Immigration Regimes and Immigrant Conflict in Great Britain and Germany

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1. Introduction: The Study of Immigrant Conflict

Why do some countries experience more conflict involving immigrants than others? And why, within countries, do we observe clashes between immigrants and natives in some cities and not in others? Finally, when are we likely to observe confrontations between immigrants and state actors, rather than struggles between the native population and immigrant newcomers? In recent years, the high political salience of issues surrounding immigrant integration and the intensity of the immigration debate give rise to the impression that conflicts involving immigrant populations are both ubiquitous and inexorable. Riots involving second and third generation immigrant youths in France, an upsurge in racist violence in Belgium, a fiercely anti-immigrant political campaign in Switzerland, and local successes of the xenophobic British National Party in Britain are only some of the more publicized phenomena that have made headlines across Europe in the last few years. Even in the United States, where immigrant integration has often been more favorably compared to developments in European countries, publics and policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about the consequences of large-scale illegal migration.

The issue of immigrant integration has not escaped scholarly attention, but there have been remarkably few attempts to systematically and comparatively study conflict involving immigrants as they unfold on ground. While there is a vast literature covering the incidence of ethnic conflict across the globe, relatively few comparative works study the occurrence of conflict in localities of immigrant settlement.[1] Countless local single-case histories provide interesting and rich accounts of the immigrant experience. But these narratives generally do not aim for generalizable explanations. Even in the context of ethnic minority relations in the United States, a widely-studied topic, "there have been remarkably few comparative studies that bring...locally specific work together" (Jones-Correa 2001a: 2).

In contrast to case studies, cross-national research shows how macro-level variables such as unemployment rates, immigration levels, economic restructuring and electoral institutions can account for the success and failures of anti-immigration parties, but their focus is generally not the area of immigrant settlement.[2] Relatively similar low national vote shares of anti-immigrant parties (as in Germany and Great Britain) may thus mask massive amounts of cross-national variation in the incidence of local anti-immigrant movements. Another body of literature that has addressed the broad topic of immigrant integration consists of survey research, and has demonstrated that opinions against immigrants and immigration can be shown to result from perceived economic costs in the form of lost wages, jobs or increased tax burdens.[3] Other opinion studies have pointed to the cultural threats that cause individuals to oppose the inflow of ethnically distinct newcomers.[4]

These accounts provide important theoretical insights on which the following paper builds. But we should not assume (and these studies do not argue) that the national success of far-right parties can be cleanly disaggregated into a series of conflicts in the localities of immigrant settlement. Similarly, variation in individual attitudes is most likely not linearly related to variation in collectively organized local immigrant conflict. Furthermore, local problems often do not match up with their dissemination and perception nationwide. Finally, in addition to empirical disaggregation, conceptual distinctions are also crucial; not all conflicts

[1] For exceptions, see Weiner (1978), Olzak (1992) and Karapin (2002 and 2003) and Hopkins (2007).
[2] See, for example, Betz (1994), Kitschelt (1995), Golder (2003) and van der Brug (2005).
[3] See Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Scheepers and colleagues (2002), Mayda (2006) and Hanson et al. (2007).
[4] See, for example, Sniderman et al. (2004) Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Sides and Citrin (2007).

involving immigrants are the same. Rather, immigrant conflict can be disaggregated into two types: i. immigrant-native conflict, or sustained confrontations between immigrants and natives, and ii. immigrant-state conflict, or the sustained confrontations between immigrants and state actors. What, then, explains the incidence of immigrant conflict in the localities of immigrant settlement?

This article suggests an answer by investigating the incidence of immigrant conflict in Great Britain and Germany, two countries that have received large inflows of immigrants, but that have witnessed remarkably different patterns of immigrant conflict over the past half century. First, local immigrant conflict in Germany has been much less pronounced than in Great Britain. By the mid-1980s, when large-scale immigration had occurred in both countries for three decades, Britain had witnessed local successes of anti-immigrant parties, riots between immigrants and natives as well as major instances of urban unrest involving immigrants. Germany had experienced none of these. Second, within Great Britain, the occurrence of immigrant conflict has differed strikingly across groups. Whereas immigrant-native conflict has tended to occur between South Asians and Whites, such conflict has been much rarer between Blacks[5] and Whites. Conversely, Blacks have been predominantly engaged in anti-state behavior, but South Asians have been less likely to have done so.

I argue that differences in the ways in which the British and German immigration regimes allocated economic goods and political rights across immigrants and natives and how these differences in turn played themselves out in the local areas of immigrant settlement account for the two countries' varied experiences with immigrant conflict. In short, immigrant conflict occurs when there is a shortage of resources desired by both natives and immigrants. When immigrants can back up their claims for scarce economic goods with pivotal votes, incumbents will allocate these resources to this new constituency. Natives are in turn likely to protest such distribution by turning against immigrants. Conversely, in the absence of political leverage, immigrants are left with few resources during times of economic shortage. This state of affairs may leave natives content, but is more likely to cause immigrants to engage in conflictual relations with the state. In Great Britain, the legacy of the country's colonial past, rather than careful economic planning, facilitated the settlement of millions. While these settlers had access to full political rights, few steps were taken to guide their economic integration. The inadequate supply of economic resources has been the root cause of immigrant conflict here. In Germany, the pattern is reversed. Here, economic considerations dictated the nature of postwar guestworker immigration; economic integration into the country's labor market institutions occurred by design while political exclusion of labor migrants was the norm. Turning to differences within Britain across groups, I maintain that variation in groups' local electoral power accounts for the type of immigrant conflict we observe when resources are scarce.

The article is organized as follows. In the next section I will provide evidence of variation in immigrant conflict across Britain and Germany, as well as within Great Britain across immigrant groups. Section three proposes an analytical framework that explains the incidence of both types of immigrant conflict by stressing the causal importance of the

[5] I follow the now common British usage and employ the term "Black" to refer to first or later generation immigrants who originate from the West Indies or Africa. This group is also sometimes labeled "Afro-Caribbean." The term "South Asian" refers to immigrants and their descendants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These two groups constitute the majority of Britain's nonwhite immigrants. Note that from the 1960s through the 1980s, many accounts refer to all nonwhite immigrants in Britain as "Blacks." This term was often used to express the shared immigrant experience of racism and discrimination in Great Britain.

interaction between the economic design of immigration regimes, their impacts on the localities of settlement, and the political behavior of immigrant groups. I next demonstrate how the causal logic applies to patterns of immigrant conflict in Great Britain and Germany, drawing on a host of sources, including archival research. The final section concludes by highlighting the tradeoffs involved in designing immigration regimes by discussing the consequences of unplanned migration in the case of political (rather than economic) migrants in Germany.

2. Empirical Patterns of Immigrant Conflict

After half a century of mass immigration, Great Britain and Germany are today home to large numbers of first and later generation immigrants.[6] In Britain, migrants and their descendants hail mostly from former colonies (especially from the Indian subcontinent, the West Indies and Africa). The majority of immigrants in Germany have traditionally arrived as guestworkers or as their descendents (originating predominantly from Turkey and Southern Europe). Over the years, Britain and Germany also received inflows of political refugees and, more recently, migrants from the newly joined EU member states, but the present paper is concerned with the integration of post-colonial and guestworker migrants, as well as their descendants.[7]

Specifically, I seek to understand the manifestation of two phenomena across these groups, immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict in the areas of immigrant settlement. *Immigrant-native conflict involves the sustained confrontation between members of the immigrant and the native populations in a given locality*. Confrontations between immigrants and natives must be hostile if they are to constitute inter-group conflict, but they need not be violent. Electoral success of xenophobic parties with fiercely anti-immigrant platforms is thus an indicator of inter-group conflict, as is the formation of social movements that campaign for anti-immigrant policies (such as compulsory repatriation or exclusion of immigrants from public services) as well as groups that organize to defend immigrants' physical safety. Violent attacks and non-violent demonstrations directed against individuals, groups, or properties based on their membership status as immigrants or natives count as indicators of immigrant-native conflict. Together, these measures are meant to capture both the incidence and the severity of immigrant-native conflict.

Whereas immigrant-native conflict encompasses the sustained confrontation between members of immigrant and native communities, *immigrant-state conflict involves the sustained confrontation between immigrant communities and state actors in a given locality*. Similar to my conceptualization of immigrant-native conflict, my understanding of immigrant-state conflict is based on the manifestation of anti-state behavior in a particular location over time. Anti-state behavior can take peaceful forms, for example the dissemination of views opposing the state's actions and expressing distrust in state institutions, but can also be conducted violently, for

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[6] The percentage of foreign-born residents amounts to 8.3 percent in Britain, compared to 12.5 percent in Germany (Dumont and Lemaître 2005).

[7] In recent years, Britain has received large numbers of East European migrants thanks to its residence and work regulations, which are less restrictive than those enacted by many other EU states. In addition to guestworkers, Germany has also witnessed large inflows of so-called "ethnic Germans" (*Aussiedler*), migrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc who, due to their German ancestry, enjoyed unrestricted entry and German citizenship. The majority of ethnic Germans arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Finally, political refugees from around the world have also applied for asylum in both countries. While rejection rates vary over time, the majority of asylum claims tend to be denied in both countries.

instance, when immigrant groups cause property damage to impose costs on the state or clash with representatives of the state on a small and large scale.

How, then, have postcolonial migrants in Britain and guestworkers in Germany fared over the decades? In the early 1980s, policymakers and academics in Germany grew increasingly concerned about the future integration of the country's immigrant population. Contemporary observers who compared developments in Britain and Germany noted, however, that the settlement of immigrants had proceeded much more peacefully in the latter. In comparison to Britain, one author points out, there had been no violent or non-violent "open conflict on a larger scale" between immigrants and natives in Germany (Koch-Arzberger 1985: 3). Electoral successes of anti-immigrant parties or organized resistance against the guestworker presence in the areas of settlement also largely failed to gain momentum. In the few German cities where they emerged, local anti-guestworker movements received hardly any support from the native population, in spite of the publicity they attracted. In Hamburg, for example, a local party emerged in 1982 with the sole purpose to stop immigration (*Hamburger Liste für Ausländerstopp*). Even though its campaign had been covered by the national press,[8] the party's vote share never reached above *one* percent. Similarly, political resistance against Berlin's predominantly Turkish migrant population did not prove successful. The right-wing *German People's Party* (DVP) ran in 1981, but also failed to attract more than one percent of the vote. In the northern city of Kiel, a party dedicated to limiting the number of immigrants garnered 3.8 percent of the local poll in 1982, a result that some considered a success.[9]

The British picture is quite different; Britain has witnessed large-scale violence involving first and later generation immigrants as both targets and as active participants in every decade since the 1950s. In 1958, tensions between immigrants and natives were first thrust onto the national spotlight when immigrants and natives rioted on the streets of Notting Hill, London. These clashes were no isolated incident and were indeed followed by a series of violent intergroup confrontations over the decades. Moreover, in many locations, xenophobic parties and local grassroots movements mobilized against the inflow of newcomers. To mention just a few examples, in Ealing, West London, councilors ran and won on a platform that was exclusively concerned with limiting the rights of immigrants to buy or rent houses; in Leicester, the openly racist National Front won nearly twenty percent of the vote in the mid-1970s; in Tower Hamlets, East London, the xenophobic British National Party elected its first councilor in 1993, to be followed by more recent victories in London and across the country.[10]

The relative success of British anti-immigrant parties compared to their failures in Germany is particularly striking given that local electoral rules in Germany are based on proportional representation, which generally make it easier for smaller parties to gain seats and should give anti-immigrant movements an edge over their counterparts in Great Britain, where candidates are elected according to plurality in single or multi-member districts. But, as one observer noted, the "anti-immigrant climate" in Germany did not produce "organizational forms… [as it had] in England."[11]

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[8] See, for example, *Der Spiegel*, "Ausländer: 'Das Volk hat es satt.'" May 3, 1982.
[9] *Der Spiegel*, "Ausländer: 'Das Volk hat es satt.'" May 3, 1982. See also Dancygier (2007).
[10] See Dancygier (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
[11] See Tsiakalos (1983: 21). The author rightly goes on to say that it is difficult to quantify the clearly rising anti-immigrant climate in Germany (22). I do not question that sentiments against immigrants rose during the early 1980s. But when we consider measurable instances of immigrant-native conflict, such as electoral results or large-scale violence, we observe that, comparatively speaking, Germany scores much lower on these indicators than does

In addition to the relative absence of local anti-immigrant mobilization, Germany did not experience confrontations between immigrants and state actors. A 1983 government-commissioned report on youth violence concluded that "immigrant youth in Germany, in contrast to Great Britain, have not participated in…violent confrontations" with the police.[12] In British cities, however, conflictual relations between immigrants and the forces of law and order became increasingly common. Such confrontations had begun on a small scale in the late 1960s and reached a high point, both in scale and in frequency, in the 1980s. Figure 1 charts the distribution of large-scale violent instances of both immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict in Great Britain over time.

Besides differences in immigrant conflict across Germany and Great Britain, a closer analysis of large-scale violent events in Britain reveals remarkable variation across immigrant groups. While Blacks are involved in 22 major events, only four can be categorized as constituting immigrant-native violence, with the remainder falling into the category of anti-state violence, generally addressed against the police. Turning to the South Asian population, we observe a quite different pattern. South Asians are involved in fewer events overall (10) and their involvement is generally restricted to major instances of inter-group violence. Summarizing these figures, I find that among events involving Blacks, 82 percent are episodes of immigrant-state conflict and 18 percent constitute immigrant-native conflict. Among South Asians, this pattern is reversed: only 20 percent of events are confrontations between immigrants and the state, while 80 percent can be classified as large-scale clashes between immigrants and natives.

These significant differences in episodes of violent unrest reflect variation in other manifestations of immigrant conflict. Observers have noted, if only in passing and without explanation, that "The Asian population has been the target of racialist violence and British Movement or National Front-inspired attacks, while the West Indian community does not appear to face the same degree of threat" (Shipley 1981: 197). In its first survey on racial violence published in 1981, the Home Office also noted that Asian immigrants were significantly more likely to be targeted by such attacks than their West Indian counterparts (cited in Lawrence 1987: 154). Government-sponsored investigations uncovered similar patterns in 1986 and again in 1989, when 70 percent of the victims of recorded racial harassment in London were of Asian origin and the perpetrators were usually White teenagers (Anwar 1998: 85). Others have also pointed out that "The attitudes of Asian people towards the police appear to be more favourable than those of Afro-Caribbeans, but they are particularly critical of police behaviour in respect of racial attacks…The incidence of unprovoked attacks, especially on Asian people, appears to have increased considerably" (Benyon 1986: 249). In short, the group differences that turn up in my nationwide count of collective violence do reflect a more general phenomenon.

The varied incidence of immigrant conflict across countries and groups is puzzling. Germany and Great Britain share a host of similarities when it comes to their respective immigration histories. By the early 1980s, large-scale immigration had been taking place in both countries for nearly three decades. Most arrivals were economic migrants who had hoped to return to their homelands as economic success stories, but ended up staying in their host countries. The majority of immigrants in Germany and Britain settled in urban centers, performed labor that had been shunned by the native workforce and was generally of a lower socioeconomic status than the average native worker. Finally, immigration also brought ethnic

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Great Britain. Moreover, it is important to point out that the few organizational manifestations of anti-immigrant climate that did exist received little support.

[12] BT Drs 9/2390, January 17, 1983, p. 29. See appendix for a list and explanation of archival sources.

and religious diversity to these traditionally White Christian societies. Turks, the majority of whom are Muslim, constitute the largest single nationality group among Germany's guestworker population and Islam is today the second largest religion in both countries.

Turning to Great Britain, data from the 1970s and 1980s, when most of the riots took place, show that West Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were predominantly employed in manual jobs. While a larger share of Indians was found in white-collar employment, this group is quite polarized and also contains substantial numbers of low-skilled manual workers (Smith 1977: 73, Brown 1984: 197). By the late 1970s, unemployment rates among Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and West Indian males were at approximately the same levels (Field et al. 1981: 23). Moreover, both South Asian and West Indian enclaves were dominated by semi-skilled or unskilled manual laborers, while higher-skilled individuals tended to reside in areas with relatively lower immigrant concentrations (Smith 1977: 78-79). These two immigrant groups also arrived in Britain around the same time and were thus subject to the same cultural, social, and political traditions. As Commonwealth citizens, they were equally affected by immigration and citizenship laws, and as nonwhites, they were ethnically distinct from Britain's predominantly White population.

It is also unlikely that German migrants' residential status, which has been less secure than that of their British counterparts, prevented them from engaging in anti-state behavior. The clashes that had been documented in Britain during the 1970s were still minor in nature and fell short of criminal activity that would have warranted arrest or, in the German case, deportation. Moreover, by the late 1970s, German authorities had enacted administrative guidelines that severely circumscribed the possibility of deporting second generation migrant youth who had grown up in Germany based on criminal conduct and even multiple convictions. Finally, while immigrants could not participate in elections, German law allowed non-Germans to voice their grievances through organizations, petitions and demonstrations.[13]

Broad similarities among immigrants might, however, not be matched by similarities among the native populations in Germany and Great Britain. The lacking success of local anti-immigrant movements in Germany might, for example, be due to higher levels of tolerance, perhaps brought about in reaction to the country's shameful Nazi past. Britons' unease with a group of a different religious background could also explain their disproportionate targeting of South Asian with votes and violence. Attitude surveys do, however, not bear out these claims. Opinion polls carried out in 1988 in fact reveal that prejudice against the Turkish minority was widespread and at least as pronounced as Britons' negative attitudes towards West Indians and Asians. While Germans are slightly less likely than British respondents to blame racial and cultural features for Turkish socioeconomic disadvantage, they are more likely than Britons to consider the outgroup's values problematic for achieving success (see Figures 2a-2d). Levels of social acceptance (e.g., related to marriage and work, see Figure 2d) are lower compared to British responses and answers to other questions tap approximately similar levels of subtle and not-so-subtle prejudice. Results also reveal that White Britons expressed similar levels of blatant and subtle prejudice against West Indians as they did against Asians living in Britain.[14] A cursory glance at these figures shows that there are no major differences in responses based on group assignment and in most questions, differences are indeed very small. If anything, levels of blatant racial prejudice are higher against West Indians; compared to opinions about Asians, a

[13] See Huber and Unger for a discussion of deportation practices and migrants' rights (1982: 143-144, 181-182).

[14] Respondents were split in half and randomly assigned to answer these questions based on one of two outgroups, "West Indians" (513 respondents) or "Asians" (504 respondents) (Reif and Melich 1992).

larger share of respondents blamed West Indians' disadvantaged position in British society on their allegedly inferior cultural and racial backgrounds (see Figure 2b).

To summarize, despite broad similarities among postcolonial and guestworker immigrants – their arrival as economic migrants, their concentration in urban areas, their relatively low socioeconomic status, their ethnic distinctiveness, and the attitudinal prejudice they have encountered – we observe remarkable differences in immigrant conflict across Great Britain and Germany and, within Britain, across groups. The local manifestation of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict involving guestworkers in Germany has been much less pronounced than such confrontations involving postcolonial migrants in Britain. Moreover, within Great Britain, South Asians have been disproportionately involved in immigrant-native conflict, but much less in confrontations with state actors, while the pattern among West Indian migrants is reversed. What accounts for these differences?

3. Explaining Immigrant Conflict: National and Local Variation in Economic Scarcity and Immigrant Political Power

The main focus of this paper is the study of immigrant conflict as it occurs in the localities where immigrants settle. Local immigrant integration does, however, not occur in a vacuum. National institutions crucially impact the recruitment and settlement of immigrants, shape immigrant incorporation into domestic economic structures and define the limits and opportunities for immigrant political participation in the host countries. Immigration regimes vary in all of these dimensions. Some countries deliberately follow economic rationales and carefully plan and execute the immigration and settlement of foreign labor by integrating this workforce into their labor market institutions and welfare states. Others might also open their borders to economic migrants, but take few measures to assist these workers in their search for housing or employment. Still others might pay less attention to the economic needs for and accommodation of foreign labor, but allow large-scale inflows of migrants for political reasons, for example due to historical obligations arising from colonial or wartime experiences.

Once settled in the new country, migrants also have differential access to political rights. Some countries bestow these newcomers with enhanced political privileges, allowing them to participate in local elections or to naturalize as citizens of the destination country, while others set strict limits on the scope for immigrant political behavior. Countries differ widely in the laws that govern whether, when, and which immigrants can become citizens of their destination countries. Moreover, there is variation within and across countries (as well as within countries across immigrant groups) with respect to the extension of the local franchise to non-citizens.[15]

The ways in which the state allocates economic and political goods to immigrants thus varies across immigration regimes. These differences in the national economic and political frameworks further shape and interact with variation in local *economic scarcity* and *immigrant political power* to produce varied paths of immigrant integration and conflict on the ground. In the context of this study, *economic scarcity* characterizes a situation in which there is a shortage of goods desired by both immigrants and natives. The supply of these goods is fixed in the short-term and can result in zero-sum competition. In cases of immigrant conflict, the state often exercises direct or indirect control over the allocation of these resources, which most commonly include public services such as public housing or area-based government grants. The importance of state-controlled resources derives from the fact that under certain circumstances, specified below, the state is more responsive to anti-immigrant agitation (and obviously to anti-state

[15] On citizenship regimes, see Brubaker (1992), Weil (2001), and Howard (2006).

action) than the market. The availability of material goods that are in demand among both immigrants and natives, such as housing, employment and public services varies across countries based on their immigration regimes. Furthermore, it also varies across local immigrant destinations, especially in settings where national immigration regimes do not take steps to guide immigrant settlement. Immigrants often locate in cities where opportunities for employment are initially abundant, but municipal infrastructures might otherwise not be well equipped to handle large inflows of newcomers. Over time, changes in the availability of employment will also affect overall demand for public services and economic scarcity; all else equal, immigrants (and natives) put greater strains on public services as their incomes decline.

Second, we also observe differences in the potential for *immigrant political power*. An immigrant group is considered to be politically powerful if its vote is influential in deciding the outcomes of elections. Several institutional and behavioral features determine immigrant political power. While access to citizenship and the ballot box are necessary preconditions for political power, the competitiveness of elections and/or the extent to which parties rely on the immigrant vote to keep them in power also determine whether a given immigrant voting bloc will be pivotal. My definition of immigrant political power thus privileges formal political participation of immigrants that can vote in local and/or national elections over informal, pressure group activity by immigrants who are barred from casting ballots in these electoral contests. Socio-demographic characteristics of immigrant groups interact with these formal laws to determine immigrant political power.

My theory of *immigrant-native conflict* is based on the following propositions. I begin with the assumption that the native population will only engage in anti-immigrant behavior if such actions are believed to deter immigrants from acquiring scarce resources. This in turn implies that the actor who controls the disbursement of these goods is sensitive to anti-immigrant agitation, or that the costs that such confrontations inflict on immigrants themselves are sufficiently high to discourage them from accepting these scarce goods, or both. A corollary of this implication is that immigrant-native conflict is more likely if the state, rather than the market, allocates scarce resources. In settings where the state distributes goods, deserting ruling parties in favor of candidates that advocate anti-immigrant policies is intended to increase the costs associated with pro-immigrant resource allocation borne by the governing party. Anti-immigrant organizations and rallies are meant to bring attention to the grievances caused by immigration to a wider audience, some of whom will also abandon incumbents unless policies that appear to favor immigrants are changed. Additionally, anti-immigrant violence and ensuing cycles of reprisals also cause some voters to seek out parties who advocate repatriating immigrants, which, these parties claim, would decrease the incidence of violence.

In settings where the market allocates resources, the scope for *effective* anti-immigrant activity is more limited. Not only are market actors less sensitive to local voting patterns, during times of economic recession they also generally face few incentives to give into demands for resource allocations that favor natives. Harassment and violence directed against migrant settlers would have to supplant an electoral backlash and impose sufficiently high burdens on immigrants for them to refrain from taking up market-based resources, mainly jobs, which may in turn threaten their livelihoods as well. Given these assumptions, I expect that competition over scarce resources that are allocated by the state will be more likely to lead to sustained immigrant-native conflict than competition over scarce resources allocated by market actors.[16] It

[16] It appears that debates about *immigration* policy thus tend to focus on jobs and wages, whose distribution is generally directly affected by a state's immigration laws. Debates about immigrant *integration* more often appear to

is important to underscore that the analytical distinction is not based on the type of goods per se, but on the actor who has control over the disbursement of these goods. State-owned housing, public employment or area-based government grants are goods that are linked directly to government control; but the state also affects resource allocation among immigrants and natives through, for example, regulations that give natives preferential treatment in obtaining jobs or through ethnically-based training and employment quotas.[17]

If natives engage in anti-immigrant behavior to protest the state's allocation decisions, what determines these distributional choices in the first place? I begin with the assumption that the ruling political parties charged with allocating resources to their constituencies will only disburse scarce goods to immigrant groups if the expected gains exceed the expected losses associated with such actions. This implies that political parties will only appeal for immigrant votes on the basis of material resources if they assume that the impact of the potential electoral backlash of such action is smaller than the boost delivered by the new immigrant voting bloc. In the case of naturalized immigrants or those who have access to local voting rights, this calculation is in turn based on the concentration of the immigrant vote relative to the relevant electoral boundary and the organizational capacity of immigrants to induce their co-ethnics to turn out on Election Day. However, if immigrants are barred from the ballot box, ruling parties are generally not expected to distribute scarce goods to immigrants at the expense of their native constituencies, unless legal requirements force them to do so. Note also that political parties enjoy much greater leeway when appealing to immigrants on the basis of goods that are not in short supply or not desired by natives.

If immigrant political power induces inter-group conflict when resources are scarce, I argue that it is the absence of such power during economically hard times that is likely to compel immigrants to engage in violent and non-violent conflict with the state. As with immigrant-native conflict, this proposition rests on the assumption that local political actors will only address immigrant needs in times of resource scarcity if the gains associated with the immigrant vote exceed the losses incurred by the anti-immigrant vote that such resource allocation might trigger. I also assume that engaging in anti-state actions on the part of immigrants can be intended to highlight the grievances that are seen to have been caused by state neglect. Since the local political process is less receptive to demands by groups that cannot reward politicians at the polls, and local politicians cannot make credible commitments to theses groups, acting against the state represents an alternative channel to articulate demands.[18] Actually disenfranchised immigrants who cannot vote or effectively disenfranchised immigrants who fail to translate their votes into electoral power may thus hope to effect a change in state practices by engaging in anti-state behavior.

Why should such action pay? Violent-anti state behavior is intended to impose direct costs on the local state through property damage and police injury and more general costs in the

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revolve around immigrants' use of state-based resources. Note that I am not arguing that market-based competition will not lead to anti-immigrant attitudes. I simply claim that *acting* on these attitudes will on the whole be less effective in bringing about the desired outcomes if the market is solely responsible for the allocation of resources.

[17] Jones-Correa (2001b) argues that inter-ethnic strife is often based on competition for state-based goods because the supply of the latter is usually relatively fixed and competition as a result zero-sum in nature. I would agree that, in the context of state-based resource allocation, zero-sum competition further increases the odds of immigrant-native conflict, but it is not the zero-sum character alone that leads to sustained conflict.

[18] I thus reject the hypothesis that "greed" will cause ethnic minorities to engage in anti-state behavior. While looting certainly occurred during anti-state riots in Britain, research has shown that in most cases, looters were not locals, but were Whites who traveled from outside to take advantage of an ongoing riot (Keith 1993).

form of social instability. Incumbents fear a reduction of the local tax base caused by property damage as well as a decline in future investment in areas that are prone to violence. An official dealing with immigrant integration in Frankfurt, Germany, acknowledged, for example, that one reason why the city's mayor tried to keep immigrants "happy," was to prevent riots which would cause investors to flee.[19] Moreover, some voters will punish incumbents for their failure to keep the peace. To avoid future violence, state actors will have to take immigrant demands into account. Additionally, anti-state behavior can send a signal to higher levels of government that are concerned with the maintenance of law and order and social peace. Finally, I do not claim that all actors involved in violent anti-state actions intend to impel the state to change its behavior; nor do I claim that all those who commit xenophobic acts do so to protest the state's resource allocation decisions. Rather, I maintain that such intentions represent an important component of immigrant conflict. The logic of these propositions is encapsulated in Figure 3.

To summarize, national immigration regimes impact the incidence of immigrant conflict by structuring the ways in which economic resources are allocated between immigrants and natives. If the state puts policies in place that distribute local resources to immigrants without disadvantaging natives, no conflict will ensue. When immigration regimes fail to provide for the economic integration of immigrants, but material resources are not in short supply locally, we will also not observe sustained immigrant conflict (upper row). Conversely, when immigrant inflows and settlement are less regulated by the state and economic shortages characterize areas of immigrant settlement, conflict becomes increasingly likely. In these settings, immigrant groups who are able to induce the local state to disburse scarce resources to them will become targets of anti-immigrant agitation (lower-right box). Immigrants' persistent failure to press the local state for economic resources, will leave natives content, but will leave immigrants economically disadvantaged and more likely to protest against the state (lower-left box). The capacity to claim valued goods is in turn a function of immigration and citizenship regimes, immigrant political participation and local electoral contexts.

4. Explaining Immigrant Conflict in Great Britain: Immigration without Immigration Policy

Thanks to its grand empire tradition, post-imperial Britain inherited a very expansive nationality code which considered its "colonial subjects" British citizens who could move and settle freely in the mother country. In the immediate postwar period, both the Tories and the Labour Party reaffirmed Britain's commitment to the ideals of the Commonwealth with the passage of the 1948 Nationality Act, under which Britons as well as colonial subjects were Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Large-scale immigration from the so-called New Commonwealth had not been conceived as a possibility, but became one of the Act's major side-effects.[20] The majority of these migrants filled labor shortages created by postwar reconstruction efforts and economic expansion, taking jobs concentrated in less profitable and low-paying sectors (such as the textile industry and metal manufacturing) that were generally on the decline and less desirable to natives. They predominantly settled in urban industrial areas such as Greater London, the West Midlands and in northern conurbations such as Bradford and Manchester. The process of chain migration further intensified patterns of geographic concentration. As early as the mid-1960s, New Commonwealth migrants constituted between

[19] Interview with the author, October 2005.
[20] For the political origins and unintended consequences of the 1948 Nationality Act and an historical-institutionalist analysis of the evolution of Britain's immigration and nationality laws from 1948 to 1981, see Hansen (2000).

five and fifteen percent of the resident populations in only eight percent of Britain's parliamentary constituencies, but in more than half, these settlers made up less than one percent of the population (Patterson 1969: 194-196, Layton-Henry 1992: 14, Money 1997: 700-701).

When it became clear in the mid-1950s that immigration was indeed occurring at a fast pace, politicians took few steps to restrict, guide or assist this inflow of labor. Indeed, archival records confirm that immigration was conceived of mostly as a political matter and illustrate just how uninvolved economic planners were in guiding postwar migration to Britain; the Minister of Labour was not even consulted in the British government's initial deliberations on the country's slowly developing immigration policy. It was not until the Minister requested "to be added to the Committee of Ministers to consider the problem of Colonial Immigrants, since he is much concerned departmentally with this question" that he was included in talks about new immigration legislation.[21] In sum, early immigrant settlement occurred without much coordination or assistance from state authorities; variation in local political and economic conditions thus greatly impacted the ease of integration of the incoming migrant population.[22]

Over the course of the 1950s, labor migration into Britain continued unabated as political deadlock across and within parties on the issue paralyzed effective policymaking.[23] The measures that were eventually implemented to curb the inflow of foreign labor were taken partly in response to the local repercussions of unplanned immigration (Money 1997), but also failed to guide migrant settlement in ways that would alleviate strains on public resources in the areas of concentration. The 1962 Immigration Act, for example, made immigration contingent on specific employment contracts in the case of unskilled labor, but it contained no procedures for registration or dispersal and no settlement assistance, even though many local authorities struggled with overcrowding and housing shortages and local social services tended to be overloaded in areas of concentration (Patterson 1969: 19-20). Later pieces of immigration legislation in fact probably exacerbated these problems. By restricting employment-based migration successive governments inadvertently encouraged a disproportionate inflow of dependents; between 1963 and 1967, the number of dependents as a share of all New Commonwealth immigrants rose from 31.0 to 72.7 percent (Gish 1968: 26, 31, author's calculations). Pressures on local services such as housing, education, and health care would thus only intensify, while immigrant taxpayers declined as a proportion of the total migrant population.

This lack of state intervention meant that local authorities themselves sometimes took the imitative. In the early years, this took the form of Voluntary Liaison Committees, which essentially consisted of groups of well-meaning native residents, often including members of the local clergy, who helped immigrants become familiar with their new environment and specifically with the provision of local services. The Labour government under Wilson later institutionalized these committees into community relations councils (CRCs) as part of its efforts to integrate the resident immigrant population while at the same time restricting new inflows.[24] These efforts included the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation in the form of several Race Relations Acts (Ben-Tovim 1986: 29-30). While this legislation appears quite remarkable when viewed in comparative European perspective, its remit was initially rather limited and many observers have dismissed the CRCs as well as the anti-discrimination laws as paternalistic

[21] Note to the Prime Minister (author unclear), December 3, 1955, PREM 11/2920.
[22] See also Garbaye (2005) on the unplanned nature of British immigration and the ensuing focus on locally-directed integration.
[23] See Foot (1965) on the within and cross-party deadlock.
[24] See Gish (1968: 29), Hansen (2000: 214), and Hussain (2001: 24, 27) on such legislation.

attempts by the British establishment to maintain "racial buffers" between itself and immigrant newcomers, created to prevent the national politicization of immigration.[25] When it came to financial assistance related to the settlement of immigrants, local authorities could apply for limited funds under the 1966 Local Government Act or could petition the center for monies under the Urban Programme (see below).

What the British immigration regime lacked in economic concessions, it made up for in political rights. As British citizens, New Commonwealth migrants were entitled to participate in local and national elections and their settlement in working class areas aroused the interest and concern of Labour Party strategists. While the newcomers represented considerable electoral potential, a sound party strategy would have to balance the votes delivered by this new constituency with the adverse native reactions it might provoke. Labour strategists were thus concerned with evaluating the dynamics of immigrant conflict, constantly calculating how they could gain "votes from coloured people to an extent equal to prospective losses from white Labour supporters due to this colour-clash."[26] As "whole streets which used to contain a solid Labour vote [had] now been repopulated with a coloured population almost entirely non-voting,"[27] getting out the immigrant vote while reducing the "colour-clash" would become a top priority for Labour. But a reduction in such intergroup tensions would first require an understanding of its causes.

The Economic Basis of Immigrant Conflict

Starting in the late 1950s, the Conservative government and the Labour Party began inquiring into the dynamics of immigrant-native conflict. According to government ministers and Labour officials, the central forces driving intergroup confrontations were of an economic nature. Competition was especially acute in the housing sector, which had been overburdened even before immigrants had arrived, thanks to a combination of poor planning and war-time bombings, which decimated 100,000 dwellings in London alone (Senior 1957: 305). When the Labour Party sent out a circular in 1957 to establish "a more comprehensive and factual picture of the colour question in the United Kingdom," the responses of those districts that had experienced inter-ethnic tensions all stressed the problems arising from battles over scarce housing, particularly in the Greater London area. In the working-class Vauxhall constituency, South London, for example, there had initially "never been any question of colour discrimination or prejudice… [but] there [had] undoubtedly been a change…due, among other things, to the appalling housing situation."[28] Conservative politicians, who were generally less likely to fault economic conditions for racial conflict than their Labour counterparts, tended to agree: "The immigration problem is 10 per cent prejudice, 30 per cent schooling, and 60 per cent housing," proclaimed a Tory MP in 1964.[29] Correspondence between the Home Office and the Prime Minister's office as well as deliberations between Labour politicians and strategists further reveal that the 1958 Notting Hill riot was also mostly blamed on the area's unsustainable housing

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[25] For this view, see Katznelson (1973: 179-181) and Messina (1989: 44-47). For a comprehensive account of CRCs, see Hill and Issacharoff (1971); for a discussion of British anti-discrimination laws in comparative perspective, see Bleich (2003) and Lieberman (2005).

[26] Letter from London District Organizer of the Labour Party, J. W. Raisin, to Mr. Morgan Phillips, Labour Party Secretary, September 11, 1958.

[27] Memorandum by David Ennals, Secretary of the Labour Party, International Department, July 2, 1963.

[28] Letter from Elsie L. Boltz, Agent and Secretary of the Vauxhall Constituency, undated (this letter was most likely written in 1957, in response to the Labour Party's circular).

[29] Patterson (1969: 194) cites Sir Anthony Meyer, Conservative MP for Eton and Slough, in a 1964 statement.

situation.[30] Housing was the main, but not the only source of contention. Writing about the 1958 riots, "The information available to [the Home Secretary] indicated that the recent disturbances had not been deliberately instigated by an organized body. The clashes appeared to have arisen through competition for limited housing accommodation, a declining number of jobs, and women."[31] Indeed, by the early 1960s, increasing economic competition in several high-immigration areas ultimately led the Conservative government to impose immigration restrictions, legislation which had been so difficult to agree on only a few years earlier.

The notion that White resentment towards nonwhite immigrants flared up only when newcomers were perceived to be advantaged in the distribution of resources informed much of the government's policymaking. Under Wilson's Labour government, the Urban Programme was instituted to assist areas whose social services were overstretched due to large inflows of immigrants. But its design and implementation was very much shaped, and ultimately crippled, by political considerations, for officials were concerned that "It would be difficult to disguise the fact that the urban programme was really designed to help areas of immigration concentration rather than of urban areas of social need" more generally.[32] In the design stage of the program, policymakers deliberated at length how financial aid could be disbursed within the existing legal framework that guided fiscal relations between the center and the regions – for additional legislation would call unwelcome attention to the issue – while still delivering resources to the areas that needed it most.[33] In the end, only relatively small sums were freed up in an arrangement whereby community groups and voluntary organizations submitted grant proposals to their local councils, who then applied for matching funds under the program. Soon after its inception, it was generally agreed within the government itself that the Urban Programme was "really irrelevant to the problems of race relations," hamstrung by its designers' desire to keep the policy away from the public's eye.[34]

In spite of this recognition, policymakers continued to follow the principle that "The aim of race relations policy should be to maximise the benefits given to the blacks [i.e., nonwhites] while minimising provocation to the whites."[35] This calculation was not only based on fears of a political backlash, but also intended to protect immigrants: policymakers felt they had to "ensure that in the process they [immigrants] do not and are not popularly thought to get an unduly large share of the national cake (or any particular element in it), thus occasioning disaffection and political or physical protest among the remaining white population."[36] By the late 1960s, however, competition over housing had in fact intensified since many immigrants had now fulfilled the minimum residency requirements that would allow them to apply for government-subsidized council housing. This type of housing comprised nearly a third of the nation's

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[30] Letter from London District Organizer of the Labour Party, J. W. Raisin, to Mr. Morgan Phillips, Labour Party Secretary, September 11, 1958.
[31] Note of a Meeting held in the Home Secretary's room, September 8, 1958, PREM 11/2920. Senior (1957: 304) also pointed to competition for "female companionship" as a source for inter-ethnic antagonism.
[32] Minutes of a meeting by the Official Committee on Immigration and Community Relations, May 24, 1968, CAB 134/2906.
[33] Memorandum ICR(0) (68) 6 by the Working Party on Immigration and Community Relations, May 22, 1968, CAB 134/2906.
[34] "Draft Report: the Urban Programme," June 28, 1973, CAB 184/139. See also Edwards and Batley (1978) and Kirp (1979).
[35] Letter by Mr. Plowden (Race Relations – Next Steps) to Central Policy Review Staff, April 24, 1973, CAB 184/136.
[36] Letter by Mr. Plowden, "CPRS Race Relations Study - Some thoughts on aims and objectives," to Central Policy Review Staff, April 30, 1973, CAB 184/136.

residential dwellings in 1975 (Ravetz 2001: 2) and supplied more than sixty percent of the housing stock in several inner city areas.[37] Having toured many areas with high concentrations of immigrants, a government-appointed Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration concluded that "race relations in the places…visited [were] reasonably good, in view of the conditions under which members of the community, both white and black, live; in some areas, surprisingly good." But they hastened to add that:

> It goes without saying that housing has a profound effect on race relations. Improvements in housing, both of indigenous people and of immigrants, better race relations because they remove some deep causes of friction and resentment. Failure to cope with bad housing has the reverse effect…the next ten years will be the testing time for race relations.[38]

Two years later, a task force appointed by a Conservative Prime Minister Heath to uncover the "causes of racial strife" conjectured that resource competition activated (latent) prejudice, and struggled with the policy implications of this observation:

> [W]e are thus faced with the need not only to cure irrational prejudice, but with the problem that relative improvements in black housing and jobs are likely to exacerbate the hostility felt by many whites. In short, an ideal solution might mean taking action against all…factors simultaneously, so that whites prone to protest at blacks jumping the housing queue would suddenly themselves be whisked away to brand-new council semis. In practice, we may find ourselves faced with incompatible objectives.[39]

This tradeoff would become increasingly unacceptable in the 1970s, when the task force observed with rising alarm how continued neglect of the immigrant population and its economic needs could create mounting problems for the state and its representatives. The Home Office and London's Police Commissioner had informed the task force of increasing confrontations between primarily West Indian youth and the police, who, "for many coloured people… symbolize the social system" as a whole.[40] While immigrant-native clashes had been the focus in the past, public officials were now extremely concerned that a failure to integrate immigrants into the social and economic fabric of British society would create a "fifth column when the day of third world revolution comes, or, less dramatically, [cause]…riots of the Newark, New Jersey, type."[41] Moreover, policymakers were keenly aware that resentment against the state could rise and eventually boil over, as "Large-scale failure and disappointment by the second generation… [could be] exploited by a minority (white and black) ever-ready to attribute such difficulties to our failures."[42]

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[37] These figures are based on my calculations of council housing figures from the 1981 census (Table 15, "Tenure and household size"), available from National Statistics (2006).
[38] Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Session 1970-71, "Housing" Volume 1, HLG 118/1247, July 22, 1971.
[39] Note by W.J.L. Plowden to the members of the Central Policy Review Staff, National Archives, CAB 184/136, February 2, 1973.
[40] "Race Relations," by the Central Policy Review Staff, Volume 2 (paragraph 267), November 1973, CAB 184/207.
[41] Letter by Mr. Plowden, "CPRS Race Relations Study - Some Thoughts on aims and objectives," to Central Policy Review Staff, April 30, 1973, CAB 184/136.
[42] Letter from Mr. Waldegrave to members of the Central Policy Review Staff, May 2, 1973, CAB 184/137, (emphasis in original). (Waldegrave was a member of the Staff.)

The Home Office and government ministers agreed with the task force's assessment that "the single most disturbing development in the race relations field [was] the growth of anti-social attitudes [of West Indians]…and second-generation West Indian militancy," and called for urgent action on the matter, but also noted that they "were not aware that a similar problem [was] posed by young Asians."[43] Having reviewed the evidence from various cities and towns, policymakers thus recognized the multidimensional nature of immigrant conflict, as well as the difficulties involved in attempting to simultaneously reduce the likelihood of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict, as this quote illustrates:

> These examples…show how ambiguous is the idea of a "problem" in the race relations field. The term is sometimes used to describe the problems experienced by a coloured group – for example poverty or discrimination; sometimes the problems which they are said to cause – for example overcrowding; sometimes the second-order problems to which they give rise and with which governments must deal – for example 'Paki-bashing' or white demands that they be repatriated… we have recognised that the third kind of problem may greatly limit the freedom of governments to deal effectively with the first kind; attempts to do more for coloured people always risk exciting the "white backlash." A certain amount of good may have to be done by stealth.[44]

The most serious confrontations between West Indian youth and the police would not break out until the early 1980s. Even though policymakers and police chiefs had long appreciated the underlying economic grievances that would ultimately lead some immigrants to riot, the Thatcher administration tended to dismiss these outbreaks as nothing more than criminal behavior (Thatcher 1993:146-147). Archival sources reveal, however, that almost a decade earlier officials under a Conservative leadership seriously considered the threat of violent unrest, which they understood to be part of a wider phenomenon of economic and sociopolitical exclusion. They argued that West Indian militancy would rise as attempts to break the "cycle of deprivation" would be "frustrated by discrimination" which prevented many "from getting [their] fair share of the public spending programmes aimed at the inner cities.[45] London's Police Commissioner warned of "real danger of racial violence against the police" and policymakers decided that the threat of such violence provided another reason for ensuring "that racial minorities get a fair deal out of society."[46]

The tense relationship between the police and West Indian youth in some localities had indeed been much discussed in government circles and officials noted certain flashpoints. The task force observed that "young West Indians, who are among the more deprived members of the urban working class, may well resent the police in principle as the authoritarian embodiment of a society which has failed to educate, house or employ them adequately," but it was also aware that "The problems are essentially *local* ones, and the details vary according to *local* circumstances."[47] Officials at the Home Office had pointed out that West Indian militancy was not a nationwide problem, but affected particular localities within towns and cities. A 1974 memorandum by the Home Office in fact accurately predicted the areas in London (e.g., Brixton)

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[43] Ministerial Committee on Community Relations and Immigration, July 16, 1974, CAB 134/3778.

[44] Race Relations: draft report, Part 2, written by W.J.L. Plowden, 5 July 1973, CAB 184/140.

[45] "Race Relations," by the Central Policy Review Staff, Volume 1 (paragraphs 71-72), November 1973, CAB 184/207.

[46] "Race Relations," by the Central Policy Review Staff, Volume 2 (paragraph 254), November 1973, CAB 184/207.

[47] "Race Relations," by the Central Policy Review Staff, Volume 2 (paragraphs 249-250), November 1973, CAB 184/207. Emphasis added.

and elsewhere in the country (Birmingham and Manchester) in which West Indian youths would clash with the police years later, belying Thatcher's assessment of opportunistic rioting.[48] However, policymakers were less discerning when it came to explaining the absence of South Asian involvement in confrontations with the police. They speculated that the groups' agricultural background, "certain introversion" and "respect for authority" were responsible for young Asians' apparent docility.[49] Only a few years later, South Asian youth movements and vigilante groups emerged to defend their members from racist attacks in several locations (Forman 1989).

In sum, relying on evidence produced by a variety of sources throughout the country, from the 1950s through the early 1970s, politicians, policymakers and the police placed overwhelming emphasis on the primacy of economic competition and state-sanctioned economic discrimination as the respective drivers of immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict. Many of the violent disorders involving immigrants as victims and as perpetrators indeed occurred during the economic recession of the 1980s and took place in areas that had been especially hard hit by the downturn (Dancygier 2007). But a focus on economic variables alone can only get us so far. Indeed, policymakers were at a loss when trying to account for South Asians' lacking anti-state behavior in the face of West Indian militancy. And what explains the disproportionate targeting of South Asians by native xenophobes?

The Political Basis of Immigrant Conflict

While we have seen that South Asians and Blacks are predominantly economic migrants who share broadly similar immigration histories, these two groups are quite distinct in their social organization, which, when viewed from a political angle, translates into key differences that in turn impact the incidence of immigrant conflict. Strong links of kin, caste and clan among South Asian migrants have helped these settlers gain the local political power to effectively press for scarce state-controlled resources. The great majority of South Asian migrants hail from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but, more specifically, they originate from a small set of regions and villages. Bradford's Pakistanis, for example, come from Mirpur, in Azad Kashmir; the East End's Bangladeshis in London call the Sylhet region home and Southall's Sikh population originates from villages in East Punjab. Ties of kinship, caste, and tribe have shaped both the migration process and determined the destination areas in the new country. As a result, South Asian settlement in Britain is characterized by high concentrations of homogenous immigrant groups in specific locations.[50] West Indians also followed a pattern of chain migration, but social and familial links among and between immigrants from the Caribbean islands are less extensive and their settlement less concentrated as a result. Even though we clearly observe districts with a high overall concentration of Blacks, they tend to be more dispersed within these locations than their South Asian counterparts (Phillips 1998).[51]

Census figures illustrate these differential patterns. When we examine the country's five local authorities with the highest share of Blacks (Africans and Caribbeans) and South Asians

[48] "Disaffected West Indian Youth," Memorandum by the Home Office to the Official Committee on Immigration and Community Relations, May 6, 1974, CAB 134/3722.
[49] "Race Relations," by the Central Policy Review Staff, Volume 2 (paragraph 251), November 1973, CAB 184/207.
[50] For essays about South Asian migration to and presence in Great Britain, see Ballard (1994).
[51] The discussion here focuses mainly on West Indian, as opposed to African, immigrants. African-origin migrants have long lived in Britain, but, until recently, African settlement was also relatively dispersed and small in size. According to Hiro, West Africans "were not concentrated in a particular district of the British conurbations, but were scattered throughout the areas of coloured settlement. Hence no single district with a special flavor of West African life has emerged" (1991: 66).

(Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis), and take group share averages of the wards within these local authorities with the highest concentration of each group, we observe that the average proportion of Blacks in wards with the highest share of Black Africans/Caribbeans is 22.2/17.6 percent, respectively, in 2001 (see Table 1). In contrast, the corresponding figure for Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis are 51.0, 48.9 and 31.7 percent. Table 2.3 shows that similar differences obtain when we take averages of the wards with the second and third highest group shares and when we examine figures from the 1991 census. In 1991, the highest share of Africans/Caribbeans in a single ward was 26.6/30.1 percent; by comparison, these shares for Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were 67.0, 52.8 and 60.7 percent (not shown). In short, South Asian immigrants are more likely to approach electoral majorities in wards than are Blacks, even in local authorities where both groups make up a similar proportions of the total population. The political implications of this difference are straight-forward: Based on purely geographic indicators, divergent settlement paths have served to enhance the potential for political influence among South Asians, but have diluted such potential among Blacks. But politics is not just about numbers – organization counts. It turns out that we also observe important inter-group differences when it comes to the capacity to organize politically.

The social conditions that have given rise to concentrated settlement among South Asians also inform this group's capacity to mobilize in the new country. From the moment of their arrival, South Asian immigrants have exhibited an extraordinary ability to organize, both informally, on the basis of clan and kinship, and formally, through organizations such as the Indian Workers' Association. As early as the 1960s, South Asian immigrants have regularly fielded their own candidates and have relied on strong kin, caste and clan networks to get out the vote. Numerous accounts of voter mobilization illustrate how so-called ethnic leaders within South Asian communities were able to rally their compatriots to the polls.[52] Ealing's first Sikh councilor was elected, for example, by calling on family and friends to drive fellow Indians to polling stations in hundreds of cars – a get-out-the vote effort that was likened to a "military operation."[53] Local politicians were generally in no position to ignore such organizational prowess, a point that was not lost on many South Asians. Leicester's Indian community, dissatisfied with the Labour Party's neglect of their needs, exerted their influence by threatening to field their own candidates and kindly requested that Labour refrain from running candidates in these wards.[54]

Some observers stress that obligations, as well as opportunities, generated by the underlying clan and kin relationships greatly facilitate such mobilization. Conversely, "Failure to gain support within these traditional kin-based networks usually means the failure of a political enterprise" (Scott 1972/73: 39). These dynamics have not necessarily vanished over the years; divisions of caste, clan and kin can still provide the social glue for local political mobilization and can define lines of local political support (Solomos and Beck 1995: 79-80). Far from being expressions of irrational, tribal loyalties, as some would suggest,[55] such behavior is quite rational when access to valued goods (in the political as well as in the social realm) depends on access to ethnic leaders.[56] In short, strong social networks among Britain's South

[52] See, for example, Bentley (1972/73), Scott (1972/73), Le Lohé (1979) and Eade (1989).
[53] *The Times*, "Ealing's first Sikh councilor." Tuesday, May 14, 1968.
[54] *Leicester Mercury*, "Indian Workers' move won't worry us, say councillors." March 22, 1979.
[55] Interview of a former Bradford race relations officer with the author, June 2005.
[56] But ethnic mobilization can of course also cut the other way, if identity-based appeals replace more mainstream appeals and thus fail to deliver tangible goods in the economic realm. See Dickson and Scheve's (2006) formal analysis on the relationship between identity-based appeals and policy slack.

Asian settlers have been conducive to both geographic concentration and mobilization, features that have endowed this group with considerable local political power.

The history of Black political behavior in Britain has indeed been quite different. In addition to their less concentrated settlement, Blacks encountered difficulties when attempting to organize their fellow migrants locally. As one close observer of immigration politics and race relations in Britain noted, "The West Indians by and large vote Labour, if they vote at all—but their organizations are weak…The Asians, on the other hand, both Indians and Pakistanis, are closely organized, and many of them look towards the leaders of Indian Workers' Association for a guide to voting" (Foot, cited in John (1969: 2)). Similarly, Glass questions the potential for mobilization among London's West Indian newcomers on the grounds of the group's social heterogeneity and geographic dispersion, even within London, which prevented their associations from having a discernable local impact. Moreover, West Indians were "on the whole not yet used to being 'organisation men'" (Glass 1961: 200-201). The Secretary of the West Hampstead (London) Labour Party also reported that "Quite a few Indians are members of the Party and attend Ward meetings… [but we] have met with less success with West Indians."[57] Examining the potential West Indian vote in the 1964 general election in Birmingham, a researcher concluded that the absence of community representatives made it "very difficult for anyone, whether West Indian or English, to try to speak to or influence the West Indian community as a whole. The canvassers were very disheartened by their attempts" (Shuttleworth 1965: 73).

In a survey of Nottingham's immigrant population, Lawrence (1974: 150-154) observes that Blacks not only lacked the organizational resources displayed by their South Asian counterparts; they were also less likely to approve of using ethnic membership for political purposes. Lawrence found that even though West Indians formed the largest nonwhite ethnic group in Nottingham, only two percent of West Indian respondents were members of immigrant organizations and a full 90 percent were not aware of any such local associations. By contrast, 47 percent of Indians and 36 percent of Pakistanis were members of organizations catering to immigrants and only 37 and 18 percent of Indians and Pakistanis, respectively, had not heard of any immigrant associations. Moreover, Indians and Pakistanis were more than twice as likely as West Indian migrants to agree with the idea of casting their ballots as a bloc vote to further the cause of their ethnic group in the political realm.[58] Others have also noted that West Indians in Britain are "ill-equipped by tradition and disposition to provide an exclusively 'ethnic' leadership. This is so because, whilst drawing much inspiration from the symbols and history of the ethnic group, West Indians are disinclined to base social and political action on ethnicity" (Goulbourne 1990: 297). Resistance to such calculated moves may have been less driven by objections to instrumental voting behavior, but might have had more to do with divisions within their own ranks. Several accounts have stressed that the internal fissures among Britain's West Indian population routinely paralyzed concerted political action (cf. Heineman 1972: 76-77). While some have argued that class divisions have stunted collective action and deprived West Indians of group leaders (Patterson 1963: 378-379, Sharpe 1965: 29-30), others have pointed to

[57] Letter by Hon. Secretary Roy Shaw, West Hampstead, to Eric Whittle, Asst. Commonwealth Officer, February 5, 1957.

[58] The exact question wording is as follows: "Some people have suggested that it would help Indian immigrants (or Pakistani, etc., as appropriate) if they got together and decided to vote for the same party. What do you think of this view?" (Lawrence 1974: 150). Only 18 percent of West Indians agreed with this statement, compared to 37 percent of Indians and 45 percent of Pakistanis.

rivalries that existed between immigrants from different islands, some of which were attributed to the divisive policies of their former colonial rulers (Pilkington 1988: 141). Regardless of the underlying mechanism, turnout rates have been and remain lower among Blacks than among South Asians. According to a recent survey, only 42.1 (58.6) percent of Black immigrants, compared to 66.9 (81.8) percent of South Asians reported having voted in recent local (general) elections.[59]

The mobilization of the ethnic vote at the local level has of course important distributional consequences in settings where local politicians allocate valued resources. As archival sources have revealed, scarcity of resources controlled by the state has resulted in immigrant conflict – but it is the political power of immigrant groups at the local level that decides whether natives will turn against immigrants or whether immigrants will turn against the state. Ironically, while policymakers did not recognize the political bases of immigrant conflict, the measures that they proposed to help West Indians acquire economic goods effectively substituted for this group's lacking political power at the local level. Specifically, the Home Office was urged to give "sympathetic consideration" to applications for grant aid submitted under the Urban Programme;[60] "it was agreed that the highest priority should go to self-help groups aiming to reach disaffected West Indian youth" and the Home Office also acquiesced when asked "not [to] necessarily insist on the same standards of accountability in these cases as in the general run of the Urban Programme."[61] After the 1981 riots, additional funds directed at "disaffected West Indians" were made available, and it had "become received wisdom that certain projects [had] been funded under the Urban Programme either because those who proposed them threatened that there would be riots if funding was not made available, or promised a reduction in local crime if it was" (Fitzgerald 1988: 393). While the central government had to cajole local authorities to fund projects aimed at groups whose voting power fell short, local councilors cooperated – sometimes reluctantly, other times eagerly – with politically influential immigrant groups to ensure access to such government funds.[62] As we will see next, the German state pursued a different strategy in its approach to immigrant conflict.

5. Explaining Immigrant Conflict in Germany: The Economic Logic of Guestworker Immigration

Whereas initial mass-scale migration occurred almost by accident in Britain, in Germany, employers, unions and the state designed the temporary worker program in ways that would benefit each of their constituencies. Employers faced tight labor markets and regional labor imbalances that threatened to push up wages and impede production. Unions, although initially skeptical, were not averse to immigration either, for in exchange for the inflow of low-skilled labor, German workers received a shorter work week, more extensive education and training and upward mobility. In addition to facilitating the smooth functioning of the German economy, the state valued the employment of immigrant labor for its anticipated beneficial fiscal impact. Guestworkers, especially if they were young and living without dependents, were expected to

[59] These figures apply to those born outside of the UK, since much of the previous discussion is based on the political behavior of this group. Similar patterns emerge when I include later generation immigrants. See Home Office (2005).

[60] "Disaffected Young West Indians," Memorandum by the Home Office to the Official Committee on Immigration and Community Race Relations, May 6, 1974, CAB 134/3772.

[61] "Grant-aiding Projects which Benefit Ethnic Minorities," Draft submission for Mr. Howard-Drake's signature, February 7, 1977, HO 390/7.

[62] See Dancygier (2007) for detailed accounts of such cooperation.

contribute more to unemployment, pension and health insurance systems than they would take out, would put little pressure on public resources such as schools and social services, and offered the additional benefit of helping to stave off inflationary pressures, due to their tendency to save and send money home.[63]

With interests aligned in this fashion, Germany signed its first recruitment treaty with Italy in 1955. Treaties with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), Tunisia and Morocco (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) followed. The planning and execution of guestworker migration was quite extensive. The Federal Employment Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*) and employers set up recruitment centers in the sending countries, offered language and job training and arranged for the trip to Germany. In contrast to Great Britain, labor migration was only possible within the confines of a tightly governed system of rules and regulations. Recruitment of individual workers was contingent upon the allocation of specific jobs which were subject to social insurance contributions (*sozialversicherungspflichtig*). Migrants who had been granted work permits were also legally required to receive treatment in the employment and welfare fields that was equal to their German counterparts (*sozialrechtliche Gleichstellung*) and thus were employed under the same labor laws and collective bargaining agreements.[64] During the early years of recruitment, economic integration of immigrants thus occurred by design. Equality of treatment not only provided guestworkers with a guaranteed level of compensation and benefits, it also reassured natives that the importation of low-skilled foreign labor would not put downward pressure on wages and working conditions.

While guestworkers were embedded in an already existing set of economic and social welfare laws, additional measures had to be taken to find accommodation for the hundreds of thousands of incoming workers. The recruitment treaties specified from the very beginning that employers would have to provide housing, subsidized by the state, for the workers they had brought in from abroad and the Federal Employment Office only placed foreign workers in a job, once it could be verified that they could be housed. Living conditions were, however, quite modest as employers were only asked to comply with housing laws dating back to the 1930s. Over the course of the 1960s, pressure from sending countries, the Federal Employment Office, as well as guestworkers themselves led to successive improvements in these facilities and the Ministry of Labor spelled out the minimum standards that these lodgings would have to meet in order to ensure "adequate and humane" accommodation for both Germans and foreigners.[65] In reality, guestworkers who were housed in employer-provided hostels did generally not enjoy the same standards as their German counterparts. Government planners and employers justified this discrepancy by referring to the temporary nature of migrants' stay, their intention to save and ensuing preference for cheap housing, and the lower standards that foreign workers were used to in their home countries (von Oswald and Schmidt 1999: 184-191, Herbert 2001: 214-216).

The rules governing guestworker immigration thus ensured that in the early years of immigrant arrival, competition with natives over of housing, which had been so contentious in some British cities, generally did not take place. Additionally, the fact that guestworkers' stay in the host country was contingent on holding a job, which in turn was subject to Germany's

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[63] See Herbert (2001), Schönwälder (2001), and Steinert (1995) for a more detailed discussion of the origins of Germany's guestworker program. Schönwälder (2001) also argues that in addition to economic factors, foreign policy considerations played an important role in shaping Germany's immigration regime.

[64] See, for example, Huber and Unger (1982: 131), Kühne (2000: 45), and Herbert (2001: 281).

[65] B134/37467: Draft of a memo, "Foreign workers; increased support for housing construction and infrastructure," February 12, 1973.

comparatively generous labor and welfare laws further limited the incidence of economic hardship and deprivation among the immigrant population. A comparative analysis sponsored by the Federal Employment Office indeed concluded that "in the area of social benefits, Germany clearly presents the best option" for migrants.[66] Compared to other European countries, Germany not only provided the most generous unemployment and pension benefits, it also was the most inclusive when it came to incorporating foreign workers into its labor market and welfare institutions. Most foreigners seemed to share this assessment. When asked what they could learn from Germans, the majority of foreigners (63 percent) put the country's social welfare system in first place. Although the benefits of Germany's inclusive welfare laws were praised, the report conceded that "opportunities for political involvement have hardly developed." But it went on to note that "due to the dominance of economic motives, this lack in opportunities for political involvement has thus far surely only played a secondary role."[67]

The call to extend the local franchise to non-Germans would be repeated many times over the course of the next decades, but was never successful. In the meantime, the great majority of guestworkers and their dependents remained excluded politically. This lack of local and national political leverage meant that politicians were generally predisposed to place the needs of their native constituents ahead of the newcomers'. Just as in Great Britain, where policymakers and local politicians had been painfully aware that "doing too much" for immigrants would anger natives, German officials were careful not to cater too much to immigrant needs. While the provision of housing and employment did not prove contentious during the boom years of the 1950s and early 1960s, in later years, economic slowdowns and tighter housing markets in the larger cities prompted a more cautious approach to guestworkers' economic integration.

Immigrant Economic Integration in Hard Times: Germans First

The most obvious outward signal of this new policy orientation came in 1973, when the government put a stop to any further labor migration. The ban coincided with the oil crisis and its anticipated economic repercussions, but employers and the government had become less interested in the continued inflows of foreign workers even prior to the oil shock. Employers began to view low-skilled guestworkers as an impediment to the modernization of production, while the government was forced to revise its ideas about the anticipated fiscal benefits of the guestworker scheme. The arrival of spouses and children had made the initial cost-benefit calculations associated with the large-scale recruitment of foreign workers obsolete. As one newspaper put it in 1971, "the non-integrated guestworker, vegetating on a very low standard of living, causes relatively minor costs of about DM 30,000. But in the case of full integration, claims on services totaling DM 150,000 to 200,000 per worker have to be assessed."[68]

In light of this new set of circumstances, the government began to pursue a more restrictive approach to migrant labor. While the principle of equal treatment in social and labor matters still applied to foreigners in possession of a work permit, unemployed guestworkers were at a clear disadvantage in Germany's tightening labor market; the Federal Employment Office and its local branches throughout the country were obligated to allocate jobs to foreign workers

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[66] B106/69849, report by Anke Peters, Institute for labor market and occupational research, Federal Employment Office, entitled "The economic and political conditions in the Federal Republic as determinants for the choice of destination country," April 1972.
[67] Ibid.
[68] *Das Handelsblatt*, "Mehr Auslandsinvestitionen – weniger Gastarbeiter," January 23, 1971; cited in Herbert (2001: 227). On the changing cost-benefit calculations of employers and the state, see Herbert (2001: 226-229).

only if native labor was unavailable.[69] In 1974, when the national unemployment rate had more than doubled in the span of one year, the president of the Federal Employment Office sent a letter to all local offices to make sure that the guidelines were indeed being implemented by "applying strict standards in every single case." German part-time and older workers, ex-convicts, and *Aussiedler* were to be given priority over guestworkers.[70] In the case of unemployment, then, the principle of equal treatment was replaced by the principle of "Germans first" (*Vorrang deutscher Arbeitnehmer*).

In the housing field, German households also generally fared better than their immigrant counterparts. By the 1970s, it had become apparent that the initial plans for accommodating guestworkers had outlived their usefulness. As many migrants reunited with their families, they moved out of employer-provided hostels and sought housing, which, amidst a general relaxation of the housing market, was a scarce resource in some of Germany's larger cities. In the private rented market, however, competition between native and migrant families was reduced by the availability of older, sub-standard housing that had been abandoned by German households. Based on nationwide patterns, officials concluded in 1975 that immigrant families generally rented older apartments that were no longer desired by German tenants due to the high rate of new building construction in the private and social housing sector.[71] Access to government-subsidized social housing[72] – the source of so much immigrant-native strife in Great Britain – was, in turn, virtually closed-off for guestworkers and their families. A government survey of the housing situation of immigrants in North Rhine Westphalia, the *Land* with the largest guestworker population, showed that 85 percent of migrant households lived in pre-war buildings and concluded that "immigrants hardly stand a chance of obtaining social housing."[73] Another survey conducted in 1971 confirmed this assessment; it revealed that only one percent of guestworkers lived in social housing (Mehrländer 1974: 183).

Local officials certainly faced few political incentives to house guestworkers and their families in newly built social housing units. But in light of alternatives in the private sector, there also seemed to be less pressure on such housing. At a 1973 meeting of the building finance committee (*Baufinanzierungsausschuß*), representatives of all *Länder* unanimously reported that immigrant households themselves tended to prefer the cheapest accommodations available, which were often to be found in cities' pre-war housing stock. The social housing sector was allegedly of less interest to this population.[74] This characterization is certainly too benign, in that it ignores the fact that many migrant households faced discrimination in both the private and the social housing market. Landlords often refused to rent out apartments to working class migrants, for fear of seeing the value of their properties decrease. They were, however, happy to profit

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[69] See B149/54450: Letter by the Federal Employment Office to all offices, November 13, 1974. This decree did not apply to the employment of workers from the European Community. Of the sending countries, only Italy belonged to the European Community at the time.
[70] Ibid. See footnote 7 for a definition of *Aussiedler.*
[71] B106/69849: Letter by the Federal Ministry of Land Use Planning, Building Industry and Urban Development (*Bundesminister für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau*) to several federal ministries, August 15, 1975. The secondary literature repeatedly mentions that immigrants moved into housing that had been deserted by natives. See Pagenstecher (1994: 45) and Eberle (2007) whose work is entitled, "'If someone moved out, Turks moved in.'"
[72] Social housing in Germany refers to housing that has been built with state subsidies, but is often not owned by the state. Local authorities assign this type of housing directly to tenants or may give out permits to prospective tenants to be presented to landlords. Rents and tenant incomes cannot exceed a designated ceiling (Häußermann 1994).
[73] B106/45161. This file contains BT Drs 6/3085, January 31, 1972, on which these numbers are based.
[74] B134/37467 (Band 23): report of a meeting of the building finance committee held in Bremen, September 6-7, 1973.

from immigrants by offering them derelict housing that would otherwise have to be torn down. Officials had become aware of the disadvantaged position that the newcomers occupied in the housing market. To avoid the development of immigrant "ghettos" and the ensuing "decline in reputation" of this group, over the course of the 1970s, a larger number of social housing units would be opened up to guestworkers and their families.[75] While official guidelines prevented the explicit enactment of a policy that would assign guestworker households older apartments in the social housing stock that had been freed up by German tenants who moved into newly built units, such a practice, referred to as "tenant rotation" or "apartment exchange" (*Mieterrotation* or *Wohnungsaustausch*) was nevertheless unofficially endorsed and carried out locally.[76] Notwithstanding these practices, housing did not represent a major source of grievance. A representative survey, carried out by employment offices in 1972, found that even of the 60 percent of guestworkers who had moved into private housing, 80 percent were satisfied with their accommodation.[77]

While the state's intervention on behalf of natives in the area of employment was much more extensive than its involvement in the housing sector, the federal government and the *Länder* decided to alleviate some of the pressures on housing and other public resources such as education by restricting the areas where guestworkers could settle. The immigration ban had put a stop to new labor migrants entering the country, but the government also wanted to regulate the movement of migrants within Germany. Some local governments had already acted on their own initiatives and banned immigrants from moving into their most overcrowded areas.[78] The Ministry of Labor, along with representatives of the *Länder*, followed suit by banning labor migrants from settling in areas where large inflows had put a strain on public resources. In these so-called "overburdened settlement areas" (*überlastete Siedlungsgebiete*), which included cities and towns where the share of immigrants exceeded twice the national average of six percent, employment offices were prohibited from allocating jobs to immigrants for at least one year. Future allocations would only be allowed if the number of immigrants fell below a designated threshold.[79] The ban (*Zuzugssperre*) showed some signs of success. The Bavarian Minister of Labor praised the settlement restrictions for having halted a further rise in areas of guestworker concentration and noted that the share of immigrants in Munich, where housing and public services had been stretched thin, had fallen by close to seven percent.[80] The program was, however, eventually phased out in 1977, when employers complained that constraints on immigrants' mobility had left many positions unfilled (Meier-Braun 1988: 14, 83).

A system of rules and regulations thus operated to keep Germans from losing out in the competition over employment, housing and public resources. While these goods had not been in

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[75] B119/5017: "Note for the meeting with the European Community Commission – Social Affairs Directorate – held May 9, 1974."

[76] Ibid. The Federal Employment Office said it welcomed such a policy, but could not provide financial assistance to facilitate tenant rotation, since its mandate was limited to the construction of new housing units.

[77] See B134/37467: Draft of a memo "Foreign workers; increased support for housing construction and infrastructure," February 12, 1973. The author noted, however, that the presumed lower standards of guestworkers as well as potential response biases should be borne in mind when interpreting the findings.

[78] In Berlin, for example, migrants were not allowed to settle in three districts where the share of foreigners ranged between 17 and 23 percent and had consequently put an "increased burden" on social services in the area. See B134/37467: Undated letter of the Berlin Senate to the Berlin House of Representatives.

[79] B 119/5136: Memo by the Federal Ministry of Labor, "Regulation of migration of foreign workers into overburdened settlement areas," October 22, 1974.

[80] B136/12893: Letter of the Bavarian Minister of Labor to the Chancellor's Office and other Ministries, February 12, 1976.

short supply during the initial period of guestworker recruitment when the German economy flourished and families had not yet reunited, local, state and federal officials increasingly favored natives in the allocation of economic goods once conditions deteriorated and the immigrant population expanded to include spouses and children. At the federal level, the preferential treatment of Germans was quite deliberately seen as a means to keep hostility against immigrants in check. When policymakers and organizations dealing with guestworker questions proposed expanding special housing programs for guestworker households in the early 1970s, officials were wary of allocating increased funds to these newcomers. "In light of the scarce housing supply among natives," a government official noted that, "any special program for guestworkers would not appeal to the native population and could possibly even lead to increased hostility against foreigners."[81] Even though officials acknowledged that existing housing programs were "insufficient," did not meet immigrant needs and had to be "subsidized to a greater extent," they nevertheless seemed to agree that "funds should preferably be raised without incurring additional charges on the federal budget and…should not be specially administered or distributed, if only so that the apartment-seeking domestic population were not given support for the allegation that foreigners were treated more favorably than Germans." Similarly, when confronted with the fact that many guestworkers did not move into social housing because rents were considered too high, the government rejected the proposal to single out individual guestworkers with a means-tested housing allowance that would go beyond the benefits received by the general population.[82] Finally, placing restrictions on the areas of immigrant settlement had also been conceived by the Ministry of the Interior as one of the "potential measures for the prevention of the emergence of xenophobia."[83]

The federal government, the *Länder*, and cities were certainly aware of the potential for conflict between immigrants and natives that could arise in a tense economic environment. Officials at the Ministry of the Interior, for example, collected local press clippings that dealt with latent intergroup tensions that had been building in cities like Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin where the share of immigrants had risen from close to zero in the early 1960s to eighteen, seventeen and nine percent, respectively, by the mid-1970s.[84] But unlike the situation in Great Britain, where anti-immigrant candidates had run in local elections, violent confrontations between immigrants and natives had occurred, and a government task force was charged with investigating *existing* "racial strife," the emphasis in Germany was on the *prevention* of such conflict. By 1973, though unaware of instances of confrontations between immigrants and natives in Germany, government officials deemed it important to "avoid any undesirable

[81] B134/37467: "Memo regarding the construction of apartments for foreign workers; establishment of a special fund," November 21, 1972. Even in 1960, federal Ministries rejected a proposal that would have housed guestworkers in newly built terraced houses or higher-quality hostels, rather than in the eventual barrack-style accommodations, because they felt that funding for such housing should first go to benefit the German population (von Oswald and Schmidt 1999: 187).
[82] B134/37467: Minutes of the fifth meeting of the working group "Apartments and Hostels" held March 12, 1975 at the Ministry of the Interior, Düsseldorf.
[83] B106/45159: Report, "Foreign workers in the Federal Republic of Germany – Possibilities and limits of their integration in the area of interior administration," January 23, 1973.
[84] See newspaper clippings, mostly from 1973, in B106/45166. The percentage of non-Germans refers to data collected in September 1975; see B106/45167: "Share of foreigners in the residential population of the Federal Republic," Bonn, February 27, 1976.

developments" in this area and commissioned research projects to investigate the causes of potential hostility directed against immigrants.[85]

Between Integration and Exit: State Responses to Immigrant Economic Disadvantage

I have argued that organized mobilization against immigrants did not occur in Germany because natives did not lose out in the competition for material resources. When economic conditions deteriorated, the government refrained from implementing programs that were seen to target immigrants directly with benefits, gave Germans priority in the allocation of jobs and prevented migrant workers from settling in areas where public services were stretched thin. The question that arises, then, is: why did disenfranchised immigrants not turn against the state when their economic situation worsened and state policies effectively discriminated against them?

As noted above, conflicts between immigrants and state actors did generally not take place in Germany. Official reports of smaller-scale clashes or peaceful resistance that the secondary literature might have missed failed to turn up as well in archival materials, in spite of the numerous documented occasions of discussions concentrating on the nature and effects of immigrant settlement in Germany.[86] This was not for lack of surveillance; at the National Archives an entire folder is dedicated to the monitoring of immigrants' political activities by the Ministry of the Interior.[87] The political activities of immigrants were closely watched, if only to avoid the "infiltration of communists" (Pagenstecher 1994: 29). When officials expressed concern with violent protest on the part of immigrants, it was limited to crimes committed against institutions or individuals of the foreigners' home countries. Croatian and Turkish nationalists or militant supporters of the Greek and Palestinian resistance movements, and their intentions to "carry out their differences illegally on German soil" were considered a danger to the country's security, but no mention was made of activities directed against the German state.[88]

The absence of immigrant-state conflict during times of increased economic scarcity is a result of the economic foundations of Germany's immigration regime. In essence, when economic conditions worsened, the rules of the guestworker program ensured a minimum standard of well-being on the part of migrants living in Germany by ordering or inducing the economically least successful foreigners to leave the country, while the principle of equal treatment demanded that the remaining guestworkers were covered by Germany's comparatively generous social welfare laws. The state took additional steps to ensure that this logic would operate by, on the one hand, providing incentives for dissatisfied immigrants to exit, and, on the other, by attempting to economically integrate those migrants who had decided to stay. The fear of future social unrest in case of large-scale immigrant unemployment and socioeconomic marginalization was a central motive for economic integration policies. At the same time,

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[85] B106/45159: Internal letter, Ministry of the Interior, "Research projects of the Federal Office for population research; announcement of research contracts in the areas of foreigner and citizenship law, July 24, 1973.

[86] During the 1960s and 1970s the interior ministers of the *Länder* met frequently at conferences to discuss, amongst other things, the domestic security implications of the growing immigrant presence. In addition, *Länder* representatives responsible for immigration questions (*Ausländerreferenten*) met to exchange information several times a year. The reports of these conferences and meetings do not mention instances of low-level or large-scale confrontations between immigrants and state actors (nor do they mention clashes between immigrants and natives). See B106/39995, B106/39996, B106/60299 and B106/60300, which cover the years 1965 to 1976 (for conferences of the interior ministers) and 1971 to 1973 (for meetings of the *Ausländerreferenten*). Schönwälder (2001) draws on files from previous *Ausländerreferenten* meetings, and does not mention instances of immigrant-state conflict either.

[87] See file B106/69888, entitled "Organizations of migrant workers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1956-1980."

[88] B106/45159: Report, "Foreign workers in the Federal Republic of Germany – Possibilities and limits of their integration in the area of interior administration," January 23, 1973.

politicians were not often inclined to allocate resources to a non-voting constituency, especially if such measures appeared to come at the expense of voting natives. As a result, integration policies that were specifically targeted at immigrants remained rather modest in nature. Nevertheless, for most of the 1970s and 1980s, balancing immigrant and native needs in this fashion proved sufficiently effective in limiting economic hardship and holding back major expressions of discontent among the country's migrant population.

As the term suggests, the overriding rationale of the guestworker scheme was to employ migrants temporarily in jobs that natives would not or could not do. As a result, foreign workers who were unemployed, had used up their unemployment benefits and did not receive a renewed work permit were supposed to leave the country. The assumed flexibility of imported labor to adjust to economic fluctuations had after all been a major selling point of the guestworker program. During a brief economic recession in the late 1960s, this logic did indeed seem to be at work, when approximately half a million foreigners had left the Federal Republic and unemployment among guestworkers remained below German levels.[89] Guestworkers who were not able to find work once their unemployment benefits had expired increasingly had to draw on social assistance (*Sozialhilfe*). Such migrants, who were no longer considered economically active (*unverfügbar*), were subject to deportation when social assistance payments exceeded a period of three months. The exportation of unwanted labor remained a policy objective throughout the 1970s and according to the Ministry of Labor, a substantial number of guestworkers were leaving the country thanks to the "restrictive execution" (*restriktive Handhabung*) of existing law.[90] Between 1974 and 1977, when the employment outlook appeared gloomy, net migration to Germany was negative as migrants with the least productive economic record were forced to exit.[91]

In addition, guestworkers whose economic outlook did not seem promising were encouraged to return to their home countries. Such policies were seen to be "justified, because the danger of radicalization of unemployed immigrants was very large."[92] According to a high-ranking official at the Ministry of Labor, the large-scale departure of unemployed migrants had provided "noticeable relief for the German labor market and contributed to the Federal Republic being spared major social and economic conflicts" (Bodenbender 1982: 53). Indeed, for most of the 1970s, the unemployment rate among immigrants was not significantly higher, and initially even lower, than that of their native counterparts.

Although the state had tried to coerce or encourage economically marginalized guestworkers to exit, politicians and policymakers followed the inauspicious trends in foreigners' employment status with increasing concern and became anxious that some of those who stayed would decide to voice their discontent with their deteriorating economic situation. The guiding principles of foreigner policy (*Ausländerpolitik*) were thus to maintain the immigration ban, encourage guestworkers to leave, and integrate those who stayed behind.[93] Integration and return came to represent the two pillars of Germany's immigrant policy. The socioeconomic integration of second generation immigrant youth had in fact already emerged as an important

[89] See Herbert (2001: 384). Guestworkers who had obtained a "special work permit" (*besondere Arbeitserlaubnis*) were exempt from these measures.
[90] The Ministry of Labor estimated that in the second half of 1974, 100,000 foreign workers had left the country because of the strict guidelines handed down by the Federal Employment Office. See B149/54452, prepared document for the presidents' meeting (*Sprechunterlage für die Präsidentenbesprechung*), July 14, 1975.
[91] Author's calculations, based on Herbert (2001: 384).
[92] B149/54451: Internal letter, Ministry of Labor, January 29, 1975.
[93] BT Drs 9/1629, May 5, 1982.

issue in the early 1970s. Having surveyed the generally unfavorable educational and economic performance of guestworker children, government officials and politicians began to contemplate the potential law-and-order implications of an entrenched immigrant underclass. Similar to Great Britain, officials in Germany looked to the "grave instances of civil strife" in the United States with great concern and concluded that Germany would also have to face "serious social conflicts" if migrants were to be permanently disadvantaged economically.[94] The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior likened the continuation of immigration and the associated emergence of an underprivileged, low-skilled second generation underclass to the "import of social explosives," that would eventually threaten the state.[95]

Voices outside of government had also recognized the potential social costs that could arise if immigrant youth were not integrated economically. In a letter to the Ministry of Labor, the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB) urged the government to institute policies that would allow immigrant youth greater access to the labor market. The "dangers" associated with a failure to do so, not only "for immigrants themselves, but for the state and society as a whole," the DGB warned, would far outweigh the perceived labor market benefits that resulted from the exclusion of the second generation.[96] In 1978, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) also called on the government to make the improvement of the economic opportunities of immigrant youth a policy priority. Children of guestworkers, now numbering close to one million, lagged behind their German counterparts in education, employment and occupational mobility. If no significant changes occurred, immigrant youth would "one day organize and rebel against their approaching fate."[97] Local officials similarly perceived the "masses of school dropouts as a 'ticking time bomb'" and press coverage spoke of the danger to domestic security if immigrant ghettos and "Harlem-like" conditions were allowed to develop (cf. Pagenstecher 1994: 45-46). Several years later, a government committee charged with the investigation of youth violence in Germany stated that immigrant youth had thus far refrained from engaging in violent demonstrations against the state. But it nevertheless warned that "if growing numbers of second generation immigrant youth find themselves in a hopeless situation at the margins of our society, the probability that they will react with protest rises."[98]

In view of these alarming forecasts, the federal government made the economic and social incorporation of the second generation the "overriding goal" of its overall integration framework in the late 1970s.[99] Under the leadership of Social Democratic (SPD) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, more liberal rules in the area of youth employment were enacted[100] and the government also encouraged the *Länder* to institute integration measures in the area of schooling and youth supervision. Starting in 1976, the Ministry for Youth, Family and Health ran additional programs that aimed to prepare immigrant youth for their entry into the German labor market and also promoted the supervision and support of youth in inner cities. Social support centers were expanded and reoriented from helping to meet migrants' initial settlement needs towards assisting in their children's occupational integration. Such measures were considered

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[94] This was the assessment of a 1972 study based on conditions in Munich. Its findings were summarized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior in an undated document; see B106/45167.
[95] B119/5135: undated letter is undated (most likely from late 1972 or early 1973).
[96] B149/54452: Letter from the DGB, national executive board (*Bundesvorstand*) to the Ministry of Labor, February 2, 1976.
[97] BT Drs 8/811, Mai 17, 1978.
[98] BT Drs 9/2390 January 17, 1983, p. 29.
[99] BT Drs 8/2716, March 29, 1979.
[100] See Meier-Braun (1988: 13) and BT Drs 8/2875, June 13, 1979.

especially important as they would "show immigrants ways to overcome their problems while at the same time counteract the development of dissatisfaction and aggression."[101] While the share of immigrant children attending school had risen considerably, many immigrants still did not graduate from high school and additional efforts were required to ease the transition from school to work.[102] Finally, in addition to the federal government's integration agenda, the late 1970s also witnessed a lot of activity in many *Länder*, which proposed and instituted integration plans alongside federal programs (Meier-Braun 1988).

The emphasis on integration was, however, to be short-lived. Indeed, the focus on immigrant integration, and the costs that were associated with it, was apparently only deemed practical when the economy was considered to be in good health. By 1981, following the second oil crisis, unemployment was on the rise again and the unemployment rate among immigrants started diverging from that of the population as a whole. With the great majority of immigrants employed in blue-collar work in sectors that were generally on the decline,[103] policymakers did not expect this trend to abate in the near future. As a result, the SPD-led government reordered its priorities and now officially placed the "strengthening of the willingness to return" ahead of the integration of immigrants.[104]

This policy was also vigorously pursued by the coalition government headed by Helmut Kohl of the CDU. Legislative proposals to ease the naturalization requirements for second generation immigrants were, however, rejected, as was the notion that Germany had become a country of immigration (*Einwanderungsland*) (Mehrländer 1986: 103). Instead the Kohl government passed legislation that would award "return bonuses" (*Rückkehrprämien*) to immigrant workers who had become unemployed due to factory closures or who had been ordered to work shorter hours due to falling demand (*Kurzarbeit*). While this law applied to a relatively small number of guestworkers, its stipulations made sure that it targeted workers who had been employed in the least profitable sectors of the economy that were not expected to recover in the near future, such as steel, mining and shipbuilding.[105] In addition to these specific financial incentives, other regulations allowed guestworkers to buy out their pension contributions, provided they left the country with their dependents.[106] Finally, the government also provided financial support for the reintegration of migrants into their home countries. To reduce barriers to return further and assist with the adjustment in the countries of origin, home-bound guestworkers were permitted to carry over home savings and loan agreements that had been signed in Germany without financial penalties.[107]

Overall, these measures certainly did not solve the integration problems faced by guestworkers and their family members who had decided to remain in Germany. They did, however, induce many of the economically least successful migrants to leave the country. The

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[101] Excerpt from an unsourced document entitled "Integration Measures" (*Integrierende Maßnahmen*) contained in a 1975 file on the "Overall concept for Immigrant Policies, Integration and Incorporation" (*Gesamtkonzeption für die Ausländerpolitik, Integration, Eingliederung*); see B106/69849.
[102] BT Drs 9/1629, May 5, 1982, p. 8-13. See also Faist (1995).
[103] In 1987, over 70 percent of economically active immigrants were "workers" (*Arbeiter*), compared to less than 20 percent who were white-collar employees (*Angestellte*); see BT Drs 12/6960, March 11, 1994.
[104] BT Drs 9/1629, May 5, 1982.
[105] In the state of North Rhine Westphalia, for example, every third application for return bonuses came from workers in the ailing steel industry. Companies themselves also offered financial compensation for departing guestworkers (Körner 1986: 69, Motte 1999: 179, Kühne 2000: 47, Herbert 2001: 256).
[106] In previous years, guestworkers had to wait two years before they could claim these contributions. See BT Drs 10/2497, November 26, 1984.
[107] BT Drs 10/4450, December 4, 1985.

Federal Employment Office attributed the reduction in the unemployment rate among immigrants in 1984 (then estimated at one percentage point overall, and 2.3 percentage points among Turkish workers, compared to the previous year) directly to its legislation.[108] Indeed, fifteen percent of all Turkish citizens residing in Germany, the group who had been hardest hit by unemployment, left the country that year. Far from being a sustainable solution, return migration – voluntary, induced, or coerced – only temporarily reduced economic disadvantage among immigrants in Germany by simply exporting it. In the coming decades, as the number of second and third generation immigrants who, in many cases, had never been to their parents' home countries rose steadily, fewer guestworkers pursued the exit option and would instead have to be integrated into German labor market institutions. Improvements in the residential status of immigrants who had long resided in Germany – an integrative measure that had indeed been implemented – also meant that coercive return would no longer apply to the majority of guestworkers in the coming years. Political exclusion, however, remained the norm and attempts to introduce local voting rights for immigrants failed repeatedly.[109]

Comparing Great Britain and Germany

A comparative look at developments over time as well as across countries illustrates the initial effectiveness of the guestworker regime in keeping economic disadvantage in check (especially when contrasted with Great Britain) and also depicts the effects of this system's demise. Figure 4a plots the unemployment rates of immigrants in Germany and ethnic minorities in Great Britain, while Figure 4b charts the ratio of these groups' unemployment rates to overall unemployment rates. One immediately notices the very low initial levels of unemployment among immigrants in Germany, which were even below German rates. Over time, the number of jobless immigrants in Germany increased, as did the unemployment gap between natives and immigrants. The large-scale exit of many guestworkers during the difficult 1980s led to a temporary reduction in immigrant unemployment and brought rates closer to those of their native counterparts. Since the late 1980s, unemployment rates of immigrants in Germany have tracked those of the German workforce, albeit at considerably higher levels. Turning to Great Britain, we observe considerably higher unemployment rates among ethnic minorities during the 1980s as well as a much larger gap between ethnic minority and overall unemployment. In 1984, for example, when overall unemployment rates in Germany and Britain were 9.1 and 11.7 percent, respectively, the difference between immigrant and native unemployment rates was 4.9 percentage points in Germany, compared to 10.3 points in Britain, illustrating that the labor market effects of the recession were disproportionately experienced by Britain's ethnic minorities. Economic integration and large-scale return had resulted in a smaller gap in Germany. Figure 4a illustrates these trends; the ratio of immigrant unemployment to overall unemployment in Britain almost always exceeds the ratio we observe in Germany. Finally, the decision to open up German labor market institutions, including vocational training, to descendants of guestworkers also had comparatively favorable effects on youth unemployment. In both countries, ethnic minority youth unemployment rates have been

[108] BT Drs 10/2497, November 26, 1984. While the number of returnees is not in dispute, some have challenged the government's assertion that the legislation was the immediate cause for the rise in out-migration (cf. Motte 1999).
[109] On migrants' political rights, see, for example, Huber and Unger (1982: 172), Kühne (2000: 48-49) and Meier-Braun (1988: 15-16).

approximately twice as high as overall youth rates; but in Germany, this rate was 15.4 percent among immigrant youth, compared to 28.1 percent among ethnic minority youth in Britain.[110]

6. Immigration Regimes and Tradeoffs

In sum, during times of overall economic decline, Germany's immigration regime performed better in reducing levels of economic disadvantage among immigrants than did its British counterpart, where immigration had largely eluded state and economic planners. For the first three decades of guestworker immigration, the twin logics of integration and exit worked to ensure a minimum standard of economic well-being among guestworkers and their descendants in Germany. Today, however, the initial rules and regulations that governed guestworker migration no longer apply and the labor market position of many former guestworkers and their descendants, now in their third and fourth generation, reflects their often lower skill profile. When economic conditions deteriorate, as they did starting in the mid-1990s, this group, and particularly its younger members, tends to be especially vulnerable. Similar to their counterparts in Great Britain, then, first and later generation migrants in Germany today are increasingly exposed to economic downturns and gradual advancements in education, employment and housing are often overshadowed by disadvantage.[111] Lacking local or national political clout, they also are in no position to make credible demands for improved economic incorporation. In this sense, immigrant economic integration and its implications for immigrant conflict in Germany today show some resemblance to developments among West Indians in Great Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. Even though major riots directed against the state have not characterized the overall situation in Germany, smaller-scale events have occurred and follow familiar patterns. In Berlin, for example (where immigrant unemployment rates reached over 30 percent in the late 1990s) several violent confrontations between police officers and the areas' Turkish residents have taken place, often following the arrest of ethnic minority youths.[112] The recent liberalization of Germany's citizenship laws and the ensuing rise in naturalizations could counteract these developments, but, depending on local economic conditions and migrants' political behavior, could also provoke resistance on the part of the remaining population.

The argument presented here thus produces a set of unattractive tradeoffs. On the one hand, the treatment of migrants as cogs in a greater economic machine that are easily replaced, restricted and returned reduces the incidence of immigrant conflict by shielding both natives and the state from the potentially unsettling local consequences of immigrant settlement. On the other hand, the extension of political rights to migrants and the application of less draconian and more humane economic guidelines in settings where resources are scarce are associated with a higher degree of immigrant-native conflict. The solution to both types of conflict – resource abundance – is often difficult to achieve in practice, especially when immigration is already unfolding.

This paper has focused its attention on the fate of postcolonial migrants and guestworkers in Great Britain and Germany. But the main argument advanced here also applies to other

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[110] These figures refer to 1987 (for Germany) and to 1991 (for Great Britain). In 1987, the unemployment rate of non-British (as opposed to ethnic minority) youth was 15.9 percent. This figure is less useful for our purposes, however, since the great majority of immigrants and their descendants in Britain are British citizens. For 1987 figures, see Werner and König (2001: 12-13); 1991 figures are derived from the National Statistics (2006), author's calculations ("Table L09 Economic position and ethnic group 16 and over").

[111] See Beauftragte (2005) and BMBF (2006) for recent educational, occupational and housing data.

[112] See, for example, Gesemann (2001: 364) and *DDP Basisdienst*, "'Frust und Hass' – Polizisten in Berlin bei Festnahme attackiert." November 15, 2006. For migrant labor market data for Berlin, see Hillmann (2001).

groups and settings. Indeed, in the case of Germany, the experience of political migrants puts in sharp relief the importance of immigration regimes in structuring immigrant conflict. Whereas guestworker settlement did not engender sustained local resistance on the part of Germany's indigenous population, the arrival of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) and (mostly White) asylum seekers[113] in the late 1980s and early 1990s set off brief but fierce local xenophobic reactions. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a more detailed account of this local anti-immigrant mobilization (see Dancygier 2007), it is nevertheless illuminating to relate the immigration regime that guided their entry and settlement to the incidence of immigrant-native conflict. In essence, the rapidly unfolding geopolitical events of the time – rather than concerted efforts by unions, employers and the state – resulted in the unanticipated and largely unplanned inflow of large shares of immigrants into Germany. In a further contrast with the guestworker framework, German law entitled these more recent arrivals with privileged access to a host of state benefits, including state housing. According to a study of migrant rights, ethnic Germans were the "most privileged group in the housing market…they are immediately eligible for an apartment in the social housing stock…they have the highest priority…[and] can get access to an apartment earlier than local families who have been looking for housing for some years" (Faist and Häußermann 1996: 87-89). Soon the participation rate in social housing among *Aussiedler* exceeded the rate among the local population. Similar to their obligations to ethnic Germans, local authorities are also required to find housing for asylum seekers in various forms of accommodation, including social housing, hotels, private apartments, public buildings and hostels, albeit on a temporary basis and with generally lower costs (Faist and Häußermann 1996: 90, 95).

Finally, the unplanned arrival of migrants whose status granted them privileged access to the country's housing stock coincided with serious housing shortages in many localities. During the 1980s, the Kohl government had steadily cut and eventually eliminated all federal subsidies for the construction of new social housing. As a consequence, in 1988 – when the number of *Aussiedler* had suddenly nearly tripled compared to the previous year – the construction of social housing had reached its lowest level since at least 1950 (Statistisches Bundesamt, various years). The same year, the shortage of dwellings was estimated at one million and cities like Stuttgart, Munich, Frankfurt, and Mannheim, counted thousands of residents on their waiting lists for social housing.[114] It was this constellation of factors – unplanned migration of groups with the capacity to claim state resources at a time of scarcity – that facilitated the electoral successes and violent campaigns of the anti-immigrant movement. Yet, the relatively short duration of these extremist reactions was due to their lack of actual political clout among these migrants, which in turn allowed the state to respond to German voters' xenophobia by restricting both ethnic Germans' and asylum seekers access to state resources.

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[113] The majority of asylum seekers in the early 1990s arrived from Eastern Europe and the war-torn former Yugoslavia (Blahusch 1999).

[114] *Der Spiegel*, "Wohnungsnot im Wohlstands-Deutschland." December 12, 1988.

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Appendix

National Archives – Great Britain

The following abbreviations indicate files held at the National Archives (London):

CAB:	Records of the Cabinet Office
HLG:	Records created or inherited by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and of successor and related bodies, including those of the Local Government Board and Ministry of Health, relating to the administration of local government, housing and town and country planning.
HO:	Records created or inherited by the Home Office, Ministry of Home Security, and related bodies
PREM:	Records of the Prime Minister's Office

The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (Manchester)

Unless otherwise noted, all correspondence between Labour Party members is drawn from files held at The Labour History Archive and Study Centre (Manchester).

National Archives Germany (Bundesarchiv Koblenz)

The following abbreviations indicate files held at the National Archives (Koblenz):

B106:	Ministry of the Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern*)
B119:	Federal Employment Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*)
B134:	Ministry of Land Use Planning, Building Industry and Urban Development (*Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau*)
B136:	Office of the Chancellor (*Bundeskanzleramt*)
B149:	Ministry of Labor (*Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung*)

Parliamentary Documentation Germany

BT Drs:	Lower House of German Parliament, printed matter (*Bundestag Drucksachen*)
BR Drs:	Upper House of German Parliament, printed matter (*Bundesrat Drucksachen*)

Table 1: Five British Local Authorities with Highest Share of Each Ethnic Group

	African	Caribbean	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi
			1991		
			%		
Average Group Share at the Local Authority Level	6.3	10.7	17.2	8.2	7.1
Average Group Share of Wards with the:			**%**		
Highest Group Concentration	14.0	21.8	48.7	35.3	27.1
Second Highest Group Concentration	10.4	19.8	44.9	27.9	15.6
Third Highest Group Concentration	9.4	18.7	41.8	25.4	12.6
As a Share of the total British Population	0.39	0.91	1.53	0.87	0.30
Total Number living in Great Britain	212,390	499,977	840,196	476,610	162,828
			2001		
			%		
Average Group Share at the Local Authority Level	12.4	10.9	20.0	12.0	11.5
Average Group Share of Wards with the:					
Highest Group Concentration	22.2	17.6	51.0	48.9	31.6
Second Highest Group Concentration	19.9	16.2	46.9	39.5	22.1
Third Highest Group Concentration	18.8	14.4	44.9	36.6	18.3
As a Share of the total British Population	0.9	1.1	2.0	1.4	0.5
Total Number living in Great Britain	479,666	563,842	1,036,807	714,826	280,845

Note: 2001 and 1991 figures are not directly comparable because the 2001 census also included categories for mixed ethnicity which were not part of the 1991 survey.

Source: 1991 figures are based on "Table S06 Ethnic Group: Residents," and 2001 data is derived from "Table T13 Theme Table on Ethnicity," author's calculations. Available from National Statistics (2006).



Note: I adopted the following rules for deciding which events should count as instances of large-scale immigrant-native and immigrant-state violence:
1. The event has to be mentioned in at least one of two Britain's major national newspapers, *The Times* or *The Guardian*.
2. The event has to be discussed in the quite extensive social science secondary literature.
3. London witnessed more violent events in July 1981 than this table indicates, but not all of these events should be characterized as "large scale" violence. Keith (1993) has devised an intensity ranking of "all serious incidents of public disorder" occurring in London in July 1981, drawing on a list of all incidents compiled by the Home Office. These rankings are based on a "quantitative measure of the type and extent of damage suffered by property at the scene of disorder…a quantitative measure of the type and extent of violent conflict at the scene of disorder" and the existence and use of petrol bombs as "one particular element of the 'rioting armoury' as symptomatic of the escalation of violence" (Keith 1993: 111). I am including those events that ranked in the top ten (out of 27), according to Keith's index (only nine appear in the table since Keith counts events in Southall as two consecutive incidents).
4. The London riots also sparked a number of copy-cat events throughout the country which are not listed in this table. These events tend not to be discussed in the secondary literature or in national newspapers (other than in a count of riot locations), and it is therefore difficult to assess their nature and intensity. For consistency, I excluded these events from this table. I only include the riots in Handsworth, Birmingham, Moss Side, Manchester, and Toxteth, Liverpool, as these are singled out by both The Times or The Guardian and are covered in more detail by the secondary literature. When I expand the list to incorporate events about which there is sufficient information regarding the type of immigrant conflict and the identity of participants, the differences relating to the varied involvement of immigrant groups in immigrant-native and immigrant-state violence remain.



Question wording:
Now, I would like to ask whether you have ever felt the following ways about (outgroup) and their families living here. For each feeling that I ask you about, please tell me whether you have felt that way very often, fairly often, not too often, or never.

Admiration	How often have you felt admiration for (outgroup) living here?
Irritation	How often have you felt irritation at (outgroup) living here?
Afraid	How often have you felt afraid of (outgroup) living here?
Sympathy	How often have you felt sympathy for (outgroup) living here?



Question wording:
Please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with each of the following reasons why (outgroup) living here may not do as well as the German/British people in Germany/Great Britain.

Need to try harder	It is just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if (outgroup) would only try harder they could be as well off as German/British people.
Different values	(Outgroup) living here teach their children values and skills different from those required to be successful in Germany/Great Britain.
Race	(Outgroup) come from less able races and this explains why they are not as well off as most German/British people.
Culture	The cultures of the home countries of (outgroup) are less well developed than that of Germany/Great Britain.
Discrimination	There is a great deal of discrimination against (outgroup) living here today that limits their chances to get ahead.



Fig. 2c: Policy Options - Presence of Immigrants - Germany and Great Britain

Question wording:
There are a number of policy options concerning the presence of (outgroup) immigrants living here. In your opinion which is the one policy that the government should adopt in the long run?

All	Send all (outgroup), even those born in Germany/Great Britain, back to their own country.
Born abroad	Send only those (outgroup) who were not born in Germany/Great Britain back to their own country.
Not contributing	Send only those (outgroup) back who are not contributing to the economic livelihood of Germany/Great Britain.
Criminals	Send only those (outgroup) who have committed severe criminal offenses back to their own country.
No documents	Send only those (outgroup) who have no immigration documents back to their own country.
No one	The government should not send back to their own country any of the (outgroup) now living in Germany/Great Britain.



Question wording:
Now, I would like to ask you a few more questions about (outgroup) and their families living here. Tell me as I read each of the following statements whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

Government effort — The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of (outgroup) living in Germany/Great Britain.

Marrying in own family — I would not mind if an (outgroup) person who had a similar family economic background as mine joined my close family by marriage.

Outgroup as my boss — I would not mind if a suitably qualified (outgroup) person was appointed as my boss.

Job discrimination — (Outgroup) get the worst jobs and are underpaid in Germany/Great Britain largely because of discrimination.

Politicians' attention — Most politicians in Germany/Great Britain care too much about (outgroup) and not enough about the average British person.

Sexual relationship — I would be willing to have sexual relationships with a (outgroup) person.

Comfortable relations — German/British people and (outgroup) can never be really comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends.

Work their way up — Many other groups have come to Germany/Great Britain and overcome prejudice and worked their way up. (Outgroup) should do the same without any special favor.

Welfare — Most (outgroup) living here who receive support from welfare could get along without if they tried.

Pushing themselves — (Outgroup) living here should not push themselves where they are not wanted.

Marrying outgroup — Most German/British people would not mind if a (outgroup) person with a similar family economic background as their own joined their close family by marriage.

Outgroup as boss	Most German/British people would not mind if a suitably qualified (outgroup) person was appointed as their boss.
German/British jobs	(Outgroup) have jobs that the German/British should have.

Source: Figures 4a-4d are based on survey data contained in *Eurobarometer* 30 (see Reif and Melich 1992).

Fig. 3: Immigration and Conflict

		Immigrants Possess Local Political Power: no	Immigrants Possess Local Political Power: yes
Economic Scarcity	no	No conflict	No conflict
	yes	Immigrant-State Conflict	Immigrant-Native Conflict





Notes: Germany: unemployment rates refer to the non-German population for all years. Great Britain: unemployment rates up to 1971 refer to persons born in the New Commonwealth; between 1971 and 1972, figures refer to persons born or whose parents were born in the New Commonwealth. Starting in 1973, unemployment rates cover the "nonwhite" population of West Indian, African, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. Between 1973 and 1983, ratios are the average of the nonwhite male and female unemployment rates to the average white (as opposed to overall) male and female unemployment rates. For all others years, original sources contained overall ethnic minority unemployment rates and overall unemployment rates. British unemployment rates for the years up to 1971 exclude youth unemployment (school leavers). Sources: Germany: for data covering the years 1967-1979, see Herbert (2001: 238); for 1980-2000, see Beauftragte (2002: 441). Great Britain: for data from 1965 to 1972, see Field et al. (1981: 22); from 1973-1983, see Leslie et al. (2001: 377, 379); from 1984 to 1996, see Office for National Statistics (1997: 300); from 1997 to 2000, see Labour Force Survey (2006).