THE NEW FACE
OF CANADIAN
NATIONALISM

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The 1994 Kenneth R. MacGregor Lecturer

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FOREWORD

This publication is the revised text of a public address by Roger Gibbins as the Kenneth R. MacGregor Lecturer in Intergovernmental Relations. The lecture was delivered on 16 November 1994.

Queen's University established the MacGregor Lectureship in order to bring to the campus each year a prominent public figure or scholar who can make an important contribution to the understanding or practice of federalism, inter-governmental relations or related matters in Canada or other countries. The MacGregor Lecturer usually spends a week at Queen's University where he or she presents one or more formal lectures, which are subsequently published, and meets informally with classes and other groups of students and faculty. The lectureship is funded by an endowment in honour of Kenneth R. MacGregor who has had a distinguished career in the field of insurance, including its intergovernmental complexities, in particular as the federal Superintendent of Insurance, 1953 to 1964, and President of Mutual Life Assurance of Canada, 1964 to 1973.

Previous MacGregor Lecturers have been Robert Stanfield, Peter Lougheed, Alan Cairns, Allan Blakeney, Albert Breton, Gordon Robertson and Daniel Elazar.

Roger Gibbins is one of Canada's leading political scientists. A native of British Columbia, he graduated in 1974 with a Ph.D. from Stanford University and has spent his post-graduate career entirely with the University of Calgary. He has been head of the Department of Political Science since 1987. Professor Gibbins' many books and articles reflect a research interest in and affection for his own region, but also an ability to communicate new ideas and critical understanding to conventional political debate. He is a recognized authority on regionalism in Canada, the United States, and Australia, and on constitutional politics and intergovernmental relations. He has been a consultant and advisor to the Canada West Foundation, the Government of Canada and the Government of Alberta. From 1990 to 1993 he was co-editor of the *Canadian Journal of Political Science*.

The publication of this essay comes amidst a difficult and uncertain stage — albeit one of many such stages — in Canada's constitutional history. Following the failure of constitutional reform with the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the referendum of 1992, and the stated intention of the Parti Québécois government of the province of Quebec to hold a referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec in 1995, Canadians may well ask what still unites them. Professor Gibbins' answers are chilling in their insight. In his view, a new form of nationalism is emerging in Canada, one indifferent or hostile to the historic claims of biculturalism and multiculturalism, and less preoccupied with anti-Americanism and state enterprise. Instead, the emphasis in this "new face of Canadian nationalism" is on the increasingly complex problems associated with social integration *within* English Canada, and with new social movements and political voices. It is rights-based in principle and less attuned to federalism. And, most telling for the current stage of the Canadian debate, the new nationalism has little or no resonance in Quebec.

In outlining this new form of nationalism, the author provides an overview of the variants of nationalism that have to date succeeded in maintaining unity, based most often on elite accommodation. The staying power of these traditional forms of nationalism may yet be proven; but as Professor Gibbins argues, the interplay with the new form of Canadian nationalism makes constitutional politics blunter, less compromising, and less nuanced. His analysis is bound to provoke thoughtful assessments of the prerequisites of unity, or of a new relationship between the federation partners.

We welcome his fresh perspective.

Douglas M. Brown
Executive Director
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations
May 1995

SOMMAIRE

Les débats entourant le nationalisme canadien se sont traditionnellement concentrés sur les relations complexes et souvent tendues entre les communautés culturelles et linguistiques. Le nationalisme a en conséquence été perçu en termes de compromis, comme un moyen par lequel on construit de fragiles ponts à travers un pays profondément segmenté. Il n'y a pas à s'étonner qu'en ce sens le nationalisme a largement été édifié par l'élite, un credo tissé par une classe politique vouée à une conception particulière de l'unité nationale. Des formes plus éloquentes de nationalisme, telle que celle illustrée par le «One Canada» de John Diefenbaker, furent considérées avec une vive inquiétude, comme une menace aux interprétations plus nuancées de la communauté politique.

Cependant, cette perspective traditionnelle a voilé l'émergence d'une nouvelle forme de nationalisme qui domine de plus en plus le paysage politique à l'extérieur du Québec. Cette nouvelle forme est d'attitude moins accommodante et est, au mieux, indifférente et, au pire, hostile aux conceptions biculturelles de la communauté politique. Elle est moins préoccupée que les formes traditionnelles de nationalisme par la relation du Canada avec les États-Unis et elle s'intéresse moins à l'accommodation institutionnelle du Québec. Elle est animée plutôt par les problèmes toujours plus complexes de l'intégration sociale *au sein même* du Canada anglais ainsi que par les nouveaux mouvements sociaux et les nouvelles voix politiques. Elle tend à être de nature ahistorique, puisant sa vision dans le siècle à venir plutôt que dans le passé du pays. Au plan des principes, elle se fonde sur une notion de droits, qui s'harmonise moins bien avec les principes de base du fédéralisme et qui tend à avoir un effet homogénéisateur. Tout en ayant trouvé dans l'Ouest son articulation la plus vigoureuse, elle est aussi compatible avec les cultures politiques populaires de l'Ontario et des provinces atlantiques.

L'émergence de cette nouvelle forme de nationalisme rend la politique traditionnelle d'accommodation constitutionnelle difficile à l'extrême. En effet, elle est une forme qui correspond plus facilement à un Canada sans le Québec tout en rendant cette issue plus probable. À tout le moins, elle fait la promotion d'une façon plus brutale, moins accommodante et moins nuancée d'aborder les problèmes constitutionnels.

ABSTRACT

Discussions of Canadian nationalism have traditionally concentrated on the complex and often tense relationship between linguistic and cultural communities. Nationalism has thus been seen in accommodative terms, as a means by which tenuous bridges are built across a deeply segmented country. Not surprisingly, nationalism in this sense has been largely an elite construct, a creed woven together by a political class devoted to a particular conception of national unity. More expressive forms of nationalism of the sort exemplified by John Diefenbaker's "One Canada" have been viewed with trepidation, as a threat to more nuanced appreciations of the political community.

However, this traditional perspective has obscured the emergence of a new form of nationalism that has increasingly come to dominate the political landscape outside Quebec. This new form is less accommodating in spirit, and is at best indifferent and at worst hostile to bicultural conceptions of the political community. It is less preoccupied than traditional forms with Canada's relationship with the United States, and is less concerned with the institutional accommodation of Quebec. Rather, it is driven by the increasingly complex problems associated with social integration *within* English Canada, and with new social movements and new political voices. It tends to be ahistoric in character, drawing its vision from the century to come rather than from the country's past. It is rights-based in principle, less attuned to the basic tenets of federalism, and homogenizing in effect. While it has achieved its most forceful articulation in the west, it is compatible with the popular political cultures of both Ontario and the Atlantic provinces.

The emergence of this new form of nationalism makes the traditional politics of constitutional accommodation difficult in the extreme. It is, indeed, a form that would fit most easily into a Canada without Quebec, and it may make such an outcome more likely. At the very least, it promotes a blunter, less compromising, and less nuanced approach to constitutional politics.

THE NEW FACE OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

In the analysis to follow, I would like to pursue a straightforward but perhaps disturbing thesis. First, I will discuss some of the more important forms that Canadian nationalism has assumed in the second half of the twentieth century.[1] I will then show how each of these has been eroded in recent years and, as a consequence, has been weakened as an emotional bond for the Canadian political community. Finally, I will suggest that the most vibrant forms of contemporary nationalism are paradoxical in the sense that they are premised on the assumption, implicit or explicit, that Canada as we know it will not survive. Thus the current dynamics of nationalism are also the dynamics of national disintegration, for the visions that are coming to dominate the political stage are directing our attention to a Canada without Quebec. Although this conclusion may be old hat for students of Québécois nationalism, it is only beginning to be recognized among those whose interest has been with Canadian nationalism more broadly defined.

The initial part of the analysis will focus on forms of pan-Canadian nationalism; the incorporation of Québécois nationalism into the analysis will come later. Some of these pan-Canadian forms are of relatively recent vintage, while others have deep historical roots reaching well back into the nineteenth and even eighteenth centuries. It should be stressed, however, that all are transcendent in character; they have tried to incorporate every region of the country, including Quebec, although clearly some have been more successful than others in this respect. They have all attempted to provide the foundation for an inclusive, pan-Canadian identity that would span the linguistic and regional cleavages which have bedevilled political life in this country.

What, then, are the forms of pan-Canadian nationalism that have prevailed to date, but which are being eroded in the contemporary political environment? Note, for a start, that the emphasis is on *forms*; to come up with a singular *and consensual* definition of Canadian nationalism is beyond my reach. Indeed, it has been beyond the reach of Canadians at large who for generations have supported an extensive academic, literary, and journalistic investigation into

the nature of the Canadian identity, one that has been as prolonged as it has been inconclusive. The present analysis, therefore, will address not one but five forms of Canadian nationalism, all of which have had a significant impact on the country's political thought and practice. The five are:

- defensive nationalism, or anti-Americanism;
- state enterprise nationalism, or "the ties that bind";
- international nationalism, or Canada as global peacekeeper;
- two-nations nationalism, or the nationalism of bilingualism and biculturalism; and
- Trudeau nationalism, or multiculturalism in a bilingual framework.

These five forms are not mutually exclusive, and can best be seen as interwoven threads in a complex national tapestry, or perhaps as interrelated dimensions of a larger nationalist phenomenon. Nor do the five even begin to exhaust the field; serious students of Canadian nationalism will undoubtedly be able to identify a host of additional variants and even separate species. Nonetheless, the five should supply sufficient evidence for the general thesis that a nationalist foundation for an inclusive, pan-Canadian identity has been elusive, and that the most workable forms to date are being eroded as the country approaches the twenty-first century.

DEFENSIVE NATIONALISM, OR ANTI-AMERICANISM

There is no contesting the conclusion that anti-Americanism has been a long-standing and central component of Canadian nationalism, one whose roots go back to the influx of United Empire Loyalists following the American War of Independence, to the fear of military invasion after the American Civil War, and to the threat of American manifest destiny as settlement spread westward at the end of the nineteenth century. For most purposes, Canada has had but a single neighbour, the United States. More remote neighbours across the Arctic Ocean have not played a significant role in our political consciousness nor in the evolution of the dominant forms of nationalism. Other countries have come into play primarily through broader, international conflicts and relations, both hot and cold, within which Canada has been but one of many players. In this context, and keeping in mind the asymmetrical nature of the American-Canadian relationship, it is not surprising that anti-Americanism has been so integral to Canadian nationalism. The United States has been virtually the sole model against which Canadians have tested their own identity, the only mirror in which Canadians have assessed their country's worth.

If we adopt a conventional view and see nationalism as an amalgam of in-group loyalties and out-group hostilities,[2] then it is not surprising that Americans have been the only out-group of any particular relevance for most

Canadians. Nor, given the reach and power of American firms and cultural industries, is it surprising that anti-Americanism has manifested itself in virtually all areas of Canadian life. In light of the overwhelming American presence on the continent, one might argue that *any* form of Canadian nationalism must provide a means of national differentiation and thereby defence from the colossus to the south. Where forms of nationalism have differed has been in the emphasis they have placed on this prime directive. It should also be noted, however, that the principal focus of anti-Americanism has been on the American presence *in Canada*; there is little evidence and even less likelihood that Canadians stand apart from other nationalities in their dislike of the United States or Americans per se.

Anti-Americanism can also be linked to a number of other attributes which have figured prominently in articulations of Canadian nationalism. Those who see Canada as a "caring society" and who support this conclusion by reference to the national health-care system, equalization programs, and the virtual absence of urban ghettos have American comparisons in mind. Canada is not so much a caring society in an absolute sense as it is a *more caring* society than the United States; other national comparisons are irrelevant.[3] Those who take pride in Canada's record with respect to law and order, who see their country as the "peaceable kingdom," have American comparisons in mind. And the shrinking number of Canadians who continue to take pride in their political system conjure up American contrasts when they sing the praises of responsible government, Question Period in the House of Commons, party discipline, appointed judges (but not senators!), and the monarchy.

There should be no need to demonstrate further the pervasiveness of anti-Americanism in Canadian life throughout most of the twentieth century, and its importance as a determinant of Canadian public policy. Instead, the point to stress is the recent shift in the intensity of that sentiment. Opposition to things American and, more specifically, to American influence in Canadian economic, political, and social life came to a peak during the 1960s and early 1970s. It found expression in the Foreign Investment Review Agency, a voluminous literature on economic nationalism, and the creation of a Canadian cultural veneer pasted over the American mass culture that had come to blanket the continent and much of the Western world. However, opposition has been waning over the past decade, partly as a consequence of its own success, and partly by having been dealt severe blows by defeat in the 1988 debate over the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the subsequent passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, by dramatic changes in communication and information technologies,[4] and by the ideological trumpets of globalization. Canadians have been told repeatedly by business and now political leaders that they must embrace a new continental and global future, that national boundaries and the parochialism they shelter must give way to the free flow of investment, goods

and services, cultural artifacts, and ideas. Traditional sentiments of anti-Americanism are incompatible with this message, one that has been accepted by many and quite likely most Canadians. Anti-Americanism seems, and indeed is, out of step and out of tune with the rush to embrace globalization. Canadians have emphatically rejected Brian Mulroney's nine-year legacy, but his court-ship of the United States has been a clear exception. It should be noted, though, that Jean Chrétien has pursued this courtship with more constraint and finess than was the case with his predecessor.

Of considerable importance in the years to come will be the erosion of those social programs that have been identified with a way of life north of the 49th parallel which are seen to be superior and thus worthy of public policy defence. Such programs are facing severe fiscal constraint, and are coming under growing ideological attack by the proponents of privatization, the free market, and limited government.[5] As the federal government retreats under the smokescreen of fiscal necessity from federal-provincial shared-cost programs, as it abandons more and more of the social policy field to the provinces, the notion of national programs or standards becomes increasingly tenuous. In this context it should also be recognized that nationalist pride in the unique character of Canadian political institutions has been in short supply lately. The debacle of executive federalism in the constitutional arena, the continuing strength of the sovereignty movement in Quebec, and the Reform Party's populist chal-lenge to representative democracy have all made Canadians less sanguine about the intrinsic superiority of their political system.

In summary, anti-Americanism, the traditional spine of Canadian national-ism, has been weakened. Anti-Americanism seems increasingly dated and passé within the brave new world of NAFTA, Internet and the World Wide Web, globalization, and a rapidly decentralizing federal state. However, it is not alone in its decline, for other forms of nationalism have also been weakened by some of the same forces that have diminished the centrality of anti-Americanism in Canadian life.

STATE ENTERPRISE NATIONALISM, OR "THE TIES THAT BIND"

A second and somewhat related form of Canadian nationalism has found expression in state enterprise. It has been expressed through a series of projects which have either knit the country together or have demonstrated a unique national style of public enterprise. The multitudinous components of state enterprise nationalism are too numerous to list in their entirety, but they certainly include the following:

- the construction of canals and fortifications in pre-Confederation Canada;
- the transcontinental rail system;[6]
- public utilities such as BC Hydro, Ontario Hydro, Quebec Hydro, and Saskatchewan Telephone;
- the Churchill Falls and James Bay hydro-electric developments;
- the British Columbia ferry fleet;
- the St. Lawrence Seaway and Trans-Canada Highway;
- the wheat pools and the Canadian Wheat Board;
- Air Canada and Petro-Canada; and
- the CBC, the National Film Board, and the Canada Council.

State enterprise nationalism also embraces such quasi-public endeavours as the development of the Hibernia oil field and the Alberta oil sands, and the proposal in the 1970s for a Mackenzie Valley natural gas pipeline. It found expression in John Diefenbaker's "roads to resources" program in the late 1950s, and again in the National Energy Program introduced in 1980. State enterprise nationalism may have drawn particularly enthusiastic support from the political left, and at times has induced regional conflict, but public support has generally transcended partisan, regional, and ideological divisions. As Pierre Berton reminded us in the title to his history of the CPR, the railways, and by extension other projects similar in scale and impact, were part and parcel of a more encompassing "national dream."[7] Or, as Eric Nicol and Peter Whalley observed in a less reverent fashion, "in Canada as in no other country the ties that bind are five feet long and creosoted."[8]

This form of nationalism has had a substantial and perhaps even dramatic impact on the evolution of the Canadian state and society; its artifacts have shaped the land and defined the people. However, there is no doubt that both state enterprise nationalism and the public infrastructure it has fostered are now being eroded by privatization and deregulation, by the retreat from public enterprise across English Canada as cash-starved governments confront the grim fiscal realities of deficits and debt, and by a neoliberal ideological agenda designed to shrink the state. As Jeffrey Simpson has observed:

> The Canadian state, once the agent for nationalist policies, is so encumbered by debt that it is withdrawing steadily from the economy and turning over new responsibilities to the private sector or to users who will pay for services.... English Canadian nationalists have raged against the dying of the light that animated their souls without updating their analyses from the sixties and early seventies, when foreign investment was seen to be excessive and the state was still financially robust enough to intervene in the economy.[9]

Evidence of the decline of state enterprise nationalism is not difficult to find, and indeed is hard to avoid. The collapse of the federal NDP in the 1993 general

election, the precarious future of provincial NDP governments and parties, the disappearance of Mel Hurtig's National Party, and the fixation of contemporary public discourse on the "bottom line" all suggest that the centre of political gravity has shifted in a way that is problematic for state enterprise nationalism. Nor, for that matter, has the evidence been restricted to Canada. The collapse of barriers to international trade, the globalization of financial markets, and the currents of neoconservative and neoliberal thought sweeping across Western democratic states all reinforce and to some extent drive the Canadian experience.

Now admittedly, the retreat from state enterprise and state enterprise nationalism has not been uniform across the land, and to this moment has gone further in parts of western Canada than it has elsewhere. The retreat has been most dramatic in Alberta, where Ralph Klein's Progressive Conservative government has emphatically rejected the high-spending legacy of Peter Lougheed, a legacy that provides a vivid illustration of state enterprise nationalism, albeit pitched to a provincial audience. The approach in Ontario, where the deficit rivals that of California and the debt situation is much worse, has been very different; to date there has been little sign of concern, much less hysteria. If the Ontario NDP government survives the 1995 provincial election, it will provide important evidence that deficit spending and state intervention still command a substantial electorate. If, however, Ontario swings to the right, the blow to the state enterprise form of nationalism will be substantial. On the federal front, the infrastructure program introduced by the federal Liberals following the 1993 election shows that the retreat of the federal government from state enterprise has been hesitant at best, although it is by no means clear that new sewers, curbs, and luxury boxes in hockey arenas will make the same contribution to nationalism as did more grandiose projects in the past.

It is of more than parenthetical interest to note the difference between Quebec and the rest of the country on the issues of deficit and debt, issues on which there would appear to be a deepening divide in political sentiment. The deficit and debt have received relatively light attention by the Quebec government as the province gears up for another round of the sovereignty debate, and indeed the two issues have been rolled into the sovereignty debate as much as they have been addressed on their own. While the notion of a national or societal "project" may still carry considerable appeal in Quebec, it appears increasingly at odds with the tenor of political thought outside that province. It would appear, then, that the basic themes and principles of the state enterprise form of nationalism could continue to receive support in Quebec long after such support has eroded elsewhere. The catch, of course, is that the state focus would be on Quebec, not Canada.

If state enterprise has provided a central pillar of pan-Canadian nationalism in the twentieth century, it is unlikely to do so in the twenty-first. The domestic

and international political worlds have changed in ways that will constrain the expression of state enterprise nationalism. Whether such change is for the better is a legitimate matter for debate, but the reality of the change seems indisputable.

INTERNATIONAL NATIONALISM, OR CANADA AS GLOBAL PEACEKEEPER

Canadian nationalism has found expression not only within the context of domestic state enterprise but also in the distinctive role that Canada has pursued within the arena of international politics. Canadians have taken justifiable pride in the role their country has played on the world stage, pride that finds its roots in a disproportionate national contribution to the First and Second World Wars, and that stretches through dozens of peacekeeping roles that Canada has undertaken for the United Nations. Canada has been an assertive and creative actor in a wide assortment of international organizations and initiatives ranging from the United Nations to NATO, the Commonwealth and international trade agreements such as the general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT). We have seen ourselves, and believe that others have seen us, as the "honest broker" and the "Atlantic linchpin." The "international peacekeeper" has become a symbol of Canadian nationalism, one personified by Lester Pearson when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In this sense, then, Canadian nationalism has been internationalized; the Canadian nationalist sees himself or herself as a global citizen.

Unfortunately, this form of nationalism has also encountered considerable erosion in recent years, and the erosion is likely to continue. There has been growing public disenchantment with United Nations peacekeeping as Canadian forces have become entangled in extraordinarily difficult situations in Bosnia and Somalia. Recent UN military peace*making* operations in the Persian Gulf and Haiti have been so dominated by American forces that a distinctive or even useful Canadian contribution has been difficult to discern. As peacekeeping turns more and more to peacemaking, the contribution of UN involvement to Canadian nationalism may diminish.

In addition, the collapse of communism has made it more difficult for Canada to play a brokerage role in international affairs; it is easier to be the honest middleman in a polarized world than it is in an era of American hegemony. In an international environment chock-full of middlemen, Canada loses any unique identity. It should also be noted that Canada's *relative* standing within the world economy has diminished steadily since the end of World War II. There has been remarkable growth in that economy, and in recent years particularly explosive growth in the economies of the Pacific Rim. As a consequence,

Canada has become a relatively less significant player on the international economic stage. Finally, financial constraints at home are also exerting growing pressure on Canadian aid programs abroad. In the past opposition parties on the left, and particularly the NDP, provided valuable political support for such programs. They made it difficult for the government to retreat from its foreign aid commitments even during hard times at home. Now, however, the primary opposition to the Liberal government comes from the right and the Reform Party, and it is opposition that challenges rather than supports aid programs.

None of this is meant to denigrate the positive contribution that Canada has made and will continue to make to the international order. However, the transformation of that order means that playing on the world stage provides an increasingly less effective vehicle for the expression of Canadian nationalism. The nationalist vision of Canada as the international peacekeeper, the epitome of the global citizen, burns less brightly today than it did in the past, and in all probability will continue to fade as we move into the twenty-first century.

TWO-NATIONS NATIONALISM, OR THE NATIONALISM OF BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM

When Canadians turn from the international stage to the domestic scene, by far the most difficult challenge for nationalists has been to find a pan-Canadian vision that would bridge the two linguistic and cultural communities encapsulated by the terms "English Canada" and "French Canada." The most explicit attempt has been "two-nations" nationalism and its commitment to bilingualism and biculturalism as the building blocks for the Canadian political community. As a pan-Canadian vision, this form of nationalism has been closely associated with federalists in Quebec, and has found expression in compact theories of Confederation, the rhetoric of Wilfrid Laurier and Henri Bourassa, the initial report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the recommendations of the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on National Unity and, within the academic community, in the writing of Charles Taylor. A relatively mild constitutional expression of this form of Canadian nationalism was reflected in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, and can be found in the associated constitutional notions of a special status for Quebec, the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, and the idea of "asymetrical federalism."

The two-nations form of Canadian nationalism has played an important role in constitutional and intellectual debate over the past three decades. However, the conclusion is inescapable that its proponents have lost a series of battles, and indeed the war. The decisive moment came when the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism were transformed into national policies of bilingualism and *multiculturalism*. The rejection of

biculturalism at that time was repeated with the failure of the Meech Lake Accord to win legislative ratification, and with the more emphatic popular rejection of the Charlottetown Accord in the 1992 constitutional referendum. The growing strength of multiculturalism, the transformative impact of immigration, the emergence of "Charter Canadians," and the forceful entry of Aboriginal Peoples into constitutional politics all suggest that the two-nations model is a spent force as a form of pan-Canadian nationalism. Regardless of its possible fit with the underlying reality of Canada, it no longer enjoys any significant political support outside Quebec, and its appeal within Quebec is tenuous at best. The last gasp of the two-nations concept is perhaps to be found in the recent and somewhat bizarre suggestion that Quebec, once it had achieved its independence, would then negotiate a new economic and political relationship with the rest of Canada that might even extend to common legislative institutions. It seems now that in Quebec, the two-nations framework is used more to buttress visions of an independent Quebec than it is to support Quebec's continued association with the rest of Canada.

None of this is to deny the attractiveness that the two-nations form of nationalism will still have for some Canadians both outside and inside Quebec. However, it no longer has the capacity to act as an effective national glue. It lacks emotional resonance outside Quebec, and has been rejected by constitutional visions in the west that have emphasized the equality of citizens and provinces. Within Quebec it confronts the unavoidable fact that its proponents have been unsuccessful in achieving any form of constitutional expression. Formulations of the Canadian state and society based on the recognition of two founding nations may have nostalgic appeal, but they have been overpowered by more compelling nationalist visions.

TRUDEAU NATIONALISM, OR MULTICULTURALISM IN A BILINGUAL FRAMEWORK

The major challenger to the two-nations form of Canadian nationalism is one closely identified with Pierre Trudeau and, to a lesser extent, with the Liberal party he led for more than 15 years.[10] The essence of "Trudeau nationalism" is captured by the *Official Languages Act*, national policies on multiculturalism, a liberal emphasis on individual rights, the rejection of any special constitutional status for Quebec, and sprinklings of anti-Americanism and activism on the international stage; the centrepiece is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This form of nationalism has appeal across the country in that its foundation is in the universal application of human rights. The irony is that support for Trudeau's form of nationalism is weakest in his home province of Quebec.

In the competition with two-nations nationalism, Trudeau nationalism won hands down. It was the dominant model of Canadian nationalism, at least among political elites and the chattering class, throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. When it appeared to be challenged, even at the margins, by the proponents of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, Trudeau himself roared to its defence and played a significant role in mobilizing opposition to the accords in English Canada.[11] Trudeau nationalism still enjoys substantial support among both the general public and political elites in English Canada, and until very recently it effectively preempted alternative conceptualizations of Canadian nationalism. Of course, none of this is to say that the Trudeau model has been without problems. Its bilingualism component won at best grudging acceptance in western Canada, and it appeared to posit a bilingual ideal to which few individuals could realistically aspire.[12] As Christina McCall-Newman points out, Trudeau himself was the symbol of a nationalist ideal not easily met:

> above all he was perfectly bilingual, with his French father and his English mother, his Jesuit education at home and his post-graduate education abroad, the pan-Canadian the country had been looking for, who fused the French and English into one, a kind of racial hermaphrodite, the unmatchable bicultural man.[13]

The Trudeau model also conferred disproportionate political power on a bilingual elite from Montreal, one that has dominated the Ottawa scene to the near exclusion of other, less parochial regional voices.[14]

Yet despite these shortcomings, Trudeau's nationalist vision was widely accepted throughout English Canada because it seemed to be the best response, and perhaps the only logical response, to the nationalist movement in Quebec. In short, Trudeau nationalism made good strategic sense; it offered a vision of Canada that could at least be sold to federalists in Quebec, thereby providing the badly needed glue for national unity. However, the strategic appeal of Trudeau nationalism was also its greatest flaw. If it were to be rejected by Quebec, then its strategic appeal would be lost in the rest of the country. And this, of course, is the situation we now face with a Parti Québécois government in Quebec City and 53 Bloc Québécois MPs in the House of Commons. Without its strategic appeal, Trudeau nationalism rests on a very narrow base of political support: Quebec anglophones and allophones, Quebec francophone federalists who are content with the constitutional status quo, non-Quebec francophones, and a relatively small, albeit powerful bilingual elite. It is not a form of nationalism that has intrinsic appeal to the anglophone national majority *once it has been rejected by Quebec*. Thus, while Trudeau nationalism still commands centre stage, its continued viability is thrown into question by the growing strength of the sovereigntist movement in Quebec. Even if that movement fails to win the promised sovereignty referendum, it is doubtful that the Trudeau vision will take hold again in Quebec. As a consequence, its strategic appeal outside Quebec will remain weak.

* * *

These, then, are the five forms of nationalism that have dominated the Canadian scene since the end of World War II. As noted above, they do not exhaust the field, and there are undoubtedly other strands of nationalism that could be explicated if space permitted. For example, it would be tempting to develop the "community of communities" model so tentatively proposed by former Prime Minister Joe Clark, and to build into that model the provincial pride of premiers such W.A.C. Bennett, Peter Lougheed, and Brian Peckford. It would also be desirable to explore the "northern vision" that has brought the Canadian landscape, flora, and fauna into nationalist symbolism and thought. In this context, it is difficult to forget the opening scenes in the television production of Trudeau's *Memoirs*; the canoe, the northern river, golden maple leaves, and Trudeau's buckskin jacket provided a classic example of nationalist iconography. Yet even if we were to bring a larger number of nationalisms into play, it is unlikely that the basic thesis would change, for other variants of nationalism are no more immune to the forces of erosion that have been described above. Even the "northern vision" has diminished appeal to a highly urbanized people preoccupied with globalization, and coming to grips with aboriginal claims to the north and with the realization that the "northern treasure house" has been very slow to yield its riches to Canadian entrepreneurs.

So, where does this discussion of the five forms of Canadian nationalism leave us? First, it should be stressed again that each of the forms is under attack and in retreat. Second, the challenges that they face are unlikely to abate in the short term. Certainly the national and provincial debts are not about to evaporate, and the inexorable impact of globalization will continue into the next century. As a consequence, the most vibrant forms of nationalism in the near future are likely to be found among Quebec sovereigntists and within aboriginal communities. In both cases we find a strong sense of collective purpose, a rough consensus on goals and objectives, and a shared national vision, all of which are much less apparent in the broader Canadian community. However, neither aboriginal communities nor Quebec sovereigntists provide a national vision with any appeal for English Canadians. Aboriginal nationalism plays to its own rhythm and themes, and Québécois nationalism is premised on the destruction of Canada. Neither are compatible with national visions promoted within the English Canadian community.

We are faced, then, with a situation in which relatively precarious forms of nationalism within English Canada confront more strident nationalisms among the Québécois and Aboriginal Peoples. Does this mean that English Canadians are adrift without a nationalist anchor? No, for I would argue that we are seeing the emergence of a new form of nationalism in English Canada, one that draws

from some of the forms mentioned earlier but which, in a very critical respect, is different.

THE NEW FACE OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM

What, then, is this new nationalism, and how does it differ from the earlier forms? To answer this question, we must first recognize a number of changes which are taking place in the political culture of *English Canada*. If we can engage for a moment in anthropomorphism, I would suggest the political culture is being transformed in the following ways:

- It is becoming less accommodating and more homogenizing in spirit than the Canadian political culture has been in the past. While both characteristics have never been entirely absent, they are finding more assertive expression in the contemporary environment.
- The political culture is at best indifferent and at worst hostile to bicultural conceptions of the political community, and is therefore less concerned with the institutional or constitutional accommodation of Quebec. In fact, there is a growing impatience with Quebec's ongoing discontent, and a growing demand for closure to the national unity debate.
- It supports the formal equality of individuals and the constitutional equality of provinces, although the latter does not necessarily extend to equal representation in the central institutions of the national government.[15]
- The political culture tends to be ahistorical in character, drawing its visions from the century to come rather than from the country's past. As such, it tends to be more sensitive to new Canadians and to new social movements, and less sensitive to historical complaints and the nuances of Canada's political evolution.
- The political culture is rights-based in principle, but with a focus on individual rather than group rights. It is increasingly hostile to "special interests" in any form, and supports an unhyphenated Canadian identity.
- It is receptive to populism, and as a consequence is less attuned to the basic tenets and values of federalism. As a further consequence, it no longer finds its most forceful articulation among political elites. There is probably a growing discrepancy between the elite and public political cultures, a discrepancy that was manifest in the public's rejection of the 1992 constitutional referendum.

Although these new currents in the English Canadian political culture may find their most forceful articulation in the west, they are by no means alien to the mass political cultures of Ontario or the Atlantic provinces. The west has only

amplified cultural themes that have always been present to a degree across English Canada, but which been muted by an elite commitment to the politics of compromise and accommodation.

What remains to be seen is whether these currents in the contemporary political culture will coalesce into a new form of Canadian nationalism. It is my hypothesis that they will do so, and indeed that the broad outlines of the new Canadian nationalism are already visible.This emergent form of nationalism is not without historical roots. One can find within it clear echoes of the "One-Canada" nationalism articulated with such power, and with such little short-term effect, by John Diefenbaker. As Thomas Van Dusen explains, Diefenbaker's distinctive national vision had deep roots within the history of the prairie provinces:

> "One Canada" was born on the prairie trails; in the fire and the comradeship of World War I; in the section shacks of the railroad among immigrants with unpronounceable names; in the dreams of a new world free of prejudice and discrimination. It was a Canada where every citizen possessed the same rights of citizenship; where the heritage of all was preserved, even that of the majority; where every citizen enjoyed the same chance to get ahead, regardless of what part of the country he lived in, what his name might be, or where his parents came from. It was a Canadianism respecting differences, not erecting them into impassable barriers.[16]

Not only the assimilationist rhetoric but also the populist themes of the new nationalism draw from the early years of prairie settlement, and from the Progressive critique of parliamentary institutions. Strong echoes of Trudeau nationalism also can be found in the rights-based foundation of the new nationalism, and in the rejection of any special constitutional status for Quebec. More generally, and as noted above, resistance to the institutional or constitutional accommodation of Quebec has never been far beneath the surface in English Canada; it has simply been denied a legitimating nationalist framework by the constraining influence of consociational principles, institutions, and political leadership.

In other respects, the new nationalism fits less easily with earlier forms. Although the new nationalism is not incompatible with anti-Americanism, it does not draw heavily from this theme. It is not so much that the new nationalism is pro-American as it is indifferent to what had been a traditional set of nationalist concerns. In this sense, the new nationalism lacks the defensive character of earlier forms of Canadian nationalism. There is also a lack of fit with state enterprise nationalism. While the new nationalism is not incompatible in theory with state enterprise, and although some of the social movements jockeying for space in the new nationalism support an activist state, its most vocal proponents tend to be found among fiscal conservatives who reject the ideological underpinnings of state enterprise.

This rejection suggests in turn a reasonable fit between the new nationalism and the platform of the Reform Party of Canada, and it is indeed Reform which provides the new nationalism with some partisan expression.[17] Certainly the constitutional posture embedded within the new nationalism corresponds closely to the position of Reform, as does the sympathy for populism. Echoes of Diefenbaker's "One Canada" ripple throughout the rhetoric and principles of Reform. Preston Manning's address to the 1994 Annual Assembly of the Reform Party, for example, could well have been delivered by Diefenbaker himself:

> I tell you, if we were rebuilding the national house, its foundation would be built on the bedrock of equality of provinces and equality of citizens, so that your standing with the government rests solely on your Canadian citizenship, *not* on your race, language, culture, creed, or where you live in the country. We should all be treated as equals in our own house![18]

Note also Manning's lament that Canada's national symbol has become the hyphen rather than the maple leaf:

> [Canada's] federal politicians talk incessantly about English-Canadians, French-Canadians, Aboriginal-Canadians, ethnic-Canadians, but rarely about "Canadians period." It has become patently obvious in the dying days of the 20th century that you cannot hold a country together with hyphens.[19]

Manning's language bears a striking resemblance to Diefenbaker's argument that "we shall never build the nation which our potential resources make possible by dividing ourselves into anglophones, francophones, multicultural phones, or whatever kind of phoneys you choose." [20] However, the fit between the new nationalism and Reform is less than perfect, for the new nationalism does not pick up on Reform's fiscal agenda, nor does it necessarily reflect the moral conservatism that drives so much of the party's electoral support.

By far the most problematic feature of the new nationalism is that it holds no appeal for most residents of Quebec. It allows no room for the constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, and it rejects any special constitutional claims by individual francophones or francophone communities. The new nationalism is incompatible with even the most modest binational visions of Canada; it allows for the incorporation of Quebec into the Canadian federal state only as a province like the others. Nor are many other features of the new nationalism likely to strike a responsive chord in Quebec; neither its embrace of populism nor its ahistorical character are likely to endear the new nationalism to Quebec voters.

But what does all this mean? How can we have an emergent, pan-Canadian nationalism that will be rejected out of hand by Quebec? The answer is that the new nationalism is not pan-Canadian in the traditional sense, for it envisions, if only implicitly, a Canada without Quebec. Unless we make the assumption

that Quebec will leave, the new nationalism makes no more sense and has no greater likelihood of success than did John Diefenbaker's One-Canada nationalism in the 1960s. However, should Quebec leave, it may make a great deal of sense. The new nationalism, moreover, not only assumes that Quebec is gone, but also makes Quebec's departure more likely. Because it has no place for Quebec, its articulation within English Canada can only serve as a goad to sovereigntists in Quebec. Therefore the new nationalism is, paradoxically, destructive of Canada. It offers to pull us together by driving Quebec out. It embodies a rejection of the Canada we know, but also offers a vision of the new Canada that might emerge should Quebec leave. Thus while the explicit message is not that Quebec should go, the implicit message is precisely that. It is truly a form of *Canadian* nationalism, but a nationalism built around a very different Canada.

Before bringing this rather depressing presentation to a close, a few caveats should be mentioned. First, some of the forces that have been eroding traditional forms of Canadian nationalism may be cyclical in nature. Thus the political left and state enterprise may rebound, the fiscal crisis may retreat, and anti-Americanism may intensify if the social discord within the United States deepens. If Canada does not mimic the recent American swing to the right, then anti-Americanism could be inflamed by the excesses of conservative politics south of the border. Therefore some of the forms of nationalism currently being eroded could be shored up and even rebuilt over time. However, in most cases this is unlikely to happen before the century's end. The question, then, is whether we can get through the next six years when the new Canadian nationalism and the nationalist movement in Quebec will be articulating mutually incompatible visions.

Second, even if traditional forms of Canadian nationalism are on the wane and a new, non-inclusive form of Canadian nationalism is on the rise, this does not preclude the emergence of competing forms of nationalism that are inclusive of Quebec. It might be possible, for example, to build a viable pan-Canadian nationalist coalition around an emphasis on environmentalism, as Jean Charest might have done by flying the green flag of environmentalism in his leadership struggle with Kim Campbell. Unfortunately, his obvious reluctance to do so suggests that environmentalism may not provide an effective bridge between Quebec and the rest of the country, or that Canadians are not prepared to support an environmental crusade, or that Canada's environmental track record is not sturdy enough to provide the platform for a new nationalism. It is also possible that some of the traditional forms of nationalism still have reasonable "legs" in Quebec and residual appeal in the rest of the country. The question is whether a pan-Canadian nationalism that is inclusive of Quebec can be cobbled together from federalist options in Quebec and the remnants of

support for the traditional nationalism in English Canada. Jean Chrétien's current popularity suggests that this possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand.

The final caveat has to do with the potential of the new nationalism to integrate a Canada-without-Quebec. Certainly we cannot assume that the new form of nationalism will be able to pull the country together should Quebec depart. Its implicit convergence with Reform policy may limit its appeal, and it is not a form that will be easily sold to Aboriginal Peoples or to the leadership of ethnic communities in Canada.[21] However, the potential problems that the new nationalism might confront do not preclude its emergence as a significant player on the Canadian stage.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that I am not endorsing this new form of Canadian nationalism. Nor am I suggesting that it is a particularly attractive variant of nationalism, although there is no reason why we should necessarily expect nationalism to be a positive force.[22] However, it is a form of nationalism with considerable vitality and "legs," and one that finds partisan expression, at least in part, through the Reform Party. It also strikes me as an inevitable response to the continued national unity crisis. Over the past three decades we have faced an ongoing debate among Quebecers as to whether their future would be better served within or without Canada, and Quebec nationalists have constructed very elaborate models of a Quebec without Canada. It is not surprising, therefore, that nationalists in English Canada are now starting to construct models of Canada that exclude Quebec. We have, then, two forms of nationalism that have only one thing in common, and that is the assumption that Canada as we know it will not, and perhaps should not, survive.

NOTES

1.   Forms of nationalism that had been all but displaced by the end of World War II will not be discussed. These would include, for example, forms that saw Canada as an extension of the British Empire.

2.   Hans Kohn, in his classic work on nationalism, states that "the sentiment of nationalism is double-faced. Intranationally, it leads to a lively sympathy with all fellow members within the nationality; internationally, it finds its expression in indifference to or distrust and hate of fellow men outside the national orbit." *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 20.

3.   For a comprehensive examination of Canadian-American comparisons, see David Thomas, *Canada and the United States: Differences that Count* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1993).

4.   The task of protecting Canadian television content in the emerging 500 channel environment will be beyond the reach of even the most fervent cultural nationalists.

5. If nationalists are correct in their fear that free trade will lead to the convergence of Canadian social, economic, and environmental standards with those to the south, there will be less and less evidence for the argument that life is better in Canada.

6. Although some might argue that the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway was an example of private rather than public enterprise, it was private enterprise bankrolled by the public purse.

7. Pierre Berton, *The National Dream: The Great Railway, 1871-1881* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1970).

8. Eric Nicol and Peter Whalley, *100 Years of What?* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1966), p. 10.

9. Jeffrey Simpson, "A party dies, almost unnoticed, and nationalists have lost their voice," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1994, p. A22.

10. There is an irony, of course, in speaking about the "Trudeau nationalism," given Trudeau's eloquent rejection of nationalism. See "Federalism, Nationalism and Reason," in Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 182-203.

11. Although Trudeau's political influence in Quebec has waned to the point of insignificance, this is not the case outside Quebec.

12. While some might argue that recent experience shows that *any* American could realistically aspire to be president, the Canadian requirement for bilingualism creates a much smaller pool of potential prime ministers.

13. Christina McCall-Newman, *Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1982), p. 62.

14. For supporting evidence, see Stevie Cameron, *On the Take* (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter and Ross, 1994), pp. 26-27.

15. Both are identified by David Bercuson and Barry Cooper as foundational principles in their recent polemic *Derailed: The Betrayal of the National Dream* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1994), pp. 201-2.

16. Thomas Van Dusen, *The Chief* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 69.

17. Alan C. Cairns, "Election 1993," in *Canadian Public Policy*, September 1994, p. 228.

18. E. Preston Manning, "A New and Better Home for Canadians," keynote address, Reform Party Assembly, Ottawa, 15 October 1994.

19. Cited in R. Kent Weaver, ed., *The Collapse of Canada?* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 148.

20. Cited in John Munro, ed., *The Wit and Wisdom of John Diefenbaker* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1982), pp. 80-81.

21. The new nationalism fits much better with the multiculturalism of Neil Bissoondath (*Selling Illusions*, Penguin, 1994) than it does with the more conventional practice of multiculturalism in Canada.

22. Michael Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Toronto: Viking, 1993).

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