Approaches to National Security
A Canadian-Australian Comparison

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The Queen’s Centre for International Relations (QCIR) is pleased to present the sixtieth in its Occasional Paper series. The Occasional Papers are intended to reach the policy-community and the broader public with short analyses of contemporary trends and issues in international security and in Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Michael Rostek’s paper compares Canada’s and Australia’s approaches to the contested concept of national security, showing how each country’s perceptions, doctrine, policy and institutions evolved in response to the post-2001 global and regional security environment. Given their obvious similarities — prosperous middle powers with a British colonial legacy, immigrant populations, resource-based economies, strong military traditions, and close security and defence ties to the United States — it is surprising how infrequently their policies have been subjected to rigorous comparison. From the Vietnam era to the end of the 20th century, their foreign and defence policies in fact differed in many ways, as did their respective postures toward their chief ally and protector. Neither, however, had given much thought to the foundations of a national security policy. Drawing on each country’s key foreign and defence policy statements from the 1990s, the first part of Rostek’s paper shows how far this pattern had developed by September, 2001.

The second part analyzes the impact of the attacks on New York and Washington, and of the ensuing war on terrorism, on the two countries’ definition and pursuit of national security. While it lacked an overarching national security policy, Australia’s awareness of its dangerous neighbourhood had at least provided a certain clarity of military purpose and a robust approach to the use of force. Canada had farther to come, from a fixation with human security in the 1990s to the rethinking embodied in its National Security Policy of 2004 and the International Policy Statement of 2005. The result, Rostek concludes, is a convergence of Australian and Canadian understandings of national security both as a concept and as a policy, manifested most clearly in the relations of each with an America seemingly more aware of the need for, and needs of, close friends and allies.

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Approaches to National Security:  
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Introduction

Security is a difficult concept that defies universal definition. As noted by W.B Gallie, security is an “essentially contested concept” generating unsolvable debates about meaning and application.¹ This definitional dilemma is in turn transferred to the concept of national security which does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation.² Further, the broadening (wider range of potential threats to the state such as human rights or environmental issues) and deepening (moving beyond state-centric focus down to individual or up to international focus)³ of the concept of security in the post-Cold-War era further complicated this definitional problem. Nonetheless, there are many definitions of national security all of which resemble, to varying degrees, the definition below:

National security is the preservation of a way of life acceptable to…people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack and coercion, freedom from internal subversion, and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic, and social values which are essential to the quality of life.⁴

National security is a government’s first and most important social service delivered to its citizens.⁵ This service is normally articulated by way of a national security policy. A national security policy takes into account a range of government issues as expressed below:

A state’s national security policy is a multidimensional mix of foreign and defence policies, as well as policies concerning immigration, education and many other areas of government activity. Fundamentally, it involves military capability to deter, and defeat, attacks against defined national interests, and diplomatic and other policy tools to maintain a positive security and strategic environment.⁶
More specifically, a national security policy must involve the government’s major portfolios, such as foreign affairs and defence, and the whole of Cabinet.

The terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11) sent a chilling reminder to governments around the world of the catastrophic results that can occur when they become complacent, or not, about their national security. In particular, terrorism, already a focus of security studies, had taken on new meaning. September 11 had demonstrated the emergence of transnational or post-modern terrorism and its effects on the security agenda were immediate. As noted by Lenard Cohen:

Terrorism, already an important facet of the international political landscape, seemed to have become the central organizing principle of international relations. International relations, most observers believed, had entered the post-post Cold War era. There was obviously a new security agenda, a new strategic environment.7

Canada and Australia both took positive action in the wake of 9/11. Canada was instrumental in invoking Article 5 under NATO and Australia invoked Articles 4 and 5 of the ANZUS Treaty for the first time in the 50 year history of the treaty. The actions of these two well-regarded middle powers, of the same heritage, with similar government structures, similar defence budgets and equal-sized defence forces and similar-sized populations, yet at opposite sides of the world, provide an interesting basis for comparison with respect to national security policy and the impact of 9/11 on that policy. Based on the above, it would not be wrong to presume that their respective national security approaches would be similar. The aim of this paper is to investigate the similarities and/or dissimilarities of Canada and Australia’s approach to national security before and after 9/11.

The paper will begin with an investigation of national security approaches in Canada and Australia pre 9/11. Comparisons will be drawn between national security structures/policies as well as foreign and defence policies. This will be followed by a post 9/11 comparison highlighting changes and alterations to national security structures/policies and foreign and defence policies. Throughout the paper, reference will be made to the broadening and deepening of the concept of security which became apparent in the post-Cold War era in an attempt to further define Canadian and Australian approaches to national security. National security issues are numerous and varied, especially in the post 9/11 period and as a result some issues, for example terrorist funding legislation or border security, were omitted due to the scale and scope of this paper.
Canadian National Security Pre 9/11

General. Prior to 9/11, there was a “national security policy gap”\textsuperscript{8} in Canada; that is, a national security policy was not articulated by government nor were there policy-coordinating mechanisms in place ensuring a unified government response to matters of national security. As noted by David Bashow, [i]n reality, security policy in Canada, when it has existed at all, has been more \textit{ad hoc} than codified in a structured manner.\textsuperscript{9} As a result, in order to get a sense of how national security was viewed within Canada prior to 9/11, an investigation of foreign and defence policy, key components of national security, is required.

Foreign Policy. The protection of Canada’s security within a stable global framework was a central component of the 1995 foreign policy white paper entitled \textit{Canada in the World}.\textsuperscript{10} It defined, at least in part, Canada’s national security outlook:

Our own security, including economic security, is increasingly dependant on the security of others. More than ever, the forces of globalization, technological development, and the scale of human activity, reinforce our fundamental interdependence with the rest of the world. We need to address security issues in an integrated fashion and to draw on all available foreign policy instruments.\textsuperscript{11}

The international focus of Canada’s concept of national security was further evidenced by Canada’s participation within international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), and the Organization of American States (OAS). In the Western Hemisphere, while noting the growing importance of Latin American and the Arctic, the paper asserts that Canada’s “…relationship with the US is key for security of Canadians.”\textsuperscript{12}

Further, the white paper went on to indicate that within this international context, national security must be defined in a broader context, one that moved beyond military security focusing at the individual and societal level:

Serious long term challenges are posed by environmental, demographic, health and development issues around the globe. Some of these challenges—such as global warming—could affect us directly. Others may provoke crisis producing humanitarian tragedies, epidemics, mass migrations, and other problems from which, even if half way around the world, Canada will not be immune. Still others may result in the adoption abroad of policies that ultimately degrade our economic security by undercutting labour, health, environment or other international standards. All of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy
from its narrow orientation of managing states-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security.\textsuperscript{13}

The focus on individual security came to be defined as “human security” and dominated Canada’s national security thinking in the 1990s. Human security was first defined in the 1994 United Nations Development Report:

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life — whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.\textsuperscript{14}

In 2000, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s (DFAIT) published its first edition of \textit{Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security} which recognized human security as central to Canadian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{15}

Although it is not my intention to unpackage the debate that surrounded the focus on human rather than state security within DFAIT, it is sufficient to point out that as discussed above, due to a changing international security environment brought on by the end of the Cold War, a broadening (mass migrations) and deepening (human security) of Canada’s concept of security took place prior to 9/11. It is perhaps more significant to note that this approach to national security was not codified under any overarching national security policy. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the 1995 foreign policy was drafted without consultation with the Department of National Defence (DND). In fact, DND’s white paper was released prior to the foreign policy white paper, which was quite surprising in light of the fact that defence policy is traditionally viewed through the lens of foreign policy.

\textbf{Defence Policy.} Although conceived in isolation, Canada’s \textit{1994 Defence White Paper} was heralded as a bold gesture to break the defence establishment out of the Cold War mindset into a more broadly conceived notion of security. Like the foreign policy white paper, the defence white paper did not explicitly discuss national security. However, the white paper clearly projected the desire to remain internationalist by stating that Canada continued to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada’s economic future depended on its ability to trade freely with other nations.\textsuperscript{16}

The opening chapter, “International Environment”, set the tone for the white paper as a whole. Security concerns included such global pressures as overpopulation and refugee flows, environmental degradation, resource depletion and failed states as well as ethnic, religious and political extremism and weapons proliferation. This picture represented an unsettled international security environment despite a reduced threat to global war. Under these global security conditions, Canada’s response was a “…flexible, realistic and affordable
defence policy, one that provides the means to apply military force when Canadians consider it necessary to uphold Canadian values and security interests, at home and abroad.”

Chapter Six, “Contributing to International Security”, states that “[a]s a reflection of the global nature of Canada’s values and interests, the Canadian Forces (CF) must contribute to international security.” Further, it stated that “[m]ultilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is an expression of Canadians’ values in the international sphere.” In this respect, the white paper stressed Canada’s tradition with multilateral operations was unsurpassed and the CF would continue to engage and expand multilateral experience with Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia, Latin America and Africa alongside its traditional multilateral participation with the UN, NATO, OSCE, and others.

Canadians deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies. This was an abiding foundation of Canada’s commitment to collective security. Concurrently, collective defence with NATO and the US was also recognized and “…remains fundamental to [Canada’s] security.” As a result, a multi-purpose combat capable force was the means by which Canada could best attend to its security needs.

Domestically, while acknowledging that the decline in direct military threat to Canadian territory has not eliminated an ongoing role for the CF at home, the defence white paper detailed a broadening role for the CF in terms of securing borders against illegal activities, fisheries patrols, environmental surveillance, and disaster relief. In fact, it was this internal focus that eventually led to the establishment of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) in February of 2001. OCIPEP originated from the “Y2K” operations and three weather related incidents from 1997-1999 and was set up within the Department of National Defence (DND). OCIPEP’s mission statement was “…to enhance the safety and security of Canadians in their physical and cyber environment with a vision of a safer more secure Canada.” OCIPEP, despite what one might infer from the mission and vision, focused on emergency preparedness. This reflected a further broadening of the security definition in Canada as it covered geographical as well as cyber-related emergencies. Further, as OCIPEP operated from within DND, we saw a further modification of DND’s role which now assumed organizational responsibilities for domestic emergencies whereas previously, they provided a response capability to national or provincial authorities.

National Security. Since the end of the Cold War and prior to 9/11, it was a widely-held view that there was no immediate direct military threat to Canada and that conflict was far from Canada’s shores. Additionally, Canada was seen to have a vital interest in global security especially since Canada’s economic future depended on its ability to trade freely with other nations. Thus Canada’s national security was directly linked to international peace and security
and Canada’s national security and policy decisions were conditioned by Canada’s alliance commitments to NATO, North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) and the United Nations. Complementing this internationalist position was DFAIT’s focus on human security, conceived and employed in isolation. National security was coordinated from the Privy Council Office and remained the sole purview of the Prime Minister:

The Prime Minister of Canada is ultimately accountable to Parliament and to the people of Canada for the integrity and security of the nation. The Prime Minister therefore provides broad guidance to the security and intelligence community.

The inaction of the Canadian government in structural and procedural matters demonstrated a general lack of interest in a more formal national security process even as its own documentation clearly articulated a broader and deeper concept of security. Although Y2K and weather related disasters from 1997-1998 prompted the establishment of OCIPEP, whose mission was to enhance the safety and security of Canadians in their physical and cyber environment with a vision of “a safer more secure Canada,” there was no impetus to establish a national security process linking foreign and defence policy. As Jane Boulden notes:

For all the government’s speeches and publications about foreign and defence policy, there is no overall linking strategy which is articulated in one document as a national security strategy, and which acts as a policy anchor for defence and foreign policy.

Australian National Security Pre 9/11

General. In 1996, largely due to its strategic circumstances and historical sense of insecurity, Australia established a national security framework consisting of a National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) and a Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS). At the political level, the Prime Minister chairs the NSCC, which is the focal point of decision-making on national security. The committee includes key government portfolios such as the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and others. Supporting the NSCC is SCNS comprising the heads of agencies engaged in national security issues, and chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Australia also had a National Anti-Terrorist Plan in Place which was controlled by SAC-PAV (Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence) created in 1978 after a terrorist bombing incident in Sydney. Despite this structure, a national security policy was not
articulated and calls for a unified, high-level policy development and coordina-
tion staff ensued as the NSSC and SCNS were not seen to be fulfilling their role:

The creation of the National Security Committee of Cabinet and the
Secretaries Committee on National Security,…, does not fulfill this re-
quirement. These are essentially interdepartmental rather than
supra-departmental in nature, and the wrangling between the depart-
ments continues.31

Although the creation of national security structures signals a greater aware-
ness of national security issues, the lack of an articulated national security
policy directs one’s attention to foreign and defence polices in order to get a
better sense of national security thinking in Australia.

Foreign Policy. In 1997, Australia released a new foreign policy white pa-
per entitled In the National Interest. While recognizing that Australia was not
likely to face a direct threat by armed force the white paper described the re-
gional context within which Australians viewed their national security:
“…Australia’s national security and its economic interests are inextricably linked
to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region.”32 As evidenced in the
preceding citation, Australians’ notion of national security was rooted in their
economic well-being and the stability of both Asia Pacific and East Asia:

Any threat to the security of East Asia — from tensions through sanc-
tions to war — would have immediate and adverse affects on Australia’s
trade with its major export markets and, consequently, on the jobs and
standard of living of individual Australians.33

The regional focus of Australian national security was in part embedded in
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); however, “[t]he Government did not regard
regional approaches to national security as a replacement for strong bilateral
security agreements. The two were mutually supportive: both contribute to re-
gional peace and stability.”34

The 1997 white paper briefly described a global component of national
security emphasizing the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), chemical and biological weapons and terrorism. In addition, Australia’s
security interests went beyond the traditional military threats and recognized
potential non-military threats, signalling a broadened security concept:

Over the next fifteen years it is likely that even more attention will be
paid to so-called non-military threats such as pandemics, illegal immi-
gration, refugee flows, environmental degradation, narcotics and
transnational crime. They reinforce the importance of taking a broad
view of security which goes beyond military and defence issues.35
However, while recognizing the broader security agenda, Australia found itself facing traditional military threats from its regional neighbours as military expenditures rose in the wake of regional economic prosperity:

Throughout the region armed forces are making the transition from their earlier roles in internal security and national development to the more outwardly oriented roles of defence of national sovereignty and protection of national assets. The higher levels of military expenditure in the region increasingly provide regional countries with more effective means to protect assets, including areas where land and sea territorial claims overlap. This adds to the risk of conflict in the region.36

The white paper also recognized the global pre-eminence of the US and particularly in the Asia Pacific region where it was regarded as a “...crucial stabilizing influence, and an indispensable condition for the continuing strategic stability on which the regions economic success is ultimately dependant.”37

As can be seen from within foreign policy, Australian national security was directly linked to the Asia Pacific region. Both traditional (military) and non-traditional (pandemics, environmental) regional security threats were “…where Australia’s security interests are most directly engaged.”38 Australia’s alliance with the US was considered important and the US engagement in the region was considered the “…linchpin of regional security.”39 The white paper gave only passing regard to global security, noting that regional security and global security were not mutually exclusive.

Defence Policy. Australia released its defence policy white paper entitled *Defence 2000 – Our future Defence Force* (D2000) in December 2000. D2000 does not discuss national security per se; however, there is a great deal of discussion of security issues. In particular, D2000 is arguably focused traditionally at the state level exclaiming “…nation-states remain the most important strategic actors.”40 Australia’s national security thinking is regionally focused as described in D2000, “Australia…cannot be secure in an insecure region, and as a middle-size power, there is much we can and should do to help keep our region secure, and support global stability.”41 Further, D2000 states that “globalizing trends are being accompanied by growing regionalism, especially in the field of security, where the end of the Cold War has moved attention from the global power balance to a series of regional strategic systems — including the Asia Pacific.”42 D2000 outlines Australia’s security concerns in priority from state, to region and finally to global security. In fact upon closer inspection, one observes that three of the five strategic objectives outlined focus on the Asia Pacific. The importance of the Asia Pacific is summed up as follows:

The most critical issue for the security of the entire region is the nature of the relationships between the region’s major powers — China, Japan, India, Russia and the United States. These countries are important
to Australia’s security because they have the power — actual or potential — to influence events throughout the Asia Pacific region. Their relationships will set the tone for the whole region.43

D2000 also gives evidence of a broadening security agenda in outlining “new military tasks” or “peacetime national tasks” such as humanitarian relief, evacuations, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, coastal surveillance, illegal immigration, and counter-terrorist response. Security concerns from non-military threats such as cyber attack, organized crime and terrorism were also identified as part of Australia’s strategic environment.44 However, despite recognition of the broadening security agenda, D2000 clearly articulates that traditional security thinking remains valid, stating that the “…approach is to draw on the expertise of the Defence Force where it is most appropriate to do so, but not allow these roles — important as they are — to detract from the ADF’s core function of defending Australia from armed attack.”45

In recognition of a lack of power or reach to protect many of its own interests, Australia relies on multilateral and bilateral security arrangements:

We work through the growing range of multilateral security forums and arrangements in our region, as well as a network of bilateral defence and security relationships, including Australia’s most important single strategic relationship — our alliance with the United States.46

The United Nations’ broadened range of security activities and responsibilities represents Australia’s multilateralism at the international level. Regional security relations include bilateral security arrangements with many Asia Pacific states and multilateral arrangements such as the ARF and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). However, Australia views its security relationship with the US, underwritten by the ANZUS Treaty, as a “great national asset”47 and the US’s continued engagement in the Asia Pacific region is seen to “…play a critical role in maintaining strategic stability in the region as a whole.”48

National Security. As mentioned above, Australians established a national security structure but have not articulated a national security policy. How they thought about national security was derived from their foreign and defence white papers. Investigation revealed that although there was evidence of the deepening and broadening conceptualization of security in both the foreign and defence policies, the foreign policy paper “adopted a policy of cooperative security designed to promote greater regional dialogue and cohesiveness.”49 Graeme Cheeseman noted that D2000 “…represents old rather than new thinking on defence and security.”50 Further, Paul Dibb commented that D2000 is “…centered on the defence of Australia and adjusted for the strategic circumstances in our immediate region”51 This confusion between foreign and defence policies is further exacerbated by the idea that the alliance with the US is a “national asset.” While it is not my intention to unpack the defence and foreign policy
dilemma in Australia, it must be recognized that a well-articulated national security policy could potentially overcome this dilemma in balancing these competing national security issues.

**Summary: Canada-Australia Pre 9/11**

Neither Canada nor Australia articulated a national security policy prior to 9/11. Although neither state felt threatened, Australia was more conscious of the security implications of its regional location than was Canada. As a result of its historical insecurity, in 1996 Australia established a structural framework with the NSCC and SCNS. SAC PAV and the NATP were already in place. Canada, on the other hand, feeling somewhat less threatened, maintained a minimalist national security structure embedded within the Privy Council Office. Foreign and defence policies in both states recognized the emergence of a broadening and deepening security environment but it was Canada, with its focus on human security (individual), coupled with its conceptualization of national security through a global perspective indivisible from its allies (international), that best responded or adjusted in a tangible way to the emerging security environment in the post-Cold-War era. Australia, on the other hand, clearly established the state as the key strategic actor and envisioned its national security as indivisible from that of the Asia Pacific region. Sparked by economic prosperity in the region, Australia’s neighbours expanded their militaries and began looking more outward creating a more traditional and militaristic security environment. Australia had no choice but to respond to this environment and as a result only gave passing reference to the global security environment, focusing instead on its immediate region. Both Australia and Canada acknowledged the importance of their relationship with the US; however, it was Australia which considered the relationship underwritten by the ANZUS treaty as a “national asset.” In terms of process, Australia followed a developmental process where defence policy followed from foreign policy. Canada, however, had no such established process; both foreign and defence policies were crafted in isolation, signalling a lack of interest in the grander scheme of national security. With the creation of OCIPEP, however, one might argue that national security thinking in Canada was on the rise.

**Canadian National Security Post 9/11**

General. Aside from the immediate national outpouring of sentiment for the US, Prime Minister Chrétien was criticized for his “fumbling response” to the tragic events of September 11. It has been suggested that the omission of
Canada from President Bush’s speech to Congress on 20 September 2001 was the catalyst for a quickened Canadian policy response. The key initial actions taken by the government are listed below:

**Ad Hoc Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism.** A cabinet committee “…charged with examining all policies and legislation relating to security and terrorism and making appropriate policy adjustments in the wake of September 11 was established. The Canada-US Border Act, The Anti-terrorist Act and the Public Safety Act were the principal policy initiatives derived from the committee’s work.

**Budget 2001.** In December 2001, the government released the “security budget” which allocated $7.7B over five years to air security, the military ($1.2B) and initiatives designed to create a more secure and efficient border.

**Anti-Terrorist Legislation.** “The Anti-Terrorism Act” (Bill C-36) became law on 18 December 2001 creating a new package of legislation to deter, disable, identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorist groups; provide new investigative tools to law enforcement and national security agencies; and ensure that Canadian values of respect and fairness are preserved and the root causes of hatred are addressed through stronger laws against hate crimes and propaganda.

**Public Safety Act.** Although originally initiated in November 2001, the Public Safety Act, 2002, Bill C-17, addresses gaps in the federal legislative framework for public safety and protection. Bill C-17 essentially amends 22 existing acts and enacts a Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention.

Although the initial government response to 9/11 was slow, the urgency under which the Canadian government responded after President Bush’s speech to Congress on 20 October was noteworthy. Up until this point, national security decisions remained solely the responsibility of the Prime Minister. However, with the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism under the “security czar” and Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley, coupled with his subsequent move to the position of Deputy Prime Minister while retaining his national security functions, Canada’s approach to national security began to change.

**Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (NSP).** Upon being sworn in as Prime Minister, Paul Martin immediately announced organizational changes to close security gaps and establish a clear centre of responsibility and accountability for addressing public safety and security issues. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) was established in December 2003, integrating the Solicitor General’s office with the National Crime Prevention Centre (formerly of the Department of Justice) and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (formerly of the Department of National Defence). PSEPC also includes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Correctional Service of Canada, the National Parole Board,
the Canada Firearms Centre, the Canada Border Services Agency and three review bodies. Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister, became the first Minister of PSEPC signaling, as with John Manley, the importance of this portfolio to the Prime Minister.

In April 2004, the Martin government released its first ever comprehensive national security policy *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*. While it is not the intention of this paper to critically analyze that statement in detail, there are points that warrant mention which are pertinent to our discussion. First, in creating what it calls an “integrated security system,” the Minister will be supported by a National Security Advisor responsible for development and implementation of the security system; a National Security Advisory Council will be responsible for evaluation, improving the security system as well as harnessing outside security expert advice; an integrated threat assessment centre; and a cross-cultural roundtable on security composed of members of Canada’s ethno-cultural and religious communities will advise the Minister.

Second, the drafters of the policy recognized that national security was about more than just terrorism:

Beyond the fight against terrorism, there are new procedures aimed at improving the country’s emergency preparedness. Ottawa will strive to work more closely with the provincial and territorial governments in preparing to combat natural disasters and health crises, such as SARS.56

In addition, the document takes account of the deepening security agenda in stating that national security “…is closely linked to both personal and international security”. 57

Third, the core national security interests identified are: protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and contributing to international security. Six key strategic areas are identified in support of the above interests: Intelligence, Emergency Planning and Management, Public Health, Transport Security, Border Security, and International Security. The national security policy arguably has a domestic focus as evidenced by the interests and strategic areas listed above. While the rational for this is position is open to debate, it is reasonable to presume that the importance of Canada’s economic relations with the US underpins much of the content of the national security policy.

**International Policy Statement (IPS).** Prime Minister Paul Martin renewed interest in relations with the US and foreign policy:

My first foreign trip as Prime Minister was to meet with the countries of the Americas at the Monterrey Summit. This was an important opportunity to develop our hemispheric relations and, significantly for Canada, to take a first step toward a new relationship with the United States.
The Government is therefore developing a contemporary approach to:
our foreign policy objectives, our trade and investment needs, our de-
defence requirements, and, our development assistance programs.\(^{58}\)

On 19 April 2005, the Martin government delivered its new foreign policy.
Of note was the method of delivery for the report in that the Minister of Foreign
Affairs Minister, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of International
Trade, and the Minister of International Cooperation were all present to deliver
their respective potions of the “international policy statement.” In addition, the
format of the IPS has taken on what is referred to the “3D” format — undertaking
Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing Diplomacy to
enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain
that Development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effec-
tive way\(^{59}\), the basis of which can be found in the NSP — Chapter 8 (International
Security). From a policy formulation process point-of-view, this demonstrates a
degree of congruence between the different departments in formulating an in-
ternational policy.

**Diplomacy.** It remains clear within the diplomacy statement that Canada
continues to define security as both broad and deep. From its focus on environ-
mental issues to refugee migration and from international security through to
human security, Canada continues to approach national security from a full-
spectrum point of view. This is not to say that action is endorsed in all areas, in
fact, there is greater recognition today that Canada cannot be everything to
everyone. For example, in terms of aid policy, Martin commented: “We will be
realistic about Canada’s ability to help others, but we will be resolute in ensur-
ing that our aid money is targeted so that it does as much good as possible.”\(^{60}\)

Canada still sees its national security in an international context in stating
that a “…world that is peaceful and prosperous,….., is a world of opportunity for
Canada and Canadians.”\(^{61}\) However, the opening chapter entitled “A Strategy
for Our North American Partnership” signals a greater emphasis on North Ameri-
can region as a “…anchor to [Canada’s] international reach.”\(^{62}\) While several
references are made to the NSP, the IPS also refers to the Security and Pros-
perity Partnership of North America signed between Canada, the US and Mexico
in March 2005 designed to “…enhance our common security and increase the
strength and competitiveness of our economies.”\(^{63}\) Further specific initiatives
to be undertaken by Foreign Affairs to modernize Canada-US security involve
borders, counterterrorism, NORAD and NATO all of which fall within the NSP
framework.

From an international security perspective, “Canada remains firmly com-
mitted to the United Nations as the cornerstone of the multilateral system…”\(^{64}\)
The government listed its priorities as: dealing with failed and fragile states;
countering terrorism and organized crime; combating the proliferation of weap-
os of mass destruction (WMD); and promoting human security\(^{65}\) all of which
Resonate, to varying degrees, in the NSP. The release format and structure of the ISP demonstrates a greater congruence, not only within the ISP itself, but also in its linkages to the NSP.

**Defence.** As mentioned above, national security was a key issue with Prime Minister Martin and there was greater recognition of the role defence plays in pursuing national security. To that end, “[i]n Budget 2005, the Government made the largest reinvestment in Canada’s military in over 20 years, totalling approximately $13 billion.” The NSP identifies the Canadian Forces as a critical element in responding to threats and emergencies and the linkage between the NSP — primarily Chapter 8: International Security — and the defence statement is evident throughout. While acknowledging the NSP, the defence statement notes that the CF will continue with three broad roles: protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United States and contributing to international peace and security.

The events of 9/11 underpin much of the defence statement, which states: “[t]he events of 9/11 raised the profile of domestic security, and the defence of the continent that we share with the United States.” With the distinction between international and domestic security becoming blurred, the government has decided to focus in three areas: failed and failing states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Fighting terrorism also factors in the chapters dedicated to “Protecting Canada and Canadians” and “The Canada-US Defence Relationship in a Changing World”.

The defence statement is not just about terrorism and 9/11. The statement responds to a more broadening and deepening security agenda in supporting multilateral cooperation as a foundation for a stable and peaceful international system; the legitimacy and importance of the UN; the transformation of NATO; and the role of the European Union in international peace and security. Further, the transformation of the CF into a modern combat-capable maritime, land, air and special operations force responsive to domestic tasks (i.e. protecting our environment or responding to natural disasters), as well as international tasks, (i.e. recent operations in Haiti and Afghanistan), is encapsulated in a new Canada Command Headquarters and three types of joint formations: Special Operations Group, Standing Contingency Task Force and Mission Specific Task Forces. While the threat of terrorism underpins much of the defence statement, DND clearly acknowledges and responds to the broadened and deepened security agenda.

**National Security.** In the post 9/11 period Canada adopted an impressive array of national security related policies and structures. From anti-terrorism legislation in late 2001, to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in 2003, a newly minted national security policy in 2004, followed by the International Policy Statement, Canada responded to its new security environment providing the policy and structural framework for greater national security.
Australian National Security Post 9/11

General. As mentioned above, from 1996 onward Australia had a national security structure in place with the NSCC, SCNS and SAC PAV. These arrangements allowed Australia to respond quickly to the events of September 11 — a response arguably heightened by Prime Minister John Howard being in Washington at the time of the attacks. Prime Minister Howard invoked articles IV and V of the ANZUS Treaty for the first time in the history of the treaty. In addition, Australia had a “comprehensive and well-tested” National Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP) in place prior to 9/11. Even with this structure and plan in place, the government commented that they had committed over $2 billion to counter-terrorism, and implemented over 100 measures since September 11, 2001.

Much of the increase in finances and policy measures stemmed not only from 9/11 but also from the terrorist bombing of the Sari nightclub in Bali on 12 October 2002 where 80 Australians died. In its aftermath, Prime Minister Howard immediately commissioned a Review of Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Arrangements. In addition, Howard and the State and Territory Premiers and Chief Ministers signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and The Department of Prime Minister took on the lead role in counter-terrorism policy. Other immediate measures included a reward of $2.5M for any person providing information leading to the conviction of a person for an indictable offence contained in Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation and increased funding for the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Airline Liaison Officers (ALO) programme and the Australian Customs Service. Prime Minister Howard emphasized that the focus of his programs was terrorism:

The war against terrorism is not a war against Islam. The measures that the Government announced after the 11 September attacks and that I announce today do not target particular religious or racial groups within our community. These measures are aimed at terrorists, whatever their faith, whatever their race. These measures are aimed at protecting our tolerant Australian community, not dividing. They are aimed at pooling our collective resources to combat terrorism, wherever it occurs and whatever its form.

Review of Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Arrangements. The review of Commonwealth Counter Terrorism arrangements found the NATP deficient in the current global security environment. As such, the review introduced the most significant change to Australian terrorism management in more than 20 years. The new mechanism agreed to by Commonwealth, State and Territory leaders established a clear operational and strategic coordination role...
to ensure a response to any national terrorist situations from the strongest possible position. Most significantly, SAC-PAV was reconstituted as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), with a broader mandate to cover prevention and consequence management issues and with Ministerial oversight arrangements.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{Budget 2002-2003.} On 14 May 2002 the Australian government delivered a budget in response to 9/11. The budget speech opened by reinforcing D2000 and increasing the funding for Defence by $1B with a further $524M for the ADF and the War Against Terrorism. Under the second heading of “Upgrading Domestic Security”, $1.3B over five years was allocated for improvements to national security. Other areas targeted for increased funding included airport security, Australian Federal Police, technology, as well as creating response units such as the ADF Tactical Assault Group, a permanent Incident Response Regiment and a Federal Police Strike Team. Securing Australia’s borders also received attention in this budget receiving $2,8725M over five years for immigration, maritime surveillance and refugee processing. The Treasurer closed by stating that “[t]his is a Budget to keep Australia safe, our borders secure, and to keep our economy strong.”\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Foreign Policy 2003.} In February of 2003, Australia released its new foreign policy entitled \textit{Advancing the National Interest}. The release of this white paper was delayed by the Bali bombings of October 2002 and other international events and, in turn, the white paper was shaped by these same events:

The climate in international relations was then profoundly affected by the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States, by the subsequent declaration by the United States of a war against terrorism, by the US-led coalition intervention from late 2001 in Afghanistan, pursued with Australian participation, and by the bombing in Bali in October 2002. The context for the 2003 White Paper was clearly affected by these major developments.\textsuperscript{74}

The focus of the white paper is “maintaining security and prosperity” where terrorism has been singled out as the key threat to Australia’s security. Deepening (bilateral, regional, global and people-to-people) and broadening (people smuggling, drugs, arms, and environmental challenges) approaches to security are mentioned within the white paper; however, terrorism clearly gets the initial and bulk of the attention in security terms.

Realism and traditional security thinking, arguably a constant in Australian foreign policy, is also evident in this white paper:

At the same time, traditional security concerns remain. The Asia-Pacific region is still home to eight of the world’s ten largest armies and, after the Middle East, the world’s three most volatile flashpoints — the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula and Kashmir.
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and 12 October 2002 in Bali have been defining events. They have changed Australia’s security environment in significant ways. They starkly demonstrated that threats to Australia’s security can be global as well as regional.75

Perhaps also demonstrating a realist focus, the white paper called into question the authority of the United Nations and the effectiveness of international law76 a position which brought the Howard government considerable criticism:

The Howard Government was on the defensive today, responding to claims it’s finally admitted to turning its back on the United Nations. The statement by Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer, that “multilateralism is a synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator” has raised the ire of some including former UN weapons inspector, Richard Butler, who described it as an unprecedented attack on the world body and the principles of international law.77

A further criticism of the white paper, arguably underlining its realist approach, is the undeniable importance of the Australian-US alliance and the subsequent US influence on Australian foreign policy. Rawdon Dalrymple articulates this point in commenting that:

It seems to me you are left with the impression after reading this document that advancing Australia’s interest really means making Australia more secure by linking it more and more tightly with the United States and the other countries with which we have principal historical, cultural and other similarities and ties.78

In addition, the Australian-US relationship received a dedicated chapter entitled “Strengthening our alliance with the United States” where the importance of the relationship was articulated:

Australia’s longstanding partnership with the United States is of fundamental importance. The depth of security, economic and political ties that we have with the United States makes this a vital relationship. No other country can match the United States’ global reach in international affairs. Further strengthening Australia’s ability to influence and work with the United States is essential for advancing our national interests.79

Following the release of Advancing the National Interest, the Department of Defence immediately issued a defence update entitled Australia’s National Security as a means to respond to the new foreign policy.
Defence Policy. The Australian government released a defence update in February 2003 entitled *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update*. This update outlined adjustments in defence policy as a result of 9/11 and the Bali bombings. The defence statement was “…intended to present the implications for national security policy assessed as the result of recent changes in Australia’s strategic environment, most notably the emergence of global terrorism.”

First, the defence statement “…concludes that while the principles set out in the D2000 remain sound, some rebalancing of capability and expenditure will be necessary to take account of Australia’s strategic environment.” The interpretation of the deepening and broadening security agendas is contained within the final chapter entitled “A Troubled Region” which follows the more traditional security chapters on “Global Terrorism” and “The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” This in fact links well with the 2003 foreign policy white paper. However, while the national security thinking in the defence update generally fits within the construct of D2000, its focus has altered; that is, “the update argues for the increased importance of global strategic and security environment over the established focus on the defence of Australia.”

One might conclude that as a middle power, Australia might wish to take a broader multilateral approach to global security through stronger support of the UN but, as noted above, Australia has put its bilateral relationship with the US ahead of any multilateral approach with the UN. In fact, the defence update makes mention of the UN in one sentence in describing the drawdown in East Timor. In contrast, the defence update mentions the US throughout and indicates that the Australian-US relationship has provided for a greater degree of security:

As a result of a combination of factors including greater stability in major power relations and increased US strategic dominance, the threat of direct military attack on Australia is less than it was in 2000.

The defence statement reaffirms that its relationship with the US is a “national asset.” Derek Woolner argues the defence statement emphasizes interoperability with American forces more than any other defence policy document in 25 years and has heightened the relationship with the US from one of “important consideration” to one of “determining influence.” Perhaps one of the best examples of support for the US in its approach to 9/11 concerns the issue of pre-emptive strikes:

The most outspoken endorsement of the developing American response to the threat of global terrorism came from Senator Hill, the Minister for Defence, in June 2002. Senator Hill agreed that pre-emptive strike is a valid national security measure against countries thought to be supporting terrorist activities, when terrorist groups might gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Prime Minister enunciated this position even more strongly in December 2002, suggesting that it
would be valid policy for Australian forces to conduct a pre-emptive strike on the territory of a regional neighbour in order to thwart a terrorist attack.\footnote{86}

These points concerning the Australian-US relationship and decreasing significance of the UN are themes also evident within the 2003 foreign policy white paper.

In criticizing capability development for the ADF as approved wish-lists without guidance from a strategic policy, Aldo Borgu states, “[a] link also needs to be established in placing our Defence White Paper within the parameters of a broader National Security Strategy.”\footnote{87} Dr. Alan Dupont, addressing the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, stated that “[w]hat was missing, in his view, was a broader “overarching document where the foreign affairs white paper and the defence white paper can be seen to fit.”\footnote{88}

The defence update following the foreign policy white paper demonstrates a semblance of a policy formulation process; however, as noted above, there is no overarching national security policy driving these two policies. Dr. Alan Dupont notes that “[w]e still lack in this country an overarching whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, trade and national security.”\footnote{89}

**National Security.** Australia has yet to articulate an overarching national security policy bringing together both foreign and defence policies. Australia’s approach to national security remains legislative.\footnote{90} This means that national security is comprised of a broad suite of acts called “National Security legislation.” In 2002, this legislation was further consolidated under the ‘Counter Terrorism Legislative Package.’

Structurally, NSCC and the SCNS oversee Australia’s domestic and international security. In July 2003, Prime Minister Howard established the National Security Division (NSD) within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet with the mandate to foster greater coordination of, and a stronger “whole-of-government” policy focus on national security. The division is made up of two branches: the Defence and Intelligence Branch and the Domestic Security and Border Protection Branch.

The division provides the Prime Minister with advice and support on matters relating to defence policies; national security; intelligence community and law enforcement. The Secretariat for the National Counter-terrorism Committee and the Taskforce on Offshore Maritime Security are both located within National Security Division.\footnote{91}

Of particular interest is the fact that the Australian government chose a decentralized model, as contrasted with a homeland security-type model. The rationale for this decision lies with differing degrees of coordination as well as a hesitation to expand government bureaucracy:
It will always be a matter for debate, how we go about organising structures to coordinate the national effort. In Australia, we have a relatively small number of agencies involved, and of course a much smaller number of states and territories than in the US. For example, we have 9 police forces, not 18,000 as the US has. The government believes that in general current arrangements are serving Australia well and that we have high-performing agencies with well-defined roles. As already outlined, the government’s approach is to make sure the structures we have are well funded and administered, with legislation appropriate to the threat we face, and which are well coordinated.92

However, in characterizing the Howard government’s current national security approach as “…complex web of agencies and departments presided over by a patchwork of part-time ministers” the “shadow” government (official opposition) proposed a simplified Homeland Security portfolio:

The portfolio will encompass border protection, crime prevention, intelligence-gathering, investigation and prosecution, taking in all domestic counter-terrorism agencies — as well as Labour’s community security agenda. It will provide a one-stop shop approach for working with the States and Territories to enhance Australia’s national security.93

This obviously is based on the US approach and could be considered a natural political manoeuvre by the shadow government. However, it does possess a certain degree of attraction especially in light of the fact that decentralized authority was considered to be one of the factors in the inability to identify the 9/11 attackers before they struck.94

Summary: Canada-Australia Post 9/11

Both Canada and Australia responded in significant ways to the tragic events of 9/11, although Canada’s response was somewhat slower. As noted above, Australia had national security plans and structure in place (SAC PAV, NSSC, and NATP) allowing for a quick response; extensive review has created new structures and policies (NSD, NCTC and NCTP), yet they remain decentralized, employing a “whole-of-government” approach. Canada established new legislation (Bills C-17 and Bill C-36) coupled with policy and centralized structures which eventually manifested themselves as a permanent national security framework (PSEPC and NSP). Canada’s Budget 2001 directed little towards defence, but this changed with significant new funding in Budget 2005 recognizing DND’s key role in national security. Australia’s Budget 2002-2003 directed much of its new funding to the Australian Defence Force “in order to keep
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Australia safe." Both countries have recently released foreign and defence polices which respond directly to 9/11 and in Australia's case, strong reference is also made to the Bali bombings in October 2002. While Canada demonstrated an improved process where defence and foreign policy are informed by a national security policy, Australia has still not drafted a national security policy even though the process of foreign policy informing defence policy remains intact. Canada's new foreign and defence policy, while acknowledging the threat of terrorism, remain cognizant of, and active in, a broadened and deepened security environment. In contrast, Australian foreign and defence policies are clearly aimed at the threat of terrorism and remain focused in the realist security tradition while acknowledging the broadened and deepened security environment. In matters of global security, the UN remains a cornerstone to Canadian foreign and defence policy while Australia's government was highly criticized for essentially turning its back on the UN. Both Canada and Australia have signalled a greater affinity for the US, which for Canada is articulated in a greater North American regional focus and, for Australia, in a greater acknowledgement of the US's position of global strategic dominance.

Conclusion

The contestability of security as a concept makes national security a difficult term to define. In the post-Cold-War era, this difficulty has been exacerbated by the broadening and deepening of the concept of security. While many states were in the process of conceptualizing their security policies in accordance with this new agenda, the terrorist attacks in the US took place, reminding governments of their first and most important social service, national security. Prior to 9/11 Canada had taken many tangible steps towards incorporating the new security environment into its thinking, most notably with its international security focus coupled with the human security agenda. However, national security, when thought about, was conducted in an ad hoc manner. Australians, although they acknowledged the broadening and deepening security agenda, were more regionally focused on the Asia Pacific and more forthright about national security. Although they lacked a national security policy, they clearly took national security seriously, signalled by the creation of the NSCC and SCNS. These structures were being put in place at roughly the same time that Canada was aggressively pursuing its human security agenda. Despite the many similarities between the two states, prior to 9/11 they viewed national security quite differently, with Australia clearly having approached national security in a more affirmative fashion.

Post 9/11, both states took substantial steps towards establishing or augmenting their national security frameworks. Australia was better able initially to
respond to 9/11; it had a structure and plans in place, which were subsequently reviewed in response to the Bali bombing in October 2002. It created the NSD and articulated a “whole-of-government” approach without drafting a national security policy. In response to 9/11 and Bali it undertook a new foreign policy and defence update and articulated a more traditional security approach focused on terrorism.

Canada took a new approach to national security most notably in the creation of a centralized structure with PSEPC and the drafting of its first-ever NSP. The NSP was followed up by an IPS linking the NSP with foreign and defence polices. Although 9/11 and terrorism were important aspects of the policy documentation, Canada continued to account for the broadening and deepening security agenda through human security and international security alliances. In the post 9/11 period, it is clear that both states took similar strides towards a more robust national security position. However, Canada appears to have taken greater steps forward in clearly establishing its national security framework.

It is not the position of this paper to pass judgment on whose national security approach will provide the greatest degree of security; the aim is rather to compare the two approaches to further our understanding of national security. Canada and Australia are very similar states — history, culture, institutions — and the evolution of their respective approaches to national security highlights the complexity and challenges of national security within a dynamic global security environment. From evidence presented in this paper, it can be argued that 9/11 has levelled the playing field and that Canadian and Australian national security frameworks are more similar now than they were five years ago. One conclusion that stands out in considering matters of national security is that “geography matters”. This was strikingly apparent in the post 9/11 period — Canada’s ad hoc, minimalist approach to national security compared to Australia’s regionally focused structural framework. It is seemingly ironic that the one catalyst which arguably brings these two rather disparate national security policies closer together knows “no geography”; namely, terrorism. Terrorist acts such as those of 9/11 and Bali, alongside other threats to peace and stability, are stark reminders of the constantly changing and often volatile global security environment within which we live. Such reminders reinforce the need for governments to give due regard to the most important social service they provide to their citizens, national security.
Notes

2. Ibid. 16.
5. Ibid.
11. Ibid, ii.
15. *Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security* has since been published as a second edition in response to 9/11 and can be viewed at <http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/freedom_from_fear-en.asp>.
17. Ibid, 8.
18. Ibid, 27.
19. Ibid.
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22. Ibid.
27. Boulden, 2-3.
30. Boulden, 34.
32. Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Statistical Services), 1997) 1.
33. Ibid, 2.
34. Ibid, 38.
35. Ibid, 3.
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37. Ibid, 29.
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62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid, 9.
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67. Ibid, 5.
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75. Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Advancing the National Interest, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003): ix.
76. Ibid, xii.
78. The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, The (not quite) White Paper, 5.
79. Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Advancing the National Interest, (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003): 86.
82. Woolner.


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89. Ibid: 5.


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