Creating an International Network
Of Democracy Builders: The Overview
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Intervention and Conflict: Moving Towards a More Realistic Understanding of Democracy
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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements............................................................................................................... 3

Introduction and Overview........................................................................................................ 6
  Democracy as a Universal Commitment............................................................................. 6
  Building Local Knowledge................................................................................................. 7

The Approach: National Narratives and Democratic Development................................. 9
  History, Conflict, Diversity and Democracy....................................................................... 9
  Comparison and Theory: Perlin’s Model............................................................................ 13

Case Study Summaries and Contents..................................................................................... 16
  The Process of Democracy Building in the Republic of Costa Rica................................. 16
  Liberia: Assessing the Conditions for Liberal Democracy in a Post-Conflict State 17
  The Palestinian Territories: Optimism with Information / Democracy in the Islamic World:................................................................. 18
  The Tipping Points............................................................................................................ 20

Assessment and Next Steps.................................................................................................... 27
  Attainment of Democratic Norms..................................................................................... 27
  Summary Matrix Based on Case Studies......................................................................... 28

Appendix I: Intervention and Conflict: Moving Towards a More Realistic Understanding of Democracy .................................................................................................. 30
  Introduction....................................................................................................................... 30
  The Debate Over Sequencing and Gradualism.................................................................. 31
  The Relationship Between Democracy, Violence and Conflict....................................... 33
  Lessons Learned from External Democratic Interventions............................................. 34
  Individual Case Studies.................................................................................................... 37
  Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 37

Annotated Bibliography......................................................................................................... 38
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Thomas S. Axworthy, co-author of this overview, first met Oscar Arias through their joint involvement in the InterAction Council and President Arias stimulated the intense interest of our Centre in Costa Rica and our hope that Costa Rica might become a model for other countries transitioning to democracy. Leroy Sua was a refugee, fleeing from the turmoil of Liberia, when he was welcomed to Canada in the 1980s. An expert in development, he has subsequently become a United Church Minister. His family has created the Sua Foundation in Liberia and that organization, along with the University of Liberia, carried out a survey on Liberian political attitudes, in itself a great accomplishment, given the decades of civil war that country has endured. Since the 1960s, Nicholas Fogg, starting as the Middle East Director of Christian Aid and then as the Master of Religious Studies at Marlborough College, has worked for democracy, human rights and development in the Middle East, with a special emphasis on Palestine. It was a pleasure to work with him again and Fogg’s narrative history is excellently complemented by Khalil Shikaki’s recent surveys of Palestinian opinions on democracy.

The mission of the Centre for the Study of Democracy is to develop a vibrant community of democracy builders, through a program of comparative case studies that involve local partners, matched with experts affiliated with the CSD. This study, supported by the IDRC, contributes to that mission by the academic partnerships on display between Nicholas Fogg, Ali Salam and Khalil Shikaki; Jamie Ordóñez, Diego Padilla, Timothy Andres Sayle and Patricia DeGennaro; and Darigbe LeRoy Sua, Dangbe Sua, Thomas Weber, Sherman Tarnue
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Introduction and Overview

Democracy as a Universal Commitment

When asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what he thought was the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century, the 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen had no difficulty in choosing the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.¹ This idea of democracy as a universal commitment that is unconstrained by geography or culture is quite new. Unlike the nineteenth-century discourse on whether a country was “fit for democracy,” the prevailing view in the twentieth century is that a country has to become “fit through democracy.” In his book Development As Freedom, Sen developed his insight that the value of democracy includes its intrinsic importance of political and social participation in human life, its instrumental role in generating political incentives to formulate and respond to economic needs, and its constructive function in the formation of democratic values.

This is a broader view of democracy – going well beyond the freedom of elections and ballots – that gives a central place to guaranteeing free public discussion and deliberative interactions in political thought and practice. What is required in “the exercise of public reason,” as John Rawls observed, is the safeguarding of “diversity of doctrines – the fact of pluralism” which must be secured in a democracy by “basic rights and liberties.”² The championing of social deliberation, pluralist interactions and basic liberties is part of the global heritage that challenges the idea that democracy is just a form of Westernization.

Building Local Knowledge

Building local knowledge of democracy as participatory governance in countries undergoing democratic transitions begins distinctly at home. The three country case studies presented in this volume are national histories of democratic development in very different contexts. The process of democracy building is examined in Costa Rica, long counted amongst Central and Latin America’s most stable and pacific democracies, that has enabled it to move towards a modern welfare state. Considered a poorer cousin to its neighbours, it has nevertheless created a society with an effective liberal-constitutional framework, a universal education system, extensive social security and public health provisions, while at the same time nationalizing the banking system and disbanding its army in 1949. The political history of Costa Rica is therefore instructive, both for an understanding of how it achieved an “intelligent balance between the market and the State” that has promoted “growth, development, distribution and sustainable democracy” in the period 1949-1980, and the search for a new equilibrium that balances development and democracy under mounting public debt and global pressures to improve national competitiveness.³

In contrast, the Liberian case study examines the conditions for liberal democracy in a post-war situation following a horrific civil war from 1989 through 2003, fought with eight violent militia groups over access and control of the country’s natural resource rich areas. In 2005, following two years of interim government and UN supervised disarmament and demobilization of armed gangs, and vital infrastructure and judicial reform, including anti-corruption measures, peace and security was sufficiently restored to hold elections for a permanent government. Liberians turned out in massive numbers to elect Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as president of a fragile regime charged with post-conflict reconstruction, economic reform and political institutional reform. She has the daunting task of repairing the country, repatriating Liberian refugees living abroad in asylum countries, promoting reconciliation between former combatants, and reintegration of its citizens. The prospects for reconstituting a viable democratic regime in these circumstances are still uncertain. “An examination of the

history of Liberia, particularly since the end of the Second World War, acknowledges many if
the potential stumbling blocks on the path to political freedom, while highlighting essential
elements for any successful transition to democracy.”

The third and final case study chronicles the political events that produced the Palestinian
territories and gave rise to Hamas and its electoral victory in 2006. It asks the central
question whether “extreme and anti-democratic parties should be permitted to benefit from
electoral success in the democratic process?” In the process, the study directly confronts the
debate within the world of Islam between “those who regard democracy as a Western concept
that is incompatible with Muslim society, and those who view democracy as a natural and
necessary extension of the Islamic tradition.”

As described, these detailed case studies also identify general lessons about democratic
transitions by examining local and external factors explaining either the success or failure of
transition in each one of the country cases. These factors, and their interactions, are context-
specific. Factors driving democratization in post-conflict Liberia are not necessarily the same
set of factors related to democratic consolidation and quality in Costa Rica or those associated
with the transition to electoral democracy in Palestine. The specific approach to identifying
general lessons from particular national histories is to situate those histories in a larger,
transnational perspective. In this case, the comparative analysis is made possible by adopting
the normative framework of liberal democracy – operating principles, necessary conditions
and facilitating conditions to achieve and sustain liberal democracy – that was developed by
George Perlin, founder of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at Queen’s University.

4 Timothy Andrews Sayle. (June 2008). Liberia: Assessing the Conditions for Liberal Democracy in a Post-
Conflict State, (Kingston: Queen’s University, Centre for the Study of Democracy): p 9.

5 Nicholas Fogg and Ali Salam (June 2008), Optimism with Information. Democracy in the Islamic world: The
Palestinian Territories, (Kingston: Queen’s University, Centre for the Study of Democracy): p 58.

6 Ibid.: p 65.

7 For a methodological discussion on the potential influences on democratic transition outcomes, see Michael
McFaul, Amichai Magen and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (February 2008), Evaluating International Influences on
Democratic Transitions: Research Guide for Case Study Authors, (Stanford University: Center on Democracy,
Development and the Rule of Law).
The Approach: National Narratives and Democratic Development

History, Conflict, Diversity and Democracy

Few would disagree with the observation that documenting and understanding the context of a country’s democratic development requires delving into its history. Indeed, the phenomenon of democratic transition is essentially historical and the human experience of democracy over time is deserving of serious historical analysis. Lived history is embedded in the documented narratives of the past that, in the national context, is limited to the narrative of shared experiences bounded by space and time.

Good national narratives of shared social connection are explicitly referential and empirically grounded, and “whose claims to knowledge consist in locating events, ideas, things, and persons in explanatory contexts.” In short, historical accounts do more than set context; they also provide explanations for the democratic experience. Individual case studies can distil the essence of that particular experience through the historical method, the careful use of evidence and coherence of arguments. The best-known example of this is de Tocqueville (1835), the French political thinker and historian who wrote of his travels in early nineteenth century America and explored the effects of the rising equality of social conditions on the individual and the state in Democracy in America.

In his seminal work What Is History? the British historian of international relations E.H. Carr argued that history is always constructed; it is a discourse about the past and not a reflection of it. It is that while historical events may be taken as given, what Carr calls historical facts are derived within the process of narrative construction. His answer to the question “what is history?” is that it is a continuous “process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past;” further, historical “facts speak only

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when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context.”

The risk of subjectivity and relativism is tempered by how historical meaning is constituted, by how the historian arranges the facts as derived from the evidence, and influenced by his knowledge of the context.

Simon Schama, in his well-known book *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, analyses the intellectual trends that have characterized the historical treatments of that seminal event. His insights apply to history generally, but also to the three case studies that form the core of this project. It is difficult, he writes, to winkle “out the mysterious truths of cause and effect” in that kaleidoscope of “contingencies and unforeseen consequences.”

Francis Fukuyama makes the same point about contemporary state building: there is a great deal that we don’t know how to do in transferring strong institutions to new democracies. Fukuyama writes that we know “how to transfer resources across international borders, but well-functioning public institutions require certain habits of mind and operate in complex ways that resist being moved.”

Modesty, then, is an appropriate scholarly virtue when attempting to describe something as complex as a revolution or developing a democracy. Yet, Schama’s book employs the two basic approaches that have traditionally tried to improve our understanding of cause and effect. The first is to assess social structures, cultural values and economic attainment, the deep or background frameworks that shape how human beings interpret the events and risks of their time. Social structure, social science has long taught, has its own imperatives. Thus, Schama describes schools of history that have “turned away from the witching drama of events – the surface brilliance of the historical record – to probe deeper into archival sources or general laws of social behaviour.” In this vein, in assessing the three case studies, we

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13 Schama: p. 6.
employ a framework or typology of key background factors developed by George Perlin. This framework is the analytical spine of the study. A typology does not establish the relationship between cause and effect, but it does organize data into categories that can be understood.

In assessing the different outcomes – Costa Rica emerging from fragility to become a consolidated democracy; Liberia, since the 1980s, being almost the classic definition of a “failed state”; and Palestine, born in such hope in 1993, falling into a downward trajectory of violence – the structural comparisons explain a lot. Costa Rica, while enduring a high level of conflict in the 1940s, had a long history of self-government and a traditional emphasis on the value of education. These engrained habits prove stronger than the temporary passions of civil war. Liberia, in contrast, had a narrowly focused elite, intent on economic advantage, which eventually spawned a revolution that quickly degenerated into terror (as did the French Revolution). Palestine had an external revolutionary elite that returned after the Oslo Accord to limited self-rule. There were large difficulties in integrating this returning elite with the local inhabitants who had organized the intifada. Arafat’s Palestinian National Authority had the added burden of not having full sovereignty over its territory and with continuing tensions with Israel. In short, Costa Rica enjoyed a good ranking in most of the conditions outlined by Perlin, while Liberia and Palestine were lacking in almost every category.

While paying due regard to social history, Schama is also part of the earlier historical tradition of Plutarch and Carlyle, which emphasizes that human agency is still critical. Background conditions pattern choices, but it is still human beings who make the choices. Events and personalities can still dominate a chronicle: “if, in fact, the revolution was a much more haphazard and chaotic event,” Schama writes, “and much more of the product of human agency than structural conditioning, chronology seems indispensible in making its complicated twists and turns intelligible.”

Malcolm Gladwell, in *The Tipping Point*, makes the contemporary case on how little things can make a big difference. Choices are made, and as a result, “ideas and products and

14 Schama: p. xv.
messages and behaviours spread, just like viruses do.”15 In an event as tumultuous as the French Revolution, one can point to many tipping points, but certainly one was the convening in 1789 of the Estates General in the first place. Louis XVI had many other choices than in convening this ancient body, but once the decision was taken that only by this dramatic initiative could support be won from the aristocracy for the imposition of new taxes, then the die was cast and events were in the saddle. This project concentrates on applying Perlin’s framework to the three cases, but key events in the three histories are highlighted. One such event – the decision of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to leave North America to return home to contest the Liberian election of 2005, forms the basis of a teaching case by Valerie Ashford in the Liberian Case Study (Volume 2).

In the democracy case studies of Costa Rica, Liberia and the Palestinian Territories, we have in each a record of experience with drama, a lively dialogue between past and present, and a sense of contingency that are the essential elements in a compelling historical narrative. Thematically, these also explore the very complex and difficult “relationship between conflict, democracy and diversity, if only to adopt a more realistic and nuanced approach to democracy assistance.”16 At the same time, these development pathways critically test the prevailing conceptual model of third-wave democratic transition that assumes a set sequence of stages consisting of democratic opening, breakthrough, and consolidation.17 In particular, these national narratives challenge the assumption that democratic transitions “are being built on coherent, functioning states”. Indeed, the case studies describe the “gray zone” of ambiguity, with attributes of democratic political life as well as serious democratic deficits, thereby showing that “state-building has been a much larger and more problematic issue than originally envisaged in the transition paradigm.”18


18 Carothers, *ibid.*: pp 9, 16.
Comparison and Theory: Perlin’s Model

At this point of discussion, two observations can be made about the historical and comparative approach that governs these IDRC case studies. The first is that while national histories are distinctive and variegated, “the nation cannot be its own historical context” isolated from the rest of the world; “no less than the neutron or the cell, it must be studied in a framework larger than itself.” While the nation-state is the natural container of history or the shared memory of its people, it also shares a common global history. If, as Sen has argued, people everywhere have participated in a single global history of democratic governance since the twentieth-century, then it is worthwhile to develop enriched national narratives that are situated more fully within the larger, transnational and intercultural global context of democratization.

This then begs the second question - how to integrate and make sense of the country case histories with other, larger stories of democratic development? The Queen’s University approach is to examine the country case studies through a wider lens, one based on normative democratic attainment fashioned by Professor George Perlin as a comparative theoretical framework.

This approach was developed as part of a major evaluation of international democracy assistance recently completed by the Centre for the Study of Democracy for Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). It is worthwhile to highlight the essential features of the Perlin model as described in the DFAIT report:

A key feature of the research and analysis is testing George Perlin’s theory-of-change towards the creation of democratic values. Democracy at its core, Perlin argues, is a normative concept. Democracy is a system of governance that is organized to give effect to the values embedded in the tradition of liberal political thought that gave rise to the democratic transformations which began at the end of the Eighteenth century. Whatever the particular forms they have assumed, all contemporary liberal-democracies are committed to the values of freedom, equality, and justice as they have


evolved in that tradition. Thus, democratic development may be defined as the establishment of institutions and processes of governance that promote and protect liberal-democratic values.

Based on this definition, Perlin has proposed a model of democratic development that can be used by policy-makers, program administrators, and practitioners to help define their objectives in particular situations and decide on the means that are most likely to help realize these objectives. The model represents what a developed liberal democracy should look like, not in terms of characteristics of established regimes, but as an ideal standard. It is intended to serve as a reference point for evaluating where a particular country may be on the path to democratic development.... Analysis based on this conception of democratic development has the virtue of recognizing that there are likely to be many different paths toward democratic development reflecting the differing economic and social conditions in, and political and cultural experiences of, countries embarked on its achievement. Although this approach lacks logically phased precision in a process of step-by-step realization of democratic reform, it is what our own experience in the established democracies has taught us.

The first part of the model is derived from the proposition that there are two sets of organizing principles through which liberal-democratic values are given effect. One is summarized in the concept of liberal-constitutionalism, which is comprised of the principles of constitutional or limited government, the entrenchment of enforceable rights, the rule of law (incorporating the principles of the supremacy of law, equality before the law, and the impartial and fair administration of the law), and democratic control of institutions of state security. The second is summarized in the concept of popular sovereignty under a system of representative democracy which subsumes those principles that give effect to democratic decision-making: the existence of governing institutions and processes that are effective, responsive and accountable to citizens; the selection of political elites through regular, free and fair, competitive elections; the accountability of elites to citizens; a genuinely competitive system of party politics effectively representing a broad spectrum of societal interests and contributing to accommodation of diverse interests; a system of group politics based on the principles of pluralist theory; and a system of political communication providing for a free flow of ideas and information.

The second part of the model describes conditions thought necessary to establish and sustain a system of democratic governance. It ventures into more controversial territory because some of its elements incorporate contested propositions....[it] distinguishes between conditions that are widely agreed to be an essential and integral part of a stable, self-sustaining, functioning democracy and those that facilitate the realization and sustainability of a functioning democracy. The essential conditions are the political engagement of citizens, a democratic political culture, and a well-developed network of autonomous, private associations as understood in the concept
of civil society. The “facilitating” conditions are more contentious. While not all of the propositions advanced here are accorded general agreement, they are those most widely supported in empirical theories of democracy. They are: an open, non-polarized system of social stratification; a functioning market economy regulated to prevent disproportionate aggregations of power and ensure fairness in economic relations; and a political community that is internally cohesive.

It needs to be emphasized that the elements of the model, because they are an ideal standard, do not represent a form of democratic development that is ever actually likely to be realized. This approach acknowledges that liberal democracy is constantly evolving. The practices of democratic governance as they exist in the established democracies today are the result of a constant process of adjustment, reflecting continuing debate about how best to realize the purposes of liberal democracy. Further, this approach recognizes that democratic governance can be understood to embrace many different sorts of institutional arrangements. There is no universally applicable best way to organize the practice of democracy. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. What is appropriate in one set of circumstances may not be appropriate in another.21

Against this methodology backdrop that emphasizes the national narratives of democratic development as part of a larger examination of democracy building, the next section presents executive summaries of the three case histories, followed by an assessment of democratic attainment to date in Costa Rica, Liberia and Palestine using the Perlin model. The national narratives were developed prior to the formulation of the Perlin model but additional efforts were subsequently made to consider the implications of the narratives in terms of the theoretical ties that bind the case studies within the larger Perlin framework.

21 Ibid pp 24-25. See Case Study Appendices for a detailed tabular exposition of the Perlin model.
Case Study Summaries and Contents

The Process of Democracy Building in the Republic of Costa Rica

The first section of this study presents an analysis of the Costa Rican historical background, and its construction between 1821 and 2000. In particular, we examine the period from 1821 to 1948, from the Independence to Civil War.

It is difficult to define a sole and exclusive turning point to explain the Costa Rican transition from authoritarian regimes and the political evolution towards democracy since most of the events of the 19th century lead, in one way or another, to the establishment of a pacific and civil political system. A process of the creation of a constitutional system, the codification of norms and the liberal reforms gradually consolidated the Costa Rican Democracy.

The role of education is also of substantive importance for the definition of a Costa Rican idiosyncrasy and their unique development with regard to other countries in the region.

A social tendency in most Costa Rican policies, groups and civil movements before 1948 was fundamental for the interventionist character of the State apparatus in subsequent years, leading to particular social conditions fundamental to current contradictions between the requirements of a global society and the historical background of the country.

Costa Rica’s second Republic begins in 1949. The strong political turmoil that Costa Rica experienced during the decade of the 1940’s resulted in a deep set of social and political reforms, ultimately launching the Costa Rican version of the welfare state. The abolition of the army, an extensive social security and public health system, a huge investment in education, and the nationalization of the banking business, among other measures, marked the dynamic three decades (1949-1980) in which Costa Rica almost quadrupled its national income and per-capita indicators.

These measures notwithstanding, expansion processes have, since 1980, reversed and economically contracted, in part because of the weaknesses of foreign trade balances and the
rapid increase of financial rates over Third World external debts, situations that have impacted much of Central America. The Costa Rican paradigm has undergone major reformations, which have been felt in social development and governmental policies in the new millennium.

The second part of this investigation presents the latest indicators of Costa Rica’s democratic system and the historical nature of developments of national institutions. Here, we see the logic behind some of the challenges and contradictions of present-day Costa Rica.

Costa Rica’s current economic and political situation has substantially departed from its past. First, the historic bipartisan system has become a multi-partisan system. Second, economic and productive sectors have shifted significantly. Third, changes in the formation of social classes, socio-economic levels, and political parties have had considerable effects on Costa Rican social institutions and living conditions. A succinct review of all these factors and the legality framework applicable is fundamental to drawing conclusions from the investigation.

**Liberia: Assessing the Conditions for Liberal Democracy in a Post-Conflict State**

Liberia (from the Latin for *free*) is Africa’s oldest republic, founded in 1847. But the path to liberty for Liberians has been onerous, with some waxing and much waning of political freedoms, periodic flirtations with democracy and considerable horrors under Liberian warlord rule and civil war. A UN-sanctioned intervention in 2003 saw the end of Liberia’s civil war, and the international community continues, since 2003, with efforts in infrastructural reconstruction and socio-political support.

Post-conflict reconstruction efforts unites international, governmental and non-governmental agencies in conflict-prevention, peace-building, economic development, human security and development, good governance promotion and democratic development programs, all of which overlap. Success or failure in one field will often impact others, but equally possible is the misinterpretation of where successes have actually occurred; in Liberia, significant success in conflict-prevention and disarmament is co-terminus with the presence of the UN peacekeeping force deployed at the end of the horrific civil war in 2003, there is promise in
the country’s single albeit very hopeful election and a dramatic reduction in open violence, but can we assume that the country is ripe for democracy? If so, upon what criteria?

The Perlin model provides a comprehensive framework enabling the assessment of complex post-war environments to determine the presence or lack of liberal-democratic conditions.\textsuperscript{22} The model is a tool by which the field worker, political analyst or aid donor is assisted in the determination of where to best focus resources. In applying the Perlin framework to an analysis of post-2003 Liberia, this paper demonstrates the model’s utility; the framework is of particular value in cases of competing prognoses, which can muddy prospects for international consensus on the merits of various aid alternatives. An assessment of essential conditions in Liberia, including levels of political engagement, democratic political culture and civil society, as well as such facilitating conditions as social stratification, market economy functionality, and political community cohesion, indicates that Liberia has not met all or most of the conditions to achieve and sustain a liberal democracy. Liberia held a free and fair election in 2005 that was met with great enthusiasm by the electorate,\textsuperscript{23} and this event signifies a level of political engagement amongst Liberians, which is promising for democracy in Liberia, but several requirements (an engaged and informed citizenry, state elites mindful of the limits of their authority, an active civil society) are finally burgeoning but may not be sustainable without (currently significant) international troop presence and financial aid. Ultimately, such facilitating conditions as a large middle class and a functioning market economy have yet to develop. The assessment provides both a set of Liberia-specific targets for improvement and a transferable method for assessing other post-conflict scenarios.

\textbf{The Palestinian Territories: Optimism with Information / Democracy in the Islamic World:}

The story of Historic Palestine in the last century may be said to be one without too many heroes. The issue of whether a non-democratic party should be permitted to obtain power through the democratic process is clearly intertwined with the nuances of the history.

\textsuperscript{22} See Liberia Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{23} See Liberia Appendix III for details of public opinion on the election and prospects for future voter participation.
economy, religion and politics of the region. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions might be reached.

The chief of these is that there are aspects of Islam that would appear to be incompatible with democracy as it is conceived of in the West. These may be attributed to the adherents of the religion who are frequently described as ‘fundamentalists’, who wish to impose Shari’ah law on their societies. Such an imposition would be incompatible with democracy because it does not accord full rights or status to minority groups and to women. It also features such non-democratic concepts as prohibition of apostasy from Islam and the suppression of a free media and system of justice. From its pronouncements and actions, it would appear that Hamas is seeking to achieve these ‘fundamentalist objectives in Historic Palestine.

Nevertheless there are clearly elements within Islamic society and culture who see no such dichotomy between their religion and participatory and democratic structures. Unlike the fundamentalists, such people represent a diversity of stances. Some consider the Qu’ran to be a holy book, not a social and political manifesto. Others seek a secular society in which religion plays a moral and confessional role, but is not involved in the due processes of state.

In terms of a search for the rapprochement in historic Palestine, which, it is clear, is in the interest of most of the concerned parties, US administrations have failed to exercise their full diplomatic clout because they have been over-concerned with addressing domestic constituencies.

In 40 years of occupation, Israel has failed to address the problems of the West Bank and Gaza in economic or political terms. Rather it has behaved as if it possesses the rights of a ruling power without assuming the responsibilities, pursuing its own agenda regarding settlements, etc, which has proved inhibiting of any genuine progress towards peace.

Without a doubt, the financial and institutional corruption existing around the regime of Yasser Arafat in the Palestinian Territories contributed to the disillusionment of many Palestinians. Many, but not all, observers would consider that his failure to grasp the opportunities offered by Camp David II was a disastrous development for the peace process.

The rise of Hamas did not occur in a vacuum, but in response to a number of circumstances.
From the experience of Turkey in recent years, it would appear that an Islamic society may well seek an Islamic identity. As a cultural manifestation, this need not represent a threat to individual freedoms or social contracts. Nor need the election of an ‘Islamic’ party represent a threat to democracy, provided that constitutional safeguards are in place to prevent the abolition of rights and liberties, although the role of the Army as guardians of the secular constitution represents a restraint on the abuse of constitutional power that would be better safeguarded in other ways. The failure of Arafat regime to develop such safeguards undoubtedly was a factor of the success of Hamas and the subsequent civil war.

**The Tipping Points**

Mathew Johnson, in his literature review on democracy and conflict in Appendix I, highlights the advice of Thomas Carothers that any potential intervention in democratic institution-building must have a deep knowledge of local conditions. Carothers’ list of the five factors that improve the likelihood of democratic transition is similar to the Perlin framework – level of economic development, concentration of national wealth, identity-based divisions, historical experience with pluralism and whether the region or neighbourhood is democratic. Carothers and Perlin both argue that any democratic intervention has its own particular needs and requirements. The literature review confirms the utility of using frameworks that focus attention on local conditions and underlying structural conditions.

Johnson also summarizes the classification scheme by Derick Brinkerhoff, which categorizes countries as failed, failing, fragile and recovering states. The three case studies of this project correspond to Brinkerhoff’s categories. Liberia was a failed state, now attempting to recover through the leadership of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Tensions between the Fatah Party of President Arafat and the extremist Hamas movement and the never-ending pressure by Israel has made Palestine into a failing state. The surprise victory of Hamas in the 2006 election has led to a division with Gaza being ruled by Hamas, and the West Bank, by Fatah. The authors of the Palestinian study, Fogg, Salam and Shikaki, still have guarded optimism that Palestine’s situation is redeemable, but as of this writing, the violence between Hamas and Fatah on the one hand, and Hamas and Israel on the other, has not ceased. Costa Rica was
certainly a fragile state in the 1940s, but rather than going down the spiral which we have seen in Liberia and Palestine, it instead enacted a new democratic constitution in 1949 that included the break-through initiative of abolishing the army.

Each of these case studies points out critical tipping events triggered by elections. The impact of elections on fragile or post-conflict states has spawned much debate. Larry Diamond writes, “Failed or acutely failing states pose distinctive problems for democracy promotion.”

Civil war must first come to an end before a state can build democracy. This occurred in two of our cases — Costa Rica in 1949 and Liberia in 2003. Subsequent elections have to regenerate legitimate power. If elections are to replace violence, and if the losers are to accept the results, then the elections have to be seen to be fair.

The emphasis placed by democratic promotion experts, independent Elections Commissions or independent observers, to monitor elections is wise. In Liberia in 2005, for example, the front runner in the first October vote, George Weah, lost in the November run off and initially claimed election fraud. Monitors of the election, the Carter Center and the European Union, found some irregularities, but on the whole declared the election to be free and fair. Mr. Weah ultimately withdrew his protest and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took office in January 2006.

In Palestine, the election of Hamas in 2006 was universally acknowledged to free and fair. However, in this case, the election precipitated another kind of tipping point — the negative and instantaneous reaction of the international community to boycott Hamas. As described by Fogg, Salem, and Shikaki, the election of a radical party created its own dynamic; do you enter into negotiations and dialogue (the Northern Ireland model) or intervene to prevent the transfer of power (Algeria)? Despite the opposition of the international community, Hamas initially shared government with Fatah for a year and one half before seizing power and expelling Fatah from Gaza in 2007. Since then, Hamas has been in conflict with both Fatah and Israel.

Costa Rica has become a model consolidated democracy because of the decisions made by President José Figueres Ferrer following the short, but violent revolution of 1948. As

described by Ordonez in the Costa Rica case tensions had been building in the Central American Republic since the 1940s. In 1948, in a disputed election, the conservatives newspaper publisher Otilio Ulate claimed victory by 10,000 votes over the former prescient Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, But, one day after the election, a fire destroyed many of the ballots. Calderón refused to accept defeat and petitioned the legislature to nullify the results President Picado, an ally of Calderón and president since 1944 declared Ulates election as fraudulent and vowed to stay in office.

In this period of confusion and disorder a legendary Costa Rican figure, Jose Maria (“Don Pepe”) Figueres Ferrer, entered the scene. An exile in Mexico, Figueres let a small force into Costa Rica and initiated a short civil war to nominally overturn the violation of democratic norms. In five weeks Figueres was victorious and became head of a revolutionary junta. In a key tipping point decision he signed a pact with Otilio Ulate (the disputed winner of the 1948 election) to relinquish power in eighteen months. Ulate would follow Figueres as the head of the Costa Rican government. The pact with Ulate precluded Figueres from establishing a personal dictatorship and also legitimized the decisions of the junta — especially the landmark abolition of the army. The elites of Costa Rica, unlike those of Palestine, were more committed to the principles of procedural democracy than personal power. Figueres went on to win two terms as president under Costa Rica’s new constitution. The country’s forty day revolution, precipitated by a disputed election, ultimately resulted in a power sharing pact and a new constitution that has helped consolidate Costa Rican democracy ever since.

In the Constitution proclaimed by Figueres, Article 12 states “the army as a permanent institution is abolished.” The President declared, “it is time for Costa Rica to return to her traditional position of having more teachers than soldiers.” The abolition of the army not only freed up resources for education and social security, it removed a potential source of political instability (as the history of military coup d’états in Central and Latin America demonstrates). The impact of that 1949 tipping point decision is one of the major themes of the Costa Rica case study. There is no question that Costa Rica’s impressive social achievements are related to that critical decision. In 1949, Costa Rica was also a party to the Rio Treaty, and this external guarantee ensured that an attack against one member was an attack on all. When
Nicaragua signed the treaty (Costa Rica’s only serious external threat), Figueres abolished the army a month later.

The lessons of this tipping point decision for other democratically transitioning states are two: a) it is possible to divert resources from guns to education if political will is sufficient, but, b) this risk can only be taken if security is guaranteed by an international treaty or by powerful, friendly neighbours. The necessity for regional security pacts, as a precondition for military demobilization is a key conclusion of the Costa Rica case. Liberia is currently debating the future of its army, as Costa Rica did in 1949. But president Johnson-Sirleaf, if following the Costa Rican model, should negotiate a security pact with her neighbours before significantly dismantling Liberia’s armed forces.

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s tipping point decision to return from North America to run in the 2005 election highlights the potential role of diasporas in democratic institution-building. After her election, Johnson-Sirleaf explained her return by recalling that

> I came face to face with the human devastation of war, which killed a quarter of a million of our three million people and displaced most of the rest. Hundreds of thousands escaped across borders. More - who could not - fled into the bush, constantly running from one militia or another, often surviving by eating rodents and wild plants that made them sick and even killed them. Our precious children died of malaria, parasites and mal-nourishments. Our boys, full of potential, were forced to be child soldiers, to kill or be killed. Our girls, capable of being anything they could imagine, were made into sex slaves, gang-raped by men with guns, made mothers while they were still children themselves.

But listening to the hopes and dreams of our people, I recall the words of a Mozambican poet who said, "Our dream has the size of freedom." My people, like your people, believe deeply in freedom - and, in their dreams, they reach for the heavens. I represent those dreams. I represent their hope and their aspirations. I ran for president because I am determined to see good governance in Liberia in my lifetime. But I also ran because I am the mother of four, and I wanted to see our children smile again.25

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The impact of Diasporas, or the expatriate community, is potentially controversial. The survey carried out by the Sua Foundation and the University of Liberia found that a significant minority of 32% believe that returning expatriates should not be appointed to government positions because there are qualified Liberians who have never left the country even though Liberians returning from the Diaspora were the two top presidential contenders. Their candidacies, compared to the locals who ran, were aided by the prevailing view that time abroad was useful in learning about freedom and democracy. Two-thirds of the respondents in the CSD-sponsored survey believe that freedom and democracy were the main reasons Liberians had gone to Europe or North America during the civil war. The same percentage (62%) believe that freedom and democracy, rather than money, were the reasons that the expatriates had left, and that, therefore, living outside Liberia had been a positive learning experience.

The survey shows that there is suspicion among many about the role of expatriates, but at the same time, two-thirds of the respondents believe that the experience of living in free societies abroad improves commitment to freedom at home. The Liberia survey and the electoral success of President Johnson-Sirleaf illustrate the important affect that diasporas can have on building democracies. As in the case of Liberia or Taiwan, the impact of some diasporas are positive, but there are other instances, such as in Sri Lanka or the Balkans, where expatriate communities are often more intransient than those living in the midst of conflict. Whether positive or negative, the Diaspora connection to democracy building is a largely neglected area of research, but in our case study of Liberia, at least, it was an absolutely crucial one.

If the survey in Liberia illustrated the impact of the expatriate community, the surveys by Khalil Shikaki demonstrate a well-known, but still crucial, dimension of democracy building – the negative consequences of corruption. The May 2006 survey by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research shows that 88% of the Palestinian respondents believe it would be good to have a democratic political system in Palestine, and this overwhelming majority prefers democracy to any other system, despite recognition of its problems. There is a democratic base in Palestine. But corruption was the Achilles’ heel of Fatah: 71% of Hamas

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26 See Liberia Appendix II.
supporters in 2006 put fighting corruption as their top priority, compared to only 19% of Fatah supporters. Shikaki concludes that Hamas understood the desire for governmental integrity very well, while Fatah did not, or chose to ignore it, hoping to meet public needs in other areas, such as the peace process. He writes: “Fatah lost the election because voters believed Hamas could offer better governance in the critical area of fighting corruption.”

Voter dismay about the reality of Fatah corruption was the main reason that Hamas won, not because Palestinians increased their support for extremism or because there has been a decline in support for democracy. One of the tipping points in the Palestinian story, therefore, is President Arafat’s refusal to change his governing style from the era when Fatah was in exile. As Fogg describes, Arafat was the symbolic, and, for a time, real, hero for his people. To survive the murderous world of Palestinian exile politics, Arafat became a master of divide-and-rule by using money to reward and punish. When he became the legitimate elected President of Palestine, he continued to practice the personal style that had served him well in exile, but which created aversion when he was head of a system that now was accountable to voters.

There are many tipping points in the Palestinian case study – most to do with Israel – but Israel did not force President Arafat to run the Palestine National Authority as he did. Unlike leaders like Nelson Mandela, who understood that his revolutionary style in the era of the outlawed African National Congress, was no longer appropriate for the elected President of South Africa, Arafat could not, or would not, change. The Palestinian case study demonstrates that corruption is often a negative tipping point in stunting democracy building. Corruption led to election of Hamas. Unlike Costa Rica in 1948, Hamas and Fatah could not agree to a viable power-sharing pact — the result has been civil war.

Costa Rica, Liberia and Palestine are good examples of Gladwell’s thesis on tipping points. “Don Pepe” Figueres negotiated a power-sharing pact with his rival that gave legitimacy to his radical decision to abolished the army, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took the chance to return home to run for President and President Arafat decided not to change the habits of a lifetime. These cases illustrate the conclusion by Gladwell that:
Tipping points are a reaffirmation of the potential for change and the power of intelligent action. Look at the world around you. It may seem like an immovable, implacable place. It is not. With the slightest push – in just the right place – it can be tipped.27

27 Gladwell: p. 259.
Assessment and Next Steps

*Attainment of Democratic Norms*

Several observations can be made from mapping the case study results against the Perlin model. In the first instance, such a checklist coveys results only in a binary form – in this case, either yes or no to a particular democratic norm. This raises the question of how to gauge progress towards achieving an ideal democratic standard. No degrees of difference in democratic attainment can be deduced from such a portrait, nor any explanation found in such a matrix. There is no substitute here for the serious historical narratives that are presented here as country case studies. Such is the case with the Palestinian Territories where the emergence of democracy “has laboured under a heavy external burden”, specifically the continued supervision of Palestinians by the Israeli authorities, and the Hamas challenge of the compatibility of violence with democracy. Under these circumstances, the Perlin model raises important questions about the transition to democracy in Palestine, including the conditions necessary to achieve and sustain liberal democracy. Given the external factor, how does one assess the political engagement of citizens, the democratic political culture and civil society? How does Hamas’ electoral success fit with notions of popular sovereignty in terms of governing institutions responsive and accountable to citizens, free and fair elections, party politics and representative government? More broadly, can the Perlin model incorporate democratic tendencies within Islam? For all these reasons, the authors of the Palestinian case study have not declared the achievement of specific conditions for democracy as outlined in the Perlin model.

Where applicable, however, it should be understood that the Perlin model is diagnostic tool that enables policy makers and analysts to identify key areas of democratic development and non-development, of strengths and weaknesses, which form the basis of any assessment for further policy or research action. For example, this set of results may be used to probe specific areas in country-level state of democracy audits such as conducted by International

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IDEA. To focus research resources, such results may indicate priorities for evaluation. In any event, it is certainly possible to use the matrix form to structure discussion and explanation, as amply illustrated in Appendix II “Costa Rica Through the Perlin Model Lens” in the Costa Rica case study.

A final observation is that such a checklist is an assessment of current conditions for democracy that are dynamic and fluid. This is notable in the case of Liberia where gains made in certain essential and facilitating conditions for democracy in the 2005 election are tenuous for a post-war state. These are inextricably linked to the ability of the Johnson-Sirleaf administration to undertake effective state reforms and the continued presence of international peacekeepers and donor organizations to assist in conflict-prevention and economic reconstruction.

Summary Matrix Based on Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perlin’s Ideal Standards For Liberal Democracy</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Operating Principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-constitutionalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Yes, but no compliance mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework of entrenched and enforceable rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law incorporating the principles of the supremacy of the law, equality before the law, and the impartial and fair administration of the law</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic control of internal and external security institutions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular sovereignty expressed through institutions, processes of representative democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing institutions that are effective, responsive and accountable to citizens</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political elites chosen through regular, free and fair elections</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Increasingly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A genuinely competitive system of party politics effectively representing a broad spectrum of societal interests and contributing to accommodation of diverse interests</td>
<td>Yes, but increasingly factional</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>To some degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A system of political communication that ensures a free flow of information about public affairs | Yes | -- | Yes, but declining

A system of group politics that ensures the representation of citizen interests based on the principles of pluralist theory | Yes | -- | Yes

### B. Conditions necessary to achieve and sustain liberal democracy

**Essential conditions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political engagement of citizens</td>
<td>Yes, but decreasing</td>
<td>High in voting, but not otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic political culture</td>
<td>Yes, but increasing disaffiliation</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but overly dependent on NGO support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Facilitating conditions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open, non-polarized system of social stratification</td>
<td>Yes, but some increase in poverty</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A functioning market economy regulated to prevent disproportionate aggregations of power and ensure fairness in economic relations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Newly regulated but weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An internally cohesive political community</td>
<td>Yes, but threatened by poverty</td>
<td>Yes, but may be a function of international peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Intervention and Conflict: Moving Towards a More Realistic Understanding of Democracy

By Mathew Johnson

Introduction

The optimism that greeted the surge of democracy after the fall of communism has waned. In its place has emerged a much more pessimistic attitude, fed, in part, by incidents such as the post-election violence in Kenya this year, the failure of the American democratization project in Iraq, the nationalism-fueled wars in the former Yugoslavia and other setbacks for democracy around the world in states as wide ranging as Russia, Venezuela and Nigeria. All these incidents have generated questions whether democracy should be regarded as the universal prescription once suggested by its most ardent supporters. In particular, many authors have begun to link democracy to internal state conflict. Not only has democratization come to be seen in many circles as a cause of violence, but doubts have emerged over the capacity for the international community to successfully engender democracy around the world. While there are still many authors who remain fervent democrats, others have begun to explore this relationship between conflict, democracy and diversity, if only to adopt a more realistic and nuanced approach to democracy assistance.

The recent literature on conflict and democracy has touched on three key themes. The first has seen a recent debate has emerged over whether some form of “sequencing” or “gradualism” is appropriate in order to develop functioning and sustainable democracies. In many ways, this can be seen as a proxy for a much deeper exchange between the optimistic and pessimistic views of democracy. Behind his debate has appeared a more theoretical discussion about the relationship between democratization and conflict, and exploring the conditions, both positive and negative, which have an impact on the process of democratization. Third, given the challenges that have emerged from recent democratic
interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, many authors have begun to consider what has been learned from democratization efforts around the world, and how best to approach these tasks in the future. Beyond these questions, scholars have continued to examine the results of democratizations, both self-generated and externally imposed, in specific states, seeking to identify and develop the lessons that can be learned from these case studies. All these questions have done much to refine our understanding of democracy and democratization, which will hopefully contribute to future international efforts around the world to nurture emerging democracies.

**The Debate Over Sequencing and Gradualism**

The last two years have seen an extended exchange within the Journal of Democracy over disagreements about the appropriate “sequence” that should be taken in democratizations. The debate began with an article by Carothers criticizing the recent theory of ‘Sequencing’ that he described as a “fallacy.” Sequencing, developed by Mansfield and Snyder, was based on the premise that emerging democracies are more prone to violence than both mature democracies and autocracies. Sequencing warned that if democratizing countries was not supported by certain pre-conditions, the outcome would be prone to “hybrid” democracies which were illiberal, conflict-prone, and dangerous to surrounding states. As such, sometimes it was not always best to pursue democracy, and that instead, sometimes democracy would be more damaging in the long run. Democracy could be pursued when the necessary pre-conditions were finally in place.

Carothers agrees that democracy should not be introduced in the absence of rule of law and a functioning state, but that the standard required by Sequencing is too high. He argues that sequencing plays into the hands of autocrats who wish to avoid democratizing. While some autocrats are sufficiently enlightened to implement rule-of-law and economic reforms that later will support the development of democracy, most pursue their own self-interest. Further, rule-of-law and autocracy go poorly together – any autocratic pursuit of rule-of-law will be truncated at best. This means that it may take years, if not longer, for the preconditions to be

in place to satisfy the sequentialists. Carothers argues instead that democracies, while potentially prone to some forms of internal weakness, are capable of, and potentially even superior to autocracies in, state-building. Carothers argues that “State-building is not necessarily successful in new democracies. Yet unlike with autocracies, there is no basic underlying tension between an effective state and a successful democratic government.”

Ultimately, citizens in states demand elections – some democracy is better than none, and the West has far less ability to shape its development than we generally think.

As a response to Sequencing, Carothers proposes a theory of ‘Gradualism’, arguing that while Sequencing’s pre-conditions go too far, it raises the important question about the underlying economic, social and political conditions, structures and historical legacies that will have an impact on a democratic transition. Paying more attention to these will improve the likelihood of success of such transitions. Carothers points to five factors that increase the likelihood of democratic success: level of economic development, concentration of sources of national wealth, identity-based divisions, historical experience with pluralism, and whether the neighbourhood is democratic. But he emphasizes that these factors should not be seen as preconditions – instead, they form a continuum of likelihood of democratic success. Where these factors are less favourable, Carothers favours a gradual approach to democracy, rather than holding off, as the sequentialists would suggest. Such a process would hold off elections while negotiations are held to ensure that all sides accept the rules of the game beforehand.

The debate has continued in a pair of later responses in 2007. Snyder and Mansfield emphasize that their concern is that an improperly sequenced transition risks setting states on a course towards authoritarianism that is difficult to avert. Sequencing argues that by delaying democracy in the short term it makes stable democracies far more likely to emerge. Rushing too quickly into democracy only delays that ultimate goal. They also argue that Gradualism and Sequencing are not that different. Carothers disagrees, arguing that gradualism “seeks to find a way for countries where few circumstances favor democratization to take incremental but definite steps toward open political competition while simultaneously pursuing state-

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building and rule-of-law reforms.” Sequentialism is fundamentally pessimistic about democracy, seeing it as a process unleashing wars, revolutions and ethnic bloodshed. Gradualism is much more optimistic. This debate is likely to continue into the future.

**The Relationship Between Democracy, Violence and Conflict**

An exploration of the relationship between democracy and conflict underlies the recent discussion surrounding Sequencing and Gradualism and has been ongoing for a number of years. For many authors, this question is tied to broader questions surrounding the Democratic Peace theory developed in the International Relations theory. One suggestion that has gained increasing support is not that democracies do not fight, but rather that mature democracies do not. Nascent democracies, before developing strong institutions, are at risk of national, ethnic or religious calls to mobilization, and are more prone to both fighting external wars and descending into internal conflict. Even more prone to conflict are “incomplete” or “hybrid” democracies, which have partly democratized, but retain significant aspects of autocracy.

There is little agreement, however, over the factors that make such conflict more likely. Aslaksen and Torvik, for example, argue that resource wealth increases the likelihood of conflict, while high productivity decreases it. Overall, they argue that conflict is increasingly likely where resource wealth is high, labour productivity is low, political competition is high and politicians are shortsighted. Collier and Rohner, on the other hand, argue that the sole important variable is income, and that there is a level of income in a democracy above which the likelihood of violence in a state decreases, while below will increase the likelihood of violence. Autocracies, on the other hand, show the reverse. As income increases in non-democracies, the likelihood of violence increases.

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33 See, for example, Cederman, Hug and Wenger, 2008 and Merkel, 2008.

34 Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006.

35 Collier and Rohner, 2008.
Fish and Kroenig challenge the assumption that diversity leads to conflict. Their model suggests that the presence of oil and Islam decrease the likelihood of democracy, while the presence of a large population and rough terrain (which provides cover for guerrillas) increase the likelihood of conflict. Diversity, whether linguistic, ethnic or religious, was neither a barrier to democracy, nor an indicator of conflict. The authors suggest, in fact, that diversity can have a positive effect on democracy. Merkel emphasizes the role of neighbourhood in the likelihood, with autocratic regions more likely to generate conflict within democracies. War is also likely to create democracies, especially when autocracies lose (as opposed to democracy, which generally just leads to a change in government), but democracies generated as the result of war are more likely to turn into incomplete hybrid democracies.

The significant questions within this debate surround the roles of diversity and resources in predictions as to the likelihood of conflict in a given state.

**Lessons Learned from External Democratic Interventions**

There has been an attempt within the literature to better understand the nature and consequences of attempts by the international community to intervene in conflict-ridden, failed, and post-Conflict states. Many authors remark that the success rate of international interventions has been low, and have sought to determine why some interventions have been more successful than others. Grimm and Merkel have divided interventions into four categories: enforced democratization after occupation, restoring elected governments, humanitarian interventions, and democratic interventions. These four categories also roughly correspond to distinct time periods: enforced democratization was pursued in Japan, Germany and Austria in the wake of WWII, restoring elected governments occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in Panama, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, Humanitarian interventions were pursued in the 1990s, from Cambodia to Sierra Leone to East Timor and others, while Democratic interventions have occurred in the last decade in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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36 Fish and Kroenig, 2006.
37 Merkel, 2008.
These authors suggest that each type of interventions has its own particular needs and requirements, and that importing lessons learned in Germany to Iraq, for example, may fail to take into account the nuances of these differing forms of international involvement. Hippler pursues this question in far more detail. He develops a matrix to classify conflict, incorporating the cause(s) of the conflict, the political configuration of the conflict itself, especially in terms of the number and unity of opposition groups, as well as the effectiveness of the state (and its independence from foreign-domination), and finally the way the conflict ended, whether in an outright victory, stalemate, negotiated settlement, or externally enforced resolution. Hippler suggests that each of these characteristics will require a unique approach by the intervening powers. Truly understanding the nature of the conflict that the international community is involving itself within will allow us to do a much better job of developing a workable strategy, identifying local partners that are committed to democracy and strong enough to provide local support for the process. Hippler also emphasizes the need to ensure that we do not allow self-interest to cloud our interventions, as this has been a crucial reason for many of the recent failures.\footnote{Hippler, 2008.}

Brinkerhoff (2005) agrees that there is a need, and a failure on the part of the international community, to understand the unique circumstances and nuance surrounding each individual intervention. Brinkerhoff suggests that interventions would do well to borrow from the development literature as a source of inspiration and expertise. He also emphasizes that the international community should not focus too strongly on the “re”aspect of rebuilding, reconstructing. Many interventions have attempted to return the conflict-ridden society to a romanticized pre-conflict state, often forgetting that by reconstructing many of the old traditions and sources of authority (for example, local Chiefdoms in Sierra Leone) they risk reproducing societal features that may have been factors in causing the original conflict.

Rondinelli and Montgomery, on the other hand, look at the various interventions and seek to identify lessons that may be usefully imported into future post-Conflict operations. Most importantly, they argue in favour of much better consistency and coherence in nation-building policies between the various actors involved, and that more attention must be paid to the
social and psychological aspects of reconstruction. The authors note the following lessons:
1) ensuring security and the peaceful settlement of conflict is vital in order to make progress on any other aspect of reconstruction; 2) nation building is more likely to achieve its goals if those goals are openly and officially acknowledged; 3) without strong coordinating mechanisms for carrying out aid, donor assistance will produce conflicting results; 4) the requirement of creating a strong state includes the need to protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, combat poverty and inequality and respond effectively to emergencies; 5) democratic objectives, such as elections or developing parties can be counterproductive if implemented too early or as a substitute for stable, responsible government or the rule of law – donors must be aware of adverse consequences if stability has not been established; 6) the quicker that decisions can be transferred to the host government and people, the more effective will be the results, as well as ensuring that all segments of society are involved in making decisions about such results; 7) a competitive economy is a prerequisite for progress, including establishing a framework for currency, customs and taxation systems and a banking system; and 8) focusing on the long-term goal of developing human capital, reducing poverty, promoting social equity and alleviating social problems are necessary for the ultimate success of rebuilding. Such projects must be started early.

Overall, the authors who examine post-conflict interventions stress the need for long-term commitments on the part of external actors. In particular, they link the willingness of states to commit to the necessary time and resources to properly reconstruct a country to the legitimacy of the war itself. In doing so, they explicitly extend the *jus ad bellum* (justification for war) to a *jus post bellum*, in that a failure to adequately plan and support an intervention retrospectively invalidates the justification for that war. The authors are unanimous in agreeing that if a state is not willing to put in the effort to plan for, and then see through, post-intervention reconstruction, they should not intervene in the first place, as the result will more likely than not be worse than the situation was before their involvement.

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40 Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005.

41 Ibid, pp 18-21.
Individual Case Studies

Many authors continue to look to individual cases to draw lessons both of internal violence, and the lessons to be learned from international interventions. Blunt and Turner, for example, look at Cambodia and the consequences there of decentralization, especially where there is little experience with local democracy. The Cambodian case illustrates how central governments can co-opt donor intentions to reinforce their own influence.42 Bormeo, on the other hand, explores the unique characteristics of colonial wars, and how its unique features may be more conducive to democracy than other forms of internal conflict, by exploring the democratic revolution in Portugal.43 Similar examinations of the differences between the democratizations of Croatia and Serbia,44 the intervention in Sierra Leone,45 and the result of Hamas’ victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections.46

Conclusion

Despite setbacks in Iraq and disappointments in states such as Russia and Venezuela, the democratic debate continues to rage around the world. While the consensus is no longer nearly so optimistic as it was a decade ago, this may represent a maturing of the discussion. With scholars attempting to discern the best approaches to developing democracy, including whether there are necessary pre-conditions or preferable conditions, as well as attempting to better understand and classify the nature of the conflicts that we have and will intervene in. All these will improve future interventions. Democracy is no longer seen as a panacea, and while the resulting view is much more pessimistic, this may allow us to adopt a much more realistic view about when and how to best export what remains the best form of government that we have tried.

42 Blunt and Turner, 2005.
44 Zakosek, 2008.
Annotated Bibliography


There has been considerable academic debate over the relationship between primary resources and conflict. The existing literature suggests that the presence of “lootable” resources such as oil, gemstones and minerals are associated with conflict, while non-lootable resources such as agriculture have no effect on democracy and conflict. The authors model a political economic game to simulate the choices made by various political actors when faced with elections and the possibility of resorting to conflict.

The model is premised upon the question of whether “resource rents make the payoff from conflict relative to democracy higher.” Where the payoff from conflict exceeds that of playing by democratic rules, political actors are much more likely to follow this course of action.

After developing a fairly extensive model, the authors conclude that that resource wealth makes conflict more likely, while high income due to high productivity increases the likelihood of democracy. Specifically, the possibility of achieving a self-sustaining democracy decreases as the size of resource rents increase. Conflict is increasingly likely where resource wealth is high, labour productivity low, political competition is high and politicians short-sighted.


Attempts to understand the effect of the Portuguese colonial wars on its democratic transition. Suggests that while wars and conflict, both internal and external, generally have a negative influence on democracy (only 10% of 385 conflicts between ’46 and ’91 produced a democracy, and of these, 30% failed within first five years), that in the Portuguese case, a number of factors meant that the consequences of the war were positive for democracy. Normally, conflict is a negative factor: it changes the territory and composition of states, which weakens the demos and national unity that contribute to democracy; it undermines the trust necessary to found a democracy, as well as provide narratives that anti-democratic forces can use to challenge the system; it leaves an increased capacity and tendency towards violence, both in terms of available weapons, but in terms of the psychological acceptability of violence; finally, wars also leave the military humiliated and radicalized, which can be used by anti-democratic coalitions to mobilize support for coups and authoritarianism.

In Portugal, the revolution occurred in part due to the high costs of a failed and unwinnable war. Capitalists increasingly saw funds and economic capacity being diverted to the military, while they
saw a future in European integration. The military was being overstretched and tired of the conflict. Emigration and overseas postings exposed individuals to outside information and undermined the informational monopoly of the elite. Finally, the necessity of maintaining support for the war forced Caetano to offer liberalizing reforms which created a democratic constituency. Lastly, the war required that large segments of the population to join the military, which meant that the officer corps reflected Portuguese society. Heterogeneous ideologically, its internal divisions meant that there was no single institutional push from within the military. Lastly, the fact that it was a foreign, colonial war meant that its local effect was limited, while its loss increased Portuguese prestige by its reacceptance into the international community rather than national humiliation.

It was also significant that the Portuguese state retained significant capacity following the revolution that allowed it to consolidate democracy. Portuguese authoritarianism was never kleptocratic, but rather effective, despite its coercive nature. It was also highly judicial, using legislation to justify its actions both domestically and in the colonies. A significant legal capacity and network were vital to the new democratic government. The revolutionary government retained 92% of its employees, despite purges, while the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs were left virtually untouched. Justice was integral in re-establishing the rule of law, while the MFA used its contacts to secure financing and resources necessary for the new government.

Also vital was the timing of elections. The revolutionary leaders had promised elections within a year, which were developed. This provided credibility to democracy, while strengthening the hands of the moderate groups who enjoyed widespread support. That these elections were demonstrably free and fair signaled to far-right and –left elements what the cost would be if they attempted to wrest power.

The author posits three final hypotheses: first, that colonial wars leave legacies that are very different from traditional international or domestic wars which are more likely to inhibit democratic development; second, that when wars leave state bureaucracies intact, they are much more likely to be followed by stable democracies; and third, that ideological heterogeneity is “absolutely crucial” amongst military elites by ensuring that the intra-military discussion was similarly democratic to the broader society and by ensuring that no single group was powerful enough to impose its will.


Discusses the recent push towards decentralization and devolution within Cambodia. Nearly 30 years after the civil war and the defeat of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia still remains a weak state with limited capacity and democracy. Donors pushed for decentralization. The paper looks at how governments will accommodate donor interests though public statements and legislation without following through with the necessary implementation. Cambodian government interest is to reinforce
the control of the ruling party, and decentralization was seen as an opportunity to extend party influence into the grassroots. Actual capacity and power of communes is limited. Authors acknowledge that in post-conflict societies, peace and stability will be focus, and this desire amongst both government and society must be acknowledged and accepted, despite potentially not being fully “democratic.”


An overview article of a number of other in-depth case studies, the author argues that external interveners need more nuance in operations. While further developing general knowledge of democratization, it is also important to be flexible enough to adapt to unique situations in individual countries. Moving towards conception models that classify states into failed, failing, fragile and recovering states, and analyzing conflict on a spectrum from insecure to secure is an important step in the right direction.

Looking at experiences in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Cambodia, clearly the most important tasks are reconstituting legitimacy, re-establishing security and rebuilding effectiveness. Each of these has its own needs and own challenges. More work needs to be done to understand the unique circumstances surrounding each imperative.

Overall, the author suggests that there are similarities between post-conflict reconstruction and development work, and that conflict literature could usefully use development work as a source of further ideas and expertise. The other key requirement is success in all aspects of reconstruction. Focusing on some at the expense of others will hamper development and risk failure due to a lack of overall progress. Finally, it is important not to be too concerned with the “re“ in rebuilding/reconstruction as often the old systems contributed to the original failure. Not romanticizing the past will ensure that only those systems that are truly beneficial will be reconstructed. Pursuing “re-“ development for the sake of it being the old way is a recipe for disaster. This requires an understanding of the local context, and flexibility in applying what donors perceive to be “best-practices.”


Carothers responds to Mansfield and Snyder’s 2007 article as part of an ongoing exchange concerning the theories of sequencing and gradualism. Carothers takes issue with many of Mansfield and Snyder’s characterizations of his positions. He begins by rejecting the connection between democratizing states and violence and civil war, and criticizes the data that underlies their thesis.
Instead, he reiterates his support for gradualism. At its core, this argument suggests that democracies are more capable than autocracies in engaging in the second phase of state building, which focuses on institution building and rule-of-law development. Carothers suggests that sequentialism, where democracy is delayed until certain conditions are in place, prolongs autocracy for what could be significant lengths of time. The evidence suggests that countries that move early towards elections do better than those who delay.

Carothers suggests that instead of being “moderate groups,” those actors who have pushed for democratization in the last two decades have been vigorous democrats pushing for reform with little thought for the consequences of mass politics, and that there is little evidence for the “controlled reforms” referred to by Mansfield and Snyder. He does acknowledge, however, that where a state is failed or in the midst of civil conflict, democratizing makes little sense.

Carothers argues that gradualism and sequentialism are fundamentally distinct. Where sequentialism is about putting off democracy while pursuing state building and developing the rule-of-law, gradualism “seeks to find a way for countries where few circumstances favor democratization to take incremental but definite steps toward open political competition while simultaneously pursuing state-building and rule-of-law reforms. Sequentialism is fundamentally pessimistic about democracy, seeing it as a process unleashing wars, revolutions and ethnic bloodshed. Gradualism is much more optimistic.” Ultimately, risking democracy now is the choice of most ordinary citizens when they get a chance to choose.


The authors attempt to determine the consensus within political science literature about the relationship between democracy, conflict, and what we have learned about external democratization efforts. The authors turn first to the International Relations literature, which they note has focused on the democratic peace theory, but recently begun to explore how in the early stages of democratization, the risk of war with neighbours increases. While mature and stable democracies contribute to global stability and peace, developing democracies are “more conflict-prone than states without a changing regime.” This is partly due to increased conflict between old and new elites, democratic institutions that are not sufficiently strong to regulate mass political competition. In the early stages of democratization, “elites have to turn to other means to mobilize public support” in the absence of strong institutions such as parties, courts free media and a transparent electoral system, it is to nationalism that politicians tend to resort. Further, coalition politics favours logrolling and nationalist outbidding strategies, and are drawn towards belligerent foreign policies, all of which are destabilizing. The literature suggests that the greater the leap toward democracy, the greater the risk of war.
Overall, “incomplete” democratizations are especially prone to war, while quick and complete democratizations are much less risky. “Limited transitions in countries with weak central government institutions are likely to result in undesirable foreign policy consequences, including war.” This has encouraged a more cautious view of democratization, though authors such as Carothers and Paris have criticized this.

While the IR literature focuses on the external consequences of democratization, the comparative literature focuses on domestic conflict, and in particular, the risk of civil war. Similar to the IR literature, comparativists suggest that incomplete transitions are “disproportionately affected by civil wars.” Despite this, consideration of the link between conflict and democracy in comparative literature is relatively uncharted territory.

Looking at the literature as a whole, three key dynamics can be identified that increase the risk of both external and internal conflict. First, opening the political arena gives previously marginalized groups an opportunity to mobilize. In extreme cases, this can force the center to loosen its grip on the periphery, creating a political power vacuum at the centre. Second, democratization creates incentives for political actors to compete over constituencies and resources. This can lead to polarization, and risks having groups on the losing side resort to non-democratic means of protecting their interests (as occurred in Palestine). Third, mis-timed elections are particularly problematic. Elections held too early are likely to further intensify conflict, while national elections held after local or regional elections can destabilize the whole country (as occurred in Yugoslavia).

The authors conclude that the evidence of whether democratization triggers conflict is “somewhat mixed”, but that increasingly sophisticated means of analysis appear to be capable of discerning an effect.


The study seeks to explore the relationship between democracy, political violence and income. While democracy decreases the likelihood that its citizens will resort to violent opposition, the reduction in capacity for repression means that democratic governments and societies will face increased violence because they are prevented through democratic accountability from taking non-democratic steps to end the violence. As such, the authors suggest that democracy has an ambiguous effect on political violence. As such, the authors look to see whether income might play a part in determining whether violence will increase or decrease.

Empirically, the data suggests that this is the case, and that there is a level of income where above will decrease the overall level of political violence, while below will have the reverse effect. As such, democracies become safer as average incomes increase. Alternatively, autocracies become more prone to violence as incomes increase, as non-elite groups seek their share. The authors suggest that this
raises significant questions for the promotion of democracy in low-income countries, as its encouragement may lead to more, rather than less, violence. This, however, should not discourage the promotion of democracy, but rather that low-income democracy promotion needs to be accompanied by the internal strengthening of security.


The authors seek to determine, based on the post-communist democratizations in Eastern Europe of the 90s, whether there is a statistical correlation between fragmentation, democracy and conflict. The authors note that the theory that diversity is inimical to democracy, and more likely to cause civil war, is long-standing and well-established in political science literature.

Contrary to expectations, the authors conclude that neither the presence of diversity (measured by the degree of social fragmentation), nor polarization (where one group enjoys >49% and another has >7%) has any effect on democratization. Statistically significant indicators include the presence of oil or Islam, both of which are negatively correlated to democracy, and the promise of EU accession, which was positively correlated. Importantly in the models, neither ethnic, linguistic nor religious division (nor the lack thereof) is a predictor of democracy.

The authors conducted similar analysis with respect to whether diversity makes conflict more likely. Similar to the likelihood of democracy, there is no correlation. The two significant variables are the population size and the proportion of rough terrain present in a country. Neither diversity, polarization nor economic wealth associated with the presence of conflict. There is some indication suggest that ethnic and linguistic fragmentation decrease the likelihood of conflict, while religious division increases it, but in no models was fragmentation statistically significant except one, where linguistic polarization reduced the likelihood of conflict.

The authors also considered the link between democracy and conflict. Even then, diversity variables remain poor predictors, though the data suggests that conflict “complicates” democratization. The authors conclude with a consideration of Bulgaria, which they suggest is an example of a state where fragmentation decreased the likelihood of conflict and promoted democracy.


Fukuyama discusses the tension between state building and democracy-building in new or failed states in which international actors are contributing to that rebuilding process. Since new states have not had comparatively strong states emerge from the violent state-building process as occurred in Europe, these states are having to be “begged, borrowed or stolen” from other sources, including multilateral agencies, international organizations or intervening states. One trend that as been relied upon to help develop States is local ownership – the most successful example of this has been the EU’s accession
process. However, local ownership is not a new idea, and past uses have “degenerated” into corruption, self-dealing and rent-seeking where local input was merely an excuse for demanding more resources.

Despite this, state-builders should maximize local ownership for three reasons: 1) the difficulty of sustaining the effort necessary to run a country outright; 2) outsiders frequently do not know how to govern; and 3) early local ownership increases the likelihood of creating sustainable local institutions that are capable of surviving the exit of the occupying power. This often means that it is necessary to retain the old state apparatus, as occurred in post-WWII Germany and Japan. This is arguably the most significant mistake of the Iraqi occupation.

State building often conflicts with democracy promotion, and failing to balance this properly can lead to violence and internal conflict. State building is concerned with building the institutions necessary that enjoys a monopoly of legitimate power and can enforce the rule of the government throughout the territory of the State. Democracy promotion involves putting constraints on the use of that power so that it is dispersed to localities, limited by the rule of law and subject to public accountability and consent. Without a balance of both democracy and state building, whether due to a lack of democracy, or because of pre-mature democratization, states will not be effective and may be prone to conflict. This requires careful thought as to the proper sequencing of when and how to build institutions. Where there is no state, however, we must not believe we are building democracies, but rather merely trying to extract states from ongoing weakness and failure.


Compared with post-WWII reconstructions in Germany, Austria and Japan, recent attempts have been far less successful. The article asks why external actors have not been able to replicate the same types of successes as they had immediately following 1945. Grimm classes interventions into four categories: enforced democratization by occupation, restoring elected governments, humanitarian intervention, and democratic interventions. After reviewing the 17 interventions since WWII, Grimm draws three initial conclusions: that the various types of intervention are tied to time periods, the success of the democratization project depends on the type of war or conflict, and that dividing conflicts into inter- and intra-state conflicts is not sufficient to explain the success or failure of democratization efforts.

There are four key structural conditions that are relevant to success: the level of socio-economic development, the level of stateness, the existence of nation, and any minority conflicts. The post-WWII reconstructions each had economic capacity that was quickly re-established, while newer interventions have not, with mechanisms of clientelism, corporatism, patrimonialism, and corruption hindering the development of democracy. Similarly, post WWII interventions could rely on long
traditions of stable state structures, even if they had been recently destroyed. Recent interventions have not had this benefit. The same differentiation also applies in terms of the existence of a nation. It is also relevant that the end of the conflict after WWII was much clearer than in nearly any other intervention. The unconditional surrender of the axis gave the allies more room to rebuild than in recent conflicts, which have not generally had “clear-cut endings.”

Grimm identifies five areas that external actors need to focus on. These are interlocking and mutually reinforcing, with failure in one often disrupting progress in others. These areas of transformation take place over three transitional stages: stabilization, institutionalization, and consolidation. The five areas are: Welfare, which includes humanitarian aid, economic development, property rights and a tax system, and the development of infrastructure and production facilities; Stateness, which requires security, demobilization, disarming, and the development of new security forces; Rule of Law, which requires the development of an independent judiciary and the infrastructure and skills necessary to support it; Political Regime, which requires a generally accepted political system and free media; and Political Community, which requires long-term conflict resolution, transitional justice, and the integration of various groups into the cohesive polity. Ultimately, a key driver for success is the acceptance by both locals and elites of the external intervention.

The author concludes that the post-war interventions are sufficiently distinct from recent ones, that their experience should not be used as a template for current operations. A more nuanced approach is necessary to approach current democratization efforts.


The authors look at why some external democratization attempts have been more successful than others. To do so, they identify four modes of democracy promotion: 1) enforced democratization through enduring post-war occupations, 2) restoring elected governments through intervention, 3) humanitarian interventions and 4) democratic interventions, where a nation invades in order to install a new democratic regime. These are roughly divided into various time periods. The authors seek to examine the legality, legitimacy and effectiveness of the four distinct types of democracy promotion. To do so, the authors examine the recent international legal literature on the subject, and how views have changed in order to accommodate new types of intervention.

The authors conclude that “war can open a window of opportunity for regime change” and is especially true in the cases of post-war occupation and humanitarian democracy promotion. Democratization activities, however, need to be tailored according to the unique type of intervention being pursued. In both Humanitarian and Democratization interventions, success will only be realized where the external party is able to maintain a stable balance of power and guarantee the parties’ compliance with democratic procedures.
In all cases, external actors must be willing to stay long enough to establish democratic roots and include all local actors. Failing to do so will undermine even the best strategies. Finally, it is easiest to democratize when it is not necessary to engage in nation- and state building at the same time. Where the demos, territory or monopoly over the use of force is not challenged, democratizing a regime will prove much easier. The largest risk is leaving behind a “hybrid” regime (or a failing states) after interventions. Such states are more likely to engage in external conflicts and destabilize their regions.

Ultimately, democratic interventions require long-term commitments to post-war support. This is difficult for democracies to commit to, especially considering the cost in lives and resources. This requires extensive planning and awareness of the difficulties. The UN is often best placed to soften the rigid constraints on long-term interventions by multilateralizing the process.


The author is concerned about the lack of success of the community in its democracy-building efforts, especially recently in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Before discussing those particular cases, the author suggests that in order to successful nation-build after civil wars, we must understand civil wars better. To this end, he attempts to categorize different causes, types and ends of civil wars. He suggests that their various features should determine the nature of the intervention.

Eight various sources of conflict are identified: resources, territory, autonomy/secession, type of rule/system of government, governance, personnel/personalities, identity and independence from external control. These can be present in various overlapping combinations, as well as changing, expanding or contracting as the conflict develops. Understanding the various sources of conflict is important because a failure to address those adequately, peace and democracy will face difficulties, if only because certain groups will perceive democracy to be of secondary importance.

The end of the war is also important, and any democratic analysis must focus on its political configuration (as opposed to, for example, the military details). Hippler develops a matrix where conflicts are divided based on the degree to which the state is indigenous or foreign controlled, the effectiveness of the state, and the nature of the opposition actors (specifically, whether there is one organized group, few groups, many groups fighting for a common goal, or many groups fighting primarily amongst themselves). Most conflicts can be classified to a greater or lesser extent within this matrix, which could be a useful tool for understanding how conflicts differ and how best to address them. Bi-polar conflicts, for example, are more amenable to negotiated compromises, while a wide range of opposition actors, such as in Darfur, will make efforts to promote peace and democracy that much more difficult.

The end of the war is also important. Hippler identifies four scenarios: wars that end through a clear victory by one side, those that end due to compromise, those that end due to general exhaustion, and
those that end due to external pressure or force. These are rarely clear-cut, but their differences will impact the success of an intervention.

The author then discusses the relationship between war and peace generally, noting the arguments in the literature over opinions of whether peace and democracy are pre-conditions for each other, or whether democracy should be put aside until peace and stability are established.

Finally, the author notes three ways to address ethnic diversity in state building: imperial, hierarchical integration, homogenization based on individual equality, and pluricultural integration, which includes concordance, federalism, local representation and cultural autonomy. Democracy requires something between individual equality and pure pluriculturalism – each individual society will need its own fit. Failing to properly accommodate ethnic groups will increase the likelihood of war.

External interventions are problematic. On one hand, they can greatly increase the available resources for rebuilding, but, alternatively, can generate nationalistic backlashes that will undermine the chance of democratic success. Looking at recent democratization attempts, the author identifies four reasons for our lack of success: first, democratization has been in conflict with “imperial” policy interests, so that interventions will only be successful to the extent that the intervention does not contradict self-interest; second, security forces undermine democracy, as a lack of security alienates the international community from the local population; third, interventions have taken place in highly complex societies whose dynamics have not really been understood; and fourth, democratization has not been the root motivation of recent interventions, and planning for democracy, as opposed to the military aspect of the intervention, has been inadequate.

Ultimately, democracy cannot be imposed. It can only be supported where there are willing local actors. If this is not present, we should stay out. Where we do intervene, we must have a clear and workable strategy, focus on strategic local partners that are committed to democracy and strong enough to be relevant, and to avoid the temptation to mix peace and democracy promotion with “imperial” designs.


The article looks at the 2004 passage of the Local Government Act, and how an impetus towards decentralization fits into the overall context of post-war Sierra Leone. The article reviews many of the causes and details of the civil war, the nature of the pre-war local authorities (chiefdoms), and the wider historical context in which Sierra Leone operates. Local government had been abolished in 1972, leaving only traditional tribal structures established by the British. These were often run arbitrarily, and contributed to the mobilization of the RUF. The Chiefdoms were re-established following the war in order to encourage stability, but little was done to reform their governance structures, leaving many of the conditions that contributed to the war in place.
The article discusses how existing structures (bureaucracy and the chiefdoms) have resisted decentralization, as infringing on their influence. The article also discusses how those interests watered down the reforms. The role that diamonds play in the corruption of local officials is also a key element to the analysis.

The article concludes that good local government is the sole way to overcome structural opposition to development at the local level. From the case of SL, we can take a number of lessons: first, understanding traditional social structures and how it will affect local democracy is vital; second, not all those who claim to be “representative” of the population necessarily are; third, it is important to clearly establish the relationship between various levels of governance, and how conflicts and resource distribution between them will be resolved.

For SL, reforms have been positive, but need to go further. Restoring traditional authority does not necessarily lead to legitimacy or good governance. Finally, while going back to pre-war structures may appear to be attractive, doing so often re-creates the same conditions that led to war in the first place. SL will need to modify its reforms to ensure that they are successful.


Kiai, the executive director of the Kenyan H.R. Commission, discusses the causes and consequences of the flawed election in Kenya in early 2008. He is very critical of the corruption amongst Kenya’s elite, and even just in the significant compensation that Kenyan MPs receive. He suggests, however, that the population of Kenya has begun to develop democratic values, though this has surpassed the democratic nature of the nation as a whole. Kiai argues that the main lesson that should be drawn from Kenya is the need to look beyond the forms and façades of democracy and instead look at its substance, which has been lacking in Kenya. This requires a truly independent election commission, an effective parliament and effective anti-corruption bodies, as well as legitimate space for independent media and civil society.

At the moment, Kenyans are ahead of their leaders in pushing for such reforms, but Kiai believes that the state will eventually catch up. This requires international support, which must be “pro-people” rather than concerned with funding targets, which often just prop up regimes.


Malki suggests that the 2006 Palestinian elections were remarkable in both their conduct and what they signify for both the Palestinians and the Arab world more broadly. The smooth operation of the election and the independence of the election committee suggest that this was not a one-off event, but rather an indication of the strength of Palestinian democracy. The election represented a massive
defeat for Fatah, which had refused to reform itself, and that it was more of a pronouncement than a statement of support for Hamas.

Malki argues that the election has demonstrated to Palestinians that there is room for a third, and even fourth, legitimate political opinion in Palestinian politics. With the 2006 elections showing that political dualism is possible, a further step towards multipartism is possible. Given the weak showing of various leftist parties, it is a moderate option between Fatah and Hamas that is most likely to emerge, one whose floor of support may be upwards to 25%. The window of opportunity for such a party is limited, as both Hamas and Fatah may move to limit the ability for any competitors to emerge, which means that pro-democratic liberals within Palestinian society must move quickly to establish such an alternative. Young members of Fatah may prove to be a prime source of leadership for such a new party.


Mansfield and Snyder respond to articles in the January 2007 Journal of Democracy by Carothers and Berman who comment on their recent book on democratic Sequencing. They argue that countries which are in the early stages of democratic development are prone to conflict and violence, and suggest that democratizations should only be attempted where certain conditions are in place which will provide for more successful transitions. The authors agree with Carothers that certain conditions facilitate democratic transitions, including a high level of economic development, a non-oil based economy, an absence of identity-based divisions, prior democratic experience, and democratic neighbours. The authors see these as preconditions, while Carothers disagrees. The authors suggest that to proceed prior to mass mobilization, democratic institutions should have begun to take root otherwise democratizers should be wary about promoting democracy. This is the case because premature, out-of-sequence attempts to democratize may make subsequent efforts to democratize more difficult and more violent then they would otherwise be.

Impartial state institutions are required to manage ethnic and sectarian divisions. Authors suggest that states that lack such institutions will end up looking like Iraq and Lebanon. Once states start on this trend, “ideas are unleashed and institutions are established that tend to continue propelling it along that trajectory.” Sequencing is important because of concerns over the consequences of transitions occurring under less-than-desirable conditions. Such transitions instead delay the eventual achievement of stable democracy.

Carothers argues against sequencing, but supports gradualism. The authors suggest that the two are similar, except that gradualism is unnecessary when the necessary conditions are present. Where these pre-conditions are not present, then gradualism and sequencing are essentially the same. While dictators can occasionally use sequencing to delay reforms, many such reforms have had the
unintended consequences of improving the chances of democracy, despite the wishes of the
government.

Ultimately, “realistic knowledge about the sequencing of transitions may help to promote a few
successes and avert a few Burundi- and Iraq-style disasters.

Merkel examines the nature of the Kantian “democratic peace” thesis, and then analyzes it through the
lens of both international law and political ethics. Looking at “democratic peace”, Merkel first notes
that democracies do not fight less frequently than autocracies. Instead, the Kantian formula is recast so
that mature democracies do not fight each other, while unconsolidated democracies are much more
prone to conflict, given their undeveloped political institutions and increasing social mobility, which is
often captured by ethnic or national rhetoric. Ultimately, mature democracies are more likely to win
the conflicts they enter, choose their wars more carefully, are less likely to initiate crises, create
collective and defensive alliances, and rarely initiate preventative wars. Unconsolidated democracies,
on the other hand, do not have the same restraining power developed by more mature institutions.
They are 60% more likely to be involved in a war than states that are not undergoing a democratic
transition.

War is positive for democracy because not only do democracies win more often than autocracies,
when autocracies lose the subsequent destabilization opens the way to democracy. When democracies
lose, their government changes. However, for democratic change to be successful it must be internally
generated. Interventions are more likely to create “hybrid” regimes that are more prone to violence.
Also, regimes are subject to influence by their region. Countries surrounded by autocracies are far
more likely to remain in a hybrid state.

This means that democratic interventions must be prepared to stay in a country until it has reached a
certain level of democracy, so that it has emerged from the “hybrid” state. This is a difficult long-term
commitment for democracies, which are subject to limitations in terms of what voters will allow.

Merkel then looks at international law and ethics, concluding that where negative rights are
sufficiently threatened, there exists a legitimate basis for intervention outside of UN authorization.
There is, however, no justification for intervention based on the violation of positive rights. Further,
*jus ad bellum* should be closely linked to *jus post bellum*. The legitimacy of the war is undermined if
the intervener is not willing to ensure that a stable and pro-human rights regime is installed in the
recipient state before leaving.

Can Donors Restore Governance in Post-Conflict States?” Public Administration and
Summarizes many of the difficulties with rebuilding post-conflict societies, yet argues that with experience and greater knowledge that we can begin to apply best practices and minimize our mistakes. This is important, given the number and cost of such rebuilding. The authors argue that there is a need for consistent and coherent nation-building policies that tie together the efforts of the various actors involved in the process, focusing not only on the economic and physical, but also on the social and psychological aspect of reconstruction. The authors then identify 8 key lessons from recent experience: 1) ensuring security and the peaceful settlement of conflict is vital in order to make progress on any other aspect of reconstruction; 2) nation building is more likely to achieve its goals if those goals are openly and officially acknowledged; 3) without strong coordinating mechanisms for carrying out aid, donor assistance will produce conflicting results; 4) the requirement of creating a strong state includes the need to protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, combat poverty and inequality and respond effectively to emergencies; 5) democratic objectives, such as elections or developing parties can be counterproductive if implemented too early or as a substitute for stable, responsible government or the rule of law – donors must be aware of adverse consequences if stability has not been established; 6) the quicker that decisions can be transferred to the host government and people, the more effective will be the results, as well as ensuring that all segments of society are involved in making decisions about such results; 7) a competitive economy is a pre-requisite for progress, including establishing a framework for currency, customs and taxation systems and a banking system; and 8) focusing on the long-term goal of developing human capital, reducing poverty, promoting social equity and alleviating social problems are necessary for the ultimate success of rebuilding. Such projects must be started early. One particularly important development is developing gender-based programmes to empower women.

Learning from experience, and focusing on lessons learned, can help to ensure that our efforts are as effective as possible.


Turner examines the 2006 election of Hamas in the context of the Liberal Peace Theory, as well as its implications both on Palestinian politics, the international response, and Israel. Turner argues that Palestine is a unique case for broader international relations theories. It is a heavily dependent quasi-state, incapable of enacting many of the policies that would allow it to be sufficiently strong to contain its anti-democratic tendencies. Unfortunately, transitional democracies with institutions that are weak and ineffective are unlikely to build democratic norms and may lead to increased conflict.

Islamic movements are on the rise in the Middle East in part due to recent liberalizations. Economic liberalization forced states to reduce their welfare provision, and Islamic movements filled the gap.
Political liberalization has then allowed them to consolidate the support they received due to their charity work politically. The same occurred in Palestine.

After reviewing the deficiencies of the PA in its internal organization and relationship with Israel, Turner evaluates the international response. She suggests that cutting off money and aid, as well as a refusal to recognize the Hamas government brought the reformist and radical wings within the Hamas movement together, where the reformers were previously willing to consider negotiations and compromise. The policy has also indicated to other Islamic movements that the US will only recognize the movements it supports, which decreases their likelihood of reforming and submitting to the democratic process in their own states.

By creating an incomplete democracy, Palestine has been created as a Hybrid democracy, which the literature suggests are more likely to revert to violence and civil war.


Zakosek contrasts the development of Serbia and Croatia to determine why each state has achieved such different results. He notes that many researchers accept the pre-requisite of “stateness” for democratization, that state-building and democratization are not always compatible, and that war is inherently opposed to democracy, and that it will produce authoritarian tendencies. He notes that these basic theses do not adequately explain the wide array of democratizations that have been seen around the world, and shows that they are insufficiently nuanced by contrasting the two Balkan states.

Zakosek engages in a comprehensive overview of both the history and politics of both states, as well as of the various international responses to the Balkan conflicts. He notes that of the responses, it was the new forms of intervention – NATO peace enforcement and the ICTY – that were more effective than the traditional modes – embargoes and peacekeeping. Further, he notes that Croatia’s cooperative and responsive attitude to Serbian intransigence that proved to be a significant difference between the two states.

Ultimately, the two states differed in key ways: first, Croatia had a clear state-building goal, while the Serbs’ was undefined and fluid. The Serbs’ formula: ‘all Serbs in one State’ provided no guidance as to the nature of that state. Instead, a general desire for “Greater Serbia” prevailed. Comparatively, Croatia pursued an independent state within their pre-existing Republican borders (though there were attempts to assimilate Croatian territory within Bosnia). This realistic goal enabled the Croats to effectively state-build, while the Serbian process was longer and drawn out. Second, Croatia democratized much faster than Serbia. Serbia under Milosevic was populist-authoritarian with
democratic trappings before turning into an “incomplete sultanate” later in his rule. Democracy only emerged in 2000. In Croatia, the Yugoslav communists reformed the system, and while the resulting system was not perfect, it was far more democratic than Serbia’s. The opposition victory in 2000 instituted further reforms, but this built upon a pre-existing stable foundation. Third, Croatia developed a stable semi-Presidential system compared to Serbia’s “institutionally diffuse personal regime” under Milosevic.

Zakosek concludes that “today, further consolidation of democracy in Croatia can rely on a complete and stable state framework and on democratically institutionalized civilian-military relations. This is still a decisive difference between the two states.”