Perspectives on the Politics of Borders and Belonging
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Queen’s University’s Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP) is pleased to present the latest in its series of monographs, the *Martello Papers*. Taking their name from the distinctive towers built during the nineteenth century to defend Kingston, Ontario, these papers cover a wide range of topics and issues in foreign and defence policy, and in the study of international peace and security.

This edition of the *Martello Papers* series is unique in that it showcases contributions from the Political Studies Graduate Student Association’s inaugural annual conference, an event the CIDP was proud to sponsor. The conference focused on the theme of *The Politics of Borders and Belonging at Home and Abroad* and offered insights on border and identity politics from both national and international contexts. Scholars who study borders know that, whether these are fixed or fluid, there is constant contestation over their meaning.

The collection is notable for the diversity in theoretical and epistemological approaches taken but is remarkably coherent. The authors also highlight the importance of actors at all levels, from local communities and border guards to policy communities, political parties, and international stakeholders. In terms of security, one of the most salient and controversial dimensions of border management, we not only have to ask how it is provided but by whom? Doing so uncovers a whole ecosystem of security actors and shifting power dynamics.

The contributing authors offer fresh perspectives on traditional questions in international relations and comparative politics related to the
tension between the processes of globalization and integration that seemed unstoppable at the turn of the millennium and the resurgence of protectionist and nationalist reflexes that have accompanied the ascent of populist politics in the United States, the UK, and Europe. This tension reached its apex with the ongoing migration crisis. Appropriately, the authors problematize political discourse surrounding borders and belonging, such as the inclusive narrative of Canadian multiculturalism, bringing “othering” practices to the fore. The case studies introduced are also fascinating in their own right, from an analysis of the Turkish borderlands to border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The CIDP and the Department of Political Studies are natural allies for this publication on border and identity politics. The CIDP relies on the expertise of faculty members, fellows, and graduate students from Political Studies to conduct and disseminate research on issues of importance for national and international politics. As is the case with all Martello Papers, the views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre or any of its supporting agencies.

Stéfanie von Hlatky
Director, CIDP
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Marin Ingalise Beck, Bailey Gerrits, Alexandra Liebich, and Rebecca Wallace
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Constructing boundaries and borders that differentiate between those who belong, and those who do not, determines and colors the meaning of the particular belonging. It is here that the interrelationships between the politics of belonging and struggles for national self-determination are anchored, and that both collusion and resistance between them are performed and narrated. (Yuval-Davis 2004, 216)

Borders may be seen as analogous to the thick black lines on the pages of colouring books that children are told not to traverse with their over-eager bright markers or crayons. We can perhaps recall our own parent or guardian saying, “Stay within the lines,” just as, in many cases, people are told to mind the borders of a certain region or state—remain within, return to, or perhaps identify with the state between the thick black lines. The colouring-book-style map imagines that each state is a single, solid colour, starkly demarcated from surrounding states, “conveying the impression of internal homogeneity and suggesting that various facets of social reality overlap congruously within” (Kopper 2012, 277). One colour, one country, one people. But the world is not a system of neatly organized, perfectly cropped, homogenous entities; it is diverse, dynamic, and “messy” (Sassen 1996), with a mismatch between political and cultural boundaries, between territories and identities. Territorial boundaries are not incisive lines in the daily experiences of people
living within and among the lines. There are flows of people, goods, and ideas across the lines and through what Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) terms the “borderlands” where people live crowded against the lines themselves. Borders that appear to separate single-colour territorial spaces or boundaries between groups are often contested. One does not have to look far into history for examples of negotiation and contestation over borders—either in the sense of territory or identity. Nor does one have to look far to find instances of conflict over belonging: who belongs, how they belong, and what the terms of belonging are. Contemporary events in Canada and around the world signal the continued importance of studying the politics of borders and belonging.

There are some who suggest that borders are becoming less important or even obsolete. Nearly twenty years ago, globalization theorists were predicting the end of the nation-state and the artificial territorial boundaries that congeal the messiness of the state (Hannerz 1996). More recently, proponents of the metropolitan global city assert that the way of the future is to have mayors run the world outside of, or beyond, state boundaries because the nation-state is dying (Barber 2013; Manent 2013). Others assert that the nation-state has run its course and is being replaced by other forms of belonging, including at the supra-national level (for example, the European Union) and the sub-national or local level (for example, the “new regionalists” examine various sub-state entities such as the Scots and Catalans). Yet amidst all of these debates, there has been a seemingly constant confirmation of the significance of borders (Dragojlovic 2008, 279). Moreover, in the past few decades there has been a resurgence in the study of borders, which is characterized by a crossing of disciplinary boundaries and the coming together of scholars in diverse disciplines, from geography and political science to anthropology and security studies (Newman 2006). Recent real-world events around the globe have demonstrated the continued salience of territorial and identity borders.

The 2015 Canadian federal election campaign highlighted the ongoing contestation over what it means to be Canadian and the implications of this debate for citizenship and identity. Politicians and voters alike were engaged in the “niqab debate,” a topic centred on questions of who belongs and what this belonging looks like, as well as on the consequences of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, issues of citizenship and
belonging were not confined within Canada’s borders. Debates over belonging in Europe and around the world filled news headlines in 2015, as hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the Middle East and North Africa. The “refugee crisis” sparked discussions about mobility rights, state obligations, moral inclusion, and border policing. Questions of belonging remained front and centre with the tragic events in Paris and Beirut in November 2015.

The following year was no different. The 2016 American presidential campaign was plagued by questions of who should legally be allowed to enter the United States and be called a legitimate “American.” In 2017, the Trump administration’s multiple attempts to implement a travel ban continues to fuel exclusionary political rhetoric. Europe was, and still is, experiencing the refugee crisis as some states looked to further exclude refugees; for example, Hungary held a referendum in September 2016 to seek a mandate to reject a European-enforced migrant quota. The borders of the European Union will be redrawn (and possibly challenged further) after the shockingly successful Brexit vote, held in June 2016, gave Britain the mandate to negotiate its exit from the EU. At the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil saw increased media attention to questions of nationalism, as spectators cheered for athletes competing for their home country’s colours; simultaneously, Brazil itself faced a political crisis and, after spending billions of dollars on the Games, average Brazilians were economically excluded from attending the events and displaying their national pride. Even more countries saw protests after narrow election margins, arrests of opposition members, and lack of change in the faces at the top; for example, the Republic of Congo was added to the list of countries in which the men in power changed fixed election terms to keep themselves in office.

These real-world events provoke many important questions for scholars, policy makers and citizens alike: What is the relationship between nationalism(s) and “othering,” between territory and identity, between lines on maps and peoples’ lived experiences? How is citizenship constituted, practiced, and performed? What do inclusion and exclusion look like, and what kinds of challenges arise with each? How is identity politicized at the intersection of multiple and multi-sited belongings, such as race, class, and gender? To consider these questions, over fifty graduate students from Ontario and Québec gathered at Queen’s Uni-
versity in Kingston, Ontario on 6 May 2016 for The Politics of Borders and Belonging Conference. Hosted by the Political Studies Graduate Student Association (PSGSA) at Queen’s University, and organized by doctoral students in the Department of Political Studies, this conference considered and debated some of the most pressing issues facing the world today. Indeed, the panels included presentations of papers that sought to understand contemporary topics ranging from instability along the Kurdish-Turkish and Pakistani-Afghani borders to Canadian border security and multiculturalism policy to gendered and racialized questions of migration, violence, and identity. The conference included six panels and one keynote presentation from Dr. Erin Tolley, who offered insights from her recently published book, *Framed: Media and the Coverage of Race in Canadian Politics* (2016). The following collection of essays in this volume critically reviews the arguments and discussions generated at this event to illuminate some of the cutting-edge graduate research on these topics. Several themes emerged and, chief among them, was the study of the politics of borders and belonging and the pressing nature by which these “great fictions” are being constructed and negotiated by those who belong, seek to belong, or will never belong.

The conference presenters took both critical and mainstream approaches in considering the challenges and opportunities presented by the politics of borders and belonging. In the review of the panel titled “Colonialism, Racism, and Identity Politics,” the juxtaposition of “belonging and unbelonging” was used to explore the tensions inherent in belonging in Canada, “where Muslims feel simultaneously welcome and unwelcome as a way for the white settler society to enact its supremacy and domination through … a feeling of vulnerability” (Equihua).

Questions of racialization were also central to the keynote address. Tolley discussed the salience and “visibility” of race in Canadian political life, specifically the differences in the ways political candidates of diverse backgrounds are portrayed in/by news media—and the implications of this for the candidates themselves, for consumers of media, and for Canadian democracy. Tolley presented compelling evidence that political news coverage in Canada is racialized and that race influences the Canadian political landscape in powerful and pernicious ways (contrary
to the “myth of multiculturalism”). This racialization in the news media exposes some of the ways in which belonging may be central to both Canadian national identity and the politics of the state, with broader implications for practices outside the media, such as the carding of black men in Toronto (Mockler).

The review of the panel entitled “Nationalisms and Identities in Canada (Merolli) calls attention to the ways in which race is often ignored in Canadian nationalism, as well as the emotional or affective labour caught up in the production of belonging to the Canadian state. This analysis recalls Yuval-Davis’s (2006) distinction between belonging and the politics of belonging, in which the former refers to the emotional desire to belong and the latter to the “political project aimed at constructing belonging” (197). However, rather than separating belonging and the politics of belonging, the paper suggests that they are intimately linked.

Some of the papers presented in this edited volume suggest that the current system of territorial demarcation “spurs conflict, forced migration, identity crises and gendered violence” (Chavez). Regardless of territorial borders’ artificiality, they have real, often negative, consequences for the people living in the borderlands, for the families cut off by state demarcations, and for the people trying to navigate borders. This was the conclusion reached by Chavez in reviewing the panel titled “Critical Reflections on Borders, Migration, and Violence.”

Focusing on two specific geographic regions (the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Kurdish borderlands in Turkey), another panel described the agency of local actors in the production of both identities and borders, and how overlapping and competing identities in the borderlands can influence the borderlands’ governance. In his review of the panel titled “Identity and Borders in the Middle East and Asia,” Pasch explains how power shapes the interactions between identities and borders, and he argues for a re-framing of governance, agency, and geographic space in order to better understand these interactions.

Other presenters suggested that the question is not about the usefulness of borders, but rather about mapping the actors and structures involved in providing security within borders. In the review of the panel titled “Internal and External Borders and Security” (Twietmeyer),
suggestions were made about how to improve national security by “understanding the dynamics and conflicts inherent in the provision of security.” One can see a key theme emerging: local actors—whether they are security providers, private individuals, or people involved in local governance—can and do contest the demarcation of space and identity.

Another set of panellists focused on issues of inclusion and exclusion in liberal democratic states, particularly in terms of policy making and the rhetoric about migrants. In his review of the panel “Immigration and Nationalism in the Global North,” Rainford discusses the narratives emerging around the shrinking of (democratic) space, especially around notions of egalitarianism and equality. Critically analyzing debates over immigration policy in Western liberal democracies can tell us where the boundaries or limits of inclusion are located and how they shift over time.

It is worth noting here the importance of the second half of the conference title: The Politics of Borders and Belonging At Home and Abroad. As Dr. Tolley reminded us, there is something very powerful about turning the critical academic gaze back on Canada, especially as Canada has been cited as an example of successful multicultural politics. If there is contestation happening in our own backyard, it is imperative that we do not simply focus on issues of borders and belonging far beyond our front door. Just as the issues in the Kurdish borderlands, for example, undoubtedly deserve attention, so too, do Canadian movements such as Idle No More and Black Lives Matter. Learning about the politics of borders and belonging at home, wherever that may be, can be instructive for understanding these politics abroad, and vice versa. Scholars, policy makers, and citizens alike need to be attuned to this fact and should pay close attention to contestation within and beyond borders and to their implications for belonging both “here” and “there.”

The politics of borders and belonging is a rich area of study that cuts to the very heart of contemporary issues in global politics and to the heart of being human, as these papers deftly suggest. Themes interwoven throughout this volume include the movement of borders and the movement of people, the role of the state in maintaining borders and creating belonging or fostering exclusion, identities and borders as always contested and constructed, belonging as political and affective, Canadian belonging as racialized and rooted in colonialism, and
borders as gendered. It is clear that the thick black lines on a map need interrogation. Indeed, despite the cleanness and solidity of these lines, the world that is lived, experienced, and contested around them is much more dynamic and complex. By focusing on borders and belonging, especially on notions of borderland, we can critically analyze some of the great challenges facing the contemporary world and, at the very least, relate to the artificiality of belonging within and among those borders. Rather than throwing out the concept of the nation-state, the framework of borders and belonging demands that scholars, policy makers, and citizens alike stay attuned to the interactions between artificial lines in the sand, the affective politics required to build senses of belonging within lines, and the politics of resistance between and among borders.

References and Further Reading

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“Belonging” and Canada’s Political Institutions

Lessons from Dr. Erin Tolley’s keynote address, 
Framed: Media and the Coverage of Race in Canada

PATRICIA MOCKLER

In the conference’s keynote address, Dr. Erin Tolley introduced compelling evidence of the subtle but significant influence of racialized assumptions on political coverage in Canadian media. Her talk, which presented some of the main ideas from her recently published (2016) book entitled Framed: Media and the Coverage of Race in Canada, focused largely on how racialized ideas shape the media landscape, and structure the media coverage of visible minority politicians. Dr. Tolley proposed a “racial mediation thesis,” which holds that a politician’s status as a visible minority influences the content of their portrayal. Her address included several recent examples of racialized coverage, and she discussed the implications of this type of coverage both for political candidates and for consumers of news media. Tolley’s arguments provide important insights into the politics of race in Canada; the evidence of racial mediation she presents demonstrates the need for a critical examination of Canada’s political institutions. In particular, Tolley’s data suggests that the notions of “belonging” transmitted by institutions in Canadian politics have significant implications for the politics of race. The exclusionary ideas of “who belongs” that underpin racial mediation shape other institutional cultures in Canada in pernicious ways. This paper will first outline some of Tolley’s main ideas and the evidence used
to support her claims. It will then analyze the significance of Tolley’s arguments for interrogating these institutional norms of belonging, and their impact on Canadian politics and public policy.

Tolley’s address offered a number of key insights into the politics of race in Canada and specifically, the implications of race for the quality and fairness of political media coverage. The main argument put forth by Tolley is that political news coverage in Canada is racialized: significant differences exist in the portrayal of visible minority politicians compared with that of white politicians. She suggests that this racialized difference provides evidence of a broader salience of race in Canada, which often goes unacknowledged by the general public, by academics, and by policy makers.

In the introduction to *Framed* (2016), Tolley unpacks some of the challenges of an analysis rooted in the concept of race. She notes that racial distinctions lack scientific support and are often “arbitrary” and “fluid” (6). Despite this, her work employs racial categorization. As Tolley aptly points out, “we cannot erase the salience of race by simply referring to its imagined quality, nor should the acknowledgement of that social construction stop us from examining it” (6). *Framed* seeks to provide empirical evidence of this salience; her study indicates the importance of a critical examination of Canadian political institutions rooted in an understanding of the continued influence of race.

Tolley’s analysis draws upon an extensive literature on the significance of framing decisions in media. Iyengar (1991) defines framing as “the subtle alterations in the statement and presentation of judgment and choice problems” (11). Iyengar’s study of television news suggests that significant “framing effects” result from choices regarding which details of a case are included in creating a news story (11). These choices have implications for audience perceptions of the issue under consideration. In her discussion of framing, Tolley points out how the media relies on racialized frames when writing about politicians as individuals, as demonstrated in coverage of recent Senate appointees that highlighted their “diversity” and noted their country of birth. This type of framing also appears in stories about policy decisions made by visible minority politicians; the ethnicity or religious background of a politician is used to explain a particular policy stance in a manner that is not found in coverage of white politicians.
Tolley’s research suggests that the racialized nature of political news coverage structures the experience of politicians in a number of important ways. Drawing on interview data, she argues that visible minority candidates are likely to highlight race in their self-presentation in anticipation of its role in media coverage of their activities, political or otherwise. Portrayal in media that foregrounds the “otherness” of racial minority candidates shifts emphasis away from discussions of a candidate’s qualifications or political experience. Candidates who are racial minorities running for election against an incumbent are less likely to be presented as viable as their white counterparts. She terms this difference in presentation a “challenger penalty” (58) that influences how voters perceive racial minority candidates. Racial mediation introduces barriers to election that are more significant for visible minority candidates and thus contributes to a playing field that is differentiated by race and is undemocratic.

Racialized news coverage, Tolley finds, is the result of choices made by media outlets operating within a context of industry-wide norms that guide the portrayal of political candidates and is not simply a reflection of objective reality. Canadian news media rely on racialized assumptions in making choices about what is newsworthy and how it should be presented. The apparent increase in racial diversity in the media is largely the result of enhanced racial diversity in on-camera, highly visible positions, rather than the result of a widespread shift in industry composition. Tolley further notes that an increase in the number of individuals with diverse backgrounds in news organizations would not necessarily improve the quality—and equality—of political coverage in Canada, due to the racialized institutional norms noted above. Despite the constraints in which journalists operate, Tolley proposes the use of an “analogous news judgment” (196) to guide decisions regarding when to incorporate race into political coverage. This test asks journalists to consider whether a similar story involving white politicians would include comments on the politicians’ race. One of Tolley’s main take-away points is as follows: Journalists should not default to a racial explanation in explaining the behaviour or political outcomes of visible minority politicians.
Implications for Politics and Public Policy

Tolley’s evidence of the impact of racialization in media coverage raises questions for policy makers regarding the broader consequences of the politics of race in the Canadian context. Her detailed analysis demonstrates the importance of a critical engagement with the ways in which formally inclusive institutions function to reinforce exclusionary notions of belonging, such as those perpetuated by racial mediation.

Critical examination of ostensibly inclusive institutions can also help to elucidate the racialized implications of policy decisions and lay the foundation for the development of institutional frameworks that improve the state of racial politics in Canada. One case, in which a nuanced analysis of institutional norms is necessary, concerns the use of street checks or “carding” by law enforcement officials. This practice has been the subject of intense media debate in recent months, and in March 2016 Ontario’s Liberal government introduced changes to regulations of the practice. Carding has parallels in the process of racial mediation both in the transmission of exclusionary notions of belonging and in the divergence between societal expectations and actual practice. These parallels are explored further below.

Reforms to carding regulations were designed in response to ongoing public pressure and criticism regarding the racialized nature of carding. In announcements of the recent reforms, the Liberal government cited complaints that Indigenous people and people of colour were far more likely to be approached by police for “random” information gathering (Canadian Press 2016). In Toronto specifically, 25 percent of the Field Information Reports (which contain information regarding stops) filled out between 2008 and 2011 involved an interaction with a person who is black, even though the black population accounts for only 8.3 percent of the population (Rankin and Winsa 2012). The new regulations now require Ontario police officers to create a “written record of any interactions with the public…including how to contact the Independent Police Review Director.” The demographic characteristics of the citizen being questioned and the neighbourhood in which the interaction takes place cannot be used as grounds for initiating contact (Canadian Press 2016).

Media and law enforcement are both institutions that provide evidence of a divergence between societal expectations and actual practice
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in their approach to race. People with lived experience of carding shared some of their perspectives on this phenomenon in a *Globe and Mail* article from August 2015. Lascelles Small, an activist and photographer who was interviewed for the piece, observed the racialized nature of carding, noting that “carding is supposed to be different than profiling, but profiling and carding they got married and the marriage is still going on” (Young 2015). Small’s observation signals the commonly held expectation that law enforcement personnel do not discriminate based on race, as he notes that carding is considered to be distinct from racial profiling—which is openly racist. This disconnect between commonly held understanding of policing tactics derived from official policy, and what occurs in practice, has parallels in Tolley’s exploration of news media. Tolley notes that overtly racist portrayals of politicians do not appear in mainstream media and that majority sentiment reflects a belief that media practices are not structured by race. However, her more nuanced analysis points to an institutional framework underpinned by racialized assumptions that lead to different outcomes for visible minority residents than for white residents.

Notions of belonging and membership in Canadian society are shaped and transmitted by institutions such as law enforcement and media. The practice of carding visible minorities contributes to a notion of belonging that is racially exclusive despite a legal framework that prohibits race-based exclusion ostensibly guiding the practice. Carding raises questions of membership in Canadian society and reveals for whom membership is assumed and who must demonstrate their belonging through the provision of evidence of identity at the request of law enforcement officials. The practice thus has further significant parallels with Tolley’s arguments about the implications of racial mediation of political coverage, which contributes to notions of “otherness” or “novelty” of racial minority politicians.¹ Racial mediation works to reinforce notions of “who belongs” in Canada’s formal political institutions, just as the higher threshold of showing proof of citizenship experienced by racial minorities in Canada reinforces an understanding of who does not belong.

Differentiated coverage of politicians based on race has consequences for perceptions of candidate qualification. Personalized coverage that focuses on the birthplace of, or immigration by, the politician more
often accompanies stories about visible minority politicians than does coverage that highlights their qualifications or political acumen. This type of framing can raise questions about the competence and quality of a given candidate, which may place an additional burden on visible minority candidates and may have an impact on an individual’s choice to run for office. In this way, racial mediation may function to further reinforce understandings of belonging by contributing to a lack of racial diversity among elected officials. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s recent announcement of a Cabinet that “looks like Canada” signals and attempts to respond to the Canadian public’s appetite for enhanced descriptive representation. By the standard of descriptive representation, Canada’s legislature has historically not performed well, and many commentators note that the current Liberal Cabinet has some gaps despite a concerted and highly touted attempt to reflect Canada’s broad diversity (see Gagnon 2015). The insights from Tolley’s keynote address about the impact of racial mediation on the political careers and behaviour of visible minority candidates may be instructive in efforts to address this deficiency through the recruitment and election of a more diverse and thus inclusive representative body.

Tolley’s address contained arguments that have implications for the broader public, as she notes the need for a change in the discourse of race in Canada as an important first step toward a more inclusive political landscape. She maintains that the prevalence of declarations of “colour-blindness” by those wishing to demonstrate an acceptance of diversity and a commitment to inclusion. Tolley argues that claims to “not see race” are counter-productive and potentially dangerous because it is impossible to confront the dynamics of race while dominant discourse perpetuates the myth of a “post-racial” Canada. Tolley suggests that scholars, policy makers, and the general public should avoid the temptation to be self-congratulatory about the status of race relations in Canada or to subscribe uncritically to Canada’s “myth of multiculturalism” (See Perry, Levin, and Nolan 2015; Foster 2014; Ash 2004).

Tolley examines the roots of Canada’s self-congratulatory perspective on race relations and suggests that this perspective arose in part from comparisons with the United States and other countries with more obvious problems relating to the politics of race. Tolley argues that relying on comparisons with countries with more obvious racial ten-
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sion is inappropriate, as is relying on state borders to demarcate the appropriate locus for a critical analysis of race. This is a particularly important point to make in light of the exclusionary and violent racial discourse that featured prominently in the most recent US election. In 2013, 585 crimes were reported to police that were motivated by “hatred of a race or ethnicity” in Canada (Allen 2015). Racial violence in Canada suggests the need for a critical examination of the salience of race “at home.”

Other commentators have also noted the resistance on the part of Canadians to engage with the impact of race within Canada. Toronto-based human rights lawyer Anthony Morgan (2015) characterizes the commonly held reluctance to discuss or accept the existence of racial discrimination as “racial exceptionalism.” In a similar vein to Tolley, he asserts that dominant discourses frame Canada as a post-racial society in which people of colour do not face systemic discrimination or overt violence as a result of their race; alternatively, instances of racialized violence are framed as isolated incidents or individual problems. Morgan argues that this perception is incorrect. He cites ongoing police violence involving people of colour, workplace discrimination, and other experiences highlighted and decried by the Black Lives Matter movement as evidence of the impact of race on social, economic, and political outcomes in Canada.

The Canadian state’s treatment of Indigenous people provides further evidence of the inaccuracy of claims of Canada’s status as a post-racial society. The Canadian government’s historical reluctance to respond to the numerous cases of murdered and missing indigenous women provides a recent example of this treatment. This travesty, along with the other examples of racially discriminatory policies and practices noted above, reinforces the importance of a critical examination of dominant notions of belonging “at home” in Canada and the ways in which these notions are structured, in part, by institutions underpinned by racialized assumptions. Examining the implications of racial bias within Canada—as opposed to solely considering these dynamics abroad—is an important first step toward addressing racial ongoing oppression.

Tolley’s keynote address highlights the importance of a critical examination of notions of belonging in Canadian politics. Her arguments on the continued salience of race in Canada and its impact on visible
minority politicians suggest that race influences the political landscape in pernicious ways. Her arguments serve as a call for a critical examination of mainstream discourses of racial politics in Canada, which tend toward discussions of multiculturalism and inclusion. Her comments on the subtle yet significant influence of racial mediation demonstrate the need for a critical analysis of Canadian political institutions rooted in an understanding of the politics of race in Canada. Tolley’s address raises important questions and themes that serve as a valuable basis for further discussions and debates about the politics of belonging both in Canada and in the international context.

Notes

1. Tolley notes that the Canadian Press Stylebook suggests that journalists should note the ethnic background of individuals when the accomplishments or outcomes being covered are “surprising” for people of a given racial background. She points out the problems of this approach by noting the racialized assumptions that making this type of assessment requires, and the differences that follow from these assessments in the coverage of people from racial minority backgrounds. Reinforcement of “otherness” is one such outcome of this differentiated coverage.

References and Further Reading


Belonging While Not Belonging: The “Othering” of Muslim Bodies and Spaces in Canada

Natalia Equihua

Panel

Islam, Zoya. “Muslim in Canada: An Examination of Muslim Exceptionalism Through Discourses Surrounding Honour Killings and Female Genital Mutilation”
Viscardis, Katherine. “Unwelcoming Community: Local Violence and the Recolonization of ‘Canadian’ Space”
Discussant: Eleanor MacDonald

Since being officially adopted in Canada in 1988, multiculturalism went from being a policy to an ideology and a national identity that describes the country’s openness to diversity (Bannerji 2000; Haque 2010). Yet, rather than fostering inclusion, multiculturalism has created an illusion of diversity that ultimately places the English and the French at the centre of the nation as the “two founding races” (Haque 2010, 81) and relegates other ethnic groups to the margins. This has created an imaginary border within the nation that perpetuates a separation between the European “original founders” and the peripheral “others.” As a result, although Canada welcomes migrants and includes them as “part
of its economy, subject to its laws, and members of its civil society”, it excludes them from the national identity and “its self-definition as ‘Canada’ because [they] are not ‘Canadians’” (Bannerji 2000, 65). This is a logic that sociologist Himani Bannerji calls “the paradox of both belonging and non-belonging simultaneously” (65). Historically, this dynamic is a strategy that white settlers have used to legitimize their belonging to the territories they occupied during colonization. In the panel under review, the presentations by Zoya Islam and Katherine Viscardis discussed how current exclusionary acts and discourses over Muslim bodies and spaces in Canada have contributed to generating the image that Muslims do not belong in this country. This paper will review these presentations to explore how Canada has constructed the Muslim as an opposite that defines and affirms the Canadian national identity as modern, secular, and accepting. To this end, I will first discuss Z. Islam’s presentation, with attention to her argument on how Islamophobic discourses have reduced Muslims as essentially “traditional” and “barbaric,” resulting in their exclusion from the category of human. I will then move on to a discussion of Muslims’ spaces and colonialism by looking at Viscardis’s analysis of a recent arson attack on the only mosque in the city of Peterborough, Ontario, in what she calls a “recolonization of Canadian spaces.” Finally, I will conclude by looking at the presenters’ suggestions about how to address this belonging-unbelonging paradox.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, and more recently after the 2015 Paris attacks, the West declared a state of emergency that increased surveillance of certain bodies and identities. Not long after the attacks, the enemy gained a face which “[targeted] Muslims of colour as the ‘enemy within’ the physical borders of the white ‘settler colony’” (Patel 2012, 273). Indeed, in the post-9/11 world, “the Muslim” has been profiled as the enemy of the liberal-democratic society, not only militarily but also culturally. Z. Islam drew from this context to argue that Muslims in Canada experience an exclusion not just from the society at large, but from the category of *human*. Popular discourses in the media and at the policy level have contributed to the image of Muslims as either non-human or inhuman, and essentially as cultural subjects whose “identities are shaped entirely by an unchanging culture into which they are born” (Haque 2010, 88–98). Bannerji explains that the construction of non-white people as cultural subjects in Canada has
been possible through a politics of diversity that uses multiculturalism as a tool to divide the national space into cultural communities (Bannerji 2000, 7). Fixed “ethnic” characteristics, values, and cultural practices are used to define these communities and to set boundaries between one another, and between the English and French Canadian national subjects. Z. Islam’s analysis considered how fixing Muslims as cultural subjects allows for the production of discourses of exclusion that describe Muslims as “essentially religious, traditional, or pre-modern, and thus civilizationally backward” (ibid.). Her argument specifically focused on two discourses that relate to violence against women: honour killings and female genital mutilation (FGM).

Parting from Sylvia Wynter’s analysis of the formation of the concept of Man, Z. Islam explained that Muslims are dehumanized by opposing them to the ideas of modernity and secularism that have been foundational to the conception of the White Man (Wynter 2003). The inclusion of Muslims (and many other minority ethnic groups) in Canada has become a necessary compromise to aid the economic development of the nation (Bannerji 2000, 76). Yet, following the logic of Edward Said’s Orientalism, just as the Orient was used to define Europe “as [their] contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (1979, 1–2), modern-day Canada uses the dehumanization of Muslims as a tool to assert the humanity of the legitimate Canadian citizen. This dehumanization occurs in two ways: firstly, by characterizing Muslims as a culture founded on ancient traditions that contradict modern values and perspectives that is fundamentally traditional, and secondly, by linking their cultural traditions to acts of violence against women. As opposed to the discourses on terrorism, what these particular cases illustrate is the way in which the Muslim man becomes a threat to the ordinary lives of all Canadians. So, while FGM and honour killings supposedly target Muslim women, media outlets and political propositions such as the Zero Tolerance to Barbaric Cultural Practices Act extend this potential threat to all women in Western societies. The resulting effect is an exaltation of the white settler’s humanity, but one that works to “[conceal] the colonial violence that marks the origin of the national subject” (Thobani 2007, 10), and as Z. Islam pointed out, all other violent acts that white settlers commit against women. In other words, by elevating violence against women to a set of particularly “barbaric” cul-
tural practices that reside within a specific cultural group, it is possible for the white settler to “dominate, restructure, and have authority” over the Muslim (Said 1979, 3), and at the same time legitimize their own superiority on the power hierarchy. It is “legitimate Canadians” who get to make decisions about which kinds of violence against women should be addressed and which ones should be concealed.

Another aspect of the discourses of honour killings and FGM is the way in which they racialize Muslims. During the session, an audience member took exception to Z. Islam’s use of Wynter in the context of Islamophobia, arguing that Wynter’s work focuses on race rather than religion. I want to bring this critique to the forefront because it opens up the discussion of the transformation of religion into a race marker. In fact, Wynter’s work provides a useful clue to this transition. In her essay “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom,” Wynter explains that in fifteenth-century Spain, Jews and Muslims were considered “irrational” because of their religious beliefs and, as a result, they were given the option to either convert to Christianity or to be expelled. Those who agreed to convert were included in the Spanish Kingdom as political subjects but were rejected because their religious ancestry rendered them impure. Wynter concludes that the converts experienced a double exclusion: firstly, because of “their impurity or uncleanness of blood” and secondly, because of their faith (2003, 308).

When cultural differentiation is racialized (Bannerji 2000), the boundary between “legitimate” citizens and the Other stretches. As a result, Muslims may continue to exist within the physical boundaries of Canada, but outside the boundaries of national and cultural belonging. If we add to this the fact that most Muslims arrived in Canada through a migration that, in most cases, has been propelled by the “structural conditions of the global economy” (Thobani 2007, 16), then we notice that Muslims find themselves in a “perpetual estrangement,” where their inclusion becomes “conditional” as “supplicants to the nation” (ibid., 6). Indeed, their belonging becomes a vulnerable position that depends on the “goodness” of those who “fully” belong.

Although the discourses of honour killings and FGM specifically target the exclusion of Muslim men, this does not mean that Muslim women are free from experiencing exclusion. While these discourses portray white Canadians as heroes “saving brown women from brown men”
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(Spivak 1994, 93), on the flip side, Muslim women are punished—and racialized—when they adhere to the Islamic religion. An example of this is the ban on “burkinis” in France (Quinn, 2016) enforced during the summer of 2016, which excluded Muslim women from beaches unless they agreed to attend unveiled. As Haque claims, Muslim women become “the battlegrounds which clearly demarcate the line between the civilized secular modern nation and premodern religious fundamentalisms” (2010, 80). The burden of these racialized discourses of violence against women is double for the female Muslim: not only are they the victims of violence, but they also become excluded from the Canadian nation when they refuse secularism. The consequences that FGM and honour killing discourses have for Muslim women is an area that remains to be explored. Z. Islam, however, highlighted the disavowal that comes with discourses that target violence against women as culture specific, because they address some types of gender violence as more pressing than others. Instead, she argued that “all violence against women is honour based.” While Z. Islam did not produce an analysis of “honour,” we must consider that in most cases, if not all, subordination and supremacy over the female body are some of the main aspects of violence against women. For Sherene Razack, the imperial project of colonization itself is gendered and sexualized to the point that “colonizers sought to establish their claim to ownership of the land and conquest of its occupants, not only through the rape of women but also through the feminizing of colonial men” (2005, 343). Violence against women is a tool of dominance, and it is especially used when this dominance feels threatened or undermined by the subjected Other. After all, as Z. Islam rightly pointed out, “the very existence of the Canadian state is founded upon terrible acts of violence against Black and Indigenous peoples.” Violence—whether colonial or domestic—is an enactment of masculine power used to sustain and indeed “honour” a structure of dominance.

Racialization and dehumanization are not only used against Muslim bodies in order to assert a white Canadian national identity, they are also used against Muslim spaces. As Razack explains, “the national mythologies of white settler societies are deeply spatialized stories” (2002, 3). Katherine Viscardis’s talk argued that space in Canada is used as a tool of exclusion over non-white ethnic groups and, as I will argue, to
create a feeling of vulnerability that allows for the subjugation of the land and of other ethnic minorities. For this purpose, Viscardis used the example of the 2016 arson attack on the only mosque in Peterborough, Ontario. The first part of the talk centred on the initial media response to the attack. In contrast to their reports on crimes that involve ethnic minorities, in this case the media were cautious about calling the attacker a “terrorist” and of labelling the crime as “racist” or as a “hate crime” until the investigation unveiled more concrete details. Unlike the discourses against Muslims discussed in Z. Islam’s paper, which articulated violence as something communal and culture specific, here the violent act against the mosque was articulated as an isolated case. It was only after some investigation that the authorities officially called the attack a “hate crime,” and although some media outlets reported on the attack using that term, many of them devoted a large portion of their report to exalt the “goodness” of the non-Muslim community and their solidarity with those affected. The Globe and Mail for example wrote: “Peterborough has displayed a unified front. Along with condemnations of the arson attack, the mayor, police chief, local Member of Parliament and church leaders offered a portrait of a tolerant and welcoming community” (Chowdry 2015). In Sunera Thobani’s words, this shows how the failings of Canadian national subjects are treated as “individual and isolated ones. The failings of outsiders, however, are seen as reflective of the inadequacies of their community, of their culture, and indeed, of their entire ‘race’” (2007, 6).

Beyond these media discourses that “mediate the imagination” of the Canadian national community (Haque 2010), the second part of Viscardis’s presentation focused on the white settler’s construction of himself as the cartographer of the Canadian territory. From the moment of the initial colonization to the present day, white settlers have created mythologies and legends of the Great White North. The most important aspect of these myths is that they have justified the declaration of Indigenous lands as terra nullius, a “racist legal fiction that declared Indigenous peoples too ‘primitive’ to bear rights to land and sovereignty” (Coulthard 2014, 175). Glen Coulthard has extended this term to modern urban spaces, calling them urbs nullius or “urban space void of Indigenous sovereign presence” (ibid., 176). Historically, both strategies have been used by settlers to displace and marginalize minorities,
and subsequently to seize control of the land. Those who control the land, in this case white settlers, also get to decide who belongs and who does not. In Peterborough, the mosque and its members acquired a “conditional” belonging (Thobani 2007, p. 6). The attacker’s decision to deliberately set fire to the mosque after its community members had left, shows an intent to create fear rather than bodily injury. At the same time, the level of destruction, which rendered the mosque unusable, also shows the attacker’s objective to erase this Muslim space. Making the space appear vulnerable is a tactic that, according to Viscardis, suits the settler project because it prevents the Muslim person from ever feeling fully part of the wider Canadian community. Here, it is worth revisiting Razack’s idea that feminization is a tool of colonialism (2005, 343). Although, in this case, feminization “is more about emasculating a male than about ownership of a female body” (Krishnaswamy 1998, 3) because, by generating fear in the Muslim community, the attacker positioned himself as fearless, dominant, and reactive, in direct opposition to the fear he generated. At the same time, the national benevolence and support, reported in The Globe as a “portrait of a tolerant and welcoming community” (Chowdry 2015), emphasized Canada’s response as rational, reasonable, and morally acceptable. This is in complete opposition to the discourses analyzed by Z. Islam that portrayed Muslims as “intolerant” and “violent.” Thus, rather than the attack showcasing the exclusion of Muslims, it served to also exalt the Canadian citizen as one who condemns violence. The consequence of this kind of exaltation is that it forces Muslims—as well as other minority groups—“to remain grateful to the white gatekeepers for allowing them the privilege of setting foot within the physical borders of the nation” (Patel 2012, 277). Ultimately, what this example demonstrates is that Muslims’ belonging and unbelonging is mediated by white settlers’ violence as much as by their benevolence.

The discussions in these two presentations described not only how a settler nation imagines the Other as a violent threat against its people and its values, but also how that same nation subjugates non-ethnic Others through violent acts (such as attacks to their community spaces) and dehumanizing discourses. In Canada, these two ways of excluding Muslims are used both to generate a state of vulnerability and instability of Muslim bodies and spaces and also to exalt Canadians’ tolerance and
benevolence. As a result, Muslims are invited to belong but they are also denied belonging whenever the nation requires to describe itself as secular, rational, and modern. In her final comments as a discussant for the panel, Eleanor MacDonald posed an important question regarding the actions that can be done to counter exclusion and, I want to add, to avoid this paradoxical belonging. MacDonald asked Viscardis to consider what exists beyond her unmapping critique, a question that can also be extended to Islam’s analysis. There is not a straightforward response to this question, but it is a necessary one, and part of the answer is perhaps the need to continue to produce critical analyses that deconstruct the way in which minority groups in Canada remain on the periphery. Perhaps in order to understand the ways in which the imagined border between white Canadians and the racialized Others may eventually be removed is to look beyond national discourses and mainstream media, and to examine bordering through the agency and the lens of those affected by these racist discourses. In her final remarks, Z. Islam asked Canadians to stop advocating for Muslim assimilation, a situation that she says impacts more than one ethnic minority in Canada, particularly recent immigrants. As Haque (2010) argues, the ideal of a linear integration of immigrants into the dominant white culture in Canada often ignores important socioeconomic and psychological challenges that result in violence and discontent. Viscardis, on the other hand, concluded with an invitation to reflect on the violent foundations of the Canadian nation and how these continue to repeat with other ethnic groups. Bannerji (2000) and Thobani (2007) agree that the racialization of ethnic minorities through policies like multiculturalism have also created rivalries between these groups. It is necessary to delve into these dissonances to deconstruct the power hierarchy that white settlers have created and that they control. In the end, what resonates with communities such as the Muslims, is that the border that the Canadian nation has crafted allows for only a partial inclusion that is haunted by a feeling of unbelonging.
References and Further Reading


Wynter, Sylvia. 2003. “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/
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A critical reflection on the arguments presented in Nationalisms and Identities in Canada

JESSICA L. MEROLLI

Panel

Jacques, Olivier. “The Use of Social Policy in the Federal-Provincial Competition to Shape Quebecers’ Identity.”
Robbins-Kanter, Jacob. “Political Discourse Quality in a Bilingual Setting: A Study of French and English Leaders’ Debates in Canada.”
Discussant: Jessica L. Merolli

Canadian politics is continually caught up in the tensions between distinct national identities and state unity. In comparative work, Canada’s ability to manage these tensions is held out as an exceptional, or even aspirational, case (Bloemraad 2006; Joppke 2012; Kymlicka 2010). Rather than thinking about identities as primordial or inherent, post-structural and constructivist scholars have pushed us to think about how identity is produced through the labour that goes into creating the boundaries of the community (Anderson 1991; Walters 2004). In studies of nationalism, we often turn to the state as the powerful actor with the techniques at its disposal to achieve these ends. However, identities
are not fixed, and they require continual collective and individual labour to be sustained.

The papers in this panel attend to the underlying assumptions that inform our contemporary understanding of how national identities are produced and, perhaps more accurately, are reinforced. Although not always explicit on this matter, the papers are trying to determine what might explain the persistence of the dual nationalisms in Canada, beyond the federal structure. While the production of identities is a central topic in political studies, we have only begun to examine the various sites for investigating the work that produces these identities. Drawing from post-structural accounts that emphasize the importance of language and discourses to shaping political realities, we might also ask, how do certain discourses gain traction over others and how are those discourses materialized through institutions that are informed by their logic? With these comments, I do not intend to impose my own ontological or epistemological commitments on the authors but instead to situate their work within these existing and dynamic debates.

The remainder of this paper moves in two parts. First, I provide a more detailed overview of the arguments advanced by the authors on the panel. While seriously considering their arguments, I turn my attention to what I see as an emergent and necessary call to problematize our understandings of nationalist politics in Canada. The critiques I offer on the current state of the literature, including my own work, emerge from the activist movements of Idle No More and Black Lives Matter, which work to trouble our rather narrow (read: racist) understanding of nationalisms in Canada and our role as scholars in (re)producing these logics. Then, looking to the “affective turn,” in the fields of international politics, sociology, and anthropology, I argue that Canadian politics generally, and Canadian nationalism and identity studies specifically, would benefit from their own “turn” in this direction.

Olivier Jacques argues that his piece on the instrumental use of social policy by nationalist projects responds to a clear gap in the literature, where scholars rely on pure theory or case comparisons to make their claims. Instead, he proposes to look at a single case, Quebec, and to use survey data to test the theory. For Jacques, federalism is at least part of the explanation, as it sets out the institutional parameters that allow the Quebec National Assembly to use social policy to shore up support
for the nationalist movement. While politicians and political informants might tell us that they use social policy in this way, Jacques seeks to test if this strategy actually works. Drawing on survey and social spending data from 1996–2014, he finds that social spending does have an effect on identification with Canadian and Québécois identity but that this relationship is complex. He finds that although changes in provincial expenditures, relative to federal expenditures, have no effect on Québécois identity, when the proportion increases, identification with Canadian identity decreases. Meanwhile, increases in federal direct transfers have a negative impact on identification with Québécois, and increase the likelihood that Quebeckers will identify with being Canadian. Further, the relationship between federal direct transfers and identity are even stronger; this relationship remains robust—even when controlling for political party, GDP growth, and deficits. All of this suggests that this strategy is far more effective for federal governments than provincial governments.

While the piece provides important empirical data that confirms, at least partially, what many take for granted, the limitations of research design and operationalization of the data suggest that more research is needed. While the Moreno questions are firmly established in the field, they do have two important ontological biases: They assume that identities are ordered, even if that order is a tie, and they ontologize Canadian and Québécois as (the only) identities that exist. This is not unique to this paper and is a point I will turn to below. However, the more important limitation here is the reliance on expenditures as a measure of social spending. In order to avoid a double-count of government transfers for health care, education, and social services, Jacques excludes federal transfers to the provinces. This is problematic for two reasons. First, public health care remains a key source of national pride, notwithstanding the confusion over who funds or provides the care. This leads to the second concern: If we are to expect investment in the welfare state to stimulate identification with that order of government, does it matter who is funding the program? Or are people’s perceptions of who is responsible for providing and expanding the services what matters? Moreover, developing a measure that can address perceptions of government support would allow for comparisons across institutional contexts, where federal structures are different (i.e., Flanders), or powers
are delegated within a unitary state (i.e., Catalonia, Scotland).

Where Jacques tries to provide an explanation for dual nationalism, the paper by Jacob Robbins-Kanter uses the federal election debates to revisit the question of whether there are distinct differences between French and English debates with regards to the quality of discourse. Polling data suggest that, despite strong regional identities, the political values across the provinces are quite similar, with Quebec the only outlier (c.f. Wiseman 2008). Robbins-Kanter suggests that differences in the deliberative quality of the debate might help to explain why French- and English-speaking Canadians have different opinions and relationships with the various leaders and political parties. Although the author does not make this point, I would add that these kinds of differences in deliberation during debates may also help to explain variation in political culture across regions. However, the direction of the causal mechanism remains unclear: Do leaders present their ideas differently because they are responding to different political cultures, or are the cultures produced through these differences, or both?

As an exploratory paper, Robbins-Kanter’s analysis is unable to provide such answers. Using the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI), he adapts the tool to fit the parameters of the debate context. The DQI scores speeches on six indicators: ability to participate, level of justification for position held, inclusiveness of the justification, content of justification (interest-based versus values-based), acknowledgement of counter arguments, and general tone. In comparing the French and English debates, Robbins-Kanter finds that the French debates score higher, with 51 percent of speeches classified as deliberative, compared to 36 percent for the English debate (13). However, he does not find much difference between the performance of the individual candidates, with the exception of Elizabeth May, who scored much lower in French, possibly because of her low level of French proficiency. Robbins-Kanter does not provide an explanation for the absence of difference, but argues that his findings suggest that the debate format itself may be preventing high quality discourse.
New Directions?

Across the various panels of the *Borders and Belonging* conference, participants grappled with questions about how divisions between us and them, citizen and foreigner, home and abroad are constructed and challenged. We saw in the plenary panel by Erin Tolley (2016) how media coverage of electoral candidates is informed by, and contributes to, racist discourses. These panellists on nationalism turned attention to the French and English cleavages within Canada, but in their own way, also addressed how language can structure people’s understanding of themselves and others. In taking the insights of Tolley’s conclusions seriously, I would add that, as scholars of nationalism and identity in Canada, we must attend to how our own research and work is also informed by, and contributes to, racist discourses.

What is left unsaid and assumed in studies of nationalism in Canada? As scholars we are often caught up in competing commitments—to our disciplines and fields of study, to our departments, to the communities we study, and to our own principles, among others. The tension between conceptual clarity and breadth is often where we work through the fine balance of our various commitments. How can we be interested in the Québécois and English nationalisms at play in Canada, and remain committed to challenging and dismantling white supremacy? Does our study of these topics reify these constructed identities and give them added weight over other identities? What does it mean, and what do we understand when we characterize people as having “ambivalent identity” because that identity is not fixed to a privileged identity?

In the months that preceded and followed this conference, Canadians excluded from these narratives have demanded to be heard and seen. Both Idle No More and Black Lives Matter are emergent and necessary critiques of the kinds of assumptions that are embedded within our work. They demand that we acknowledge the ways in which race is erased and ignored. For example, when survey questions ask participants to identify with either Canada or Quebec, other identities are rendered invisible. This is particularly problematic for Indigenous peoples, for whom the continued denial of nationhood remains a key pillar of the ongoing colonial project in Canada. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that all research needs to address every question at play in Canadian
politics; this would not only be impossible, but would undermine the collaborative nature of academic research. Instead, I argue that scholars engaged in the study of nationalism and identity politics should both emphasize the constructed natures of the categories they are using and be more forthright with the limitations of their own work. In particular, we need to place at the centre of our own analysis the ways in which our work feeds into the construction of the categories we are studying, a practice which is more well established in other fields of political studies.

As a distinct field of study, I would like to suggest that scholars of Canadian nationalism are lagging in another respect. Whereas we have witnessed the “affective” turn in a variety of sub-disciplines in political studies, and especially in critical approaches to international relations, this turn is only in its nascent forms in Canadian politics. Attending to this approach in our studies does not necessitate that we abandon epistemological or ontological positions. Scholars within this field range from political psychologists (Neuman et al., 2007) to critical feminist theorists (Ahmed, 2004). Instead, what I am arguing is that we should abandon thinking about the study of affect as a sub-field of politics, and instead ask ourselves what we miss when we ignore the affective dimensions of whatever political phenomenon we study. After all, nationalism and identity politics is, at its heart, about understanding how fellow-feeling is produced and deployed: how we feel love or show concern for the members of our imagined community, and hate and disdain for others.

How would these new directions change the kinds of questions we ask and the ways we go about trying to answer them? I turn back to the papers of this panel to offer some examples. The research questions presented are compelling in their own ways because they take up generally accepted theories in Canadian politics and attempt to test them. Accepting the positivist orientation of the research design, I think that much can be gained in adopting mixed-methods in data collection and analysis. Especially for new scholars, I understand the appeal to using existing data sets as the basis of our research; for example, Jacques’s piece highlights how such data can be used to identify broad patterns in the relationship between social spending and identification. However, as a deeply affective phenomenon, survey data, which demands clearly
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defined categories, necessarily misses important aspects of how identities are formed, performed, and changed. The kind of information I am speaking about cannot be ascertained simply by controlling for a variety of individual markers, be it race, gender, country of origin, language spoken, and so on. Integrating qualitative methods into research design can help us to better understand not only how and why investment in social spending increases identification with a particular nationalism, but also how those nationalisms are (re)constructed through those identifications. Responding to Jacques’s own questions about how to compare across cases, I suggest that adopting a mixed-method approach would allow researchers to focus on people’s perceptions of social spending, instead of on financial arrangements of which they might not be aware or understand. Such an approach would focus research on individual narratives and lived experiences, and would thus open researchers to consider the perspectives of those who live outside of official or dominant narratives of belonging.

As I have tried to emphasize in my reflections, language matters in Canadian politics, and not just in terms of the linguistic cleavages across the country. Post-structural scholars point to a variety of discourses circulating in society and trace how particular discourses came to dominate and are materialized in legislative or institutional form (Milliken 1999). Robbins-Kanter’s piece looks at discourses from a different perspective and attempts to quantify the quality of discourse. While I accept the author’s methodological choices, it is useful to remember that scholarship is always already caught up in the production of its own set of paradigms (Kuhn 2012). In calling on scholars of Canadian politics to attend to the affective dimensions of politics, I am asking that we disrupt our a priori assumptions that positions rationality in opposition to emotions. One of the issues with the DQI is that it is based on this presupposition. Affective discourses are powerful, but they are not inherently bad as a result. Affect can be deployed as a critique of purely rationalist arguments, which themselves can be exclusionary and violent. Again, Idle No More and Black Lives Matter remain examples of how affect and “high quality” deliberation can go hand in hand.

The papers presented by this panel draw our attention to the multiplicity of actors who are engaged in the construction of, and resistance to, state-based identities. Robbins-Kanter’s paper points to how
political parties, politicians, and media actors work to produce different English and French national political discourses during elections, an insight that could be carried beyond the election cycle. Similarly, Jacques focuses on how the funding and delivery of social services influences individual identities. Together they draw attention to the sustained work that goes into producing particular identities that dominate our individual and collective understandings of Canadian politics. These are important contributions to the literature on the dual nature of nationalism in Canada. However, our role as scholars of politics must include space to challenge the centrality of these identities within our work and to respond to the way in which scholarship is implicated in the construction of boundaries between “us” and “them.” To understand national identity in Canada requires that we situate our work within the broader struggle for recognition and for resistance to systemic violence, exemplified by the Idle No More and Black Lives Matter movements. Revisiting these embedded assumptions allows us to understand how our research remains embedded within, and contributes to, systems of inequality and can push us to focus our work on dismantling and constructing a new something better.

References and Further Reading

Migration, Violence, Human Rights Violations, and Identity Contestations in the Borderlands

A critical reflection of the arguments presented in the Critical Reflections on Borders, Migration, and Violence panel

América Nicte-Ha López Chávez

Panel

Abawi, Zuhra. “Solidarity through Dialogue: Indigenous and Migrant Voices in Education”
Equihua, Natalia. “Migration, Culture, and Syncretism: The Dynamics of Cultural Relations at the Borders”
Lee, Monica. “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Intrastate Conflict”
Odutayo, Aramide. “From Human Security to Global Ethics? An Examination of the International Refugee Crisis”
Discussant: Celia Romulus

The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which is often cited as the beginning of the current international system, created sovereign nation states and borders (Kissinger, 1994; Gross, 1948). It was designed to bring order and peace, but currently the world is rife with armed conflicts, forced
migrations, and state violence. The four papers presented allude to these problems, albeit from different perspectives and contexts, demonstrating how a border does not simply demarcate two sovereign states, but is also a contested territorial space that can spur conflict, displacement, identity issues, and/or violence.

This review critically assesses the papers presented during the panel, navigating their arguments regarding applied ethics and gender-based violence, solidarity, education practices for immigrant and indigenous students, and cultural exchange on the Mexican-American border. The papers offer thought-provoking reflections, with the common undercurrent that borders have grave consequences for the people living beside them, and for those trying to navigate through and around them. These papers highlight how borders have the potential to reshape, construct, and assimilate identities, which occurs as people engage in practices that contest border-shaped identities.

**Critical Review of the Presentations**

Critically assessing the gendered implications of war and governance, Monica Lee argues that gender-based and sexual violence has always been present in intra-and inter-state conflict, applying this argument to the case study of a Jordanian refugee camp. Lee further argues that the gendered perspective of conflict—especially within inter-state conflict—is uncommon in the international arena, as women (as combatants and non-combatants) are frequently ignored in the literature or appear as vulnerable, helpless victims.

Lee’s argument underscores the importance of paying attention to the gendered assumptions that may underpin the UN’s and other international agencies’ assessment of victimization in conflict. Her arguments regarding the relationship between borders, gender, and (in)security are not entirely novel; feminist scholars have long paid attention to the ways in which borders—artificially imposed but nonetheless eliciting tangible effects—need to be understood with a keen eye to gendered experiences (Wood 2009; Livingston 2004; Talpade Mohanty 2003; Razack 1995; Anzaldúa 1987). According to Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003), “borders suggest both containment and safety, and women
often pay a price for daring to claim the integrity, security, and safety of our bodies and our living spaces” (1–2). Lee’s analysis suggests that the UN and other intergovernmental organizations have much to learn from strong, gendered analyses of victimization and survivorship in the borderlands.

Taking a more theoretical approach, Aramide Odutayo applies John Rawls’ veil of ignorance (1971) to the issue of states refusing to accept refugees. Odutayo demonstrates how actions taken by such governments are ethically unjustifiable. Imagine that behind the veil of ignorance, decision makers do not know whether their citizens will be refugees or not. If this were possible, they would not and could not ethically justify excluding refugees. Odutayo takes this argument further to consider contemporary cases where states, such as Canada, detain successful asylum claimants by implementing restrictive policies. Since the early 1990s, “women fleeing severely abusive spouses, who can show that their countries of origin are unwilling or unable to protect them can now argue that domestic violence is a form of persecution as understood in Canadian refugee law” (Razack 1995, 47). Applying Odutayo’s ethical guidelines, such actions could not and would not be justified behind the veil of ignorance.

Turning a critical gaze toward within-border questions, Zuhra Abawi discusses the ways Canadian education could be improved by centring indigenous peoples and immigrants in curricula and dialogue. There is evidence that within Canadian education regarding multiculturalism, there is a perpetual division of non-white and indigenous students (James 2008; Kehoe 1994). As a result, Abawi puts forth a critical race critique, which includes interrogating the system of white supremacy and privilege toward a critical understanding on how racism impacts racialized bodies through systemic and institutional pressures.

According to Abawi, multiculturalism is a “divide and conquer policy,” that keeps immigrants and indigenous peoples separated and in competition for scarce resources in a neoliberal educational system and market economy. Instead, Abawi proposes a counter narrative where teacher education programs and school administrators initiate sensitivity training, as well as professional development programs, to ensure that non-white and indigenous students can understand one another’s experiences; thus, they will become better versed in diversity and inte-
migration, which can lead to an atmosphere of solidarity. Abawi highlights the contestation of identities and the potentiality for solidarity and resistance in education strategies.

Natalia Equihua demonstrates that internal borders are not the only sites of identity contestation. The US-Mexico border has become a symbol of geographic, social, and cultural exclusion, whereby the majority culture excludes the minority in order to maintain hegemony. At the same time, the US-Mexico border is a space in which cultures interact and are fundamentally changed through this interaction. As James Clifford (1992) puts it, “even the harshest conditions of travel, the most exploitative regimes, do not entirely quell resistance or the emergence of diasporic and migrant cultures” (108). Equihua maintains that the US-Mexico border is a space whereby identities are created and contested; it is both an open wound dividing a pueblo and, on the other hand, a way to bring two sides together (Anzaldúa 1987, 24–25). Equihua argues that it is essential to reimagine borders as transactional spaces where goods and dynamic cultures are exchanged. Yet, these borderland spaces are not harmonious, as each cultural interaction has its particularities and incompatibilities, and the minority continues to resist total domination. Nevertheless, Equihua emphasizes that minority cultures enmesh with the dominant culture while retaining unique pieces of their own heritage.

**Critical Reflections on Borders**

Borders are contested spaces where identities are negotiated, solidarity and exchange are possible, ethics are tested, and violence occurs. As Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) puts it, “the coming together of two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference [borders] causes un choque, a cultural collision” (100). Therefore, “borders” mark physical and political demarcations but also refer to conceptual communities that have unique ethnic, linguistic, and gender characteristics. What these papers expose is the ways in which (contested) borders continue to directly impact the well-being of peoples, cultures, and identities.

The papers present open space in which to consider additional areas of research that have policy ramifications. Lee, for example, argues
that a gendered perspective of sexual violence in conflict is needed to highlight the ways in which non-combatants also face violence during conflict. What Lee adds to this discussion is the importance of considering the psychological impacts of sexual violence, which suggests that understandings of victimhood need to be expanded to capture how conflict is gendered.

Taking a critical view of contested ethnocultural borders within states, Abawi’s thoughtful discussion of the failures of multicultural education practices brings into sharp focus the supposed success of multicultural policies. Canadian multiculturalism is touted as exemplary for its accommodation of immigrants (Kymlicka 2012, 2015; Kymlicka and Banting 2006, 2013), yet nefarious racism in Ontario schools suggests that either multicultural policies intend to reconstitute potentially harmful ethnocultural borders or multicultural education policies, in Ontario at least, are failing. Is anti-racism education the solution? There is a considerable amount of scepticism about the usefulness of anti-racism education in Canada (Kehoe 1994). Nonetheless, Abawi presents compelling ideas that suggest a reconsideration of the status quo in education.

These papers highlight the importance of considering the spatial, ethnocultural, and political context of borders. While none of the papers explicitly discuss this theme, it is clear that specificity can be key towards understanding the complexities of contested borders. Focusing on the specific socio-political dynamics of the borders discussed in each paper could advance future studies on the intersecting identities of power and privilege among those living in or around them.

Notes
1. This initial assumption is problematic. Discussing the relative absence of sexual violence committed by the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka, Elisabeth Jean Wood argues that since sexual violence is sometimes rare in war, “there are stronger grounds for holding responsible those groups that do engage in sexual violence” (2009, 131). In other words, sexual violence is not an inevitable aspect of conflict.
References and Further Reading

Challenges to Conceptualizing Security in a Context of Change, Governance, and Globalization

A structural analysis of arguments presented in the Internal and External Borders and Security panel

SAMANTHA TWIETMEYER

Panel

Donald-Tebutt, Ashley. “Unnecessary Enemies: Human Rights as a Form of Security”
Discussant: Kyle Hanniman

Despite the seemingly simplistic suggestion of the panel’s title, “Internal and External Borders and Security,” policy making regarding security provision is extremely complicated and faces ever-emerging challenges
to conceptualizations of borders, security, and power. The relationship among these concepts forms a complex web of connections and shifting interpretations, which were addressed by the four panellists under review in this paper. In attempting to define security, the four papers confronted the contradictory nature of who provides and receives security across a variety of research areas, and their ultimate findings raise serious questions and policy concerns about the role of governments in security provision. In order to encompass the lessons drawn from the assorted contributions, this discussion will progress through three general topic areas, beginning with a process of defining and framing security through the structural lens of Susan Strange (1998), then moving to observe the constitutive impact of the porousness of borders, and concluding with a discussion of the role of the market in determining emerging issues for borders and security.

In defining security, while the panellists illustrate the multiple approaches taken by scholars toward both power and security, as a group they highlight the structural relations of power that create security as examined by Strange (1998). Power is generally understood as a product of relations among actors, as the ability of some to impose their will on others. Steven Lukes (1974) famously expanded this to capture the structural nature of these relations, including not only direct power over decisions, but power over the choices and even the questions guiding those decisions. Strange examines these relations within the international political economy and categorizes them into four structures: security, finance, production, and knowledge. She suggests that in order to understand power relations in the security structure, one must understand “who provides security to whom,” “against what perceived threats,” and to whom “a state, a corporation, a social group or an individual look[s] for greater security” (45). In mapping out the actors and power relations involved in each of the presentations in this panel, one can highlight the structural nature of the provision of security. Moreover, this security provision is influenced by the production and knowledge structures of both the state and the market beyond the state. It is through these trans-border structural relations that the panel demonstrates the fuzziness and porousness of borders that are characteristic of security in a context of change and globalization.

In Andrew Nguyen’s analysis, for example, these questions are an-
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answered at the provincial level with a competition for power over security between the courts and the legislatures. His analysis of charter compliance between the provincial legislature and the judiciary following the 2007 Supreme Court of British Columbia’s ruling on *Health Services and Support vs. British Columbia (BC Health)*, which overturned essential services legislation (ESL), raises the question of authority in provincial legislation. Nguyen finds that the BC Supreme Court decision had little impact on the subsequent passing of similar ESL in Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, noting that this could be a function of vagueness of terminology in the BC Health decision or of institutional constraints in smaller provinces. He also notes that the BC Supreme Court ruling gains greater importance in the hands of opposition parties in provinces where they now have the power to legally overturn any ESL based on the BC Health precedent, regardless of provincial context. “Security” here is defined as the provision of public safety. Nguyen suggests that this case supports an argument that public reliance on the court system to make favourable decisions is undermining the elected legislature’s role in decision making and provision of services—such as security—to their constituents, thereby contributing to democratic debilitation in terms of the authority of the people. This raises the question: Do Canadian citizens and residents want issues of constitutional rights decided through litigation or through the political process? Depending on the perception of the threat, whether it be a lack of health workers due to labour action or a violation of the labour rights of health workers by the government, the response to the question of who is ultimately responsible for this security provision is widely divergent.

Hayley McNorton’s study turns the discussion of borders to the international level in looking at Ontario’s border security with the United States in the Great Lakes and Saint Lawrence River regions. Her analysis highlights the strains placed on security providers in the region by the Trusted Trader & Traveller Program and the problems of monitoring a marine environment. McNorton suggests that Ontario’s border security is best improved by a layered approach, pushing border security back from the physical boundary and conducting risk-management assessments before people reach the border itself. Here, the concept of security is also defined in terms of public safety, where the risks to the public stemming from current challenges to the state’s ability to monitor and
control various forms of cross-border activity are under examination. Similarly to Nguyen, the concluding point in this analysis is that the government officials, whom the public might expect to be held responsible for provision of public security, such as workers in the Canadian Border Security Agency in this case, may not ultimately be the actors who are doing the providing. If risk management for a marine border with trade-efficiency measures such as the Trusted Trader & Traveller Program needs to be conducted in layers prior to reaching the border, then the duty of security provision for the destination country will rest upon the country of origin. But how does the public hold a foreign country accountable for this provision? Security thus becomes an exercise in good faith. Returning to Strange’s set of parameter questions, the “who” providing the security in this scenario is a foreign state, while the individuals, groups, and companies seeking security can only turn their expectations toward their home states.

This disruption of expectation and reality where security is concerned is a particular dilemma for a state-centric estimation of security provision. As Peter Andreas observed in his 2003 analysis of US policy toward clandestine transnational actors, there is a “widening gap between the traditional realist conception of security and borders and what many states are actually doing in the realm of security and border defenses” (82). Much of this tension, and possibly some of the resolution, can be seen as an effect of the market on border regions, requiring innovative action such as cooperative cross-border security provision in order to allow for the “opening up” and demilitarization of border regions for trade. This also demonstrates that the power dynamic in this provision of security is not quite as cut and dried as some of the recipients of this security might perceive it to be, with deference to market security demands taking precedence over traditional notions of state security, such as in the Trusted Trader & Traveller Program. The above examples demonstrate that there is a disconnect in the general expectations of who is responsible for providing security and who is inevitably doing the providing. They also call into question a simple binary of internal and external security by demonstrating that borders are not as finite as they might appear to be.

This border porosity is exemplified by Ashley Donald-Tebutt’s approach to the question of human rights regimes through a realist
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perspective of international security. Donald-Tebutt argues that human rights (HR) can and should be considered through a realist lens as a strategy by which a state can increase its power and influence through the hegemonic power of international norms. This argument rests on a conceptualization of globalization as a border-erasing mechanism in which ideas are a global currency of power and influence. The argument supports a hegemonic theory of power relations, suggesting that security at the global level can be influenced by one power’s compliance or non-compliance with an international regime if they are important enough in the system. The notion of hegemonic power encompasses a combination of military, economic, and ideological influence. This latter form of influence can be observed in global state responses, both positive and negative, to various policy decisions within the United States (Anderson 2007, 461–462). Donald-Tebutt chooses to illustrate this by a case study on international terrorism and the violations of HR through the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp. In presenting terrorism as a radicalization process, or pyramid (Leuprecht et al. 2010), Donald-Tebutt asserts that HR compliance can provide the means to interrupt pathways of victimization and political grievances before they progress to support for terrorism.1 Under Strange’s framework (1988), the United States becomes the expected provider of national security for other states in the international system, yet the US has no responsibility to provide security beyond its own interests. The argument made by Donald-Tebutt is that in the borderless world of ideas, where international terrorism is structured, it is in fact to the benefit of the national interest of the US to provide this security. In order to be responsible to its public, the US should demonstrate HR compliance, thereby being accountable to its own public while also providing the security expected by other states in the international system.

Working in the realm of environmental disaster and economic policy, Korey Pasch establishes a different perspective on security and borders than the other three panellists because his focus is on the insurance market rather than government relations. Despite this difference, his study also provides an examination of structures of power and security, focusing more squarely on the role of the economy in determining these positions of power. The natural disaster “market” is intriguing because of the localized nature of the event versus the trans-national availability of
the investment opportunity. Pasch presents a study of insurance-linked securities and catastrophe bonds (CatBonds), a method of reinsurance in the United States stemming from the adaptation of the market to “nature’s casino” (Lewis 2007). Pasch’s major concern is to turn the literature away from market- and policy-based understandings of the rise of these financial instruments toward a discourse-based understanding of the role of structural power in their emergence by asking, “who benefits?” Investors stand to gain a significant return should a natural disaster fail to occur within the bond’s allotted duration; however, they lose their interest in the event that a catastrophe occurs. Meanwhile, the insurers who sell the bonds are entirely covered. But in terms of the individuals, groups, and companies who are purchasing the insurance that is then being sold into CatBonds, rates fluctuate not in relation to their own circumstances, but rather due to the re-insurance market and investors’ demands. Therefore, actors who utilize financial instruments that rely on environmental disaster have power over this relationship and ultimately over security provision.

Access to post-disaster insurance is vital for people who live and work in potential disaster regions, and its availability and affordability is, therefore, a mechanism of security provision. As the market moves toward profit in this particular industry, this provision of security is called into question. In the US, instruments such as CatBonds are not yet sold at the national level, and their rise is recent enough in the US market that policy for control or monitoring are not yet operating in many US states. But this raises the question of who exactly is monitoring the provision of security and, as with Nguyen’s earlier argument, who should be doing so? Is it the state? Is it the market? In other parts of the world, the state itself has chosen to use CatBonds to finance its disaster response and preparedness; the WorldBank even services their provision to catastrophe-prone, less-developed regions (Ghesquiere and Mahul 2010). This may be a decision that the US will have to take up in the future as this market expands, and the inevitable change in the dynamics of security provision that will follow demonstrates the need to consider the role of the market in shaping these structural relationships of power and security.

In States and Markets (1998), Strange pushes scholars of the structures of security in political economy to move beyond the “who” and
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the “what” to question the systemic aspects of security, power, and economy. Key points of inquiry include questioning variation in the provision of security due to individual states, whether security provision is affected by markets and economic development, and whether there is a significance in the balance of power in the society of states (46). The first question is confronted in Nguyen’s piece on inter-provincial influences on Charter compliance. It appears as though the provincial interest takes precedence over the definition and provision of security, although this might be challenged in the future. In terms of the latter question, Donald-Tebutt’s theory has the potential to suggest that there is indeed a significance in the “geometry” of the international security structure. Particularly as this concerns the market of ideas and information, the role of the hegemonic power in the production and dissemination of regimes is vital to the notion that ideas can have a realist dynamic of power. McNorton’s work addresses the question of market influence, clearly demonstrating a necessary shift in border security policy as a response to the opening of the US-Canada trading relationship. This impact of the market on provision of security is also shown through Pasch’s analysis of insurance-linked securities and CatBonds.

The resulting policy lessons of this panel are three-fold. The first is that defining the parameters of security and power are instrumental to understanding the dynamics and conflicts inherent in the provision of security. For policy makers, it is important to try to understand where there might be a disconnect between what the people expect to be provided and by whom, and what happens in the reality of the state and international system. This could help mitigate miscommunication and disagreement and allow for a stronger position of authority as well as a more efficient provision of security. Furthermore, the provision of security does not necessarily adhere to an interpretation of “borders” as sovereign national boundaries or lines on a map.

The second major lesson, therefore, is a growing acknowledgement of the variety of ways in which borders are porous and the need for innovation in security theory and policy. The papers demonstrate that scholarship has come a long way since Peter Andreas’s (2003) admonishments about the reluctance to include porous border policing and monitoring in literature around national security policy. However, there is still work to be done on this topic of porousness. Donald-Tebutt, in
particular, confronts almost full border erasure in terms of the external influences that impact national security. No panellist goes so far as to suggest that national border security has disappeared as a reality for states, but each demonstrates an understanding of the constantly shifting nature of borders. It is most likely that these shifts will become more important as trade relations open more avenues of cross-border cooperation.

This leads to the third and final observation I will make from this panel, which is that market forces create an environment where questions of security provision by the state require creative policy responses. In the area of insurance-linked securities and CatBonds, states must make a decision about whether it is their responsibility to monitor and control the reinsurance due to the resulting impacts the instruments have on the communities suffering disaster. Where are the borders drawn in the insurance and reinsurance market? These market forces are also directly tied to the question of Ontario border security raised by McNorton’s piece. Here, the demands of the free trade area under NAFTA require a porous Canada-US border. In Ontario, with the high levels of border traffic and the length of the marine border, this creates major issues for the policing of criminal activity that have to be overcome by creative policy responses; once again the state must confront the question of what level of interference in the market it is willing to commit to for the purposes of providing security. These issues frame a larger debate regarding the authority of the government versus that of the market. There are important questions to be considered in determining what type of government best serves the security interests of its constituents: one that defers to the market or judiciary, for example, or one that exerts power upon these other forms of authority. This panel demonstrates the many different lenses through which these issues can be analyzed—by these emerging scholars and by the political science discipline as a whole.

Notes

1. For more on the radicalization theory as pathways of ideas and perceptions, see: McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). This theory suggests that radicalization operates through mechanisms that can be interrupted by
directives policy.

2. Also see: “Catastrophe Risk Financing” at Treasury.WorldBank.org for information on CatBonds in Mexico and the Caribbean.

3. There is a fourth systemic question in States and Markets (Strange 1998) regarding the influence of technological change. This can certainly be raised in relation to all four papers; however, for the purposes of my key findings from the presentations, I have decided to set this discussion aside. I would suggest this question has much purchase for continuing this conversation around the structural conditions of security provision.

References and Further Reading


(Re)Framing Identity in the Borderlands: Agency, Power, and the State

An analysis of the arguments presented in the Identity and Borders in the Middle East and Asia panel

KOREY PASCH

Panel


Okcuoglu, Dilan. “Territorial Control and Ethnic Conflict in Turkey: Evidence from the Kurdish Borderlands”

Discussant: Ariel Salzmann

The relationship between borders and belonging seems, prima facie, to be a fairly straightforward one: the existence of a border separates those living on either side of it into different groups that have different histories, identities, and objectives. This relationship between borders and belonging fundamentally tethers the physical demarcation of space to the production of differing identity groups, giving great salience to these concepts in the governance of borderlands, where more mainstream understandings, such as those found within international relations theory,1 equate governance with the power of the state and its control over territory (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2). However, as dis-
cussions and presentations at the conference made abundantly clear, this simply is not the case, particularly surrounding questions of identity. Reframing the connection between governance, power, agency, and geographic space is necessary to better understand the relationship between borders and identities. The conference’s panel, titled “Identity and Borders in the Middle East and Asia,” provided such a reframing. The presenters spoke to the larger conference theme that challenged more mainstream understandings of borders and belonging and drew a link between the agency of local actors and the governance of border areas. The panel’s themes revolved around the interaction between the identities to which groups in border areas subscribe and the relationships between those identities, geographic space, and the governance of those areas. The panel focused on locality and the significance of local politics and identities, and on what becomes visible when viewing border governance and inter-state tensions from perspectives informed by the periphery rather than the core.

The panel featured two papers, both of which highlighted the significance of the politics of identity in shaping how borders and belonging are constructed and contested at differing levels of governance. The themes raised can be loosely grouped into three categories: first, the agency of local actors in the production of both identities and borders; second, how power, as exercised by local actors, shapes the interaction between identities and borders; and third, how the contrasting and overlapping identities in border areas influence the state and its governance role—especially in relation to the first two themes. In order to contextualize the panel proceedings, this review will begin by briefly outlining the main points of the two panel presentations. It will then discuss the three overarching themes that each of the panellists examined in their presentations. Finally, the review will highlight the important questions raised by the panel and the larger theoretical implications for the field of international relations.

Both panel presentations make an important contribution to the discourse surrounding borders and identities by taking seriously the role and production of identity and its connection to territory. Through their critical engagement with this idea, the panellists demonstrated that the conceptualization of power in the field of international relations is far more complex and nuanced than mainstream or traditional theories.
make it out to be. In effect, there are important subtleties to be observed in the production of actors’ identities, the production of agency, and the notion that power operates to condition the relations not only between states, as the existence of a border suggests, but also the relations of local actors and other domestic-level factors that impinge on borderland governance. Thus, the panel presentations can be understood as challenging traditional theories of international relations, which see the state as a monolithic or static entity, a “black box” or unitary actor in the geopolitical sphere (Sterling-Folker 1997, 1). By taking into account the significance of identity in shaping the state and its conflicts, mainstream understandings of the state become far more complex and muddled.

In the first panel presentation, Queen’s University doctoral candidate Dilan Okcuoglu focused on the relationship between democratization and violence. She asserts that the mainstream understanding—which postulates that democratization results in less violence—does not appear to apply in the case of the Turkish borderlands. Okcuoglu seeks to understand the cause of this discrepancy and theorizes that the territorial control of an area can actually undermine democratic reforms, leading to a reduced impact of democratization and therefore an increase rather than a decrease in violence. Okcuoglu situates her thesis in a broader argument that the control of territory is a central factor in the continuation of the Turkish conflict, and she utilizes a bottom-up approach of conflict analysis and peace making.

Focusing on the relations and interactions between the various groups and actors in the Turkish borderlands, Okcuoglu’s presentation made three central observations: First, the interaction of actors is reciprocal in the sense that groups located and living in the borderlands have agency and shape the course of the conflict by influencing the state’s ability to produce and implement policy in the borderlands. Second, the perception of the conflict by those groups has an impact on various components of the conflict, such as perceptions of territory, homeland, borders, and the state. Finally, for Okcuoglu it is extremely important to recognize the historical nature of the conflict: The past experiences of borderland groups influence their political stance in the current manifestation of the conflict. Okcuoglu seeks to create space to focus on local actors, to examine the implications of border-making policies in
light of the larger dynamics of ethnic conflict. Okcuoglu’s focus finds large areas of overlap with the other panellists: University of Waterloo Master of Arts students Lema Ijtemaye and Reshem Khan.

In their presentation, Ijtemaye and Khan sought to problematize the inter-state tensions along the Durand Line, the border imposed by the British in 1983 to delineate Afghanistan and Pakistan. Specifically, the panellists focused their analysis on the current border governance issues of the Durand Line beyond the state-centric analysis of the more mainstream discourses. Ijtemaye and Khan are interested in how the overlapping and competing group identities of the border area foster what they term a “mutual interest in a zero-sum game” between those groups.

Contrary to more traditional explanations that focus on military activity along the border or inter-state tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the panellists postulate that the concept of identity as understood by the groups involved in the conflict is a more compelling explanatory variable for the current border governance issues of the Durand Line. Effectively, Ijtemaye and Khan argue that while the area is formally, in a de jure sense, governed by the sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in practice and in the de facto sense, it is the local actors who govern the border area of the Durand Line. Given the significance of the local actors in the governance of the geographic space surrounding the Durand Line, the interplay between competing identities in the border area is a central component of the presenters’ analysis.

Toward this end, Ijtemaye and Khan’s typology features two distinct categories of identity: national identity, which is subdivided into the competing Pakistani and Afghani identities; and ethnic identity, which is composed primarily of the Pashtun and Baloch groups, although the panellists discussed other identity groups as well. According to Ijtemaye and Khan, these identities are not solid or fixed, but fluid: they overlap and flow into one another, and the boundaries between various groups are not “hard” but “soft.” Indeed, the scholarly literature agrees that collective identities are not fixed or solid, but vary depending upon the group’s internal debate over their meaning in a process described as “contestation” (Abdelal et al. 2006, 696). This fluidity of identity results in a complex and shifting array of relationships between these
groups that actively shapes the governance of the border area surrounding the Durand Line. Ijemaye and Khan highlight the fact that these identities lead to competition between these groups in different ways, for example: Pakistan vs. Afghanistan, Pakistan vs. Pashtun, Pashtun vs. Baloch, and Baloch vs. Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is this competition that fosters the actors’ mutual interest in, and understanding of, a zero-sum game of territorial control within the area. These competing identities speak to the first overarching theme of the panel: the agency of local actors in the borderlands.

The focus on the agency of local actors in the governance of border areas and the continuation of conflict in those areas, allows for what discussant Dr. Ariel Salzman called “a re-centring of the discussion] around what is happening on the ground.” Indeed, both presentations focused on the importance of local agency in the governance of border areas. Okcuoglu points out that local actors have both political agency and political impact in the area, highlighting that the local Kurdish population has the agency to influence the state’s ability to both produce and change policy in the area. This agency comes from the crisscrossing of identities of those actors on the ground; as Salzman noted, there is both a blurring of lines surrounding the roles of the actors in the borderlands, whether they can be considered state actors or semi-autonomous agents, as well as questions as to which group they belong. This is important because group identity affects the understandings of an actor’s political and economic interests as well as the past (Abdelal et al. 2006, 699).

The agency and power of local actors is further reflected in Okcuoglu’s findings on the increasing agency of mayors within the borderlands, borne out by her paper’s statistical analysis. Cities in the Turkish borderlands have been growing in size, affording the mayors more influence in the area. Okcuoglu’s observations speak to the significance of local actors in shaping the conflict; they situate themselves within the conflict in different ways, due in large part to their perceptions of the conflict and its facets. Indeed, Okcuoglu argues that the militarization within the borderlands affects these groups’ perception of themselves, their lives, and presence within the border area. Her point matches with Abdelal and his colleagues’ observation that identity affects a group’s understanding of land, territory, and culture (700). Okcuoglu’s analysis
demonstrates how the agency of local actors both constructs, and is constructed by, the conflict. This is significant to the conceptualization of power, as the identities and historical experiences of local actors are actively shaping their perceptions of how their agency can be utilized within the borderland. Okcuoglu’s focus on local agency provides a point of departure for her larger arguments against traditional understandings of the state as monolithic, such as those historically favoured within the field of international relations.

Okcuoglu’s observations are reflected in, and complementary to, Ijtemaye and Khan’s analysis—especially the distinction they draw between the formal governance of the Durand Line that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the informal governance of the border generated through the competing identity groups inhabiting the area. Indeed, Ijtemaye and Khan place significant emphasis on the agency of these local actors to influence the governance of the border, asserting that the local identity groups serve as a more compelling explanatory variable than other mainstream international relations understandings that emphasize interstate competition in explaining the peculiarities of the Durand Line case. This is not to say that Ijtemaye and Khan’s analysis does not provide space for more macro interstate-based explanations; they point out that competing state interests are part of the complex and shifting governance of the Durand Line. Both the Afghani and Pakistani states are represented in their analysis through the fostering of the Afghani and Pakistani national identities, reflecting what Abdelal et al. refer to as the “co-terminality” of identity and territory (698). The agency of local actors, according to Ijtemaye and Khan, is found in the production of regional identities specific to the border area, for example Sunni Muslims, non-Sunni Muslims, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, and Baloch, amongst others. These group identities compete amongst and balance against one another as well as with and against the state-level identities of Afghani and Pakistani.

For Abdelal et al., this production of regional and state identities relies heavily on the discursive formulation of relations between groups (698). These competitions take the form of “in-groups” and “out-groups,” which delineate the agency of the competing identity groups within the geographic space, a process that mirrors what the literature refers to as Social Identity Theory (SIT) or the production of competi-
tive behaviour between groups based on the formation of in-group and out-group identities (699). This competition creates a situation that Salzman describes as a “regional dynamic that … is very much the tail … wagging the dog.” Ijtemaye and Khan’s in-group/out-group typology is reflected in Okcuoglu’s observations regarding the identity of actors within the Turkish borderlands and the manner in which that identity affects their agency. Both of the panellists’ presentations argued that local actors possess agency and therefore the power to influence governance in border areas. This highlights the second overarching theme of the panel: How power, as exemplified through local actors, shapes the interaction between identities and borders.

According to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), the ability of local identity groups to influence the governance of border areas demonstrates that they possess power—since governance and power are connected at a fundamental level (2). Barnett and Duvall argue that the various facets that make up governance—rules, structures, and institutions—also constitute the elemental facets of power and so link the two together (2). This connection between power and governance was demonstrated by the panellists through a focus on how identity factors into the exercise of both power and governance in border areas. Importantly, the panel highlighted that identity groups are not equal in their agency or power, and are therefore unequal in their ability to influence governance in the borderlands. Indeed, they pointed to the fluidity of identity and how that fluidity affected local groups’ ability to exercise power and influence.

Returning to Okcuoglu’s observations about mayors within the borderlands, the power of mayors to exert influence was dependent upon how other authorities viewed their position, with mayors being careful about the perception of their identities and allegiances. Reflecting on this, Dr. Salzman stated that what is at issue are the “various stabilities of concreteness of identity and continuities of identity” within these border spaces. There are important implications here regarding international relations more broadly: Barnett and Duvall point out that an examination of power in international politics must account for the factors that allow actors to have power over others as well as the various structures, institutions, and processes that both restrict and enable actors to shape their futures (2005, 3). From the panel’s discussion, we learn that
these structures are arguably more visible and salient at the periphery, and demonstrate the need for recognition of the ability of local actors to impact processes that traditional international relations theory ascribes within the authority of the state.

With regard to the final theme, the role of the state in the governance of borders and the production of identities, the panellists contrasted traditional understandings of the state—especially those that are foundational within the field of international relations—with their own emphases on locality. The agency and power of local actors in border areas demonstrate a need to re-evaluate the dominant Westphalian conceptualization of the state, based on the principles of territoriality, sovereignty, and autonomy (McGrew 2011, 24). As Susan Strange (1996) observes:

The need for a political authority of some kind, legitimated either by coercive force or by popular consent, or more often a mixture of the two, is the fundamental reason for the state’s existence. But many states are coming to be deficient in these fundamentals (5).

Within the field of international relations, the dominant theoretical traditions, specifically Realism, have claimed the concept of power for themselves, treating it largely “as the ability of one state to use material resources to get another to do what it otherwise would not do” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2). However, as Jennifer Sterling-Folker points out, this focus on power and the state as a unitary actor leads to a reduced emphasis on the causally significant aspects of governance found within the “black-box” of the state (1997, 1). Here, we see that the panel’s discussions of the agency and power of local actors in border areas fits with the evolving role of the state in an era of globalization as espoused by Strange (1996) and with the emphasis on domestic-level variables advocated for by Sterling-Folker. Okcuoglu’s focus on the interplay between various actors in the Turkish borderlands challenges state-centric views of international relations and pushes back against more traditional concepts of the state as the sole possessor of power within the geopolitical and territorial space. Her observation about the nature of power, as something negotiated and contested in border areas, allows her to move from the locality of the borderlands to her broader argument that the state is a non-monolithic entity—one that is shaped by myriad actors actively negotiating, competing, and contesting amongst one another.
Ijtemaye and Khan echo Okcuoglu’s sentiments, focusing on how the crisscrossing identities in the territory surrounding the Durand Line, on both the Afghani and Pakistani sides of the border, leads to the production of a commonly perceived zero-sum game by the various participating identity groups. This is especially interesting in the context of international relations theory, given the centrality of the concept of the zero-sum game within the discipline (Hollis and Smith, 1991). According to Ijtemaye and Khan, it is this perceived zero-sum game that affects how the border area is governed while at the same time influencing the manifestation and reproduction of the identity groups themselves. Territory is thus tied to competing identities, which manifest in complex ways in border areas, and these complex interactions between competing identity groups act to reproduce each other.

One of the most interesting and important elements of Ijtemaye and Khan’s argument is their attribution of particular goals and interests to specific identities within their analysis. This is significant, as their attribution of state interests onto state-based identities—namely, Pakistan’s interest in balancing the Indian presence on the subcontinent and Afghanistan’s interest in reducing external interference—maps itself onto more state-centric understandings of border governance within international relations theory. As Abdelal et al. (2006) observe, “in world politics … the identities of nations and states are formed in constant interaction with other nations and states;” this occurs within nations and states at the group level, where recognition of group identity, both de facto and de jure affects “the goals associated with an identity” (700-01).

The panel’s analysis speaks to larger questions: Is it “government inefficiency that causes or perpetuates different racial identities in border regions, or is it competing identities that create these borders?” For Ijtemaye and Khan, as well as Okcuoglu, it appears that the answer is both. Further, Salzman suggests that the panel is really asking what constitutes a border and how we can know this, especially in the context of these complex contested spaces. These observations speak to issues of power and agency at the state level as well, since the governance of these border areas reflects the state’s capacity—or incapacity—to control the border. Specifically, the institutional capacity to enforce state-based identities over more ethnically based ones, and the capacity to control what Dr. Salzman termed the border’s “porosity.”
While the panel clarified and complicated our understanding of borders and belonging, it also provided an opportunity to problematize and question the more fundamental assumptions that undergird the field of international relations on such a foundational concept: the state. By linking the concepts of borders and identities to larger questions of power and governance, the panellists demonstrated how theoretical assumptions that have come to positions of authority and dominance within the field might not capture the full range of detail and complexity when these contested spaces are examined from the periphery of the borderland.

Notes

1. I refer here to the dominant Realist and Liberal understandings within the international relations literature.

2. Borderlands is a somewhat fuzzy concept but can be thought of as areas that are “not just peripheries but central sites of state power where national identities are created, challenged, and reinvented, reflecting local needs and external geopolitical pressures” (Zhurzhenko 2011, 80–81).

3. I refer here to understandings that fit within the mainstream international relations theoretical perspectives of Realism and Liberalism (see Hollis and Smith 1991, 16–44).

References and Further Reading


ford: Oxford University Press.
The Politics of Exclusion and Rhetoric: Shrinking Space and Immigration in the Global North

Charan Rainford

Panel

Gillis, Jackie, “A Big Heart and a Strong Arm: The Discursive Construction of Asylum Seekers in Australia”
Troup, Daniel, “The Populist Divergence in Post-Crisis Europe”
Discussant: Charan Rainford

The question of who is included within the constructs of nation, peoplehood, and citizenship has consistently been featured as an overriding concern of the scholarship aimed at interrogating these relationships. This is as true of the study of early-modern nationalism, illustrated by Anthony Marx’s exceptional work uncovering the relationship between civic nationalism, culture, and exclusion, as it is true of the study of policy responses to difference in multinational states (Marx, 2005). While most visibly seen in the violence brought about by civil wars that have erupted because of minority (or majority) challenges to majoritarian (or minority) domination, it is also true in the subtler debates around
immigration policy in liberal democracies in Western Europe, North America, and Australia. This latter trend has intensified in the post-9/11 context. In 2016, the policy relevance of these questions is illustrated by the wave of xenophobia sweeping across Western Europe. For example, in Britain, many rural and Northern voters who voted in favour of “Brexit” did so in the belief that it would halt immigration (Khan, 2016). In continental Europe, rhetoric against Syrian refugees took on dark cultural and racial overtones at odds with an inclusive Europe. In the United States, Donald Trump won the presidency on the back of an extraordinarily divisive campaign in which he championed anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric (Gabriel, 2015).

This paper will reflect on the major themes and questions that emerged during the panel on “Immigration and Nationalism in the Global North.” Each paper makes an important contribution to contemporary debates, both in liberal democratic states and among liberal political theorists, around issues of inclusion and exclusion, and where the boundaries for inclusion are located and how they shift over time. The focus for their interrogation is primarily migration. More precisely, the authors speak to emerging narratives concerning the shrinking of space, particularly about notions of egalitarianism and equality. Both Gillis and Mathieu examine policy making directly, while Troup addresses similar themes without delving directly into the rhetoric behind policy making. He seeks to understand contestation from anti-establishment parties towards such decisions and policies. In the Western European governments that Troup examines, serving administrations have responded to anti-establishment challenges by seeking to colonize and reacquire space that has been open to contestation. If we look further east, the Syrian refugee crisis generated a hard turn to the right by Central and Eastern European governments that was largely aimed at a pre-emptive bid to prevent “outbidding” by anti-establishment parties. Outbidding occurs when political parties and influential elites adopt positions towards the endpoints of any issue-based spectrum (Chandra, 2005). In Australia, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s administration moved quite assiduously to prevent outbidding on immigration issues, whereas Britain’s former Prime Minister David Cameron’s administration was equally successful in translating speech acts condemning liberal multiculturalism into policy. Donald Trump demonized
outgroups—Muslims, illegal immigrants, the establishment itself—to outbid his Republican rivals on key policy areas. “Othering” of this nature is nothing new; Marx’s repudiation of the notion of inclusive nation-building demonstrates how outgroup vilification was utilized as a key tool in cohering the idea of a nation (2005).

The contemporary record of exclusionary rhetoric and policy in Western democracies casts a negative light on the idea that there is utility in differentiating between “civic” and “ethnic” forms of nation. Proponents of such a dichotomy argue that while illiberal “ethnic nations” reproduce and protect the ethno-cultural characteristics of their dominant nation, liberal “civic nations” envisage themselves as a “community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachments to a shared set of political practices and values” (Ignatieff 1993, 3–4). The liberal, civic state is regarded as ethno-culturally neutral in the individual lives of its citizens. Will Kymlicka’s pioneering liberal theory of minority rights, introduced in Multicultural Citizenship (1996), has sought to reconcile the primacy given to such neutrality and individual rights in liberalism with the needs of modern societies. Differentiated rights are viewed as violating the autonomy of individuals to define their own identity. Yet, the idea that liberal democratic states are ethno-culturally neutral is, as Kymlicka puts it, “manifestly false” (2001, 18). Kymlicka points to the intrinsic importance of societal cultures in providing meaning to the lives of minorities and indigenous groups (1996, 76). In the case of immigrant groups, they require government support to sustain their societal cultures amid the pressures of the majority culture. Such support is generally missing in integrationist or, certainly, in assimilationist states.

Multicultural policies are, however, rarely literal in most Western democracies. If the policies were, they would adopt education or language policies that preserve and protect the language and culture of national minorities and immigrant groups. As such, observing multicultural policies provides a rough theoretical entry point for observing inclusion-exclusion patterns. France and Denmark are the only states that fall inarguably into the integrationist camp, but most other states discussed by Mathieu and Gillis have adopted multicultural policies to varying degrees. Britain and the Netherlands have both had multicultural policy legislation, although both states have backpedalled from those
commitments; Australia has failed to commit to a multicultural agenda; Denmark and Sweden have increasingly adopted multicultural policies, and Germany’s policy towards Syrian refugees has arguably indicated a shift from integration to something more multicultural. Even in the case of Denmark, the Economist ran a story in 2015 speaking to its “failed multiculturalism.”

Félix Mathieu’s paper squarely addresses the question of multiculturalism by seeking to examine the gap between rhetoric and policy in the twenty-first century in the United Kingdom, a period encompassing David Cameron’s administration (2010–2015) and the New Labour administrations of Tony Blair (2000–2007) and Gordon Brown (2007–2010). Mathieu points to the very different public stances taken towards multiculturalism in the 1990s, particularly at the apex of New Labour and from 2000 onwards. Contrast Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s statement in 2000 that chicken tikka masala is now a “true British national dish” (a perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences) with Education Secretary David Blunkett’s statement in 2002 that he was weary of an “unbridled multiculturalism which privileges differences over community cohesion” (Mathieu, 2). The UK, it should be noted, is one of the primary contemporary cases of a state that, despite lacking explicit laws stating core principles about multiculturalism, has policy that features clear multicultural dimensions. Moreover, British multiculturalism policy includes public programs and initiatives that recognize immigrants as minorities to which the state accords specific treatment, thus permitting immigrants to enjoy rights as British citizens without discrimination (Mathieu, 6).

Mathieu’s methodology for examining the evolution in British policy towards multiculturalism is to adopt, and to update, Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Policy Index (MPI). The MPI is a research project that seeks to monitor the evolution of multiculturalism policies in twenty-one Western democracies through a qualitative standardized composite index consisting of eight indicators. The Index has four data points: 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, and Mathieu’s original contribution consists of updating the UK’s performance on the MPI for 2015 (8–9). Focusing on the evolution of policy between 2000 and 2015 parallels the transition in tone around multiculturalism, from positive resurgence in 2000 to Cameron’s 2014 assertion that state multi-
culturalism had failed. Mathieu also makes good use of the scholarship concerning the issue of multiculturalism, particularly grappling with Christian Joppke’s (2004) assertion that Britain had moved “beyond multiculturalism” and towards a stronger thickened civic identity.

Through his empirical evaluation of the MPI index mapped to policy decisions in the period under evaluation, Mathieu argues that the statement regarding the death of multiculturalism in the UK was premature. Rather, multiculturalism policy in the UK has largely remained stable over time. Indeed, he finds that there is a slight increase in its overall MPI score. This increase was brought about by his assessment that bilingual education in the form of “complementary schools,” voluntary organizations set up to support mother-language learning, had emerged in the period between 2010 and 2015. How, then, do these results fit with the assessment that the UK had moved towards a more civic integrationist approach to immigrant integration? Mathieu concludes that there is not necessarily a zero-sum relationship between multicultural and integration policies, enhancing the scholarly view that integration is a core principle of multicultural policy (Benhabib 2002; Madood 2013; Parekh 2006). As such, there is no inherent discrepancy in the UK adopting policies that appear integrationist on the surface while largely maintaining its multicultural nature (Madood 2013).

Mathieu makes two primary contributions in his paper. The first is empirical. His updating of the UK’s MPI score relies on a careful analysis of policy decisions and policy making. It provides fresh material to our understanding of multiculturalism in the Cameron era and subverts expectations that it has represented a slide in state multiculturalism. Second, the paper represents an invaluable corrective to the assumption that discourse and rhetoric necessarily correlate to the content and quality of policy making or, at the very least, that policy change may take longer than the lifespan of an administration. It would be instructive to re-visit Mathieu’s findings in post-Brexit UK given that while overall patterns on multiculturalism policy may be unchanged in the UK, the quality of multiculturalism may have eroded. Future qualitative research would have to critically examine whether “civic thickening” ultimately erodes multiculturalism. Indeed, even the area of improvement—bilingual education—does not reflect on state policy given that complementary schools are voluntary and autonomous. Moreover, many of these
courses are in European languages rather than those languages—Urdu or Arabic, for example—that are more central to contemporary angst about immigration in the UK.

Whereas the United Kingdom has slowly improved its rating in the MPI, Australia has been the highest scoring state since its inception. It has scored perfectly in the last three iterations. Yet, this positive outlook on immigration policy clashes jarringly with media depictions of Australia’s immigration policy, which feature controversial policy making and incendiary discourse by influential political elites, including the former Prime Minister Tony Abbott. The centrepiece of Abbott’s strategy, Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), initiated in 2013, is a border-protection operation aimed at controlling the arrival of asylum seekers by sea, primarily through the adoption of offshore asylum detention centres. Jackie Gillis’s paper analyzes the arguments and discursive acts that have been deployed to justify and legitimize offshore detention and processing. The role of language and discourse plays an even more central role in Gillis’s paper, as she hypothesizes that the argumentation used by Abbott constructed different identities between Australians and “Others,” thus legitimizing exclusionary policies against the latter. She argues that this language both draws on, and evokes, a historical racist ideology around notions like “White Australia,” which in the present day continues to influence discourse and serve as a legitimizing device.

Gillis employs critical discourse analysis, specifically Ruth Wodak’s (2001) Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), to examine her case. This approach, as with other forms of discourse analysis, interrogates language as a form of social practice through which power circulates. Using a triangulating approach that builds on interdisciplinary foundations, the DHA seeks to distinguish between topics and contents of discourse, delivery strategies, and the linguistic realization of those strategies; it uses the Aristotelian notion of topoi to examine discourse and argumentation. Gillis applies this model to thirty-one discursive acts made by Abbott, including speeches, interviews, and media statements.

The result of Gillis’s combination of the DHA and a discourse analysis of Australia’s contemporary and historical attitude towards migration, particularly non-white migration, is a compelling understanding of the social power behind language and the exclusionary patterns it mirrors and produces. Placing OSB in the historical context of Australia’s
divisive immigration policies, she provides a framework for discussing the repeated speech acts on non-white migrants. She asserts the importance of repetition of key words, phrases, and positions as a rhetorical device; this has the effect of making controversial positions appear more “common sense.” In the case of preventing boats from making it to the mainland, the impression given by Abbott’s public statements was that this was the key issue driving his electoral success and that achieving this goal would mean the fulfillment of that promise. The policy of redirecting illegal migrants to offshore sites or their point of origin was consistently criticized in the public and media. Thus, “stop the boats” became a refrain whose goal was to naturalize or normalize this state of exception. Gillis points to the phrase’s utilization fifty-six times in the thirty-one discursive acts analyzed, arguing that it represented “one key means through which exclusionary identities, and practices, were facilitated within the discourse” (17). A similar narrative thread is evident in the repeated, and incorrect, assertions by Abbott that Australia’s policies were not in contravention of international humanitarian law. This refrain was deployed fifty-one times. Finally, there was a repeated effort to link the policy with Australian sovereignty, arguing that the latter was at risk if illegal migrants were allowed to successfully reach Australia’s shores.

A major contribution that Gillis makes to our understanding of discursive acts is that different argumentations can reinforce one another such as those about humanitarianism and danger. Humanitarian arguments suggest that the existence of a specific danger should warrant a response against it. Abbott frames a clearly anti-minority position as one that is aimed at saving lives for humanitarian purposes. He repeatedly juxtaposes stopping boats with compassion and preventing deaths at sea, thus combining the topoi of humanitarianism and threat. This acted to legitimize the mantra of stop the boats, while emphasizing an anti-Other position that acted to dissuade future asylum seekers. In effect, therefore, Gillis argues that this allowed Abbott to construct the Other, the “illegitimate asylum seeker who presented a threat” to the Australian state and its sovereignty, while legitimizing the OSB as a humanitarian obligation to save this Other from itself (25). Although beyond the scope of Gillis’s paper, it would be interesting to measure how successful this combined Othering/legitimization process was, as
that would act as an interesting counterpoint to Mathieu’s findings.

Daniel Troup argues that the narrative of a wave of far-right populism sweeping EU states in the wake of the Euro crisis requires reconsideration. He posits that achievements by radical right parties are successful only in core EU economies whereas in peripheral economies, left-wing populist rhetoric has been more appealing to audiences. The most prominent example of this can be seen in the case of Greece: Until 2015, it was the “rapid ascent” of the far-right, crime-linked Golden Dawn that concerned onlookers; however, by the 2015 elections, this masked the fact that radical-left SYRIZA had also enjoyed a “meteoric rise” in the aftermath of the crisis (Troup, 4). Indeed, although Golden Dawn at its height never gained more than 10 percent of the vote, SYRIZA’s vote share rose from around 5 percent in five consecutive elections between 2001 and 2009, to 16.8 percent (June 2012 legislative), 26.6 percent (May 2014 European), and 36.3 percent (January 2015 legislative) in three successive elections. Golden Dawn’s performance in the January 2015 election marked a decline from the two previous polls. Furthermore, according to Troup, while “rightist parties have made greater gains than left-wing anti-establishment parties, the discrepancy in their average vote shares is narrower than the concern over a rising might suggest” (5). Troup utilizes a “conceptual bifurcation” that demarcates European economies into “core” and “periphery” categories, which is largely established in the literature. His paper adroitly examines the relationship between populism, ideology, and development, while linking that relationship to the existing division in the literature on populism. Troup notes that the study of European populism tends to focus on right-wing actors, whereas similar studies in the Global South discuss left-wing governments and political groups, such as those in Venezuela and Bolivia. As such, ethno-nationalism is divorced from the latter and highlighted in the European cases. Moreover, each rough archetype can also be characterized by the nature and direction of its Othering: right-wing populism is associated with ethno-nationalism, mobilizing against internal threats (Jews, communists, feminists, etc.) as well as external threats (refugees, immigrants, foreigners, etc.), whereas left-wing populism adopts a more unified understanding of “the people,” effectively focusing on external oppressors or privileged internal elites. As such, Troup hypoth-
esizes that while all European populism can expect to benefit from a rise in anti-establishment sentiment, overall fortunes are linked to the core-periphery distinction. Absent a credible external threat, left-wing populists in core European states are overshadowed by their right-wing counterparts; the converse is true in peripheral economies.

To test this hypothesis, Troup examines electoral data from EU and national elections between 2004 and 2015. The results indicate that there has been approximately a doubling in the anti-establishment share of the vote (14.2 percent between 2004–2008 to 27.5 percent between 2012–2015). Whereas there has been an increase in radical right-wing populism in both core and periphery economies, the gains made by left-wing parties in periphery economies have been more impressive between 2012 and 2015. On the other hand, despite some marginal gains, left-wing parties in the core have seen a decline in their share of the populist vote. Moreover, Troup finds that the “average leftist share of the populist vote in the periphery between 2012 and 2015 has been greater than the right’s share in the core” (18). Moreover, this divergence appears to be accelerating. Thus, the narrative that post-crisis Europe has been characterized by a rise in right-wing populism requires reassessment. Even though these results would, as Troup notes, be strengthened with data from the post-expansion EU states in Eastern Europe, these initial findings suggest that there is a correlation between political ideology and the core/periphery distinction Troup draws upon.

Taken together, these three contributions provide an invaluable lens into narratives of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary Western societies. Immigration and asylum seeking have increasingly become spaces of contestation. The increasing securitization of these policy areas has ensured that governing parties have sought to re-colonize narratives about inclusion and exclusion. Rhetoric against migrants has become increasingly politically charged, acting as a sort of radioactive political football, whereby losing control has seemingly immediate political consequences. Donald Trump and Brexit are only the most visible manifestations of this, and future analysis of the latter with respect to the United Kingdom’s multicultural bona fides, despite a decade of anti-multiculturalism rhetoric, will be instructive. In all of these instances, there is shrinking space for legitimate discourse around the benefits of diversity and immigrant integration in the Global North.
Moreover, pushing back against this dominant narrative, particularly from the political left, is further complicated by the increasing securitization of immigration.

References and Further Reading


Conclusion

ELEANOR MACDONALD

It is my honour to provide some closing remarks to this volume of review essays that together provide an overview of, and reflection on, “Borders and Belongings,” the Queen’s University Department of Political Studies Graduate Conference of May 2016. I thought I would use this opportunity to reflect on some of the general themes of the conference—principally, the importance of understanding the meanings and effects of borders, the politics that characterize debates about belongings, and the many other conceptual elaborations that the interrelationship of these two topics demand.

In preparation for the conference, the organizers told me that world, national, and regional events leading up to the conference inspired their choice of topic. They were thinking of such events and issues as the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis with its obvious challenge to open borders, debates over public bans on religious symbols in political jurisdictions such as Quebec and France, and the recent 2015 Canadian federal election in which “what it means to be Canadian” was again showcased, deliberated, and redefined. These and further controversies and crises related to borders and belonging continue unabated to this day and into the foreseeable future. The recent American presidential election may well be remembered in coming years for the winning candidate’s many promises and statements about borders. These include his plans, now underway, to exclude Muslim immigrants from the US, his ambition to move toward a more protectionist trade environment, and his vision of an impenetrable wall extending the length of the Mexican/US border.
There are further directions as well, not taken here, that illustrate the necessity of reconceiving questions of borders and belongings, such as the ongoing crises in environmental politics that transcend borders, or the issues regarding indigenous self-government and its challenges to both legal/geographical borders, to control over territories, and to debates about belonging within and outside of national sovereignties. Indeed, there is little that does not fit into the conference topic. This has the advantage of allowing for a broad, comprehensive dialogue that draws on interdisciplinary, methodologically varied research and a range of theoretical approaches.

The topic of borders and belongings is so extensive that one of my academic colleagues at Queen’s commented on the conference topic by quipping (and I paraphrase here): “Oh good! A conference topic that means nothing.” In essence, even if glibly, he praised the organizers for having arrived at a conference theme so broad as to be potentially meaningless. It could, his remark averred, be useful inasmuch as it could embrace everything and thus allow for the maximum inclusion of presenters and papers. With all respect and appreciation to my colleague for his good sense and good humour, my own sense is that this pairing of “borders” with “belonging” is not so broad as to be meaningless, but rather, offers one of the most fruitful and productive conceptual pairing of terms that we can work with in political studies research.

One of the most valuable aspects of academic conferences is the way in which they enrich participants’ understandings of their own research through positioning diverse projects alongside one another. A kind of cross-pollination or fertilization takes place; one sees one’s own work differently as a consequence of witnessing the ways in which it changes when it is held up beside alternative methodologies or different case studies or other kinds of questioning. Even the very concepts that we deploy become protean in a context in which their meanings shift and develop through various usages and users, through layering and interweaving different interpretations and implementations of them.

I would argue that the very title of the conference, with its juxtaposed terms, borders and belongings, opens into this sort of creative apposition. Each term is, indeed, so central to the practice of politics, so obvious, that both risk a kind of invisibility. Borders are simply the lines drawn between nations, and citizens belong to those nations. And
yet, the terms are not as obvious as they first appear. What happens
when these terms are put into proximity, as they are here? How do they
resonate or clash? How do they work in and against each other? What
new insights can emerge from their operations and into our study of
them? What other concepts do they require for sense? What else do
they evoke?

In asking such questions, we find ourselves, fairly immediately, po-
sitioned critically in relation to this pairing. I suggest this because we
know, almost without being told, how they are intended to function.
This is to say that we understand that the actual relationship is expected
or intended to be symbiotic. It is assumed that borders are part of an
international system that defines the edges of various nations, and that
they function to secure and contain that nation. At another level, be-
longing is a neat descriptor for citizenship, for the practices that govern
those who belong within those borders, and for their affective compo-
nent. Within this outer/inner symbiotic dynamic, the contiguous bound-
aries of nations, carefully maintained, are expected to function like the
proverbial fences that “make good neighbours.” Correspondingly, these
borders are expected to circumscribe areas of belonging—the inhabi-
tants of each circumscribed region are assumed to share some founda-
tion of heritage or values, a common past and/or a common purpose.
We know, in other words, what the authors of the introduction to this
volume suggest with their metaphor of “colouring between the lines,”
that belonging is intended to occur in those territorial spaces that are
circumscribed by defined borders. And yet, the study of such things is
almost always a study of how this has gone, or may yet go, awry. To
study borders and belongings is almost always to enter into the analysis
of a problem. The juxtaposition opens quickly into a critique of inter-
locking systems that are, more often than not, asynchronous, content-
tious, troubled, and combative.

This critique develops beyond recognition of the unsettled nature
of the pairing of borders and belongings to the realization of the way
both terms are themselves fundamentally contested and problematic.
Throughout this collection of reviews of the conference panels, we see
the troubling of both borders and boundaries at two levels: The confer-
ence offered multiple accounts of the contestation of actual borders and
actual experiences of belonging (or unbelonging) and the conference
participants also troubled the very concepts of borders and belongings while offering accounts of the troubles caused by actual borders and the failures of belonging.

One sees this troubling of the conceptual tools in the ways that various papers analyze the terms themselves as riven by instability and uncertainty in ways that allow for multiple contestations. While both borders and belonging operate as legal, juridical, verifiable terms available to political scientists (for example, geographically located borders, the holding of citizenship, refugee, immigrant, or foreigner status), the terms also operate at more affective, cultural, and metaphorical levels. One can speak meaningfully of a “sense of exclusion” or a “feeling of belonging,” just as one can use metaphors of frontiers, divisions, and limits. We often speak of borders, both literally and metaphorically, as the frontlines of struggles; they demarcate not so much or so often a shared understanding of a line of differentiation as they do, at times, a battleground. Even where the geographical line is uncontested by war or other violence, a border is a site of containment and exclusion. We speak of borderlands as places of uncertain belongings, as regions that are both divided and contained, and as characterized by multiple and overlapping cultures and identities.

Discussions of borders and belonging also introduce concerns over how each term functions in relation to a variety of other concepts. Most prominent among these, in this collection, is that of “identity.” How are national, regional, local, cultural, racial, ethnic, gendered identities constructed? In what ways are meanings of these various identities constructed and contested? Nearly every author in this collection emphasizes the central role that struggles over identities play in these political debates; the following examples illustrate just a few directions they take. Charan Rainford, for example, discusses the way in which the inclusion and exclusion of various groups from nationhood are contested and vary over time. América Nicté-Ha López Chávez talks about borders and the contestation over them as “having the potential to reshape, construct, and assimilate identities.” Korey Pasch focuses on the “agency of local actors in the production of identities and borders.” Natalia Equihua conveys how her panel’s elaboration on how the marginalization of immigrants within Canadian communities serves to produce an exclusionary Canadian identity.
Conclusion

This focus on identities is matched by a concern with power relations, systems, and processes. In discussing borders, for example, we can see power functioning through both coercion and consent. As Samantha Twietmeyer notes in her essay, power is defined in ways that both indicate the imposition of one agent’s will on another but also extend to the securing of consent through agenda setting and other means. And the range of concerns that involve power is not limited to the setting of borders or the establishment of belonging. It extends to the geography and history and futures of those borders, to their porousness or solidity, to the means required to pass through or beyond them. It encompasses the efficacy of claims to belonging and to establishing the meanings of community, solidarity, and identities. All of these terms are wildly contested. Who belongs on which side of a border? Who is forbidden entry? How does a border function to divide, contain, enhance, exclude, prohibit, expel? How do power relations imbue a sense of belonging, of entitlement, of security—or conversely, the lack of any of these?

Other politically charged terms are also evidently put into play repeatedly in the conference’s discussions of borders and belonging. “Space,” “territory,” and “mapping”—all in both literal and metaphorical usages, undergo consideration. “Security” is a term that enjoys tremendous affective appeal; it is the most frequent justification for the fortification of boundaries, but as Twietmeyer’s essay suggests, it is also an unstable concept and destabilizing practice, the effects of which remain highly contradictory. “Culture” is a term that broadly indicates the way in which these relations, identities, spaces are normalized and through which they are contested. Erin Tolley’s analysis of the media’s racialized representation of electoral candidates, summarized and analyzed here by Patricia Mockler, provides a valuable critique of Canadian media culture. Further, and fundamentally, the conference developed—implicitly or explicitly—conversations about how, as a person or as a member of a larger community or society, nation or humanity, we can enact a greater “social justice.”

Each of us will take different things away from this discussion. For me, power, space, identity, culture, and social justice are concepts that threaded their way through the conference conversations and through these review essays in ways that are rich and resonant, and which I believe will continue to inform our work. I hope and trust that readers
Eleanor MacDonald

will have found their own inspirations in these pages, in the concepts, methods, theories, and issues, that are delineated here. And I hope and trust that each reader will develop this intriguing, confusing, and complex interplay of concepts in new and interesting ways that enrich future work on these and other topics.

In moving this work forward, it is vital that we also contemplate political research as itself an entry into political action. Several of the conference panels provoked presenters and participants to consider the effects of our own work in producing and reproducing borders and belongings. This is most evident here in the contribution by Jessica Merolli. She suggests that, as scholars, we need to be mindful of the ways in which our work may reproduce conventions of our culture, may persist in only “seeing” certain identities, and thus we need to consider the ways in which our own work contributes to the construction of boundaries between “us” and “them.” She continues by advocating research that resists our culture’s “embedded assumptions” about identities and belonging and that engages in a self-critique that would “push us to focus our work on dismantling and constituting anew something better.” By resisting the conventions of our discipline, its typical methodologies and assumptions, we may be able to produce work that is more socially just and politically aware.

Following from Merolli’s advocacy to think of our research as politically engaged in social justice projects, I would add that the conference topics, themes, and concepts presented in this collection also open onto other possible discussions, ones not entered into here: the challenge to rethink our concepts of boundaries and belonging in relationship to bodies and psyches, to time and nature. There is political pressure on us to rethink the bounded ways in which we conventionally conceive of humans and the environment, of emotions and reason, of pleasures and suffering alongside critical thought. I mention this not so much as critique of the conference, but as suggestive of the ways in which it might resonate in further and future directions.

I wish to conclude my remarks by saying something about this collection as representative of the work primarily of graduate students. These final words are addressed directly to a graduate student audience. I want expressly to commend you and to encourage you. You have, undoubtedly, been exposed for the last many years to a barrage of discouragement.
Conclusion

You have been told repeatedly that there are and will be no jobs for you, that the academy—particularly in the social sciences and humanities where most of you are studying—is floundering. And yet, you are here in the university; you are reading this collection. Perhaps you are one of the contributors to it. You continue to study, to work, to teach, and to produce research of a very high calibre. So I have to believe you are doing this because you are genuinely highly motivated, intelligent, creative people who want to understand the world we live in and change it for the better. You are, in other words, exactly what we need. So, in that spirit, I would like to thank the conference organizers for making possible the gathering and presentation of these ideas. I would like to thank the editors of this collection for their efforts to disseminate the work of these authors and the research of the conference panelists. And I would like to conclude by wishing graduate student readers of this collection strength to continue this important work.
Biographies

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**Eleanor MacDonald** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University, and is cross-appointed to the Department of Gender Studies and the Graduate Interdisciplinary Program in Cultural Studies. The focus of her research and teaching is contemporary political theory. She has written on identity politics and psychoanalytic, feminist, postmodern, and critical theory. Her current research regards the theoretical grounding of the link between identity and property, and the challenges that environmental and indigenous concerns pose to the dominant liberal paradigm of property ownership. She has received the Ontario Undergraduate Student Alliance Award for Excellence in Teaching and the Arts and Science Undergraduate Society Teaching Award. She has also been a finalist for a number of other teaching awards, including the TVO Best Lecturer Competition, the Alumni Teaching Award, the Chancellor A. Charles Baillie Award, and the Frank Knox Award for Excellence in Teaching.
Jessica Merolli holds the Skelton-Clark Postdoctoral Fellowship in Canadian Affairs (2015–2017) in the Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University. Her work focuses on the influence of expertise in the implementation of immigration and citizenship policy. She is interested in how the construction of national identities is challenged and resisted by those responsible for delivering policy.

Patricia Mockler is a first-year PhD student in Political Studies at Queen’s University. She recently completed the MA program in Political Studies at Queen’s. Her Master’s Research Project is entitled “Challenges to Deliberation: An Examination of Structural Inequality, Capacity, and Influence in Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution.” Her research interests include deliberative democracy, state-society relations, and political participation in Canada.

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Samantha Twietmeyer is a PhD candidate at Queen’s University. Her research examines the interaction between external intervention and the domestic context in the Northern Ireland and Cyprus peace processes. Her MA research focused on the liberal peace agenda in state-building interventions. Through her conflict management research, Samantha seeks to combine current scholarly and theoretical pursuits with policy to benefit peace practice more generally.