006).
6. According to government reports, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) suffered
a predictable round of retribution by government forces – such as aerial bombardments of villages and encouraging armed bandit and militia attacks against humanitarian convoys and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) camps – was unleashed across the western part of the country.\(^7\) Given this spike in aggression in Darfur and the fragile condition of those living in IDP camps in the region, it is conceivable that the portentous threshold of half-a-million deaths will be surpassed in the near future.

Prior to the establishment of UNAMID in 2007, the crisis in Darfur caused observers of every stripe to ponder why it took so long for a full-scale UN mission to be sent to the region. For more than four years, a seemingly endless parade of stories and images on the human rights abuses proliferated through media and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports. A variety of deployment options were raised – ranging from regular forces sanctioned by the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the League of Arab States (more commonly referred to as the Arab League) to private military companies (PMCs) – though all were quickly discarded.\(^8\) Perhaps driven by the desire to distract attention from the growing political and military quagmire in Iraq, American officials were vocal on the need to address the Darfur crisis. Although the mention of Darfur was sporadic in televised media in the United States, important print media outlets such as the *New York Times* refused to let the issue slip from their pages. Throughout the first part of 2007, advertisements advocating decisive action in Darfur on humanitarian grounds appeared regularly in the *New York Times* – coupled with sympathetic articles by noted op-ed columnist Nicholas Kristof. Notably, Kristof’s op-ed pieces are re-printed in numerous newspapers across the United States. Concomitantly, pro-intervention editorials and articles on Darfur appeared in various news periodicals such as *The New Republic*.

\(^{45}\) casualties and government forces lost 20 men during the rebel offensive led by Khalil Ibrahim (McDoom, 2008). This led the Sudanese government to sever diplomatic ties with Chad on 11 May 2008, for it had long accused President Idriss Deby of employing the JEM as a proxy force against Sudan. The accusation stems, in part, from claims that Deby and Ibrahim are from the same tribal group.

\(^7\) Information on several attacks against internally-displaced persons (IDPs) camps was disseminated by the African Union United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in early September 2008. See for example Daniel Van Oudenaren (2008).

\(^8\) Early calls for a ‘PMC-only’ force were swiftly rejected. Nevertheless, United States-based Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is one of several PMCs that have been contracted to provide training for UNAMID forces (Van Oudenaren, 2008).
Over the past couple of years, student-led advocacy campaigns at dozens of university campuses in the West have been able to persuade university administrations to divest from firms operating in Sudan. Public and private investment funds of all type are under pressure to divest from especially Chinese petroleum firms operating in Sudan, such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Although this trend is worrisome for the Sudanese government, it is unclear whether the divestment campaign has influenced China in terms of either its relationship with Sudan or its behaviour at the UN Security Council. The CNPC is state-owned, and the Chinese government has proven to be immune to the appeals of human rights activists in the past. Whereas negative publicity and shareholder unease led Canadian petroleum firm Talisman Energy and Sweden’s Lundin Petroleum to sell their holdings in Sudanese oil projects prior to the outbreak of major hostilities in Darfur, the CNPC is expected to maintain its business operations in the country. In addition to its multi-billion-dollar investment in the Sudanese petroleum sector, China is building hydroelectric dams in the country and selling weapons to the government. Aside from their symbolic value and perhaps serving as a minor irritant to the Sudanese and Chinese governments, the veritable impact of student-led divestment campaigns has been negligible.

Envisioned to supplement the beleaguered AMIS contingent, UNAMID is a special ‘hybrid’ operation that operates under the auspices of the United Nations and the African Union. Established by a UN Security Council resolution that was co-sponsored by the United Kingdom and France, UNAMID is expected to reach a complement of 26,000 personnel along with 5,000 support staff, which will make it the largest peacekeeping operation witnessed thus far. Preliminary estimates place the annual budget for UNAMID in the US$ 2 billion range. The deployment of UNAMID has been slow, with only 50 per cent of personnel having arrived in Sudan by October 2008 – a figure that is expected to grow to approximately 85 percent in the field by March 2009.

**Human Rights and Genocide**

Free from some of the constraints of the Cold War, the UN Security Council began to frame responses to human rights violations as threats to international peace and stability. Framed in such a manner, the option of armed intervention was employed in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
early 1990s. As the decade of the 1990s progressed, the concepts of human rights and security began to evolve and indeed overlap. Human security became conceptual short-hand among analysts and practitioners as a means of referring to the need to separate the security of states and the security of citizens (UNDP, 1994; Paris, 2001; McRae and Hubert, 2001; Hampson et al., 2002; Burgess and Owen, 2004; Mack, 2005; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report emphasized the need to promote human security, a concept that quickly gained currency in the foreign policy circles of countries such as Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. In 2001, the duty of the international community to defend human security was codified in the publication of the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001). The ICISS Report promoted a ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), which held that if gross human rights violations take place in a particular country, then the host state must take action to end such abuses (ICISS, 2001; Welsh et al., 2002; Williams and Bellamy, 2005). If the state in question is either unable or unwilling to act, then the responsibility to protect is transferred to the international community.

Despite an increased acceptance by the international community of the need to protect human rights through armed intervention in recent decades, the international norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state has remained resilient. Thus, the ill-treatment of individuals by states either directly through its institutions or indirectly via proxies often continues regardless of protests launched by local and transnational NGOs, local and international media outlets, church groups, and, more recently, awareness campaigns by student groups, such as STAND (Students Taking Action Now Darfur) Canada
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, Nobel Peace Prize laureates, and celebrities
11
, such as Mia Farrow, George Clooney, Don Cheadle, and Steven Spielberg.
12
Farrow has been one of the most active critics of Chinese policy towards Sudan. In January 2008, Farrow participated in a series of protests in countries that had suffered from acts of genocide. The protests sought to draw attention to China’s support for Sudan and the crisis in

10. See for example Ira Goldstein and Devin McDougall (this volume, chapter 7).
11. For a discussion of the role of film actors engaging in ‘celebrity diplomacy’ regarding Darfur, see Andrew Cooper (2008, 118-19).
12. Under pressure from Mia Farrow and other Darfur activists, Steven Spielberg finally resigned from his position as artistic advisor for the Beijing Olympics in February 2008.
Darfur. Activists have also antagonized the Chinese government by calling the Beijing Olympics the ‘Genocide Olympics’.

Genocide has been labelled as the worst possible crime, for the deliberate intention of one group to destroy a designated group of innocent men, women, and children is simply wrong. Although most episodes of genocide are carried out over several months or a year, some have lasted for five or more years. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the United Nations and its member-states created the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Since its unanimous passage by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, the Genocide Convention has been incorporated into international law and ratified by 140 State Parties.

Canada and other State Parties have accepted the legal obligations of the Genocide Convention to prevent, to suppress, and to punish the crime of genocide. Despite the clarity of these obligations, states have most consistently abdicated these clear duties in the face of genocide by simply refusing to acknowledge that a specific case is genocide. Aside from relatively weak norms, there is no international legal framework to respond effectively with any reliable means to crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or any other gross violation of human rights. Ergo, even if a state has ratified the Genocide Convention but later determines that it does not wish to respond to a particular episode of genocide, then it can simply do so by not acknowledging that such wanton crimes are taking place.

Although the case may be made that genocide is transpiring in Darfur, this is not to say that the term has both political and moral connotations, which is precisely the case given what is compelled and what duties must be undertaken in such a situation. One must resist the urge to cast Darfur in terms of a simplistic ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ dichotomy. Despite authorizing the largest peacekeeping force to date, the United Nations has resisted judging the crisis in Darfur a case of genocide. The dictates of diplomacy compel the use of strongly-worded euphemisms instead to avoid upsetting

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13. Helen Fein (2007, 128) provides a useful chart that lists the dates, perpetrators, victims, and the number of victims (and their proportion to the domestic population) of episodes of genocide from 1915 to 2006.

the government of Sudan. Regardless of the political, moral, or even technical considerations, it is clear that extreme violence is being inflicted in an organized and deliberate manner on civilians in Darfur.

Overview

This edited volume is organized into two main sections. Section I contains chapters that examine the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and Section II focuses on the variety of subsequent international responses to the conflict.15 In chapter 2, Abdelkérim Ousman provides us with an in-depth historical account of the violence in the region with particular emphasis on the political economy of ethnicization and racialization of Sudanese politics. Specifically, Ousman argues that the ethnic divides and tensions in Darfur are based on decades of political and economic struggles over resources produced by ecological pressures and government land policies. In the third chapter, Anita Singh employs a gendered approach in her study of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Singh finds that the sub-field of security studies lacks the necessary analytical tools to address intra-state conflicts wherein civilians are the primary target of aggression. Drawing upon the insights of feminist International Relations scholars, such as J. Ann Tickner and Christine Sylvester, Singh calls for a broader and more nuanced brand of security studies that includes all forms of violence, ranging from physical to structural to ecological threats.

Next, Ulrich Petersohn’s chapter seeks to understand why the international community has been so slow in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Petersohn posits that the international community generally accepts the duty to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations, but will only act if a ‘credible agent’ is able to generate a consensus on the scope and nature of the humanitarian intervention. Petersohn finds that although the United States is in the best position to form such a consensus regarding Darfur, the country has lost much of its credibility since the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003.

In chapter 5, Brent Beardsley and John Schram consider the compelling question of whether the international community has learned from its failure to stop the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The authors express doubt in

15. The chapters from Adibe, Ousman, and Singh are based upon separate research projects that may be published in a longer format elsewhere.
this regard, citing the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Beardsley and Schram then outline five requirements that should guide any humanitarian intervention in Darfur: clearly defined objectives; political will to persevere until the mission is completed; a commitment to the highest ethical, moral, and legal standards; sufficient financial support to sustain a multi-national, combat-capable force; and the rapid deployment of forces while recognizing that the mission may take years to complete. The authors also contend that given its experience as part of humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Ethiopia-Eritrea, Canada could play a more robust role in Darfur than is currently the case.

Clement E. Adibe begins the sixth chapter by situating the origins of the Darfur crisis in the context of ecological challenges in western Sudan. Adibe then traces the evolution of United States-Sudan relations since 1967 in order to illustrate the conditions that led the George W. Bush Administration to declare that genocide was occurring in Darfur. Adibe questions the sincerity of the Bush Administration’s position on Darfur. He concludes that the declaration of genocide was driven primarily by domestic political considerations (e.g., the ‘Christian Right’) and that the Bush Administration continued to quietly provide Khartoum with sizable financial aid packages in return for counter-terrorism intelligence on Al-Qaeda.

In the volume’s final chapter, Ira Goldstein and Devin McDougall argue that civil society organizations (CSOs) can play an important role in shaping and motivating state action in relation to R2P. The authors examine the case of STAND (Students Taking Action Now Darfur) and elucidate how this CSO has employed education and social mobilization to remedy the R2P policy-making challenges referred to as the ‘options gap’ and the ‘implementation gap’.

**Conclusion: The Prospects for Peace in Darfur**

During their respective terms in office, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair were among the more vocal leaders in reminding the international community that it had a duty to prevent another ‘Rwanda’ from taking place. For much of this period, however, such reminders appeared to fall on deaf ears. In contrast, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and several Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African governments have remained outwardly wary of Western-led interventions in African conflicts. Over the past years, these regional powers
have been cool to the idea of far-reaching international sanctions against Khartoum. In response to the possibility of a strong Western presence in Darfur, these countries have also raised a variety of spectres ranging from neo-colonialism to yet another Christian incursion against the ‘Islamic world’. This resonates within Africa given the latent distaste for white, former colonial countries to intervene in the continent whenever the ‘humanitarian’ impulse arises. Aside from a few exceptions, such as Sierra Leone at the beginning of the present decade, there is a palpable antipathy towards the thought of having Western security forces on the ground in Africa with the power to either make or break governments.

The government of Sudan has been unequivocal in its opposition to Western troops being part of UNAMID. Khartoum need not worry, at least in the short term. The United States and United Kingdom are devoting the bulk of their military resources to Iraq and Afghanistan. Canada, Germany, and other Western countries are presently involved in Afghanistan, placing a strain on their modest armed forces. With that said, roughly one-quarter of UNAMID’s budget is provided by the United States (Van Oudenaren, 2008). Canada has provided more than 100 armoured vehicles for use by UNAMID personnel, and pledged an additional contribution of C$ 40 million for training and equipping UNAMID’s African troops. Although it is not presently in the Darfur region, the Canadian Forces (CF) has 31 members deployed in Sudan under UN auspices. Canada also contributes financial assistance to Sudan. In fact, Sudan is the third-highest recipient of Canadian aid at a total of C$ 143 million since January 2006. Part of this financial assistance is allocated to the UN World Food Programme, which in turn uses donor funding to feed approximately two million Darfuris per day. In April 2008, the Canadian government announced a supplemental aid package that would bring the total up as high as C$ 275 million, which would also cover unspecified security and diplomacy initiatives. Germany has military personnel in Sudan as part of the AMIS and UNMIS mandates. Germany has provided approximately 200 members of the Bundeswehr to coordinate AMIS flights and 38 unarmed military observers in southern

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Sudan under UNMIS (Volkery and Gathmann, 2007). In February 2008, the European Union Force (EUFOR) mission to Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) began primary operations in eastern Chad in order to provide security for a dozen refugee camps that are home to Sudanese fleeing the violence in Darfur. France has signalled that it will be a significant contributor to the 3,700-strong peacekeeping force. Although EUFOR’s establishment was initially perceived as a positive step towards providing stability in the region, it has been subject to recent criticism from several quarters ranging from aid agencies and NGOs to President Deby for failing to provide adequate protection for refugees as attacks by rebel groups become increasingly aggressive in their push towards seizing N’djamena.

In addition to the above efforts, Western countries could make other important contributions in Darfur in terms of airspace and so-called ‘quiet diplomacy’ efforts. UN Security Council Resolution 1769 prohibits offensive military flights, such as aerial bombing, in the Darfur region. From a perspective of logistics and capacity, the United States, United Kingdom, and France would be in the best position to enforce this ban. These three countries could provide satellite-based photographic information on Darfur as a means of tracking militia movements. American, British, Canadian, German, and French diplomats, among others, could also engage in ‘quiet diplomacy’ to encourage neighbours such as Chad, Libya, and Egypt to promote regional stability, and leading powers China and Russia to assuage Khartoum’s fear of having an effective humanitarian force in Darfur. Given Egypt’s pledge to provide troops to UNAMID, Cairo is in a position to perform a leading role in addressing the crisis in Darfur by inviting the Arab League to play a high profile and supportive role in the region. France can also make good use of its relationships with Chad and Central African Republic to promote regional stability.

The unlikely establishment of UNAMID on 31 July 2007 has led to some cautious optimism concerning the prospects for peace in Darfur. Predictably, however, several problems have cropped up. One cause for concern now centers on the final composition of the UNAMID force. Initial plans called for UNAMID to consist of African and Asian personnel. After meeting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the Chairman of the AU, announced that UNAMID would be solely comprised of African personnel. Sénégal and Malawi have pledged 1,000 and 800 troops, respectively, while Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria have promised an unspecified number of troops for UNAMID. Although these pledges are generous, the challenges of insufficient equipment and
training – something that dogged the present 7,000-member AMIS force – will hamper the effectiveness of UNAMID. Among the envisioned Asian contributors to UNAMID – Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh – the latter two countries are veterans of peacekeeping missions in Africa and tend to be adequately equipped and trained.

Another cause for concern relates to the positions and participation of the rebel factions in the region. The successful negotiation of a peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the various Darfur rebel factions is vital, as is a move beyond the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Initial steps towards this objective occurred in mid-2007, as a dozen rebel factions met for four days in Tanzania in early August 2007. Under the stewardship of Ahmed Abdul Zayed, the Egyptian mediator assigned to the Arusha meetings, the faction leaders that were present agreed on a common platform of issues ranging from security to land rights to power-sharing (BBC News, 4 August 2007). However, the leader of one of the key groups – Abdul Wahid Mohammad Ahmed al-Nur of the SLM/A faction – was notably absent from the August 2007 meetings. Suleiman Jamous, arguably the most important rebel faction leader due to his reputation as a keen negotiator, missed the meetings owing to the fact that he was being held by the Sudanese government. As the relationship between Khartoum and the rebels formalizes, the cohesiveness of the rebel factions – or lack thereof given that the number of SLM/A factions has roughly doubled in recent months – will have significant implications for not only the pace but also the chance of success of future peace negotiations.

UNAMID can also learn from Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) and the long-running humanitarian crisis in the Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). For instance, it will be important to prevent vulnerable populations in Darfur from being assaulted by predatory and opportunistic peacekeepers and support staff. The international community writ large – not just the West – has a compelling development obligation to the people of Darfur as well. Humanitarian assistance should also be delivered through locally active NGOs, for they are the individuals best able to understand what is transpiring ‘on the ground’ given their familiarity with local perceptions and agendas. The next step will be to assist in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. The international community must understand that the present intervention implies a costly, lasting commitment to Darfur.

Finally, the prospects for peace in Darfur will depend in large measure on a potential International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President
al-Bashir. As this edited volume goes to press, ICC judges continue to mull over the proposed July 2008 indictment of President al-Bashir for war crimes in Darfur, including 10 counts of genocide. The ICC’s chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has argued that President al-Bashir ordered attacks on Darfuri civilians. If an arrest warrant is indeed issued for President al-Bashir, we can expect the Sudanese government to be vociferous in decrying the ICC. Furthermore, it is likely that the Sudanese government will reverse course regarding recent concessions towards UNAMID and engagement with some of the rebel groups in the region. Veiled threats regarding the safety of international aid agencies and their staff have already begun to circulate via informal channels. Aid agencies should take all necessary precautions to safeguard their personnel. In the event that an arrest warrant is issued for President al-Bashir, and this leads to more aggressive behaviour by the Sudanese government or its armed proxies, neither UNAMID nor the ICC should truncate their efforts to promote peace and justice in Darfur.

Acknowledgments

This chapter traces its roots to the workshop entitled ‘Darfur: Crisis and Response’, held at Queen’s University on 17 March 2007. I thank the panelists – Clement Adibe, Brent Beardsley, Ira Goldstein, Abdelkérim Ousman, Ulrich Petersohn, and John Schram – and the audience participants for their valuable input and comments which helped shape this chapter. I also thank Bruce Berman and Charles Pentland for their enthusiasm and efforts in support of this project.

References

Introduction


2. Darfur: A Diagnosis of the Conflict

Abdelkérim Ousman

Introduction

Much of the recent scholarly literature on Darfur tends to explore the immediate causes of the crisis, such as ecological considerations, recent Sudanese government policies, and the activities of the Janjaweed militia. This chapter seeks to broaden our understanding of the Darfur conflict by focusing primarily on the ethnicization and racialization of Sudanese politics before the inception of Sudan as an independent country, the history of conflicting relationships among ethnic groups, and government land policies. Taking these salient factors into account, the argument is made that the ongoing war itself is only a recent phase in a long process of cultural subjugation, political domination, and economic exploitation of the Darfuri for almost a century.

With the scope of this chapter in mind, it should be noted that the categorization of the population of Darfur by words such as ‘Blacks’ and ‘Arabs’ has no ethnological basis (Bowen, 1996, 3). In effect, centuries of inter-marriages render the assertion of racial purity a fabled notion. Nevertheless, the claim to Arab descent as a relative index of power over and distinctiveness from the ‘Blacks’ is politically important; it has fixed

the conflict on the intersection of local tribal and international ideological frontiers of ‘Arab’ and ‘Black’ nationalism.

This chapter demonstrates that the Darfur conflict is a complex political problem combining traditional ethnic divides and tensions with the struggle over resources induced not only by ecological change but also by the government’s land policy – which is an attempt to reorder the relationship between ethnic groups by making some superior to others (Bridgland, 2004). This reordering did not only help to ‘racialize’ the conflict – which was otherwise merely seasonal ethnic tensions – but also to internationalize it along regional ethnic lines. The analysis in this chapter points to the fact that the government’s role in this conflict is shaping the horizons and behaviour of existing traditional ethnic identities, which led individuals to perceive themselves as either ‘Blacks’ or ‘Arabs’ and then seek support beyond Sudan’s borders.

The first section of the chapter deals with Darfur’s history and ethnic makeup as a way to prove that the ‘Arab’/‘Black’ divide is exaggerated. The second section shows that the government – through its land policy – made the ‘Black’ and ‘Arab’ identities politically significant. The third section depicts how government policy is resisted by rebel groups and many local communities alike. However, the resistance to government policies to exacerbate the ‘Black’-‘Arab’ divide is not coordinated, which will hamper any hope of forming a cohesive and united front against the government of Sudan and its Janjaweed.

**Darfur’s History and Ethnic Makeup**

In Arabic, Darfur literally means the ‘Fur Homeland’. Darfur is located in the west of Sudan. Darfur is bordered by Libya in the north, Chad in the west, and the Central African Republic in the south-west. The region’s first traditional rulers, the Daju, probably traded with ancient Egypt; they were succeeded by the Tunjur. Darfur’s Christian period (circa 900 to

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2. Suliman shares this perception regarding the link between ecological change and the struggle for scarce resources yet omits the role of the government of Sudan. See for example Mohamed Osman Suliman (1999, 34).

3. Daju and Tunjur are usually described as two successive dynasties. While the Daju’s period of reign is uncertain, it is believed that the area southeast of Jebel Marra was the centre of the Daju Dynasty perhaps beginning as early as the thirteenth century. Although the origin of the Tunjur is uncertain (though possibly Arab), their Dynasty replaced the
1200 A.D.) was ended by the advance of the Kanem-Bornu Empire in the thirteenth century, leading to the Islamicization of Darfur’s inhabitants and establishment of Kanem-Bornu’s rule until the seventeenth century. The kingdom was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1874, which ended the Keira dynasty, successor of the Tunjur. In 1883, the army of the Sudanese Muhammad Ahmad became the dominant military force in the region. After the collapse of the latter in 1898, Darfur recognized the sovereignty of the Anglo-Egyptian administration of Sudan and became semi-autonomous.

In 1899, the British re-established Sultan Ali Dinar on condition that he pay an annual tribute to the Khedive, the governor and monarch of Egypt. Early in World War I, Sultan Ali Dinar transferred his allegiance and loyalty from the Khedive to the Ottoman Empire, and declared *jihad* against the British. As a result, a British expedition occupied Darfur and terminated the Sultanate in 1916, which annexed Darfur into British-ruled Sudan the following year. When Sudan became an independent republic in 1956, the central government sought to establish its sovereignty over Darfur.

**Ethnic Groups**

Any portrayal of the current conflict in Darfur as a fight between ‘Blacks’ and ‘Arabs’ is misleading. Furthermore, not all ethnic groups are involved in the violence. In reality, the conflict is transpiring among those who consider themselves part of the following ethnic groups: Arabs versus Zaghawa; Arabs versus Masalit and Fur; and Zaghawa versus Masalit and Fur. Besides the Fur, all of the above-mentioned ethnic groups are found in both eastern Chad and western Sudan.

There are about 572 tribes and clans, and 56 ethnic groups in Sudan. Darfur is home to some 80 tribes and ethnic groups divided between

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4. Besides the ‘Arabs’, there are several ‘Black’ Muslim groups in the north. The most notable of these are the Nubians, who live along the Nile in the far north of Sudan and in southern Egypt. Most Nubians speak Arabic as a second language. The same applies to the Beja, who inhabit the Red Sea Hills. Although they adopted Islam, these pastoral nomads have retained their Bedawiye language, which belongs to the Cushitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family. Other non-Arabized Muslim people are the Darfuri who are referred to in the current conflict as ‘Blacks’. Sudan’s main ethnic groups: ‘Arabs’ (about 39 per cent), mostly in the north; Nuba (about 5 per cent), living mostly in the Nuba Mountains of southern Kordofan in the geographical center of Sudan; Beja (about 6 per cent), mostly in
nomads and sedentary communities. The region is home to an estimated 6 million people, comprised of a complex tribal mix with a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-linguistic population that exhibits contrasting lifestyles. Inter-marriage and cross-tribal affiliations are known to occur. However, two-thirds of the people of Darfur do not self-identify as having ‘Arab’ cultural identity or ethnicity because they speak local languages and dialects. While some Darfuri may display certain Arab physical features, groups living throughout northern Sudan tend to identify themselves as ‘Arabs’ based on cultural considerations rather than in a racial sense of the term. It is almost impossible to classify these groups as ‘Arabs’ on purely ethnic grounds.

The questions of race and ethnic divisions between the numerous tribes of Darfur are difficult to grasp and the tribes and ethnic groups in the region are numerous. Hence, this chapter will restrict its focus to the ethnic groups that are directly involved in the current conflict – namely the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, and ‘Arabs’.

It is also important to emphasize some key details relating to the different ethnic groups. First, all the ‘Arab’ and ‘Black’ tribes are Sunni Muslims, followers of the Imam Malik Mazhad (branch within Islam, school of law/rite) and, commonly, disciples of the same Sufi order. The majority of these groups use Arabic as their lingua franca. Second, the categorization of ‘Arabs’ as nomads and ‘Blacks’ as settled farmers could, in some cases, be false. For example, while the Fur are farmers, they also herd cattle. The Habbania, a major tribe of the Baggara, are largely farmers. Other tribes also have similar hybrid lifestyles.

In Darfur, as in Sudan in general, the use of characteristics such as language, skin colour, physique, facial structure, hair, and/or selected cultural symbols such as language and customs, to classify people into ‘ethnic’ groups or categories is, clearly, an unreliable instrument. In fact, it is common in Sudan to find peoples of Negroid physical features claiming to be ‘Arabs’. Likewise, it is not rare to find people with brown eyes and relatively lighter skin, which might normally sever any link with the standard ‘Arab’ identity.

Prior to the 1970s, however, the ‘Black’/‘Arab’ identity divide never amounted to mass-murder, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Yet, beginning in the 1970s, the Sudanese government’s policies that favoured the ‘Arabs’, led
to a split between ‘Blacks’ and ‘Arabs’, which has led to ultra-competitive land claims with conflicting legitimacies that can only be achieved at the expense of the other group. This is why armed hostility between the so-called ‘Blacks’ and ‘Arabs’ has emerged as a means to determine political positioning throughout Sudan.5

The Emergence of ‘Black’ and ‘Arab’ Political Identities

Intermittent tribal and ethnic tensions are neither new nor uncommon in Darfur. Small- and large-scale conflicts in the region have been recorded as far back as 1939. These episodes of violence have generally arisen from disputes over access to natural resources like range lands and water points as well as livestock trespassing (unauthorized grazing on farm lands), closure of herd routes, and cattle raiding. Historically, these tensions turned bloody when they involved acts of banditry and killing often directed by ‘Arabs’ or Zaghawa nomads against farmers. Even when tensions turned bloody, they were calmed down by traditional means of compensation and reconciliation, and rarely amounted to armed rebellions against the governing authorities as the latter used to act as mediators.

However, in the years leading to Sudan’s independence from Britain, the politicization of ethnicity became a major feature in Sudanese politics. What could be recorded as the first reordering of inter-ethnic relations began in the 1940s with the formation of an alliance of religious sects, tribes, and a nationalist movement that harboured the two northern political parties: the Umma (Nation) Party representing the Mahdi sect and the National Unionist Party, based on the Islamic Khatmiyyah sect (Barakat, 1993). This alliance, which was founded on Islamist and Arab nationalist ideology, from the outset sought to exclude ‘Blacks’ from the political sphere. The racist nature embodied in this type of political culture has been reproduced and exacerbated by regime after regime and has, dialectically, led to the emergence of several ‘Black’ regional political formations in the 1960s: the General Union of Nuba Mountains (GUNM), the Beja Congress in the extreme east, the Sudan African National Union (SANU), and the Southern Front in the south. All these organizations represented politically marginal-

5. See for example the conceptual analysis developed by Oliver Tzeng and Jay Jackson (1994).
ized Sudanese people who felt they had to fight in order to get their rights enshrined in the constitution of the state (Diriage, 1989).

In Darfur, the rise of an embryonic ‘Black’ political consciousness goes back to 1938 with the formation of what was known as the ‘al Kutla al-Sawda’ – the ‘Black Bloc’ – which included people from Nuba Mountains and ancient immigrants from Chad and West Africa. In 1965, under the leadership of another eminent Darfuri politician, Ahmed Ibrahim Diriage, ‘Black’ ethnic groups such as the Zaghawa nomads, Meidob, Masalit, Berti, Tama, Mararit, Bargu, Bornu, Fulani, and Tunjur established the Darfur Development Front (DDF). The objective of the DDF was to protect and lobby for the interests of the indigenous Darfuri (Rahhal, 1996).

**Land Reform and Clash of Identities**

In most African countries, government interventions in land management have frequently resulted in disastrous outcomes (Williams, 1998, 5). Sudan has two different systems of land management: one for pastoralists and the other for farmers. Customary systems of land tenure vary by region and coexist with colonial-based ‘modern’ land law. The Nubian, Funj, Fur, and the southern regions of Sudan are all governed by different systems of land tenure. Besides these systems, other semi-feudal systems administer areas closer to the Nile, particularly the areas where the Mahdi and Mirghani families are dominant. It should be noted that: “The colonial legislation made custom one of the major sources of Sudanese Land Law. Local and state courts were obliged to implement customary law if it fulfilled the following conditions: being reasonable, universal, certain, and compatible with public order, morality and law” Committee of the Civil Project (2006, 3). While colonial and post-colonial rules have not changed these traditional land tenure systems, successive governments, including the Islamist government, based their land management policy on colonial rules. These rules asserted the authority of the state to allocate land and to confiscate “large areas of land for commercial farming (notably cotton production) and regulating who was able to reside in towns (in order to guarantee the security of the colonial regime)” (ibid.).

In spite of their diversity, customary systems of land tenure in rural areas share the following set of principles:
• Land is not formally registered
• Use rights predominate
• Rights lapse if land is not used for a certain period
• Overlapping rights – one individual or family may be using a piece of land but other members of his or her family also have rights to the land, so that the individual cannot be said to have individual title to land
• Land remains within the clan or tribe and can rarely (if ever) be sold
• A native authority chief has the power to allocate land (e.g., to newcomers, and to adjudicate disputes)
• Women have restricted land rights – often they can only own land through their husbands or fathers and do not have full rights of inheritance.  

Successive governments have gradually undermined these principles. According to Omer Egemi and Sara Pantuliano (n.d., 2):

The 1970 Unregistered Land Act (URLA), a de facto nationalization, abolished customary rights of land use and transferred the ownership of all unregistered lands (all of Sudan’s rainlands) to the State. The Act applies countrywide, even in places (the South) that have or had no previous system of land registration. In short, this means heavy cut in rural communities, rights to land and inducement of resource scarcity.

Thus, the URLA replaced the Native Administration System (Al-Idara Al-Ahliaa in Arabic) and reoriented the economy of the region towards large-scale, mechanized rain-fed capitalized export agriculture. As a consequence, it gradually shrank the lands that were used for traditional farming and grazing. The URLA also gave rise to land claims with conflicting sources of legitimacy and contradictory outcomes regarding who can establish access to and control over lands. A leading example of this is the dispute over land due to the settlement of Zaghawa pastoralists from Darfur in the Gawamaa land in Kordofan. While the Gawamaa claimed to be the sole group entitled to the land, the Zaghawa considered the land to belong to the wider public, and as Sudanese citizens, they argued, they have the right to use it. The URLA has brought about sharp swings in the land available for pastoralists, thereby intensifying competition between pastoralists and farmers and among pastoralists themselves. As a result, traditional instruments of dispute settlements such as conciliation and compromise have largely

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6. Adapted from Committee of the Civil Project (2006, 3).
lost their authority, and few institutional innovations have been developed to fill the vacuum. In turn, this has led to an escalation of violence with consequent spirals of revenge and retribution in an environment of armed tribes and clans.

The implementation of the Regional Government Act in 1983 by Nimeiry’s Government accentuated ethnic and tribal sensitivities. The mutual reference to the various ethnic groups as ‘Arab’ or ‘Black’ became common, further inflaming tribal animosities. In addition, the round-up of dark-skinned people on the streets of Khartoum (known as the Kasha) during Nimeiry’s era affected many citizens of Darfur who were forcibly deported back to their region (Idris, 1999).

During the government of Nimeiry, Darfur became the theatre of many bloody tribal clashes: between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Blacks’, among ‘Arabs’ themselves such as the 1982-1983 incident between the Taisha Arab pastoralists and the Salamat farmers, or within indigenous ‘Black’ tribes such as the 1987 clashes between the Zaghawa pastoralists and Fur farmers. It is, however, noticeable that the government of Sudan loses its neutrality whenever the conflict involves an ‘Arab’ tribe. From the mid-1980s onwards, successive central governments introduced the system of Amarat (Arabic for principalities), which has no roots in Darfur’s centuries-old traditional governance system. This was in replacement to the system of ‘Dar’ (tribal homeland) under which the major tribes voluntarily agree to the settlement of other groups and accord them a recognized administrative status. This change from the system of Dar to the system of Amarat also had the effect of seriously disrupting coexistence between various ethnic groups.

After the 1985 coup that brought down the regime of Nimeiry, several ‘Arab’ leaders from Darfur won cabinet positions in Sadiq El Mahdi’s government. However, this was not enough to satisfy the Arabs’ aspirations in Darfur itself, where the government seems to have attempted to ensure some degree of ethnic balance in the administration. On this occasion, the Darfur ‘Arab’ tribes (mainly pastoralist nomads) – in addition to the urban ‘Arab’ merchants and government officials mainly of Jellaba origin – formed an alliance under the name of “Arab Gathering” with the goal of dominating the politics of the region. This goal was expressed in the famous 1987

7. See also Yousef Takana (1998, 195-225), a Darfur scholar, who lists three traditional, resource-based conflicts between 1968 and 1976; five between 1976 and 1980; and 21 between 1980 and 1998. He attributes the relatively small occurrence of conflicts in Darfur before the 1980s to the prevalence of values favouring co-existence.
“Arab Letter addressed to Sadiq Al Mahdi” – himself an ‘Arab’ and leader of the Mahdist party. Their chief grievance was the perception that they were under-represented in various levels of government and, consequently, demanded an increase to 50 per cent representation. They addressed the Prime Minister with the following sentence: “You are our brother and one expects more from a brother than from someone else” (Morton, 2004, 9). The alliance concluded their letter with a thinly disguised threat: “We fear that if this neglect of the participation of the Arab race continued, things will break loose from the hands of the wise to those of the ignorant, leading to matters of grave consequences” (International Crisis Group, 2004, 14-15).8 The signatories used race as a polarizing device and expressed a supremacist ideology implying that the ‘Blacks’ are of low cultural status.

The “Arab Gathering” was a doctrine of solidarity among ‘Arab’ groups throughout Sudan. It was increasingly invoked to link the pastoral ‘Arabs’ of Darfur to the Jellaba-dominated central government, which alarmed the ‘Blacks’ all over Sudan. The memoranda related to this doctrine surfaced intermittently (to the surprise of the ‘Blacks’), and the wording of such documents was far less reserved than the above-mentioned letter to Al-Mahdi, as they revealed detailed plans of ethnic cleansing, including deals with foreign nomadic elements (from Chad) to engineer forced replacement of sedentary ‘Black’ tribes on Darfur lands by the ‘Arabs’. Towards the end of the 1980s, unfair land policies were combined with the will of the ‘Arabs’ to dominate Darfur. Although these events were not enough to transform the inter-tribal tension into explosive violence, the drought generated a fierce competition over water and fertile land. As a result, what was mere tension among ethnic groups between the 1950s and 1970s became persistent large-scale battles between the Fur and the Arabs in 1987-1989, between the Zaghawa and the Arabs in 1994-1997, and between the Masalit and the Arabs in 1996-1998. The intensity of the battles was constantly fuelled by government policies of land redistribution that were contrary to local traditions and customs, and partly meant to compensate the ‘Arabs’ for the wars they waged on behalf of the government of Sudan in either Darfur or the southern, Christian part of the country (Ohlsson, n.d.). It should be noted the Janjaweed are not a new phenomenon; throughout the 1990s, there were reports of armed militias of the same name raiding villages occupied by ‘Black’ tribes in Darfur (Dagne, 2004). In fact, even the ‘Black’ armed rebellion is not new; it started in 1992 when the late Daoud Yahya Bolad, a one-time leading member of the ruling

party, broke ranks and organized members of his Fur clan to forge a link with the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M). The emergence of the Arab Gathering and the perception that it was backed by the government of Sudan – in which the National Islamic Front (NIF) was a coalition partner – seem to have turned Bolad, an Islamist who became Darfuri nationalist, against his former colleagues.

Thus, instead of acting as a mediator and maintaining its monopoly over the use of force, the government of Sudan sided with ‘Arab’ tribes and armed them, while at the same time contributing to destroy the ‘Black’ communities’ tenure on ancestral lands. The following assessment of the politics of ethnicity in Sudan is worth quoting at length. According to M.A. Mohamed Salih, a scholar based at the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Sweden,

Retribalization has taken two passages: a) the militarization of the warrior tradition and b) the use of tribal entities by political and educated elites as a main source of power. This has in effect led to the shrinking of the modern political arena…. The use of ethnic cleavages in pursuing short term political gains has gone beyond reason to the extent of using tribal militias to fight a civil war on behalf of the state…. In the face of a weak state which manages survival rather than development … the populaces have begun to isolate themselves from any notion of political modernization to local politics … the various tribal militias have the genesis of ‘nationhood’ and may contemplate the creation of their own independent states in the face of a weak debilitated state (Salih, 1989, 168-174).

From 1988 to 1990, the Amarat policy resulted in ethnic cleansing campaigns targeting the Fur, Masalit, and Zagawa tribes. The ethnic cleansing of the 1990s was concomitant with the 1994 administrative division of Darfur into three different states, which has split the Fur and their centrally located fertile plains of Jebel Marra. This new system of governance was mostly created at the expense of the ‘Black’ groups. Moreover, a decision on 13 March 1995 by Mohamed al-Fadul, then governor of Western Darfur, to divide the traditional homeland of the Masalit into thirteen Amarat (principalities) – of which five were allocated to ‘Arab’ groups – is generally considered the primary trigger for the 1996-1998 conflict. This strategy has greatly strengthened the government of Sudan’s military position to secure the oilfields of Western Upper Nile (International Crisis Group 2003a and 2003b). This was the context under which the Rezeighat tribesmen of South Darfur were armed by the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The Rezeighat tribesmen were not only fighting the Fur, the Masalit, and southern Sudanese Christians; they were also fighting the Zaghawa who
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armed themselves from the abundant small arms available in neighbouring Chad to loot livestock that belongs to ‘Arabs’ and ‘Blacks’. Less known at the time was that the Zaghawa elites, who collaborated in the Chadian government and military, began arming their relatives in Sudan with funds from the Chadian treasury. Now that the Zaghawa have been empowered, they no longer fight for survival. Their objective is to maintain their hold on power in Chad and to force the government of Sudan into serious negotiations, which may lead to the creation of Dar Zaghawa (Zaghawa Homeland) within Darfur.

Given this new strategic context, in the early 1990s, the NIF government, which came to power in 1989, has intensified the armament of the ‘Arabs’ and the attacks on the Zaghawa who, naturally, resisted. The NIF saw this resistance as a threat to its hold on power. The Fur, for their part, also felt threatened by both the ‘Arabs’ and the Zaghawa, and formed their own tribal militia, using retired soldiers to train hundreds of recruits to serve in their alliance with the SPLA. In fact, all those who felt marginalized economically and culturally began attacking the armies of the government of Sudan. The situation mirrors the dynamics of other conflicts throughout Sudan (Dagne, n.d.). In addition, the opening up of both registered and unregistered lands to private investment, following the 1998 Investment Act, has done little good for both local farmers and herders by transforming the symbiotic relations of cooperation that previously existed into competition and ethnic wars (ibid.).

The Rebel Groups

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

Al-Turabi, the leader of the Islamist movement in Sudan and former leader of the National Assembly, was a mentor to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir until their disagreement in late 1999, when he wanted to wrest power from the President through machinations in the National Assembly. President al-Bashir declared a state of emergency and suspended the National Assembly for a few years. Al-Turabi, who with many Islamist followers formed his own party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), began to challenge the government with labour strikes by teachers in regional capitals and other similar actions, claiming to represent the true Islamist movement. When Al-Turabi signed an agreement with John Garang, head of the SPLA, in February 2001, his enemies in government seized on this opportunity to
throw Al-Turabi in jail for ‘treason’. Although the Constitutional Court ordered his release later in the year, the government kept Al-Turabi in jail through executive order, in full defiance of national and international human rights norms. He remained in jail, and hundreds of his PNC followers were in and out of jail, until late 2003. The government of Sudan re-arrested Al-Turabi and at least six PNC officials on 31 March 2004, alleging that they were plotting a coup.

Currently, the government of Sudan fears that the ‘former’ statesman Al-Turabi will find his way back into power by using the Darfur conflict and the former elements of his political movement – the PNC – many of whom are leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). This fear is not baseless because Al-Turabi is believed to be a native of the region, which is, in fact, his power base in terms of ethnicity and religion. Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, the leader of JEM, was a member of Al-Turabi’s Islamist party until 1999. He published a booklet inspired by Al-Turabi entitled The Black Book, denouncing the domination of the country’s political leadership by only three Jellaba tribes: the Shaygia, Jaaliyin, and Danagla – which claim to be culturally ‘Arabs’ even though they speak their respective languages. The booklet advocates a change in the course of Sudanese politics. It enunciates that “the long-oppressed Black African people of Western Sudan have finally awakened to the reality of Sudan and are prepared to speak out against the discrimination against them”.

In fact, it was because of Al-Turabi that the ‘Black’ Muslims of Darfur were previously considered the popular and military basis of the fundamentalist regime of Khartoum. It was for this reason that they gained the sympathy and encouragement of Al-Turabi, who was al-Bashir’s godfather and prominent influence behind his government (Snyder, 2004). This embodies a direct threat to Khartoum. When the NIF expelled Al-Turabi, he established the PNC, which became the rival Islamist faction to al-Bashir’s NIF and one of the rare allies of the JEM among the Sudanese political elites (Ali-Dinar, n.d.).

At the beginning of its war against the insurgents, the government of Sudan relied on the trustworthy elements of the Sudanese army. Yet, by 2003, the successive blows of the rebellion began to alarm the military authorities. Consequently, the Janjaweed militias were reactivated, in February 2003, by Khartoum to support its military ground operations against the insurgents. In March 2003, the rebel groups captured local garrisons, and in the following month, they killed 70 soldiers and destroyed four jets at the al-Fasher airport in the Northern Darfur State. These incidents – together
with the detachment of the national army from its traditional foundations and the apparent ‘war fatigue’ of the Sudanese military personnel – led the government to launch the *Janjaweed*, in a covert way, to fight a proxy war on its behalf.

The more the government of Sudan used the *Janjaweed*, the more the Zaghawa received moral and material support from the Chadian Zaghawa, which made the Darfur insurgency a “Zaghawa threat” in the eyes the government of Sudan. In this complicated picture, the JEM – which is Zaghawa-dominated – advanced on the Sudanese capital in mid-2008, an indication that it will not only seek to redress local grievances but also seek wider political power in Sudan, following the example of the other Zaghawa in Chad. Regardless of the outcome of the JEM attacks near Khartoum, the Sudanese traditional political elites feel threatened by the Zaghawa people because they subjected Chadian ‘Arabs’ to military harassment and looted their livestock while the government of Chad refused to intervene and protect them.

*The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)*

The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the larger of the two rebel groups, was known as the Darfur Liberation Movement prior to February 2003. While it is composed primarily of Fur and Masalit tribes, the organization also includes some Zaghawa armed factions. In its political declaration, the SLM/A explained its struggle as a way to achieve a decentralized form of governance based on the right of Sudan’s different regions to govern themselves autonomously through a federal system. SLM/A Secretary-General Minni Arkou Minnawi, a Zaghawa, recently confirmed this political objective:

> The objective of the SLA is to create a united democratic Sudan. Sudan’s unity must therefore ultimately be based on the right to self-determination and the free will of the various peoples of Sudan ... on an economy and a political system that address the uneven development and marginalisation that have plagued the country since independence (quoted in Plaut, 2006).

Within the SLM/A, the Fur are led by Ahmed Shafie Yacoub Baasi. Earlier in the brief history of the SLM/A, Baasi and Abdel Wahed Mohamed Ahmed el-Nur were both members of a group of senior commanders. Then, Baasi led a group of 30 commanders (all Fur) that abandoned Ahmed el-Nur in July 2006. Baasi maintains good relations with the National Redemption
Front (NRF). Within the SLM/A, the Masalit are led by Khamis Abdullah Abakar, the current leader of the ‘Group of 19’ field commanders, known as the G-19. At the beginning of the civil war, Abakar lacked influence within the SLM/A. However, he is now Deputy to Ahmed el-Nur to ensure ethnic balance between Masalit and Fur within the SLM/A leadership.

On 8 May 2007, in an interview with the Sudan Tribune, Ahmed el-Nur complained that the international community is deliberately ignoring the root causes of the Darfur conflict. He stressed that: “The government confiscated the land, killed Darfurians and replaced them by new comers. So, we need to stop the killing, restitute the land to evicted legitimate owners and allocate individual compensations for IDPs [internally-displaced persons] and refugees” (Sudan Tribune, 8 May 2007). Ahmed el-Nur warned Khartoum, but stated that his movement is still committed to a ceasefire agreement signed in 2004 despite the repeated breaches, and that they seek sincerely a lasting settlement in Darfur. He added that as long as the legitimate demands of Darfur peoples are not realized, his movement would not stop the struggle. Ahmed el-Nur also warned that

They are patient enough up to now but he can’t promise to maintain this situation indefinitely [and that] the resolution of the crisis can be reached if Khartoum: a) stops the killing of the people of Darfur, restitution of the land – or what Darfur people call Hwakir (land ownership); b) disarms the Khartoum backed militias; and, c) implements the UN Resolution 1706 related to the deployment of UN forces in Darfur” (ibid.).

In closing, it should also be noted that the SLM/A is divided into armed tribal factions, including the Zaghawa who have no relatives in Chad, the Fur, and the Masalit. Unlike the JEM, the SLM/A has called for the separation of state and religion, and its political platform clearly rejects Islamic law (Shari’a). The relationship between the SLM/A and JEM is one of rivalry. Because of the support it has from the Chadian Zaghawa, the JEM is by far the richer of the two and the one with the greater international media exposure. Some of the Zaghawa factions within the SLM/A also found a safe haven in Chad. Adam Bakhit and Adam Ali Shogar are the respective leaders, and they participated in the military coup that brought to power the current Chadian president, Idriss Deby, in 1989. The two leaders rejected the recent American-sponsored peace deal between the government of Sudan and other SLM/A factions led by Minni Arkou Minnawi (Plaut, 2006).
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have maintained that Darfur is far from being an ethnic conflict caused by the change in the regional ecology. Rather, my argument is that the conflict is political and cannot be fully understood without a detailed analysis of government policy regarding land tenure and reform. Thus, the above analysis began by describing the ethnic makeup of the region to demonstrate that ethnic diversity is *not* the cause of the conflict, and the divide between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Blacks’ does *not* represent the real identities of various ethnic groups, tribes, and clans. However, this divide is significant only when it relates to the abolition of customary rights to land brought about by the introduction of the Unregistered Land Act, the abolition of the Native Administration system, the reorientation of the economy towards heavily capitalized export agriculture, and the distorted and confused devolution of powers between the central government and the regions under the 1994 Federal decentralization system.

Throughout the chapter, it appears that the government’s favouritism toward the ‘Arabs’ was meant to reward them for the proxy war they waged and continue to wage on its behalf. The use of the ‘Arab’ militia by the government is neither new nor uncommon. The government first used such a strategy against the Christians in the southern part of the country. When the latter group seemed to have relatively succeeded in terms of being heard outside Sudan, the government turned the militia against ‘Black’ Darfuri, whose uprising is not ethnic but rather political. From the beginning of the crisis, ‘Black’ Darfuri movements sought alliances with other Sudanese opponents to the regime in Khartoum. However, the support of Chadian Zaghawa to their brethren in Darfur is increasingly undermining the political character of the conflict and fuelling its ethnic, tribal, and clan aspects.

Currently, a clear and simple picture of the crisis in Darfur is difficult to draw. For beneath the ethnically false and politically significant divide between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Blacks’ different ethnic identities exist – which are equally important when it comes community survival, protection, and empowerment. Darfuri rebel leaders have so far proven incapable of presenting a united front that surpasses both their ethnic origins and political identities imposed upon them by Sudanese elites. With the arrival of ‘assistance’ from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Egypt – each acting in favour of its own interests in terms of reinforcing the sub-Saharan Sunni belt, protecting ‘Arabs’, or securing one of the sources of the Nile, respectively – the conflict risks
becoming truly internationalized and fought along regional ethnic lines, pitting ‘Arabs’ against ‘Blacks’ from other parts of the African continent.

There is no easy solution to the crisis in Darfur, and any serious one should first include the return of IDPs to their ancestral lands. Second, the international community must encourage Sudan to abide by its own legal traditions wherein courts were obliged to implement customary law – a practice that has been in place since the country’s independence. For current land tenure legislation is neither reasonable nor universal; the ethnic favouritism that it entails is incompatible with public order and morality – as the current conflict demonstrates. Third, instead of seeking the help Arab countries and ‘Arab’ tribesmen throughout the African continent to secure their dominance over Sudan, Sudanese elites should abandon their ‘Arab’ supremacist ideology and start genuine nation-building efforts. Such efforts have the potential to decrease foreign influences including those from the Chadian Zaghawa, which may help solving Chad’s civil conflicts in which, as we have seen in this chapter, the government of Sudan has been and remains an important player.

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3. **Women and Conflict in Darfur: Towards a Gendered Perspective of Security Studies**

*Anita Singh*

**Introduction**

The sub-field of traditional security studies has been tested to its limits since the end of the Cold War, simply because of its inability to address non-state, intra-state, and civilian conflict. In the cases of Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, and now Darfur, traditional security theory attempted to explain some elements of these conflicts. Yet, with their complexity, these cases underscored the need for a more diverse set of variables to explain the nature of conflict. For Darfur, it is apparent that a gendered approach to security studies has been unnecessarily, and detrimentally, ignored in assessments of the conflict.

With the end of the Cold War, civilians have been the primary targets for ethnic conflict and, more specifically, women have constituted the bulk of non-combat civilian deaths, internally-displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees. In addition, international conflicts have identified never-seen-before

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agency by women, playing increasingly visible roles in policy-making, international civil society, and militaries. Despite this empirical progression, policy-makers and academics continue to assess the conflict through a gender-neutral, traditionalist lens. A quote from Simone de Beauvoir sums up this problem of security studies, where “representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with the absolute truth” (de Beauvoir quoted in Tickner, 1992, 1).

Therefore, this chapter provides a gendered investigation of the conflict in Darfur and a critique of the traditional security paradigm. The chapter addresses the following questions: how do we understand threats to security with gender as a central variable? How does female agency deal with these threats to security? Why is gender not considered a salient variable in security studies and how does the inclusion of this variable change our understanding of contemporary international conflicts? In response to these questions, the chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it assesses the traditional security analysis of the conflict in Darfur. Second, the chapter re-examines the conflict using gender to reconceptualise the referent object. Third, by considering these threats, the chapter provides policy-relevant suggestions towards the resolution of the threat to women in Darfur.

Are There Women in Darfur? Traditional Security Explanations and Criticisms?

The sub-field of traditional security studies has been summed up by Stephen Walt as the “study of the threat, use and control of military force” (Walt, 1991, 212). The theories that underpin traditional security studies have a very close relationship with practices and policies of the Cold War, where the threat of superpower conflict and nuclear exchange dominated the discourse surrounding security. Since then, security scholars have been perfectly willing to assume that the postulates of this theoretical approach are relevant to assess all incidences of international insecurity. In Darfur, the history of the region is complex, with a multiplicity of regional, natural resource, religious, economic, and ethnic cleavages exacerbated by

governmental negligence and exploitation. Scholars of traditional security studies tend to simplify these conflicts in ‘ethnic’ terms, where groups with historical grievances manifest their conflict in violent means (ibid.). Yet, it is because of the predominance of this narrow definition of security that even events like Darfur are seen through a lens of state-centrism, national interest, and military conflict.

The focus of the aforementioned traditional theoretical approach is based on military conflict between the various actors. Within this security framework, the Darfur conflict is a culmination of tensions among nomadic Arab groups and ‘Black’ farmers over economics, oil revenue, and farm land. Existing tensions brought about by successive drought conditions, changes to farming boundaries, and the government’s unwillingness to provide famine support during droughts since the 1980s were exacerbated by the central government’s favouritism towards Arab groups with its distribution oil-export profits. The response within the non-Arab population, which includes the Fur, Zaghawa, and several other tribes, gave rise to two military movements: the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Eventually, their discontent was manifested in an uprising against government military targets in February 2003, killing 700 government soldiers (International Crisis Group, 2006b). Unprepared for an attack, the government was further disadvantaged due to the concentration of Black soldiers within the government army from the affected regions in Darfur. Therefore, the government was forced to quash the rebellion by supporting the Arab-based Janjaweed militia. In the following months and years, the government used an-air strike policy, destroying major infrastructure within villages, followed by ground attacks by the Janjaweed militia systematically targeting SLM/A, JEM, and non-Arab civilians (Erasmus, 2007).

**Responding to the Crisis**

In the traditional approach, states are not only the “referent object” of security, but also the central actor, as this perspective assumes that resolving insecurity can only be achieved through state action. In this state-centric format, the responses to this complex situation have been woefully inadequate. Several institutional attempts to stop the violence in Darfur have failed, thereby undermining future attempts for negotiations. More importantly, institutional attempts to end the conflict have actually resulted in increased levels of violence as shown by the examples of the 2004
N’Djamena ceasefire and the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The April 2004 N’Djamena ceasefire was negotiated to allow humanitarian and military observer groups into the country to address the devastating refugee situation (CIA, 2004). Yet, N’Djamena was undermined from the point of signing, as rival groups did not stop their violent clashes even during the negotiations of the ceasefire. One of the more notable breaches of the ceasefire was an attack in Nyala which killed forty-five civilians and ended any chance of a prolonged ceasefire, rushing the parties back into conflict (BBC News, 24 May 2004).

Even more desperate have been the ramifications in the post-DPA months, which resulted in the most aggravated violence since the beginning of the conflict. In May 2006, the Government of Sudan and one of the SLM/A factions – SLM/A-Minawi – signed the DPA. Sponsored by the African Union (AU) and the US Deputy Secretary of State, the pact was intended to disarm and disband the Janjaweed militia, and absorb the members of SLM/A-Minawi into the Sudanese armed forces, police force, and other security organizations (US Secretary of State, 2006a and 2006b). As noted by researchers from the Small Arms Survey, the DPA was undermined by distrust and suspicion of the process. Similar to the N’Djamena ceasefire, the groups involved were unwilling to believe that others would adhere to the DPA. Therefore, other SLM/A factions – such as the SLM/A-Abdul Wahid – and the JEM rejected the DPA (Small Arms Survey, 2006). In response, government forces began attacks on non-signatories of the Agreement, resulting in the renewed violence in June and July 2006. In fact, the violence was so severe that the humanitarian aid community in Darfur threatened a full-withdrawal from the region, as ambushes, banditry, and kidnappings of personnel inhibited the ability of these groups to deliver aid.3

Despite the level of devastation in Darfur there has only been a half-hearted international military response to the conflict. This is based on several reasons. First, Western countries and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in particular have overstretched themselves in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, the international community has invoked

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3. The Small Arms Survey report identified several reasons why the DPA was ultimately rejected by these groups. First, the full-text of the DPA was offered to these groups in English only a few days before the deadline. Between translation and intra-group negotiations, the rebel groups were uncomfortable signing the text. Second, negotiators were forcing rebel groups into an all-or-nothing agreement, as they were unable to remove or negotiate specific clauses of the text. Third, memories of the failed N’Djamena ceasefire ensured that each group was weary of adherence by other groups.
symptoms of its recurring ‘Somalia-syndrome’, unwilling to commit troops to dangerous humanitarian missions. The AU finally sent a peacekeeping mission of over 7,000 soldiers to Darfur in 2005 in order to provide some military support and observe breaches of the N’Djamena ceasefire (ibid.). While the presence of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) did lead to an initial slowing of raids in January 2005, the rebel groups were quick to learn of the inadequate training, supplies, and equipment possessed by the AMIS forces, and thus resumed their activities in Darfur. This has proved to be problematic for the mission. The largest attack on AMIS to date occurred on 1 October 2007, when the AU base in Haskanita was overrun by a SLM/A splinter group. In addition to the killings, 30 soldiers and several pieces of equipment went missing from the base. Since this attack, the Commander of the AMIS force admitted that they are outmanned and outgunned by the rebel groups.

These attacks have reduced the potential for future deployments to Darfur. In June 2007, Sudan finally accepted the deployment of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force of 26,000 troops (Black and Shaw, 2007). The UN-AU hybrid force – known as the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – was supposed to send its envoy to Sudan by October 2007 and achieve full capacity by the following year. However, with the increasing boldness of rebel groups and the risk-aversion of Western governments, some have suggested that attacks on peacekeepers would keep foreign troops out of Darfur indefinitely (BBC News, 1 August 2007). Support for the UN comes from only a few actors in the region, the Government of Chad, the non-governmental organization (NGO) community, and the leader of the now-defunct SLM/A-Minawi. In addition, the security of UN forces is always questionable because of the contempt for the mission by the Government of Sudan. In many instances, the government has called the UN mission an “act of colonialism” and has clearly that stated it would treat the force as a “foreign invasion” (ibid.). The recalcitrant attitude of the Sudanese government has slowed progress on the deployment of UNAMID. Thus, it now appears that UNAMID will not reach full capacity until late-2009.

Traditional security explanations for the Darfur conflict also emphasize other considerations, such as the role of China and other states in the region. As is widely known, China has investment interests in Sudanese oil reserves. Although only six per cent of Chinese oil imports come from Sudan, some authors suggest that the country is seen as a “safe” investment for China due to the lack of Western involvement in its oil production (Tiemessen and Williams, 2007). Second, and more interestingly, China’s Sudanese policy
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has furthered its international legitimacy as a major power within Africa due to its non-interventionist foreign policy. China sees this as a valuable form of soft power, which serves as a counter-weight against African perceptions of the ‘imperialist’ West. This being said, China’s non-intervention and continued oil investments place foreign money directly in the hands of the Sudanese government, enabling Khartoum to ignore the violent conflict raging within its borders.\(^4\)

The other consideration relating to foreign involvement is the role of regional actors and the conflict in Darfur. This includes both informal and formal networks that are linked to conflicts occurring in neighbouring states, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia, which has formed as a decades-long arms-trading system. Even further, Robert Muggah suggests that “with Chinese, Pakistani, Bulgarian, and Russian expertise, Sudan is also now allegedly manufacturing small arms and ammunition” (Muggah, 2007). These weapons are turning up in the arsenals of the armed groups and cattle camps throughout Sudan.

**Limitations of the Traditional Security Perspective**

There are several limitations of the traditional security perspective in being able to explain the Darfur conflict aside from the basic observation of the outbreak of hostilities. For example, the largest and most important implication of the conflict is the human cost of the Darfur crisis. These attacks have included the use of rape, murder, and ‘scorched earth’ policies to create a humanitarian and regional security crisis. It is estimated that since the conflict in Darfur began in 2003, 400,000 people have died as a direct result of the conflict, of which 300,000 have died due to malnutrition, disease, and famine (Williamson, 2006). Even more disturbing however, are the potential mortality rates for the combined 2.5 million IDPs and refugees\(^5\) living in and around Sudan. In addition, due to increased attacks on NGOs and AU peacekeepers, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan estimated that

\(^4\) In 2007, Beijing started to alter its position on Sudan. Critics suggest that the actions are just ‘window-dressing’. Yet, in February 2007, Chinese president Hu Jintao told Sudan to allow the UN to have a greater role within its borders. In addition, China signed a contract with Sudan to build schools and a new presidential palace, reduce tariffs on imported Sudanese goods, and grant a loan of 600 million yuan for infrastructure projects in the country.

\(^5\) Richard Williamson (2006) estimates that 600,000 refugees have crossed the Sudanese border and are living in Chad.
by the end of 2006, 195,000 people would be completely inaccessible to humanitarian groups (UNSG, 2006).

The second limitation of the state-based perspective is its inability to explain the dynamics within the groups involved in the crisis. While members of the international system have attempted to negotiate with the ‘leaders’ of the conflict, it has been difficult to determine who is responsible for the conflict itself. At the beginning of hostilities, it was possible to argue that the violence was occurring between a handful of actors, including the SLM/A, the JEM, the Janjaweed, and the Sudanese government. Over the past few years, a splintering of these groups has created a number of actors including umbrella groups the G-19 and the National Redemption Front (NRF), and others such as SLM/A-Minni, SLM/A-Free Will, SLM/A-Unity, and the original SLM/A-Al Nur (McCrummen, 2007). This adds yet another layer of complication for two key reasons. First, there are an increasing number of groups at the discussion table during negotiations. Second, these independent groups have begun fighting amongst one another, thereby exacerbating the conflict and humanitarian crisis.

Third, and the most important limitation of the traditional security perspective relates to the male-centric terms of reference concerning the Darfur conflict. By ignoring the victimization of women and the possible proactive role for women in resolving the conflict, the traditional security perspective captures only part of the ongoing dynamics within the conflict. Therefore, the next section will focus on the threats to the security and agency of women in Darfur.

**Whose Security? A Feminist Response**

While this chapter’s central focus is the female actor in Darfur, it does recognize that a gendered analysis is not only a reference to the biological differences among men and women. Rather, feminist security studies includes multiple definitions of gender within its framework, critical of the traditional security use of normative applications of gender, stereotypes, values, and qualities. In addition, a gendered analysis includes a criticism of perspectives and inter-gender relationships. For example, the theoretical structure of traditional security retains a top-down perspective, emphasizing structural matters such as sovereignty, economics, and militaries. In Darfur, this perspective means that the focus on security analysis examines the conflict between the government, the Janjaweed militia, and the SLM/A factions. The traditional security perspective emphasizes a structure which
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is male-centric in terms of its actors, significance, and variables. In contrast, feminist security studies argue that contemporary intra-state conflicts are better understood from the bottom-up, focusing on the grassroots and incorporating a micro-level analysis (Youngs, 2004; Zalewski, 2002; Murphy, 1996). Therefore, the referent object in feminist analysis shifts the focus to women in conflict, but also changes how threats to security and power are defined. In this vein, gendered security studies examines threats which are not only material or militaristic but the product of gendered social constructions. This shift is significant within the field of security studies as it includes the complexity of power relationships in the multiple divisions – cultural, biological, and societal – between women and men. Finally, this redefinition ensures emphasis on the disproportionate burden of structural threats on women, including the lack of security and basic necessities (this is similar to the human security paradigm as identified by Acharya, 2001; Alagappa, 1998; Alkire, 2002; Bajpai, 2000; Lodgaard, 2000; Basch, 2004; Fukuda-Parr, 2004).

**Woman as a Referent Object**

Assessing women as the referent object for security is admittedly complex and often contradictory. First, by associating women with victimhood, it falls back on traditional stereotypes that identify women as the ‘weaker sex’ who need to be protected rather than as proactive actors within an intra-state conflict. Second, identifying women’s insecurities diminishes the impact of war on other vulnerable members of society, including the disabled, elderly, and children. This being said, while a gendered referent object does not address many of these realities, it does use a bottom-up approach to security studies, which opens up the ability to include these groups in further analyses of intra-state conflict.

The first way women are victimized in Darfur is due to the refugee crisis. By early 2004, an estimated 600,000 refugees had left Darfur for neighbouring Chad (Williamson, 2006) and nearly 2 million people had been internally displaced (UNOCHA, 10 March 2004). These refugee groups, while theoretically ‘saved’ from the military violence in the region, are subject to unsanitary living conditions and a lack of food, water, and health supplies that have been attributed as the major cause of death in the region. These statistics are not gender-neutral in their implications, as it has been estimated that women and children constitute over 80 per cent of the world’s refugees (Tickner, 1997, 625). In Darfur specifically, the statistics
are even more significant – the United Nations Darfur Task Force has noted that in 2004, over 90 per cent of people forced to leave villages in Darfur were women and children (UNOCHA, 10 March 2004). While traditional security approaches do not include these human insecurities within their overall framework, gendered security underscores these threats by a calling for the inclusion of all forms of violence, including physical, structural, and ecological threats to security (Tickner, 1997 and 2004; Sylvester, 2001 and 2002). At the structural level, traditional approaches to security “fail to take account of the specific ways in which women and children are affected by war, military occupation, militarization, (forced) migration, human trafficking, sexual and other forms of slavery and (forced) prostitution” (Youngs, 2004, 83).

Second, it is notable that women have not necessarily been the primary targets of traditional violence in the Darfur conflict; rather, they have been victims of a deeper, structural violence which has disproportionately affected the female population. In Darfur, mostly because of the gendered nature of the refugee crisis, but also attributable to the nature of the conflict, women have been particular victims of a lack of access to essential goods and services. The root of this threat begins with several levels of insecurity. Initially, the lack of life-sustaining goods is the direct result of several elements such as violence occurring within the villages razed and pillaged by the *Janjaweed* and the lack of access in and out of the refugee areas. These food scarcities are more acute because of the large role women play within the agricultural sector in Darfur, including both large-scale and individual farms used for subsistence agriculture. Recent studies have shown that, due to the lack of women in agriculture, only 57 per cent of Sudanese family farms cultivated land in 2006 (Amnesty International, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006).

Further, food rations that do exist are monopolized to feed the soldiers of the several rebel groups operating in the region. In many ways, the *Janjaweed* is not alone responsible for this outcome since factions of the SLM/A and JEM are directly contributing to the scarcities of the populations *in whose interests they are meant to be fighting*. This shortage includes the access of humanitarian agencies to needy populations as the Sudanese government and rebel groups have made the region so unfriendly and violent that humanitarian groups can not address these needs. One of the more startling developments within Darfur is the ambushing and looting of humanitarian agencies by rebel groups. USAID notes that in October 2007 alone, “7 aid workers were killed, 10 humanitarian vehicles were
carjacked, and 7 convoys were ambushed and looted in Darfur”. Unlike the traditional explanations where there are clear lines between the parties causing insecurity, the gender-specific referent object shows that all conflict parties are guilty of perpetuating insecurity for the population.

Finally, one of the largest implications of these structural threats for women comes as a result of the disease, malnutrition, and water- and fuel-shortages occurring within protected refugee camps. To feed themselves and their families, women are forced to leave the camps to collect firewood, but once outside they are often abducted, gang raped, and/or violently mutilated before being released (Amnesty International, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006). The occurrence of rape is the most significant gendered reality of the war in Darfur. Not only has rape been a spoil of war, but has been used as a way to further the objectives of the groups involved in the conflict. Within the traditional security perspective, rape is treated as a side-effect to the main occurrence of war; a sideshow within the larger conflict. The feminist analysis of rape as ‘power’ is not material, military, or economic; rather, it is based on a socially constructed hierarchy between genders, between an oppressor and an oppressed, and based on the social relationships among the religious and ethnic groups within Darfur.

Rape has been used as a tool of war by the combatant parties in three specific ways. First, the Janjaweed militia has used rape as a tool against the Black population to subjugate their victims through humiliation, revenge, or as a spoil of war (Hansen, 2001, 68). In traditional security studies, the threat of the use of force is used as a deterrent, creating fear within a population to succumb to state interests. Here, the use of deterrence has its roots in sexual violence and the use of sexual subjugation. In Darfur, rape was initially used to instil fear within the female population in villages. The Janjaweed used this technique to cause flight from villages and camps allowing easy land-capture throughout Darfur (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2005; Mohammed, 2005).

Second, rape has a direct link to the objectives and roots of the violence in Darfur, where the Janjaweed specifically attempts to rape high numbers of women to cause cultural and familial destruction. In cultural relations between Black and Arab populations, rape is culturally understood as ‘polluting’ traditional family blood lines with foreign ‘seed’. This challenges both the honour of the family and interrupts the entire family blood line (Harvard School of Public Health, 2004, 41). In this way, rape has also

been viewed as changing the long-term demographics of Darfur as babies are born with both ‘types’ of blood (Polgreen, 2005). This has the effect of disintegrating the family, as women are often ostracized from their families because of sudden ‘impurity’. In addition, that children are thus born of the conflict means that these implications are long-term in nature: the disrupted familial structure indicates that there will be little chance of resettlement even when the Darfur conflict ends. In addition, the physical and psychological results of rape include:

- miscarriages;
- irregular menstrual cycles;
- sexually transmitted diseases;
- physical injuries due to beatings;
- injuries sustained during flight from their enemies;
- and psychological disturbances, such as nightmares. The psycho-social consequences of sexual violence included shame, depression, stigma, illness, difficulty coping, and at the worst suicide (Moszynski, 2005, 654).

Finally, rape victimizes women at a third level, as the Sudanese government has also imposed a system of insecurity through the institutionalised police and judicial system. In many instances, the government has denied that rapes are occurring, and many women who were impregnated during the attacks were jailed for adultery. In an op-ed piece on the Darfur crisis, Nicholas Kristof illustrates the response by the local police: “Last year [in 2005], a student who was gang-raped sought treatment from a French aid organization in Kalma camp, but an informer alerted the police, who rushed to the clinic, burst inside, and arrested the girl” (Kristof, 2006). The above example is symptomatic of the plight of women raped during the course of the Darfur conflict.

The pervasiveness of rape in Darfur is indicative of its use as a tool of war. In these cases, age is not a factor and rape victims include children and women as old as 70 years. There are estimates that 16 to 25 per cent of the female population has suffered from rape. Yet, these figures themselves are understood to be low because social stigma, female mortality rates, and displacement have left many rapes unreported. Estimates from other regional conflicts, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), suggest that for every rape reported there are 30 that have gone unreported. Moreover, these estimates do not include the number of perpetrators active at any

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7. There is a large variation in the estimates of the number of women raped in the Darfur conflict. See for example Harvard School of Public Health (2004, 16), Lene Hansen (2001, 68), Médecins Sans Frontières (2005), and Adan Azain Mohammed (2003).
given time, but rather the number of incidents of rape (Harvard School of Public Health, 2005).

**What is to be Done to Protect Women in Darfur? Suggestions for Positive Change**

The role of women in the peaceful cessation of armed conflict is duly noted in several cases. For example, “[women have] helped in the return of child soldiers in Uganda. In communities across Bosnia, they are the first to attempt reconciliation and return. In Rwanda as well, women have led national and local efforts at reconciliation” (Onyejekwe, 2005, 277). When identifying gender-defined threats to the female referent object of security in Darfur, how does the field then conceptualize its response in resolving these insecurities? Do mainstream militaristic or even diplomatic solutions to insecurity adequately address gendered insecurity? Since traditional threats to security are identified in ‘male-centric’ terms of reference, gendered insecurities either have been ignored or addressed using traditional mechanisms. As discussed in the previous section, traditional security research attempts to find solutions to end conflicts through institutional, diplomatic, and negotiated means. Yet, issues such as structural, sexual, and individual threats to security – as defined by gendered analysis – do not end with a ceasefire. Instead, insecurity continues after the ceasefire, in four obvious ways.

First, women are victimised by all parties within Darfur, as rape and violence is perpetuated by not only the Janjaweed but also government actors and members of the JEM and SLA/M. Second, even in the event of the cessation of hostilities, the displaced population – and women in particular – continue to be affected by the limitations concerning access to food, water, and shelter. Third, cultural stigmas and dishonour within the family unit lengthen the duration of insecurity, as women that have been victimized by sexual violence are often ostracized from their home communities. Finally, because there is no readily identifiable enemy (and a multitude of perpetrators), gendered crimes are rarely prosecuted. Rather, sexual violence is treated as epiphenomenal to the ‘larger’ violence within the conflict, and the resultant solutions are dealt with in an ‘epiphenomenal’ way.

The Darfur case is rife with examples of failures to protect women from gender-based insecurity. For example, in March 2007, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for the arrest of several top members of the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militia. In its list of more
than 50 charges, only four were for sexual violence. Despite the pervasiveness of rape is blatantly evident in Darfur, where an estimated 30 to 50 per cent of women have been victimized (United Nations Security Council, 2005), these charges serve as a glaring omission of the gendered threats to security. The ICC has not been the only court guilty of being unable to address women’s issues. In 2005, when a Sudanese court set hearing dates for several perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the trials became indefinitely postponed as the defendants did not show up at the trial (ICC, 2005). This small example highlights the difficulty that women have in stopping the threats to their security and protecting themselves in conflict zones.

Even diplomatic and peaceful measures have excluded women from the security table. This glaring oversight is noted in a recent report on peace-making efforts in Darfur:

International efforts have more recently focused exclusively on security and gaining NCP consent for a UN mission … The DPA has failed to achieve this, in part because of rebel divisions during the negotiation, in part because essential actors such as traditional leaders, the displaced and women were largely excluded from the talks, and in part because the AU mediation and its international partners in Abuja were more interested in brokering a deal than addressing the conflict’s root causes. (International Crisis Group, 2006b, 13).

Cynthia Enloe argues that mainstream International Relations (IR) has defined ‘important’ roles as those dominated by males, and that the field is predetermined not to ‘find women’ in active, security-promoting roles (Enloe, 2000). An essentialist view of women further stereotypes women in order to keep them from contributing to the ‘real world’ of security studies. Furthermore, this view is stereotyping women as more appropriate for the sub-field of peace studies and rendering women ‘useless’ in matters of war-making and ‘hard’ security (Elshtain, 1997, 79). Ann Tickner argues that essentialist feminism is paradoxically regressive, as it takes traditional domestic, family-building roles for women and attempts to apply them, unconvincingly to the international scene (Tickner, 1997, 615). Alternately, the feminist approach looks to deconstruct myriad socially constructed gender-roles and argues that the roles for women are in fact increasingly multi-dimensional. Drawing upon this assertion, the constructivist school claims that male dominance is also a product of socialization within the

8. See also Ann Tickner (1997, 6), Jessica Byron and Diana Thorburn (1998), and Spike Peterson (2002, 154).
field of mainstream IR. Therefore, barriers to female participation in security studies must be deconstructed to allow for women to contribute from their experiences and perspectives. This debate is exemplified in the case of female agency in Darfur, where women are most consistently involved in the NGO community and civil society more generally in Sudan, though not within the militaristic elements of the conflict. Owing to the aforementioned exclusions, this section responds by employing a prescriptive approach to women in military and policy-making roles.

**Women in the Military**

Women comprise 90 per cent of civilian mortalities within modern armed conflicts. This figure is indicative of the disproportionate share of insecurity women suffer during violent conflict. In comparison, women represent only 2 per cent of military service people worldwide (Status of Women Canada, 2005). This disconnect shows the clear distinction between women as proactive actors, and their predetermined in the role as victims.

Yet, female participation in the military has a place in peacekeeping forces. States committing troops to the current missions – AMIS and UNAMID – have not taken into account the important role women play in cultural sensitivity and rapport-building within peacekeeping efforts. An additional challenge is that in many Muslim societies, including those in Northern Africa, women are segregated from non-family males. This prevents Darfuri women from engaging in discussions about development and other human security problems that they face within refugee camps. Even more troubling is the fact that rapists are not brought to justice for committing sexual crimes because women are unwilling to come forward and speak with male peacekeepers.9 Incorporating a greater female presence in the peacekeeping missions would still allow for respect of local traditions, and – if conducted in a sensitive manner – allow for cross-cultural relationships of trust to be built between intervening peacekeeping forces and local populations.

Furthermore, female participation has an obvious benefit within militaries and related policy-making positions in conflicts such as Darfur. In the post-Cold War era, the central task for militaries has not been engagement in full-scale conflict. Instead, they have been involved in peacekeeping,

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9. Darfuri female victims of sexual assault are also reluctant to speak with male NGO personnel.
peacemaking, development, institution-building, and nation-building roles (Government of Canada Department of National Defence, 2005). Therefore, it is important to recognize that while women traditionally have not engaged in combat due to stereotyped gender-roles, women have a newly identified part within new, multi-dimensional responsibilities for militaries. For example, women are crucial members of military units containing reconstruction teams as they can serve as liaisons with local women to redevelop a country’s institutions and economy (ibid.).

The slow yet important movement towards the integration of women in the military and security forces is exemplified by the creation of an all-women intervention force in Liberia, which was deployed at the end of January 2007. The battalion is known as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and operates as part of a specialized Formed Police Unit, “which in the past has been used as a rapid reaction force, to control riots and crowds and also to train local police forces” (BBC News, 8 September 2006). As perhaps a sign of the future for UN peacekeeping, India’s deployment of women peacekeepers was deemed “unprecedented” (Daily News & Analysis, 15 September 2006). Indeed, “female peacekeepers are seen as bringing a different style to international policing by appearing less threatening and more approachable for women and children” (ibid.). Yet, while able to address culturally-sensitive and women-outreach roles, military women are also able to pursue ‘traditional’ security aspects of peacekeeping. As the director of the CRPF, J. K. Sinha, points out: “Our women going there will send two messages – first, that women in India are on par with men, and [second, to] inspire women … wherever they go” (ibid.). This is a welcome development for post-conflict Liberia, which should serve as an example to follow as part of the response to the Darfur crisis.

Women, Civil Society, and Darfur

When examining ‘women as actors’ within the Darfur crisis, it is essential to refer to the work that has been work done at the grassroots level by NGOs.10 At the start of the Darfur conflict, the Sudanese government severely restricted outside groups from entering the country. Therefore, many of the civil society groups that intervened at the early stages of the Darfur crisis were those that were already present in Sudan, such as the International

10. See also Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005).
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières.\textsuperscript{11} Notably, one of the core movements that developed in the country following the outbreak of the conflict in Southern Sudan in the 1980s has been the involvement of women’s NGOs that provide crucial security support for displaced women in the country.

The African Women’s Development and Communications Network (known as FEMNET) is an important example of one of these organizations. FEMNET was established in 1988, and seeks to find ways to end systemic oppression of women in African states. FEMNET’s mandate is guided by the overarching objective to deal with women’s issues such as “mobilizing resources for African women’s development, equality and other women’s human rights by local, regional and international sources; and enabling collective action by African women’s movements in order to tackle regional gender issues” (FEMNET, 2006). Included in their mandate is a movement to work alongside other NGOs, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, regional bodies such as the AU, and various UN agencies in order to promote women’s issues. This becomes especially crucial with respect to the Darfur case because FEMNET provides a support system for women that have been ignored within the larger context of the conflict between the SLM/A and the \textit{Janjaweed}. One of their most recent campaigns is the push to send the perpetrators of sexual violence to the ICC (IWPR, 2006). This campaign followed ICC Justice Antonio Cassese’s report to the UN Secretary-General about the widespread and unprosecuted cases of rape that have occurred in Sudan. Within Sudanese law, a woman needs to have four male witnesses to corroborate the charge of rape. Hence, within the circumstances and turbulent setting of the Darfur conflict this evidence is virtually impossible to obtain. The efforts by FEMNET represent a crucial campaign that aims to reduce the institutional barriers to the enforcement of women’s security in Darfur.

Another example of the grassroots role of women is an organization called the Darfur Consortium. The Consortium is a group of 30 NGOs that have formed a large coalition to address the numerous threats to human security in Sudan (Darfur Consortium, 2006). Among this group of NGOs, many come from women’s organizations – which also comprise the core membership of the Consortium. This is important for several reasons as these women’s

\textsuperscript{11} See for example Médecins Sans Frontières (2005).
groups have a large and sympathetic forum with which to bring women’s security issues to the forefront within the African NGO community. In addition, these groups can draw connections between the human rights abuses targeting women and the larger frame of violence – highlighting the links between grassroots security and larger institutionalized conflict.

While FEMNET and the Darfur Consortium are two examples of NGOs that have been active in attempting to restore security to the Darfur region, they are just a small proportion of the number of women that participate in NGOs and grassroots movements within conflict zones. While these two examples represent local NGOs working in and around Darfur, it should be noted that a significant number of transnational NGOs active in Darfur are staffed by women, such as the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières, as well as the various UN agencies providing humanitarian support in the region.

Conclusions

This chapter has provided three scholarly contributions to the sub-field of security studies. First, the chapter has demonstrated how a gendered conceptualisation of security has been vastly underrepresented in traditional security studies. A key finding is that traditional security studies are largely unaware of their male-centric frames of reference. The redefinition of women as a referent object identifies how threats to security are reconceptualised within intra-state conflicts. It has been demonstrated that women are disproportionately victimized by the war in Darfur, principally through the use of sexual violence by the armed groups as a means asserting power in the region. In general during wartime, women are disproportionately victimised by structural impediments such as threats to their personal health, economic well-being, and overall quality of life (Alkire, 2002, 26-7; Musani et al., 2004).

Second, this chapter has questioned the material and militaristic roots of insecurity within traditional conceptions of power and security in the post-Cold War era. It is important to be cognisant that not all threats to security are manifested through direct acts of violence. The chapter has put forward the argument that the definition of power should be broadened to include non-material considerations. One of example of the broadening power is the idea of sexual violence as a form of power. Specifically, the Janjaweed has used rape as an assertion of power over the Black population in Darfur.
Third, this chapter provided a prescriptive discussion of the role of women in resolving gendered threats to insecurity. Traditional, male-centric frames of reference have not only misconceptualized threats to security, but also misunderstood the best ways to address these threats to security. While women are susceptible to the aforementioned structural threats to human security, they are even more vulnerable to physical threats, including rape, mutilation, and death. Yet, contemporary examples of institutional, militaristic and state-oriented resolutions have not been effective to resolve these threats. Notably, however, this is not a phenomenon that is exclusive to the Darfur crisis. Rather, these structural and agent-driven insecurities also threaten the physical well-being of women in intra-state conflicts across the globe.

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Women and Conflict in Darfur


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Section II
The Responses
4. Responsibility without Capability: Norms, Credibility, and the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention

Ulrich Petersohn

Introduction

Since 2003, the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed militia have been conducting a brutal campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleansing in response to an uprising by the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). In July 2004, Colin Powell called the crisis in Darfur a “genocide” (Powell, 2004). Despite such clear words, the response of the international community was quite limited. The African Union (AU) agreed on deploying 5,700 troops and 1,400 policemen in June 2004 as part of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). By the end of 2006, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) took over and the number of troops was increased to approximately 10,000. In July 2007, the United Nations Security Council mandated an AU-UN hybrid force of 26,000 troops and police named the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). However, the mission is not expected to be fully deployed until well into 2009. Experts are not overly optimistic regarding the future prospects for the success of either mission. According to these commentators, even UNAMID would be unable to protect the civilians (Seymour, 2007, 2). This is not surpris-
ing since the contingent remains ill-equipped, lacks training and logistical support, and is supposed to cover an area of 500,000 square kilometres.

The insufficient answer to the crisis is even more remarkable since more than a decade ago the world’s failure to prevent the Rwandan Genocide was described as a “sin of omission” by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2004). High-ranking political leaders such as the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair promised afterwards that “if Rwanda happens again we would not walk away” and he further insisted that international society has a “moral duty” to provide military and humanitarian assistance whenever it is needed (Blair, 2001). Thus, the following question arises and indeed animates this chapter: why has the international community not responded properly to the crisis in Darfur?

I will answer this question in two steps. First, I outline the assumption that the international community accepts a duty to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations. Second, I put the argument forward that even if a duty to intervene is accepted, measures are not taken automatically when human rights violations occur. A credible agent is therefore needed in order to apply it to a particular case and to form a consensus. Since the most important advocate of an intervention – the United States – lost its credibility, the international community failed to reach such a consensus. Finally, I draw the conclusion that the case of Sudan points to a deeper problem concerning the duty to intervene and the incapability to protect. This leads me to the discussion of options that may close the capability gap.

Is There a Duty to Intervene?

I start from the assumption that the international system is a social system wherein norms are in force. Norms are shared guidelines stating what behaviour is considered to be appropriate under what circumstances (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 891-93). I argue that a duty to intervene emerged during the 1990s. Since new norms never appear in a normative vacuum, they have to compete with other norms that are already established (ibid., 897). Inevitably, questions arise discerning how the new norm prevails over an established rule or when a new norm is actually accepted by relevant actors. There is a consensus among scholars that a critical mass of states supporting a particular norm is required. However, the determination of when this threshold is reached is a matter of disagreement. One important factor is certainly the total number of states accepting the new norm. As a rule of
thumb, usually a sum of one-third of the states in the international system is considered sufficient. Besides the quantity of states, it also matters which ones adopt the norm. There are powerful states – such as the United States, Russia, and China – whose consent to the adoption of a new norm may turn out to be difficult to attain, whereas the obstinacy of weaker states may be ignored more easily (ibid., 901).

In the section below, I briefly describe the changes in the normative structure of the international system after the Cold War leading towards the emergence of a duty to intervene. Next, I argue that the critical mass of supporters has indeed been reached and the norm regarding humanitarian intervention can be considered to be in force.

Changes in the Normative Structure of the International System

In the field of human rights, the body of international declarations and treaties has expanded since 1945. The UN Charter stipulates an obligation to promote and implement human rights. In 1948, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, followed by the signing of several treaties on civil, political, social, and cultural rights. However, it cannot be inferred that this establishes a right or a duty for states to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations. Until the 1980s, there was no complementary right or duty of humanitarian intervention in existence. The institution of sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention were considered to be more important. This opinion was confirmed for example by the UNGA in its Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention (1965). Therein, the UNGA expressed the opinion that no state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of another state. In the same way, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared in reference to the Corfu Channel case (1949) that “between independent States the respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation for international relations” (quoted in MacFarlane, 2002, 36). This illustrates the ambivalent evolution of norms during the Cold War. Although international law forbids states to ill-treat their citizens and binds them to human rights standards, a parallel body of norms that restricts intervention in the internal affairs of a state has evolved (Akehurst, 1985, 95; Abiew, 1999). Between the end of Second World War in 1945 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a norm relating to the responsibility of the international community to intervene into a state to protect its citizens from
gross human rights violations did not exist. The norm of sovereignty was valued higher than the enforcement of human rights. Respect of sovereignty and non-intervention was seen as the central pillar for the stability of the international system and the security of its member-states.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, new ideas challenged this restrictive normative structure. Powerful actors like the UN and transnational non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as Amnesty International, Save the Children, Christian Aid, and Oxfam demanded a more active promotion of human rights. They advocated for the replacement of the ‘old’ humanism – where help was granted as a charitable act – and in its place the establishment of a common political, economic, and military duty to intervene (Chandler, 2002, 22; MacFarlane, 2002).

The new significance of human rights was reflected in discussions about security. The 1994 edition of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report weighed in on the debate:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust…. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives (UNDP, 1994, 22).

The UNDP report promoted a new understanding of security, shifting from a state-centric view towards the concept of ‘human security’. Human security was defined as safety from such threats as hunger, disease, repression, and protection from disruptions in the patterns of daily life. The concept meant adopting a bottom-up view of security that focused on the relationship between states and their citizens. Security of a state or regime was no longer equated with the well-being of its citizens (Krause, 2005, 3). The UN was not alone in supporting this new understanding, as some states backed the new concept. For example, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland were among the leaders of a group of states that founded the Human Security Network in 1999.

However, the enforcement of human rights by an external actor was still seen as an infringement of sovereignty. Promoting a more active humanitarianism also required a new interpretation of sovereignty. The former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali claimed, in An Agenda for Peace, that the age of absolute and exclusive sovereignty had come to an

end (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). His successor, Kofi Annan, shared this view by defining sovereignty as responsibility, not just power. He stressed that sovereignty was never meant to be a licence for governments to trample human rights and human dignity (Annan, 1998). According to this view, sovereignty was no longer an inherent right of the state. Instead, it was granted to the state by its citizens and the international community. Bhikhu Parekh is correct in pointing out that:

Since it has both an internal and an external basis, the state is accountable not only to its own citizens but also to outsiders for the conduct of its affairs. Its citizens are not cut off from the rest of mankind but form an integral part of it, and are object to its legitimate moral concern (Parekh, 1997, 63).

Sovereignty was not understood in absolute terms anymore, but as a concept composed of rights and duties. If a state violates its duties, mainly defined by the standards of the international community, it can forfeit its erstwhile protection under the non-intervention norm.

The evolution towards more emphasis on human rights found its initial peak in 2001, with the publication of the report of the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001, IX). The ICISS report combined the new understanding of human security and limited sovereignty, promoting the duty to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations, called the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). In principle, R2P demands that when gross human rights violations take place, the home state is called upon to take measures to end the violations in question. If the state is unable or unwilling to act, R2P is transferred to the international community.

However, the question remains whether the norm regarding sovereignty has been accepted by the international community. As outlined above, this would be the case so long as a critical mass had been reached. One indicator of the acceptance might be the practice of the international community. The one-third threshold appears to have been reached, at least among countries participating in the discussions around R2P. During the informal consultations about R2P within the confines of the UNGA in 2005, 28 countries were in favour, 12 against, and three undecided. Even the important ‘permanent five’ (P-5) of the UN Security Council seemed to be in favour of R2P. The UN Security Council adopted several Resolutions expressing the will to remain no longer passive in cases of gross human rights violations and to

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consider these cases as threats to international peace and stability, and to intervene with military means if necessary.

This change in attitude – albeit with reversals – has evolved since the end of the Cold War. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) held that the suppression of the people of Iraq – particularly the Kurdish population – represented a threat to international peace. With the exception of South African apartheid, this was the first time the UN Security Council had recognized internal repression might threaten international security. This was in sharp contrast to the Cold War practices of the UN Security Council. In March 1971, when India had argued that the refugee flows across its borders – caused by Pakistan’s killing of thousands of Bengali civilians – created a threat to the regional security and stability, the UN Security Council disagreed. The prevailing view at the time was that the human rights violations were part of the internal affairs of Pakistan (Wheeler, 2003, 33). When addressing the tumultuous situation in Somalia in 1992, the UN Security Council went further than in the Iraq case. By employing the language of Chapter VII, the UN Security Council emphasised its willingness to use force for humanitarian purposes.

However, there have also been sceptical voices about a duty to intervene. The lack of intervention in Rwanda in 1994 might have been quietly justified on the grounds that the genocide fell within Rwanda’s domestic jurisdiction (Wheeler, 2003, 33). Russia and China have often argued against the competency of the UN Security Council in human rights matters and always underlined the exceptionality of the Resolutions in the cases of Iraq and Somalia. Furthermore, both states wanted to make “joint efforts for strengthening the leading role of the UN and its Security Council in world affairs and countering any attempts to subvert the fundamental of international law with the help of such as humanitarian intervention and limited sovereignty” (quoted in MacFarlane, 2002, 58). This scepticism was shared by the foreign ministers of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries – which is known more commonly as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – when they issued a joint-statement opposing the right to intervene. Their position is unequivocal: “We reject the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or in

the general principles of international law” (Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, para 263, 2000).

Despite this opposition, it can be argued that the requisite critical mass has already been reached. Supporters of R2P include the Group of Seven (G-7) states among others.\(^5\) R2P, with some modifications, was included in the final document of the UN World Summit in 2005 (UNGA, 2005; Bellamy, 2006).\(^6\) Even Russia and China agreed to the final document, although one wonders whether this was just ‘lip service’. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902) argue that after the ‘tipping point’ has been reached, opponents can be pressed to adopt the new policies since their reputation as legitimate members of the international community rests on norm-compliance. Russia and China cannot literally be forced to comply with the norm, but the shaming power and possible harm to their reputation restricts their options. Even though states are uncomfortable with the new norm, they rarely challenge interventions when gross human rights violations take place. In the case of Iraq in 1991, for example, no member voted against the UN Security Council Resolution. No state wanted to be seen as opposing a military action that was clearly saving lives. This makes sense only when a responsibility to protect human rights is in force, compliance is a source of reputation, and non-compliance might be harmful (Wheeler, 2003, 39).

In the case of Sudan, these notions of reputation and compliance become clear. During the 5015\(^{th}\) meeting of the UN Security Council the situation in Darfur was discussed. China made it clear that the intentional community should help facilitate a peaceful end to the crisis in Darfur. However, from China’s point of view the primary responsibility for resolving the crisis lies with Khartoum. Since Beijing disagreed with the mandatory measures included in the draft version of the resolution, it ultimately abstained from the vote.\(^7\) The remarkable part is that as a P-5 member of the UN Security Council, China could have vetoed the Resolution. Yet, it chose not to do so. The power of a new norm becomes evident through its capacity to constrain the actions of states. Thus, it is safe to assume that a critical mass has been reached. In other words, the duty to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations has been accepted by the majority of the members of the international community and hence in force. With that said, the international

\(^5\) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/government_statements/c133>.
community has been reluctant to intervene in Darfur – in a robust manner – since the escalation of hostilities in 2003. This conundrum is addressed in the next section.

The Reluctance of the International Community to Intervene in Darfur

Even if the duty to intervene is a norm is in force, measures are not taken automatically when human rights violations occur. Norms – even duties – are never unconditional. No agent is obliged to intervene when the risk of escalating the conflict is too high. The risk increases dramatically when a state possesses weapons of mass destruction or a large capable army. Outside forcible interventions on the behalf of the people of Tibet (in China) or Chechnya (in Russia) are therefore impossible. However, the Sudanese People’s Armed Forces (SPAF) has 105,000 troops, is ill-trained, lacks sufficient command and control systems, and almost 50 per cent of its military equipment is not ready for action. In sum, the SPAF is in poor shape and has very limited capabilities (Meinken, 2005, 40).

Even if the risk associated with intervening in Darfur is perceived as small, the duty to intervene does not provide a justification for an individual state to take action whenever the time is deemed suitable. According to Martha Finnemore, humanitarian interventions “must be multilateral if states are to accept it as legitimate and genuinely humanitarian” (Finnemore, 1996, 181). Although ‘multilateral’ means three or more actors in the strictest sense, meaningful multilateral action connotes several countries working together on a common issue. Multilateral interventions require consensus-building exercises in order to set common conditions, means, and aims. Consensus-building in this context requires a powerful agent in order to frame the situation and apply the international norm.8 The greater the international credibility of the consensus-leader, the better the chances of gaining consensus on common ideas and objectives. International credibility is gained by previous instances of international norm compliance (i.e., reputation) and level of involvement in the proposed initiatives (i.e., burden-sharing).

The United States has been the most important advocate of a humanitarian intervention in Sudan (Bellamy, 2005, 40). Yet, it took years of ‘foot-dragging’ to establish a modest multinational force – UNAMID – which lacks

robustness. The reluctance of the international community to intervene in Darfur is due to the loss of credibility by the United States on the international stage. This argument is elaborated upon below.

Why is the United States Important?

A successful humanitarian intervention can only be undertaken with modern military forces. The forces must be highly professional and capable to carry out expeditionary operations. The number of states possessing these capabilities is small: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and, to a minor extent, Germany. However, with the exception of the United States, each member of this list of states has limited capabilities and manpower. Britain and France are able to intervene in smaller countries, as they proved in Sierra Leone (2000) and Côte d’Ivoire (2004), respectively. Australia is capable of leading an operation in its intermediate neighbourhood, as it did in East Timor (Kurth, 2005, 88). After an intervention, troops are needed to stabilize and secure the country. As we can learn from the operation in Iraq, it requires far more troops to restore peace and stability than to succeed on the battlefield. As a rule of thumb, to stabilize a particular region, 20 troops per 1,000 inhabitants are needed (Broemmel et al., 2007, 110). Darfur’s population is estimated to be in the range of 6 million. Thus, 120,000 troops are necessary, according to this ratio. However, this number needs to be tripled due to the logistics associated with a troop rotation system: preparation for the mission; going into operation; and a subsequent ‘home leave’ phase every six months.

Given the resources required to support a robust humanitarian intervention in Darfur, UNAMID (or any future mission) will be hard-pressed to find success without the participation of the United States. Despite the fact that the United States was one of the leading actors in drawing the international community’s attention to the Darfur crisis, the country has faced a credibility problem since the start of the Iraq War in 2003. The United States has lost much of its international reputation because several high-ranking officials in the George W. Bush Administration framed the Iraq intervention in humanitarian terms. For example, the then Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz argued that the military campaign in Iraq was about bringing democracy and human rights to the Iraqi people (Wolfowitz, 2003). Furthermore, it was argued that Saddam Hussein himself was a weapon of mass destruction since he had massacred the Kurds in 1988 and the Shiites in 1991. However, in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, it seemed that the
United States had made no prior preparations to establish a stable environment and to conduct meaningful nation-building in the country.

The loss of reputation is also rooted in the American presentation of the Iraq case before the UN Security Council. The United States presented evidence and made subsequent arguments that later turned out to be false, which harmed its international reputation and made it much more difficult to advocate intervening in Sudan in 2004. Most state actors were suspicious about the real intentions of the United States and suspected that the country had a hidden agenda. Moreover, it was easier for Russia and China – both having vital interests in Sudan – to argue against American efforts in general and any proposed humanitarian intervention in particular (Bellamy, 2005, 45). Thus, the Iraq War harmed the reputation of the United States and diminished its ability to garner widespread support in favour of a robust, multilateral humanitarian intervention in Sudan.

An additional factor for consideration relates to the logistics facing a US-led multilateral intervention in Sudan. Given its military commitment in Iraq (and Afghanistan), the United States had no resources left to carry out another intervention. In December 2001, the United States Army had deployed approximately 100,000 troops overseas. By 2007, this number had increased to 248,000. In Iraq, the United States Army has had to rely heavily on reserve components and the National Guard. By April 2004, more than 150,000 troops of drawn from reserve units had been called to active service. According to estimates made by military experts, the current level of American military operations actually requires an additional 60,000 troops (O’Hanlon, 2004, 4-6). A large-scale American troop commitment – which would be required as part of the call for action in Darfur by the United States – was actually very unlikely. This led the United States to look for other states to carry the burden and to see an option in the AMIS. However, in arguing for an extension to AMIS coupled with the small proposed contribution of American forces, such actions served to reduce further the international credibility of the United States.

**Implications for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention**

The problem outlined by the Sudan case is two-fold. First, a credible state actor (or set of state actors) is needed to make the case for a humanitarian
intervention. This actor needs to be imbued with a good international reputation and capacity to take on a significant part of the burden entailed by the intervention. If its international reputation is flawed, then the state agent will not be able to build a consensus for action – as evidenced by the United States regarding Sudan. Although, the international reputation of the United States might recover in the medium-term, decisive action is required sooner rather than later. P-5 powers such as the United Kingdom and France or middle powers like Australia, Canada, and Germany are candidates that could place their respective international reputations to the test and attempt to form a consensus on Darfur. However, even if one or more of these countries are able to make the case for a robust intervention in Darfur (that exceeds the modest mandate of UNAMID), the second problem arises. That is, these countries lack the capability to conduct humanitarian intervention operations on a large-scale. The problem becomes even more severe, since the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany have substantial troop commitments in Afghanistan. There are simply no resources left to conduct other operations with reasonable prospects of success.

What chances are there to overcome the capacity and capability problems? The best prospects relate to the conduct of high-intensity operations on a large-scale by the Europeans – if they keep on developing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 2007, the ESDP battle-groups went (partly) operational. A battle-group comprises 1,500 troops drawn from different countries and is supposed to enhance crisis-response capabilities. However, the expectations should not be too high. According to the ‘Helsinki Headline Goals’, the Europeans want to build a 60,000-troop ‘Rapid Reaction Force’. Even if two ESDP battle-groups are always available for simultaneous deployment, the ambitious overall aims of the Helsinki Headline Goals are far from being met. Further developments in this area are expected to take a long time and actual capability at present is rather limited.

Another option might be outsourcing of peace enforcement to private military companies (PMCs). The operation of Executive Outcomes (EO), a former South African PMC, helped to stabilize Sierra Leone (temporarily) and Angola (eventually). EO’s training of the Forças Armadas de Angola (FAA) served to strengthen the capabilities of the Angolan military in the mid-1990s. After inflicting heavy losses on the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and recapturing the diamond mines in the north-eastern part of the country, hope for attaining the peace envisioned by the Lusaka Protocol began to blossom (Shearer, 1998, 46-48). By February 2002, the FAA had UNITA on the defensive.
and managed to kill the rebel group’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, which led to a final cease-fire less than two months later.

Chris Taylor, who serves as ‘head of strategy’ for Blackwater – an American PMC – stated that his firm has a database containing thousands of former police and military officers. According to Taylor, small groups drawn from this pool of individuals could be employed as guards to protect Darfuri villages and refugee camps – perhaps as a means of supporting or working in conjunction with the UN.\(^\text{10}\) Although PMCs may assist in the short-term in terms of building the capability of war-torn states to provide stability, this option remains problematic. It is often noted that EO was not able to implement long-term stability in Sierra Leone. Other barriers range from how to prosecute member of PMCs when they break the law to uncertainty over accountability. The UN has considered the option of employing PMCs before – such as the case of Rwanda in 1994 – but the idea was rejected by decision-makers (Ogata, 2005, 203-04).

A final option is to turn to African crisis response capabilities as envisioned by the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF). In 2004, African Heads of State approved the policy framework for the establishment of the ASF. The idea is to build up standby brigades in five African regions which are capable of conducting – under AU-mandate – everything from observer missions to robust humanitarian interventions. However, the schedule envisages the operationability of ASF capabilities by 2010. Even with help offered by the European Union (EU) to train ASF troops, build up infrastructure, and develop doctrine and procedures, this remains an ambitious project and in any case a short-term option (Cilliers and Malan, 2005).

**Conclusion**

In the early years of the Darfur crisis, there was no consensus in the UN Security Council regarding an appropriate response. Pakistan, China, and Russia were generally opposed to an intervention in Sudan, whereas some European states were in favour. However, the most powerful advocate for an intervention in Sudan – the United States – had lost much of its international credibility and reputation as part of its justification for intervening in Iraq. Therefore, the United States was not able to form the requisite consensus for

action in Darfur and made it easy for the opponents of a robust humanitarian intervention in Sudan to succeed.

In the absence of a viable state agent to form a consensus and shoulder the burden of a humanitarian intervention, the chapter assessed other means to protect civilian populations at risk. The penultimate section of the chapter provided a brief overview of several options as a possible means of closing the capability gap. Although the use of PMCs in support of the UN might be the best short-term option, it is not feasible owing to objections concerning accountability and a variety of political issues. As explained above, relying on European or African capabilities – if at all – remains a long-term option. Thus, the prospects for a robust humanitarian intervention in the near future are slim.

Although UNAMID may develop into an effective force, the resilience of the norms supporting R2P remains rather tenuous. It does not help that a perception exists in some quarters that the selective enforcement of the protection of human rights by Western states – such as the case of Darfur – is a double standard or even an example of Western hegemony (McSweeny, 2003). This may lead to the restoration of the ‘old’ concept of sovereignty and norm of non-intervention, and provide China and Russia with the ammunition to discredit the norms related to R2P. The best way to counter such reversals would be to enforce human rights and to intervene where help is desperately needed at all times. A short review of the most recent Human Rights Watch reports\textsuperscript{11} shows that there is no lack of opportunities. This might prevent the norms of R2P from becoming simple rhetoric and steal the thunder of proponents of a reversal in favour of the traditional conceptions of sovereignty and non-intervention. Therefore, more rather than less humanitarian intervention is needed. However, this point may be moot given that the capability challenge remains formidable.

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\textsuperscript{11} See <http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=pubs>.

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Responsibility without Capability


5. Lessons Learned?
Credible International and Canadian Responses to the Crisis in Darfur

Brent Beardsley and John Schram

Introduction

Canadians share a well-justified sense that Canada should be in the lead of an international effort to save the people of Darfur. Guiltily aware that for the past six years we have been watching a genocide in progress, we cannot square our post-Rwanda sentiments of “never again” with the half-hearted international responses – ranging from United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – which have done little to stop the killing, and very little more to relieve the plight of those devastated by yet another incident of people’s inhumanity towards one another. Yet there is still a reluctance both here and abroad to face the reality of what is happening – and, worse, to confront and overcome our limitations in helping to bring it to an end.

We do not lack calls to action. Demands for Canadian troops on the ground in Darfur, increased humanitarian assistance, and more effective diplomacy are many and easily made. However, practical alternatives are few. And, these alternatives are difficult to implement. The question remains: what should Canada do? If past experience is a worthy guide, we have the
opportunity to learn some lessons from those conflicts where Canada did in fact respond.

Where Canada Intervened

In the 1990s, Canadian forces joined American troops in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Canada went not because we knew anything about Somalia, or had any but the most indirect interests there – we did not. Rather, Canadian forces found themselves in Somalia because of Canada-United States imperatives, and media-led pressure to get food to starving people. Despite the disillusionment at the end of the mission, our forces did a good job, not only on defence, but also on diplomacy and development. Canadian troops were highly regarded by their American and United Nations (UN) colleagues, and obviously well-liked by the people of Belet Huen for their humanitarian involvement and empathy.

When Canadian forces went to Ethiopia and Eritrea as conventional peacekeepers in the early 2000s, it was again for much broader reasons than Canada’s direct interests in the Horn of Africa. This time, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien wanted to support the then-Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in his peace-making initiative, to show our commitment to and concern for Africa in the lead-up to the Group of Eight (G-8) Summit at Kananaskis, Canada. Others wanted to re-invigorate the flagging image of Canadians as peace-makers. More immediately, we were responding to the Dutch, who persuaded us to join them demonstrating that the Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade For UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) rapid-response concept could work.

Neither the Dutch nor the Canadians had significant or direct interests in the Horn of Africa. Yet, our SHIRBRIG forces moved into a conflict zone on time with fully operational equipment. Together they accomplished a well-stated purpose within a precise timeline and a fixed budget. They showed that Canada was indeed a reliable, prepared, and professional military, well capable of the highest levels of professionalism in peacekeeping. Canadians can be proud of what our troops did – certainly, the leaders of both Eritrea and Ethiopia were sorry to see them go.

1. For a recent assessment of Canada’s role in SHIRBRIG, see Peter Armstrong-Whitworth (2007).
Lessons Learned? 79

Where Canada Did Not Intervene

Somalia and Ethiopia-Eritrea are two examples of where Canada made a definitive humanitarian intervention through the provision of diplomatic, defence, and development resources. There may be several lessons from each intervention that would be instructive for any Canadian role in the Darfur crisis. Nonetheless, far and away the most significant example of international response to a crisis is one where the international community – including Canada – failed. That is, the Rwandan Genocide.

From April to July 1994, in a period of roughly 100 days, approximately 800,000 human beings were murdered during the Rwandan Genocide (Prunier, 1995, 261-65).2 The international community failed to either prevent or stop the killing; it largely stood quietly as bystanders while hundreds of thousands died in one of the fastest and deadliest genocides in history.

In April 2004, while the world commemorated the Rwandan Genocide and lamented its failure in 1994, while pledging “never again”, another genocide was exposed – this time in Darfur, Sudan. In the years since 2004, the world has watched, largely as bystanders, while the death toll has climbed from 40,000 to a current estimate of 400,000 dead, 2.5 million people displaced (either within Sudan’s borders or made refugees), and at least another million placed at risk from starvation, disease, and despair. Clearly the combination of private and public diplomacy, commissions of inquiry, media coverage, governmental and non-governmental reports, United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) declarations, a weakly mandated, ill-equipped, and inadequately supported peacekeeping force, and the feelings of disgust of at humanity has been sadly inadequate to stop the genocide in Darfur. Will the international community, including Canada, continue to pursue what is a set of failed policies and an ineffective strategy in Darfur? Or, will we honour our moral, legal, and policy obligations to stop the genocide in

2. Prunier (1995) was among the first scholars to investigate the number of individuals killed in the Rwandan Genocide and concluded that the figure was between 800,000 and 850,000. Human Rights Watch (1999, 1) commissioned a later and more extensive investigation that concluded that no fewer than 500,000 people were killed. There is considerable debate amongst scholars and bureaucrats regarding the exact number. The conclusion of most commentators is that we will never know. For instance, the Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (2000, chapter 14, 80) supports this conclusion and sets the number at no less than 500,000 and more likely in a range of up to 800,000. Notably, 800,000 has become the most generally agreed-upon figure.
Darfur? Perhaps we can learn from a previous failure, namely the failure to either prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 in order to craft a new and effective response to the ongoing genocide in Darfur.3

Genocide

Genocide is the worst of crimes and has been labelled the ultimate crime. The deliberate intention of one group to destroy a designated group of innocent men, women, and children is morally wrong and places an obligation on all of humanity to rescue the victims of genocide. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the UN and its member states of the day established the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Commonly referred to as the Genocide Convention, it was unanimously passed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 9 December 1948. Since 1949, the Genocide Convention has been become international law, ratified by 140 State Parties,4 and incorporated into the national legislation its signatories (Weitz, 2003, 9). As signatories to the Genocide Convention, Canada and numerous other states have accepted the moral and the legal obligations of the convention to prevent, suppress, and punish the crime of genocide. Despite the clarity of these obligations, states have most consistently in the face of genocide abdicated them by simply refusing to acknowledge that a specific crisis is genocide. There is no international legal obligation to respond effectively with “any and all means”, to crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or any other gross violation of human rights. Therefore, a state that has ratified the convention, but determines it does not wish to respond to genocide, can simply do so, by not acknowledging that genocide is taking place.5

4. This number may increase over time. For an up-to-date list of State Parties to the Genocide Convention, see <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=318&chapter=4&lang=en>.
5. For more information on the legal aspects of genocide, see the following selection of readings. The seminal work on genocide by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990, 65-377) provides case studies of 14 genocides from Melos in Ancient Greece to the Holocaust. Raphael Lemkin (1944, 79-80) invented the word genocide and made an initial attempt to
Lessons Learned?

Partially in response to the failure to prevent or suppress the Rwandan Genocide, and in direct response to a challenge from then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in September 2000, the Government of Canada commissioned the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The commission report is entitled The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The report (and the policy that it articulates) has influenced Canadian foreign policy and has been adopted by the UNGA as an international policy. R2P’s central theme “is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS, 2001a, VII-XIII). This policy proposes a two-pronged strategy of humanitarian intervention. First, it encourages and justifies the non-use of force by promoting diplomacy, humanitarian aid, international condemnation, restrictions such as embargoes or sanctions, commissions of inquiry, monitoring missions, referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. These actions constitute a non-violent ‘pole’. However, if they fail in preventing or suppressing the humanitarian catastrophe, then the R2P Report recommends, as a last resort, that the UN Security Council move to the use of force, directly intervene with military forces, and use any and all means to stop a humanitarian catastrophe like genocide. With that said, the shift to the use of force must conform to six principles, namely, right intent, a just cause, use of force as a last resort, proportional use of force, sanction by a legitimate authority, and the carefully measured estimate of whether success is likely. If these six principles are not met, then it is understood that force should not be used and the implementation of non-military tools, like those mentioned above, should be continued.6

Most observers now agree that the current situation in Darfur is genocide and meets the Genocide Convention’s legal “definition and acts” thresholds. In addition, through its failure or inability to date to stop the genocide in Darfur, the Government of Sudan has abdicated its responsibility to protect define the word, which has been modified by the Genocide Convention, scholars of genocide studies, and various national laws relating to genocide. William Schabas (2000, 553-58) dedicates the first two chapters of his book to the efforts to develop the Genocide Convention and in the pages noted provides the first two drafts of the Convention and the Final Convention, which were adopted into international law. Samantha Power (2003) devotes three chapters to the struggle to develop the Genocide Convention and then the struggle to get it ratified by nations like the United States. 6. See for example ICISS (2001a; 2001b).
its citizens. In accordance with the R2P, Canada and the wider international community, through the UN, must now assume that responsibility. To date our efforts, which have all been clearly on the non-violent pole (meaning short of the use of force), have clearly failed to stop the killing in Darfur.

For the international community to act effectively to end the ongoing carnage in Darfur, it must first learn some hard lessons from the Rwandan Genocide. The experience from Rwanda would suggest five critical requirements that must be understood to be the foundation of any effective international, UN, or AU humanitarian intervention into Darfur. The five crucial requirements are: a clearly defined objective of such an intervention; the will to see the intervention through to its successful conclusion, the way or method to carry out such an intervention; the means required to successfully conduct an intervention into Darfur; and a timeline for such an intervention. Each of these requirements will be briefly examined in the following section.

**Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur**

First, and foremost, a clear and coherent *objective* of a humanitarian intervention into Darfur must be established. In short, it must be the implementation of any and all means to stop the genocide in Darfur with a view to providing a climate of human security essential for the return of the targets of this genocide to their homes and to resume their lives without fear that the Government of Sudan will resume genocidal acts. In turn, this objective has five key components, namely ending the genocide immediately, providing human security for the targets of this genocide, removing any threats that prevent the targeted populations from confidently returning to their homes, supporting the resumption of their normal lives, and ultimately convincing the Government of Sudan and its surrogates to end their policy of genocide and to support the provision of basic human security to all of their people in Darfur.

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7. See for example Romeo Dallaire with Brent Beardsley (2003), which provides a first-hand account by the Canadian Commander of the Rwandan Genocide that instils and understanding of the complex and dangerous challenges faced by anyone trying to either prevent or stop a genocide. The lessons described in this present chapter are the views of Major Beardsley alone and are based on his experience and his research on the Rwandan Genocide.
The second critical requirement is the will that is sustained and determined to achieve the above objective. Political will – both at the government and grassroots levels – in Canada and in the broader international community must be mobilized behind this intervention. If the political will is absent, the means to carry out the humanitarian intervention will never materialize. An intervention of this magnitude could result in numerous casualties for all sides and will cost a significant amount of ‘treasure’ while providing no absolute guarantee of success. Therefore, any forceful intervention must enjoy the support of public opinion, national governments, and the international community acting in concert to achieve the objective required in Darfur.

For Canadians, gone are the days when its government could commit the Canadian Forces into harm’s way without the consent of Parliament or the support of the electorate. The post-Cold War era has clearly demonstrated that Parliament wants a full and open debate and vote and the Canadian people want to be kept fully informed. The cost in treasure and blood (i.e., casualties) demands that Parliament and Canadians fully understand the risks of any military intervention and are prepared to pay the price that may be required to stop a genocide with the use of force. In addition, Canadians must realize that Canada cannot go it alone. We do not have the means in treasure or military muscle and therefore whatever we do must be with allies and preferably under the aegis (or at least with the permission) of the UN.

In addition, the will of the media to provide full, consistent, and balanced coverage of the intervention as a means to mobilizing and sustaining public awareness and support for the mission must be sought and sustained. Finally, the will of national militaries contributing to the coalition must be resilient. The objective of the mission, the myriad tasks, and the support required must be logical, guaranteed, and achievable. Political will can only be mobilized if there is a consensus that what is taking place in Darfur is a threat to our collective values and interests, represents a direct threat to international and regional peace and security, which in turn requires an effective response to honour our moral, policy, and legal obligations under the Genocide Convention and such that the present genocide in Darfur must be confronted and defeated with sustained determination.

The third requirement is the way or method of conducting an effective humanitarian intervention to stop the genocide in Darfur. The mission must have timely, relevant, and accurate information or knowledge of the area, the people, and the conflict in Darfur. In order to build a plan that will be effective, decision-makers at all levels must have all of the relevant information – from all sources – which they require in order to ensure that they
clearly understand the conditions and the requirements for the success of the mission. Before and during the mission, all participants must make a commitment to the highest ethical, moral, and legal standards in the conduct of the mission. The coalition must fully comply with all international legal requirements in order to ensure their intent is correct and their cause is just in order to sustain public support for the mission.

The policy, strategy, and mandate of the mission must be clear, legitimate, credible, and transparent to all. The R2P meets these criteria as a policy directive. A two-pronged strategy that attempts in the first instance to resolve issues with ‘non-use of force’ tools, but is also prepared and capable of backing up soft power with hard power in the form of the use of force will be essential. Finally, a mandate, ideally from the UN, under Chapter VII, which provides for the use of any and all means – within international law and norms – to stop the genocide is essential if further intervention is to be successful. A UN mandate provides legitimacy, credibility, and transparency while demonstrating the will of the international community against the genocidal actions of the Government of Sudan and its surrogates.

The fourth requirement is the means or essential capabilities required to conduct successfully the humanitarian intervention. There must be a comprehensive and fully integrated campaign plan to drive the intervention. It must bring together political, economic, social, security, humanitarian, and human rights players – both international and non-governmental – to coordinate their actions in order to achieve the objective of the mission in the most effective and efficient manner. The financial support to conduct the mission properly must be obtained, shared, and sustained throughout the mission. The treasure required to pay for such an intervention will be considerable and must be guaranteed. The requirement to use force, when absolutely necessary, must be acknowledged and legally authorized. While every problem is not a ‘nail’ that requires a ‘hammer’, some challenges to the mission or to the people it seeks to protect are nails and will only be neutralized with a hammer. The requirement for a multi-national, combat-capable force that can deploy rapidly, conduct a full spectrum of operations from combat operations against those who threaten innocent civilians to providing security for humanitarian assistance, and be sustained indefinitely must be acquired from states. The force may not have to fight, but if it or the people who the force is responsible for protecting are attacked or threatened with the possibility of an attack (or if its mandate is challenged), it must have the authority and the capability to use lawful and ordered force.
A related requirement is the ability of the sponsoring nations to risk casualties. If force is used against non-complying parties then it is likely that force will be used by perpetrators against the coalition force which will in all likelihood result in casualties. The provision of the aforementioned means required by the force must see sponsoring nations and the international community able to absorb casualties and not withdraw at the first sight of blood. Knowledge, treasure, use of armed force, the actual combat capable force, and the ability to sustain friendly casualties are the critical means which must be provided to secure an effective armed humanitarian intervention into Darfur.

The final requirement for the humanitarian intervention is in appreciating and accepting an effective use of time. Clearly, all efforts to date have failed to stop the genocide in Darfur. With the deaths of approximately 400,000 people over the past six years, the imminent health risks (including death) for 2.5 million displaced people, and the proliferation of this conflict to neighbouring areas, it is now time to recognize that a more robust and effective intervention is required to stop the genocide in Darfur and honour our moral, policy, and legal obligations under international law. In the business world, it is often stated that “time is money”. During a genocide, “time is lives”. Every day, week, month, or year of delay will result in the deaths of many more innocent people. If the decision is taken to intervene in a robust manner in Darfur, then in the short-term the mission must be launched as rapidly as possible. One must view deployment, at least initial deployment, in terms of days and weeks – not months. In the medium term, the duration of the mission will be far beyond the norm of six-month or one-year mandates. Such a robust humanitarian intervention, at this stage of the genocide and in this region, will take years to achieve its objectives. Finally, in the long term, returning people safely to their homes, helping them to resume their normal lives, and guaranteeing a change in the behaviour of the Government of Sudan will most likely require decades of sustained effort.

All of the critical requirements examined briefly above were absent in Rwanda during that genocide. There was no clear objective for the mission during the genocide. There was little to no international, national, public, media, or military will behind the mission. There was no legal, ethical, and moral way to stop the genocide in Rwanda as there was no international policy, no effective strategy, and no mandate for effective intervention. Knowledge of Rwanda, its people, culture, and history was weak at all levels and most decision-makers operated more out of blind ignorance than
any form of wisdom. There were totally inadequate means provided to the mission. Insufficient financial support, disastrous restrictions on the use of force, the provision of an operationally ineffective force in-theatre, and a strong aversion to taking any risks that might result in friendly casualties, even while Rwandans were dying by their thousands each and every day of the genocide. Finally, in Rwanda the international community made poor use of time. It continued to pursue a failed strategy until the genocide was complete. It took months to deliver vital capabilities to theatre, which were required in days at best and weeks at worst.

In the medium and long term, the international community thought it could clean up Rwanda after the genocide in a matter of months. Over a decade later, Rwanda is still struggling to reconcile and reconstruct itself from the genocide, with little from the international community except some good intentions but totally inadequate means. These lessons from the Rwandan Genocide were learned the hard way with the failure to prevent or stop the genocide and more importantly with the blood of hundred of thousands of victims and peacekeepers. These lessons should be taken seriously indeed by an international community confronted by what the UN has deemed “the world’s worst humanitarian disaster” (Economist, 27 October 2007, 55).

So What Can Canada Do in Darfur?

Canada is a leading exponent of human security and human rights. Canada is also committed to multilateral action, and to the R2P. Thus, what should Canada be doing in its role as a significant member of the international community including prominent multilateral bodies such as the G-8? Against the compelling lessons from our failures in Rwanda, why have Canadians – like our Western partners and most of the rest of the international community – been so modest in responding to yet another example of genocide?

Three factors have impelled and impeded Canada’s (and the West’s) reaction to the Darfur crisis. The most obvious motivator has been Canadian public pressure – arising from the shared horror – which ordinary Canadians feel at what we read and see in the media. Many Canadians really do still believe that we are our “brothers’ keepers”; they are not willing to sit by and watch as other human beings are killed or starved while we live in such peace and amid such plenty. Canadian media and civil society are especially sensitive to public opinion, often leading both and always prepared to act in response. In Canada, nothing moves a Member of Parliament’s priorities
faster than the opinions of his or her constituents – and few things impel political action more readily than a groundswell of popular outrage among Canadians. In the case of Darfur, there indeed appears to be significant public pressure for an effective Canadian response.

But to carry the day, public pressure must be judged by the Canadian government as important enough to warrant action. Thus, the second factor influencing Canadian responses is the political will of the government. Even the most stolid of bureaucrats in government ministries such as Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) can be astonishingly quick to act when ministers or their staff – or, even more persuasively, the Prime Minister – give direction. Our Canadian Forces go where the government sends them. Once in the field, the Canadian Forces do a good job – they will deliver. Yet, the Canadian Forces will not be in the field at all unless the government of the day has the political will to send them. With public demand and resulting political will, there will be results; provided that there are the resources to make it happen without an unacceptable cost to current living standards in Canada.

Hence, there must be resources to support a humanitarian intervention in Darfur. In every earlier case of intervention, the greatest determinant of what could or would not be done has been human, physical, and financial resources – invariably, the lack of them. In Somalia, and in Ethiopia-Eritrea, few in the Departments of National Defence, Foreign Affairs, or CIDA wanted Canada to become involved. There may have been many reasons, but the first line of argument was lack of available people, equipment, and money. In thinking about the future and about Darfur, one must have a realistic grasp of the significance of limited resources. At the present time, Canada’s contribution to the intervention in Afghanistan is absorbing the greatest part of whatever we have available for our conflict diplomacy, aid, and defence efforts in response to violent conflicts abroad.

There are also the specific factors surrounding this particular conflict – factors which both governments and those pressing for a more muscular response should take into account when gauging what Canada and its partners can usefully do to stop the killing and bring sustained peace to Darfur. Among the most insidious is the role and perceptions of other major global players. China, Sudan’s Arab neighbours, and substantial international players like India, Malaysia, Indonesia, several key Latin American governments (and at times even South Africa), are wary of Western intervention in African conflicts. On Darfur, they will work to prevent the West from embarrassing the Sudan government. They will help circumvent sanctions;
these governments will try to limit the AU- or UN-sponsored intervention to prevent Western political or economic gain and to maximize their own policy and economic goals. These governments will also happily join those who portray or see Canadian and Western force participation as yet another Christian or Western incursion against the ‘Islamic world’.

Canadians have to expect and indeed accept a certain degree of caution exhibited by our Western allies. The United States, despite its allegations that genocide occurred in Sudan and its own interest in seeing the Darfur crisis resolved, is no more likely than major European Union (EU) members to want to jeopardize its own forces, business interests, and need to keep Sudan’s government on-side in the fight against terrorism. Preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East more broadly will ensure that all Western countries will be measured by our collective response while at the same time being hemmed in by broader global concerns that stretch beyond our humanitarian obligations in western Sudan.

Our African partners, too, are lukewarm in their response. Darfur in not only a Sudanese problem; its roots lie in Libya and Chad. Despite the brave new face of the AU and its New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the AU has been severely challenged by the Darfur crisis. One can understand the inadequacy of the AU’s peacekeeping efforts in Darfur as they work against great human and resource odds in dangerous territory. One also has to recognize that there remains a sense of ‘brotherhood’ amongst African leaders which hinders direct action by all against any of their number. There is also an inherent distaste for white, former colonial countries intervening in Africa for whatever purpose. Moreover, there is real antipathy towards the notion of having Western security forces in Africa with the power to either make or break governments.

A major hurdle to what Canada or any other country (or multinational force) can do in Sudan comes from the Sudanese government itself. The government does not want us there. Whatever Darfur may look like, Khartoum is a bustling city at the centre of an expanding economy, an oil-filled future, a powerful if poorly disciplined army. Khartoum enjoys many global partners and friends – drawn from governments and the private sector. The Sudanese government and army will be formidable enemies for Canadian or any other unwanted peace-makers.

Equally troubling (and often overlooked) is the difficulty of getting it right in the morass of Darfur. The history, rivalries, underlying causes of confrontation, cultures, and motivations of the various groups and peoples in the Darfur crisis are extraordinarily complex. Just read the analyses of

The above is a sobering list of the realities that must be part of Canadian decision-making on what we can reasonably do to help. But, it is not a fatal blow to the possibility of successful Canadian action or objectives. We do have to be realistic about what is possible, what the realities are, and what will accomplish most for the actual people of Darfur. Despite the frustrating caveats and dangers, there is an answer to an effective response. It lies in a well-reasoned combination of diplomacy, development, and defence.

Diplomacy

Canadian government ministers, officials, and civil society can continue to work with major like-minded allies and African institutions and leaders to press, cajole, and persuade the Sudanese government that its own long-term goals will be best met by peace, international acceptance, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. We can continue, if not increase, our strong policy and capacity support for the AU. Indeed, one wonders how many Canadians know that we have some seven advisers working with AMIS and providing support to the Darfur Integrated Task Force in Addis Ababa. Furthermore, we should try to convince neighbouring countries Chad and Libya, where so many of Darfur’s present problems may be traced, that peace serves their interests as well. Canada should also press China and influential Islamic countries to play a more positive role in moving the Sudanese government away from making worse a conflict that no longer serves even their most cynical of interests, and whose protagonists – even originally government-sponsored – they can no longer control.

Canada and its like-minded partners should rely less on sanctions and more on dialogue. Sanctions certainly have their place – in apartheid South Africa, they were a powerful force in convincing the National Party (NP) government that there was a better way to preserve white culture than apartheid. In Sudan, however, sanctions lack both the symbolic and practical leverage that they had in South Africa. As Sudan’s expanding economy shows all too well, the Sudanese government will get all it needs politically and in resources from its Arab allies, China, and private sector friends.

8. See also Julie Flint and Alex de Waal (2005).
Defence

Canada’s defence forces certainly have a role to play, but not simply as armed troops on the ground in Darfur. Other troops which are more politically acceptable in these sensitive circumstances will have to take the lead. We should also continue to respond effectively to AU needs for logistics, matériel, and, most of all, training and advice. Canada already has some 45 Canadian Forces personnel working with the AU and UN as military advisers and expert planners in support of the North-South peace process and AMIS in Darfur. Our senior officers and officials can continue to work as advisers to the AU or UN, and in so doing can help to persuade both rebels and the Sudanese government that it is in their interests to see and trust a strong AU-UN presence.

The Government of Canada – like most other governments in the world – has not yet taken the decision to intervene unilaterally in Darfur to stop the genocide. Canada cannot go it alone. It must have reliable and dependable allies operating with a legally sanctioned mandate. If the decision is taken at some point in the future to participate fully as part of an armed intervention into Darfur, then each and every Canadian must be made fully aware that it will cost an enormous amount of treasure and that using military force will result in the shedding of blood – namely ours and that belonging to the ‘bad guys’ – and that there is no absolute guarantee of success. The use of military force is only one of many tools available to the Canadian government but it is an expensive tool in treasure and in blood. In order to pay those prices, Canadian leaders and the Canadian people must clearly understand the implications and the costs of the use of force and they must be prepared to support the mission to its successful conclusion. In short, if one is not prepared to risk the costs, then do not commit the men and women of the Canadian Forces to a forceful military intervention.

Development

Canadians have a compelling development obligation as well – to commit and deliver significant humanitarian assistance through local (non-governmental organizations) NGOs. These civil society groups possess the people who know what is occurring ‘on the ground’ and who are familiar with local perceptions and agendas. Most significantly, any Canadian assistance now in bringing peace and stopping the killing implies an equally strong duty to sustain that peace and re-build society. Otherwise, violence
will soon break out again. Canada must be prepared to allocate development resources to long-term peace-building and support for a new society in return for an agreement by the Sudanese government and local warring parties to maintain a sustainable peace. Canadians – and all members of the international community – have to recognize the harsh reality that intervention now implies a costly, lasting commitment.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has addressed the question of whether the international community, including Canada, will continue to pursue a failed set of policies and an ineffective strategy in Darfur or honour our moral, legal, and policy obligations to stop the genocide in the region. Perhaps we can learn from a previous failure, namely the failure to either prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in order to craft a new and effective response to the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Thus far, UNAMID has done little to assuage the fears that these lessons have not been learned.

As Canadians learned in Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in Rwanda – and as we are now learning in Afghanistan – political will, popular support, and proper coordination and planning among our partners is crucial. Another lesson from these war-torn states is a pragmatic acceptance of what Canada can realistically expect to accomplish within a broader mosaic. Canada can and should be playing an even more credible role in restoring peace and security to the people of Darfur. Canada’s commitment will be expensive and challenging. But the cost pales in comparison to the scale of the current humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and becomes both bearable and necessary if it can bring to an end one of the world’s most damning man-made catastrophes.

References


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**Introduction**

In the aftermath of the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, the United States (US) was roundly criticized for creating an environment that discouraged robust international action that could have prevented or stopped the Rwandan genocide (Dallaire with Beardsley, 2003; Barnett, 2002). As then US President Bill Clinton acknowledged in 1998: “We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: *genocide*” (in Barnett, 2002, 154, emphasis added). As Barnett (2002, 131) elaborated in his remarkably insightful study of that unfortunate episode in contemporary international affairs, many of the key international actors:

were genuinely pained by the tremendous human suffering and believed that the UN had an obligation to act. There were members who came to lament their previous vote to reduce UNAMIR, a vote taken under the influence of incomplete information and increasingly regretted in the face of the genocide, and who were now determined to reverse history if possible.

Remarkably, they would have their chance a decade later, beginning in 2003, as yet another human tragedy was set in motion in Sudan’s Darfur region, where thousands of Bantu (Black) Sudanese citizens have been killed by Arab militia, their fellow *citizens*, in what appears to be a case of genocide.
This time around, unlike in Rwanda, the US – the world’s most dominant actor – wasted little time in characterizing the tragedy in Darfur as genocide, a move that has set it apart from other international actors, including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU). This development raises two crucial questions, which shall be examined in this chapter: 1) given the relative strategic insignificance of Sudan to American national interests, why would the United States take the lead in characterizing the Darfur crisis as a case of genocide?; and 2) what impact will the American declaration have on the processes of conflict resolution in the Darfur region? I shall argue that the American characterization of the Darfur tragedy as genocide, which was a direct consequence of domestic political calculations by the Bush administration, has had the (unintended) consequence of compounding the processes of conflict resolution in the region and diminishing the core principles of the Genocide Convention.1

This chapter is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, the chapter examines the origins of the Darfur crisis in the context of ecological challenges in western Sudan. The third section traces the evolution of America’s foreign policy toward Sudan, and the final section elucidates a series of concluding remarks.

Between Huntington and Kaplan: Analyzing the Origins of the Conflicts in Darfur

Not unlike many conflicts around the world, there are not one but many conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan. There is a resource conflict, an environmental conflict, a political conflict, a religious conflict as well as an ethnic conflict. Although distinct in character, several combinations of these conflicts have occurred in Darfur over the past decade. Tracing the origins of the Darfur conflict will require nothing less than an excellent mastery of African historiography which, undoubtedly, is an uncommon skill amongst students of international politics. A particularly insightful account of the Darfur crisis by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal (2005, 3) traces the roots of the modern conflict to the sixteenth-century attempts to establish a “centralized state” apparatus in the form of the Tunjur Empire “in the mountainous

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1. The Genocide Convention is also known as the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. For discussion of the Genocide Convention, see for example Brent Beardsley and John Schram (this volume, chapter 5).
triangle between Kutum, Kebkabiya and Korma.” Geography and power, the two variables that have shaped the formation of African states and other conflicts in Africa (and indeed the modern Westphalian state beyond its European borders), have special significance in Darfur’s crisis. Here,

[i]n the dry sandy areas of eastern Darfur, especially, villages grow and die along with their water supplies and the fertility of their soils; in the far south, along the forest edge, the frontier of cultivation creeps southward every year. *Mobility and distance make it difficult to maintain authority:* those in power must always contemplate their subjects’ option of simply moving beyond reach (ibid., 2, emphasis added).

The Tunjur Empire buckled because of the pressures of extending its political authority over inhospitable geography, an environment that rendered the ordinary course of human migration a desperate move for survival. The latter was especially true between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when large numbers of nomadic Arabs arrived in Darfur in a desperate search for water and pasture for their herds of cattle. Their presence in large numbers placed not only further stress upon the delicate balance between ecology and humans but also tested the absolute limits of the Tunjur political structure. We see in this early history an empirical proof of the Herbst (2000, 11) thesis that the key problem “facing state-builders in Africa – be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era – has been to project authority over inhospitable territories than contain relatively low densities of people.”

By the mid-seventeenth century, the Fur Sultanate emerged where once stood the Tunjur Empire and thus was born the “first Muslim state in Darfur.” The name *Darfur* came to mean “the homeland (*dar*) of the Fur” (Flint and de Waal, 2005, 3), and its main struggle thereafter would be to avoid the fate of its predecessor. And try it would. As the industrialization-induced expansionism of European states beyond their shores began to occur by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Fur Sultanate stood as the most powerful state within the borders of modern-day Sudan. In adopting Islam as the official state religion, the Fur sultans also embraced Arabic as a language of religious faith, scholarship and jurisprudence. Both Arabic and Fur were spoken at court. Darfurians – like most Africans – were comfortable with multiple identities. *Dar Fur was an African kingdom that embraced Arabs as valued equals* (ibid., emphasis added).

The religious and racial narrative that has emerged from the foregoing account should not obfuscate the inevitable bubble that was bound to follow
given the delicate ecosystem at play in western Sudan. As Sheikh Heri Rahman, the octogenarian Darfurian, reminisces in the conclusion to Flint and de Waal’s *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*:

The Arabs came here [Darfur] looking for pasture, and when the grass was finished they went back. They used up our grass, but they took good care of the gardens and the people. There were no robberies, no thieves, no revolution. No one thought of domination; everyone was safe. We were afraid only of lions and hyenas. Now there is nothing but trouble, all over Sudan. There is no government, no control. Look around you. What do you see? No women, only armed men. We no longer recognize it, this land of ours (2005, 134).

We know what happened: by most accounts, the bubble of ethno-religious tolerance burst in Darfur in 2003. Despite the fact of its religious and linguistic homogeneity – nearly all Darfurians are Muslims and speak Arabic – the region, like Somalia a decade earlier, had been ridden with violent conflicts that have resulted in the death of at least a quarter of a million people and the forced displacement of more than two million citizens (Dagne, 2006; Reeves, 2007). So, why did the political bubble burst in Darfur?

As I will demonstrate later in this essay, the Darfur crisis fits the simplistic binaries created by Washington’s ‘neo-cons’ who see in the famous ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis of Samuel Huntington (1993; 1996), the roadmap to solving the world’s seemingly intractable conflicts. To them, Darfur clearly demonstrates the danger that fundamentalist Islam poses to international peace and security. At best, this is only partially true, and even such a scenario would require that the victims in Darfur be non-Muslims. However, they are not; the victims and the perpetrators are all Muslims (Wax, 2006).

It is not Huntington but Thomas Homer-Dixon,² the Canadian scholar, and Robert Kaplan, the American essayist and alarmist par excellence, whose analyses provide a better explanation for the Darfurian ‘bubble’. In a widely publicized essay written in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Kaplan (1994, 46) predicted that:

West Africa [was] becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms … are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.

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Kaplan (ibid., 59) had based his predictions on a careful adaptation of Homer-Dixon’s theory:

In Homer-Dixon’s view, future wars and civil violence will often arise from scarcities of resources such as water, cropland, forests, and fish. Just as there will be environmentally driven wars and refugee flows, there will be environmentally induced praetorian regimes – or, as he puts it, ‘hard regimes’. Countries with the highest probability of acquiring hard regimes, according to Homer-Dixon, are those that are threatened by a declining resource base yet also have ‘a history of state [read ‘military’] strength’.

Based on this analytical construct, Kaplan (ibid., 57-58) makes one of the most astonishing claims in his essay:

For a while the media will continue to ascribe riots and other violent upheavals abroad mainly to ethnic and religious conflict. But as these conflicts multiply, it will become apparent that something else is afoot…. Mention ‘the environment’ or ‘diminishing natural resources’ in foreign policy circles and you meet a brick wall of skepticism or boredom. To conservatives especially, the very terms seem flaky.

Kaplan (ibid., 58) promulgated a thesis and a prediction that are especially prescient and poignant today:

It is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts – will be the core of foreign policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War.

To be clear, resource scarcities and environmental degradation do not, by themselves, cause conflict between humans. That outcome – the dependent variable – is most certainly mediated by any number of intervening variables, prominent among which is the degree of politicization by power-seekers or the state. What is significant about Kaplan’s analysis is his explication of the context in which such causal variables, such as political mobilization, could occur. It is to contextual concerns that I now turn.

For so long, the Darfur crisis had existed below the radar because of the existence of a much larger conflict between Sudan’s predominantly

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3. See also Robert Kaplan (2000).
Arab-Muslim ruling elite based in the northern part of the country and insurgents drawn mostly from the non-Muslim African (Bantu) Christians and animists of the southern regions. Broadly speaking, this conflict centered on what de Waal (1997, 86) described as “the spread of a set of exclusivist social values and political-economic structures associated with the northern Arab ‘core’ of Sudan.” Seen as an ‘ethnic conflict’, the North-South conflict is anything but *sui generis*; Horowitz’s seminal study† shows its manifestations in Malaysia, for example, between Malays and Chinese. Instead, the North-South conflict in Sudan may be seen as emblematic of the post-colonial state in Africa and Asia where European colonization produced states that comprised ethnically and religiously incompatible populations. Upon decolonization following the end of World War II, many of these states witnessed secessionist and irredentist claims that often resulted in civil wars (Horowitz, 1985).

Sudan, Africa’s largest state (by area), was a likely candidate for such violent conflict. On the basis of comparative land mass, Sudan is four times the size of France. Yet, it is so poorly linked by transportation infrastructure that the central authority in Khartoum had no means of exercising effective authority beyond its immediate confines from around the River Nile to the northeastern part of the country. While this state of affairs was tailor-made for the British colonial policy of indirect rule (Lugard, 1922), it would prove disastrous for any serious attempt at nation-building following the attainment of independence in 1956. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that, according to a US Congressional study, in the four decades that followed its independence, Sudan became “the scene of intermittent conflict” as southern Sudanese violently resisted their social, economic, and political subjugation by northern Sudanese Muslim elites (Dagne, 2006, 1). The insurgency, which was organized under the aegis of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), was led by John Garang. Garang expressly associated the social, political, and economic marginalization of southern Sudan with the exclusivist ideology of the northern elite (Johnson, 2003). In doing so, however, he skilfully argued that the goal of his insurgency was the ‘emancipation’ of all Sudanese people. Secession was not the goal of the SPLA; integration of southern Sudanese into the social, political, and economic mainstream of the Sudanese state was the objective. The SPLA was on traditional ground and, for the most part, it waged a traditional war – its soldiers were recruited from southern Sudan and they were, by their uniforms at least,

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† See Horowitz (1985).
distinguishable from the Sudanese national army against whom they waged battles as necessary. Their activities were limited to southern Sudan, while the central government was content with holding sway over Khartoum and the rest of the country. The SPLA’s conservative strategy yielded a predictably conservative outcome – *stasis* – as the war was virtually neglected by the outside world, except for the active involvement of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that flooded Sudan following the outbreak of horrific famine in the 1990s (de Waal, 1997; Minear and Weiss, 1995). In the aftermath of the drought that brought significant international focus on Sudan and the arrival of multinational oil corporations to exploit recently discovered commercial-grade oil fields in southern Sudan, multi-level pressures were exerted on the SPLA and Khartoum to end the civil war (International Crisis Group, 2002; Goodman, 2004). The result was the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that brought the SPLA (now ‘Movement’ or SPLM/A) into the central government in Khartoum, effectively bringing the civil war to a formal end in 2005.

The Darfur conflict, by contrast, which gained international prominence in 2003 just as the quarter-century-old North-South conflict was winding down, is anything but traditional; it is a post-9/11 conflict *par excellence* where the actors are not clearly defined nor are the goals reasonable enough to be readily amenable to negotiations. A recent report prepared by Ted Dagne (2006, 2) for the US Congress describes the conflict as follows:

The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur. The Sudan Liberation [Movement/] Army [SLM/A] and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claim that the government of Sudan discriminates against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur and has systematically targeted these ethnic groups since the early 1990s. The government of Sudan dismisses the [SLM/A] and JEM as terrorists. The conflict pits three African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit [Masalit], against nomadic Arab ethnic groups.

In truth, the conflict predates 2003. As I had indicated at the beginning of this section, the origins of the Darfur conflict go well before Sudan’s colonization by the United Kingdom after World War I; it is linked to ecologically induced migration that threatened traditional political authority as well as limited agricultural resources of land, water, and pasture. The Congressional report identifies this much: “At the core of the current conflict is a struggle for control of political power and resources. The largely nomadic Arab ethnic groups often venture into the traditionally farming communities of
Darfur for water and grazing, at times triggering armed conflict between the two groups” (ibid.). The author is correct, however, in emphasizing the increasing racialization of the conflict, especially as the Sudanese state got more desperate in the face of a deepening crisis of legitimacy. According to Dagne (2006, 3):

Many observers believe that the NIF government has systematically and deliberately pursued a policy of discrimination and marginalization of the African communities in Darfur, and has given support to Arab militias to suppress non-Arabs, whom it considers a threat to its hold on power.

Understanding the legitimization crisis faced by the Sudanese state is crucial to explaining the Darfur crisis and its impact beyond the borders of Sudan. In my view, the legitimization crisis began, as they always do in Africa, when General Jaffar El Nimeiry toppled an imperfect but democratic regime that had led the Sudanese out of European colonialism. That was in 1969, in what was arguably Africa’s most politically tumultuous decade (Decalo, 1990). Nimeiry and his gang of putschists declared theirs a ‘radical’ military regime. This regime-type, according to Decalo (1990, 293) “is composed of a junta (though one leader usually is pre-eminent within it) that exhibits a strong reliance on force, with few reservations … about revealing its military fount of power.” Nimeiry promised a radical departure from Sudan’s divided past; he promised to unite the country and harness its resources for socio-economic development. For legitimacy, his young regime depended on his promises of security and economic improvement for all Sudanese. To this end, he rejected sectarian elements of the ‘old guard’ and instead surrounded himself with ‘nationalists’, including prominent Darfurians. Threatened by a series of counter-coups in the early 1970s, Nimeiry began to seek comfort in the company of his former adversaries, the sectarian elements of the old political order. By 1978, Nimeiry had mended fences with the tough-talking Islamic fundamentalist group, the Sudanese Muslim Brothers, in a bid to shore up support for his regime (de Waal, 1997, 87). As he became increasingly interested in holding on to power, Nimeiry lost his focus on the Sudanese economy, which further hastened the lack of public confidence in his regime:

Money was borrowed recklessly, but much of it went into private consumption and greasing the wheels of Nimeiri’s increasingly corrupt patrimonial system. When the debts fell due in 1977-78, Sudan could not pay. This economic crisis pushed Nimeiri to turn to the IMF, USAID and ‘national reconciliation’. Earlier political alliances with secular professionals and the south were
abandoned. His rule became characterized by an embrace of political Islam and deepening economic dependence (ibid., 88).

Few political appointments better communicated the new thrust of the Nimeiry regime than that of Hassan al-Turabi, a leading member of the Muslim Brothers, as the Attorney-General, the chief law enforcement officer of Sudan. Al-Turabi quickly “embarked upon Islamizing the legal system” and ensured that the “civil service, army and financial became dominated by Islamists” (ibid.). The effect of these moves reverberated throughout Sudan:

The social base of the regime narrowed: prominent secularists and regional leaders left one by one, and the South reverted to unrest and finally war. Nimeiry now sought legitimacy in political Islam, declaring himself as Imam and demanding an oath of unconditional allegiance from all members of the civil service and judiciary. He claimed he was accountable solely to Allah (ibid.).

Nimeiry’s selfish actions ‘green-lighted’ an open season of bigotry and hate throughout the country. Where once racism and religious bigotry resided informally within the fringe elements of society, it increasingly became the policy of the Sudanese state after 1983. In Darfur, a rising tide of Arab-supremacist ideology and praxis reached a horrifying crescendo during this period. In what would be a dress rehearsal for the mass murder that would follow, armed Arab militia rounded up innocent villagers at a weekly market in Awal in 1982. Chillingly,

they demanded to know which tribes their victims belonged to. Arabs were allowed to take their belongings and leave; non-Arabs were robbed, beaten and kicked…. Similar events … occurred in other villages…. The victims were always Fur or other non-Arabs, never Arabs (Flint and de Waal, 2005, 52).

In no time, the nascent Arab militia evolved into a potent killing machine and assumed the name Janjaweed (or Janjawiid) under the leadership of Musa Hilal. Nimeiry had let the ‘genie’ out of the bottle and even the collapse of his regime in 1985 could not reverse Sudan’s descent into genocidal anarchy.

Faced with their own crisis of legitimization, Nimeiry’s successors sought to consolidate their weak regime by reaching out to his arch-rival to the northwest, Libya’s Muamar Ghaddafi. The al Mahdi regime allowed Ghaddafi to use Darfur as his staging ground against Chad’s Hissene Habré “[i]n return for oil and weapons for Khartoum’s war in the south” (ibid., 51). This would not be the last time that Darfur would be at the receiving end of Khartoum’s ‘Pareto-optimal’ thinking. In a move to consolidate further the powers of the central government, the new regime unilaterally redistricted the political map of Darfur in 1994:
From being a single region, Darfur was divided into three administrative states – North Darfur; West Darfur; and South Darfur. The reform divided the Fur, the largest tribe in Darfur, among the three new states, making them minorities in each and significantly reducing their influence. Most problematically, it created a raft of new positions – and gave almost all to Arabs. Eight new amirs were appointed. All were Arabs, although they represented at most one-quarter of the population, and most were relative newcomers from Chad.

In response to Khartoum’s blatant racially-based power-play, Darfur’s non-Arab majority protested the government’s underhandedness, and it quickly snowballed into yet another round of violent conflicts with their Arab neighbours from 1996 onward. Every encounter between Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur during this period revealed the shady hands of the Sudanese state in the atrocities meted to the non-Arab Darfurians by the Janjaweed.

According to Flint and de Waal (2005, 64-65), that the Janjaweed “enjoyed complete impunity” in their military campaigns in Darfur became an incontrovertible fact by 2002:

In the words of a tribal leader in Dar Zaghawa who was once not unfriendly to the government: “When the Janjaweed burned a village, our people went to the police, but the government didn’t care about it. But if Zaghawa attacked Arabs, they went quickly to kill the Zaghawa.” Worse even than impunity, people suspected that powerful men in government in Khartoum were giving the orders.

The Janjaweed’s modus operandi was simple and consistent: “The [Sudanese] army would search and disarm villages, and two days later the Janjaweed would go in. They would attack and loot from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., only ten minutes away from the army” (ibid., 60). Flint and de Waal’s account was corroborated mutatis mutandis by the 2005 report of the UN-mandated International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID). According to the Commissioners, the timing of the attacks at “just before sunrise between 04.30 AM and 08.00 AM when villagers were either asleep or at prayer” (United Nations Security Council, 2005, 64), was calculated to ensure maximum civilian casualties. The impunity of these acts further strengthened the non-Arab opposition and, even more importantly, forced the Fur and Zaghawa tribes to unite under the aegis of the SLM/A and the JEM, respectively, to better resist the Janjaweed after 2001. To the extent that the JEM is heavily influenced by al-Turabi, the ideological mastermind of the Islamicization project of the Nimeiry years, the marriage of convenience between the SLM/A and JEM has further complicated efforts...
to derive a nomenclature for the Darfur conflict (Flint and de Waal, 2005, 95). In my view, however, the involvement of JEM and al-Turabi against the Janjaweed does not by itself alter the racial – not religious – thrust of the Darfur atrocities. As I demonstrate in the next section of this essay, the al-Turabi-JEM nexus is, therefore, of little material significance to the debate as to whether or not to define the incontrovertible atrocities in the Darfur region as genocide.

The first real evidence that the SLM/A-JEM pact had produced a stronger military force against the hitherto invincible Sudanese state army came in spring 2003. Seizing on the element of surprise, SLM/A-JEM forces attacked government military garrisons and assets in Darfur between April and May, destroying aircraft, huge caches of arms and ammunition, while also killing and capturing several hundred Sudan Defence Forces (SDF) soldiers. By mid-2003, the joint insurgency had won “34 out of 38” encounters with the SDF, leaving Khartoum concerned that “it would lose the whole of Darfur ... if their advances continued” (ibid., 101). With its hands tied by crucial high-stakes negotiations, under international supervision, with the SPLA to end the long-running North-South civil war, the al-Bashir government in Khartoum resorted to the Nimeiry-era counterinsurgency strategy of unleashing the Janjaweed on Darfur civilians. Once described as “counterinsurgency on the cheap”, this strategy was significantly modernized by al-Bashir: Furthermore, the Janjaweed “were upgraded to a full paramilitary fighting force, with communications equipment as well as plentiful new arms, some artillery, and military advisors” (ibid., 24, 103). Soon, the nimbler but more lethal Janjaweed, led by Musa Hilal, established their base in Misteriha barracks. By early 2004, Hilal’s militia had taken positions throughout Darfur in preparation for a sustained assault on SLM/A-JEM support base. Between February and November 2004, according to several reports, including one by ICID, the Janjaweed were let loose on Darfur’s non-Arab populations. Consider one gruesome incident that occurred in North Darfur in April 2004:

[The] Janjaweed summarily executed a group of young men with bullets in the back of the head. One young man who was the only survivor in his family, having saved his life by hiding under a dead mule, recounted how the attackers ‘took a knife and cut my mother’s throat and threw her into the well. Then they took my oldest sister and began to rape her, one by one. My father was kneeling, crying and begging them for mercy. After that they killed my brother and finally my father. They threw all the bodies in the well’ (United Nations Security Council, 2005, 104).
If this incident is eerily similar to authoritative accounts of the Rwandan genocide a decade earlier (Gourevitch, 1999; Dallaire with Beardsley, 2003), contemplate the close working relationship between the murderous militia and government forces in the following ICID account of an attack on the village of Anka in February 2004:

Before the \textit{Janjaweed} entered the village, the Government armed forces bombed the area around the village with Antonov aircraft. One aircraft circled the village while the other one bombed… The bombing lasted for about two hours, during which time 20 to 35 bombs were dropped around the outskirts of the village. A hospital building was hit during the bombardment…. After the bombing, the \textit{Janjaweed} and Government soldiers moved in and looted the village including bedding, clothes and livestock. Remaining buildings were then destroyed by burning. Janjaweed also fired RPGs into the village from the top of the hill overlooking Anka. The bombing of the areas around the village appear to have been conducted in order to facilitate the looting and destruction of the village by \textit{Janjaweed} and Government armed forces on the ground (United Nations Security Council, 2005, 67).

In my view, such scorched earth policies and practices bring into serious question the ethical and moral lapses of the Sudanese state; they also challenge international commitments to the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) as well as the principles of ‘just war’ (ICISS, 2001; Williams and Bellamy, 2005; Williams, 2006; Bellamy and Williams, 2006; Walzer, 1977; Nardin, 1996).

\textbf{It is Genocide! The Evolution of US Policy on Darfur}

That Khartoum had overplayed its hand by 2004 when it colluded with the \textit{Janjaweed} to commit egregious offences in Darfur is hardly in doubt. The crucial question here is: why did the Sudanese government participate in such activities in Darfur? The answer may be very simple indeed. According to Flint and de Waal (2005, 117), Khartoum thought that “it would be a quick fix…. \textit{And because Darfur has neither Christians nor oil, in any significant quantities, they thought that the Western world, happy to see peace in the South at last, would give them a free hand in Darfur}” (emphasis added). Even if we were to neglect the factor of Colin Powell, an African-American, as US Secretary of State in 2004, the al-Bashir regime still made a colossal miscalculation – one that rivals Saddam Hussein’s ill-fated invasion of Kuwait in 1990 – by not considering the tumultuous \textit{history} of US-Sudan relations.
Unlike many African countries, Sudan did its best to keep itself on America’s foreign policy radar both during and after the Cold War. Following the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, Khartoum unilaterally broke off diplomatic ties with Washington in solidarity with the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa. When diplomatic relations were resumed in the 1970s under General Nimeiry, America’s concern with Sudan’s links with terrorists surfaced with the assassination of the US Ambassador and his deputy in Khartoum by “members of the Black September group” (O’Sullivan, 2003, 236). Although US-Sudan relations warmed up in the early 1980s because of Sudan’s endorsement of the Camp David Accords between Sadat and Begin, Khartoum raised eyebrows among Christian conservatives in the United States when Nimeiry imposed Shari’a law in 1983. Worse still, Nimeiry’s belated acknowledgment of the widespread famine that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of his own citizens between 1984 and 1985 greatly dismayed his few supporters in Washington who admired his anti-Ghaddafi stance in the region (de Waal, 1997, 91).

By the 1990s, Sudan’s Islamicization project would become a major source of tension between the two states as General Omar al-Bashir consolidated his power by building closer political alliances with al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF) and increasingly assuming “an Islamist fundamentalist” posture (O’Sullivan, 2003, 237). When yet another famine hit Sudan in 1990, the al-Bashir government – like the Nimeiry regime before it – displayed such incompetence and utter insensitivity to the plight of victims (mostly Darfurians), that international aid agencies, including USAID, accused Khartoum of playing a deadly game of political bias against Darfurians. The source of Washington’s angst was the government’s ban, in the face of a catastrophic famine, on the movement of food aid within Sudan:

Foreign NGOs planned to distribute food in rural areas: the government [in Khartoum] wanted to divert it to the towns. In one instance, after a food riot in Um Ruwaba town, NGO relief food intended for displaced Southerners was commandeered at gunpoint and distributed to the town’s residents. The ban on the movement of food left 35,000 tonnes of USAID-donated food in warehouses. USAID suspected the government would redirect it from the

5. Alex de Waal (1997, 89) notes, however, that the inherently ‘anti-communist’ philosophy of the NIF’s main political base, the Muslim Brothers, endeared them to the ‘cold warriors’ of the Washington establishment.
Western provinces [of Darfur] to Khartoum. This was the spark for a dispute with the US government (de Waal, 1997, 103).

US-Sudan relations got even worse as 1990 came to an end. In what has been described as the “mother of all miscalculations” Sudan’s NIF had openly supported Saddam Hussein’s August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait – even as the US canvassed for support in the Arab world for its coalition to free Kuwait at the beginning of 1991 (Flint and de Waal, 2005, 28). In response, Congress passed legislation in November 1990 “prohibiting any military cooperation or assistance to Sudan” and, in spring 1991, the Bush administration “suspended Sudan’s trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences to protest the country’s failure to protect workers’ rights” (O’Sullivan, 2003, 237).

Five important developments between 1993 and 1999 worsened US-Sudanese relations during the Clinton presidency. The first was the growing presence in Khartoum of radical Islamists, including Osama bin Laden, who found a safe haven in, and spiritual connection with, the NIF’s fundamentalist brand of Islam. The second was the unsuccessful attempt in 1995 to assassinate Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak upon his arrival in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to attend the summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in June 1995. Ethiopian and Egyptian intelligence traced the assassination plot directly to the Sudanese government. US responses to these incidents were swift. In 1993, the US State Department placed Sudan on its list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’. According to O’Sullivan (ibid., 240), “the terrorist designation … obliged the United States to oppose lending from international financial institutions to Sudan” and impose other unilateral economic sanctions as well. In response to the Mubarak assassination attempt, the US (with Ethiopia and Egypt) sought and obtained a UN Security Council resolution imposing limited diplomatic sanctions on Sudan.

The third development was the simultaneous bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by terrorists suspected to be adherents to radical Islam. US intelligence fingered Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and, in response, on 20 August 1998, President Clinton authorized US cruise missile strikes on suspected ‘terrorist targets’ in Khartoum. To near-universal embarrassment, however, it turned out that the US missiles had hit a pharmaceutical plant instead of Al-Qaeda’s network of chemical plants, as the Clinton Administration had originally claimed (ibid., 243).

The fourth development that rattled US-Sudanese relations was the passage by Congress of the International Religious Freedom Act in October 1998, which required the US State Department to maintain an annual
list of countries that violate religious freedoms. According to O’Sullivan (ibid.): “In every year that has since passed, Sudan has been identified as an egregious violator of religious rights due to its restriction of the religious practices of non-Muslims”. Finally, the appointment of a special envoy for Sudan in August 1999 demonstrated the priority status of the Sudanese issue in the US government. In addition to coordinating inter-agency activities in relation to Sudan, the establishment of the new office sent a powerful signal of sustained US activism on the Sudanese issue to Khartoum and the rest of the international community.

The vast network of domestic constituencies that mobilized for tangible US actions in the face of humanitarian challenges in the Sudan – and many of these actions were aimed at supporting the struggles and aspirations of the people of southern Sudan – would be put to the service of the cause of non-Arab Darfurians early in the twenty-first century. These constituencies and their interests may be categorized in three main groupings. The first group encompassed African-Americans and human rights organizations that were appalled by the operation of ‘Black slave camps’ by Sudan’s ‘government-backed’ Arab militias (Vick, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2003, 242). For obvious historical reasons, slavery is an especially sensitive among African-Americans. During her visit to southern Sudan in November 2000, Susan Rice, then US Assistant Secretary of State and the highest ranking African-American in the Clinton foreign policy team, publicly denounced Khartoum’s “support for militias involved in the slave trade” (O’Sullivan, 2003, 244). The second grouping included humanitarian NGOs whose political skills had been honed during ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’. This constituency was deeply concerned by Khartoum’s record of meddling with the distribution of humanitarian aid with the expressed intent of preventing such aid from reaching endangered populations. This constituency sought US sanctions on a regime that it saw as violating international humanitarian law and practices by attempting to obstruct the smooth delivery of humanitarian aid to populations in need. The third group consisted of Evangelical Christians, or members of the ‘Christian Right’, who were “infuriated by government aerial bombings of civilian areas, including churches and hospitals” in predominantly Christian communities of southern Sudan (ibid., 242).

*The Darfur Conflict and the George W. Bush Administration*

As the Republican candidate for the presidential elections of November 2000, George W. Bush criticized the multilateralist thrust of the Clinton
foreign policy, especially its commitment to ‘nation-building’ in post-conflict societies. It was not the business of the US, he argued, to engage in nation-building abroad. Bush’s foreign policy agenda was limited: strong national defence, and especially a renewed focus on the development and deployment of a missile shield to protect the US. By contrast, his domestic agenda was expansive, including generalized tax cuts. But one item on that agenda that received little attention was his commitment to break the Democratic monopoly on the ‘minority vote’, particularly the African-American vote. To this end, Bush developed a two-prong strategy. The first policy strategy was to focus on education reform – under the slogan ‘No Child Left Behind’ – with emphasis on boosting student performance across the board. The goal was to confront and defeat what he called the “soft bigotry of low expectations” of black and minority students (Sampson, 2002). Thenceforth, teachers would be held accountable for the performance of their students. The second policy strategy, which was a continuation of the Clinton legacy of reflecting the diversity of America in the president’s cabinet, was to appoint an African-American Republican to a high-profile position in his cabinet. For a Republican president, this would be a major accomplishment. Upon his inauguration in January 2001, President Bush delivered on this promise. His foreign policy team comprised two African-Americans: Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Within months of his inauguration, Bush took on the Sudanese government over its egregious human rights practices. In May 2001, he named USAID Director Andrew Natsios – former Vice President of World Vision, a Christian charity – as his special humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, while also pledging that “his administration would ‘continue to speak and act for as long as the persecution and atrocities in Sudan last’” (O’Sullivan, 2003, 245, emphasis added). But why an African country like Sudan, and why so soon in the life of the Bush administration – especially by a Republican president?

Two factors explain Bush’s hard stance toward the al-Bashir regime. The first is the growing importance of Sudanese oil – mostly in Chinese hands – in Sudan’s political economy and Khartoum’s external relations (ICG, 2002; Goodman, 2004; Hallward, 2004; Flounders, 2006). According to O’Sullivan (2003, 245): “Khartoum’s growing oil wealth sparked fears that in a few years Khartoum would have the financial resources to subdue the south through force alone, leading many to believe that the window for exerting pressure on Khartoum to end the civil war was rapidly closing.” Indeed, Khartoum’s oil receipts had been rising steadily since 1999 as
Once Bitten, Twice Shy

multi-billion dollar Chinese investments in a network of pipelines, drilling, and refining capacity came on-stream. Even more troubling is that “[a]bout 80 percent [of Khartoum’s] [US] $500m annual oil receipts” went to buy weapons” and that does not include the three Chinese-built “weapons factories near Khartoum” (Goodman, 2004, A01). The Bush administration, therefore, accepted the argument made by many human rights NGOs and activists that Khartoum’s “oil receipts” – estimated to rise to US$ 30 billion by 2012 – “have helped pay for a government-led scorched-earth campaign” against southern Sudanese in whose communities oil is being produced (ibid.).

The second factor was the restlessness of Bush’s conservative base, the ‘Christian Right’, from whose ranks emerged Andrew Natsios (Beaumont, 2004). As O’Sullivan (2003, 245) notes: “The new American president discovered that Sudan had become a rallying point for influential Republican interests in both Congress and the executive branch.” For this traditional Republican base, long accustomed to a simple moral compass of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, the Sudanese dilemma presented the President with an easy opportunity to ‘hit a home run’ with his political base. On 6 September 2001, President Bush appointed Senator John Danforth – the venerable Republican Senator and an ordained Episcopal priest who is highly regarded by both sides of the Congressional aisle – as his special envoy for peace in Sudan. Senator Danforth’s mandate was two-fold: 1) to determine the willingness of the Sudanese government and southern-based rebel groups to commit to a negotiated settlement; and 2) prescribe the role America should play in order to support the peace process. By the time Danforth’s report was presented to the President in May 2002, the 11 September 2001 attacks had occurred and Bush’s foreign policy was now defined by an exclusive focus on the terrorist threat.

When the 11 September 2001 attacks occurred, Khartoum saw an opportunity to correct the strategic blunders it made during the first Gulf War when it supported Saddam Hussein. Free to conduct Sudan’s foreign policy without the influence of al-Turabi, whom he fired from government in 1999, President al-Bashir firmly denounced Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and pledged to cooperate with Washington in rooting out the terrorist menace. In Washington, al-Bashir’s unsolicited support – like Ghaddafi’s – was especially well received by Powell’s State Department which was saddled with the task of putting together a ‘coalition of the willing’ on very short notice. According to Peter Hallward (2004), Khartoum delivered on its promise: “Since 9/11, Bashir has provided the US with a steady stream
of much-vaunted intelligence” which has been used to track and target Al-Qaeda networks and funds. For this, the Bush administration rewarded Bashir very generously: it “acquiesced to the lifting of UN sanctions against Sudan on September 28, 2001 [barely two weeks after 9/11], and quietly quelled pending legislation for imposition of capital market sanctions” (O’Sullivan, 2003, 246). For the next two years, the Bush administration treated Khartoum as an ally in its war on terror while al-Bashir’s security forces and the Janjaweed roamed Darfur with greater impunity.

Washington’s new-found love fest with Khartoum greatly alarmed humanitarian NGOs and activists. They took their concerns to the US Congress and painted a clear picture of the gross violations of human rights that were occurring in Darfur. Based on their pre-existing concerns about Sudan’s human rights violations, members of Congress responded positively to these pressures. In July 2004, “the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate unanimously passed resolutions … declaring the crisis in Darfur to be genocide” (Dagne, 2006, 4). For his part, Secretary Powell empanelled a team in the State Department to examine claims of genocide in Sudan. On 9 September 2004, Secretary Powell testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and stated unequivocally that “after reviewing evidence collected by State Department team, ‘genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit [sic] bear responsibility’” (ibid., 4). Powell assured the Senate committee that he would press the UN to mount an official investigation of Sudan to ascertain violations of the Geneva Conventions. One week later, on 18 September 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1564 authorizing the UN Secretary-General to “rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur … [and] to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred” (United Nations Security Council, 2004, 5). While the Commission met for five months, the “Bush Administration officials continued to support a negotiated settlement between the rebels in Darfur and the government of Sudan” (Dagne, 2006, 4).

The UN Commission submitted its much-awaited report on 25 January 2005. In the ICID report, the Commission concluded (on grounds of technicality, in my view), “that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide” because “the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned” (United Nations Security Council, 2005, 4). The Commission, however, found and described detailed accounts of egregious violations
of human rights in the Sudan and recommended for prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) a list of 51 suspects.

Initially, US officials dismissed the ICID report, insisting that Sudan had committed genocide. By contrast, in Europe and Africa, there were concerns that the US had been too quick to characterize the awfully egregious violations in Darfur as genocide. For many African states south of the Sahara, the racial dimension of the Sudanese crisis was scary if not *sui generis*. Many of them have coped uneasily with Arabs in their own countries in conditions of mutual suspicions between Blacks and Arabs or, better, Arab-leaning Bantu Muslims. Sudan was a problem they would much rather not confront openly without risking political repercussions at home.

Some critics of America’s stance on Sudan argued that the Bush administration was disingenuously *pandering* to its political base as it prepared for a tough re-election campaign in the November 2004 elections amidst an increasingly unpopular war in Iraq. According to Hallward (2004), Bush was using Darfur as an “opportunity to adopt [an] election-season cause that can appeal, simultaneously, to fundamentalist Christians, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, multilateralist liberals and the altruistic ‘left’.” Indeed, these groups coalesced around the ‘Save Darfur’ project and they became increasingly vocal – even for many years after the 2004 elections. In April 2006, for instance, the coalition staged a major rally on the Washington Mall to protest inaction by the Bush administration. According to several sources, this coalition included Hollywood stars, such as George Clooney, and many religious organizations, including Jewish groups, Evangelical Christian groups, and the Catholic Bishops conference (Beckerman, 2006; Cooperman, 2006). In explaining the proactive role played by religious groups – especially the pivotal role of American Jewish groups – in the ‘Save Darfur’ campaign, Ruth Messinger, President of the American Jewish World Service, stated that: “The Jewish community has probably had a higher level of lingering guilt over Rwanda than the average person…. And now learning about another genocide, I think people are beginning to understand that we are close to making a mockery of the words ‘Never Again’” (quoted in Beckerman, 2006). Therein lay the real dangers of Bush’s Darfur policy.
Concluding Remarks

There are lingering concerns that the Bush administration overcompensated for America’s indecision in the face of the Rwanda Genocide by mischaracterizing the Darfur conflicts as genocide. Driven mostly by domestic political considerations, the Bush administration vastly compounded the problem just by the very actions it took in its dealings with al-Bashir within weeks of accusing Khartoum of genocide. In working with the al-Bashir regime in 2004 to craft the CPA that would end the North-South conflict, the Bush administration risked being seen to be engaging in the worst form of double standards. Rather than isolate and punish those it had accused of committing genocide, in the spirit of the Genocide Convention, the Bush administration chose instead to coddle them. For instance, although Sudan had been accused by the US of genocide in 2004, Ambassador Zoellick, US Deputy Secretary of State, met with Sudanese officials to discuss a US$ 1.7 billion assistance package in April 2005 (Dagne, 2006, 11). During the same period, the CIA flew in Sudan’s spy chief, Abdalla Gosh, to Washington “for talks on counter-terrorism related issues” (ibid.). Talk of sending the wrong message spread in September 2005, when the “State Department moved Sudan from Tier III country, worst offenders of Trafficking in Persons (TIP), to Tier II … because the Secretary of State … determined that Sudan ‘is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance’” (ibid.).

Was labelling Darfur a ‘genocide’, therefore, not a deliberate mendacity pushed by the Bush administration to seize the moral high ground on the cheap? For that reason alone, the greatest tragedy yet out of Darfur may well be the desecration of the once-hallowed principles of the Genocide Convention by the very power that encouraged the world to say “Never Again!”.

References


6. In mid-February 2007, Andrew Natsios confirmed activists’ worst fears when he told his audience at Georgetown University that “the term genocide is counter to the facts of what is really occurring in Darfur” (quoted in Lobe, 2007).


7. Civil Society Responses to Darfur: The Case of STAND Canada

Ira Goldstein and Devin McDougall

Introduction

Following an uprising in the Darfur region in 2003, the Sudanese government has pursued a counter-insurgency campaign characterized by wide-scale ethnically-targeted killing and rape perpetrated primarily by local Janjaweed militias with support from the Sudanese armed forces. Despite the post-Rwanda commitment to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine, which calls for an effective international response to large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing (ICISS, 2001), international policy responses designed to achieve protection in Darfur have been near-total failures. Episodes of mass killing, sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing have been recorded in the Darfur region since 2003 – precisely the type of atrocities that R2P policies were designed to address.

The United States declared that the crisis in Darfur was genocide in 2004, and although most other states have shied away from that designation, condemnation for the atrocities perpetrated in Darfur has been widespread. Furthermore, the R2P doctrine was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2005, even as violence raged in Darfur (UNGA, 2005). Yet, little has changed to interrupt the patterns of violence on the ground in Darfur. Estimates place the number of killed as...
high as 450,000 (Reeves, 2007) and the number of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) at over 2 million (IDP News Alert, 6 December 2007).

Although states have endorsed the language of the R2P and possess the means of taking action to operationalize the R2P, civil society organizations (CSOs) can play a critical role in shaping and motivating state action. In discussions of the R2P in the context of Darfur, there has been an excessive focus on the role of state actors. To remedy this deficiency, this chapter will explore the specific ways in which CSOs within states external to the crisis can contribute to the process of effectively realizing the R2P. Thus, this chapter will approach the R2P not as a static concept, but rather as a dynamic process, the course of which can be influenced by civil society actors at several crucial junctures. First, an analytical framework identifying spaces for CSOs to exert agency in shaping state policy will be developed. There are two gaps in the R2P policy-making process which CSOs can help fill: 1) the ‘options gap’, which is the lack of a precise understanding of effective policy options; and 2) the ‘implementation gap’, which is the lack of political will sufficient to implement R2P policies. Second, the experience of the largest Canadian CSO focused on Darfur, STAND (Students Taking Action Now Darfur) Canada, will be assessed in order to provide empirical examples of strategies of education and social mobilization that other CSOs can employ to help fill the two aforementioned gaps in the R2P process.

R2P and Civil Society Organizations

R2P norms have achieved significant public support and have been endorsed by states through official UN channels. The UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) mentioned the importance of endorsing a ‘Responsibility to Protect’. As part of the UNGA’s “Outcome Document” from the World Summit in 2005, both the responsibility of individual states to protect their citizens and the responsibility of international community to take action as required if states fail to do so were unanimously endorsed (UNGA, 2005). On 28 April 2006, the UN Security Council (UNSC) formally endorsed the R2P through UNSC Resolution 1674, which “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UNSC, 2006).
Yet, much work remains to be done in strengthening the R2P process to overcome the options gap and implementation gap. First, there has been a clear need for greater understanding of the empirical situation in Darfur in order to formulate effective R2P policies. Much initial discussion about the R2P in Darfur centred around highly infeasible plans for military intervention that were likely to worsen rather than improve conditions for the afflicted in Darfur. At the same time, given the complexity of the conflict, the many chances for the exertion of diplomatic and economic policy options were less apparent and opportunities were therefore missed.

Second, there has been a lack of sufficient political will to motivate policy-makers to take needed actions on Darfur. In democratic contexts, political will is the *sine qua non* of state action on issues outside perceived strategic interests. However, political will can be difficult to generate on issues related to human rights violations committed out of sight, in distant regions. Thus, the options gap and the implementation gap create space for a vibrant CSO role in advancing the realization of the R2P. To tackle the options gap, CSOs can undertake education efforts, targeted at the general public as well as policy-makers, to improve the quality and sophistication of R2P policy. To help solve the implementation gap, CSOs can organize social mobilization efforts, such as rallies and phone drives, in order to build the political will required to implement effective R2P policies. The crisis in Darfur is among the international community’s most complex challenges and may at times seem intractable, but opportunities for action remain. In the following section, each of the two gaps discussed above will be examined in detail in order to map potential spaces for the exertion of agency by CSOs.

*The Options Gap*

A key gap in the R2P process for Darfur has been the lack of sufficient understanding of effective policy options among the public and among policy-makers. In the early stages of the crisis, the urgency of responding to the genocide at times overrode consideration of practical policy questions; to use Albert Hirschman’s terminology, motivation outstripped understanding (Hirschman, 1965). Given the shocking nature of the atrocities, this is understandable, but the effect is problematic because it can cause results that paradoxically worsen conditions for the afflicted. For example, there were initially many calls for the deployment of military power to force a resolution to the crisis, without adequate engagement with the serious
challenges and unintended consequences associated with such a project.\footnote{1}
In the absence of popular understanding of effective policy options, the
question of how the R2P should be realized was unfortunately resolved
for many into a simple question of “doing nothing” (which was correctly
judged unacceptable) or “sending in the Marines” (which was incorrectly
judged an effective policy option).\footnote{2}

This is particularly problematic, because in Darfur, as in many cases,
non-consensual military intervention is likely to lead to highly negative
outcomes for intended beneficiaries of protection. These potential problems
were recognized within the ICISS R2P report: A central tenet of the R2P
that is often overlooked is what Gareth Evans has termed “the balance of
consequences test” (Evans, 2006). ICISS considers that all potential military
actions must be subject to a series of prudential criteria, culminating in the
requirement that military action have reasonable prospects of achieving net
positive results for the victims in question:

Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of suc-
cess, that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the
intervention in the first place. Military intervention is not justified if actual
protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon
the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all (ICISS,
37, 2001).

In particular, a military intervention is disallowed if it is likely to trigger
a larger regional conflict; military action must produce more good for the
victims than harm for them (Evans, 2007). Thus, although some members
of the CSO community have written insightful critiques identifying the
potential for the R2P to be misinterpreted or abused in the service of a
militarist agenda, the R2P framework can also be deployed to restrain unjust
or ill-conceived military expeditions.\footnote{3}

Thus, in order to improve the quality and sophistication of the policy
options debate, CSOs can undertake education efforts. These education
campaigns should target the public as well as policy-makers in the govern-
ment, who are faced with many competing policy demands and may not
be versed in the latest developments on Darfur. As a result, policy-makers

\footnotesize{1. See for example Susan Rice (2006) and Eric Reeves (2004; 2005; 2006).
cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/DarfurCSR22.pdf>.
3. For a thoughtful critique, see Alex de Waal (2007a).}
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may simply not know what can be done. To fill the gap, CSOs can provide ‘pre-digested’ policy options, explained clearly, to facilitate effective policy-making.

The Implementation Gap

Even after questions regarding the methods of R2P policy-making are explored, there remains the problem of building and sustaining the political will to tackle the challenges of effective action. Governments tend to have little problem arousing themselves to attend to problems which policy elites determine to be related to ‘national interests’, but in situations without perceived strategic importance, CSOs must act to mobilize needed political pressure. In particular, for the Government of Canada, major combat operations in Afghanistan currently consume a great deal of government foreign policy resources. Significant popular social mobilization is required to motivate an allocation of governmental resources towards the fulfilling the R2P in Darfur.

Popular political pressure has been critical in moving governments to action so far, but the crisis remains unresolved and the need for political will remains as crucial as ever. As John Prendergast and colleagues (2007) have observed, popular Darfur activism has been a major factor in achieving such successes as the appointment of US and Chinese special envoys to Darfur, the strengthening of US sanctions against Darfur, and the revival of AU/UN peace negotiations for Darfur. In broader historical perspective, popular political pressure was an important factor in the success of worldwide struggles to end slavery and colonialism, the campaign to ban landmines, and the global anti-apartheid movement. However, the peace process for Darfur will face many challenges in the coming years, including the deployment of UNAMID (the AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping force), and the continuing pursuit of a durable peace agreement. Implementing the R2P means supporting the successful achievement of these goals, and political will is an integral part of that endeavour.

A Canadian Darfur-Focused CSO: STAND Canada

As discussed above, CSOs can contribute to the realization of the R2P in the realm of policy options and implementation. This section will examine the efforts of STAND Canada to act within those spaces to contribute to the Canadian R2P process. This case study is useful to analyze because STAND Canada is the largest Darfur-focused CSO in Canada, with 25 university and college chapters, 43 high school chapters, and approximately 3,600 list-serve subscribers. Evidence indicates that STAND Canada has made effective efforts in each realm and that civil society more broadly has a critical role to play in advancing the development of sound R2P policy.

A case study of STAND’s advocacy efforts reveals several main strategies, which illustrate potential means by which CSOs can take concrete action to help fill the R2P’s options gap and implementation gap. First, STAND has taken action to educate both the public and policy-makers about policy options for implementing the R2P in Darfur. Second, STAND has organized social mobilization campaigns, particularly a series of rallies and a telephone drive, in order to build up the political will required for effective implementation of the R2P in Darfur. Each of these two domains of action will each now be examined in detail.

The Formation of STAND Canada

STAND Canada was first formed when a core group of students came together at a national conference of the Canadian Federation of Jewish Students (CFJS) in January 2005 in Montréal. These students were motivated to assemble as a group after hearing a presentation about the conflict in Darfur from the co-founders of CASTS (Canadians Against Slavery and Torture in Sudan), Dr. Norman Epstein, and Dr. Alcol Dor – herself a Sudanese refugee. The impetus to act came from a combination of prior knowledge of the ongoing crisis in Darfur, the passionate appeal from Dr. Dor and the

5. Although STAND Canada is the largest single Canadian CSO specifically focused on Darfur, there is a strong community of Canadian CSOs active on the Darfur issue with which STAND has benefited from cooperating. For example Save Darfur Canada and the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group are coalitions of organizations advocating for Darfur.
realization that Canada could do much more to contribute to the international response to the crisis.  

At the conclusion of Epstein and Dor’s presentation, one student accurately gauged the feeling amongst delegates and said, “I think we all agree that we need to do something about this.” The group of approximately thirty students agreed, and met that evening in a hotel conference room, eventually forming a subcommittee of the CFJS to take action on Darfur. From this meeting emerged the blueprints for the group’s first campaign: a 10,000-signature petition calling on Canada to play a more active role in the Darfur conflict, to be presented in the House of Commons. The team resolved to make the best possible use of the opportunity to raise awareness about the crisis in Darfur, envisioning a press-conference with representation from all federal parties on Parliament Hill.

With the ideas in place for an inaugural campaign, group members sought to develop the organization and refine their policy recommendations. The organization eventually outgrew its position as a subcommittee of the CFJS, and a core team of members decided to name their new group ‘STAND (Students Taking Action Now: Darfur) Canada’ – after consulting with the then-nascent STAND (Students Taking Action Now: Darfur) organization at Georgetown University. Progress on the petition continued, and the group decided on a six-week signature-collection period, beginning in March and ending on the eleventh anniversary of Rwandan genocide. With the policy and action plan in place, the team developed content for a website, and actively sought out like-minded students across the country to join the petition campaign, which had been named ‘10,000 Canadian Voices: A Difference for Darfur’. With the launch of the website in February 2005, STAND Canada became a full-fledged member of Canadian civil society.

As the campaign expanded, STAND Canada grew. Group members spread word of the 10,000-signature campaign by telephoning their friends on other campuses, utilizing the CFJS mailing list, and networking through other campus organizations from a wide variety of ethnic and political backgrounds. STAND Canada slowly developed a broader geographical base of support, as individuals concerned with Darfur campuses across the country began to notice the organization’s work and sought to get involved. The composition of the core team evolved over time, but eventually coalesced around a group of four key members, who collaborated primarily

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
by means of email and conference calls: Ben Fine and Jonathan Laski at the University of Western Ontario, Josh Fisher at McGill University, and Alexandra Zalucky at the University of Toronto.\(^\text{10}\)

Owing to the hard work and collaboration of many in STAND Canada, over 10,000 signatures were successfully collected and a press conference was held in Ottawa to announce the results of the petition campaign (Chung, 2005).\(^\text{11}\) On the same day as STAND Canada’s press conference, then Prime Minister Paul Martin announced Canada’s plan to support international efforts in Darfur, including a robust monetary assistance package and the creation of a Special Advisory team headed by Ambassador Robert Fowler, and Senators Mobina Jaffer and Romeo Dallaire.\(^\text{12}\) A serendipitous encounter with a Member of Parliament (MP) in the Privy Council Office (PCO) that afternoon led to the opportunity for a group of STAND Canada members to meet with Prime Minister Paul Martin. The meeting evolved into a lengthy discussion relating to Canada’s response to the Darfur crisis. STAND Canada’s first campaign, and the experience gained in Ottawa, gave the students the resolve to further grow the organization and continue to press the Canadian government to do more with respect to the Darfur crisis.

The Options Gap: Beyond the Use of Force

To influence the policy options that the Canadian state chose to implement with respect to the R2P, STAND Canada launched education campaigns targeted both to the public at large and to policy-makers. The broad objective of this education effort was to move beyond the simplistic apathy/invasion policy dichotomy, and explore more practical policy options. Popular education initiatives were designed to make information about the conflict accessible to non-specialists, while taking care not to over-simplify the relevant issues. In contrast, policy-maker education initiatives were designed to provide policy-makers with the in-depth treatment of the issues and specialist knowledge they require.

Over the years, STAND made use of a variety of popular education programs in order to reach the broadest possible audience. For example, an email list-serve was set up in order to send out ‘Action Alerts’ to recipients...

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following a recent development on the ground in Darfur or a significant Canadian or international policy announcement. This initiative brought the conflict in Darfur to the in-boxes of hundreds of Canadians and provided them with the necessary information – in an easy-to-read format – to press their MP and other relevant government offices on the pertinent issues. Moreover, STAND Canada’s website was used as a clearinghouse for materials related to Darfur and advocacy strategies. Campus chapters held meetings throughout the school year, providing accessible explanations of the dynamics of the Darfur conflict and Canada’s role in implementing the R2P in Darfur. Finally, the national planning team organized conference calls so that anyone from anywhere in Canada could learn about the Darfur conflict, toll-free.

Another public education effort initiated by STAND Canada was an op-ed series in the National Post. This project brought together community leaders, diplomats, MPs, and other prominent Canadians amid the pages of a national newspaper to discuss Canadian policy options as part of an effort to deepen public discourse about competing policy options for Darfur. For seven days in late March and early April 2007, the National Post ran articles about Darfur by experts on peace-building and conflict resolution, including Senator Romeo Dallaire, former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and Canada’s former Ambassador to the UN, Allan Rock. In a final instalment, former UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown emphasized the problems and costs of military options such as an invasion or a no-fly zone, and discussed the effectiveness of economic sanctions to support diplomatic efforts to negotiate peace.

In an effort to educate policy-makers directly on the practical options in Darfur, STAND Canada created the ‘Darfur Digest’, a research-intensive monthly report on developments in Darfur and recommended Canadian policy responses. From its initiation in October 2006, the number of Darfur Digest subscribers grew from 33 subscribers in its first month to 1,126 subscribers by December 2007. Subscribers include members of the Canadian government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the national media. The Darfur Digest supplemented popular education initiatives with

16. STAND Canada list-serv statistics.
relevant, specific policy recommendations that could be utilized by decision-makers in the construction of policy.

Lastly, STAND Canada’s spring 2007 national leadership conference in Ottawa combined both public and policy-maker education initiatives. The conference sessions focused on popular education through comprehensive teaching sessions designed to teach and train delegates. Those delegates could then return to their home communities and train others, utilizing the information and skills learned at the conference. At the same time, the STAND national team arranged meetings between student delegates and parliamentarians in order to further an agenda of educating policy-makers. In addition, STAND Canada organized personal briefings and meetings between its leaders and strategically chosen MPs.

The Implementation Gap: Building Political Will

STAND Canada has also worked on building the political will necessary to support the implementation of the R2P. STAND Canada focused its efforts in this realm on social mobilization, seeking to organize large public displays of support in favour of Canada’s implementation of the R2P concerning Darfur. The two key strategies of social mobilization employed were public rallies and a telephone-call drive. These two activities have great potential for substantive impact and accessibility to the public, which warrant a detailed examination.

First, public rallies in major population centres demonstrated to the federal government public support for a Canadian action on Darfur. In solidarity with thousands of activists in cities around the world, STAND Canada participated in two Global Days for Darfur, the first in 2006, and most recently in September 2007. On 30 April 2006, STAND Canada organized the ‘Scream for Darfur’ rally at Toronto’s Queen’s Park in conjunction with Project Equity – a high school organization that focuses on sustainable development. Numerous MPs joined over 1000 attendees and members of the Darfuri Association of Canada in a show of support for Canadian

implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. In September 2007, the ‘Don’t Look Away’ rally brought opposition MPs, activists, and Darfuris together on Parliament Hill as part of a Global Day for Darfur. At a moment of planned group action, attendees arranged single-file in a semi-circle in front of Parliament and donned blindfolds to signify the ineffectiveness of Canada’s implementation of the R2P and to bring public displeasure with Canadian foreign policy to the doorstep of federal politicians. Over the past several years, these rallies have helped demonstrate and cultivate public support for an expanded Canadian role in peace-building in Darfur.

The second key means of social mobilization employed by STAND Canada was organizing phone-calling drives using a toll-free hotline for contacting Canadian politicians. This hotline, dubbed 1-800-GENOCID(E), was launched in Canada on 15 October 2007. It was publicized online, through a poster campaign on Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) subway cars, and disseminated among campuses and communities across the country. 1-800-GENOCID(E) works by providing the caller with a list of talking points on policy recommendations for Canada in Darfur. It then connects callers to the Office of the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other stakeholders in government who shape and influence the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Complementing the expressions of support provided by public rallies, the direct advocacy hotline brings the voices of Canadians directly into the offices of their elected representatives. In its first nine months of operation, the hotline facilitated over 4,677 calls, an average of 520 calls per month.

The 1-800-GENOCID(E) initiative was built on the lessons learned from the failed international response to Rwanda. Samantha Power, in her book, A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, describes how a lack of political will impeded efforts to provide an effective response to the Rwandan genocide. The author emphasizes this point with the following example: “When Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch met with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake two weeks into the Rwanda genocide, he informed her that the phones were not ringing. ‘Make more
noise!’ he urged” (Power, 2003, 509). Accordingly, as this chapter goes to press, the 1-800-GENOCID(E) phone calling drive continues and Canadians continue to ‘make noise’ to support Canadian fulfilment of the R2P.

Conclusion

In sum, it is important to recognize that Darfur represents one of the international community’s most complex challenges. The obstacles to realizing the R2P in Darfur are real and can often seem overwhelming, leading to difficulties in bridging the options gap and the implementation gap. First, determining which policy options best support the R2P can be a difficult task. As Alex de Waal has written, Darfur is a “graveyard for simple theories of how to resolve conflicts and stop atrocities,” noting that “simple ideas are always confounded by Sudan’s complicated realities” (de Waal, 2007b, n.p.). Second, gathering and sustaining the necessary political will to support the implementation of R2P policies is also challenging. As Mark Malloch Brown observes, “We all have other causes. We have kids’ soccer or ice hockey matches to go to, and community responsibilities to meet. There is a real danger that we will throw in the towel and move on” (Malloch Brown, 2007, n.p.).

However, these challenges to the R2P process also represent spaces within which CSOs can and must take action. The experience of STAND Canada illustrates several potential strategies for doing so. To help fill the policy options gap, CSOs can engage in education campaigns targeting both the public and policy-makers. To help fill the implementation gap, CSOs can support social mobilization through organizing rallies and phone drives. When there is a temptation among the public or policy-makers to ‘throw in the towel’, it is critical for voices within civil society to take the lead and marshal the will for further action. Although heads of state and government officials often receive the lion’s share of media attention in crisis response situations, CSOs are an integral part of the R2P process. Moving forward, CSOs can play a key role in struggling to bridge the options gap and implementation gap, to help to ensure that the Responsibility to Protect is no longer ‘honoured in the breach’.
References


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Major Brent Beardsley is a serving infantry officer in the Royal Canadian Regiment of the Canadian Army. He has served for 29 years in a wide variety of field force and staff appointments. In 1993 and 1994, he served as the personal staff officer to then Major-General Romeo Dallaire, before and during the genocide in Rwanda. Major Beardsley was the co-author with General Dallaire of the award winning and best selling non-fiction book *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (2003). He has also consulted to several documentaries and a motion picture,
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Ira Goldstein is a National Director on STAND Canada’s Executive Committee, and oversees the national Targeted Divestment campaign. Goldstein graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree (Honours) in Political Studies from Queen’s University. During his time at Queen’s, he volunteered extensively within the Kingston and surrounding communities. Actively involved with Frontier College, Canada’s largest literacy organization, he has worked to facilitate unique prison literacy initiatives in three federal penitentiaries. Owing to his volunteer work, Goldstein received a special recognition from Corrections Canada in 2006, and was as a nominee for the 2007 Civic Responsibility Award from Queen’s University and the City of Kingston. In September 2008, he will begin a MA degree in Political Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Goldstein’s research will focus on civil society’s interaction with governments in the Middle East and Africa, and will seek to understand how those relationships affect prospects for regional peace and security.

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