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Queen's University  
Department of Geography and Planning

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GLOBAL ENCOUNTERS: NEW VISIONS



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## LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

The Editorial Board is proud to present the third volume of Global Encounters: New Visions undergraduate geography journal. Re-launched in 2020, GENV Journal is continuing to aim to be an annual publication that brings together exemplary undergraduate work from across the diverse fields encompassed in geography and planning at Queen's University. We want to extend a big thank you to the many students who submitted their work for publication this year. As always, 2022-2023 presented us with many excellent papers on a wide range of fascinating topics. All were a pleasure to read.

The submissions featured in this volume speak to the expansive diversity of our field and how interests are growing to think about interactions with and within the city, commodity chains, and the Indigenization of academia. There is a wide variety of outputs showcased in the journal this year, from book reports, to posters, short papers, concept mapping, policy reviews and proposals, and longer papers. These works offer a variety of strategies and ways of thinking for analyzing and negotiating processes of uneven development and its implications for community change and social justice.

This third volume of GENV Journal would not have been possible without the collaborative efforts of our dedicated editors, authors, and faculty advisor (Dr. Laura Jean Cameron) who took time during busy semesters to bring the journal together. We would also like to thank the Department of Geography and Planning for assisting us in the physical production of this journal.

We sincerely hope you enjoy the third volume of GENV Journal,

**The Global Encounters: New Visions Journal  
Editorial Board**

Kimberly Hill-Tout (Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor)  
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Nichol Kaiser  
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## CONTRIBUTORS

### **Improving Cycling and Walkability at Queen's University**

**Cameron Decloet 10**

Cameron Decloet is in his second year of undergraduate studies as a Geography major. He is currently pursuing certificates in both GIS as well as Urban planning. Cameron's academic interests include Remote sensing, GIS, and transportation planning; with a particular focus on rethinking car-dependency. Cameron aspires to contribute to a greener and healthier future through sustainable transportation solutions.

### **The City We Became: Book Review**

**Mikayla Densham 15**

Mikayla Densham is currently a second-year student at Queens University, completing a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree, with a Major in Geography. On top of my major, she is completing a Certificate in Urban and Regional Planning with the Department of Geography. She really enjoys all her human geography courses, especially any course that is based around cities and how to maintain them as well as upgrade them without displacing the current community. In her spare time she likes to be outside, depending on the season, that could be just going for a walk, biking, swimming, or skiing.

### **A Policy Analysis of Canada's Carbon Offset Market**

**Grace Gates 18**

Grace Gates is a third year Concurrent Education student studying a major in Geography and a minor in Indigenous studies at Queen's University.

### **The Plight of Pretoria's Precariat**

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Sarah Kaye is a third-year interdisciplinary artist based in Katarokwi/Kingston currently working towards her Bachelor of Fine Arts (Honours), Bachelor of Education, and minor in Geography at Queen's University. She specializes in performance, printmaking, and sculpture to examine narratives of lived experiences and their relationship to place and space. With an interest in social justice, Kaye's geography research focuses on the housing crisis and possible solutions.

### **Cassava Flour Production**

**Emma Vandebelt 41**

Emma Vandebelt is in her first year of undergraduate studies at Queen's University, graduating in Spring 2026 with a Bachelor of Science (Honours). She will be majoring in environmental science, with a minor in geography. Her interests lie in exploring human geographical relationships, and the spatial aspects of human-environmental interactions. When she is not busy with her studies, she enjoys dancing with Queen's Dance Club, reading, hiking, backcountry camping, and being out in nature.

### **Grandmother Moon**

**Sarah Morgan 46**

Sarah Morgan is a fourth-year student at Queen's University, studying Geography, English, and Concurrent Education (teaching). Her interests lie where her three disciplines of study intersect. Particularly, she ponders how young people and children can take part in reconciling Indigenous-Settler relations. After graduation, she intends to further explore Indigenous-Settler geographies in her teaching practice.



Destinee Joly (2021)

(right) Battersea, Ontario  
*Photo taken while on field trip for soil, environments, and societies class in order to collect soil samples to work with throughout the semester.*



Natasha Burgert (2021)

(top left) Pembroke, Ontario  
*My team and I were rushing to get back to town before all the restaurants closed after a long day of netting and tagging Lake Sturgeon. But I believe there's always time to stop and capture a beautiful moment. These pink flowers framing the still river were just looking too photogenetic to pass by unnoticed.*

(bottom left) Renfrew, Ontario  
*I feel so lucky to be in a province with such hidden fairytale-esque sceneries sprinkled everywhere. I'm surprised I didn't stumble upon a troll living under this bridge!*

Marley Gryfe (2023)

Deerfield Beach, Florida  
As part of the Aging Playfully project with the Population and Place Research Lab, this fieldwork looked at traditional recreation for older adults in the saturated environment of an age-restricted community. This photograph shows a group of older adults partaking in morning water aerobics, promoting community cohesion and active lifestyles.



Chloe Earnshaw-Osler  
(2022)

Iqaluit, Nunavut  
Far along the Apex trail, we found exposed ice in a sink hole and took some back to the lab for analysis.



Jordan Beer (2022)

Pinware, Labrador  
*Dr. Robert Way riding a ski-doo as the sun sets on a day of winter field work.*

Danika Watson (2022)

Cape Bounty Arctic Watershed Observatory, Melville Island, Nunavut  
*A herd of muskox grazing in a wet sedge meadow.*




Jordan Beer (2022)

Newfoundland Island, Labrador  
*The largest peat plateau site within our peatland permafrost monitoring network.*



## FIELDWORK SPOTLIGHT



*A view of camp around midnight, as the sun dips close to the horizon and casts long shadows.*

Danika Watson (2022)  
Cape Bounty Arctic Watershed Observatory, Melville Island, Nunavut

# IMPROVING CYCLING AND WALKABILITY AT QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY **AN URBAN PLANNING PROPOSAL**

DECLOET, CAMERON

## **ABSTRACT**


This article will explore urban planning issues that are pervasive in North American cities through a solution-oriented, local perspective that highlights how such issues manifest in Kingston, Ontario. Correspondingly, while the solutions offered below are focused on improving infrastructure on the Queen's University (herein "Queen's") campus, such recommendations can be replicated anywhere. Car dependency is a paramount contemporary problem, the ubiquity of which — in Canada and the United States — suggests that moving away from the automobile-reliant status quo will be a procedurally rigid and contentious process. Nevertheless, such an overhaul is necessary as increasingly widespread reconsiderations of previous car-centric design represents a renaissance in urban planning that Kingston should not disregard. Furthermore, change is necessitated by the climate emergency, as one of the major driving factors are the emissions from personal automobiles. Although mitigating atmospheric pollution is reason enough for a retooling of ground-level infrastructure, it is hardly the main goal nor the only benefit of altering street design. The following analysis employs diagrams, satellite as well as ground-level imagery, and ArcGIS Online to visualize how a reconstruction of roads on the Queen's campus would look if implemented.

**RELATING COMMON TRANSPORTATION PLANNING ISSUES TO KINGSTON, ON**

Car dependency is the root cause of many issues facing urban settings in North America. Issues associated with areas that are designed for cars as opposed to humans are inseparable from one another. For instance, it has been established that wider roads result in higher speeds, which increases risk to pedestrians, cyclists, and drivers simultaneously (Harvey, 1992).

Intersections are areas of acute danger for all involved; “around a third of all fatalities, and around 45% of serious casualties” occur at intersections (Candappa et al., 2014). Typical four-way intersections, which are commonplace in Kingston, are particularly concerning due to the angle of the interchange; four-way intersections are, “considered to be the most severe of angles at which to collide, given there

is no potential for dissipation of crash energy” (Candappa et al., 2014). At these intersections, crashes are typically between vehicles moving perpendicular to one another. When similar physics are applied to incidents between cyclists and automobiles, it is easy to understand how cyclists at these intersections are at high risk of serious injury or death. With all this in mind, it is unsurprising that Kingston — where the dangerous combination of high-speed wide roads and four-way convergences is pervasive — sees more than, “300 injury collisions and an average of three fatal collisions each year” (City of Kingston, 2022). These dangerous wide roads have the dimensions that they do in part because there is a lack of bicycle infrastructure. This is particularly apparent on the Queen’s campus where existing bicycle infrastructure ends abruptly. Despite roads like Union Street and University Avenue being designated as bicycle routes, bicycle lanes on these routes —



**Figure 1.** Map of cycling and parking infrastructure on the Queen’s University campus in Kingston, ON. GIS data retrieved from <https://www.cityofkingston.ca/explore/data-catalogue>

which are only separated from cars by paint on the road — do not continue through the campus, terminating north and west of the campus (**Figure 1**).

“Most people will not ride a bicycle if they don’t believe they have a safe and comfortable place to do so” (Dill et al., 2019. p. 5). Because of this psychological reality, places that have inadequate cycling infrastructure, as is the case on the Queen’s campus, do not come close to meeting its potential volume of cyclists. As a result, more people will opt to commute with their personal automobiles, thereby perpetuating car dependency and the associated problems of air and noise pollution, high collision potential, as well as traffic. Clearly there exists an opportunity for Queen’s University to be a template for a revitalization of Kingston roads, in a manner that improves the safety of pedestrians, cyclists and drivers, while simultaneously encouraging non-automobile modes of transportation.

## PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The following recommendations are predicated on the data-backed understanding that improved cycling infrastructure, such as buffered bicycle lanes, encourage cycling primarily by making it safer. This has a lot to do with perceived levels of comfort on cycling infrastructure, which has been quantified through surveys. Comfort levels are quite low on roads that have no cycling infrastructure but increase dramatically on roads that do. According to Dill et al (2019), there is an “increase in stated comfort of 24% to 31% for the painted buffers and buffers with parking, and an increase of around 50% more comfortable for the buffers with a concrete curb, plastic flexposts, or planters.” (p. 7). The strong evidence as to the effectiveness of buffered cycling infrastructure inspires a recommendation for the introduction of these types of facilities to the Queen’s campus, particularly on the major routes of Union Street, University Avenue, and Division Street. These not only improve the transportation experience for cyclists through physical separation, but also slow cars down, making it safer for pedestrians and driv-

ers. Reduced speeds are encouraged by an expansion of separated cycling infrastructure because it narrows the roads. This is another way road design can influence perceptions of appropriate speed and driving behavior; narrower roads “can act as a reminder or encouragement to drive slowly or calmly.” (Harvey, 1992).

The specifics of the proposed changes include: bike lanes that are extended to cover the whole length of University Avenue through the campus. This would be a drastic improvement from the current design where bike lanes on University Avenue terminate north of the campus. Such infrastructure would also benefit from being elevated to the level of the sidewalk and by being delineated by flex post bollards (**Figures 3 and 5**). On Union Street, the bike lanes could be expanded the whole length of the road through campus; here they are at ground level but are also delineated by flex post bollards (**Figures 4 and 6**). On Division Street the bike lanes would again be elevated to the level of the sidewalk and will be separated by the same bollards (**Figure 2**). The Addition of bike lanes on Union Street will perhaps be the most disruptive as this design necessitates the removal of on-street parking. Nevertheless, this is a reconcilable sacrifice as there is ample parking on campus already (See figure 1). More to that point, if the goal of these changes is achieved, there will be less need for parking, as more people will feel comfortable cycling. Moreover, bicycle- only slip lanes could easily be introduced on the Northeast and Southeast corners of University Avenue and Union Street. Such an upgrade would allow cyclists to make quick and safe right turns without going through the intersection (**Figure 3**).

A possible concern is the question of whether or not there will be adequate space for two-way bus service to continue on University Avenue. If implemented properly there will be. University Avenue is nine meters wide, per Google Earth, while the average bus width, according to dimensions.com (2022), is around two and a half meters; this means that if cycling lanes are limited to one meter in width on either

side, there would be adequate space for buses to pass. Another key feature of these recommendations is the raised intersection. These designs are highly effective at improving pedestrian safety, “Raised intersections have been found to induce speed reductions on approach to the intersection and can create a traffic calming effect” (Candappa et al., 2014., p. 6). Because speed is a key determinant in the severity of crashes, such an alteration will have positive effects on pedestrian safety by way of speed reduction (Candappa et al., 2014., p. 5). At the



corner of University Avenue and Union Street, this should work in conjunction with the existing pedestrian-oriented intersection signaling to create an extremely safe walking experience.

Overall, the implementation of these recommendations should improve pedestrian and cyclist safety through the combined effects of traffic calming and sidewalk-level infrastructure, whilst promoting environmentally-, as well as health-conscious, bicycle commuting.

**Figure 2 (left).** Proposed changes for the intersection of Division Street and Union Street in Kingston, ON. Imagery retrieved from Google Earth.

**Figure 3 (top-right).** Proposed changes for the intersection of University Avenue and Union Street in Kingston, ON. Imagery retrieved from Google Earth.

**Figure 4 (bottom-right).** Proposed expansion of cycling infrastructure near the intersection of University Avenue and Union Street in Kingston, ON. Imagery retrieved from Google Earth.



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# THE CITY WE BECAME

## BOOK REVIEW

DENSHAM, MIKAYLA

### ABSTRACT

Can all New York's problems be solved? That is the question *The City We Became* by N.K Jemisin aims to answer. All five boroughs of the city are represented in the book, what challenges they face and how they are all connected. Each borough has a designated person who was chosen to represent them, and those five people need to figure out how to save the city from a higher power that is attacking it. While trying to save the city it comes to light what geographical issues are happening within the boroughs. There are discussions about gentrification and varying urban experiences within the same city. Something to keep in mind is that this book is a fantasy book meaning there are different avatars and superpowers that are not in the real world. This book would be an enjoyable read for anyone who is studying or who enjoys geography, and I would recommend it to upper-year high school students and beyond.

New York City must be saved and protected. The *City We Became* by *N.K. Jemisin*, is a highly rated fictional fantasy book that shows its readers the stereotypes, damage and changes happening within New York City and its five boroughs. The book has separated New York into 5 main characters, each one representing a borough; Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island and then there is a sixth character who represents the whole city. The book being set up this way shows us the gentrification happening within certain boroughs, as well as how urban experiences are different for everyone.

The book follows these six avatars as they discover who they are and what strengths they possess. All the avatars need to find each other so their strengths can grow stronger, they can protect each other and figure out who or what is attacking their city. Each of them has different experiences with “a women in white” or with something referred to as tendrils attacking either parts of the city or people. Common citizens of New York do not see the women in white or the tendrils unless the citizen is in direct danger of the damage, they are ensuing on the city. Other than that, the citizens are oblivious of the city being attacked.

When reading the book, you learn different things about the boroughs or the people representing them. Staten Island likes to keep to themselves and have limited association with the rest of the city. Queens is full of culture which makes for a tight knit community. The Bronx was the first borough established in New York and is often seen as rundown and dangerous but has a good heart. Brooklyn is full of wealth and seen as one of the best places to live in New York. Finally, Manhattan is the heart of the city, with Wall Street, Central Park, and Time Square all being within the borough.

By the end of the book, you find out if Staten Island chooses to help save the city or join the women in white. The rest of the group goes off and tries to find the 6th avatar that represents the entire city while fighting off the tendrils and women in white. The main question is

are the boroughs able to save New York City?

A common theme throughout the book is the gentrification taking place in certain boroughs. Gentrification is defined as:

“The process by which urban neighborhoods, usually the home of low-income residents, become the focus of reinvestment and (re)settlement by middle classes. This process is seen in the redevelopment and upgrading of housing and retail landscapes. Socially, it is frequently represented by displacement of existing residents as rents and property taxes rise” (Jonas, McCann, and Thomas, 2015, p. 32).

Gentrification was shown throughout the book taking place in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Bronx. The avatar, who is Brooklyn and her family lived in two brownstone buildings her family bought years ago. They recently received a letter informing them that the two houses are going to be sold back to the city without their knowledge and there is very little they can do to stop the sale. The city will take houses and land back to be redeveloped and then the previous owners must find somewhere else to live. Another gentrification situation came up in Bronx where a rundown condo building that Bronx heard “there was trouble a couple of months ago, something about jacked up rent” (Jemisin, 2020, 356) is now being turned into luxury condos. In both cases, citizens of these two boroughs are being displaced and forced to find other living arrangements, but in the situation of Bronx, it may be harder for the displaced residents to find affordable housing since the average income is lower in comparison to Brooklyn. The book shows that gentrification can affect anyone no matter the situation or income of the people/families.

Throughout the character development of all five boroughs, the author does an excellent job of showing their urban experience. Both within their boroughs and within each character because a person’s urban experience is shaped by who they are as individuals and by how they are perceived along lines of social difference (Perez, 2022). A prominent example throughout the book would be in the case of Staten Island. The avatar of Staten Island felt



as though she was not truly part of New York City, and the other four boroughs had the same thoughts towards Staten Island. When Brooklyn was explaining the city to Manhattan who is referred to as Manny, she explained Staten Island by saying “That one will be a small-town thinker even though they are part of the biggest American city. They do not want to be part of New York remember. They will not let you forget it” (Jemisin, 2020, 135). The mindset of Staten Island can relate to the different identities and power within a city. Staten Island is perceived to not have much power compared to the rest of the city which shapes their identity of small-town thinking.

There are other examples throughout the book showing the urban experiences of each borough and how that defines them. Brooklyn and Manny got along well throughout the book, and this could be because both their boroughs are seen as wealthy and nice places to live. Bronx had tension with Brooklyn and that is likely because their boroughs are quite different. Bronx comes across as slightly more run down so there was hostility towards Brooklyn. I enjoyed seeing all the different identities and urban experiences grow throughout the book to define each borough.

The book was well-written and kept my attention at some points, but I would likely not continue the series. I would recommend the book for university courses, and I feel it would be an informative read for anyone in the upper years of high school and beyond. The book gave me a better understanding of how the city is divided into boroughs and the different cultural and social dimensions that define each one. One controversial thing I noticed throughout the book was the use of stereotypes. Although I understand using stereotypes to identify the different boroughs, the author took this to an extreme that was not needed to get the point across. I mixed between reading the book and listening to the audio version and in the audio version many of the boroughs were given stereotypical accents that came across in a mocking tone. I feel the author could have approached defining each of the characters differently. The book was

well written in the sense that it kept the readers' attention, especially towards the end, but the character development was too stereotypical for the different boroughs.

The City We Became was an interesting book that showed its readers the gentrification happening within certain boroughs of New York City, as well as how urban experiences are different for everyone. Gentrification was shown in two very different boroughs, which proves that it can affect anyone. It was also very interesting to see how the different identities and urban experiences affected each borough and how they interacted with one another as well as their different mindsets. In the end New York City was saved... for now.

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# A POLICY ANALYSIS OF CANADA'S CARBON OFFSET MARKET

GATES, GRACE

## **ABSTRACT**

In 2022, the Canadian Government released the second stage of their federal carbon offset policy called the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA). This policy set a national benchmark for provinces in both the individual and industrial sectors to account for the greenhouse gas emissions with the environmental costs in daily decisions. This act was created as it was determined that the provincial policies for environmental backstops were not progressing at the globally agreed upon rate of the Paris Agreement. This policy review was created to summarize and compare the GGPPA to economic theories to understand the different perspectives on this marketization process. This is to ultimately determine that the Government of Canada has created a policy that is not consistent or fair amongst Canadians and it will create a power imbalance between other markets that compete provincially.

## SUMMARY

Over the past decade, Canadians have seen a variety of provincial policies that were all implemented with the same goal, to reduce overall Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. In the past three years, the federal government has been working diligently to find a way to reduce GHG emissions in a way that ensures 'consistency and fairness' to all Canadians. In a two phase policy, the federal government is implementing the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA). This will reduce emissions by creating a minimum 'benchmark' that provinces must maintain (Government of Canada, 2022). This act enables the government to create a national commodity out of pollution in a way that accounts for the environmental costs in daily decisions. This is notably the ultimate goal of all carbon policies, but execution falls short in comparison as previous policies were set on a provincial scale and lacked in consistency nation-wide. The federal government believes that putting a standard price on carbon is the most efficient way to reduce GHG emissions while reinforcing innovation (Government of Canada 2022). In the past two years, Canadians have seen the first phase of the policy was successfully implemented into society by a means of adding carbon taxes to the gas prices. In July of 2022, the second phase of this policy was implemented in the industrial sector. The purpose of this paper will be to analyze the two different phases to create a deeper understanding of the first federal environmental act that interferes with a traditionally provincial responsibility. This is done by comparing the flexibility of the policy with the uneven distributions of emissions between each province causing the 'consistency and fairness' of the benchmark to be questioned. By analyzing this policy using course materials and external perspectives, the reader can visualize the application through a variety of lenses to see how this unevenly affects the citizens based upon province of residence. Ultimately, this paper will determine that this policy has uneven benefits for citizens across the country and the discrepancies between them will leave a power imbalance affecting other markets which compete provincially.

## DESCRIPTION OF MARKET/ MARKETIZATION PROCESS

The first phase of GGPPA was administered as a fuel charge to 21 different types of fuel and combustible waste (like tires, asphalt, singles, etc.) (Government of Canada 2022). Overall, this affected most Canadians on an individual level as well as the businesses that transport goods and services both provincially and more heavily when nationally. In plain terms, civilians saw when they would go to a gas station, for every litre of gas they would purchase, there is an additional eleven cents to account for the carbon tax (Potkin, 2022). As of 2022 only Ontario, Manitoba, Yukon, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Nunavut voluntarily have the federal fuel charge in place which is an important aspect to remember for later (Government of Canada, 2022). The second phase of the GGPPA was an Output Based Pricing System (OBPS). On June 8, 2022, Canada's Greenhouse Gas Offset Credit System (GGOCS) was put in place as the specific program for the OBPS which was applied to industrial projects across the country. Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Yukon, Nunavut, and some of Saskatchewan are all subject to the Greenhouse Gas Offset Credit System as these provinces are the only ones without a carbon pricing system that meets or exceeds federal requirements (Burton, 2022). These protocols are intended to support a domestic carbon offset trading market where companies and municipalities will have new economic opportunities to reduce emissions as it is evenly applied on a case-by-case basis for each project (Williams, 2022). It is applicable to all projects which fall under the Compendium of Federal Offset Protocols which must be approved and monitored by the Minister (unspecified which one) (Government of Canada, 2022). For summary, the project must apply for carbon offsets if these emissions would not have been generated had the project never existed (Government of Canada, 2022, p, 4). Canada requires these projects to have a specific crediting length based upon what type of project (Government of Canada, 2022, p, 5). With the second phase now implemented, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island will all

be joining the fuel charge in 2023 as they did not have enough consumer carbon levies to account for the new standardized benchmark that was created when phase two was implemented (Potkins, 2022).

## **ANALYSIS OF POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL DEBATE**

### **What is this marketization process trying to solve and why now?**

This market is inevitably trying to reduce Canada's GHG Emissions as it has become evident that the provincial policies are not decreasing emissions at a rate fast enough to meet federal and international goals. Moreover, the federal government created this system to ultimately keep the investments domestic and ensure a national 'benchmark' for a more regulated system when implementing the backstop (Government of Canada 2022).

This policy has built traction behind it as scientists have given the world until 2030 to reduce emissions or else it is inevitable that the global temperature increase will be too high for the human race to survive in the distant future (IPCC 2021). Furthermore, the Paris Agreement was the driving international force which set the standard with how the world would keep the global warming temperature to ideally 1.5°C, which was noted before industrial levels (UNFCCC 2019). With increasing pressure of the high expectations for the Paris Agreement, 2030 is a critical year as the UNFCCC believes that "zero-carbon solutions could be competitive in sectors representing over 70% of global emissions"; but in actuality, very few countries have done enough to reduce emissions (UNFCCC 2019). If anything, most countries have significantly increased their emissions since the agreement was first signed in 2015 (UNFCCC 2019).

### **Political Environment Around Policy**

Before reflecting on the provincial response to the OBPS, the federal government's incentives need to be discussed to see how provinces are encouraged to participate in the

newly managed sector. When the first phase of the GGPPA was introduced, if provinces did not meet the federal benchmark, they would be automatically enrolled unless they proposed a different plan. Except, Sadikman and Brinker highlighted that any province that has voluntarily adopted the federal OBPS system has the choice for the proceeds collected from the taxes could be directly returned to that area (2022). The provinces that did not voluntarily adopt the federal OBPS would have to return all the money that was collected within the jurisdictions (Sadikman and Brinker 2022). In 2019, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan were the only provinces to voluntarily adopt the fuel charge and they were able to collect and reinvest the proceeds through two programs: The Future Electricity Fund (FEF) and the Decarbonization Incentive Program (DIP). FEF was created to support new clean electricity programs or projects and in 2019 they collected 81.4 million dollars to be allocated between the four participating provinces (Sadikman and Brinker 2022). DIP is a merit based program and the authors highlight how "the program will specifically support single- or multi-year projects with the objective of deploying commercially available and/or proven low-carbon technologies and processes in eligible provinces (i.e, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan for the 2019 compliance period)" (Sadikman and Brinker 2022). DIP collected 79.5 million dollars between the four provinces for their use in 2019 (Sadikman and Brinker 2022).

Between these two incentives, it is clear that the federal government wants to reward the provinces for voluntarily participating. The important thing to note is how there is still a fuel charge that must be applied to all provinces regardless, but only voluntary participation is rewarded. This poses the question of what is there to 'lose' if the province joins? The public reaps the rewards in terms of being able to earn the tax back and there is already a program set in place so there is no additional work required from the provincial government to meet the benchmark. The analysis of different provincial perceptions and overall political environments

is imperative to understand how the OBPS is being perceived across a geographically and socially diverse country.

### **Provincial Response**

In terms of industry and present day participation, the only provinces that are not included in the new OBPS program for 2023 are Manitoba, P.E.I., Yukon, and Nunavut as their current systems are still below the backstop benchmark threshold. On January 1, 2023, the rest of the maritime provinces (except P.E.I.) will be joining the federal program. In an interview, Gulibeault describes to CBC how all negotiations were 'rather smooth except for Nova Scotia' where they said the talks were filled with 'theatre and drama' (Thurton and Zimonjic 2022). Because of this interview, we will be analyzing two different maritime provinces as the social climate, geography, and overall close relations in terms of political decisions are so similar. By analysing these, we can see how there were such different responses between New Brunswick who voluntarily joined in 2019 and Nova Scotia who seemingly begrudgingly joined for 2023.

Nova Scotia was very against the Carbon Tax as the Premier openly stated that they were in 'outright rejection of its initial carbon plan and would not submit a new plan for the deadline' (Campbell 2022). The province contradicted the statement when they did submit their own carbon pricing proposal 'under the wire' of the federal deadline (Campbell 2022). In a press conference, the premier stated that the province doesn't believe a carbon tax is the right thing to do when the country is seeing one of the largest inflation periods ever (Campbell 2022). That is originally where the premier stood, but instead, the province opted for the output based pricing system (the carbon offsets), as it is primarily interested in putting pressure on high emitters of greenhouse gasses in the industrial sector (Campbell 2022). The premier also stated that, "If the federal government chooses to tax Nova Scotians for their carbon – at the pumps and on home heating fuels – there is nothing we can do to stop them, but we expect the revenues to be returned to the province to benefit Nova

Scotians" (Campbell 2022). This is in direct correlation to the argument made earlier where the government has laid out their policy in a way that the policy hurts citizens more to not participate in the federal policy. Finally, the premier believes this is better than the province's old cap and trade system as it doesn't have a hard stop, but rather the OBPS 'allows emissions to increase over time if production increases' (Campbell 2022).

In comparison, New Brunswick joined the federal program in 2019 and was one of the first provinces in the country to voluntarily adopt the program. The province recently released their climate change plan for 2022 to 2027 where they are applying a carbon tax and the OBPS with their main promise being that it will deliver a carbon pricing system that is fair to its citizens. One of their main 'selling features' is how it is reinvesting back into the community with these taxes (Province of New Brunswick 2022). One reason for their early joining of the federal system can be suspected by the fact that most of their emissions are from the industrial and transportation sectors which are the two areas that the OBPS is actively trying to deter. The one thing to note, is when analyzing the federal government's list of participating provinces for 2023, they do not recognize New Brunswick in the federal system meaning they would not receive the incentives. Yet, the province is advertising that they will reap the rewards? This begs the question as to which federal programs can they participate in or not and why? How will this be perceived to the province who has been participating in this for 3 years already.

### **Whose Interests are Being Reflected**

The federal government has made clear that their interests and intent for the market are for the people. The policy is set up to only hinder society if they don't participate. When looking at it from a provincial perspective, the provincial governments who were hesitant to join were in retaliation because of the increased cost of taxes in an era that has already seen astronomical inflation. Except, this secondary phase that

was implemented this year is only being reflected in industrial projects. It was the first phase that affected individuals, but the second phase is where the country sees an astronomically increase in the benchmark as industrial emitters produce much more GHGs than the residential comparison. This renders the argument and hesitancy of the past to be null as the future of this policy now deliberately attacks the industrial sectors rather than the individual. From this attack on industrial emitters, it could cause later disputes on competitive provincial sectors that will experience heavy taxing such as energy, forestry, and agriculture. When individual privileges like travel are taxed and the backlash is still abundantly clear 3-4 years after implementation, the disputes that directly affect livelihood could be much more severe and difficult to expect a unanimous acceptance across the nation.

### **ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MARKETIZATION PROCESS**

The federal government created this industry so that it could be rooted in a domestic trading market. The importance of this domesticated market is how it will function in practical application. Using Paton and Cahill's reading *Thinking Socially and Spatially About Markets* and lecturers from Dan Cohen, we will understand the different ways we can view the effects of this marketization process. From the Neoclassical Orthodoxy to Heterodox Economics where we see The Marxian Approach, The Feminist Approach, and The Institutionalist Approach. All of these provide a different lens through which we could view this economic policy to see how this will affect Canadians on an individual and communal level when in practical application.

Neoclassical Orthodoxy is the 'traditional' way society views markets. On an individual level, it is rooted in the ability for people to make their own decisions based on being informed and having rational preferences based on outcomes (Cohen, Lecture 2, 2022). When we look at institutions, firms are rooted in making the most money by inflating a commodity based on supply and demand (Cohen, Lecture 2, 2022).

When thinking of different applications of Neoclassical Orthodoxy, the most important aspect to acknowledge is that this market is based around supply and demand, and in return, the idea that those who can afford it will participate in the project and those who can't, won't. If we consider the extra cost a company or individual must take on for every project we must question if the government could be preventing innovative projects because of the basic cost of offsets for unavoidable tasks like heavy machinery? Moreover, Neoclassical Orthodoxy believes that people will have rational preferences, but is that possible if all Canadians are participating solely based on province of residence? Meaning they cannot receive the grants and incentives if their government made the choice to opt out, not the individual. Lastly, when we look at institutions, if firms are realistically rooted in the ability to make the most money, will the federal government inflate this market as time goes on? By how much? Will every province receive the same inflation rates even if not all provinces are emitting the same amounts?

After viewing the traditional approach, we can look into Heterodox Economics which is an umbrella-term that largely agrees that markets are social institutions (Cohen, Lecture 3, 2022). When applying this market to the Marxian Approach, we see that Marx believed that markets were based around class and the power associated with it (Paton and Cahill 2020). The Marxian Approach also strongly believed that labour was the most important aspect of markets; For instance we see this contradicted in modern society where it is not the worker who can declare their wage, it is rather the position of power who gets to set it (Paton and Cahill 2020). Although this market doesn't have a direct labour force associated with it, Carbon Offset Markets align with the Marxian Approach because the money collected has the opportunity to go back to the people who are performing in the different labour markets. Except, this policy demonstrates that the financial incentives don't go to the labour force, it goes to the company or position of power for them to use the money how they see fit. It must be

further investigated depending on how much money they receive, could it affect the wage of the labour force for this project? Would there be mandates to ensure that the money goes to the people, the community, or the company? Marx states that power is driven by the opportunity to make more money, but in this case, as power and wealth are accumulated, the more money will be allegedly invested into the communities through the contracting companies (The Government of Canada 2022). The question is, is it deceiving that the money is not going to the community like the government advertises? Do these companies have to be local? Can the contracting company be from a province that isn't participating, but they are working in a province that is?

Next, the Feminist Approach views markets in a manner that portrays how gender shapes capitalist markets (Paton and Cahill 2020). The Feminist Approach looks at how gender is viewed in society and the social expectation associated with each gender (Cohen, Lecture 3, 2022). For instance, when we look at home relations, who is expected to cook and clean and look after children? The Feminist Approach highlights that without this background work, markets can't run this smoothly (Paton and Cahill 2020). Without childcare or household upkeep, people cannot invest time into energy or new projects, and they certainly cannot invest the time into creating innovative technologies. When reflecting, all the incentives and grants are rooted in phase two which predominantly focuses on the industrial projects. What can Canada do for households that have to pay transportation tax when they are a single income family or disabled? Will there be greater tax returns? Can there be grants specifically for innovating residential areas to encourage other industries to invest and improve home relations? This market has the ability to steer investments and innovations into any industry they choose, if home relations are what allow all markets to function, shouldn't we focus on innovating those?

The last Heterodox Economic Lens I want to discuss is the Institutional Approach. The Institutional Approach focuses on the firms

rather than the individual and their application to the market. This approach believes that the structures shape what is viewed as acceptable methods of exchange as the norms and legal framework around each market adjusts (Paton and Cahill 2020). Essentially, it is rooted in somewhat of a 'popularity contest', it is won by the more powerful group being able to shape the market (Cohen, Lecture 3, 2022). This could be a reflection of power of the federal government, as this was imposed by the federal government and the previous provincial power in the climate industry had to accept their conditions to reap the rewards. The Institutional Approach is the most interesting to view because it shows the uneven power struggle because of the inability for a single province to revolt as now eight provinces and territories are seeing the benefits of the system and only four continue to have their own system. This approach shows a unique view on how provinces can act against the federal government.

## CONCLUSION

Overall, these approaches allow society to see economics for its unevenly applied power and fairness across the country. This was a previously provincial industry that the federal government is slowly intercepting. Although it is very important to have a unified climate plan, this carbon offset system is not 'consistent and fair' like how the government advertises it. It shows uneven power across the 'have' and 'have not' provinces and territories and it affects every Canadian on an individual and community level. Moreover, we see how it applies to all industries and projects across Canada, but it doesn't consider the inter-provincial issues. Markets like energy, fossil fuels, education, healthcare, and many others are a provincial responsibility. From this, we could face the issues that could create deep divisions across the nation. For instance, if one province who is participating in the federal program receives millions of dollars to build a new self-sustaining school or hospital, but another province is forced to pay out of tax dollars, how can we consider that fair for all Canadians? Moreover, how much will provinces like Alber-

ta be taxed more for producing the fossil fuels for the country and massive contributions to the country's GDP? Overall, we see that this policy will create a division of power with no fairness for Canadians, these grants and incentives are unevenly applied across the country and neglect the individual participation in the policy. If the federal government is going to intervene, they need to create a policy that is actually consistent and fair to all Canadians for all to utilize in all markets regardless of the size, industry, or application for either residential or industrial. Most importantly, it needs to be a policy that works with provinces to maintain fairness across provincially run industries.



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# THE PLIGHT OF PRETORIA'S PRECARIAT

## **SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH THE LENS OF RACIAL CAPITALISM**

HODGES-MALEY, GEORGE

### **ABSTRACT**

While inequality (particularly of wealth) is on the rise globally, South Africa finds itself acutely afflicted. The “world’s most unequal country” (Katy Scott, 2021) offers a window into not only the grotesque uneven development disseminated by colonial legacies, but also illustrates concretely the growth of chronic, systematic employment insecurity: the expansion of the precariat class. Swaths of the nation’s population live in situations of abject poverty or precarious, informal employment, which follows distinctly racialized lines. The expansion of South Africa’s precariat class is simply a microcosmic symptom of a larger issue in the neoliberal capitalist system, an ailment which disproportionately impacts the Global South. I assert that the legacies of racial capitalism are the driving factors of the contemporary racialized precariat and that the degree of socio-economic devastation brought by the COVID-19 pandemic are a direct product of racializing ideologies.

With precarity in the era of COVID-19 being such a pervasive issue, by paying particular focus to South Africa’s principal sectors, mining and energy, the scale of multifaceted inequality can be vividly examined.

### **THE POSITION OF THE PRECARIAT IN SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY**

Today, the position of many South Africans is one of precarity, where incomes are little, work is unstable, employment is insecure and labour conditions are hazardous. This is coupled with gross racial inequality, only exacerbated by other dimensions of multifaceted socio-economic inequality, such as gender. These factors convene to produce gross economic inequality and a political-economic landscape where "it would take the pay of 461 black women from the bottom 10% of earners to make as much as the average (white, male) CEO takes home in a year" (Oxfam South Africa, 2020).

In fact, the issue is as old as the capitalist system in the region, where problems of job quality, security and low-wages have always been particularly profound for racialized (primarily black) populations.

### **LEGACIES OF RACIAL CAPITALISM: THE MANUFACTURING OF RACIALIZED LABOUR DIVISIONS**

It is well understood that white-supremacist ideologies have dominated South Africa's capitalist history, where the dispossession and oppression of racialized groups enabled capital accumulation for colonisers.

Capitalism arrived in what is now South Africa in the mid 17th Century, as the Dutch began their plundering of the West Cape. Through primitive accumulation they principally appropriated agricultural land, robbing Indigenous populations of land fundamental to their pastoral economies ("History of slavery and early colonisation in South Africa", n.d.). With black Indigenous populations shunted from their own land and largely disregarded from participating in the emerging capitalist system, they were cemented as a surplus population.

Facilitated by the expropriation of indigenous land, and the exploitation of grossly cheap slave labour imported from the Indian subcontinent (Legassick, 1974) and then, later,

indigenous Africans, white European capitalists accumulated capital through agricultural exports to the core economies of Europe, seizing ownership of the means of production.

These divisions of labour laid out in South Africa's capitalist infancy were reaffirmed during the era of apartheid, where the policy of "separate development" between whites and racialized groups inevitably led to uneven development. "Dispossession through the market" occurred via laws that limited economic participation of black South Africans and policies which gave preferential economic treatment to white-owned businesses over those that were black-owned (Oxfam South Africa, 2020). Despite skilled labour having become somewhat increasingly accessible to racialized populations, especially through the removal of job reservations for white people, racialized South Africans remained disadvantaged in labour markets due to the gap in educational attainment which had been reinforced by aforementioned drivers of uneven development (Mariotti, 2011).

Although apartheid formally, legally ended in 1991 drivers of long-term, generational inequality had been set in stone throughout South Africa's capitalist upbringing. These roots of inequality exist today and, with them, the uneven social relations they propel, encapsulated by South Africa's wealth gap remaining unchanged since apartheid (Sguazzin, 2021).

### **THE MINERAL-ENERGY COMPLEX - A MICROCOSMIC ILLUSTRATION OF CONTEMPORARY INEQUALITY**

The structural inequalities and racializing ideologies disseminated in South Africa's capitalist expansion are still vividly present in contemporary divisions of labour and patterns of inequality. This is perhaps most poignant in the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) which dominates today's South African political economy. The MEC, being the country's two principal industries, is argued by Fine and Rustomjee to lie "at the core of the South African economy, not

only by virtue of its weight in economic activity but also through its determining role throughout the rest of the economy” (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996).

As the centrality of these industries emerged from a political context of segregationist policies- the apartheid era- it is no surprise that the divisions of labour and distributions of both capital and employment opportunities have been propagated along racial (and even further gendered) lines. Employment in these sectors are divided such that CEO positions are typically held by white men, while low-paying, low-skill labour is carried out by black men (and even less frequently black women) (Oxfam South Africa, 2020).

The extremity of these divisions of labour have precipitated the conditions of employment which have produced the South African precariat. While pay is one of the most significant dimensions in the unequal labour market, other severe labour inequalities disproportionately ail predominantly racialized groups.

One dimension that greatly detracts income security is the frequent sub-contracted, or often informal, nature of work in the MEC. With few contractual protections and the threat of employment being cut as multinational companies (MNCs) relocate their operations, the long-term insecurity of these regularly ‘low-skill’ jobs means that poorly paid workers can be spontaneously plunged into bouts of unemployment without compensation. In fact, “In post-apartheid South Africa, half of new jobs survive for less than a year” (SA-TIED, 2020), while 20% of black men and 40% of black women who participate in the labour market are unable to find formal work. These statistics highlight the severely limited prospects of stable incomes that the largely racialized precariat hold.

What job insecurity critically compounds, however, is the socio-health implications of frequent absences in benefits and often unsafe work environments that ‘low-skill’ jobs in the MEC are associated with. Crippling health issues are commonplace in sub-contracted and

‘low-skill’ MEC workers. In the case of miners participating in the formal economy, one particular threat is the development of silicosis, a debilitating chronic lung disease (Pierce, 2015). Miners in the informal economy are increasingly likely to face potential death (Sullivan, 2021). These hazards, endemic to MEC industries, work to deprive families who comprise the nation’s precariat of work and income. This comes as the prevailing family structures of South Africa centre around a single working father and a mother who performs unpaid social-reproductive work, meaning that without the income of the family’s sole earner, whole households can be thrust into (more extreme) poverty. This, in turn, perpetuates generational precarity, as poverty critically limits economic and educational opportunities for children, reducing potential for class mobility and carrying the potential for relegation to a permanent seat in the precariat class.

On the other side of the dichotomy that is South Africa’s contemporary divisions of labour, post-apartheid, “profits have skyrocketed for [overwhelmingly white] CEOs in the MEC” (Oxfam South Africa, 2020).

While this surge in surplus profits can certainly be attributed in part to the continued exploitation of the precariat’s labour, this has been largely driven by the increasing financialization of the MEC. Short term investment and the trade of financial instruments have both expanded significantly in recent decades, driven by the increasing neoliberalisation of South Africa’s political economy.

Neoliberal policies themselves have both directly and indirectly contributed to rise in present precarity. Directly, they have led to the removal of protections relating to job security. Indirectly, they have enabled gargantuan inflation in the capital accumulated by MEC firms, allowing some to become transnational in their operations. As is the nature of transnationals, the ability for these companies to engage in the process of creative destruction, finding new spatial fixes outside of South African borders, allows them to minimise reinvestment into the

circuit of capital, retaining extra surplus profits.

In this way, with the removal of jobs from the national labour pool and less surplus profits being reinvested into the economy, the precariat class become increasingly starved of both the means to accumulate capital and capital itself.

### **THE IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE PRESENT DAY PRECARIAT**

With the importance of job security, high wages and the detriments that neoliberal policies create being outlined, the true severity of the COVID-19 pandemic reveals itself.

Due to convening global vaccine inequalities, distribution issues, and population hesitancy resulting from poor education, South Africa's vaccine rate remains low in the final month of 2021, sitting at less than a quarter of the nation's population (Reuters, 2021). Because of this, infection rates have remained high since COVID's arrival in South African borders and resulting lockdowns have proved ruinous for the nation's economy. In just the space of three months in mid 2020, 80,000 jobs were lost from the formal economy (Accram, 2021). These job losses, and the other hundreds of thousands resulting from COVID lockdowns, disproportionately affect those experiencing precarity and poverty, both in number and magnitude of effect. It's the case, however, that those at the bottom of the precariat- people participating in the informal economy- will be affected worst, with the ILO estimating that informal workers in the global south could see earnings fall by 60% (International Labour Organization, 2020).

Contrastingly, white South Africans, who typically hold secure, well-paying service and knowledge jobs have been comparatively less scathed. Job cuts have been concentrated in less affluent, racialized populations, while higher-paid white South Africans are more likely to be able to work from home during lockdowns, further exacerbating existing wealth inequalities.

### **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

I assert that the legacies of racial capitalism, being the uneven development and divisions of labour that they have disseminated, are the principal factors in producing a precarious and insecure socio-economic class which pervades South Africa's contemporary political economic landscape. The predominantly black precariat that we see today has been directly produced by economic and social policy largely limiting the economic participation of racialized groups to work in insecure, poorly paid employment. These limitations have provided the framework for a precarious class who, facing a massively economically destabilising pandemic, have suffered much worse than the groups who benefit from their economic subjugation. The neoliberalization of South Africa's economy has contributed greatly, especially in times of COVID, to the reinforcement of the socio-economic status quo, further entrenching inequality along racialized lines.

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# GENTRIFICATION

## TORONTO'S HOUSING CRISIS

KAYE, SARAH JIHAЕ

### ABSTRACT

This paper examines gentrification and financialization as leading causes of the housing crisis in Toronto, Ontario. Gentrification is defined as the process by which low-income neighborhoods are transformed through the influx of affluent businesses and people, which leads to the displacement of low-income residents. Financialization refers to the increasing roles of finance in the operation of domestic and international economies. The paper analyzes Toronto's housing crisis through these critical concepts, revealing the intersectional social and racial dimensions that underlie the problem. The analysis shows that the city's housing crisis will continue unless active political action is taken. The paper highlights the need to take a critical geographic approach to analyze the issues of cities, questioning who has control, who is benefiting, and who is being harmed.

Gentrification, one of the most widespread urban processes that facilitates the infringement of residents' quality of life, is the leading cause of the housing crisis present in Toronto, Ontario. A housing crisis is defined by the persistent and increasing shortage of affordable housing with the housing supply unable to meet its demands. Although most major cities experience this problem, Toronto will be referenced as a case study in this review. The strong economic growth associated with financialization and gentrification has led to a surge in population growth and increased housing prices, threatening social cohesion and individual well-being.

Toronto, located along Lake Ontario's northwestern shore, is a major Canadian city and is a dynamic metropolis (Ben David, 2023). Oxford Economics released its housing affordability report on October 18, 2021, which ranked Toronto as the third least affordable city in North America (Arsenych, 2021). The financial squeeze to stay in the city is currently in the beginning stages of affecting middle and upper-middle-class residents. While the housing crisis affects the entire population, there are intersecting social and racial dimensions that show themselves as underlying themes that will be explored in this paper. With the chronically low supply of housing options, there are over 8,500 Torontonians experiencing homelessness and thousands on the waitlist for supportive housing (Vincent, 2021). A Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives report found that a minimum-wage worker would need to work 79 hours per week in order to afford a one-bedroom in Toronto (Mastronianni, 2020). The rental costs of municipal government-funded 'affordable' housing costs have been extremely high since federal and provincial governments cut social housing funding during the 1990s (Mastronianni, 2020). Housing units, initially affordable, begin to rapidly increase in price, ensuring that the number of affordable units decreases at a much faster rate than the construction of a new supply. To put the city's housing crisis in perspective, a healthy rental market should have a minimum vacancy of 4% while in 2020, Toronto's averaged 1.4 percent (Maurache, 2020). Increased rents have

been exacerbated by financialized landlords, made possible by the provincial government's decision to lift newly built/vacant units' rent control. Within this analysis, a critical assessment of the Toronto housing crisis will be revealed through the nature of gentrification and financialization ideas. Lastly, this paper concludes by determining that the housing crisis will continue as an urban problem if active political action is not taken in Toronto.

### **A CRITICAL CONCEPT**

In 1964, Ruth Glass coined the term 'gentrification' while studying the inner city of London (Gray & Wyly, 2020). It describes the process by which low socioeconomic urban neighborhoods are transformed through the influx of affluent businesses and people - in turn displacing low-income residents. An economic explanation for this urban process can be found in Neil Smith's rent-gap theory (Gray & Wyly, 2020) which illustrates the disparity between the current property income and its potential income. According to a 2021 study, investors are attracted to land where a rent gap exists because of its potential to achieve its highest possible value for economic gain, thus closing the 'disparity' (Cohen, 2021).

The second concept that is increasingly important in understanding Toronto's housing crisis is financialization. This refers to the increasing roles of finance in the operation of domestic and international economies (Epstein, 2003, 5). The post-Fordist era laid the groundwork for financialization and urban governance and since then, has become market oriented. This will be necessary for understanding financialized gentrification as this concept can be confused with a traditional form of gentrification where neighborhoods undergo character conversion, however, this is driven by financialization (August, M. et al, 2018, 126). Studying from the perspective of different critical lenses is critical to understanding gentrification and its effects on cities.



## **TORONTO'S HOUSING CRISIS THROUGH CRITICAL CONCEPT(S)**

It is crucial when analyzing issues of a city to take a critical geographic approach and question who has control, who is benefiting, and who is being harmed. Experiences of marginalized social groups need to be carefully considered when discussing such a high-priority topic as housing. Countless neighborhoods in Toronto, specifically ethnic enclaves, and areas with a high concentration of low-income and marginalized residents have suffered the effects of gentrification. Those who fit in these categories are subjected to displacement due to the rent inflation associated with the arrival of affluent corporations replacing local businesses. Inner-city neighborhoods are targets for gentrification attracting financial investors who notice and look to exploit the visible rent gap.

Global capital markets have completely reworked housing markets on a worldwide scale. As financial markets and corporations have been increasing their dominance in the housing industry, a housing crisis has formed as a result. To understand Toronto's current housing crisis, it is important to note the financial speculation in urban real estate through mortgage prices that led to the 2008 global financial crisis (Cohen, 2021). Following the crisis, we see a shift in values and the financialization of the housing phenomenon transpired. This occurs when housing is viewed as a commodity - an investment opportunity - as opposed to a fundamental necessity.

The financialized gentrification framework can be applied to reveal the core of Toronto's housing crisis. Like traditional forms of gentrification, low-income marginalized groups are targets of this process and are displaced out of the inner city into more rural neighborhoods. However the addition of financialization brings numerous distinct effects on residents; the drastic decline in affordable housing, and reduced tenant protections that benefit those with a higher socio-economic status at the expense of poorer residents (Xhaferri, 2019). This decrease in affordable housing production has

led to an increase in socioeconomic imbalances through lucrative private housing corporations. Parkdale, a residential neighborhood in Toronto, can be used to showcase this urban process. Real estate investment trusts have purchased numerous buildings in the neighborhood, renovating them into higher luxury rentals to accumulate the largest possible profit - displacing existing residents that could not afford the higher rental market as a result (Whyte, 2020). These private corporations are eerily reminiscent of colonial ideals as they arrive in 'underdeveloped' communities and gentrify the area as it is an economic opportunity. Following this definition, post-colonialist views on gentrification unveil what is occurring in this neighborhood. Parkdale's vibrant culture and affordable housing were stripped, leaving it as a vulnerable community. In Toronto's case, the effects of financialization enabled by neoliberal state policies are evident. An affordability crisis formed for renters and an economic opportunity for investors created by a withdrawal from social housing deregulated tenant protections and decontrolled rent policies.

For example, under the terms of the rent control legislation prior to its update in 2018, vacancy control limited the amount landlords could increase rent between tenants (Hale, 2018). Reversing this, the Ontario Provincial government introduced new legislation that exempted new and vacant units from rental price increases. The Progressive Conservatives claimed that this policy would motivate investors to increase housing supply, however by permitting higher income property owners to disproportionately increase rent, it erases the tenant's power - further aggravating Toronto's housing crisis. Only a year after the removal, it was reported that tenants faced double-digit increases in rent showing how much landlords took advantage of this new legislation (Ngabo, 2019). Exhibited here, we can visualize how neoliberal privatization has led to the lack of governmental reliance on private investors for housing delivery.

Taking a structuralist approach to understanding Toronto's housing crisis provides insight regarding the economic reasons why

the city is vulnerable to gentrification. Long-existing neighborhoods located in the inner core of the city are prone to speculative investment at the expense of the displacement of individuals and evictions, as seen in Parkdale (Horgan, 2018, 513). Through neoliberal approaches to housing, gentrification has been given an environment to thrive and marginalized residents are rendered homeless, unable to afford price increases. Viewing this urban issue with a structuralist lens reveals the power imbalances between housing providers and residents. Private housing units are used to generate profits for the owner showcasing the structural gentrification in the city. The housing market has transformed into a 'playground' for capitalist corporations creating the financial squeeze and displacement many Torontonians face.

### CONCLUSION

Toronto, a city that has suffered sustained gentrification is seeing its effects on housing during its current crisis. Although Toronto was used as a case study, this housing crisis and its roots can be applied to similar cities worldwide. Understanding the policies implemented to benefit capitalist corporations and how they promote gentrification and the financialization of housing is integral to addressing the city's issue. This study outlined Toronto's current housing crisis' relation to gentrification and its impact on low-income marginalized groups. It examined the provincial decisions to withdraw rent control policies and how they inhibit tenant protection and affordable housing. Discovered through this analysis, and using the gentrification framework, many hidden factors that contribute to this housing crisis were revealed; insufficient income inconsistent with rental costs, investors' means, and governmental dependency on the private housing market (Rozworski, 2019). Present in other and most urban problems, this crisis disproportionately affects low-income marginalized groups. These families are at risk of homelessness due to the private housing market, and the rent control policy removal has exacerbated these risks. The purpose of this removal was to promote private developments to meet

the housing supply needs. Nevertheless, data shows that the amount of new housing units is not coherent with the demand and is doing more harm reducing renters' protection (Xhaferri, 2019). Private corporations and financialized landlords invest in the housing market filling the 'rent gap' that exists to increase maximum profits (Perks, 2019).

This housing crisis present in Toronto will continue and likely worsen over time if policy changes are not undertaken. Despite the inevitable and simplified process portrayal in the media, the housing crisis proves itself to be a far more complex problem of power dynamics, displacement, and economic imbalances. Ultimately, through discussing the housing crisis through perspectives of gentrification, post-colonialism, structuralism, and the recent presence of financialization, different roots can be revealed and understood surrounding this urban issue.

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# INCLUSIONARY ZONING AND THE TORONTO HOUSING CRISIS

## AN URBAN POLICY SOLUTION

KAYE, SARAH JIHAE

### ABSTRACT

*Inclusionary Zoning and The Toronto Housing Crisis* focuses on the housing affordability crisis present in Toronto, which is a result of historical policy decisions, and a rising population, leading to a low supply of affordable housing units (AHU). The financialization of housing is viewed as a key factor in this crisis, where housing is viewed as an investment opportunity, and private developers invest in the housing market to close the rent gap. The paper evaluates the impact of the newest Inclusionary Zoning Plan that was voted in favour of by the Council in November of 2021. The Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) regulation sets rent and housing prices to reflect the needs of low and moderate-income households, secures 8-22% of condominium units to be affordable housing by 2030, and required units to remain affordable for 99 years. However, the potential impact of IZ on other urban issues such as upzoning are highlighted. Although there is potential for positive outcomes, this market-driven policy has limited potential to produce affordable housing and only accelerates gentrification. Kaye suggests that integrating critical concepts such as financialized gentrification into policy revision can help prevent the displacement of local residents and ensure AHUs are secured.

## SECTION 37 POLICY BRIEF

Housing is an essential component of individual well-being and an instrument for access, in that it opens access to community services and its space provides increased personal safety. The absence of adequate housing reduces the quality of life for community members — a reality that Toronto's residents are currently facing. The economic growth linked with financialization, and gentrification has resulted in an influx in population and housing price increases. Along with most major cities, Toronto experiences multiple challenges to its housing crisis including (1) the lack of housing supply considering the demands, and (2) the use of real estate as an investment. While this urban issue has had a particular impact on marginalized communities, the city's astronomical living costs are gradually encroaching upon the upper-middle class with house prices surpassing critical thresholds. The housing affordability crisis has imperiled the accessibility of residential housing, compounding the pre-existing and intensifying scarcity of housing units that continues to afflict the region.

Increased rents have been exacerbated by provincial government decisions to lift newly built units' rent control, along with the neoliberal state policies enabling the effects of financialization. In Toronto's case, the city has recognized the need for political intervention to curb the housing crisis present and has enacted policies reliant on private developers for housing surplus. These policies create necessary opportunities for affordable housing units to be created. Within this paper, a critical assessment of Toronto's Inclusionary Zoning Policy will be conducted to reveal its potential effects on Toronto's current housing crisis. This policy will require new residential developments to include affordable housing units (AHU). Finally, this policy brief concludes by determining Toronto's housing affordability crisis will only continue if real policy reforms are not undertaken.

## TORONTO'S HOUSING CRISIS

Toronto is one of the world's leading cities for unaffordable housing and its inaccessibility to adequate housing is only worsening. A housing affordability report released by Oxford Economics in October 2021 ranked Toronto as the third least affordable city in North America (Arsenych, 2021). The current housing crisis can be largely attributed to a combination of historical policy decisions and the city's increasing population. Notably, the federal government cut social housing funding and shifted its administration of it to provincial levels in 1996. This transformed the province's funding landscape to essentially leave Ontario responsible for housing in an unstable climate resulting in multiple budget cuts (Hulchanski, 2002, p.10).

With the chronically low supply of affordable housing units, emergency shelter occupancy rates are nearing 90%, and 20% of Torontonians are found to spend over half their income on housing (Tory and Iveson, 2018). New affordable housing units (AHUs) are being constructed at a slower rate than the demand, and AHUs that are initially affordable increase in price. The financialization of the housing phenomenon provides insight into Toronto's housing crisis which occurs when housing is viewed as an investment opportunity—rather than a fundamental right. Private developers invest in the housing market to close the rent gap<sup>1</sup> that exists to achieve the highest economic gain possible (Cohen, 2021). Neighbourhoods of the city undergo character conversion through the strong economic growth associated with financialized gentrification. Integrating this critical concept into policy revision practice can reveal the potential effects they will have on communities as it accelerates the process of gentrification, decreases the number of affordable housing options, and benefits those of high socio-economic status while displacing disadvantaged residents in the process (August, M. et al, 2018, 126).

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<sup>1</sup> The rent gap refers to the discrepancy between the potential economic value of a property and its actual value based on its current use or state.

## **INCLUSIONARY ZONING OFFICIAL PLAN POLICY**

As Toronto grows due to its increasing population, improvements to community facilities and services are necessary to enhance residents' quality of life. Inclusionary zoning is one of the many land-use planning tools made available to promote new developments with the inclusion of required community benefits. The newest inclusionary zoning official plan amendment that was voted in favor of by the Council in November of 2021 establishes foundational requirements for consistent incorporation of affordable housing in new developments (Inclusionary Zoning units ). Greg Lintern, Toronto's Chief Planner and Executive Director drafted an in-depth report of demographic and market data to grasp the housing demand across the city. The provincial Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) regulation was first enacted in 2018, and Ontario limited areas where it could be applied through legislative changes which resulted in the implementation of IZ to areas within a Protected Major Transit Station Area (PMTSA). This IZ policy framework builds upon this IZ regulation to reflect City-specific urban housing issues with a forward-looking and balanced approach.

Affordability is associated with one's ability to pay for a good that is set at a certain price (Hulchanski, 1995). There are three main questions to ask in the context of affordable housing: Affordable for whom? To what standard of affordability? For how long? (Stone, 2006). Toronto's IZ framework addresses each of these questions by setting rent and housing prices to reflect the needs of low and moderate-income households (Lintern, 2021). IZ will secure 5-10 percent of condominium units to be affordable housing in 2022, gradually increasing to 8-22 percent by 2030 (City of Toronto, 2021). This plan will help Toronto reach its 2030 target of approving 4,000 affordable homes and 40,000 rentals across the city (Rocca, 2021). The policy also requires units to remain affordable for 99 years to ensure that the stock of affordable housing is maintained long-term. Newly set rents and prices will provide housing options for households whose market

rents are unattainable (e.g., registered nurses, elementary and high school educators, and others earning between \$32,000 and \$92,000) (City of Toronto, 2021). After one year, the policy will be reviewed to allow for adjustments that may be needed, such as alternations to development size thresholds to guarantee the production stability of affordable housing units (City of Toronto, 2021). Through this approach, the low-moderate income residents of Toronto are supposedly supported, inclusive communities are built, and future affordable housing units are ensured, thus ultimately addressing the city's housing needs.

## **POTENTIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS**

As Toronto's Inclusionary Zoning Official Plan aims to achieve new affordable housing units, there are many potential impacts on other urban issues, specifically upzoning and gentrification. IZ has gained popularity as a planning tool to increase the supply of affordable housing units. Although there is potential for positive outcomes, this market-driven policy has limited potential to produce affordable housing and, in Toronto, can accelerate gentrification (August, M. & Walks, A., 2018).

Areas with implemented IZ can be used to showcase the potential impacts of such policies. New York City communities such as SoHo, Harlem, the Lower East Side, and Williamsburg have experienced significant displacement through IZ. Real estate investment corporations purchased unprofitable buildings to be renovated into high-rent rentals with a small percentage of affordable housing, ultimately producing less affordable housing (Burnette, 2021). Residents who cannot afford the higher rental market that is introduced into their neighbourhood are displaced as a result. Colonial ideals of private trusts are revealed as these corporations arrive in 'underdeveloped' communities and redevelop them for economic gain . Because of the inclusionary zoning, these communities, their culture, and affordable housing options were stripped.

As threatening as these effects are, Toronto's plan is unlike others and debatably worse in that it transfers costs of housing subsidies onto the new developments. Instead of offsetting costs like tax exemptions or Section 37<sup>1</sup> provisions, developers raise their costs and reduce the number of units that are built - therefore aggravating housing shortages for all groups and advancing over the market-rate prices (August, M. & Walks, A., 2018). In addition, there are natural limits to the number of AHUs IZ can deliver. It is incapable of producing the number of affordable units required to make any change to Toronto's housing crisis. Finally, and most significantly, the affordability requirements of Toronto's IZ policy significantly vary, thus targeting households between \$32,000 and \$92,000 (City of Toronto, 2021). This broad definition of 'affordable' is unfortunately unattainable for the vast majority of individuals targeted by IZ.

IZ is politically attractive to the City of Toronto due to the responsibility of social housing that was transferred to them from the federal government. Contrary to conventional social housing provided by the government, this solution does not require the city to use its own funds. Like the communities of New York City, this forces new homebuyers to cover additional costs for providing affordable housing units. Toronto's Inclusionary Zoning Official Plan is arguably a facade to make it easier to upzone and gentrify the city's neighbourhoods. There are underlying political motivations in the policy that cater to high-income households. Up-zoning is defined as the practice of changing a neighbourhood to have increased commercial use which allows greater density in the area, in turn affecting existing occupants (Cohen, 2021). As increased density introduces new residents, improvements to community facilities and services would include higher demand for parking, public transit, new buildings, and infrastructure contributing to environmental emissions and climate change concerns (August, M. & Walks, A., 2018).

Inclusionary Zoning Official Plan of Toronto presents an opportunity to promote socio-economic diversity within an affluent area. However, the history of gentrification in the city necessitates careful consideration of the potential displacement of local residents. Given private developers' prioritization of profit accumulation, the municipal government cannot depend solely on them to provide affordable housing. Successful implementation of IZ proposals require politicians' complete separation from capitalist interest; until this is achieved, IZ policies will remain an insufficient tool in providing affordable housing and continue to exacerbate Toronto's existing housing crisis.

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<sup>1</sup> Section 37 of the Planning act is a policy that authorizes municipal governments to permit developments to exceed height and density zoning regulations, in return for community contributions/benefits (2014, Gladki Planning Associates).

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# CASSAVA FLOUR PRODUCTION

## REDEVELOPING SPATIAL EQUITY IN THE COMMODITY CHAIN

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### ABSTRACT

Premium Motherland Cassava Flour is a small-scale manufacturing and exporting company based in Ghana that aims to challenge exploitative labour practices of typical global commodity chains and promote spatial equity within its own. The company attempts to achieve these goals by focusing on independent farming practices and sustainable labour practices, with a specific focus on local scale and person-focused employment. This article aims to examine these equitable practices of the company, arguing that Premium Motherland's commitment to community development, social issues, and improving business practices contribute to spatial justice and equity within their commodity chain. The study concludes that Premium Motherland's efforts in promoting spatial justice are essential to redeveloping equity in the cassava flour commodity chain and provide insights into the potential of small-scale enterprises to promote sustainable and equitable economic development.

Do you know where your flour is manufactured or even where it is originally grown? Many people are not aware, as the globalized manufacturing system is often complex and opaque. Large multinational companies can prey on this ignorance to obscure injustices within their supply chains, increasing their profits by engaging, for instance, in exploitative labour practices (Garvin, 2009). Premium Motherland is a small-scale cassava flour manufacturing and exporting company that attempts to challenge those practices. The commodity chain of Premium Motherland Cassava Flour has expanded globally - from manufacturing and business ownership in the periphery in Ghana to the markets that include the global core in Canada. While global in scope, this structure differs from the globalization of the New International Division of Labour, in which the ownership for peripheral country manufacturing shifted to core countries, distancing themselves from the factories (Mullings & Warf, 2006). Within rural Ghana, the cassava root is grown and harvested by independent farmers, and manufactured into flour through processes like washing, grating, pressing, drying, and grinding in nearby factories (Elisabeth, 2022). Equity concerns are central to the relationship between Premium Motherland and cassava flour farmers and workers. After these initial manufacturing processes, the flour is packaged and shipped across the ocean to a port in Montreal, Canada. It is then brought to a warehouse, and driven to a store in Kitchener, Ontario, where I bought it and used it to make muffins. Disposal of this product would pertain to the packaging, a 1 kg plastic pouch which was thrown in the garbage and will eventually be brought to the nearby Kingston landfill, while any food scraps would travel to a composting facility, where they would be able to improve overall soil health in the area ("Sustainable Management of Food Basics", 2022). In response to this process, I argue that Premium Motherland Cassava Flour's independent farming practices, purchase promises of cassava root in rural Ghana, and sustainable labour practices within their manufacturing processes all contribute to spatial justice and equity within their commodity chain. This company is driven by their core values and

beliefs - specifically providing opportunities for community development in and around Accra, addressing social issues among the most vulnerable within the community, and improving current business practices. Along these lines, Premium Motherland promotes and contributes to spatial justice through many aspects of their supply chain and practices ("Hope for Marginalized Youth," 2022). They do this by focusing on local scale, farmer commitment, and person-focused employment. Their goal in this effort is to challenge and attempt to change injustices that often occur within typical global commodity chains by helping to build technical skills while also providing community, opportunities, and support in gaining and keeping the socially valued resources (the largest being income, financial security, and jobs) that this company seeks to spread more evenly.

While Premium Motherland improves the equity of typical supply chain processes in many ways, farming is one of the most foundational. Cassava root is sourced from local independent farmers in rural Ghana, within 100 km of the capital city of Accra and even closer to the manufacturing plants, located just outside of Accra. Buying from independent Ghanaian farmers gives them a consistent and higher income and supports their choice of livelihood, without forcing them to abide by inflexible corporate or international labour and employment laws. They can set their own terms, hours, and are not under the control of an employer (Bruynis, 2021). While Ghana's labour force is increasing due to a relatively high fertility rate (Nyarko, 2021), labour-intensive sectors such as manufacturing have been growing more slowly and aren't able to absorb the expanding workforce (Asare, 2012). Labour migration is common in Africa for a variety of reasons such as poverty, political instability, or better job opportunities ("Steady Increase in Labour Migration", 2021) - though foreign workers often receive lower wages, overpriced housing, and fewer rights in their new country. This results in an overrepresentation of migrant workers filling a limited number of manufacturing and/low skill jobs in this sector (OECD, 2020). As more mi-

grant workers are willing to take these jobs and accept lower wages, this makes it more difficult for local workers to access low skill jobs that pay enough. This drives the workforce in Ghana to the extremes: either emigrating out to gain higher education or other employment, or potentially forced to the margins and living on the streets. In the case of Premium Motherland, employing local farmers instead of hiring migrant workers for less money increases the number of more sustainable jobs in the country for locals. It also tends to increase wages for these local workers and gives them a sense of ownership and independence (Vargas-Silva, 2020).

Furthermore, the proximity of farm to plant ensures that the cassava stays fresh without needing preservatives and that there is less product lost in transportation over longer distances (Lipińska, 2019). Within the cassava industry, it is common for there to be loss of product within the supply chain, with 4.95% of cassava root lost during harvest, and 2.2% of cassava root lost during transport to and from the factories, as well as significant loss due to spoilage during storage and discarding of small or woody tubers before the flour is manufactured (Oguntade, 2013). Not only does Premium Motherland ensure equity in the scale and proximity of farm relationships, but they also give farmers an assured product price through a “promise of purchase”. This ensures a fair process, consistent income, and, in turn, quality of life to support these farmers’ livelihoods by “promising” to buy whatever the farmers grow that year. This decreases the financial risk for the individual farmers. If these farmers did not have this kind of contract with Premium Motherland, aside from product loss elsewhere in the chain, they would inevitably have product they don’t sell at markets, which would result in a lower income and/or an uneven income distribution from week to week. In total, these practices employed by Premium Motherland contribute to spatial justice by providing more jobs to the local community and ensuring consistent income/quality of life for these independent farmers on their own terms, making sure they can afford to live by more evenly distributing money and jobs

as socially valued and necessary resources.

In addition to reimagining the relationship with farmers, Premium Motherland seeks to redress the injustices of manufacturing. After harvesting, the cassava root must go through various labour-intensive processes to become flour. The root is peeled, washed, and soaked in water in large batches then grated or sliced with a manual slicer and dried to take the water out using a manual hydraulic press (Elisabeth, 2022). These processes are critical to reducing cassava starch in the root, which contains high amounts of cyanogen, which could have deadly side effects if in large doses (Sornyotha, 2010). After drying, the root is then ground into flour and packaged by workers in the factory (Elisabeth, 2022). Within manufacturing, many of these processes and the machinery needed to create the flour are manual and require workers to operate them. This is the case for cassava production within Africa, however Premium Motherland is intentional about prioritizing sustainable employment in this way. These manufacturing processes provide more jobs with fair wages and, in particular, supply more work to local people. In addition, Premium Motherland partners with a non-profit organization called Future of Africa to train and hire youth that have been living on the streets of Accra. There is a very large number of children and youth living on the streets of Ghana, and young people in low-income countries are some of the least likely to have the necessary employment skills for getting jobs (“Around 3 in 4 youth lack skills needed for employment,” 2022). Within Accra, there are estimated to be close to 204,000 children living in street situations (“Hope for Marginalized Youth,” 2022). Under the same management as Premium Motherland, Future of Africa provides an opportunity for these youth to get off the streets and away from the associated living conditions, violence, trafficking, and sexual exploitation that arise from living there, while also gaining the skills necessary to become financially independent (Oppong Asante, 2015). As of 2023, five youth have participated in job skills training, and they intend to hire some of those youth and provide them with employable

skills to be able to work in the cassava factories located just outside Accra (“Hope for Marginalized Youth,” 2022). These labour practices within the factories are driven less by profit than by an ethical motivation to benefit the community and disenfranchised individuals and groups. They contribute to spatial justice by intentionally integrating manual processes in manufacturing, which provides more jobs to locals. Giving youth on the street the chance to work builds employable skills, which are in lower supply for young people within low-income countries (“Around 3 in 4 youth lack skills needed for employment,” 2022). This practice assists in lowering the count of homeless youth on the streets of Ghana’s capital, Accra as they gain experience and skills to provide for themselves and get off the streets.

Together, these practices of Premium Motherland provide sustainable alternatives that aim to challenge inequities and contribute to spatial justice within the global periphery. They aim to achieve this by providing a consistent income to small-scale, independent farmers in rural Ghana through a promise of purchase while also providing jobs and employable skills to youth living on the streets in Accra within the nearby factories. While Premium Motherland redresses several common supply chain challenges such as loss of product, distance from farm to industry, financial risk and cost of transport, and lack of job security (Suryaningrat et al., 2015), it is too early in the growth of this company to be able to fully evaluate the long-term sustainability of these efforts – though they remain a positive example of a new way of business. Essentially, this company challenges changes made by the New International Division of Labour, not by altering where production is happening, but by making the process within peripheral countries fairer and more equitable on both ends. This lessens uneven development, which is often the normal way of business. Uneven development is the unequal development of the global economy, creating and exacerbating global extremes of wealth and poverty (Harvey & Smith, 2008), and the goal of Premium Motherland is to lessen these extremes through

transparency and equitability. In doing this, they hope to be the change in the food production industry, where many larger companies hide things behind closed doors to further benefit at the expense of consumers and increase spatial injustice (Garvin, 2009).

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# Grandmother Moon

and the

# Tale of The Land

By: Sarah Morgan

A geographic story of the  
Land Back movement

# Author's Message of Positionality

Hello everyone,

Thank you for deciding to read "Grandmother Moon and the Tale of the Land."

Before we begin this journey of Land Back, I would like to acknowledge that, while I tell and organize this short story, the story is not mine. I was raised on the unceded traditional territory of the Algonquin peoples in a small town we now call Perth, Ontario, and was born a daughter to Settler parents. I do not identify as Indigenous.

This story encapsulates my learning about the politicization of land, Indigenous-Settler relations, the Land Back movement, and growth as an ally.

Sarah



# Key words

Turtle Island: an Indigenous name for Earth, or North America

Landscape: a complex part of society that gives hints about what humans do


Land: connection between humans and the Earth that holds wisdom

Interconnections: the way people or places are connected to each other through the environment or human activity


First Woman: Also known as Mother Earth; a female figure in creation

Sovereignty: a nation's control over itself

Land Back: the return of land, and power, back to Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island







Upon Turtle Island, or North America to some,  
there's land, and water, and animals to and from.  
These pieces make the landscape, as far as you see,  
it tells the stories of you and of me.  
The landscape gives hints of what we do each day,  
our lives, our troubles, and joys, and our play.  
Who am I, you ask? I'm happy to tell:  
I'm Grandmother Moon, pleasure to meet you, as well!






To start our story, we mustn't fray away,  
a landscape is much more than a place where we play.  
The root word of landscape starts with land,  
so, let's get all this straight, just beforehand.

- ★ Land is alive, it ties things together:
- ★ animals, trees, water, the weather.

These are interconnections, a new big word,  
reaching to roots and to sky and to birds.






Also, to note, humans grow from the Earth.  
An extension of women, it all starts at birth.  
The land is feminine, like our aunt, and our mother,  
our daughter, our sister, and like me, grandmother.  
But we must remember, the land came first,  
she's the reason we're here, she raised us and nursed.  
Her name is First Woman, she treats us with care,  
we must treat her the same as we breathe in her air.



A landscape holds more than pipelines and quarries,  
with creation, and love, and sovereignty stories.  
Over time, these lands were stolen from peoples,  
the animals too, the waters, and eagles.  
Landscapes transformed into industrial places  
or suburbia gardens with white skinned faces.  
Lands held by governments too, like lots of Ontario.  
This land isn't theirs, a horrific scenario.





Stealing land is like stealing a part of traditions and language and one's very own heart.

Land is political and has certain ties and the wisdom of Earth is what keeps us wise. First Woman's children fight for their land back, for they never asked to be under attack.

Power of territory must go into their hands. These aren't suggestions, these are demands.





Giving land back means many things,  
care and connection are a few that it brings.

Land guardians control where pipelines are bound,  
like the Wet'suwet'en nation and standing their ground.

Land protects us, so we must do the same.  
So, throw in the fuel and dance in the flame.



If you have no land to give, don't fall off track,  
for land back is more than just giving land back.  
It's all about listening, believing, and more,  
returning the power and ending a war.



From me to you, thank you for listening  
I'm awful tired from this long night of glistening.  
I now will rest until tomorrow,  
but share these ideas! You're welcome to borrow.  
Goodbye and good day, from Grandmother Moon.  
Take care of the land and I'll see you soon.



# Thank you, to...

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# Get involved at...

<https://unistoten.camp/supportertoolkit/>  
<https://4rsyouth.ca/land-back-what-do-we-mean/>  
<https://www.ubcic.bc.ca/canadafailingindigenouspeoples>  
<https://landback.org/donate/>





