



Diaspora Nationalism as a Social Movement: The Case of Crimean Tatar Communities in the USSR

Immigration, Minorities and Multiculturalism In Democracies Conference

Ethnicity and Democratic Governance MCRI project

October 25-27, 2007

Montreal, QC, Canada

Filiz Tutku Aydin, Ph. D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
tutku.aydin@utoronto.ca

Filiz Tutku Aydin, Ph. D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
tutku.aydin@utoronto.ca

Working Paper

Please do not cite without the permission of the author.

Diaspora Nationalism as a Social Movement: The Case of Crimean Tatar Communities in the USSR

1. Introduction:

In this paper, I will try to answer the question why and how the Crimean Tatar(CT) diaspora community in the Soviet Union mobilized to “return to homeland” and achieved it. This is the core case-study of my research project because it inspired the CT national revival in the other diaspora settings in the world. The CTs initiated the first and one of the strongest dissident movements in the Soviet Union, demanding their return to the homeland they were deported from and the re-establishment of their national autonomy. And after 40 years in exile, they returned to their homeland collectively. The question I would like to explore in my paper is why and how this community who became a victim of ‘ethnocide’ and was reduced to a situation of complete powerlessness could organize such a resilient and successful struggle against one of the superpowers of the time. More specifically, I will seek answers for the following questions:

- *Why did the CT diaspora movement emerge?
- *What influenced the development of the CT diaspora movement?
- *Why did the CT diaspora movement become successful?

In this paper I try to elaborate the following explanations for these questions.

* It is hard to deny that grievances caused by deportation and the feelings of attachment to the homeland were the underlying causes of the emergence of CT diaspora movement. This explains continuous massive support of the people for their movement. However, if these grievances were not re-interpreted to formulate discursive structures called 'frames', the CTs could not mobilize and create a sustained political movement. The content of the frame was the following: The CTs emphasized their unbroken attachment to their homeland despite present separation, protested the injustice of their deportation from homeland, blamed the authorities for this crime, and accordingly demanded their return to homeland and re-establishment national autonomy. The 'frame' as such provided a motivation and justification for the movement.

* The diaspora organization which emerged as a product of the 'diasporic frame' enters into a struggle to make this 'frame' the most valid and legitimate among other interpretations of reality. The 'frame' not represented the movement to potential allies in the domestic and the transnational sphere to garner their support, but also it was deployed to undermine the 'counter-frames' of the opponents. The idea was that counter-framing lies beneath the repression, it is not epiphenomenal. In order to understand the framing dispute that shaped the development of the diaspora movement, we must examine the specific features and the strategies of diaspora organizations, their alliance with the other dissident movements in the Soviet Union and transnational organizations, and the struggles with the opponents.

*The "success" of the movement was the result of the decades of efforts to influence the public opinion. They made significant alliances in the domestic and transnational sphere. When the CTs acted in accordance with its 'frame', they had accumulated enough power and legitimacy that nobody could justifiably stop their return to homeland. In fact, the CT 'frame'

had become the master ‘frame’. Otherwise, even if the window of opportunity appeared, they might not have been able to take advantage of it. The emerging window of opportunity in the political context only determined the timing of the collective return, but it was not a major cause of it.

In the following sections, I would like to (i) provide a review of how the question of the mobilization of the CT diaspora in the former USSR was approached in the literature, (ii) elaborate on my own approach. My own approach involves an examination of the movement emergence, development, and success through application of the social movement approach emphasizing the “framing processes”. The movement emergence relates to the period of 1944-1964, the movement development is understood to have taken place in the period of 1964-1987, and it achieved its goal in the period of 1987-1994.

II. The literature review:

The diasporic nature of the CT identity in the Soviet Union, epitomized in the very strong emotional attachment to the homeland is sufficiently emphasized in the literature.

(Chervonnaia 1992; Williams, 2000; Uehling 2001) Williams suggests that the development of territorial identity for the CTs was the major cause of their claims for return. According to Uehling (2001), the strong social memory of the homeland transmitted from one generation to next was the reason for their wishes to return after fifty years passed over their deportation.

What is not explained is how the CTs turned the emotional attachment to their homeland into concrete political action. “Mobilization cannot emerge from the mere sense of group identity. Aside from the existence of multiple identities around which ethnic groups may be formed in

any given society, the relevant identities for political mobilization require a coalescence of group identity with political claims.” (Bertrand: 2004, 11)

The political ingenuity of the CTs is missed under these emphases on the ethno-symbolic aspects of their identity. The political organization of the CTs did not attract as much attention as their history, ethnic identity or culture. It is interesting to note that they formed the strongest mass movement against the totalitarian state. The CTs do have a small population scattered throughout the Soviet Union when compared with the population of the Russians, Ukrainians, or Kazakhs. Yet almost all members of the nation participated in the movement activities ranging from regularly contributing money for 50 years to carrying out hunger strikes. In the literature, their role in challenging one of the superpowers of the world is neglected. The human rights movement in the Soviet Union is known better in the West, though it never turned into a mass-based movement attracting the any significant number of the Russian or Soviet people.

The CTs however did not just voice their aspirations for return to homeland, but they added a second front to their movement, the fight for civil rights in the SU. They were consistent in their protests of their own deportation in 1944, of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1978. They became the innovators of civil disobedience tactics in the FSU, transferring their experiences to the human rights defenders in the FSU. Their genuinely representative organizational structure, self-sacrifices they had made for defending their rights, their belief in civil disobedience, and shunning of violence proved that they became one of the most “democratic” nations of the Soviet state. Among indigenous populations of the world, their indigenously developed and functional democratic

representative structure is still unique. Among the diaspora populations, they had one of the most developed political organization which substituted for the lack of a territorial state.

These facts of the CT diaspora movement escape the large net of structuralist theories explaining the rise of the national movements by the regime initiative, Soviet institutional structure (Brubaker 1996), and movement cycles (Beisinger 2002). To put it crudely, CT case epitomizes how human will can make a difference where basically are no opportunities or resources. Under a repressive regime, a dislocated, scattered, deprived nation was able to transform their emotional attachment to homeland and ethnic networks into a successful political organization. Suny(1998) and Brubaker (1996) argued that the institutional and territorial structures bestowed to the titular nationalities became the major cause for the nationalist mobilization. The CTs, however, were separated from its national territory and institutions. The CT movement formed a political organization, which substituted for the lack of territorial structures. They maintained their culture, and language, wrote their own history, compiled their own archive, developed their literature, organized self-census, formed representative and decision-making institutions, collected funds, and formed diplomatic relations all in the conditions of exile.

Beisinger (2002) argued that the political opportunity provided by glasnost' enabled movements in the Soviet Union to flourish but the CT movement emerged long before that. Most of the historical account of the CT movement periodised the movement according to the change in Soviet leadership, but the Soviet regime did not change its position until the very end. In fact, the regime, with its inflexibility, remained backwards of the tactical innovation of the CTs and gradually lost the initiative to the movement. The CTs proved more innovative than the regime and they even did away with the KGB. The CT movement was constrained

but did not hinge on how strong the regime was, how ripe conditions were, how available the resources were. The CT movement was rather shaped by its own forces.

III. The Conceptual Framework:

Diaspora is not a function of primordial traits of a community but it is an identity largely constructed in the modern period for political purposes. Borrowing the theoretical tools developed by the social movement theory, I claim that the diaspora identity emerges through the political movement of diasporas. Diaspora movements can be understood by examining the “framing processes” which translates the grievances associated with the dispersal of a community into a concrete political purpose.

Early theorizing emphasized the psychological motivations, especially grievances of feelings of deprivation to explain the movements. According to Talcott Parsons, social movements were consequences of the unusual events. Big social changes affect individuals and they react to these changes. However, these relate to the pre-existing conditions for movements rather than the formation of the movement itself. As it was seen from the example of several deprived minorities (blacks, women, Native Americans etc.), grievances do not automatically create a political party or a social movement¹. The repression can paralyze people too. The transition from condition to action must not be readily assumed, it must be explained. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001).² Blumer underlines that even “a grievance should be determines as a grievance for collective action to take place”³. Ralph Turner and Lewis

¹ Mayer N. Zald (1991: 350).defended the thesis in one of his later answers to critique by pointing that the nuclear accident in Chernobyl generated more social movement mobilization in Stockholm than in Kiev or Warsaw.

² Tololyan (2000) also draws attention to the distinction between “being a diaspora,” to “operating as one.”

³ So in our time the question of lower salaries of women is a social problem but lower life-span of men is not. The latter is seen as ‘natural’.

Killian (1957) also stated that when people face an unusual occasion, they first form a shared interpretation of their situation and then decide what should be done. Despite the deportation as an experience that traumatized the CTs psychologically, framing processes were needed even identify the dimensions and meaning of it. Snow and Benford argue that the occurrence of mobilization might be due to the presence or absence of potent innovative frames, and frames cannot be assumed given the grievances. (Snow et al. 1986: 464). Frame means “schemata of interpretation” that organizes experiences and guide action. (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow et al.1986; Snow and Benford, 2000; Snow and Mc Adam, 2000). Frames involve problem identification and attribution of blame (diagnosis) as well as delineation of solutions (prognosis) (Snow and Benford 1988) Severity, urgency, efficacy (your participation might matter), and propriety (your awareness might be needed) are other important aspects of frames. We can also add insights from resource mobilizations theory: feasibility (it is possible to do something) and timeliness (‘Now or never!’ -thinking).⁴

Although frames are formulated by the intellectual elite, the whole population participates in the continuous re-construction of the frame. The frames also are influential in the emergence of organizations as they include a “prognosis”, a goal to remedy the grievances. The development of frames are influenced by the organizational processes. The framing disputes of the diaspora political organizations and their opponents in the society or state organs explain the development and dynamics of the movements. In the end, movement success (or failure) is due to the effectiveness of diaspora organizations’ strategies and tactics to take advantage of domestic and transnational discursive openings, to gain the support of conscious adherents and bystanders in the domestic and transnational spheres and demobilize the opponents. The movement success depends on the outcomes of this process. If the movement

⁴ According to Benford, there are two implications of the term of framing. I use the first one.

manages to attain a discursive higher ground, and has its own way of framing the issue to take precedence over the alternatives, then it attains power to realize its goals.

IV. The emergence of the CT diaspora movement:

In this section, I will mainly argue that the emergence of the CT diaspora movement was largely attributable to the creation of a potent innovative 'frame', which gave meaning to their tragedy and proposed a solution. In the first stage, the injustice suffered as a consequence of the deportation created a reactive movement. It is not only the leaders but the whole population wrote letters and petitions to the authorities calling for the remedy of their situation. This required only the simplest form of organization, which came together for a short time for the purpose of writing the letters and collecting the signatures. In those letters, the CTs used a pleading language, assuming that their deportation was a bureaucratic mistake and would be easily corrected with the proper application of the communist principles. The authorities just ignored them. (Chervonnaia 1992) Movements of other deported peoples remained at this level. It took for fifteen years for the CTs to apprehend that what was done was not a bureaucratic mistake of small officials, but a planned crime of Stalin and high officials. As the successors of Stalin did not revoke what he did, it became obvious that the Soviet authorities continued to approve their tragedy. The attribution of blame is an important aspect of framing.

After the young CT intellectuals came to the idea that their deportation was indeed purposeful, they began to demand instead of plead what they are truly entitled to: to return to their homeland and to re-establish their national sovereignty. (Chervonnaia 1992) The 'frame' of the movement, which can be summarized as below, began to emerge in this period:

“The CTs are the indigenous community of Crimea. They did not betray the Soviets in the war. The deportation of the CTs constitutes the definitive attempt towards realizing the long-term historical purpose of the Russians: de-Tatarization of Crimea. The Soviet regime committed a crime by the deportation of the CTs, therefore the CTs have right to return and to re-establish their national autonomy.”

Note that this specific schemata of interpretation forms the basis of the ‘frame’ of the CT movement. The implications of this frame were elaborated only in time. As a prognosis, the CTs first called for a return to the Lenin’s principles which his successors betrayed. As time passed, this ‘frame’ was modified in a major way to call for resistance to the regime. Rather than returning to the Leninist principles, the solution of their problems seemed to require the overthrow of the whole communist system.

The ‘frame’ was learned and approved by such massive numbers. . The collection of more than 100,000 signatures under these petitions shows the mass base of the movement. We must not forget that signing a petition requires a lot more courage in the SU than in a democratic state. (Chervonnaia 1992) Later, the movement activists told me in fact, they began to write the petitions mostly for their own people, not for the authorities. They told me the internal work, that is the work with their own people was more important. Having to copy the petitions and information newsletters by typewriter (no private press was possible in the SU), the CT people became very conscious of their national history, identity and goals. Common people among the CTs could cite history a lot better than any other people in the FSU who had institutions to teach national history. It must be pointed out that this ‘frame’ took hold

among the people gradually. Initially formulated by the leaders, the 'frame' became an anonymous intellectual property of the people in time being re-phrased thousands of times in the petitions and information newsletters, copied by hand. In each re-phrasing, the 'frame' was re-articulated: Some implications of it were changed, or modified, some aspects of it were taken out, and new emphases were added.

The movement 'frame' empowered the CTs to create a movement for sustained challenge of the regime. It gave meaning to what occurred to them and what should be done. It justified their engaging in certain acts which brought them in clash with the authorities. It empowered them not only going to Moscow to represent the population, organizing public protest, distributing *samizdat*, attempting to return to Crimea in defiance of the authorities, and but also for conducting extreme self-sacrifice acts for protest such as engaging in hunger strikes and self-immolation.

The 'frame' had an urgency element, as the CTs believed that they would lose their homeland forever if their return was prolonged. It was believed that time worked against the CTs and for the benefit of the regime.

The 'frame' also represented the CT movement to the outsiders. It aimed to attract support and neutralize the counter-frames of the regime. Re-defining the "truth" was the most significant aspect of the CT movement, as it was both the Soviet propaganda and the Soviet militia which became barriers for their return. This aspect will be explained further below. In this section, I described the CT movement 'frame', and its central role in the emergence of the movement, and how it was reproduced. In the next section, I would like to look at the political

factors that affected the process in which the CT ‘frame’ gradually outweighed the regime’s counter-frames.

V. What influenced the development of the CT movement?

The course of the CT movement was shaped by its political organization, which launched a systematic campaign seeking for the recognition of the CT ‘frame’. The development of CT national movement was affected by the nature of discursive opportunity structures, the dynamics of movement-opponent interaction as well as alliances with other movements, and the transnational actors. Let’s elaborate on these issues:

V.1. Political Organization:

The specific structure and features of the CT diaspora organization must be examined. The organization embody the movement ‘frame’. It is interesting to note that the CTs did not establish the “central initiative committee”, the formal centralized organization until 1987. The CT “initiative groups” were informal (underground) cells which began to emerge in the second half of the 1960s. These initiative groups emerged as based on societal networks. Weddings or other traditional gatherings, kinship, friendship, common residence were important for recruitment. Compact residence in Uzbekistan made the organization to be denser there. These initiative groups covered almost all of the population. Every small unit of CT settlements (neighborhood, street, etc) had their own initiative groups. They emerged and acted autonomously but in time they largely coordinated their activities again through “information newsletters”(Chervonnaia 1992), which reproduced the movement frame.

The initiative groups had a simple decision-making structure and they distributed tasks among the members. The tasks included: preparing, copying petitions, information newsletters which involved the movement frame by typewriter, collecting signatures under petitions, distributing the information letters, selecting rotating representatives to Moscow, collecting money for the expenditures of those representatives, informing the community of the reports of the representatives at Moscow, organizing participation in the public demonstrations. Those who lost their jobs due to participation in the movement, and the families of the persecuted were taken care of by his/her local initiative group. The duties of the representatives in Moscow included systematizing and sending petitions to the government and informing the representatives of the Soviet "civil society" about the condition of the people. They were to report about their service and expenditures to their local community. The delegates continuously changed. According to Jemilev, these all necessitated an effective organization of people connected to each other for a continuous task. (Chervonnaia 1992). I was surprised by how easily people donated money, and the transparency of these organizations. Almost no rumors or corruption appeared in relation to those who took the money and went to Moscow to represent the people. I learned that the rule was that the representatives could not buy any presents other than a box of candies for their children. Once a representative bought a sofa for his home, but he was publicly shamed so that nobody ever dared such a thing. The chosen delegates were generally children or relatives of the Soviet partisans, or respected citizens according to the Soviet standards, such as the most hard-working laborer in factory, or a successful scientist. They rarely refused to go, despite the risks of losing one's job, status, or salary. Wives spent months in Moscow leaving their small children with their husbands, which was unusual for the patriarchal CT society.

Several leaders emerged out of these grassroots structures. But, since top leaders were arrested, and spent most of their time in prison or camps, the base of the movement remained significant. Decentralization was also required by geographic dispersion of the diaspora movement. Communication among the distant communities was enabled through networks, distribution of information newsletters, and later *samizhdats*. (Chervonnaia 1992) The ‘frame’, which was a common product of the diaspora communities gave them a higher coherence.

The decentralized structure was also the result of the conditions of repression. (Chervonnaia 1992) In this structure, different parts of the movement influence but do not control each other. The arrest of members of certain groups by KGB had no effect on other groups as they were mainly independent in their activities. If it were centralized, KGB could arrest the head of the organization, and the whole organization could easily dissolve. Arrest of certain members could not end the organization either. The initiative groups were so ingrained in community networks that they had to arrest all CTs to end the movement totally.

The initiative groups had also other methods to deal with the repression. For example they were careful not to give reasons for outright repression. The CTs would know the law well and often justified their action by law. When sending representatives to Moscow, they said they relied on the Soviet law which gave every person with a mandate of 1000 signatures a right to go to Moscow and demand hearing from the Politbureau. Most importantly, the CTs never exerted violence in demanding their rights.

The movement ‘frame’ provided a goal for the organization and it justified its existence. The political organization gained a central place within the movement. People inside and outside the movement began to see the political organization as synonym with the movement. The

political organization in time formed a tradition towards which the CT people developed loyalty. The CT political organization substituted for the lack of territorial institutions providing many functions. The CTs maintained their culture, and language, wrote their own history, compiled their own archive, developed their literature, organized self-census, constituted representative and decision-making institutions, and formed diplomatic relations within the organizational structure. It embodied the political experience of the movement. After the 'collective return' to homeland, the CT political organization was easily transformed into a national congress and assembly. To understand the effect of the political organization exactly, we must further look at how it interacted with the authorities and allies in the political context, which strategies and tactics it used to defend the CT 'frame'.

V.2. The Framing Disputes with the Opponents:

Stalinism as a 'counter-frame':

The major aspect of the Soviet state is that not only it did not provide a space for societal participation, it had committed atrocities against the society under Stalin. At the end of Stalin's reign, the society was paralyzed with fear. After Stalin was dead, it simply could not continue that way. Certain amount liberalization was necessary. Khrushchev was the one who exploited the deep desire for the end of fear to come to power. He revoked some of Stalin's extreme policies, but he did not go as far as complete de-Stalinization, because he was also a participant of previous Stalinist acts. His successors also did not engage in de-Stalinization, in fact they took steps back in the direction of re-Stalinization, as they were scared that any loosening of their grasp of power could start a process of overthrowing the whole system. (Shatz 1980)

With his secret speech on the 20th party congress, Khrushchev criticized certain policies of Stalin such as the mass terror and the deportation of nationalities.⁵ On 12 February 1957 *Izvestiya* published about the new law exculpating the deported peoples and permitting their return with the exclusion of the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Meskhetian Turks. (Shatz 1980) This means that Khrushchev's criticisms of the system did not reach to the level of full *de-stalinization*. The only good thing for the CTs was that they were released from *the special settlement camps*. The condemnation of Stalin's deportations without permitting the repatriation of the nation created an immense disappointment among them. This was entrenched by Khrushchev's presenting Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR as a gift for the "300th anniversary of the re-unification of Ukraine with Russia". To appease the Tatars, Khrushchev offered them cultural benefits such as a newspaper in their language, "Lenin Bayragi" (1 March 1957), a folkloric ensemble "Kaytarma", and optional classes of CT language. (Lazzerini 1990)

The Tatars were not appeased. This "thaw" provided the opportunity for small-scale dissent. The CTs used the available *discursive* channels in the system creatively and turned them into tools of aggressive opposition. They wrote petition letters compared to dissertations, with their sophisticated use of the Leninist theory. They collected more than 100,000 signatures. They organized large public protests on Lenin's birthday and on the day he bestowed the CTs with the Crimean ASSR. Their representation reached 10,000 people in Moscow, and became permanent after 1964. The regime's first response to them was ignorance, but soon it tried to suppress the movement by arresting and deporting representatives from Moscow.

⁵ In 1956, XXth party congress Khrushchev noted that "mass deportations from their native places whole nations, together with all communists and Komsomol members are rude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationalities policy of the Soviet state." (Lazzerini 1990) :418)

When these methods did not work, appeasement was used by the authorities again not to escalate conflict. In 1965, for the first time they agreed to meet several Tatar groups. In June 1967, KGB Head Andropov promised that an announcement would be forthcoming rehabilitating them and facilitating their return. This *ukaz* (decree) clearly came as a result of the CT pressure. With the *ukaz* announced on 5 September 1967, CTs were exculpated from any collective crimes but nothing was said about the return. Moreover, the *ukaz* established them as “Tatars formerly residing in Crimea” not spelling their ethnonym “Crimean Tatars.” It presented a distorted view of the situation of the CTs claiming that the CTs integrated in the places they were settled (meaning they did not wish to return), and enjoyed the same civil rights as all Soviet citizens. In fact, the CTs had to declare that they do not want to return to Crimea in order to become a member of the Communist Party. The *ukaz* announced that the CTs can live in any part of the USSR. This was wrong too because when the CT families attempted to return to Crimea, they were stopped by the Crimean authorities. (Chervonnaia, 1992: 108)As it was seen, this was the tactic of the regime to end the CT movement breaking their hopes for return and to consolidate the outcomes of Stalin’s policies. The regime made it clear that it would not attempt *de-stalinization*. There was not another *ukaz* on the CTs until 1988, which shows that the regime basically did not change its position until the end.

The continuing legacy of the Stalinism shaped the acts of the regime. Indeed, *the Stalinist ‘counter-frame’ lied beneath the acts of the regime against the CTs*. This ‘counter-frame’ was apparent in many policies of the regime: The betrayal of the CTs were still accepted as the “truth” because even when Khrushchev exonerated them in 1956, it was not announced to the Soviet people so that they could know about it, and adjust their behaviour towards the CTs. Similarly, the regime refrained calling them with their ethnonyms. It presented Crimea to Ukraine completely ignoring that it was the homeland of the CTs. It cleansed the parts about

the CTs from the history books related to Crimea. The regime “talked” in its documents as if the CTs never existed and Crimea was never their homeland. (Chervonnaia 1992) Clearly, *the regime did not just aim to repress the CTs physically, but it also aimed to repress their national identity*. The continuous calls of the CTs for the return to Lenin’s nationalities policy aimed to make the point that Stalinism still overshadowed the Soviet policy. Therefore, *the CTs built their major strategy on exposing the lies of the Soviet regime, subverting the ‘counter-frame’, and making their own ‘frame’ accepted*. I argue that these two opposing ‘frames’ provide the background for the interaction of the regime and the movement, which I will examine next.

Movement-regime interaction: The Fight of Words

The interaction between the movement and the regime could be best understood as dialectical. The strategies of the movement and the regime mutually shape each other. State repression caused tactical innovation of the movement. Each new tactic created new forms of repression by the state. The major strategy of the CTs was the massive public opinion campaign to pressure the government. All these acts were informed by the movement ‘frame’, and aimed to convince the ‘bystanders’ and subvert the Stalinist ‘counter-frame’. In accordance with this strategy, they appealed to older tactics of mass petitioning, group lobbying, public protests, appeals to media and civil society more forcefully. They organized a bigger protest in Moscow in 1968. (Chervonnaia 112) But they also applied newer tactics of underground struggle, (*samizhdats*, *tamizhdats*, collaboration with the dissidents, and sending the information about human rights violations to the West), show trials, hunger strikes, and self-immolations.

As noted above, the Soviet regime remained a Stalinist one at the core until the end. Though it did not view mass terror as in Stalin's times necessary, it gave an automatic, repressive, institutionalized bureaucratic response to any organized expression of social autonomy. The regime used administrative methods, and full scale judicial campaigns for neutralizing or ejecting from the political arena real or putative opponents of the regime. The administrative technique involves bureaucratic harassment of the dissenter (job demotion, dismissal, termination of telephone service, suspension of drivers license), psychiatric terror (medicalization of dissent), official hooliganism (assault, battery, murder in such a way that it would be impossible to prove their police origins), forced expatriation for those dissidents "too hot to handle". (Here the assumption is such that the foreign media would lose interest in the dissident after it fills its shelf life and the dissident would be neutralized being cut from her social environment.) The judicial methods are divided into the political trial and the criminal trial as a political trial. This was a last resort. Judicial repression of dissidence was party's ad hoc police power and was subject to greater political control and planning. (Sharlet 1978)

All of these techniques were used against the CTs. The administrative tactics ranged from removing the statue of Lenin for repair (!) when the CTs wanted to organize a meeting on Lenin's birthday, or creating the rule of the requirement of residence permits, when CTs attempted to settle in Crimea. More crude techniques involved scaring the enterprises in Crimea not to offer jobs or any help to the CTs, breeding the emergence of anti-Tatar attitude among the local Crimeans. Some administrative techniques involve the following: The Crimean authorities were ordered not to issue residence permits, and the authorities in Uzbekistan were ordered not to issue passports for leave for the CTs. More than 100,000 Tatars sought to move to Crimea, only to be prevented from resettling in their homeland by

bureaucratic resistance and arbitrariness, as well as police harassment and brutality. Many Tatars lost their jobs, or right to go to the university due to their participation in the movement. Ayse Seytmuratova was impeded to pursue her doctoral studies, and in the end she was expatriated due to her “extraordinary talent for organization” as stated in the KGB reports. A law permitting easier to evict and deport Tatars from Crimea emerged in 1978. On the application of that law in June 1978, a CT of 46 years old, Musa Mamut immolated himself as a protest for his inability to get *propiska* (residence permit) (Chervonnaia 124).⁶ Intimidation, house search were common methods CTs got used to. (Chervonnaia 1992). *All these administrative tactics aim to repress the public performances and visibility of the CTs and discourage them from such acts.*

As time passed, the CTs became experts in doing away with authorities in administrative matters. They were not allowed to demonstrate publicly, so they would announce that they would like to put flowers on Lenin’s statue on his birthday, which could not be refused in the communist system. When many were convened, this would turn into a public protest for return to homeland. They would still make a speech about Lenin, but about how Lenin gave them their national autonomy and how it was necessary to go back to his policies. When the militia discovered the information newsletters at their homes, they would argue that they already sent copies of it to the Politbureau, and that they were not secret, which was true. The CTs learned the Soviet law very well, and organized their activities within the boundaries of law.⁷ The elders of the movement stated that there was no point at having oneself sent to prison and cut off from the movement. The experiences of coping with the authorities were transmitted through organizational channels to new participants, and entered into the

⁶ Ilya Rips, a 20 years old Jew, attempted to self-immolate in Riga in 1969. He wanted to emigrate to Israel. This was part of the repertoire of the forms of movement for the Soviet peoples.

⁷ The problem was of course that the Soviet state did not always obey its own laws.

repertoire of the CT movement. The new participants used this repertoire when choosing tactics and sometimes improved them.

As to the judicial methods of repression, the first arrests took place in 1961. The arrest of the activists consistently increased after 1965. Between 1965 and 1969, 200 activists were sent to courts. After 1970s, the arrest of the forefront activists took place. The political trials were organized for a certain number of them. (Chervonnaia 1992: 112) These show that the regime needed to counter the 'frames' of the CTs in the discursive manner as well. The regime perhaps intended to organize show trials in the sense of 1930s and 1940s when the Soviet state aimed to teach a lesson to people by trying "kulaks" or "bourgeois nationalists." Nevertheless, as opposed to regime's intentions, these turned into show trials in the sense of 'populists' in the 1880s in the Russian Empire, in which the accused dissident would not plead guilty and would maintain her innocence until the end. The dissident authors, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuri Daniel applied this tactic which existed in the repertoire of the Russian dissent. (Shatz, 1980) The CTs creatively used this tactic to mobilize support and to propagate their own 'frame'. In the speeches, they proclaimed the goal of the movement, demands of the CTs and created an offensive position. Mustafa Jemilev did not want a lawyer and defended himself in his first court in Tashkent on 1 May 1966. (Chervonnaia 1992) He equated the deportation of the CTs with Nazi genocide, which was a powerful discursive technique to subvert the regime's legitimacy. His defense was secretly recorded and published by the *samizdat*, and was even sent to the West to propagate the CT 'frame'. Wherever the CTs are put of trial, great demonstrations were held in front of the court building. Therefore, the regime's tactic was turned against it, and soon the regime retreated and decided hold the hearings in secret and remote places for them not to provide an opportunity for CT public protest.

The authorities who were initially overwhelmed by the tactical innovation of the movement learned over time and became more effective in instituting social control. The newer tactics involved attempts to maneuver by the intrusion of intelligence services. In the 1970s, KGB concentrated on creating a more conformist, cooperative intelligentsia. They chose people who suffered from the 1960s repression and who enjoy respect of their people. They offered them prestigious jobs or university acceptances with the possibility of recruiting them as informers. They were successful in some cases. Some intellectuals worked for modifying the radical aspects of the CT 'frame', i.e. softening the demands for return, agitation for remaining in the places of special settlement, to leave roots, and develop culture in exiled places. For more radical leaders they spread slanders. If the CTs themselves attacked them, it would be more convincing. They wanted to shake their legitimacy in the eyes of the All-Union people and show that they are not popular even with their own people. In the spring of 1968, the authorities used the surnames of people who never approved such words in their fake letters. They wrote as if there were serious divisions among the CTs and discredited the leadership (Letter of 17). They aimed to isolate leadership but these were strategic mistakes. After those people announced they did not sign such a letter, KGB's deception became known and the regime was once more discredited in the eyes of the Tatar people. (Chervonnaia 1992) These showed the Soviet regime made serious mistakes in advancing its 'frame'. With these methods communicated in the *Samizdat*, the legitimacy of the regime eroded.

The regime however was aware that it cannot suppress the movement by arresting the leaders. It was a mass movement. Tactics of co-opting the movement participants were also used. In some CT settlements, the CTs were selected for higher posts. There was also an attempt to form a CT national autonomy in a place called *Mubarek* in Uzbekistan, geographically a

desert. CT newspapers were used to make propaganda for moving into the region where the CTs would be compactly be settled. Some CTs were convinced to move to the region. These attempts also intended to support regime's 'counter-frames' about integration in the places of exile instead of return. The regime also appealed to the appeasement tactics. Orgnabor (1968) was an organized return program for the CTs, who did not participate in the national movement. The number of the eligible Tatars however was only in hundreds. Two more CT newspapers in addition to the *Lenin Bayragi*, began to be published in Central Asia: *Yildiz*, a literary journal and *Dostluk Bayragi* (1979). A CT Language and Literature Department was opened in Tashkent University. These efforts did not look genuine for the CTs. For, the graduates of this department could not find jobs as the CT language was not taught in the schools. Similarly, *Dostluk* and *Yildiz* were seen as publishing mostly the communist propaganda, only in the native language. They were not accepted as genuine attempts to revive the CT culture. (Chervonnaia 1992)

The regime increased its repression in the 1970s, and it became impossible for the CTs to organize public demonstrations. Many CTs were sent to gulags or prison. The 1970s was portrayed as a "crisis" or "sleep" period in the literature of the time. It was a great challenge for the CT movement. (Chervonnaia 1992) The repression for sure affected and shaped the forms of the CT movement, but it did not weaken it. Perhaps there were less public protests in Uzbekistan in the 1970s, but the fact that more Tatars managed to return and live in Crimea in the 1970s show that in fact the movement did not cease or weaken. Repression paved way to the emergence of new forms of movement, and new tactics. Another proof is the increase in unorganized, ad hoc activism. Mustafa Jemilev began hunger strike, and Musa Mamut immolated himself to protest severe repression. These proved to be very significant acts for the movement. These acts demonstrated that the CT movement was more than a political

organization, it was deeply ingrained in the dispositions of the community. Once certain sacrifices were made in a movement, it was not possible to turn back or stop. Actions within the movement have feedback effects. These heroic acts strengthened the determination of the CTs despite the repression. The national movement became the major reference point for the CT identity. Such acts of self-sacrifice increased the legitimacy of the movement in the eyes of ‘bystanders’. Therefore the graphic of the movement continued to rise in the 1970s although it met with more severe repressions.

IV. 3. ‘Frame-bridging’ as a way of making alliances

To increase their power in pressuring the authorities and resisting their repression, the CTs chose the strategy of appealing to outsiders in the Soviet society. They first appealed to the neighboring communities, members of the Soviet administration, Moscow government representatives of “civil society”, media, universities, intellectual organizations, authors’ and artists’ unions. They also gained the support of other nationalist movements, and All-Union Human Rights movement, establishing institutional links with the latter. Alliance with the human rights movement enlarged the horizons of the CT movement. (Chervonnaia 1992: 108)

As organizations operating in the same multi-organizational field (the field composed of organizations working for the same purpose), the CT movement engaged in ‘frame-bridging’. (Snow et al. 1986: 467). ‘Frame-bridging’ refers to “the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). It added a second front to the CT struggle against the regime, the fight against discrimination and basic human rights. The CTs and other dissident movements ‘learned’ from each other various forms of resistance. The CTs provided them many concrete examples of the human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, which the human rights defenders then

published in their major *samizdat*, the *Chronicle of Current Affairs*. It was otherwise impossible to learn about these as there was no free media in the Soviets. (Chervonnaia 1992: 108)

V. 4. Transnationalization of the movement: CT movement forms alliances

Under repression, the CTs chose the strategy of transnationalizing the movement. The transnationalization first emerged within the SU. The movement became active in more than one national republics and these activities were coordinated. When repressed in one republic, the movement's centre of action was moving to another one. If it was suppressed in Uzbekistan, it moved its activities to Crimea. The CT struggle expanded to whole Soviet territory and began to be a truly diasporic movement within the Soviet Union, connecting all the diaspora communities settled in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and various parts of Russia. In September 1967, the first illegal meeting of the initiative groups from Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan took place in Leninabad. (Chervonnaia 1992: 108) Representatives of all initiative groups began to meet regularly and decide on their common national viewpoints on issues. These meetings facilitated communication and the emergence of a shared 'frame' of their struggle. After the *ukaz* of 1968, the first attempts to return to Crimea and to carry the struggle there appeared. (Chervonnaia 1992: 108)

The CT diaspora settled in New York, Turkey, West Germany, and other places mobilized to support of their co-ethnics. They held big demonstrations in their places of settlement. In fact, the diaspora communities outside the SU revived after this connection was established. The extradition of Ayse Seytmuratova to the United States contributed to the revitalization of the CT diaspora communities outside the Soviet Union, bringing them immense information

about the situation of their co-ethnics and their struggle. (Altan, 2005; Aydin, 2000) The Soviet Union indeed made a big mistake extraditing Ayse Seytmuratova. It is hard to ignore the transnational aspect of the diaspora movements. Repression does not end them as the center of action can always move to another diaspora setting. This provided a space for the propagation of its 'frame' outside the Soviets.

Alliance with the human rights and democracy movement opened the ways for the transnationalization of the CT movement. Soviet dissidents helped the CTs to cross the border and reach the Western progressive audience. The representatives of the human rights movement in the USSR sent a petition to the UN for the return of the CTs, and appealed several times to the international bodies in their name. In 1968, the CTs met former General Pyotr Grigorenko, a prominent dissident through Sergey Kosterin, the head of the Human Rights movement at the time. Grigorenko became the most fierce supporters of the CT claims for return. The increasing possibilities of publishing *samizdat* and *tamizdat* with the help of the networks of dissidents made CT 'frame' known domestically and internationally.

(Chervonnaia 1992:108)

This represented the phase of "transnationalization" of the CT movement. New discursive opportunity structures appeared by the emergence of the Third Basket of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) as it became possible to put pressure on the human rights issues on the Soviet leadership, especially on the high days of *détente*. However when *détente* falls from the agenda, the regime focused on disrupting the communication of the CTs with the leaders of the democratic movement in the Soviet Union and the world community. For the letter sent to Saudi King about the death of Musa Mamut, Resat Jemilev was charged for three years of hard labour. But the gene was once out of the bottle. (Chervonnaia 1992: 108) The CT

movement enjoyed larger support in this period both in the Soviet Union and in the outside world. It successfully propagated its 'frame' and attracted the international public opinion its own side. It was mainly successful in neutralizing the regime's 'frame' at least outside the Soviet Union.

VI. Conclusion: What explains "success"?

Between 1965 and 1986, thousands of CTs had settled in Crimea, despite the efforts of authorities. When glasnost' was announced in 1986, tens of thousands joined them, mostly settling in the barren land of northern Crimea. In the period of glasnost', the regime continued not conforming the demands of the CTs, but it increasingly lost the initiative. In 1987, the CTs created a centralized structure with nine chapters in Crimea and adjacent Krasnodar. They carried out the biggest meeting in the Red Square in the Soviet history. This was handled with surprising indulgence. The Gromyko Commission, the first official body to discuss minority demands convened. The CTs increased their pressure in these circumstances. They proclaimed 26 July as a deadline for the Commission to take a positive decision and organized demonstrations in numerous locations including Moscow throughout the month. They organized twenty-four hour sit-in on 25 July until Gromyko agreed to meet them. Nevertheless, the Gromyko Commission denied the problem once more, and discredited the CT movement in the eyes of the Soviet people. Regime was afraid that granting the CT demands would produce undesirable effects in other ethnically contested areas. It could also cause problems within Crimea itself. CT demands for return and national autonomy were denied as unreasonable and impossible to grant. (Lazzerini 1990)

However, the regime felt the need to provide more partial recognition of the CT identity. Courses teaching the Crimean Tatar language were instituted in addition to schools in Uzbekistan and Ukraine, including the Crimea itself. Teacher-training programs were designed. A Department of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature was established at the Simferopol' State University in Crimea. Several textbooks were compiled in Tashkent and Kiev. Radio and tv programmes expanded in Uzbekistan and introduced Tadzhikistan. *Dostluk* in Crimean Tatar began as a supplement to the *Krymskaia Pravda*. A non-Tatar newspaper in Cankoy (city in northern Crimea with dense CT population) began to publish excerpts from the CT newspaper, *Lenin Bayragi*. Many CT figures were rehabilitated. 'Crimean Tatar' was again recognized as an ethnic identifier. (Lazzerini 1990) Lazzerini (1990) observed that "concessions allowed the authorities to look good in the face of Tatar pressure and buy time", and they hoped that "public support for Tatars would remain minimal and passage of time would weaken Tatar resolve". The CTs however saw that a window of opportunity emerged, the authorities simply lost their power to stop them, and the number of the CTs who undertook return increased massively. The Yanaev Commission, which convened in 1988 finally granted that the CTs have a right to return and that the state must finance their return. (Chervonnaia 1992: 108) This was the confession that the authorities also accepted the CT 'frame'.

It is generally argued that the CTs returned due to the opportunities provided by the liberalization of the Soviet regime. Beisinger(2002), and McAdam et al.(2001) relates the CT mobilization to the 'protest cycle' which was initiated by glasnost'. It is true that allying with other parallel movements allowed the CTs to direct a sustained and effective challenge to the system. The CT movement took advantage of the changes in the political opportunity structure but the return of the CTs had its own dynamics, which cannot be explained by

overall structural changes. After all, not any of the other deported peoples (Volga Germans, Meskhetian Turks, Germans, Greeks, Armenians of Crimea) were able to return. We must remember that the CT movement began long before the glasnost'. My analysis brings forward three reasons for the movement success:

1. The CTs returned because their political organization undertook systematic actions over the decades for its own way of framing the issue to take precedence. CT way of framing the issue is that **“the CTs are indigenous community of Crimea. Soviet regime committed a crime by the deportation of the CTs for the CTs did not betray the Soviets in the war. The deportation of the CTs constitute another attempt in the historical purpose of de-Tatarization of Crimea by the Russians. Therefore it is the moral right of the CTs to return.”** This ‘frame’, which was highly resonant among the CT people as it was based on their grievances and collective identity (memory and attachment to the homeland) motivated them for struggle. The CTs by every means struggled to have their ‘frame’ to be accepted and the Soviet ‘counter-frame’ was rejected. *For, the discursive foundation of the regime lied behind their deportation and its continuing consequences.* The CTs in every opportunity tried to expose the inconsistencies in the regime ‘frame’ and erode its credibility. They appealed to the ‘conscious adherents’ in the domestic and transnational spheres for support. This was perceived as an utmost threat by the authorities as the Soviet state is based on the ideology to continue its grasp of power and was severely opposed.

The movement’s ‘success’ in its goal of the ‘collective return’ came when it became obvious that the CT movement attained a discursive higher ground against the regime. Eventually the authorities also had to concur. It became impossible to challenge the CT’s return on the discursive level. It became the “truth,” the master ‘frame’. Nobody dared to question how

come it was their moral right to return to “homeland” after 50 years, why the CTs ought to live in Crimea, why it is necessarily their “homeland”, and whether any other solution other than return could be found. By not offering a potent ‘counter-frame’, an alternative solution, the Soviet Union lost.

The “cohesive, vigorous, persistent” (Lazzerini 1990) argument of the CTs was heard by the Western and the Soviet publics and the support of these ‘conscious adherents’ and ‘bystander publics’ proved pivotal in the movement success (as inferred by the resource mobilization theory). Many human rights organizations outside the Soviet Union pressured for the return of the CTs. In the Rejkjavik summit (1986), Reagan asked Gorbachev to release Mustafa Jemilev, the heroic leader of the CT movement, with other three Soviet dissidents. The CT ‘frame’ gained respect and legitimacy by their demonstrated self-sacrifice (self-immolations, hunger strikes, gulag and prison terms, lives spent for the movement), by their consistency which became apparent with their also defending other nationalities’ human rights (Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Volga Germans, etc). The long tradition of the CT national movement, and the democratic and representative nature of movement organization, their ability to preserve cohesion and solidarity despite maneuvers of the opponents and calamities, their ability to defend their ‘frame’ with a successful public relations campaign and civil disobedience strategy without resorting to violence contributed to the legitimacy of the movement.

2. In addition to preparing the public, the fact that they virtually had a political organization with a mass base at the time of glasnost’ played the significant role in their achievement of return. If they did not have the political organization ready to undertake the systematic return and take power in the homeland, they could not return.

3. Glasnost' provided them with the needed discursive window of opportunity. It determined the timing of return. It explains why they could not return before. Indeed the window of opportunity was closed in 1994 with the consolidation of successor states, and as a result the movement goals were not totally met. The half of the CTs still could not return. The CTs could not establish a national sovereignty due to their disadvantaged power balance in Ukraine. The movement however continues and the 1994-2007 period represents another phase of it, which is beyond the limits of this chapter.

Referred Bibliography:

- Altan, Mübeyyin. (30 May 2005) "The Crimean Tatar National Movement and the American Diaspora" at <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/diaspora.html>
- Aydın, F. Tutku. (2000) "A Case in Diaspora Nationalism: Crimean Tatars in Turkey" *Unpublished M.A. Thesis*. Bilkent University, Ankara.
- Beissinger, Mark. (2002) *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. (2000) "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611–39
- Bertrand, Jacques. (2004). *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Brubaker Rogers. (1996) *Nationalism Re'frame'd: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Sharlet, Robert (1978) "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Changing Patterns Since Khrushchev" *International Journal* 33, pp. 763-796
- Guboglo,-M.N.; Chervonnaia,-S.M. (1995) *Krymskotatarskoe Natsiyonal'noe Dvidzenie*. Moscow: TsIMO
- Lazzerini 1990, Edward. 1990. "Crimean Tatars" In Graham Smith (Ed.) *The nationalities question in the post-Soviet States*. London and New york: Longman, pp. 412-436
- McAdam D, Tarrow S, Tilly C. (2001) *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Shatz, Mashall. (1980). *Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Snow, David, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. (1986) "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51, 4: 464–81.
- Snow David and Robert Benford. (2000) "Clarifying the Relationship Between Ideology and Framing in the Study of Social Movements: A Comment on Oliver and Johnston" *Mobilization: An International Journal* 5: 55-60

Snow David. and D. McAdam. (2000) "Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus" in S. Stryker, T. Owens, and R. White (ed.s) *Self, Identity, and Social Movement*,. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 41-67

Suny, Ronald. (1998) *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*. Oxford University Press: Oxford

Turner Ralph H. & Killian Lewis M. (1959) *Collective Behaviour*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs.

Uehling, Greta. (2004) *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return*. Palgrave MacMillan: New York

Williams, Brian Glyn (2001) *The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of A Nation*. Leiden: Brill

Wilson. Andrew. (1998) 'Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming', in Edward A. Allworth (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*. Durham & London: Duke University Press, pp. 281-322