Competing Narratives and Cold War Politics
The Case of South Africa Before the UN Security Council

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Over the past two decades, the leading objectives of post-apartheid South Africa have been to increase the country’s prominence on the world stage and project a position of diplomatic leadership across the African continent. Indeed, under Presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma, South Africa has pursued an ambitious foreign policy platform that has resulted in the awarding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and admission to the select club of influential regional powers known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Since 2000, South Africa has also been a regular contributor to African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions, served two terms as Chair of the global governance initiative on conflict diamonds known as the Kimberley Process, and engaged in ‘oil diplomacy’ in Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and parts of Eastern Africa.

Given such gains in status and prestige associated with the ‘new’ South Africa, it is easy to forget that the country was once notorious for domestic policies that promoted institutional racial discrimination. South Africa’s state-sanctioned racial discrimination was first brought to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1946 – in the international organization’s second year of existence. Following the National Party’s electoral victory in 1948, South Africa’s racial discrimination policies were concretized and implemented throughout the country, which unleashed myriad socio-economic repercussions that affected every segment of South African society. South Africa’s apartheid policies were regularly condemned within not only the UNGA, but also the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is the latter venue that serves as the main focus of Neil O’Reilly’s welcome study on how the international community sought to address apartheid during the Cold War era.

Like many issue-areas relating to questions of human rights and social justice across the globe, the UNSC was largely impotent in compelling South Africa to change its apartheid policies. In many ways, the treatment
of apartheid South Africa provides yet other illustration of the structural and substantive weaknesses of the United Nations in general, and the UNSC in particular. It certainly did not help matters that members of the ‘Permanent-Five’ (P-5) themselves were pushed and pulled by conflicting foreign policy objectives towards South Africa, ranging from Janus-like pronouncements (i.e., the United Kingdom, France, and the United States) to episodic inconsistency (i.e., China and the Soviet Union). In view of recent difficulties in generating consensus within the UNSC for decisive humanitarian intervention in Libya and Syria, perhaps it is no surprise that South Africa’s apartheid policies persisted for several decades. Put differently, the South Africa case emphasizes how the UNSC is constrained by seeking to uphold the sovereignty of states on the one hand, and protecting human rights on the other. Although the apartheid issue-area could also be described as a case where the combination of geopolitical, trade, and commercial interests trumped human rights, there was a positive – albeit outside of the purview of the UNSC – outcome. That is, the anti-apartheid divestment campaign underscored the ways in which corporate social responsibility (CSR) can move beyond a normative exercise and become an effective tool to compel modifications to extant domestic policy.
Acknowledgments

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Introduction

The issue of state sanctioned racial discrimination in South Africa first became a topic of interest within the United Nations (UN) in 1946, when India filed a complaint in the General Assembly against the legislation of discriminatory land ownership policies against South Africans of Indian origin.\(^1\) With the election of the National Party in 1948, racial discrimination became increasingly entrenched through legislation and federal governing policy formation.\(^2\) Institutional racial discrimination in South Africa, as topic of interest to the UN, remained a matter of consideration until the dissolution of apartheid and multi-ethnic elections in 1994. The question of South Africa first became a topic of debate within the UN’s Security Council (SC) in 1960, with the issue of apartheid and South African intransigence continuously ascending and abating in prominence within the SC for the next 34 years. Periods of SC debate over the issue were interspersed amongst years of silence, despite the continuance of institutional racist policies, human rights abuses and extraterritorial sovereignty violations on the part of South Africa.

There is currently very little literature on the role of the SC in regard to the issue of apartheid, especially compared to other organs of the UN. This is indicative of the small part it played in dealing with the situation. This, then, begs the question of whether the SC mattered in this instance. The SC is not only the primary actor on issues of international peace and security, but also provides a “forum for the expression and development of world opinion and for the presentation by states before the international community of their points of view.”\(^3\) The authority of the SC in international security allows member states a powerful position from which to express their views, and to press for their concerns to be dealt with. The case of apartheid era South Africa before the SC provides a valuable study of how this dynamic has been played out.
Within the SC debates concerning South Africa there was unanimous consensus that apartheid was an abhorrent, unsustainable and unacceptable form of governance. However, there was much less consensus in how to address the problem. This is where divisions within the permanent five members (P5; China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) and between P5 and non-permanent members (NPMs) became obvious. Repeated calls for action by NPMs of the non-aligned movement (NAM), Organization of African Unity (OAU), and Africa Group at the UN, reflected a collective anxiety about finding a voice within the bipolarity of superpower Cold War politics. For many of these states, the struggle against apartheid was a reaction to their own histories of colonization and marginalization in the world order.4 The P5 states, on the other hand, used the debates over South Africa to pursue, defend, and sometimes provide cover for their own geo-political interests.

When the SC did take action, many of the debates that arose over the wording of resolutions condemning South Africa were centered both on controlling the narrative, thus limiting the liability of certain P5 members supporting the regime, and limiting the extent to which resolutions would demand concrete action. In formulating policies that would be agreeable to those participating in the SC votes on South Africa “the protracted negotiations over the wording of sensitive resolutions...suggest[ed] that this content matters for reasons of law, politics and policy”5. The question this raises is: for whom did it matter, and why? To answer this, this paper will focus on debates within the Security Council concerning the question of South Africa, with particular attention paid to the views and positions presented by P5 member states.

Right of the Victors

The preamble to the UN Charter states that one of its purposes is to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”6. In the wake of the horrors and atrocities of the Second World War this seemed a reasonable and even necessary ideal for an institution designed to prevent a repeat of that era. Portending later divisions within the organization, however, was that “only those states which had, by March 1945, declared war on Germany and Japan and subscribed to the United Nations Declaration” were invited to participate in the San
Francisco Conference and the signing of the UN charter.\textsuperscript{7} It is clear from this that the inclusion of states, formation of policy and divisions of power within the UN was the prerogative of the victors. Within this collective the most powerful players within the alliance, the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), France, the Soviet Union and China (despite the fact two out of five of them had recently been occupied, and China was in the midst of a civil war), secured for themselves positions of global predominance in the form of the SC.\textsuperscript{8} Within this elite of the already exclusive organization there was an assumption of primary responsibility for the “maintenance of international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{9}

On the one hand this assumption of international security monitoring by the SC made sense, in so much as the countries of the P5 had the means, economically, militarily and diplomatically, to enforce their will upon non-compliant and belligerent nations. As such, in the design of the UN charter and its organs, the P5 assumed a position of permanent responsibility for responding to international peace and security issues brought before the UN. Conversely, while the Council was being formed, solidarity within the organization was contemporaneously undermined by the divisions and polarization of the rapidly emerging Cold War. Within this context, the UN as a whole, and the SC in particular, took on a dysfunctionality that came into play throughout the remainder of the Cold War and influenced both the tone and the nature of the debates within the Security Council. What came to matter, for P5 states in particular, was more a concern of national interest than community arbitration and mediation. The case of South Africa before the SC illustrates how this collective, ostensibly formed to promote peace and stability, failed under the weight of its individual components mandates to take collective action, despite its intended purpose.

The Debate Begins

The opening round of Council debate concerning South Africa began with a letter of indictment against South Africa by 29 states calling on the SC to “consider the situation arising out of the large scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa”.\textsuperscript{10} This was done under the authority of member states, enshrined in the UN Charter, to “bring any dispute or any situation [which might lead to international friction] to the
attention of the Security Council”.11 Amongst the signatories to this letter, the only sitting member of the SC at the time was Tunisia, who brought the matter to the SC as a representative of the 29 states. Though Tunisia was the only state that was both an SC member and a signatory to the item on the agenda, its representative was the sixth delegate to address the Council, behind the UK, France, Italy, the Soviet Union and the US, respectively. Obviously put out, Tunisia raised this as a point of order and stated that “normal procedure would have been to call first on those delegations which have brought the question before the Council”.12 This disparity in power between NPMs and the P5 indicates that the discussion was weighted more toward big power politics than the supposed issue at hand.

In regards to P5 members, opening remarks of the debate over South Africa came from the UK delegation and clearly established the British position. The context of the British stance in regards to South Africa was inextricable from their shared history. As a former colony and member of the Commonwealth, South Africa was linked to the United Kingdom through custom, culture, language, history and economy. Within the confines of the SC chamber, the UK was free to admonish the Government of South Africa for its racial policies, but practical considerations prevented it from promoting resolutions or measures that would have called for action to be taken against South Africa. In support of this position, the UK representative, quoting Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, stated that “nothing in the Charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State”.13 With this simple statement, the UK firmly established and articulated a hands-off policy concerning South Africa. Rather than firmly address the intransigence and racist policies of the former Colony, Britain instantly turned the debate into one of sovereignty. This implicitly guided the direction of discourse within the SC. Before the debate over apartheid in South Africa had truly begun, the question of the debate became one of sovereignty, at least from the British perspective.

France was the second member of the P5 to make remarks on the issue. The French representative, echoing the British position, instantly invoked adherence to the Charter by also quoting Article 2, Paragraph 7.14 Going one step further, the French delegation called into question the legality of hearing the matter of South Africa within the SC chamber. This was based on an unease over the “competence of the Council to deal with this question”, as it fell within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign
The British and French approach was thus to absolve the SC of responsibility for the question of South Africa. The remainder of their respective stated positions in the early debates became iteration upon iteration of the same sentiment.

Unlike its allies, the United States initially approached the question of South Africa with reference to the ideals upon which the UN was founded. In his opening remarks on the subject the US representative, and then SC President, Henry Cabot Lodge, cited Article 55 of the Charter, which calls for the “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”. In light of this he insisted that the “question is a proper one for United Nations consideration”. The US was promoting the view that the SC was indeed the appropriate form to address the question of human rights violations, even within the bounds of a sovereign state. This view cannot be separated from the context of America’s post war idealism and investment in international institutions, evinced by its role in the founding of the UN and various Bretton Woods institutions. This new internationalism was, for the US, a keystone of national security and international stability, insomuch as it provided forums of dialogue and systems of integration that were absent in the prelude to the Second World War.

From the earliest SC debates regarding the situation the Soviet Union took a firm position against the government of South Africa. In opposition to its Western counterparts on the SC, the stated position of the Soviet Union was informed by the rhetoric of Soviet ideology. Its position was marked by the usage of revolutionary language, and painted a picture of the South African government as a colonial regime in the British tradition, which was essentially a proxy of Western capitalist interests in Southern Africa. In the debate leading to the first sanction against South Africa with the adoption Resolution 134, which stated that the situation in South Africa might endanger international peace and security, the delegate from the Soviet Union accused South Africa of being in violation of Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the United Nations Charter.

With this indictment, the Soviet position saw the situation in South Africa as one that did indeed threaten global peace and security. From as early as 1963 it pushed to have the situation in South Africa fall under a Chapter VII UN mandate. During the 1054th meeting of the SC, the Soviet delegate stated that the “The Security Council should consider the explosive situation existing in the Republic of South Africa... constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.” This position did not
change throughout the course of the thirty-four year debate concerning the issue.

The Soviet position regarding South Africa, and in regard to all of Africa during the decolonization period, was formalized in a statement made at the 1041st meeting of the SC. Citing a statement from Nikita Khrushchev, the delegate stated the Soviet position as follows: “the struggle for the final liquidation of Colonialism in all its forms...[will] meet not only with sympathy but also with friendly support from the Soviet people and its Government.” This was not empty rhetoric, as post-colonial governments and various liberation movements in Southern Africa, including the African National Congress (ANC), came to receive matériel and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union. The position of the Soviet Union within the SC against the Western powers was consistent with their stated world view and activities under the Cold War paradigm.

Complicating an understanding of the Chinese position over the course of the South African situation was the status of Chinese representation in the SC. China was initially represented, in accordance with Second World War alliances and the wishes of the Western powers, by the Republic of China (RoC), based in Taiwan after Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang government lost the civil war. It was not until 1971 that Chinese representation transferred to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This changed the dynamic and tone of Chinese positions in the SC. Once in the Security Council seat The PRC took a more aggressive stance against both the apartheid government and fellow council members, and was more inclined than its predecessor to use the SC to pursue its own diplomatic goals. Statements from the Chinese representatives in SC debates on South Africa included vociferous diplomatic attacks against the Soviet Union over the Sino-Soviet split, and on the Western powers over ideological differences, as well as staunch and vocal opposition to the policies of the apartheid regime.

The Odd Break With Habit

With few exceptions there was great consistency over time in the positions of members of the SC in regards to South Africa. NPMs of the SC that were also members of NAM, the OAU or the Africa Group within the UN (often times being members of all three groups) were consistent and unified in their opposition to the South African regime. For members of the
P5, however, any chance to promote national interests, or any opportunity to attack an enemy or capitalize on prevalent conditions was not to be missed. Within the SC debates positions need not necessarily be consistent in order to be coherent with the overall aims the individual states. This is evidenced by the Soviet response to Resolution 191, which established an expert committee, made up of Council members, to study measures which could be taken by the Council against South Africa. For the first and only time during the debate over South Africa the Soviet Union (along with Czechoslovakia and France) abstained from voting upon a resolution against South Africa. The stated reason given by the Soviet Union was that the resolution did not go far enough in punishing South Africa. It also made too many concessions to the Western powers to be accepted by the Soviets, and included a provision for the continuation of the Group of Experts, which, according to the Soviet position, was a prevarication and ultimately toothless academic exercise. Thus, its abstention, while deviating slightly from its regular approach to South Africa, allowed it to use the SC as a forum in which to oppose the Western powers.

While the PRC maintained a voice of strong opposition against the government of South Africa, ostensibly on the grounds of human rights concerns, and strongly declared an abhorrence for the policies of racial discrimination, it ultimately did not have much to say on the specific matter of apartheid. Once it had attained a place in the UN and on the SC as the lawful representative of China, it neither wasted time in learning how to use the Council to promote its own agenda, nor lost an opportunity to do so. Perhaps more than any other member of the P5, the PRC used the forum to attack its enemies on issues that were sometimes tangentially related to the situation in South Africa, and sometimes distinctly different matters. In a reflection and projection of the PRC’s worldview, expressed through the SC, China couched its criticism of South Africa in revolutionary language similarly espoused by the Soviet Union, but with a Maoist bent, by referring to the South African government and its policies as “counter-revolutionary”. Departure from the subject at hand became almost standard form in the elocutions of the Chinese delegates. At the 1637th meeting of the SC, concerning the question of Namibia, the Chinese representative took the opportunity to attack the United States and Britain for being the “behind the scenes big bosses of South Africa”. A few years later, during the 1900th meeting of the SC, regarding Angola and South Africa, in an even more overt redirection of the debate concerning South Africa and clearly channelling the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese
representative launched a verbal assault against the Soviet Union. In his delivery, the delegate accused the Soviet Union of “flaunting the flag of socialism” while it “pushes fervishly its colonial policy of expansion”\textsuperscript{31}.

The United States showed perhaps the greatest degree of variance in its response to the situation in South Africa over the course of the SC debates. Though sharing the same liberal democratic ideals as the UK and France, especially in regards to opposing the Soviet Union and PRC, the US was more subject to policy shifts on this particular matter, in accordance with the priorities of each incoming administration. In 1963, reflecting its opening statement from the first debate on the South African question, and conceding its own difficulties with race relations, the US reaffirmed its original position and a belief that the SC could make a positive impact on the situation on South Africa\textsuperscript{32}. By 1964, however, the United States became more wary of the idealist approach that it had previously adopted, stating at the 1133\textsuperscript{rd} meeting of the SC that it “continues to believe that the situation in South Africa ... does not today provide a basis under the Charter for the application by the SC of coercive measures.”\textsuperscript{33} Though the US disagreed with apartheid, it was not at this time prepared to implement a Chapter 7 resolution, and the actions that would entail. This marked a US shift from its earlier post-war idealism to Cold War pragmatism. Economics and Cold War considerations, and the attendant ideology of the US in these regards, came to play a greater role in its dealings in the SC debates on South Africa.

By 1976 the U.S. was consistently voting in line with its Cold War priorities, and with consideration to issues outside of the situation in South Africa. At the 1906\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the SC in 1984, preceding the vote on Resolution 387, condemning South Africa’s incursions into Angola, the American delegate used his statement to attack both the Soviet Union and Cuba for their involvement in Angola in particular, and Southern Africa in general.\textsuperscript{34} This statement relegated the situation in South Africa, from the American position, to a proxy conflict in the ongoing feud between the Super Powers. The United States abstained from censuring South Africa in this instance because the draft resolution made no mention of Soviet or Cuban involvement in Angola, despite the fact this was neither the topic of the debate nor the aim of the resolution. Once again, what was being discussed was not the plight of the people of South Africa, but topics which were of greater geo-strategic interest to the P5 members of the SC. The forum was, once again, a playground of one upmanship.
The UK was bound to South Africa, much more so than any other permanent member, by historic, economic and strategic bonds. Even the Labour government of Harold Wilson, after having taken a hard line anti-apartheid approach during the election campaign of 1963, was forced to face the particular realities of the South African/UK relationship upon assuming power. France, while consistent in its repeated appeals to the sanctity of sovereignty, also had significant financial interests in South Africa. France also had its own issues to deal with in its decolonization of African territories. However, these positions, even within the cloistered confines of the SC, were becoming increasingly untenable.

The Special Committee

Despite its thirty-four year presence as a matter for consideration by the SC, the question of South Africa did not always hold a dominate position in Council discussions. There was no debate on the issue, and subsequently no resolutions passed, between 1964 and 1970. During this time there were several developments in and around South Africa which exasperated the situation, such as the further legal entrenchment and enforcement of apartheid, South African failure to relinquish control of South West Africa (Namibia), its involvement in the Rhodesian civil war, and the assassination of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. The UN General Assembly did, however, establish the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (later shortened to the Special Committee Against Apartheid), which was tasked with documenting the ongoing situation in South Africa. Its mandate was to detail abuses both within South Africa and by member states in their dealings with South Africa, and to provide both the General Assembly and the SC with an accounting of and recommendations for dealing with the situation.

As an internationally comprised body of representatives from states nominated by the Secretary of the General Assembly, independent from the SC, the Special Committee did not suffer from the same biases present amongst the P5 member states. However, being composed of entirely non Western states, there was much overlap between members of the committee and those states and international organizations that were pushing for sanctions. Where the SC debated endlessly over
whether the situation in South Africa warranted a Chapter 7 mandate, the Special Committee was clear on this matter from its earliest reports. In the Interim Report of The Special Committee, it recommended in no uncertain terms that the “Security Council should consider the report as soon as possible and take the measures called for by the grave situation at present prevailing in the republic of South Africa, which represents a serious threat to international peace and security”.

Between its initial report in 1963 and its final report in 1995 the Special Committee released 88 documents detailing abuses, infractions and misdeeds resulting from the situation in South Africa. Many of the incidents included in reports submitted to the SC by the committee were cited by those members who called for sterner action against the South African regime. However, and once again, while no party ever denied the repugnancy of the racist policies of South Africa, and despite having open access to documents detailing a plethora of indictable offences committed by the government of South Africa, these reports played very little role in influencing the positions of P5 members when it came to voting on resolutions. While it would be a mischaracterization to claim that the reports of the Special Committee were completely ignored by the P5 members, it must be acknowledged that the advocacy of the Special Committee had no obvious influence on permanent members in formulating their respective positions. The Committee did, however, document and bear witness to events, exposing the situation in South Africa (and its border regions) to the world. This, in turn, contributed to the formation of public opinion, and ultimately the censuring of South Africa by means other than the SC.

Resolution 418

June 16, 1976 saw the beginning of the Soweto uprising, with a student led protest against a government policy that made the teaching and speaking of Afrikaans and English compulsory in schools. The first day of protests and rioting resulted in 23 deaths, with subsequent protests and confrontations between demonstrators and security forces leaving hundreds of black South Africans dead. This led to the adoption by consensus of SC Resolution 392, which concerned the “wanton killings, perpetuated by the apartheid regime in South Africa”. Edging towards a Chapter VII mandate, this resolution reaffirmed that the policy of apartheid “seriously disturbs international peace and security”. At this point South Africa had
also become more aggressive in dealing with anti-apartheid (and therefore anti-government) elements, to the point of launching extraterritorial raids against neighbouring countries suspected of harbouring enemies of the state. Resolution 392 was followed by Resolution 393, which was prompted by a complaint by Zambia concerning South African incursions into its territory.\textsuperscript{41} This in turn, was followed by Resolutions 402 and 407, which dealt with complaints by Lesotho against South Africa for the closure of border posts “aimed at coercing Lesotho”.\textsuperscript{42} South Africa was clearly, in the eyes of the SC, quickly emerging as a threat to international peace and security. There was a tonal shift in the language used by the SC in the wording of Resolution 417, which recalled and iterated Resolution 392.\textsuperscript{43} This was the first instance of the SC referring to the government of South Africa as the “racist regime of South Africa”.\textsuperscript{44} Despite the apprehensions of France, the US and the UK, the conflict in South Africa had crept beyond the borders of South Africa. There could no longer be any denial on the part of any P5 members that the situation in South Africa had indeed become a threat to international peace and security.

On November 4, 1977, Resolution 418 passed unanimously.\textsuperscript{45} This resolution, citing repression within South Africa and its attacks on independent states, declared that the “acts of the South African government are fraught with danger to international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{46} With this, a Chapter VII mandate had been invoked, and a mandatory arms embargo was placed on South Africa. It must be noted that three draft resolutions were vetoed by France, the US and UK, on the grounds of particular wording, before unanimous consensus could be reached. Resolution 418 was shortly followed by Resolution 421, also unanimously adopted, which established a committee to oversee the arms embargo.\textsuperscript{47} The rationale for the invocation of this Chapter VII mandate, especially by the otherwise intractable, veto holding members of the P5, must now be examined.

The Soviet Union and China had long called for the invocation of a Chapter VII mandate on South Africa. Their respective positions were generally consistent, and their support of Resolution 418 was to be expected. However, the Western powers, which had fought against a Chapter VII mandate for South Africa, were persuaded, despite their earlier apprehensions, to bring sterner measures against the regime. How this was handled by the Western powers depended upon each individual nation.

The French position in the lead up to the adoption of Resolution 418 showed a marked change from its previous stance. In this instance, the French delegate stated “the question of apartheid is no longer the
internal individual State, but a matter of legitimate concern to the entire international community.” This was a turning point in the French attitude toward the situation in South Africa within the SC, as it could no longer cite Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the UN Charter to insulate the regime.

Consistent with its earlier stance against the violation of the sovereignty of independent states, France adopted a harder line against South Africa when it started launching raids against its neighbours in Southern Africa. Subsequent to this, and in many of the SC resolutions against South Africa throughout the 1980’s, France broke with its allies and came out against South African belligerence by participating in votes and supporting resolutions against South Africa. The rationale for this change in position is suggested in statements made by the French representative at the 2598th meeting of the SC, during a debate preceding the adoption of Resolution 568. The revised French position concerning South Africa is contained in the statement “France unequivocally condemn(ed) that violation of the territory of a sovereign, independent country in flagrant disregard of international law.” France affirmed this position in subsequent debates with statements such as “France most vigorously condemns these unjustifiable armed attacks carried out in violation of international law”. This line was held and applied by France until the end of debates within the SC concerning the situation in apartheid era South Africa.

With international outrage mounting against the situation in South Africa, and South Africa’s own transgressions against neighbouring states, the position of the UK, at least in the forum of the UN and SC, could not be maintained. In the lead up to Resolution 418 the British delegate finally conceded that “the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related material in the current situation does constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.” This position would not be strictly adhered to for long. British interests still relied on a stable, pro-Western government in Pretoria, and this trumped serious consideration of human rights in South Africa.

With the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the policy of the UK concerning South Africa moved to “constructive engagement”. While the Thatcher administration did not explicitly support the apartheid regime, it considered dialogue to be a more effective tool of persuasion, and more in line with British interests, than forceful coercion. This view was summarized by the UK delegate at the 2600th meeting of the SC preceding Britain’s abstention from a vote on Resolution 581. In his statement before the Council the representative of the UK declared that “the system of apartheid
must be brought to an end”, of which there was no disagreement within the SC. However, he proceeded to state the British position as “For my own government the path of negotiation and dialogue between the communities concerned must be preferred to armed struggle, violence and the repression this engenders”. Thus the British insisted on continuing engagement with South Africa as a matter of policy.

This position clashed markedly with British public opinion, however, and grass roots movements conducted their own campaigns in an effort to raise public awareness, sway their own government’s policies, and bring an end to the apartheid regime. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), officially formed in 1960 by South African expatriates and exiles living in the UK, was instrumental in gaining widespread support for the anti-apartheid cause, applying domestic political pressure, and spearheading the British divestment campaign from South Africa. Protests and boycotts by student groups caused Barclays Bank, then the largest British investor in South Africa, to lose a substantial portion of its market share of student loans, down from 28% to 17% in 1981 alone. By 1986 they became the first major firm to pull out of the country, with a fire sale of their shares in South African banking. Cultural boycotts, such as the Gleneagles agreement, which banned contact with teams and sporting organizations representing South Africa (and carried much less strategic risk than economic and political divestment), appealed even to the political establishment.

The UK did censure the South African government on occasion subsequent to the adoption of “constructive engagement”. At the 2612th meeting of the SC in 1985, the UK delegate declared that the UK “finds it incredible and altogether unacceptable that the South African Government should disregard the decisions of the Council.” In this case the UK did vote in favour of Resolution 574, which was adopted unanimously. However, the official policy of the UK remained one of engagement. Though inconsistent with international norms prevalent in the UN regarding relations with South Africa, and despite the apprehensions of its populace, this policy was maintained until the end of the apartheid era in South Africa, and throughout debates surrounding this issue within the SC.

The US joined with the international consensus in the lead-up to the adoption Resolution 418. In his statement before the Council at its 2045th meeting the American delegate cited the failure of the voluntary arms embargo called for under Resolution 181, and more importantly, apprehensions about the attainment of nuclear weapons by South Africa.
as a matter of great concern to the American government. The American position at this stage in the debate can be attributed to the overall foreign policy of the US under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, and was reminiscent of its original position when the situation in South Africa was first introduced as a subject of interest to the SC. However, the position of the US would, once again, do an about face with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1981.

Under the Reagan administration the US, following the lead of its like-minded ally in Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom, adopted a policy of “constructive engagement” with South Africa. This new policy was reflected in the voting record of the US in SC resolutions involving South Africa during the tenure of Reagan. Though by the 1980’s there was general agreement amongst all nations involved in SC debates that the apartheid system was completely unacceptable, the Americans favoured dialogue with South Africa, over the possibly alienating measures proposed through numerous SC resolutions. This view was expressed by the American representative at the 2551st meeting of the SC. After abstaining from the vote on Resolution 554, the representative explained that, according to the American position, “An opportunity now exists for sustained progress in curbing violence, negotiating mutually acceptable solutions, and pressing ahead with the urgent agenda of peaceful change.” He continued to undermine the general consensus of the international community, and the predominant view of SC members, in addressing the situation in South Africa by claiming that “Under the circumstances, no issue is posed which is appropriately within the purview of the Council.” This was an iteration of the position the US held within the SC throughout the Reagan administration, and which was maintained until the resolution of the situation in South Africa in SC debates.

As in the UK, the general American populace was opposed to the apartheid regime, and was willing to act in other ways against the regime. By 1987, 127 American companies had signed onto a divestment campaign based on seven principles of corporate social responsibility developed by civil rights activist Reverend Leon Sullivan. After meeting with Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu in 1986, even congressional Republicans turned against Reagan and his policy of engagement. The congressional revolt of 1986 saw an overriding of Reagan’s veto, and the passing of the Anti Apartheid Act. While they did not, by themselves, bring an end to South Africa’s policies of exclusion, pressure from American and British
popular movements and divestment programs contributed significantly to the degradation of the economic foundations of the apartheid regime.67

Towards the End of Apartheid

Subsequent to the turning point marked by the adoption of Resolution 418 and a Chapter 7 mandate, 38 additional resolutions were passed concerning the situation in South Africa. Though the last of these were in response to the dismantling of apartheid, most of the ensuing resolutions concerned South African belligerence against its neighbours, the imposition of the death penalty against anti-apartheid activists within South Africa, and iteration upon iteration of past resolutions censuring the regime. Of the 37 resolutions passed between Resolution 421 in December of 1977, and the removal of the question of South Africa as a matter of interest to the SC under Resolution 930 in 1994, 25 passed unanimously.68 These resolutions censuring South Africa for the policy of apartheid and violence against its citizens were deemed, at this point, pro forma, and passed as a near fait accomplis. The opponents of apartheid maintained their respective positions, albeit for seemingly diplomatic national purposes over a sense of humanitarian or altruistic concerns. Even the UK and the US participated and voted for most of the resolutions against South Africa after the 1977 arms embargo introduced by Resolution 418.

However, repeated resolutions proposed against South Africa for involvement in and with Angola and the Namibian War of Independence proved a much more contentious issue than merely censuring the apartheid regime. Given the nature of the conflict, and with the participation and support of a variety of Cold War belligerents including Cuba, the Soviet Union and the US, the war took on a greater significance to the major powers. Angola was a hot spot in the Cold War, with South Africa serving essentially as a proxy force of the West. Of the 38 resolutions passed subsequent to 418, 10 of these referred to the situation in Angola. Of these resolutions, the US, France and the UK collectively abstained from voting on Resolutions 447 and 454, which condemned South African attacks on Angola through South West Africa. The US and UK jointly abstained from voting on Resolutions 546 (condemning attacks on Angola), 554 (condemning the 1984 general election and adoption of a
constitution that further entrenched apartheid), 581 (condemning attacks on by South Africa on its bordering states), and 623 (concerning the death sentence imposed upon anti-apartheid activists Paul Tefo Setlaba). The US independently abstained from Resolutions 545 (concerning attacks on Angola), 556 (demanding a cessation to state sanctioned violence and the release of political prisoners). Using the Council as a forum to counter its nemesis of the Soviet Union, the US abstained from eight of the resolutions passed against South Africa, citing Soviet influence and Cuban involvement in the region. The allied Western powers also called for a separate vote on Article 5 of Resolution 571 and Article 6 of Resolution 577, both of which called for aid and assistance to Angola and other front line states “in order to strengthen their defence capacity against South Africa”.69

Even within this, however, there seemed a certain inconsistency, as Resolutions 567, 574, 602, and 607, all concerning South African incursions into Angola, passed unanimously. However, upon a reading of the debates, the logic behind these positions is revealed, and once again points to the primacy of national interests. In detailing the reasoning of the United States in supporting Resolution 567, the US delegate stated that “South African military action in Cabinda [Angola] posed a threat to the lives of United States citizens, and a danger to the property of United States companies there.”70

Both the US and UK abstained from voting on Resolution 569, which called for the South African government to “set free immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and detainees, first of all Mr. Nelson Mandela”. In this instance, neither the UK nor the US prevaricated in stating their reasoning for abstention from the vote. The U.S representative stated that “the suspension of new investments troubles us”.71 The British representative stated that “it would not be responsible to call for measures which...we know to be ineffective”.72 In both instances the representatives made clear the intention of their respective governments to pursue the mutually adopted policy of “constructive engagement”. In predictable fashion the Soviet delegate retorted “The Soviet Union vigorously condemns the military-political support of the racist regime by certain Western Countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”.73 In these waning days of apartheid, with international criticism against the South African regime at its peak, the debate within the SC remained one of partisan politics along the Cold War division. In the West’s tacit defence of South Africa through inactivity in promoting or supporting resolutions, and the
Soviet Union’s attacks on South Africa, the West and the Eastern bloc found an avenue through which to confront one another along a shared border of their ideologically divide. For the NPMs, South Africa continued to be a cause around which radically divergent, but all relatively marginalized states, could coalesce.

There were no resolutions passed concerning South Africa between 1988 and 1992. The last resolution from which any permanent members abstained was Resolution 623. This resolution, passed in response to the death sentence imposed upon Paul Tefo Setlaba for the crime of “common purpose”, passed with a vote of 13-0, with the UK and US abstaining. In citing their respective purposes for abstaining from the resolution both the US and UK representatives cited Mr. Setlaba’s admission of guilt in committing murder. While this last case of P5 members’ abstention from a vote does not expose explicit national interests, one could perceive it as tacit and ultimately symbolic support for a regime in its final days. The five remaining resolutions concerning South Africa as a matter of interest to the SC passed unanimously. Of these, both Resolutions 765 and 772 condemned violence amongst various factions vying for power and a place in the emerging political order, while the remaining three (Resolutions 894, 919 and 930), no longer censuring the South African regime, referred to the active steps being taken toward the dismantling of apartheid.

Conclusion

Initially, outcomes of the SC debates, and their subsequent meaning for the situation in South Africa, were almost inconsequential. Even though there were 52 SC resolutions passed against South Africa in the 34 year history of the issue before the Council, many of these lacked both aggressive sanctioning of the apartheid regime and compulsory compliance on behalf of member states. Furthermore, despite the mandatory arms embargo that passed with Resolution 418 in 1977, the regime circumvented the embargo by developing its pre-existing military industrial complex into one that was wholly self-sufficient, contributing to the persistence of apartheid for another 17 years. More importantly, the UK, US and France, as P5 nations with vested economic and strategic interests in South Africa, abstained from many of the votes on resolutions censuring the regime, and tacitly supported the South African government as a
bulwark against the feared spread of Soviet influence and communism in Southern Africa.⁷⁸

Within the SC, and amongst the P5 in particular, there was a lack of unanimous resolve to apply pressures that would amend the behaviour of apartheid era governments in South Africa. With members of the P5 basing their positions on matters that were not wholly related to the situation in South Africa, critics of the UN, and the SC in particular, may take this case as a prime example of what is wrong with the institution. However, that the issue came before the SC exposed it to the world in a way that would not have otherwise been possible, and in no small way brought the case of SA to public consciousness. It also provided the NPMs a forum to present their concerns at the same table as the big powers, even if this did often prove to be little more than a courtesy.

The case of apartheid era South Africa before the UN provides a window into the workings of the Security Council, especially the P5 in its relationship to global events during a highly combustible period in African history. While the activities of the SC in this case can be considered to be too little, too late, and then only reluctantly, at the very least it provided a space for the conversation to take place, and ultimately for something to be done in a relatively peaceful manner. Under the circumstances of the time and place, and with few palatable alternatives, that is success, of a sort.

Notes

1. UN General Assembly Document A/RES.44(1), Dec. 8, 1946. India was concerned about the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which limited property ownership for South Africans of Asian origin.

2. For a comprehensive overview of South African history and the social dynamics leading to the formation of the National Party and apartheid see: Brian Lapping, Apartheid: A History, George Braziller Inc.: New York, 1990.


8. China’s inclusion on the Security Council may seem anomalous, as there was a civil war raging at the time of the founding of the United Nations. China’s position is even further confused by the supersession of the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of China (Taiwan) as being a permanent member. This raises questions concerning structures of the Security Council which fall outside the scope of this paper.


10. UN Security Council Document S/4279, March 25, 1960. This was in reference to the Sharpeville massacre, when South African security forces fired on and killed 83 black South Africans protesting against the Pass laws, which severely limited freedom of movement for black South Africans.


26. Security Council Official Records, 19th Year: 1135th Meeting, 18 June 1964, New York, [S/PV.1135(OR)], 01/03/1965, Paragraphs 61-72. While Czechoslovakia was abstaining as a member of the Eastern bloc alliance, France maintained its position that the UN is “not entitled to intervene so directly in the domestic affairs of a member state”.


28. Under the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese position was consistent in its condemnation of South Africa, but did not use the platform to assail other members. This changed drastically when it was replaced by the PRC.


37. UN General Assembly, Resolution 1761 (XVII), The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, 1165th Plenary Meeting, November 6, 1962. For the sake of brevity the author will refer to this body as the Special Committee.


40. Ibid.


44. Ibid.


46. Ibid.


55. British policy on South Africa at this time was inextricably linked to the views of Margaret Thatcher. Much has been written on this issue by both her detractors and defenders. For a brief discussion on the ambiguity of her position see: Thomas Hauschildt, “Thatcher’s Carrot and Stick Approach Toward Apartheid”, *International Policy Digest*, www.internationalpolicydigest.org, April 10, 2013. Available at: www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/04/10/thatchers-carrot-and-stick-approach-towards-apartheid/ Accessed on: April 3, 2014.

56. For a full record of AAM activities and campaigns see: Catalogue of the Archive of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1956-98, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House Available at: www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/rhl/aam/aam.html#introduction


58. The Gleneagles Agreement achieved unanimous consensus, and was signed by the heads of states of all members of the British Commonwealth, including UK Prime Minister James Callaghan.


66. Anti-Apartheid Act, 99th Congress (1985-1986) H.R.4868. To be overridden this act requires a two thirds vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.


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