

although student migration has not. Typically, models view migration as an investment in human capital or, more generally, the outcome of an individual's attempt to maximize lifetime utility. In most migration studies, students have been excluded from the analysis because their motives for migrating are believed to differ from those of the working population, despite the fact that student migration may also be viewed as an investment in human capital or the outcome of utility maximization. Variables such as wage rates which are important determinants of the migration decisions of the working population are likely to be less important to student migrants. Similarly, variables relating to the cost of a university education are unlikely to influence general migration patterns in the population as a whole.

#### PREVIOUS STUDIES

Among the most recent studies on the topic of student migration are Mixon and Hsing and Hsing and Mixon, but their analysis is restricted to the United States.<sup>15</sup> With the exception of this chapter, no models exist for explaining student migration in Canada.

Mixon and Hsing formulate a two-equation model of college student migration based on the human capital theory of migration, which hypothesizes that migrants will choose the destination in which the difference between the costs and benefits of migration over the life-cycle are maximized. The dependent variable in their first equation is out-of-state enrolment at the institution as a percentage of total enrolment and their model is, thus, a model of out-of-state enrolment rather than a model of migration per se. Out-of-state enrolment is assumed to depend on tuition fees, total enrolment at the institution, and a number of variables related to institutional quality, such as an index of entrance difficulty, the percentage of full-time professors with a PhD, and the number of students per full-time faculty member.<sup>16</sup> Their second equation assumes that tuition fees depend on total enrolment, the percentage of students who are from outside the state, and various measures of institutional quality; it is estimated simultaneously with the first equation using two-stage least squares.

Mixon and Hsing's 1994 results suggest that out-of-state enrolment will be higher, the higher are tuition fees at the institution. This contrary result is blamed on a lack of independence between the explanatory variables: most of the other explanatory variables in the out-of-state-enrolment equation also appear as explanatory variables in the tuition fees equation, with significant coefficients. After re-estimating their model with tuition fees deleted from the out-of-state enrolment equation, they find that nearly all the remaining variables in the equation have significant coefficients with the expected signs. The strongest conclusion to be drawn from their study is that student migration

in the United States depends heavily on institutional quality, as measured by the variables included by *Mixon and Hsing*. Nevertheless, it is surprising that tuition fees appear to have no effect on migration decisions. Their results imply that differences in tuition fees across institutions are not large enough to have an important effect on student migration decisions.

In *Hsing and Mixon*, the two authors estimate an equation in which the rate of net in-migration to a state is the dependent variable.<sup>17</sup> Their cross-section data set includes the 50 US states in 1992. Among the explanatory variables they include tuition fees, per capita personal income in the state, the number of educational institutions in the state covered by the migration data, the lagged net migration rate of students, average expenditures per student in the state, and various state characteristics, such as the rate of growth of employment, the per capita tax burden, and the crime rate. This model resembles more closely standard models of migration applied to the labor force. The lagged migration rate is included to account for the possibility that the decisions of student migrants may be influenced by the experiences of relatives and friends who had migrated in the past, while variables such as the rate of employment growth and the tax burden are included to represent differences across states in the future payoff to education. Finally, the crime rate reflects the quality of life in a state, which may influence the mobility decisions of students. The equation is estimated using Weighted Least Squares to account for heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable.

In this study, *Hsing and Mixon* find that although the coefficient of tuition fees has a negative sign, it is not statistically significant, implying that tuition fees have no impact on the net migration of college students in the United States. Expenditures per student, however, do have a positive effect, as do the rate of employment growth and the lagged net migration rate, while a higher per capita tax burden and a higher crime rate will tend to deter student migrants. These results are consistent with those obtained in studies of labour market mobility; however, the finding that the coefficient of per capita income is negative and significant is not. The authors argue that in the case of student migrants, the sign of the latter variable is impossible to predict, since higher incomes may lead to more out-migration because they permit more families to finance the migration of their college-age children, or encourage more in-migration because they are an indicator of better future earnings opportunities.

#### A MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL OF STUDENT MIGRATION

An econometric model that has been widely used in Canadian studies of migration is the conditional logit model (also referred to as the multinomial logit

model) developed by McFadden.<sup>18</sup> It is particularly useful in the empirical analysis of problems involving a choice from among a fixed number of alternatives, and is consistent with an underlying theoretical model in which student migration decisions are based on the maximization of lifetime utility.

The multinomial logit model supposes that students have already made the decision to attend university and, conditional on this decision, it predicts the rate of migration from province  $i$  to province  $j$ . To apply the model, the important characteristics of a province that influence student migration decisions must be identified. A lifetime utility maximization model of student migration implies that these characteristics would include variables related to future incomes, the cost of an education, and personal welfare. We suppose that each student faces ten possible alternative destinations: their home province and the other nine provinces. First, we expect that the previous year's flow of student migrants from province  $i$  to province  $j$  will have a positive effect on this year's flow, not only because friends and relatives may have sent back favourable reports, but also because degree programs typically last three to four years. Further, after a student has spent at least a year in a particular institution, the costs of leaving to go elsewhere increase because students may not be able to transfer all the credits they have earned at their first institution. Second, we expect that provincial differences in the costs of a university education will influence the choice of province of study. Initially, we divide costs into two components: annual tuition fees and residence accommodation costs. Both are measured in 1992 dollars.<sup>19</sup> We also estimate some equations in which tuition fees and residence accommodation costs are summed to obtain a "total cost" of education. The higher is the cost of a university education in province  $j$ , the lower one would expect the rate of migration to that province to be. Third, the provincial average of scholarships, bursaries, and prizes awarded to students by institutions in province  $j$  is expected to be positively related to student migration, since scholarships constitute a form of student aid. Fourth, we expect the availability of student loans to be positively related to migration to province  $j$ . From a migration point of view, however, what is likely to be most important is whether loans are portable from one province to another, and whether the eligibility criteria for provincial loans include a residency requirement. These factors are more likely to influence student migration decisions than the average level of student loans in the province. Unfortunately, such data were not available for our study, so student loans are excluded from our estimating equations.

The remaining variables in the model are characteristics of the destination province  $j$  which might influence the student migration decision. The first characteristic is the provincial unemployment rate, which is an indicator of the ease of obtaining employment and the ability of students to supplement

their income while studying. If students also wish to remain in their chosen province of study after graduation, this variable may also serve as an indicator of future employment prospects. Second, we include the distance between origin and destination, which is calculated as the road distance between major cities in each province. Distance serves as a proxy variable for both the psychic and monetary costs of moving, and has been found to be a highly significant determinant of migration flows in other studies. Because such costs are expected to increase with migration, we would expect distance to have a negative coefficient in the model. Finally, degree days above 0°C are included as a measure of the severity of the climate. The higher the number of degree days above 0°C, the milder the climate. Holding all else equal, many Canadians — and no doubt students — would prefer a milder climate to a colder one, and thus we expect the coefficient of this variable to be positive.

It is worth noting that the explanatory variables differ in the dimensions in which they vary. During the sample period used for estimation, only the lagged migration flow varies over origin, destination, and year. Tuition fees, accommodation costs, total cost, the unemployment rate, and average scholarships vary with destination and year.<sup>20</sup> Finally, distance varies with both origin and destination but is constant over time, while the climate variable used is an average over a period of 30 years and therefore varies only with destination. A long-term average was believed to be the best choice for the climate variable because most students expect to continue their studies in their chosen province for a minimum of three years.

## RESULTS

The estimation results of the multinomial logit model, obtained using annual data for the academic years 1973-74 to 1995-96, are presented in Table 5. With 23 years of data for each of the ten provinces of origin and ten possible destinations, we have a total of 2,300 observations in the sample. The first three columns in Table 5 contain the coefficient estimates for three different equations estimated for all students, while the last two columns contain the estimates for separate equations for female and male students.

The coefficients in all the equations are statistically significant at the 1-percent level of significance; however, some of the results are unexpected in that the financial variables do not always have the expected sign. In column one, the first specification of the model, tuition fees have the expected negative coefficient but residence accommodation costs have a positive coefficient, suggesting that students are drawn to provinces where residence accommodation costs are higher. In column two we present the results with the accommodation costs variable dropped from the model. Dropping accommodation costs has no effect on the sign and little effect on the magnitude of the

Table 5: Conditional Logit Model of Student Migration: Coefficient Estimates for 1973-74 to 1995-96

Variable	(1)	All Students (2)	(3)	Females (4)	Males (5)
Lagged migration	0.0254 (0.0000273)	0.0254 (0.0000272)	0.0260 (0.0000276)	3.34 (0.00740)	3.15 (0.00649)
Tuition fees	-0.312 (0.00250)	-0.289 (0.00225)			
Accommodation costs	0.00624 (0.000289)				
Total cost			-0.0114 (0.000247)	-0.00270 (0.000730)	0.00346 (0.000725)
Unemployment rate	-21.0 (0.371)	-20.4 (0.371)	-7.68 (0.353)	-53.4 (0.791)	-55.5 (0.735)
Distance	-1.55 (0.00117)	-1.55 (0.00117)	-1.55 (0.00118)	-0.173 (0.00133)	-0.159 (0.00129)
Degree days above 0° C	0.250 (0.00208)	0.242 (0.00204)	0.255 (0.00210)	0.310 (0.00481)	0.252 (0.00471)
Average scholarships	0.393 (0.00768)	0.389 (0.00768)	0.0390 (0.00714)	-0.832 (0.0203)	-0.334 (0.0186)
Log of likelihood function	-4,115,285	-4,115,519	-4,122,544	-544,492	-597,067
R <sup>2</sup>	0.7845	0.7844	0.7841	0.2436	0.2335
No. of observations	2,300	2,300	2,300	2,300	2,300

Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.  
 2. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 1,000.  
 3. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1-percent level of significance.  
 4. R<sup>2</sup> is defined as 1 - (log L<sub>R</sub> / log L<sub>0</sub>), where log L<sub>R</sub> is the value of the log-likelihood function when all coefficients are assumed to be zero, and log L<sub>0</sub> is the value of the log-likelihood function for the estimated model.

remaining coefficients. When the two cost-of-education variables are summed to obtain a total education cost, as shown in column three, the coefficient of the total cost variable has the expected negative sign. With the exception of the unemployment variable, this last specification yields coefficient estimates for the non-financial variables that are very similar to those for the other two specifications.

The coefficients of the non-financial variables in the model in all three specifications are as expected. The results suggest that the flow of student migrants from province  $i$  to province  $j$  will be higher, the higher the number of students who migrated from  $i$  to  $j$  the previous year, the milder the climate in  $j$ , the higher the average level of scholarships in  $j$ , the lower the unemployment rate in  $j$ , and the smaller is the distance between  $i$  and  $j$ .

The model was also estimated by gender over the whole period, and for francophones and anglophones in New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario for the period 1981-82 to 1995-96. The results by gender are reported in columns four and five of Table 5. Surprisingly, total cost has the expected negative coefficient only in the equation for females. In other equations not reported here, the coefficient of tuition fees had a positive sign for both males and females, while accommodation costs had the expected negative sign. In all the equations estimated for males and females, average scholarships had an unexpected (and significant) negative coefficient. We cannot explain these discrepancies between the results for males and females and those for all students.<sup>21</sup>

Overall, the results obtained were not fully consistent with our expectations, at least in terms of the financial variables relating to a university education. Nevertheless, the model suggests that several factors are important in explaining the rates of migration of university students. Notwithstanding these results, the decision to study out of province is, at least in part, influenced by the choice of university where students would like to study. For instance, the decision of a student from Ontario to study in Quebec at, say, McGill University is a function of factors such as tuition fees and distance from home, but is also influenced by the quality and reputation of the university. In other words, the decision of students to migrate may depend more on the choice of university to study at rather than the province where it is located. For the United States, Mixon and Hsing found that variables relating to institutional quality and other institutional characteristics are likely to play an important role in out-of-state enrolment.<sup>22</sup> Thus a more appropriate model of student migration might be one of institutional choice, rather than one of interprovincial migration. Unfortunately, such a model would not yield information about interprovincial flows of students unless data on the province of origin of students were available on an institutional rather than a provincial basis. Due to confidentiality restrictions, much of this institutional data is not available to researchers.<sup>23</sup>

## LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Canada is facing a number of challenges in its postsecondary education system which may have profound consequences for interprovincial student migration. The greatest challenge is to provide the financial resources for quality education while addressing the problems of provincial and federal deficits. Most provinces have tried to balance these conflicting objectives by raising fees substantially in recent years. In an attempt to prevent out-of-province students from taking advantage of much lower fees in Quebec relative to Ontario and the Atlantic provinces, Quebec is now charging higher fees to out-of-province students. Recently, the British Columbia government also announced that it is considering imposing an extra \$1,500 fee on all out-of-province students, because the fees it charges are much lower than those of some other provinces, and thus it fears excessive in-migration.<sup>24</sup>

Underlying the question of fees is concern for the accessibility of a university education. To make university accessible to more young Canadians, the federal government announced a Canada Millennium Scholarship (CMS) in the 1998 budget. The CMS is designed to support more than 100,000 full- and part-time students each year through an endowment of \$2.5 billion. For full-time students, scholarships are expected to average \$3,000/year, and students are eligible to receive up to \$15,000 over a four-year degree program.<sup>25</sup>

We examine the possible effects of rising and differential fees and the CMS on interprovincial student migration rates using simulations from the multinomial logit model. In each case, the simulation involves changing the values of one or more explanatory variables, and involves a comparison of the in- and out-migration flows relative to a base-case scenario. Variables that are not directly involved in the simulation are held constant at their 1995-96 levels.<sup>26</sup> The base-case scenario was constructed using the estimates in column two of Table 5 to generate the predicted migration flows for each origin and destination for the last year of the sample period, 1995-96.

When evaluating the simulation results it should be noted that the model does a better job of predicting gross migration flows for some provinces than for others, and even for a given province of origin predicts some flows better than others.<sup>27</sup> For example, the model grossly over-predicts inflows to Prince Edward Island from the other Atlantic provinces, Quebec, and Ontario. Similarly, the model tends to over-predict inflows to the four western provinces from each other, and thus total inflows to these provinces. While the predicted flows tend to be more accurate for Quebec and Ontario, the two largest provinces, the over-predictions of inflows to Prince Edward Island and the western provinces are offset by under-predictions of total inflows to these provinces. Further, the simulations should be viewed as short-run projections as they only predict migration rates and not the number of students deciding to attend university. In fact, changes in tuition fees and other variables are

likely to affect the total number of students choosing to attend university as well as the distribution of students across provinces, but a more complex model would be required to incorporate this effect as well. Consequently, the simulations should be interpreted with caution, and thus the numbers generated cannot be regarded as definitive. Nevertheless, these errors in the predictions appear to be relatively constant across simulations, leading to percentage changes, relative to the base case, that do not seem unreasonable for each of the simulations performed.

#### RISING FEES

Between 1995-96 and 1997-98 the Canadian average of tuition fees in a full-time undergraduate program in Arts rose by 15 percent in real terms. In our first simulation, we assess the impact of the fee increases over these two years. In this simulation, nominal tuition fees are raised to the 1997-98 levels and converted to constant dollars using an appropriate price index.<sup>28</sup> The resulting percentage changes in inflows and outflows of students are presented in the first panel of Table 6. As one would expect, increased in-migration into some provinces as a result of these tuition fee increases tends to be accompanied by decreased out-migration from these same provinces. The largest percentage increases in inflows are observed in British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Manitoba — the provinces in which the change in tuition fees between 1995-96 and 1997-98 was lowest. These provinces also experience decreases in out-migration of students, and consequently are net gainers of students. The provinces which experience the largest decreases in in-migration are, in order of importance, Newfoundland, Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, and New Brunswick. These provinces end up as net losers of students. Thus the overall effect of the change to 1997-98 tuition fee levels is to redistribute students from provinces with high tuition fee increases to those with low tuition fee increases.

#### DIFFERENTIAL FEES

The consequences of differential fees in Quebec for out-of-province students and the possibility of a \$1,500 fee for out-of-province students in British Columbia are examined in panels two and three of Table 6. These simulations present the effects of differential fees in addition to the effect of the 1997-98 fees on student migration. In the case of Quebec, we simulate the effect by doubling the 1997-98 fees for all students other than those whose province of origin is Quebec.

In the second panel of Table 6, the model predicts that differential fees will have a very large effect on student inflows to Quebec. In particular, the



Table 6: Simulation Results

Province	(1) Real tuition fees at 1997-98 levels		(2) Add to (1): Tuition fees doubled for out-of-province students in Quebec		(3) Add to (2): Nominal tuition fees raised by \$1,500 for out-of-province students in BC		(4) Add to (3): Nominal average scholarships raised by \$300 for migrants only	
	% Change in Inflows	% Change in Outflows	% Change in Inflows	% Change in Outflows	% Change in Inflows	% Change in Outflows	% Change in Inflows	% Change in Outflows
Nfld.	-8.8	8.6	-5.7	5.1	-5.7	5.1	-1.0	14.1
PEI	5.4	-2.1	8.9	-4.4	8.9	-4.4	15.7	-0.5
NS	2.3	-0.2	6.1	-3.1	6.1	-3.1	12.6	2.2
NB	-0.3	0.7	1.8	-4.2	1.8	-4.2	8.7	0.7
Que.	-0.4	-1.9	-44.0	-1.9	-44.0	-1.9	-40.1	8.1
Ont.	-6.7	7.1	-5.6	-27.4	-5.5	-27.5	2.5	-19.3
Man.	0.3	-0.1	0.5	-1.6	2.0	-3.0	9.8	4.3
Sask.	3.4	-2.1	3.7	-2.5	5.2	-5.0	13.7	1.7
Alta.	-5.8	5.7	-5.6	5.5	-4.8	-3.5	2.5	4.7
BC	8.7	-7.5	8.8	-7.7	-25.2	-7.7	-19.1	1.4

Base case: All variables at 1995-96 levels. The total number of students originating in each province is assumed to be constant at the 1995-96 level. New values for tuition fees and average scholarships were deflated using 1997 regional city CPIs.

simulations predict that inflows will decrease by over 44 percent. It further suggests that most of these students who are deterred from studying in Quebec by higher tuition fees would have originated in Ontario, since the predicted decline in out-migration from Ontario is also high, at about 28 percent. By comparing the percentage changes in panels one and two of Table 6 we can identify the other gainers and losers, in terms of student migration, as a result of Quebec's decision to introduce differential fees. The simulation suggests that all other provinces experience greater inflows and smaller outflows as a result of the Quebec policy change. After Ontario, the four Atlantic provinces appear to benefit the most in terms of increased numbers of students.

For all provinces, the changes in migration rates are much greater than those associated with the increase in fees from 1995-96 to 1997-98. The provincial results, however, obscure the effect of differential fees on certain institutions in Quebec. For example, the policy is likely to have a pronounced negative effect on enrolment at McGill University and Bishop's University, where in 1995-96 some 31 and 58 percent of the student body were from outside the province.

We can examine the effect of differential fees in British Columbia in panel three of Table 6. The simulation supposes that fees are at their 1997-98 level and that Quebec already has in place differential fees for out-of-province students. For this simulation, the \$1,500 increase is added to the nominal value of the 1997-98 tuition fees for British Columbia for out-of-province students, and then converted to constant dollars using the 1997 value of the CPI for Vancouver. The major effect of this selective tuition fee increase is to reduce inflows of students to British Columbia: inflows decrease by 24 percent relative to the previous scenario, and are 18 percent less than the base-case scenario. Virtually all of the students lost by British Columbia would have come from the west, and in particular Alberta. The percentage decreases in outflows from the six eastern provinces are virtually the same as predicted in panel two, and thus the differential fees in British Columbia have only a small impact on student migration from the east.

#### INCREASED SCHOLARSHIPS

Many of the details of the CMS have yet to be announced and thus it is difficult to predict how the scholarships will affect the average scholarships variable used in the student migration model. For example, it is not clear whether the program will have a differential impact on the funding available to students in different provinces, or whether all provinces will be affected in an identical fashion. Given these uncertainties, we carried out two simulations of the likely impact of the CMS. The first involved increasing the nominal value of average scholarships by \$300 for all students in each province; the second consisted of restricting the \$300 increase in scholarships to migrating students.<sup>29</sup> These

changes are in addition to specifying tuition fees at their 1997-98 level and differential fees for out-of-province students in both Quebec and British Columbia.

Increasing the nominal value of average scholarships by \$300 for all students in each province yielded results that were very similar to those in panel three of Table 6, and thus they were not included. In other words, the model predicts that an "across-the-board" increase in average scholarships will only have a small effect on student migration flows. Provinces that benefit in terms of slightly higher inflows and slightly lower outflows of students are Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia. However, the differences are negligible, which suggests that for the Canada Millennium Scholarships to have a major impact on the migration rates of full-time undergraduate students across the country, the funds must be targeted toward encouraging study in particular provinces. Panel four of Table 6 presents the results of the second simulation, which restricts the increase in scholarships to migrating students only. While it is unlikely that the provisions of the CMS would be this restrictive, this scenario does allow for the CMS to have a differential impact across provinces.

This alternative scenario yields considerably different results from an "across-the-board" increase in average scholarships to all students. Relative to the previous scenario in panel three, all the provinces experience increases in inflows of students, with the largest improvements occurring in the Atlantic and Prairie provinces. However, out-migration also increases relative to the previous scenario in all provinces. In short, the number of migrating students rises as a result of restricting the scholarship increase to students who are willing to move. In fact, the volume of migration is higher under this scenario than under any of the others, including the base case.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite the importance of migration and tertiary education in Canada, very little work exists which both describes and explains interprovincial student migration. Using data from Statistics Canada and Human Resources and Development Canada we have tried to take a step toward filling this gap. We found that although the overall rate of student migration in Canada has fluctuated very little, the pattern of migration between provinces has changed a great deal. For example, since 1972-73 Quebec has been transformed from a province that provided almost 40 percent of all out-migrants to one that provided less than 14 percent of the total in 1996-97. Similarly, in 1972-73 Quebec was the destination of less than 2 percent of all migrating students, but in 1996-97 was the destination of about 20 percent of migrating full-time undergraduate students in Canada.

The observed changes in migration patterns can, in part, be explained by shifts in the relative costs of education, as measured by tuition fees and accommodation costs. Simulations of the model of student migration estimated here suggest that recent changes in provincial government policies regarding tuition fees are likely to bring about further changes in these patterns. As gaps widen between the fees imposed in different provinces, more and more students may move to take advantage of them. Indeed, the results of our first simulation suggest that in the absence of differential fees for out-of-province students, the 1997-98 fee structure would actually have induced greater migration of students between provinces. But if more provinces follow Quebec's lead by introducing differential fees for out-of-province students, students will likely become less mobile rather than more so, unless other sources of funding become accessible to them. This is where the Canada Millennium Scholarships and Canada Student Loan Program may be able to play an important role; if their eligibility criteria are structured so as to encourage student mobility, they may be able to offset some of the effects of differential fees for out-of-province students.

We hesitate to speculate at this point on how the provincial governments might react to an explicit attempt by the federal government to encourage student mobility through either the Canada Student Loan Program or the Canada Millennium Scholarship Fund. Even though its criteria have yet to be determined, the CMS program has been greeted with hostility by some provincial governments, who regard it as an unwanted federal intrusion into an area of provincial jurisdiction — education. But in the presence of tuition-fee differentials for out-of-province students, there may be an economic efficiency argument in favour of a scholarship program that fosters student mobility. Economists have long recognized that economic efficiency in the presence of a mobile population requires some form of transfer system when there are spillovers between regions in the consumption of public goods such as postsecondary education. It may simply be more efficient for some students from New Brunswick to study in Nova Scotia or Ontario, because New Brunswick's economy may require workers with a particular type of training that is too costly to provide within the province. However, Ontario and Nova Scotia would be unlikely to provide sufficient educational services to train New Brunswick students as well as their own in the absence of some additional funding from the federal government. Indeed, this is one of the primary justifications for federal transfers in support of postsecondary education, which currently are incorporated in the Canada Health and Social Transfer program. A scholarship program such as the CMS, although it takes the form of direct payments to students rather than to provincial governments, could be justified on similar grounds, particularly if out-of-province tuition-fee differentials exist. This line of argument raises the interesting question of whether intergovernmental

transfers or transfers to individuals constitute the most efficient means of ensuring an adequate supply of postsecondary education.

While the issue of efficiency in the provision of postsecondary education is an interesting one, it should not be forgotten that student mobility may build not just human capital but social capital as well. In a country as vast and sparsely populated as Canada, it is sometimes difficult for individuals in one region of the country to understand the problems of those in other regions. Spending several years of one's life in another region is the best possible way to rectify this problem. For this reason, we should be concerned about any development that is likely to reduce student mobility, such as differential fees for out-of-province students. While more empirical work needs to be done on the effect of differential fees, our results suggest that such policies will significantly reduce the level of mobility of full-time undergraduate students in Canada.

## NOTES

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1. Further details about the data sources are provided in K.M. Day and R.Q. Grafton, "Interprovincial Student Mobility in Canada," Working Paper 9805E (Ottawa: Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, 1998).
2. For another recent discussion of trends in university student mobility in Canada, see G. Butlin and I. Calvert, "Interprovincial University Student Flow Patterns," *Education Quarterly Review* 3, 3 (1996): 30-41.
3. Space limitations prevented us from including many detailed tables in this section. Readers interested in additional numerical information are referred to Day and Grafton, "Interprovincial Student Mobility in Canada."
4. "Province of origin" corresponds to the variable "geographic source of student" in the University Enrolment Database. For students who enter university immediately after high school, it corresponds to the province in which they completed high school. For all other students, it corresponds to the province of permanent home address, as reported on their application for admission.
5. Throughout the chapter we restrict our attention to individuals who have already decided to go to university. For this reason percentages are generally computed in terms of total FTUS within a province, rather than the total number of university-age individuals.
6. This possibility was suggested by an anonymous referee.

7. Space does not permit us to examine the interesting question of how fees differ across disciplines, and how those differences have changed over time.
8. R. Finnie, and S. Schwartz, *Student Loans in Canada* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1996).
9. Readers interested in these data may consult Day and Grafton, "Interprovincial Student Mobility in Canada."
10. In lieu of providing direct Canada Student Loans to Quebec students, the federal government provides funding to the province which in turn maintains its own separate assistance program. For this reason, direct CSL data are not available for Quebec.
11. R. Finnie and G. Garneau, "An Analysis of Student Borrowing for Post-Secondary Education," *Canadian Business Economics* 14 (1996): 51-64.
12. See Human Resources Development Canada, "Mobility of University Students" Learning and Literacy Directorate, draft paper prepared 7 August 1997; and "Improved Reporting to Parliament — Pilot Document" (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1997), pp. 4:13-4:21.
13. It should be noted that although the majority of university students are undergraduates, graduate student awards are typically much larger than those given to undergraduates. Thus, our average scholarship figures will likely overestimate the average award paid to undergraduates.
14. Canada, Department of Finance, "The Canadian Opportunities Strategy," <http://www.fin.gc/budget98/binbe/bin2e.html> (1998).
15. F.G. Mixon and Y. Hsing, "College Student Migration and Human Capital Theory: A Research Note," *Education Economics* 2 (1994): 65-73; and Y. Hsing and F.G. Mixon, "A Regional Study of Net Migration Rates of College Students," *Review of Regional Studies* 26 (1996): 197-209.
16. For the public institutions in the sample, the tuition fees are for non-resident students.
17. Hsing and Mixon, "A Regional Study of Net Migration Rates of College Students."
18. D. McFadden, "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice," in *Frontiers in Econometrics*, ed. P. Zarembka (New York: Academic Press, 1974). The conditional or multinomial logit model has many applications. See K.E. Grant and J. Vanderkamp, *The Economic Causes and Effects of Migration: Canada, 1965-71* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1976); S.L. Winer and D. Gauthier, *Internal Migration and Fiscal Structure* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1982); and K.M. Day, "Interprovincial Migration and Local Public Goods," *Canadian Journal of Economics* 25 (1992): 123-44 for examples of applications of the conditional logit model to migration behaviour in Canada.
19. See Day and Grafton, "Interprovincial Student Mobility in Canada," for complete details on the construction of the data used in estimation.

20. The recent introduction of fee differentials for out-of-province students by some provincial governments means that from 1997-98 on, tuition fees will depend on both origin and destination.
21. The model performed poorly for francophones and anglophones. The signs of many of the coefficients were counter-intuitive and the likelihood function did not converge for anglophones. For this reason, the results were not reported in Table 5.
22. Mixon and Hsing, "College Student Migration and Human Capital Theory."
23. The results may also be improved upon by using individual (if it were available) rather than aggregate data. Individual data would allow for the inclusion of individual characteristics that might influence the migration decision, such as family income.
24. "B.C. Fears Student Invasion," *The Globe and Mail*, 8 June 1998.
25. Department of Finance, "The Canadian Opportunities Strategy."
26. Because the model predicts only migration rates, not migration flows, in order to generate migration flows it was also necessary to fix the number of students originating in each province at its 1995-96 level.
27. In "Interprovincial Migration and Local Public Goods," Day observed similar problems in within-sample predictive power in applying a similar model to aggregate migration data for Canada as a whole. She attributed this problem to the fact that differences across provinces in the explanatory variables tend to dominate changes over time, so that the model does a relatively poor job of predicting year-to-year changes in migration flows.
28. Conversion to constant dollars is necessary because the model was estimated using data in constant dollars.
29. College students as well as university students are eligible to receive Canada Millennium Scholarships. Dividing the estimated annual value of CMS, \$300 million (\$3,000 per student and 100,000 recipients), by 870,000, the approximate total of college students and university undergraduates, yields an average value of about \$350. The more conservative value of \$300 was suggested by an anonymous referee.

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## Canada's Political Parties in the 1990s: The Fraying of the Ties that Bind

A. Brian Tanguay

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*Les partis politiques fédéraux ont joué jusque dans les années 1970 un rôle de premier plan dans l'unification du Canada et dans la neutralisation des conflits régionaux. Les résultats présentés dans ce chapitre suggèrent que le système canadien de partis fédéraux s'est effondré. Pour reprendre l'expression de David Smith, les partis nationaux ne représentent plus le nerf du fédéralisme sain. L'élection de 1997 a confirmé le triomphe du régionalisme à l'intérieur du système de partis tel que l'avait anticipée l'élection de 1993. On retrouve parmi les causes de cette fragmentation régionale : l'émergence sous Pierre Trudeau d'une vision politique pancanadienne (symbolisée par la Charte des droits et libertés, la politique nationale de l'énergie et la Loi sur les langues officielles), l'effet déformant du système uninominal à un tour et l'effondrement de la coalition maladroite entre les populistes de l'ouest et les nationalistes québécois sous Brian Mulroney. Alors que le Reform et les Conservateurs divisent le vote de droite (les Réformistes dominant à l'ouest, les Conservateurs à l'est) et se neutralisent ainsi l'un et l'autre et que le NPD s'enlise dans les dissensions internes et l'impertinence politique, les Libéraux gouvernent par défaut.*

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Over a decade ago, in his study of party government and national integration for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Macdonald), David Smith remarked that "political parties have commonly been accepted as the sinews of a healthy federalism."<sup>1</sup> At the time, Smith complained that the federal Liberal Party under Pierre Trudeau had failed to balance the competing interests of nation and region and promoted instead pan-Canadian or centralist policies — official bilingualism, the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and the National Energy Program — which "push[ed] the provinces into an exaggerated defence of provincial concerns because, unlike the era of Mackenzie King or St. Laurent ... the provinces



today see no defenders of their interests at the centre.”<sup>2</sup> This resulted in the disillusionment of important segments of the citizenry, regional alienation, and growing disaffection from all political institutions, including the parties.

A glance at an electoral map displaying the results of the 1997 federal election will confirm that the tensions described by Smith have only gotten worse in recent years. The Canadian party system has now fractured into five regional subsystems, with no party gaining significant support from all regions in the country.<sup>3</sup> Western alienation is as pronounced in 1998 as it was at the time of the Macdonald Commission, and the fate of Quebec is less certain than ever, despite the optimism generated in some quarters by the recent Calgary Declaration. The causes and consequences of the triumph of regionalism in our party system will be explored in the first section of this chapter.

In addition to these perennial problems of Canadian politics, our parties are affected by global forces that are transforming the structures of representative democracy in all of the industrialized nations. In the following section of the chapter, I examine two of these trends and their impact on Canada's political parties. The first is the “flattening out”<sup>4</sup> of political discourse in an era characterized by globalization and the exhaustion of the old Cold War ideological dualism. This manifests itself in the continuing marginalization of the traditional Left, whose large-scale economic projects and penchant for social engineering elicit widespread scepticism among the electorates of the industrialized democracies. As well, policy convergence is now an endemic feature of politics in the West: more and more, no matter what the ideological leanings of the party in power, economic and social policy seems to vary within an exceedingly narrow band. In the words of Susan Strange: “the political choices open to governments these days have been so constricted by those forces of structural change often referred to as ‘globalization’ that the differences that used to distinguish government policies from opposition policies are in process of disappearing.”<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the yawning gap between what a party promises in order to win an election and its actual performance while in power serves to fuel voter hostility to parties and politics in general. Large numbers of voters, in Canada as elsewhere, seem convinced that no political party is capable of delivering the jobs and prosperity that were the hallmarks of the long postwar boom. An examination of the behaviour of Jean Chrétien and the Liberals while in power will confirm the validity of Susan Strange's observations and shed light on one of the principal causes of voter cynicism in Canada.

The second global trend to be explored below is perhaps even more far-reaching than the first: the decline of deference among today's voters, which translates into widespread mistrust of parties and politicians, along with demands on the part of ordinary citizens to be consulted on the major issues of the day. “[E]verywhere, ordinary people are now in a better position to examine

what their representatives are up to, observe their errors, smirk or snarl about their sexual and financial peccadillos, and wonder whether it is really a good idea to let such a collection do so much of the business of politics."<sup>6</sup> These changing value orientations have promoted the rise of populist "anti-parties" like the Reform Party of Canada and have strengthened interest in institutional alternatives to parties and representative democracy, such as the use of citizen initiatives, referenda, recall, deliberative polling, televoting, and electronic town halls.<sup>7</sup>

#### CANADA'S PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1990s: THE TRIUMPH OF REGIONALISM

It is always dangerous to posit the existence of a golden age for any institution, and this is certainly true of Canada's party system. Nonetheless, it can be argued that from the time of Confederation to the rise of John Diefenbaker's populist brand of conservatism in the late 1950s, the federal party system managed to mitigate regional tensions in the country more effectively than is the case now. There were, of course, eruptions of regional protest in federal politics — these have been a recurrent feature of Canadian political life — but federal party leaders had at their disposal a number of mechanisms to neutralize or minimize the effects of these protest movements. The effectiveness of the federal party system in attenuating regional conflict was purchased at considerable cost to representative democracy itself. Policy and ideological incoherence, for instance, was a defining characteristic of Canadian politics, a situation described in sordid detail by the French political sociologist, André Siegfried, when he visited this country in the early part of the twentieth century. Siegfried complained in his classic study of Canadian politics, *The Race Question in Canada*, that the federal parties' obsession with questions of local patronage and "public works" tended to "lower the general level of political life" in Canada.<sup>8</sup>

To Siegfried and other students of Canadian politics, however, the incoherence and opportunism exhibited by the federal parties were simply the price that had to be paid in order to keep Canada — a country with severe regional, linguistic, and religious cleavages — unified. According to R. McGregor Dawson, author of what was for a long time the most commonly used text on Canadian politics:

probably the primary political generalization about Canadian parties [is] that no party can go very far unless it derives support from two or more regional areas in the Dominion, and this leads to the further consequence that a national party must take as its primary purpose the reconciliation of the widely scattered aims and interests of a number of these areas. It is chiefly for this reason that the

party leaders have been compelled to modify their principles and their policies, to favour the neutral shades rather than the highly satisfying — but politically suicidal — brighter colours.<sup>9</sup>

This need to balance the many competing interests in the country has also tended to place a great deal of importance on the role of the party leader in Canadian political life. In Dawson's view, "[i]t is no accident that the three prime ministers with by far the longest terms in office — Macdonald, Laurier, and King — possessed to an extraordinary degree the ability to compromise and to bring together people possessing divergent interests and beliefs."<sup>10</sup>

Between 1867 and 1957 two different leadership styles, two different methods of attenuating the regional and social tensions in Canada — in effect, two different party systems — existed.<sup>11</sup> From Confederation to the end of World War I, the two major parties were loose coalitions of local notables and elections were contests between the "ins" and the "outs" over control of constituency-based patronage. First Macdonald and then Laurier skilfully used patronage to create national party organizations in each riding and, ultimately, a national community.<sup>12</sup>

Social changes brought on by rapid industrialization and urbanization in the early part of the twentieth century shattered the two-party system in the years immediately after World War I (1918-21) and sparked the rise of a series of regional protest parties — first the Progressives and United Farmers, then the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and Social Credit in the 1930s.<sup>13</sup> From 1921 to 1957, however, the two most successful prime ministers, Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent, managed to hold in check the centrifugal forces unleashed by sweeping social and economic change. Both party leaders — King in particular — were astute practitioners of the art of *brokerage politics*, the pragmatic cobbling together of party programs designed to appeal to as broad a coalition of diverse interests as possible.<sup>14</sup> King, for instance, was able to blunt the effectiveness of the Progressives as the voice of agrarian protest by buying off some of the movement's leaders (T.A. Crerar, most importantly) with Cabinet posts and implementing relatively minor reforms of federal tariff and freight rate policies. By the late 1920s, the Progressives were a spent force in federal politics. King also managed to accommodate *some* of the labour movement's most pressing demands, albeit grudgingly and usually only when confronted either with worker militancy or incontrovertible evidence of the growing popularity of the CCF. The King government's adoption of the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations (PC 1003) in 1944, for instance, legally established the *Wagner Act* model of collective bargaining in Canada, thereby providing an organizational fillip to the labour movement.<sup>15</sup>

While some charitable observers have admired King's skilful exercise of political dexterity "through depression, drought, war and reconstruction," his

many critics have been repelled by his endless vacillations and smarmy sanctimoniousness. Frank Underhill, for example, in an article written in 1944, assailed King for "patting himself on the back" for enacting progressive labour legislation. In Underhill's view, King's motives were purely cynical or manipulative — to undercut popular support for J.S. Woodsworth and the fledgling CCF, or to shore up votes among the western Progressives — and not compassionate.<sup>16</sup> Later critics like John Porter contended that the price paid for national unity was too high. Canada's party system, Porter charged, was distinguished among those of major industrialized societies by its entrenched conservatism and the virtual absence of real political debate (what he called "creative politics"), and this was directly attributable to our intellectual obsession with regionalism and national unity.<sup>17</sup>

A second tool employed by King and St. Laurent to attenuate regional conflict within the party system was to stock their respective Cabinets with influential regional chieftains — men like Jimmy Gardiner, C.D. Howe, and Ernest Lapointe. Reg Whitaker has labelled this type of party organization *ministerialist*, and he argues that:

at the national level, it always remained true that the relationship between the cabinet ministers, and thus between the leaders of the various regions within the party, were as much relations of mutual accommodation as hierarchical, involving horizontal rather than vertical patterns of interaction.<sup>18</sup>

Although there were powerful ministers in the Cabinets of John Diefenbaker (Alvin Hamilton, Davie Fulton), Lester Pearson (the so-called "three wise men" — Pierre Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier, and Jean Marchand), and Pierre Trudeau (Marc Lalonde, Allan MacEachen), a combination of personal and ideological factors limited their influence and placed them in a distinctly subordinate position vis-à-vis the prime minister. In the case of Diefenbaker, for example, "instead of allowing his appointees to apply their talents, [he] acted as if he were the silent partner in every cabinet minister's office. He ignored the normal delegation of authority, and attempted to operate the federal administration through personal prerogative."<sup>19</sup> Ministerialist party organization essentially died with Louis St. Laurent.

The electoral defeats suffered by the federal Liberals in 1957 and 1958 laid the groundwork for a third party system, one that was "pan-Canadian," to use Smith's terminology, and therefore much less accommodating of regional interests than its two predecessors.<sup>20</sup> The policies pursued by each successive prime minister were moulded by a centralizing vision of the country, even if some leaders (Diefenbaker, for instance) were more sensitive to regional concerns than others (Trudeau). Diefenbaker's concept of "One Canada," combined with his championing of a Bill of Rights, drew attention to the formal equality of all citizens and "appealed to Canadians as Canadians regardless of where

they lived or what language they spoke."<sup>21</sup> Pearson's national medicare program, the Canada Pension Plan, and the Laurendeau-Dunton Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, along with Pierre Trudeau's *Official Languages Act*, National Energy Program (NEP), and *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* were even more relentlessly centralizing. These initiatives were at least partly inspired by the idea of Ottawa as the laboratory for progressive social and economic policy and a counterweight to more hidebound provincial governments.

By the time Pierre Trudeau came to power, the electoral objectives of the federal Liberal Party had subtly merged with the national interest. The NEP, for example, which did so much to inflame the wounds of western alienation, had both official and tacit objectives, as Charles Doran has demonstrated. Greater energy self-sufficiency and the promotion of conservation were among the official objectives of the policy, which Doran describes as "one of the most complex energy initiatives undertaken by any of the advanced-industrial democracies."<sup>22</sup> The real purpose of the program, however, was political: the strengthening of Ottawa at the expense of the energy-producing provinces. Holding energy prices below world market levels was certain to shore up the federal Liberal Party's power base in central Canada (Ontario and Quebec). If the American government and the western provinces were angered by the policy, this was deemed an acceptable price to pay to bolster the "Liberal party coalition. The interests of the Liberal party and of Canada seemed to coincide."<sup>23</sup>

As subsequent history has demonstrated, however, this convergence of the interests of the "government party" and the country was more apparent than real. Trudeau's pan-Canadian policies patently failed to knit the country together. Official bilingualism and the NEP outraged the western provinces, and while Trudeau's constitutional reforms may have struck a responsive chord in English Canada (where the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, along with medicare, has become one of the defining elements of the national identity) they alienated Quebec and provided fertile soil for the growth of the sovereigntist movement. It might be argued that the pan-Canadian party system could function effectively only so long as Pierre Trudeau was at the helm of the federal Liberal Party, since only he had the ability to deliver impressive majorities from his native Quebec while successfully appealing to individual citizens in English Canada over the heads of their provincial or regional representatives.<sup>24</sup>

The pan-Canadian thrust of federal economic and social policy from 1957 to 1984 was paralleled by the growing regionalization of the party system. Each of the two main parties drew the bulk of its electoral support from one or two regional strongholds, and the same was true of the CCF/NDP as well. None of these organizations was actually a *national* party with solid cross-

country support. This regional fragmentation was exaggerated by the effects of Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system, to be sure. For example, the Liberals under Pierre Trudeau gained a widespread reputation for insensitivity to the west, in part because their electoral strength lay in central Canada. Nonetheless, in each of the four western provinces the Liberals managed to take at least a fifth (22 percent) of the votes in every election between 1968 and 1980. Because of the vagaries of the single-member, simple plurality electoral system, however, these respectable vote totals translated into no more than a handful of seats, aside from the 1968 "Trudeaumania" election (see Table 1). The Liberals' woes in the west were mirrored by the Conservatives' failure to make any electoral headway in Quebec: in the five elections held between 1968 and 1980, the Tories managed to win at least 13 percent of the popular vote in Quebec, but this consistently translated into two or three seats at best (see Table 2).

Alan Cairns, in an influential article on the centrifugal effects of Canada's electoral system written *before* the Trudeau era, indicted the first-past-the-post system for being

detrimental to national unity.... The electoral system has made a major contribution to the identification of particular sections/provinces with particular parties.... By so doing, it has rendered the parliamentary composition of each party less representative of the sectional interests in the political system than is the party electorate from which that representation is derived.<sup>25</sup>

As will be seen below, the divisive effects of Canada's electoral system are as acutely felt in the 1990s as they were in the period from 1957 to 1984.

The disintegrative effects of Canada's first-past-the-post system have been compounded by conscious party electoral strategy. Indeed, the institutional context (the nature of the electoral system) partly determines the strategies of the various actors who contest an election. Party officials quite rationally tend to direct the bulk of their limited organizational and financial resources to those regions in which they stand the best chance of winning. This was especially obvious in the case of the federal Liberal Party during the Pearson and Trudeau years. After the massive defeat of 1958, when John Diefenbaker's Conservatives won the biggest (to that point) landslide in Canadian history, a group of young, predominantly urban reformers centred around Walter Gordon, Keith Davey, and Tom Kent (the group was known as "Cell 13") recast virtually all aspects of party organization and ideology. The party's structures were centralized; new types of candidates were attracted into the fold; new campaign techniques modelled on American practice were adopted (improved use of television and opinion polling, for example); and the focus of the party's electoral appeal shifted to the urban ridings in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, rural voters being more or less conceded to the populist John

Table 1: Liberal Party Votes and Seats (%)\* in Federal Elections, 1953-1997

Region	%	Election															
		1953	1957	1958	1962	1963	1965	1968	1972	1974	1979	1980	1984	1988	1993	1997	
Atlantic	Votes	56	51	43	47	51	43	39	45	40	46	36	47	59	36		
	Seats	82	36	25	41	63	44	18	32	40	34	59	24	69	47		
Quebec	Votes	61	58	46	39	46	54	46	51	61	67	35	30	33	36		
	Seats	88	83	33	47	63	75	76	76	81	89	23	16	25	35		
Ontario	Votes	47	37	33	42	46	44	47	37	45	36	42	30	39	53		
	Seats	60	25	18	52	61	60	73	41	62	34	55	15	43	99		
Manitoba/ Saskatchewan	Votes	39	28	21	27	29	28	35	28	29	26	20	27	39	30		
	Seats	43	16	0	7	7	4	27	12	19	7	4	18	61	25		
Alberta	Votes	35	28	14	19	22	22	36	25	25	22	13	14	25	24		
	Seats	24	6	0	0	6	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	15	8		
British Columbia	Votes	31	20	16	27	32	30	42	29	33	22	16	20	28	29		
	Seats	36	9	0	18	32	32	70	17	35	4	4	3	19	18		
CANADA	Votes	49	41	34	37	42	40	45	37	42	40	44	28	21	41		
	Seats	65	40	18	38	49	49	59	41	53	40	52	14	28	60		

Note: \*Rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: CNEWS *Federal Election Summaries 1945-1968 & 1972-1993*, [http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWS/FedElections/fed\\_elxn\\_1972-.html](http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWS/FedElections/fed_elxn_1972-.html) [% of seats 1953-1988]. Chief Electoral Officer, *Official Voting Results, 35<sup>th</sup> General Election 1993* [% of seats and % of votes, 1993]. Chief Electoral Officer, *Official Voting Results, 36<sup>th</sup> General Election 1997* [% of seats and % of votes, 1997]. Howard Penniman, ed., *Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975) Appendix [% of vote 1968, 1972, 1974]. J. Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968) [% of vote 1953-1965]. Harold Clarke et al., *Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1991) Appendix, Table A2 [% of vote 1974-1988].

Table 2: Progressive Conservative Party Votes and Seats (%)\* in Federal Elections, 1953-1997

Region	%	Election															
		1953	1957	1958	1962	1963	1965	1968	1972	1974	1979	1980	1984	1988	1993	1997	
Atlantic	Votes	40	47	55	45	42	44	53	50	44	42	39	54	41	28	35	
	Seats	15	64	76	54	33	54	78	69	53	56	41	78	38	3	41	
Quebec	Votes	29	31	50	30	20	21	21	17	21	13	13	50	53	14	22	
	Seats	5	5	67	19	11	11	5	3	4	3	1	77	84	1	7	
Ontario	Votes	40	49	56	39	35	34	32	39	35	42	36	48	38	18	19	
	Seats	39	72	79	41	32	29	20	45	28	60	40	71	46	0	1	
Manitoba/ Saskatchewan	Votes	19	30	54	46	48	44	34	40	42	43	39	43	37	12	13	
	Seats	13	35	97	87	87	87	38	58	65	61	43	64	39	0	4	
Alberta	Votes	15	28	60	43	45	47	50	58	61	67	66	69	52	15	14	
	Seats	12	18	100	88	82	88	79	100	100	100	100	100	96	0	0	
British Columbia	Votes	14	33	49	27	23	19	19	35	42	45	41	47	34	14	6	
	Seats	14	32	82	27	18	14	0	35	57	68	57	68	38	0	0	
CANADA	Votes	31	40	54	37	33	32	31	37	35	36	33	50	43	16	19	
	Seats	19	42	78	44	36	37	27	41	36	48	37	75	57	1	7	

Note: \*Rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: CNEWS Federal Election Summaries 1945-1968 & 1972-1993, [http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWSFedElections/fed\\_elxn\\_1972-.html](http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWSFedElections/fed_elxn_1972-.html) [% of seats 1953-1988]. Chief Electoral Officer, *Official Voting Results, 35th General Election 1993* [% of seats and % of votes, 1993]. Chief Electoral Officer, *Official Voting Results, 36th General Election 1997* [% of seats and % of votes, 1997]. Howard Penniman, ed., *Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975) Appendix [% of vote 1968, 1972, 1974]. J. Murray Beck, *Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968) [% of vote 1953-1965]. Harold Clarke et al., *Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1991) Appendix, Table A2 [% of vote 1974-1988].



Diefenbaker.<sup>26</sup> In the 1962 election, this meant that the federal Liberals concentrated their efforts in Ontario. In Walter Gordon's words: "I'm an accountant in these things. The Toronto area has more seats than Saskatchewan, and we can win them."<sup>27</sup> This strategic reorientation paid electoral dividends, as Table 1 shows: in the 1962 election, the biggest improvements in the Liberals' electoral fortunes were registered in British Columbia and Ontario. In the 1963 election, which displaced Diefenbaker and brought the Liberals back to power (albeit in a minority situation), the party continued to make gains in Ontario and British Columbia and recovered some of its former strength in Quebec to forge its victory.

For the federal Liberal Party, however, and for the national party system itself, the electoral success of the Cell 13 reforms represented short-term gain for long-term pain. The centralization of the Liberal Party organization was intensely resented by Liberal activists in both the eastern and western "peripheries," and especially in the west. Many western Liberals doubted whether the "bright boys" from Toronto had the desire or the ability to understand their region's particular concerns, let alone represent their interests.<sup>28</sup> By the 1990s, this simmering hostility toward the Liberal Party in the west was directed against *all* of the so-called old-line parties, a resentment that facilitated the spectacular growth of the populist Reform Party.

The 1984 and 1988 federal elections marked a brief, apparent resurgence of parties as instruments of national integration. It was Brian Mulroney's great achievement, no matter what his failings as prime minister, to form a federal government in 1984 with representation from all regions of the country. Mulroney did this by grafting onto the traditional Tory strongholds of eastern and western Canada an unlikely alliance from Quebec, a coalition that included the vestiges of the old Union Nationale, some Liberals who were unhappy with the federal party's decision to anoint John Turner as Pierre Trudeau's successor, and, most important of all, nationalist and separatist sympathizers of the Parti Québécois. The PQ, in fact, provided crucial organizational support for Mulroney during the campaign. Lucien Bouchard, a strong nationalist who had served the Parti Québécois government in a variety of capacities, acted as Mulroney's adviser on Quebec matters during the campaign. As well, at least three Tory candidates — Pierre Ménard, Suzanne Duplessis, and Monique Vézina — had campaigned openly for the yes side in the 1980 referendum.<sup>29</sup>

Mulroney promised that a Conservative government would heal the wounds inflicted on Quebec by Pierre Trudeau's constitutional gambit in 1982, and this was an important factor in the Tories' remarkable success in that province in 1984, when they took 58 seats (out of 75) and 50 percent of the popular vote. That Mulroney won two successive majorities with this unusual coalition of western populists (who seethed at the very mention of official

bilingualism and "French power") and Québécois nationalists is testament to his partisan and brokering skills. Yet even Mulroney was unable to prevent the unravelling of the coalition over the Meech Lake Accord (along with such other issues as the imposition of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the awarding of the CF-18 maintenance contract to Quebec rather than Manitoba). The Progressive Conservative Party, led by an inexperienced and gaffe-prone Kim Campbell, was nearly annihilated in the 1993 election, winning a mere two seats with 16 percent of the popular vote. To employ Stephen Harper and Tom Flanagan's arresting image, the Conservative Party "became a barrel tapped at both ends," as its former supporters flooded to two new regional protest parties, Reform in western Canada and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec.<sup>30</sup>

The 1993 federal election masked the extent to which the national party system had broken down along regional lines. It is true that the Liberals managed to win seats in every region of the country (see Table 1). Nevertheless, their 19 seats in Quebec were mostly from Montreal ridings with heavy concentrations of anglophones and non-francophone minorities; the BQ, overwhelmingly, was the voice of francophone Quebec. Moreover, the Reform Party was clearly the first choice of voters in the two most disaffected western provinces, Alberta and British Columbia. It was only the massive Liberal sweep in Ontario (taking 98 of 99 seats, which constituted fully 55 percent of the Liberal caucus), along with a strong performance in the Atlantic region, that furnished Chrétien with his superficially convincing national victory. In the words of Alan C. Cairns, "[a]lthough the Liberals won the election, the election's overall symbolic message was of an old order tottering, of its possible replacement by one knew not what, and thus that Canadians, haltingly and apprehensively, were beginning a new era."<sup>31</sup>

With the 1997 election the party system fragmented into five distinct regional subsystems (see Table 3 for a provincial breakdown of the results):

- The Atlantic region, where the surprising emergence of the NDP — largely due to the coattails effect provided by the newly installed leader, native daughter Alexa McDonough — created a three-party race among Liberals, Tories, and the NDP;
- Quebec, where the Liberals managed to win seven more seats than they had in 1993 (at the expense of the still dominant BQ, which suffered from the miscues and gaffes of its new leader, Gilles Duceppe), and gain a toehold in some of the francophone regions of the province;
- the Liberal one-party state of Ontario;
- Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where three parties — Reform, Liberals, and NDP — garnered roughly equal shares of seats;
- Alberta and British Columbia, where a one and a half-party system pits a powerful Reform Party against a much weaker Liberal Party.

**Table 3: 1997 Election Results by Province: Popular Vote (%) and Seats Won (N)**

Province/Territory		Party					
		Lib	PC	Ref	BQ	NDP	Other
Newfoundland	%*	38	37	2	-	22	1
	N	4	3	-	-	-	-
Nova Scotia	%	28	31	10	-	30	1
	N	-	5	-	-	6	-
New Brunswick	%	33	35	13	-	18	1
	N	3	5	-	-	2	-
Prince Edward Island	%	45	38	2	-	15	1
	N	4	-	-	-	-	-
Quebec	%	37	22	-	38	2	1
	N	26	5	-	44	-	-
Ontario	%	50	19	19	-	11	2
	N	101	1	-	-	-	1
Manitoba	%	34	18	24	-	23	1
	N	6	1	3	-	4	-
Saskatchewan	%	25	8	36	-	31	1
	N	1	-	8	-	5	-
Alberta	%	24	14	55	-	6	1
	N	2	-	24	-	-	-
British Columbia	%	29	6	43	-	18	4
	N	6	-	25	-	3	-
Northwest Territories	%	43	17	12	-	21	7
	N	2	-	-	-	-	-
Yukon	%	22	14	25	-	30	10
	N	-	-	-	-	1	-
CANADA	%	38	19	19	11	11	2
	N	155	20	60	44	21	1

Note: \*Rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, *Official Voting Results, 36<sup>th</sup> General Election 1997*, Tables 7, 9.

In addition to the fracturing of the party system along regional lines, one of the more disquieting aspects of the 1997 election result is the extent to which the Liberals owe their tenuous hold on power to the idiosyncrasies of the electoral system. As Table 4 shows, the Liberals and the Bloc Québécois benefited disproportionately from the largesse of our first-past-the-post system in both 1993 and 1997, while the Reform Party managed to win about the same share of seats as votes. The NDP and the Conservatives, meanwhile, whose support in both elections was spread thinly across the country, were severely punished by the system. Defenders of the single-member, simple plurality system invariably point out that Parliament need not be a perfect mirror of public opinion, and that the principal virtue of our system is to produce stable governing majorities. Strong parties are thus rewarded, and weak ones discouraged, with the added benefit of encouraging national parties "to be tolerant and to keep their appeal within the middle-of-the-road consensus."<sup>32</sup>

Although the electoral system in 1997 did transmuted the Liberals' paltry 38 percent of the popular vote into a bare majority of seats in the House of Commons, it is difficult to argue either that the Liberals deserved this kind of beneficence or that the result was a boon to the political system and the country. The implicit message that voters were trying to send to the political class in the election — that a solid majority of them trusted *no* political party to govern effectively or responsibly — was lost. A party interested primarily in its own political survival now governs the country at a time when imagination and innovative policy making are desperately needed simply to ensure the

**Table 4: Effect of Electoral System on Seat Distribution, 1993 and 1997 Federal Elections**

Party	1993			1997		
	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio*	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio*
Liberal	41.32	60.00	1.45	38.36	51.50	1.34
Reform	18.72	17.60	0.94	19.34	19.93	1.03
Bloc	13.51	18.30	1.35	10.73	14.62	1.36
PC	16.00	0.68	0.04	18.88	6.64	0.35
NDP	6.87	3.05	0.44	11.04	6.98	0.63
Other	3.57	0.34	0.09	1.64	0.33	0.20

Note: \*Of seats to votes.

Source: Calculated from: Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, *Official Voting Results, 35<sup>th</sup> General Election 1993*, Table 8; and *Official Voting Results, 36<sup>th</sup> General Election 1997*, Table 8.

federal system's continued existence. Most disturbing of all, the regional payoffs of the first-past-the-post system contributed to the Reform Party's decision to play the "Quebec card" during the 1997 election campaign, with potentially dire consequences for the future of the federation. Reform's television advertisements attacking the prominent role of Quebec-born politicians in federal politics over the past 30 years may have appealed to many voters in the west and even in supposedly middle-of-the-road Ontario,<sup>33</sup> but they certainly reinforced the impression of most francophone Quebecers that English Canada is not likely to accede to substantive reforms of the existing federal system. It is difficult to see how this kind of election strategy could possibly serve the cause of national unity, although it is worth noting that Preston Manning seems to think of himself as a Canadian version of Abraham Lincoln. During the 1997 campaign, Manning called for additional debates on national unity, arguing that they should be "similar to the seven debates on the future of slavery that Abraham Lincoln ... held with Illinois senator Stephen Douglas three years before the Civil War." The Lincoln-Douglas debates, Manning averred, "presented ideas that became a vision and ultimately the solution" to the problem of slavery.<sup>34</sup> Interestingly, Manning argued that Alexa McDonough would have to be barred from the debates — since her party, the NDP, had nothing new or interesting to say on the subject of national unity — as would the separatist leader, Gilles Duceppe. These comments provided a chilling insight into the Reform Party leader's fundamentalist views on politics and national unity.

Not all of Canada's national unity problems can be attributed to the workings of its electoral system, of course. Moreover, previous elections have produced parliaments almost as regionally fragmented as the current one. The 1979 election, for example, saw Joe Clark and his Progressive Conservative Party win a plurality of seats, most of them from the Atlantic region, Ontario and the west. It took but two seats out of 75 in Quebec, at a time when the prospects for Canada's very survival as a nation seemed almost as doubtful as they are in the late 1990s. And at least one of our national parties, the CCF, has had a near-death experience (in the 1950s), only to reemerge stronger and more focused a decade later. So what is new about the present situation? Is it not possible that some semblance of normalcy will reestablish itself in the national party system? In the next section of the paper, I argue that there are at least two additional reasons for pessimism when assessing the future of Canada's national parties as instruments of integration and linkage.

## THE DECLINE OF PARTIES IN CANADA

In all of the industrialized democracies in the 1990s, though to varying degrees, traditional political parties have come under attack for being corrupt,

self-serving, and elitist organizations that are indifferent to the demands of the average citizen.<sup>35</sup> Symptoms of the widespread distrust of politicians and parties are easy enough to detect, whether in the form of vicious personal attacks on party leaders and candidates at election time organized by a welter of interest groups, or in survey data revealing that "the repute of politicians as a profession has fallen down to the lower reaches — cheek by jowl with journalists, lawyers and other systematic distorters of the truth."<sup>36</sup> In Canada, for example, a recent poll by Goldfarb Consultants Limited asked respondents to indicate their level of respect for various professions on a scale of 0 to 100. Doctors topped the scale with an aggregate score of 72, followed by teachers (69), journalists (46), rock musicians (45), bankers (44), car salesmen (31), and, at the bottom, federal politicians (30).<sup>37</sup> As faith in political parties has declined, numerous single-issue groups and social movement organizations have emerged to challenge the former pre-eminence of parties as institutions linking the individual citizen to the state. To take the Canadian example again, in the early 1990s the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (RCERPF) lamented the fact that so many citizens, "especially large numbers of well-educated activists, have eschewed partisan politics, and thus political parties, as mechanisms of democratic political participation," preferring instead to work within an interest group or a social movement, where they do not have to "accommodate their goals with competing interests."<sup>38</sup>

It would be premature, however, to sign the death certificate of traditional political parties just yet. As their defenders point out, parties still dominate the electoral process in all of the industrialized democracies, and they continue to wield considerable influence within the modern state's policy-making structures (an influence that is, however, shared with interest groups, bureaucrats, and other institutional power centres).<sup>39</sup> In addition, party organizations have not withered away or collapsed; there is as yet no *general* trend of declining membership in the traditional parties, in Canada or elsewhere.<sup>40</sup> Finally, there is still no clearly established institutional alternative to parties and representative democracy, despite the growing enthusiasm in some quarters for citizen initiatives, referendums, electronic town halls and other tools of direct democracy.

While political parties in Canada and the other liberal democracies are obviously not in their death throes, they are facing some of the most serious challenges to their survival since they first emerged in their present form during the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the words of German sociologist Ulrich Beck, modern mass political parties resemble "dinosaurs from a fading industrial age ... [which] seem to belong more to a museum than to a government."<sup>41</sup> Geoff Mulgan, a British intellectual and adviser to Tony Blair's Labour government, contends that political parties "cannot avoid looking like elderly institutions that have been overtaken by more effective means of campaigning, communicating and policymaking, whether these be in the voluntary

sector, the media or the research institutes."<sup>42</sup> Thus while the parties continue to field candidates, contest elections and provide government with decision-makers, the affective or ideological ties between them and their supporters are unravelling. To quote Mulgan again, contemporary political parties "are condemned to perpetual underachievement. Even as they offer programmes, they seem less able to offer coherent frameworks for thinking about the world."<sup>43</sup>

A comparison of the 1993 and 1997 federal elections, along with an examination of the actions of the Chrétien government during its first term in office, will help to show why Canada's voters, like their counterparts elsewhere in the industrialized democracies, are so disillusioned with political parties. The 1993 federal campaign was the second consecutive contest — after the 1988 free trade election — in which voters were seemingly offered a clear choice between competing party programs — something rare by the standards of Canadian politics. During the campaign, the newly installed leader of the Progressive Conservatives and short-lived prime minister, Kim Campbell, was vilified for implying that levels of unemployment would remain "unacceptably high" until the end of the century and for claiming that an election was no time to have a serious debate on social policy reform. The Tories' strategy centred on attempting to portray Campbell as the embodiment of the "new politics," and asking the electorate to trust them to deal with the deficit — their central preoccupation in the campaign — in as humane a way as possible. This allowed the Liberal Party to position itself to the centre-left of the ideological spectrum and offer the same kind of interventionist job-creating strategies (though in much less detail) that Bill Clinton had advocated in his successful campaign for the US presidency a year earlier. In stark contrast to the "heartless Tories," Jean Chrétien and other leading Liberals criss-crossed the country clutching copies of the "Red Book" like talismans, and talked of offering hope to voters whose principal preoccupation was finding and hanging onto a decent job.<sup>44</sup> The Liberals committed themselves to harnessing the power of the state, through a six-billion dollar infrastructure plan and other measures, to invest in people and bolster economic confidence.

What was the result of the Liberals' convincing victory in 1993? Painful and humiliating retreats by the Chrétien government on key issues trumpeted during the campaign (the Pearson Airport fiasco) and essential continuity with the Tories on other policies (like the purchase of military helicopters) were the hallmarks of their first term in office.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps most shocking of all was the morphing of Chrétien and his finance minister, Paul Martin Jr., into Kim Campbell clones, job-creators transformed into dogged deficit-fighters. Such was the extent of the metamorphosis of the federal Liberal Party under Jean Chrétien that two Reform Party intellectuals, Stephen Harper and Tom Flanagan, could write without a trace of irony, that the "current Liberal government is more conservative on most issues than the previous Progressive

Conservative government.... Conservative voters are getting better results as outsiders influencing a Liberal government than they did as an inside influence within a Progressive Conservative government."<sup>46</sup>

Even by Canada's quite remarkable standards of ideological flexibility, the Liberals' *volte-face* was a virtuoso performance. It was all the more impressive for being at least partially successful: by the time the 1997 election was called, the Chrétien government's single greatest achievement in the minds of voters was to have significantly reduced the federal deficit after years of idle talk by the Mulroney Conservatives. In their study of the 1997 election Clarke *et al.* show that a plurality of voters who thought that the deficit was the most important issue in the campaign believed that the Liberals were the party closest to them on the issue. However, the deficit still lagged far behind unemployment as the single most important issue of the campaign (health care was the second most important), and voters actually preferred "none of the parties" on five of the ten most important issues cited, including unemployment.<sup>47</sup> A more qualified endorsement of the existing party system would be difficult to imagine.

Although the federal Liberals have often in the past campaigned from the left and governed from the right — indeed, this was one of the keys to their remarkable longevity as a governing party in the latter half of the twentieth century — the typical voter in Canada in the 1990s seems to have a longer memory and a much more rigid notion of government accountability than was the case previously. Thus the Liberals' backsliding exacted a heavy toll in increased voter cynicism. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Chrétien government's mishandling of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). In 1990, when the populist upheaval against the widely hated GST was at its height, Chrétien pledged at a Liberal rally that " 'the Mulroney GST will disappear' under a Liberal government. 'I am opposed to the GST. I have always been opposed to it. And I will be opposed to it always.'"<sup>48</sup> The famed Red Book was a little less definitive on the subject, committing a Liberal government only to replacing the GST "with a system that generates equivalent revenues, is fairer to consumers and to small business ... and promotes federal-provincial fiscal cooperation and harmonization."<sup>49</sup> This prudence was nowhere evident in the campaign pronouncements of Sheila Copps, however: the future deputy prime minister promised to resign if the GST was not scrapped altogether, saying that " 'you've got to be accountable for the things that you're going to do and you have to deliver on it.'"<sup>50</sup>

Of course, the Chrétien government could not deliver on this particular promise, as Finance Minister Paul Martin Jr. admitted in his 1996 budget. Instead of replacing the GST, the Liberals managed only to harmonize the tax with the provincial sales taxes of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick. Martin apologized to Canadian voters for making an "honest mistake" on the GST, but this act of contrition was followed by a farce in three acts.



Prime Minister Chrétien, displaying a punctilious and legalistic attitude toward the English language, denied that there was any cause for apologizing, since the harmonization of the GST in his opinion fulfilled the letter, if not the spirit, of the Liberals' Red Book promise. Worse, Chrétien berated participants in an electronic town hall who had the temerity to disagree with his view. Sheila Copps, after an ill-advised attempt to joke her way out of her election campaign promise (attributing the pledge to a bad case of "loose lips"), eventually resigned her seat in the House of Commons. She subsequently won the by-election quite handily, to the dismay of the Reform Party and its allies, like the National Citizens' Coalition, who had hoped to transform the vote into a plebiscite on the Chrétien government and the issue of party accountability.

This sorry spectacle over the GST served as a foreshadowing of the dismal 1997 election, which had a thoroughly ritualistic air about it. Even Chrétien, at the press conference to launch the campaign, seemed unconvinced of the need for an election, and the voters responded with a turnout of just under 67 percent, one of the lowest levels of the twentieth century.<sup>51</sup> In essence, the Liberals won by default, *faute de mieux*, since a lack of enthusiasm among voters for the partisan alternatives to the Liberals is, along with the workings of the electoral system, the key to the Chrétien government's shaky grip on power. Not one of the four parties competing with the Liberals in 1997 even remotely resembled a national party with cross-country support. In the case of the Bloc Québécois, this lack of a national presence is simply a reflection of its *raison d'être*, to serve as midwife to Quebec's accession to independence. However, since the departure of Lucien Bouchard for provincial politics the BQ has been less visible and less relevant in Ottawa than at any other time during its brief existence. Gilles Duceppe's well-documented travails during the 1997 campaign were in part the result of his inexperience and wooden public demeanour, but they also reflected a deeper malaise and lack of focus within the party.

As for the Reform Party, its attempts to make a breakthrough into eastern Canada and establish itself as the national alternative to the Liberals stalled, as the party lost its only seat in Ontario.<sup>52</sup> In fact, the party regressed in Ontario in 1997, taking only 19 percent of the vote (in contrast to 20 percent in 1993) and coming in second in 39 ridings, as opposed to 57 in 1993. In spite of the party's overtures to Quebec, in the form of a dialogue with the Bloc Québécois on a "united alternative" and the prominent media role it gives to its young bilingual MP from Edmonton-Strathcona, Rahim Jaffer,<sup>53</sup> it is difficult to see how Reform could ever be a truly national party as long as Quebec remains in Canada. This fact, along with Manning's decision to play the Quebec card in a particularly divisive way during the 1997 campaign, tends to reinforce the notion that Reform and the BQ are locked in a kind of perverse symbiosis, with potentially dire consequences for the future of Canada.<sup>54</sup>

Reform is now experiencing the growing pains and internal bickering that typically afflict a protest movement as it attempts to adapt to the demands of Westminster-style parliamentary life. The recent squabble during the summer of 1998 that erupted when a small number of Reform MPs decided to opt back into the much scorned "gold-plated" pension plan for Members of Parliament is illustrative of the tension between the Reform's anti-party roots and the natural tendency toward professionalization and bureaucratization that occurs once a party is installed in Ottawa. To date, Reform's leadership has negotiated these organizational shoals much more successfully than some of its predecessors — the Progressives in the 1920s, most notably — and the party remains at the constituency level the most vibrant and dynamic of the five represented in the House of Commons. However, the party seems fated not to achieve the one thing its leader most desires: real power at the national level (as opposed to influence through the governing party).

Reform has all but eliminated the Tories west of Manitoba, and its ongoing efforts to break into Ontario blunt the Conservatives in that province as well. The ideological and organizational ties between Mike Harris's Conservative government in Ontario and the Reform Party also compound the federal Tories' difficulties. Indeed, of the five federal parties, it is the Conservatives that face the bleakest future. Jean Charest's departure for provincial politics to become leader of the Quebec Liberal Party<sup>55</sup> has left the Conservatives facing one of the worst crises of their long existence. Charest had succeeded in pulling the party back from the brink of oblivion, raising it to official party status in 1997 after the election debacle four years earlier, when the Conservatives were reduced to a pitiful rump of two in the House of Commons. But Charest as party leader was unable to exorcise the ghost of Brian Mulroney, which continues to make the party very unpopular in Ontario and the western provinces. As a result, the Conservatives managed to elect only a single member west of the Ottawa River in 1997.

The "race," such as it was, for the vacated leadership of the Progressive Conservatives in the summer and fall of 1998 was symptomatic of the party's woes. Alberta Premier Ralph Klein, the Tory with the highest national profile and the strongest support among the party rank-and-file, disavowed any interest in the job almost as soon as Charest had announced his resignation. Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon, former Reform MP Stephen Harper, and former Alberta Treasurer Jim Dinning did likewise, leaving the field to former Prime Minister Joe Clark and four relative unknowns: Hugh Segal, former adviser to Ontario's Big Blue Machine and to Brian Mulroney; Brian Pallister, who had been government services minister in Gary Filmon's Cabinet; Michael Fortier, a young bilingual lawyer from Montreal; and David Orchard, a Saskatchewan farmer who ran on an anti-free trade platform. To say that the leadership race failed to generate much enthusiasm among the voting public,

or even among party militants, would be an understatement. In a vote of party members (as opposed to the traditional delegated convention), Joe Clark was crowned — once again — party leader.

Clark's moderate brand of conservatism may well appeal to a number of Ontario voters who are unhappy with the Chrétien government's "style" — the autocratic tone evinced in the debate over the hepatitis-C compensation package, for example — but who view the radical right-wing populism and Quebec-baiting of Preston Manning and Reform with considerable scepticism. He may even attract some francophone Quebec voters who are sympathetic to his flexible and decentralized version of federalism. In all likelihood, however, the Clark-led Tories are unlikely to recover their former strength in the west; nor can they count on winning many seats east of the Manitoba border. But they are capable of blunting Reform's attempts to secure an electoral beachhead in the east, and thus they appear to provide the Liberals with a formula for perpetual hegemony.

The Reform Party is aware of the electoral consequences of a fragmented opposition, and since the 1997 election has been trying doggedly to unite the right. In February 1999, Reform held a convention in Ottawa aimed at creating a "United Alternative" to the Liberals, whether through the merger of the Conservatives and Reform, the creation of an entirely new party, or the establishment of a "confederal" party with separate regional leaders. Since the unite-the-right initiative is clearly the brainchild of Manning and Reform, however, it is viewed with considerable scepticism by the Conservative Party hierarchy and many in the party's grassroots. It is therefore highly unlikely that this initiative will yield the cohesive organization necessary to dislodge the Liberals from power.

Finally, the federal NDP's apparent resurgence in 1997, when it took 21 seats with 11 percent of the popular vote, served to divert attention from the acute crisis that still wracks the party. Virtually all of the NDP's success in 1997, as noted above, can be attributed to its traditional strength in the western provinces (apart from Alberta), where it took 12 seats, and to the regional popularity of its new leader, Nova Scotia native Alexa McDonough. The NDP won a surprising eight seats in the Atlantic region in 1997, where it split the protest vote against the Liberals with the Conservatives. However, the NDP was shut out for a second consecutive election in Ontario, where it won just under 11 percent of the vote. The party was simply not viewed as a credible option by large numbers of voters in Ontario, despite the two years of turmoil and polarization engendered by Mike Harris's Common Sense Revolution. Many Ontarians, and this includes a good number of traditional NDP supporters, appear to be still suffering from the lingering after-effects of Bob Rae's five years in power.

Symptomatic of the NDP's ideological confusion was the fact that its 1997 election manifesto came with an errata sheet, as some of the numbers in the

party's fiscal plan did not quite add up.<sup>56</sup> In truth, the party's program consists largely of warmed-over Keynesian nostrums more relevant for the 1950s than the present era. Many NDP activists seem to be engaged in a massive exercise in selective amnesia or auto-suggestion, the ultimate purpose of which is to convince themselves that the party's misfortunes can be attributed to its failure to be sufficiently left-wing and not to the demonstration effects of unpopular, overweening and less than fully competent provincial administrations in Ontario and British Columbia. Alexa McDonough has recently sparked a real debate within the party (something quite rare in recent years) by proposing that it adopt a more business-friendly approach and seek to imitate the success of Tony Blair's Labour Party and some other European social democratic parties. This long overdue move has been greeted by the predictable uproar from the usual sources — organized labour and the academic Left. Thus there is no guarantee that the party will be able to engage in the critical self-examination needed in order to stave off or simply slow down its decline into political irrelevance.

In summary, the federal party system in Canada is anything but healthy, and it is patently failing to integrate Canadians from different regions or to link citizens to the state in a durable and effective way. This conclusion is disputed by some observers, who point among other things to the continuing high levels of support enjoyed by the Chrétien government.<sup>57</sup> This argument misses the point, however: between elections, when most citizens pay minimal attention to politics, a party can appear to enjoy tremendous popularity — as did Chrétien and the Liberals prior to the 1997 election, or Lyn McLeod's Ontario Liberal Party before the 1995 provincial election — but this support is extremely soft. It can easily evaporate in the heat of an election campaign, as the 1997 contest demonstrated. This simply underscores one of the most prominent features of politics in the 1990s: high levels of voter volatility combined with extremely tenuous affective ties between voters and parties. As Clarke *et al.* point out, in 1997 fully 30 percent of voters did not identify with *any* political party, something "unprecedented for any election year since 1965."<sup>58</sup>

This decline in levels of party identification is fuelled by, and in turn contributes to, the decline in deference among voters which has been observed by Nevitte and others. Voters today are unwilling to trust politicians or political parties, and in some cases they resent the fact that these organizations presume to speak for them. This phenomenon has potentially troubling implications for the future of democracy in Canada and elsewhere, as it facilitates the rise of populist anti-parties and, in some cases, of strong leaders offering simplistic solutions to the complex problems of the late twentieth century. In Canada, there can be no doubt that the Reform Party has benefited from this anti-party sentiment, as the data in Table 5 (taken from the 1992-93 National Election and Referendum Study) show. A post-referendum

**Table 5: Feelings Toward Politicians (Thermometer Scores, 0-100) by Party Identification, 1992**

<i>Party ID</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
Liberal	43.46	560	20.86
PC	43.33	356	21.01
NDP	41.52	217	21.36
Reform	30.88	68	19.74
BQ	40.64	192	20.34
None	36.99	624	21.89
Total	40.53	2,017	21.41

Note:  $F = 9.788$        $\text{Sig.} = .000$

Source: Data from the 1992-93 Canadian Referendum and Election Survey were provided by the Institute for Social Research, York University. The survey was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), grant numbers 411-92-0019 and 42-92-0026, and was completed for Richard Johnston, André Blais, Henry Brady, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte. I am solely responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here.

(Charlottetown) panel survey of voters indicated that Reform supporters were significantly more hostile towards political parties than supporters of other parties: their mean thermometer score was just under 31, compared to a high of about 43 for the Liberals. Interestingly, the large number of non-identifiers (approximately 30 percent of the sample), were second to the Reformers in terms of distrust of politicians. Reform Party supporters are much more sceptical about the effectiveness of our democratic system in general than are other voters.<sup>59</sup> It is unlikely that this situation has changed much since the early 1990s; indeed, most indications are that distrust of parties and politicians has increased since that time.

## CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the federal party system in Canada has broken down. The national parties no longer serve as the sinews of a healthy federalism, to use David Smith's expression, and the 1997 election served to confirm the triumph of regionalism in the party system, something that had been foreshadowed by the 1993 election. Among the principal causes of the regional fragmentation of the party system are the emergence

of a pan-Canadian political vision (embodied in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the National Energy Program, and the *Official Languages Act*, among other policies) under Pierre Trudeau; the centrifugal effects of the first-past-the-post electoral system; and the collapse of Brian Mulroney's ungainly coalition of western populists and Quebec nationalists. With Reform and the Conservatives dividing the right-of-centre vote along regional lines (Reform dominant in the west and the Tories in the east) and neutralizing each other in the strategic electoral battleground of Ontario, and with the NDP trapped in a spiral of irrelevance and internal dissension, the Liberals essentially govern by default.

Political parties in Canada and the other industrialized societies are also under attack as the primary vehicles of democratic representation, the most important links between citizen and state. The causes of this trend are complex, but two in particular can be cited. In the first place, there is a growing perception among voters that no matter what the ideological stripe of the party in power, it will be powerless to protect the domestic economy against the forces of globalization or to guarantee the economic prosperity — and in particular stable, high-paying jobs in the manufacturing sector — that characterized the long postwar boom. An examination of Jean Chrétien's government during its first term in office confirms that there are rational grounds for voter scepticism, since the gap between promise and performance in this particular case was huge. Secondly, voters have lost a large measure of their trust for politicians and parties, and are less inclined than ever to allow them to speak on their behalf. This decline of deference has helped fuel the rise of populist anti-parties like Reform, which have been quick to exploit voter cynicism with the existing party system.

Are Canada's federal parties doomed to underachievement, as Mulgan has argued? There are possible reforms that might revitalize the party system — a change in the electoral system being an obvious place to start. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to such necessary reforms, however, is the incumbent prime minister and his distinctly old-style approach to politics: at a time when innovative thinking is required, it is "politics as usual" in Ottawa.

## NOTES

1. Peter Aucoin, ed., "Party Government, Representation and National Integration in Canada," in *Party Government and Regional Representation in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 1.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
3. The fragmentation of our federal party system has been exaggerated and intensified by our first-past-the-post electoral system, a problem that will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.

4. François Furet describes the flattening out of public life in his article, "Europe After Utopianism," *Journal of Democracy* 6, 1 (1995): 81-83.
5. Susan Strange, "The Limits of Politics," *Government and Opposition* 30, 3 (1995): 291.
6. "The Future of Democracy," *The Economist*, 17 June 1995, p. 13. For an insightful treatment of this topic, see Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1996).
7. For interesting and cautiously enthusiastic overviews of the new technologies of direct democracy, see "Democracy and Technology," *The Economist*, 17 June 1995, pp. 21-23; and "Happy 21st Century, Voters! A Survey of Democracy," *The Economist*, 21 December 1996.
8. André Siegfried, *The Race Question in Canada*, ed. Frank Underhill (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Carleton Library edition, 1966 [originally published in French in 1906]), p. 114.
9. R. McGregor Dawson, *The Government of Canada*, 5th ed., revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 430.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 430-31. R.K. Carty also underscores the crucial importance of the party leader in Canadian politics in his article, "For the Third Asking: Is There a Future for National Political Parties in Canada?" in *In Pursuit of the Public Good: Essays in Honour of Allan J. MacEachen*, ed. Tom Kent (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), p. 149. According to Carty, "party leadership has been ... much more important to the survival and health of Canadian parties than those elsewhere."
11. The next few paragraphs draw on the analysis in Smith, "Party Government, Representation and National Integration," pp. 2, 15-25. See also R.K. Carty, "Three Canadian Party Systems: An Interpretation of the Development of National Politics," in *Party Democracy in Canada*, ed. George Perlin (Scarborough Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), pp. 15-24.
12. See Jeffrey Simpson, *Spoils of Power* (Toronto: Collins, 1988), chs. 3 and 4 for a detailed historical account of the Macdonald and Laurier administrations' uses of patronage.
13. This transformation of Canadian society and polity is skilfully examined by John English in his book, *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901-1920* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). See also W.L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).
14. John McMenemy defines brokerage politics as "[p]olitical behaviour based on practical actions best suited to achieving and maintaining power. Brokerage politics is justified as the proper management of social tensions in a heterogeneous society through pragmatic decision-making to maintain social harmony." *The Language of Canadian Politics*, rev. ed. (Waterloo Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1995), p. 14.
15. As some critics have legitimately pointed out, the *Wagner Act* model of industrial relations has been a double-edged sword in Canada: while it may have

- encouraged unionization in its early years, it also established "one of the most restrictive and highly juridified frameworks for collective bargaining in any capitalist democracy." Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, *The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social Contract* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993), pp. 12-13.
16. Frank H. Underhill, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 114-15.
  17. John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), ch. 12. See also Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen: Stability and Change in Brokerage Politics," in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, 2d ed., ed. A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon (Scarborough: Nelson, 1996).
  18. Reg Whitaker, *The Government Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. xxii. See also pp. 407-14 for a more detailed discussion of the concept and the actual practices of King and St. Laurent.
  19. Peter C. Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973), p. 92.
  20. In "Three Canadian Party Systems," Carty refers to this third party system as the era of "electronic politics." Rather than focusing on federal-provincial dynamics in the party system, Carty explores the impact of new campaign technologies — the media, pollsters, consultants, and spin doctors — on parties as organizations and as the pre-eminent linkage institutions in liberal democratic society. These trends will be examined in greater detail in the next section of the chapter.
  21. Smith, "Party Government," p. 27.
  22. Charles Doran, *Forgotten Partnership* (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1984), p. 221.
  23. Ibid.
  24. As I argue below, Brian Mulroney and the federal Conservatives were able to duplicate Trudeau's success, but only for six or seven years at most.
  25. Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," in *The Canadian Political Process*, rev. ed., ed. O. Kruhlik, R. Schultz and S. Pobihushchy (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 140. The article was originally published in the *Canadian Journal of Political Science* in 1968.
  26. These reforms are examined in great detail by Joseph Wearing in his excellent book, *The L-Shaped Party: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1958-1980* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, Ryerson, 1981). See also Tom Axworthy, "Innovation and the Party System: An Examination of the Career of Walter L. Gordon and the Liberal Party," unpublished MA thesis, Queen's University, 1971.
  27. Quoted in Peter C. Newman, *The Distemper of Our Times* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), p. 79.
  28. See Wearing, *L-Shaped Party*; and David E. Smith, *The Regional Decline of a National Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).



29. John Sawatsky, *Mulroney: The Politics of Ambition* (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1991), pp. 46-47.
30. "Our Benign Dictatorship," *Next City* (Winter 1996/97): 39. In spite of its obvious right-wing bias, this article contains a very perceptive analysis of the current crisis and future prospects of the federal party system.
31. Alan C. Cairns, "An Election to be Remembered: Canada 1993," *Canadian Public Policy* 20, 3 (1994): 226.
32. David Butler, "Electoral Systems," in *Democracy at the Polls*, ed. David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), p. 18.
33. See Harold Clarke, Peter Wearing, Allan Kornberg and Marianne Stewart, "The Contest Nobody Won: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election and the National Party System," paper presented to the biennial Association for Canadian Studies in the United States (ACSUS) Conference, Minneapolis, 20 November 1997, p. 3. The authors estimate that Reform gained approximately 8 percent in Ontario in the last week of the campaign, after "going negative" and "airing television commercials suggesting that it was time that Canada had a prime minister who was not a Quebecker."
34. *The Globe and Mail*, 21 May 1997. Michael Fellman, a professor of history at Simon Fraser University, wrote a withering critique of Manning's alarming views, arguing that the Lincoln-Douglas debates did not resolve the issue of slavery but merely heightened tensions in the United States. Fellman concluded that "[t]he degree to which Canadian politicians muddle the sovereignty issue is the degree to which they can prevent separation. Sharpening our indecisive polity in another Lincoln-Douglas debate is precisely the wrong way to handle our fundamental divide." See *The Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1997.
35. For especially eloquent expressions of this view, see Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Europe, Europe* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 81; and Martin Jacques, "The End of Politics," in *Comparative Politics 94/95*, ed. Christian S  e (Guilford CT: Dushkin Publishing Group, 1994), p. 100. Jacques, the former editor of *Marxism Today*, first published his article in *The Sunday Times* of London in November 1993.
36. Geoff Mulgan, *Politics in an Antipolitical Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 9.
37. Reported in *Maclean's*, 1 June 1998, p. 12. Details of the sample size and the margin of error were not reported in the article. These survey results mirror data published in *The Gallup Report* throughout the 1980s. For a discussion of the declining levels of trust in Canada's political parties, see A. Brian Tanguay, "Reflections on Political Marketing and Party 'Decline' in Canada ... or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the 1988 Election," in *Democracy with Justice/La juste d  mocratie: Essays in Honour of Khayyam Zev Paltiel*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), pp. 391-406.

38. Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing [RCERPF], *Reforming Electoral Democracy*, Volume I (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), p. 222.
39. Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, trans. Marc Silver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 268.
40. See Per Selle and Lars Svåsand, "Membership in Party Organizations and the Problem of Decline of Parties," *Comparative Political Studies* 23, 4 (1991) for evidence about the European case.
41. *The Reinvention of Politics*, trans. Mark Ritter (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 145.
42. *Politics in an Antipolitical Age*, p. 29.
43. Ibid.
44. Liberal Party of Canada, *Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada* (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993).
45. One of the first actions of the Chrétien government was to cancel the contract for purchasing 50 EH-101 helicopters, a deal that the Liberals had roundly denounced during the election campaign as a symbol of Tory profligacy and of its penchant for putting guns before butter, hardware before people. The Liberal government was forced to pay over \$470 million in compensation to the Anglo-Italian consortium that manufactured the EH-101. Ultimately, the Liberals ended up purchasing a smaller number of what was essentially a modified EH-101. See Jeffrey Simpson, "The government spins its own propellers over the helicopter deal," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 January 1998, p. A12.
46. "Our Benign Dictatorship," p. 39. For a useful account of the metamorphosis of the Chrétien government, see Edward Greenspon and Anthony Wilson-Smith, *Double Vision* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1996).
47. "The Contest Nobody Won," p. 5 and Table 3.
48. Quoted in Greenspon and Wilson-Smith, *Double Vision*, p. 373.
49. Liberal Party of Canada, *Creating Opportunity*, p. 22.
50. Quoted in Greenspon and Wilson-Smith, *Double Vision*, p. 374.
51. The lowest turnout for any federal election in the twentieth century was 66 percent (in 1925); in 1953 only 67 percent of voters actually cast their ballots. See Munro Eagles, "Voting and Non-Voting in Canadian Federal Elections: An Ecological Analysis," in *Voter Turnout in Canada*, ed. Herman Bakvis (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), p. 6.
52. The party had won Simcoe-Centre in the 1993 election, but that riding was lost to redistribution and the incumbent chose not to run again. Reform's best result in Ontario in 1997 was in the riding of Bruce-Grey, where it managed to take only 33 percent of the vote.
53. Jaffer is regarded by some in the Quebec media as an appealing politician who might have a chance of establishing some sort of beachhead in Quebec or, at the

- very least, of getting the party noticed by the province's voters. See Michel Vastel, "L'armée secrète du Reform Party," *L'Actualité*, 15 mars 1998.
54. See A. Brian Tanguay, "The Transformation of Canada's Party System in the 1990s," in *Canadian Politics*, 2d ed., ed. James P. Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (Peterborough Ont.: Broadview Press, 1994), pp. 124-31, for a more detailed examination of the "symbiotic" relationship between Reform and the Bloc.
  55. A party that finds itself frequently at odds, both organizationally and philosophically, with its federal counterpart in Ottawa. Tensions between the two wings of the Liberal Party were most evident during the recent Quebec provincial election (held on 30 November 1998, and resulting in a virtual photocopy of the results of the 1994 contest). At the very outset of the campaign, Prime Minister Chrétien gave a press interview in which he claimed that no more "goodies" would be forthcoming for Quebec, since "all" of the province's historical constitutional demands had been met. Jean Charest and the provincial Liberals understandably felt as though their federal counterparts had betrayed them and needlessly hobbled them during the campaign; the fact that they were able to take a slightly larger share of the popular vote than the Parti Québécois, even if they lost the election, was viewed as a moral victory in the face of enormous odds.
  56. NDP, *A Framework for Canada's Future* (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1997).
  57. An Angus Reid poll published on 10 July 1998, for example, shows that "Chrétien continues to ride high in public esteem," with a 65-percent approval rating. Forty-nine percent of those surveyed indicated that they would vote for the Liberals if an election were held the next day; the next highest level of support was for the Tories, with a mere 15 percent. The poll is available on Angus Reid's web-site, [www.angusreid.com](http://www.angusreid.com).
  58. "The Contest Nobody Won," p. 4. The authors write: "Prior to 1997, the largest percentage of nonidentifiers in any election year was 14% (in 1993), and the average was 12%."
  59. On this topic see the interesting research done by Colleen Nichols in her MA major research paper, "Responding to Postindustrialism: The Case of the Reform Party of Canada," Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, September 1997.



V

Identity,  
Citizenship  
and Culture

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## Redress Politics and Canadian Citizenship

*Matt James*

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*Ce chapitre s'appuie sur une étude de cas des mouvements canadiens demandant réparation. À partir de la notion d'honneur civique, on y suggère que les demandes de changements symboliques à l'histoire gagnent à être vues comme autant d'efforts de la part de groupes marginalisés pour être respectés publiquement. Je soutiens que la capacité à être respecté est une caractéristique essentielle de la citoyenneté. En effet, la participation à la vie politique requiert le respect des autres. Bien que les demandes de réparation aient été décrites comme une menace à la citoyenneté canadienne, elles apparaissent plutôt posséder une fonction intégrative lorsqu'elles sont considérées comme des efforts pour gagner le respect. Bref, demander réparation devrait être vu comme une tentative de construire une identité sociale permettant la participation dans l'arène publique.*

*En conclusion de ce chapitre, les demandes de réparation sont inscrites dans le processus d'apprentissage politique à travers lequel les mouvements sociaux du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle ont mis en lumière les conditions nécessaires, au-delà de l'égalité formelle, à l'exercice de la citoyenneté. À l'intérieur de cette perspective où le non-respect constitue un obstacle majeur à la participation politique, les conflits symboliques représentent, aux yeux des mouvements demandant réparation et des «nouveaux» mouvements sociaux, un moyen important de transformer les modes traditionnels d'allocation du respect. Je soutiens, en terminant, que le retour des communautés affligées sur les injustices passées peut conduire à l'élaboration d'une citoyenneté capable de canaliser les loyautés et les énergies de ces communautés.*

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All people share the universal need to gain the respect or esteem of others, since without it they can not as easily elicit the help of others.

William J. Goode, *The Celebration of Heroes*

## INTRODUCTION

Groups seeking redress for past injustices have made historical symbolism a crucial focal point for contemporary Canadian debates about citizenship.<sup>1</sup> This role is fitting, for revisiting wrongs that were inflicted in the past can help elevate group status in the present. When a community forces removal of the historical stigma under which it previously laboured, it improves its capacity to influence the political dialogues and struggles whose outcomes will help to shape its future.

The significance of redress for debates about Canadian citizenship has been established by Alan Cairns, who situates redress campaigns as responses to Canada's postwar experience of constitutional introspection. As Cairns argues, a country undergoing a prolonged period of constitutional rethinking — in Canada's case, a process of altering inherited practices and understandings in favour of ones better able to attract support from a multinational and pluralistic society — is likely to face demands that devising an acceptable common future requires reinterpreting the past.<sup>2</sup> The controversies over symbolism that have featured so prominently in this process of rethinking have also been remarkably controversial and stressful.<sup>3</sup> Redress politics is certainly no exception: Cairns describes it as an "adversarial, accusatory history [that] challenges the majority society through its government to reprove what are now viewed as nefarious acts committed by its ancestors."<sup>4</sup>

The symbolism of redress attracts the energies of social movements that seek to replace the stigma, and even the more subtle civic invisibility, produced by past humiliations with images of group honour to deploy in future civic endeavours. Historical episodes that violate contemporary standards of equal citizenship become potent political tools when they can be made to symbolize what others must learn about, understand, and then repudiate in order to produce a more satisfactory future. In 1988, for example, Japanese Canadians won an authoritative reversal of the verdict of dishonour imposed by their World War II internment. The federal government proclaimed that "the shame on [Japanese Canadians'] honour, their dignity, their rights as Canadians is now removed forever."<sup>5</sup> More recently, in January 1998, the Assembly of First Nations forced Ottawa to apologize for its past policy of forcing native children to attend residential schools. This struggle produced the official admission that "the contributions made by all aboriginal peoples to Canada's development ... have not been properly acknowledged."<sup>6</sup>

In this chapter, I focus on symbols as power resources,<sup>7</sup> as political signifiers that are prized or reviled for what they tell others about a collectivity's worthiness and virtue. In particular, I draw upon an ancient notion that features extensively in redress politics, the concept of honour. Until well into the early modern era, to speak of honour in citizenship was to invoke the additional judgement of respect that formally-entitled participants required if they were

to be accepted by their peers as legitimate civic interactants. By invoking a conservative concept from a past era, my aim is twofold. The first is to show how "dishonour" can still be associated with an informal exclusion from the public sphere of citizen interaction. The second aim is to establish campaigns for redress as vehicles that the informally excluded employ in order to better enjoy the participation rights that citizenship aims to confer. Key to understanding the politics of redress, I argue, is the movement's attempt to accumulate a "symbolic capital"<sup>8</sup> of honour with which to convince suspicious or indifferent others that members of the formerly denigrated or marginalized group are worthy civic participants.

The chapter begins by surveying the various redress claims and the historical episodes from which they derive. It then proceeds to situate redress movements as campaigns of identity transformation that respond to problems of civic interaction experienced by historically stigmatized communities. Although these campaigns are often confrontational, I argue that they are potentially crucial vehicles of civic integration. As the examples of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the ongoing Jewish-Catholic dialogues about the Holocaust well attest, to demand apologies for past wrongdoing is also to seek more harmonious future relations with former antagonists. This point is important to consider in the case of First Nations peoples, to whom the desirability of Canadian citizenship has often seemed less than obvious. But neither can the differences between the residential schools campaign and the other redress movements be ignored. Thus, my analysis distinguishes between demanding historical atonement as an unambiguous project of citizenship inclusion and doing so as a means of assessing more cautiously the desirability of achieving such inclusion in the future.

The chapter concludes by characterizing the redress movement's emphasis on eliciting respect as an illustration of the impact of equality-seeking social movements on the twentieth-century evolution of liberal-democratic citizenship. Like the social democrats of the interwar period, who argued that the inequities of *laissez-faire* capitalism made a mockery of liberalism's promise of political equality, such "new" social movements as feminism and anti-racism offer a probing focus on how denials of respect mitigate the ideal of equal civic participation. Building on this evolutionary account, I suggest that the debate between redress movements and their critics offers a useful lens through which to consider a larger conflict between two understandings of citizenship in which Canadians have increasingly become embroiled.

One understanding emphasizes the importance of securing for previously excluded or marginalized actors the social conditions upon which meaningful opportunities for the practice of citizenship depend. Critics of this view, who have become increasingly influential in Canada as populist opponents of "special status," resent the burdens of adjustment imposed upon them by contextually-informed approaches to citizenship and, accordingly, demand the

return of a rigorously formal approach to equality. The chapter concludes by arguing that the increasingly successful backlash against the egalitarian emphasis on the prerequisites of citizenship, while understandable, poses an extreme danger because it encourages Canadian citizens and their governments to avoid undertaking the important society-level work of reconciliation upon which a more inclusive and durable citizenship must rest.

## REDRESS POLITICS IN CANADA

Among non-aboriginal redress movements, the successful campaign waged on behalf of the approximately 22,000 Japanese Canadians internees of World War II is the most well known. In September 1988, the National Association of Japanese Canadians received a Parliament Hill ceremony, \$450 million in financial compensation and an official apology from the Conservative federal government.<sup>9</sup> Other movements have also demanded redress for historical wrongs, wrongs that include the World War I internment of roughly 5000 Ukrainian Canadians and the racist policies (of which the notorious "head tax" is the most widely remembered) that, until 1947, severely restricted Chinese immigration to Canada.<sup>10</sup>

These movements have not matched the success of their Japanese-Canadian counterpart. The National Congress of Italian Canadians was forced in 1990, after failing to win financial redress for the World War II internment of approximately 1,000 Italian Canadians, to settle for an informal, out-of-Parliament apology from Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.<sup>11</sup> The Congress continues to lobby the federal government for an official apology, the establishment of university chairs in Italian-Canadian studies and the payment of unspecified amounts of compensation to remaining survivors.<sup>12</sup> In 1993, the other non-aboriginal redress movements — most notably Canadians of Chinese and Ukrainian ancestry — ended collective redress negotiations with the Mulroney administration when it became clear that no financial compensation would be forthcoming.<sup>13</sup>

These groups were rebuffed entirely a year later, when the government announced its policy of refusing to offer monetary restitution or apologies of any sort.<sup>14</sup> In protest, the Chinese Canadian National Council has taken its claim to the United Nations, to make Ottawa face the "spectacle of elderly pioneers ... bringing forth their individual cases of human injustice before the world community."<sup>15</sup> The Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, like its Italian-Canadian counterpart, continues to press its case with the federal multiculturalism ministry. The association seeks the erection of memorial plaques at all 24 former internment sites (it has persuaded Ottawa to establish two such memorials), an official parliamentary acknowledgement and \$563,000 to cover the costs of documenting the internment experience.<sup>16</sup>



In contrast to Italian Canadians, who received an apology but no compensation, the movement seeking redress for the hundreds of Inuit who were relocated under federal government auspices in the 1950s recently experienced a setback of the opposite sort.<sup>17</sup> In March 1996, the Department of Indian Affairs agreed to offer \$10 million in monetary compensation for the coerced relocation — which buttressed Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic by sending the Pond Inlet and Grise Fiord Inuit thousands of kilometres north as “human flagpoles”<sup>18</sup> — but refused to apologize.<sup>19</sup> The Inuit, who wished “to try putting their misery behind them,” accepted what appeared to be the government’s final offer.<sup>20</sup> Ottawa also adopted the compensation-without-apology approach in response to First Nations’ demands for atonement and restitution for a residential schools policy that, for many survivors, issued in the near-destruction of their families and languages. In December of 1997, the Department of Indian Affairs agreed to set up a \$200 million fund (raised subsequently to \$350 million) to help meet the health-care and counselling needs of survivors, but refused steadfastly to apologize or to accept responsibility for the residential schools fiasco.<sup>21</sup> But after extremely difficult negotiations with the Assembly of First Nations, the Chrétien government relented on the eve of the January 1998 reconciliation ceremony, which was its planned forum for offering its long-awaited response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. “To those of you who suffered this tragedy at residential schools,” said Minister Jane Stewart, “we are deeply sorry.”<sup>22</sup>

## PAST WRONGS AND CONTEMPORARY CITIZENSHIP

Many of the past discriminatory federal policies for which redress has been sought are ones that, solely on the basis of group identity, excluded particular Canadians from some of the most basic rights of citizenship. In the case of the federal government’s World War II internment operations, the denial was almost total. The vast majority of the interned “Japanese” and “Italians” were Canadian citizens who, with absolutely no proof of their disloyalty, were removed from their communities, incarcerated, forced to work without compensation and, in many cases, stripped of their homes and possessions.<sup>23</sup> Little wonder that Italian Canadians in World War II doubted “that they were dealing ... with a democratic state,”<sup>24</sup> or that Japanese Canadians now consider internment as “a betrayal of democracy itself.”<sup>25</sup>

Like internment, other past federal policies for which redress has since been claimed also shattered communities by separating innocent individuals and their families against their will. These state actions seem clear violations of liberal citizenship’s historic concern to respect the “life, liberty and security of the person.” For instance, until the early 1970s the federal government’s

residential schools policy aimed at eliminating what authorities viewed as "backward" native cultures by, each year that the policy was in place, effecting the forcible removal of thousands of aboriginal children from their homes.<sup>26</sup> The 1994 Assembly of First Nations report, *Breaking the Silence*, has spoken powerfully about the damage inflicted by this policy on First Nations families and communities. Even excepting the horrific experiences of physical and sexual abuse that are now the schools' most well-known legacy, prolonged periods of near-total familial separation under authoritarian and degrading conditions meant that children who attended residential schools "found themselves becoming alone — silent and isolated and without any hope of belonging to a sensible world."<sup>27</sup> The ban on speaking aboriginal languages, which all the residential schools enforced, though with varying degrees of brutality, is further testimony to how thorough was this assault on First Nations communities and identities.<sup>28</sup>

The Inuit who were relocated from their northern Quebec homes to the High Arctic also experienced the shock of an unexpected community breakup brought about by state policy. As survivor John Amagoalik has recounted, "we just went into a panic because [the RCMP] had promised that they would not separate us."<sup>29</sup> Rather than fracturing an already existent Canadian community, Canada's "Chinese exclusion" policy (1885-1947), which made "married bachelors"<sup>30</sup> of two generations of Chinese men drawn to Canada by the lure of work and wages, worked to prevent viable Chinese-Canadian communities from forming. The onerous head tax and subsequent ban on Chinese immigration consigned these men, many of whom found themselves abandoned by the same employers who had urged them to come to Canada, to permanent separation from their wives and families. With a ratio of 2,790 men for every 100 women, there would be virtually no second Chinese-Canadian generation until well after World War II.<sup>31</sup>

Redress movements remember these episodes as unjust assaults launched by a hostile government and society against the very existence of their communities. As former residential school student Gilbert Oskaboose wrote "To the Government of Canada" in 1996: "when we returned to our own communities we had become strangers.... [T]he policies of assimilation ... brought pain, suffering, lost lives, vicious in-fighting, divisions, waste and sorrow."<sup>32</sup> Unsurprisingly, redress-seekers find it difficult to discharge with any enthusiasm the concomitant obligation that accompanies the enjoyment of citizenship; loyalty to the state within which the status has been assumed.<sup>33</sup> In 1984, for example, an angry Roy Miki of the National Association of Japanese Canadians told Jack Murta, the federal minister then responsible for multiculturalism: "your government instituted a policy which was meant to destroy the community, and that policy worked."<sup>34</sup> To seek official atonement for past injustices may thus be one way of endeavouring to reconcile citizenship's

demands of loyalty with the undimmed awareness of equal citizenship denied. As one Japanese-Canadian internee remarked four years prior to the historic redress settlement of 1988: "A sense of incompleteness gnaws at me. I need to feel right about my country."<sup>35</sup>

Redress may also be valued for reasons of an even more purely private nature. In particular, individuals who trace severe personal and family difficulties back to past injustices may seek apologies and restitution in order to help further their often painful recoveries. Representative of this latter focus is Inuit leader Martha Flaherty's query to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: "whether the High Arctic exiles do not deserve some recognition so that they can start the healing process and rebuilding their lives?"<sup>36</sup> Official repudiation of the relevant historical wrong is welcomed as evidence that the victims will find support from the wider society in their rehabilitation. One survivor, for instance, reacted to Ottawa's apology for the residential schools disaster by saying: "It's a nice feeling ... to think that the government was listening. It's certainly a better day today than it was yesterday."<sup>37</sup>

Although internment burdened many Japanese-Canadian survivors with psychiatric problems, and winning redress has been described as akin to having "a tumour removed,"<sup>38</sup> the focus on redress as an aid to personal recovery has been most evident in the residential schools campaign. With so many First Nations people suffering problems of low self-esteem and family dysfunction because of the abuse and mistreatment they experienced in residential schools, recognition of their undeserved suffering, according to the Assembly of First Nations, is valued as the "beginning of respect, of feeling that [they] are capable of making a contribution to the world."<sup>39</sup> This focus on the personal needs of survivors has also driven demands on behalf of former residential students for monetary compensation, which, as native filmmaker Phil Lane has argued, is necessary "to start healing, because we don't have adequate therapy, addiction treatment, child care or education."<sup>40</sup> Such indeed is the major emphasis of the \$350 million healing package included as part of Ottawa's response to the residential schools redress campaign.<sup>41</sup>

## REDRESS AND THE SYMBOLIC CAPITAL OF HONOUR

Demands for redress are thus in part the reaction of traumatized persons who feel that the entity responsible has now an obligation to help them overcome their suffering's ongoing contemporary manifestations. However, this focus on personal motivations leaves unexplored other important aspects of redress politics, such as the involvement in the various campaigns of persons other than the immediate victims themselves. As one business opponent of redress has rather harshly put it: "Precious few [survivors] returned to their homelands

because of their treatment by Canada. It is their children and grandchildren who are claiming that redress must be made."<sup>42</sup> The fact that the residential schools, High Arctic relocation, World War II internment and "Chinese exclusion" redress campaigns have all been driven, if not actually led, by survivors of the relevant episodes does not mollify their critics. Nor does the fact that descendants of the immediate survivors have often spoken eloquently about the impact of their parents' torment on their own lives.<sup>43</sup>

More specifically, critics find it difficult to understand why, particularly given the gaps of time extending between the original occurrences and the present in which redress is now sought, claimants do not seek reconciliation through the more customary routes of psychiatry or forgiving-by-forgetting. Puzzlement on this question seems to lead opponents to reduce redress politics to a cynically orchestrated attempt to raid the public purse.<sup>44</sup> Thus, *Winnipeg Free Press* editor John Dafoe has complained: "The theory used to be that time healed all wounds. Now there is a growing belief that time plus about \$30 million might just do the job."<sup>45</sup> Prominent columnist Jeffrey Simpson has depicted the emphasis on financial compensation similarly, as "crass multicultural politics" that aims at forcing "today's generation to pay for policies and attitudes of generations past."<sup>46</sup>

But redress politics is a more complex phenomenon than such comments leave room to admit. Certainly, redress movements aim at more than simply meeting the personal needs of survivors — but noting their pronounced monetary emphasis falls glaringly short of considering adequately what these other aims may be. More useful for understanding the powerful attraction of redress is Cairns's point, that redress movements see historical contestation as their means to a "more dignified future."<sup>47</sup> This perspective highlights the political specificity of redress movements, as attempts to employ the unique visibility of highstakes battles over past injustices as vehicles for transforming damaged civic identities. Pursuing it further should help to bring out more clearly the relevance of redress politics for contemporary Canadian citizenship.

The advocacy literature on redress abounds with references to the public humiliation that can attach to a community even after the original episode or policy that gave rise to its initial official stigmatization has passed. According to the Chinese Canadian National Council, "having been singled out by law for unequal treatment," Chinese Canadians have been labelled as "inferior and undesirable."<sup>48</sup> The anniversary of 1 July 1923, the date the *Chinese Immigration (Exclusion) Act* was passed, is remembered by survivors and their descendants as "Humiliation Day."<sup>49</sup> For the National Congress of Italian Canadians, "Canadians of Italian origin were denigrated and discriminated against in their own country... For that stigma there can never be sufficient compensation."<sup>50</sup> And Japanese Canadians, as community leader Maryka Omatsu explains, have been "scarred by our history in this country," by a "debilitating virus that ... filled me with a shame that I could not understand as a child."<sup>51</sup>

These comments call attention to how acts of official stigmatization, which communicate authoritatively that the stigmatized community is "disloyal" or "backward," can leave even future members of the groups so tagged with a profound feeling that their equal worth is denied, or accepted only superficially, by their "normal" anglo-celtic counterparts. The reaction of redress movements to the specifically civic dimension of this problem of social interaction is captured usefully by the concept of honour.<sup>52</sup> Although honour is a "protean concept, capable of many social and personal applications,"<sup>53</sup> here the term is most important in the former sense. As opposed to personal, or inner honour — that "most sublime of virtues" — social understandings of honour are concerned with the nature and function of perceived virtue rather than with the moral issue of whether a given person is or is not truly virtuous.<sup>54</sup> In the civic context, honour as a reputation for virtue designates a socially produced good whose possessors enjoy what Frank Henderson Stewart describes as a "losable right to respect."<sup>55</sup>

The losable right to respect that civic honour confers can be contrasted with the non-losable right to respect associated traditionally with liberalism's concern to uphold the innate dignity of the person, which, as Charles Taylor points out, recognizes and respects "a universal human potential, rather than anything a person may have made of it."<sup>56</sup> Thus critical theorist Axel Honneth, for instance, describes the civic honour so important in the early modern age as "what each individual [had to] *further accomplish* in order to actually attain the level of social standing collectively accorded to his or her estate."<sup>57</sup> This understanding of honour emphasizes that a reputation for virtue allows those so favoured to command a respectful hearing from others, while "dishonour," even for the formally included, can help to effect an informal exclusion from the circle of persons accepted as worthy partners in collective action. This notion of honour as a losable right to respect, in which demonstrated accomplishment is key, provides a useful conceptual model for explaining why receiving official atonement for past injuries has become so politically important today.

Undeserved dishonour can be experienced as an extreme form of misrecognition, which makes "outsiders," even "foreigners," of persons whose citizenship histories ought to support a quite different response. For example, Chinese-Canadian redress-seekers blame the exclusion, disfranchisement, and head-tax legislation for preventing other Canadians from relating to them as civic partners. One member of the Chinese-Canadian redress movement has remarked that despite being able to trace his Canadian family history to 1906, his children were still told to "go back to Hong Kong" while attending Simon Fraser University some 80 years hence.<sup>58</sup> As the Chinese Canadian National Council put it, "the bitter legacy of the Canadian government's 62 years of legislated racism is a Chinese Canadian community that is still seen as a new immigrant community."<sup>59</sup> A similar point has been made by the National

Association of Japanese Canadians, which found during its redress campaign that it "still had a long way to go in making ... Canadians aware that [internment] was carried out against Canadians who happened to be of Japanese ancestry, and not against Japanese nationals who happened to find themselves in Canada."<sup>60</sup>

From this misrecognition redress movements can trace a legacy of barriers that inhibit their ability to become, in more than a merely legal sense, equal civic participants. They speak bitterly of group histories marred by orientations to public action strikingly similar to that evinced singly by Erving Goffman's prototypically stigmatized individual, who "may perceive, usually quite correctly, that whatever others profess, they do not really 'accept' him and are not ready to make contact with him on 'equal grounds'."<sup>61</sup> This is a retrospective bitterness that resents the lesson of quietism drawn by the affected community from its initial experience of official stigmatization. Such episodes are often taken as cues to abstain from civic interaction, to "play it safe" lest the original harm become the basis of future experiences of disrespect. Goffman explains this fearful orientation by saying that "the very anticipation" of receiving disesteem in social encounters leads "the stigmatized to arrange life so as to avoid them."<sup>62</sup>

Thus, as novelist Joy Kogawa remarked during the Japanese-Canadian redress campaign, "internment worked beyond the wildest dreams of politicians. [F]orty years later, most of the people of my generation are still hiding in the woodwork and wanting to speak."<sup>63</sup> Omatsu, too, has written of a "passivity ... fashioned by our history in this country, that, like some invisible undertow, pulls us down on bended knees."<sup>64</sup> A similar reaction among Ukrainian Canadians was noticed after the World War I internment. One school principal remarked at the time that his Ukrainian-Canadian pupils, who had felt before internment that "they were really becoming Canadians[,] ... are now hurt, bewildered, shy and drawing back into their halfdiscarded alien shells."<sup>65</sup> Internment, according to Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association research director Lubomyr Luciuk, "conditioned the entire community to be very apprehensive about their ... status as Canadians."<sup>66</sup> Above all, these remembrances indicate how a citizen's formal right to public participation can be compromised significantly by the (historically justified) perception that accepted actors do not regard them with respect.

Achieving redress is thus prized as highly public and authoritative proof that the historical stigmatization of the redress movement's constituency was ill-deserved. For example, the federal government's "Statement of Reconciliation," the outcome of extensive negotiations with the Assembly of First Nations, spoke of "the assistance and spiritual values of the Aboriginal peoples who welcomed the newcomers to this continent," of "diverse, vibrant Aboriginal nations" and of "the strength and endurance of Aboriginal people"

— contributions and characteristics that “too often have been forgotten.”<sup>67</sup> For the National Congress of Italian Canadians, redress would “restore the positive image of Italian Canadians as significant contributors to this country of ours in this century.”<sup>68</sup> Focused particularly on securing lasting reminders of extraordinary contributions to Canada’s development was the 1988 Chinese Canadian National Council redress proposal. It urged the “symbolic community redress [of] commemorative plaques dedicated to our elderly true pioneers at the site of the last spike of the Canadian Pacific Railway [and at the] House of Commons Railway Committee Room.”<sup>69</sup>

Pursuing redress also allows the movement to display evidence of its present virtue. To display public-spirited virtue can be crucial in the arena of citizenship politics, where a heavy burden of suspicion often faces actors susceptible to construction as “special interests.”<sup>70</sup> Accordingly, one of the most prominent themes in the advocacy literature on redress is the movement’s insistence that its aim is to prevent similar racist acts from being visited on others. The National Association of Japanese Canadians emphasized that “it is as an act of citizenship and because we refuse to see democracy betrayed that we seek an honourable resolution to the injustices of the war years.”<sup>71</sup> Similar confirmations that redress is valued as an opportunity to display altruism include the Chinese Canadian National Council’s call for “a trust foundation ... to ensure that similar discriminatory government actions do not happen again”<sup>72</sup> and the Ukrainian-Canadian redress movement’s plea to “ensure that no other ... minority in Canada will in the future experience the injustices Ukrainian Canadians did in the past.”<sup>73</sup> Like the bygone duel of honour, in which combatants strove to demonstrate certain prized traits in order to defeat threats to their status as “gentlemen,”<sup>74</sup> redress campaigns seek to elicit the respect accorded “worthy” participants by demonstrating virtue.

Striking is the contrast between unrepudiated past policies that work as what Goffman calls “stigma symbols”<sup>75</sup> and the positive symbolism that a redress settlement may convey. Processes or events that replace negative symbolism with images of undeserved suffering overcome by group virtue are truly forms of social alchemy which, at their strongest, transform the stigma of dishonour into a symbolic capital of honour.<sup>76</sup> Unveiled in a moving 1988 Parliament Hill ceremony, the Japanese-Canadian redress settlement symbolized the transformation of a shamed group tagged with a reputation for disloyalty into a proud community of Canadian citizens whose activism had elicited their prime minister’s “solemn commitment” that the “injustices of the past ... will never again be countenanced or repeated.”<sup>77</sup>

The social alchemy of redress follows from its capacity to provide a capital of symbols that ratify a group’s political response to its experience of historical wrongs as potent evidence of its past and present honourability. The successful Japanese-Canadian campaign produced lasting signifiers of Japanese-

Canadian honour, reminders symbolizing that the community's struggle was motivated by a concern to enhance the future well-being of other Canadians. For example, because the 1988 *Emergencies Act* — which replaced the old *War Measures Act* that had enabled the various internments — was largely a federal government response to Japanese-Canadian protests, the *Nikkei Voice* newspaper could call the new act the Japanese-Canadian community's "Gift to Canadians."<sup>78</sup> The establishment of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation as part of the terms of the 1988 redress settlement stands similarly as usable proof of Japanese Canadians' concern to help protect other Canadians from potential future acts of racist oppression. By no means irrelevant to its 1986 argument that a "Japanese-Canadian human rights foundation" would "help other groups ... encountering similar difficulties" in the future<sup>79</sup> was the imperative to present other Canadians with an ongoing and visible reminder of Japanese-Canadian virtue.

However, critics of redress ask (often with angry cynicism), why do redress movements seek "conscience money ... to appease,"<sup>80</sup> why do they demand "cash to expiate the perceived sins?"<sup>81</sup> Despite the rather narrow preoccupation that tends to animate such complaints, the question is important. After all, Conservative Multiculturalism Minister Gerry Weiner's 1993 offer of a parliamentary ceremony and formal apologies for the various movements seeking redress through his office was refused by all the groups involved, on the ground that redress without money was not redress at all.<sup>82</sup> The need for better health and addictions services in First Nations and Inuit communities has of course given an understandably consistent monetary emphasis to the two redress claims dealt with by the Ministry of Indian Affairs. But money is not necessarily the "concrete" opposite of symbolism in redress politics — it is in fact integral to that symbolism.

The insistence that any sincere repudiation of the racist policies of the past requires paying financial restitution in the present can be understood as a contemporary instance of money's ancient symbolic role, as a universally exchangeable equivalent used to authenticate agreements when trust is lacking.<sup>83</sup> With this monetary emphasis, redress movements indicate that they are willing to forgive the wrongs of the past, but only if they can elicit a persuasive indicator that those wrongs will not be repeated. One cannot, after all, be brutally robbed, accept a casual "sorry" from the absconding thief and feel with confidence that the exchange augurs well for the future. As the National Association of Japanese Canadians insisted in 1988, "significant individual compensation acknowledges the severity of the injustices [and provides] an honourable and meaningful settlement."<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the federal government itself emphasized at the 1988 Japanese-Canadian redress ceremony that the sincerity of its anti-racist regret was underwritten financially. The \$450 million compensation package, Prime Minister Mulroney declared, "is symbolic of



our determination to address this issue, not only in the moral sense but also in a tangible way."<sup>85</sup>

The symbolic contribution of money to redress also stems from the medium's ability to lend to an apology a certain symmetry with which to match the original misdeed. Groups whose past victimization caused them direct and significant financial hardship<sup>86</sup> insist that an honourable apology, one that does credit to both offender and victim, must contain an equally significant financial component. Thus, the Chinese Canadian National Council deplored the federal government's failure to offer "a symbolic sum to acknowledge the injustice of the [head] tax,"<sup>87</sup> while the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association protested that a proposed memorial at a former internment site was utterly insufficient: "a small plaque, valued at \$15,000, is not enough. The internees suffered substantial economic losses."<sup>88</sup>

But money's symbolic importance in redress is by no means exhausted by its role as the proof movements demand in order to be convinced, in their own minds and hearts, that Canada's repudiation of past wrongs is sincere. Struggles for financial redress are also oriented toward showing others that the movement's dedication and power have been sufficient to force the government to respond to the injustices of the past with more than just rhetorical declarations of future good intent. To return to the mugging analogy, accepting apologies from absconding thieves is only likely to boost one's reputation in circles where masochism is a particularly cherished value. Redress movements, then, view the importance of financial compensation through two lenses. The first sees the willingness to pay restitution as a symbol of the integrity of the state's apology: this lens seeks to determine whether governmental regret is sufficiently profound to have dictated a course of action that repudiates past misdeeds with the appropriate symmetry. The second lens through which the question of financial restitution is considered attempts to ascertain what a particular proposed settlement is likely to tell other Canadians about the movement to whom the apology has been proffered. In short, it judges the settlement's adequacy as potential symbolic capital.

Financial restitution as a form of symbolic capital became particularly important after the precedent set by the 1988 Japanese-Canadian settlement. It is, of course, commonplace to deride the "imitation factor" so often apparent in the field of what is called "ethnic" politics.<sup>89</sup> Redress, which has often been criticized for its potential economic cost, on the ground that "more [claimants] will probably join the queue,"<sup>90</sup> is certainly no exception. The notion of civic honour, which links the nature of the future social reception a group can anticipate to its externally perceived virtue, can help more adequately to explain the significance of this competitive aspect of financial restitution in redress politics. As a nineteenth-century defender of the duellist's honour so violently put it: "anyone who turns into a worm has no right to complain if

they are crushed underfoot ... [I]n this world, complete independence from the opinions and prejudices of others is a mere chimera."<sup>91</sup> The point, of course, is that being seen as successful in eliciting respect in the present can bear crucially on how one fares in social interaction in the future.

In the wake of Japanese-Canadian success, winning financial redress has come to be viewed as a measure of whether the group is regarded by other Canadians as sufficiently worthy to deserve an "honourable and meaningful settlement."<sup>92</sup> Failure to elicit financial compensation, it is feared, will inaugurate an unflattering symbolism that contrasts the apparent disregard with which the unsuccessful movement's constituency has been handled with the concrete demonstration of respect already accorded one's more successful counterparts. Indicating how common this fear has been among redress movements are remarks such as: "redress offered to ... Japanese Canadians would be discriminatory if it ignored the experience of the Ukrainians in Canada";<sup>93</sup> "compensation [was] given to the Japanese[,] the Inuit ... deserve the same recognition";<sup>94</sup> "how could the federal government redress ... other past wrongs but not the ... Chinese Head Tax?"<sup>95</sup>

Other redress movements know that it is the Japanese-Canadian campaign, and not their own, that will be recognized when visitors read the inscription announcing that the Canadian Race Relations Foundation was established "on behalf of the Japanese Canadian community, in commemoration of those who suffered injustices during and after World War II."<sup>96</sup> Certainly, the vehement reaction of the Chinese Canadian National Council to the Liberals' 1994 refusal to offer redress would have been inconceivable absent the backdrop of Japanese-Canadian success. The anger of Council representative Victor Wong resembled the 1960s reaction of those non-British anglophones who felt that the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's proposed recognition of dualism would effect a damaging symbolic erasure of their contribution to Canadian development: "We need to respond very strongly to this measure. It's unacceptable, unfair and racist."<sup>97</sup>

## REDRESS AND CITIZENSHIP INCLUSION

Critics who condemn this combative emphasis argue that "the search for restitution for past wrongs ... risks piling up more division in a country already quite divided,"<sup>98</sup> that "this rush for compensation for past slights and indignities is likely to open old wounds."<sup>99</sup> At the extreme, they see redress-seeking as a vehicle of vengeance rather than of reconciliation: "Everybody has a horror story to tell about what used to go on. The time has now come to get even."<sup>100</sup> But focusing on the notion of civic honour, which mediates "between individual aspirations and the judgment of society,"<sup>101</sup> suggests a more integrative function to this conflict. In their bids for honour, redress movements

see a potential lever with which to transform the formal right to participate into a far more potent right, which they have seen so often redeemed by more fortunate others — the informal right to be heard.

A leader of the Japanese-Canadian movement has written that “the winning of redress restored honour to my community.”<sup>102</sup> The political response of the Japanese-Canadian community to this restoration demonstrates how the social alchemy of redress can promote civic integration and increased political participation. For example, the energetic and thorough contribution made by the National Association of Japanese Canadians to the 1991-92 parliamentary hearings on the ill-fated Charlottetown constitutional proposals contrasts with the failure of most of the unsuccessful redress-seeking organizations to appear at all. The Japanese-Canadian organization presented on three different occasions to argue in support of, among others, its positions in favour of entrenching Aboriginal peoples’ inherent right to self-government and recognizing Quebec as a distinct society.<sup>103</sup>

Crucial to this participation was a new confidence about their civic status on the part of citizens who, in Omatsu’s words, had sought previously a safe public identity by adopting an “invisibility” of “fatalistic resignation” and maintaining a “low crime rate.”<sup>104</sup> Because the successful redress campaign had replaced undeserved stigma with official acknowledgment of its constituency’s virtue, the National Association of Japanese Canadians could use redress to convey in shorthand its status as a powerful organization carrying an almost unique authority with which to speak on civil liberties issues. Thus, President Art Miki began: “We were the organization that was deeply involved in achieving the redress settlement on behalf of our community.”<sup>105</sup> As Miki suggested, because of “the things [that have] occurred to Japanese Canadians ... there may be some suggestions we can offer to strengthen the ensuring of minority rights.”<sup>106</sup>

Most significant is that the National Association of Japanese Canadians connected explicitly the successful outcome of its redress campaign to, in President Miki’s words, a growing desire on the part “of Canadians of Japanese ancestry [to contribute] to the development of a better and stronger Canada.”<sup>107</sup> One appearance the association concluded by declaring: “We are thankful that the Canadian government has recognized the past injustices ... We feel it is now our role to ensure that other past injustices will be acknowledged and that our new Constitution will protect all of us from future violations.”<sup>108</sup> The National Association of Japanese Canadians has indeed extended “moral support and advice” to the other redress movements,<sup>109</sup> which, most recently, have included participating in a conference held by the British Columbia Union of Indian Chiefs, in which the former organization provided useful and frank advice as to how the First Nations campaign might replicate Japanese-Canadian success.<sup>110</sup>

The stigma of dishonour can be a powerful obstacle to healthy civic involvement: viewing their stigmatization as a warning of future disrespect from others, the "dishonoured" are prone to retreat to the ostensibly safer posture of withdrawal. Therefore, to understand redress campaigns as bids to elicit a more active acceptance from others is to argue that redress-seeking may be a more healthy phenomenon than its critics suppose. Redress politics calls our attention to the presence in contemporary Canada of groups of citizens, emerging from prolonged periods of relative disengagement from civic life, that are now engaged in a course of action that aims at helping to promote the more broadly-based citizen participation whose absence contemporary analysts bemoan.<sup>111</sup> Far from being fissiparous threats to a common Canadian citizenship, redress movements seek to participate more effectively in the common affairs of a society in which they find history has placed them at a significant symbolic disadvantage. Indeed, for the previously dishonoured, honour in its public sense assumes value primarily as a means of forging more acceptable future relationships with former detractors. Struggles to gain the respect of past antagonists are meaningless unless one desires to undertake with them common projects in the future. Even in the case of the duel, because it was employed as an alternative to the far more uncompromising strategy of retribution, the challenged party was not only an enemy, but also a potential friend.<sup>112</sup>

Strategies that have securing an apology as their object reveal with particular clarity that the aim in question is reconciliation rather than rupture. An apology allows the offended party to relate positively to the offender in a way that would not be possible if the latter refused to convincingly disavow their actions. Where, for instance, a person may signal a desire to sever relations with a tormentor by demanding punishment, the apology-seeker demands reassurance that the attitudes that gave rise to the past offence have now been decisively repudiated. Like the crime victim whose condition for undertaking future relations with the mugger is receiving persuasive evidence that the former wrongdoer no longer harbours piratical intentions, redress movements premise their search for apologies on the desire to engage in future interaction with other Canadians, not on the impulse to renounce it.

This is a particularly important point to make about the residential schools redress campaign. But the caveat must first be registered that this movement cannot be portrayed unequivocally as a push for integration within the larger Canadian society. The quite different approach to the question of honour taken by the residential schools movement is a helpful guide to understanding its specificity. On those occasions when the movement has described itself as a vehicle for attaching honour to First Nations people, the context of interaction most often cited has been that of particular status Indian communities. This focus contrasts with that of the High Arctic Inuit, who stressed that the respect they sought to garner through redress was respect from non-native Canadians: prominent spokesperson Martha Flaherty has described the

relocated Inuit as "Canadians who suffered for Canadian sovereignty and deserve ... recognition."<sup>113</sup>

This theme has not been as conspicuous in the residential schools campaign, which has been more overtly concerned to use redress as a remedy for interaction problems that it sees within First Nations communities. As the Assembly of First Nations has summarized the consensus among residential schools survivors: "people realized they needed to work on themselves first, help family next, and then their communities."<sup>114</sup> Recalled with painful regret are the tendencies of many abuse survivors to either shun interaction with their families and former neighbours<sup>115</sup> or to return only to inflict their own suffering on significant others.<sup>116</sup> Thus, the Assembly of First Nations has viewed *Breaking the Silence* as a means of ending a cycle of "dishonourable behaviour"<sup>117</sup> so as to create stronger and more healthy native communities. Encapsulating this project of achieving community solidarity through healing has been the phrase, "the honour of one is the honour of all."<sup>118</sup>

This tendency to focus primarily on the movement as a vehicle for producing respect and healing within First Nations communities, and to place less stress on accumulating honour as a means of achieving more effective participation within Canadian institutions, helps to point up the immense difficulty that Canada's historical legacy poses for native peoples. Canadians cannot expect First Nations to view redress in the same way as non-aboriginal movements, which have seen atonement unequivocally as a symbol of their more fully-fledged inclusion within the political community. For the First Nations campaign, redress does not inaugurate necessarily or unanimously a new chapter of integration within the Canadian polity. At least equally significant for the residential schools movement has been the understanding of redress as a precedent for bolstering future court attempts to make the federal government financially accountable to individual abuse survivors.<sup>119</sup>

Pointing to the immense problems bequeathed native communities by past federal policies underscores one of the most important reasons for the equivocation with which many First Nations persons view Canadian citizenship. As Darlene Johnston argues, federal government policies (like the early ban on traditional practices such as the potlach and the assimilative thrust of the residential schools policy and 1970 White Paper proposals) have produced cumulatively the lesson that achieving equal Canadian citizenship requires repudiating — or simply becoming dispossessed of — aboriginal lands, heritages, connections, and identities. It is only against this background, Johnston writes, "[that] the ambivalence and resistance that First Nations display toward Canadian citizenship [can] begin to be understood."<sup>120</sup>

But those who worry that the native stress on past wrongs augurs poorly for a common Canadian future should consider the potential implications if First Nations stopped attempting to discuss history with other Canadians. The analogy ought not be pushed too far, but the near-total breach in Canada-Quebec

relations following the 1990 collapse of the Meech Lake Accord has also been accompanied by a marked shift in the role played by historical grievances in Quebec nationalism. Complaints directed at English Canada about historical attitudes and policies toward Quebec, and particularly about the "betrayal" of 1982, were extremely prominent in the Meech debates.<sup>121</sup> But since Meech's failure, angry remarks about Quebec's history in Canada seem much less appealing to English-Canadian consciences than bids to consolidate pro-independence sentiment among Quebecers. As Charles Taylor writes: "With the demise of Meech, something snapped.... A certain kind of compromise was for ever over."<sup>122</sup>

Of course, aboriginal nationalism lacks the economic and institutional advantages that make independence a far more immediate prospect for its Quebec counterpart. But there are other alternatives to joint historical discussion that First Nations may come increasingly to find as the only honourable basis from which to create future relationships with Canada. These alternatives could include, and indeed have included, engaging in campaigns of civil disobedience, launching embarrassing complaints in international fora, or even — more subtly but also indicative of an increasing apartness that would bode ill for a common future — adopting the sullen posture of inauthentic acceptance with which inhabitants of the former Soviet empire awaited their captor's demise.

Therefore, it is important to note that the Assembly of First Nations has indeed sought redress as part of an attempt to "forge a more conciliatory relationship with the federal government."<sup>123</sup> Similarly, the co-chair of the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, Nelson Keitlah, told the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples that an apology "would go a long way toward patching up the differences between Canada's Indians and the federal government. When a person hurts another person, the first thing that comes about before a friendship can start again is that [they] say, 'I'm sorry'."<sup>124</sup> *Breaking the Silence* has also drawn a connection between redress and seeking greater inclusion within the Canadian polity: "Today, First Nations are reclaiming their history and affirming their place in Canada, a trend which includes speaking out about their residential school experience."<sup>125</sup> Individual survivors, too, have recognized that pursuing redress is a move that involves the risk of adopting a certain openness toward non-aboriginal Canadians and the federal government. At a British Columbia redress meeting, one woman expressed this feeling by saying: "Sometimes we have to reach out.... I guess that's what we're doing here. Trusting the government that somehow things are going to be ... dealt with."<sup>126</sup>

Certainly, such aboriginal organizations as the Metis National Council, Native Women's Association of Canada and Native Council of Canada have been angered by the fact that the program proposals contained in the reconciliation agreement seem designed primarily for on-reserve status Indians.<sup>127</sup> Comparing Minister Stewart's 1998 reconciliation statement with the stronger apology given Japanese Canadians by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1988 has

also occasioned bitterness.<sup>128</sup> Willie Blackwater, a former student of the Port Alberni Indian Residential School, expressed his dissatisfaction by saying: "If any kind of apology is going to have any meaning, it's got to come from the top. It meant nothing because one of Prime Minister Chrétien's flunkies gave it."<sup>129</sup> Others have pointed out that Stewart apologized only to those who actually attended residential schools and thus ignored the related suffering of the former students' friends and families.<sup>130</sup> The fact that Ottawa failed to admit responsibility and remorse for undertaking policies whose intent was cultural assimilation, and simply expressed "regret" for the abuse associated with the schools, has also invited the important criticism that the Statement of Reconciliation was intended more to assuage the guilt of non-aboriginal Canadians rather than to signal a genuine repudiation of racism and colonialism.<sup>131</sup> And for many, doubtless that the enormity of Canadian wrongs and aboriginal suffering simply militated against receiving the agreement with undue enthusiasm in any case.

But it is also clear that redress has been understood as a means of reaching out, of attempting to gauge the sincerity of a polity that claims to want partnership with Aboriginal peoples.<sup>132</sup> Thus, it is important to note that many First Nations individuals did react to the apology and healing package as an appropriate basis from which to begin reconciliation with non-native Canadians: "I felt that we didn't have hope, that this was ever going to materialize. And today it did";<sup>133</sup> "It's a nice feeling — after listening to the pain and hurt of so many people for so many years — to think that the government was listening. It's certainly a better day today than it was yesterday";<sup>134</sup> "It's a good first step";<sup>135</sup> "[it's] a historic step to break from the past."<sup>136</sup> An editorialist for the publication *Windspeaker* has summarized well the mixed First Nations reaction to Minister Stewart's Statement of Reconciliation: "The minister went miles ahead of where other colonial governments have gone. That much is true. But ... if the goal was really to put paternalism to bed and call an end to cultural suppression, we've still got miles and miles to go.... But it's a start and it's about time."<sup>137</sup>

Ottawa's previous refusal to admit that the residential schools policy constituted an injustice for which it would accept responsibility meant that survivors seeking healing would have to do so without Canada's recognition and active assistance. To survivors, therefore, redress symbolizes a welcome shift in non-aboriginal thinking about the residential schools issue. In the wake of Minister Stewart's apology, a First Nations person scanning the pages of *The Vancouver Sun* could find that the quotation marks used formerly to signify journalistic doubts about the veracity of his or her grievances, as in, "'Atrocities' alleged in mission schools,"<sup>138</sup> had now been replaced with a forthright admission: "Residential schools: A sad history of abuse."<sup>139</sup> It is unwarranted to expect that such symbolism will in itself alleviate the anger

and mistrust with which many First Nations people regard non-native society and Canadian institutions. But Canada's official acceptance of responsibility and communication of belief has already begun to make a small but not insignificant difference. In British Columbia, for instance, calls to a provincial sexual abuse helpline from First Nations persons have doubled (up from 12 to 25 calls a day) since Minister Stewart's announcement, while approximately 50 to 60 additional former residential schools students have initiated new formal abuse complaints with the RCMP.<sup>140</sup> This does not mean that redress is a workable substitute for settling land-claims agreements or that it can solve the political impasse between demands for self-government and populist opposition to anything smacking of "special status." But it does show that a willingness to deal with history by addressing past wrongs can help First Nations people to connect with Canadian institutions on a footing of respect. By encouraging residential schools survivors to contact, in an environment that portends trust and support, institutions and authorities that history has given them good reason for distrusting, Canada has earned an opportunity to show Aboriginal peoples that a common citizenship can provide a basis from which to address pressing problems in concert with other Canadians.

## CONCLUSION

By making respect a politicized issue of citizenship, redress movements telescope into a shorter time frame (and thus make more vivid to the observer) key elements of the project in which the so-called new social movements have been engaged over a much longer period. Movements such as feminism, anti-colonialism and gay rights have all sought to demonstrate the inaccuracy of past judgements of their constituencies as "unworthy" or "incompetent," to recover for public consideration their neglected past accomplishments and to undertake courses of action that demonstrate their contributions to building a better future.<sup>141</sup> Pithy testimony to the relevance of this comparison is the work of symbolic contestation undertaken by lesbians and gay men, which has furthered the transformation of former "deviants" into the inheritors of a proud tradition that claims as members such eminent historical figures as Sappho, da Vinci, and others. Like redress campaigns, equality-seeking social movements have come to react against legacies of civic stigmatization by struggling to achieve the elusive status of honour, which is prized for its ability to elicit the concrete judgement of respect that makes the promise of equal participation rights more meaningful.

Today's "identity politics" of historical revision and symbolic contestation is the product of a long process of political learning, through which social movements have come increasingly to look behind the formally equal participation rights of liberal-democratic citizenship to emphasize the prerequisites



of participation.<sup>142</sup> This was a focus pioneered by the social democrats of the mid-twentieth century, who argued for understanding social rights as necessary to extend to working-class and poor people the participation opportunities enjoyed by more fortunate actors.<sup>143</sup> Social movements that are organized explicitly around the politics of respect bring this emphasis on the prerequisites of equal citizenship into the sphere of symbolism, culture, and identity.<sup>144</sup> For instance, many feminists are concerned about sexism in language because they understand demeaning references to women in particular arenas of social interaction as signals that women are not accepted actors in those contexts. Like redress movements, the fear is that leaving prevailing symbolic repertoires unaltered will only serve to prevent one's constituency from taking its rightful place in the public sphere. Whether they argue forthrightly for symbolic recognition as a vehicle of citizenship inclusion or, as in the case of the First Nations campaign, do so in order to better gauge their prospects of achieving honourable inclusion in the future, Canadian redress movements are clearly part of an historical movement toward more demanding understandings of what equal citizenship entails.

Situating redress politics as part of the great postwar social movement against racism and colonialism might seem implicitly to suggest the ready existence of clear-cut criteria according to which the frivolous redress movement may be separated from the worthy. One might, for instance, distinguish redress claims animated by lingering, and perhaps unwarranted, perceptions of disrespect from those that aim to confront actual contemporary experiences of racism. From this perspective, then, redress claims such as those of the Italian- and Ukrainian-Canadian communities might be viewed as unjustified to the degree that their members tend no longer to face forms of disrespect that extend to direct instances of public discrimination or experiences of outright civic rudeness.<sup>145</sup> But it is important to understand that actors may also find their putative civic equality mitigated by a comparatively benign form of subordinate status. As Hobbes points out, "to neglect is [also] to Dishonour."<sup>146</sup>

Inhabiting a polity in which so many important conflicts are understood in terms of linguistic dualism, "third force" ethnic minorities often find their collective civic identities collapsed into a near-faceless membership in a larger "English Canada," an entity whose British traditions of constitutionalism and responsible government are credited for Canada's ascent from colony to nation. In the terms of a dramaturgical metaphor, the English-Canada narrative assigns leading civic roles to anglo-celtic identities while relegating, say, Eastern or Southern European players to peripheral parts irrelevant to the main line of action. Or, as one prominent Italian Canadian framed his objection to the Meech Lake Accord's emphasis on dualism: "not all the people of this country have been dealt the same constitutional card, nor have they been equally credited with being a dignified and contributing part of this country."<sup>147</sup> Thus,

while racism and colonialism may properly be understood as proxy signals for the urgency of responding to redress claims, it is also important to keep in mind that "third force" demands for redress constitute an attempt to confront an often subtle politics of prioritization that, for these actors, impairs their civic visibility. In short, the tendency of historical patterns of inequality to furnish some groups of citizens with more promising symbolic bases of civic participation than others poses a problem that the government and citizens of Canada, if they take the notion of equal participation seriously, have a responsibility to address.

Yet the apparent widespread public opposition to the concept of "special status" indicated by the 1993 referendum defeat of the Charlottetown Accord seems part of a more general revolt in Canada against the demands imposed by contextually-informed approaches to practising citizenship. The rallying cry, "equal rights for all, special rights for none," which is now brought to bear on issues ranging from welfare "entitlements" to aboriginal fishing rights and gay-positive information in the schools, bespeaks a thoroughgoing impatience with any approach to equality that looks beyond the formal. It reacts to the postwar adjustments that have sought to make Canadian citizenship a more hospitable environment of interaction for women, French-speakers and others by saying: "No more adjustment. We've adjusted far too much already."

The chapter in this volume by Frank Graves warns powerfully against the mistake of understanding hardened citizen attitudes on issues such as wealth redistribution and official multiculturalism as a simple reflex of economic recession. I want to suggest similarly that depicting this rise in hard-line orientations as a temporary product of fiscal crisis is to ignore a phenomenon of long-run significance. Business-cycle explanations of "get-tough" attitudes are attractive, for they suggest that increased future harmony awaits only the employment boom of whose imminence finance ministers and free-market pundits seem certain. But, as I have tried to suggest by situating Canadian redress movements within the evolution of twentieth-century understandings of citizenship, the increasingly adamant opposition to any accommodation with "special interests" has far deeper roots than the current jobs crisis. Key among these roots is the tendency of newer, more challenging approaches to citizenship to place heavy demands on historically privileged actors, who have lost not just their own former "special status" in the explicit sense but find under attack the informal social honour that once attended their exalted public role as well. Indeed, the fear that politically charged historical revision might engender such a reaction can even produce opposition within the redress-seeking group itself. As one member of the National Association of Japanese Canadians explained about redress: "It's a painful subject which many [Japanese Canadians] want nothing to do with ... They fear confrontation and recrimination."<sup>148</sup>

Applying this evolutionary perspective on citizenship to Canada's recent proliferation of redress politics and the often hostile reactions it has received highlights a conflict between two understandings of citizenship that the balm of future prosperity is unlikely to salve. One understanding argues for including respect as a prerequisite necessary to realize the promise of equal citizen participation. Accordingly, its demands of adjustment target those who once derived valorized civic identities from the exclusion or stigmatization of "outsiders." The other understanding of citizenship emphasizes the advantages of simplicity that follow from more formalistic notions of citizenship-as-legal-status. But these advantages are not neutral in their manner of distribution. By rejecting action that aims at easing the burdens of citizen participation for marginalized actors, formalist conceptions make their own demands of adjustment, which weigh most heavily on those whose identities, accomplishments, and histories have not been traditional components in the West's stereotypical rendering of the virtuous citizen.

In this clash between formalist and more radical views of citizenship, the sympathies of the present administration in Ottawa seem increasingly clear. The federal government's 1994 refusal of the remaining non-aboriginal redress claims, the extreme reluctance with which Ottawa apologized for the residential schools policy and the prime minister's remarkable absences from the 1998 First Nations reconciliation and Nisga'a land claims ceremonies (to say nothing of his obvious antipathy to social movement protest more generally), all suggest the growing influence of the backlash against the demands imposed by contextually-informed approaches to practising citizenship. This is not to say that it is wrong to question how far the recognition of context and group histories in citizenship should go, any more than it is to argue that all redress claims are equally meritorious and that automatic acceptance is invariably the most appropriate way to respond. The respect desired by stigmatized or marginalized groups wishing to become citizen actors would be almost meaningless were it dispensed in uniform doses from above against the protests of a recalcitrant majority.

Indeed, it would be unwise to conclude without sounding a certain note of scepticism about the capacity of redress to serve as a recipe for a more inclusive citizenship. One reason for such scepticism is the unfortunate paradox that actors who lie outside Canada's anglo-celtic and francophone bourgeois male elites, but who are also unable to call upon the potential symbolic capital furnished by extraordinarily visible episodes of past oppression, may lack the historical levers of sympathy to which some comparably less discriminated-against groups have access. As Cairns points out, for example, communities that only began to immigrate to Canada in significant numbers after World War II do not have legacies of internment or head taxes for which now to claim redress and, thus, may face even greater barriers in seeking to

impress forcefully their claims for recognition on the public consciousness.<sup>149</sup> Thus, this problem of inequality in symbolic resources amongst non-dominant actors points up the shortcomings of using redress alone as a strategy for producing a public sphere more amenable to equal citizen participation.

But such problems and shortcomings ought not to lead Canadians into dismissing redress politics as an opportunistic form of psychological irredentism that only confirms the wisdom of Trudeau's insistence that "we can only be just in our own time."<sup>150</sup> For accepting too readily the merits of formal equality while emphasizing the contrasting drawbacks of "special status" and a preoccupation with past sins offers a powerful stimulus to the dangerous belief that history has no moral bearing on our present. Contemporary conservatives exhibit a "like-it-or-lump-it" approach to historical grievance, which, with no small irony, denies Edmund Burke's understanding of citizenship as a partnership between the dead and the living. Wondering if "anyone [has] told France that England is sorry it burned Joan of Arc?"<sup>151</sup> critics of redress mutter darkly about a wrong-headed fixation on "long-forgotten administrations"<sup>152</sup> and "claims that go back to the Dark Ages."<sup>153</sup> Opposition to the recent Nisga'a land claim deal in British Columbia betrays a similar amnesia, which contrasts the "Pandora's box ... of attempting to resolve historical 'wrongs'" against the justice of living "as equals without special status for anyone."<sup>154</sup> Thus do some opponents of native land claims pose as defenders of "the integrity of Canadian democracy."<sup>155</sup>

In short, the attractive simplicity of formalism is helping to justify an often self-serving indifference toward the contemporary outcome of a legacy of oppression and conquest. When exhibited in relation to Aboriginal peoples, such indifference is more than just unseemly. But even if only the redress claims of the comparatively fortunate Italian- and Ukrainian-Canadian communities are one's object of critique, the insistence that past wrongs are unreasonable items of political discussion involves a refusal to confront a significant problem of contemporary Canadian democracy. This problem is that Canadians wishing to participate on the civic stage are to a significant extent faced with a preexisting allocation of roles according to which members of some groups enjoy a much greater capacity to command civic notice than do others. To the degree that it is through participation in democracy that we shape our futures, this question of civic honour carries an importance that goes far beyond psychological issues of self-esteem.

How, then, can Canadians better connect? The country's sheer bigness indicates an important need for instruments of connection capable of transcending the basic physical obstacles of population density and geographic scope. Citizenship can serve precisely as such an instrument of connection. It provides a basic framework of equality within which people can relate as normative equals. Its democratic rights provide the basis for creating broad communities of action that can help to found solidarities and understandings, even if

these are only provisional, where none existed before. Indeed, citizenship constitutes the only terrain on which it is possible for all the adult members of the polity to participate in the querying, refining and shaping of the rules and norms by which they are to collectively live. Yet for individual citizens, redeeming equal citizenship's promise depends, in an important and too often unacknowledged sense, on being able to command the positive regard of others. For without this crucial prerequisite of successful interaction, the civic arena is a remarkably intimidating, and in extreme cases even unthinkable, forum in which to enter.

For the federal government, therefore, demands that Canada must revisit unflattering episodes and practices of its past afford an opportunity. This opportunity is to seek to realize in a more thorough and inclusive manner the potential of the most basic instrument of connectedness that we have. Struggles over respect and recognition are often discomfiting, but they are premised on the desire to pursue the project of a common citizenship. Meeting this desire by seeking to foster a respectful and considered dialogue about past wrongs is a far more promising basis for lasting unity than is the growing refusal to entertain minority-group grievances about the limitations of existing Canadian modes of togetherness.

## NOTES

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1. Alan C. Cairns, "Whose Side is the Past On?" in *Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change*, ed. by Douglas E. Williams (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995). Also see Veronica Strong-Boag, "Contested Space: The Politics of Canadian Memory," Presidential Address, *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* (1994).
2. Cairns, "Whose Side is the Past On?" pp. 20-25.
3. See, for example, C.E.S. Franks, *The Myths and Symbols of the Constitutional Debate in Canada* (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1993).
4. Cairns, "Whose Side is the Past On?" p. 24.
5. "Speaking Notes for the Honourable Gerry Weiner, Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship, at the Japanese Canadian Redress Agreement Press Conference," 22 September 1988. "Speaking Notes" loaned by Alan Cairns.

- Subsequent materials from this source, which are also on file with the author, will be indicated by the designation, (AC).
6. Jane Stewart, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, "Statement of Reconciliation: Learning From the Past," 8 January 1998. Reprinted in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 8 January 1998, p. A19.
  7. Here I apply to symbolic conflict a term from Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle* (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1983).
  8. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), ch. 4, "Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power."
  9. On Japanese-Canadian internment, see Roy Miki and Cassandra Kobayashi, eds., *Justice in Our Time: Redress for Japanese Canadians* (Vancouver: National Association of Japanese Canadians, 1988). The redress agreement and Minister Weiner's and Prime Minister Mulroney's apologies are reprinted in Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *Justice in Our Time: The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement* (Vancouver: Talon Books, 1991), pp. 138-39.
  10. On Ukrainian-Canadian internment, see Lubomyr Luciuk, *A Time for Atone-ment: Canada's First National Internment Operations and the Ukrainian Canadians, 1914-1920* (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1988). On the "Chinese exclusion" policy, see B. Singh Bolaria and Peter S. Li, *Racial Oppression in Canada* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985), pp. 85-95. German, Sikh and Jewish Canadians have also sought redress for World War II internment, the Komagatamaru incident, and the refusal to accept Jewish refugees during World War II, respectively. Because of their comparatively low profile (they attracted very little press coverage and produced no publications on redress), these movements are not discussed here.
  11. For the apology, see "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the National Congress of Italian Canadians and the Canadian Italian Business Professional Association," Toronto, 4 November 1990 (AC). Details of Italian-Canadian internment are found in the National Congress of Italian Canadians, "A National Shame: The Internment of Italian Canadians" (1990) (AC). A more readily available account, though dealing only with the Quebec case, is Bruno Ramirez, "Ethnicity on Trial: The Italians of Montreal and the Second World War," in *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945*, ed. Norman Hillmer et al. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988).
  12. Agata de Santis, "Canada's unknown PoWs," *Montreal Gazette*, 14 April 1997, p. A4.
  13. "Hefty price tag delays settlements," *Calgary Herald*, 1 June 1993, p. A12.
  14. Ministry of Canadian Heritage News Release, "Sheila Finestone Tables and Sends Letter on Redress to Ethnocultural Organizations," 14 December 1994 (on file with author).
  15. Victor Yukmun Wong, "An old wrong stays wrong," *The Vancouver Sun*, 13 January 1995, p. A15.

16. Eva Ferguson and Jim Cunningham, "Ukrainians [sic] to get federal hearing," *Calgary Herald*, 1 February 1997, p. B7. The complete proposal is Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, "The Ukrainian Canadian Case for Acknowledgment and Redress," A submission to the Honourable Gerry Weiner, PC, MP, minister of state for multiculturalism and citizenship, 28 October 1988 (AC).
17. On the relocation, see Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *The High Arctic Relocation: A Report on the 1953-55 Relocation* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994).
18. Jack Aubry, "Compensation urged for 'coercive' move of Inuit to High Arctic," *The Vancouver Sun*, 14 July 1994, p. A6.
19. Under the terms of a "reconciliation agreement," Ottawa "acknowledges" the "hardship" caused by the relocation and agrees to set up a \$10 million High Arctic Trust to benefit the affected Inuit. The relocatees are required to agree that federal planners "were acting with honourable intentions," Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development News Release, "High Arctic Relocation Reconciled," 28 March 1996 (on file with author).
20. Emanuel Lowi, "A shameful episode," *Montreal Gazette*, 6 April 1996, p. B5.
21. Erin Anderssen, "Natives to get \$200-million fund," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 16 December 1997, p. A1.
22. Minister Stewart, "Statement of Reconciliation."
23. Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement*, pp. 17-49; National Congress of Italian Canadians, "A National Shame," pp. 7-12.
24. Ramirez, "Ethnicity on Trial," p. 80.
25. National Association of Japanese Canadians, *Democracy Betrayed: The Case for Redress* (Vancouver: National Association of Japanese Canadians, 1984), p. 1.
26. Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence: An Interpretive Study of Residential School Impact and Healing as Illustrated by the Stories of First Nations Individuals* (Ottawa: First Nations Health Commission, 1994), pp. 13-19. More generally, see J. R. Miller, *Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).
27. Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence*, p. 34.
28. On the federal government's "assimilative linguistic campaign," see Miller, *Shingwauk's Vision*, p. 200; and Celia Haig-Brown, *Resistance and Renewal: Surviving the Indian Residential School* (Vancouver: Tillacum Library, 1988), esp. pp. 51-54.
29. Quoted in Alan R. Marcus, *Out in the Cold: The Legacy of Canada's Inuit Relocation Experiment in the High Arctic* (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1992), p. 21.
30. Bolaria and Li, *Racial Oppression in Canada*, p. 94.

31. Chinese Canadian National Council, *It is Only Fair! Redress for the Head Tax and Chinese Exclusion Act* (Toronto: Chinese Canadian National Council, 1988) (AC), p. 14; Bolaria and Li, *Racial Oppression in Canada*, p. 95.
32. Gilbert Oskaboose, "To the Government of Canada," *The First Perspective*, December 1996, p. 4.
33. See Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education* (London: Longman, 1990), p. 2.
34. Quoted in Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement*, p. 132.
35. Frank Moritsugu, quoted in Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *Redress for Japanese Canadians*, p. 15.
36. Quoted in Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *The High Arctic Relocation: Summary of Supporting Information* (Vol. I) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), p. 77.
37. Charlene Belleau, quoted in Janet Steffenhagen, "Apology to abused natives elicits their powerful emotions," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A3.
38. Joy Kogawa, *Itsuka* (Toronto: Penguin, 1992), p. 276.
39. Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence*, p. 125.
40. Quoted in Suzanne Fournier, "Abused natives seek \$1 billion," *The Province* (Vancouver), 4 December 1997, p. A3.
41. See Peter O'Neil, "Natives say Ottawa's apology may sway judges in civil suits," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A1.
42. Arthur Drache, "Little basis for redress of long past injustices," *The Financial Post*, 6 September 1990, reprinted in Lubomyr Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice: The Debate Over Redress for Canada's First National Internment Operations* (Toronto: The Justinian Press, 1994), p. 84.
43. A good example is Omatsu's discussion of how internment affected her relationship with her father, *Bittersweet Passage*, p. 39.
44. A particularly hostile reaction to the residential schools campaign, "Residential schools and the electric chair," can be found in *Western Report*, 22 August 1994, p. 37.
45. John Dafoe, "The cash that heals wounds," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 August 1994, p. A6.
46. Jeffrey Simpson, "The trouble with trying to compensate groups for historical wrongs," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 14 June 1990, reprinted in Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice*, p. 78.
47. Cairns, "Whose Side is the Past On," p. 24.
48. Chinese Canadian National Council redress pamphlet, "Then, Now and Tomorrow," September 1988 (AC), 11. Quoted in Cairns, "Whose Side is the Past On?" p. 23.



49. F.J. McEvoy, "'A Symbol of Racial Discrimination': The Chinese Immigration Act and Canada's Relations with China, 1942-1947," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 3 (1982), p. 26. Also see Chinese Canadian National Council, *It is Only Fair*, p. 13. The 1923 legislation replaced the earlier \$500 head tax with a ban on Chinese immigration, mandatory registration of all persons of Chinese ancestry in Canada and severe restrictions on Chinese-Canadian mobility within Canada, *ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
50. National Congress of Italian Canadians, "A National Shame," p. 21.
51. Omatsu, *Bittersweet Passage*, p. 39.
52. Honour's obsolescence has been proclaimed by (among others) sociologist Peter Berger ("On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor," in Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* [New York: Vintage Books, 1973]), a judgement with which Charles Taylor has recently concurred ("The Politics of Recognition," in Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, eds., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994]). It is hoped that the examples and arguments contained herein are at least sufficient to register persuasively a certain qualification to these judgements.
53. Geoffrey Best, *Honour Among Men and Nations: Transformations of an Idea* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. xi.
54. Social and personal conceptions of honour are often, of course, closely related: Clinton's apparent lack of honourability may augur poorly for how the American electorate perceives his presidency. But, as Machiavelli is most famous for observing, too much personal honourability can ruin one's honour in the socio-political sense; Joe Clark's prime ministership seemed plagued by this problem.
55. Frank Henderson Stewart, *Honor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 21-23.
56. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 41.
57. Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. by Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 123, my emphasis.
58. Gim Wong, quoted in Kim Bolan, "Liberal's [sic] refusal to redress head tax 'betrays' Chinese-Canadians' trust," *The Vancouver Sun*, 15 December 1994, p. A3.
59. Quoted in Kim Bolan, "Chinese group [sic] asks UN to act on redress," *The Vancouver Sun*, 22 March 1995, p. B3.
60. Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement*, p. 80.
61. Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (New York: Touchstone, 1986), p. 7.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
63. Quoted in Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *Redress for Japanese Canadians*, p. 10.
64. Omatsu, *Bittersweet Passage*, p. 69.

65. Quoted in John Herd Thompson, "The Enemy Alien and the Canadian General Election of 1917," in *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War*, ed. Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), p. 40.
66. Quoted in "Ukraine: In the shadow of Lenin: 'Enemy aliens' remember," *Edmonton Journal*, 8 October 1988, p. F5 (AC).
67. Minister Stewart, "Statement of Reconciliation."
68. National Congress of Italian Canadians, "A National Shame," p. 21.
69. Chinese Canadian National Council, "Resolution of Chinese Canadian National Council at 1991 National Meeting" (AC).
70. See Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1990), ch. 4, "The Ideal of Impartiality and the Civic Public."
71. National Association of Japanese Canadians, *Democracy Betrayed*, p. 1.
72. Chinese Canadian National Council, *It is Only Fair*, p. 21.
73. Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association brief, "A Time for Atonement" (1988) (AC).
74. The duel must not be confused with vengeance, for its most important function was to provide a means of reconciliation and reputation-saving for persons — usually, though not always, men — involved in potentially unseemly public disputes. On the duel of honour in the antebellum American South, see Kenneth Greenberg, *Masters and Statesmen: The Political Culture of American Slavery* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), ch. 2, "The Duel as Social Drama." For Germany, where duelling was, well into the nineteenth century, employed as a potential vehicle of upward mobility by ambitious middle-class men, see Ute Frevert, *Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel*, trans. by Anthony Williams (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
75. Goffman, *Stigma*, p. 43.
76. On symbolic capital as a medium of social alchemy, see Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, p. 192.
77. "Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, on Japanese-Canadian Redress," House of Commons, 22 September 1988 (AC).
78. See Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement*, p. 121.
79. National Association of Japanese Canadians, Presentation to the House Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 9, 27 May 1986, p. 10.
80. "Post no bills," *The Ottawa Sun*, 10 November 1988, reprinted in Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice*, p. 50.
81. Drache, "Little basis for redress," in Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice*, p. 84.
82. "Hefty price tag delays settlements," *Calgary Herald*, 1 June 1993, p. A12.

83. Noting the historic existence of closed communities with highly developed modes of production but no money, Marx argues that money "originally appears, rather, in the connection of ... different communities with one another, not in the relations between the different members of a single community," Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 239. Also see Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, p. 173.
84. Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *Redress for Japanese Canadians*, p. 7.
85. "Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney on Japanese-Canadian Redress."
86. To give just two examples, the Chinese Canadian National Council has reported that between 1885 and 1923, Chinese immigrants to Canada paid \$23 million in head taxes, or over \$1 billion in current dollars, *It is Only Fair*, p. 23. The Price-Waterhouse accounting firm has estimated that the federal government confiscated \$450 million in current dollars from interned Japanese Canadians, see Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement*, p. 93.
87. Chinese Canadian National Council, quoted in "Hefty price tag delays settlements," *Calgary Herald*, 1 June 1993, p. A12.
88. Lubomyr Luciuk, "Time to correct injustice," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 October 1994, p. A7.
89. A sensitive discussion of inter-group comparisons in Canadian constitutional politics is Alan C. Cairns, "Political Science, Ethnicity, and the Canadian Constitution," in *Federalism and Political Community: Essays in Honour of Donald Smiley*, ed. David Shugarman and Reg Whitaker (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1989), pp. 120-26.
90. Patrick O'Flaherty, "Grievances from the grave," *Western Report* 34, September 1993, p. 15.
91. Heinrich Alexander von Oppen, quoted in Frevert, *Men of Honour*, p. 22.
92. Miki and Kobayashi, eds., *Redress for Japanese Canadians*, p. 7.
93. Lubomyr Luciuk, Civil Liberties Commission of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Presentation to the House Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 11, 12 August 1987, p. 49.
94. Martha Flaherty, quoted in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *The High Arctic Relocation: Summary of Supporting Information* (Vol. I), p. 77.
95. Victor Yukmun Wong, "An old wrong stays wrong," *The Vancouver Sun*, 13 January 1995, p. A15.
96. On the foundation, see Audrey Kobayashi, "The Japanese-Canadian Redress Settlement and its Implications for 'Race Relations'," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 1 (1992): 1-19.
97. Quoted in Kim Bolan, "Liberal's [sic] refusal to redress head tax 'betrays' Chinese-Canadians' trust," *The Vancouver Sun*, 15 December 1994, p. A3. On the commission and the reaction of the "third force" minorities, see Raymond Breton, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building," in *The Politics of Gender*,

- Ethnicity and Language in Canada*, ed. Alan C. Cairns and Cynthia Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 44.
98. Simpson, "The trouble with trying to compensate groups for historical wrongs," in Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice*, p. 79.
  99. Christopher Dafoe, "Lining up for compensation," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 22 October 1988, reprinted in Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice*, p. 40.
  100. Ibid.
  101. Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Honor," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 6, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 503.
  102. Omatsu, *Bittersweet Passage*, p. 9.
  103. The National Association of Japanese Canadians appeared before the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada on 31 October 1991, 4 November 1991, and 11 December 1991. The Ukrainian Civil Liberties Association and the Chinese Canadian National Council failed to appear, while the National Congress of Italian Canadians, in a joint appearance with the Canadian Jewish Congress and Hellenic Canadian Congress, spoke only for half a page, and then only in response to a committee members' question (see Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 58, 3 February 1992). The as-then unsuccessful Inuit Tapirisat of Canada and Assembly of First Nations did appear, no doubt because of the crucial aboriginal interests at stake.
  104. Omatsu, *Bittersweet Passage*, p. 67.
  105. National Association of Japanese Canadians, Presentation to the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 16, 4 November 1991, p. 53.
  106. Ibid., No. 29, 11 December 1991, p. 16.
  107. Ibid., p. 18.
  108. Ibid.
  109. Bob Bergen, "Plea for redress," *Calgary Herald*, 30 March 1997, p. A1.
  110. Art Miki, "Japanese Canadian Redress Strategy," in Provincial Residential Schools Project, *Chiefs' Special Assembly on Residential Schools*, proceedings held in Vancouver, BC, 25-26 March 1996.
  111. See Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory," *Ethics* 2 (1994): 352-81.
  112. Frevert, *Men of Honour*, p. 24.
  113. Martha Flaherty, quoted in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Summary of Supporting Information, Volume 1*, p. 77.
  114. Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence*, p. i. Also see the views of survivors canvassed in Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, *Indian Residential Schools: The Nuu-chah-nulth Experience* (Vancouver: Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, 1996), pp. 172-89.
  115. See Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence*, on "running away" as a response to "shaming and humiliation," pp. 93-97.

116. See, for example, the abuse survivors quoted in Susan Lazaruk, "77-year-old pedophile sentenced to 11 years," *Windspeaker* 2 (June 1995), p. 3.
117. Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence*, p. 55.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
119. See Peter O'Neil, "Natives say Ottawa's apology may sway judges in civil suits," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A1; Paul Barnsley, "Minister anticipates changes in department," *Windspeaker* 8 (December 1997), p. 3.
120. Darlene Johnston, "First Nations and Canadian Citizenship," in *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship*, ed. William Kaplan (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. 349.
121. See Alan C. Cairns, "Passing Judgement on Meech Lake," in *Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles, from the Charter to Meech Lake*, ed. Douglas Williams (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), pp. 226-29.
122. Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," in *Options for a New Canada*, ed. Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 65-66.
123. Erin Anderssen and Edward Greenspon, "Federal apology fails to mollify native leaders," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 8 January 1998, p. A4.
124. Quoted in "Apologize for residential schools says Indian leader," *The First Perspective* 1 (March 1997), p. 1.
125. Assembly of First Nations, *Breaking the Silence*, p. 2.
126. Phyllis Chelsea, quoted in Penny Gummerson, "Residential school inquiry releases report," *Raven's Eye*, 3 July 1997, p. 3.
127. "The money will be used to finance healing centres, native-language training and counselling programs on reserves," Erin Anderssen, "Natives to get \$200-million fund," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 16 December 1997, p. A1. For the reaction, see Erin Anderssen and Edward Greenspon, "Federal apology fails to mollify native leaders," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 8 January 1998, p. A4.
128. "Aboriginal leaders also criticized the statement for not being nearly as strong as the apology former prime minister Brian Mulroney offered to Japanese [sic] interned in Canada during the Second World War," Peter O'Neil, "Natives say Ottawa's apology may sway judges in civil suits," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A1.
129. Quoted in Paul Barnsley, "Apology, a compromise," *Windspeaker* 10 (February 1998), p. 4.
130. "Ottawa acknowledges mistakes," *ibid.*, p. 2.
131. Psychologist Roland Chrisjohn has expressed this criticism: "Nowhere in the *Statement of Reconciliation* does the government admit it was the intention of the federal policies to assimilate. [It] is an attempt to turn that page before anyone can read it," quoted in Paul Barnsley, "Gathering Strength not strong enough," *ibid.*, p. 3.

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133. Jeri Sparrow, quoted in Janet Steffenhagen, "Apology to abused natives elicits powerful emotions," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A3.
134. Charlene Belleau, quoted in *ibid.*
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136. Phil Fontaine (head of the Assembly of First Nations), quoted in Janet Steffenhagen, "Apology to abused natives elicits powerful emotions," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A3.
137. "Give us strength," *Windspeaker* 10 (February 1998), p. 6.
138. Jack Aubry, "'Atrocities' alleged in mission schools," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 August 1994, p. A1.
139. "Residential schools: A sad history of abuse," *The Vancouver Sun*, 8 January 1998, p. A3.
140. Stewart Bell, "Abuse claims soar in wake of apology," *The Vancouver Sun*, 27 January 1998, p. A1. "Some of the callers want to know how they can get their share of the \$350 million, but most are asking what counselling help is available and how to initiate criminal charges against their abusers," *ibid.*
141. See, for example, Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, ch. 6, "Social Movements and the Politics of Difference"; Paul Colomy and J. David Brown, "Goffman and Interactional Citizenship," *Sociological Perspectives* 3 (1996):371-81; Cairns, "Whose Side is the Past On?" pp. 27-28.
142. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, pp. 115-17.
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144. This is not to say that culture and identity have been irrelevant to working-class movements, only that the explosion of identity-oriented social movements in the postwar West has made the emphasis far more pronounced and explicit. On the role of culture in Canadian socialist and working-class politics, see Bryan Palmer, *Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980* (Toronto: Butterworth, 1983).
145. Thanks to one of this publication's anonymous reviewers for pointing out this important implication of the distinction between perceived and actual disrespect.
146. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 64.
147. Liberal MP Sergio Marchi, quoted in Cairns, "Political Science, Ethnicity, and the Canadian Constitution," p. 124.

148. Dr. Wesley Fujiwara, quoted in Alfred Holden, "Backlash feared by Japanese [sic] over compensation bid," *Toronto Star*, 21 January 1985, p. A2.
149. Alan Cairns, personal communication with author.
150. Pierre Trudeau, defending the 1969 White Paper, quoted in Sally Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 179.
151. "Good Guys," *The Ottawa Sun*, 23 May 1991, reprinted in Luciuk, ed., *Righting an Injustice*, p. 100.
152. Drache, "Little Basis for Redress of Long Past Injustices," reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 85.
153. Progressive Conservative MP Don Blenkarn, quoted in Tom Philip, "Haunted by history: Ukrainians, Italians and Chinese [sic] seek redress for historical ill-treatment by Ottawa," *Alberta Report*, 17 December 1990, reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 94.
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## English and French and Generation X: The Professional Values of Canadian Journalists

*David Pritchard and Florian Sauvageau*

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*En s'appuyant sur les résultats d'un sondage conduit auprès de 554 journalistes canadiens choisis au hasard, on s'attarde dans ce chapitre aux différences entre les journalistes anglophones et francophones, entre ceux travaillant pour Radio-Canada/CBC et ceux oeuvrant dans les médias privés de même qu'entre ceux appartenant à la génération X et leurs aînés. Les résultats semblent indiquer l'existence d'un «credo» journalistique largement partagé par les journalistes canadiens. La précision du traitement et la rapidité à communiquer l'information sont les principaux éléments de ce credo. Les résultats du sondage montrent que les journalistes anglophones et francophones posent un regard fort semblable sur leur profession, bien qu'aucun groupe ne démontre d'intérêt envers les médias de l'autre langue. Les résultats du sondage soulignent d'importantes différences entre les journalistes de Radio-Canada/CBC et ceux travaillant dans les médias privés, notamment quant à l'aspect commercial du journalisme. Les différences les plus importantes se trouvent entre les journalistes de la génération X et leurs aînés. Les plus jeunes tendent à être plus conservateurs, moins scolarisés, moins orientés vers les médias de prestige et accordent moins d'importance à la précision dans le traitement de l'information.*

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At the end of World War II novelist Hugh MacLennan published *Two Solitudes*,<sup>1</sup> a story about relationships between French and English Canadians whose title has become a familiar metaphor for what many Canadians believe is the country's principal cultural fault line.

At the end of the Cold War another Canadian, Douglas Coupland, published a novel that described cleavages in the world he perceived. The book, *Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture*,<sup>2</sup> not only gave a name to a generation of young adults but suggested that generations were a fundamental source of social and cultural identity.



Social scientists have confirmed the importance of generational affiliations. Pollster Michael Adams, in a 1997 book analyzing Canadian social values, went so far as to write: "Far greater divisions exist among the generations than between anglophones and francophones. If there are in fact two solitudes in Canada, they are the young and the old."<sup>3</sup>

As Canadian society changes, of course, so does Canadian journalism. The people who reported on the tumultuous (and, to many, exciting) 1960s and 1970s are leaving newsrooms, and a younger generation with a somewhat different conception of journalism is moving into positions of prominence. The passing of the torch is taking place during a time of increasing concentration of ownership in privately owned media and at the end of a decade of major budget cuts at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation/Société RadioCanada, an institution created in part to help Canada's various "solitudes" understand each other.

These changes have important social and political implications, because journalists play major political roles in democratic societies by serving as vital communication links not only between the governors and the governed but between different groups and regions. This linking function of journalism (and of the mass media generally) has special relevance to Canada, where the ties that bind citizens together are strained by the immense size of the country, its strong regional nature, and its lack of a common language and culture. More broadly, the news stories journalists choose to tell influence how a society comes to understand itself. It is not an overstatement to assert that Canadian society cannot fully be understood unless its journalism and journalists are understood.

Unfortunately, very few national surveys of journalists have been conducted in Canada, and those that do exist are limited in scope. One striking fact that emerges from a review of the existing studies is that scholars of journalism in Canada tend to speak only to members of their own linguistic community. Quite literally none of the national or regional studies of journalists published before 1998, for example, cited research on Canadian journalists that was published in the other official language — a stark example of how Canada's media scholars tend to exist in two solitudes. Such mutual ignorance not only impedes a full understanding of Canadian journalism but increases the likelihood that scholars from one linguistic community will fail to grasp the richness and complexity of journalism in the other.

In the absence of representative data about Canada's news people, it is inevitable that ideas about the country's journalists will be based largely on subjective impressions, often those of politicians or pundits who have strong (and generally critical) opinions about why the news media covered a given issue in a given way. As interesting and entertaining as the subjective impressions may be, the lack of systematic evidence makes it difficult to assess the validity of widely held notions about Canadian journalists. For example, is it

true, as many believe, that French-Canadian journalists are less devoted to factual reporting than their English-language counterparts? Or that "lefties pervade its [CBC's] producer ranks," as Diane Francis, editor of *The Financial Post*, put it?<sup>4</sup>

We designed a survey to help answer such questions with evidence. Our data came from telephone interviews with 554 randomly selected journalists,<sup>5</sup> including an oversample of 50 francophone journalists from Quebec.<sup>6</sup> The sample included journalists from all kinds of news organizations — those who work at weekly newspapers as well as those who work at metropolitan dailies, those who work at tiny radio stations as well as those who work for CBC/Radio-Canada. Journalists turned out to be willing survey respondents. Only 36 refused to take part in the survey, resulting in a response rate of 94 percent. We ended up with 51 respondents from news organizations in the Atlantic provinces, 146 (including the oversample of 50) from Quebec, 206 from Ontario, 88 from the Prairie provinces and the territories, and 63 from British Columbia.

#### OVERALL RESULTS

We estimated that Canada had about 12,000 full-time journalists at the time our survey was conducted in 1996. About half of them worked in print journalism, the other half worked in radio or television. Specifically, 30 percent of Canada's journalists work at daily newspapers, 27 percent in radio, 22 percent in television, 18 percent at weekly newspapers, and 3 percent at other kinds of news organizations (represented in our survey by wire services and news magazines). No previous survey of journalists included those at weekly newspapers and most have ignored radio journalists, two groups who together account for 45 percent of Canada's journalists.<sup>7</sup> A substantial proportion of Canada's journalists — about 19 percent, according to our survey — work for CBC/Radio-Canada.

Table 1 provides a brief description of Canada's journalists. The typical journalist is a man (72 percent) at the beginning of middle age (about 40 years old) who has a university degree (56 percent), works in a unionized newsroom (63 percent), and who in 1995 made a little more than \$49,000 from his news work. Like Canadians in general, journalists as a group perceive themselves to be politically left of centre (rating themselves at 36 on a 100-point scale where 0 means "very progressive" and 100 means "very conservative").<sup>8</sup> We also found Canadian journalists to be less cynical than many observers believe. Although most journalists say it is important to be sceptical of public officials and business, most also said that the chance to help people and the opportunity to make a community a better place were important.

**Table 1: Profile of Canadian Journalists, by Media Sector**

	<i>Dailies</i>	<i>Weeklies</i>	<i>TV</i>	<i>Radio</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Overall</i>
Age (years)	42.0	36.2	41.1	38.2	38.6	39.7
Experience (years)	17.6	11.6	17.0	14.1	13.3	15.3
Sex (% male)	77%	66%	64%	76%	70%	72%
Conservative (max=100)	31	39	36	40	33	36
News room is unionized	83%	9%	87%	53%	89%	63%
Income from media (1995)	\$57,150	\$30,150	\$59,100	\$43,950	\$55,050	\$49,050
University degree	65%	41%	61%	49%	87%	56%
N (weighted)	151	91	113	134	15	504

Men outnumber women in all media sectors, but by the biggest margin in daily newspapers (77 percent male) and radio (76 percent male) and by the smallest in television (64 percent male) and weekly newspapers (66 percent male). Daily newspaper journalists are the most politically progressive journalists, those who work in radio and at weekly newspapers the least progressive (but still perceiving themselves to be left of centre). Weekly newspaper journalists place the greatest emphasis on helping others and making the community a better place.

Salaries are highest in television (\$59,100) and daily newspapers (\$57,150) and lowest in weekly newspapers (\$30,150). Salaries are closely related to whether a newsroom is unionized. Levels of unionization in daily newspapers, television, and "other" (wire services, magazines) range from 83 to 89 percent; average salaries in those places ranged from \$55,000 to nearly \$60,000. Only about half of radio newsrooms, where salaries average \$43,950, are unionized. Fewer than 10 percent of weekly newspapers are unionized, helping to explain the very low average salaries at such places.

We also found that Canadian journalists share a set of core beliefs which can be construed as constituting a sort of unwritten "credo" of Canadian

journalism. Our survey asked journalists to rate each of 14 journalistic functions on a 1-to-4 scale, where 1 meant "not at all important," 2 meant "somewhat important," 3 meant "quite important," and 4 meant "very important." Table 2 not only shows the average scores on each function, but provides the proportion of journalists who considered each function to be very important.

**Table 2: Respondents' Views of the Importance of 14 Journalistic Functions**

	<i>Proportion who Say it Is "Very Important" to:</i>	<i>Average Score on the Item (Maximum=4)</i>
Accurately report the views of public figures	86.2%	3.82
Get information to the public quickly	79.6%	3.75
Give ordinary people a chance to express views	77.6%	3.70
Investigate government and public institutions	73.5%	3.68
Provide analysis of complex problems	68.0%	3.58
Discuss policy while it is being developed	57.2%	3.41
Focus on news of the widest possible interest	48.8%	3.24
Be sceptical of the actions of public officials	48.5%	3.20
Be sceptical of the actions of businesses	44.1%	3.12
Develop the public's cultural interests	26.0%	2.71
Increase circulation or ratings	25.3%	2.70
Provide entertainment and relaxation	21.7%	2.60
Influence public opinion	7.2%	2.04
Set the political agenda	3.5%	1.73
N (weighted)	504	504

Five functions were clearly more important than the others: (a) accurately reporting the views of public figures, (b) getting information to the public quickly, (c) letting ordinary people express their views, (d) investigating the activities of government and public institutions, and (e) providing analysis and interpretation of complex problems. These are the concepts that two-thirds or more of Canadian journalists believe to be very important. Heading the list is accurate reporting. If there is a single unshakable article of faith among Canadian journalists it is accuracy.

## TWO CULTURES, TWO JOURNALISMS?

The conventional wisdom in much of Canada is that French-language journalists are more likely than their English-speaking *confrères* to allow their personal opinions to guide the content of news stories. A more nuanced variation on this theme comes from Lysiane Gagnon, well-known columnist at *La Presse* in Montreal. Gagnon has written that the French-Canadian press inherited a style and direction from France's journals of opinion, resulting in a "predominance of analysis, as opposed to simple reporting of events" and "the tendency to treat matters conceptually rather than in terms of people and events."<sup>9</sup>

In an important university textbook, political scientist Arthur Siegel provides a similar view. He notes that "the newspaper system in Quebec today is, by and large, North American in style, with an emphasis on objective journalism." Nevertheless, Siegel also highlights presumed differences between French- and English-language newspapers: "Whether under the surface or quite openly, it [the French-language press] retains its intense political involvement. The press of opinions may have disappeared, but the opinions remain; the great journalists of the French-language press are more editorialists than reporters, in a continuation of the need to 'form' rather than 'inform.'"<sup>10</sup> In 1981, the Royal Commission on Newspapers stated as fact that "French-language journalists — like the priest or politician — saw themselves as invested with a certain nationalist mission."<sup>11</sup>

Differences in style between anglophone and francophone journalists might be nothing but a curiosity except for the emergence of a powerful independence movement in Quebec in the 1970s. By the time the Parti Québécois (PQ) won power in the 1976 elections, it was no secret that many francophone journalists in the province supported independence.<sup>12</sup> Many observers came to believe that the personal preferences of journalists explain the well-documented fact that anglophone and francophone news organizations cover issues relating to the Parti Québécois (and constitutional matters in general) quite differently.

Since the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, which resulted in a razor-thin victory for the federalists, charges and countercharges about biased reporting

have become more heated. In 1997, for example, influential *Globe and Mail* columnist Jeffrey Simpson wrote that *Le Devoir*, where he had been a regular contributor, had become "the house organ for the Parti Québécois."<sup>13</sup> The reaction by *Le Devoir* publisher Lise Bissonnette was bitter in tone: "The only reasonable explanation for this sudden transition from friendship to slander is a decision to consider us as political adversaries, and to use any means to win."<sup>14</sup>

Although many of the accusations of biased reporting about constitutional issues have focused on the French-language media, in the late 1990s it may be the English-language media that have become more opinionated. Starting about 1995 Gérald Leblanc, a reporter who covers English Canada for *La Presse*, began to notice a qualitative change in the treatment Quebec received in the English-Canadian media. Columnists and editorial writers increasingly express open animosity toward Quebec, he writes, and this "militant antagonism sometimes finds its way into what are supposed to be news stories."<sup>15</sup> Leblanc says "pamphleteering" replaces journalism in the English-Canadian media "when the subject is one that can hurt the separatists." *Toronto Star* journalist Robert McKenzie, who has covered Quebec politics for more than 30 years, also has noted what he called "un durcissement" — a harder line about Quebec — in the anglophone media in recent years.<sup>16</sup> It seems that most English-language journalists are convinced that their francophone colleagues are all separatists<sup>17</sup> while most French-language journalists have been convinced for a long time that their anglophone colleagues are blinded by their fear of Canada breaking up.<sup>18</sup> Can it be that the presumed nationalist mission of francophone journalists has found its counterpart in the presumed patriotic mission of anglophone journalists to save Canada?

The future of Canada and Quebec is such an emotional issue that some journalists may shed the impartiality that characterizes their work on other topics when they write about it. Nonetheless, our findings contradict certain long-lived stereotypes that exaggerate the differences between how journalism is practised in English-language and French-language news organizations in Canada.<sup>19</sup> As Table 3 shows, the five functions that anglophone journalists consider most important are the same five that francophone journalists consider most important.

Accuracy is the most important function of journalism for both anglophones and francophones. Contrary to the stereotype of opinionated French journalism, francophone journalists are significantly more likely than anglophones to consider accuracy very important ( $p < .01$ ).<sup>20</sup> Similarly, while Gagnon's observation that the French-language press emphasizes analysis more than the English-language press may have been true when she wrote it in 1981, the evidence from our survey suggests that in the late 1990s journalists from both language groups are equally interested in analysis. The differences in anglophones' and francophones' responses to the question about the importance

**Table 3: English- and French-Language Respondents' Views of 14 Journalistic Functions**

	Proportion who Say it Is "Very Important" to:		Average Score on the Item (Maximum=4)	
	English	French	English	French
Accurately report the views of public figures	84.5%	93.2%	3.79	3.93 <sup>2</sup>
Get information to the public quickly	81.0%	73.6%	3.76	3.73
Give ordinary people a chance to express views	78.8%	72.3%	3.70	3.70
Investigate government and public institutions	75.1%	66.9%	3.69	3.62
Provide analysis of complex problems	67.5%	69.6%	3.56	3.67
Discuss policy while it is being developed	59.9%	45.3%	3.43	3.33 <sup>1</sup>
Focus on news of the widest possible interest	46.1%	60.8%	3.17	3.53 <sup>4</sup>
Be sceptical of the actions of public officials	45.8%	59.9%	3.13	3.52 <sup>4</sup>
Be sceptical of the actions of businesses	40.6%	59.2%	3.03	3.50 <sup>4</sup>
Develop the public's cultural interests	21.7%	43.9%	2.57	3.30 <sup>4</sup>
Increase circulation or ratings	26.3%	21.1%	2.67	2.83 <sup>1</sup>
Provide entertainment and relaxation	22.9%	16.2%	2.58	2.68
Influence public opinion	7.0%	8.2%	1.96	2.35 <sup>4</sup>
Set the political agenda	2.5%	7.4%	1.59	2.33 <sup>4</sup>
N	406	148	406	148

Notes: <sup>1</sup>p < .05, <sup>2</sup>p < .01, <sup>3</sup>p < .001, <sup>4</sup>p < .0001

of providing analysis and interpretation of complex problems are small and insignificant.

Although anglophones and francophones agree on the most important functions of journalism, the survey did reveal differences with respect to functions of journalism respondents considered less important. Francophones, for example, rate developing the cultural and intellectual interests of the public as a much more important function of journalism than do anglophones ( $p < .0001$ ). They also are much more sceptical than their English-media counterparts, both of public officials and of businesses ( $p < .0001$  for both items).

In addition, francophone journalists are more likely than their anglophone counterparts to think that it is important to influence public opinion and to set the political agenda ( $p < .0001$  for both items). There is evidence, in other words, that francophone journalists are more likely than anglophone journalists to see political action as a valid journalistic function. It would be a mistake, however, to make too much of this finding. Both for francophones and for anglophones, influencing public opinion and setting the political agenda were by far the least important functions of journalism.

For all practical purposes, then, the results of our study contradict the image of opinionated and politically activist journalism traditionally associated with francophones and increasingly with anglophones. It is likely, we believe, that the images of journalistic activism are based on flawed assumptions about the reasons why major French-language media cover national issues differently than do the major English-language media. Many politicians and pundits assume that differences in coverage are caused by journalists slanting the news to match their personal opinions or by major differences between anglophones and francophones about fundamental conceptions of the roles journalism should play in society. We found no evidence to support either assumption.

That said, it is not surprising that anglophone and francophone media do not cover subjects relating to federalism in the same way. What is important to understand is that the differences result not from any lack of "objectivity,"<sup>21</sup> but rather from the fact that English- and French-language news organizations must speak to their respective communities, which have markedly different orientations toward the Canadian federation. As Siegel notes:

Since the 1960s, nearly every provincial election in Quebec has had a referendum element, a matter of particular interest for English Canadians. Quebecers, for their part, want coverage of the campaigning politicians' views on policies that may be of little interest outside the province. Thus, the differences in coverage across linguistic lines can be attributed in part to the specific interests of different audiences.<sup>22</sup>

Other observers suggest that the legitimacy granted to the PQ by francophone journalists flows from their near-unanimous belief that it is important to faithfully report the actions of important public officials — such as major figures



in the Parti Québécois, which has held the reins of the Quebec government for more than half of the past 25 years — to a population that is split more or less evenly in its views on possible Quebec independence.<sup>23</sup> Whatever the causes of the differences in coverage, it is clear that the conditions which create a context for respectful coverage of the independence option in Quebec are not present in English Canada, where, needless to say, the PQ does not have much support.

To a great extent, francophone and anglophone journalists work in two separate worlds. Content analyses of news, especially news dealing with constitutional issues, demonstrate this phenomenon, and our study found evidence of it as well. Although most francophone journalists (85 percent) say they speak English, relatively few read English-Canadian newspapers: 28 percent read *The Globe and Mail*, 13 percent *The Gazette* of Montreal. The reverse is even worse; less than 5 percent of anglophone journalists read a francophone newspaper. Only 14 percent of English-Canadian journalists say they speak French. Most anglophone journalists would have a very hard time gaining first-hand information about the francophone culture in Quebec.

Our survey contained a question about which magazines journalists regularly read. The responses suggested that Canadian journalists are interested most by their own society (English Canadian or French Canadian), somewhat by US society, and least by the Canadian culture to which they do not belong. The magazines most likely to be read by Canadian journalists are Canadian: A clear majority of francophone journalists (62 percent) read *L'Actualité*, and a near majority (49 percent) of anglophone journalists read *Maclean's*. Next in popularity for both language groups are US news weeklies. *Time* is read by 24 percent of francophones and 20 percent of anglophones; *Newsweek* is read by 10 percent of francophones and 14 percent of anglophones. Only 11 percent of francophone journalists read *Maclean's*, the most important news magazine in English Canada. Only 2 percent of anglophone journalists read *L'Actualité*, the most important news magazine in French Canada.

Canadian journalists share a common conception of their profession, one that places them squarely in the mainstream of North American journalism. But anglophone and francophone journalists practise their profession in separate worlds, as their media consumption habits show. Neither group pays much attention to what happens in the other's culture. In this sense, the two solitudes are alive and well.

#### JOURNALISM AT CBC/RADIO-CANADA

The government's creation of CBC/Radio-Canada in the 1930s was part of its efforts to build a nation and then to hold it together. As Walter Stewart noted: "History, custom and necessity have led us to recognize that, with so few

people and so much geography, we had to use government agencies as major instruments of national development."<sup>24</sup> It is to promote national development that CBC/Radio-Canada is legally required to "reflect Canada and its regions to national and regional audiences" and to "contribute to shared national consciousness and identity."<sup>25</sup> With the weakening of the Canadian Press as a national news agency in recent years, the public broadcaster's multiple networks — which include television news, radio news, and around-the-clock cable news, all in both English and French — stand alone as sources of comprehensive, nationwide news for Canadians anywhere in the country.

CBC/Radio-Canada was modeled on the fabled British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Like the BBC, it has developed an international reputation for high-quality journalism. Even judges, not necessarily known for being admirers of the media, have noted the importance of CBC/Radio-Canada. In an opinion about a libel case, for example, the British Columbia Supreme Court noted:

In terms of prestige, power and influence ... [CBC/Radio-Canada] is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the sleazy scandal sheet. Created and maintained by Parliament to inform the Canadian public, its news services are accorded great respect throughout Canada. They have a well-merited reputation for reliability.<sup>26</sup>

Over the years, CBC/Radio-Canada has acquired what journalist George Bain has called "the mystique of leadership," especially among government officials and people in the media.<sup>27</sup> Bain was certainly right about the public broadcaster's reputation in media circles. More than half of the anglophone journalists in our survey who identified a news organization as Canada's best chose either CBC (54 percent) or Radio-Canada (1 percent) as Canada's best news organization. The proportion of francophone journalists choosing the public broadcaster approached those levels, with 41 percent identifying Radio-Canada and 5 percent identifying CBC as the best news organization. No other news organization, print or broadcast, came close to CBC/Radio-Canada's status among journalists.

In addition, CBC/Radio-Canada and its 24-hour-a-day cable networks, *Newsworld* in English and RDI in French, are by far journalists' preferred sources for television news. Among anglophone journalists, 57 percent say they get most of their television news from the CBC, 8 percent from *Newsworld*, and 1 percent from Radio-Canada. Among francophones, the proportions are even higher, with 69 percent getting most of their television news from Radio-Canada, 14 percent from RDI, and 1 percent each from CBC and *Newsworld*. Overall, one CBC/Radio-Canada service or another is the principal source of television news for 69 percent of Canadian journalists who watch television news (a handful do not watch television news, and were excluded from these calculations).<sup>28</sup>

CBC/Radio-Canada's reputation for high-quality journalism notwithstanding, the fact that it is financed principally by the Canadian government coupled with the fact that its parliamentary mandate is somewhat ambiguous has led some politicians to make questionable interpretations of its mission, especially in the context of news coverage of Quebec. No news organization has been criticized as often as Radio-Canada for alleged pro-separatist bias. One Cabinet minister said publicly that he believed that Radio-Canada journalists should be unequivocally pro-Canada.<sup>29</sup> After all, CBC/Radio-Canada was created to help build a country, not to help tear it apart. Or so the argument goes.

And what an argument it can be, with important federalist public figures blaming Radio-Canada for the victory of the Parti Québécois in the 1976 elections. The charges that Radio-Canada's news coverage was slanted in favour of the PQ were investigated by the CRTC and ruled to be unfounded,<sup>30</sup> but the suspicions remained. They resurfaced at the time of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien suggested that Radio-Canada's coverage was failing to promote national unity. Chrétien may have forgotten that the *Broadcasting Act* of 1968, which required the CBC to "contribute to the development of national unity"<sup>31</sup> was replaced in 1991 by a new *Broadcasting Act* that has the less politically charged mandate to "contribute to shared national consciousness and identity."<sup>32</sup> Federalists are not the only critics of Radio-Canada, however. Some supporters of Quebec independence cannot see a positive Radio-Canada report from English Canada without perceiving propaganda in favour of federalism or national unity.

Another illustration of the tension between CBC/Radio-Canada and politicians was Brian Mulroney's 1991 appointment of University of Toronto professor John Crispo to the Corporation's board of directors. Just before being appointed, Crispo had harshly criticized news and public affairs programming on the CBC, saying that it was a "lousy, left-wing, liberal-NDP-pinko network."<sup>33</sup> The presumed domination of leftists at CBC/Radio-Canada's English-language services is as frequent a criticism as is the presumed domination of separatists at the French-language services. Crispo, Diane Francis, the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute and others regularly denounce what they consider to be the pro-labour, pro-NDP, anti-free trade and anti-United States bias of CBC coverage. Crispo even called the CBC "Radio Iraq" for its coverage of the Gulf War.<sup>34</sup>

Although our survey shows that CBC journalists are somewhat more left of centre than other Canadian journalists, they are far from the agitprop activists described by Crispo and others. The English-language journalists for the CBC averaged a score of 31 on the 100-point scale of conservatism, while English-language journalists for private media rated themselves at 37 — still to the left of centre, but not as far left as the CBC journalists (the difference between CBC and private media journalists in English-language news

**Table 4: Private-Media and CBC/Radio-Canada Journalists' Views of 14 Journalistic Functions**

	Proportion who Say it Is "Very Important" to:		Average Score on the Item (Maximum=4)	
	Private	CBC/R-C	Private	CBC/R-C
Accurately report the views of public figures	85.3%	90.2%	3.80	3.90
Get information to the public quickly	80.8%	74.4%	3.77	3.68
Give ordinary people a chance to express views	77.7%	76.8%	3.70	3.70
Investigate government and public institutions	70.0%	89.1%	3.63	3.89 <sup>3</sup>
Provide analysis of complex problems	64.0%	85.9%	3.52	3.84 <sup>4</sup>
Discuss policy while it is being developed	53.4%	73.7%	3.36	3.65 <sup>3</sup>
Focus on news of the widest possible interest	51.5%	36.8%	3.29	3.00 <sup>2</sup>
Be sceptical of the actions of public officials	46.3%	57.9%	3.17	3.33
Be sceptical of the actions of businesses	40.9%	58.2%	3.07	3.32 <sup>2</sup>
Develop the public's cultural interests	24.3%	33.3%	2.69	2.83
Increase circulation or ratings	28.8%	9.9%	2.79	2.28 <sup>4</sup>
Provide entertainment and relaxation	24.3%	10.3%	2.71	2.11 <sup>4</sup>
Influence public opinion	6.5%	10.3%	2.03	2.09
Set the political agenda	2.5%	8.0%	1.71	1.80
N (weighted)	410	94	410	94

Notes: <sup>1</sup>p < .05, <sup>2</sup>p < .01, <sup>3</sup>p < .001, <sup>4</sup>p < .0001

organizations was significant at  $p < .05$ ). A similar, though statistically non-significant, tendency was found among francophone journalists. Those who work for Radio-Canada averaged 32 on the conservatism scale, those who work for private media 35. There is nothing unique about the left-of-centre views of CBC/Radio-Canada journalists, however. Journalists who work at daily newspapers are even a shade farther to the left, according to our survey.

In addition to their somewhat different political orientations, news people at CBC/Radio-Canada are different in other ways. CBC/Radio-Canada journalists tend to be older. They are more likely to be female, and much more likely to have a university degree. Further, they are quite a bit higher paid than their private-media counterparts. These tendencies hold both for anglophones and for francophones.

Despite such differences, the ideas that form what we have called the "credo" of Canadian journalism are widely shared, at CBC/Radio-Canada as well as in the private sector. Although CBC/Radio-Canada journalists prioritize their functions somewhat differently than do private-media journalists, both groups have the same five functions at the top of their list, as Table 4 shows.

Not surprisingly, private-media journalists are more concerned than are CBC/Radio-Canada journalists with the commercial aspects of journalism. Private-media journalists place significantly higher importance on focusing on news of interest to the widest possible audience ( $p < .01$ ), on increasing audience size ( $p < .0001$ ), and on providing entertainment and relaxation ( $p < .0001$ ). CBC/Radio-Canada journalists, in turn, focus more than do the private-media journalists on investigative reporting ( $p < .001$ ), on analysis and interpretation ( $p < .0001$ ), and on discussing public policy while it is still being developed ( $p < .01$ ). CBC/Radio-Canada journalists also are more sceptical of business than are journalists in the private media ( $p < .01$ ). Neither group expresses much interest in influencing public opinion or in setting the political agenda, two functions that would be expected to be associated with activist journalism.

## GENERATION X JOURNALISTS

The story we have told to this point suggests that Canadian journalists, regardless of language and regardless of whether they work for CBC/Radio-Canada, to a great extent share a single conception of journalism that highlights functions which are central to journalism's role in democratic societies — accurate reporting, rapid transmission of news, letting ordinary people express their views, investigative reporting, and analysis and interpretation of the news. What is more, Canadian journalists overwhelmingly get their news from and admire the media organizations that embody that kind of journalism, especially CBC/Radio-Canada.

The above statements are true of journalists over 30 years old. Younger journalists, however, have somewhat different views. To explore those differences we divided our sample of journalists into three generations: Generation X, defined as journalists 30 years old and younger; Baby-Boomers, defined as everyone over 30 but less than 50; and Elders, everyone 50 years or older.<sup>35</sup> Initial analyses showed very little difference between Baby-Boomer and Elder journalists, so we collapsed those two categories into one. Although Gen-Xers make up only about 20 percent of the Canadian journalistic workforce, understanding them is important because their professional values offer a hint at the future of Canadian journalism.

Our study shows Gen-X journalists to be different in several ways from their colleagues over 30 years old. The younger journalists are slightly more conservative (averaging 39 on the conservatism scale compared to 35 for their elders), less likely to have a bachelor's degree (45 percent of Gen-Xers have such a degree compared to 59 percent of journalists over 30), more likely to be female (45 percent to 24 percent), and much less likely to work in a unionized newsroom (32 percent to 71 percent). In 1995 they earned, on average, about half of what journalists over 30 earned (\$27,150 to \$54,600).

Gen-Xers are less oriented to the traditional media elite than are their elders. They are less likely to get their television news from CBC/Radio-Canada and less likely to read prestige newspapers, phenomena especially pronounced among young francophone journalists.<sup>36</sup> Anglophone Gen-Xers are almost as likely as older English-language journalists to say that they get most of their television news from one of the CBC services (58 percent to 63 percent). A majority of francophone Gen-Xers, however, prefer private networks (mostly TVA) as their principal source of television news. Only 37 percent say they get most of their television news from Radio-Canada, compared to 88 percent of their elders.

Less than a third of young anglophone journalists (31 percent) read *The Globe and Mail*, Canada's only national newspaper at the time of our study, compared to 54 percent of the English-language journalists over 30. Among the newspapers widely available throughout Quebec, francophone Gen-Xers are less likely than their elders to read *La Presse* (58 percent to 81 percent) and *Le Devoir* (11 percent to 40 percent), and quite a bit more likely to read the tabloid *Le Journal de Montréal* or its Quebec City cousin, *Le Journal de Québec* (47 percent to 22 percent). Journalists' assessments of quality do not necessarily match their patterns of media consumption. Although younger journalists are less likely to watch CBC/Radio-Canada for news, roughly equal proportions of young and old journalists in both linguistic communities rate CBC/Radio-Canada as Canada's best news organization.

The most striking difference between Generation X and the older journalists is that a substantial proportion of the younger journalists do not rate

accurate reporting of the views of public figures as a very important journalistic function, as Table 5 shows. Gen-X journalists were almost three times as likely as their elders to rate accurate reporting in a category other than "very important," a difference that was highly significant ( $p < .0001$ ). This generational gap in the importance of accuracy appears to be an anglophone phenomenon; only about two-thirds of anglophone Gen-X journalists (69 percent) think accuracy is "very important," compared to 88 percent of their elders. Among francophone journalists, 90 percent of the Gen-Xers and 94 percent of the others say accuracy is very important, a difference that is not statistically significant. Gen-X journalists also place less importance than their elders on virtually all kinds of reporting related to government. As Table 5 shows, not only are the younger journalists less interested in accurately reporting the views of public figures, but they place less importance on investigative reporting ( $p < .01$ ), on discussing public policy while it is under consideration ( $p < .001$ ), and on being sceptical of public officials ( $p < .01$ ).

There are indications that Gen-X journalists are not atypical of their generation, one that distrusts absolutes, sees everything as relative, and feels less connected to traditional institutions such as the news media and government. In addition, there is evidence that young people in general tend to reject conventional definitions of news and treat the hallowed distinction between information and entertainment as artificial and irrelevant.<sup>37</sup> Many Gen-Xers focus more on style than on substance; for them, style is substance. "Why do so many young people watch MTV and not the news?" a Gen-X keynote speaker asked a broadcast journalism conference in 1996. The answer, according to the speaker: "Because they would rather watch that style of picture design." His recommendation to the broadcast news executives? "TV news needs to be design driven."<sup>38</sup>

There is no denying the importance of visual design in today's world, especially among the young. Design-driven journalism will have different strengths and weaknesses than content-based journalism that many veteran news people hold dear, but it will not necessarily be "worse" journalism. It will simply be different journalism, managed by journalists who may have somewhat different priorities.

Our finding that 28 percent of Gen-X journalists do not consider it to be very important to accurately report the views of public figures will be seen as a portent of doom by supporters of classical "objective" journalism. Some might go so far as to see the lower level of interest in accurate reporting among younger journalists as a threat to democracy, which after all relies upon a citizenry accurately informed about public affairs. However, the fact that one of the most important functions of journalism for Gen-X news people is giving ordinary people a chance to express their views is somewhat reassuring. Certainly the desire to give ordinary people the chance to express their views

**Table 5: Generation X and Older Respondents' Views of 14 Journalistic Functions**

	Proportion who Say it Is "Very Important" to:		Average Score on the Item (Maximum=4)	
	Younger	Older	Younger	Older
Accurately report the views of public figures	71.3%	89.7%	3.59	3.87 <sup>4</sup>
Get information to the public quickly	79.5%	79.7%	3.75	3.75
Give ordinary people a chance to express views	79.2%	77.2%	3.77	3.68
Investigate government and public institutions	61.4%	76.4%	3.53	3.72 <sup>2</sup>
Provide analysis of complex problems	64.4%	68.9%	3.52	3.59
Discuss policy while it is being developed	45.4%	59.9%	3.19	3.46 <sup>2</sup>
Focus on news of the widest possible interest	48.0%	49.0%	3.28	3.23
Be sceptical of the actions of public officials	35.9%	51.4%	2.96	3.26 <sup>2</sup>
Be sceptical of the actions of businesses	31.4%	47.1%	2.88	3.17 <sup>2</sup>
Develop the public's cultural interests	17.3%	28.0%	2.48	2.77 <sup>1</sup>
Increase circulation or ratings	22.0%	26.1%	2.59	2.72
Provide entertainment and relaxation	25.5%	20.8%	2.65	2.59
Influence public opinion	3.2%	8.2%	1.66	2.13 <sup>4</sup>
Set the political agenda	0.7%	4.2%	1.63	1.75
N (weighted)	95	409	95	409

Notes: <sup>1</sup>p < .05, <sup>2</sup>p < .01, <sup>3</sup>p < .001, <sup>4</sup>p < .0001



is a democratic impulse, perhaps even more so than the desire to parrot the views of public figures. One thing is certain: Gen-X journalists are less interested than their elders in imposing anything on their audiences. They place much less importance, for example, on developing the cultural and intellectual interests of the public ( $p < .05$ ) and on influencing public opinion ( $p < .0001$ ).

## DISCUSSION

We conducted this survey in large part to gather representative evidence that would enable us to assess the validity of some commonly held assumptions about Canadian journalists. Our finding that the similarities between anglophone and francophone journalists are greater than the differences will surprise those who have accepted the old stereotype that English-Canadian journalism is more factual and French-Canadian journalism more opinionated. The survey uncovered no evidence to support the stereotype. Journalists from both language groups hold very similar conceptions about the relative importance of various journalistic functions. Accurate reporting is at the top of the list for anglophones and francophones alike; influencing public opinion and setting the political agenda are at the bottom for both groups.<sup>39</sup> What is interesting about anglophone and francophone journalists was the extent to which they are uninterested in each other's media and culture. In this respect, Canadian journalists reflect their news organizations. With the exception of CBC/Radio-Canada and a very few other news organizations, neither English-language nor French-language media show much interest in regular in-depth coverage of the other linguistic community.

We also examined differences between CBC/Radio-Canada journalists and journalists who work in private news organizations. We did find some evidence to support the assertion often made by conservative pundits that CBC/Radio-Canada journalists (especially those at the CBC) are more left of centre than journalists in the private sector, though daily newspaper journalists are even a bit more left than their counterparts at the public broadcaster. However, just as we found no evidence that francophone journalists insert their opinions into news stories, we found no evidence that CBC/Radio-Canada news people are more likely than their private-media counterparts to view journalism as a tool of political activism. A huge majority of CBC/Radio-Canada journalists and private-media journalists alike say that accurate reporting is very important. And both sets of journalists rank influencing public opinion and setting the political agenda as the least important functions of the 14 functions of journalism explored in the survey.

There is no reason to believe, in other words, that a federalist journalist cannot write a fair and accurate news story about a Parti Québécois convention, or that a journalist who regularly votes for NDP candidates cannot write

a fair and accurate story about the Reform Party's policy proposals. These findings are consistent with research that has demonstrated that the content of news stories is determined principally by organizational needs, not individual journalists' personal opinions about the topics of the news stories.<sup>40</sup>

It is true that journalists whose stock in trade is flamboyant opinions are becoming increasingly visible in Canada. The mission of such journalists is to win the loyalty of their audience members by "entertaining, amusing, outrageous, goading,"<sup>41</sup> even if their inflammatory comments sometimes impede rather than enhance public understanding of issues in the news. Such journalists often are invited to appear on radio and television precisely because they have clearly identifiable biases that they express without subtlety. Their visibility and vociferousness can give the misleading impression that journalists in general allow their personal biases to guide their decisions about how to report the news. By focusing on a representative sample of journalists, not just the loud minority of journalists who are in the business of selling their opinions, we believe our study paints a more valid picture of the reality of Canadian journalists.

The vast majority of Canadian journalists say that accurately reporting the views of public figures is very important; indeed, all groups subscribe to what we have called the credo of Canadian journalism. That said, Generation X journalists — and especially English-language Gen-Xers — are significantly less likely than their elders to consider accurate reporting to be very important. In addition, they place less importance than do their elders on several of the traditional tenets of public affairs reporting, including investigative reporting, discussing public policy while it is being developed, and being sceptical of public officials and businesses.<sup>42</sup>

Will Gen-X journalists remain relatively uninterested in traditional public affairs journalism as they age and advance in their careers, or will age and experience make them more like their elders? It is a question that a single survey cannot answer. Research on US journalists suggests that professional values associated with an individual's generation are somewhat resistant to change as the individual moves through familiar cycles of life — a steady job, marriage, home ownership, a family.<sup>43</sup> In contrast, professional values not directly tied to one's generational membership do evolve as individuals gain experience and responsibility in life as well as in journalism. The key question, then, is whether today's Gen-X journalists will, as a group, ascribe more importance to the traditional ideals of public affairs reporting as they grow older, or whether their hesitancy to make an unambiguous commitment to those ideals is a hallmark of their generation. Future research should track the professional values of Gen-X journalists as they age and gain experience.

If today's Gen-X journalists continue to place less importance on accurately reporting the views of public figures — indeed, if they share the views of some young US journalists that news is an "obsolete artifact"<sup>44</sup> — it is

valid to ask whether the public's trust in news about politics and government, already challenged by spin doctors and entertainment values, will erode even more. Roger Bird recently wrote in a book with the ominous title *The End of News* that the important political role of the news media in democratic societies depends on the public's trust in the accuracy of what the news media report: "If the news is not believed to be 'the truth,' even in a naive sense, by a majority of the public, it is drained of its importance."<sup>45</sup>

A related question is whether it makes sense to talk about "the news" in an increasingly fragmented political, social, and media environment. As Adams wrote in *Sex in the Snow*: "More and more, Canadians refuse to be constrained by the specifics of their demographics; instead, they are determined to be the authors of their own identities and destinies."<sup>46</sup> They are not just French Canadians or English Canadians or even Gen-Xers or Baby-Boomers. Instead, there are countless solitudes constructed from individual Canadians' values. New modes of communication — electronic and print "zines," the interactive and information-rich Internet, ever more specialized cable channels — make it possible to "narrowcast" to each of the "values tribes," as Adams calls them. In fact, it is possible for individuals to choose only the news and information they want from the wealth of sources available to them.

The *Broadcasting Act* not only requires CBC/Radio-Canada to "contribute to shared national consciousness and identity"<sup>47</sup> but requires all radio and television to be "a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement of national identity."<sup>48</sup> Many major newspapers also cloak themselves with a public service mission linked to democracy. However, in a society increasingly characterized by the pursuit of individual interests it is valid to ask whether the concepts "public service" and "national identity," when applied to the media, have the same meanings they had in a world where most of the nation gathered at 10 p.m. every evening to watch news provided by CBC/Radio-Canada. Can Canada even be considered to have a "public" if fewer and fewer of its citizens share common knowledge of public issues?

Such questions, which essentially are questions about the meaning of citizenship, have no clear answers at this point. Nor is there any clear consensus about what, if anything, journalists can do or should do to foster citizenship and national identity. Canadian journalism and democracy, like those of many other industrialized nations, are entering a period of uncertainty.

## NOTES

1. Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes* (Toronto: Collins, 1945).
2. Douglas Coupland, *Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

3. Michael Adams, *Sex in the Snow: Canadian Social Values at the End of the Millennium* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 30-31.
4. Diane Francis, "Analysis Reveals CBC's Regional and Philosophical Biases," *The Financial Post*, 25 February 1997, p. 21.
5. We defined journalists as salaried full-time editorial personnel (reporters, writers, correspondents, anchors, columnists, news directors, and editors) responsible for the information content of daily and weekly newspapers, more-than-monthly news magazines, wire services, broadcast networks, and individual radio and television stations. Photographers and camera operators were excluded because their function is more to illustrate news than to decide what will be news. For a complete description of the survey, see David Pritchard and Florian Sauvageau, "The Journalists and Journalisms of Canada," in *The Global Journalist: News People Around the World*, ed. David H. Weaver (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1998), pp. 373-93.
6. We oversampled francophone journalists from Quebec so that we would have a sufficient number for statistical analyses of that group. In analyses of anglophone and francophone journalists, we use a weighting factor of 0.64 for the francophone journalists from Quebec.
7. One scholar, George Pollard, has studied Canadian radio journalists in some depth. See citations of his work in Pritchard and Sauvageau, "The Journalists and Journalisms of Canada," p. 390.
8. A survey of the Canadian adult population a year before our survey showed that 30.6 percent of Canadians consider themselves to be "liberal" or "extremely liberal," 51.8 percent consider themselves to be "moderate," and 17.6 percent consider themselves to be "conservative" or "extremely conservative." Figures compiled from data in Reginald W. Bibby, *The Bibby Report: Social Trends Canadian Style* (Toronto: Stoddard Publishing, 1995), p. 118.
9. Lysiane Gagnon, "Journalists and Ideologies in Quebec," in *The Journalists, Research Studies on the Newspaper Industry*, vol. 2, Royal Commission on Newspapers (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981), p. 28.
10. Arthur Siegel, *Politics and the Media in Canada*, 2d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1996), p. 219.
11. Royal Commission on Newspapers (Kent Commission), *Report* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981), p. 31.
12. Pierre Godin, "Qui vous informe," *L'Actualité*, May 1979, pp. 31-40.
13. Jeffrey Simpson, "Léon Dion: A Man who Kept Searching for a New Canada," *The Globe and Mail*, 21 August 1997, p. A-18.
14. Lise Bissonnette, "La semence de la colère," *Le Devoir*, 27 August 1997, p. A-6.
15. Gérald Leblanc, "The English Canada Media and Quebec," *Inroads* 7 (1998): 23-30.
16. Quoted in Gérard Roy, "De l'autocensure et un plus grand contrôle des patrons," *Le 30*, October 1995, p. 7.

17. *Globe and Mail* journalist Graham Fraser, quoted in Vincent Marissal, "Les deux solitudes," *Le 30*, October 1997, p. 11.
18. Marissal, "Les deux solitudes," pp. 11-12. See also Michel Cormier, "The amazing double standard," *Media* 2, 4 (1995): 16-17; and Fred Langan, "Charges of media bias run two ways as Quebec votes today on separation," *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 October 1995, p. 1.
19. This is not to suggest that there are no differences between anglophone and francophone news media. A journalist at *La Presse* recently wrote that English-language newspapers produce better stories than French-language papers because editors at the former are more heavily involved in working with reporters on stories. Marie-Claude Lortie, "Que le meilleur gagne!" *Le 30*, June 1998, p. 18.
20. The terms "significant" or "meaningful," when applied to the quantitative results of this survey, refer to differences that are statistically significant at the traditional  $p < .05$  level. Levels of statistical significance are two-tailed probabilities from the Mann-Whitney U test (also known as the Wilcoxon test). See Alan Agresti and Barbara Finlay Agresti, *Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences* (San Francisco: Dellen, 1979), pp. 175-79.
21. We use the word "objectivity" with caution, for while we favour detachment and impartiality in reporting we share many of the reservations others have expressed about the ideological biases of so-called "objective" journalism. Hackett and Zhao, for example, note that the regime of journalistic objectivity "systematically produces partial representation of the world, skewed towards dominant institutions and values." Robert A. Hackett and Yuezhi Zhao, *Sustaining Democracy? Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1998), p. 161.
22. Siegel, *Politics and the Media in Canada*, p. 222.
23. This view is widely held by members of the Quebec journalistic community, be they federalists or supporters of Quebec independence. There have been some attempts to make Canadians outside Quebec understand. See, for example, the text of a speech to the Empire Club of Toronto and the Canadian Club of Toronto by Roger D. Landry, the staunchly federalist publisher of *La Presse*. The text of the speech, "Media and the Unity Issue," was published in *The Media Series: A Special Collection of Luncheon Addresses* (Toronto: Canadian Journalism Foundation, 1997).
24. Walter Stewart, "The Seven Myths of Journalism," in *The Forty-Ninth and Other Parallels*, ed. David Staines (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 103.
25. *Broadcasting Act*, 1991, art. 3 (1) (m) (ii) and (vi).
26. *Vogel v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1982] 3 W.W.R. 97 (B.C.S.C.) at 178.
27. George Bain, *Gotcha: How the Media Distort the News* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1994), p. xi.
28. It is interesting to note that journalists differ from the Canadian public in their preferred sources for television news. In English Canada at the time of our sur-

vey, *CTV News* was drawing ratings about 50 percent higher than CBC's *The National*. In Quebec, the rating of the TVA evening news were slightly ahead of Radio-Canada's *Le Téléjournal*.

29. André Ouellet, quoted in Graham Fraser, *Le Parti québécois* (Montreal: Libre Expression, 1984), p. 147.
30. Arthur Siegel, "Une analyse du contenu: Similitudes et différences entre les nouvelles des réseaux anglais et français de la Société Radio-Canada (unpublished paper prepared for the CRTC, July 1977).
31. *Broadcasting Act*, 1968, art. 2 (g) (iv).
32. *Broadcasting Act*, 1991, art. 3 (1) (m) (vi).
33. Quoted in Wayne Skene, *A Requiem for the CBC* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993), p. 218.
34. Skene, *A Requiem for the CBC*, p. 219.
35. We defined generations as did Adams in *Sex in the Snow*.
36. Conclusions about francophone Gen-Xers should be regarded as tentative because they are based on the responses of only 19 journalists. We have greater confidence in conclusions about anglophone Gen-Xers, which are based on 83 responses.
37. See, e.g., Carl Sessions Stepp, "The X Factor," *American Journalism Review*, November 1996, pp. 34-38.
38. Stephen Marshall, quoted in Felix Vikhman, "Video Killed the TV News Star," *Ryerson Review of Journalism*, Spring 1998, p. 16.
39. The functions that Canadian journalists rate highly are those also rated highly by US journalists. David H. Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, *The American Journalist in the 1990s* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers, 1996).
40. The research is summarized nicely in Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, 2d ed. (White Plains, NY: Longman, 1996).
41. David Taras, "The Winds of Right-wing Change in Canadian Journalism," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 21 (Autumn 1996): 485-95, esp. 487.
42. Because young journalists are especially likely to work at weekly newspapers and radio stations, we wondered whether it might be the kind of news organization rather than the age of the journalist that was the principal factor in the differences. Analyses of the data, however, showed that Gen-X journalists are systematically different than their elders in the ways described regardless of where they work. As far as we can tell, in other words, the differences are not a function of where young journalists work; they seem to be a function either of their age or of the unique generation to which they belong.
43. Jian-Hua Zhu, "Recent Trends in Adversarial Attitudes Among American Newspaper Journalists: A Cohort Analysis," *Journalism Quarterly* 67 (Winter 1990): 992-1004.
44. Stepp, "The X Factor," p. 35.

45. Roger Bird, *The End of News* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1997), p. 7.
46. Adams, *Sex in the Snow*, p. 16.
47. *Broadcasting Act*, 1991, art. 3 (1) (m) (vi).
48. *Broadcasting Act*, 1991, art. 3 (1) (b).

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## Identity and National Attachments in Contemporary Canada

*Frank L. Graves with Tim Dugas and Patrick Beauchamp*

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*Ce chapitre remet en question l'opinion reçue selon laquelle le nationalisme canadien serait affaibli par les transferts de pouvoirs aux provinces, la réduction de la taille du gouvernement fédéral et les pressions de la mondialisation. On y soutient que les facteurs économiques n'épuisent pas le nationalisme. Cette recherche sur les structures sous-jacentes de l'identité canadienne s'appuie sur les données colligées par les Associés de Recherche Ekos dans leurs sondages Rethinking Government. Des comparaisons internationales de même que des tendances canadiennes à long terme sont aussi présentées. Depuis 1994, les opinions de plus de 12 000 Canadiens ont été sondées par Ekos. En s'attardant aux attitudes récentes des Canadiens vivant en Ontario et au Québec, on avance que le sentiment d'appartenance au Canada demeure fort au Canada anglais. Au cours des quatre dernières années, l'attachement au pays est demeuré stable alors que l'attachement à la province a diminué. Même au Québec, où l'attachement au Canada est beaucoup plus faible, l'attachement à la province a subi un recul important au cours de la même période. En dernière analyse, il appert que l'identité canadienne demeure importante pour une majorité de Canadiens, en particulier au Canada anglais. L'attachement au Canada est aussi présent au Québec où il rivalise avec un nationalisme ethnolinguistique. L'État-nation est peut-être en déclin, mais ce déclin ne se manifeste pas dans l'opinion publique selon les données d'Ekos.*

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### INTRODUCTION

Many people are making claims about the fragile state of Canadian nationalism. There is a significant lineage of work predicting the inevitable weakening and possible demise of Canada.<sup>1</sup> More recently, the works of Thomas Courchene and Robert Kaplan have captured considerable popular attention.<sup>2</sup> Our ongoing research on public attitudes shows that anxieties about the integrity and viability of Canada are shared by many members of Canadian society. Outside Canada, others have commented on the impending demise of the nation-state. Often these popular and academic arguments are linked to the



economic, social and political consequences of globalization in general and the liberalization of international trade in particular.

Although the integrity of nation-states cannot be reduced solely to the domain of identity and attachment, a strong sense of identification and belonging to country is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for its survival. Therefore, any discussion of the future of Canada should give explicit consideration to empirical evidence of levels of identification and attachment. In many instances, recent popular and academic discussions are conspicuously lacking evidence in this domain. The macrosociological consequences of economic or political change are often taken as a given. For example, if Canadians are less economically interdependent, will they then be less loyal or committed to Canada (and more committed to their local, regional interests or those of their new more significant trading partners)? These forms of arguments are expressions of a materialist or economic determinist model of history, and they may well be true. It is, however, essential to pause and consider the available direct evidence on identity and attachment to see if it supports or contradicts these broad theses.

In this chapter, we examine the current status and future prospects for national identity and attachment in Canada. We are broadly evaluating the hypothesis that national attachment is weakening under the pressures of devolution, federal diminution, and globalization. Is Canada an anachronism unravelling under the combination of regionalist frustrations arising from its historical roots and the contemporary pressures of globalization?

Our empirical evidence is imperfect. On some indicators, we can measure Canada against other countries and compare changes over the past three decades. Our most extensive data, however, comes from the EKOS Research Associates' *Rethinking Government* project which provides a broad range of indicators measured over the past four years.

#### AIMS AND STRATEGY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine current and evolving levels of national attachment with a view to describing and interpreting the role of shifting political and economic forces in Canada. Recent empirical data measuring strength of attachment to Canada are drawn largely from the ongoing *Rethinking Government* project.<sup>3</sup> The first part of the chapter provides a fairly straightforward description of identification and attachment in order to situate the other chapters in this volume within the realm of current public attitudes and beliefs.

The topic of identity and attachment is hopelessly broad and ambitious. For purposes of focus and tractability, we will examine the issues of identification and attachment as they have unfolded recently in Canada as a whole but with a special focus on Quebec and Ontario.

We selected Quebec as a special case because our research suggests that attachment to Canada is qualitatively different in intensity and form in Quebec

than in the rest of Canada. This is clear from the basic descriptive analysis. A more sophisticated analysis of both the underlying structure of identity and belonging attitudes (using factor analytic techniques) and the multivariate factors which explain or predict strength of attachment, shows that Quebec is really a distinct phenomenon. For example, in our best multivariate models predicting overall strength of belonging to Canada, a variable representing whether one resides in Quebec or not accounts for 27 percent of the overall variation in the ratings of sense of belonging to Canada; roughly ten times the influence of all other predictors. In other words, the sheer impact of living in Quebec overwhelms the influence of all other factors on how strongly one feels attached to Canada. We will also see later in the analysis that Quebecers reveal a somewhat different value structure and that different values are linked to Canadian nationalism in Quebec than in the rest of Canada.

Our interest in Ontario is also keen, but for different reasons. Here we want to examine at least part of Tom Courchene's thesis that Ontario is moving from being the heartland of Canada to becoming a North American region/state. The thesis is provocative and important, not just for Ontario but, by implication, for the rest of Canada. Courchene's thesis is by no means restricted to the realm of Ontarians' perceptions of these shifts and indeed most of his elaborate argument is offered in the realm of historical analysis and political-economic shifts. However, Courchene also speaks of the "social" transition of Ontario. Although he moves broadly across the political-economic, geographic and constitutional-legal levels of analysis, there is little question that a central component of his argument comes from the realm of perceptions, attitudes and other psychological states. As such, his thesis collides squarely with our topic of identity and attachment.

In his introduction, for example, he speaks of "recent dramatic changes in Ontario and Ontarians' perceptions of their role in Canada."<sup>4</sup> Elsewhere, he speaks of "Ontarians' views," the "Ontario psyche," their "attention and loyalties." These are not parenthetical components of his argument but are cited as "defining characteristics" of Ontario (*qua* heartland). These themes permeate the book, but there is little if any direct evidence to support his explicit and implicit conclusions regarding this domain.

We intend to (roughly) test a range of hypotheses with a view to exploring anomalies/contradictions in the current public landscape and offer some tentative explanations. Our ultimate questions are: (i) What are current levels of attachment to Canada? (ii) How have they been changing? and (iii) Why are these changes (or lack of changes) occurring?

#### METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

We have extended the basic statistical analysis in several directions as a partial fix for some of the weaknesses of a simple univariate and bivariate analysis.

These do not eliminate the weaknesses of our research design, but they do redress some of the threats to validity.

First, we test whether or not changes in recent time series of expressed strength of attachment (belonging) to Canada and province are statistically significant. We then control for the influences of age and region using analysis of variance.

Second, we conduct factor analysis of selected identity indicators and related attitudinal concepts. Factor analysis is a technique which identifies the extent to which groups of variables tend to vary together.<sup>5</sup> If the patterns of common variability are found to be reliable, the variables are interpreted to reflect a common underlying variable or trait. This analysis was used both to evaluate the measurement quality (particularly construct validity) of the identity indicators and related concepts and to discern the underlying patterns of meaning evident in the data. These analyses have been reproduced for different years of the database using the same indicators in order to assess whether the data are reliable (intersubjectively repeatable) and valid (plausibly linked to the underlying theoretical concepts). In both cases, we find usable reliability and validity. We also find interesting patterns of regional variations in the underlying structure of identity and attachment to Canada.

Third, we conduct a series of correlative tests (using simple bivariate correlation coefficients and cross-tabulations) which are then extended to more carefully identified multivariate models. These multivariate models have been constructed to test theoretically plausible structures of influence and refined to deal with some of the typical problems that confront this type of analysis.

We use secondary data reported by Neil Nevitte to compare Canada to other western countries on primary source identification.<sup>6</sup> We reproduced this question on a new random sample of the Canadian population last spring. This allows us to make broad comparisons about relative identification with Canada, province, world, North America and local community over a nearly 30-year time span. Although this analysis is weak in terms of ability to cross-tabulate and link to other data, the extended period of the time series does redress one of the key weaknesses of the *Rethinking Government* database (i.e., fairly short time series: 1994-98).

Finally, our analysis relies on both self-conscious accounts of the public (e.g., we believe Canada is disappearing because of government withdrawal) and indirect analysis of patterns of covariation in the data (e.g., people who are more frequent users of new technology are less attached to Canada). The data and our research design are decidedly non-experimental. There are major risks involved in drawing causal inferences about the factors producing attachment or change in attachment.<sup>7</sup> Our extended multivariate analysis provides some limited controls for these difficulties but we caution the reader that our ability to draw firm causal conclusions is quite limited.

DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSION: THE CONCEPTS

Identity is one of those rare terms which can mean its exact opposite — either absolute similarity or individuality. That identity can mean both that which is unique *and* that which is common reflects one of the ironies of the social world. The construction of a sense of *personal* identity is negotiated from interaction with the external social world.

Attachment is used here in the vernacular sense of belonging or devotion. One can identify with something without feeling an affective bond but this is not typically the case. Although identity and attachment are conceptually distinct, they tend to blur under empirical observation (although there are notable exceptions). For the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on the issue of sense of attachment or belonging while occasionally examining the separate issue of identity. For most respondents in social surveys, the terms evoke similar responses.

Human beings have always felt a need to identify themselves according to various social group memberships. In preliterate societies, marriage and kinship delineated not only identity but the bases for all social and economic exchange. Family and consanguineal kinship provided the roots of we versus others. From preliterate hunting and gathering societies we see increasingly complex forms of economic and political organization, but this powerful instinct to affiliate on the basis of blood and belonging is still the most potent source of identity and attachment to this day.<sup>8</sup> Identities still serve powerful social and economic functions — they guide how we think, who we associate with, and who we have conflicts with. Even economic and artistic pursuits are highly conditioned by one's set of social identities.

Most national identities are rooted in blood and belonging or minimally based on common ethno-linguistic foundations and strong shared historical or mythic narrative. Canada is relatively unique in featuring an ahistoric, multi-ethnic society. Some have argued that in the absence of traditional levers of nation-building the federal state has assumed a special role in constructing a sense of national identity.<sup>9</sup> In a period of turbulent debate concerning the role of the state and its connection to identity, it may be helpful to review the recent empirical evidence.

Against the backdrop of devolution and decentralization, diminution of federal role, the apparent inevitability of another Quebec referendum, continued western disaffection, shifting trade patterns from east-west to north-south, and inexorable globalization which some relate to the end of the nation-state, the answers to these questions may appear obvious. Our data and analysis will bring into question some of the current wisdom about the inevitability of these forces (while confirming other parts).

CANADIANS' CURRENT AND SHIFTING LEVELS OF ATTACHMENT


ATTACHMENT TO CANADA AND RECENT SHIFTS

The following two figures show how Canadians rate their sense of belonging to Canada and the provinces. The wording of the question is fairly straightforward and the stimuli (e.g., family, country) are presented in random order to the respondent. In this sample, a mean difference of about 0.2 on a seven-point scale is statistically significant.

Figure 1 shows that people do discriminate different sources of belonging and that family is the most important source of belonging. Of the political-geographic sources of belonging, Canada is strongest by a highly significant margin. This varies significantly by region, particularly in Quebec where only 55 percent express strong positive belonging to Canada. Overall, Canadians' high identification with country is unusual and many other advanced western countries reveal relatively stronger attachments to community and region. When this list of sources of belonging is extended to include North America or the world, these sources score the weakest of all sources.

**Figure 1: Sense of Belonging for Canada**

*"Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following. Use a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the midpoint 4 means somewhat strong."*



Note: n=1824


Source: EKOS Research Associates Inc., *Rethinking Citizen Engagement*, March 1998.

Figure 2 shows recent shifts in belonging to Canada and province. Overall, there have been no significant changes in strength of attachment to Canada over the nearly five-year period tested.<sup>10</sup> The fact that it remains so robust is interesting and important. Recall that this period straddles the Quebec referendum, growing levels of free trade, the federal deficit crisis, and the diminution and withdrawal of many key federal programs. It is not surprising given the range and depth of these shocks to federalism that many would predict the weakening of bonds connecting Canadians to Canada. It is, however, the case that attachments remained strong and stable.

The same figure shows a significant (tested using analysis of variance) shift in attachment to province.<sup>11</sup> Attachment to province is significantly weaker and more turbulent, and it actually declined over this same period. This trend will be even more revealing when we break it down by Ontario and Quebec.

**Figure 2: Tracking a Sense of Belonging to Canada vs. Province**

*"Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following. Use a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the midpoint 4 means somewhat strong."*



Source: EKOS Research Associates Inc., *Rethinking Government*, 1994-1997; *Rethinking Citizen Engagement*, March 1998.


COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL ATTACHMENT AND LONGER-TERM TRENDS

Neil Nevitte presents comparative survey evidence which supports the thesis that national attachment is both relatively more important in Canada than other western countries and has strengthened over the period he measures from 1981 to 1990 (Figure 3).<sup>12</sup> Our updates of this indicator show that identification with a country has remained the most popular source of belonging in Canada with locality declining further since 1990 (Figure 4).

Interestingly, Nevitte's data also show little support for the view that localism is rising as a source of attachment. In fact, town and region have declined significantly everywhere. Conversely, more cosmopolitan sources of attachment (i.e., continent and world) increased over the period from 1981 to 1990. The sizable advantage which Canada reveals in terms of identification with nation would undoubtedly be larger still if we were to focus only on English Canada.

**Figure 3: Percentage Belonging to Given Geographical Units, 1981-1990**


*"To which of these groups would you say you belong, first of all? And what would come next?"*



Source: International Comparative Research Group, 1981; and 1990 World Values Surveys.

**Figure 4: Tracking Sense of Belonging for Canada**

*"To which of these groups would you say you belong, first of all?"*



Source: EKOS Research Associates Inc., World Values Survey; and *Rethinking Government*, March 1998.

It is noteworthy that the international belonging advantage which Canada reveals does not extend to pride. Our data tracking "pride in Canadian culture" show no significant changes over the past 15 years. Canadian nationalism tends to be less chauvinistic and quieter than that of a country like the United States. Nevitte shows similar results in his review of the World Values Survey.<sup>13</sup> A more detailed cross-national analysis of national pride by Smith and Jarkko of NORC provides a much more detailed but consistent analysis of this phenomenon.<sup>14</sup>

Based on data from 1989 and 1990, Nevitte has suggested that the Canadian public is becoming less parochial and more cosmopolitan. Our newer findings suggest that these trends are continuing in Canada in 1998 (see Figure 4).

The proportion of Canadians who select a subnational unit (i.e., town or region) as their primary source of belonging has decreased steadily from 62 percent in 1981 to 40 percent in 1998. Over the same time period those who select a more cosmopolitan source of belonging (i.e., North America or the



world) has also steadily increased, from 9 percent in 1981 to 16 percent in 1998. Belonging to country increased steadily from 1981 to 1990 (30 percent and 40 percent) but has stabilized over the past several years (41 percent in 1998). It still is, however, the most popular source of identity by a margin of over two to one for the next most popular source.

#### SUMMARY

Sense of belonging to Canada is quite high, second only to family. Sense of belonging to Canada is higher than for all other geographic levels and it has remained very high with no significant shifts over the past four years. Province and local community show lower levels of attachment and they show significant decline over same period. Comparatively, Canada has the highest levels of belonging to country of those areas tested in the World Values Survey. Longer-term trends show national attachment strengthening, local attachment declining, and cosmopolitan attachment rising but still clearly subordinate to national attachment.

#### EXAMINING RECENT SHIFTS IN QUEBEC AND ONTARIO


Focusing on Ontario and Quebec helps underline some important findings (Figure 5). First consider Ontario.

#### ONTARIO

For reasons noted in our introduction, Ontario provides an interesting point of focus for recent shifts in identity and attachment. Courchene argues that Ontario is moving away from its traditional role as the heartland of Canada to becoming a North American region/state. Although his thesis is by no means restricted, or even focused on the perceptions of Ontarians, it definitely strays into this area. Whether this reflects political or economic reality is debatable, but the evidence on attachment (and sense of role and status in Canada) flies in the face of this part of his thesis. Ontarians' sense of attachment to province has declined significantly since 1995. In 1995, 81 percent of Ontario residents expressed a strong sense of belonging to their province. By the spring of 1998, only 64 percent still felt this way. Meanwhile, Ontarians' attachment to Canada has remained largely stable over the past several years (and much higher than for province). Following the Quebec referendum, 95 percent of Ontario residents indicated a strong sense of belonging to Canada; in 1998, 87 percent still expressed this strong attachment to country. The fact that attachment to both Canada and province rose sharply in 1995 is an interesting phenomenon. We also saw a sharp rise in attachment to province in Quebec.

**Figure 5: Tracking a Sense of Belonging for Ontario and Quebec**

*"Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following. Use a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the midpoint 4 means somewhat strong."*



Source: EKOS Research Associates Inc., *Rethinking Government*, 1994-1997; *Rethinking Citizen Engagement*, March 1998.

Although it may be a statistical anomaly or “outlier,” we suspect that it was conditioned by cultural insecurity linked to the trauma of the Quebec referendum debate (contemporaneous with this data collection). The sense of potential loss or profound change in identities associated with this event may have produced a temporary strengthening of attachments.

These Ontario findings bring into question the age-old dispute about the relative role of culture and economy in shaping each other (e.g., Marx’s base and superstructure). Courchene clearly supports a materialist conception where economic arrangements (e.g., trade flow) will determine consciousness and identity. The data, at least in the short term, are difficult to reconcile with this perspective. We have seen no decline in affiliation to Canada as the vested economic interests of Ontarians shift from an east-west to north-south trade axis.

We will show later that nationalism is linked more strongly to idealism, values, and culture than to the economic realm. Economics and political

economy are related to attachment, but more weakly. For example, we find that those who believe that their province does not receive its fair share are significantly less attached to Canada. Paradoxically, however, Ontarians are much less likely to feel this sentiment compared to respondents in other provinces. No doubt vested economic interests influence beliefs but they do not appear to determine them. Another possible explanation is that the extent of these shifts in economic interests may well be overstated. Helliwell's chapter in this volume argues that the vast majority of economic flows are still east-west in Canada.

For Ontario, Figure 5 reveals two key conclusions. First, attachment to province is substantially lower than attachment to Canada (and the national advantage is even larger focusing on the most intense level of attachment). Second, and particularly problematic for the Courchene thesis, attachment to Canada has remained fairly stable and high (95 percent to 87 percent), while provincial attachment has declined sharply (81 percent to 64 percent) over the past three years. This decline has occurred in spite of a period of unprecedented federal diminution and a relatively concentrated period of protest about Ontario's "fair share" from the past two premiers of Ontario.

The failure to grow, let alone even sustain, a serious regionalist identity alternative to Canada during this period, in spite of obvious political economic forces favouring such growth, provides cause for serious scepticism of the region-state hypothesis. These surprising trends are not unique to Ontario, although they are more apparent there.

#### QUEBEC

Quebec is different again. The most striking feature of the Quebec data is the profound difference in level of attachment to Canada. At 54 percent, attachment to Canada is much lower than attachment to province and tests of statistical significance indicate that over the time period examined, it is highly stable. Attachment to province is mercurial and the analysis of variance confirms highly significant fluctuations. The most recent sounding from last spring shows attachment to province at 68 percent down fully 19 points from the 87 percent registered in 1995 (post-referendum). Identification with Canada or Quebec is directly linked to sovereigntist fortunes as Maurice Pinard and others have argued.<sup>15</sup>

A couple of further features of Quebec identity and attachment are worth noting. Quebecers' attachment to province (or "Quebec" in random wording experiments) is no higher than attachment to province in the rest of Canada. In fact, Newfoundlanders and Nova Scotians show significantly higher levels of attachment to province than Quebecers. What really distinguishes Quebecers is a lower attachment to Canada and a higher attachment to ethnic group than other Canadians. For example, Quebecers attachment to their ethnic group or

national ancestry is the highest in Canada at 71 percent, while Ontarians attachment is at 58 percent. The lowest attachment to ethnic group or national ancestry is found in Alberta at 43 percent.<sup>16</sup>

Quebecers' identities are more plural and diffuse. Quebec identity is also rooted more in a sense of consanguinal community (what Michael Ignatieff refers to as the sense of "blood of belonging" characterizing ethnic nationalism<sup>17</sup>). But Quebec identity is more complex and pluralistic than this. Our subsequent multivariate analysis shows that not only is Quebec qualitatively different in terms of overall levels of identification and attachment but that the underlying structures and causal influences of identity are very different in Quebec. There are also some significant differences in the value structures of Quebecers.

## PERCEIVED BASES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND UNDERLYING DIMENSIONS

In this section we present two types of analysis. First, we examine Canadians' self-reported perceptions and images of Canadian identity. Next, we conduct dimensional analysis using factor analytic tools to help discern the underlying patterns of meaning latent in the interconnections of the data.


### PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

It may be helpful to examine a couple of defining features of Canadian identity which are drawn from our recent research (Figure 6). There is a consensus within the Canadian public that there is a Canadian culture and that it is a positive source of pride and accomplishment: fully 83 percent agree that Canadian culture is something we can "all take pride in." Furthermore, participants in focus group sessions are explicit in their feelings of pride and nationalism about Canadian culture (although these feelings are much more pronounced in English Canada than in Quebec).

Canadians also believe that Canadian identity is elusive and complex. Seventy-six percent agree that it may be difficult to identify precisely but there definitely is a unique Canadian culture. The extent of the vagaries of Canadian identity is evident in the fact that 47 percent disagree with the suggestion that there really is no distinct Canadian identity, but fully 40 percent agree. Canadians also believe that identity is rooted in diversity. This almost Zen koan-like belief that unity lies in diversity is a recurring feature of qualitative research as well. This somewhat ambiguous notion that unity is stimulated by diversity does produce mixed responses. Amongst francophones and younger Canadians this positive unity-diversity linkage is viewed much more sceptically.

### Figure 6: Perceptions of Canadian Identity

"Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means you strongly agree and 4 means neither."



Note: n=1204

Source: EKOS Research Associates Inc./Les Associés de recherche Ekos inc., November 1995.

#### DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS

A series of factor analyses were conducted using a battery of attitudinal variables from *Rethinking Government*, 1996.<sup>18</sup> Factor analysis is used to analyze multiple measures, identify a common underlying theme, and create a summary measure. This summary measure reduces the amount of data and the complexity of subsequent analysis. The summary measure also provides a more reliable measure than any single variable measure would provide.<sup>19</sup> Factors are now variables created by linking together the original variables used in the analysis to produce higher order factors. They reflect patterns of association which reflect the underlying structures or themes uniting various individual variables. Because they are based on observed correlations rather than direct questioning some argue that they detect underlying latent structures of meaning.

We chose 1996 because it had the most complete set of data related to this topic. Since some data were obtained on different waves of the 1996 *Rethinking Government* survey, only cases where there were valid observations for all variables were used in the analysis. Three core dimensions or summary measures emerged from the factor analysis which were relatively stable when tested using all cases or cases from only Ontario and Quebec. These three dimensions or factors represent an intuitively plausible organization of the original variables. After observing the configuration of the factor analysis, we labelled these dimensions (or factors) "liberalism," "conservatism," and "nationalism."<sup>20</sup> The variables which are most strongly related to each of these dimensions are presented in Tables 1 to 3. The correlation coefficients are a simple measure of the strength of relationship between two variables. The coefficient ranges between 1.0 (a perfect positive relationship) and -1.0 (a perfect negative or inverse relationship), with zero meaning no relationship at all. Each "loading" (coefficient) is a measure of the strength of connection between the original variable and the factor. Technically, a factor loading is a regression coefficient between the variable and the factor.

It is quite interesting to see the liberalism, conservatism, and nationalism factors emerging so distinctly. They also reveal different socio-demographic correlates, and they perform independently and meaningfully in models predicting strength of belonging to Canada. The theoretically plausible structure suggests that the data have usable validity and reliability. The loadings for the sense of belonging questions, however, varied substantially between Canada overall, Ontario, and Quebec.

**Table 1: Factor Analysis for All Cases: "Liberalism" Factor**

<i>Variables Correlated with the LIBERALISM FACTOR</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>
How important... social equality	0.744
How important... collective human rights	0.723
How important... distribution of wealth among poor and rich	0.639
How important... tolerance for different people, cultures, and ideas	0.624
How important... clean environment	0.602
How important... preservation of heritage	0.592
How important... social cohesion	0.565
How important... healthy population	0.561
How important... distribution of equality among all regions of Canada	0.513
How important... freedom	0.492

**Table 2: Factor Analysis for All Cases: "Conservatism" Factor**

<i>Variables Correlated with the CONSERVATISM FACTOR</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>
How important... thriftiness	0.646
How important... respect for authority	0.587
How important... prosperity and wealth	0.568
How important... security and safety	0.566
How important... hard work	0.536
How important... minimal government intrusions	0.502

**Table 3: Factor Analysis for All Cases: "Nationalism" Factor**

<i>Variables Correlated with the NATIONALISM FACTOR</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>
Sense of belonging... Canada	0.721
How important... national unity	0.668
How important... Canadian identity	0.666
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.579

Table 1 shows the individual variables that loaded (linked) on the liberalism factor. The strongest items, social equality, collective human rights, wealth redistribution and tolerance reflect popular small "l" liberal values. On the other hand, the key items in the separate (statistically independent) conservatism factor are quite recognizably small "c" conservative values (*viz.*, thriftiness, respect for authority, prosperity, security, hard work, and minimal government). The final factor clearly reflects national attachment or belonging to country, and the values of national unity and national identity. Interestingly, government as "a positive force in my life" is also incorporated in this factor. This reflects an interesting and stable linkage between identity and the role of the state; a linkage which we suspect is stronger in Canada than in most other countries.

In order to focus more narrowly on the underlying structure of the sense-of-belonging questions, a restricted factor analysis was conducted using only the five "sense-of-belonging" questions. When the questions were run alone

**Table 4: Factor Analysis for All Cases: Sense-of-Belonging Variables**

<i>Sense of Belonging Variables</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>	
	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>
Sense of belonging... Canada	0.816	
Sense of belonging... your family	0.622	
Sense of belonging... your community	0.594	0.433
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group or national ancestry		0.796
Sense of belonging... your province		0.752

**Table 5: Factor Analysis for Quebec Only: Sense-of-Belonging Questions**

<i>Sense of Belonging Variables</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>	
	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group or national ancestry	0.713	
Sense of belonging... your community	0.667	
Sense of belonging... your province	0.649	-0.587
Sense of belonging... your family	0.554	
Sense of belonging... Canada		0.870

for all cases, two factors emerged, one with Canada, family, and community loading together and the other with ethnic group and province with some overlap with sense of belonging to community as well (Table 4). The Quebec-only analysis revealed two different factors, one with ethnic group, community, province, and family loading together and on the second factor, province again loaded, *negatively* this time, with Canada (see Table 5). For Ontario, Table 6, only one factor resulted (also true for the Atlantic provinces and the west).

Recalling our earlier discussion, it appears that the underlying structure of identity in Quebec is more complex than in Ontario. We see a separate dimension of ethnic nationalism linked to province and family (blood and belonging?) and a separate Canadian identity, which competes with, and is negatively related to provincial identity. In Ontario, and the rest of Canada, nationalism is more unidimensional and exclusively "Canadian" in nature.



**Table 6: Factor Analysis for Ontario Only: Sense-of-Belonging Variables**

<i>Sense of Belonging Variables</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficients</i>
	<i>Factor 1</i>
Sense of belonging... your province	0.767
Sense of belonging... your community	0.716
Sense of belonging... Canada	0.672
Sense of belonging... your family	0.532
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group or national ancestry	0.511

## EXPLAINING BELONGING TO CANADA

The analysis now turns to the problem of "explaining" sense of belonging to Canada. As noted earlier, we make no claims for rigorous causal explanation. We do, however, offer and test a number of hypotheses using simple bivariate cross-tabulations and correlations. These are drawn from our existing data using strength of belonging as our dependent variable. Our independent variables include: (i) measures of the perceived role of the state in general and the federal government in particular, (ii) rated values, and in particular, values rated most important for national government, and (iii) age (as a rough proxy for possible generational shifts). These variables are closely linked to some of the forces putatively underlying broader socio-economic changes discussed in our introduction. The bivariate analysis is easier to illustrate to the lay reader but it is susceptible to a number of methodological flaws; most notably the possibility of spurious causal relationship. Properly identified multivariate models can serve as a partial correction for this and other problems. We will present and discuss three final multivariate models which emerged from a much larger set of tested models.

### GOVERNMENT

Tables 7a and b show a strong positive bivariate connection between a sense that strong national government is important, and a belief in the need for strong national standards. It is impressive to note the very small minorities who disagree. Moreover, agreement with the importance of strong national government and strong national standards is positively linked to a stronger sense of belonging to Canada. This may be somewhat obvious and slightly tautologous. Table 7c is less obvious.

**Table 7a: Connection Between Attachment to Canada and Role of State**

*"Because of our vast geography and the diversity of our people, Canada cannot survive without a strong national government to provide shared goals and values."*

	No Strong Attachment to Canada		Moderate Attachment to Canada		Very Strong Attachment to Canada		Total	
Disagree	52%	49	22%	34	8%	96	12%	179
Neither	15%	16	23%	34	10%	129	12%	179
Agree	32%	31	56%	83	82%	1022	76%	1136
Total	6%	96	10%	151	83.5%	1247	100%	1494

Notes: (Chi<sup>2</sup>=213, df=4, P<0.001)  
n=1494.

Source: EKOS Research Associates, *Rethinking Government*, November 1996.

**Table 7b: Connection Between Attachment to Canada and Role of State (cont'd)**

*"How important is it to have strong national standards in the area of medicare?"*

	No Strong Attachment to Canada		Moderate Attachment to Canada		Very Strong Attachment to Canada		Total	
Not important	13%	30	3%	19	2%	46	3%	85
Moderately important	10%	21	14%	39	5%	116	6%	176
Very important	76%	170	82%	219	93%	2299	91%	2688
Total	8%	221	9%	267	84%	2461	100%	2949

Notes: (Chi<sup>2</sup>=150, df=4, P<0.001)  
N=2949.

Source: EKOS Research Associates, *Rethinking Government*, November 1996.

**Table 7c: Connection Between Attachment to Canada and Role of State (cont'd)**

*"All in all, government is a positive force in my life"*

	<i>No Strong Attachment to Canada</i>		<i>Moderate Attachment to Canada</i>		<i>Very Strong Attachment to Canada</i>		<i>Total</i>	
Disagree	62%	138	50%	134	33%	823	37%	1095
Neither	25%	57	29%	80	25%	625	26%	762
Agree	12%	27	21%	55	41%	1008	37%	1080
Total	8%	222	9%	269	83%	2456	100%	2947

Notes: ( $\text{Chi}^2=14$ ,  $\text{df}=4$ ,  $P<0.001$ )  
 $n=2947$ .

**Table 7d: Connection Between Attachment to Canada and Role of State (cont'd)**

*"In the past three months, approximately how often have you personally had direct contact with the federal government, either initiated by yourself or a government official, including in-person, mail and telephone contacts?"*

	<i>No Strong Attachment to Canada</i>		<i>Moderate Attachment to Canada</i>		<i>Very Strong Attachment to Canada</i>		<i>Total</i>	
Never	66%	147	69%	186	62%	1528	64%	1861
1-2 times	22%	50	16%	41	19%	460	19%	551
3+ times	11%	25	13%	34	18%	440	17%	499
Total	8%	222	9%	261	83%	2428	100%	2911

Notes: ( $\text{Chi}^2=14$ ,  $\text{df}=4$ ,  $P<0.001$ )  
 $n=2911$ .

Belief that government (any government) is a "strong positive force in my life" produced highly polarized responses (37 percent agree, 37 percent disagree). A positive view of the state is strongly linked to strength of belonging to Canada. This effect remains robust in the multivariate models and is one of the few terms which has the same strength and direction of effect in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Recall that the factor analysis linked this variable to Canadian nationalism. Table 7d shows another linkage which is not attitudinal but behavioural. Those who have had more direct contact with the federal government are more likely to feel a significantly stronger sense of belonging to Canada. The effect is modest but important. It survives in some of our multivariate models (although not the one we chose for the conclusion of this chapter).

It is possible that stronger nationalism produces a greater desire to contact the federal government but the reverse is more likely. Contact, particularly meaningful, successful contact strengthens belonging. This leads to interesting questions about the future prospects for nationalism in a devolved universe where the lion's share of delivery and contact are shifted downwards to the provinces and municipalities with increased use of commercial and third sector delivery.

The broad underlying question is: What is the role of the federal state in constructing a sense of national belonging? Others have commented that the federal government has played an unusual role in constructing a sense of national identity in Canada.<sup>21</sup> Our data suggest that it is not only the role of the federal government but government in general which underlies a sense of national attachment in Canada. This dynamic appears to have persisted during a period where the federal role has withered somewhat. The prospects for the future, however, are less clear.

#### VALUES AND IDENTITY

Further reinforcing the connection between the state and identity is a random test of preferred values for society versus the federal government. Some *Re-thinking Government* respondents were (randomly) asked to rate the most important values for society as opposed to the most important values that should guide the federal government. The comparison of results obtained using each version yields the important conclusion that these values are seen as basically identical. The federal ratings are generally slightly lower but the overall ranking and intensity ratings are virtually identical. Moreover, when factor analyzed, the underlying structures are identical for each level (federal, societal). This finding is similar to earlier research we have conducted randomizing societal priorities versus federal priorities. Often a conclusion of no difference in a test is seen as banal. In this case, the finding of no difference may be significant.

One possible interpretation is that Canadians largely equate societal values (and priorities) with the federal government. Another interpretation is that respondents simply answer the question with a focus on values rather than values for whom. Other evidence and analysis leads us to believe it is a little of each. For example, "family values" loads differently in the "social" version of the question than the "government" version which suggests that people do discriminate between different values for government and society, where appropriate. This is consistent with our earlier research and Richard Gwyn's notion of Canadian identity as constructed from "state-nationalism."<sup>22</sup> It also explains some of the anxiety and intensity of debate related to federal withdrawal. As discussed earlier, Canadians reveal a very strong attachment to Canada (particularly in English Canada). They worry about the fragility and viability of Canada in light of federal retrenchment, devolution, protracted unity troubles over the Quebec issue, and an increased sense of Americanization. Here we see evidence that Canadians see their societal values as inextricably connected to the federal state: the societal level is seen as slightly more important than the federal, but Canadians may have difficulty conceiving of a methodology for nation-building that excludes the federal government.

#### LINKS TO ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CULTURAL INSECURITY

Table 8 summarizes selected correlations between strength of attachment to Canada and attitudes toward the economy and political economy.

**Table 8: Connection Between Belonging to Canada and Selected Economic Attitudes**

	Pearson Correlation	Significance
I'm confident that I have the knowledge and skills to move easily in today's labour market ( <i>Rethinking Government</i> , November 1997; n=2814)	-0.137	0.000
The most important things in life don't depend on money ( <i>Rethinking Government</i> , April 1996; n=1385)	0.117	0.001
How would you rate your ability to access the Internet? ( <i>Rethinking Government</i> , December 1996; n=1475)	-0.085	0.001
My province puts more into confederation than it gets out ( <i>Rethinking Government</i> , November 1997; n=1471)	-0.089	0.001

The following variables are linked to *lower* levels of attachment to Canada: (i) those expressing the greatest confidence in their skills; (ii) those who are more materialistic are less attached to Canada; (iii) those who are most comfortable with technology; and (iv) those who do not feel that their province receives its fair share from Confederation. Attachment to Canada is inversely related to economic security. The most economically secure have the higher levels of attachment to Canada and the economically insecure have lower levels of attachment.

In our past analysis, we have also identified a cultural insecurity factor which is linked to economic insecurity. Cultural insecurity combines a sense of nostalgia and regret for the passage of old Canada with a sense of anxiety and trepidation about the pace of change. It is more deeply felt amongst more economically insecure, older, less educated, English-speaking Canadians. It is linked to a stronger attachment to Canada, almost as a desire to hang onto some symbolic anchors or roots in a bewildering world which is changing too quickly.

By corollary, and these correlations support this, those who feel confident and poised to meet the challenges of globalization and the new economy are less rooted in national identity. This may be a reflection of the more cosmopolitan ethnic characteristic of what Robert Reich referred to as the symbolic analyst class.<sup>23</sup> Symbolic analysts are techno-literate; and we also find that youth goes hand in hand with technological literacy. This may eventually weaken the viability of a unique Canadian identity in an increasingly information-driven global economy. These forces may eventually weaken attachment to Canada in a future where today's young Canadians dominate and look to symbols, narrative and economic interests less and less rooted in Canada.

One final point of interest from Table 8 is the positive correlation between self-expressed idealism and attachment to Canada. This correlation may indicate that economism, rationalism, and materialism are not the key drivers of attachment, and hence explain, in part, the improbable persistence of strong national attachment in a world where there is less and less of an economic reason to feel this way.


#### ATTACHMENT TO CANADA AND PROVINCE BY AGE

Examining how attachment to province and country vary by age reveals possible generational effects with young Canadians being much less attached to Canada (and other sources of identity) than their parents and grandparents (Figure 7). These may simply be reflections of patterns of aging effects rather than generational shifts but the possibility of a generational shift also exists and must be considered.

Analysis of variance demonstrates statistically significant age effect on the sense of belonging to Canada. Overall, between 1994 and 1997 the attachment to Canada for Canadian youth was considerably lower compared to the evidence

**Figure 7: Sense of Belonging for Canada**

"Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following. Use a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the midpoint 4 means somewhat strong."



Source: EKOS Research Associates Inc., *Rethinking Government*, 1994-1997; *Rethinking Citizen Engagement*, March 1998.

for their parents and grandparents. Overall, however, the sense of belonging to Canada did not vary significantly according to the year of our study. To put it in other words, changes in belonging means over years are too small to be considered as statistically significant shifts. When exploring the interaction effect of age and year, the interaction effect was non-significant, which indicates that there was no difference in average ratings over time for each of the two age groups. So, overall, young people are less attached to Canada in each year but attachment to Canada has not changed.

Different results are produced by the analysis of variance for the sense of belonging to province. As in the case of belonging to Canada, generation plays a statistically significant effect on the variance of overall scores with young Canadians feeling less attached to their province than their older counterparts. Moreover, the sense of belonging to province decreases significantly according to the year of the study. Finally, there is a statistically significant interaction effect between respondents' age and year of the study. There is some evidence that the overall attachment advantage which Canada enjoys over province is much smaller for young people and is narrowing. We have seen this phenomenon expressed in a range of parallel analyses that we have conducted.

This sheds interesting light on the issue of the "self-sustaining thesis" which suggests that even though identity was constructed through state-nationalism it can now persist independently. Whereas, clearly, there is some inertia to Canadian nationalism, these potential generational splits bring into question the idea that nationalism will persist indefinitely without state intervention. This conjecture becomes more troublesome still for Canadian nationalists when it is linked to the symbolic analysts-globalization trends discussed earlier. In other words, the mutual influences of aging, technology, and globalization could well lead to a Canada which engenders much lower levels of attachment in the future.

#### MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

If factor analysis can help identify latent mental maps used to cognitively organize different values and attitudes, regression analysis can help isolate the relative contribution of these forces to attachment and belonging. We are attempting to roughly isolate the relative explanatory power of different forces. We utilize the factors of liberalism and conservatism, as well as other demographic and behavioural variables in order to model the strength of belonging. These models are better approximations of causal tests than the simple bivariate tests examined in the preceding section.

A series of regression models<sup>24</sup> were run using the conservatism and liberalism factors described earlier,<sup>25</sup> the rating for the perception that government is a positive force in the respondent's life, and the four remaining sense-of-belonging questions (family, community, province, and ethnic group) as predictors. The results of this model for all cases are presented in Table 9. Based on these models, the best predictors of a sense of belonging to Canada were sense of belonging to your community (beta = 0.22), government is a positive factor in my life (beta = 0.22), and the conservatism factor (beta = 0.19); — all with positive coefficients. The positive coefficients indicate that higher levels of sense of belonging to community, the perception that government is a positive factor in one's life, and higher levels of conservatism were all correlated with higher levels of a sense of belonging to Canada. Weaker, but still significant, linkages are evident between sense of belonging to province and ethnic group. These variables had a negative impact on a sense of belonging to Canada, while sense of belonging to family had a positive coefficient. The only insignificant variable was the liberalism factor of trying to incorporate the very different structure of the Quebec and rest-of-Canada (ROC) data. Testing separate models for Quebec and ROC proved more useful.

Once this model had been developed, the impact of including a variable representing Quebec versus all other regions was tested. The inclusion of this variable was highly significant and once a dummy variable for Quebec entered the equation, ethnic group became highly non-significant.<sup>26</sup> All in all,



**Table 9: Multivariate Analysis of Belonging to Canada for All Cases**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Dependent Variable: Sense of Belonging to Canada</i>				
	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Sense of belonging... your community	0.242	0.003	0.224	7.243	0.000
Sense of belonging... your family	0.177	0.053	0.100	3.378	0.001
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group and national ancestry	-0.0896	0.025	-0.107	-3.563	0.000
Sense of belonging... your province	-0.0759	0.033	-0.071	-2.317	0.021
Liberalism	0.0045	0.004	0.035	1.087	0.277
Conservatism	0.0258	0.004	0.194	5.950	0.000
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.207	0.027	0.220	7.713	0.000
Constant	1.084	0.446	—	2.430	0.015

the attempt to construct an overall model of attachment to Canada is quite difficult, particularly because of the stress of trying to incorporate the very different structure of the Quebec and ROC data. Testing separate models for Quebec and ROC proved more useful.

Was the structure of the equation different for Quebec versus the rest of Canada? To answer that question, a formal test of the interaction between Quebec and all the attitudinal variables was conducted. The test revealed that there was a strong statistically significant interaction effect. The significant interaction effect indicates that the structure of the Quebec model (compared to other regions) was substantially different, and the model coefficients for all of Canada presented in Table 9 could not be applied to Quebec and the other regions equally. To refine the nature of these structural differences, a segmented model was run for Quebec and Ontario using the exact same variables used in the model for Canada overall. The differences are both significant and revealing. As seen from Table 10, for Quebec, the most important predictors of sense of belonging to Canada were a sense of belonging to province (beta = -0.35), overall government is a positive force (beta = 0.26) and a sense of belonging to community (beta = 0.18). The key difference is the very strong negative influence of a sense of belonging to province, compared to the weaker (but

**Table 10: Multivariate Analysis of Belonging to Canada for Quebec**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Sense of Belonging to Canada				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Sense of belonging... your community	0.220	0.064	0.182	3.437	0.001
Sense of belonging... your family	0.042	0.094	0.024	0.442	0.659
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group and national ancestry	0.086	0.066	-0.073	1.297	0.196
Sense of belonging... your province	-0.452	0.072	-0.353	-6.281	0.000
Liberalism	0.017	0.011	0.097	1.653	0.099
Conservatism	0.023	0.009	0.148	2.477	0.014
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.313	0.060	0.264	5.182	0.000
Constant	1.070	0.955	—	1.120	0.264

still negative) coefficient in the overall model. Of the remaining variables, the only significant predictor was the conservative factor (a positive coefficient). Ethnic group, family, and liberalism were all non-significant.

The Ontario model (see Table 11) was substantially different from the Quebec model. First, the most important predictors were a sense of belonging to province (beta = 0.31) and a sense of belonging to family (beta = 0.29). The strong *positive* relationship between sense of belonging to province and sense of belonging to Canada for Ontario residents stands in marked contrast to the strong *negative* relationship for Quebec residents. While this was probably the most extreme difference between the Quebec and Ontario models, it was not the only significant difference. Unlike the Quebec model where the conservatism factor was a significant predictor, for the Ontario model the conservatism factor was highly non-significant and the liberalism factor showed a significant positive relationship to sense of belonging to Canada. Government as a positive force remained significant, however, sense of belonging to community and ethnic group were non-significant.

To summarize, Quebecers' sense of attachment to Canada is not only qualitatively much lower than in other parts of Canada but the underlying structure is quite different. Moreover, the factors producing attachment in Quebec are

Table 11: Multivariate Analysis of Belonging to Canada for Ontario

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable: Sense of Belonging to Canada				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Sense of belonging... your community	0.0104	0.038	0.014	0.273	0.785
Sense of belonging... your family	0.436	0.075	0.288	5.822	0.000
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group and national ancestry	-0.015	0.026	-0.031	-0.602	0.547
Sense of belonging... your province	0.197	0.035	0.309	5.610	0.000
Liberalism	0.0117	0.004	0.160	3.087	0.002
Conservatism	-0.0036	0.005	-0.035	-0.670	0.503
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.0993	0.027	0.172	3.615	0.000
Constant	1.362	0.513	—	2.653	0.008

quite different. In Ontario, (and the ROC) attachment to provinces *reinforces* belonging to Canada; in Quebec it is the other way around. In Ontario belief in liberal political culture reinforces attachment to Canada; in Quebec it is conservatism that stimulates attachment to Canada. Interestingly, the key unifying factor across both Quebec and ROC is positive attitudes to the role of the state.

## CONCLUSIONS: WHITHER CANADIAN NATIONALISM?

This review and the analysis shed fairly clear light on two of the three originating questions "What are current levels of attachment to Canada?" and "How have they been changing?" These answers are relatively straightforward and pose significant challenges to theories of ongoing or imminent national disintegration. We also provide some helpful, but much less definitive evidence regarding the question "Why are these changes (or lack of changes) occurring?"

For those who have waded through the statistical manipulation in the middle of this paper, and more pointedly, for those who have skipped to the substantive conclusion we will try to make some sense of this exercise.

## THE CORE QUESTIONS

Let us first consider the less controversial conclusions of this analysis.

*National Trends.* We find that sense of belonging to Canada is quite high, second only to family. Sense of belonging to Canada is higher than for all other geographic units and it has remained very high with no significant shifts over the past four years. Province and local community show lower levels of attachment and they have experienced significant decline over the same period.

*International Comparisons.* Comparatively, Canada has the highest levels of belonging to country of all areas tested in the World Values Survey. Longer-term (30 year) trends show national attachment strengthening, local attachment declining and cosmopolitan attachment rising, but still clearly subordinate to national attachment.

*Ontario.* Ontario does not show any significant evidence of declining attachment to Canada over the past five years and attachment to region has actually declined in a statistically and substantively significant fashion. These conclusions are true in spite of a declining federal presence, shifts in the density of interprovincial versus international trade flows and growing critique of fair share and other federalism issues from provincial leaders from the left and right of the political spectrum.

*Quebec.* In terms of the underlying structure of identity and attachment Ontario is similar to the rest of Canada. Quebec on the other hand is quite different. Although there are some cross-cutting loyalties and patterns of similarity Quebec really is distinct in its patterns of attachment and identification. Quebecers reveal *much* lower levels of attachment to Canada, but they have also shown sharply declining attachment to the province over the past four years. In fact, what distinguishes Quebecers from other Canadians today is *not* higher levels of attachment to Quebec but lower attachment to Canada (and significantly higher attachment to ethnic group). Quebecers' attachment to province has been quite mercurial and this turbulence is greater than in any other part of Canada. The sharp decline in attachment to province is also linked to a sharp decline in the intention to vote yes in a future referendum.<sup>27</sup>

## IS THERE A CANADIAN IDENTITY? DOES IT MATTER?

Our data indicate that there is a Canadian identity, that Canadians believe that there is a national identity, and that it is a source of pride and belonging. Moreover, there is also a Quebec identity which coexists with this Canadian identity, although Quebecers reveal mixed allegiances. In English Canada, *Canadian* identity is clearer and more important to the citizenry. This identity

is somewhat vague and amorphous; it is a loose combination of diversity, values, political-geography, and state-nationalism. In Quebec, identity is more pluralistic and split across ethno-linguistic nationalism for Quebec and allegiance to Canada.

Canadian identity, although confused, is extremely important, particularly for English Canadians. It engenders powerful attachment (even against international comparison) and it outstrips all other sources of belonging (save family). Canadian identity is strongest in older, less secure anglophones. By corollary, identity is weaker amongst the more secure, younger and agile portions of Canadian society. Our data also suggest that identities do not compete; they reinforce each other, particularly at the local/regional level. Quebec is an exception to this reinforcement rule: country and province do compete. However, the Canada-province link is strong throughout the rest of the country. For most Canadians, the province-Canada question is not an issue of either/or. In fact, they tend to mutually reinforce each other.

#### DESCRIBING NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTACHMENT

Dimensional analysis of linked attitudinal data reveals a theoretically plausible underlying structure of national identity. The key ingredients are values, which separate clearly into conservative and liberal values; attachment to other geographic and social groups; attitudes to government; and attitudes to skills, technology, and globalization (the latter is less reliable). This structure can be applied (loosely) on a pan-Canadian basis.

If we restrict attention to sources of belonging (i.e., family, province, community, and ethnic group) we are incapable of developing a Canada-wide model. Quebec splits into two dimensions with province, ethnic group, community and family all forming one factor (blood and belonging?) and belonging to Canada on its own, with a strong negative loading for province. In Ontario, and the rest of Canada, the belonging variables are unidimensional with each tending to reinforce the other.

#### EXPLAINING NATIONAL ATTACHMENT

The explanatory analysis suggests that attitudes and interaction with government positively correlates with Canadian nationalism. The overall analyses suggest that government in general and the federal government in particular are key sources of national attachment. Although Canadians do not reduce Canada to government, the state is inextricably linked to the future of Canadian nationalism. The relationship is clearly not a simple linear relationship. One can reasonably speculate that the response of the federal state is the key

conditional variable underlying the future of nationalism in Canada (and Quebec).

Values are connected to sense of belonging although the intensity and direction of these connections varies by the value considered the social setting. For example, conservative values are positively linked to Canadian nationalism in Quebec whereas liberal values are positively linked in Ontario. We also find that in general, self-professed idealism and non-economic values are more strongly linked to the sense of belonging. This connection may help explain the partial failure of economic-materialistic theories to account for recent trends, although there is evidence that perception of vested interests are separately linked to nationalist sentiments in a rational manner.

Another key conclusion is that blending Quebec with Ontario or the rest of Canada tends to obscure certain important dynamics of nationalism. Although some forces work the same way (e.g., a positive perception of the role of governments in general), other key forces work in opposite directions. For example, belonging to province *reinforces* belonging to Canada in Ontario, but sharply *reduces* belonging to Canada in Quebec. In general, sense of belonging to one level reinforces sense of belonging to all other levels and by corollary disconnection at one level is linked to broader alienation.

#### LOOKING FORWARD: WHITHER CANADA?

The preceding conclusions are firmly rooted in our empirical analysis. We can also speculate about broader issues which are too important to be left to the purely empirical realm. We believe that we can construct reasoned conjectures about the forces driving levels of attachment. This provides an alternative picture of nationalism which is at least as firmly rooted in logic and evidence as some of the more dramatic accounts of the ongoing weakening and demise of Canadian nationalism. Our analysis leads to some areas of broad agreement, with some of the pressures on Canadian attachment, but leaves open the strong possibility of the persistence of a strong, dominant national identity (in English Canada) albeit with significant alterations.

So are we really witnessing the end of the nation-state as a source of salient identification? Is national affiliation fading against the backdrop of globalization and an anachronistic federal state? Somewhat surprisingly, there was a general rise in national attachment in Canada (and even the United States) between 1980 and 1990; meanwhile, attachment to communities went down despite the rising localism claims of some theorists (e.g., Courchene's "globalism"). In Canada, the trend in favour of country was even more pronounced. The nation-state may be fading, but the empirical attitudinal evidence shows that this has yet to express itself in the realm of public attitudes.

The key conditional question lies in the future response of the federal state. In Canada, the state has played a crucial role in constructing national identity. This linkage is clearly evident in several lines of the analysis presented here. If the Canadian federal state does not offer a vigorous and different vision of Canada to younger Canadians then the seeds of dissolution evident in our analysis may take root. On the other hand, there is ample evidence of strong demand and preference for the construction of a new twenty-first century Canadian identity. Although hazardous social forecasting is a tempting exercise, those seeing one clear future path poses either more skill or courage than this analyst. Certain trends and conditional outcomes are more plausible than others.

The recent crisis of federalism linked to fiscal and unity woes has had the ironic impact of strengthening national attachments while weakening provincial attachments. The long-term viability of this crisis effect as a boon to Canadian nationalism is highly questionable, as is the thesis of how self-sustaining it is. In our survey research, Canadians themselves discount the possibility of a rudderless, standardless Canada surviving. Moreover, generational shifts suggest weakening attachment amongst the youngest cohort (who have experienced diminished federalism during this period).

One of the more important but less obvious conclusions that we draw is that the production of a national identity is more strongly linked to ideals and values than programs and policies (although these two interact). Material interests and political economy appear to exert a significant but modest influence on national attachment. It appears, however, that values and ideals are even more potent forces. In particular, the case of Ontario vividly contradicts the thesis that sentimental attachments will follow political/economic interests.

It may well be that the desire for a sense of place, community and meaning in a too-rapidly changing world is more important than the rational calculus of benefits and costs. The elusiveness of these conclusions to many elites may lie in class differences in acknowledging the role of idealistic and materialistic factors. Our ongoing research in the *Rethinking Government* project shows that elites give far greater prominence to economic-material factors than do the general public. These polarizing trends may be reinforced by the role of globalization, technology and the new class (of cosmopolitan symbolic analysts). Our analysis reveals that participation in the new class, use of new information technology and feeling well-equipped to negotiate globalization all lead to a diminished need for a national identity. Insecurity, however, both cultural and economic, is at least as prevalent as security. Perhaps this is why the putative collapse of nationalism, tribalism, and ideology, predicted by various post-industrial theorists has failed to materialize.

Localism, regionalism, and cosmopolitanism may all blend to displace nationalism in the next millennium. Canada may well disappear and citizens may even be happier under this new order. After all, state nationalism and

multi-ethnic federalism are merely ephemeral blips in the evolution of human sources of identity and community. In the meantime, however, we must consider that the very recent trends based on empirical analysis of claimed identities and attachments of citizens themselves do not follow these patterns or predictions. Moreover, Canadians demonstrate an intense penchant for maintaining this somewhat improbable model of identity and attachment.

## NOTES

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1. For example, see George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965)
2. Thomas Courchene with C. Telmer, *From Heartland to North American Region State* (Toronto: Centre for Public Management, University of Toronto, 1998); Robert D. Kaplan, *An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America's Future* (New York: Random House, 1998).
3. The methodology for each year of the *Rethinking Government* study typically involves the following components: an initial telephone interview of over 200 questions with a random sample of 3,000 Canadians 16 years and over;
  - a second detailed telephone interview (over 150 questions) with approximately 1,500 of the original 3,000 public survey respondents;
  - a third survey of the general public (over 150 questions) with approximately 1,300 of the original 3,000 panel respondents, and 200 general public respondents;
  - six follow-up focus group sessions with respondents from "Rethinking Government"; and
  - a survey of the top governing and economic decisionmakers in Canada.

Question wording and sampling will be provided as data are introduced. Additional methodological information is provided in Appendix B.

4. Courchene, *From Heartland to North American Region State*, p. 14.
5. For a solid introduction to factor analysis, see Chapter 12 in Marija I Norusis/SPSS Inc., *SPSS Base System User's Guide* (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1990).
6. Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference* (Toronto: Broadview Press, 1996).
7. For an introductory discussion of these issues, see Frank Graves, "The Changing Role of Nonrandomized Research Designs in Assessment," in *Action Oriented*



- Evaluation in Organizations*, ed. Joe Hudson, John Mayne and Ray Thomlison (Toronto: Wall and Emerson Inc., 1992), pp. 230-54.
8. For a contemporary treatment of the topic, see Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging* (Toronto: Viking, 1993).
  9. Richard Gwyn, *Nationalism Without Walls* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995).
  10. The F statistic reported in the figure is essentially the ratio of the variance in the dependent variable (in this case the sense of belonging) that can be explained by the predictor or independent variable (in this case time) relative to the variance that can be explained using only the mean of the dependent variable as the predictor. The p value is the likelihood or probability that a statistic occurred by chance. A p value of less than 0.05 is generally used to reject the hypothesis that the observed statistic could have occurred by chance.
  11. Analysis of variance was conducted on the *Rethinking Government* data from 1994 to 1997. The March 1998 data presented in this and subsequent exhibits is drawn from EKOS Research Associates Inc.'s *Rethinking Citizen Engagement* study.
  12. Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference*.
  13. Ibid.
  14. Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko, "National Pride: A Cross-National Analysis," CSS Cross-National Report No. 19 (Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago, 1988).
  15. Maurice Pinard and Robert Bernier, *Un combat inachevé* (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1997).
  16. EKOS, "Rethinking Government IV."
  17. Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*.
  18. The analyses were performed using a principal components extraction with a varimax rotation.
  19. See H.H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis*, 2d ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
  20. A fourth factor consisted of measure of confidence in skills and self-rated ability to work with computers. However, the reliability coefficient for this factor was relatively low.
  21. For example, see Gwyn, *Nationalism Without Walls*.
  22. Ibid.
  23. Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for the 21st Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
  24. Regression models allow the testing of the relationship between one independent variable or predictor and the dependent variable while holding the effect of all other variables in the model constant. A Beta coefficient measures the amount of change in the dependent variable as a result of one standardized (e.g., using

two scores, which are the result of subtracting the mean from each value of a variable and dividing the result by its standard deviation, having a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) unit of change in the independent or predictor variable, controlling for or holding constant all other variables in the regression model. Since both the dependent and independent variables are standardized, the coefficients between different variables can be compared. The Bs, or unstandardized regression coefficients, measure the amount of change in the dependent variable as a result of a change of one unit in predictor. But since the units of measurement are not standardized, the coefficients for different variables cannot be compared unless they have the same unit of measurement. For example, comparing an unstandardized coefficient for total household income and the age of the respondent would be meaningless since one variable has a unit of measurement in the thousands and the other virtually never exceeds 100. Since the unstandardized coefficients (Bs) in the model are sensitive to differences in the units of measurement for each predictor, the standardized coefficients (Betas) should be used to compare results between different predictors used in the models. Fred N. Kerlinger and Elazar J. Pedhazur, *Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973).

25. The scales were simple additive scales which were the sum of each variable listed in Tables 1 to 3. To maintain the original seven-point scale measurement, each summary measure was divided by the number of variables used to create the measure, yielding an average score that ranged between one and seven.
26. The dummy variable for Quebec is a variable which is coded one if the respondent is from Quebec, and zero otherwise. This variable measures how much higher or lower on the dependent measure residents of Quebec tend to be compared to respondents from all other regions, all other variables in the equation being held constant.
27. See EKOS Research Associates Inc, *Press Release*, "Sovereignty Movement at Ebb Point as Charest Enters Quebec Theatre," 1 April 1998.

## APPENDIX A

### Correlation Between Sense of Belonging to Canada and Attitudinal Variables

*Table A-1: Correlation Between Sense of Belonging to Canada  
and Values — Canada*

<i>Attitudinal Variables</i>	<i>Sense of Belonging... Canada</i>	
	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	<i>Two-Tailed Significance</i>
Liberal factor	0.180	0.000
Neo-conservative factor	0.248	0.000
Nationalism factor	0.577	0.000
Sense of belonging... your community	0.276	0.000
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group and national ancestry	0.014	0.600
Sense of belonging... your family	0.195	0.000
How would you rate your ability to work with computers?	-0.086	0.001
I'm confident that I have a knowledge and skills necessary	-0.175	0.000
How important... Canadian identity	0.519	0.001
How important... national unity	0.484	0.000
How important... hard work	0.286	0.000
How important... distribution of equality among all regions of Canada	0.242	0.000
How important... security and safety	0.214	0.000
How important... respect for authority	0.201	0.000
How important... clean environment	0.165	0.000
How important... tolerance for different people, cultures, and ideas	0.163	0.000
How important... thriftiness	0.129	0.000
How important... healthy population	0.132	0.000
How important... social cohesion	0.135	0.000
How important... family values	0.135	0.000
How important... freedom	0.112	0.000
How important... collective human rights	0.083	0.002
How important... social equality	0.085	0.001
How important... minimal government intrusions	0.062	0.020
How important... prosperity and wealth	0.061	0.023
How important... preservation of heritage	0.053	0.044
How important... distribution of wealth among poor and rich	-0.010	0.712
How important... integrity and ethics	0.198	0.000
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.227	0.000

**Table A-2: Correlation Between Sense of Belonging to Canada and Values — Quebec**

<i>Attitudinal Variables</i>	<i>Sense of Belonging... Canada</i>	
	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	<i>Two-Tailed Significance</i>
Liberal factor	0.230	0.000
Neo-conservative factor	0.268	0.000
Nationalism factor	0.698	0.000
Sense of belonging... your community	0.180	0.001
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group and national ancestry	0.070	0.181
Sense of belonging... your family	0.100	0.055
How would you rate your ability to work with computers?	-0.106	0.044
I'm confident that I have a knowledge and skills necessary	-0.194	0.000
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.260	0.000

**Table A-3: Correlation Between Sense of Belonging to Canada and Values — Ontario**

<i>Attitudinal Variables</i>	<i>Sense of Belonging... Canada</i>	
	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	<i>Two-Tailed Significance</i>
Liberal factor	0.292	0.000
Neo-conservative factor	0.196	0.000
Nationalism factor	0.382	0.000
Sense of belonging... your community	0.277	0.000
Sense of belonging... your ethnic group and national ancestry	0.190	0.000
Sense of belonging... your family	0.383	0.000
How would you rate your ability to work with computers?	-0.105	0.034
I'm confident that I have a knowledge and skills necessary	0.035	0.485
All in all, government is a positive force in my life	0.272	0.000

## APPENDIX B

### Survey Marginals

#### Frequencies

The following frequencies are drawn from *Rethinking Government 1994 to 1997* and *Rethinking Citizen Engagement 1998 Surveys*. Included are the complete questions with preambles as well as frequencies, means, standard deviations, and number of respondents.

#### RG94-1

#### FAM

##### Your family

01	Not strong at all .....	1	0%
02	.....	2	0
03	.....	3	1
04	Moderately strong .....	4	2
05	.....	5	4
06	.....	6	-
07	Extremely strong .....	7	9 x=6.71
08	DK/NR .....	9	84 s=0.81
			0 n=2369

#### COMM

##### Your community

01	Not strong at all .....	1	2%
02	.....	2	2
03	.....	3	3
04	Moderately strong .....	4	13
05	.....	5	17
06	.....	6	24 -
07	Extremely strong .....	7	37 x=5.62
08	DK/NR .....	9	37 s=1.47
			0 n=2369

#### PROV1

##### Your province

01	Not strong at all .....	1	3%
02	.....	2	2
03	.....	3	4
04	Moderately strong .....	4	15
05	.....	5	17
06	.....	6	23 -
07	Extremely strong .....	7	37 x=5.57
08	DK/NR .....	9	37 s=1.51
			0 n=2369

**COUN**

Canada			
01 Not strong at all .....	1	3%	
02 .....	2	2	
03 .....	3	3	
04 Moderately strong .....	4	11	
05 .....	5	11	-
06 .....	6	18	x=5.85
07 Extremely strong .....	7	51	s=1.55
08 DK/NR .....	9	0	n=2369

**RBEL4**

Some people have a strong sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following. Please use a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the mid-point 4 means moderately strong.

**YFAM4**

Rotation => YRELG

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG...TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING ON A 7-POINT SCALE**

Your family			
01 Not strong at all .....	1	1%	
02 .....	2	1	
03 .....	3	1	
04 Moderately strong .....	4	3	
05 .....	5	6	-
06 .....	6	16	x=6.47
07 Extremely strong .....	7	72	s=1.10
08 DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**YCOM4**

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG...TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING ON A 7-POINT SCALE**

Your community			
01 Not strong at all .....	1	3%	
02 .....	2	2	
03 .....	3	4	
04 Moderately strong .....	4	16	
05 .....	5	23	-
06 .....	6	25	x=5.39
07 Extremely strong .....	7	28	s=1.47
08 DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**YPROV****MESSAGE: HOW STRONG...TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING ON A 7-POINT SCALE**

Your province

01	Not strong at all .....	1	2%	
02	.....	2	2	
03	.....	3	3	
04	Moderately strong .....	4	11	
05	.....	5	17	
06	.....	6	25	x=5.76
07	Extremely strong .....	7	40	s=1.38
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**YCANA****MESSAGE: HOW STRONG...TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING ON A 7-POINT SCALE**

Canada

01	Not strong at all .....	1	3%	
02	.....	2	2	
03	.....	3	2	
04	Moderately strong .....	4	6	
05	.....	5	10	
06	.....	6	22	x=5.99
07	Extremely strong .....	7	54	s=1.51
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**YETHC****MESSAGE: HOW STRONG...TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING ON A 7-POINT SCALE**

Your ethnic group or national ancestry

01	Not strong at all .....	1	4%	
02	.....	2	3	
03	.....	3	5	
04	Moderately strong .....	4	17	
05	.....	5	19	
06	.....	6	22	x=5.25
07	Extremely strong .....	7	29	s=1.63
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

RG96-1

P8

Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following. Please use a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the mid-point 4 means moderately strong.

YFAM8

Rotation => YETH8

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...**

Your family

	Quebec	All		
01 Not strong at all	1	1%	1%	
02	2	1	0	
03	3	1	1	
04 Moderately strong	4	5	3	
05	5	4	3	-
06	6	11	10	x=6.7
07 Extremely strong	7	77	82	s=1.0
08 DK/NR	9	1	0	n=2961

YCOM8

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...**

Your community

	Quebec	All		
01 Not strong at all	1	6%	3%	
02	2	4	3	
03	3	6	5	
04 Moderately strong	4	21	17	
05	5	19	19	-
06	6	16	22	x=5.4
07 Extremely strong	7	27	31	s=1.6
08 DK/NR	9	1	0	n=2961

YPRV8

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...**

Your province

	Quebec	All		
01 Not strong at all	1	3%	3%	
02	2	2	2	
03	3	3	4	
04 Moderately strong	4	18	16	
05	5	14	18	-
06	6	18	21	x=5.4
07 Extremely strong	7	41	35	s=1.6
08 DK/NR	9	0	0	n=2961



## YCANA

MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...

Canada

	Quebec	All		
01 Not strong at all .....	1	11%	3%	
02 .....	2	6	2	
03 .....	3	5	2	
04 Moderately strong .....	4	22	9	
05 .....	5	13	10	-
06 .....	6	14	19	x=6.0
07 Extremely strong .....	7	28	55	s=1.5
08 DK/NR .....	9	1	0	n=2961
		n=726		

## YETH8

MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...

Your ethnic group or national ancestry

	Quebec	All		
01 Not strong at all .....	1	4%	9%	
02 .....	2	4	7	
03 .....	3	3	5	
04 Moderately strong .....	4	21	22	
05 .....	5	15	16	-
06 .....	6	17	14	x=4.8
07 Extremely strong .....	7	36	27	s=1.9
08 DK/NR .....	9	1	0	n=2948
		n=984		

## RG97-1

Some people have a stronger sense of belonging to some things than others. Please tell me how strong your own personal sense of belonging is to each of the following, using a 7-point scale where 1 means not strong at all, 7 means extremely strong and the mid-point 4 means moderately strong.

## BFA10

MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...

Your family

01 Not strong at all .....	1	1%	
02 .....	2	1	
03 .....	3	1	
04 Moderately strong .....	4	4	
05 .....	5	5	-
06 .....	6	11	x=6.53
07 Extremely strong .....	7	76	s=1.07
08 DK/NR .....	9	0	n=3007

**BCO10**

*MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...*

Your community		
01	Not strong at all .....	1 3%
02	.....	2 3
03	.....	3 4
04	Moderately strong .....	4 19
05	.....	5 23
06	.....	6 21
07	Extremely strong .....	7 27
08	DK/NR .....	9 0

x=5.24  
s=1.56  
n=3007

**BPR10**

*MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...*

Your province		
01	Not strong at all .....	1 3%
02	.....	2 3
03	.....	3 4
04	Moderately strong .....	4 17
05	.....	5 19
06	.....	6 21
07	Extremely strong .....	7 32
08	DK/NR .....	9 0

x=5.37  
s=1.58  
n=3008

**BCA10**

*MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...*

Canada		
01	Not strong at all .....	1 4%
02	.....	2 2
03	.....	3 3
04	Moderately strong .....	4 10
05	.....	5 10
06	.....	6 19
07	Extremely strong .....	7 52
08	DK/NR .....	9 0

x=5.89  
s=1.57  
n=3010

**BRT10**

*MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR OWN PERSONAL SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...*

Your ethnic group or national ancestry		
01	Not strong at all .....	1 9%
02	.....	2 5
03	.....	3 6
04	Moderately strong .....	4 20
05	.....	5 17
06	.....	6 14
07	Extremely strong .....	7 27
08	DK/NR .....	9 1

x=4.87  
s=1.89  
n=2979

*Rethinking Citizen Engagement*

**POV1**

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...**

Your province

01	Not strong at all .....	1	4%	
02	.....	2	3	
03	.....	3	5	
04	Moderately strong .....	4	18	
05	.....	5	22	-
06	.....	6	22	x=5.22
07	Extremely strong .....	7	27	s=1.58
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=2042

**CAN1**

**MESSAGE: HOW STRONG IS YOUR SENSE OF BELONGING TO ...**

Canada

01	Not strong at all .....	1	3%	
02	.....	2	2	
03	.....	3	4	
04	Moderately strong .....	4	12	
05	.....	5	12	-
06	.....	6	19	x=5.73
07	Extremely strong .....	7	47	s=1.61
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=2042

**CCI**

Please tell me how you feel about each of the following statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means your strongly agree, and the midpoint 4 means neither.

**OCUL4**

Rotation => GRED4

**MESSAGE: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ...**

One of the biggest problems with Canada is that we don't have a strong overall culture to unite the country.

01	Strongly disagree .....	1	12%	
02	.....	2	11	
03	.....	3	12	
04	Neither .....	4	15	
05	.....	5	19	-
06	.....	6	15	x=4.31
07	Strongly agree .....	7	17	s=1.96
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**PRID4**

MESSAGE: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ...

Canadian culture is something we can all take pride in.

01	Strongly disagree.....	1	2%	
02	.....	2	2	
03	.....	3	3	
04	Neither .....	4	9	
05	.....	5	13	-
06	.....	6	25	x=5.85
07	Strongly agree .....	7	47	s=1.45
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**NCID4**

MESSAGE: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ...

There really is no distinct Canadian identity.

01	Strongly disagree.....	1	19%	
02	.....	2	16	
03	.....	3	13	
04	Neither .....	4	12	
05	.....	5	14	-
06	.....	6	12	x=3.78
07	Strongly agree .....	7	13	s=2.06
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**CCUL4**

MESSAGE: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ...

It may be difficult to identify precisely but there definitely is a unique Canadian culture.

01	Strongly disagree.....	1	3%	
02	.....	2	4	
03	.....	3	4	
04	Neither .....	4	13	
05	.....	5	21	-
06	.....	6	26	x=5.39
07	Strongly agree .....	7	29	s=1.54
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

**GRE4**

MESSAGE: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ...

One of Canada's greatest sources of national identity is our cultural diversity.

01	Strongly disagree.....	1	4%	
02	.....	2	3	
03	.....	3	5	
04	Neither .....	4	12	
05	.....	5	23	-
06	.....	6	27	x=5.31
07	Strongly agree .....	7	25	s=1.56
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	n=1204

RG96-1

Next I am going to read you a number of statements. Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means you strongly agree and the midpoint 4 means you neither agree nor disagree.

**GEOG8**

Because of our vast geography and the diversity of our people, Canada cannot survive without a strong national government to provide shared goals and values.

01	Strongly disagree.....	1	5%	
02	.....	2	4	
03	.....	3	4	
04	Neither.....	4	12	
05	.....	5	15	-
06	.....	6	23	x=5.5
07	Strongly agree.....	7	38	s=1.7
08	DK/NR.....	9	0	n=1508

**SNS8M**

Rotation =&gt; SNS8W

**MESSAGE: HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE STRONG NATIONAL STANDARDS IN THE AREA OF ...**

Medicare

01	Not at all important.....	1	1%	
02	.....	2	1	
03	.....	3	1	
04	Somewhat important.....	4	6	
05	.....	5	9	-
06	.....	6	21	x=6.3
07	Extremely important.....	7	61	s=1.2
08	DK/NR.....	9	0	n=2961

**GPOS8**

All in all, government is a positive force in my life.

01	Strongly disagree.....	1	15%	
02	.....	2	10	
03	.....	3	12	
04	Neither.....	4	26	
05	.....	5	17	-
06	.....	6	11	x=3.9
07	Strongly agree.....	7	10	s=1.8
08	DK/NR.....	9	8	n=2959

**Q61**

In the past three months, approximately how often have you personally had direct contact with the federal government, either initiated by yourself or a government official, including in-person, mail and telephone contacts?

01	Never .....	1	-
02	DK/NR .....	9	x=1.9, s=6.6, n=2963

**RG97-1**

I am going to read you a number of statements. Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means you strongly agree and the mid-point 4 means you neither agree nor disagree.

**KN10**

I'm confident that I have the knowledge and skills necessary to move easily in today's labour market.

01	Strongly disagree .....	1	6%	
02	.....	2	4	
03	.....	3	5	
04	Neither .....	4	16	
05	.....	5	15	-
06	.....	6	21	x=5.07
07	Strongly agree .....	7	25	s=1.79
08	DK/NR .....	9	7	n=2814

**RG95-3**

I am going to read you a number of statements. Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means you strongly agree and the mid-point 4 means you neither agree nor disagree.

**IMPO6**

**MESSAGE: DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT?**

The most important things in life don't depend on money.

01	Strongly disagree .....	1	6%
02	.....	2	5
03	.....	3	7
04	Neither .....	4	11
05	.....	5	17
06	.....	6	22
07	Strongly agree .....	7	32
08	DK/NR .....	9	0

x=5.2  
s=1.8  
n=1385

## RG97-2

I am going to read you a number of statements. Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means you strongly agree and the mid-point 4 means you neither agree nor disagree.

## ACC11

How would you rate your ability to access the internet? Please rate your answer on a 7-point scale where 1 is extremely poor, 7 is excellent and 4 is average.

01	Extremely poor .....	1	33%	
02	.....	2	6	
03	.....	3	5	
04	Average .....	4	16	
05	.....	5	7	
06	.....	6	11	$\bar{x}=3.71$
07	Excellent .....	7	19	$s=2.35$
08	DK/NR .....	9	0	$n=1475$

## RG96-1

I am going to read you a number of statements. Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements using a 7-point scale where 1 means you strongly disagree, 7 means you strongly agree and the mid-point 4 means you neither agree nor disagree.

## PROV8

My province puts more money into confederation than it gets out.

01	Strongly disagree .....	1	7%	
02	.....	2	6	
03	.....	3	6	
04	Neither .....	4	29	
05	.....	5	11	
06	.....	6	13	$\bar{x}=4.7$
07	Strongly agree .....	7	23	$s=1.8$
08	DK/NR .....	9	5	$n=1471$



# VI

## Chronology



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## Chronology of Events July 1997 – June 1998

*Melissa Kluger*

An index of these events begins on page 393

3 July 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

A report is released by the BC legislature's aboriginal affairs committee indicating that the cost of settling the province's land claim issues could be up to \$1.4 billion. The year-long study advocates a streamlined treaty process as the best direction for settling land claims. The report includes: a call to the BC and federal governments to apologize for injustices that the native people have suffered, elimination of native tax-free status, and the implementation of native self-governments. Their jurisdiction will include: local health and education, language, land use, and taxation. The report endorses the Nisga'a land-claim agreement, the only major treaty near completion; but a minority statement from Opposition members criticizes the agreement for being too vague and urges a provincial referendum before any treaties are signed.

7 July 1997  
*Fisheries*

Federal Fisheries Minister David Anderson announces that the government will continue to aid East Coast fishermen and plant workers after the \$1.9 billion Atlantic Groundfish Strategy, established in 1994, runs out a year early than expected. Anderson, new to his portfolio, says he is aware of the necessity of transitional measures but does not offer details as to how the new aid will be distributed.

- 9 July 1997  
*Unity*
- The federal government supports a move to put national unity on the agenda at the upcoming annual Premiers' Conference. The meeting will include a brief from the Business Council on National Issues. Representing high-powered business groups, this package emphasizes the need for a rebalancing of federal and provincial powers, equality of the provinces and recognition of the distinct needs of Quebecers. On 10 July Premier Lucien Bouchard dismisses the proposal, saying that there is nothing in it that has not already been rejected.
- 12 July 1997  
*Premiers*
- Nova Scotia Liberals choose federal MP Russell MacLellan as their new leader and premier. MacLellan has promised Nova Scotians that his government will work to ease the burden of the blended sales tax, eliminate proposed tolls for the new provincial highway and work toward a better deal for the province on pipeline tolls from Sable Island's natural gas.
- 14 July 1997  
*Sovereignty*
- Andre Joli-Coeur is appointed by the Supreme Court of Canada to participate in the legal arguments to determine whether or not Quebec has the right to secede unilaterally. Known as a sovereigntist, the Quebec City lawyer will act as a friend of the court in the case that will be brought in the fall. While representing separatist interests, Joli-Coeur will not formally represent the Quebec government, as the province maintains that any decision about secession must be determined by a vote of the people and not through the courts.
- 14 July 1997  
*Energy*
- Nova Scotia's premier-designate, Russell MacLellan, introduces a new toll proposal for the Sable Island natural gas development. MacLellan wants to scrap the June agreement which gives Nova Scotia's gas distributors a 10-percent discount on tolls for the first eight years and New Brunswick 4 percent for three years, and to establish a new agreement in which tolls are determined by volume.
- 18 July 1997  
*Premiers*
- Nova Scotia's new premier, Russell MacLellan, and his Liberal Cabinet are sworn in.
- 23 July 1997  
*Quebec*
- Federalist and sovereigntists clash over the unveiling of a statue at the entrance to the Plains of Abraham of Charles de Gaulle. It was paid for by the Quebec government.

25 July 1997  
*Health*

Four Canadian hepatitis C victims file a class action suit against the Red Cross, the federal government, and eight provinces for failing to test the blood supply for the dangerous virus. Federal Health Minister Allan Rock says that, if he can get support from the provinces, he will consider compensation. The suit seeks damages of \$3.5 billion.

29 July 1997  
*Fisheries*

The Fisheries Resource Conservation Council issues a warning about the future of the East Coast fishing industry. The report indicates that not enough action has been taken to improve the cod stocks. While some small commercial cod fishing has resumed, the report warns that there is hardly any opportunity for the industry to grow. The council urges the federal government to work with industry to reduce and restrict fishing activity.

30 July 1997  
*Premiers*

Alberta Premier Ralph Klein and Ontario Premier Mike Harris meet in Edmonton. The premiers agree that Ottawa must hand over some of its power to the provinces in the areas of health, education, and welfare. They suggest that such a rebalancing of power would help in convincing Quebec that federalism is viable.

30 July 1997  
*National Unity*

Gordon Wilson, head of the BC Progressive Democratic Alliance Party, submits the results of his "National Unity Project" to the BC government which had commissioned the study. The report suggests that BC should play a proactive role in the non-constitutional renewal of the federation while also developing contingency plans in the event of Quebec's secession. The government of BC distances itself from Wilson's report which results in his resignation as constitutional advisor to Premier Glen Clark.

31 July 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

At an Assembly of First Nations meeting, leader Phil Fontaine speaks of new partnerships with Ottawa as well as with businesses, community, and interest groups which share native concerns. Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart assures delegates that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples will not be ignored and that the report is being studied in order to decide how its recommendations will be implemented.

- 1 August 1997  
*Health*
- The British Columbia Supreme Court rules that the province's decision to cut the pay of new doctors who refuse to practise in remote areas contravenes the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and the *Canada Health Act*. BC is just one of a number of provinces that has introduced a policy of this nature to prevent doctors from opening new practices in the major cities where there are already more than enough.
- 6 August 1997  
*Unity*
- Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard writes a letter to New Brunswick Premier Frank McKenna reprimanding McKenna for supporting a Quebec partitionist group. This prompts a response from Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion, who then exchanges letters with Quebec in order to show Quebecers the potential consequences of separation. Dion warns that Quebec will not have international respect without Canada's support and says that separatists cannot use Canadian law only when it is to their advantage. On 28 August, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien praises Dion's letters, saying that they have earned Ottawa increased support in the west and have encouraged debate within Quebec.
- 7-8 August 1997  
*Premiers' Conference*
- Premiers and territorial leaders meet in St. Andrews, NB. The leaders urge Ottawa to reduce Employment Insurance premiums by 25 percent and create a youth employment strategy. Led by Ontario, the provinces agree to ask Ottawa to hand over some of its control in areas such as health, education, and welfare — areas that are constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the provinces. Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard says his province will not be a part of the other leaders' agreement, explaining that no Quebec premier would accept the premise that Ottawa has jurisdiction over social programs. Also at the meeting, the nine federalist premiers and two territorial leaders agree to meet again in the next few months to discuss Canadian unity without representation from Quebec or from Ottawa. Bouchard calls the planned meeting a waste of time and says that it will lead nowhere.
- 13 August 1997  
*Health*
- The Ontario Health Services Restructuring Commission announces that Ottawa's Monfort Hospital will not be shut

down, as had been announced previously, but will continue to operate with reduced services. The announcement follows a politically charged campaign to save the province's only francophone hospital.

13 August 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples/  
Natural Resources*

The Alberta government approves the proposal for a \$250-million coal mine on the boundary of Jasper National Park. Local people file a treaty and land claim in an attempt to block the development. The approval, which is waiting for federal sanction, is consistent with recommendations that were put forth by a federal-provincial panel in June.

14 August 1997  
*Fisheries*

In an attempt to prevent British Columbia from escalating the salmon war between Canada and the United States, the federal government files a law suit in the BC Supreme Court. BC Premier Glen Clark had threatened that on 22 August he would terminate the navy's lease on the Nanoose Bay testing site if the dispute over salmon quotas was not resolved. The federal government argues that BC does not have a legitimate reason for terminating the lease and that its cancellation would violate an international defence treaty with the United States. Clark writes to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien that Ottawa has performed "a great disservice to BC" by undermining the province's decision and failing to represent national interests.

14 August 1997  
*Health/Children*

In response to recent deaths of children in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, the federal Health Department launches its first national study on child abuse. The three-year, \$500,000 study will investigate reported cases of neglect and abuse. It will also study the relationship between child abuse and socio-economic factors.

18 August 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

The federal government agrees to buy land from the Quebec community of Oka. The 12,000 square metres of land will be used to expand a Mohawk cemetery. The agreement resolves one of the outstanding issues left over from the 1990 crisis at Oka, in which police raided barricades erected by the Mohawks in protest over the expansion of a golf course in and around the native cemetery. This most recent agreement is part of an ongoing effort by Ottawa to create a continuous land base for the 1,200 Mohawks.

- 19 August 1997  
*Unity*  
New Brunswick Premier Frank McKenna announces that Canada's premiers, minus Quebec's Lucien Bouchard, will meet to discuss national unity. The meeting, scheduled for September, will be held in Calgary in an attempt to confront the controversial issue.
- 20 August 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*  
The General Council of the United Church of Canada expresses its sorrow for its role in the native residential school system, but fails to offer an apology. The Church has gone to court to hold the federal government responsible for its role in the operation of residential schools in British Columbia.
- 20 August 1997  
*Health*  
Federal Health Minister Allan Rock acknowledges that the cuts in health-care transfer payments have hurt. Speaking to the Canadian Medical Association in Victoria, Rock did not promise new money, but did say that the reduction in transfer payments to the provinces is over – leaving \$6 billion more than expected over the next five years. Representatives vote against a BC motion for private health care and urge the government to restore adequate health-care funding in order to prevent a two-tiered system. \*
- 20 August 1997  
*Quebec*  
Leon Dion, dean of Quebec constitutional experts and father of federal Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion, dies in Sillery, Quebec at the age of 74.
- 22 August 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*  
The Sechelt Indian band of British Columbia is offered \$48.2 million and 348 hectares of land to settle its land claim. The deal also includes the transfer of 11 commercial fishing licences and a commitment to giving the band municipal powers. In exchange for this offer, the Sechelt band will be required to start paying sales and income taxes within 12 years.
- 25 August 1997  
*Quebec/Premiers*  
Dr. Vivan Rakoff, former director of the Clarke Institute admits that the psychological profile he drew of Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard was unscientific and influenced by his own political biases. Commissioned by Liberal MP John Godfrey, Rakoff had concluded that Bouchard might suffer from "esthetic character disorder" – emotional zoning in which a person can be passionate about a project only to then drop it and take up an entirely different cause.

26 August 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

The Newfoundland Court of Appeal grants an injunction to Labrador Innu and Inuit to stop Inco Ltd's construction of a temporary road and airstrip near Voisey's Bay. The injunction is established pending an appeal of an earlier decision that allowed the construction after determining that the road and airstrip were for exploratory purposes only.

2 September 1997  
*Sovereignty/Unity*

The Supreme Court of Canada grants lawyer Guy Bertrand his request to present partitionist resolutions as part of his intervention in the federal government's case regarding the legality of Quebec secession. Bertrand says, "we can't talk about separation without talking about partition."

5 September 1997  
*Education*

After 73 percent of Newfoundlanders voted in a referendum to move to a non-denominational school system, legislators pass a resolution that asks Ottawa to allow the reform. The Pentecostal and Roman Catholic churches, which have traditionally controlled the province's church-run school system, vow to continue their fight against the reforms.

9 September 1997  
*Sovereignty/  
Aboriginal Peoples*

Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard announces that he has resumed talks on self-government with Quebec's Inuit community. The talks began four years ago, but were pushed aside by the 1995 provincial referendum. The talks are just one of a number of efforts by the premier to improve relations with native communities as debate grows about the partitioning of the Quebec. Quebec's aboriginal community has opposed separation.

9 September 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

Ottawa introduces third-party management on Alberta's Stoney Reserve, appointing management firm Coopers and Lybrand to take control of the reserve's finances. This new arrangement comes in the wake of accusations of mismanagement and corruption on the reserve. In 1996-97, the Stoney had a \$5.6 million deficit, even though they had received \$50 million from Ottawa and natural gas royalty revenue. On 13 September the federal Indian Affairs Department turns financial information about the reserve over to the RCMP for a criminal investigation.

11 September 1997  
*Health*

Canada's health ministers meet in Fredericton to draft an agreement for a new national blood agency. Federal Health Minister Allan Rock announces that Ottawa will contribute \$81 million over the next two years for the establishment of the agency. The ministers agree to establish an interim transition bureau to oversee takeover negotiations with the Red Cross. The bureau will include federal and consumer members and will have representation from all provinces except Quebec, as the province has decided to create its own blood agency. Also at the meeting, provincial health ministers call on Ottawa to grant more power over health care to the provinces since Ottawa is providing less funding. Rock says Ottawa will not surrender any of its power but agrees that the federal and provincial powers should be more cooperative on issues regarding the future of public health care.

11 September 1997  
*Fisheries*

British Columbia's Premier Glen Clark accuses the federal government of treason for undermining the province's attempt to force the United States to abide by treaty negotiations established to conserve salmon stocks. Also, on 10 September, BC accused the government of trespassing onto provincial territory off Vancouver. The territory is a weapons-testing site used by the American navy. BC threatened to evict the navy, which, in turn, led to a suit filed by Ottawa.

12 September 1997  
*Social Services*

Social services ministers from the federal, provincial, and territorial governments, except for Quebec, release a paper that outlines steps to reduce the depth and extent of child poverty in Canada and to help low-income parents to remain in the workforce. The new National Child Benefit will be implemented in July 1998 in an effort to improve support for families with net incomes below \$26,000. The paper defines the roles of the federal, provincial, and territorial governments in the development and administration of the new system, and reaffirms their commitment to building a better future for Canada's children.

14 September 1997  
*Unity*

The nine federalist premiers of Canada agree to consult their citizens in order to determine a way in which to recognize Quebec's unique status. At the Calgary meeting, the premiers declare that Quebec's unique character is



essential to the makeup of the country, but also insist that all Canadians and provinces are equal and therefore any constitutional amendment that confers powers to one province must be conferred to all. The premiers also schedule a 18 November meeting with aboriginal leaders, who were excluded from the Calgary meeting. Quebec's minister of intergovernmental affairs, Jacques Brassard, sees no improvement for his province in the premiers' declaration and explains, "The only thing that could give full satisfaction to Quebecers ... is to recognize Quebec as a people." On 16 September, Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard rejects the Calgary Declaration, calling it "insipid" and "banal." Meanwhile, the grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations, Phil Fontaine, complains that Quebec has been afforded more attention than Aboriginal peoples and that they have been "lumped in" with all of Canada's multicultural groups and have therefore not been given a high enough priority in the new unity framework.

16 September 1997  
*Natural Resources*

Heritage Minister Sheila Copps rejects a commercial development plan put forward by the Banff town council. Copps concludes that the plan, which would increase commercial development by 25 percent, would put the national park in grave danger.

17 September 1997  
*Sovereignty*

In response to the rising partitionist movement, Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Jacques Brassard announces the introduction of a new group in Quebec. This group, which may be called Democracy Quebec, will promote secession without partition and will work to counter the federal government's strong stand against separation.

19 September 1997  
*Education*

Federal Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Stéphane Dion, says that the government still intends to introduce a constitutional amendment to change the Quebec school system from religious-based to language-based, but adds that opponents to the change will still have the opportunity to raise their concerns before the final decision is made.

23 September 1997  
*Throne Speech*

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's Liberals begin their second mandate by announcing that the federal budget will be balanced by 1998-99, but leave open the possibility of eliminating the deficit even earlier. It is announced that

half of future surpluses will go toward social programs and the other half will go toward tax and debt reduction. More specifically, the government pledges to improve health-care services, increase financial assistance to students, invest in technology partnerships, increase the child-tax benefit, expand programs that provide aboriginal assistance, and work with the provinces to develop a framework for financing a national drug plan.

23 September 1997  
*Senate*

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien restores a Liberal majority in the upper chamber by appointing four new senators. The new members of Senate are: former Liberal MP Fernand Robichaud of New Brunswick, who gave up his seat to Chrétien; former premier of Prince Edward Island, Catherine Callbeck; social worker Marisa Ferratti Barth of Quebec, and Sister Mary Alice Butts of Nova Scotia, a Roman Catholic nun. The Senate now comprises 52 Liberals, 48 Conservatives and 3 Independents.

25 September 1997  
*Health*

Ontario Premier Mike Harris announces that his government will delay next year's proposed \$507 million budget cut for hospitals for at least a year. The announcement comes after the Ontario Hospital Association went public with two studies that indicated the dangerous effects of health-care cuts. Since the Conservative government has been in power, hospitals have seen their budgets cut drastically, first by \$365 million in 1996-97 and then by \$435 million in 1997-98. The association says that hospitals have been forced to close, merge or alter services at such an alarming speed that they have been unable to cope.

25 September 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart cancels planned changes to the *Indian Act*. The changes, which died on the order paper when the June election was called, were put forward by former Indian Affairs Minister Ron Irwin. The changes were met with dissent by aboriginal leaders who called for the abolition of the Act rather than an overhaul. Stewart is applauded by the grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations, Phil Fontaine, for her statement that she will not make changes to the Act without the support of Canada's Aboriginal people.

29 September 1997  
*Sovereignty*

French President Jacques Chirac holds a private meeting with Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard in which he tells Bouchard that "whatever path Quebec chooses, France will accompany it" and that "Quebec can count on the friendship and solidarity of France." Bouchard interprets this to mean that France would recognize an independent Quebec if it voted to secede from Canada. The following day, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin clarifies France's position by saying that his country does not intend to meddle in Canada-Quebec affairs. Also, on 30 September, Canada welcomes France's decision to cancel a postage stamp that marks former President Charles de Gaulle's visit to Quebec in 1967. The visit, in which de Gaulle proclaims "Vive le Quebec libre," fed the Quebec separatist movement.

2 October 1997  
*Environment*

Federal Fisheries Minister David Anderson gives the go-ahead for the establishment of an open-pit coal mine within 2.8 kilometres from Jasper National Park. Environmentalists, concerned about the impact the mine will have on the park's wildlife, threaten a court challenge.

6 October 1997  
*Sovereignty*

Quebec City lawyer Guy Bertrand announces he is going back to court to earn the right to pay his taxes to Ottawa if Quebec tries to secede unilaterally.

7 October 1997  
*Premiers*

Exactly ten years after he won every seat in the provincial legislature, Frank McKenna announces his resignation as New Brunswick's premier. Treasury Board President Marcel Massé calls the resignation "a loss for national unity," since McKenna played a key role in the development of the Calgary Declaration.

8 October 1997  
*Unity*

Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow takes over New Brunswick Premier Frank McKenna's lead role in the unity discussion. Romanow says he wants to deal with issues of national unity more quickly in order to build enthusiasm for the ideas put forth in Calgary. Romanow plans to hold a conference call among the premiers, who are in the midst of consulting their provinces about unity, to see what progress has been made since the Calgary Declaration on 14 September. Romanow hopes that each provincial

government will introduce unity resolutions into their legislatures by the spring. The resolutions would be non-constitutional statements of intent that would acknowledge Quebec's "unique" character and deal with the difficulties of unity. In the meantime, Romanow says it is important to remind Canadians of the everyday issues that prove that Canada works.

8 October 1997  
*Health*

Alberta's first private hospital starts treating patients. The hospital, which Federal Health Minister David Dingwall threatened to shut down, offers services not currently insured by the province's health plan, such as cosmetic and dental surgery. The hospital is still waiting for permission to perform operations that would require an overnight stay.

9 October 1997  
*Sovereignty*

The Supreme Court of Canada rules the spending restrictions of Quebec's referendum law to be an unconstitutional restriction of freedom of speech. Under the law, only Yes and No camps can authorize spending. Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard considers using the constitution's notwithstanding clause to preserve the provincial law.

9 October 1997  
*Fisheries*

Federal Fisheries Minister David Anderson says the government will continue to provide transitional support to East Coast fishermen after the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) expires. One option would be for the government to buy back fishing licences, since there are not enough cod stocks to support the number of fishermen. Future income support seems less likely. After Auditor-General Denis Desautels declared TAGS a failure, the Liberal government says it does not intend to "extend, renew or replace" the aid program. Newfoundland Fisheries Minister John Efford warns that, without a clear alternative, many fishermen will be forced to fish illegally.

10 October 1997  
*Atlantic Canada*

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien makes his first visit to Atlantic Canada since the 2 June federal election in which the Liberals lost 20 of the 31 seats it held previously in the region. Speaking in Moncton, Chrétien acknowledges that the Atlantic provinces were the hardest hit by federal spending cuts and defends the losses as necessary.

- 17 October 1997  
*Education* Education ministers representing every province, except Quebec, agree to broad guidelines for science education.
- 20 October 1997  
*Health* Quebec Health Minister Jean Rochon says that his ministry will manage the province's blood supply when the Red Cross is replaced. Canada's nine other provinces have agreed to create a new national agency. Doctors, advocacy groups, and patients who depend on the blood supply warn that Quebec's decision to exclude itself from the agency could lead to life-threatening shortages for the province and for Canada. Currently, Quebec collects about one-quarter of the country's blood supply. While Quebec itself uses most of that blood, provinces have traditionally shared blood in times of shortages.
- 21 October 1997  
*Emergency Aid* Estimates suggest that the total cost of the Manitoba flooding of last spring amounts to \$300 million, a cost to be shared by the provincial and federal governments. Manitoba Finance Minister Eric Stefanson says that up to \$100 million will have to be withdrawn from the province's Fiscal Stability Fund.
- 23 October 1997  
*Premiers* Prime Minister Jean Chrétien invites Canada's premiers and territorial leaders to a First Ministers' Meeting to be held 11-12 December in Ottawa. Unlike the recent meeting in Calgary, unity will not be on the agenda. Instead, the main topics of discussion will be youth employment, health care, and social policy renewal. Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard says he plans to attend the conference because the issues on the table affect his province.
- 27 October 1997  
*Energy* A federal-provincial panel led by the National Energy Board approves the Sable Offshore Energy Project and endorses a plan to build a pipeline through Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into Maine. Pending federal and Nova Scotia approval, the \$3 billion project and pipeline will pump 85 billion cubic metres of gas from fields near Sable Island.
- 30 October 1997  
*Health* Federal representatives meet with BC Health Minister Joy MacPhail in order to assess the best way to deal with soaring rates of HIV among injection drug users in Vancouver. MacPhail accuses Ottawa of neglecting a public health

crisis and says that BC spends more on AIDS and AIDS education, prevention, and treatment than the federal government spends across Canada. Reports suggest that up to half the 6,000-10,000 addicts in the city could be HIV positive.

30 October 1997  
*Gun Control*

The final details of Canada's gun control law are introduced in the House of Commons. The details are a supplement to Bill C-68, passed in the House in 1995, which mandates that all gun owners register and license their weapons. The new regulations set standards for gun clubs and target ranges, establish a national firearm registry, and set fee structures and timetables for the registry. Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the two territories have gone to court to challenge the registry, charging that it is unconstitutional.

31 October 1997  
*Education*

Ontario's 126,000 primary and secondary-school teachers walk off the job. The walkout, which is the largest teacher's strike in Canadian history, is in protest to Bill 160 which would allow the government to decide class sizes, reduce teacher preparation time, extend the school year, and allow non-certified people to teach some classes. The bill will also remove principals and vice-principals from the teachers' unions.

5 November 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

The Newfoundland government announces that the province's Inuit will be given direct ownership of 15,700 square kilometres, or 5 percent, of Labrador. The Inuit will also receive 25 percent of revenues from the province's mining, oil and gas production. A cap is also introduced, stipulating that once the Inuit per-capita annual income reaches that of the Canadian average, provincial royalty payments will be cut off. The Inuit hope that this deal will lead to a land-claims agreement within the year.

5 November 1997  
*Energy*

The Federal Fisheries Department asks the Justice Department to clarify the fact that Sable Island, southeast of Halifax, is federal territory and not part of Nova Scotia. The ownership dispute began in 1971 when undersea oil and gas were first discovered surrounding the island. The dispute has renewed itself since a federal-provincial panel gave the green light to Mobil Oil for the construction of a pipeline from the Maritimes to New England.

- 7 November 1997  
*Infrastructure* New Brunswick Premier Ray Frenette and federal Solicitor-General Andy Scott unveil a \$300-million package to improve the Trans-Canada highway in the province.
- 10 November 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples/  
Environment* The British Columbia Court of Appeal rules that the province does not have sole control over its forests until aboriginal land claims have been settled. Earlier in the month, the New Brunswick Court of the Queen's Bench ruled that Aboriginal peoples have the right to cut down trees on Crown land. The Court declared that they have ownership of those trees and that they maintain their title to the property.
- 12 November 1997  
*Environment* Federal and provincial environment and energy ministers, excluding Quebec, agree to set a target of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by 2010. Quebec hopes to make an even more significant reduction.
- 18 November 1997  
*Unity* Premiers from every province except Newfoundland, Alberta, and Quebec meet in Winnipeg with native leaders to develop a companion document for the Calgary Declaration. Native leaders had complained that while the declaration recognizes Quebec as having "unique character," Aboriginal peoples were lumped in with the rest of Canada's multicultural citizens. The companion document recognizes natives as constituting a distinct society of their own with a separate order of government. The premiers agreed to include aboriginal leaders in future constitutional and social policy talks.
- 18 November 1997  
*Education* A motion is passed, with overwhelming support, in the House of Commons to amend the constitution in order for Quebec to replace its denominational school boards with linguistic boards.
- 24 November 1997  
*Supreme Court* Supreme Court Justice John Sopinka dies at age 64.
- 26 November 1997  
*Senate* Former federal Cabinet minister Serge Joyal and Alberta Metis leader Thelma Chalifoux are appointed to the Senate by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. With the new appointments, 53 of the 104 seats belong to the Liberals, 47 to the Conservatives, and 4 to Independents.

- 30 November 1997  
*Sovereignty* At a Parti Québécois meeting in Quebec City, Premier Lucien Bouchard says he will hold an election, rather than a referendum, if the Supreme Court of Canada rules against the province's right to secede unilaterally.
- 1 December 1997  
*Health* To mark World AIDS Day, federal Health Minister Allan Rock announces that Ottawa will give \$211 million to a new national AIDS strategy. AIDS groups attack Rock for providing insufficient funds, as the number of people infected with HIV continues to rise.
- 2 December 1997  
*Health* The Quebec legislature calls on the federal and provincial governments to consider a compensation package for victims of hepatitis C. Quebec is the first government to extend compensation to these victims.
- 5 December 1997  
*Justice* At a meeting of justice ministers, the federal government agrees to consider the establishment of a public national registry of serious offenders and pedophiles. The ministers also discuss giving victims of crime a stronger voice, toughening the *Young Offenders Act* and cracking down on domestic violence.
- 8 December 1997  
*Finance* Legislation is introduced in the House of Commons to stabilize social and health transfer payments. Fulfilling an election promise, the bill sets a \$12.5 billion floor on money to be sent annually to the provinces, thereby giving the provinces an extra \$143 million this year and about \$6 billion over the next five years.
- 9 December 1997  
*Finance* Provincial finance ministers express discontent over the cuts that Ottawa has made in order to reduce the federal deficit. They decide on ways they would like to see a future surplus spent. The ministers say that they would like to see the reduction of provincial tax burdens and of Employment Insurance rates, as well as the restoration of transfer payments for health, education, and social programs. The ministers urge Ottawa not to introduce any new social programs until traditional funding has been restored. Federal Finance Minister Paul Martin agrees to think about giving the provinces more flexibility in setting tax rates and tax brackets, and in providing tax credits.



- 9 December 1997  
*Education*
- A constitutional amendment is passed in the House of Commons to allow for the elimination of church-run school boards in Newfoundland.
- 10 December 1997  
*Unity*
- Members of the Alberta legislature vote unanimously to support the Calgary Declaration on national unity. In a recent government questionnaire, 75 percent of Albertans supported the general framework of the accord, while 33 percent objected to the recognition of Quebec's "unique character." On 2 December, the Newfoundland legislature unanimously adopted the same resolution.
- 11 December 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- The Supreme Court of Canada rules unanimously that native peoples have a constitutional right to own their ancestral lands in areas where treaties have not been signed. The decision has a great impact on parts of Atlantic Canada and most of British Columbia.
- 11 December 1997  
*Sovereignty*
- After a week-long tour of western Canada, in which he promoted a post-separation partnership between Canada and Quebec, Bloc Québécois Leader Gilles Duceppe says that if sovereigntists win the next referendum, the Bloc will still run candidates in the next federal election in order to provide a separatist voice during negotiations between Canada and an independent Quebec.
- 12 December 1997  
*Premiers' Conference*
- Canada's federalist premiers win an agreement from Ottawa to negotiate the country's social framework. Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard had agreed to participate in the conference but his conditions, including the right of his province to opt-out of any new national program with compensation, could not be met. The nine other premiers demand that Ottawa reinstate some of the \$6 billion cut from federal transfer payments for health and other social programs, but Ottawa commits to nothing more than its previous \$12.5 billion promise. The premiers also agree to continue to find ways to reduce students' debt burdens, make youth employment a national priority, and to launch a national child benefit system by 1 July 1998. Ottawa says it is willing to double its \$850 million commitment to poor families and children when the provinces establish matching programs to help parents get off welfare.

- 12 December 1997  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart signs an agreement that will compensate British Columbia's Osoyoos Indian band for land that they lost in 1870, when it was sold after a clerical error failed to indicate that it was part of the reserve. Accompanying the deal is \$7 million from the federal government and \$3.1 million from the province. The band will also be allowed to use \$9.5 million of the settlement money to purchase unspecified land to be added to their reserve.
- 12 December 1997  
*Ontario*
- The megacity of Toronto learns that under changes to municipal finances, the provincial government's efforts to download services and their costs will leave the municipality with a \$163 million shortfall. Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman campaigned for mayor on a platform that promised a tax-freeze, and accuses Ontario Premier Mike Harris of lying when he said that the service exchange would be "revenue neutral." Under the new bill, which was passed 2 December, local governments will now cover the costs for transit, public health, and social housing and will contribute more toward welfare and child care. In exchange, the Ontario government will take over \$2.5 billion in education funding and transition funds.
- 15 December 1997  
*Education/Language*
- A motion to amend the constitution to allow for Quebec to have language-based school boards, rather than religious-based boards, is passed by the Senate in a 52-17 vote.
- 15 December 1997  
*Environment*
- Following a ten-day environmental summit in Kyoto, Japan, Natural Resources Minister Ralph Goodale announces a three-year, \$60 million energy efficiency program. During the conference, Canada pledges to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases by 6 percent — a tougher agreement than the provinces and Ottawa had agreed to when federal and provincial environment ministers met in November. Alberta Premier Ralph Klein complains that the new efforts to reduce emissions are too harsh for his oil-dependent province, while environmentalists complain that the new pledge does not go far enough.
- 16 December 1997  
*Fisheries*
- The federal government announces that the \$1.9 billion Atlantic Groundfish Strategy will not be exhausted as early

as expected. Since fewer people than anticipated have required financial assistance, Human Resources Minister Pierre Pettigrew says that the funds will be extended until 31 August instead of only until mid-May. More than 25,000 people in Atlantic Canada will qualify to receive the extended funds.

18 December 1997  
*Sovereignty*

Quebec Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Jacques Brassard says that the Quebec government will ignore lawyer Andre Joli-Coeur's attempts to challenge the Supreme Court of Canada's authority to rule on Quebec's right to secede.

19 December 1997  
*Unity/BC*

The *Vancouver Sun* releases a survey indicating that 25 percent of British Columbians believe that their province would be better off without Canada.

27 December 1997  
*Emergency Aid*

The total estimated cost of the flooding in Manitoba exceeds \$400 million, thereby doubling the initial estimation.

30 December 1997  
*Energy*

The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board approves the province's \$3 billion gas project. The board stipulates that certain environmental conditions must be met and that preference must be given to Nova Scotian and Canadian bids for work. The Sable Island's partners estimate that 5,000 jobs will be created, mostly during the development of the six energy fields.

6 January 1998  
*Emergency Aid*

An ice storm cripples Quebec and continues both east and west, leaving over 1.4 million people in Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritimes without electricity for up to a month. The Canadian Armed Forces send over 14,000 soldiers to aid the devastated areas. The federal government pledges \$50 million in aid for Quebec and \$25 million to assist Ontario. The Quebec government promises cash payments to residents without power and Ontario announces that it will provide \$50 million in emergency relief. In order to respond to the crisis, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Ontario Premier Mike Harris delay their trip to Mexico City for the Team Canada trade mission and Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard cancels altogether. Estimates indicate that the storm could cost approximately \$2 billion

- dollars and that the reparation of fallen hydro lines could cost as much as \$500 million in Quebec and \$100 million in Ontario.
- 6 January 1998  
*Health*
- The Red Cross disables Quebec's plan to establish a blood agency independent of the rest of Canada by announcing that it is not interested in transferring its blood-related assets to the province.
- 7 January 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- The federal government issues an historic "statement of reconciliation," apologizing to Canada's Aboriginal peoples for more than a century of mistreatment. Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart extends a specific apology to those who suffered abuse at residential schools; and she introduces a \$350 million healing fund for treatment and counseling of victims. She announces another \$250 million will be spent to improve housing and health conditions on impoverished reserves. Stewart also announces that an independent land claims body will be established to ease the current backlog. The Assembly of First Nations grand chief, Phil Fontaine, welcomes the apology.
- 7 January 1998  
*Sovereignty*
- The English-speaking Catholic community of Quebec becomes angry when Jean-Claude Cardinal Turcotte, archbishop of Montreal, says that Quebecers have the right to decide their future and that the Supreme Court of Canada should not stop Quebec from seceding if the majority of its citizens vote for separation.
- 8 January 1998  
*Supreme Court*
- Prominent Bay Street lawyer, Ian Binnie, is appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
- 9 January 1998  
*Unity*
- Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow expresses his optimism for the Calgary Declaration and points out that Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Northwest Territories have already passed resolutions to support the unity declaration.
- 15 January 1998  
*Energy*
- The Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board approves Newfoundland's second offshore oil project to develop an oilfield about 350 kilometres southeast of St. John's. The board's approval was the project's last hurdle, having already been cleared by Ottawa and the province.

15 January 1998  
*Justice*

Four provinces send a proposal to federal Justice Minister Anne McLellan urging Ottawa to crack down on young offenders. Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island propose a ten-point plan including: lowering the age of criminal accountability, publishing the names of convicted youth, and sending 16-year-olds who have committed serious or violent crimes to adult court.

22 January 1998  
*Finance*

Federal Finance Minister Paul Martin surprises the provincial governments by announcing that a bonus in transfer payments will be distributed to each province in March. The extra \$236 million comes as a result of a revision in Statistics Canada figures for economic growth.

23 January 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

The Aboriginal Human Resources Development Council is established as part of the government's response to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The council, made up of cabinet ministers, aboriginal leaders, and corporate heads will work to seek partnerships with business and thereby improve employment for Indians, Metis, and Inuit. Ottawa commits \$1.5 million to the council, in addition to \$200 million already set aside for aboriginal employment programs.

28 January 1998  
*Education*

University students across Canada protest rising tuition costs. Education costs have gone up, on average, 9 percent since the federal government slashed \$6 billion in education and health-care transfer payments to the provinces.

29 January 1998  
*Environment*

The nine federalist premiers sign an Accord on Environmental Harmonization — a controversial agreement established to reduce federal-provincial overlap in dealing with particular environmental issues. Quebec Environment Minister Paul Begin criticizes the agreement for not going far enough to eliminate duplication, while environmentalists fear that the provinces have been given too much responsibility.

31 January 1998  
*Emergency Aid*

65,000 Quebec residents, hardest hit by the ice storm in Eastern Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes head into their twenty-seventh day without power. Hydro-Québec plans to spend \$650 million to improve its damaged power

distribution network and Ontario Hydro expects to spend between \$100 and \$200 million in repairs. On 16 January, the federal government gave out \$45 million in aid to hire unemployed people to clean up the wreckage of the storm. This pledge comes in addition to \$75 million already announced for relief in Quebec and Ontario.

6 February 1998  
*Labour*

Ottawa and Saskatchewan sign a labour market agreement. The pact, designed to decrease federal-provincial duplication and improve delivery of services, will put the province in charge of current federal employment programs and over 100 federal employees.

8 February 1998  
*Emergency Aid*

Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard accuses the federal government of trying to sabotage the province's plan to eliminate its deficit by the year 2000, after federal Treasury Board President Marcel Massé says that ice-storm ravaged Hydro-Québec does not qualify for federal disaster compensation. Massé explains that like Ontario Hydro, Hydro-Québec is a Crown corporation with its own financial resources. Quebec is seeking more than \$1 billion in federal compensation, approximately two-thirds of which would go toward Hydro repairs.

12 February 1998  
*Budgets*

Alberta Premier Ralph Klein provides evidence that the years of fiscal restraint are ending by including a \$123 million tax break in the provincial budget. The budget also includes an increase in spending of \$222 million for education, \$136 million for health and social services, and \$260 million for public works. Other budgeted expenditures include a \$100 million for municipal grants and \$24 million for incentive bonuses to government employees. Much of the surplus from the 1997-98 fiscal year will be used toward the province's accumulated debt.

12 February 1998  
*Unity*

British Columbia's national unity panel says that 90 percent of the province's citizens consider national unity important and that the majority endorses the premiers' Calgary Declaration.

14 February 1998  
*Taxes*

Cigarette taxes go up by \$1.20 per carton in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. The hike,

levied by both the provinces and the federal government, is expected to discourage young Canadians from smoking.

15 February 1998  
*Sovereignty*

Bloc Québécois leader Gilles Duceppe announces that a series of protests will take place surrounding the Supreme Court's hearing on Quebec's right to secede. The case begins 16 February.

17 February 1998  
*Health*

Federal and provincial health ministers fail to agree on a system for compensating Canadians who contracted hepatitis C from tainted blood. Federal Health Minister Allan Rock says that if no agreement is reached, Ottawa is prepared to go it alone in compensating hepatitis C victims.

17 February 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

The Innu Nation of Betsiamites files a \$500 million lawsuit in the Quebec Superior Court. The band claims that they were cheated in a land deal with Ottawa and Quebec. The deal, struck in 1973, authorized the government to use the band's land for a major hydroelectric project. The band, which received \$150,000 for the land, thought that they were negotiating a right-of-way for a power line, not a hydro dam. The Betsiamites want compensation for the infringement on their rights and also hope to stop the development of the dam.

17 February 1998  
*Agriculture*

A controversial bill that changes the face of the Canadian Wheat Board is passed in the House of Commons. Under the new legislation, the board will be able to expand its monopoly of grains beyond barley and wheat. In addition, the makeup of the board will change from a few government-appointed commissioners to a 15-person body. The new body will be made up of ten individuals elected by Prairie farmers and five, including the president, to be selected by Ottawa.

19 February 1998  
*Senate*

For the first time in 131 years, the Senate suspends a senator. After coming to work only 47 times in the last 13 years, and only 14 times since 1990, senators say that Liberal Andrew Thompson is in contempt, not only of the Senate, but also of the Canadian people. Just over half the Senate was present for the historic vote, leaving the Senate under much scrutiny. On 27 February, Liberal Senator Len Marchand announces he is resigning from the Senate.

leaving the standings in the red chamber at: Liberals 50, Conservatives 45, Independent 4, and 5 vacancies.

24 February 1998  
*Budgets*

For the first time in a 28-year history of federal deficits, the budget balances at zero. Finance Minister Paul Martin presents this landmark budget with a focus on social spending, tax relief, and debt reduction. In the area of social spending, students make the most gains. Most significantly, Martin announces the establishment of a \$2.5 billion millennium scholarship fund to help over 100,000 post-secondary students based on financial need and merit. Tax relief focuses on the lower and middle classes. 400,000 low-income Canadians will be exempt from taxes altogether, while another 46 million will see a tax cut; \$9 billion will go toward paying down the \$583 billion national debt.

Opposition parties criticize the budget for not providing enough tax relief to middle-income Canadians and, on 25 February, the Quebec government seeks the right to opt out of the education fund with compensation, explaining that education is a provincial responsibility.

25 February 1998  
*Fisheries*

British Columbia Premier Glen Clark sends a letter to federal Fisheries Minister David Anderson, urging Ottawa to keep Alaskans away from coho salmon stocks. Calling for a Pacific treaty on salmon quotas, Clark says the stocks in BC's northern waters are on the verge of extinction as a result of Alaskan fishing. Anderson responds by saying that while a renewed agreement with the United States would be useful, it would only be a small step in dealing with a larger problem — citing El Nino and habitat destruction as the major threats to both Pacific and Atlantic stocks.

2 March 1998  
*Leadership*

Daniel Johnson steps down from his position as leader of the Quebec Liberals. On 13 March, federal Conservative Leader Jean Charest announces that he will consider filling the vacant position.

6 March 1998  
*Senate*

Three new Liberal senators are appointed to the Senate: British Columbia entrepreneur Ross Fitzpatrick, Newfoundland business woman Joan Cook, and former



president of the Prince Edward Island Federation of Agriculture, Archibald Johnstone. The Senate is now composed of 52 Liberals, 45 Conservatives, and 4 Independents. Three vacancies remain.

6 March 1998  
*Sovereignty*

Andre Jolie-Coeur, the lawyer representing the sovereignist's side in Ottawa's court reference on the legality of separation, files a document which argues that Canadians are not one people, but rather are a collection of four "peoples" — English Canadians, Quebecers, Acadians, and native peoples. With this established, he claims that each of these "peoples" has the right to self-determination. On 13 March the federal government submits a response to the Supreme Court citing evidence that there *is* a Canadian people and suggesting that Jolie-Coeur's argument defies logic.

6 March 1998  
*Labour*

Newfoundland and Quebec sign a labour-mobility deal that will allow Newfoundland construction workers and contractors to work in Quebec. Before the agreement, Quebec's residency regulations prevented Newfoundlanders from working in Quebec, while Quebecers were able to work in Labrador.

10 March 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

After a ten-year legal battle, the Blueberry and Doig River bands of northeastern British Columbia receive \$147 million from the federal government as compensation for the loss of mineral rights to part of their reserve.

10 March 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

At an Assembly of First Nations policy conference, chiefs vote to support a motion to accept Ottawa's apology and its establishment of a \$350 million healing fund for Aboriginal people who suffered abuse at residential schools.

10 March 1998  
*Energy*

After a 25-year impasse, Newfoundland and Quebec agree to preliminary negotiations for the development of a new hydroelectric project on the Churchill River system in Labrador. Native people protest the negotiations and say that they will not participate in discussions until they are compensated for the flooding of their land in 1971, when the first Churchill Falls project began.

- 12 March 1998  
*Social Programs*
- Social service ministers meet to report on how they will spend the extra money that comes out of a new national child benefit. In the recent budget, Ottawa announced that it would put an additional \$1.7 billion, over the next three years, toward the benefit provided that the provinces announced matching programs to take children out of poverty and get parents off welfare. All the provinces, except Quebec, have announced such programs.
- 12 March 1998  
*Environment*
- Environment Minister Christine Stewart tables amendments to the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*. Under the revised legislation, Aboriginal people will be included in a new committee that will advise Ottawa on how to manage toxins.
- 17 March 1998  
*Unity*
- A motion put forward by the Reform Party to allow Members of Parliament to place Canadian flags on their desks is defeated in a vote of 194 to 51. The vote follows a controversial "flag flap" that began in the House on 26 February when Bloc Québécois MP Suzanne Tremblay, who had complained that there were too many Canadian flags at the Winter Olympics, was unable to ask a question over the noise caused by Reform and Liberal MPs who were singing "O Canada" and waving flags. On 16 March Commons Speaker Gilbert Parent ruled that the Members were out of order when they silenced Tremblay, explaining that it had been a question of free speech and not of patriotism.
- 19 March 1998  
*Budgets*
- Saskatchewan's NDP government releases its fifth consecutive balanced budget. Finance Minister Eric Cline also announces a 2-percent cut to provincial income taxes, bringing the provincial rate to 48 percent of the federal rate. Cline explains that with this new cut, families making \$50,000 a year will save almost \$600, while low income families will save even more. Cline also introduces \$200 million in new spending, in areas such as health care, education, and programs for low-income children. \$500 million will go toward cutting the province's \$12.1 billion debt.
- 23 March 1998  
*Senate*
- Senator Andrew Thompson resigns his seat, one month after being suspended from the Senate.

23 March 1998  
*Fisheries*

The House of Commons fisheries committee releases a report dealing with the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery. The report lays blame on the federal government and foreign fishing, recommending that the Fisheries Department be decentralized and that foreign fishing be curbed. The report also calls for continued financial support for unemployed fishermen.

25 March 1998  
*Premiers*

Nova Scotia's Liberal and New Democratic parties tie with 19 seats each in the provincial election. Liberal Premier Russell MacLellan retains governing status because his party was not defeated.

26 March 1998  
*Leadership*

Jean Charest confirms that he will leave his position as leader of the federal Conservatives to seek the leadership of the Quebec Liberal Party.

27 March 1998  
*Health*

Health Minister Allan Rock announces a \$1.1 billion federal-provincial package to compensate those Canadians who contracted hepatitis C through tainted blood between 1 January 1986 and 1 July 1990. The announcement sparks outrage and notice of lawsuits from those victims who received the tainted blood before and after the set dates. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien criticizes the provinces for contributing only \$300 million while the federal government is contributing \$800 million.

27 March 1998  
*Labour*

Federal and provincial ministers responsible for the labour market meet in Toronto to determine ways to tackle youth joblessness.

30 March 1998  
*Health*

The Quebec government confirms its plans to establish its own blood system, thereby eliminating the possibility of a nation-wide system. Quebec Health Minister Jean Rochon says the new arms-length "Hema-Quebec" will be a non-profit entity with a budget of \$125 million.

30 March 1998  
*Education*

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard agree to meet in order to find a compromise for problems arising surrounding the new Millenium Scholarship Foundation. Announced in the recent federal budget, the foundation was established to provide financial assistance to students across Canada. Emphasizing that

education is a provincial responsibility, Bouchard says Quebec should be able to decide where the money is spent.

31 March 1998  
*Budgets*

Quebec Finance Minister Bernard Landry tables a budget that tackles the province's deficit, bringing it down from \$2.2 billion to \$1.1 billion. In order to accommodate the reduction, Landry announces cuts to education, health, social services, and municipalities. The budget is in keeping with the government's goal to be deficit-free by 1999-2000. Landry says the deficit cannot be eliminated sooner because the federal government, in its efforts to eliminate its own deficit, have made significant cuts to health care, education, and social assistance in the province. Beyond the deficit, the budget also focuses on job creation — planning to cut taxes for small and medium-sized businesses by \$225 million in 2000-2001 and by \$300 million in 2001-2002.

1 April 1998  
*Leadership*

Conservative Leader Jean Charest says goodbye to the House of Commons as he prepares to leave his post to seek the Quebec Liberal leadership. Public opinion polls indicate that if a provincial election were held today, Quebecers would choose Charest and his Liberals over Premier Lucien Bouchard's Parti Québécois.

1 April 1998  
*Fisheries*

Faced with a seventh season of the federal cod moratorium, union leaders representing Atlantic fishermen come to Parliament Hill to seek an aid package to replace the \$1.9 billion Atlantic Groundfish Strategy that expires in August. Ottawa says it is looking into the matter.

2 April 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

Quebec Native Affairs Minister Guy Chevrette presents a new strategy for an improved relationship with Quebec's native peoples. Quebec's 11 bands are invited to establish self-governments that could include representation in the provincial legislature. The strategy also explores the possibility of giving taxation power to the bands and giving them the opportunity to share revenue from new projects from such things as forestry, mining, and hydro-electricity. The government also proposes a \$125 million fund for community projects over the next five years. The strategy is part of Premier Lucien Bouchard's efforts to improve relations between the government and native communities in Quebec.

- 8 April 1998  
*Sovereignty*
- After Jean Charest predicts that Quebec will try and weasel its way out of another sovereignty referendum, Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard says that a referendum *will* be held if his party is reelected in the next election.
- 8 April 1998  
*Media*
- Media baron Conrad Black announces plans to launch a new national newspaper.
- 15 April 1998  
*Environment*
- Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Quebec urge Ottawa to repeal its ban on the controversial gasoline additive MMT. The additive may pose environmental or health risks and may interfere with emission controls on automobiles.
- 20 April 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- The Indian Claims Commission recommends that Ottawa begin negotiations with the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation of Northern Alberta. The band's reserve is located on what once was a flourishing delta that was home to muskrats and other fur-bearing animals. In 1967 a dam was built in the area which drained the delta of water, destroyed the flourishing ecosystem and thereby deprived the Cree band of their fur-trapping livelihood. The band seeks compensation for its losses.
- 22 April 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- The New Brunswick Court of Appeal rules against an earlier court decision that gave natives unrestricted rights to Crown trees and ownership of Crown lands. The ruling enables the New Brunswick government to order native loggers to stop their logging.
- 24 April 1998  
*Environment*
- Rather than taking immediate action to reduce the level of greenhouse-gas emissions in the country, Canada's environment and energy ministers agree to spend more time researching the economic impact of such a reduction.
- 27 April 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- British Columbia Premier Glen Clark announces the approval of a \$250 million dam project in the West Kootenay area. Two days later, Okanagan First Nations chiefs send a letter to the premier saying such an announcement should not have been made without giving consideration to native concerns. The chiefs referred to a recent Supreme Court case in which it was ruled that native people who have not signed treaties for their land have the constitutional right to own that land and to use it as they wish. The chiefs threaten to ask for a court injunction to stop the project.

30 April 1998  
*Leadership*

Jean Charest gives his first speech as leader of the Quebec Liberals. Charest attacks the governing Parti Québécois for making Quebec poorer in its pursuit of separatism. Charest says he wants to begin a new era in the province.

5 May 1998  
*Budgets*

The Ontario government softens its image by focusing its budget on tax cuts and policies for helping children. Finance Minister Ernie Eves announces that the \$5.2 billion 1998-99 deficit will be reduced by only \$1 billion, but assures the legislature that future plans for a zero deficit are still in place. In terms of taxes, the budget includes the final phase of a 30-percent provincial income tax cut and the final step of the employer health tax exemption. Business education taxes are to be reduced by \$510 million over the next eight years and the small-business tax rate halved. Support for children includes \$140 million toward a new child-care supplement for middle and low-income families, an increase of \$170 million over the next three years to the Children's Aid Societies, and \$25 million in child-care subsidies to help single parents on welfare finish school. The budget also includes \$120 million over four years toward marketing Ontario as a tourist destination.

6 May 1998  
*Education*

Ontario's Education Minister Dave Johnson announces that the government is deregulating tuition in the province. Beginning in 1998-99, sharp increases in tuition will be allowed for all graduate programs and for professional programs for undergraduates such as business, law, and medicine. If a university is able to double its entry-level spaces by September 2000, then that institution will also be able to increase tuition for undergraduate courses such as engineering and computer science. Universities that choose to increase their fees must set aside 30 percent of that new revenue to assist low-income students. Despite this assistance, opposition parties and student groups accuse the government of limiting the accessibility of higher education.

7 May 1998  
*History/Sovereignty*

Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard attends the unveiling of a monument in Quebec City which commemorates the 1943-44 conferences between British Prime Minister

Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien expresses anger regarding the monument since it fails to recognize the role of former Prime Minister Mackenzie King in those conferences. Federalists protest King's exclusion.

9 May 1998  
*Unity*

Prime Minister Jean Chrétien tells a Quebec news conference that the focus of his government is on jobs and the economy, rather than constitutional change.

12 May 1998  
*Leadership*

Quebec Liberal Leader Daniel Johnson says farewell to Quebec's National Assembly. In March, Johnson announced that he was stepping down in order to make space for a new and more popular leader. Former federal Conservative leader, Jean Charest, was recently acclaimed to fill that leadership position.

14 May 1998  
*Leadership*

New Brunswick Liberal leader, Camille Theriault, is sworn in as premier.

14 May 1998  
*Unity*

British Columbia's NDP government introduces legislation that extends the original scope of the Calgary Declaration. While including the original seven principles, the extended proposal adds: an increase of provincial responsibility in areas important to that province; a federal equalization program for per-person funding of education, health, and social programs; and the establishment of national health standards. British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia are the only provinces that have not approved the original declaration.

14 May 1998  
*Sovereignty*

In conformity with last fall's Supreme Court ruling, the Quebec government tables electoral amendments that will allow limited spending beyond the Yes and No committees for future referendums.

14 May 1998  
*Health*

Health ministers fail to reach a consensus on new provisions for hepatitis C victims. Federal Health Minister Allan Rock is continuously under attack for Ottawa's compensation package that only assists those infected between 1986 and 1990. Meanwhile, on 4 May, Ontario Premier Mike Harris offered to extend compensation by \$200 million in order to include all those infected with hepatitis C

through tainted blood. On 6 May, Quebec followed suit, pledging \$75 million more toward those victims outside Ottawa's time bracket. British Columbia says it will also consider an increase in aid, but not without national consensus.

14 May 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal overturns an earlier court decision that would allow the province's 27,000 Metis the same hunting rights as the province's status Indians, who are currently exempt from many provincial restrictions. On 15 May, the Metis announce that they plan to ignore the ruling.

19 May 1998  
*Quebec*

About 500 people attend a public meeting to protest Ottawa's appointment of a former Parti Québécois candidate as chief executive of Ottawa Hospital. David Levine, a Montreal anglophone, ran for the PQ almost 20 years ago in an effort, he says, to unite anglophones and francophones. On 20 May, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien expresses anger toward the PQ and the Bloc Québécois for using the incident to enrage Quebecers and bolster separatist sentiments.

21 May 1998  
*Immigration*

British Columbia signs a five-year deal with Ottawa, giving the province more control over immigration. The deal will give BC increased control over programs to assist new Canadians and will also allow the province to nominate up to 200 immigrants and their families each year to match employment demands. The federal government will direct \$45.8 million toward the deal.

26 May 1998  
*Unity*

Ontario formalizes its support for the Calgary Declaration, leaving Nova Scotia as the only original signatory that has not yet passed a legislative resolution.

27 May 1998  
*Fisheries*

As a result of improved stock off the south coast of Newfoundland, Federal Fisheries Minister David Anderson announces that quotas on cod in the region will be raised to 20,000 tonnes — doubling last year's limit. Newfoundland fisherman would like to see that quota raised to 30,000 tonnes.



28 May 1998  
*Health*

Federal Health Minister Allan Rock announces a permanent, annual commitment of \$42.2 million toward the fight against AIDS. Rock is criticized for guaranteeing funding for all HIV/AIDS victims, while providing compensation to only some victims of hepatitis C.

28 May 1998  
*Budgets*

Nova Scotia Premier Russell MacLellan and New Brunswick Premier Camille Theriault call on federal Finance Minister Paul Martin to use surplus Employment Insurance premiums toward aid for Atlantic fish workers and tax cuts. The Quebec National Assembly calls for Ottawa to use the surplus toward support for young people and seasonal workers. Ontario Premier Mike Harris accuses the federal government of stealing from his province's workers and businesses. The surplus has reached \$15.7 billion and is expected to rise to \$19.9 by the end of the year.

4 June 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*

A BC court rules that both the federal government and the United Church are legally liable for past sexual and physical abuse suffered by aboriginal students at a BC school in Port Alberni and orders that 30 former students be compensated. The ruling prompts the United Church of Canada and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops to call on Ottawa to take a leadership role and to seek an out-of-court solution to compensate other aboriginal victims, rather than dealing with the 1,200 law suits on a case-by-case basis. Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart says that while the government is still dealing with the cases individually, Ottawa is looking for a "more human" route to compensation.

5 June 1998  
*Unity*

Bloc Québécois MP Pierre Brien and Reform MP Rahim Jaffer meet in Edmonton to discuss their future visions of Canada. While the Bloc and the Reform Party seem like unlikely allies, both parties are interested in putting more power in the hands of the provinces. Jaffer discusses the Reform's New Canada Act, which advocates the rebalancing of federal and provincial powers, and Brien outlines his party's New Quebec-Canada Partnership.

9 June 1998  
*Unity*

Nova Scotia is the last of the nine federalist governments to approve the Calgary Declaration on national unity.

- 11 June 1998  
*Transportation*
- A report released by the House of Commons transport committee suggests that the federal government should contribute up to \$25 million for a new high-speed rail line to run between Quebec City and Toronto.
- 12 June 1998  
*Senate*
- Prime Minister Jean Chrétien appoints five new Senators: hockey superstar Frank Mahovlich, Nova Scotia activist Calvin Ruck, chancellor of Lakehead University Lois Wilson, Manitoba businessman Richard Kroft and an Ontario community organizer, Marian Maloney. Wilson will sit as an Independent and the others will sit as Liberals, bringing the standings in the Senate to: Liberals 55, Conservatives 43, and Independent 4. There are two vacancies remaining.
- 12 June 1998  
*Unity*
- Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard announces that the Calgary Declaration is doomed, since not even Quebec Liberals are willing to defend the unity proposal. Bouchard held public hearings on the declaration even though his government has publicly ridiculed the proposal. New Liberal Leader Jean Charest refused to participate in the hearings, seeing them as a separatist trap. The declaration, which recognizes the "unique" character of Quebec while maintaining the equality of all provinces, has been rejected by Bouchard, who says that this is the least Quebec has ever been offered to stay in Canada.
- 15 June 1998  
*Finance*
- Provincial finance ministers come to Ottawa hoping to restore the \$6 billion that has been cut from funding for health, postsecondary education, and welfare. While Prime Minister Jean Chrétien rejects their request, federal Finance Minister Paul Martin says he will consider the provinces' proposal.
- 18 June 1998  
*Social Services*
- In its effort to fight child poverty and to reduce Canada's number of welfare recipients, Ottawa launches a new national child benefit. Human Resources Minister Pierre Pettigrew explains that families making up to \$25,921 a year will receive as much as \$1,000 in extra child-tax credits. The federal government will start the program off with \$850 million and promises to increase its contribution to \$1.7 billion by the year 2000.

- 18 June 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples*
- Land that was taken from Aboriginal people and turned into a military base during World War II will be returned to the Stoney Point natives of southwestern Ontario. Indian Affairs Minister Jane Stewart and Chief Elect Norman Shawnoo sign a \$26.3 million agreement that returns the 900-hectare Camp Ipperwash to the band and provides money for community restoration, economic development, community healing, and environmental assessment.
- 18 June 1998  
*Aboriginal Peoples/  
Taxes*
- The Supreme Court of Canada rules that New Brunswick has the right to charge its status Indians sales tax. In 1993, the province imposed the 11 percent sales tax on off-reserve purchases and was accused of violating the *Indian Act*.
- 19 June 1998  
*Fisheries*
- Federal Fisheries Minister David Anderson offers \$1.1 billion in federal aid to assist Canada's coastal fisheries. Of that aid, \$730 million will be directed to the East Coast, to carry the Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS) to its original expiry date of May 1999. TAGS ran short of funding after more people than expected applied for assistance. In addition to aiding the 20,000 TAGS recipients, the funding will also go toward licence buybacks, economic development, early retirement, job training, education, and moving expenses. On the West Coast, \$400 million will go toward the establishment of a salmon fishery more attuned to conservation. Complaints come from both coasts that the government has not provided adequate funding.
- 22 June 1998  
*Economy*
- The Canadian dollar sinks to an all-time low on North American markets, falling to 67.77 cents US.
- 24 June 1998  
*Finances/Territories*
- Federal Finance Minister Paul Martin announces that the establishment of Nunavut, a new territory in the eastern half of what is now the Northwest territories, will cost Canada almost \$100 million more each year. The new territory, which will come into existence next 1 April, will cover a land mass nearly twice the size of Ontario.
- 25 June 1998  
*Leadership*
- Former Prime Minister Joe Clark announces his candidacy in the leadership race for the federal Conservative

party. There are now six men vying for the position of leader, including veteran Tory strategist Hugh Segal and former Manitoba Cabinet minister Brian Pallister.

26 June 1998  
*Quebec*

Gilles Rocheleau, co-founder of the Bloc Québécois with Lucien Bouchard, dies of cancer at the age of 62.

26 June 1998  
*Environment*

Heritage Minister Sheila Copps announces that Ottawa is freezing development in national parks for a year while a strategy to prevent encroachment of business and residential growth is established. She also announces that the federal government will have the final say on development plans in towns that exist within national parks.

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