MOTIVATIONS OF INTEREST

Since, as Ron Watts himself has noted, “of twenty-four contemporary federations all but two (…Micronesia and the United Arab Emirates …) have bicameral legislatures” (Watts 2003d, 68), it is only too natural and would by itself not require any further explanation that they are a particular subject of scholarly interest in federal studies. Thus it would be rather surprising if this were not so in the writings of Ron Watts. And, indeed, he dedicated much research and analytical attention to them.

However, besides this evidently scholarly motivation there was also and always has been a politically driven one behind his energy in investigating into the rationale, the complexities and the intricacies of second chambers in federal systems. This energy has for decades been deeply rooted in the issue of Senate reform in Ron Watts’ own country by the fact that the Senate of Canada “is unique … in terms of its lack of political legitimacy as a body representing regional interests at the federal level” (Watts 1999b, 119). The reasons for this rather harsh-sounding judgement are embodied in the fact that Canadian Senators are all appointed by the Federal Government for a practically life-long term (until the age of 75). There are, though, regional groups of provinces (4 regions of 24 each, plus 6 for Newfoundland and 2 for territories) to be observed in such appointments (Watts 2003d, 82). But however keenly some Senators might cherish the interests of their own localities, because they have not been compelled to account to their provinces or regions the Senate has not established itself as a champion of provincial rights or sectional interests. The Senate occasionally has protected the provinces; but more often it has supported the interests of the central government, usually acquiescing to the interests of the majority party in the Senate. The provinces and minorities, therefore, have had to rely upon the
ballot box and upon representation in the Cabinet as the major safeguards of their interests, rather than upon the Senate.” (Watts 1970c, 317)

Thus “in Canada, Senators have had in comparative terms the least credibility as spokes persons for regional interests, even when they are residents of the regions they represent” (Watts 2003d, 80).

Throughout all of his writings one can virtually feel how much these facts have plainly annoyed and politically provoked Ron Watts, and his own biography of service for the nation, indeed, reflects these motivations: That applies in particular to his positions as a Commissioner on the Task Force on Canadian Unity (Pepin-Robarts) in 1978-79, as a Consultant to the Federal Government during the constitutional negotiations in 1980, as an Advisor to Premier Peterson of Ontario during the discussions over the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 and as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Constitutional Development from April 1991 to September 1992, culminating in the Charlottetown Agreement. All of these activities were to a large extent shaped by the major and still unresolved issue of Senate reform.

CATEGORIES OF RELEVANT WRITINGS

Ron Watts’ dedication to this issue and to the central relevance of second chambers for federal systems has resulted in an enormous amount of comparative work. Although it is certainly problematical to categorize research endeavours and publications in such a wide field, one can perhaps distinguish three groups of his work in this field, and within these groups only a few of the most outstanding ones for each of them can be named here:

Within the first of these groups, the analytical writings, one rather early and one almost contemporary publication clearly stand out. The early one is his essay on “Second Chambers in Federal Political Systems” in the “Background Papers and Reports of the Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation” of 1970 (Watts 1970c), and the almost contemporary one is his chapter on “Bicameralism in Federal Parliamentary Systems” in “Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew” of 2003 (Watts 2003d). In these two publications he unfolds the full range of his analytical approaches and
categories, which will have to be reviewed with particular care and interest in the main part of this contribution to the festschrift in his honour.

The second group comprises his predominantly descriptive and, deriving from such descriptions, comparative works. Leading in this group is his probably meanwhile best-known and frequently translated book, the second edition of “Comparing Federal Systems” of 1999, in which he devotes a sub-chapter with two very informative tables referring to the role of federal second chambers (Watts 1999b, 92-97). Another and earlier example of his descriptively comparative work on second chambers is to be found in his book on “New Federations – Experiments in the Commonwealth” of 1966, in which he carefully describes and compares the bicameral national legislatures in India, Pakistan, Malaya and Malaysia, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyassaland, and the West Indies (Watts 1966). Also his observations about second chambers in his chapter on “The Theoretical and Practical Implications of Asymmetrical Federalism” in the book on “Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States”, edited by Robert Agranoff in 1999, need to be named here (Watts 1999e, 24-42).

The third group is made up of his numerous advisory publications in the processes of constitution-making and constitutional developments in foreign countries. Only examples can be referred to here, such as his chapter on “Provincial Representation in the Senate” in Bertus de Villiers’ volume on the “Birth of a Constitution” in South Africa (de Villiers 1994a) (Watts 1994d, 125-143) and his bicameral observations in the chapter on “Contemporary Views on Federalism” in the same editor’s attempt at “Evaluating Federal Systems” (de Villiers 1994b) in the South African constitution-making process (Watts 1994e, 1-29).

ANALYTICAL APPROACHES AND CATEGORIES

PURPOSES OF SECOND CHAMBERS IN GENERAL AND IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS IN PARTICULAR

Bicameralism is, of course, not a peculiarity of federal structures. Unitary systems have second chambers as well, and the historical “mother” of them has been the British House of Lords (on which, strangely enough and although established in a federal constitution,
the Canadian Senate was modelled by the *British North America Act* in 1867). The question is therefore: Which purposes do second chambers in unitary and in federal systems have in common? Ron Watts offers two answers to that: first, that “bicameral systems add an element of deliberate ‘redundancy’ into the legislative processes “ (Watts 2003d, 68), which means that they offer a chance for second thoughts, which “is particularly important where legislative proposals may have been prepared in haste and passed in the first house under strict party discipline” (ibid). Second, “depending upon the membership of the second chamber, such a body may also provide an opportunity to bring particular forms of expertise to bear on the debate of an issue before parliament finally confirms its decisions” (Watts 2003d, 69). In federal systems, as Ron Watts has observed, second chambers have two additional functions: They act “as a device to check the power of majoritarian elements that might otherwise dominate the governmental process and, second, to ensure adequate representation of regional and minority interests and viewpoints” (ibid).

**FEDERAL SYSTEMS UNDER PARTICULAR REVIEW**

Ron Watts has analysed numerous and probably even all federal systems in the world. In his studies of second chambers in such systems he has, nonetheless, concentrated on two groups of them for good reasons: The first of these groups consists of the United States, Switzerland, and Australia; the second one comprises the newer Commonwealth federations already enumerated above; and in the third one there are Germany and – although up to now only quasi-federal – the Republic of South Africa. Russia he considers to be a special case between the first and the second group (Watts 2003d, 72-4).

**DUAL VS. INTERDEPENDENT FEDERALISM**

Before we can turn to the reasons for this grouping it will be necessary to make ourselves acquainted with his discussion of the concepts of dual versus interdependent federalism. His point of departure is the definition of the federal principle as given by K.C. Wheare, Ron Watts’ own “academic father” (Wheare 1963). As quoted by Watts, Wheare defined the federal principle as “the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent” (Watts 1970c, 322). Thus this traditional theory of “dual federalism” presupposes, in the words of Ron Watts, that there are “dual sets of government … each separate in its water-tight compartment and
within its own sphere of independence of the other” (ibid). Although admitting that this concept “has the advantage of clarity”, Ron Watts rightly observes that it “has a fatal flaw” because “the isolation from each other of the activities of the other levels of government has simply proved impracticable” since it is “too legalistic” and also “logically unsound” in assuming “that if one government were dependent on another, the former necessarily would be subordinate” (Watts 1970c, 323, 325). For these reasons he contrasts it with the concept of “interdependent federalism”, and it is at this point that a second chamber comes into play “as one of a number of interacting elements within a single political system which embraces both levels of government” (Watts 1970c, 326).

On this background Ron Watts distinguishes three fundamental aspects of the working of a federal system: First, “the distribution of functions and responsibilities between the levels of government”. Second, that “the activities of the two levels of government interpenetrate both administratively and politically. Intergovernmental relations, therefore are a … fundamental aspect of any federal system”. Third, that in representing “a form of partnership, an especially crucial aspect is the process through which the diverse sectional or cultural groups participate in reaching a federation-wide consensus”. From this Watts concludes that “as an institution contributing to this process has a federal second chamber performs its prime function” (ibid). Thus a second chamber has “not merely a negative function of protecting the interests of sectional and cultural minorities from the permanent majority, but the positive one of resolving conflicts of interests and of widening the area and extent of agreement and accommodation between them” (Watts 1970c, 327). We will see at a later point how important the issue of intergovernmental relations implied in this reasoning has been for Ron Watts in his deliberations about the powers and, in particular, about the composition of federal second chambers.

**PLURALIST AND PARLIAMENTARY FEDERATIONS**

Pluralist federations Ron Watts sees “exemplified by the United States and Switzerland”, and the typical examples for parliamentary federations for him are “Canada, the other Commonwealth Federations, and Germany” (ibid), but concerning Germany and with a particular view to the role of the second chamber this will have to be relativised. In his categories the marking notion of pluralist federations is “that political authority should be dispersed among multiple centres of power: not simply between central and state institutions, but also among a variety of central institutions” (ibid). Parliamentary
federations have “made a radical departure” (Watts 1970c, 329) from this axiom by a division “between concentrations of power in the central and provincial parliamentary governments” (ibid). In these federations thus a “hybrid of parliamentary and federal institutions” (Watts 1970c, 330) has been created. This “has produced a style of political interaction radically different, and in so doing has affected the role and impact which the second chamber might play within such a system” (ibid). He means by this that “the responsibility of the cabinet to the majority in the popularly elected first chamber” has restricted the role, which the second chamber might play in effectively influencing central policies on behalf of provincial or minority interests” (ibid). Thus in these “parliamentary federations the major responsibility for performing this function has fallen upon the political party or parties constituting the majority in the popular house, rather than upon the interaction of different central institutions, including the second chamber, checking and balancing each other” (ibid).

This is where a strong reservation has to be made against counting Germany as fully belonging to this group of federations. Although a parliamentary federation plainly by the fact that the Bundesrat has no say in the election and the composition of the Federal Government, this second chamber is certainly a strong watchdog of regional interests both by its composition, which will have to be discussed later, and by its powers, which practically give it an absolute veto over all legislation affecting the constitutional rights of the constituent units, the Länder.

That takes us directly into the distinction between second chambers on the basis of their constitutional powers.

“STRONG” AND “USEFUL” SECOND CHAMBERS

In the (almost ever-lasting) debate on House of Lords reform in the United Kingdom it has been said that second chambers are either “strong” or they are “useful”. Ron Watts takes up this distinction of Lord Campion by referring to a “strong” second chamber as “one which is able to stand up to the popularly elected house on an equal footing”, while a “useful” one is a second chamber “which maintains some degree of influence over legislation but only within the limits of restricted powers” (Watts 1970c, 334). As a general
rule Watts attributes the “strong” type to the pluralist federations, and as far as one can see there is apparently no exception to that rule.

Nonetheless, the distinction between pluralist and parliamentary federations does not fully correspond to that between “strong” and “useful” second chambers in federal systems. While one will have to agree with Ron Watts that in the parliamentary federations the second chambers are generally to be counted as belonging to the “useful” group, there is an exemption to this rule, and – as hinted at already – this exemption is the German Bundesrat. However, Ron Watts sees that very clearly by stating that “among the parliamentary federal systems” this second chamber is one “of special interest” (Watts 1970 c, 339). Maybe, one should not go as far as I did in an analysis of “Basic Questions of Federal Bicameralism” in the constitution-making process of South Africa by writing “that in federal systems second chambers should be both useful and strong or else they will be useless” (Leonardy 1994, 148). But Ron Watts is certainly right in saying that “a number of features have made the Bundesrat a more influential and significant body than the second chambers in any of the parliamentary federations in the Commonwealth” (ibid).

There is no space here to discuss the powers of the Bundesrat in any detail (for such detail see Leonardy 1999, 3 ff), but it will be necessary to emphasise that a large proportion of federal legislation in Germany is based on so-called consent bills, which means that without the consent of the Bundesrat they cannot come into the Statute Book. Although their number has been somewhat diminished by recent reforms (see Holtschneider/Schön 2007), the fact remains that – in Watts’ words – “the Bundesrat (is) in a powerful position to influence federal legislative policy” (Watts 1970c, 340). Indeed, in a lecture given in Bonn in 1994 (into which I am proud to have “provoked” him) Ron Watts has gone as far as stating that “in functional terms (the Bundesrat) is undoubtedly the most powerful of the second chambers to be found in any parliamentary federation” (Watts October 1984, 61). This fact, however, has its roots not only in its legislative position but also in other factors such as its composition and membership. Not only in the context of the Bundesrat, this will have to be the next field to turn to.

COMPOSITION AND MEMBERSHIP OF SECOND CHAMBERS

The composition of second chambers and the methods for the selection of their members are, indeed, no less important than their powers and functions, and there is a close relation
between the two. Both composition and the selection of members are highly relevant for the relationship between the two chambers in unitary and in federal systems alike, and for federal second chambers the methods for the selection of members clearly reflect the extent to which the constituent units can influence decision-making in the federation. Thus it was almost imperative that Ron Watts devoted a substantial part of his research and writing to these issues.

In the first field, the power-relationship between the two chambers in both unitary and federal structures, one rule would seem to be of paramount significance, to which Ron Watts, however, refers only rather rarely and indirectly: He quotes Meg Russell, the probably most profound researcher in contemporary efforts at British House of Lords reform (Russell 2000) with the sentence that “first, the second chamber must have a composition distinct from the first chamber” (Watts 2003d, 86). Meg Russell wrote this on the background of bringing elements of direct election partly or even totally into the composition of the House of Lords, and she rightly observed that because of the ensuing equality of the bases of legitimation this would result in the certainly unwanted situation of political rivalry between the Lords and the Commons (Russell 2000, 254-7, 315-36). That, however, applies not only to unitary but also to federal second chambers, and one would have expected that Ron Watts would have emphasised this effect more decidedly than merely by a quote from another researcher. So one wonders why he did not do so. One can, of course, only speculate about this, but my hopefully substantiated guess about that would seem to be incorporated in the history of the efforts for Canadian Senate reform: Although other models had been clearly in the foreground until the end of the 1970s, the concept of a “Triple E Senate” (meaning above all an elected one) then dominated the debate, so that “there was a clear preference in public opinion surveys for a reform of the Senate that would give it electoral legitimacy” (Watts 1991f, 37. Ron Watts was (and apparently still is) a clear supporter of the models discussed prior to that, which will have to be described at a later stage, but he obviously shied away from those models after that swing in public opinion in favour of electoral legitimacy for a new Senate.

Be that as it may, it would seem to be indisputable that if both chambers are equally based on direct and nation-wide election they are bound to have conflicts with each other because of the identity of their sources of legitimation. The example of the Australian Senate, which is popularly elected even by proportional representation, would seem to prove that.
Also, in such a system there is no visible emanation of regional interest representation, which is after all the rationale for federal second chambers. Direct popular election might also affect that representation politically even if it is not practiced simultaneously for all constituent units on a nation-wide basis. The example for that is the American Senate: US Senators have more and more come to consider their States as constituencies on issues of national policy rather than as bases for a representation of regional interests, and the growth of a multitude of State-coordinating organisations taking the place of the Senate as lobbyists for State interests has become a clear proof of that ever since Senators are no longer elected by the State Legislatures, as they were until 1913 (Leonardy 1994, 149).

Thus numerous federal states have developed other methods for the selection of the members of their second chambers. They range from indirect election by the legislative assemblies of the constituent units to appointment ex officio by state governments and to mixed models as well as to devices of weighted state voting. All of these different methods cannot and, indeed, need not be enumerated here, since they have all been carefully investigated into and compiled by Ron Watts, especially in his Tables 16 and 17 in “Comparing Federal Systems” (Watts 1999 b, 93, 94). On the basic philosophy of this multitude of devices he has rightly remarked already at a rather early stage of his research in comparative federalism that “(t)he appeal of the bicameral solution has lain in the compromises in regional representation and in the methods of selection that it makes possible” (Watts 1970c, 332).

ROLE OF THE SECOND CHAMBER IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

A particular merit of Ron Watts’ studies on federal bicameralism has been his emphasis on the fact that the second chamber in federal states can play an important role in the intergovernmental relations between the executives both on the regional level horizontally and in federal/regional relations vertically. In this field he has on numerous occasions pointed to the German Bundesrat formed by members of the regional (Länder) governments themselves so that “by contrast with the others, the German Bundesrat performs an additional and equally important role of serving as an institution to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration. It is able to do this because, unlike the other federal second chambers, … it is composed of instructed delegates of the Land governments … “ (Watts 1999b, 97). That, indeed, gives the Bundesrat a strong role in
intergovernmental relations, although it should be noted that constitutionally this applies to the vertical federal/regional relations only in-as-much as the Bundesrat as a federal organ is concerned with matters within federal competence and thus not directly with the horizontal coordination among the Länder themselves (Leonardy 1999, 7-10). In practice, however, there are numerous overlappings of these areas, which are most visibly reflected in the fact that the respective federal ministers are always represented in the interdepartmental conferences of the Länder ministries, on whose agendas numerous items of both federal and Länder competences and concerns are frequently negotiated. Irrespective of these differentiations the most remarkable effect of the actual work of the Bundesrat particularly in its committees and the always public documents about it lies in the fact that it contributes substantially to transparency in intergovernmental relations. By doing so they practically serve (as I once put it in a hearing before the Scottish Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons) as “a window into intergovernmental relations” (Scottish Affairs Committee 1998, 40). Ron Watts has also drawn attention to the influence, which this model has had on the creation of the South African National Council of Provinces in 1996 (Watts 1999b, 77 and 2003d, 78). However, it must also be said that under the influence of more recent and very strong centralising tendencies this Council has, unfortunately, not proved to be very successful, because its chances – with provincial executive members as “special delegates” in the provincial delegations – have not really been used effectively. Under those tendencies a contemporary observer has even come to call the National Council of Provinces a “National Council of Pointlessness” (Dawes 2007). That is certainly a regrettable development, but it does not minimise the role which an organ like the Bundesrat can have in intergovernmental relations as a federal second chamber.

CONCLUSION OF RON WATTS’ ANALYSES

To try and give a comprehensive summary of Ron Watts’ analyses and observations of federal second chambers would appear to be an almost impossible attempt. A statement coming closest to the nucleus of such a summarising conclusion would perhaps be the words of another scholar of comparative federalism (Campbell Sharman) which Watts quotes himself: “Bicameralism is the natural ally of federalism: both imply a preference for incremental rather than radical change, for negotiated rather than coerced solutions, and for
responsiveness to a range of political preferences rather than the artificial simplicity of dichotomous choice” (Sharman 1988, 96; Watts 2003d, 70).

EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ron Watts’ style of argumentation both orally and in writing is always very cautious, never pressing and on issues of political relevance even almost diplomatic. This helpful politeness in style even vis-à-vis adversaries is one of the characteristics which make him so likeable personally and also so convincing in his publications. He never tires in emphasising that what is good and reasonable in one constitutional and particularly in one federal system must not necessarily be good for another one, because the differences in history, structures, and beliefs must always be observed. That would seem to be the essence of what makes him such a respected comparative scholar. At the same time, however, that is what sometimes does not make it easy to discover evaluations, let alone recommendations in the results of his research.

Yet on the other hand and in particular in his comparative work about federal second chambers he is very clear in his formulations concerning the “assessment of effectiveness” (Watts 2003a, 85-6). In a review of relevant contemporary political science literature – that of Lijphart (1984), Tsebelis and Money (1997), Patterson (1999), Russell (2000), Sharman (1988) and himself – it takes him five rather voluminous paragraphs on two pages to define the criteria for such assessment determined by the other authors, but only one sentence to define his own: He suggests “that to obtain the confidence of the citizens in the different units, the shared institutions of the federal governments and legislature must meet two criteria: genuine representativeness of the internal diversity within the federation and effectiveness in federal government decision-making” (Watts 2003a, 86). His most often occurring test-case in the ensuing contexts of evaluating and recommending is, of course, the suitability of any particular model for Canadian Senate reform, and from what has been said at the beginning of this contribution this would seem to be only too natural.

THE GERMAN Bundesrat AS A POTENTIAL MODEL FOR CANADIAN SENATE REFORM

For a German author of this chapter there is, of course the danger of coming into the suspicion of propagating his own country’s second chamber as a model for another country
and here even for Ron Watts’ own one. This would, however, be completely out of place, and besides that it would run straight against Watts’ own scientific, if not ethical standards for comparative work. So sufficient proof must be given for the allegation that he himself did and does, indeed, consider the Bundesrat model as one which at least deserves specific attention in the long-lasting and ongoing debate about the reform of the Canadian Senate.

Much of this proof is already to be found in his early essay of 1970 about “Second Chambers in Federal Political Systems” (Watts 1970e). Referring to the fact that members of the Länder governments appointed by their cabinets are the members of the Bundesrat, he states that “a Senate on this pattern would certainly perform a distinctive and useful function in the political process of the Canadian federal system” (Watts 1970c, 354). In awareness of the fact that “Canadians may not be in a habit of looking to the Germans for lessons in the art of self-government” he gives several reasons for this, which can only be hinted at here in key-words: the ability of the members “to speak with real authority for provincial interests, since they would be responsible to democratically elected governments in the provinces”; the protection against “any tendencies for provincial functions to gravitate into the hands of the central authorities”; the enabling of “provincial governments, including Québec, to contribute to the making of federal policy”; the encouragement of cooperation between the two levels of government by the participation of federal cabinet ministers in the deliberations of the chamber, and – last but not least – the facilitation of cooperation among the provinces (ibid).

Besides these institutional factors Ron Watts does not forget to mention those with an impact on the party system: In his evaluation a Senate on this pattern “would reduce to some extent the independence of provincial political parties but will encourage federal parties to give even more attention to the reconciliation of different provincial points of view “ (ibid). In his particular field of scientific attention in the comparison of federal structures he also emphasises that “by serving as a permanent meeting ground for the federal and state governments and their bureaucracies, (the Bundesrat) has become the major institution for intergovernmental negotiation and cooperation” (Watts 1970c, 340).

In his more recent writings Ron Watts gives a detailed account of the support for these ideas particularly in the 1970s and of their later (and final?) defeat in the 1980s. He reports that in the late 1970s numerous Provinces and in particular British Columbia and Ontario,
the Québec Liberal Party, the Canadian Bar Association and last but not least the Task Force on Canadian Unity (the Pepin-Robarts Commission, on which he served himself) each “advanced proposals to convert the Canadian Senate into a House or Council of the Provinces along lines heavily influenced by the model of the German Bundesrat” (Watts October 1994, 65). Then, however, and apparently under the impact of their rejection by the MacDonald Commission ”such proposals went out of fashion” (Watts 1991f, 37; also: 2003, 92-3). Then during the 1980s and early 1990s they were defeated in public opinion by the idea of a directly elected so-called “Triple-E Senate” (Elected, Equal representation of each province, and Effective) shaped on the Australian model (for details see Watts 1990f, 164-6). This is not the place to recapitulate the history of Canadian Senate reform in any more detail and by doing so – as we say in the German language – “to carry owls to Athens” – in a Canadian publication. But it would seem to be in place to emphasise that Ron Watts never really gave up his support for the relevance of the Bundesrat model, though with variations, for the Canadian reform debate. This is shown by a publication of his as recent as 2003, in which he says that the fears levied against the German model (giving “provincial governments too large a voice and introduce a divisive element in federal deliberations”) “were clearly based on a failure to understand the actual operation of the German Bundesrat” (Watts 2003a, 93).

Nonetheless – and Ron Watts would not be himself if this were not so – he also raises “some valid reasons for caution about applying the German model to Canada” (ibid). He sees them mainly in the “very different form of the Canadian distribution of powers” placing “much more emphasis upon the exclusive jurisdiction and autonomy of each order of government, whereas in Germany the emphasis is upon the interdependence of the federal-state-local governments” (ibid). Moreover, he points to the fact that the introduction of the Bundesrat model or anything like it “would require a major constitutional amendment” and that it would by that be “unlikely to be a practical prospect in the current conditions in Canada” (Watts 2003a, 94). However, he does not forget to add that this would apply to other devices for Senate reform, too, such as e.g. a reformed appointment process for the Senators in the present structure (Watts 2003a, 98-100).
SUMMARY

As has been said already at an earlier stage, there is no realisable chance of summing-up Ron Watts’ contributions on federal second chambers in any substantiated, let alone any comprehensive detail. What is left and required to be said, however, is that his analyses, his descriptions, his evaluations and his recommendations display a vast reservoir of scholarly investigation and comparative experience – a reservoir not easily to be coupled in political science and in practice-related application of constitutional research. Not only his publications, but also his strong involvement both in the founding and in the practice of the Forum of Federations have helped substantially to disseminate the contents of this reservoir to all who want to learn and by doing so to profit from it.

CITED WORKS


Watts, R.L.: see complete list of publications at end of this volume
