Canada and International Democracy Assistance
What Direction for the Harper Government’s Foreign Policy?

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Foreword

Even before the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democratic development in other countries was increasingly embraced as a goal of foreign policy by Western states. Governments in Ottawa, Liberal and Conservative, were as keen as other Western states to devote energy and resources to the cause: both the governments of Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien were enthusiastic promoters of democratic development. When it came to power in February 2006, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper likewise seemed attracted to democracy promotion as part of a “principled” foreign policy. But in its seven years in office, the Harper government has progressively abandoned democracy promotion as an important foreign policy objective.

In this Occasional Paper, Gerald Schmitz, one of Canada’s foremost experts on human rights and democracy promotion, explores the emergence—and then the disappearance—of democracy promotion under the Harper Conservative government. He notes the enthusiasm of parliamentarians in 2006 and 2007 for a reinvigoration of democracy promotion was soon replaced after 2009 by an increasing tendency of the government to back away from embracing such initiatives, exemplified by the termination of Rights & Democracy, a government-supported organization for global democracy promotion. Schmitz suggests that while some of the broader challenges to democracy globally might account for part of Ottawa’s reluctance, he argues that we need to look to other explanations, particularly the desire of the Conservatives to recast the very bases of Canadian foreign policy.

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Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government’s Foreign Policy?

It’s curious that the Harper government should have shelved its many promises to make democracy promotion a larger part of its foreign policy agenda. In the early years, the Harperites lectured various countries on their shortcomings, China and Turkey among them. They’ve been very keen to underscore the lack of democracy in the Arab world, in contrast to democratic Israel.

But the gap between rhetoric and action has yawned from the beginning, and is yawning wider still as the Harper government whittles away at existing efforts. What was needed then remains a need: an agency to pull together and co-ordinate Canada’s democratic promotion efforts with more resources and coherence than what we have now.

Jeffrey Simpson, The Globe and Mail

Introduction

While support for democratic values has long been part of the liberal internationalist faith underlying Canadian foreign policy, and continues to be declared as one of its main principles, Ottawa's funding for democratic development in other countries only dates back to the 1980s. Recently Canadian assistance for democratic development has suffered a period of turmoil that raises many questions about the nature of Canada’s continuing commitment to international democracy assistance. It also raises questions about the character and direction of the foreign policy of the Conservative government of Stephen Harper.

This comes at a time when democracy is under pressure in many parts of the world and when democracy promotion efforts have been
subject to growing skepticism. Notwithstanding the unexpected “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s fourth annual edition *Democracy Index 2011*, published in December 2011, reached the sobering conclusion that: “The dominant pattern globally over the past five years has been backsliding on previously attained progress in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing negative trends in political development.” Democratic prospects in Tunisia and Egypt are seen as “highly uncertain”; their unfinished revolutions as not easily reproduced elsewhere. Overall, the 2011 trends observed by the Index are largely negative, with the average of countries’ “democracy scores” declining for all regions—including North America and Europe—apart from the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Freedom House’s annual global survey published in 2013 records some, albeit ambiguous, gains as a result of the Arab popular movements. “However, a number of regions experienced setbacks due to a hardened and increasingly shrewd authoritarian response to these movements.”

It seems clear that democratic development challenges are not diminishing globally; quite the contrary. At the same time, the case for addressing these challenges through international action is made more difficult when the democratic functioning of the traditional aid-donor countries in European and North America is becoming less exemplary. Moreover, democracy promotion has suffered from a backlash against the perceived aggressive and ideological policies of its largest funder, the United States—specifically President George W. Bush’s ill-fated “freedom agenda” associated with ill-advised military interventions and market-oriented liberalization. U.S. government spending on international democracy programs has also been affected by pressures to focus on domestic priorities and get rising budget deficits under control.

Although such factors may have had a cautionary effect on the Canadian environment for providing democracy assistance, they do not adequately account for the Harper government’s apparent backtracking from plans announced from 2007 through 2009 to significantly expand Canada’s role in international democracy support, a retreat lamented by commentators like Jeffrey Simpson and others.

First, the Canadian multi-party consensus on democratic development has defined it in terms of a broad pluralistic human rights-based approach, usually in contradistinction to a U.S. style of intervention burdened by contested strategic motives. As briefly outlined in the next two sections,
this is as true of the 2007 parliamentary report that prompted the Harper
government to make its initial promises as it was of the seminal 1986 par-
liamentary foreign policy review report that led to the statutory creation of
the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
(commonly known as Rights & Democracy) in 1988. As much as critics
of Canadian foreign policy on the left frequently allege a convergence
of Canadian with U.S. foreign policy objectives, the notion of democracy
promotion as a Western ideological crusade or national security imperative
has been seen in Canada as something to be avoided. Supporting the
advance of democracy has been viewed as in the Canadian interest in the
same way as the spread of international human rights norms and the rule
of law. That has been the dominant internationalist perspective, at least
until growing signs of a shift away from it by the Harper Conservatives.

Second, although spending cuts are the order of the day to shrink the
federal government’s budget deficit, Canada’s fiscal position is the strong-
est among the G7 countries and the amount of Canadian aid devoted
to democratic development, even given the most generous estimate, is
proportionately a fraction of the democracy assistance expenditures of
the U.S. and big European donors. The Harper government’s decision to
close down Rights & Democracy was announced days after the tabling
of the March 2012 federal budget. But in terms of savings, Rights & Democ-
racy’s funding from the public purse of about $11 million annu-
ally is barely more than a rounding error in the international assistance
envelope. One needs to look for other reasons behind Rights & Democ-
racy’s demise to get closer to an explanation of the Harper government’s
methods and intentions.

There remains the fact that, prompted by the 2007 parliamentary
report’s recommendations, the government’s 2008 Throne Speech
promised to create an important new democracy promotion agency and, in
a 2009 report, a government-appointed advisory panel strongly favoured
the idea, putting forward a detailed plan for its establishment with a much
larger annual budget than ever enjoyed by Rights & Democracy. So this
initiative was still under consideration at a time when the global financial
crisis had already taken its toll. Since then, however, the momentum
seems to have been lost if not reversed. Units devoted to democracy
programming that had been set up within the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) before their merger in 2013 as the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) became submerged within
their larger bureaucracies. The government-NGO forum, the “Democracy Council”, in which both participated, disappeared along with an annual conference on democratic development (the last took place in 2009).

Something more than backlash or budgetary constraints is required to explain what on the face of it appears to be a curious move away from these initiatives. Prime Minister Harper and his foreign ministers still regularly invoke democratic values as part of their conception of a “principled foreign policy”. But one may ask: “Where’s the beef?” In analyzing these developments I will offer a critical perspective on the evolving role of democracy promotion in Canadian foreign policy and what that may signal for its direction under the Harper Conservatives. First, some historical context.

Canada’s International Democracy Support: Modest Beginnings

Although Canada’s development assistance programs expanded in the context of the Cold War, with keeping developing countries out of the Soviet sphere of influence being one of the motivations, development aid projects were conceived largely in terms of projects providing economic and social benefits, alleviating poverty while building these countries’ capacity for economic growth. Little attention was paid to political development. In the early 1980s, however, the issue of using development aid to promote the spread of democracy was galvanized by the U.S. Congress’s creation of a National Endowment for Democracy. At the time there was strong Canadian opposition to President Ronald Reagan’s overtly ideological “democracy crusade” in the Americas, which included supporting the “Contras” in Nicaragua. Canadian proponents of bringing human rights and democratic considerations to bear on Canada’s relations with developing countries took a very different tack. They argued for a modest approach in keeping with Canada’s pluralist and internationalist traditions.

The multiparty Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons mandated by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1985 to review Canada’s international relations was persuaded that Canada should have a role in democratic political development, though excluding the kind of political party-based assistance that characterized the large U.S. entities (the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute) and German political foundations. The committee’s June
1986 final report, *Independence and Internationalism*, recommended instead the creation of a small agency for human rights and democracy assistance that would be at arm’s length from government, albeit subject to periodic parliamentary review. This proposal was subsequently seconded in *For Whose Benefit?*, the landmark May 1987 report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (since 2006, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development), which remains the only comprehensive parliamentary examination of Canada’s official development assistance (ODA) policies and programs.

Mulroney’s foreign minister, Joe Clark, embraced these ideas over considerable NGO and bureaucratic resistance. Objections were driven in part by the ongoing negative association of democracy promotion with U.S.-style interventionism and the worry that Canada would be entering a political minefield that was best avoided. Even the co-rapporteurs engaged by the government to examine setting up such an agency were so concerned that the word “democracy” would raise fears of following US policy that they recommended it be dropped in favour of the blander “institutional development.” While that advice was not taken, the 1988 act of Parliament establishing the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) very explicitly anchored its mandate within the terms of the International Bill of Rights (the Universal Declaration and the two major international protocols on civil and political rights and social, economic and cultural rights).

In short, Canada’s initial foray into democratic development was closely tied to multilateralist support for United Nations human rights standards, eschewing the notion of promoting some “Canadian model” of Western political ideology and institutions. Moreover, the new centre, based in Montreal, was to be at arm’s-length from government, something the parliamentary committees had insisted on. Funding from the ODA budget was set at a very modest initial allocation of $5 million annually with the requirement of a statutory review every five years. The Mulroney government also appointed Ed Broadbent, former leader of the social-democratic New Democratic Party (NDP), to be the centre’s first president.

CIDA did not really begin examining the implications of democratic development for its ODA programming until the early 1990s. In part this was spurred by a newfound interest in governance issues on the part of international financial institutions (IFIs). In particular, the World Bank’s 1989 study of Africa focused attention on weak or bad governance as
a key missing piece in achieving development effectiveness. Soon the development agencies of Western liberal democracies adopted the language of “good governance” objectives, which raised questions about the quality of decision-making processes, the relationship of the state to its citizens, and the public accountability of decision-makers. Unlike the IFIs, restricted by supposedly “non-political” technocratic mandates, these bilateral donors soon started associating improvements in governance with advances in democratic rights and freedoms as well as the smooth functioning and “sound public administration” of state institutions.

Seeking guidance, CIDA commissioned a study which resulted in a 1992 bilingual book on democratic development. ICRDD, given its relative freedom from government, was already positioned to undertake more politically risky activities including support for democratic oppositions in authoritarian regimes (such as Burma). The general aid program sought ways to encourage respect for human rights and democratic development through more formal institution-building in recipient countries. Strengthening civil society would also be an indirect way of creating conditions favourable to democratic development.

In 1996 the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien released a “Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance.” These concepts had been introduced into the mainstream aid agenda, even if CIDA continued to struggle with how to operationalize them within its programming practice. By the time that Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin, published his international policy review in 2005, Canada was engaged in a modest way in supporting some forms of democratic development. ICHRDD (which adopted the short-form title Rights & Democracy) had gained respect for its work, but its budget remained tiny and primarily devoted to human right causes. CIDA’s governance work was not well known or understood even within the agency. CIDA was also more comfortable with providing technical assistance and aid to civil society than getting involved in the riskier area of directly political democratic structures and processes (although it did fund a number of electoral support projects). The question arose whether Canada should scale up its activity in this area and take a bolder approach to democratic development. Several prominent advocates, notably Thomas Axworthy, made the case for a much bigger Canadian contribution to democracy promotion through a new institution devoted to that purpose.

After the first Harper minority government was elected in 2006, Conservative MPs on the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID) gained the support of the other parties for an examination of Canada’s role in democracy assistance. The result was a lengthy and ambitious July 2007 report, Advancing Canada’s Role in International Support for Democratic Development. Noting the rather limited and low-profile nature of existing Canadian efforts, the report recommended several new arms-length agencies—in particular a Canadian foundation for democracy support—including an emphasis on getting involved in assisting multiparty democracy.

Taking into account familiar concerns about association with discredited US ideological rhetoric on democracy promotion—mainly aversion to the much-criticized “freedom agenda” of President George W. Bush—the Committee report took pains to elaborate a distinctively independent Canadian approach and to acknowledge the complexities of the enterprise (including a focus on context-specific analysis, learning from the lessons of comparative experience, local ownership, better implementation and evaluation). The report’s first recommendation deserves citing since it articulates that approach in terms consistent with the human rights-based and developmental conceptions advanced in the 1980s and 1990s:

Canada should continue to provide assistance to democratic development abroad, based on a broad conception of democracy that includes attention to the system of governance as a whole, the full range of international human rights—including socio-economic and cultural rights—and the full participation of citizens, including the most disadvantaged, in the processes of democracy. Over the long term, Canadian policy on support for democratic development should aim to improve the quality and sustainability of democracy in the recipient countries.9

The committee was not satisfied that the existing structures, including that of the main funder, CIDA, was up to the task of carrying forward such an ambitious agenda. Indeed the report’s recommendations focused at length on the need for investment in “practical knowledge generation and research on effective democratic development assistance.” Noting
the weakness in evaluating effectiveness, the third recommendation called for a full independent evaluation of all publicly-funded democracy assistance to be undertaken within one year, tabled in Parliament and referred to the committee.10

Given this concern, it is striking that at no time was the committee made aware of the CIDA-commissioned evaluations then underway of the performance of the agency’s work in the “governance” sector since the 1996 policy was put into effect. Several months before the committee’s report was tabled, CIDA had received four external evaluations of the main sectors of governance programming, including one of its “democratization portfolio” of projects. The results were summarized in a “Synthesis Report” that was eventually posted to CIDA’s website.11 CIDA figures indicate that as much as $3.8 billion was spent on governance programming over the 1996-2006 period—and as much as $1.3 billion on 835 “democratization projects”—though the amounts cannot be stated with any confidence given very high number of coding errors (57 per cent) in the democratization portfolio.

These evaluations, had they been known to the committee, would certainly have reinforced its doubts about CIDA’s role as the primary instrument for delivering democracy assistance. The analysis reveals numerous deficiencies and failings in governance programming which were not allayed by the creation of a short-lived internal Office of Democratic Governance (ODG). A main conclusion of the Synthesis Report is blunt:

The Agency’s performance in management and delivery of governance programs is ineffective. The 1996 HRDDGG policy was highly regarded inside and outside the Agency, but there has been an enormous gap between policy and implementation. Once a leader in the sector, CIDA is no longer viewed as an innovator. The problems underlying this state of affairs are, in large measure, structural and institutional in character. Yet, beyond this there has been little effort at the Agency level to come to terms with what might be required to support governance as a priority sector.12

Although CIDA management acknowledged the Synthesis Report’s recommendations for taking corrective action, one of the evaluators involved describes the response as “pro forma.”13 In effect the findings were buried and had little impact on operations. Since the demise of the ODG, governance has been presented as “cross-cutting” CIDA priority.
But given the fate of these evaluations, there is little reason to believe CIDA has progressed as an effective provider of democracy support.

Not all of the House committee’s 2007 recommendations commanded non-partisan support. MPs parted ways—with the Bloc Québécois and NDP members ultimately dissenting from the Conservative-Liberal majority—over the report’s argument that a new institutional framework was required in order to make Canada a major player in the democratic development field. The report observed that there were many Canadians already working in the field for US-based and international organizations who could be attracted by a Canadian organization. Calling for significantly more funding devoted to democracy assistance, the Committee report cited Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy as examples of the scale and arm’s-length nature of what could be done. Nevertheless, the Bloc and NDP members remained unconvinced that a new government-established institution would not overshadow and perhaps attempt to control, if not take over, the work of existing organizations such as Rights & Democracy and the Parliamentary Centre, both of which had made submissions to the committee proposing a larger role for themselves in delivering democracy assistance. Moreover, although the report recommended that the new institutions be governed by an independent arm’s-length relationship to government and supported by multi-party cooperation, the dissenting MPs remained suspicious of potential ideological motivations behind the Conservatives’ strong endorsement for creating such institutions. Similar suspicions would come to the fore in 2010 when a battle over the direction of Rights & Democracy, and allegations of undue government interference, exploded into public view. The effect was to paralyze and ultimately fatally undermine an agency which had been created by a previous Conservative government, with implications that I will turn to shortly.

To this point there was still an expectation that a new government initiative on democracy promotion would be forthcoming, even if progress on the file had been slow and had followed a rather ambiguous path. The Harper government’s November 2007 formal response to the committee’s report had been positive overall, promising a three-member expert panel to study the idea of creating a substantial new foundation and the release of a whole-of-government strategy within six months. Matters then languished over the next year with ministerial shuffles, a fractious
minority parliament, a controversial prorogation, and an election which returned the Conservatives to power with another minority. There had been no panel or strategy announced. So it was somewhat of a surprise when the Conservatives’ election platform promised action. The Harper government’s November 2008 Speech from the Throne included a commitment to establish a new multiparty democracy promotion agency “to support the peaceful transition to democracy in repressive countries and help emerging democracies build strong institutions.”

Curiously, though, the responsibility for this file was then transferred from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the new Minister of State for Democratic Reform, Steven Fletcher, appointed to this position on 30 October 2008. More months of uncertainty followed another prorogation and a second throne speech focused entirely on economic recovery from the global recession. The official position remained that work was proceeding. At his first appearance before SCFAID in February 2009, Harper’s fourth foreign affairs minister, Lawrence Cannon, indicated the government was still committed to a new democracy promotion agency, and used the analogy to IDRC. For his part, Fletcher affirmed that “we need to lay the foundations for an agency that will allow for a dynamic ability to help countries in a fast-changing world. ... It is absolutely critically important for our foreign policy going forward ... and I’m very much aware of the importance of getting this correct.”

The government subsequently appointed a four-person advisory panel chaired by Thomas Axworthy, then head of Queen’s University’s Centre for the Study of Democracy (and a former principal secretary to Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau), which began deliberations in June 2009. Its summary report, made public in November 2009, focused on implementing the Standing Committee’s recommendation that the Canadian Parliament, following all-party consultations, “consider setting up a centre for multiparty and parliamentary democracy, with a parliamentary mandate.” In proposing a “Canadian Centre for Advancing Democracy,” with an annual C$30-70 million budget based on a five-year funding cycle, the panel included a number of stipulations to ensure that its governance would be fully at arm’s length from the government of the day. The panel also expressed the view that the centre should concentrate on carefully selected countries and operate a network of field offices including in “high priority, but high conflict states like Afghanistan and Haiti.”

Notwithstanding the panel’s enthusiasm, the sense I have from officials familiar with the file is that within government it was losing, not
gaining, momentum. The Harper government never followed up the panel report’s quiet release with any public response to its recommendations. Meanwhile, Rights & Democracy’s internal conflicts, for which opposition parties blamed the government, were damaging the prospects of obtaining multi-party support for any initiative.

Before turning to those troubles, it should be noted that some critics of Canadian foreign policy on the left had always been deeply suspicious of democracy promotion, seeing it as in too close alignment with U.S. interests and a “neoliberal” agenda. In the Americas, for example, it was associated with complicity in the ousting of the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti (in which Rights & Democracy’s role was also attacked), and criticism of other leftist populist governments (Venezuela, Bolivia) while pursuing free-trade deals with countries like Colombia. As Anthony Fenton put it:

Successive Canadian governments, beginning with Paul Martin’s Liberals and gaining momentum under Harper’s Tory minorities, have pushed full steam ahead with efforts to expand Canada’s democracy promotion efforts globally. Canadian leadership in the regime change and military occupation of Haiti (2004-present) gave rise to a renewed emphasis on Canada as an emerging power, an idea fomented by the Harper government. Democracy promotion is seldom discussed in the Canadian public sphere, even though it has been the subject of a multitude of federal-level conferences, reports and parliamentary hearings over the last five years. Over that same period, Canada has increasingly been integrating its instruments of democracy promotion with those of the US.20

Neil Burron offers a more nuanced scholarly critique. He argues that, notwithstanding the SCFAID parliamentary report’s articulation of a broad human rights-based conception of democratic development, Canada’s approach to democracy promotion has been increasingly subordinated to foreign policy objectives that, driven by security and commercial considerations, “have very little to do with democracy.” Again the Americas is cited as a case in point: “As governments across the hemisphere contest the neoliberal development model, Canadian democracy promotion is increasingly being used as a political device to promote free markets and to criticize governments that have strayed from the Washington consensus.”21
In addition, Burron alleges that the Harper government has shown a tendency to want to assert control over the Canadian “democracy assistance community of practice”—which he identifies with the rights-based approach to democratic development as enshrined in Rights & Democracy’s founding legislation, adopted by CIDA and followed by the NGOs who met periodically to dialogue with their government counterparts in the “Democracy Council” forum that emerged from the Martin government’s 2005 International Policy Statement. The Council became effectively defunct in 2010 while one of its members, the Forum of Federations, also lost its government funding. According to Burron:

Under Harper … the independence of Canada’s main arm’s-length democracy agency, Rights and Democracy, has come under attack, while many progressive nongovernmental organizations involved in supporting democracy have seen their funding cut. Such developments threaten what remains of Canada’s rights-based approach to democratic development with its expansive view of citizenship and focus on empowering grassroots organizations. For those who believe that Canada still has a positive role to play on the international stage, these are worrying times.

From Turbulence to Termination: The Conflicted Case of Rights & Democracy

The eruption of controversy over the direction of Rights & Democracy in early 2010 could not have come at a worse time for the Axworthy-led panel’s proposals, since the controversy aroused widespread doubts about the Harper’s government’s intentions and modus operandi. Why would anyone trust them with a new democracy assistance agency if they were sabotaging the existing one?

The first two presidents of Rights & Democracy were two respected federal politicians, Ed Broadbent and Warren Allmand. Under their successor, Jean-Louis Roy, Rights & Democracy was shaken by allegations of lavish spending habits and loose financial accountability controls. Concerns about the organization’s management surfaced in the five-year statutory review and a 2007 report on the organization by the Inspector General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Although these concerns were addressed by a new president, Rémy
Beauregard, appointed to the post by the Harper government in 2008, Rights & Democracy was vulnerable to other criticisms. It was never much loved by Foreign Affairs or CIDA, and it came to be seen by some as a thorn in the side for its criticisms of Canadian foreign policy and associations with left-leaning NGOs.

During 2008-2009, the Harper government appointed several members of a more conservative bent to the board of Rights & Democracy. One of these, Aurel Braun, a political science professor at the University of Toronto, became board chair in March 2009. Braun and several other board members questioned certain activities which had been approved by the president and his staff, and objected to small grants that had been made to Middle East NGOs critical of Israel. Braun, Jacques Gauthier and Elliot Tepper were also involved in a negative performance review of Beauregard which became the object of much contention. Tensions boiled over during a heated board meeting on 7 January 2010, in which Beauregard felt his position had been made untenable and several board members resigned in protest. His unfortunate death from a heart attack that night added to an atmosphere of recrimination. Most of Rights & Democracy’s staff signed a letter calling for the resignation of Braun and the board members responsible for the disputed performance review. Some senior staff were subsequently fired; lawsuits for wrongful dismissal were launched; and special investigations were ordered by the interim president, Jacques Gauthier.

The circumstances which threw Rights & Democracy into turmoil have been extensively documented in a June 2010 SCFAID report that was published after several months of public hearings, and will not be further belaboured here.24 The upshot is that the opposition parties and a growing chorus of NGO critics of the government accused it of using the appointments process to undermine the non-partisan independence of Rights & Democracy—in effect, to bring it more in line with Conservative foreign policy—damaging its reputation in the process. The subsequent controversial defunding of long-established organizations, notably KAIROS and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, sent a further chill through the development NGO community.

The Harper government’s appointment of Gérard Latulippe, who had once been a Canadian Alliance candidate, to the presidency of Rights & Democracy in the spring of 2010 did little to appease the critics, despite Latulippe’s promises to right the ship and restore an organization that most agreed was in crisis and had become dysfunctional. The opposition
MPs who held a majority on SCFAID were nevertheless not ready to give up on Rights & Democracy. The committee’s majority report expressed a strong belief that “there remains a vital role for Rights and Democracy in the promotion and protection of international human rights and the strengthening of democratic systems around the world. … Considering the events that have been witnessed in recent years where Rights and Democracy has been active—whether it is Zimbabwe, Burma, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, or the Sudan—the rationale for having such an organization has never been stronger.” The report’s first recommendation was to affirm that: “The Government of Canada should publicly recommit to the independence and continuing role of Rights and Democracy in providing critical support for human rights and democratic development around the world.”25 The other recommendations proposed corrective actions to support this renewal.

While Conservative MPs on the committee disagreed with criticisms made of the government and some recommendations, they accepted the body of the report and, expressing confidence in the new president and board as well as a new five-year plan, agreed that Rights & Democracy should now move forward. Indeed, quoting Hansard from 10 March 2010, they stated in their dissenting opinion to the report:

The government’s unquestioning support for Rights & Democracy has been confirmed by the Hon. Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs: “Rights & Democracy was created by a Conservative government. Given that our government has a sincere and fundamental belief in the work of this organization, it will continue to support Rights & Democracy.”26

The Harper government’s written response to the SCFAID recommendations praised the record of Rights & Democracy and stated: “Given the important work it carries out in the field, the Government reiterates its support for the organization and is committed to working with the new President to ensure the organization is able to increase its effectiveness and influence on the world stage.”27

However, the government did not accept responsibility for the internal crisis that had afflicted Rights & Democracy. The organization continued to suffer from staff departures and a climate of distrust; it was a wounded organization that needed time to heal. At the same time, the idea of a new democracy assistance agency seemed to have been dropped from the
government’s agenda. It was not mentioned in the March 2010 Speech from the Throne or in the first Throne Speech of the majority Harper government elected in May 2011. The new minister of foreign affairs, John Baird, confirmed that the proposal was dead when questioned by NDP foreign affairs critic Hélène Laverdière, a former diplomat, during his first appearance before SCFAID on 1 December 2011. He added that: “I’d like to review the mandate and operations of Rights and Democracy, which I think can play a greater role than it has played in the past.”28

Whatever internal review may have taken place, in the absence of any public consultation, it certainly did not reach such a salutary conclusion. On the heels of the government’s March 2012 budget, which included substantial expenditure cuts to both DFAIT and CIDA, Baird abruptly announced on 3 April that Rights & Democracy would be closed down through forthcoming legislation (which would no doubt easily pass given the government’s comfortable majority). The minister’s brief statement cited the organization’s “many challenges” and the need to move beyond them with a “clean slate.” But it also framed the decision as “part of our efforts to find efficiencies and savings,” adding that Rights & Democracy’s “functions will be brought within Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.”29

One could hardly find a more direct indication that the work carried out by a once independent organization would hereafter be subordinate to the government’s foreign policy objectives, even though what more DFAIT might actually do in this field was left unspecified. To date there has been no indication of any new activity by DFAIT supporting democratic development, including in the Arab world. Moreover, the Harper government did not even bother to introduce separate repeal legislation that would be referred to the House foreign affairs committee. Instead the deed was effected through a single sentence in the over 400-page omnibus budget implementation Bill C-38 introduced on 26 April 2011, Part 4, Division 33 of which “repeals the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development Act and authorizes the closing out of the affairs of the Centre established by that Act.”30

The reactions to Rights & Democracy’s closure are telling. The opposition parties were quick to condemn the move, arguing that it was the government’s interference and mismanagement of the situation that had exacerbated the organization’s challenges and left it gravely weakened. Observed journalist Kate Heartfield: “The interpersonal and ideological
clashes at R & D are better known than the work it did. Whether or not you think something was broken at R & D before the Conservative started messing with it, it’s hard to argue that the Conservatives bull-in-a-china-shop approach was successful. It got so acrimonious that people on both sides have called for the office to be replaced." Indeed, Rights & Democracy’s first president Ed Broadbent lamented: “My friends abroad, who recognized the institution for its independence, lost all respect for it in recent years. It’s been put out of its misery.” France-Isabelle Langlois, the organization’s deputy director of programs until the summer of 2011, was even harsher: “For close to two years it was nothing more than an empty shell, without a vision, objectives or solid projects. It’s too bad, but under the circumstances [shutting it down] was no doubt the best thing to do.”

Perhaps most telling was the reaction of Rights & Democracy’s former board chair, Aurel Braun, who figured so prominently in the 2009-2010 crisis. He argued that Rights & Democracy had been fatally flawed in terms of its work prior to his arrival, and that he and others had only tried to make it more accountable and responsible:

“This was an organization that previously pursued a private ideological philanthropy supporting extremist groups with taxpayer money. When you’ve got an organization that has such deep structural faults that have to be changed by legislation and where promotion can, perhaps, be done through other organizations or, perhaps, something new can be created in the future, then I certainly support the decision by the government to close down this organization.”

It is clear from the above that there was a substantial ideological difference between some members of the Rights & Democracy board appointed by the Harper government and the existing orientation of the organization which they encountered and tried to change. Whether that was the purpose behind their appointments is a moot point. The government seems to have decided that Rights & Democracy had become a liability, and the cover of budget cuts was a good way to dispose of it. One commentator who defended Braun, and was highly critical of how Rights & Democracy had been run, expressed the hope that the government, and the opposition parties, might now “get behind a proper democracy promotion agency” like the one proposed by the 2009 advisory panel. Terry Glavin argued that:
… when the Arab Spring erupted last year it wasn’t just certain loud-mouthed “human rights activists” who looked so surprised and stupid because of their persistent and unseemly preoccupations with Israel and their long-standing habit of dealing with Arab gangster states by cutting them slack. The Canadian government was also caught flatfooted. Compared to the United States, Britain and even the Netherlands, Canada was nowhere on the scene. The best and brightest Canadians in the field had already moved on, mostly to American agencies like the National Endowment for Democracy. Setting up a proper Canadian democracy-promotion agency would be just one way for Baird to “put those problems behind us and move forward,” as he says he intends.\(^{35}\)

One alternative to a new agency, Glavin argued, was at least to bring more “coherence and co-ordination” to existing federal government programs that support the advancement of global human rights and democracy.

Opposition critics and the NGOs that supported Rights & Democracy have criticized the Harper government’s foreign policy for veering away from previous liberal internationalist positions—moving away from the language of “human security,” downplaying the role of the United Nations (especially after Canada’s failure to win a seat on the Security Council in 2010), and taking an aggressively pro-Israel stance to the detriment of Canada’s standing as an “honest broker” in the Middle East. There has also been considerable criticism of CIDA for cutting funding to some traditional NGO partners and putting increased emphasis on private-sector development in contrast to the poverty reduction and human rights priorities set out in the 2008 ODA Accountability Act passed during the minority parliament.\(^{36}\) Government supporters may applaud these directions, as well as an increased emphasis on the role of the military and on pursuing free-trade negotiations and commercial deals with other countries. But in the current circumstances there would seem to be faint hope of finding any cross-party agreement or public consensus on the next moves in democracy promotion.

What Glavin also ignores is the arm’s-length independence that was given to Rights & Democracy and that was insisted on by the 2007 SCFAID report in relation to the new institutions it proposed. Rights & Democracy’s creation by Parliament had all-party support; its demise was denounced by the opposition parties. In short, what started as an internal fight over its direction turned into a partisan sore point that leaves sharp divisions
in its wake. The NDP’s Hélène Laverdière complained that: “Canada is losing its place and its reputation in the area of democracy promotion [and the closure of Rights & Democracy] is another black eye for Canada.”

The question remains what course the Harper government will now follow with regard to democracy assistance. Was the abandoned 2008 commitment to establish a new agency a result of the government having second thoughts, a strategic retreat in the face of the Rights & Democracy controversy, a victim of post-recession belt tightening, a combination of all of these, or were other factors also involved? And what does this episode say about the Harper government’s approach to foreign policy?

**Retreat or Reorientation? The Ascendancy of a New Conservative Foreign Policy**

The initial years of Harper’s first minority government were marked by a strong interest in Canada’s role in promoting international democratic development. This was notably manifested in SCFAID’s 2006-2007 study and the July 2007 report. While there was not consensus on the advisability of creating new institutions for that purpose, there was agreement that the Canadian contribution should be increased. As that report stated: “all parties are agreed that now is the time for Canada to move forward significantly in the challenging area of international democratic development, and to bring an approach to this complex field that reflects Canadian values and interests in the world.” Foreign Affairs had created a “Democracy Unit” in 2006 and in early 2007 its Policy Research Division undertook an internet-based public consultation on democracy promotion. In CIDA the idea of a “Canada Corps” that had surfaced in the Martin government’s 2005 *International Policy Statement* morphed into an “Office of Democratic Governance.”

Supporting democratic development could be seen as a very Canadian thing to do and it also seemed to align with the Conservatives’ characterization of their foreign policy approach as “values-based” and “principled.” Conservative members on SCFAID, backed by the foreign minister, Peter MacKay, were intent on a major initiative led by a new agency, even if that raised concerns among existing organizations, such as Rights & Democracy and the Parliamentary Centre, that their work might be overshadowed by, or worse brought under the umbrella of, a larger entity. The Harper government’s November 2007 response
to SCFAID’s recommendations was generally positive. It seemed the ground was being prepared for a new agency in the context of a broad policy thrust in which the government promised to:

- Develop a Whole-of-Government Policy Statement for the specific area of Democracy Support (within six months of the tabling of this Government Response).
- Establish a Canadian research program on democracy support and a Democracy Partners Research and Study Program to generate knowledge on the challenges to democracy in specific country contexts.40

Neither of these promises was kept. However the 2008 election platform included the following commitment: “A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will make the promotion of Canada’s democratic values on the world stage a major focus of our foreign policy. We will establish a new, non-partisan democracy promotion agency that will help emerging democracies build democratic institutions and support peaceful democratic change in repressive countries.”41 That carried over into the subsequent Speech from the Throne and was the backdrop to the work of the 2009 Axworthy advisory panel. (The four-person panel included Leslie Campbell, a senior executive with the U.S. National Democratic Institute who had been chief of staff to former NDP leader Audrey MacLaughlin, and who had previously worked with Axworthy to promote the idea of a Democracy Canada Institute.)

At the same time, however, this momentum encountered difficulties that became more apparent during 2010. One was fiscal: by the time the Axworthy panel reported in late 2009, there was a ballooning deficit and thus little appetite for substantial new funding programs. The other was ideological and bears closer scrutiny. The second Harper minority government was marked by an increasingly fractious parliament and partisan divisions which spilled over into the area of international affairs. The 2010 battle over Rights & Democracy was a flashpoint in a larger estrangement between the Harper government and the constituencies which supported a traditionally liberal internationalist approach to foreign policy. The opposition parties and the NGO community rallied around the embattled staff of Rights & Democracy. Canada’s failure to secure a Security Council seat in the fall of 2010 was blamed by the government’s many critics on its stridently pro-Israel stance and cuts in aid to some
of the poorest African countries. In addition, further controversy was sparked that fall when it was revealed that Bev Oda, CIDA’s minister, had inserted a hand-written “not” on a memorandum from senior CIDA officials recommending funding to the interchurch development coalition KAIROS, making it appear that those senior officials had recommended terminating KAIROS funding.

The Harper government, with its emphasis on the military’s combat role in Afghanistan over UN peacekeeping, its diminished posture at the UN, its free trade and commercial priorities, was seen as moving Canada away from the established liberal internationalism of its predecessors. That perception was correct and the distancing deliberate, argues Kim Richard Nossal, as “the Conservatives used international policy unambiguously to advance the broader political goal of displacing the Liberals as Canada’s natural governing party, in particular through a concerted effort to break with a past in Canadian foreign policy that is seen as deeply Liberal.”

On the democracy assistance file, one senses a note of betrayal as well as frustration among critics. For example, Nicholas Galletti, a former senior advisor to Rights & Democracy’s president, and Marc Lemieux, a former director the Forum of Federations, noted in The Globe and Mail at the end of 2010 that “instead of building up and strengthening Canada’s democracy support architecture, our government has been systematically dismantling it.” They noted that CIDA’s Office of Democratic Governance had been disbanded; the Democracy Unit in Foreign Affairs had been folded into the Francophonie and Commonwealth division; the Democracy Council, a forum for discussion and collaboration among Canadian democracy promotion agencies, had been disbanded; the Parliamentary Centre’s Sudan and Haiti programs had been “de-prioritized.” Galleti and Lemieux concluded that their own organizations, Rights & Democracy and the Forum of Federations, had been “rendered impotent by partisan and ideological board appointments and de-funding respectively.”

In light of the early 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the Canadian government was observed to be “missing the democratic moment” as a February 17 Globe and Mail editorial put it, in contrast to the number of Canadians working abroad with other democracy-promoting organizations. Interviewed by the Canadian Press, Leslie Campbell, the National Democratic Institute’s director for the Middle East and North Africa lamented: “The fact that Canada doesn’t have a democracy and governance program, and the fact that there’s really no Canadian footprint that I can
see in the Middle East, means that if Canada wants to play a role in the
debate about the direction that these transitions take in the Middle East
right now it’s doing so from a huge disadvantage.”45 For his part, Tom
Axworthy argued that the Conservative government should not sit on the
sidelines: “As a new democratic wave crashes into the autocracies of
the Middle East, Prime Minister Harper should return to his original good
idea and make democracy central to our foreign policy.”46

However, the Canadian Press story suggested the democracy agency
proposal was not completely dead, but had been sent back by cabinet.
Citing a Conservative source, it was noted that “some felt that the climate
was not right for establishing the centre in the context of the political battle
being waged over the state of arm’s-length body Rights & Democracy,
and with the substantial costs that would be incurred by such an initia-
tive.”47 While not enamoured of plunging ahead with an expensive new
agency, George Perlin, who had succeeded Axworthy as head of Queen’s
University’s Centre for the Study of Democracy and Diversity, argued that
Canada should be doing more to help the democracy assistance com-

munity: “International research and education on democracy promotion
policy are still substantially under-developed. Despite its current limited
engagement, Canada is well-positioned to take a leading role in this
field. It has a strong corps of experienced practitioner organizations and
individuals who can work with the academic community in creating Cana-
dian capacity for knowledge development and professional education. An
investment in these activities can not only help improve the effectiveness
of Canada’s own policies; it can help Canada contribute in an important
way to the collective international enterprise.”48

Unfortunately such an argument, however well-founded and seem-
ingly endorsed in the government’s own 2007 response to the SCFAID
report, was not likely to have much traction in a highly partisan election
year. As well, the evidence from other fields is that the Harper Conserva-
tives were not keen on supporting independent policy-based research
the findings of which fit uncomfortably with the government’s political
calculations and decisions. The Conservatives were especially not keen
on funding potential critics or alternative sources of policy advice. More-
over, the pattern of decisions, arrived at in a PMO-controlled top-down
manner, tended to reflect considerations of partisan advantage. It is not
surprising, therefore that the Harper government has not been much in-
terested in open public consultations, especially drawn-out ones, where
dissident views could find a platform.
In international affairs the result has been a concentration on a narrower set of priorities that consciously mark out Conservative foreign policy as distinct from that of its Liberal predecessors. There is a growing disconnect between the Harper government and those who have traditionally favoured liberal internationalist goals. A good example is UBC political scientist Maxwell Cameron’s appeal for more support to NGOs and more public involvement in the government’s approach to the Americas. To the extent that democracy support is central to the Harper government’s renewed attention to the Americas, he argues: “The policy of engagement with Latin American democracies needs an injection of resources, imagination and political will. Canada can regain influence by funding sustained on-the-ground engagement, and by giving a longer leash to Canadian diplomats. It could promote dialogue with civil society in the region, and fund Canadian non-governmental organizations (like KAIROS and the Canadian Council for International Co-operation) that build bridges with the region.”

Cameron was well aware of the irony that the government had instead defunded both KAIROS and CCIC. The trend has continued: there is a distinct “chill” in the air and an implicit pressure to conform to, or at least defer from taking issue with, the government’s priorities. In 2011, the government allowed the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), which had been a forum for government-NGO dialogue, to close for lack of funding. The Harper government is also known for its strict message control over what diplomats can say, not for giving them a “longer leash.”

Cameron suggested that: “A minority government situation is probably responsible for the lethargy in the government’s democracy agenda.” While it is true that the atmosphere for multi-party cooperation deteriorated through 2010-2011, it is not the case that democracy assistance suffered due to opposition objections. Quite the contrary. The Liberals strongly supported the ambitious recommendations of the July 2007 SCFAID report. Had the government moved expeditiously on its 2007 promises it would have had Liberal support. In 2010, Liberal leader Bob Rae published a book extolling a role for Canada in democracy promotion. Indeed the Liberals’ 2011 election platform contained the following commitment: “We will establish a Canada Democracy Agency, with capacity to broker, coordinate and support deployments of Canadian governance expertise, from both within federal agencies, and beyond—including other governments, retired professionals, the private sector and NGOs.” In December 2011, when NDP’s foreign affairs critic questioned the foreign minister,
John Baird, about the lack of any democracy promotion initiative, the implication was that her party would also support an initiative responding to developments such as the “Arab spring.”

Baird’s response, on behalf of a majority government, was a definitive “no” to any new agency, and his touted review of Rights & Democracy’s mandate became a termination notice. The Conservative platform during the 2011 had already dropped any mention of democratic development. Instead there was a promise to create an Office of Religious Freedom in Foreign Affairs “to monitor religious freedom around the world, to promote religious freedom as a key objective of Canadian foreign policy, and to advance policies and programs that support religious freedom.” Protecting freedom of religion is certainly part of an overall human rights agenda, but why would it now be singled out for special attention?

The closed and limited nature of consultations that have taken place on getting this new office up and running lend credence to suspicions that it is intended to appeal to religious social conservatives and the “values-oriented” ethnic constituencies that the Harper government has assiduously courted. There is an irony that the government has at the same time substantially reduced funding to a number of religious-based development NGOs, as commented on by Jim Creskey: “So why is the Harper government out to get these Canadian non-partisan church organizations—whose policies are guided more by the Sermon on the Mount than any political ideology—while trumpeting the government’s concern for religious freedom?” As Creskey noted, “These faith-based groups do often raise the kind of uncomfortable questions about foreign policy, mining and environmental problems at home and abroad that don’t fit the government’s agenda for corporate nationalism. But why doesn’t the Harper government have enough confidence to work with them, democratically ironing out their differences?”

According to Creskey, the government’s partisan inclinations are to exploit worthwhile objectives like defending religious freedom as electoral “wedge” issues. The fact that the Harper government has made no effort to seek parliamentary or broad public input for this policy tends to support this hypothesis. It may also help to explain why the prior democracy promotion initiative that did have cross-party parliamentary support was dropped in the government’s search for electoral advantage. In the view of Grant Kippen, a noted Canadian working in the field of democracy assistance who chaired the 2009 Afghanistan Electoral Complaints Commission, the government’s lack of political will to move forward with this
is not accidental: “Ideology appears to be a driving factor, as the govern-
ment seems to take a very combative and hyper-partisan approach to any
government-funded initiative.” Moreover, the Axworthy panel’s proposals
for a new agency to be established by Parliament involved undertaking
support for political party development. As Kippen put it to me, “I don’t
think that the current environment in Canada is conducive to work in this
area internationally. There is too much acrimony between the government
and opposition to make things work in an efficient and effective manner,
and petty political differences would end up poisoning the process—R&D
[Rights & Democracy] being a case in point.”

Likewise, the Harper government has an apparent lack of interest in, if
not aversion to, public consultations that might give voice to a diversity of
views including critical ones. Cameron has argued that “Canadian foreign
policy itself should be democratized. A well-designed, broadly consultative
foreign policy review is overdue. There are all sorts of innovations in
civil society participation that could serve as models for democratic
consultation. … A bold democracy assistance agenda would not be just
about making ‘them’ more democratic like ‘us.’ It would be about making
the world a more democratic place, Canada included.”

In the area of foreign policy the Harper Conservatives believe they
have a mandate to pursue their policies on their terms without any need
to invite further parliamentary or public input. The government’s emphasis
on economic growth, trade and private-sector development are readily
apparent. Beyond that, any policy reviews remain internal. I have heard of
work being done within CIDA to update the human rights, democratization
and good governance policy. But nothing has been made public to that
effect, and as observed earlier, there is little evidence of the lessons of
critical evaluations being taken seriously.

Foreign Affairs and CIDA officials were extremely reluctant to say
anything about present policy. On the Foreign Affairs website, “democracy”
continues to be one of the declared “core values” of Canadian foreign
policy. Baird has pointed to the “democratic transitions” envelope of the
Glyn Berry Program in Peace and Security (formerly the Human Security
Program under the Liberals) which funnels $3 million annually into small
projects that fit the government’s priorities.

This is, however, a fraction of the $5 million annual budget of the
new Office of Religious Freedom which was finally unveiled on 19 Feb-
uary 2013, almost two years after being announced without the benefit
of public consultation or parliamentary study. The unveiling took place,
conspicuously, at the Toronto-area mosque of a Muslim minority sect, doubtless to allay concerns that it would focus on threats to the rights of Christians and Jews. However, critics are unlikely to be reassured by Harper’s simultaneous choice as the office’s first ambassador of Andrew Bennett, a dean at Augustine College, an institution that strongly appeals to conservative Christian tradition. It has been never been made clear why among the full range of international human rights only this particular one deserves a specific office and ambassador. (Previously the Harper government had eliminated ambassadorial positions for circumpolar affairs and sustainable development.) The vague mandate of the office speaks of promoting “tolerance” but without addressing the potential for rights claimed on religious grounds to come into conflict with other fundamental rights, for example the equality rights of women and of sexual minorities.

The broader agenda of human rights and democratic freedoms has not been forgotten by opposition spokespersons in Parliament. For example, Paul Dewar, Official Opposition critic for foreign affairs, observed that: “Action on this is valuable—but must not come at the expense of, or to the exclusion of, developing other important democratic rights.” Dewar claimed that the Office “represents both a broken Conservative promise and a missed opportunity. Conservatives had repeatedly promised a democratic development agency, but they broke that promise and now they’re moving forward on a much more limited and narrow approach.” He claimed that the real motives are less than pure, and called on the Conservatives “to stop playing domestic politics on the international stage.”

The Harper government continues to assert that support for democracy is part of its “principled” foreign policy. For example, interviewed as part of a Policy Options April 2012 issue devoted to Canadian foreign policy, Baird responded to a question about disturbing developments in Russia by asserting that “promoting democratic development is a key priority, promoting freedom is a big priority around the world, in Russia and everywhere.” At the same time, it is hard to square these occasional rhetorical flourishes with bureaucratic moves like putting DFAIT’s former democracy unit, which administers the Glyn Berry democratic transitions envelope, into the Francophonie and Commonwealth Division, even if the latter has added “democracy” to its title. Still to be determined is the impact that very substantial cuts to DFAIT and CIDA announced in the March 2012 federal budget may have on what remains of democracy support programs. There is no indication that the merger of CIDA into
DFAIT as a result of the March 2013 federal budget will have any positive effect on available resources. So one is left with a paradox. With the closing of Rights & Democracy, it seems very likely that Canada will be spending less on government support for democratic development in the next several years than was the case in 2006 when SCFAID started its examination of how Canada could do more.

There is a vacuum that could be seen as an opportunity to at least improve the effectiveness of the remaining support programs and build a better knowledge basis for work in this field without getting into more controversial areas like political party development. In December 2012 the McLeod Group of international affairs consultants released a study suggesting the creation of a new body that they argued could provide a “learning and policy development function in the fields of human rights and democratic development.” In their view such an organization could develop “an implementation capacity that would allow it to act in a responsive manner to requests for support from developing countries.” As a repository of Canadian expertise, it would have both a training function and could provide an evaluation service for Canadian efforts in the field.61 While the McLeod Group proposed that the House foreign affairs committee study their recommendation, any further action is unlikely: funding independent policy research and analysis at arm’s length from partisan interests is not the Harper government’s style.

The Disappearance of Democracy Assistance in Harper’s Foreign Policy

This paper began with a quote from Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson railing against the Harper government’s curious, not to say paradoxical, retreat from its earlier democracy promotion promises, especially the establishment of a big new agency of the Axworthy-Campbell “Democracy Canada” type which Simpson has long favoured. It is certainly on the face of it a curious case of policy development, or rather ambiguity ending in abandonment. But this can be best understood as part of an evolving partisan political reassessment and reorientation of the Conservative approach to foreign policy—one that makes sense in terms of Harper’s political instincts and Reform roots and that accords
with the government’s post-recession fiscal circumstances, budgetary choices, and electoral calculations.

As Nossal has observed, the Harper Conservatives came to power in 2006 with a limited and simplistic view of international affairs. The prime minister was more focused on supplanting the Liberals as the country’s “natural governing party.” In piously declaring freedom and democracy among Canadian “core values” to be promoted abroad, the 2006 Conservative election platform took an easy shot at Liberal foreign policy for having “compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests.” However, “Canada’s new government” never came up with anything to replace the abandoned Martin government 2005 International Policy Statement that had been long laboured over and preceded by Bill Graham’s 2003 “Dialogue on Foreign Policy.” And although the apparent early enthusiasm for a Canadian democracy initiative did provide impetus for the subsequent parliamentary committee study, the committee report’s internationalist perspective and exploration of policy complexities was never matched by the government’s own elaboration of a new policy.

Was this backing away from any substantive internationalism a case of naïveté giving way to a more realist shift? In the notable case of the People’s Republic of China, the Harper government has certainly moved far from its initial preachy approach to one of doing business with Chinese state corporations regardless of human rights concerns. (As an aside, one wonders what the Office of Religious Freedom will have to say about the rights of Chinese followers of Falun Gong or the Dalai Lama.) While the Harper government appears more circumspect on these files, it has failed to articulate an overall foreign policy vision that is consistently realist or even particularly conservative. After the May 2011 election, the prime minister articulated a “Manichean” view of a “dangerous world” marked by a “struggle between good and bad”, with Canada of course on the “right side,” whether others like it or not. More importantly, in my view, married to this is an overriding “idea that the primary purpose of international policy is to advance a domestic partisan agenda.” If the result combines posturing about “principles” with a pragmatic disregard for policy coherence, so be it.

Advocates of an expansive multilateralist Canadian liberal internationalism—a foreign policy perspective generally shared by what Neil Burron calls the Canadian community of practice on democracy assistance—have
understandably reacted negatively to these developments. Burron sees the pressure on this community to realign towards compliance with Conservative government objectives, as well as a subordination of diplomacy to commercial interests, as trends moving in the opposite direction to a progressive rights-based approach to democracy promotion.

As Andrew Cohen has argued, there is a wider agenda at work in the 2012 budget cuts: “There are many words commentators have used to describe the new federal budget: conservative, cautious, humdrum, prudent, bold, visionary, revolutionary, transformative. It’s hard to find le mot juste but here’s another: small. Small government. Small minds. Small ideas. Parochial, petty, cheap.”

I think the operative phrase here is small government, meaning a long-term restriction in the role of the federal government and reductions in direct federal funding in favour of encouraging private-sector initiatives. Bob Miller, former head of the Parliamentary Centre and an astute long-time participant-observer in the field of Canadian democracy assistance, points to the influences on Prime Minister Harper of the neoconservative, small-government philosophy of University of Calgary mentors associated with some have called the “Calgary School”—former senior advisor Tom Flanagan, Barry Cooper and others. Although Harper has disappointed many on the ideological right with his pragmatism in power, and is not one to announce grand visions, preferring to move strategically and incrementally, in this view his intention remains to shift the Canadian policy space in that more conservative (or at least anti-Liberal) direction. At the same time, the fiscal squeeze provides an opportunity to make government smaller.

This environment hardly fits with the idea of spending a lot of money to establish a new democracy promotion agency, especially one not controlled by government that might end up providing funding support to NGOs and others critical of government policies. Such an agency fits more comfortably in the Liberal election platform. The Harper government’s declaratory support for human rights and democratic development should be understood in the context of a conscious reorientation of foreign policy away from the progressivist liberal internationalism of its Liberal predecessors, and an alignment of stated Canadian values and principles with targeted priorities that play to domestic political constituencies—as in the case of an inexpensive special office devoted to promoting religious freedom.
Conclusion: Diminishing Public Expectations in Lieu of Democratization

Canada not only no longer punches above its weight, but has gone missing in action on democratic development, falling further behind American and European initiatives. (Indeed the U.S., after being chastened by the backlash over the Bush agenda, may be renewing its efforts if President Obama’s second inaugural address is any indication, affirming that: “We will support democracy from Asia to Africa; from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom.”) What accounts for the Harper government’s bold intentions of a few years ago to boost Canada’s role in democracy promotion coming to naught?

The most plausible answer has little to do with actual fiscal constraints, and more to do with the Harper government’s incremental reconsideration and reorientation of established foreign policy in directions that most strategically serve its interests while appealing to its electoral base. We are seeing the elaboration of a Conservative foreign policy that consciously deviates from that of previous Liberal governments, and indeed from the internationalism of the Mulroney government that, with cross-party support, created an institution like Rights & Democracy. In taking a narrower approach to international issues more attuned to domestic partisan and ideological considerations, the Harper government has shown it is not inclined to reach out to opposition parties or to engage in wide-ranging public consultations, especially now that it has a stable majority. To be blunt, I think it believes it has nothing to gain from that kind of (potentially troublesome) democratization.

One might well ask “who cares?” when international issues—including our Afghanistan involvement that has cost so many soldiers’ lives—were barely mentioned during the last election campaign, and if most Canadians do not seem to be much roused by the above controversies. Nossal concludes that “the new directions in Canadian foreign policy have not inspired the kind of negative reactions among the broader public that might otherwise prompt the Conservative government to change its mind about the current directions in foreign policy.” He suggests that this is likely to be self-reproducing: “the more that the public accepts (or, as importantly, does not reject) new ideas about Canada’s proper role in world affairs articulated by the Conservatives, the less relevant that reminders of a
Liberal internationalist—if not liberal internationalist—past in Canadian foreign policy will become.”

So, although there is scope for Canada to do much more in the field of international democratic development—as extensively reviewed by the 2007 SCFAID report during the first Harper minority government and affirmed by the 2009 Axworthy panel report—the Canadian political climate has deteriorated significantly for a publicly-funded internationalist initiative based on broad parliamentary and public support.

It might be said that the Harper Conservatives are more interested in curtailing expectations of public funding, and controlling such funding in ways that advance their interests and confer electoral advantage, than in democratizing policy processes. It is an orientation that applies as much to international as to domestic spending. Unless and until this situation changes, there is little prospect of any substantial new Canadian undertaking in international democracy assistance consistent with the multi-party and liberal-internationalist premises that have traditionally guided Canadian foreign policy in this area.

That does not mean that those who do care about reviving that legacy and building Canada’s position in the world should throw in the towel. There is a compelling case to be made for a larger and carefully considered Canadian role in supporting international democratic development. It awaits another government to make it.

Notes


5. House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Advancing Canada’s Role in International Support for Democratic Development, Ottawa, July 2007. Full disclosure: I was the drifter of the report.

7. For a critical analysis see, Geoffrey Cameron, “Between Policy and Practice: Navigating CIDA’s Democracy Agenda,” University of Regina, The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public Policy Paper 47, December 2006.


10. Ibid., pp. 52-54.


16. Cannon’s exact words were: “Hopefully it is done in much the same way as at IDRC, which is I think not only world renowned but certainly something of whose work Canada can be extremely proud.” See House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Evidence*, no. 2, 10 February 2009, 10, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/402/FAAE/Evidence/EV3663799/FAAEEV02-E.PDF.


19. Ibid., 10.
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22. The Democracy Council consisted of representatives from Foreign Affairs, CIDA, Rights & Democracy, Elections Canada, the IDRC, the Forum of the Federations, the National Judicial Institute, and the Parliamentary Centre.


25. Ibid., 29-30.

26. Ibid., 43.


28. SCFAID, Evidence, 1 December 2011.


33. Ibid.


35. Terry Glavin, “Killing Rights and Democracy was the right thing to do,” Ottawa Citizen, 6 April 2012, A11.


47. Ditchburn, “Canadians in the thick.”


55. Grant Kippen, e-mail communication, 3 May 2012.

56. Cameron, “Democracy promotion.”

57. The formal announcement and rationale for the office can be found on the Prime Minister’s Office website: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&featureId=6&id=5306. The office includes a “Religious Freedom Fund” budgeted at $4.25 million annually.


60. The cuts amount to $170 million from DFATD’s budget by 2014-2015 and $320 million for the development assistance over the same period. Other federal departments and agencies that engaged in aspects of democracy support such as Elections Canada have also had their budgets cut.


64. Nossal, 22 and 29.

65. Ibid., 22.


67. SCFAID, which has never revisited its 2007 democratic development recommendations, is currently studying the role of the private sector in international development.

68. Interview with Bob Miller, Ottawa, 18 January 2012.


About the Author

One of Canada’s foremost experts on Canadian foreign policy, Gerald Schmitz was employed by the Parliamentary Information and Research Service (PIRS) for thirty years, a parliamentary career that also made him one of this country’s most distinguished public servants. Specializing in the fields of international relations, political economy, human rights and parliamentary affairs, Schmitz held several senior roles with PIRS prior to his retirement in 2011. He was also the longest-serving research director for the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade/Development (1994-2008). During this time he was the lead drafter of many major reports, including: Canada and circumpolar cooperation; the future of the World Trade Organization; relations between Canada and the United States and Mexico; Canada’s relations with the Muslim world; Canada’s international democracy assistance; and Canada’s role in Afghanistan. Schmitz’s reputation for excellence in research and government policy knowledge also led to him twice being seconded-first as a program director for the North-South Institute and, later, as an advisor for Minister of Foreign Affairs. Schmitz was awarded a Hans-Seidel Memorial Fellowship in 2007 and is a prolific author, having penned an array of scholarly papers, books and critical parliamentary reports. Among a wide range of interests, Schmitz is an accomplished photographer, winning the World Wildlife Fund’s international grand prize in 2005. An ambassador of the Canadian Film Institute, he is also the longtime film critic for the Saskatchewan-based weekly journal The Prairie Messenger. In March 2013 he was recognized as an alumni of influence by the University of Saskatchewan’s College of Arts and Sciences.