Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: An Agenda for Intervention
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Queen’s University’s Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security.

How governments make decisions in times of crisis is a topic which has long fascinated both theorists and practitioners of international politics. Michael Manulak’s study of the Canadian government’s decision to take part in NATO’s use of force against Serbia in the spring of 1999 deploys a novel social-scientific method to dissect the process whereby that decision was made. In that respect this paper descends from a long line of inquiry going back to the 1960s and the complex flow-charts designed by “scientific” students of foreign policy. But the model deployed here has a more flesh-and-blood quality to it than those early works. Problem, policy and politics – the three “streams” that converge to produce the decision – capture ideas and forces instantly recognizable to any student of government, and frame a narrative populated by real people who have – and make – real choices all along the way.

Canada’s participation in the seventy-eight day air war against Serbia was framed as a humanitarian intervention prompted by Belgrade’s suppression of Kosovo’s Albanian majority but, as Manulak points out, its unprecedented decision to support a multilateral NATO mission in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate was driven by a variety of factors about which those involved and those who observed continue to differ. The bold claim driving this study is to provide a fuller and more persuasive account of
those events than we have heretofore had, in a form that is both concise and theoretically sophisticated.

We are, as always, grateful to the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence, whose ongoing support enables the Centre to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance to national and international security. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre or any of its supporting agencies.

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Director, QCIR
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Contents

List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................. ix

INTRODUCTION: CANADA’S KOSOVO CRISIS ............................................. 1
  Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 2
  Argumentation, Methodology, and Research ......................................................... 6
  Background to a Crisis ............................................................................................. 9

1. THE PROBLEM STREAM ...................................................................................... 17
  1.1 The Problem Stream in Agenda Setting ..................................................... 17
  1.2 Indicators and Feedback in the Problem Stream .................................... 18
  1.3 Focusing Events, Crises, and Symbols ....................................................... 22
  1.4 Problem Definition and the Kosovo Crisis .............................................. 24
  1.5 Budgets and the Kosovo Crisis .................................................................... 26
  1.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 26

2. THE POLICY STREAM AND THE SPECIFICATION OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES ................................................................. 29
  2.1 The Policy Stream in the Multiple Streams Model ............................. 29
  2.2 The Canadian Foreign Policy Community and
      the Specification of Alternatives................................................................. 31
  2.3 Recombination, Criteria for Survival and an Emerging
      Consensus ....................................................................................................... 37
  2.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 40
3. THE POLITICS STREAM ................................................................. 43
   3.1 The Politics Stream within the Multiple Streams Model .......... 43
   3.2 The Canadian National Mood ................................................ 45
   3.3 Organized Political Forces ..................................................... 50
   3.4 Government in the Political Stream ........................................ 51
   3.5 Consensus Building and the Bandwagon Effect in
       the Politics Stream .............................................................. 53
   3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................. 54

4. POLICY WINDOWS, ENTREPRENEURS AND CHANGE .......... 55
   4.1 Policy Windows, Entrepreneurs, and Stream Couplings
       in the Multiple Streams Model .............................................. 55
   4.2 The Opening of a Policy Window in January 1999 ................. 57
   4.3 The Policy Entrepreneur and a Coupling of the Streams ....... 58
   4.4 The Kosovo Intervention and the Canadian Decision
       Agenda .................................................................................. 62
   4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 63

CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 65

Notes .............................................................................................. 69

Bibliography .................................................................................... 81

About the Author ............................................................................. 89
List of Acronyms

ACTORD   NATO Activation Order
CF       Canadian Forces
CIIA     Canadian Institute of International Affairs
DFAIT    Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND      Department of National Defence
FRY      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HRW      Human Rights Watch
ICTY     International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
KLA      Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM      Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK      Democratic League of Kosovo
MUP      Serbian Ministry of the Interior Special Police
NAC      North Atlantic Council
NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PGM      Precision-Guided Munitions
UNAC     United Nations Association- Canada
UNHCR    United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VJ       Yugoslavian Army
Introduction:
Canada’s Kosovo Crisis

On 24 March 1999 four Canadian CF-18 Hornets thundered toward their targets in the south Serbian province of Kosovo. The mission marked the first wave of a robust humanitarian intervention that would last 78 days. In Ottawa, officials from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and Department of National Defence (DND) worked late into the night to prepare their communication strategy for the most vigorous Canadian Forces combat deployment since the 1950 Korean War. The Canadian decision to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention represented a striking shift in Canadian foreign policy. Although Canada had supported interventions in Somalia (1992) and Zaire (1996), those missions were primarily aimed at securing civilian access to emergency assistance in countries that exercised only nominal sovereignty. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-1994) and Haiti (1994) the Canadian government approached military intervention with great reluctance. In the Kosovo case, the Canadian government supported a forceful imposition of NATO’s will on a sovereign country that did not welcome interference in its affairs. The operation was conducted without the benefit of a United Nations Security Council resolution and marked an important evolution in NATO’s mandate. As a result, the Canadian decision to participate in Operation Allied Force represented a clear and controversial point of Canadian policy change. This study of Canada’s Kosovo policy will focus on the pre-decision stages of the policy process to gain an appreciation of the forces that precipitated this change. The analysis will use John W. Kingdon’s multiple-streams model, outlined in his 1984 book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.* ¹
The introductory section of the paper will describe the scholarly literature on Canadian policy toward the Kosovo crisis and note some of its limitations. It will then discuss the paper’s methodology and argumentation, including a short summary of its findings. The introduction will conclude with background on the Kosovo conflict as well as the Canadian policy approach to these events.

Literature Review

The literature on the Canadian part in Kosovo conflict management is limited to sundry journal articles and book chapters. The interpretations of Canadian policy fall into two major categories. The first argues that Canada exercised minimal independence in its decision to participate in NATO’s intervention because of its alliance obligations. This assessment fits with the period’s discourse of decline in Canada’s international influence. The competing view suggests that Canada participated primarily because of its strong and independent commitment to protecting Human Security. Other scholarly contributions integrate elements of both assessments. This section will discuss the principal exponents of these views.

Two prominent examples of the NATO obligation interpretation are those advanced by Douglas L. Bland and Michael Bliss. Bland, a professor at Queen’s University, argues that Canada participated in the Kosovo campaign because of “allied demands.”2 For Bland, there was “no serious consideration [given to] walking away from the NATO consensus” and, in its “complacency and dependence,” Canada’s political leadership “acknowledged and acquiesced” to contributing a “token” force, because:

In 1999, the government had no choice but to suffer indignation at home: Ministers knew that they did not have enough resources to buy a ticket for admission to meetings where votes were being, as the saying goes, weighed but not counted. Moreover, they had no intention of being manoeuvred by popular or allied demands into committing any more military resources than were readily available or were necessary to spend so that Canada could be seen to be supporting the alliance.

Bland devotes insufficient attention to other influences on Canada’s participation and overstates the role of alliance obligations on Canadian decision making.

Michael Bliss, a history professor at the University of Toronto, follows a similar line of argument in a feature interview done for Policy Options.3 For
Bliss, Canadian policy was characterized by the familiar colonial refrain “ready, aye, ready.” Bliss argues: “Instead, as junior partners, we simply went along. Our politicians were, publicly, ventriloquists’ dummies, and from the public record, it’s not at all clear that Canada exercised anything like real independence.” Like Bland, Bliss does not sufficiently consider the possibility that Canada supported the NATO policy because its political leadership was in strong agreement with the humanitarian intervention. Sometimes independence expressed for its own sake reflects a far greater degree of national subservience than well-considered concurrence. Bliss derides the argument that the international community had an obligation to protect civilians from widespread victimization by intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state. He contends that humanitarian intervention policy represented “a recipe for international destabilization and ultimately a kind of global chaos in which nothing but might rules.” Though he deplores the lack of “useful and constructive” Canadian debate over the intervention, Bliss fails to analyze the reasons that the intervention garnered such widespread, if non-critical, Canadian public support.

The alternative interpretation of Canadian motivations for participating in the intervention is advanced by DFAIT’s former Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy Paul Heinbecker and foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy. Both suggested that Canada’s participation was largely motivated by the imperatives of its Human Security agenda. For example, Heinbecker argued that:

There were no strategic purposes to NATO intervention in Kosovo. There was no oil, no geographic commanding height nor maritime sea lane, no rare precious resources, no scientific secret, no Hitler-in-the making to dominate Europe and no potential global conflagration to be nipped in the bud. The important consideration here is that the war against Serbia was a war of values, a war of human security ... 

This argument, consistent with DFAIT statements of the time, is expanded upon by Heinbecker in four articles on the Canadian part in the crisis. Although he acknowledges the importance of the intervention for NATO’s credibility and for regional stability, Heinbecker maintains that Canada enthusiastically participated in the Kosovo air campaign because it was “the first war for values, not interests.” The author also provides insight into Canada’s efforts to engage the United Nations prior to the air campaign and into Canadian statecraft during the crisis. On the whole, Heinbecker’s articles represent the best contemporary accounts of Canadian crisis diplomacy available in the literature.
Lloyd Axworthy takes a similar approach in the chapter on the crisis in his memoirs. He provides a valuable description of Canadian efforts through the 1990s to mitigate tensions in the south Serbian province. Axworthy argues that “the willingness to exercise military force to uphold the principles of protection” represented the “ultimate test for a human security policy.” Although Axworthy provides some information on his role in multilateral diplomacy, his description is somewhat opaque on these matters and would have benefitted from greater detail. Considering the importance of Axworthy’s active role in the diplomacy that led to UN Security Council resolution 1244, which brought the conflict to an end, this is regrettable.

Heinbecker’s and Axworthy’s analyses simplify the complex impulses that motivated Canadian participation. They interpret events within a simple, continuous narrative flowing from the Canadian campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines in 1997 to the Kosovo intervention in 1999. The authors devote attention to the problem side of agenda setting and to the policy implications of the human security agenda, but do not discuss the political conditions that enabled Canadian participate in the operation. Their treatment of the decision to support the NATO intervention suggests a simple and direct relationship between the nature of the problem and the policy option selected. As this paper will demonstrate, the specification of policy alternatives was not as straightforward as Heinbecker and Axworthy imply.

By tracing the development of Canada’s Human Security agenda in the decade preceding the Kosovo crisis, Hevina S. Dashwood’s article in the 2000 edition of the Canada Among Nations series supports the Heinbecker/Axworthy interpretation. For Dashwood, the “primary impetus” behind the intervention was humanitarian and fit well with the period’s human security agenda. Her primary concerns with the intervention were its lack of a United Nations mandate and its alienation of Russia. Although she notes that “historic and state security interests” eased the decision to intervene, Dashwood’s description of historic interests is vague and her appraisal of the implications of the conflict for Balkan stability is ephemeral. Her suggestion that “contrary to what might be expected, Canada was not unduly concerned about NATO alliance solidarity and credibility” misses the mark, and its force depends on what she means by “unduly.” Dashwood’s assessment would also have benefitted from greater attention to Ottawa’s political climate.

Michael Manulak’s spring 2009 article, “Canada and the Kosovo crisis: A ‘golden moment’ in Canadian foreign policy,” is based on a series of
interviews with former officials. By providing information on the nature of Canadian diplomacy within NATO and G-8 forums, the article argues that Canada “made an important military and diplomatic contribution to the resolution of the Kosovo crisis.” Although the article considers a series of motivations for Canadian participation in the NATO operation, it does not consider the agenda setting and policy-alternative specification processes.

Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel’s “Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower” also analyzes the Canadian decision to participate in Operation Allied Force. The article canvases a range of possible explanations for Canadian involvement, including: national security, alliance entrapment, history, domestic politics and opinion, and humanitarian motivations. The authors argue that Canada was a “happy follower” because it believed in “essential rightness of the use of force in these circumstances,” but did not have a “serious capacity to influence” alliance policy. Nossal and Roussel’s assessment is valuable because it interrogates a wider range of possible motivations for policy choice. The principal weaknesses of the piece are that it does not devote much analysis to the various policy options considered by the government and underestimates Canadian influence in alliance decision-making.

The question of Canadian autonomy and motivations was taken up in a paper prepared by Nelson Michaud and Stéphane Tremblay for the 2007 International Studies Association convention. Michaud and Tremblay statistically analyze government responses to opposition queries during the House of Commons question period by sorting statements into motivational categories such as: historical appeal, domestic values, national pride, international development imperatives, Canadian domestic support for multilateral institutions, global security, economic factors, multilateral and bilateral obligations, and regionalism. For the authors, government responses are worthy of particular attention because they constitute “a sample of the government’s policy justifications ‘given on the spot,’ which are more spontaneous than those expressed in rehashed speeches.” The authors conclude that, of the range of motivations, those categorized as domestic in origin were the most prominent in government responses. Michaud and Tremblay contribute an interesting approach that, nevertheless, has several weaknesses. First, since government question-period responses are usually scripted by political staffers, the degree of spontaneity heard may be overstated by the authors. Second, the House of Commons may not represent the most promising medium through which to discern government policy orientations. Third, although the categories delineated are sound,
the categorization of statements is not as clear-cut as their inquiry suggests because many responses straddle more than one category.

For students of Canada’s international policies these explanations of Canadian support of a forceful humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are unsatisfactory because of their simplicity. Three issues are worthy of more extensive treatment. First, a study of the mechanisms that caused the Kosovo issue to emerge on the Canadian government’s agenda would enrich understanding of the topic. After all, in 1999 Kosovo was only one of several instances of civil conflict. Bloodshed in places like Sierra Leone, Chechnya, East Timor, and Afghanistan also demanded the attention of policy makers. Second, a more thorough account of the arrival of the humanitarian intervention policy alternative within the Canadian conflict management toolbox is demanded by the subject. The literature occasionally implies that this choice was inevitable. A closer look at the historical record as well as the range of competing policy alternatives suggests that this was not so. Third, too little attention is devoted to the influence of the Canadian domestic political setting. The importance of widespread political support, particularly in Quebec, should not be understated in considerations of Canadian foreign policy.¹¹

**Argumentation, Methodology, and Research**

This paper will demonstrate that it was a convergence of independent problem, policy, and political dimensions that caused the Kosovo humanitarian intervention to emerge on the Canadian agenda. The Kosovo issue, monitored closely by Canadian officials long before 1999, emerged on the Canadian governmental agenda through the presence of ample indicators, feedback mechanisms, and a powerful focusing event. These factors helped produce a sense of crisis that caused a policy window to open in Ottawa in mid-January 1999. Developing autonomously was a discourse within Canadian and international policy communities which stimulated the generation of well-defined policy alternatives on the best means of managing intrastate conflict. Members of the Canadian foreign policy community aimed to soften-up domestic opinion on the desirability of these policy proposals through giving papers, making speeches, and providing testimony. After the Kosovo problem arrived on the governmental agenda, a policy entrepreneur, DFAIT Assistant Deputy Minister Paul Heinbecker, seized this opportunity to push through his favoured policy alternative: humanitarian intervention. Heinbecker, furthermore, used his authoritative
position and his political acumen to ensure that the bureaucratic context was supportive of this policy solution. The broader domestic political environment, including the national mood, was conducive to Canadian support of NATO’s forceful intervention into Kosovo. When a NATO operation became imminent, the Kosovo humanitarian intervention policy solution was formally backed by the Canadian cabinet.

The analysis in this paper will employ John W. Kingdon’s multiple-streams model to understand the processes of agenda setting and alternative specification. According to Kingdon, agenda setting is about structuring the governmental agenda, which includes the issues to which people in and around government are paying serious attention. Alternative specification refers to the narrowing of realistic policy choices available to decision makers. These processes are animated by three ingredients: problems, policies, and politics. These three ingredients flow autonomously as streams, only coming to a confluence at critical junctures in the policy process. The problem stream, which will be the subject of chapter 1, is given definition by problem indicators, feedback, and focusing events. Policy makers monitor events in the problem stream to determine if a circumstance should be considered a public policy problem, necessitating government remediation. The policy stream concerns the development and resilience of ideas within a policy primeval soup. Kingdon argues that policy alternatives float about in this soup for a period of time, waiting for a propitious moment. Although these mechanisms appear disorderly, several well-defined criteria govern the survival of policy alternatives and impose order on the policy process. This process will be described in chapter two. The politics stream, the focus of chapter three, is composed of readings of the national mood, impressions of the preponderance of persuasive power among organized political forces, and the exigencies of internal governmental and bureaucratic politics. Political, bureaucratic, or electoral turnover can either accelerate or stymie the policy process.

A coupling of these autonomous streams at critical junctures often enables a policy item to move from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda, which includes matters that are awaiting authoritative government decision. An opportunity for this coupling is provided by the opening of a policy window. Kingdon argues that policy windows open because of developments in the problem or politics streams. If a pressing problem emerges or political conditions are believed to be favourable, advocates are given a fleeting window of opportunity to connect their preferred policy option to the new circumstance. These advocates are labelled policy entrepreneurs.
because they invest personal resources in their pet policy proposal. These entrepreneurs must also demonstrate an adroit political sense by bringing the third stream, whether it is the problem or political component, into line with their policy thrust. These concepts will be applied to the Kosovo case study in chapter four.

The multiple-streams model contributes a valuable analytical tool to this research program because it provides a comprehensive framework from which to explain the concurrent and synergistic interaction of independent forces of policy change. In the Kosovo case, it describes the interaction between the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the problem stream, the broad-based political support in Canada, and the emergence of the humanitarian intervention policy alternative. This appreciation of events contrasts with the sources on the topic that treat the Canadian policy response as inexorably related to either the nature of the problem or the country’s NATO commitment.

Given the dearth of published sources on the topic, this study made use of a carefully planned program of interviews with politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats and military officials to gain a comprehensive inside view of events. In total, twenty-four interviews were conducted, most of these with officials in DFAIT and DND/Canadian Forces (CF). The interviews were held confidentially and, as a result, none of the interviews is cited in this paper. This procedure protected the identity of the interview subject and enabled more candid conversations.

Interview selection was based on knowledge of the subject’s importance in managing Canada’s Kosovo policy. On the whole, the interviewees were extremely accommodating and forthcoming, providing new information on Canadian policy and decision making. The timing of the interviews, approximately ten years after the 1998-1999 crisis in Kosovo, was fortuitous because the interview subjects were able to recall their activities in detail, while feeling sufficiently free to speak in a frank manner.

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because of the passage of time. In view of the inherent subjectivity of personal reflections, the author took a cautious approach to all information obtained. The scope of the interview program ensured that all information employed in the paper was verified by subsequent interviews or public source documents.

The use of research interviews was particularly fitting for an inquiry into agenda setting and alternative specification because these segments of the policy process are seldom described in the literature. The interviewees were able to contribute highly relevant insights, such as perceptions of the national mood and the nature of bureaucratic politics. Interviews were the primary research method used by John Kingdon when developing his multiple-streams model.

In addition to interviews, the analysis drew extensively on government public-source documents. Of particular value were the proceedings of the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. The twenty-five committee hearings into the Kosovo crisis, running from 28 October 1998 to 6 June 2000, featured enlightening testimony from politicians including Lloyd Axworthy and Defence Minister Arthur Eggleton, as well as from lead officials including Paul Heinbecker and the DND Assistant Deputy Minister-Policy Dr. Kenneth Calder. Another essential public source of information for this study was the transcripts of the daily press conferences held by DFAIT and DND at National Defence Headquarters after the commencement of the bombing campaign. Since the press conferences were usually hosted by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, General Raymond Henault, and DFAIT’s Director General for Central, East, and Southern Europe, James Wright, the transcripts were a source of high-level analysis and detail. Although the press conferences were largely focused on the conduct of the NATO bombing campaign, information relevant to this study often surfaced. The research program was given a final boost through documents received in the dozens of access-to-information requests submitted by the author to DFAIT and DND. The information obtained in these documents supplemented and reinforced the data found in oral interviews and other public sources.

Background to a Crisis

The Kosovo issue first appeared on Canada’s foreign policy radar in 1989, when the Serbian government, under the direction of President Slobodan
Milošević, compelled the Kosovo assembly to repeal the considerable provincial autonomy contained in the federal republic’s 1974 constitution. Kosovo, a province in southern Serbia, was widely considered the cultural and religious heartland of the Serbian people. The government tightened its grip on Kosovo by ensuring Serb control of political, bureaucratic, educational, judicial, and penal institutions. These measures marked the first steps in Milošević’s pursuit of Kosovo’s “colonization” through Serbianization. The Milošević government aimed to alter Kosovo’s demographic balance by facilitating ethnic Serbian settlement and by making life intolerable for the province’s ethnic Albanian majority, which, by the mid 1990s, had come to represent close to 90 percent of its population. While Milošević’s first strategy produced results that disappointed him, the second was more successful. Violent repression of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population was perpetrated through beatings, torture, and death at the hands of Serb police forces. Kosovo’s 70 percent unemployment rate, exacerbated by Belgrade’s unwillingness to invest in basic economic infrastructure, contributed to an abysmal per capita income. The Kosovar Albanians’ quality of life plummeted and their infant mortality rate, 27.8 per 1000 live births, was the highest in the Yugoslav Federation. This repression elicited outrage and protest among Kosovars and most of the population responded with a determined effort to regain autonomy through passive resistance.

On 2 July 1990 the Kosovar Assembly issued a Declaration of Independence and, two months later, adopted the “Constitution of the Republic of Kosova.” Between 26 and 30 September 1991 an underground referendum was held in which 99.87 percent of the Albanian population voted for an independent Kosovo Republic. On 24 May 1992, Kosovars held semi-underground Presidential and Parliamentary elections which brought the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and President Ibrahim Rugova to power. Rugova aimed to achieve Kosovo’s independence by delegitimizing Serbian institutions, by advocating strict Kosovar adherence to non-violent resistance, and by drawing international attention to Serbian repression.

The situation in Kosovo worsened following the November 1995 Dayton Accords. The Dayton agreement, which settled the Balkan conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, failed to address the Kosovo question. This omission, staggering to many Balkan observers, was traumatic for the Kosovar Albanians, who had endured years of brutal repression with the hope of international rescue. The Dayton omission discredited the LDK’s non-violence policy and empowered Rugova’s violent opponents. In his memoirs, Axworthy argued that: “The fallout [of the Dayton accords] was
fateful for the cause of peaceful resolution. The message conveyed to the
Muslim community in Kosovo was that they were being abandoned.16
Despite widespread frustration in 1995 and 1996, groups that advocated
violent tactics, such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), were armed
with little more than rifles to combat the well-armed Serbian security forces,
and remained on the fringe of Kosovar society.

This began to change in March 1997. Civil strife in neighbouring Al-
bania led to the raiding of government arms caches, making ammunition,
grenades, and weapons suddenly available.17 The KLA, with financial
support from international sympathizers in the substantial Albanian di-
aspora communities,18 had access to the resources necessary to purchase
these weapons.19 The KLA, whose size and popularity swelled in 1997
and 1998, escalated their guerrilla campaign against Yugoslav targets in
Kosovo. Because the KLA leadership realized that it could not defeat its
enemy, some of its operatives sought to draw international attention by
provoking Serb atrocities.

These events had important implications for Canada’s human security
agenda. The human security agenda aimed to focus international security
policy on the well-being of communities and individual citizens. Although
state security remained essential, proponents argued that it was not a suf-
ficient means of achieving international peace and stability.20 The major
human security initiatives pursued by DFAIT in this period were the
campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines, aggressive support for the es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, and a fight against small
arms proliferation.21 Since violence in Kosovo disproportionately affected
civilians and resulted in egregious human rights violations, the Kosovo
conflict became an important human security issue. The large refugee flows
streaming out of the province, furthermore, had the potential to destabilize
the region and diminish human security in neighboring countries.

Canada was one of the first western countries to engage Yugoslavia
on the issue of human rights in Kosovo. In April 1996, Axworthy visited
Yugoslav foreign minister Milan Milutinović in Belgrade and expressed
his concern about human rights abuses in Kosovo.22 Since it was one of
Axworthy’s first visits as foreign minister, the meeting communicated the
seriousness of Canadian apprehensions. In early 1998, James Wright, the
Director General for Central, East and South Europe, met with the Yugoslav
president and encouraged cooperation with the moderate Rugova.23 As
violence worsened, DFAIT allowed its ambassador’s criticisms to become
more public. For example, after the brutal March 1998 Serbian special police
(MUP) operation against the Jashari family in the Drenica valley village of Prekaz, Ambassador Raphael Girard granted interviews with European media and recounted his visit to the site graphically.

Canada’s bilateral relations with Yugoslavia provided few avenues to solve the Kosovo quandary. Diplomatic relations had deteriorated badly through the 1990s. The rise of Slobodan Milošević and brutal violence in Croatia and Bosnia made Yugoslavia a symbol of ethnic intolerance and chauvinism. The gossamer veil of democracy that Milošević fashioned in meetings with western officials was viewed with scepticism by Canadian officials who called his political chicanery over Bosnia. Belgrade was extremely slow in allowing the new Canadian ambassador to present his credentials in autumn 1997. In turn, the ambassador’s mandate letter contained instructions to be overtly critical of the Yugoslav human rights record. The Yugoslav government, moreover, made it clear that they considered the Canadian ambassador a trouble maker and took to frequently haranguing him for “misunderstanding” the Kosovo issue. In January 1999, for example, Ambassador Girard was summoned to the Yugoslav foreign ministry after midnight, a common Yugoslav means of underlining their displeasure with an ambassador, to be read a scripted account of events. The ambassador was not permitted questions or comments and brusquely told to report back to Ottawa. The Yugoslav ambassador in Canada, Dr. Pavle Todorovic, was widely regarded as a sycophant and did not provide Ottawa with influential access to Belgrade. Therefore, as the Kosovo issue came to a head, Canada had little leverage to employ as a means of forestalling Balkan violence.

In March 1998, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior’s special police (MUP) commenced operations to systematically root out the KLA from ethnic Albanian villages. The Canadian government responded by supporting the increased engagement of international organizations in the Kosovo issue. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160, passed on 31 March 1998, condemned the violence in Kosovo, instituted an arms embargo, urged cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and called upon Yugoslavia to realize a political settlement. Responding to increased bloodshed in Kosovo in August 1998, Axworthy denounced Yugoslav conduct and publicly called for greater Security Council engagement on the matter. Canadian officials in New York pushed members of the Security Council to ensure a tough Chapter VII mandate in a new resolution being drafted in response to violence in Kosovo. The stumbling block was Russian unwillingness to permit a Chapter VII resolution that included enforcement mechanisms.
Axworthy sought to overcome Russian intransigence by engaging Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian foreign minister with whom he had warm personal relations, in the matter. Axworthy also aimed to cash in Canadian diplomatic credits gained in his advocacy of NATO’s nuclear disarmament. The final UN resolution, passed on 23 September under a Chapter VII mandate, recognized the conflict as “a threat to international peace and security” but did not include explicit enforcement mechanisms. UN Security Council Resolution 1199 set out a series of conditions for Yugoslav compliance including, *inter alia*, an end to violence, the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression, the unimpeded access of humanitarian organizations, and Yugoslav cooperation with the ICTY.

Canada supplemented these political measures with sanctions. In March 1999, the Canadian government suspended export credits, the negotiation of landing rights for Yugoslav Airlines, and discussion of other bilateral agreements. Canada also strongly supported the imposition of sanctions at the May 1998 G-8 foreign minister’s meetings in London. Although these measures were of limited impact, since Canadian exports to Yugoslavia in 1998 amounted to only $Cdn9.7 million, they symbolized Canadian displeasure and contributed to a broader international sanctions regime.

Canada was a vigorous proponent of NATO involvement in the Kosovo issue. At the May 1998 NATO foreign ministers’ meetings the alliance announced its support of a peaceful resolution to the crisis and its resolve to protect the stability and security of Albania and Macedonia. At the 11-12 June 1998 meetings of the NATO defence ministers, allied military officials were instructed to develop a series of plans for ground and air operations in Yugoslavia under various levels of resistance. These plans were presented to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in August 1998. On 12 August 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced the alliance’s military planning publicly. NATO’s engagement in the Kosovo issue was deepened by a 15 June air show of force in the region, and Partnership for Peace exercises in Albania and Macedonia in July and September 1998. Canada’s political leadership, which believed that Milošević would only respond to force, was firm in its resolve to make NATO’s coercive threats more credible. To this end, Canada’s NATO ambassador and permanent representative on the NAC, David Wright, was given considerable latitude in pursuing means of solidifying allied determination to respond to Yugoslav violence.

Despite these measures, strife in Kosovo continued to worsen. On 26 September 1998, reports reached Ottawa that the MUP had slaughtered
21 Kosovars in the village of Gornje Obrinje. Prior to this, the Serbs had endeavoured to keep the level of violence below a threshold that might precipitate western involvement. The Serbian strategy is consistent with Kingdon’s discussion of indicators, which states that policy makers are more likely to recognize a problem that is worsening than one that remains in a relatively steady state.35

The allied response to the Gornje Obrinje incident provides further support for Kingdon’s belief. The massacre helped galvanize NATO leaders into approving an Activation Order (ACTORD)36 on 13 October 1998.37 The Canadian government played its part in NATO’s coercive diplomacy on 12 October 1998, announcing that Canadian CF-18s would participate in air operations.38 Although the ACTORD formally committed all NATO governments to an air campaign, Canadian officials did not expect to have to deliver on this commitment. One former Canadian diplomat commented: “The ACTORD was just sabre rattling. We weren’t prepared to do anything at that point.”

NATO’s ACTORD, the diplomatic efforts of U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, and Yugoslavia’s desire to avoid a confrontation, facilitated a 16 October agreement with Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević on a ceasefire and the creation of a verification mission. NATO was also permitted aerial reconnaissance over Kosovo. The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) permitted 2000 civilian observers to enter Kosovo to monitor the ceasefire. Although the KVM could not enforce the ceasefire, it was hoped that an international presence might dissuade both sides from committing further violence. In addition, the KVM provided a feedback mechanism for western governments to assess the efficacy of their Kosovo policy. The ceasefire was connected to a political process, conducted by U.S. ambassador Chris Hill and Austrian diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch.

As the fledgling verification mission was rolled out in autumn 1998, the confrontation over Kosovo reached a tenuous, but hopeful, resolution. NATO allies had threatened the use of air strikes against Yugoslavia, but were relieved when the credibility of this threat was not tested. Canadian decision makers had viewed the Kosovo issue with considerable alarm, had been actively engaged as conflict managers multilaterally, and had been determined to see the crisis to a peaceful resolution.

The balance of this study will focus on the period from the 16 October 1998 Holbrooke agreement to the Canadian decision to support an intervention in Kosovo on 24 March 1999. Chapter One will discuss the problem
stream of the multiple-streams model as a means of explaining the Kosovo problem’s path to agenda prominence. Chapter Two will focus on the policy stream and the process through which the humanitarian intervention policy alternative reached the Canadian short list of ideas for addressing the Kosovo problem. Chapter Three will discuss the politics stream and how the domestic political context was conducive to the Kosovo problem’s high agenda status and to an assertive Canadian part in ensuring the peace and stability of Kosovo. Chapter Four will complete the application of the multiple-streams model by describing the opening of a policy window in January 1999, the efforts of a policy entrepreneur to promote an intervention in Kosovo, and the coupling of the three streams. It was these processes that led to the Canadian government’s acceptance of humanitarian intervention policy as a suitable means of international conflict management and of promoting human security.
1. The Problem Stream

Instability in the south Serbian province of Kosovo had been monitored by bureaucrats in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND) for over a decade. Despite indicators of ethnic tensions, frequent violence, and egregious human rights violations, the issue failed to emerge on the Canadian government’s agenda. This chapter provides background on what John Kingdon calls the problem stream. It will then apply Kingdon’s multiple-streams model to the Canadian context as a means of understanding the Kosovo issue’s emergence onto the Canadian foreign policy agenda in early 1999. This will include a consideration of the principal indicators and feedback mechanisms, as well as an assessment of the influence of a focusing event and a sense of crisis on problem recognition. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the role of values and categorization in problem definition.

1.1 The Problem Stream in Agenda Setting

Kingdon’s multiple-streams model seeks to explain why certain problems attract the attention of decision-makers, while others remain in the background. In particular, Kingdon focuses on the role of indicators, focusing events, and feedback mechanisms on problem recognition. Indicators allow policy makers to monitor and evaluate the magnitude and trajectory of issues.39 The indicators most likely to draw the attention of decision makers are those that are quantitative in nature.40 Although indicators help illustrate the nature of a problem, Kingdon contends that focusing events, crises, and symbols often provide a “little push to get the attention of people in and
around government. This dimension of the multiple-streams model is particularly relevant to this research program because international conflict management efforts are usually driven by crises. The “Kosovo Crisis” in Canada, as we shall see, was no exception. The final driver of Kingdon’s problem stream is program feedback, which usually comes from formal procedures, civil servant reports, or complaints.

According to Kingdon, two other dimensions are relevant to understanding the emergence of a problem on the agenda. The first factor is budgets, which can act as a facilitator or a constraint on the consideration of a policy problem. However, in rare instances when decision makers “find the circumstances sufficiently compelling,” the budget is ignored. The second element, which will receive extensive treatment in this chapter, is problem definition. A circumstance is defined as a problem when policy makers believe that they should do something about it. Issues are defined in this way through values, comparisons, and categorizations.

Canadian monitoring of the Kosovo issue was facilitated by several indicators and feedback mechanisms. Canadian officials, for example, assessed the reports of the United Nations Secretary General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as those emerging from non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch. The Canadian government also analyzed the extensive information intelligence gathered from formal and informal channels. In the spring of 1999, several feedback mechanisms were present, including the situation reports of its Belgrade embassy and those of a verification mission in Kosovo. Despite the presence of credible indicators and formal feedback mechanisms, it was a focusing event, the January 1999 massacre in the village of Račak, which brought the Kosovo problem to the Canadian governmental agenda. Our assessment of indicators and feedback will emphasize the information available to Canadian policy makers at that time.

1.2 Indicators and Feedback in the Problem Stream

The Canadian government utilized several indicators to monitor the Kosovo issue, including the analysis of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Secretary General, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the reports of non-governmental organizations such as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch. This information was combined with two feedback systems: the Kosovo Verification Mission and the Canadian embassy in Belgrade.
Although violence ebbed in October and November, the UN Secretary General reported “alarming signs of potential deterioration” and indications of “growing tensions on the ground” in December 1998. Bloodshed was concentrated in the western Kosovo towns of Malisevo, Pec, Dakovica, and Prizren. The nature of the conflict continued to evolve in January 1999 when information emerged on the widening of armed clashes to areas that had previously only experienced low levels of violence. The expanding conflict reduced the size and number of zones of relative stability for civilians, which “resulted in a real increase in the number of persons who live in apprehension or direct experience of violence or arbitrary treatment.” Ominous signs also began to emerge of increased ethnic tensions among civilians in Kosovo’s multiethnic urban areas and of targeted attacks against “influential individuals and locations known for open-mindedness and flexibility in community relations.” These developments represented a dangerous deterioration of the situation and a threat to human security.

The widening violence precipitated a deluge of civilian displacement, including an estimated 20,000 in the first three weeks of January 1999. On 21 January the UNHCR estimated that 300,000 Kosovars had been displaced by violence. Of these, 180,000 remained inside Kosovo, many living in hills and forests exposed to the cruel Balkan winter. By mid-March 1999, these numbers ballooned to 450,000 displaced, including 190,000 refugees. The UNHCR’s reports of displacement and refugee outflows were the most frequently cited example of Yugoslav culpability in Canadian official statements and in research interviews. One explanation for the Canadian emphasis on displacement and refugee totals is provided by Kingdon: “The countable problem sometimes acquires a power of its own that is unmatched by problems that are less countable.”

An important corollary of the growing civilian displacement was its potential to destabilize the Balkans. Of particular concern was the effect of a massive influx of refugees into Macedonia and Albania on regional peace. The Slavic leadership of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which sought to maintain stability in a country which had a large and restive Albanian minority, feared that Kosovar refugees would tip their country’s delicate demographic balance. Albania, the poorest country in Europe, had just emerged from governmental collapse and bankruptcy in 1997 and remained corrupt and unstable. Further anxiety was caused by KVM reports in January 1999 of Yugoslav cross-border mortar attacks and incursions into Albanian airspace. The delicacy of the regional balance
was described in November 1998 by Jim Wright, DFAIT’s Director General for Central, East, and Southern Europe:

The efforts under way right now in Kosovo reflect the fact that if Canada, and countries like Canada, do not go in and preserve stability in that region, the Kosovo conflict will spill over into other parts of Yugoslavia. It will spill over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, into Albania, and into Bosnia.57

Canadian officials also feared that Yugoslav forces might target NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina or aim to disrupt the tenuous peace in that country.58 The presence of 1300 Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina made this prospect especially troubling. Milošević’s adversarial relationship with President Milo Đukanović of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro was yet another concern.59 Furthermore, Canadian officials feared that instability in Kosovo could awaken dormant regional rivalries and territorial ambitions among and between Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria, thereby igniting a Southern European conflagration.60 This dimension was important because of Canada’s classical interest in “forward-based defence” and European peace.61

The other side of the instability coin was Milošević himself. One former official argued that the Kosovo conflict was seen within a ten year context: “In our mind, however, this conflict began ten years before. Milošević had plenty of chances to cooperate. He waged war first against the Slovenes, then the Croats, then the Bosnians, and, throughout, the Albanians.” For many Canadian officials, renewed violence confirmed this long-held suspicion that the Yugoslav President was the principal source of Balkan instability. At the same time, most Canadian and international actors realized that Milošević was the only person who could bring the Kosovo issue to a speedy resolution.

Indicators exposed dire reports of human rights violations in Kosovo. In December 1998, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that at least 1000 ethnic Albanians had been detained in prisons and were subjected to severe “beatings with rubber batons and torture, including the use of electric shock.” HRW reproved the Yugoslavian government for impeding the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to detainees.62 The UN Secretary General and High Commissioner for Human Rights documented particularly flagrant violations of Yugoslavian judicial procedure against Albanian detainees in Lipljan and Gnilane prisons, who were:
[transported by] heavily armed special police, who, holding automatic weapons, were permitted by the presiding judge to remain in the courtroom, at a ratio of one policeman to one defendant, instead of regular court guards. Such prisoners were chained on arrival in the courtroom, remained in a submissive head-down position throughout the proceedings, looked to individual police guards before answering even cursory questions put to them by the court.  

The treatment of prisoners represented important infringements of human rights and of international humanitarian law as embodied by the Geneva conventions. These reports elicited a particularly strong reaction from Canada’s foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy.

Events in Belgrade and in Kosovo were monitored closely by allied intelligence services. With allied assets in Bosnia, NATO was able to easily gather and distil information on Yugoslav communication and troop movements. One former official observed that “all through the crisis we had really excellent intelligence and often knew more about the positions of Serb forces than they did ... We were definitely not operating out of a lack of knowledge.” Another former official added: “we had very good intelligence. We knew when Milošević’s vehicles were moving, we knew when their flights were ebbing and flowing.”

The reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission reinforced these indicators and demonstrated the failure of Canadian and western policy toward Kosovo. By January 1999, Yugoslavia was in clear violation of several important terms of the October 1998 Holbrooke agreement. The KVM’s January 1999 report delineated “serious violations” of the ceasefire, including a Yugoslavian Army (VJ) offensive from 24-27 December 1998, which displaced 5000 civilians. In January 1999 the VJ used the capture of eight Yugoslav troops by the Kosovo Liberation Army as justification for increasing its force presence in Kosovo far beyond the levels permitted in the October 1998 agreements. By March 1999, Yugoslav security forces exceeded agreed force levels by a factor of five. The mandated cooperation with the investigations of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was violated on 10 December when Serb police obstructed the access of a forensics team to investigate a suspected mass grave in Gornje Obrinje. Yugoslav contempt for the work of ICTY was further demonstrated when its chief prosecutor, Louise Arbour, was denied access to the village of Račak on 18 January.

KVM reports also revealed an important unanticipated consequence of the Holbrooke agreement: when Serb security forces withdrew from their
posts in Kosovo in October 1998, KLA units occupied the Serbian road checkpoints along major routes and began to exercise control over the flow of traffic in Kosovo. By December, the KLA had increased its territorial control and continued to provoke Serbian forces. One Canadian diplomat remembered that “one thing the Kosovo Verification Mission reports revealed was the fact that the KLA and Albanian criminal gangs were not heroes and did not play by any rules we could endorse.”

Ottawa had particularly rich and “unsanitized” access to the information derived from the KVM. In the early stages of the mission, the Canadian ambassador in Belgrade, Raphael Girard, had a political officer stationed at the verification mission’s co-ordination centre in Pristina to ensure a direct information feed from the field to the Canadian legation. This information was circulated widely in Ottawa and to other Canadian missions. Ambassador Girard supplemented this information through excellent access to U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill, who was leading the political negotiations in Belgrade. The Girard-Hill channel gave Ottawa excellent information on the progress of the Belgrade negotiations.

By January 1999 the feedback emerging from the KVM and the Canadian embassy made it clear that the existing policy toward Kosovo was not meeting its stated goals and was becoming increasingly untenable. Ample indicators demonstrated that there was a grave and growing humanitarian quandary in Kosovo. Still, the Canadian government and most of its NATO allies wavered in their desire to employ the robust force called for in NATO’s October 1998 Activation Order. Moreover, although deplorable, the scale of violence and displacement levels in Kosovo did not objectively set it apart from other conflicts. In Sierra Leone, for example, the UNHCR reported serious human rights violations and the presence of 440,000 refugees in Guinea and Liberia.69

1.3 Focusing Events, Crises, and Symbols

On 15 January 1999, Canadian policy makers received reports of intercepted intelligence that Nikola Sainovic, the Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, had ordered the Serbian internal police (MUP) to “go in hard” into the southern Kosovo village of Račak. On 17 January KVM head William Walker entered the village to find 45 Kosovars dead. Many of the dead, which included a woman, a young child, and elderly men, had been summarily executed and their bodies mutilated. Graphic images of the Kosovar victims covered the
front pages of influential newspapers, such as the *Globe and Mail* and the *New York Times*. The violence caused 6400 Kosovars to flee the village and its surrounding communities. Ambassador Walker publicly referred to the incident as a “massacre” and an “unspeakable atrocity.” In response, Milošević ostentatiously declared the ambassador persona non grata and demanded that he leave Yugoslavia within 48 hours. To make matters worse, the ICTY chief prosecutor Louise Arbour was denied a visa to investigate the site and Finnish forensic investigators were not allowed to conduct autopsies until 21 January.

The Račak incident provided a focusing event that “defined the issue” for policy makers and “was a turning point” for Canada’s Kosovo policy. Through powerful images, the incident added an agonizing sense of immediacy to ubiquitous problem indicators and feedback. Milošević’s recalcitrant response to the KVM and ICTY contributed to the view that the Yugoslav President would only respond to force. As we will see, the massacre also provided an impetus for thinking within the policy community.

John Kingdon’s description of variations in focusing events helps us better appreciate the influence of Račak in Canadian policy. Kingdon argues that the personal experiences of policy makers can give increased salience to an issue. For Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, whose most important reference point was their experience with Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia, Račak was reminiscent of Serbian atrocities in Srebrenica. Srebrenica was emblematic of how indecisive western policy contributed to the massacre of 8000 Bosnian Muslims. Although the scale of the Račak atrocities was much smaller than those in Srebrenica, it portended worse to come. Furthermore, the power of repeated occurrences is consistent with the findings of Kingdon, who notes that “awareness of a problem sometimes only comes with the second crisis, not the first, because the second cannot be dismissed as an isolated fluke, as the first could.” In Ottawa, Račak crystallized Kosovo as Bosnia II, and Bosnia II could not be ignored.

In February 1999 Contact Group countries convened mediation among Yugoslav and Kosovo Albanian leaders at the French chateau of Rambouillet. At Rambouillet, the Contact Group, which included Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States, aimed to establish Kosovo Albanian autonomy within Serbian jurisdiction, guaranteed by a NATO-led peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of Serbian security forces. The terms of the Rambouillet accord included: Kosovo would gain substantial autonomy, although Yugoslavia retained sovereignty until a summit was
convened three years later to negotiate a permanent settlement; Yugoslav forces in Kosovo would be withdrawn, although a police force could be retained; NATO would form the core of a multinational implementation force; and the agreement demanded the disarmament of the KLA. 76 In mid-March the Kosovo Albanian delegation accepted the terms of the Rambouillet accord, but the Yugoslav delegation rejected the provisions.

The highly-publicized Rambouillet conference, largely a response to the Račak incident, focused attention on the Kosovo crisis from mid-February to mid-March 1999. Although the Rambouillet exercise was viewed with scepticism by officials in Ottawa who favoured the UN as the most legitimate forum for mediation, Yugoslav obduracy reinforced the sense of crisis. Crisis in Kosovo, shaped by a focusing event, moved the problem onto the governmental agenda and stimulated the search for policy alternatives in Ottawa.

1.4 Problem Definition and the Kosovo Crisis

Kingdon notes that problem definition represents a critical factor in determining whether a circumstance is defined as a policy problem. The essentially perceptual and interpretive aspect of problem definition is shaped by values, comparisons, and categories. 77 The contribution of values in problem definition is described as the belief that a given issue is “appropriate for government action.” 78 In the Kosovo case, the belief that Canada should seek to mitigate violence within a faraway sovereign country that did not welcome outside interference represented an important shift in Canadian policy.

Three important value assumptions factored into Canadian problem definition. The first is the relative decline of the non-intervention norm in international policy. State sovereignty represented a longstanding and fundamental characteristic of the international state system that was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The strength of this norm, however, had been weakened in the post-Cold War world. The growing weight of international humanitarian law, the powerful and borderless reach of communications technology, and the brutal civilianization of internecine conflict diminished the credibility of non-interventionism in western capitals. The declining status of state sovereignty provided an important conceptual underpinning for Canada’s human security agenda. As Axworthy told an Edmonton audience in November 1998: “The assertion of state sovereignty
– which for so long served as a pretext to hide human rights abuses – is losing its potency and credibility.”79 As a result, by the late 1990s internal conflicts were increasingly seen as a matter of policy concern in Ottawa. Taking a broader view of the Kosovo conflict, one former Canadian official argued that the most interesting aspect of the Kosovo problem was “how we considered an intervention in the internal affairs of a country. If we had been looking at this issue in 1988 or 1989 we would have thought it was an internal Yugoslav issue. After all, Yugoslavia was a sovereign country.”

A second assumption was the belief that violence in Europe should be nipped in the bud. As mentioned above, Canada has historically followed a policy of forward defence as a means of maintaining the stability of the international system.80 Because of Canada’s classical “Atlantic vision” in world affairs, forward defence usually meant European defence. The power of this inclination is evidenced by Canada’s participation in NATO, as well as its willingness to maintain costly troop deployments in Germany throughout the Cold War and in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s. The strong sensitivity of Canadian policy makers to conflict in Europe was also based on socio-cultural factors. An interviewee nicely illustrated this impulse:

This was a scourge in our part of the world and we couldn’t allow it to happen.... There was also a sense that this was happening in our backyard. This wasn’t like Iraq, which was very far away. It was close to home. We shared many cultural norms with the Serbs.

In 1999, therefore, the traditionally Eurocentric approach of Canadian policy makers meant that remediation efforts were viewed as essential. In contrast, operations in other parts of the world, while desirable, were seen as optional.

The third value assumption was based on Canada’s longstanding commitment to peace operations. Prime Minister Chrétien reflexively articulated this point on 30 January 1999 while responding to questions about Canada’s willingness to participate in a Kosovo peacekeeping mission that might follow a diplomatic settlement: “when it comes to maintaining the peace, to saving lives, Canada is never far.”81 Although the answer did not deal with the type of robust intervention that was to come in March 1999, it did imply that civil strife in a faraway country was a problem that was appropriate for action by the Canadian government.

A second dimension of problem definition is the influence of categorization in structuring perceptions of an issue.82 Much of the “struggle” to define a problem, Kingdon contends, centres on categories, because: “people
will see a problem quite differently if it is put in one category rather than another.83 A review of Canadian political and media opinion demonstrates that the Kosovo conflict was usually associated with the category of violence seen in Rwanda and Bosnia. In describing Canada’s contribution to the NATO mission, one former senior official argued that Canadian pilots were “looked upon as peacekeepers [by Canadians].” This categorization was not, however, inevitable. Although ethnic violence in Kosovo was reprehensible, in January 1999 the scale of the atrocities was not yet close to that seen in Bosnia or Rwanda. Furthermore, the air campaign contemplated in January 1999 was far from a traditional peacekeeping operation and involved a forceful imposition of western will on a sovereign country. The importance of Kosovo’s categorization can be seen in contrast to the prevalent public view that the 2003 U.S.-led mission in Iraq was an unsavoury example of American power abuses.84

1.5 Budgets and the Kosovo Crisis

In the Kosovo case, budgets were not a significant factor in problem recognition and resilience. In fact, as military officials set out options for Canada’s military participation in allied operations, the preoccupation of the Canadian political leadership was the extent to which the various contribution levels would “make a difference” in Kosovo. This was not an unimportant fact considering the cost of deploying the CF-18s, the personnel assigned to those planes, and the planned use of costly precision-guided munitions (PGMs).85 Before the commencement of the air campaign, the CF had incurred $Cdn20.5 million in maintenance and operational costs since six CF-18s had been sent to Aviano, Italy in June 1998.86 This cost would escalate quickly when Canadian planes began dropping bombs that, in some cases, cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per unit. Considering these costs, the Kosovo case may qualify as an instance where the budget was of secondary importance to decision makers.

1.6 Conclusion

The Kosovo problem ascended to the top of Canada’s foreign policy agenda in March 1999 because of a focusing event, the massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians by security forces in the Kosovo village of Račak, and because of a sense of international crisis stimulated by the failure of the Rambouillet
talks. These events reinforced problem indicators and feedback mechanisms and concentrated the minds of Canadian policy makers. Problem definition was underpinned by important categorizations and value-based assumptions about Canada’s international policies. The “special problem” of budgets was a secondary factor in Canadian problem recognition.

By early 1999 the Kosovo problem demanded the attention of policy makers and presented an urgent challenge to the credibility of Canada’s human security agenda. In seeking to address the Kosovo problem, Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy and senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) considered a menu of policy alternatives that emerged from the foreign policy community. This chapter will employ John Kingdon’s multiple streams model to illustrate the process of policy alternative specification. First, it will provide background on Kingdon’s concept of the policy stream. Second, the chapter will describe the Canadian foreign policy community and its influence on policy configurations and alternatives. The chapter will conclude with a description of the criteria that enabled the survival of policy alternatives and the nature of the emerging consensus in the policy stream in early 1999.

2.1 The Policy Stream in the Multiple Streams Model

The policy stream of John Kingdon’s multiple streams model sets out the process whereby policy alternatives are specified. Public policy alternatives float about in a “primeval soup,” and are discussed extensively within policy communities. These communities, defined as the informal collection of specialists associated with the study of a given discipline, often include academics, politicians, civil servants, and analysts from non-governmental organizations. In addition to sharing a proficiency and interest in a
subject, those within the community usually have frequent personal and professional interactions. Members are familiar with each other’s research, expertise, and ideas.

Some members of the policy community become associated with, and advocate, a particular policy option. These “policy entrepreneurs” can come from any segment of the policy community and are defined by their willingness to invest their time, energy, and reputation on the advancement of their favourite policy. Policy entrepreneurs “soften up” the specialist community and the broader public by raising awareness about the content of their proposals. Common means of achieving this include making speeches, holding hearings, floating legislative trial balloons, discussing their ideas in social settings, and writing articles. This process enables a better reception for the policy alternative at a propitious moment.

Kingdon contends that the emergence of policy alternatives involves the evolution of proposals within the policy primeval soup. Ideas confront each other within policy communities and are refined through the recombination and repackaging of familiar elements into new proposals. Similar to a process of natural selection, recombination allows some ideas to develop attributes that enable them to survive. Conversely, proposals that fail to evolve are prone to fade. As a result, the origin of a policy idea is less relevant than the evolutionary progression itself. An important implication of the recombination and softening-up processes is that policy alternatives are never wholly new.

The policy alternatives that survive in the primeval soup usually share several characteristics. Within the policy community, technical feasibility and normative acceptability are the most important criteria for survival. The technical feasibility of a proposition is assessed by the policy community so as to ensure that it will actually accomplish what its proponents claim that it will. Proposals that are seen as impractical either do not survive or are substantially reworked. The normative (?) acceptability of an idea is frequently considered based on its efficiency, its ideological suitability, and its perceived fairness. Advocates of a proposal also evaluate an idea based on external factors, such as expected budget constraints, the likelihood of public acquiescence, and anticipated political support. The budget constraint ensures that a proposal can be implemented at an acceptable cost. If the policy is seen to offer insufficient bang for the public buck, it rarely survives. Prospects for public acquiescence influence the specification of alternatives by delimiting the range of options to those that are unlikely to generate intractable public opposition. Anticipated political support for a
proposal can affect the process by facilitating or hindering the acceptance of an idea based on its anticipated political allure.96

The processes described above produce a short list of well-known policy alternatives that are ready for consideration by policy makers. Although organized interests influence the agenda-setting process, the dominant force in the ascent of a given policy alternative is the content of the idea itself.97 Policy actors debate ideas, evaluate the available evidence, solve intellectual puzzles, and, ultimately, judge a proposal largely based on its merits. From the short list of policy alternatives, a “widespread feeling” emerges in and around government through a process of diffusion that produces “a growing realization” that a particular set of alternatives should be considered.98 Kingdon compares the diffusion process within the policy community to a bandwagon effect or tipping point.99

2.2 The Canadian Foreign Policy Community and the Specification of Alternatives

The policy community is defined by John Kingdon as the collection of specialists that are concerned with a particular policy area. These experts exist inside and outside of government and are usually well-acquainted with each other’s ideas. Because the Kosovo issue was seen as a critical one in Canadian foreign policy, it was highly salient to a wide segment of the policy community, rather than a narrower slice of it. Events in Kosovo, for example, were a subject of interest for those following the human security agenda, humanitarian assistance, international development, and defence policy.100 Many observers would use Canada’s response to violence to gauge the influence and relevance of Canada’s role in the world.

A compelling element of foreign affairs departmental practice under Axworthy, especially from the perspective of Kingdon’s model, was its regular interaction with the Canadian policy community. Axworthy, often described as a populist, eagerly elicited opinion through speeches and consultations. The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, an active in-house DFAIT think-tank, conducted research and coordinated conferences aimed at enriching Canadian policy thinking. A former cabinet minister recalled: “We often used the centre as a mechanism to develop our thinking ... It was a real agency for developing ideas.” Axworthy also convened an Advisory Board, composed of Canadian civil society leaders, as a tool for testing opinion and generating feedback on DFAIT’s initiatives.
The advisory board, chaired by University of Toronto professor Janice Stein, included Canadian Broadcasting Corporation journalist Ann Medina, Project Ploughshares’ Executive Director Ernie Regehr, and Dr. Nola Kate Seymour of the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Axworthy attended these meetings and participated in their deliberations. As we shall see, avenues for interaction with the policy community influenced the alternative specification process.

The policy community produced three primary policy options for stemming the violence in Kosovo. This section will outline these options and explain their influence on the Canadian policy agenda. The first option was for the Canadian government to advocate a negotiated partition of Kosovo between its Serbian and Albanian inhabitants, mediated by the international community. The partition would involve carving off southern Kosovo and turning it into an international protectorate. A partition would likely lead to Kosovo’s eventual independence. Serbia would retain the northern portion of Kosovo, which contained the highest concentration of Kosovo Serbs as well as many Serbian orthodox churches and historic sites. The majority of Kosovo’s mines were also located in the province’s northern region. Partition proponents argued that this half-loaf solution might placate both sides and prevent further instability. It was, as one observer put it, a fittingly “Balkan solution.”

Partition by the international community along ethnic, linguistic, or national lines has had a long history in global statecraft, most notably as a principal means of organizing the post-World War One state system at the 1919 Paris peace conference. Although the partition approach was rejected in the terms of the 1995 Dayton accords, which settled the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it continued to exist within the policy primeval soup. By 1999 the precarious and restless peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the escalating tensions in Kosovo seemed to add credence to the argument that the region was home to “ancient hatreds” that could not be dampened. Since these hatreds could not be extinguished by the international community, proponents argued, creating nation states through partition represented a practical means of mitigating conflict and preventing bloodshed.

In the years following the Dayton accords, the partition option continued to be discussed in Canadian policy forums as a means of conflict management, particularly vis-à-vis the still restive former Yugoslavia. The most notable proponents of partition in the Canadian policy community were Simon Fraser University international relations professor Lenard J. Cohen, and retired Canadian general Lewis MacKenzie. Cohen, one of Canada’s
leading Balkan experts, had been a principal advocate of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between its Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim inhabitants. Cohen softened-up Canadian specialist opinion through his writings and through his testimony to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. In November 1998, Cohen argued to the Canadian parliamentary defence committee that Canada:

may have to revisit the question of partition. We may even have to assist in nurturing what I call a civilized and peaceful partition and be realistic about what will happen in Bosnia … These will be national states. They will be not totally homogeneous but predominantly homogeneous, with probably very little tolerance for their small minorities … I don’t expect, however, a viable, integral, united Bosnian state to emanate from all the work we have done ...

Cohen later applied his partition logic to the Kosovo case, suggesting that NATO should negotiate a reconfiguration of the province’s borders.

Cohen fleshed out this logic in a Toronto Star article, arguing that a reconfiguration of Kosovo’s borders should form an ethnic Albanian state comprising the southern two-thirds of the province’s 1999 boundaries. This was, according to Cohen, the “more sophisticated answer” to Balkan violence because the Serbs would be pacified and because a peaceful resettlement of displaced people could be enabled. Retired Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, the first UN forces commander in Sarajevo in 1992, echoed Cohen’s argument:

[I]t is my contention this Serbian obsession does not necessarily apply to all of Kosovo and therefore the potential for a successful partition of the province between the ethnic Albanians and the Serbs is quite high. The number of Serbs living in Kosovo is much fewer than the 200,000 so often quoted and a good number of those who do live there are refugees from the 1995 Croatian offensive in the Krajina, which cleansed hundreds of thousands of Serbs and sent them on their way to Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo. They would like nothing better than to leave Kosovo and move to the relative stability of Serbia … Let’s face it, the Serbs and ethnic Albanians will not live together happily ever after, no matter what happens in the next few weeks. Everyone could do a lot worse than partition, with a modest international force patrolling the new border between the two communities until tensions ease.

MacKenzie’s argument was further outlined in a set of articles in the Ottawa Citizen, the Windsor Star, and the Edmonton Journal.

A second policy alternative was for Canada to push for greater United Nations engagement in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict. As described above, the UN Security Council had been actively involved in the matter
through a series of resolutions in 1998 and 1999. A UN peace enforcement mission was only one possibility. UN sanction of a NATO operation would provide unparalleled legitimacy and a clear legal basis for action. Proponents of an enhanced UN role argued that Canadian diplomats should redouble their efforts to secure UN endorsement of any intervention for two main reasons. First, a military action against a sovereign country without UN sanction could be interpreted as an illegal act of international aggression. Given the longstanding and deep-seated Canadian commitment to international law, recently exemplified in Canadian support of the creation of the International Criminal Court, this charge was important. Strong support of international legal institutions was a central theme of the human security agenda and of Canada’s promotion of a rules-based international order. Permitting a well-publicized exception to the UN’s monopoly on the legal use of force against a sovereign country could have a deleterious effect on global stability.

Advocates of a UN mandate also argued that an intervention would destabilize international political systems. Circumventing the UN would undermine the authority of the world organization and diminish its credibility in conflict management. Since the UN represented a crucial forum for the exercise of Canadian diplomatic influence and a vital counterpoise in bilateral relations with the United States in global security matters, this possibility was not taken lightly in Ottawa. Furthermore, skirting the UN could poison diplomatic relations with Russia and China, antagonizing two important world powers. Cooperative relations with these veto-wielding countries were integral to an effective United Nations Security Council and to a peaceful world order.

The chief means of attaining UN assent were through negotiating a Security Council mandate or through pursuing a rare “Uniting for Peace” resolution. The former course would require disarming Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese opposition to a tough Security Council resolution. The Uniting for Peace provision, created in November 1950, provided a mechanism for action by the UN General Assembly in instances of Security Council deadlock. The resolution could be invoked either through a procedural vote on the Security Council or a request to the Secretary General by the majority of UN member countries. In the case of a successful motion, a special session of the General Assembly would be convened to address the matter.

Support for United Nations predominance in international conflict management had a broad base in this period, particularly in the Canadian
bureaucracy and within the membership of the UN Association of Canada (UNAC). In 1995, UNAC coordinated a series of studies into mechanisms through which the UN could become more effectively and actively engaged in the promotion of global human rights. Retired diplomat and chair of the Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations Geoffrey Pearson led a working group to examine the active UN role in conflict management envisioned in former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s June 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. The Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations also convened a conference in December 1995 to consider means of UN engagement in incidents of conflict. The committee reports and the December conference aimed to reinvigorate Canadian confidence in a world body that faced a crisis of credibility in the wake of its inadequate responses to strife in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans. UNAC’s ambitious efforts aimed to develop thinking and soften up opinion within the Canadian policy community for renewed UN predominance in international crisis management.

The objective of UN engagement also had great resonance among Canadian officials. In particular, Canada’s UN ambassador, Robert Fowler, emphasized the damage that an unauthorized intervention would have on international legal institutions. This viewpoint was mirrored by many in DFAIT’s United Nations section. Canadian enthusiasm for working through the UN was bolstered by the fact that Canada assumed a seat on the Security Council in January 1999. Senator Douglas Roche, University of Toronto professor Michael Bliss, *Globe and Mail* journalist Marcus Gee, and Geoffrey Pearson were some of the most outspoken Canadian proponents of reengaging the UN in the Kosovo issue.

A third alternative to emerge from the foreign policy community was for Canada to push for a humanitarian intervention. Advocates of humanitarian intervention policy argued that outside powers have the right and, according to some, the responsibility to intervene as a means of protecting civilians from widespread victimization. In some cases, this included non-consensual interference in the domestic affairs of a state that did not have the will or the capacity to protect its population. Although its conceptual roots date back to colonial times, humanitarian intervention policy gained increased currency in international affairs following the desultory and befuddled western response to the decade’s terrible atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the wake of these events, activists and scholars such as French humanitarian Bernard Kouchner, scholar Mario Bettati, and the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata studied and illuminated this approach.
Because of its public pronouncements and military stance on the Kosovo issue as well as its role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO was seen as the principal avenue for a potential humanitarian intervention. NATO military officials had produced detailed military plans for an intervention in Kosovo under different levels of Yugoslav military resistance. Canadian representatives in Brussels had strongly supported NATO’s efforts to coerce Yugoslavia and had sought to reassure jittery allies about the need to maintain a forceful posture on the Kosovo question. The development of NATO plans did not, however, necessarily bar the UN route because many in and around the Canadian government hoped that an intervention would receive UN endorsement.

Within Canada, awareness of humanitarian intervention policy had grown, partially because of the advocacy work conducted by CARE Canada. In 1992 CARE petitioned the Canadian government, the UN secretariat, and the U.S. State Department to intervene militarily to enable the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid to imperiled civilians in Somalia. CARE also pushed the same bodies for an intervention in Rwanda in 1994. In December 1995, CARE Canada’s Deputy Director Nancy Gordon co-authored a paper that aimed to further develop and soften up thinking on the concept of humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{117}

After backing the UN intervention in Somalia, the Canadian government was reluctant to intervene in humanitarian crises. Canada thwarted U.S. efforts to use air power in the service of humanitarian objectives in Bosnia through 1993 and 1994.\textsuperscript{118} In the summer of 1994, Canadian decision makers were unwilling to directly support a U.S.-led intervention to expel the Haitian dictator General Raul Cédras.\textsuperscript{119} It was not until 1996 that humanitarian intervention policy began to enjoy support within the Canadian government and bureaucracy. When violence and disease threatened Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canadian General Maurice Baril, and DFAIT’s Assistant Deputy Minister Global and Security Party Paul Heinbecker supported an intervention.\textsuperscript{120} The anticipated intervention in Kosovo, however, would be of a much more forceful character than was envisioned in Zaire.

Paul Heinbecker became a particularly strong advocate of humanitarian intervention within his department and the Canadian policy community. As Balkan tensions worsened, Heinbecker identified Kosovo as a test case for human security and frequently discussed its implications with Axworthy over a late night scotch. It was Heinbecker, moreover, who sparked an “intellectually stimulating” discourse among Axworthy, lead officials in the ministerial office, and DFAIT’s global and security policy bureau. The
minister became well-versed in the scholarship on just-war theory as well as the writings of notable Sudanese scholar/statesman Francis Deng and City University of New York professor Thomas G. Weiss.

Beyond advancing thinking within DFAIT, Heinbecker softened up the broader foreign policy community through speeches and articles. At a 17 October 1998 Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) conference in Ottawa, Heinbecker identified human security and national security as “opposite sides of the same coin.” The Assistant Deputy Minister continued: “Clearly, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, diplomacy is most effective when backed up by military capability.” This speech went farther than the address given by Axworthy to the same conference the previous day, which welcomed NATO’s role in the Balkans as proof of the strength of human security priorities. This incongruence was deliberate. Heinbecker wrote Axworthy’s speech and even wryly challenged the CIIA’s distinguished audience to compare his message with that of his boss. In a subsequent article in the January 1999 edition of Behind the Headlines, Heinbecker took his message a step further, stating: “Just as human security is a necessary complement to national security, soft power is a complement to hard or military power, not an alternative to it.”

This section has described the three principal policy alternatives that arose in the Kosovo context, as well as efforts by segments of the Canadian foreign policy community to soften up specialist and mass opinion. In the case of all three alternatives, however, the softening up process was aided by widespread awareness of these competing approaches to conflict management. As noted above, by 1999 partition had had a very long history in international affairs and represented a prominent means of stemming conflict. The objective of UN engagement in international and regional crises had been a primary means of coping with conflict since the organization’s inception in 1945. The UN had been actively involved in managing intrastate conflict through the 1990s. Similarly, humanitarian interventions had been a frequently used tool for preventing widespread victimization in zones of crisis, such as northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. In the latter case, NATO had used air strikes to help precipitate an end to conflict.

2.3 Recombination, Criteria for Survival and an Emerging Consensus

As Canadian policy makers sought to find an appropriate response to conflict in Kosovo, they found no scarcity of alternatives floating about in
the primeval soup. Although policy ideas begin in a somewhat haphazard fashion, Kingdon argues that several factors enhance greatly the likelihood that a particular proposal will survive within the primeval soup. As noted in section 2.1, qualities such as normative (?) acceptability, technical feasibility, tolerable cost, receptivity among decision makers, and anticipated public acquiescence influence the emergence of policy alternatives on a short list of ideas. According to Kingdon, the short list of ideas is composed of policy alternatives that have risen to the top of the primeval soup and are ready for policy makers to consider. The survival of some policy proposals is secured by revision and enhancement through recombination. This section will illustrate the process through which the UN and humanitarian intervention alternatives survived into early 1999 and found a place on the short list of ideas.

While the partition alternative was promoted by prominent policy entrepreneurs, it did not have widespread appeal within the Canadian policy community because many had profound reservations about its efficacy in the Kosovo case. Kingdon’s criteria for the survival of a policy alternative help explain why the proposal did not reach the short list of ideas. First, the viability of partition as a means of protecting human security in Kosovo was doubted. Some argued that the independence, immediate or long-term, implied in a partition would have two pernicious implications for regional stability. First, it could lead many Kosovar Albanians to seek union with Albania. This might impel the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia to seek further union. A “greater Albania” movement would badly upset the Balkan’s delicate ethnic balance. Second, partition might undermine the tenuous Dayton peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was predicated on inter-ethnic cooperation. The presence of Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia made the spectre of nationalist revanchism particularly ominous.

The second problem with the partition alternative was its political implications for the Canadian domestic context. Kingdon contends that the rise of a policy alternative is greatly hindered if those in and around government anticipate opposition from elected officials. Because of Canada’s own national unity concerns, Canadian governments have historically treated separatist violence with extreme caution and have sought to avoid the reconfiguration of national or sub-national boundaries. In the case of partition, Canadian political leaders, particularly Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, advocated accommodation within existing borders as the most appropriate means of stemming ethnic tensions. In addition to national unity concerns, partition did not jibe with Axworthy’s human security agenda. Partition
would likely stimulate the relocation and displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, diminishing human security in the short run. This smacked of an anachronistic form of statecraft that directly contradicted the human security agenda’s emphasis on openness and transparency.

Broad agreement did, however, emerge within the policy community that the UN and humanitarian intervention options were the most prominent and suitable. Given the non-consensual nature of a potential Kosovo intervention, it was clear that the mission would encounter intense Yugoslav military opposition. Kingdon’s criteria that favour the survival of a policy alternative illustrate the reasons why the UN option reached the short list of ideas. Backing for the United Nations was prevalent within Canadian society and support for this course of action was seen as a given. More importantly, the UN path was the most agreeable from a values perspective. Support for the world body appealed to Canadians at a democratic level. In many ways, the UN represented an international manifestation of the Canadian principles of peace, order, and good government. Furthermore, although Russian intransigence on the Security Council provided an obstacle to the UN route’s technical feasibility, in early 1999 many in the policy community still hoped that Russia could be persuaded to support a tough resolution.128

The humanitarian intervention alternative that emerged on the short list of ideas was the product of a recombination with elements of Canadian military doctrine. Although support for the use of air power in Ottawa was slow to develop, the case for air power received a boost in November 1995 when the NATO air campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Deliberate Force, ostensibly compelled Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević to the bargaining table and ended the three-and-a-half year war.129 By the late 1990s “everyone [in the Canadian Forces (CF)] knew the skill and effectiveness of air power. It was just a common understanding at the time.” In 1997, after sustained advocacy from the CF’s most ardent air power proponent, Lieutenant-General Al De Quetteville, the CF invested in a precision-guided munitions capacity. This was a shrewd investment because, by the late 1990s, a precision-guided capability had come to be regarded as “an absolute requirement” for humanitarian interventions. One senior military official stated:

Precision ordinance also meant that we were able to limit collateral damage. There was a strong message from the Government of Canada that if its CF-18s were going to participate in support of humanitarian interventions, collateral damage needed to be kept to an absolute minimum. This type of thinking had developed considerably since the Gulf Crisis, where we dropped gravity bombs and even fired some rockets.
Modern air power seemed surgical, restrained, and, at some level, dispassionate. Furthermore, the perceived utility of air power as a means of humanitarian protection enhanced confidence in the technical feasibility of a potential intervention.

The normative acceptability of a humanitarian intervention was augmented by the limited nature of NATO’s proposed operation. As noted in the introductory chapter, the alliance had developed plans for a phased air campaign, which incrementally intensified the military pressure on the Yugoslav regime. Any change in phases required approval from the North Atlantic Council. Many observers, however, doubted that an escalation would be necessary and predicted a short campaign. Furthermore, NATO’s plans aimed to exclusively drop precision-guided munitions. The accuracy of these munitions reassured those who feared civilian casualties and would allow pilots to maintain a medium altitude “floor” of 15,000 feet. This greatly reduced the risk of allied casualties and eased any decision to intervene. High-tech warfare seemed to guarantee that casualties would be almost completely limited to ethnic cleansers. This prospect greatly enhanced the normative acceptability of an intervention within the expert policy community.

By surviving the process of softening up and satisfying the criteria that specialists use to evaluate policy proposals, two major policy alternatives reached the short list of ideas in the Kosovo context. Through a process of diffusion, widespread agreement grew within the Canadian policy community by early 1999 that the UN and humanitarian intervention proposals represented the best policy options for addressing the bloodshed in Kosovo. As noted in section 2.3, in early 1999 these two paths were not entirely inconsistent because many in the Canadian policy community hoped that diplomatic efforts might still be used to secure UN assent of a NATO-led humanitarian intervention. In January and February 1999, the difference was primarily one of emphasis. Those that pushed an intervention emphasized the urgency of the problem over the need for UN accord. Advocates of the UN path argued that securing a UN role in Kosovo conflict management should be the priority.

2.4 Conclusion

The policy stream had an important impact on Canada’s response to ethnic conflict in Kosovo. Through a process of diffusion, consensus was
reached within the policy community around a short list of two prominent policy alternatives. These alternatives churned their way to the top of the policy primeval soup after exacting processes of alternative specification, softening up, and recombination. In both cases, the policy alternatives met the criteria that specialists use to evaluate the viability, acceptability, and prospects from adoption. These processes illustrate the sinuous nature of a policy proposal’s path to prominence and the fact Canada’s policy response to the Kosovo crisis was far from inevitable.
3. The Politics Stream

By March 1999 the Kosovo problem had captured the attention of the Canadian government. The turmoil in Serbia’s southern province stimulated a search for policy alternatives aimed at managing the conflict. Flowing autonomously from events in the problem and policy streams were a series of developments in the politics stream. As this section will demonstrate, the Canadian political context influenced policy by fostering an environment conducive to the rise of the Kosovo issue on the government and decision agendas. This chapter will first describe the politics stream in John Kingdon’s multiple-streams model. It will illustrate the major currents within the Canadian “national mood,” analyze the power of organized political forces, and consider the impact of internal governmental and bureaucratic politics.

3.1 The Politics Stream within the Multiple Streams Model

The politics stream promotes or inhibits the rise of agenda items or policy alternatives. Policy actors survey the political landscape to judge whether the environment favours the rise of an agenda item or policy initiative. The politics stream introduces an element of political pragmatism into the agenda setting process through three main phenomena: the national mood, consensus and conflict among organized political forces, and internal government politics. The first two are especially important to the structuring of the governmental agenda, while the last often influences the prominence of a policy alternative on the structured agenda.

The “national mood” is defined by Kingdon as the notion that “a rather large number of people out in the country are thinking along certain
common lines, that this national mood changes from one time to another in discernable ways, and that these changes in mood and climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes."\(^{133}\) Many politicians and officials believe that they possess highly refined antennae for sensing the national mood. Some means of ascertaining this mood are through reviewing news editorials and media coverage, reflecting on personal interactions at public and party gatherings, reading mail, holding consultations, assessing the persuasive power of interest groups, or meeting with constituents. Although conclusions about the national mood are "hardly concrete or specific," officials that "have their ear to the ground" argue that their observations about the political climate are palpable and highly relevant.\(^{134}\) These perceptions constitute an essential force in either the advancement or obstruction of an agenda item through the potential for political repercussions.\(^{135}\) The national mood usually influences the status of subjects on the government’s agenda, rather than the selection of particular policy alternatives.\(^{136}\)

A second element of Kingdon’s politics stream is the sway of organized political forces. This category of actors includes non-governmental organizations, political parties in opposition, think tanks, and business interests.\(^{137}\) To gain insight into the balance of support or opposition for a particular policy measure, people in and around government judge the intensity of opinion, often from the frequency and vigour of communications. In addition to the intensity of expression, officials evaluate the relative advocacy power of actors based on political resources, group cohesion, electoral mobilization, and economic clout.\(^{138}\) Issues that lack a natural support constituency are frequently overlooked.

The third component of the politics stream, occurring inside government, includes the role of bureaucratic or electoral turnover and of jurisdiction in the advancement of policy agendas and alternatives. A change in government or in political leadership can cause the government’s agenda and policy priorities to shift dramatically. A turnover of key personnel often enables or hinders the progression of a subject because new officials regularly bring fresh priorities or emphases to the job.\(^{139}\) Issues of jurisdiction can have a range of effects on the policy process. “Turf battles” among government agencies can slow or forestall the progression of initiatives by creating insurmountable institutional barriers. Conversely, in some circumstances, questions of jurisdiction can generate rivalries that accelerate consideration and action.\(^{140}\) The most important factor in determining the character of the jurisdictional influence is the perceived popularity of the issue.\(^{141}\)
Unlike the policy stream, where accord is established through persuasion, consensus in the politics stream is obtained primarily through a process of bargaining. Coalitions are established through offering concessions and benefits to those that join. As momentum is generated in support of a policy, key actors jump on the bandwagon to avoid exclusion from the benefits of participation. This process generates a feeling that “compromise is in the air” and contributes to a willingness of political stakeholders to end posturing and reach compromise.

3.2 The Canadian National Mood

In 1998-1999, observers of the national mood concluded that there was a widespread public willingness to support an assertive Canadian role in global affairs and in peace operations. This outlook was reinforced by strong national unity and by a consensus among the major political parties. Using Kingdon’s discussion of the national mood, this section will survey several of the methods that the Canadian government used to judge the political climate regarding the Kosovo issue, including: personal interactions, polling data, media opinion, and parliamentary attitudes.

In Jean Chrétien and Lloyd Axworthy, Canada had a prime minister and foreign minister highly sensitive to the Canadian political landscape. Chrétien, a populist Shawinigan lawyer personally inclined to eschew the establishment world of diplomacy, prided himself in his ability to identify with Canadians as a “values-based pragmatist” in foreign policy. The prime minister regularly polled his cabinet colleagues and friends across the country to test their opinions on policy issues. A former member of the Prime Minister’s Office remembered:

Prime Minister Chrétien is someone very good at judging the national mood. He would speak to the caucus quite a bit. He found the views of some [Members of Parliament] particularly helpful with issues like [Kosovo]. He had some very senior cabinet ministers. The cabinet members were not a bad focus group. He would also call a few people ... he never told us who ... across the country to get their opinions.

Axworthy, who often proudly described himself as a “constituency politician,” regularly discussed foreign relations topics with his Winnipeg South constituents: “every weekend [Axworthy] would return to [his] constituents and talk to them at local events and on the street.” Like Chrétien, Axworthy engaged his colleagues, particularly members of parliament Allan Rock
and Bill Graham, in his deliberations about the political ramifications of Canada's international policies. Graham was able to give Axworthy valuable insights into specialist and parliamentary opinion because of his role as the respected chair of the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The foreign minister also used the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and his ministerial Advisory Board to access the opinions of Canadian civil society. These democratic impulses underpinned the Canadian human security agenda’s emphasis on the democratization of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{145}

Kingdon argues that another means of gaining insight into the national mood is through polling data. Although no Canadian polls surveyed opinion on the Kosovo issue until after the intervention commenced,\textsuperscript{146} polls in the late 1990s indicated public enthusiasm for a vigorous Canadian role in international affairs. An April 1998 Compas poll found that Canadians overwhelmingly supported an activist foreign policy, which included the promotion of international peace, stability, law, and human rights. The poll also demonstrated wide support for Canadian participation in peace operations and a public willingness to increase defence spending to better equip Canadian Forces personnel in their missions.\textsuperscript{147} These signs of unfettered public backing for peace operations were especially powerful given the decade’s dangerous and frustrating peacekeeping experiences in Rwanda, Somalia, and the Balkans. Indicators convinced many officials that public support for an effective Canadian role in peace missions was strong, resilient, and tolerant of more muscular approaches.

Polling also indicated that Canadians increasingly accepted the need to use military means to protect human rights and promote humanitarian objectives.\textsuperscript{148} The prevalence of this view was fuelled by the shock and exasperation that many Canadians felt upon hearing of the brave, yet impotent, peacekeeping missions of Canadian Generals Roméo Dallaire and Lewis MacKenzie in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively. The decisive use of vigorous force by NATO in Bosnia in autumn 1995 seemed to provide a concrete and successful alternative to traditional peacekeeping. Moreover, public affinity for NATO, a military alliance with an emerging role in these types of robust peace enforcement missions, was strong. In 1998 over two-thirds of respondents believed that NATO was the only alliance able to effectively confront an aggressor country.\textsuperscript{149} A 1997 Goldfarb poll indicated that 70 percent of those surveyed thought that Canada should place a high priority on its role in NATO.\textsuperscript{150}
Another means that decision makers use to glean the national mood is an assessment of media opinion and coverage. A reading of editorial opinion and media coverage of the time also suggested a desire for Canada to be actively engaged in the maintenance of global peace and security. A June 1998 Toronto Star editorial, for example, effusively described Canada’s activist foreign policy as an example of Canada “showing [its] colours in a troubled world.”¹⁵¹ The media response to Canada’s non-participation in the June 1998 NATO show of force was one of near universal regret.¹⁵² In October 1998 when NATO issued its activation order to reach a state of military preparedness, press coverage was supportive. Furthermore, as the NATO air campaign became imminent in March 1999, three major Canadian dailies, the Globe and Mail, the National Post, and La Presse, supported Canadian participation in a humanitarian intervention. Even Montréal’s Le Devoir, the only major Canadian daily to oppose the NATO-led bombing, advocated a firm stance against Milošević.¹⁵³

The Canadian population’s growing acceptance of the need for forceful humanitarian means was echoed in media and expert scrutiny of the time, which increasingly called for greater emphasis on military power. Journalist Mike Trickey of the Ottawa Citizen was critical of Axworthy’s advocacy of soft power. In a sardonic July 1998 article, he summed up academic and foreign estimations of Axworthy’s foreign policy as “irrelevant, out-of-step and dilettantish.” Trickey contended that cuts to military spending and a penchant for “wishy-washy” headline-friendly issues had diminished greatly Canada’s international influence and reputation.¹⁵⁴ This call for a more muscular policy was amplified in an Ottawa Citizen editorial on Canada’s response to violence in Kosovo:

Probably no one but our federal government thinks Canada is an important player in the nasty crisis that has pitted Serbia against the recalcitrant province of Kosovo. Yet there was Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on Tuesday, explaining, though not in so many words, that the Balkan debacle is a good test case for his theories on “soft power” and “human security.” If so, we pray the test ends well. But we fear that it won’t.¹⁵⁵

Although the Ottawa Citizen was the most strident and conspicuous in its criticisms, these views were consistent with those expressed in other papers. For example, journalist Paul Koring of the influential Globe and Mail drew attention in early 1999 to the government’s lack of military readiness to play a significant part in Kosovo conflict management.¹⁵⁶ Prominent academics such as McMaster University’s Kim Richard Nossal and Fen Osler Hampson
of Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs shared this view, disparaging the government for its neglect of the military. These criticisms spurred many in the government, the bureaucracy, and the military to demonstrate the Canadian Forces’ continuing viability as a fighting force. In early 1999 this view was becoming increasingly prevalent within the political discourse and made an imprint on evaluations of the Canadian national mood.

There was also a consensus within the Canadian political party system about the need to act on the Kosovo problem. At the Canadian parliamentary debate on the Kosovo problem, which occurred on 12 October 1998, all of the political parties represented in the Canadian House of Commons supported an assertive Canadian role in Kosovo. Bob Mills, the Reform Party’s foreign affairs critic, emphasized the importance of maintaining regional stability, a leadership role for Canada within world affairs, and parliamentary engagement on the issue. The Bloc Québécois censured the government for not acting sooner to stem violence and, in an uncharacteristically hawkish statement, argued that the government “must go beyond [humanitarian efforts] to contemplate armed retaliation, military action, until peace is restored.” The support of Quebec’s sovereignist party confirmed government impressions of the province’s favourable attitude toward Canada’s prospective involvement in the issue. Stressing his party’s regret that the United Nations route was blocked, Svend Robinson of the normally dovish New Democratic Party argued that Canada should play a lead role in safeguarding human rights in Kosovo. The Progressive Conservatives’ David Price underlined the importance of a NATO part in Kosovo, arguing that “Canada must play a role of responsibility. It must understand that NATO is the one structure that can make a difference and it must take action with our allies.” Parliamentary consensus illustrated the salience of the issue across numerous Canadian political, linguistic, and regional spectrums and contributed to the government’s appreciation of the national mood.

Opinion in Quebec has always had a crucial influence on the posture of Canada’s foreign relations. In sensing the mood in Quebec, the government concluded that there was support for Canadian involvement in the Kosovo question. As noted above, major Quebec papers, Le Devoir and La Presse, abhorred Yugoslav ethnic cleansing and supported a firm response. The support of the Bloc Québécois, a party usually in tune with the province’s sentiments, for Canadian involvement in Kosovo was a further indicator
of mainstream public support. Opinion polls reinforced this view, showing that most Quebeckers supported an activist Canadian foreign policy that promoted international peace and human rights. For a country that had just emerged from a harrowing Quebec referendum, hostility from the country’s French Canadian population could well have constrained Canadian involvement in Kosovo. The support among Quebeckers represents a vital, and often overlooked, ingredient in the issue’s prominent position on the government’s agenda.

Other means of reading the country’s political climate, such as letters to Members of Parliament and the representations of organized political interests, were less influential. One interviewee emphatically noted: “it is really surprising how few people send letters on an issue like [Kosovo]. We’ll get thousands and thousands of letters in opposition to the seal hunt. But, for issues like this, letters did not make much of a difference.” Another official remembered that, although the letters coming into DFAIT were scrupulously read and replied to, they had minimal influence on Canadian policy. Outside of the Serbian-Canadian community, Canadian interest groups were not well-organized on the Kosovo issue and, therefore, failed to significantly shape government estimations of the Canadian national mood. More detail on the nature of interest group activities will be found in section 3.3.

When Chrétien and Axworthy judged the national mood in spring 1999 by meeting with constituents, discussing policy with insightful friends and colleagues, keeping abreast of opinion polls, assessing media opinion, and observing partisan attitudes, they concluded that Canadians expected their government to play a part in preserving stability and peace in the Balkans. In addition, there was a growing public acceptance of, and a media appetite for, the need to use military power in the pursuit of humanitarian ends. This sense is summarized nicely by DFAIT’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy Paul Heinbecker:

The Kosovo crisis clearly demonstrated that Canadians will support intervention, indeed will demand it, when they believe the cause is just ... The steady screening of refugees [in television media] in all their misery and despair, in scenes that evoked the Holocaust, persuaded Canadians of the rightness of intervening.\textsuperscript{162}

Therefore, impressions of the national mood had an influence on the process of policy alternative specification.
3.3 Organized Political Forces

John Kingdon argues that, while setting the policy agenda, decision makers form an opinion about the balance of persuasive power among organized political forces. People in and around government usually judge the influence of organized interests based on the intensity of their advocacy and the resources that they are able to devote to their activities. Assessing the balance of power among organized political forces is, like the national mood, an interpretive exercise that is influential in the politics stream.163

In the Kosovo context, the most notable advocacy campaign was conducted by the Serbian-Canadian community in vociferous opposition to Canadian and NATO interference in Yugoslavia’s domestic affairs. In October 1998 hundreds of Serbian-Canadians gathered outside the United States consulate in Toronto to oppose NATO’s coercive threats.164 Protests reappeared in late February 1999 and mushroomed in size when a NATO air campaign seemed imminent.165 By mid-March 1999, protests spread from Toronto to many other Canadian cities, including Ottawa. Demonstrations in Toronto, where over a thousand protestors gathered, turned violent and caused a three-and-a-half hour closure of University Avenue.166 Members of the community also berated and threatened the physical well-being of the Canadian foreign minister on a family bike ride in Ottawa.167 Aside from protests, members of the Serbian diaspora community in Canada, which was estimated to number about 250 000, met with Members of Parliament to express their dissent towards Canadian policy.

Support among organized political forces for Canadian engagement in Kosovo was, by contrast, muted. The Albanian-Canadian diaspora community only numbered about 5000 and was not an important advocacy force.168 Although Canadian public awareness of the Kosovo issue was enhanced by humanitarian organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and Oxfam, these organizations largely restricted their activities to seeking government resources for emergency relief.169 None of these agencies encouraged the type of military response that was being contemplated in Ottawa. Furthermore, while all the major Canadian political parties supported a firm policy response to violence in Kosovo, they were not vigorous in their advocacy and did not significantly enter into government calculations about organized political forces.

Hence, as decision makers gazed upon the panorama of competing organized forces in early 1999, the strong, well-mobilized Serbian-Canadian
opposition to Canada’s engagement in Kosovo dominated the landscape. Though Serbian-Canadian actions caused tough questions to be asked within the Liberal caucus and around the cabinet table, their opposition had a small effect on Canadian policy because it was overwhelmed by other factors in the politics stream. The government’s reading of the national mood suggested that support for an assertive Canadian role in Kosovo was widespread, though tacit. In addition, as we shall see section 3.4, bureaucratic forces aimed to push Canadian policy toward active involvement. This is consistent with Kingdon’s contention that organized political forces are a less potent factor in the politics stream than other factors, such as the national mood or government politics.

3.4 Government in the Political Stream

John Kingdon argues that internal government politics can have an important effect on the policy agenda through turnover of key personnel or through questions of jurisdiction. Elections or changes in important actors frequently cause crucial shifts in policy agenda priorities as new players seek to influence the policy process. Questions of jurisdiction can accelerate or stifle the progress of a policy agenda item or alternative. When “turf wars” erupt between government departments or between bureaucratic subsections, Kingdon argues, the progress of an issue is often slowed or retarded. Conversely, when an issue is seen as popular, competition between departments can promote rather than inhibit agenda status. This section will examine the role of internal government politics on the government agenda and on policy alternatives.

Turnover was a relatively minor factor in the Canadian policy process. The only relevant personnel change in this period was Robert McRae’s autumn 1998 appointment to Brussels as Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council. Prior to this appointment, McRae served as DFAIT’s Director of Policy Planning Staff and was a major architect of Canada’s human security agenda. In this role McRae developed a close relationship with Axworthy. Therefore, as the Atlantic alliance was becoming an increasingly important forum for the promotion of human security, McRae was well placed to contribute to the process. McRae was instrumental in the Canadian effort on the North Atlantic Council to ensure that the air campaign was conducted in a manner consistent with the human security agenda.
Outside of McRae, the period from 1998 to 1999 was marked by unusual personnel stability among Canada’s key foreign policy actors. The Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had been in office since 1993. Although Lloyd Axworthy energetically emphasized human security issues after becoming minister of foreign affairs in January 1996, the immediate ascent of the Kosovo issue on the agenda cannot be attributed to turnover in the minister’s office. Furthermore, the two DFAIT bureaucrats most involved in the Kosovo matter, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Global and Security Policy Paul Heinbecker and the Director General for Central, East and South Europe James Wright, had been in place since 1996 and had observed the issue develop over a number of years. The minister of National Defence, Arthur Eggleton, had been appointed in 1997 and was not a significant factor in the rise of the Kosovo issue on the Canadian governmental agenda.176

Bureaucratic politics influenced the Canadian response to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in three important ways. First, the perceived popularity of, and shared departmental interests in, the Kosovo issue stimulated an appetite within Canada’s foreign and defence ministries for a robust Canadian role in crisis management. A potential military role in a NATO-led humanitarian intervention was welcomed by senior officials within the Department of National Defence, who aimed to respond to public criticism of Canada’s military preparedness. A substantial military contribution would also lend credibility to the active diplomatic role in international fora sought by DFAIT.177 These interwoven departmental objectives contributed to a political setting conducive to the Kosovo subject’s rise on the governmental agenda as well as a high receptivity to the humanitarian intervention policy alternative.

Departmental accord also contributed to policy coherence. There was, as one interviewee argued, “a great meeting of the minds on the Kosovo issue. In the Department of National Defence, the military and the civilians were of one mind. Foreign Affairs and National Defence were on the same page. The Privy Council Office agreed with Foreign Affairs and Defence. There were no bureaucratic battles on this one, which is pretty rare.” By delegating authority for decision making to Axworthy and Eggleton in consultation with the prime minister, the cabinet made possible an orderly and depoliticized decision-making process. Prime Minister Chrétien and central government agencies allowed Axworthy and Eggleton to manage their departments with minimal interference. This streamlined process facilitated efficient decision making:
During the invasion of Kuwait every move required reference to cabinet. Every action was step-by-step and gradual. It was painful and difficult. By the time Kosovo came around, though, it was incredibly easy to get decisions in Ottawa. There was no significant opposition ... I was always surprised at how easy it was.

In addition, an interdepartmental taskforce, chaired by Paul Heinbecker, was created to coordinate Canadian policy at the bureaucratic level. The taskforce, which was established as violence in Kosovo began to reach crisis proportions, served as the hub of Canadian policy. Members of the taskforce reviewed information intelligence, drafted media lines, and composed instructions for Canadian diplomatic representatives abroad. These measures contributed to a highly synchronized, coherent Canadian military and diplomatic effort.

The third influence of bureaucratic politics was to augment the standing of the humanitarian intervention policy alternative. While supporting efforts to engage the UN in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict, Heinbecker believed that the urgency of the crisis justified acting in the absence of UN endorsement. By virtue of his position as chair of the interdepartmental taskforce, Paul Heinbecker was able to affect the direction of Canadian policy. For example, after receiving a despatch from Canada’s UN Ambassador Robert Fowler that expressed reservations about Canadian support for a humanitarian intervention, Heinbecker closed the door to any further discussion with an unusually tart response to the senior Canadian diplomat. Similarly, Heinbecker moved to muzzle Canada’s Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Raphael Girard, when he did not approve of his interpretation of events in Kosovo. Heinbecker also exercised influence on ministerial statements and often delivered his message directly to the meetings of the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Both of these responsibilities fell within the mandate of his interdepartmental taskforce.

3.5 Consensus Building and the Bandwagon Effect in the Politics Stream

In John Kingdon’s politics stream, consensus is built through bargaining and negotiation. Unlike consensus building in the policy stream, which hinges on persuasion, actors in the political stream support a policy initiative primarily because of political and professional interests. Kingdon suggests that “potential coalition supporters are enticed into support by
promises of some benefit, and others climb aboard the bandwagon out of fear that they will be left without their share of the benefits.”180 This process creates a tipping effect when key actors come to believe that “compromise is in the air.”181

In the case of Canadian policy, consensus emerged in favour of a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Through his persuasive efforts within DFAIT and his work on the interdepartmental taskforce, Paul Heinbecker was instrumental in producing a consensus within the Canadian government. This policy thrust was aided by strong support within the Canadian Department of National Defence. Those who had initially opposed the intervention within DFAIT, such as Fowler or Girard, withheld further criticism once it became clear that the government was moving inexorably toward supporting an intervention. As Kingdon would say, the bandwagon was “in motion.” One former official reflected on this process: “These things develop a momentum and everyone within a department drops their opposition. You get out of the way or get run over.” Heinbecker, a former Waterloo varsity football player once drafted to play professionally, had a reputation as a particularly tough bureaucratic infighter.

3.6 Conclusion

The political stream, as described in John Kingdon’s multiple-streams model, had a significant influence on the Canadian agenda and on the context in which policy alternatives were evaluated. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, both known for their sharp political acumen, sensed that the public mood was supportive of active and assertive Canadian involvement in restoring peace and stability to the Balkans. Bureaucratic politics served to promote a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, if necessary. Although the well-organized Serbian diaspora opposed a Canadian role in managing the Kosovo conflict, internal bureaucratic politics and the government’s reading of the national mood served as powerful promoters of the Kosovo issue’s high agenda status.
This thesis has examined Canada’s response to violence in Kosovo by focusing on the nature and development of the problem, policy, and politics streams described in John Kingdon’s multiple-streams model. This chapter will summarize the role of policy windows, couplings, and entrepreneurs in Kingdon’s model. It will analyze the opening of a policy window in January 1999 that helped move the Kosovo issue onto the Canadian governmental agenda. The chapter will then examine the role of a policy entrepreneur, Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy Paul Heinbecker, in precipitating a coupling of the humanitarian intervention policy alternative, the Kosovo problem, and the necessary political backing. It will conclude with a description of the Kosovo intervention’s arrival on the Canadian decision agenda.

4.1 Policy Windows, Entrepreneurs, and Stream Couplings in the Multiple Streams Model

In Kingdon’s multiple-streams model, agenda change is facilitated by ephemeral windows of opportunity, usually opened by the arrival of pressing problems or by important changes in the political landscape. Kingdon defines policy windows as “an opportunity for advocates to push their pet solutions or to push attention to their special problems.” This opportunity is, however, fleeting and must be seized before the window closes and the occasion for policy change passes.
The coupling process varies slightly depending on the conditions that led to the opening of the policy window. In the case of a window opened by a pressing problem, a policy is plucked from the primeval soup and used as a solution to that problem. These solutions fare better if they meet the test of political acceptability.\textsuperscript{183} When a political condition, such as a change in government or national mood, opens a policy window, decision makers search for policy alternatives that best fit the political setting or climate. The chosen alternative must, however, solve a genuine public problem.\textsuperscript{184} In both instances advocates of a policy alternative have to sense the existence of an open window and be willing to seize the opportunity before it closes.

A coupling of the streams is made by policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon defined policy entrepreneurs as: “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea.” Policy entrepreneurs can come from any segment of the policy community and are defined by their willingness to invest their time, energy, and reputation on the advancement of a policy.\textsuperscript{185} Policy entrepreneurs soften up the specialist community and the broader public by raising awareness about the content of their proposals. Common means of achieving this include making speeches, holding hearings, floating legislative trial balloons, discussing their ideas in social settings, and writing articles.\textsuperscript{186} Once a policy option has been adequately softened, policy entrepreneurs wait for a propitious moment, the opening of a policy window, to play a central role in coupling the previously autonomous streams. In addition to advocacy, a policy entrepreneur acts as a broker, seeking to negotiate support among potential allies.\textsuperscript{187} For example, in the case of a problem window, entrepreneurs will not only hook their chosen policy alternative to an urgent problem, but will aim to enlist political allies in support of their solution. The opportunity for policy change presented by the opening of a window cannot be seized without a coupling of the streams. Without a policy entrepreneur, a joining of the streams may never take place.\textsuperscript{188} As a result, many worthy policy alternatives lie dormant because they lack an entrepreneur.

A final aspect of the coupling process is the importance of an available alternative. An available alternative is defined as a well-developed and adequately softened policy alternative ready to be adopted. The prospects for a problem to climb onto the governmental agenda, which includes subjects that people in and around government are paying serious attention to, are increased if a solution is attached. The probability that a problem will rise on the decision agenda, which is restricted to issues that are awaiting an authoritative decision, is dramatically increased if a solution is attached.\textsuperscript{189}
As a result, the existence of an available alternative is of great importance in the rise of a problem on the agenda.

4.2 The Opening of a Policy Window in January 1999

As violence escalated in the summer of 1998, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) closely monitored problem indicators and feedback mechanisms to gain an appreciation of the state of affairs in Kosovo. These sources revealed that there was a serious and growing crisis in the province that had the potential to precipitate a wider Balkan conflagration. On 21 January, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 300 000 Kosovars had been displaced by the Serbian internal police campaign to root out the Kosovo Liberation Army. About 120 000 Kosovars had sought refuge within the borders of Kosovo’s fragile neighbouring countries: Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro. A sense of urgency was fostered by reports that 20 000 of the displaced had been uprooted in the first three weeks of January alone. Evidence of egregious human rights violations and of a contemptuous Yugoslav disregard for the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were a particular source of frustration for Canada’s foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy.

Canadian apprehensions over events in Kosovo intensified greatly after word reached Ottawa of the shocking 15 January 1999 massacre of forty-five ethnic Albanians in the southern Kosovo village of Račak. The sense of emergency stimulated by the Račak incident represented a focusing event that was crucial to the Kosovo issue’s ascent on Canada’s foreign policy agenda and to the view that the issue was pressing. The perceived crisis in Kosovo opened a problem window in January 1999. This interpretation is reinforced by the incident’s treatment in Heinbecker’s and Axworthy’s writings, as well as in the recollections of former officials interviewed for this research program. In a fall 1999 article in the journal Canadian Foreign Policy, Heinbecker stated that “The Račak tragedy defined the issue.” Similarly, Axworthy’s memoir noted that “matters came a head” because of the Račak episode. In interviews conducted for this thesis, former officials identified the massacre as “a turning point” in Canadian policy and recalled how the event “ratcheted up ... indignation levels” in Ottawa and in other allied capitals.
4.3 The Policy Entrepreneur and a Coupling of the Streams

As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated badly there were two major policy alternatives floating about in the policy primeval soup. The first option, more prominent in Ottawa than in Washington or London, was for Canadian diplomats to push for the vigorous engagement of the UN in Kosovo conflict management. This scheme had great appeal because of Canada’s traditional interest in a strong United Nations and because of Canada’s new seat on the Security Council. A UN mandate could be obtained either through a Security Council resolution or through a Uniting for Peace motion in the UN General Assembly.

The other major policy alternative was for Canada to support a humanitarian intervention aimed at protecting Kosovo’s inhabitants from victimization. The most likely vehicle for such an intervention would be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which had issued an activation order in October 1998 and had the necessary military capacity to conduct an operation. A prospective intervention was complicated by deadlock on the United Nations Security Council. If the intervention were to proceed without UN endorsement, it could be labelled an illegal act of aggression against a sovereign country and could have a deleterious effect on international political systems.

Paul Heinbecker was instrumental in promoting the humanitarian intervention policy alternative. Through 1998 and early 1999, the Assistant Deputy Minister stimulated a discourse within DFAIT on just means of upholding human security in instances of civil conflict. The major participants in this dialogue were Heinbecker, Axworthy, DFAIT’s Director of Policy Planning Staff Robert McRae, and ministerial policy advisors Heidi Hulan and Joseph Stern. In addition, by contending that military force was a necessary means of promoting human security at an October 1998 Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) conference, Heinbecker floated a policy trial balloon that softened up the specialist community and advanced departmental thinking on the subject.

Following the well-publicized incident in Račak and the opening of a policy window, Heinbecker, with Axworthy’s firm support, seized the opportunity by drafting a series of ministerial speeches that associated the humanitarian intervention policy alternative with Canada’s human security agenda and with DFAIT’s Kosovo policy. Axworthy used the January 1999 Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development “National Forum” at the Université de Montréal to explicitly connect the idea of humanitarian
intervention with Canadian policy toward civil conflict. This message was reinforced in a pair of speeches delivered in New York on 12 February 1999. In his speech to the UN Security Council, Axworthy noted the terrible civilian toll of intrastate conflict, and argued that: “It is a state’s prerogative and obligation to ensure the protection of all of its citizens, especially in times of armed conflict. This is a public good, but one that governments do not or cannot always provide.” This early conceptualization of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine was inspired by a personal meeting between Axworthy and the UN Secretary General’s representative on internally displaced persons, Francis Deng. Later that afternoon at Columbia University, Axworthy called for:

the use of innovative partnerships with like-minded countries and civil society, and new techniques such as soft power principles. These must be balanced with a willingness to use robust action when and where necessary in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives – as in Kosovo, for example.

At a 25 February address on the Human Security agenda to the Société des Relations Internationales de Québec, Axworthy went further still:

There should be no mistake: human security can involve using strong measures, including sanctions and military force. The human security agenda confirms a Canadian tradition of firmness in the face of threats to peace and security. We have shown our resolve in confronting the challenges of weapons of mass destruction ... In Kosovo, it is the defence of humanitarian objectives – the protection of civilian lives – that brought Canada with its NATO allies to the brink of military force ... Our focus on human security should therefore not be misconstrued as softness.

This tough talk publicly associated the Canadian foreign minister with the humanitarian intervention policy alternative.

Heinbecker was also the chair of the interdepartmental taskforce that coordinated Canadian diplomacy in the lead-up to the government’s decision to support a NATO-led intervention into the south Serbian province. An interview with a member of the taskforce suggests that proceedings were dominated by the committee’s dynamic chair. Heinbecker was granted considerable freedom of manoeuvre because he enjoyed Axworthy’s complete trust and because DFAIT’s Deputy Minister, Donald Campbell, was “pretty passive” on policy issues like Kosovo. The taskforce’s primary responsibility was to review incoming information on the conflict and to draft diplomatic instructions for the Canadian missions involved in implementing Canadian policy toward the crisis. The instructions emanating
from Ottawa, including those reaching Canada’s representative to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, were supportive of a firm NATO response to Yugoslav intransigence.

Heinbecker’s efforts were helped by the fact that, by March 1999, the UN alternative no longer appeared feasible. Ambassador Fowler engaged in aggressive UN corridor diplomacy in January and February 1999, endeavouring to steer the Security Council toward concurrence. These efforts were backed by Axworthy, who made multiple visits to New York in early 1999, and by Canadian officials who met with the Russian Ambassador in Ottawa. Canadian policy makers, however, concluded by early March that Russia and China would not countenance the tough resolution they favoured. Efforts to resolve the impasse concluded with one Canadian official pugnaciously declaring to Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin that, if Russia used its veto, “they would quickly find out that they didn’t have a veto [on the proposed NATO intervention].” No UN resolution was attempted because Canadian and NATO policy makers believed that no resolution was better than proceeding in defiance of a vetoed one.

Canadian diplomats also explored a Uniting for Peace resolution among members of the General Assembly. Fowler worked to generate support for the idea and backing for the scheme was strong. The Egyptian ambassador, for example, promised support from the entire voting bloc of Islamic countries. A Singaporean official predicted that such a resolution would generate support from 150-160 UN member countries. Although the prospects for successfully referring the Kosovo issue to the General Assembly were promising, the proposal was eventually abandoned because officials feared that the initiative could become ensnared in acrimonious General Assembly debate. Furthermore, the fact that most within DFAIT had concluded that the urgency of the crisis necessitated an intervention before the UN option could be more fully explored illustrates the effectiveness of Heinbecker’s advocacy.

The perceived urgency of the crisis also contributed to the willingness of Canadian officials to circumvent the United Nations in favour of NATO. Although regrettable to the government from a values perspective, this circumstance was made tolerable by the government’s commitment to the western alliance. Prime Minister Chrétien was a strong advocate of a vigorous role for the fifty year old alliance in the post-Cold War world. This desire was manifest in Canada’s promotion of a strong peace support mandate for the alliance during the 1999 revision of its Strategic Concept. Furthermore, through its efforts to coerce Milošević, NATO had staked its
credibility on conflict management in Kosovo. If the allies backed off in the face of Yugoslav recalcitrance, the “unity of purpose of the Alliance might have dissolved and, ultimately, NATO itself might have been undermined, with incalculable consequences for European security and stability.” A successful NATO role in Kosovo would cement the alliance’s new emphasis on peace support operations and safeguard its credibility into the 21st century. Therefore, the NATO obligation argument describes a powerful impulse in Canadian alternative specification. Canada’s obligation, however, arose from its strong commitment to the purposes of the alliance.

Aside from persuasively linking the humanitarian intervention policy alternative to the Kosovo problem, Heinbecker played a pivotal part in ensuring that the political setting within the Canadian bureaucracy was supportive of the policy thrust he advanced. As noted in chapter three, upon receiving a dispatch from Robert Fowler, Canada’s respected UN ambassador, that questioned the decision to intervene without UN assent, Heinbecker quashed further discussion. One interviewee recalled the exchange:

Axworthy and Paul Heinbecker argued that we didn’t need a UN mandate because of overriding humanitarian reasons. On the other side of the equation there was Bob Fowler, the Ambassador to the UN ... There was a certain amount of traffic back and forth of a very interesting type. The correspondence ended off with Heinbecker putting out a message basically saying: “okay, this is enough debate. Shut up, this is the line.”

Another former official confirmed this account: “Bob Fowler and [Heinbecker] disagreed on the legality and necessity of the operation. He put the legality ahead of the necessity, and [Heinbecker] did not.” Similarly, the advice of the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia, who questioned the wisdom of an intervention based on his reading of Belgrade’s political state, carried little weight in Ottawa. One former official characterized the interaction between Ottawa and its Belgrade embassy as a “dialogue of the deaf” and remembered that, in the months leading to the decision to intervene, Heinbecker was unreceptive to divergent opinion. By quelling discussion of other policy approaches, Heinbecker solidified the place of the humanitarian intervention alternative and ensured a compliant bureaucratic context.

Kingdon argues that, when a pressing problem causes the policy window to open, the political acceptability of a policy alternative is of great importance. The broader Canadian public had been adequately softened and, by March 1999, appeared receptive to the humanitarian intervention policy alternative. Readings of the national mood revealed an appetite for active Canadian engagement in world affairs. Most Canadians, appalled by the
bloodshed in Kosovo graphically reported in television and print media, wanted the international community to prevent the type of atrocities seen just a few years earlier in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Furthermore, parliamentary consensus and the perceived public backing for an intervention in Quebec reinforced the political acceptability of the policy alternative.

Heinbecker was the clear policy entrepreneur in this process because of his part in stimulating DFAIT’s policy dialogue, in softening up Canadian public and specialist opinion, in linking the intervention alternative to the pressing Kosovo problem, and in ensuring receptivity within the Canadian bureaucracy. Heinbecker meets all of the qualities Kingdon attributes to a successful policy entrepreneur: claim to a hearing, political skills, and tenacity. First, by virtue of his position and status within the Canadian foreign ministry, Heinbecker had a legitimate claim to a hearing within the Canadian government. Second, he had developed a strong personal and professional relationship with Axworthy and had great prestige within DFAIT. Finally, the tenacious Heinbecker had been a proponent of humanitarian intervention policy since at least 1996, had become an increasingly effective practitioner of public diplomacy, and was adept at coaxing and cajoling reluctant colleagues into supporting his policy initiatives. In the research interviews, Heinbecker was cited by every interviewee as being influential in the policy process.

Kingdon underlines the power of the available alternative in facilitating the rise of a problem on the government and decision agendas. In the Kosovo case, the ostensibly decisive role of intervention and air power in Bosnia in 1995 had a tremendous influence on the decision to intervene forcefully in Kosovo. There was a feeling among Canadian decision makers that Kosovo was analogous to Bosnia and that NATO bombing could be used again to settle the conflict rapidly. Although policy makers considered other options, the intervention alternative was seen as the most viable means of tackling a recalcitrant Yugoslavia. Having a ready means of addressing the problem eased greatly the issue’s ascent on the governmental agenda and, eventually, the proposed Kosovo intervention’s arrival on the decision agenda.

4.4 The Kosovo Intervention and the Canadian Decision Agenda

There was a coupling of the problem, policy, and politics streams in early 1999 that caused the Kosovo intervention to climb onto the Canadian decision agenda in March 1999. The need for a final policy decision was,
however, on hold until 18 March 1999, when it became clear that the Kosovar Albanian leadership had accepted, and the Yugoslav government had rejected, the terms of the Rambouillet accord. This fulfilled an essential condition that enabled the North Atlantic Council to move toward launching an air campaign. U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke made a last-ditch visit to Belgrade on 22 March and delivered a final ultimatum to Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević. The Yugoslav president, however, remained defiant.

Following the collapse of the Rambouillet talks and the impending NATO intervention, the Canadian cabinet met and formally approved Axworthy’s and Eggleton’s recommendation that the government participate in Operation Allied Force. This policy thrust was given emphasis by the government’s decision to “go heavy” with its contribution to NATO’s humanitarian intervention. Canada’s heavy participation was aggressively pushed by Heinbecker and Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril. Ultimately, the Canadian government elected to make eighteen CF-18 fighter jets available to the alliance, a contribution that exceeded NATO’s force requirements. One former senior military official contended that Canada’s contribution was seen as “a political statement that Canada was a key player in the NATO context of the Kosovo campaign ... It put us in the top 3-5 in terms of allied aircraft in theatre.” DFAIT aimed to capitalize on the strong military contribution to gain diplomatic leverage within NATO and buttress the alliance’s resolve.

On 23 March the North Atlantic Council convened an all night session in Brussels to make final their determination to empower NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe General Wesley Clark with the authority to launch air strikes on Yugoslav targets in Kosovo. The Canadian ambassador, David Wright, conveyed his government’s vigorous support of the NATO-led intervention, including a willingness to immediately approve phase two of air operations, which included concentrations of armour, artillery, and fielded forces in Kosovo. Following this decision, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, General Raymond Henault, called the head of Canada’s Taskforce Aviano, Colonel Dwight Davies, to authorize the personnel stationed in the region to participate in NATO operation in Kosovo.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the Canadian decision to support NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was far from inevitable. The
January 1999 massacre of forty-five ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo village of Račak contributed to the belief that there was a pressing crisis in Kosovo. This opened a policy window in Ottawa, an opportunity for advocates of a policy alternative to link their proposals to a pressing policy problem. The opportunity was seized by a policy entrepreneur, Paul Heinbecker, who was able to hook the humanitarian intervention option to the Kosovo problem. Heinbecker, furthermore, ensured a supportive political setting by sidelong potential bureaucratic opposition and by contributing to the development of Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy’s thinking on the intervention’s advisability. The Kosovo intervention’s ascent onto the Canadian governmental and decision agendas was aided by the power of the available alternative. Canada’s participation in the NATO air campaign reinforces Kingdon’s argument that policy decisions are only made after an extensive processes of softening up and consensus building.
Conclusion

The decision to intervene in Kosovo on humanitarian grounds represented an important change in Canadian foreign policy. The Canadian government had previously approached military interventionism with considerable ambivalence. This paper has studied the pre-decision stages of Canada’s Kosovo policy and demonstrated that the intervention’s ascent to the Canadian decision agenda was fuelled by a confluence of autonomous problem, policy, and political streams consistent with those described in John W. Kingdon’s multiple-streams model. This concluding chapter will summarize the major findings of the study and will discuss some of its implications for the broader literature on Canada’s Kosovo crisis.

In 1998/1999 violence in Kosovo represented only one instance of civil conflict. Other crises, such as the one in Sierra Leone, demanded Ottawa’s attention. To monitor the Kosovo issue the Canadian government analyzed problem indicators, such as the reports emanating from the United Nations Secretary General, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Feedback mechanisms, such as the Canadian mission in Belgrade and the Kosovo Verification Mission, provided information on the efficacy of the international community’s conflict management efforts. The picture that emerged from these indicators and feedback channels was sharpened by the Račak massacre of 15 January 1999. The Račak incident, and Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević’s defiant response to it, helped create a sense of crisis. The belief in Ottawa that the Kosovo problem was pressing enabled the Kosovo issue to emerge on the governmental agenda.
There was no shortage of policy alternatives floating about in the primeval soup. The most prominent of these were a negotiated partition, the intensified engagement of the United Nations in the management of the crisis, and a forceful humanitarian intervention. Members of the Canadian and international foreign policy communities discussed these proposals extensively and aimed to soften up public and specialist opinion in support of these options. Several criteria, both internal and external to the policy community, were used to evaluate the applicability of the available policy alternatives. A process of diffusion allowed the UN and humanitarian intervention policy alternatives to reach Ottawa’s short list of ideas. Although NATO was seen as the most likely avenue for an intervention, many Canadian officials hoped that diplomatic efforts might enable a robust intervention with UN endorsement.

As Canadian officials assessed the Kosovo problem and considered the available policy alternatives, politicians and lead bureaucrats surveyed the domestic political setting. These officials paid close attention to the national mood, which they judged from public meetings and events, media coverage and editorials, opinion polls, and the stance of opposition political parties. These actors concluded that the national mood was largely, though tacitly, supportive of active Canadian engagement in the Kosovo conflict. The perceived support of most Quebeckers was a subtle, but important force in Canadian policy. Politicians also came to an estimation of the preponderance of opinion among organized political forces. Although the trenchant opposition of the Serbian-Canadian community dominated government estimations of organized forces, the power of their remonstrations was sapped by considerations of the national mood and by a supportive bureaucratic context. Shared departmental interests promoted an aggressive Canadian policy response to the Kosovo issue. Support for the humanitarian intervention policy alternative was fostered within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade by the work of its Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy Paul Heinbecker. Turnover of key personnel was not an influential force in the Kosovo case.

The opening of a policy window following the January 1999 massacre at Račak provided an opportunity for policy change. This opportunity was seized by a policy entrepreneur, Paul Heinbecker, who attached his favoured humanitarian intervention policy alternative to the pressing Kosovo problem. Heinbecker worked to foster a supportive political and bureaucratic environment for the NATO-led intervention. Through this process, a coupling of the three independent streams occurred, which propelled the
Kosovo intervention onto the Canadian decision agenda. After the failure of the Rambouillet talks and Richard Holbrooke’s last-ditch 22 March visit to Belgrade, the cabinet approved the Canadian Forces’ active participation in Operation Allied Force.

This study, therefore, suggests that Canadian policy was more complex than has been stated in the literature. Two interpretations have dominated the academic treatments of Canada’s Kosovo policy. The first position argues that Canada participated in NATO’s humanitarian intervention primarily because of alliance obligations. The second view contends that Canada intervened in Kosovo because of the government’s independent desire to protect and promote human security in the Balkans. These views both contain elements of the truth, but a much more diverse constellation of factors influenced Canadian policy in the pre-decision stages.

The view that the Canadian government “acquiesced” in NATO’s policy is advanced by scholars Douglas Bland and Michael Bliss. To the extent that NATO’s activism on the Kosovo issue was essential to the viability and political acceptability of the proposed mission, the authors are correct. But this interpretation goes too far. While the NATO commitment was important, there was an impressive array of domestic factors that affected policy agendas and alternatives, namely domestic problem definition and values, impressions of the national mood, and internal bureaucratic politics. Furthermore, the government of Jean Chrétien was a strong supporter of the alliance and aimed to enhance NATO’s credibility through a successful operation in Kosovo. The desire to promote the alliance as an important Canadian foreign policy tool reflects an active and strategic approach to alliance relations, not the subservient attitude described by Bland and Bliss.

Exponents of the view that the mission was primarily motivated by the imperatives of Canada’s human security agenda would find evidence in this study to support their interpretation. Because violence in Kosovo was identified as a critical test of Canada’s human security agenda, the Kosovo issue was given a very high priority within Axworthy’s department. Canada’s sizable political, diplomatic, and military contributions to the resolution of the Kosovo conflict reflected the foreign affairs department’s commitment to the protection of human security. Furthermore, the human security agenda influenced the likelihood of survival for policy alternatives by delimiting the range of politically acceptable options to those that fit with human security approaches to conflict management. If the Kosovo problem had not been seen as an issue of such great importance to the human security agenda, it is unlikely that Canadian involvement would have been so vigorous.
Yet one-dimensional interpretations simplify the agenda setting process. The multiple-streams model addresses the complexity of the issue by illuminating several important and heretofore neglected dimensions of the policy process, including the importance of competing ideas in Canadian policy, the unpredictability of agenda setting, the character of government political calculations, the nature of internal government politics, and the structured role of leadership in moving a policy proposal forward.

Following the Kosovo intervention, Canada supported the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to study the role of humanitarian intervention in the international state system. Despite enduring Canadian and international interest in the subject, an intervention like the one seen in Kosovo has not yet reoccurred. The Kosovo air campaign, therefore, is unique in Canadian history. A study of the mechanisms that fuelled this policy shift is relevant to understanding Canada’s international policies and to appreciating some of the forces that underpin conflict management agendas in liberal democracies.
Notes

5. This is particularly true in: “Case Study: The Kosovo Air Campaign.” (co-authored with fellow diplomat Robert McRae and contained in *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*). And in “Kosovo.” (contained in David Malone’s *The United Nations Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*).
11. There is also a lack of attention to the role of Canadian multilateral diplomacy in international events after the commencement of the air campaign. This is regrettable because there is a compelling story of influential Canadian diplomacy that has hitherto eluded academic studies of the crisis. This topic receives its most extensive treatment in: Paul Heinbecker and Robert McRae. “Case Study: The Kosovo Air Campaign.” In Robert McRae and Don Hubert. Eds, Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001, 122-133. Also see: Michael W. Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo crisis: A ‘golden moment’ in Canadian foreign policy,” International Journal, Volume 64, Issue 2, Spring 2009, 565-581.


14. The referendum was held with an 87 percent voter turnout.


18. Much of this support came from the large Albanian community in the Bronx, New York. (Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 127).


22. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Axworthy to Visit Moscow and Former Yugoslavia. 4 April 1996.


24. In the 1970s and 1980s Canada had good diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the United Nations General Assembly, Canadian officials often collaborated with Yugoslavian representatives, who were influential leaders of the non-aligned movement. Moreover, since Yugoslavia was a relatively open and tolerant multi-ethnic society, it received western political and economic support. The country’s relative ethnic harmony was particularly valued by Canadian policy makers, who faced their own pressing national unity questions.


32. David Wright. NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: Political Management in the NAC. Harvard University. 5 March 2001.
33. NATO. Statement by the Secretary General of NATO. 12 August 1998.
34. The Canadian desire to be actively engaged in the Kosovo issue was reflected by the embarrassment among Canada’s political leadership when Canadian planes were not available in theatre to participate in Operation Determined Falcon, the 15 June 1998 NATO show of force. The Department of National Defence quickly rectified the situation by stationing six CF-18 fighters in Aviano, Italy on 23 June. The fighter’s presence demonstrated allied unity, while aiming to intimidate Milošević and to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the force accumulation, the continued intensification of Yugoslav hostilities demonstrated that NATO’s threats failed to impress Milošević.
36. The ACTORD was the final step in a series of allied manoeuvres. In autumn 1998 the alliance employed its Cold War era system of heightening operational readiness as an incremental means of increasing the pressure on Yugoslavia. NATO issued an Activation Warning (ACTWARN) at the 24 September defence minister’s summit in Vilamoura, Portugal. The ACTWARN authorized allied commanders to identify targets for potential military operations. On 1 October 1998, the NAC approved an Activation Request (ACTREQ) to further tighten the screws. NATO’s ACTREQ entailed an appeal by the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) for a formal commitment of allied forces.
37. NATO. Transcript of the Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana. 13 October 1998.
38. DND. Canada to participate in NATO military enforcement action in Kosovo. 12 October 1998.
42. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 100-103.


51. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR escorts frightened civilians to safety. Ogata renews appeal for cease-fire in Kosovo. 21 January 1999.

52. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR’s Ogata says civilians in Kosovo must be protected, urges open borders. 26 March 1999.


69. UNHCR. Ogata stresses link between human rights and refugee protection, 10 December 1998.

70. See, for example, the 18 January 1999 image of an ethnic Albanian woman on the front page of the Globe and Mail crying over the body of her brother, found dead in a Račak gully. “Kosovo War Horrors,” Globe and Mail, 18 January 1999, A1.


100. In addition, because the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and the G-8 were all actively involved in managing the Kosovo conflict, those concerned with the viability of those institutions were interested in the matter.


108. Bill Schiller, “‘What’s the plan? There is no plan’; Atrocities are the excuse for the air strikes, but they are precisely what bombs can’t stop,” *Toronto Star.* 27 March 1999, 1.


111. Although Chinese resistance was less vociferous than Russia’s, the Chinese government strongly opposed an UN resolution backing an intervention. Furthermore, the Chinese government had blocked the renewal of the United Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in 1998. For Axworthy’s take on China’s “special interests” in the Balkans, see: Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future.* Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 180.


118. This was primarily because of the presence of Canadian peacekeepers in the enclaves of Srebrenica and Visoko (note that Visoko, unlike Srebrenica, was not a UN-proclaimed “safe area.”). For an account of Canadian motivations, see: James Bartleman, *On Six Continents: A Life in Canada’s Foreign Service 1966-2002,* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2004), 209-214.


120. Bartleman, *Rollercoaster,* 171-204.


122. Lloyd Axworthy. “Speech delivered by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1998 Foreign Policy Conference.” *DFAIT Statements and Speeches.* 16 October 1998.


128. An October 1998 meeting among the Contact Group countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States) at London’s Heathrow Airport had convinced many of those present that Russia would only condemn a NATO intervention that circumvented the UN Security Council. This reassured those that feared that Russia might take more aggressive action. See: Strobe Talbott. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy.* (New York: Random House, 2003), 302.

129. Even following the celebrated role of high tech air power in the 1991 Gulf War, many Canadian Forces personnel viewed it solely as a complementary form of military strength. One air power advocate remembered: “In the early 1990s I recall repeatedly making the ‘why fighters’ argument and explaining their high utility in terms of speed, reach, and economy.” Air power had only been employed in Bosnia after strenuous Canadian objections.

130. It should be noted that, although there was confidence in the air campaign, many Canadian officials and politicians, including Prime Minister Chrétien, thought that President Clinton’s March 1999 decision to publicly dismiss the “ground option” was ill-advised. (Paul Heinbecker and Robert McRae. “Case Study: The Kosovo Air Campaign.” In Robert McRae and Don Hubert. Eds, *Human Security and the New Diplomacy.* Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001, 130.

131. Phase one, secretly the only stage approved in NATO’s October ACTORD, restricted targets to Yugoslav anti-aircraft installations. Phase two consisted of tactical targets in Kosovo, such as fielded security forces. Phase three objectives included strategic targets throughout Yugoslavia. (Department of National Defence. “Kosovo Crisis,” Press Conference PRINCIPAL(S): Hon. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence; Lieutenant-General Ray Henault, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; James Wright, Director General of Relations with Eastern Europe, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Speaker: General Raymond Henault, 16 April 1999).

132. To appreciate the accuracy of PGM technology by 1999, one observer compared the efficiency of these weapons with those available to the allies during the Second World War: Therefore, if you want a 90 percent probability of having hit a particular target [in World War II], you had to drop some nine thousand bombs. That required a bombing run of one thousand bombers and placed ten thousand men at risk. By contrast, with the new weaponry, one plane flown by one man with one bomb could have the same level of probability. That was an improvement in effectiveness of approximately ten thousand-fold. See: David Halberstam. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals.* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 52.


146. Opinion polls conducted after the commencement of the bombing campaign indicated public approval. An Angus Reid poll reported that two-thirds of Canadians backed the NATO bombing campaign. Although less enthusiastic about the campaign, the poll demonstrated that Québécois also backed the mission. See: Murray Campbell, “Canadians back bombing campaign: How the poll was done,” *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 12 Apr 1999, A1.

149. Ibid., 45.


Eggleton was, however, a more active participant in determining the nature of the military contribution.

Heinbecker and McRae, 128-129.

In addition to Heinbecker, regular DFAIT participants on the taskforce included: Bertin Côté, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Europe, Middle East and North Africa section, Andrew Shore of the Southern Europe Division, Charles Court of the department’s NATO section, Patrick Wittmann of the UN Security Council affairs section, the International Security Bureau Paul Mayer, and Heidi Hulan of the ministerial office. Outside of DFAIT, Stephen Wallace or Helene Corneau would attend meetings on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Department of National Defence was usually represented a working level.

197. Lloyd Axworthy, “Notes for an address the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the conference at Columbia University on the ‘Protection of Children in Armed Conflict,’” *DFAIT Statements and Speeches*, 12 February 1999.
198. This position was not universal. From New York, Fowler argued vehemently with Heinbecker that the UN route should not be abandoned. From his dominant position in Ottawa, Heinbecker was able to overcome Fowler’s opposition.

205. David Wright. *NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: Political Management in the NAC*. Harvard University.

206. Six Canadian CF-18s had been stationed in Aviano, Italy since July 1998 to monitor Bosnian airspace.

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