Metropolitan Governance: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives

Edited by
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and Andrew Sancton

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Victor Jones, Project Coordinator
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About the Authors
FOREWORD

An old saying among political scientists is that foreigners are more likely than natives to understand a country’s political culture. They may even give respectability to or be the originator of facile, untested legends. But the principal contribution of an outsider is to raise questions, often embedded in sweeping assertions, that move insiders to confirm, modify, or refute the visitor’s findings and conclusions.

We do not aspire to the role of Toqueville, Lord Bryce, or Lord Durham. We hope, however, that our collaborative examination of three specific aspects of Canadian and American federalism at work will bring to each participant, as well as to our readers, a clearer appreciation of Canadian and American government and politics. The give and take of our collaboration over the past five years has given us a clearer picture and a sharper background for observing the formation of new, and the total or partial dissolution of old, federal bonds all over the world.

The generic problem is the structuring and restructuring of conflict and controversy so that center, region, and locality participate effectively (not necessarily efficiently) and with at least a modicum of satisfaction to parochial and superparochial interests. In this sense, unitary governments are faced with similar conflicting interests without the formal admission of territorial constraints in their resolution. We are still faced with Harold Laski’s question: what difference does federalism in any of its organizational manifestations make? We need more penetrating and detailed comparisons of interest articulation, policymaking, and policy implementation along a continuum from totalitarian central management to anarchy.

I hope that our transnational collaboration extending from the selection of topics and participants through collegial discussion and criticism of individual papers and their editing into a book (a process not at all unusual in academia), which we have enjoyed in the Canadian-American Federalism Project, can be continued. There are dozens of topics that need to be explored arising from Canada’s ongoing search for an acceptable constitutional order. Likewise, in the supposedly stable American federal system, we are faced with the systemic strains and opportunities of our unstable intergovernmental relations (national, state, and local) as we move cyclically from the more passive (at least

Note: Each author spells and measures in accord with his or her respective national custom, e.g., labour/labor, kilometres/miles, Canadian dollars/U.S. dollars.
ideologically) Reagan-Bush role of government to the promise of a more active role under Clinton and undoubtedly back again, but never to the status quo ante. All of this is occurring in both countries in the context of a globalization we cannot yet fully comprehend.

For the past five years, 18 Canadians and 21 Americans from 14 American and 11 Canadian universities have been exploring the differences and similarities in intergovernmental relations under the two neighboring federal systems. In fact, even more scholars have been involved since the workshops for the federalism project have been held back-to-back with the annual University of California seminars on federalism under the leadership of Professor Harry N. Scheiber.1 Three independent critics have also been present at each workshop. We are grateful to the following for intellectual and social stimulation and for specific criticism of the papers: Jean-Pierre Gaboury (University of Ottawa), Thomas Anton (Brown), Ronald Watts (Queen’s), Bruce Cain (Berkeley), Deil Wright (North Carolina), L. J. Sharpe (Nuffield College, Oxford), John Kincaid (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations), Peter Leslie (Queen’s), and Henry Keith (U.S.-Canada Business Institute, San Francisco State University).

This series consists of three volumes. The first volume, Metropolitan Governance: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives, edited by Andrew Sancton (Western Ontario) and Donald N. Rothblatt (San Jose State University), examines the governance of metropolitan regions under the Canadian and American federal systems. Volume two, States and Provinces in the International Economy, is edited by Douglas M. Brown (Queen’s) and Earl H. Fry (Brigham Young). Volume three, Representation and Policy Formation in Federal Systems: Canada and the United States, edited by C. E. S. Franks (Queen’s) and David Olson (University of North Carolina at Greensboro), studies representation of regional and other interests in the two federal systems.

The Canadian-American Federalism Project was initiated and conducted by the Canadian Studies Program of the University of California, Berkeley. The cochairmen of the Canadian Studies Program,

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Professor Thomas G. Barnes (History and Law), and Professor Nelson Graburn (Anthropology), have been supportive, encouraging, and demanding. We needed all three elements of oversight and are thankful to Professors Barnes and Graburn for their kindness and persistence.

The Canadian Studies Program for most of its life was part of the Institute of International Studies. It was a pleasure to work with its director, Professor Carl Rosberg, its assistant director, Harry Kreisler, and its managing officer, Karen Beros. The Canadian Studies Program continues under the university’s International and Area Studies, headed by Dean Albert Fishlow. Literally, the project would not have survived without the 24-hour assistance and guidance of Peggy Nelson. Rita Ross, administrative assistant for the Canadian Studies Program, has been a capable and friendly successor.

The Canadian Studies Program has profited from the participation of scholars from other colleges and universities in the Bay Area. We are grateful to Ted Thomas (Professor of Sociology and Provost of Mills College), Donald Rothblatt (chairman, School of Urban and Regional Planning, San Jose State University), and Calvin Massey (Professor of Law at Hastings College of Law, for participation in the federalism project.

The Institute of Governmental Studies (IGS), both under its former director Eugene C. Lee and its current director Nelson W. Polsby, has served de facto as a second home for the federalism project and in fact for the entire Canadian Studies Program. Without its in-kind support (paper clips, office spaces, xerox, telephones, library, etc.) I should not have been able to formulate and manage the Canadian-American Federalism Project.

I have lived in the IGS Library off and on since 1938. I thank past and present librarians for their tolerance, help, and friendship. Our federalism project is indebted to Jack Leister, former head librarian, Terry Dean, current head librarian, Kathleen Burgess, Ron Heckart, Marc Levin, Diana Neves, and Susi Schneider. Since I have never been allowed to browse in the stacks, I salute the many pages who over the years have retrieved books for me.

Equally important has been IGS’ support of the annual seminars on federalism under Harry N. Scheiber of the Boalt Hall School of Law. IGS Associate Director Bruce Cain and Assistant Director Adrienne Jamieson continue to be delightful and supportive colleagues.

The three project reports are being published by IGS Press and marketed in Canada by the Institute of International Relations of Queen’s
University (Douglas Brown, Director) and in the United States and elsewhere by IGS. We are deeply indebted to the IGS Director of Publications, Jerry Lubenow, and his associates, Maria Wolf (Publications Editor), Pat Ramirez (Publications Coordinator), and Catherine West (Publications Marketing Coordinator). I personally accept responsibility for all my procrastination, which makes Maria Wolf's continued good nature both extraordinary and appreciated.

The IGS Press has also assumed from the University of California Press the publication of the Franklin K. Lane series of books on major metropolitan regions. Three of the nine published volumes are on Canadian metropolitan regions: Albert Rose (University of Toronto) on Toronto, Andrew Sancton (Western Ontario) on Montreal, and Meyer Brownstone (University of Toronto) and T. J. Plunkett (Queen's) on Winnipeg. IGS Press will also publish this year a volume on the extended Toronto region by Frances Frisken (York University)—the author of an essay in volume one of this series.

We are especially indebted to several people at Queen's University: Ronald Watts, Douglas Brown, Richard Simeon (now at the University of Toronto), Peter Leslie, C. E. S. (Ned) Franks, and T. J. Plunkett. Similar assistance, encouragement and criticism has come from Peter Oberlander and Alan Cairns at the University of British Columbia and from Patrick Smith of Simon Fraser University.

The Canadian government has also been closely involved in developing the idea of a joint venture and in furnishing financial assistance to support the research of several participants. The encouragement and assistance of the following are especially appreciated: Alan Unger, Public Affairs Officer, Consul Stuart Hughes, and Andrew Thompson, Academic Affairs Officer, at the Canadian Consulate-General in San Francisco. From the beginning of our efforts to go forward with Canadian-American collaboration Norman London, Academic Relations officer at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C., has constantly shown the deepest interest in our work. We are grateful to him and to the Canadian government for a close professional friendship.

The Honorable James D. Horsman, Deputy Premier of Alberta and Minister of Federalism and Intergovernmental Affairs has taken time frequently to visit with the Canadian Studies Program and to discuss events leading to and following from Meech Lake and the national and Quebec referenda of 1992.

We would also like to acknowledge the advice, stimulation, and criticism at various times and in various ways from Stanley Scott
(Berkeley); Martin Landau (Berkeley); Randy Hamilton (Berkeley and Golden Gate University); Don Chisholm (UCLA); James Desveaux (Texas A&M); Evert Lindquist (Toronto); Peter Lyden (visiting scholar at IGS); John Sproul, Roger Thompson and David McLean of the Advisory Group to our Canadian Studies Program; Malcolm Taylor (York); David Elton (University of Letheridge and Canada West Foundation); Alan Artibise and David Elkins (University of British Columbia); Lloyd Brown-John (University of Windsor); Charles Doran (Johns Hopkins-SAIS); Daniel Elazar (Bar Ilan University and Temple University); Stephen Schecter (Russell Sage College); David Walker (University of Connecticut); Lyle C. Fitch (Institute of Public Administration); Carl Stenberg (University of Virginia); Bruce McDowall (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations); and Kent Mathewson, a leader in the reconstruction of intergovernmental relations in metropolitan regions.

This magnificent experience for all participants and the publication of some of our findings and conclusions have been possible only because the William H. Donner Foundation decided to fund our efforts. We salute William T. Alpert for his trust backed by the generosity of the foundation. Other people and institutions have contributed equally generously with grants to match the foundation’s support. Robert H. Gayner, executive director of the Business Fund for Canadian Studies in the U.S., made it possible to complete the project. The Pacific Gas Transmission Company, The McLean Group of Vancouver, the Canadian Embassy, the Province of Alberta, and Marathon U.S. Realtors, Inc. were equally generous throughout the life of the project.

Victor Jones

Canadian-American Federalism Project
Project Coordinator
Introduction

Policymaking for Urban Development in American and Canadian Metropolitan Regions

Andrew Sancton
University of Western Ontario

In 1990-91 there were 51 metropolitan areas in the United States with populations of over 800,000. In Canada there were five. (See Table 1.) This research project looks at policymaking for urban development in nine metropolitan regions in the two countries: five in the United States and four in Canada. Even with fewer cities, the coverage of Canada is relatively much more comprehensive. This is especially obvious when it is realized that the two largest American metropolitan areas, New York and Los Angeles, are not included in the project at all. Respectively, they are more than four and three times more populous than Toronto, which is Canada's largest metropolitan area. Given such wide differences in scale, it seemed appropriate for them to be excluded.

Even Chicago, which is included in the project, has more than twice the population of Toronto. San Francisco, Boston, and Houston are also included, but their population levels are much closer to those of Toronto and of Montreal, which is Canada's second-largest metropolitan area. Minneapolis, Vancouver, and Edmonton round out the study but, even among this group, the American metropolitan area is by far the largest.

The central object of this collection of papers is to determine the extent to which we can characterize American and Canadian metropolitan regions as each having distinctive policymaking processes and patterns of intergovernmental relations with respect to regional planning and the provision of major urban infrastructure. We are particularly interested in the policymaking role of metropolitan governments and/or other mechanisms whereby municipalities can collaborate with each other in approaching intermunicipal issues relating to urban development. In the
Table 1. *Metropolitan Regions with Populations over 800,000 in the United States and Canada, 1990-91*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population of Region (000s)</th>
<th>Population of Central City (000s)</th>
<th>Ratio of Central City to Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 New York</td>
<td>18,087</td>
<td>7,323</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Los Angeles</td>
<td>14,532</td>
<td>3,485</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CHICAGO</td>
<td>8,066</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 SAN FRANCISCO</td>
<td>6,253</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Philadelphia</td>
<td>5,899</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Detroit</td>
<td>4,665</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 BOSTON</td>
<td>4,172</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Washington</td>
<td>3,924</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 TORONTO</td>
<td>3,893</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Dallas</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 HOUSTON</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Miami</td>
<td>3,193</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 MONTREAL</td>
<td>3,127</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Atlanta</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Cleveland</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Seattle</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 San Diego</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 MINNEAPOLIS</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 St. Louis</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Baltimore</td>
<td>2,382</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Pittsburgh</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Phoenix</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Tampa</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Denver</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Cincinnati</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Milwaukee</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 VANCOUVER</td>
<td>1,603</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Kansas City</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Sacramento</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>.25</td>
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<td>30 Portland</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>437</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Norfolk</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Columbus</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 San Antonio</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Indianapolis</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 New Orleans</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
36 Buffalo 1,189 328 .28
37 Charlotte 1,162 396 .34
38 Providence 1,142 161 .14
39 Hartford 1,086 140 .13
40 Orlando 1,073 165 .15
41 Salt Lake City 1,072 160 .15
42 Rochester 1,002 232 .23
43 Nashville 985 488 .49
44 Memphis 982 610 .62
45 Oklahoma City 959 445 .46
46 Louisville 953 269 .28
47 Dayton 951 182 .19
48 Greensboro 942 184 .20
49 Ottawa 921 314 .34
50 Birmingham 908 266 .29
51 Jacksonville 907 635 .70
52 Albany 874 101 .12
53 Richmond 866 203 .23
54 West Palm Beach 864 68 .08
55 EDMONTON 840 617 .73
56 Honolulu 836 365 .44

Notes: Metropolitan regions in UPPER-CASE letters are treated in separate essays in this collection; underlined ones are in Canada. American metropolitan regions are Metropolitan Statistical Areas or, where applicable, Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Canadian metropolitan regions are Census Metropolitan Areas.


collection’s concluding essay Donald N. Rothblatt examines some of the implications of the differences between the two countries both for understanding policymaking and for attempting to come to grips more effectively with each country’s urban development problems.

The United States and Canada are both federations and in each case the federal, or national government, has no constitutional jurisdiction over municipal or local government. As the essays in this collection will show, such a lack of jurisdiction has not prevented either federal government from having a profound influence on the nature of urban
development. But the ways in which this influence have been exercised has been significantly different in each country.

In both countries, federal governments have always been major urban landowners, primarily as a result of their need for centrally located facilities for both military and civilian purposes. The Canadian government tended to become more involved in the direct ownership of ports, railways, and airports, but American federal law and spending policies were determining factors in how many vital elements of the urban infrastructure developed in the United States. Indeed, for urban expressways, the American federal government became virtually the direct provider, a role in urban policymaking never even contemplated by its Canadian counterpart.

During the 1930s both federal governments became actively involved in arranging the financing of new housing. The postwar construction of North American suburbia was in many ways a direct result (Doucet and Weaver 1991). But it was not until the 1960s that the two federal governments launched direct and massive interventions across a wide array of policy areas that had hitherto traditionally been the preserve of state/provincial or local governments. In the United States, federal initiatives resulted from the civil rights movement and President Johnson's War on Poverty. Prime Minister Pearson borrowed Johnson's rhetoric and introduced a series of social measures, including universal medicare, that probably had more lasting influence on the quality of urban life in Canada than any of Johnson's measures had in the United States.

During this period both federal governments were active sponsors of massive downtown urban redevelopment. The new cabinet positions of Secretary of Housing and Urban Development in the United States and Ministry of State for Urban Affairs in Canada were supposed to help ensure that federal intervention in urban areas was coordinated, controlled, and responsive to local wishes. One such wish was that massive federally sponsored downtown redevelopment schemes cease—and eventually they did.

In both countries during the 1970s and 1980s, direct federal involvement in policies relating to urban development and urban problems was dramatically reduced, but for quite different reasons. In the United States, more conservative federal administrations attempted to block the flow of conditional federal funds so as to reduce overall government expenditures on redistributive programs (Kantor 1988, Ch. 10). In Canada, opposition to federal involvement, led mainly by
Quebec, came from the provinces. They preferred to control urban policy themselves and were generally successful in forcing the federal government to retreat. The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was abolished in 1979 (Oberlander and Fallick 1987). In the constitutional agreement of August 22, 1992, all governments agreed that any province could, if it wished, take control over its share of all federal money spent on urban affairs and housing, thereby eliminating the federal presence in these fields within its territory.

In practical terms, the Canadian federal government’s formal retreat means very little to individual municipal governments. The government of Canada has virtually no ongoing programs to channel funds directly to municipal and other local governments. This contrasts with the American federal government, which, even after the Reagan cutbacks, still supplies funds to cities for urban transit, public housing, senior citizens’ programs, and other related functions.

Observers walking the inner-city streets of cities in the two countries might well take issue with the notion that there is less federal involvement in Canadian cities than in American ones. Vancouver has its federally sponsored Granville Island, Toronto has Harbourfront, and Montreal and Quebec City are seeing old port areas rejuvenated by federal agencies. Although similar projects can be found in American cities, few, if any, are under the direct control of the federal government. Rather than turning its surplus land over to others, the Canadian government has itself developed new amenities in many of Canada’s larger cities. Its physical presence in urban areas is significant—and likely to remain so—but its presence in the day-to-day operation of local government is nonexistent.

In the United States there are meaningful sets of relationships between both the federal governments and the states and between the federal government and local governments. In Canada, the federal government interacts only with the provinces. This means that, for a Canadian municipality, its provincial government is more significant to it than a state government is to an American municipality, especially since, as the essays in this collection will show, Canadian provinces are much more interventionist in local affairs than their American counterparts.

American and Canadian political institutions are more similar to each other at the municipal level than at any other (Munro 1929, 99). In both countries the origins of municipal institutions can be traced to Britain. In the mid-nineteenth century—first in the United States and then in
Canada—they were increasingly subject to democratic control. Unlike Britain, mayors in both countries began to be directly elected. Canadians, however, generally resisted Jacksonian pressure for the direct election of other local officials. Progressive reformers at the turn of the century had profound influences in both countries: nonpartisan municipal elections became the norm; city manager schemes were introduced; special-purpose bodies were established for certain sensitive functions considered inappropriate for direct control by municipal politicians; the rationalization of municipal boundaries so as to facilitate comprehensive planning was urged almost everywhere (Schiesel 1977; Weaver 1977). During the Great Depression municipalities on both sides of the border were unable to cope with demands for unemployment relief. The result was that most welfare functions were generally taken over by the federal and state and provincial governments (Leman 1980, 21-42).

In the period immediately after World War II, major metropolitan areas in both countries experienced an explosion in suburban growth. In both countries academics and planners urged further governmental consolidation so as to bring central city and suburb under some kind of common planning and taxing authority. In Canada these proposed reforms were generally implemented. In the United States they were not. Explanations of these contrasting outcomes are plentiful (Teaford 1979; Magnusson 1981). This collection is more concerned, however, with the impact of the different institutional arrangements. Does it matter much that Canadian metropolitan regions generally have some form of multifunctional metropolitan government while American ones generally do not?

With the exception of those particularly interested in metropolitan reorganization, American scholars have shown little interest in Canadian cities. Given the content of Table 1, this is scarcely surprising. However, there has been at least one occasion in the recent past when attention by an American to the Canadian experience would have added a great deal to the American analysis. The work in question is Paul Peterson's acclaimed and controversial work, *City Limits* (1981). In his concluding chapter Peterson proposes three reforms aimed at increasing the capacity of American local governments to adopt and implement policies that redistribute resources from the wealthy to the poor. One of them is that "The federal government should institute a revenue-sharing plan that would attempt to equalize per capita fiscal resources available to each state and local government" (219). Such a plan is not only federal policy in Canada, it is now entrenched in the constitution.
Furthermore, each province has some form of municipal fiscal equalization scheme performing the same function internally (Auld and Eden 1987). These policies—combined with other Canadian municipal regulatory practices likely to win Peterson’s favour—ensure that financially weak municipalities in Canada are not in the same objectively subordinate position in relation to their creditors and large businesses as Peterson argues is the case in the United States.

Peterson makes reference to local government equalization schemes in Britain, but not in Canada. This is unfortunate, because federalism and the absence of strong socialist parties in local politics makes the Canadian setting much more useful for contemplating the possible effects of implementing Peterson’s proposed reforms in the United States. What he would discover from the Canadian experience is that such policies do indeed reduce the influence of creditors and local big businesses on municipal politics. Since local taxation and service levels are not likely to vary much (by American standards at least) within a given province, the stakes of municipal politics in Canada for community elites are generally much lower. Freeing municipal councils from what some would see as economic reality does not, however, usher in a new era of local autonomy and democracy. Control by provincial government is substituted for the control by banks and big businesses (Keating and Mehrhoff 1992; Garber and Imboscio 1992)—a substitution of which Peterson would doubtless approve but one that he might have better understood by looking to Canada.

Canadian scholars who have compared American and Canadian cities have developed two opposing positions. Not surprisingly, some consider that there are meaningful distinctions to be made between American and Canadian cities and others that there are not. Much of the debate depends on one’s perspective (Linteau 1987). If one is looking at cities of the world, Canadian and American ones appear quite similar. If comparisons are restricted to the two countries, there can be considerable debate about which variables are relevant. Goldberg and Mercer (1986) focused on those that appeared to be different in the two countries and arrived at the predictable conclusion that Canadian cities have recognizable, distinct, and quantifiable characteristics that set them apart from American cities collectively and any particular subset of American cities. Certain of the Goldberg and Mercer findings seem beyond dispute. Central areas of Canadian cities are more densely populated than equivalent areas in American cities; Canadian city-dwellers make more
use of public transit; and there is more disparity between central city and suburban mean incomes in the United States than in Canada.

The most serious challenge to the Goldberg and Mercer case has come from Frances Frisken (1986). She claims that in recent years Canadian provincial governments have begun to relax previous efforts to bolster the economic and political strength of central cities and have instead catered more to the needs of peripheral suburban municipalities. "In this respect at least the situation of Canada’s larger cities is now very like that in which the large cities of the northern and eastern United States had begun to find themselves by the 1920s" (376). Frisken agrees with Goldberg and Mercer that Canadian and American cities are different but disagrees with them about the explanation. For Goldberg and Mercer there is a whole range of social, economic, and political variables that mutually reinforce the differences. For Frisken, the differences result primarily from political decisions taken mainly in the 1950s and 1960s by Canadian provincial governments. The policies seem to be changing; if the trend continues, Canadian urban distinctiveness in relation to the United States will inevitably decline.

A third possible hypothesis is that in advanced western democracies urban public policy is increasingly determined by global socio-economic factors over which national governments—let alone regional or local ones—have little control. As the world economy becomes more open and competitive, diseconomies of urban concentration (e.g., overburdened infrastructure, high housing costs, pollution, crime) make established urban centers less desirable and encourage continued decentralization of development to outlying areas (Hall and Hay 1980; Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Levine 1989). This line of reasoning suggests that urban development in Canada and the United States is simply a reflection of world trends. Their cities, and those in western Europe and Japan, are indeed becoming more similar, but not as the result of actions taken by government.

For the moment, however, we are concerned with the urban differences between the two countries, notwithstanding the possibility that they might be eroding. Since Goldberg and Mercer aim more to document these differences than to explain them, they need not be especially concerned about confusing cause and effect. For example, they include in their book a chapter on urban local government which shows that Canadians have been much more likely than Americans to establish multifunctional governments for metropolitan regions. It remains unclear, however, whether or not these governments are theorized as relatively
independent variables that help create and maintain the differences or whether their existence is a result of the differences. For Frisken the existence of such governments reflects provincial policy; it is the provincial policy that is the main independent variable.

Let us assume that the main differences to be explained relate in one way or another to the demonstrated healthier state of Canadian central cities, i.e., more diversity of land use, better public services, less urban poverty, etc. One line of argument is fundamentally political. As a result of political values embedded in their society, Canadians have made decisions that, in comparison to those made by Americans, have limited the rights of individuals to pursue wealth through the exploitation of urban land. Instead they have protected certain collective interests that may or may not be subject to explicit definition. This appears to be Frisken's approach; she is worried that Canadian political values (and hence ultimately public policies) are becoming more American or market-oriented and that, as a result, Canadian central cities will suffer.

Another explanation relates to the social realities of the two countries. Until the mid-nineteenth century black slave labour in the South was an integral part of the American economy. The formal abolition of slavery had little immediate effect on American cities. It was not until the mechanization of agriculture in the South and the industrial boom in the North caused by World War II that southern blacks migrated to the major cities of the North. Such cities had been renowned for their capacities to assimilate wave after wave of European immigrants. For whatever reasons, similar assimilation of blacks did not occur. Those who stress the importance of the racial issue in understanding the politics of American cities (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 44) would no doubt argue, if asked to assess the relevance of the Canadian experience for the United States, that the increasing presence of a black underclass in American central cities has so dramatically changed the nature of American urban life that such innovations as metropolitan government, municipal fiscal equalization, and centrally imposed minimum standards for public services are now politically and financially impossible and/or irrelevant, even if at some time in the past they might have been at least conceivable. Had Canadian cities been subject to the same kind of migration from the descendants of black slaves, the argument goes, their central cities would now be indistinguishable from those of the United States, notwithstanding the implementation of the distinct Canadian policies referred to above.
This collection is not meant to catalogue similarities and differences in urban form and public services in the two countries. The focus is the political process, especially within intermunicipal institutions whose territories cover substantial portions of the relevant metropolitan areas. How and why are decisions made, or not made, about the nature of urban growth? In attempting to answer this question we aim to learn not just about urban political power in the two countries but about the role of the public sector in shaping our urban physical environment.
REFERENCES


Development Policy in Metropolitan Boston

Mark I. Gelfand
Boston College

INTRODUCTION

More than any other U.S. city, modern Boston is the product of a long and rich history, and the structure of metropolitan institutions in the region reflects this. The same heritage of local self-government and central city-suburban antagonism that led the Boston metropolitan area to pioneer in the regional delivery of essential urban services at the close of the nineteenth century has also stymied the development of vigorous metropolitan political and planning institutions at the close of the twentieth century. More than 350 years after the Puritans embarked on their "errand into the wilderness," metropolitan Boston remains enthralled with its uniqueness, which is both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness.

This paper is divided into six sections. The first is an overview of the Boston region's geographic and governmental setting. The second section offers a historical discussion of the Boston metropolitan area's political fragmentation and the abortive efforts during the past century at re-integration. The following two sections examine water and sewerage and transportation. The background and current status of metropolitan planning are the focus of the fifth section. A concluding section presents some impressions of the parts played by local, state, and national governments in the policymaking process of the Boston metropolitan region.
GEOGRAPHIC AND GOVERNMENTAL SETTING

Boston is both the capital of and largest city in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Although the Hub (from Oliver Wendell Holmes' characterization of nineteenth century Boston as "The Hub of the Universe") ranks (1990) but twentieth in population (574,000) among U.S. municipalities, the Boston-Lawrence-Salem (N.H.) Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA), extending over five counties in eastern Massachusetts and part of one in southern New Hampshire, is the seventh largest CMSA (4,025,000). Confining the borders of the Boston region to the limits of the 101 cities and towns that are members of the state-established Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) (see Map 1.1) reduces the population figure to 2,922,000 but does not alter the underlying relationship between the central city and its environs. Boston may account only for slightly less than 20 percent of the planning district's population, but it is about six times as big as the next largest city in the region (Cambridge). (See Table 1.1.) Of the metropolitan area's many newspapers, only the Hub's two dailies circulate throughout the whole region, and all four VHF television stations licensed in eastern Massachusetts are based in Boston. (There are also VHF stations in Rhode Island and New Hampshire whose signals can be received in different parts of the region.) Although Boston no longer holds the global spotlight the city once did, within its immediate surroundings it still casts a giant shadow.

Similarly, the Boston metropolitan region dominates the state demographically, economically, and politically. The MAPC district, covering about 18 percent of the Commonwealth's land area, contains more than half of its residents. The state's largest employers are located in the region and, with the advent of statewide banking in the past decade, the power of Boston's financial community—always a major element in the Commonwealth's economy—has grown even larger. Five of the six men elected governor since 1960 have been residents of the region; significantly, however, none lived in Boston itself. Because the Commonwealth does not provide its chief executive with an official mansion, these governors continued to live in their suburban communities and to experience on a daily basis the opportunities and frustrations awaiting the typical metropolitan citizen.

Despite the metropolitan region's towering presence, the state's political leaders, who have adopted generally liberal philosophies regardless of party affiliation, have not made metropolitan issues a focus
Map 1.1. *Metropolitan Area Planning Council District*
Table 1.1. *Cities and Towns in the Metropolitan Area Planning Council; Showing Population (1990) and Membership in Special-Purpose Districts.*

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Totals: 2,922,934 38 43 78 35 21 Cities, 80 Towns

**Cities in Bold Type**
Population data are either preliminary 1990 census results or Metropolitan Area Planning Council estimates.

MWRA = Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
MBTA = Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
MDC = Metropolitan District Commission

of their campaigning or legislative programs. Only once (in 1970) has a regional matter—involving the construction of an Interstate highway—intruded into an election contest, but its potential as a catalyst for sparking discussion of metropolitan areawide problems was quickly neutralized by statements from both the incumbent Republican governor and his leading Democratic challenger pledging that the road would not be built.
That the Boston metropolitan area remains more an artificial statistical and cartographic construct than a popularly perceived economic, social, and political entity is revealed in both the organization of state government and the outlook of private groups. Neither the executive nor legislative branches are set up to look at metropolitan issues in a comprehensive way. Committees of the Great and General Court are arranged along functional lines and, while they may on occasion propose metropolitan solutions to problems, their tendency is to concern themselves with statewide matters. Several boards and authorities have been created during the past century to supply regional services (water and sewerage, parks, mass transit, harbor and airport), but these agencies operate not only within different geographic boundaries but also independently of one another. The agency with the largest purview, both in terms of territory and mission, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council, has only advisory power and lies outside the regular state governmental structure.

Private groups have mirrored—one might even say generated—the state government’s hesitant approach to metropolitan issues. Most of the business and public interest associations in the Commonwealth are either statewide or local in organization. Whether the controversy in recent years has been taxes, the handling of solid waste, or the allocation of state aid to localities, the context of debate has been the Commonwealth as a whole or the community, not the metropolitan area. It has been almost two decades since the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, one of the few groups with a metropolitan focus to its membership, took a strong stand on a metropolitan question. The Boston College Citizens’ Seminars, inaugurated in the mid-1950s to bring businessmen and academics together in an effort to revive the region’s foundering economy, were instrumental in both paving the way for Boston’s urban renewal boom in the 1960s and gaining state approval for the Metropolitan Area Planning Council in 1963. But in the decades since, the Citizens’ Seminars have lacked the will or power to generate public discussion on metropolitan issues. A recently formed organization, 1,000 Friends of Massachusetts, which counts among its members some of the region’s leading businessmen and civic activists, seeks to promote controlled-growth policies, but its political effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.

An environmental group, the Conservation Law Foundation, has relied mainly on the courts to push its program. Besides forcing a massive cleanup of Boston harbor, the foundation has attempted to curb
further development of Boston's business district, citing the inadequacy of mass transit facilities and violations of federal air pollution laws. The Sierra Club, which generally has had a low profile in this part of the country, recently gained local headlines with its legal challenge to the state- and business-backed $4 billion plan to tear down the elevated interstate highway that has disfigured Boston's downtown since the 1950s and replace it with a tunnel. The club's suit raised questions about the air quality around the proposed tunnel's exhaust vents.

But if Boston has become a battleground between groups with competing visions of its future, there has been scant consideration of how development of the other parts of the metropolitan area is to be handled. Although the Commonwealth recently authorized the imposition of strict land-use controls on Cape Cod, a popular vacation peninsula just south of the metropolitan region, there has been little agitation for similar controls within the region itself. The gutting of MAPC's MetroPlan 2000 in the spring of 1990 is indicative of the lack of consensus on even whether, much less how, the various elements of the metropolitan area should be coordinated.

Also instructive on this point has been the fate of a 1969 statute commonly known as the "Anti-Snob Zoning Act." Passed at a time when the Commonwealth's social conscience had been raised by the civil rights struggle and the war on poverty, the law allowed the state to overrule local zoning codes when communities with less than 10 percent of their housing in the "affordable category" used their zoning powers to block construction of low- and moderate-income housing. In the 20 years the act has been in force, this power has been invoked infrequently, despite the fact that only a handful of communities (mostly older cities with an aged housing stock) are in compliance with the 10 percent standard (Boston Globe 1989).

As will be discussed in the following section, the Boston region has always been marked by a dispersal of population, but this scattering of people, as elsewhere, gained momentum in the past half-century. The construction in the 1940s and 1950s of the circumferential Route 128, on an arc about 10 miles from downtown Boston, and the building in the 1960s and 1970s of Interstate 495, on an arc of about 25 miles, dramatically increased mobility within the region and provided the focus for linear development only marginally related to the central city. (See Table 1.2.) Much of the economic vitality of the Boston area since the 1960s has been associated with the rise of high technology firms, first along Route 128 and then along I-495. The city of Boston enjoyed an urban
Table 1.2. Metropolitan Region: Population Distribution and Population Change, 1980-1990*

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central City (1)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Suburbs (27)</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Suburbs (32)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Suburbs (41)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>+6</td>
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*101 Cities and Towns in the Metropolitan Area Planning Council District.

The renaissance of its own during this period, resulting largely from its reputation among young professionals as a livable community, but if the downtown core made a rapid adjustment to the modern service economy, other parts of the city and many of Boston's neighbors were not so fortunate. The Boston region had long been characterized by numerous small manufacturing units spread throughout the area. Although the individual closings of these facilities were not as dramatic as the shutting down of huge industrial plants in the Rustbelt, the cumulative effect was almost as severe.

State politics over the past 15 years have been dominated by economic development issues. The Commonwealth suffered badly during the national economic malaise of the 1970s, hurt not only by the general shift to the Sunbelt but also by its reputation as a high-tax state ("Taxachusetts"). In 1980 the voters adopted Proposition 2½, which imposed severe limitations on local property taxes. In conjunction with the dramatic growth of the computer industry and the higher defense spending of the Reagan administration, Prop. 2½ is usually credited with fostering the "Massachusetts Miracle" that almost carried Governor Michael Dukakis to the White House. Although Dukakis directed most of the increased state revenues resulting from the boom times of the 1980s into social services and additional local assistance, he also worked to keep the business community happy. In one of the more controversial decisions of his 12-year tenure as governor, Dukakis, over the vehement protests of preservationists, approved construction of a company headquarters building on one of the few remaining extensive open spaces within the inner suburban belt. In the spring of 1990 the building was
vacant, a victim of corporate reorganization and a slackening regional economy.

Now that the Massachusetts Miracle is history, the pressures for creating a positive climate for business have intensified. Much of this has, so far, been directed at cutting state taxes; leading the fight has been the Massachusetts High Technology Council, a lobbying group for the large computer-related firms. Although the economic slowdown has led to declines in housing prices, which had been among the highest in the nation, and curbed new housing construction, thereby easing the strong pressures during the 1980s for suburban development, the renewed focus on business opportunity and job creation may make metropolitan planning and regional land-use controls even less palatable than they were in the past.

The absence of a metropolitan vision in the Boston area has its roots deep in the region’s history. The major contribution of Massachusetts to the American polity has been the autonomous local community governing itself through the town meeting. Already a political icon by the time of the Revolution, the town meeting remains more than 200 years later the fulcrum of local government in 80 of the planning district’s communities. Whether it be an open town meeting (which all voters in the town may attend, speak, and vote) or a representative one (members elected on a district basis—Brookline, which has one-tenth the population of Boston, has a representative town meeting of 251 members, whereas Boston, which like 20 other communities in the district functions under a municipal charter similar to that of most U.S. cities, has a council of 13 members), community decisions regarding appropriations and land use are made by a comparatively large segment of the local population. With a long tradition of local self-government to fall back on, Massachusetts towns have generally been successful in resisting state efforts to encroach on their powers. Aberrations such as the "Anti-Snob Zoning Act" have been both extremely rare and of limited effectiveness.

The dichotomy between state and local government has been heightened by the weakness of Massachusetts county government. Indeed, in the commonly accepted use of the term, the Commonwealth’s 14 counties (of which six—in whole or in part—lie in the planning district) are not units of government at all, but rather administrative arms of the state. Besides lacking the authority to tax directly (they are financed by assessments on the communities within their borders), counties in Massachusetts do not have a power usually possessed by their counterparts elsewhere in the U.S., namely, control over "unincorporated
areas." There are no "unincorporated areas" in Massachusetts—every square inch of land in the Commonwealth is within one or another of the state's 351 cities and towns and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of local government. Because counties *per se* are so inconsequential and also because they split up the metropolitan region, they have not figured in the various schemes for regional government and planning that have been considered over the past century (Legislative Research Council 1970).

**A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION**

Three different plans for reorganizing local and regional government have been offered to the citizens of the Boston metropolitan area during the past 100 years. Each was rejected, as the combination of seventeenth century Puritan theology, eighteenth century Republican political theory, and nineteenth and twentieth century sociology proved too strong for the self-proclaimed advocates of modernization.

The political history of the region between 1630 (date of the first settlement at Shawmut, i.e., Boston) and the 1890s was an almost uninter-
rupt ed story of fragmentation. Geography, population growth, the Puritan concept of independent churches, and the Republican faith in local self-government worked in unison to divide and subdivide the territory not only of Boston, but of its neighbors as well. While the towns of Brookline, Chelsea, Quincy, Revere, and Winthrop were being carved out of Boston, other communities also saw peripheral areas spun off into separate towns; in the most extreme case, 12 towns—either in whole or in part—were formed from the original Dedham. Not until 1897, with the creation of Westwood, was this process finally brought to a close (McCaffrey 1937).

For a short period in the 1860s and 1870s an opposite trend took hold. Pursuing what historians have labeled a policy of "urban imperial-
ism," Boston's business and civic leaders held out the allure of better and more economical municipal services in appealing to their neighbors to consolidate with the central city. This promise of improved water supply, sewerage, schools, police, and lower tax rates proved attractive to the "streetcar suburbs" of Roxbury, Dorchester, Charlestown, Brighton, and West Roxbury. Between 1867 and 1873, Boston expanded from 8 square miles to 40 and, for the first time since the Revolution, held more than half the metropolitan area's population.
But if these working- and lower-middle-class towns were prepared to give up independence to enjoy the benefits of more efficient administration, Boston’s prosperous neighbors were not. In 1873, the same year that Charlestown, Brighton, and West Roxbury voters accepted Boston’s invitation, Brookline’s citizens spurned it by a better than 2-to-1 margin. This affluent suburb preferred to keep control of its physical and social environment firmly in its own hands and was able and willing to bear the burden that the decision to go it alone entailed. With Brookline’s rejection, the campaign to widen the political borders of Boston ran out of steam. There would be one additional annexation in 1912 (Hyde Park, a working-class town), but even with that Boston would remain geographically the smallest (45 square miles) of the nation’s major cities (Jackson 1985).

Widening social and cultural fissures between the central city and its suburbs played an important role in keeping Boston and its neighbors apart. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the inhabitants of the metropolitan area had been fairly homogeneous, but with the coming of the Irish in the 1840s, the bonds were broken. Forced by poverty to remain in Boston, the Irish gave their new home a totally different tone. Although old-line families still maintained control of Boston’s economy, on the political and social fronts they were in sharp retreat. What had once been a Yankee, Protestant, and Republican city, was increasingly an Irish, Catholic, and Democratic city. Facing the loss of this citadel of western civilization to those they considered barbarians, the Yankees set up defensive positions in the suburbs from which they would counter-attack.

The anti-Boston forces also maintained an outpost in the heart of the enemy camp—the State House. Alone of the nation’s big cities in the nineteenth century, Boston was its state’s capital, and the propinquity of State House and City Hall fostered the use of state power to deal with what rural and suburban legislators saw as the dangers of urban life. Both literally and figuratively, the State House on top of Beacon Hill looked down on the city.

State intervention as a remedy for urban ills surfaced as early as the 1860s. Distressed by the unwillingness of municipal officials in Boston and some of its heavily populated neighbors to enforce the state temperance law, the Massachusetts Senate in 1865 passed a bill combining the police forces of Boston, Chelsea, Cambridge, Charlestown, and Roxbury into a single unit under state direction. In recommending this step a committee report had declared:
It is necessary to adopt the *metropolitan principle* (emphasis added) in order to prevent the elements which are destructive of property and laws from keeping practical control of the city; and so, from the size and wealth of Boston, and the intimacy of its relations with the whole state, undermining the prosperity and peace of the commonwealth.

This intrusion into local authority proved too much for the House to accept, but out of this concern came establishment of the state police. Two decades later, following election of the first Irish Democratic mayor of Boston, the state legislature took the power of appointing the city's police commissioner away from the mayor and gave it to the governor. This authority would not be restored to the mayor until the 1960s (Blodgett 1984).

If provincial assertions of cultural supremacy lay behind these efforts to employ state power, a different type of threat associated with urban life would create the setting for a more enlightened and innovative exercise of state authority. In 1869, Massachusetts established a statewide Board of Health, the first in the nation, and in its annual report for 1873 the board focused on the sewage problems of the Boston region. Finding that the situation was beyond the capacity of individual communities to cope with, the board pointed to the need for a metropolitan approach. The state legislature took no action on this recommendation, nor on similar reports issued in 1880, 1883, and 1884. Finally, in 1889, the legislature created the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission to construct and maintain a comprehensive waste-water disposal system for Boston and 17 additional communities. The Metropolitan Sewerage District is usually accorded the honor of being the first modern special-purpose district in the United States. Within a decade there were also formed a Metropolitan Park Commission (serving Boston and 35 communities) and a Metropolitan Water Board (Boston and 12 communities) (Merino 1968).

These special-purpose districts performed spectacularly well in their early years, but they had their critics. While conceding that much good had been done, these critics argued that supporters of these state boards and commissions had made a Faustian bargain. If the suburban communities had successfully avoided political consolidation with Boston, they had fallen into the trap of turning over their long-held and cherished power to tax and spend to outside and unrepresentative authorities. With an influential Republican Boston newspaper editorializing along these lines, the legislature agreed to the appointment of a special commission to investigate alternative approaches to metropolitan organization.
The commission’s report, issued in 1896, urged a federal plan similar to one recently adopted for the London metropolitan area. Local initiative and local autonomy would be maintained in all matters where the service could be carried on by the individual communities working within their own borders. Larger and more general undertakings (i.e., water, sewerage, parks, highways, and mass transit) would be the responsibility of a council elected by the voters of the 29 communities in the region (covering 273 square miles and having a population of nearly 1 million—of which about half lived in Boston). But the proposal never had a chance. Suburbanites feared that the council scheme was simply a ruse to pave the way for consolidation with Boston, and that even if formal annexation was avoided, Boston’s great strength on the council would politicize and corrupt its operations (Wakstein 1972).

The decisive rejection of the metropolitan council proposal at the turn of the twentieth century stifled consideration of alternative designs for regional government until the mid-1940s. The New England region in general, and the Boston area in particular, had known economic hard times long before the Great Depression, and business, government, and academic leaders recognized that unprecedented levels of planning and cooperation were necessary if war-time prosperity was to be maintained in the postwar period. To stimulate thinking along these lines, the governor, the mayor of Boston, and the presidents of Harvard, M.I.T., and the Boston Chamber of Commerce sponsored the Boston Contest of 1944. Entrants were asked to prepare specific proposals for improving the political, economic, social, and physical environments for residents of the metropolitan area.

The winning entry, prepared by a team of Harvard professors led by political scientist Carl J. Friedrich, and including sociologist Talcott Parsons and economist Seymour Harris, began by stressing the importance of the historical record:

Boston is hemmed in by the heritage of the past. No plan for the metropolitan area . . . can overlook this tradition-bound substructure, for it is not only physical, but social, economic, governmental, and cultural in its impact.

Working from this premise, the Harvard group proposed enlarging the definition of the metropolitan region from the customary radius of 10-15 miles from the State House to 20-25 miles. By this step, the population balance would be clearly shifted away from the central city and "the outlying communities would not have to fear being dominated by Boston."
A specialist in federalism, Friedrich devised a plan that he believed compatible with both the region's history and its need for metropolitan government. He criticized the special-purpose-district approach, which the 1896 report also had, for lacking "firm, democratic foundations" and urged that these districts be "democratized, expanded and constituted as a federation of all the local governmental authorities in the area." This new entity, which Friedrich proposed calling the Boston Metropolitan Authority, would "exercise those joint functions which are clearly metropolitan in nature," including water supply, sewerage, parks, fire, police, health, sanitation, welfare, economic development, transportation, and planning. The policymaking power of this authority would reside in a council whose members would be elected directly by the residents of the metropolitan region from districts corresponding to the existing cities and towns. This council could levy taxes (but not real estate taxes, which have been the mainstay of local budgets) and select a professional administrator to oversee the authority's operations (Boston Contest of 1944).

The Friedrich plan was unveiled with great hoopla at a December 1944 gathering at historic Faneuil Hall. With characteristic hyperbole, Life magazine wrote, "In the future history of Boston this Boston Contest meeting may be considered as important as the Tea Party of 1773 or the founding of the Anti-Slavery Society in 1832." But the plan went nowhere. The political and cultural divide that separated Boston and its suburbs was as wide, or perhaps even wider, in the 1940s than it had been in the 1890s. Less than a year after the Faneuil Hall session, James Michael Curley was back in Boston City Hall for a fourth term; more than anyone else in twentieth century Massachusetts politics, Curley's career personified for Yankee suburbanites all that was evil about Boston. With this buccaneering and Yankee-baiting politician running the city, any hopes for metropolitan cooperation were dashed. Thirty years would pass before metropolitan government would receive another serious hearing.

This most recent effort was inspired by the federal government. As part of the Nixon administration's espousal of a new federalism, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) George Romney approached his fellow Republican, Governor Francis W. Sargent, with an offer of HUD funds to finance a study of novel approaches to metropolitan development. Although a Yankee, Sargent represented the new breed of Massachusetts politician who reached out across ethnic lines and combined "good government" reform passion for efficiency with a liberal
belief in the efficacy of government action. (By the time the report was ready in June 1975, Sargent had been defeated by Michael Dukakis, whose background and party affiliation were quite different, but whose outlook was virtually identical.) To head the task force, Sargent chose Robert Wood, an academic with substantial government experience. Wood, author of the widely acclaimed *Suburbia* (1959) and architect of many of the Great Society’s urban programs, was quite familiar with the Commonwealth, having been on the faculty of M.I.T. in the 1950s and early 1960s, and president of the University of Massachusetts since 1969.

Like the winners of the Boston Contest of 1944, Wood and his associates began their report with a bow to the past. There has been a "firm tradition" in Massachusetts, the report declared, "of communities resolving their own difficulties and problems, and a strong sense that this makes for the most effective, responsive, and satisfying government." Schemes devised elsewhere for metropolitan integration were not transferable here because the "special New England tradition of participatory local government requires a unique solution for Boston." Indeed, the 1960s had given additional meaning to the role of "participatory local government":

We have strong reservations about any metropolitan approach that would create a bureaucracy. We would be greatly distressed about any new mechanism which would undercut gains in neighborhood-based participation and power that have been achieved at so much cost in the last decade and a half.

The basic job we are about is the reaffirmation of localism and neighborhood—the capacity of a large metropolitan community to govern itself and to maintain over-the-fence living in central city as well as suburb. The basic job we have is not to abdicate to state or national authority. We need to build a regional structure, not from the "top down," as higher authority preempts local responsibilities, but from the "bottom up" when existing neighborhoods, cities and towns contribute to the regional policy and achieve greater control over their collective destiny.

To reconcile these seemingly contradictory aspirations, the task force urged not a metropolitan government of general jurisdiction, but rather "a representationally constructed entity that would have the power to review developmental decisions of key regional importance." This new entity would have: (1) oversight powers in regard to the state agencies supplying water, sewerage, parks, public transit, and airport and harbor
facilities for the metropolitan area; (2) authority to block state projects (e.g., highways, land disposal, higher education, solid waste disposal, health care, air and water quality plans, allocation of state housing funds) when inconsistent with regional plans, subject only to gubernatorial override; (3) authority to review local requests for federal aid and to block the granting of local requests for state aid, this latter power again subject only to gubernatorial override; (4) authority to override local land-use decisions when the sites involved were of strategic importance to the region. The governing board would comprise the top elected officials (e.g., mayor or chairman of the board of selectmen) of each member community, who would cast weighted votes linked to the population of the city or town they represented (Governor’s Task Force 1975).

Variations on the task force suggestion for a strong planning agency with service responsibilities came from other sources (notably the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce) in the early and mid-1970s, but none of them including that of the task force itself came to fruition. Ethnic and political (the state was now overwhelmingly Democratic) hostilities may have been muted by the migration of Boston’s Irish into the suburbs and the arrival of newcomers to the region, but the long-standing divisions within the region had not dissolved. When Boston faced a severe financial crisis in the early 1980s, Democratic legislators from the suburbs would not come to the assistance of the Democratic mayor of Boston until they had been guaranteed that their constituents would not be taxed to bail out the city. Giving the central city-suburban split even greater intensity in recent decades has been the emergence of racial diversity. Compared to most of the nation’s major cities, Boston had a small black population in the century following emancipation, but beginning in the 1950s the African-American share of the city’s population began to climb as the white middle-class moved out. In 1963, Boston’s segregated school system became the focus of black protests and, in 1974, court-ordered integration, which required large-scale busing, generated considerable violence in the city’s streets and big headlines in the national media. Although some of Boston’s suburbs had been enrolling, on a voluntary basis, ghetto children in their excellent school systems, the spectre of a racially torn Boston killed any chance of greater metropolitan cooperation. There has been no serious discussion of regional governance—of any type—for more than a decade.
WATER AND SEWERAGE

The Boston region’s nineteenth century path-setting approach to providing metropolitan services became an issue in the 1988 presidential campaign. Ninety-nine years after creation of the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, George Bush traveled to the home state of his Democratic opponent and, standing in a boat in the middle of Boston Harbor, labeled the Harbor an environmental disaster. Whatever the validity of Bush’s efforts to tag Michael Dukakis with responsibility for polluting the harbor’s waters, there was no denying that the harbor was a pestilential mix of sewage and toxic waste and that it would cost area residents $6 billion to clean up. The governor’s claim to managerial competence never recovered from this assault, and the garbage that had been accumulating in Boston Harbor for more than three centuries claimed its first political casualty.

Central city-suburban political animosity had played a key role in the formation of the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission in 1889 (and of the Metropolitan Park Commission in 1892 and the Metropolitan Water Board in 1895), but for the first quarter-century or so of their operations, these state agencies overcame the divisions and provided their member communities with an excellent set of services. Although the park system, with its imaginative mix of forest preserves, beaches, and scenic corridors drew the most attention from outside observers, the water and sewerage systems were equally impressive. Construction of the Wachusett Reservoir, 40 miles west of Boston, with a capacity of 65 billion gallons, multiplied sevenfold the water supply available to Boston and its neighbors. Less glamorous, but just as important, was the completion of a comprehensive sewer network for each of the three major drainage basins in the region.

Consolidation of the three agencies into the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) in 1919 opened a period of general decline. Most of the prominent civic leaders who had spearheaded the movement for special-purpose metropolitan districts had passed from the scene, their positions as commissioners taken by patronage-hungry politicians. And while MDC was still capable of such large-scale construction projects as the Quabbin Reservoir (65 miles west of Boston), built in the 1930s and having a capacity of 412 billion gallons, it became increasingly bogged down in the mechanics of running playgrounds, supplying clean water and carrying away the dirty. By mid-century, the commission was widely perceived as unresponsive to the region’s growing needs and uninvolved
in its newer problems. As the metropolitan region expanded, the additional communities now within its orbit avoided becoming members of MDC for reasons strikingly similar to those that had halted the annexation movement 75 years before (Wakstein 1972).

Indicative of MDC’s failure to command confidence and provide direction was the abortive effort in the early 1950s to move the commission into the field of solid waste disposal. Legislation enacted in 1952 authorized MDC to build and operate a refuse disposal plant to serve 17 communities. But MDC and the cities and towns were unable to agree on terms, and the bond issuing power lapsed. Not since then has MDC been considered as a worthy vehicle for new metropolitan endeavors (Legislative Research Council 1976).

Critics of MDC have identified at least two weaknesses in its structure. Unlike the metropolitan transit agencies, MDC never had any mechanism for local input toward its decisions. A 1938 legislative committee noted proposals for an advisory body but, without explanation, simply dismissed them as “not expedient at this time.” Apparently nothing has made them expedient in the 50 years since, because MDC continues to function without benefit of counsel from locally elected officials. This resistance to change stems from the legislature’s desire to keep the commission tightly under its control. With thousands of jobs to hand out, MDC became “a place that employed everybody’s cousin.” The location of MDC skating rinks and pools were an integral element of the bargaining that characterized decision making on Beacon Hill. But the State House politicians were not content merely to exploit the commission for its pork-barrel possibilities—they also intruded on its rate-setting authority for the water and sewer services MDC provided, imposing limits that forced the commission to operate at a loss and to issue bonds to cover the deficits. By such action the legislature was able to hide the real costs of providing water and sewerage and pass them along as part of general increases in the local property tax (Birkhead 1972).

MDC lived off its illustrious past for about a half-century, but in recent decades the toll of abuse and neglect began to mount so noticeably that it could no longer be ignored. Construction of the Quabbin Reservoir was intended to meet the water needs of the region through the 40-year planning period from 1940 to 1980. As the 1980s ended, however, the system’s designed yield of approximately 300 million gallons per day was outpaced by an average demand of 343 million gallons per day; on some hot summer days consumption soared to 440
million gallons. Although there has been recurring discussion about tapping additional watersheds, opposition from the Connecticut River valley communities that would be affected, and the high costs that such a project would entail, have blocked action. Consequently the focus in recent years has been on demand management, including metering, leak detection, system rehabilitation, and pricing policy. The effectiveness of these is limited somewhat by the fact that each community retains a large measure of autonomy, especially in regard to rate structure (Massachusetts Water Resources Authority 1987). In the spring of 1989, following several years of low precipitation, a water emergency was declared, restricting consumption by homeowners and municipalities. By early summer, however, heavier than normal rainfall permitted the lifting of these rules.

Uncertain as the last decade has been for the adequacy of the region’s water supply, it has been almost tranquil compared to the turmoil surrounding the sewerage system. Not only was MDC’s sewer operations the oldest of its functions, but it was also the one serving the largest number of communities (43, compared to 38 in the water district [see Maps 1.2 and 1.3] and 35 in the park district). Like the water division, the sewer division did not completely stagnate after MDC’s creation in 1919, but its efforts did not keep up with needs or rising expectations. Towns and cities were responsible for sewers to serve individual homes and businesses, while MDC built the large collecting sewers. An early decision to combine waste-water sewers and storm sewers into a single system would come back to haunt the region when in the 1960s MDC built a primary treatment plant on an island in Boston Harbor. On days of heavy rainfall, the combined flow of water exceeded the capacity of the treatment plant and dumped raw sewage into the harbor. Such activity had been going on for centuries, but by this time the federal government was committed to ending pollution of the nation’s waters. In the early 1970s, following passage of the Clean Water Act of 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began pressuring MDC to do something about the combined sewer overflows and to upgrade its plant from primary to secondary treatment. Between 1973 and 1983 more than 100 consultants’ reports were prepared for MDC and EPA on how untreated sewage could be kept out of Boston Harbor, but nothing was done. MDC would not risk the political fallout that would be generated by going to the legislature for the estimated (1976) $750 million it would take to carry out the EPA proposals. For its part, EPA showed little inclination to force the issue. When the Dukakis adminis-
Map 1.2. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority—Sewerage District
Development Policy in Metropolitan Boston

Map 1.3. *Massachusetts Water Resources Authority—Water District*
tration requested a waiver from the Clean Water Act, the matter sat on the agency’s docket for five years. Only after the Conservation Law Foundation announced in the spring of 1983 that it intended to file a federal suit against both MDC and EPA "to force them to act, to end this federal-state, Alphonse-Gaston approach," was EPA’s rejection of the application announced (*Boston Globe* 1983a).

Helpful as the Law Foundation’s action had been in moving things along, the real drama occurred in a state court in suburban Dedham. In July 1983 a judge began hearing a case brought by the city of Quincy against MDC demanding an end to fouling of the harbor and despoiling of Quincy’s beaches. The judge, who in a different capacity had put the Boston Housing Authority under court receivership for its failure to serve its tenants adequately, turned down a plea by MDC to defer to the political branches on this matter, calling the history of political efforts "bleak." By fall, the idea of a separate sewerage authority, with the power to set its own rates, to write its own budget and issue its own bonds, and the ability to hire a new staff of professional engineers and managers, was gaining support (*Boston Globe* 1983b).

Although Governor Dukakis endorsed the proposal (broadened to include both sewerage and water supply) in his State of the State Message in January 1984, it would be December before the bill was on his desk for signature. The struggle on Beacon Hill brought out into the open the fissures that had characterized efforts to deal with metropolitan problems since the 1880s. Legislators from the western part of the state feared the new agency would have the power to divert the Connecticut River and disrupt the recreational opportunities residents of the area had traditionally enjoyed around Quabbin Reservoir. More generally, legislators from outside the 43 cities and towns to be serviced by the authority were afraid that their constituents would end up being taxed for the water and sewerage district’s deficits, just as they were already being taxed to pay for the fiscal shortfalls of the metropolitan transit system. And legislators from the Boston region looked for ways to shield their voters from the much higher user rates that would be necessary to finance the massive construction projects. After much negotiating, and a forceful nudge from the judge who ordered a ban on new sewer hookups (thereby threatening to bring home and office building in the region to a halt), the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) was created (*Boston Globe* 1984).

MWRA represents yet another effort by the Commonwealth to find a proper mix of state and local responsibility for providing metropolitan
services. The authority, with its own rate-setting, bond-issuing, and pay-scale powers is, unlike MDC (now left only with its parks division—but including responsibility for the areas around the Quabbin and Wachusett reservoirs) largely free from legislative influence. Although the authority is required by statute to assess communities at a level sufficient to cover operating and capital costs, the individual communities still determine how the costs are passed along to consumers. Direction of the authority is vested in an 11-member board, five of whom are appointed by the governor, three by the mayor of Boston, and three by the cities and towns through an MWRA Advisory Board. For the first five years of its activities, MWRA was viewed as following the managerial policies and political preferences of Governor Dukakis.

Although predictions of huge rate increases were fulfilled (rates have tripled since 1985 and are expected to triple again in the next decade), the major controversies surrounding MWRA have been over the siting of its facilities. The MWRA board chose locations for secondary waste treatment, sludge processing, and solid-debris landfills recommended by its professional staff (Massachusetts Water Resources Authority 1988). Despite having been given considerable financial concessions to accept the sludge-processing plant, Quincy’s unhappiness with the deal prompted a major fracas between the legislature and the governor. In the spring of 1989, after much public discussion, the MWRA board, under pressure from Governor Dukakis and Mayor Flynn, agreed to place the authority’s headquarters in a building to be constructed on a parcel of land targeted for redevelopment in one of Boston’s most depressed minority neighborhoods. Arguing that fairness as well as lower cost should have sent the MWRA offices to Quincy, representatives from that city and other South Shore towns persuaded the legislature to pass a measure mandating that MWRA locate its staff in Quincy. Dukakis vetoed the bill and the legislature, after keeping the measure in limbo for over six months, eventually upheld the governor’s action, but by then MWRA had already renewed the expiring lease on its offices in Charlestown.

Still another battle over siting occurred in the winter and spring of 1991. Walpole, 25 miles southwest of Boston and home to the Commonwealth’s maximum security prison, had been named in 1989 as the location for the landfill to accept solid debris created by MWRA operations. Although the state already owned the property in question, the legislature, ignoring the pleas of Governor Dukakis, refused to enact a law transferring title to MWRA. When William Weld, who assumed the governorship in January 1991, withdrew executive support for the
Walpole site and called for further studies, the federal judge supervising the harbor clean-up slapped a ban on all new sewer hook-ups in the MWRA region. With his hands full trying to cope with the state's serious financial woes and depressed economy, Weld backed off from a confrontation with the court and submitted a bill giving the ownership to the MWRA. The legislature gave it its reluctant approval.

TRANSPORTATION

Because of the central city's small geographic area, transportation issues in the Boston region have had a metropolitan character since the earliest days of mass transit. The first horsecar route in 1856 went from Central Square in Cambridge to Bowdoin Square at the foot of Beacon Hill. When electric trolley service started in 1889, the first line went from the Allston neighborhood of Boston through the town of Brookline to Park Street alongside the Boston Common. Boston built the nation's first subway in the late 1890s, and over the next two decades extended its rapid transit system to Cambridge and Everett.

Even before the subway, the Commonwealth had started recognizing the metropolitan nature of public transportation. Legislation enacted in 1887 gave the state Board of Railroad Commissioners, which oversaw the finances of street railway companies, the power to pass on requests for new routes in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline. The commissioners had opposed this broadening of their responsibilities, fearing that the board "may be brought into conflict with the city authorities upon matters which they have, after a public hearing, previously acted, and which have always been deemed to be within their special province" (Board of Railroad Commissioners 1888). Although their advice had been rejected, the commissioners exercised the discretion granted them; in 1893, for example, the board overturned Cambridge's decision to have a new electric trolley line constructed on elegant Brattle Street and ordered it built on Mt. Auburn Street instead. In 1898 the legislature further strengthened the board's role by giving it the power, statewide, to issue a franchise for a connecting line desired by a transit company despite objections of the locality involved.

But even as the Board of Railroad Commissioners was gaining power at the expense of communities, the Boston metropolitan region had begun the process of replacing private ownership of mass transportation with public control. Until 1887 Massachusetts had followed a policy of encouraging competition among private transit companies as the best
means of providing coverage and service. But lured by the promise of swift adoption of the new technology offered by electric trolleys, the Commonwealth consented in 1887 to formation of the West End Street Railway Company, which consolidated seven of the horsecar companies linking Boston and its neighbors. West End delivered on its pledges, giving the region one of the country’s first unified metropolitan surface transportation systems, but when the company owners proved hesitant about plowing their hefty profits into rapid transit (subway and elevated) construction, the legislature in 1897 allowed West End to be taken over by yet another firm, the Boston Elevated Railway Company. In return for this permission, Elevated agreed not only to finance the rapid transit improvements, but also to hold the fare at 5 cents for 25 years (Cheape 1980).

By 1917 the mass transit system was on the verge of breakdown. Higher than expected wage costs and the heavy expenses of new construction left inadequate funds for replacement of rolling stock. The following year the legislature took over the property of the Boston Elevated Railway Company by guaranteeing the corporation’s stockholders a 5-6 percent return on their investment. The company’s rapid transit and trolley operations were to be run by five trustees appointed by the governor. Fares were set at levels that covered the cost of service. Deficits flowing from other sources were to be paid for by assessments on the 14 cities and towns directly served by Elevated; these assessments were based on the degree to which citizens of each community used the system.

New legislation enacted in 1931 continued the key features of the existing arrangement and made a few alterations. In order to supply the financing to retire Elevated’s preferred stock, the 1931 law created a Metropolitan Transit District, a body politic and corporate comprising the 14 cities and towns. This district, administered by a board made up of four gubernatorial appointees and one appointee chosen by the mayor of Boston, could issue tax-exempt bonds that were to be paid off by assessments on the communities. The measure also established a Metropolitan Transit Council to bring together the mayors and chairmen of the boards of selectmen of the 14 cities and towns. The council was to determine whether the annual operating deficits were to be dealt with through fare hikes or assessments. Deficits continued to climb during the next decade, and in the mid-1940s the legislature appointed a study commission to recommend steps for improving mass transit in the metropolitan region. In two reports, issued in 1945 and 1947, this
commission emphasized the importance of extending the geographic boundaries of the transit district and of expanding service throughout the region. It was the commission’s contention that decline in transit patronage could be attributed to the movement of population beyond the limits of the existing transit network and, by extending that network farther into the suburbs, that ridership would reach levels that would put the transit system back in the black.

The legislature rejected the commission’s proposals. Not buying the commission’s argument that mass transit was a much better public investment than new highways, the legislature was not prepared to enlarge the transit district against the wishes of the 15 communities the commission had targeted for inclusion. Any expansion of the transportation network beyond the 14 cities and towns would have to be approved by residents of the individual communities to which service might be provided. In 1948, when it was suggested that the transit district take over commuter lines being abandoned by the New Haven Railroad, voters in Quincy and Braintree defeated the proposal by overwhelming margins.

The new transit law (whose most important provision was public purchase of all remaining Boston Elevated stock) passed in 1947 reflected this suburban resistance to metropolitan cooperation on transportation matters. Not only was the new Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) confined to the same area as its predecessor, but it was also less representative than the previous arrangement. Gone was the Metropolitan Transit Council and its power to set fares and assessments. This authority rested with a board of gubernatorial appointees whose selection was more often a function of political patronage than of executive talent or knowledge of mass transit issues.

MTA’s inability during the 1950s to halt the decline of patronage and the increasing flow of red ink made it even less attractive to suburban communities, but the 14 cities and towns in its operating area did have some of their power restored by mid-decade. The legislature agreed to the establishment of an MTA Advisory Board identical in composition to the old Metropolitan District Council. Board approval was required for appointment of the MTA’s general manager, changes in fares, and the issuance of new bonds. MTA members cast weighted votes tied to the share of the MTA’s assessments (based on usage) their communities paid; a majority of 85 percent (reflecting the large vote cast by Boston) was necessary for the board to act (Deem 1953).

Although given national publicity by a popular song of the 1950s (Kingston Trio, *The Man Who Never Returned* [Charlie on the MTA]),
MTA was turning into a local disaster by the early 1960s. Operating deficits were running at about $16 million annually, the 14 cities and towns were complaining about burdens on their property tax rates, and the region seemed likely to lose the last of its commuter railroads. With Boston business interests screaming for action, Governor Endicott Peabody in 1964 endorsed a major restructuring of the metropolitan transit framework. A new Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) was to be created, covering the original 14 cities and towns and 64 additional communities. (See Map 1.4.) This breakthrough in the district’s geographical dimensions (1,022 square miles compared to MTA’s 123 square miles) was accompanied by an equally important change in the Commonwealth’s role—for the first time state funds would be appropriated for capital expenses. (Federal funds for mass transit construction and purchase of equipment also became available in the mid-1960s.) Having already started moving in this direction on its own, the legislature quickly approved the major points of the governor’s program.

Passage of the MBTA legislation was just one indication of the Commonwealth’s developing interest in and growing sophistication about metropolitan transportation issues. In 1959 the legislature had established a Mass Transportation Commission (MTC) to explore the coordination of highway, mass transit, and land-use policies in the metropolitan region. As one element of its work, MTC received federal grants for a demonstration program to determine how commuters could be enticed to relinquish their cars for public transportation. MTC’s recommendations also played a role in the creation of MBTA. In conjunction with the state Department of Public Works, MTC also received federal funds for the Boston Regional Planning Project, later renamed the Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project (EMRPP), which was to prepare a comprehensive transportation and land-use plan. Originally scheduled to be completed by late 1964, this plan would not be ready until mid-1969.

By the time the EMRPP report appeared, the Commonwealth’s love affair with the automobile had begun to sour. Like most states, Massachusetts had gone on a highway-building spree in the postwar decades, with most of the construction concentrated in the metropolitan area. A Master Highway Plan put together in 1948 by the Department of Public Works, the State Planning Board, and the Metropolitan District Commission, had envisioned an inner belt around the core of Boston, a circumferential route (Route 128) on an arc about 10 miles from the State House, and six radial expressways from the central city into various parts
Map 1.4.  Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
of the hinterland. By the late 1960s, all but the inner belt and one of the radials (the Southwest Expressway, I-95) were largely completed. Neighborhood opposition to construction of the remaining links in the system gained strength in Cambridge and Boston during the latter part of the decade as part of a growing movement for citizen participation in government decisions, and when the EMRPP report finally appeared in mid-1969 with the inner belt and I-95 on its maps, the plan was immediately denounced as the handiwork of highway engineers who had no appreciation of the social, economic, and environmental consequences of their proposals.

With Boston and Cambridge activists joining forces with suburban opponents of I-95, the highway issue entered the political arena. In May 1969, Governor Sargent, who in an earlier capacity as Commissioner of Public Works had helped end the veto power localities had enjoyed over interstate highways within their borders, announced the formation of a task force to review transportation planning in the state. In December 1969, Mayor Kevin White of Boston, who was preparing to challenge Sargent for the governorship in the following year’s elections, announced his support for a moratorium on all new highway construction. The next month the governor’s task force recommended that Sargent impose a moratorium, a step he took in February 1970. Sargent went on to defeat White in November and subsequently ordered that the inner belt and I-95 be deleted from state planning maps (Lupo, Colcord, and Fowler 1971).

The highway battle led to a new focus on mass transportation. Massachusetts politicians put partisan labels aside to work together for federal legislation permitting transfer of the highway funds originally slated for the inner belt and I-95 to mass transit construction projects. Their success made $1.1 billion available, enough for significant extension of one of the subway lines and the total rebuilding of another in the right-of-way that had been cleared for I-95. The state also began assuming a share of MBTA’s operating deficit—at present it absorbs almost 70 percent of the authority’s $400 million annual loss.

Under the reorganization of state government carried out in the 1970s, MBTA is part of the Executive Office of Transportation and Construction. With MBTA and the Department of Public Works now under the same administrative roof, coordination between highway and mass transit programs has been substantially improved. An MBTA Advisory Board similar to that which functioned under MTA remains operational, but important initiatives are largely the product of the governor, his Secretary of Transportation and Construction, and the
MBTA General Manager, who is a gubernatorial appointee. Because of the region's heavy reliance on public transit (the MBTA system is the fifth largest in the U.S.) and its inability to meet federal clean air standards, MBTA has been very sensitive to the issue of fares. Despite an increase in the late 1980s in the cost of subway tokens from 60 to 75 cents and a further rise to 85 cents in 1991, mass transit in Boston remains a bargain compared to the rest of the nation. Nonetheless, as failure to extend one of the subway lines to Route 128 because of community opposition demonstrates, more enlightened state management in Massachusetts does not always translate into measures beneficial to the metropolitan region as a whole.

PLANNING

Although the Puritan visions of a "city upon a hill" and of a model Christian commonwealth looked toward a planned society where the good of the whole took precedence over the interests of the individual, the Boston experience—from almost the very start—has been quite different. Economic opportunity overwhelmed religious conviction, and the process of urban development from the colonial period to the present, as elsewhere, has largely been driven by the engine of private enterprise, which, in turn, has been fueled by public action.

Local government has had the key promotional role, but the state has also been an important participant—most dramatically in the filling in of Boston's Back Bay. Lying immediately west of Beacon Hill and northwest of the Common, this was a 580-acre area of mudflats that were covered and uncovered daily by the tidal ebb and flow of the Charles River. Because it presented both an obstacle to access with Boston's western neighbors and the convenience of being located near downtown, the Back Bay became the subject of several proposals for turning it into usable land. In the 1850s, the Commonwealth, rejecting the city's request for permission to fill in the mudflats, decided to assume the task itself, and over the next two decades a special state agency managed the massive operation. Reclamation of the Back Bay returned a hefty profit to the state from the sale of land and provided Boston with an upper-class residential neighborhood that has one of few systematic street-naming and grid arrangements in the entire city. Unfortunately for Boston, however, the planners of the Back Bay made no effort to integrate these street patterns with the adjacent South End, which was being developed with city assistance. With the state taking steps to ensure the exclusivity of
the Back Bay, the South End quickly lost its attraction for the well-to-do and went into a long period of decline (Kennedy 1988).

The Back Bay experience provided a precedent for the sewerage, park, and water boards of the 1890s, but with the new focus now on the metropolitan area. In 1911, with the Progressive movement at its height, the legislature authorized the formation of a commission to develop proposals for a metropolitan planning agency. Completing their work the following year, the commissioners urged establishment of a permanent and salaried Metropolitan Planning Board of five members (three to be appointed by the governor, two by the mayor of Boston) that which would prepare a comprehensive plan for Boston and 37 neighboring communities. Once this plan was in place, the board would have the power to review all local projects that affected the plan and to suspend for one year those local projects in conflict with it. To encourage local cooperation with the board, the commissioners also recommended that the state contribute to the financing of metropolitan area projects. Notwithstanding this inducement, suburban legislators killed the scheme (Scott 1969).

Another decade would pass before the Commonwealth took a first small step down the planning road: creation of a Metropolitan Planning Division in 1923 within the recently reorganized Metropolitan District Commission (MDC). Placing the planning unit within MDC was more a matter of administrative necessity than appreciation of the importance of linking service delivery to planning; the Massachusetts constitution imposed a limit on the number of executive branch agencies and the new planning division had to be placed somewhere. The division had its own board, composed of four members chosen by the governor, plus representatives of the state departments of Public Works and Public Utilities, MDC, and the Boston Transit Department. Like MDC, however, the planning division was financed not out of state funds but from assessments on the communities of the metropolitan region. Its purview confined to transportation issues, the division devoted itself almost exclusively to laying out new suburban parkways. In 1941 its staff was transferred, in the name of "simplification and economy," to the State Planning Board, which granted the metropolitan region no special recognition (Wakstein 1972).

Action on the national level in the 1950s and 1960s prompted renewed state attention to metropolitan planning. Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 made federal grants available to metropolitan planning agencies, and the following year Massachusetts passed
legislation enabling contiguous communities to form regional planning districts, with purely advisory powers, on their own accord. None of the cities and towns in the Boston region took advantage of this opportunity. Business and civic leaders in the region began mobilizing support in the mid-1950s for special state legislation creating a Boston metropolitan planning agency, and by 1963 three successive governors of the Commonwealth had endorsed the idea. The major hurdle to be surmounted was the opposition of William F. Callahan, chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. Callahan, who was as close as the state ever came to having a power broker like Robert Moses of New York, had for years been seeking legislative approval to extend the Turnpike from its eastern terminus in the suburbs into the heart of Boston. When the legislature finally gave Callahan what he wanted (the alternative to his toll road was a freeway with 90 percent financing by the federal government as part of the Interstate Highway System), Callahan, no longer fearing that the planning agency might block his project, withdrew his objections. In the summer of 1963 the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) was established.

What ultimately emerged from the legislature was a planning body that was a unit of the state government. The council was to consist of one representative (appointed by the mayor or board of selectmen of the municipality) from each of the 47 cities and towns specified by the law, 21 private citizens chosen by the governor (a 1970 amendment to the law would require the governor to include "sufficient representation of minority and low-income groups so as to substantially represent these viewpoints"), and ex-officio members from nine state agencies (Metropolitan Transit Authority, Metropolitan District Commission, Department of Public Works, Department of Public Safety, Department of Commerce, Massachusetts Port Authority, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, Mass Transportation Commission, and State Housing Board) and two Boston agencies (Redevelopment Authority and Department of Public Works). Although control over the council’s policies rested with the cities and towns, direction of MAPC fiscal affairs remained in state hands. Council operations were paid for out of state appropriations, which the state recovered by population-based assessments on the communities.

If the council structure reflected the peculiar features of Massachusetts’ 75 years of experience in dealing with metropolitan Boston, the council’s responsibilities were fairly conventional. MAPC was authorized to conduct research and prepare such reports as might be helpful or necessary to improve the physical, social, and economic conditions of the
metropolitan district; to provide technical planning assistance to member communities; and to "prepare comprehensive plans . . . with respect to the optimum use of the land areas and the most efficient provisions for the utilities serving" the region. Such plans, when adopted by the council, were to be only advisory in character (MAPC 1989a).

MAPC's geographic boundaries expanded significantly in its first decade. The 1963 legislation specified that the 47 communities receiving at least one of the services provided by the MDC were to be members of the council. It also opened up membership as a matter of right to any community contiguous to the MDC area that desired it, and allowed any other community to join, subject to consent of a majority of MAPC cities and towns. By 1965, membership under these provisions had increased to 51 but, in that same year, the legislature jumped the total to 79. This was done in order to have the MAPC district conform to the Bureau of the Budget's definition of the Boston metropolitan area, a step necessary to make the council eligible for federal planning grants. Then in 1970, as part of a general reorganization of the various regional planning units set up across the state, the legislature placed 99 cities and towns within MAPC. One community would subsequently receive legislative approval to quit MAPC, but three others would seek and gain MAPC consent to join. Since the mid-1970s, MAPC has covered 101 cities and towns in a 1,422 square mile territory with a population (1990) of nearly 3 million. (See Map 1.1.)

The 1970 legislation, in response to calls from council representatives, also removed MAPC (and the other regional planning agencies) from the state governmental structure. The practical effect of this step was to give the council greater control over its budget. No longer would MAPC have to get legislative approval every time it wanted to increase the per capita assessments levied on members, although the 1970 law set a cap of 5 cents. The ceiling was raised to 15 cents in 1974, but with the proviso that MAPC could go even higher if two-thirds of the representatives of the cities and towns agreed to the hike. For fiscal year 1989 the assessment was slightly more than 19 cents, bringing in just under $550,000, about 45 percent of the council's regular budget.

It was the lure of federal money that led to MAPC's creation in the 1960s, and the council has remained heavily dependent on federal and state grants to carry on its work. Funds from the federal highway and urban mass transit agencies, as well as from various state departments, have supported the council's transportation, land-use, economic development, and environmental quality studies. Severe cutbacks in federal
spending in the 1980s put a crimp in council activities, although the state did step up its assistance. In 1986 the Commonwealth appropriated funds directly out of the state budget for MAPC and other regional planning agencies, but the legislature has not repeated this action and is unlikely to do so in the near future, given the state’s current financial problems (MAPC 1964-1988).

The unsettled condition of MAPC funding reflects the fundamental weakness of the council during its quarter-century of operations: MAPC’s inability to generate enthusiasm for or commitment to its purposes. Despite several changes of leadership and of approaches to exerting influence, MAPC has not been an active player in the Byzantine maneuvering that characterizes decision making in highly politicized Massachusetts. On a technical level, MAPC is included in the interagency studies that supposedly inform legislative or executive action on metropolitan issues, but when deals are struck behind closed doors the council’s representatives are not present. Neither the council’s elected spokesmen, typically civic-minded suburbanites, nor its professional staff, have demonstrated that they speak for anyone but themselves, and thus they have yet to find a way to transform MAPC’s advisory authority into a strong bargaining chip. Even Governor Dukakis, who was temperamentally inclined toward planning, adopted a distinctly low-level profile on metropolitan issues. Political power in Massachusetts flows out of the locality, and in his last eight years as governor, Dukakis did not challenge that fact of life. In the absence of a metropolitan consciousness among the 101 cities and towns, the officials on Beacon Hill are not about to act on their own.

Conspicuous among MAPC past failures was its inability to prepare the "comprehensive plan" called for in the 1963 legislation. Although the council made some progress in encouraging subregional cooperation on local problems, over its first quarter-century MAPC could never find the will to translate its many research studies into a blueprint for the region’s future. In 1987, however, under the lead of a new executive director, MAPC started moving toward that goal. Unveiled in the spring of 1990, MetroPlan 2000 adopted as its "basic tenet" the belief that "concentrating development is economically and environmentally more practical than our current mode of scattered development." According to this concept, development would be directed toward two types of areas in the region: (1) the urban core (roughly within the arc of Route 128); and (2) subregional growth centers—areas currently experiencing growth or where growth is anticipated (a total of seven, with all but two lying west
of Boston). The plan envisioned a major saving of infrastructure costs by stressing conservation measures and enhancements to existing water and sewer systems before new water supply sources or new sewer systems are developed, and by creating a network of high occupancy vehicle lanes on existing major highways rather than building new roads. MetroPlan 2000 also included a laundry list of specific recommendations in seven categories (economic development, housing, land resources, transportation, water/wastewater, solid waste, and facility siting) to deal with regional problems (MAPC 1990).

Although the MAPC Council approved MetroPlan 2000 in May 1990, it did so only after eliminating the proposal's designation of specific communities and areas as subregional growth centers. Some of the towns were unhappy at being selected, while others were dissatisfied for being left off the list. The notion of such centers remained alive, but MAPC's aspirations to be a vigorous planning agency were dealt a serious set-back.

CONCLUSION

Writing in the mid-1940s, soon after the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Metropolitan Sewerage Board, a proponent of regional cooperation observed that the "state has been the one solvent capable of containing the conflicting elements of the Boston area" (Atkins 1944). Nearly a half-century later, with the board's centennial all but ignored, this statement remains valid. Although the ethnic divisions that had exacerbated the cleavage between central city and suburbs have eased, and while the federal government has altered the playing field with the imposition of new rules, the state still occupies the central role in meeting the service needs of metropolitan Boston.

It is a role the state has accepted both willingly and by default. Reviewing a proposal from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that metropolitan residents "on their own initiative" establish metropolitan study commissions, a report prepared for the Massachusetts legislature dismissed the idea as "completely alien to Massachusetts tradition" (Legislative Research Council 1964). Thus, with communities showing no inclination to cooperate voluntarily, the state found itself obliged to act. It might have imposed metropolitan government upon the region, but chose not to do so because this would have created a major rival to its own authority. Hence, the creation of a
set of state agencies that functioned for decades as patronage havens as much as suppliers of essential services.

Growing national involvement forced the state to start cleaning up its act. Federal highway and environmental laws broke the state Department of Public Works' monopoly over road construction and paved the way for a more comprehensive treatment of the region's transportation requirements. With money from Washington available for transit subsidies, MBTA was both obliged to operate more efficiently and given the opportunity to extend its system. Federal legislation and court action led to the dismemberment of MDC and inauguration of the largest public works program in the history of the Commonwealth. Because Massachusetts waited so long to do something about Boston Harbor, most of the funds for this job will have to come out of state coffers—federal aid that was previously available for this purpose is drying up. Additional large expenditures also loom if federal administrators ratify a preliminary finding that national water quality rules demand improvement in the region's purification facilities for drinking water.

Metropolitan government for Boston in the absence of an absolute federal mandate is not likely during the foreseeable future, but federal planning regulations might act as the catalyst to bring the region's development under areawide control. Although federal authorities have been lax about enforcing their own rules, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council proposes to take them seriously. The council's record is not encouraging, but if it can discover the means to convince local, state, and federal officials that its MetroPlan 2000 is necessary and workable, then the future of the Boston region may yet be different from its past.
REFERENCES


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Chapter 2

Metropolitan Government in the Montreal Area

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THE MONTREAL REGION:
A BRIEF PRESENTATION

Changing Economic Structure

There are many reasons to believe that Montreal is at a crossroads. Its economic and cultural domination over Canada has been challenged by Toronto. The quality of its economic links with the rest of Quebec has been questioned. It has now entered a process of restructuring its economy and redefining its role within Quebec, Canada, and the entire world. What is the link between these profound changes and land-use planning? What is the role of the various levels of government in confronting these changes? What kind of metropolitan governance system is already in place? These are some of the questions addressed in this paper.

Montreal vs. Toronto

During the 19th century, Montreal served as the main port of entry to Canada for the British Empire. Technology would not allow an easy crossing of the Lachine Rapids, so goods had to be trans-shipped in Montreal. Mass arrivals of immigrants from Europe and the high birth rate of French Canadians provided a wealth of cheap labor that facilitated industrial development.

Many studies have shown that, since World War II, Montreal has been declining in relation to Toronto. The reduction in trade with Britain, combined with economic growth in western Canada and increasing economic integration with the United States, has strengthened
Ontario's economic role, particularly with the development of the automobile and chemical industries (Léveillé 1978; Québec, OPDQ 1977). Decisions by the Canadian government concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact, and oil pipelines have favored the development of Ontario and the western provinces while necessarily diminishing Montreal's influence over Canada as a whole (Québec, OPDQ 1977). Traditional sectors of the Montreal economy, such as textiles, garment-making, and food processing, have been adversely affected by various international economic developments such as the increasing manufacturing strength of some developing countries, especially in Asia.

The decline of Montreal has been well documented. Professor Benjamin Higgins' book, *The Rise and Fall of Montreal* (1986), presents one of the most recent and provocative pictures of Montreal's past and present. The decline of Montreal is noticeable in the manufacturing and financial sectors as well as in relative population growth.

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Jobs</th>
<th>Percent of Total Employment</th>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>30.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>305,700</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>282,000</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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*Source: Lemelin et Morin, 13; Ville de Montréal, 1990, 13.*

The most dramatic examples of manufacturing decline were the closing down of petrochemical industries in Montreal East and of old industrial plants along the Lachine Canal. In both cases vast amounts of derelict land were left.

Because of the loss of highly skilled jobs, the departure of corporate head offices to Toronto was of great concern in Montreal throughout the 1970s. Higgins, however, has gathered figures to show that this process started a long time ago and that the shift of Canada's financial center to
Toronto was already a reality by 1970, even though it did accelerate in the 1970s, especially after the Quebec elections of 1976 (p. 58).

As Higgins indicates, in terms of population, after 1970 "the picture is one of stagnation in Montreal and vigorous growth in Toronto" (p. 54). For instance, "Toronto's metropolitan region grew three times as fast as Montreal's during the 1971-1976 period." With low population growth (see Table 2.4) and stagnation in employment at the end of the 1970s, commercial activity was also bound to decline.

Restructuring the Economy

Governments at all levels responded to this critical situation by establishing study committees and announcing action plans. In 1981, the government of Quebec held a regional summit in Montreal. In 1986, the city of Montreal organized one on downtown development. The federal government created a committee on development in the Montreal region that presented an impressive report in 1986 (Canada, Rapport Picard 1986). In some cases local workers badly hit by plant closures instigated the establishment of experimental joint committees aimed at public-private collaboration in economic redevelopment: the CREEM (Comité pour la relance de l'économie et de l'emploi de l'Est de Montréal) and the CREESOM (Comité de relance de l'économie et de l'emploi du Sud-Ouest de Montréal). They involved every level of government, unions, local citizens' groups, and local business people. More recently, the city of Montreal, after acknowledging unemployment rates between 15 and even 30 percent in many areas, prepared a strategy for local development in partnership with local groups, and enterprises (Ville de Montréal 1990). All of these came out with more or less specific proposals, many of which have already been implemented. In short, people are getting together to tackle the important economic development challenges that Montreal is facing. There is a great number of interesting ideas in circulation, although implementation is not as easy.

On the other hand, tertiarization is increasing in Montreal, as in most western countries. The 1982 recession dealt a further blow to Montreal's manufacturing sector, but in so doing it created further opportunity for diversification.
Table 2.2.  

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<th>Number of Jobs</th>
<th>Percent of Total Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>989,000</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Lemelin et Morin, 15.

While the tertiary sector in Montreal has steadily developed, it has been noted (Canada, Rapport Picard 1986, 20) that its growth during the '70s was much stronger in Toronto and Vancouver. As a result, there is a danger that Montreal will become only a regional center and a satellite of Toronto (*Ibid.* 23), thereby squandering its apparent potential as an international metropolis. Even as a regional center, however, Montreal still has its problems. Its economic links with the rest of Quebec are weak, and it lacks the strong network of nearby urban centers that characterizes metropolitan Toronto (Québec, Groupe de travail sur l'urbanisation 1976; Higgins, Martin, Raynauld 1970).

**Montreal vs. the Suburbs**

While the central parts of Montreal were declining, much of the new growth was occurring in the suburbs. New industries were developing to replace old ones, but they tended to locate outside the central area. In 1971, 185,000 or 65 percent of manufacturing jobs could be found in central Montreal. That number dropped to 116,000 or 41 percent in 1986; in the other parts of the metropolitan area, they rose from 95,000 to 164,000 during the same period (Lemelin et Morin 1989; Ville de Montréal 1990). Table 2.3 examines in more detail the distribution of these changes during the seventies.

Similarly, but to a lesser degree, tertiary employment increased more rapidly in the suburbs than in the center. In 1971 central Montreal was the location of 69 percent of the tertiary employment in the metropolitan area; by 1986 the figure was only 52.5 percent (Lamonde 1989). Given the rather slow growth rate for the entire region (Table 2.4), these figures are worrisome; they imply a simple transfer of tertiary employment from the central area to the urban periphery.
Table 2.3. Evolution of Manufacturing Employment by Planning Sector in MUC and in the Suburban Ring, 1971-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971 Number</th>
<th>1971-1981 Number</th>
<th>1981 Number</th>
<th>1971-1981 Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West-Central</td>
<td>21,200</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>21,300</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>184,800</td>
<td>-46,200</td>
<td>138,600</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>-25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>20,200</td>
<td>36,300</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUC</td>
<td>248,400</td>
<td>-1,900</td>
<td>246,500</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban Ring</td>
<td>35,600</td>
<td>23,200</td>
<td>58,800</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCMA</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>21,300</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See Map 2.2. Planning Sectors.

Geography and Demography in Montreal

Montreal’s geographical setting has always been a matter of considerable importance. It was chosen for settlement because of its location at the foot of the then impassable Lachine Rapids on the St. Lawrence River. Furthermore, Montreal is itself a vast island some 30 miles long. On its north side, the island of Montreal is bordered by the Rivière-des-Prairies and by two large islands, Île-Jésus and Île-Bizard, themselves separated from the north shore by the Rivière-des-Mille-Îles (see Maps 2.1 and 2.6). All this forms an impressive archipelago comprising more than 300 smaller islands, two large lakes as well as many rapids. In terms of development, this has posed tremendous transportation problems. Montreal cannot be reached by land except by bridge or tunnel. Victoria Bridge, the first, was built in the early nineteenth century. There are now some 14 bridges and one tunnel, the majority of which were built or greatly redesigned since 1945.

Until that period, settlement in Montreal was very much concentrated around the old central core. Occupation densities were high: in 1976, the central area still registered a density of 84.2 units/hectare compared to 11.2 in the western sector, according to the Montreal Urban Community
Map 2.2. *Montreal Urban Community: Planning Sectors, 1986*

Table 2.4. *Demographic Trends in the Montreal Census Metropolitan Area (1966-1991)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% MUC</td>
<td>% MUC</td>
<td>% MUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>1,298,648</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>1,218,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>624,530</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>741,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MUC</td>
<td>1,923,178</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>1,959,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Suburbs</td>
<td>647,804</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>784,065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | %MCMA     | % MCMA     | % MCMA     |
| Montreal Census Metropolitan Area | 2,570,982  | 100.0      | 2,743,205  | 100.0      | 2,814,065  | 100.0      |

Development Plan (MUC 1986, 19). The city of Montreal is also notable by Canadian standards for having more tenants (68 percent in 1981, *id.*) than owner-occupiers.

Changes in transportation and industrial technology have dramatically reversed this pattern. Since 1951, most of the population increase occurred outside the central area (Map 2.2). According to an MUC study, when the population increase in the central area was only 1.77 percent for the period 1951-56, it was 6.46 percent for the other parts of Montreal Island, and 7.74 percent for the outer suburbs, even though in absolute numbers, the central area was still much more heavily populated: 1,196,127 against 311,526 for the island and 322,579 for the outer suburbs (Communauté Urbaine de Montréal [CUM] 1985). Yet, Table 2.4 shows that as the years passed, this trend persisted; in 1966 Montreal’s
### Table 2.4. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% MUC</td>
<td>% MUC</td>
<td>% MUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>982,339</td>
<td>1,015,420</td>
<td>1,017,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>777,695</td>
<td>737,162</td>
<td>758,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MUC</td>
<td>1,760,034</td>
<td>1,752,582</td>
<td>1,775,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>1,068,315</td>
<td>1,168,775</td>
<td>1,351,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
<td>% MCMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal Census Metropolitan</td>
<td>2,828,349</td>
<td>2,921,357</td>
<td>3,127,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Metropolitan area coverage: $1981 = 2,814.43 \text{ km}^2$
  $1986 = 3,508.89 \text{ km}^2$

*Source: MUC Development Plan 1986, p. 20 and Statistics Canada*

Population started to decline in absolute numbers as well and was superseded by the rest of the metropolitan area. (See also Figure 2.1.)

This fact may have been underestimated following the creation of the metropolitan government (MUC) in 1970, because we now tend to compare figures between MUC territory and the rest of the metropolitan area. Yet, in terms of settlement patterns, central Montreal and other parts of MUC appear quite different, as indicated by the density figures in Table 2.5.

The MUC territory covers the entire island of Montreal plus the much smaller Île-Bizard and the tiny Dorval Island. This division has been said to be a very logical approach politically (Sancton 1985). But the definition of administrative boundaries following the lines of the unusually triangular island of Montreal did cause some problems.
Figure 2.1. *Population Evolution in the Montreal Area 1951-1986*

Montreal Census Metropolitan Area*

Montreal Urban Community

City of Montreal

Suburban ring

Laval

Source: Statistics Canada; OPDQ, Montreal region, 1988

*Territorial basis: 1971 Census*
Table 2.5. Housing Density on MUC Territory by Planning Sector (housing unit per hectare)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West-Central</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Development in Montreal has always been related to the St. Lawrence River. Many smaller towns also developed along the river, particularly near rapids, such as Lachine, Laval-des-Rapides, or Longueuil. Although Montreal originally developed as a trading and transportation center, the island also had very good farm lands and the best agricultural climate in Quebec. Rural villages developed all along the riverside, north and south of the island. These were not typical suburbs. Incorporation of some of them (like Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, Ste-Geneviève, Senneville) into metropolitan bodies was accidental, mainly due to their location within the island of Montreal. For that matter, the presence of Île Bizard within the MUC is not logical; it remains even today mainly rural.

Until recently urban development all over the island was seen as normal. Typical suburban development occurred beside old villages and on good farm lands, with very little public concern in either case. Currently, 75 percent of the 500 km² of MUC territory is urbanized (376,6 km²). Between 1961 and 1981, according to the MUC Development Plan (MUC 1986, 15), 60 km² were developed at an unprecedented pace. However, attempts to preserve the last open spaces have recently become important public issues. But, as we shall see later, development and its demographic repercussions also have a political impact because votes on the MUC Council are distributed according to population. As Table 2.4 has shown, Montreal still has the majority of the MUC population, but the suburbs are now getting closer to equality.

On the south shore of the St. Lawrence River small towns such as Longueuil, St-Lambert, and Boucherville had existed for long periods of time. But during the 1950s and '60s they were surrounded by new
suburbs, like Brossard, all of which were quite close to Montreal's downtown. South-shore municipalities, however, were never incorporated into Montreal's metropolitan bodies (except for Longueuil, which had a metro station built in 1967 to facilitate entrance to the Expo '67 site from the south and which was consequently linked to the Montreal Transit Commission). Although politically understandable, this fact had important consequences in relation to the difficulties of planning future urban development around Montreal. In this regard, as we shall see, the existence of the island has been a powerful barrier to the territorial expansion of metropolitan government.

Most of the 300 other islands in the Montreal Archipelago are too small to have been connected to the others and thus are still very much undeveloped. The most important exception is Ile-Jésus. This island, about half the size of the Montreal Island, has undergone tremendous development since the last world war. It has not, however, been incorporated into the MUC. Instead, the 14 small rural villages that had slowly developed on Ile-Jésus were amalgamated in 1965 by way of a special Quebec law that was the result of a proposal of the Lemay committee study on the island's intermunicipal relations. The new city, called Laval, has become the second largest city in the province, with a population of 284,164 (Québec, Ministère des Affaires Municipales 1988). Yet, as powerful as it is, it is a typical suburb, with little industrial infrastructure and no central area, unless we can accept as a center the four or five shopping malls that developed along the main north-south highway.

Outer suburban development is becoming more and more significant. In 1991 it comprised 43.2 percent of the metropolitan area's total population. There is an unlimited reserve of available land for future development. As the population of these suburbs grows, so does their demand for infrastructure and services. But the real problem, as has been pointed out in recent studies, is that, since the overall development of the metropolitan area is now rather slow, there is a danger that the periphery is growing solely at the expense of the center (Lamonde 1989; Lemelin et Morin 1989; Conseil des Affaires Sociales 1989).

Compared with other North American cities, the core city of Montreal, mostly populated by middle- and lower-class workers, mainly francophones and immigrants, has always been considered as a safe and lively area bursting with a strong cultural life. Recent demographic trends, however, show increasingly worrisome figures. The birth rate in Quebec has fallen to 1.4 in 1986 and is said to be even lower in Montreal
(Lemelin et Morin 1989, 4). The population decline in the center is not only quantitative; it is also qualitative. There is a general tendency for older people to be left in the center, because families with children are fleeing to the suburbs. Family units in the center are smaller, have fewer children, and are more at risk (unemployed or welfare persons, handicapped persons, immigrants, etc.) (Conseil des Affaires Sociales 1989; Lemelin et Morin 1989; Ville de Montréal, 1990). Criminality and drug problems are becoming more prevalent.

Some important conclusions may be drawn from these trends. First, it has become clear that suburban development is not only residential but also economic; thus it is in competition with downtown development and vitality. This will be an important issue during debates over the MUC development plan. Second, the central area has become more than ever a focus for social problems, mainly because of massive closures of traditional industries. Large numbers of jobless people have appeared in central Montreal in a relatively short period. Governments became seriously aware of these issues in recent years and started to develop special programs. But what kind of relationship has evolved between these policies and land-use planning? That remains to be seen.

GOVERNMENTS IN THE MONTREAL REGION

Who governs the Montreal region? Before addressing this question, it is important to remember that Montreal is not a capital city, which implies that it has no special attraction for major public investments, and moreover, that it is relatively remote from decision makers at both the provincial and federal levels. However, the Montreal metropolitan area contains about half the population of Quebec and is the location of more than half its economic activity (Québec, OPDQ 1988, 1-2). The dominance of Montreal within the province has ensured that the Quebec government has always been cautious about establishing a rival to itself in the form of a powerful metropolitan institution. But there are also more profound causes for the Quebec-Montreal tension. They are rooted in Montreal's unique socio-economic structure. Higgins summarizes the problem this way: "Montreal may be 'a primate city' within Quebec as a geographically and politically defined entity; but Montreal is not linked primarily to the Quebec economy. The city operates in a worldwide 'economic space'" (p. 116). Faced with the perspective of Montreal as a neo-colonial enclave, an "appendage to the American, West European and Middle-East economies" (p. 115), decision makers have been confronted
with a double dilemma concerning Montreal's economic role in Quebec development: (1) Should energies be devoted to reinforcing the Montreal region or to sustaining the underdeveloped regions? Would investing in Montreal be detrimental to the rest of Quebec, considering its weak links with the "hinterland"? (2) Should and how can these links be reinforced? To many analysts, the solution was to be found in the development of indigenous entrepreneurs and in asserting Quebec's control over major economic decisions (see Higgins 1986).

This, of course, is part of the Quebec nationalistic project, or Quiet Revolution, and has been explained in more detail elsewhere. While the purpose of this paper is not to develop these aspects at length, it is important to keep them in mind as contextual circumstances that make governance so particularly difficult in the Montreal region. It could easily be argued that in many fields it might be preferable for the Quebec government (from the nationalistic point of view) to keep some kind of control over issues and policies rather than to decentralize power to ambivalent local governments. Still, if only because of Quebec's remoteness, there was a need for some sort of regionally based institution(s) in the Montreal area.

Yet, on the local scene, these tensions also colored the relationships between the city of Montreal and other municipalities. Unequal wealth distribution and language divisions seriously hampered attempts to define new metropolitan institutions (Sancton 1985). Thus, to define functional institutional arrangements in this environment was no easy task.

According to the 1991 census (see Table 2.4), the Montreal metropolitan area comprised roughly 3,500 km² of land and 3,127,242 people. Regional governance in that area is divided between one urban community and about a dozen regional county municipalities (see Map 2.1). Although it may look like a metropolitan government, the Montreal Urban Community in reality is quite weak, as this paper will try to demonstrate. In recent years it has become apparent that even its territory of influence is minimal, and that regional governance and planning is still very fragile. The MUC itself covers only 500 km² and has a population of 1,775,871, or 56.7 percent of the total metropolitan area. As in many other cities, urban development at the fringe is threatening the central area. How is each level of government coping with this situation? This evolving context is an interesting setting for an analysis of intergovernmental relations. What role has each been playing in this process of adaptation . . . or resistance?
Federal Influence

While federal attempts to develop a national urban policy failed, the federal government's influence on regional development has always been considerable (Léveillé 1978). Its constitutional powers over specific activities (international and interprovincial transportation, including navigation, ports, airports; military installations; Indian affairs; etc.) have given it direct tools over development. In the Montreal region, the federal government thus controls the port and the St. Lawrence Seaway, some important bridges, Dorval and Mirabel airports, and the Indian reserves or settlements of Kahnawake and Kanastake (Oka). In 1989 it established a new Canadian space agency in the region but was criticized for locating it in the urban fringe at St. Hubert instead of on the island of Montreal.

The Quiet Revolution and the First Repercussions of Quebec Government Modernization on Metropolitan Governance in the Montreal Area

The Canadian constitution gives the provinces all powers over local institutions; there is no such thing as local, self-determined charters. The province alone creates, modifies, or abolishes local governments, with or without local consultation. It also determines what is a local matter and what is not. Among the most important reforms of the Quiet Revolution were the reforms of the education system and later of health and social services. The new system put in place in the '60s and '70s not only transformed a clergy-run system into a public and secular system but also put it under the complete control of the Quebec government. Regional and local democratic institutions were indeed created to manage local schools, hospitals, and other services, but they relate to the Ministry of Education and to the Ministry of Social Affairs; they are totally independent from one another or from the more traditional local municipalities. Briefly, the municipal organizations have no power nor responsibility concerning most social and educational issues.

One other important aspect of the modernization of Quebec government is that during the '60s and '70s, it also started to develop policies and establish agencies for planning and land-use issues. The province created in 1967 the Office de Planification et de Développement du Québec (OPDQ), which was to be responsible for preparing a provincial development plan. Ten administrative regions were designated where
Regional branches of every provincial department were to get together to coordinate their activities at the regional level. OPDQ was also to prepare regional development plans to further the national plan, but such a plan never appeared. At the regional level, the system did not work either. Many studies were carried out, but they had little immediate operational impact, although they may have been quite useful in the long run in reaching a better understanding of important land-use issues. At the end of the 1970s, OPDQ more or less fell into disuse as a central planning agency. Other means of coordination were developed, particularly various cabinet committees organized on a sectoral basis.

"Regional summits" were also introduced by the Quebec government at about the same time. These were opportunities for local and regional decision makers to get together in a collaborative approach to prepare regional plans and projects for presentation to the government. Preparatory and follow-up activities were very important. Several provincial agencies were involved, but the coordination team would vary from one region to another (see Quebec, Gendron 1983). As already mentioned, the first such summit for Montreal took place in 1981.

In the meantime, provincial ministries developed stronger instruments for controlling land use. The province itself became much more directly involved in housing, heritage preservation, parks, and environmental protection. Sectoral planning by each ministry proved much more effective than the comprehensive approaches considered in the 1960s.

In 1967, the Quebec Housing Corporation was established so as to implement new federal-provincial agreements concerning the decentralization of federal housing programs. The law provided for local housing offices to be established by interested local municipalities.

An Environmental Protection Branch was created in 1972 and transformed into a ministry in 1980. It is responsible for water management, air pollution, and related issues. The Environmental Impact Assessment Board, established in 1978, played an important role in overseeing several issues of special importance to Montreal, including proposals to build a new system of dams on the various rivers surrounding Montreal and to dump snow from the city's roads in the St. Lawrence River during the winter.

In the 1970s, several pieces of legislation were adopted concerning parks, ecological reserves, and natural historic areas. The adoption of the Agricultural Land Preservation Act in 1978 completed this set of legislative tools. It was one of the most powerful tools over land use that the government ever developed. It gave the Agricultural Preservation Com-
mission power to designate agricultural zones in which nonagricultural activities would be severely controlled. In particular, land subdivision in these zones was considerably restrained.

In 1972 a Cultural Property Act was adopted and a heritage preservation department was established within the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. It was made responsible for historic districts such as Old Montreal and Old Laprairie, both within the Montreal region. It could also designate natural areas and preserve specific sites or buildings. A Montreal regional heritage branch was set up to manage these areas. In the late '70s, a joint agreement was adopted between the ministry and the city of Montreal for the management of Old Montreal.

In the 1960s, at the same time as important reforms were enacted concerning public education and health, attempts were also made to reform the municipal system and to implement mandatory planning at the local level. A study commission formed in 1963 presented a report in 1968 proposing a thorough planning system integrating planning at provincial, regional, and local levels (Québec, Commission Provinciale d'Urbanisme, 1968). But the whole scheme was too intricate to be implemented directly. It was modelled on the French system and did not take into account Quebec's hitherto limited experience with land-use planning. It took 10 more years to develop a simpler and more realistic system. Finally, the adoption of the Land Use Planning and Development Act in 1979, which provided for the establishment of Regional County Municipalities (RCM) all over the province, was to complete this reform. Each RCM was mandated to adopt a development plan within seven years. Such plans were supposed to specify boundaries for local urban development and to identify resulting infrastructure objectives for both the local and provincial levels of government. This appeared a promising formula because it meant that there was to be an effort towards coordination through an intensive negotiation process between Quebec and the RCMs (Trépanier 1982).

MONTREAL URBAN COMMUNITY:
A METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT?

When the Montreal Urban Community bill was adopted in 1969, it seemed an impressive reform. But in reality the MUC developed into quite a weak form of metropolitan government. Its territory and powers may have been sufficient for the mission it was then expected to accomplish; but they were limited in relation to the problems of the region as
a whole. As time went by, it became clear to both the member municipalities and the province that the MUC was not much more than an administrative organization to help achieve better intermunicipal coordination. Political power still rested entirely in the hands of local rather than regional representatives, and the MUC has had little, if any, political clout.

Historical Background

The City of Montreal, a Product of Annexations

Between 1881 and 1921, the city of Montreal increased its population more than fourfold (148,747 in 1881 to 618,506 in 1921). Much of this was achieved through the annexation of some 30 municipalities (in total or in part). However, most of these annexations were the result of bankruptcies caused by extravagant public expenses instigated by influential land developers (Sancton 1985, 26). Yet, while the financial burden of Montreal citizens was increasing, other more fortunate municipalities were able to resist annexation, thereby preventing the central city from achieving financial equilibrium. Indeed, wealthier inner suburbs like Westmount, Outremont, Montreal West, Hampstead, and Mount Royal have successfully maintained their municipal independence to this day.

By 1920 solutions other than annexation had to be found for bankrupt suburbs so as to prevent Montreal itself from developing serious financial difficulties. Faced with a provincial government proposal of total amalgamation of the entire island, suburbs had no alternative but to accept a compromise to establish a Montreal Metropolitan Commission in 1921. The commission’s functions were essentially to manage these financial problems and redistribute the bankrupts’ debts among all central and eastern island municipalities (Sancton 1985).

The commission’s establishment came too late to prevent the city of Montreal from completely dominating in size and population the other municipalities on the island. In 1921, the total population of the Montreal and Bizard Islands was 720,502. Ranking behind the city of Montreal, in descending order by population, were Verdun (25,001), Westmount, Lachine, and Outremont. Verdun and Lachine were populated mainly by the French-speaking working class. Westmount and Outremont, on the other hand, were dominated by the wealthy; the former was very much English-speaking, while the latter comprised people of both linguistic groups. Both municipalities were perhaps already big enough to resist
annexation, but too small to become equal partners with Montreal. So they developed conservative, protectionist attitudes against the Montreal giant. This situation has been a serious handicap facing all subsequent metropolitan reformers.

Establishing the Montreal Urban Community

From 1960 to 1986 Montreal's mayor was Jean Drapeau, a strong, imaginative, yet authoritarian municipal leader. His first task had been to reorganize the city's administration. He strengthened his authority by establishing an executive committee, which he controlled with the help of Lucien Saulnier, who served as the committee's chair for 10 years before becoming the MUC's first chief executive.

Mayor Drapeau envisioned Montreal as a great international city. He successfully promoted it as the site of the 1967 World Exhibition and, later, of the 1976 Olympics. These were occasions for grandiose designs and ingenious infrastructures, such as the "Métro" subway system and the artificial islands for "Expo '67." But he also wanted to extend his territorial authority throughout the island of Montreal, using the slogan "one Island, one City." In the early 1960s, he launched a new annexation campaign. Although mainly unsuccessful, he was able to add three municipalities: Rivière-des-Prairies, Saraguay, and St. Michel.

Many of the reasons for the MUC's creation are common to all metropolitan areas. In the case of Montreal, however, the sharing of costs seemed particularly important. For instance, metropolitan services had started to be developed by the city itself, as part of Drapeau's grand metropolitan strategy (Sancton 1985, 95). Because Montreal shaped these first metropolitan services, the suburbs were even more suspicious than usual. Two services were particularly controversial: public transit and police. Montreal had built a very modern underground transit system; it was bound to extend eventually into the suburbs. But where and at what cost? Montreal's police services had become increasingly expensive during the 1960s, in part due to a wave of nationalistic terrorism. Undoubtedly, suburbs were benefiting from the work of the Montreal police. Further, a police strike in October 1969 created a crisis that needed a fast solution.

Meanwhile, the Quebec government had been endeavoring to undertake a vast local-government reform throughout the province. Local municipalities were quite reluctant. But the crisis in the Montreal area gave the government an opportunity to move. At the same time, there
were important regional problems around Quebec City and Hull (across the river from Ottawa). So in 1969 the government created simultaneously two urban communities in Montreal and Quebec, and one regional community for the Outaouais area. They were to be the three metropolitan pillars of the future reform.

The MUC was a forced compromise that satisfied no one entirely. Decision making within its institutions was very difficult; on many occasions no decision was preferred to any other solution. So stagnation was frequent, as we will see through the case studies. Finally, in 1982, after intensive discussions, an agreement was made on a set of reforms to enliven the MUC. We will examine this evolution first in terms of power distribution, second in terms of functions.

Power Distribution in the Montreal Urban Community

Institutional arrangements for the MUC combined recognition of the principle of local autonomy with the imperative of developing important regional services. More than anything else, the MUC is a federation of municipalities to which a certain number of tasks have been entrusted.

Originally, in 1971, Montreal’s population of 1,218,120 represented 62.2 percent of the total MUC population of 1,959,143 (Québec, Ministère des Affaires Municipales 1981). The remaining 37.8 percent was distributed among 28 municipalities; the most populous being Montreal North with 89,139. Eleven municipalities had a population of less than 10,000. Although the 1969 MUC Act stated that "within five years . . . the Community shall prepare and submit to the Minister a project for rearranging the territorial limits of the municipalities" (s. 195), this was never done. Many proposals were considered in the 1970s, but it was not possible to come to an agreement; according to Sancton (1985), any new arrangement would disrupt the fragile equilibrium between French and English.

This problem was so sensitive that it was generally not dealt with directly. Political accommodations had to be found within the MUC. We shall see that the original arrangements gave a predominant role to the city of Montreal, but, as demographic changes occurred, the suburbs redressed the balance.
Table 2.6. **Local Municipalities in the Montreal Urban Community, Population and Area Coverage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anjou</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>13.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baie-d’Urfé</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaconsfield</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>10.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte-Saint-Luc</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>7.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollard-des-Ormeaux</td>
<td>43,800</td>
<td>15.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorval</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>20.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampstead</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkland</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachine</td>
<td>35,400</td>
<td>17.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaSalle</td>
<td>76,400</td>
<td>16.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Île-Dorval</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal</td>
<td>1,030,900</td>
<td>176.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal-Est</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>12.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal-Nord</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>11.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal-Ouest</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mont-Royal</td>
<td>18,100</td>
<td>7.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outremont</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierrefonds</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>24.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe-Claire</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>19.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxboro</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>15.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sainte-Geneviève</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Laurent</td>
<td>68,700</td>
<td>46.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Léonard</td>
<td>77,100</td>
<td>13.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Pierre</td>
<td>4,820</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Raphaël-de-l’Île-Bizard</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>22.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senneville</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdun</td>
<td>61,200</td>
<td>8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,783,653</td>
<td>499.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Répertoire des municipalités du Québec, 1992
MUC Council

On the MUC council, Montreal was represented by all of its 55 city councillors, while all of the other municipalities were represented by only one person, the mayor. This meant that Montreal had an overwhelming majority of 66.2 percent in terms of representation while the suburbs were left with 33.7 percent. However, votes were weighted according to population. This gave a little more strength to the suburbs (37.8 percent/62.2 percent). As time went by, suburban population increased more than Montreal's, thus giving them relatively more votes on the council. But the original 1969 act contained another mechanism that proved to be the most important element in the voting procedure: every decision had to be approved by a majority of Montreal votes and a majority of suburban votes. In practice, this double majority system gave a veto power to the suburbs provided that they presented a common front. They did not take long to understand. In 1975 they formed a suburban alliance, the Conference of Montreal Suburban Mayors. According to Divay and Collin, this enabled them to develop and present alternative proposals instead of adopting merely defensive positions. However, as Sancton suggested, their main goal still is to maintain "the fundamental assumption that every municipality has the right to exist" (Sancton 1985, 148). In any case, they were able not only to block any Montreal proposal that might infringe upon their autonomy, but given this basic principle, to practically transform this voting mechanism into a veto power for every individual municipality, at least politically if not legally.

MUC Executive Committee

As in the city of Montreal, the executive committee was the MUC's most important structural element. It not only controlled the administration, but it was the sole initiator of every bylaw and budgetary proposal. Under the 1969 act, the executive committee was composed of the seven members of the city of Montreal's own executive committee, plus five suburban mayors chosen by their colleagues. Such an arrangement was an important concession obtained by the city of Montreal in order to keep control over the services it had itself previously administered (Trépanier 1975). While the suburbs had learned how to use the voting mechanism at the council, they were not happy with the composition of the executive committee. When, at the beginning of the 1980s, it became clear that population increases were favoring the suburbs, they asked for a revision
of the composition of the executive committee in order to bring parity between Montreal and the suburbs. They obtained that in the 1982 reform of the MUC Act.

Since then the MUC is said to be working better. Montreal has, however, lost much of its control. It now has to negotiate everything with the suburbs. In the 1982 reform, the government endeavored to clarify MUC functions and to encourage more commitment from MUC members to a regional perspective. This was done through establishing five permanent commissions whose chairs and vice-chairs became members of the executive committee. Chairs and vice-chairs must be distributed on an equal basis between Montreal and the suburbs. Thus, each member of the executive committee is attributed a specific mandate (like a cabinet minister) and becomes more responsible. Further, each main function is under the responsibility of two elected officials, one from Montreal and one from the suburbs. Therefore, important problems are being discussed jointly sooner in the process, with the expectation that negotiation will become easier.

MUC Functions and Achievements

Originally, the MUC was charged with such tasks as: property assessment, traffic regulation, data processing, construction standards, public transit, coordination and integration of police services, regional planning, air pollution, drinking water supply, waste disposal, public health, and intermunicipal sewers and water purification works (MUC Act, s. 112). It might also, after an affirmative vote of the two majorities, get involved in other matters, such as: recreation and parks, subsidized housing, fire services integration, and libraries (MUC Act, s. 114). At the eve of the 1982 reform, the MUC had effectively been active in: property assessment, regional planning, air pollution, public health, coordination and integration of police services, public transit, recreation and parks, and water purification works (Québec, Ministère des Affaires Municipales 1981). One other field of activity has been added: economic promotion.

While police and transit were the most important issues in the early years, environmental matters became more significant later on. But some important matters such as water supply and waste disposal were never dealt with by MUC because Montreal and the suburbs were not able to come to an agreement. Integrating police services was not easy: it needed provincial intervention to force it in 1971. In the field of environment, the most notable achievements were the building of main sewage collectors
and of a major water treatment plant; the adoption of important regulations concerning air pollution and industrial waste; and the food inspection service. Yet, most of these activities had already been started by the city of Montreal. Very few new activities were agreed upon within the MUC; they were possible only with some help or push from the province, such as regulation of industrial waste. Such was also the case to a great extent with parks and with planning, which will be examined in the case studies.

Agreement within the MUC was usually only reached on issues that were mainly technical, such as the building of sewage collectors. Unlike the case in suburban Toronto, major sewers were not an important factor in the location of new suburban development. In Montreal they were built simply to replace existing systems that had previously emptied their contents directly into the surrounding rivers. The new MUC sewage-collector system was more of an engineering and financial issue, rather than one that was crucial to the future pattern of the island’s land use. Within the MUC, such broader issues were rarely addressed.

The 1982 reform proposals regarding functions were dictated by pragmatism. The provincial government simply eliminated from MUC jurisdiction those matters that had never been dealt with. Waste disposal was a notable exception: in this case, the government hoped that the MUC would in the near future concern itself with waste recycling while leaving more traditional waste collection and disposal to local municipalities. Only one new field was added: financial assistance to artistic and cultural activities. The rest was left open to future intermunicipal agreements. This meant that the province agreed to leave the MUC’s future development to the good will of the local municipalities, bringing it closer to the model provided by councils of governments in the United States (Léveillé 1980).

The 1982 Reform in Context

Sancton has suggested that only strong interventions by the provincial government could change the MUC from a weak coordinating body to a real regional authority. However, the 1982 reform cannot be seen as a strong intervention by the province. Indeed, the province acted more like a neutral mediator between the conflicting parties. If anything, it accepted the suburbs’ arguments by slightly reducing Montreal’s influence. Many factors may be advanced in explanation. For one thing, Mayor Drapeau’s prestige had been declining since the financial disaster of the 1976
Olympics; in any case, he was getting older and less impressive. On the other hand, the Parti Québécois government was not in a very strong position itself because of the failure of its 1980 referendum on sovereignty and because of the dramatic impact on the provincial economy of the worldwide recession.

Another reason for the provincial government's caution concerning the MUC was that it was simultaneously engaged in convincing all the province's municipalities to implement a more general reorganization (Léveillé and Trépanier 1982; Divay and Léveillé 1981). For more than 15 years the government had been working on such a plan. The municipal associations had successfully resisted all radical reforms throughout this period. The reforms that were finally agreed on were a compromise (Léveillé 1982). They dealt with local fiscal arrangements, local democracy, and planning. In structural terms, instead of reorganizing the municipal system by eliminating a great number of the 1,300 municipalities with a population under 3,000, the 1980 reforms simply revised the county system. New regional county municipalities (RCM) replaced the old counties. Local municipalities were left unchanged, except that from now on every one of them (including cities and towns) had to be part of a RCM. These new regional entities were given very few powers: property assessment, waste management, and regional planning. The only significant innovation was that every one of the 95 RCMs was expected to adopt a development plan.

The government presented these reforms under the guise of aiming to reorganize provincial-municipal relations through decentralization (Trépanier 1988). The contention was that, by reinforcing local governments, a better equilibrium would be achieved. Government proposals also suggested that municipalities would learn by themselves, through planning, the importance of more coordination. The idea was that the government should withdraw from a lot of detailed, local-management matters; it should rather concentrate on major province-wide goals and issues (Trépanier 1988). The government made a commitment to invest in environmental protection, public transit, the preservation of farm land, and housing. Other more local matters were left for municipal initiative. Therefore, it cannot be said that the government was withdrawing from the urban field; on the contrary, it designed a number of special programs that were to have a major impact on urban development. For the Montreal region, this was presented as the Option préférable pour Montréal, which will be discussed later in this paper. But one idea that recurred frequently was that structural reforms were no longer the only solution.
From this point of view, the MUC was seen as an old-fashioned, "hard" structure, while RCMs were the new "soft" devices. This approach also explains partly why the 1982 reform did not force the MUC into new fields of activity, but simply provided for mechanisms for better debates between local representatives through the standing commissions and through a reformed planning process.

*From the Island to the Metropolitan Region?*

Within the MUC, city and suburban population figures are converging (see Table 2.4). Montreal’s gains in 1986 are due to the annexation in 1982 of the east-end municipality of Pointe-aux-Trembles. Without the annexation, the city’s population would have fallen below the suburbs’. An attempt to annex Verdun in 1986 was unsuccessful. That year a new Montreal government was elected with views differing from Mayor Drapeau’s; it does not intend to follow Drapeau’s steps on this matter and has taken a more conciliatory and cooperative approach toward the suburbs.

Table 2.4 shows that since 1971 total MUC population has steadily decreased, while the outer suburbs increased. The latter now comprise 43 percent of the total metropolitan population, and the proportion still seems to be growing, although at a slower pace than in the 1970s. These figures support the contention made by Divay and Collin in 1977 that the debate is bound to move from "the central City to the central Island" (the translation of their book’s title).

In its *Explanatory Notes on the 1982 Reform*, the Quebec government made a distinction for institutional purposes between the Montreal Island and the region. It contended that one single coordinating agency for the whole region would be unrealistic, especially since there were now new regional county municipalities with planning powers for the area around the island of Montreal. The document admitted that cooperation would be needed among these regional municipalities, the MUC and the government; yet, it did not intend to deal with this matter within the legislation reforming the MUC. There are now more than 13 RCMs involved in the Montreal metropolitan area; no coordinating device has yet been established.

The growth of the outer suburbs implies that municipalities within the MUC may develop a self-protective bond among themselves. This process is presently underway for many important issues, especially transportation. On many of these matters, the teaming of suburban and Montreal
representatives has strengthened the MUC position. The MUC commission’s chairs and vice-chairs have become political spokespersons on subjects within their respective fields of jurisdiction. This was one aspect of the 1982 reform that can be considered a success.

REGIONAL PLANNING IN THE MONTREAL AREA

As in many other metropolitan areas, Montreal underwent rapid development in the 1950s and 1960s. Downtown development boomed, with Place Ville-Marie as its new center. Expo '67 was the occasion for major public investments, particularly in transportation. New airports, highways and bridges or tunnels were built or planned to link the island of Montreal with the rest of the world. An innovative subway system was opened just a few months before the World Exhibition’s opening day. Federal housing policies stimulated urban development, while highways opened up new territory for development. However, urban planners were critical about the lack of direction given to these new developments. As early as 1966 a city of Montreal planning study noted that dispersion and discontinuity resulted from these massive investments; vast amounts of farm lands had been abandoned due to land speculation (Gaudreau 1988).

This boom period did not last long after Expo '67. The economic deterioration of Montreal became apparent in the 1970s. Part of it was due to the generalized financial crisis throughout the industrial world; part of it was more specifically related to economic restructuring in North America and in Canada; and part of it resulted from a redefinition of Montreal’s role in Canada and in Quebec (Martin 1979). In any case, Montreal’s industrial structure was decaying; many important activities were moving west, leaving behind vast stretches of derelict industrial land. Housing in Montreal was also very old and needed special attention. In short, the region desperately needed new strategies for redevelopment.

After the recession of the early 1980s, the rhythm of redevelopment started to accelerate. But growth was territorially selective: Montreal’s downtown, the West Island, Laval, and the South Shore have known rapid and intense development; but the old industrial areas south and east of Montreal are still dragging behind. Planning strategies needed to be designed not only to stimulate but also to channel new development in order not to amplify problems in the inner industrial and residential fringe. At the same time, environmental consciousness became more acute and demanded more policies to reduce pollution, to clean up old areas, and to preserve the last green oases on the island of Montreal.
Except for the city, individual municipalities were generally unable or unwilling to control these different stages of development from a broad regional perspective. Many were rapidly transforming themselves from old rural settlements into new urban suburbs. Both the federal and Quebec governments had difficulty understanding regional issues because they were physically distant from Montreal. Further, the provincial government, which should have provided municipalities with better tools for land-use planning, was too busy in the 1960s and '70s modernizing its own structure. Before it could deal with Montreal metropolitan development, it had to go through different phases of planning experimentation.

**Horizon 2000: First Attempts at Regional Planning**

The first studies on regional planning in the Montreal area came from the city's planning department. In 1967, it prepared an impressive audio-visual presentation on urban development in the Montreal region called *Horizon 2000*. The document presented an image of what the region might look in the year 2000, assuming adequate planning and management. It was the first attempt at contemplating a vast metropolitan region that would contain seven million people by the year 2000. It suggested an urban structure with subregional satellites and related infrastructures, linked with a complete transportation system. It also provided for a balanced distribution of urban functions, farm lands, and recreation sites (Marsan 1974, 333). Although intellectually very stimulating, *Horizon 2000* did not (and probably was not intended to) have immediate practical effects. It was more of a plea in favor of public planning and coordination. It showed that Montreal had visions for the future, and it provided ammunition to Mayor Drapeau for the pursuit of his metropolitan ambitions. As was the case for many other structure plans prepared in those days, growth predictions were far too optimistic; therefore, many of the proposed investments were quite unrealistic.

**First Planning Efforts in MUC**

The MUC’s initial planning powers were limited. Its plan was not meant to have real binding effect on local municipalities. More important still, because it was restricted to the islands of Montreal and Bizard, it could not deal with many real regional issues. Therefore, on the one hand, the MUC could only deal with intermunicipal matters but not
regional nor local matters; on the other hand, main transportation infrastructures such as bridges, highways, and the first subway lines had already been decided upon, if not already built.

Planning issues as presented in the first planning documents in 1972 and 1973 concerned the preservation of the few natural areas (wooded areas and river banks) left on MUC territory; controlling development in fringe areas where farming was still active; reorganizing land use or eliminating land-use conflicts in some areas (industrial relocation, pollution); strengthening public transportation systems (main intermunicipal roads, subway extensions, and commuting services); and creating two subcenters for mixed office and commercial development east and west along the Metropolitan Highway (Highway 40). Consensus on many of these issues was hard to reach, especially concerning the subcenters and any other proposal that involved a limitation on local development (Sancton 1985). Many suburbs also saw the planning documents as simply another means of imposing on them Montreal’s infrastructures and costs (Ducas 1987, 84).

As time went by, many committees examined the planning proposals and their financial implications (Ducas 1987), but on the eve of the 1982 MUC reform, they had still not been adopted. Indeed, they probably never would have been had the provincial government not forced it.

Quebec’s Involvement in Regional Planning in Montreal

Quebec’s involvement was eventually much more than forcing the adoption of the MUC development plan. Yet, during the first stages of the Quiet Revolution, in terms of land-use planning, the Montreal region was not considered much differently than other parts of the province. True, a regional branch of the OPDQ had been set up in the early 1970s, which prepared many studies on the Montreal region, but it had no operational authority within the government nor over the municipalities; its studies nevertheless substantiated many of the prevailing regional problems and thus helped to raise the level of consciousness on these matters (Québec, OPDQ 1977). The election in 1976 of the Parti Québécois, many of whose members were influential and knowledgeable Montrealers, triggered at the provincial level real concern over planning and development issues in the Montreal region. Indeed, the Parti Québécois was particularly strong in eastern Montreal; it had, in contrast with previous governments in Quebec, a strong urban base.
The "Preferable Option for the Montreal Region"

As soon as it took power, the Parti Québécois cabinet decided to re-examine all of the government's financial investments in the region and to shape them into a comprehensive strategy; this was presented in 1978 as the "Preferable Development Option for the Montreal Region" (Option Préférable D'Aménagement). It stated that the future goals were the: "Consolidation of the urban tissue inside the present urbanized perimeter and accelerated redevelopment of the Montreal Island in terms of quality of life" (author's translation from Quebec, 1984). These general goals were in accord with the growing awareness concerning the economic slowdown and the decaying central area. They implied a limitation on infrastructure expenses outside the already urbanized area, including a moratorium on new highways, bridges, and water-supply systems. Instead, emphasis was put on investment within the urbanized area in public transit, environmental infrastructures such as water-treatment and waste-management systems, and infill housing. Other goals involved protecting farm land in fringe areas and preserving regional open spaces.

Specific policies were subsequently adopted in accordance with these goals. The province concluded an agreement with the MUC to take over all capital investments related to the subway extension and to establish a special committee to study public transit in the metropolitan area (COTREM, Comité des Transports dans la Région de Montréal). In 1979 this committee recommended an integrated transportation plan that emphasized public transit. The government renegotiated financial arrangements with the MUC regarding its sewage-treatment program, while at the same time deciding to launch a $6-billion program for water quality throughout the province. It also adopted a strong piece of legislation, the Agricultural Land Preservation Act of 1978, to control urban sprawl and to protect the farming industry. New housing programs were created, including one aimed at restoration. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs took action concerning heritage preservation and improvement in the Old Montreal area. The province also contributed some money to help municipalities within the urbanized area develop better industrial parks and traditional commercial districts. An important and innovative project was also designed to deal with water management in an integrated manner for the entire Montreal archipelago, including protecting flood areas, building dams, and developing recreation areas.

In 1983 the government reassessed the option and amended some of the details. The aim was to assist the MUC and the RCMs in the region
in the preparation of their development plans in accordance with the 1979 Land Use Planning and Development Act (Québec 1984).

Regional Planning and the Land Use Planning and Development Act

The option was meant to help coordinate government investments and policies. It was not directly addressed to local and regional municipalities nor to the MUC. According to the 1979 Land Use Planning and Development Act, each such regional body had seven years to adopt its own development plan. At the beginning of that period, the act provided that the government was to send each of the 95 RCMs and the urban communities an individual statement concerning its intentions within the relevant area (s. 11). This document was not formally binding on the regional bodies, but development plans were required to identify government infrastructures and projects. The government retained authority to review the plans and hence could ultimately ensure that its projects were included, but only after lengthy negotiations (ss. 16, 27).

The Option and the MUC’s Development Plan

The 1982 MUC reform included a redefinition of the community’s planning powers so as to make them consistent with the provisions of the Planning Act of 1979. This meant that the content of the plan would have to be slightly different: it would describe an urbanization perimeter; it would identify areas of special interest and areas of restricted development for reasons of public safety, such as flood zones; it would also include provincial government projects (Land Use Planning and Development Act 1979, as amended in 1982, ss. 5 and 264.1). Once the plan was adopted, municipalities would be compelled to adopt local plans and by-laws consistent with its objectives (s. 33). The plan therefore was to become more significant than under previous MUC legislation.

There was no contradiction between the option and the MUC’s general positions. On the contrary, the option was a commitment in favor of reinforcing development within the MUC. Moreover, the option involved financial arrangements that relieved municipalities from much of the capital investments foreseen in the plan (e.g., transit and water treatment). In effect, the option, together with the new version of the plan, was a recognition of a new distribution of responsibilities between the province and the municipalities. As one MUC committee put it, it was now a government responsibility “to channel urban development trends
and to prefer a certain urban form at the level of the Montreal Metropolitan Area" (author's translation), while the MUC plan would define main urban infrastructures, and local municipalities would be solely responsible for land-use policies within their territory (CUM 1978). This left little for the MUC. The development plan was adopted in 1986 but raised little public debate.

Understandably, critics have said that the MUC's plan was nothing more than a recognition of the present land-use patterns; that it had no vision, presented no discussion, no alternative; that it did not relate issues to socio-economic trends; that it did not discuss Montreal's role in Quebec and in Canada; that it was too vague and presented very little operational instrumentation (Gaudreau and Veltman 1986; Divay and Collin 1977; Ducas 1987). Important issues concerning housing, industrial redevelopment, and open space were considered in general terms, with few specific recommended actions, and were left mainly to local municipalities.

The only serious issue that did cause debate was the recognition of three subcenters in the suburban municipalities of Anjou, Pointe Claire, and St. Laurent, (i.e., east, west, and north of Montreal). In the days of Montreal's Horizon 2000, such proposals aiming at creating a stronger urban network had already been worked out in terms of subregional satellites some 30 miles from the island of Montreal. The recognition of subcenters on the island itself was a different story. In Toronto, such subcenters were used to deconcentrate development from an overcrowded downtown. But that was not really a problem in Montreal. In the 1970s, when subcenters were first proposed by MUC planners, development and demographic forecasts were much more optimistic than in the 1980s. By the time the 1981 recession had struck, the city of Montreal was fiercely against such subcenters on the grounds that they might create undesirable competition for Montreal's already threatened central area. The final proposal softened the concept by establishing a clear hierarchy between Montreal's downtown and the subcenters (Gaudreau 1990). Indeed, the recognition of subcenters was merely an acknowledgement of ongoing trends and perhaps an effort to counter the tendency toward strip development along major highways. Nevertheless, the mere mention of the subcenters within the plan can be seen as a compromise by the city of Montreal.
The Option and the Regional County Municipalities’ Development Plans

Detailed assessments of the RCMs’ development plans are still to come. They have been adopted only recently, mainly in 1988 and 1989. Nevertheless, a recent analysis of the consideration given to the goals of Montreal Preferable Option by the government’s statement of intentions for each RCM in the metropolitan area (Land Use Planning and Development Act, s. 16) is quite revealing (Barcelo et al. 1990). The general conclusion was that the option was considered more loosely as time passed, as if it had been forgotten or deliberately relaxed. The study also observed that, within the metropolitan area’s 13 RCMs, the government’s statements were more vague and less compelling in the peripheral RCMs than in Laval and MUC (which were also the first to receive such statements). Thus, although the government had a real opportunity to question the urbanization perimeters adopted by the RCMs and to suggest a stronger control of urban sprawl, it appears to have assumed its responsibility very lightly.

The Option Préférable in Question

Many of the individual programs comprising the option were weakened as time went on (see Barcelo et al. 1990). Important projects for cultural and arts buildings, such as a museum of science and technology in the central area, were abandoned. So were special programs concerning the renewal of old industrial infrastructures. Only very limited funds were made available to support the redevelopment of heritage areas outside Old Montreal.

The option’s rather informal status probably affected its effectiveness (see Barcelo et al.). Indeed, part of the difficulty with the policy resided in the fact that the cabinet approved it without provision for the coordination of its implementation and without assigning any staff to monitor it. Moreover, the option was not publicly debated nor negotiated with local and regional leaders. When the new Liberal government came into power in 1985, few cabinet ministers knew anything about the option and fewer still felt bound by it. This government was well known to be closer than its predecessor to business interests and to favor such neo-conservative policies as deregulation and privatization. In these circumstances, the option seemed seriously threatened.
In 1987-88 the government decided to dismantle its own Montreal administrative region and hence the Montreal regional branch of the Office de Planification et de Développement du Québec. Instead of one administrative region, there are now five: one for the South Shore, one for Laval, two for the North Shore ( Laurentides and Lanaudière), and one corresponding to the territory of the MUC. The only provincial government institution that for many years had been seriously analyzing regional problems was now confined to the Montreal and Bizard Islands. Its new mission involved taking an active part in specific studies concerning redevelopment of old industrial areas in the central part of Montreal, but its role in developing an overall regional strategy was over.

By the end of the eighties, three issues involving the option have caused considerable debate. The first one was the presentation of a new transportation plan for the Montreal area by the Quebec Minister of Transportation (Quebec 1988). This plan proposed an emphasis on new highways outside the MUC. Montreal and other municipalities on the island pointed out that such a plan seemed contrary to the option. They felt that the government was giving in to the outer suburbs’ requests for more highways. The issue was linked to the problem of allocating public-transit deficits between Montrealers and north and south suburbanites. After much debate, the MUC, Laval, and the south-shore municipalities reached an agreement containing the following provisions: (1) the outer suburbs will share MUC’s annual public-transit deficit on the condition that MUC municipalities raise their financial commitment as well; (2) there will be a regional coordinating structure among the transit corporations for the MUC, Laval, and the South Shore; and (3) the subway system will be developed into Laval (Le Devoir, Sept. 22, 1989; La Presse, Oct. 14, 1989). As for more highways, many decisions are still pending.

The second issue concerned a changing of policies relating to the preservation of agricultural land. Originally, the legislation imposed stringent controls on property owners and local municipalities. Its implementation was entrusted to a commission having regulatory and quasi-judiciary powers. Under the Liberal government, the nomination of new commissioners, as well as some amendments to the legislation caused a general relaxation of the rules. The amendments allowed for a revision of the limits of the designated agricultural zones in the province following the coming into force of the RCMs development plans. But for a few exceptions, it appears that between 1985 and 1991, all RCMs submitted a request for the exclusion of a certain amount of lands from
the agricultural zones. Furthermore, the commission itself offered additional lands that it considered unfit for farming. The commission invoked four major reasons to allow these exclusions: (1) low biophysical potential for agriculture; (2) lands already used for other activities; (3) isolated hard to reach areas making agricultural activity too difficult; (4) lands needed for urbanization according to RCMs development plans. In its final report on the whole operation (CPTAQ 1992), the commission stated that it was not its responsibility to question the opportunity of RCMs aims and land development policies. In every case, it tried to accommodate the expressed needs. Its only concern being the vitality of farming activities, it mainly debated the specific locations of projected land developments and the preservation of the lands best suited for agriculture. At the end of this process, the designated agricultural zones in the whole province were reduced by 206,247 ha or 3.2 percent of the 6,440,463 ha previously protected. The Montreal area, however, was by far the most affected area, with a loss of 73,698 ha (4.6 percent).

Thus, the commission’s new direction, by concentrating its concerns on intensive farming, resulted in the handing over to regional municipalities of the regulation of urban fringe areas and of conflicts between urban development and farming. This meant not only that farm activity would not be as strongly supported near urban areas, but that urban sprawl might start anew. Considering that this change of policy occurred after the adoption of RCMs development plans, very few RCMs were really prepared to tackle this issue. Specially in the Montreal region, many leaders, planners, and environmentalists expressed serious worries that this would only increase Montreal’s downfall and asked for a general debate concerning urban sprawl and growth control.

The third event was a major reform of local fiscality adopted by the Québec Government in June 1991 (Québec Statutes 1991, Bill 145). The purpose of the reform was to redefine the share of public finances between all levels of government in the province so as to make the fiscal burden of the taxpayer more comparable to other Canadian provinces. Particularly, it purported to render local municipalities more accountable for local expenses previously assumed by the province, such as local police services (provided by the Sureté du Québec in rural areas), rural roads and public transit. This meant an estimated additional burden on municipal taxes throughout the province of Cdn $260 million annually. Montreal itself estimated the loss at Cdn $100 million for 1992. The city of Montreal was unable to avoid this new blow on public transit; it pleaded, however, considering its devastating economic problems, for a
special status as Quebec’s metropolis and as a central city providing special services to the region and the province. It requested that the government adopt a specific urban policy for the Montreal region and that a study commission be put up to examine publicly institutional responsibilities and fiscal resources in the region (La Presse, 14 juin 1991; Le Devoir, 6 juin 1991).

Towards New Regional Strategies?

Quebec’s answer to these requests was twofold. In December 1991, a development strategy for Greater Montreal was released by the interministerial committee on development of greater Montreal. This strategy was designed to stimulate the restructuring of Montreal’s economic base. It revolved around four axes: (1) high tech innovation, (2) modernization of the industrial structure, (3) human resources training, and (4) market expansion. However, the document recognized a real problem of coordination among regional institutions and municipalities. Therefore, the minister of municipal affairs announced his intention to tackle this specific problem. A study group on Montreal and its region was formed on April 2, 1992, to study the exercise of municipal functions in the region, and to propose a vision for the future followed by recommendations on institutions and public services, fiscal policy, land-use planning, environment, economic, social and cultural development, and transportation. The study group was given one year to issue its report, starting early summer 1992. The two groups cover the same territory, which comprises the Census Metropolitan Area (102 municipalities) plus a few other municipalities to include entire regional municipalities; the total amounts to 137 local municipalities, 13 regional municipalities and one urban community.

PARKS AND OPEN SPACE IN THE MONTREAL METROPOLITAN AREA

Metropolitan Parks and Open Space in the MUC from 1970 to 1979

When it was created in 1970, the MUC was empowered to take over existing parks of intermunicipal character and to create new intermunicipal parks (MUC Act 1969, ss. 190-91). However, it took some 10 years before any such MUC parks were established. These 10 years have been marked by extreme caution on the part of local politicians
combined with rising citizens’ expectations regarding open space and the environment. Eventually the Quebec government played a key role as facilitator for new parks and provided some much-needed financial support.

Planning Proposals and Municipal Reluctance

In 1972, preliminary drafts of MUC planning documents proposed designating four of the city’s most important parks as metropolitan parks: Mount Royal, Maisonneuve (the eventual Olympic site), the Expo ’67 site, and Angrignon. They also suggested the creation of four new parks: Rivière-des Prairies (east end), Bois-de-Liesse, Anse-à-l’Orme, and Cap-St-Jacques (west end). The planning documents also considered other lands under private property, such as golf courses, the Morgan Arboretum (McGill University), and other public property, such as the Lachine Canal (federal government). Some thought was also given to establishing green links between the parks, to designating lakeshore and riverside drives, and to protecting endangered woodlands. These elements would constitute the basis of an open-space system that is still under debate.

Designation of the Montreal parks as intermunicipal was the first proposal to be dropped. Other municipalities were unwilling to contribute to Montreal’s maintenance costs, while Montreal resisted placing its most prestigious parks under other municipalities’ supervision. Proposals to create new metropolitan parks, even though they seemed quite desirable, were met with much reserve by MUC politicians who thought purchasing costs would be too high. A committee set up to study the financial implications of the Draft Development Plan concluded in 1975 that the MUC needed provincial financial assistance in order to develop new metropolitan parks (CUM 1975). Here again, we see that the traditional tensions among municipalities, their unfamiliarity with planning tools, and their unwillingness to enter into capital investments all contributed to preventing MUC action.

Citizens’ Pressures

In the early 1970s, citizens’ groups were formed to preserve open space in the region. They formed a coalition that presented briefs urging the MUC to implement its proposals on open space and to create a parks department (Regroupement ... 1973). They suggested that a metropolitan parks department should also be responsible for many important recre-
Map 2.4. Draft Proposal for Recreation and Open Space, MUC, 1972
ation facilities such as the Botanical Garden, the Dow Planetarium, the Aquarium, and a future zoological garden, all then under city jurisdiction. Citizens' groups were more successful in preserving specific sites, particularly the Saraguay, Héritage, and Réparation woodlands. In the case of the first one, citizens became worried by a big residential development project in 1977 (Leblanc 1979). They gathered around the Société d'horticulture et d'écologie du Nord de Montréal and the Société d'animation du Jardin et de l'Institut Botanique. Their main argument was that the Saraguay woodland had been studied since the 1940s as a model of the primitive Montreal forest based on maple and hickory trees; for that reason, it had a very high ecological value (Domon and Bouchard 1981; Dansereau 1978). They finally convinced Montreal's executive committee and the Quebec Minister of Cultural Affairs to designate Saraguay as a natural area according to the Quebec Cultural Property Act. The designation in 1979 had the effect of freezing any development that might impinge on the natural character of the site, thereby buying time for the negotiated acquisition of the woodlands.

**Early Quebec Government Commitments**

The same year that Saraguay was designated as a natural area, another Quebec minister showed sensitivity to citizens' pressures in the island's east end: the Minister of the Environment, who also represented the area in the Legislative Assembly, Marcel Léger, acquired the Héritage and Réparation woodlands so as to turn them into an ecological center (a rather new concept for the Ministry of the Environment). Then, after having been shown around the Saraguay woodlands, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Guy Tardif, himself representing a nearby district in the north part of Montreal Island, decided also to get involved. He first found some $10.5 million to help the MUC start to buy lands for parks. Then he sat down with MUC's new chair, Pierre DesMarais II, a former suburban mayor, to work out solutions for the other problems. After a few months, an agreement was reached between both governments. The MUC Act was amended to allow new parks to be created more easily, without necessarily taking over existing parks of metropolitan interest. Consequently, the main cause of tension between Montreal and the suburbs on this issue was eliminated. Sites recently protected by Quebec ministers were transferred to the MUC to become metropolitan parks and a new park, Ile-de-la-Visitation, was added.
The new MUC parks (see Map 2.5) comprised: Cap-St- Jacques, Anse-à-l’Orme, Bois-de-Liesse, Bois-de-Saraguay, Ile-de-la-Visitation, Rivière-des-Prairies, and Bois-de-l’Héritage et de-la-Réparation. Capital costs for the MUC were $31.5 million (Ducas 1987). Some analysts have observed that, even with these new parks, the total area (940 hectares) thus preserved and eventually purchased was still lower in 1984 than the initial 1974 proposals of 1,134 hectares (Ducas 1987; Marsan 1983). The area effectively covered by the parks of Rivière-des-Prairies, Bois-de-Liesse, and Anse-à-l’Orme lost respectively 43, 46, and 70 percent of intended area coverage; indeed, the latter was merely a shadow of its original concept. These losses indicate not just that the land turned out to be expensive to acquire but also that MUC leaders were not entirely committed to the project.

A Growing Regional Parks System for Metropolitan Montreal

While the MUC was slowly moving forward, other governments were much more active concerning urban and regional recreation around Montreal. Both the federal and the provincial governments created new parks and open space specifically for the enjoyment of a mainly urban population.

Federally Owned Open Space in the Montreal Area

The federal government got involved in open-space creation through its activities in transportation. The opening in 1959 of the St. Lawrence Seaway caused the closing of the old Lachine Canal. Transport Canada decided to transform its banks into a cycling path, thus cleaning up portions of the derelict industrial lands along the canal. Funding was also made available to adjoining municipalities for the creation of additional open space: Montreal and Lachine acted accordingly. Other obsolete canals and locks in the area were adapted for leisure boats and tourism; facilities and open space were made available alongside. The St. Lawrence Seaway dike was also opened to the public as a cycling path.

The federal government also purchased a number of islands in the St. Lawrence River for bird sanctuaries, such as Iles-de-la-Paix and Tailhandier. While planning Mirabel Airport, the government expropriated vast areas, too much as it eventually turned out, for much of it was eventually sold back to the farmers. Some woodlands in the area were preserved for recreation, notably the Bois-de-Belle-Rivière. Finally, the
federal government started to reclaim unused port lands in the central area for recreation or redevelopment. Although some work, such as demolition of old grain elevators, had been done in the 1970s, most of the new developments came much later (Canada, Comité consultatif du Vieux-Port 1985).

**Provincial Parks and Open Space in the Montreal Region**

While the MUC was quite uncertain about how to deal with parks and open space, many ministries in Quebec became very interested in this region. Apart from the government’s involvement in MUC parks as already mentioned, the Ministry of the Environment purchased Ste-Thérèse Island in the St. Lawrence River to be used for environmental education and recreation. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs designated many cultural properties plus two historical areas in Old Montreal and the small town of Laprairie; it also developed a heritage park in Pointe-du-Moulin on Ile Perrot. Finally, the Ministry of Recreation Hunting and Fishing, and Leisure developed a new generation of parks during the 1970s, including six in the Montreal region (see Map 2.6). Many of these parks and open spaces were established as a result of public pressure for the preservation of significant ecosystems, such as hills in the Montreal plain and islands in the St. Lawrence River. By the end of the 1970s, the ministry was preparing a general policy on leisure and another one on parks.

**Great Visions But Still More Hesitations**

**The Archipelago Project**

While it was redefining its approach to the Montreal region with the *option préférable*, the Quebec government also launched other important special initiatives for the area, such as the committee on regional transportation. The Archipelago Project was probably the most ambitious of such initiatives. It aimed to develop an integrated approach towards water management in the Montreal region, by pulling together projects concerning hydraulic control, water regulation, and flood control; hydro-electric works; and recreation and conservation management along the river banks. An interministerial committee was created to bring together the relevant expertise; there was also important political supervision by
the Quebec cabinet, consultation with local representatives, and public involvement through open meetings.

The technical and financial aspects were quite intricate. Indeed, the project rested on the idea that the Lachine Rapids would be harnessed for hydroelectric power, without endangering the exceptional wildlife in the area or altering its aesthetic value. About 20 scenarios were tested including rerouting water currents around the many islands of the archipelago and building dams accordingly. Impacts on navigation, wildlife, water levels and flooding, etc., were assessed. Thousands of dollars were spent in studies. The financial gains from the project and the changes on the flood zones would allow recovering lands for recreation. However, all this assumed a continuing energy crisis and the competitive capacity of hydroelectricity. By 1985, as energy prices had dropped, the harnessing of the Lachine Rapids became less feasible, and the whole project was abandoned. This ambitious project was not a total loss, however; it generated a considerable mass of important studies on the conditions of the St. Lawrence waters that can still be very useful for future action. Besides, more specific proposals survived on their own. One of the outcomes of the Archipelago Project was the suggestion to create an Archipelago National (Quebec) Park (Décarie 1987).

The Archipelago National Park Proposal

This proposal resulted from two main initiatives: one was the Archipelago Project; the other was the product of a committee established to develop a provincial policy on urban parks. Concerning the latter, an initial study was begun in 1978 to assess what the province was doing in this field, acknowledging that past actions had been quite uncoordinated. An interministerial committee, established in 1983, prepared a diagnosis and drafted a set of objectives, concepts, and potential modalities (Québec, Nov. 1983).

The proposed policy suggested a wider notion of open space, which would include not only parks, but also town squares and ecological reserves; not only green spaces, but also "blue" (for water) and "gray" (for urban areas) spaces. The policy proposed an integrated system of parks and open space linked by networks of paths and trails, or riverside activities. A kind of green thread was proposed to structure this system, starting from the top of Mount Royal, circling it once, then, as a spiral, making another bigger circle along old railways and eventually moving toward the rivers. This open-space system would be developed following
Map 2.6. Proposal for a National Park in the Montreal Archipelago by the Quebec Government, 1984
a collaborative approach, under the leadership of a committee or a mixed public corporation. It would count on the cooperation of all public property owners, linking together not only parks but also other institutional properties such as school and university grounds, hospitals and cemeteries, public utilities lands and land owned by other levels of government. Users and private recreation services would also be expected to cooperate in managing this complex system. In other words, the document contended that, without adding much to the public lands base and without requiring much additional funding, it would be possible to achieve a more integrated, flexible system.

When the proposed policy was presented to the Quebec cabinet, ministers suggested it be merged with the archipelago project so as to create a European-style national park. The proposed archipelago park was made public in October 1984 by the Quebec prime minister and four of his cabinet colleagues from the Montreal region. The anticipated cost was $150 million; half this sum to be offered by the province to municipalities participating in the Archipelago park. Unfortunately, the announcement was little more than an election promise by the Parti Québécois, which was justifiably worried about losing power in the 1985 elections; they needed to spend money in the region, and this appeared to be a sparkling way to do it.

The proposed national park was indeed quite exciting. It was centered on the "blue spaces" of the archipelago: rivers would be the main links between a collection of parks and open space along the shores. Different networks would be developed: a nautical network, a beach network, a wildlife habitat network, a network of riverside trails and paths, including the green thread developed in the proposed policy on urban parks. The networks would be completed by provincial and local parks, services and interpretation centers. Institutional arrangements were to be developed gradually in cooperation with all the concerned organizations.

The Archipelago National Park had a short life. The 1985 elections brought in a new government committed to reducing public spending. The new Bourassa team had promised to cut public spending, and one of the ways it did so was to terminate the archipelago studies. In April 1986 most of the professional team was dismantled. Some $20 million had already been spent in Montreal, Longueuil, and Laval.

Presumably, the proposed park would have been implemented had the Parti Québécois stayed in power. One can never know. Although Quebec politicians and technocrats were impatient to implement it, local organizations and municipalities had been exceptionally cautious throughout the
entire process. The proposal was innovative and surprising. To have become a reality, however, it would have needed more time and the mobilization of much more local political support.

The MUC in the '80s: Towards an Open-Space System?

The MUC Development Plan and Open Space

Among the new tasks that were assigned to the MUC by the 1982 reform was the compulsory adoption of interim control during preparation of the development plan. Interim control measures were to last until adoption of local plans and recognition by the MUC of their conformity with its own development plan. Although the Planning Act was not precise about the purpose of these controls, there had been a pressure by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs on all the regional county municipalities to use them to control development in flood zones and other areas subject to high natural risks (Trépanier 1983). After significant damage from spring floods in 1974 and 1976, both the federal and the provincial governments had signed an agreement to map flood zones. In 1977, the province introduced into municipal legislation special powers to forbid development in such zones.

Much of the north shore of the island of Montreal was subject to floods as were many smaller islands in the Rivière des Prairies and the Rivière des Mille-Îles. The MUC adopted its interim control bylaw in September 1983 (MUC, bylaw 65). But the most controversial part of it was that it also included protective measures concerning 15 woodlands. If ecologists were applauding, developers were not, and local politicians were quite uneasy about such measures. They were not used to confronting developers, and many were not eager to lose development opportunities. During the three years that passed before the adoption of the development plan, the question facing municipalities was: who will buy these woodlands or river banks for the purpose of recreation or preservation? Very few answers were given. Neither local municipalities nor the MUC were willing or able to lead on this issue. They all turned once again for help from Quebec. Much was expected from the ongoing provincial studies about the archipelago.

When Quebec finally abandoned the archipelago plan, so did the MUC. Its development plan, as finally adopted in 1986, contained very little about open space. Of the 15 woodlands (770 hectares) identified in the interim control bylaw, eight were dropped; the seven others (550
hectares) would still be protected until adoption and approval of local plans, but no goal, no policy, no strategy was designed for them.

There was one real protective measure that was still in force, the Quebec Agricultural Land Preservation Act. Under that legislation, some 3,300 hectares on MUC territory had been preserved since 1979 from any development other than agricultural. This legislation had priority over any development plan according to the Planning Act. Therefore, the MUC could only acknowledge it. Practically, it was an easy way to wash its hands from that section of its territory on which were located four of the woodlands still under consideration.

Changes Resulting from 1986 Municipal Elections

In November 1986, after 26 years of power, Mayor Drapeau’s Civic Party was replaced by a younger, more progressive party, the Montreal’s Citizens Movement (MCM), headed by Jean Doré. Citizen activists and environmentalists formed part of the political base of the MCM. During the election campaign, the MCM promised to bring back the proposal of a "green thread" and to redevelop parks and open space in Montreal and the MUC. The new administration began by putting together a team of professionals to work on a plan for the Mount Royal (Montreal 1988), and another one on the Expo ‘67 site. Another assignment was given to the city planning department for the preparation of an open-space policy to be integrated with a new city master plan.

The MCM also brought change to the MUC. By 1987, most of the sites for the seven regional parks were still inaccessible to the general public. After MCM prodding, the MUC planning commission in December 1987 undertook a public consultation process on the "future of the regional parks." A document was prepared that summarized past actions, proposed more definite policies for the parks network, and explored the possibilities of new partnerships for preserving open space (CUM 1987). In so doing, it also referred to some of the archipelago proposals, notably the "green thread." According to the MUC document, 913 hectares of land had been acquired and preserved, involving provincial and local investments totalling $44 million. Only one park, Ile-de-la-Visitation, was totally developed. Work was partially completed in Rivièrevdes-Prairies, Bois-de-la-Réparation, and Cap-St. Jacques.

An impressive number of citizen groups responded to the invitation offered by the MUC planning commission. More than 50 briefs were presented. Although a few from municipalities expressed reluctance, the
majority of the papers were in favor of the commission's proposals; many insisted on even more vigorous positions, particularly on expanding the open-space system through the purchasing and preserving of many more sites.

Following this important support, the planning commission was able to push through some important decisions. First, $8 million was put aside in June 1988 for the acquisition of new open space (to which another $6 million was added in 1989), and a list of priority sites was established. Further, a new assistant to the director of planning was hired with the specific mandate of preparing an open-space policy. He would also supervise the preparation of development plans for each regional park. In June 1989, three of these plans were adopted, concerning Cap-St. Jacques, Bois-de-Liesse, and Pointe-aux-Prairies (formerly Bois-de-l'Héritage-et-de-la-Réparation). The first draft of the open-space policy discussed at the planning commission in September 1989 (CUM 1989b) suggested that $500 million would be needed to preserve and develop the MUC's remaining open spaces. While this amount was seen as extravagant by many politicians, there was finally, after much debate, an agreement to allocate $200 million over the next 15 years. This was part of a strategic plan for open space adopted by the MUC in December 1989 (CUM 1989c). The plan involved acquisition of 500 hectares more than the 997 already acquired, including woodlands, river shores, and the development of the "green thread." The plan endorsed many of the original archipelago proposals. It went further by introducing the "greening the city" concept and suggesting the idea of green plans for local municipalities.

Protecting farmland also remained an important issue. Contrary to all expectations, a developer had obtained a "dezoning" of 456 hectares on Ile Bizard in August 1988 (La Presse, Aug. 6, 1988); this piece of land included an important woodland that citizens were very eager to have established as an MUC regional park. The MUC itself had just identified it as one of its priorities for acquisition. Because it was dezoned by the Agricultural Land Commission, its price went up so much that the MUC found it very difficult to buy it at a reasonable price. After intense negotiations with the developer and the municipality, an agreement was reached that would allow a mixed development including housing, a golf course, and the preservation as a park of a significant part of the woodland. Still, the price the MUC had to offer was very high. Other parcels of protected agricultural land were also threatened in the West Island. Some lands were acquired by MUC to become an
agricultural demonstration park. Thus, by 1991, two new parks were added: Bois-de-l’Île-Bizard and Parc agricole (see Map 2.7). Another park, Bois-de-Liesse, was considerably enlarged. Other projects were still under negotiation.

Related to the issue of open space is the question of conformity of local plans with the MUC development plan. According to the Planning Act, local plans must be adopted before 1990. The MUC has the power to reject them if not in conformity with objectives of the development plan. Although these objectives are not very precise, the MUC does have certain instruments at its disposal to induce local municipalities to preserve open space. Furthermore, it can now appeal to its open-space strategic plan. Many municipalities are still reluctant to yield development opportunities, but there is a growing citizens’ awareness that might inspire change even in the suburbs, particularly in the West Island.

CONCLUSION

One of the objects of this comparative research project is to determine if the existence of multipurpose metropolitan governments has had any significant effects on urban growth and the distribution of urban services. If so, are such effects likely to continue or are there indications that they are changing, that metropolitan governments are weakening or losing their redistributive capacity? Can they survive without strong support from provincial or state governments?

In dealing with these questions as they relate to Montreal, this paper has first asked if there is a metropolitan government in the Montreal area. The Montreal Urban Community started with many weaknesses. The political tension between the city of Montreal and the 28 much smaller suburbs inhibited MUC in many ways. As a result, MUC functions, except for police and transit, tended to be limited to noncontroversial, technical matters such as sewage collectors or air pollution control. At first, the MUC was little more than an administrative mechanism for delivering a few metropolitan services. The MUC council strongly supported local autonomy and evolved very much like a council of governments. Another reason to consider the MUC as a very mild form of metropolitan government is that its territory is small relative to the entire metropolitan area. The MUC boundaries were not administratively logical even at first, but they became even more obsolete as development accelerated in the outer metropolitan fringe. Expanding the MUC territory
Map 2.7. **Montreal Urban Community: Regional Parks in 1991**

1. Anse-a-l'Orme
2. Cap-Saint-Jacques
3. Bois-de-Liesse
4. Île-de-la-Vallée
5. Pointe-aux-Prairies
6. Parc agricole
7. Bois-de-l'Île-Bizard
would be politically difficult. Proposals to do so could be seen as threatening the provincial government itself.

The relative lack of growth within the MUC territory has at least caused the city and suburbs to recognize their common interests. The MUC has been a useful forum for the discussion of common concerns. The 1982 MUC reform promoted more meaningful discussion by ensuring that some local politicians would be seen as having at least some degree of responsibility for specific issues.

Has the MUC significantly dealt with problems related to urban development? Its powers in this regard have been limited. For one thing, most of the growth was occurring outside its territory. Inside its territory, the MUC did not take a leading role in controlling or directing the growth. Its development plan was more of a management plan for intermunicipal infrastructures. The development of the transit system has been a major achievement, but the provincial role in financing has become so important that the role of the MUC seems marginal at best. The regional parks system and the recent "green" strategy are perhaps indications that the MUC is starting to play a new, more constructive role in urban development.

The provincial role with respect to the MUC has been ambiguous. Although it created the MUC, the province has not always been a firm and reliable supporter. Its policies for the MUC have lacked consistency. Its promises have not always been kept; even announced provincial plans have not always been implemented. The provincial government was much influenced by general political considerations in the province as a whole. For example it could not ignore demands from the outer suburbs for provincial funding of improved infrastructure. Overall, provincial support for the MUC has softened in recent years. But this apparently changing position must be considered within the context of the province's general vulnerability in a fast-changing economic environment.

In the past 10 years, the Quebec government proposed a new deal for local governments, involving more autonomy and responsibility. This meant that the province would restrain itself from interfering with local responsibilities, providing local and regional governments took their share of the burden. Accordingly, the provincial role became more of a facilitator and less of a mandator. Similar decentralization trends are apparent in other countries. There are risks in such an approach but there is also much to be gained from increased local involvement. The case study of open space in the Montreal area has been presented as an illustration of this point.
Current issues in Montreal may require new approaches. Traditionally, Montreal was seen as a rich city. Things have slowly changed since World War II. People are just beginning to become aware that, while the outer suburbs are booming, the central area is in serious decline. Both the federal and the provincial government have set up study committees and promised important investments, but significant results are still to be seen. Local people are becoming impatient. Are we beginning to be like American cities? Perhaps we shall soon know.
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Planning and Development Decision Making in the Chicago Region

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THE CHICAGO REGION

In 1990 the Chicago metropolitan region was home to 7,261,176 people according to census bureau estimates. They lived in six counties arranged in a semicircle around Chicago on the shore of Lake Michigan in the northeastern corner of Illinois. The region is bounded, somewhat artificially, by the Indiana state line on the east and the Wisconsin state line on the north. The western and southern boundaries lie in the rich agricultural lands of the midwestern heartland (see Map 3.1).

Changes in the region during the 1980s may significantly affect its future and change the policy debate on metropolitan development. Much to the surprise of and disputed by Chicago officials, the 1990 Census showed a continued decline in the city’s population. The traditional base of the Chicago economy, manufacturing employment, also continued to decline. However, Chicago experienced considerable growth in employment in the services. This growth was accompanied by a large downtown office building boom and considerable gentrification of some older neighborhoods. Overall, suburban areas continued to grow at a rapid rate with increased employment in both manufacturing and services, but there were major differences in growth between suburban communities. Serious traffic problems and the construction of high rise office buildings demonstrated a qualitative as well as quantitative change in development in the suburbs.

In retrospect the 1980s may be seen as the decade when the region turned the corner in the transition from its traditional economy to a not
Map 3.1. *Municipalities in the Chicago Metropolitan Region*
yet fully defined service economy, and from a traditional single-centered region to a multicentered development pattern with accompanying changes in public policy issues and leadership influence. Also during the 1980s Chicago went through major political struggles, electing a reform mayor and the first black mayor. Chicago endured another political corruption scandal, "Operation Greylord" in the judiciary. The traditional political split between the Democratic city and the Republican "collar" counties continued. And the region continued to be one of the most densely governed in the United States with over 1,250 local governments.

To set the context for discussion of regional planning and public infrastructure decisions in the Chicago region we will briefly review the changing and projected population and economic structure of the region and its governance structure.

Population

The Chicago region's population is expected to grow moderately over the 30-year period from 1980 to 2010 to a total of 8.18 million (NIPC 1988a). This is an additional 1 million people and a growth rate of about 15 percent for the period. By comparison, the region grew twice as much during the previous 30 years adding 2 million people. The city of Chicago is expected to grow slowly, adding 150,000 people by 2010. So the city's share of regional population will continue to decline from the 1980 ratio of 42 percent to 39 percent in 2010. The suburbs are expected to grow at a rate of about 23 percent (see Table 3.1).

From a development and planning perspective the changes in structure of the population are as important as the changes in size. For example, demographers expect the average household size in the Chicago region to decline to 2.5 by 2010. This means that the 1 million population growth in the region will be accompanied by almost 728,000 additional households. Chicago is expected to add about 173,000 households (16 percent growth), and the remainder, over a half million (40 percent growth), will be located in the suburbs. At the same time the population age profile will change to reflect the aging of the present population. There will be 130,000 fewer school age (under 20) persons, 250,000 fewer young workers (20-34) and 342,000 more persons over 65 in 2010 than there were in 1980. Almost two-thirds of the elderly will be over 75.

The racial composition of Chicago is changing with population growth. The reported white and black population of the city each de-
Table 3.1. Chicago Area Population

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>3,369,357</td>
<td>3,005,072</td>
<td>3,009,530</td>
<td>3,155,000</td>
<td>2,783,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook County</td>
<td>2,124,409</td>
<td>2,248,594</td>
<td>2,288,380</td>
<td>2,350,000</td>
<td>2,321,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(except Chicago)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DuPage County</td>
<td>487,966</td>
<td>658,835</td>
<td>727,700</td>
<td>971,000</td>
<td>781,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kane County</td>
<td>251,005</td>
<td>278,405</td>
<td>300,800</td>
<td>434,000</td>
<td>317,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake County</td>
<td>382,638</td>
<td>440,372</td>
<td>480,200</td>
<td>599,000</td>
<td>516,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHenry County</td>
<td>111,555</td>
<td>147,897</td>
<td>162,400</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>183,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will County</td>
<td>247,825</td>
<td>324,460</td>
<td>338,400</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>357,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern Illinois</td>
<td>6,974,755</td>
<td>7,103,624</td>
<td>7,307,400</td>
<td>8,181,000</td>
<td>7,261,176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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declined about one percent during the 1980s to 45 and 39 percent respectively. However, the population of Hispanic origin was 20 percent of the city total compared to 14 percent in 1980 when the census counted Hispanics differently. Whites and blacks, not of Hispanic origin, each accounted for about 38 percent of the city population in 1990, with blacks slightly outnumbering whites. The reported white population of the Chicago area suburbs was 86 percent in 1990, down from 90 percent in 1980. Persons of Hispanic origin accounted for 6.5 percent of the suburban population, while, blacks, not of Hispanic origin, are less than one percent of the suburban population.

Suburban population growth is expected to be distributed unevenly. Sixty-one communities are expected to lose population. These are older suburbs adjacent to Chicago and are fully built up. Major growth is expected to be concentrated northwest and west of Chicago as it has been in the past decade. However, not only outlying suburban communities will benefit from the new growth. Older satellite cities, Elgin and Aurora, that had been manufacturing centers but have experienced significant declines in recent decades will become major growth centers anchoring the western end of development corridors (see Map 3.1).

Regional Economy

The Chicago area regional economy is expected to grow 21 percent between 1985 and 2010 to 4,171,000 jobs (NIPC 1988a). Most of the
770,000 additional jobs will be located in the suburbs. Chicago will likely get 185,200 additional jobs, a 12 percent growth. Almost three-fourths of the remaining additional jobs will be located in suburban Cook County and DuPage County adjacent to Chicago. This rapid, concentrated suburban growth will complete a long-term shift of the major employment centers in the region from Chicago to the inner suburbs of northwest Cook and DuPage counties. In 1985 these suburban areas had drawn even with Chicago in total employment. By 2010 Chicago is expected to have 1,683,000 jobs and suburban Cook and DuPage counties 1,930,000 jobs. DuPage has been the fastest growing county in the region and will continue to be (up 43 percent to 562,000 jobs by 2010). It is home to the region's "High Tech Corridor," which includes the Argonne National Laboratories, Fermi Labs, the AMOCO Research Center, and Bell Laboratories.

The net growth in regional employment masks expected major changes in the structure of the economy that continue long-term trends. Manufacturing employment is expected to decline both in share of the economy (from 25 percent in 1985 to 14 percent in 2010) and in absolute terms (from 841,700 jobs in 1985 to 580,400 jobs in 2010). At the same time employment in finance, insurance, real estate, and services (FIRES) will grow to 1,657,200 and account for 39 percent of all employment in the region. The changes will be even more dramatic in Chicago. Manufacturing employment is expected to fall to 9 percent of all jobs in Chicago as 39 percent of the existing, remaining manufacturing jobs disappear. By 2010, FIRES employment is expected to account for 47 percent of all jobs in Chicago. Manufacturing employment is expected to grow only in DuPage County (up 67 percent) in connection with the research and development activities of the "High Tech" corridor. In all other suburban areas manufacturing employment is expected to decline while FIRES employment grows substantially. Suburban Cook County will increase FIRES employment by 77 percent while losing 20 percent of its manufacturing jobs.

The overall picture that emerges from these estimates is of an economy increasingly dominated by services employment and especially by the advanced services of finance and communications. This is a far different world from the Chicago of legend that many still have as their image—Carl Sandburg's "city of big shoulders," "hog butcher to the world," land of steel mills and smokestacks.

Although the employment estimates suggest a positive outlook for the region, there are some obvious difficulties associated with the particular
form of growth expected. First, there will need to be an adjustment of
the existing labor force to the new employment opportunities, requiring
considerable re-education. The amount of change is actually obscured by
looking at the net figures. Recent analysis suggests that the 8.4 percent
net job increase in the Chicago region between 1980 and 1986 was the
combined result of a job loss rate of 42.7 percent and a job creation rate
of 51.1 percent during the period (Austrian and Zlatoper 1988). Thus,
there is considerable churning in the regional economy similar to the
national economy. Second, the changing geography of employment will
continue to cause difficult transportation and housing problems, especially
for low-income Chicagoans seeking employment in the suburbs.

Although the region’s economy is growing as it shifts to more
reliance on services, it is not clear whether the region will gain or lose
its relative position in the national economy. A recent study of the export
employment (that portion of total employment that supports the produc-
tion of goods and services sold outside the region) in "broad services"
suggests that Chicago is not keeping pace with its national competitors.
Broad services include employment in the FIREs and TCUW (transporta-
tion, communication, utilities, and wholesale) categories. Between 1974
and 1985 the Chicago region actually lost 8.4 percent of its export
employment in broad services and fell from fourth to sixth rank
nationally (Austrian and Zlatoper 1988). Los Angeles and Boston moved
ahead of Chicago during the period. Overall, Chicago is growing slower
than the nation.

The Social Economy of the Region

Changes in population and employment composition in the region are
inseparable from changes in social well-being. In Chicago’s case the
result of recent changes appears to be that "the rich get richer and the
poor get poorer." Like other large cities, Chicago has experienced an
apparent increased disparity during the 1980s between those worst off and
those best off. Generally the suburbs appear to be better off than
Chicago. At the same time, within the suburbs there is an increasing gap
between those who are doing well and those who are not.

Poverty in Chicago is increasingly concentrated in particular areas
and among minority groups. In 1980 only 3 percent of predominately
white census tracts had poverty rates over 20 percent; 76 percent of
predominately black and 79 percent of predominately Hispanic census
tracts had poverty rates over 20 percent. Chicago’s social problems have
been well documented. They include, among others, a substantial number of persons in poverty, including an undetermined number who experience long-term or persistent poverty, high rates of unemployment for minorities, especially youth, a high rate of adult illiteracy, poor quality public schools, high infant mortality rates, high teen pregnancy rates, rapid increases in the number of AIDS cases, youth gangs, and a substantial number of homeless persons (United Way of Chicago 1988). Increasingly, concern is being raised about the possibility of a permanently impoverished group, an urban underclass, residing in Chicago. In the suburbs there are equally sharp differences between communities, as for example between the wealthy northern suburb of Kenilworth and the nearly bankrupt southern suburb of Harvey. Chicago remains one of the most segregated cities and regions in the country.

Governance Structure

There are now over 1,250 local governments in the Chicago region making it one of the most intensely governed regions in the country. In 1982 there were six counties, 261 municipalities, 113 township governments, 313 school districts, and 503 special districts. In addition, state agencies and a number of special agencies, such as the Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission, play a role in regional governance (Fiske 1989).

One historical reason for the multitude of local governments is that before passage of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, local governing bodies could issue bonds only up to 5 percent of the assessed valuation of property within their boundaries. Special districts, however, could be set up within the same or an overlapping area and could issue bonds on their own. They include park, education, library, transit, sewage, and mosquito abatement districts, among others. These special-purpose districts are established under state law and have only the powers specifically granted.

County government in Illinois traditionally administers health and social services as an agent of the state and provides services to unincorporated areas. However, counties can assume more active roles and some Chicago region counties have begun to do so, taking on more of a policymaking and development role for the county as a whole, sometimes in conflict with municipalities.

Municipalities and counties in Illinois can have limited home-rule powers. In the mid-1980s there were 67 home-rule municipalities and one home-rule county (Cook) in the region. Amendments to the state
constitution grant home rule to all counties with an elected chief executive officer; home rule is granted automatically to any municipality with a population of 25,000 or more and by referendum to smaller communities. Article VII, Section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution gives home-rule governments broad powers. The legislation and the prevalence of home rule among larger municipalities shows a preference for strong municipal governments rather than strong state, county, or regional governance.

As elsewhere in the United States, local government activities have expanded rapidly in recent years, and the financial pressure on local governments has also been increased by the cutback of federal funds. In the Chicago region municipal revenues have increased 258 percent between 1972 and 1982 while expenditures increased 276 percent (Banovetz 1988). Chicago and some of the older suburbs face more severe problems as revenues have fallen even farther behind expenditures and intergovernmental transfers have declined. Intergovernmental aid from both state and federal governments to the region fell 10 percent between 1977 and 1986 (state transfers down 7.6 percent and federal transfers down 17.4 percent) (Banir and Calkins 1988). Chicago received 58 million dollars less in transfers in 1986 than in 1977 despite an increase of 71 million dollars flowing to the city through the state.

Local planning powers are granted by numerous provisions in Illinois law. The statutes provide for local, county, and multicounty regional planning commissions. The planning statutes encourage greater than local cooperation on planning issues. County and regional planning commissions are instructed to encourage the cooperation of the political subdivisions within their territories on plans. County planning agencies in the Chicago region are required to submit their plans to the regional agency for review prior to adoption. Plans adopted by regional commissions are to be advisory only, unless the plan or a portion of it pertains to a municipality and is adopted separately by it. Between specific enabling legislation and home-rule powers it appears that there is adequate opportunity for local governments in the Chicago region to develop needed mechanisms for local and cooperative planning.

Summary

It would require more than an average crystal ball to predict with any certainty the future of the Chicago region. The estimates reported here are all subject to the usual limitations of such efforts, and some of these
estimates are contested. For example, advocates of Chicago’s policy efforts to retain manufacturing employment would probably take exception to NIPC’s employment forecasts. However, it is clear that changes are coming in the region, and they will have a large cumulative effect. The changes are slow. They have been underway for several decades, so their overall impact is easily underestimated. At the same time traditional regional characteristics continue giving comfort to those who prefer to hold on to the familiar. Some manufacturing sectors are doing well. Community organization and community-based development are very active in Chicago. Chicago continues to be a "melting pot," attracting large numbers of the newest wave of immigrants—Hispanics and Asians. The White Sox decided not to move to Florida after the promise of a large public subsidy. The suburbs mostly vote Republican, and Chicago votes Democratic. All of this seems like the old Chicago.

The changes are real, however. Already there are shortages of low-skilled labor in the suburbs. High housing costs and limited existing low-income housing in the suburbs contribute to the problem. Journey to work commuting from Chicago to western and northern suburbs now matches or exceeds commuting into the city. The revitalization of Chicago’s northside neighborhoods is clearly tied to the new, professional employment opportunities in the city and the suburbs. How these development pressures eventually get worked out and the resulting structure of the spatial social economy will depend on the policies adopted and implemented by governments in the region, even though the forces creating these pressures largely originate outside the region in national and international business and political decisions. The fields of action will probably be traditional: land-use control, environment (water, sewer, solid waste), transportation, housing, and economic development. There will be some major, high impact issues befitting a large urban region, like the question of whether and where to build a third regional airport, but most of the issues will be small. There will be a lot of them, and when they are decided the region will be different.

ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS

Decisions about infrastructure development in the region are made by municipalities, counties, special districts, and the state government. Planning and negotiation for those area development decisions requiring coordinated action or cooperation can be done in a variety of formal
settings. We will briefly review the function and activities of the major agencies that provide some form of development planning for all or large portions of the region to give a general picture of the decision-making environment. Perhaps the key term to describe the situation is variety. There is no monolithic structure for development planning in the region; no central point of coordination. Rather, there are a number of complementary, sometimes competing, ways for areawide issues to be raised and reviewed. There are two regional planning agencies, both created by the state of Illinois. The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC) is the general agency. It serves and is governed by area counties, municipalities, and special districts. The Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) is a specialized transportation planning agency that shares responsibility with NIPC for long-range areawide transportation planning. Among the many special districts, two are particularly important because of the size and spatial extent of their operations. The Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) provides public transportation in most of the region. The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District (MWRD) provides sewer services and related flood control for Chicago and the inner suburbs.

Counties in the region can act as subregional planning and development agencies. While they have no power over local planning decisions, counties are in a position to broker local conflicts and provide leadership on general issues. They can also serve as a buffer between the localities and regional decision makers. Municipalities form associations to promote their mutual interests and to negotiate with the counties and regional and state agencies. Finally, some of the larger nonprofit organizations have played a limited role in regional planning.

The agencies and some of the programs are referred to by popular acronyms in the text. A reference guide to these acronyms is given in Table 3.2.

Regional Planning Agencies

Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission (NIPC)

NIPC was created by the State of Illinois in 1957 (chapter 85, Illinois State Statutes). The enabling legislation stresses the commission's plan-making function, calling for the agency to prepare "a sound and comprehensive general plan . . . to guide and coordinate the development of (water supply, storm water, sewage, transportation, land use, local
Table 3.2:  Government Agency and Program Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>BACOG</td>
<td>Barrington Area Council on Governments</td>
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<td>CATS</td>
<td>Chicago Area Transportation Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTA</td>
<td>Chicago Transit Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDOT</td>
<td>Illinois Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metra</td>
<td>Commuter Rail Service Board of the RTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>Metropolitan Planning Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPO</td>
<td>Metropolitan Planning Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWRD</td>
<td>Metropolitan Water Reclamation District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPC</td>
<td>Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Suburban Bus Service Board of the RTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZ&amp;EQ</td>
<td>Lake County Department of Planning Zoning and Environmental Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTA</td>
<td>Regional Transportation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARP</td>
<td>Tunnel and Reservoir Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Transportation Improvement Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSD</td>
<td>Transportation System Development (Plan)</td>
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...governmental services, and improved civic design)... and to cooperate with various units of government in comprehensive planning for future growth and development." The legislation is also explicit about how limited the powers of the agency will be: "In the exercise of these powers... the Commission shall act solely as an advisory body to units of government..." NIPC's recent emphasis is the preparation and dissemination of information and technical assistance to local government. It currently defines its basic mission as threefold: (1) to prepare and disseminate information about the region and its needs; (2) to foster cooperation among units of government; and (3) ultimately, to strive for consensus on policies and plans for action that will promote the sound and orderly development of the northeastern Illinois area.

NIPC is governed by 32 commissioners. The governor of Illinois and the mayor of Chicago each appoints five members. Seven are elected on a quadrennial basis by suburban mayors and presidents. Three are appointed by the president of the board of Cook County, and one each is appointed by the county board chairs of each of the remaining member counties. Finally, the boards of the following each appoint one member: the Regional Transportation Authority; the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago; the Illinois Association of Park Districts; the Chicago Park District; The Chicago Transit Authority; Metra; and PACE.
NIPC has neither taxing authority nor any assured source of revenue. Funds can be obtained by contracting for specialized planning services and by contributions. The commission annually suggests to each governing body a sum that the commission considers a fair and equitable appropriation. In fiscal year 1987, NIPC had a total income of approximately $2.4 million. Of this total, 51 percent came from the state (mainly federal pass through funds), 38 percent was from local funds and contributions, and 11 percent was direct federal funding.

The current work program indicates that NIPC performs three main activities. First, they provide information and technical assistance. NIPC is a principal source of regional information including aerial photographs, flood hazard maps, generalized soils information, census data, population and employment forecasts, and governmental tax base and expenditure data. They also provide analyses and publications on land use and natural resource planning, housing, transportation, recreation, energy, water quality, flood/storm water, noise abatement, and other topics. To provide technical assistance to local governments NIPC has nine senior staff who spend part of their time as Local Service Officers assigned to specific geographic areas. In addition eight staff specialists are available on call for special problems. Second, NIPC develops general plans. Its first plans were developed in the 1960s to meet areawide planning requirements for federal capital grants. A Comprehensive General Plan was completed in 1968. This was followed two years later by a Regional Open Space Plan and the Regional Wastewater Plan. Subsequent plans include the 1976 Regional Overbank Flooding and Storm Water Drainage Policy Plan, and a 1977 Residential Policy Plan, a 1980 Regional Open Space and Recreation Policy Plan, a 1979 Water Quality Management Plan, a 1986 update of the Regional Solid Waste Management Policy Plan. These plans set forth the basic ingredients for a regional growth policy. They are relatively concise and heavily policy oriented. Some plans provide recommendations for followup actions or implementation mechanisms. However, since the plans are advisory, except in the instances where they are prerequisite to state or federal action, their influence is hard to gauge.

NIPC has had a collaborative role with the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) for the past 25 years in the development of long-range transportation plans. The 2010 Transportation System Development Plan was jointly developed in 1989.

Third, NIPC provides plan, grant, and permit review services. Under the federal A-95 review process NIPC was assigned responsibility for
review of local plans and related capital grant applications consistency with regional plans. NIPC continues to review local plans for their fit with adopted regional policies and for their compatibility with other locality plans, and attempts to resolve conflicts between local and regional plans as they arise. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency has designated NIPC as the responsible agency for reviewing wastewater plans and point source proposals for consistency with the state water quality plan.

*Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS)*

CATS was formed in 1955 with the mission of developing the first comprehensive long-range transportation plan for the region. The first plan was completed in 1962 and had a target date of 1980. CATS was originally formed as an experiment (hence the word "study" in its title). The perceived value of its first planning effort led to its evolution into a permanent agency and to the expansion of its boundaries. However, almost none of the plan's recommendations for freeway and transit network improvements have since become part of the region’s infrastructure. In 1971, the original CATS plan and subsequent subregional studies were combined into an Interim Plan covering the six-county area. The first complete six-county area effort resulted in the 1995 Transportation System Plan, adopted in 1974. In 1974, the CATS Policy Committee was designated by the governor of Illinois as the "Metropolitan Planning Organization" (MPO) for the metropolitan area. The Year 2000 Transportation System Development Plan was adopted in 1980. This plan was updated in 1981 and 1983 and republished in 1984. The 2010 Plan, completed in 1989, is currently the official regional transportation plan.

CATS operates through a series of policy, technical, and advisory committees with support provided by agency staff. The Policy Committee consists of "policy level" representatives of transportation operating and planning agencies in the metropolitan area. The committee is responsible for policy on both long-range planning and short-range improvement programming. The expectation is that once the Policy Committee reaches a decision, "implementation is rapid because all concerned parties with authority to act have participated in it."

The Work Program Committee monitors planning efforts for consistency with the policy decisions. The committee screens recommendations, projects, and proposals before submitting them to the Policy
Committee. It is composed of one member each from member agencies, groups on the Policy Committee, and one participant from other state and regional planning agencies.

The CATS Council of Mayors consists of a representative from each of 11 subregional councils and the city of Chicago. Of the 11 subareas, 6 are in Cook County and 5 are in the "collar" counties. The council represents over 260 municipalities in northeastern Illinois. The goal of the council is "to [allow] groups of municipalities to consider projects of mutual, geographic interest." The council has an executive committee (consisting of two members from each subarea) that meets bimonthly. The council allocates some of the Federal Aid Urban (FAU) funds. These regional councils are the basic mechanisms for linking area transportation decisions to local government.

The CATS' work program contains two major planning efforts: long-range facility planning and short-range improvement programming resulting respectively in the Transportation System Development Plan and the Transportation Improvement Program. CATS considers the Transportation System Development (TSD) plan to be the heart of its efforts. The plan identifies new capital projects and facilities, and maintenance and replacement needs for highways, bridges, and transit equipment. The 2010 Transportation System Development Plan is discussed in detail below as a case study in regional plan making.

The Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) is a five-year program of transportation projects. It presents a prioritization of how the region's federal capital assistance funds will be used to enhance the region's transportation system. Each year, the previously adopted program is reviewed and an operational and fiscal evaluation is conducted for each of the proposed projects. The Work Program Committee then makes recommendations to the Policy Committee on whether to adopt, modify, or reject the Transportation Improvement Program and Annual Element.

CATS is also involved in other transportation issues in the region. There is an Aviation Advisory Committee, which prepared the Regional Airport System Plan (RASP). The plan identifies and characterizes the operations of airports within the region and addresses issues of land use and environmental quality. The Freight Committee works in an advisory capacity to develop and implement goals for freight traffic management in the northeastern Illinois-northwestern Indiana region. Other committees and groups include: the Transportation Operations Committee, which provides guidance for overall Transportation System Management policy
and projects; a Taxi Advisory Board; the Air Quality Advisory Committee; the Mobility Limited Advisory Committee; and the Unified Work Program Committee.

Special Districts

Metropolitan Water Reclamation District (MWRD)

The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District celebrated its centennial in 1989. The district was created to address drinking water quality problems experienced due to the dumping of sewage and other pollutants into the Chicago River, which discharged into Lake Michigan, the city's drinking water source. The flow of the Chicago River was reversed by the construction of a series of canals that rerouted the Chicago waterway to eventually connect with the Mississippi River system. Today, the MWRD service area covers over 872 square miles within Cook County and includes the city of Chicago and 124 neighboring municipalities. MWRD has a total of seven wastewater reclamation plants and treats a total of almost 1.5 billion gallons of wastewater per day. MWRD is governed by a nine-member board of commissioners, elected at large within district boundaries to six-year terms (three are elected every two years). The district's 1989 budget was $406.1 million.

MWRD is in the middle of a major construction program, the Tunnel and Reservoir Plan (TARP), building a system of tunnels and reservoirs to accommodate sewage and stormwater overflows. Fifty-three municipalities within MWRD's jurisdiction have combined systems that carry both wastewater and rainwater. During periods of heavy rainfall, there have been problems with sewers backing up in low elevation areas as well as polluted overflow discharge into waterways. The TARP project is described as one of the largest public works projects ever undertaken.

TARP consists of two phases. Phase I is oriented primarily towards pollution control and consists of four tunnel systems including drop shafts, tunnels, and pumping stations. The tunnels range from nine to 33 feet in diameter and are constructed in solid rock up to 350 feet below the surface. Nearly 110 miles of tunnels will be constructed in order to eliminate 85 percent of the combined sewer overflows. About 31 miles of tunnels have been completed thus far. Phase I is expected to cost $2.25 billion. Phase II focuses on flood control and will consist of three reservoirs and 21 miles of tunnels. It will provide flood control protection and will eliminate the remaining 15 percent of pollution from
combined sewer overflows. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will be responsible for Phase II.

While MWRD does not have a specific statutory responsibility in the area of flood control, it is involved in cooperative efforts with local communities, the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, and the state of Illinois to develop and manage flood control storage reservoirs and stream improvement facilities. MWRD is a principal sponsor of regional floodwater management plans developed by the Soil Conservation Service. In addition, MWRD has an extensive water quality monitoring system for Lake Michigan, the area waterways, and the sewer system.

**Regional Transportation Authority (RTA)**

The RTA was created in 1974 by the Illinois General Assembly. The aim was to coordinate the diverse mass transportation systems in the six-county region of northeastern Illinois and to provide a consistent level of financial support. The authority is governed by a 13-member board of directors: five from Chicago; three from Cook County; and one from each of the five "collar" counties.

The RTA was extensively restructured under the RTA Amendments adopted in 1983 by the Illinois General Assembly so that primary operating responsibilities were vested with three subsidiary agencies, called Service Boards: PACE, the suburban bus division; Metra, the commuter rail division; and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), responsible for bus and rapid transit service within the city of Chicago and adjoining suburbs. The intent of the restructuring was to increase public accountability, and improve local control over fares, service levels, and system performance. RTA is now a smaller body with the responsibility of funding and oversight of the three agencies. In this capacity it is responsible for the integration of transit services in the region, for allocating resources to the different services, and for evaluating performance of the three service boards.

At the time of the 1983 restructuring, RTA received a boost in financial stability by the allotment of a percentage of sales tax within the region. In Cook County one cent out of every dollar is allocated to RTA. In the five remaining counties, one-quarter of one cent goes to RTA. Of the sales tax total, 85 percent is allocated directly to the service boards "according to need" and 15 percent is retained on a discretionary basis. RTA also receives funding from the Illinois' Public Transportation Fund equal to one-quarter of the collected sales tax receipts. Federal transit
George C. Hemmens and Janet McBride

subsidies are allocated to the service boards by the RTA on the basis of ridership. The state mandates that the agency recover 50 percent of its expenses from fare box revenues. The combined operation budget for RTA’s Service boards was estimated at about $1 billion in 1987.

For the past several years the RTA has been developing a strategic plan that was published in January 1989. The plan aims to restore the system to good condition, estimated to cost $600 million over the next 10 years, and guide extension of the system. Five general policies are developed in the plan that focuses primarily on financial issues. Increasingly, system planning is the responsibility of the three service boards.

The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) is the largest of the service boards. It serves the city of Chicago and 38 suburbs, a service area population of approximately 3.7 million, or 51 percent of RTA’s total service population. Bus service is provided on a grid system throughout the service area with express radial service provided along designated corridors for 921,000 route miles. The rapid transit system consists of six radial rail lines providing 215 route miles. Annually, 439.5 million passengers use CTA buses, and 147.0 million passengers use CTA rapid transit, taking 586.5 million trips. CTA’s 1988 fiscal year operations budget was $644.8 million. Half of this is accounted for by bus system expenditures, 32 percent by rail, and 18 percent by shared expenses. The proposed 1989 capital program budget is $217.5 million; annual capital expenditures have averaged $120 million in recent years. CTA’s estimated fare box revenue in 1988 was $320 million. Total expenses were about $636 million. The recovery ratio was 52.2 percent.

Metra is responsible for system monitoring and coordination of all commuter rail operation within the six-county northeast Illinois region. It operates several formerly private commuter rail services that have been acquired since 1981 through bankruptcy proceedings and direct purchase. The commuter rail network is comprised of over 500 route miles and 1,200 track miles. The network extends throughout northeastern Illinois and also into Indiana and Wisconsin. Metra received an estimated $140 million in fare box revenues in 1988. Estimated expenses were about $259 million. The recovery ratio was about 58 percent.

PACE describes its charge as the administration and provision of all nonrail mass transit service in all of the six-county region with the exception of that portion of Cook County that is serviced by CTA. PACE is governed by a 12-member board of directors. The board is comprised of current and former suburban village presidents and city
mayors. PACE's estimated fare box revenues in 1988 were $22 million. Total estimated 1988 expenses were about $70 million. The recovery ratio was 31.1 percent.

**County Planning Agencies**

County government is another layer of regional planning and development decision making. All six counties have active planning programs. The two most rapidly urbanizing counties, Lake County north of Chicago and DuPage County west of Chicago, have developed very sophisticated planning programs that treat the individual counties as subregions and attempt to coordinate countywide growth and development.

**DuPage County**

The DuPage County Regional Planning Commission is currently working on an update of the 1985 Countywide Land Use Plan because of the continuing high volume of development requests that are often in conflict with the plan. DuPage County has begun making impact assessments for major new developments in an effort to manage growth and mitigate the serious local traffic problems and overloading of development infrastructure. The county only exercises land-use control in unincorporated areas, and even there its influence is affected by the extraterritorial zoning powers of municipalities. However, the county sees its role as balancing development and assuring efficient use of infrastructure and transportation systems. From the county's perspective each municipality is overly generous in providing opportunities for office and industrial development in the competition to gain the tax benefits from such development. The county identifies seven regional (countywide) issues that define its planning role: conflicts between adjacent land uses; flood and stormwater management; impacts on the local road network; fiscal impacts; recreation and open space needs; impacts on the intercommunity road network; and impacts on the Land Use Plan balance.

To work with municipalities on bringing county and local plans into agreement, the County Planning Commission has formed "regional clusters" of localities, which meet with the county staff for development and review of the plan. Like NIPC, the County Planning Commission sees itself as a regional body and, because of home-rule powers, relies heavily on its role as information and assistance provider to influence land-use decisions. Their regional interests are confined primarily to the
county boundaries, however, and they do not have formal intergovernmental planning arrangements with adjacent counties.

*Lake County*

Lake County's Department of Planning, Zoning, and Environmental Quality (PZ&EQ) combines long-range planning, community development, economic development, and development regulation. It staffs separate countywide community development, economic development, and regional planning commissions. The main work of the Regional Planning Commission over the last five years has been the development of a countywide Framework Plan, the most recent update was adopted in November 1987, and a new zoning ordinance to implement it was adopted in April 1989. Like DuPage, Lake County uses information and assistance provision to encourage municipalities to cooperate on planning and development decisions. The county has joined with municipalities in part of the county to create a new water commission to bring Lake Michigan water directly to them. Jointly with DuPage, Lake County was instrumental in establishing the new state legislation requiring countywide stormwater management planning and now has an active planning program jointly governed by county and municipal representatives. Similarly, the county is jointly working with municipalities on solid waste management planning.

Also like DuPage, the Lake County Regional Planning Commission sees itself as a regional body concerned with the county. Lake County contains all the usual elements of a midwestern urban region: an aging, industrial center city (Waukegan); old established suburbs; rapidly developing new suburbs; and rural, estate, and second-home residential areas. And the county experiences the full range of social, economic, and development problems of an urban region. The southern part of the county is home to Chicago commuters, but in many respects the area sees its problems as separate issues requiring county action.

*Councils of Government*

Councils of Governments are voluntary associations of elected public officials of an area. They are completely advisory in nature. Each governmental unit is represented by its elected chief executive. The Illinois statute grants the councils the following advisory powers: (1) to study such area governmental problems common to two or more members
of the council as it deems appropriate, including but not limited to matters affecting health, safety, welfare, education, economic conditions, and regional development; (2) to promote cooperative arrangements and coordinate action among its members; and (3) to make recommendations for review and action to the members and other public agencies that perform functions within the region." Some of the existing associations have been active for a long time, starting as informal associations. Some are quite recent and were stimulated in part by CAT's creation of subregional councils. They vary greatly in population served, budget, staff, and activities.

The Northwest Municipal Conference describes itself as the second oldest intergovernmental organization in the state. It was organized by several municipalities in 1958 to study the future of commuter rail stations along the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad lines. The council has a membership of 33 municipalities and seven townships, representing a population of about one million. The members are in Cook, DuPage, and Lake Counties. Major elements of the current work program include a solid waste management planning and siting effort, the Transportation Partnership (a public-private organization), a joint purchasing program, joint training and education efforts, and legislative liaison.

The West Central Municipal Conference was founded in 1979 on a part-time basis and has been fully active since May 1986. Executive Director Dave Bennet bills the conference as a "trade association for municipalities." The conference currently has 29 members, with a service population of just under 450,000. There are a total of 36 municipalities within the area served, which is western Cook County between Chicago and DuPage County. Some of the major concerns of the conference are transportation planning, intergovernmental funding, state lobbying, economic development, solid waste management, and job training and education.

The Barrington Area Council of Governments (BACOG) began as an informal association in the mid-1960s. It was officially founded in 1970. BACOG serves seven municipalities with a population of approximately 35,000. BACOG differs from other councils in that its mandate includes development of an areawide comprehensive plan with a land-use component. BACOG is involved in planning and growth management, joint services, citizen education, the arts, demographics, school district issues, drug education, and recycling.

The South Suburban Mayors and Managers Association was formed in 1968 as an informal organization of southern Cook County government
officials. In 1978 the association first hired full-time professional staff. It serves 38 member municipalities in the southern suburbs of Cook County with a population of more than 550,000. The association provides municipal management assistance through special programs such as joint purchasing and through seminars. It is also active in municipal compliance with the Clean Water Act, support of a third regional airport, federal and state legislative liaison, a public safety program, cooperation with other intergovernmental organization, housing issues, public and media relations, economic development assistance, monitoring of transportation proposals and participation in planning efforts, review of solid waste, and review of flooding issues.

Private/Nonprofit Sector

The private sector can address regional planning and development issues through the activities of nonprofit organizations. Only a few of the many nonprofits in the Chicago region have had such a program focus.

The Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC) is an influential nonprofit in Chicago and, to a lesser extent, the metropolitan area. It was founded in 1934 as the Metropolitan Housing Council, later becoming the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council and then the MPC. MPC is led by a board of governors drawn from corporations, universities, and consulting firms. It is organized into executive, standing, and ad hoc committees served by a professional full-time staff. Estimated income in 1988 was about $733,650. The standing committees of the council are: Urban Development, Regional Planning, and Transportation. Current special projects include a task force on Chicago Housing Authority rehabilitation and reinvestment, and a task force on health care for the medically indigent.

In previous years the council has undertaken major projects on regional topics. One of the most significant was their 1982 study, MAP 2000, which evaluated public infrastructure and public capital budgeting in the region. That study found that the region lacked "a comprehensive approach to making public capital investment decisions for the region as a whole" and that plans to finance needed capital improvements were inadequate (Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council 1982c).

The Regional Partnership is a consortium of governmental, civic and business organizations that addresses key issues facing the six-county northeastern Illinois region. The partnership was established in 1983 to identify regional problems not being addressed, avoid duplication of
efforts, and combine strengths and problem-solving abilities of existing organizations. Partnership members review and select projects that require regional private/public collaboration. Projects are carried out by the sponsoring organizations using their own staff and resources. Financial assistance is also sought from foundation and trust grants. The Metropolitan Planning Council has served as staff and secretariat for the partnership.

The partnership counts as its greatest accomplishment the Regional Agenda Project, which culminated in a State of the Region Conference held in Chicago in 1987 and in the publication of a State of the Region Report. Key public policy issues facing the Chicago metropolitan region in 13 topical areas were reviewed. Other achievements influenced by the partnership include a solid waste management plan developed by NIPC, an Infrastructure Action Plan by MPC, the Regional Marketing Project by MPC, and the Economic Source Book published by the Commercial Club, MPC, and other organizations.

THE 2010 PLAN: AN EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL PLANNING

Transportation planning is the most developed example of a regional planning and decision-making process in the Chicago metropolitan area. It is not much of an exaggeration to call it the only regional planning game in town. As such, the experience with it may be a useful guide to the possibility of other forms of regional planning. Work on a new regional transportation plan began on February 26, 1987 when the CATS Work Program Committee approved a committee structure for plan development. The process ended on April 12, 1989 with the CATS Policy Committee’s endorsement of the plan. The aims of this brief case study are to describe the process, the roles played by each of the major actors, the mechanisms for agreement, and to assess the process.

The transportation planning process in the Chicago region is structured by an interagency agreement, as revised in 1981, which was strongly influenced by the existing federal regulations (CFR 450.108). CATS had been designated as the official metropolitan planning agency (MPO) by the governor. NIPC was the A-95 review agency for federal grants. Usually the MPO and the A-95 designations go to the same agency. The federal regulations stipulated that when they were different agencies "there shall be an agreement between the two organizations which prescribes the means by which their activities will be coordinated." The main substantive concern was that the agreement show how
transportation planning would be part of the comprehensive development plan for the area.

Although the A95 review process was rescinded, NIPC is still given responsibility for assuring the consistency of the transportation plan with the comprehensive development plan. This gives NIPC the lead role in identifying goals, development policies, and growth strategies, responsibility for providing the land-use framework for transportation planning, and responsibility for assessing the impacts of alternate transportation investments on regional development. CATS is given the lead role in preparing and testing alternate transportation networks. This includes system performance, user benefits, costs and revenues, and air quality impacts. There are two additional parties to the agreement. The RTA is responsible for evaluating the public transportation proposals, and the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) is responsible for assuring that the regional plan is consistent with statewide plans.

Care is taken in the agreement to assure that CATS and NIPC are equal partners in the planning process. The agreement requires that CATS staff provide full information so that NIPC "can act as co-equal with the (CATS) Policy Committee in providing guidance to CATS staff in preparing transportation plans and in endorsing these plans." The plan adoption process is similarly even handed. The draft plan is approved by the CATS Work Program Committee and forwarded to NIPC for adoption. If adopted, the plan is then sent to the CATS Policy Committee for endorsement. If NIPC does not adopt, it returns the plan to the Work Program Committee with recommended changes. If CATS does not agree with the plan as adopted by NIPC, the plan is referred to the standing Joint Subcommittee for the Resolution of Differences to work out an agreement. CATS may not endorse the plan until it has been adopted by NIPC.

The 2010 TSD Plan Development Process

In practice the supervision of plan development is done by integrated committees that represent all the interested actors, but the lines of responsibility laid out in the agreement are respected in the designation of technical staff responsibility, committee chairmanships, and committee membership. The CATS Work Program Committee oversees the plan development process and establishes the subcommittee structure for carrying out the process. The Work Program Committee has representatives from all interested parties: IDOT and other relevant state agencies;
CATS; NIPC; RTA; CTA; Metra; PACE; Chicago; each county; the Council of Mayors; and private transportation providers.

The Work Program Committee established five subcommittees for plan development. The Socioeconomic/Scenario Development Committee was chaired by NIPC and assigned responsibility for employment and population estimates and preparation and evaluation of alternate economic, energy, and socio-economic development scenarios. They also identified and evaluated specific issues for inclusion in the basic planning assumptions, such as proposals for a third regional airport and forecasts of energy costs. The Alternatives Generation Committee was chaired by CATS and assigned responsibility for compiling a list of transportation proposals, developing alternative schemes and testing them.

The Financial Considerations Committee was chaired by IDOT and given responsibility for identifying traditional and nontraditional sources of funding for transportation improvements. The Plan Evaluation Committee was chaired by Lake County and given responsibility for analysis of the tested alternative plans and preparation of the draft plan. They also reviewed public hearing comments and the financial analysis in developing the plan. The Public Involvement Committee was chaired by the Council of Mayors and given responsibility for designing and implementing the public review process.

The committees contained representatives from relevant agencies. For example, the RTA was represented on the alternatives, financial and evaluation committees. In line with the interagency agreement CATS was not represented on the public involvement and plan evaluation committees, and NIPC was not represented on the alternatives generation and financial considerations committees.

Developing the Plan

NIPC prepared the population, employment, and income estimates in consultation with the local governments of the region. The results of forecasting models at the regional level were compared with local forecasts and growth assumptions. By a process of analysis and negotiation the local and distributed regional estimates were brought into agreement. The forecasts project a regional population growth of 15 percent by 2010, a significant drop in average household size and a 29 percent increase in the number of households, and a 23 percent increase in employment. Three-fourths of the population growth is expected to occur in the five "collar" counties.
A list of 200 transportation projects was compiled from suggestions of public agencies, local governments, and public hearings. These were analyzed by CATS and reviewed by the evaluation committee. The committee approved some of the projects for further study, modified or combined others, and eliminated some. Fifty-three projects were given detailed study, and six alternative transportation system scenarios were considered. Twenty of the proposals made it into the final plan.

The highway portion of the plan proposes five new expressways, an expressway connection and two tollway improvements in addition to current committed projects from previous plans. Recognizing that it was financially infeasible to build all the expressways that could be justified by the projections, the plan also proposes designating some arterials as "strategic arterials" to be improved as locally required to supplement the expressway system. Finally, the highway plan proposes several future expressway corridors that should be preserved for meeting travel needs beyond 2010.

The transit system plan stresses the need for maintenance and improvement of the present system and proposes six major projects, including a new Chicago Central Business District distributor. Capacity constraints are expected to be most acute on the commuter rail system. Eight future transit corridors are designated.

Financial analysis estimates that the proposed highway improvements will cost $13.1 billion and the transit improvements $12.3 billion. The most optimistic revenue forecast estimates a shortfall of $2.5 billion, and the pessimistic forecast estimates a $14.2 billion shortfall.

The public involvement program included three separate rounds of meetings. The first round was to inform the public agencies and public officials of the planning process and their opportunities to participate. The second round presented planning goals and the plan evaluation criteria for discussion and issued a call for proposals for new transportation improvements. In the third round the 53 facility projects under final consideration were presented with computer simulation results of their 2010 performance, and the proposed Strategic Regional Arterial System was presented. A Public Hearing Draft Plan was released in December 1988, and a series of public hearings on the plan were held by NIPC in late January 1989.

In general, the planning process went very smoothly. Most major elements of the plan received broad endorsement, as did the Strategic Regional Arterial System and the Corridor of the Future proposals. What criticisms and controversy emerged, and there was only one major
controversy, were mainly tied to particular subregional concerns or special interests. The public hearing record shows only one general or regional concern and that was a substantial amount of public testimony that urged a higher priority for traffic management over new construction.

The South Suburban Mayors and Managers Association and representatives of southern suburbs testified that the plan underestimated growth in their part of the region because it did not include the impact of a third regional airport, which they expect will be located in their area. The draft plan was amended to include a brief discussion of the airport issue and identification of four possible sites, but no changes were made in growth or travel demand estimates. The Northwest Municipal Conference objected to the proposed five-mile spacing of the Strategic Arterials on the grounds that this criteria was arbitrary and failed to recognize local conditions. CATS had developed the criteria on technical, system-oriented grounds. Subsequent committee review also included nontechnical and political considerations, and some proposed arterials were redesignated and some additional roads were designated for the system.

The only major controversy involved the proposal for a major highway project in Lake County, in the northern part of the region, that would complete part of the regional expressway system. This proposal was not new. It has existed in some form for about 25 years. This is an area of rapid growth. The issue was framed in the classical terms of quality of life and environmental concerns versus accommodating growth and increased traffic. And, in fact, the issue pitted neighbor against neighbor. The Lake County Board testified in opposition to the project and the Lake County Regional Planning Commission and the Development Commission testified for it. Ten area municipalities endorsed it and two opposed.

The controversy placed NIPC in a difficult position. Opposition to the project was based on issues of stream, wetland, and groundwater protection that NIPC strongly advocates, but NIPC's own staff analysis supported the need for the project. NIPC resolved the process by recommending that the required Environmental Impact Statement be completed and followed by a second review of the project conducted by both CATS and NIPC. Failure of either to grant approval at that time would eliminate the project from the plan. NIPC also recommended that, in the meantime, affected local governments seek changes in state enabling law to allow municipalities and counties to enter into binding agreements on future land uses and land regulation, adopt ordinances to
protect water resources based on a model ordinance presented, and form a corridor planning council, which should seek a moratorium on development until legal and planning issues were resolved.

The compromise gave something to each of the contestants and essentially left the issue open. It was approved by CATS and incorporated in the plan. NIPC was highly praised by the *Chicago Tribune* for its leadership in resolving the issue. However, critics of the project pointed out that the recommendations are not enforceable. It is not clear whether an EIS will be conducted; the responsible officials have stated that funding is not available. Further, the Illinois Toll Highway Authority could build the project without NIPC’s approval.

Assessment of the 2010 Plan Process

From an outsider’s perspective the planning process went very smoothly and resulted in a plan that easily won wide consensus. For an insider’s look at the process we interviewed persons from the major agencies involved. One of the issues we presented to them is the typical outsider’s view of the qualities and character of the principal actors—CATS and NIPC. That view is that CATS is technically oriented, analytically sophisticated, and somewhat narrowly focused on transportation issues with a bias toward highway transportation. NIPC, on the other hand is seen as a land-use and environmental agency with a very broad agenda and a preference for general policy planning where broad agreements can be negotiated and political compromise constructed within a rational planning framework. CATS, since it is a division of IDOT, is seen as a state agency with ultimate loyalty to Springfield. NIPC, as a membership governed agency, is seen as locally based but politically weak. The days when NIPC was seen as a federal intrusion seem to be long past.

As might be expected, CATS’ staff take strong exception to this characterization and argue the opposite. The response of Peter Elliot, Director of Work Program Development, is typical. He feels that NIPC has its own biases, oriented to "bicycles and public transportation," while CATS "tries to look at the whole picture," although he admits CATS does have a leaning to highway transportation. He also took exception to the inference that NIPC has a stronger policy orientation, pointing to the many high-level policymakers on CATS’ Policy Committee and the importance they attach to their role.
Phillip Peters, NIPC’s Director of Planning and Chair of the Socioeconomic/Scenario Development Committee, feels that because CATS is primarily a transportation provider it is an uphill battle to introduce other issues such as land use and environment into the process. Reflecting on whether the situation would be different if the plan were prepared by a single agency, he suspects that there might be different divisions, but that the split between analysts and planners would still exist. Aristide Biciunas, Executive Director of CATS, likened the process to a relay race where one runner starts and runs for a while, then passes on the stick to another who runs for a while and then passes it on again. The difficult issue to judge is whether in this case where there are only two runners and many passes—CATS to NIPC to CATS to NIPC to CATS—one has a controlling advantage.

Those most directly involved with the process seemed pleased and proud of the resulting document. They pointed to the checks and balances provided by having two major agencies and committees with diversified membership involved as one of the virtues of the process, while acknowledging that the current structure can at times be unwieldy. Aristide Biciunas summed up the common view, "It doesn’t look pretty on the outside, but it works."

Outsiders generally shared this positive assessment. In commenting on the smoothness of the process, many cited positive personality and leadership factors, particularly the role of Larry Christmas, Executive Director, in setting the tone for NIPC. The assessment of NIPC’s role was generally very positive. However, many commented that NIPC’s lack of secure funding severely impacts its operating ability. It is hampered in taking policy positions, making decisions, and even in performing staff work because of the need to constantly consider the ramifications of its activities and decisions on its funding.

RTA officials were most critical of the plan-making process, feeling that it fails to give sufficient attention to nonhighway solutions to growth. John Gaudette, an Assistant Executive Director of RTA, focused on the relevance of the transportation planning process to the contemporary situation. He feels that the process has not worked to integrate highway and transit planning and is too divorced from fiscal reality. He finds the plan making to be a "process for the sake of process" rather than a process for decision making. As he sees it, the key activity of the process is allocation of funds for highway improvement among cities and counties through a bargaining and rationing process rather than through a rational planning process. Like many others Ted Weigle, Executive
Director of RTA, feels that CATS is not directed by the local Policy Committee, but takes direction from the state. The balance of power among agencies and the different governments is a subject of considerable disagreement among the participants. Phillip Peters of NIPC agrees with Weigle noting, "In Illinois controversies find their way to Springfield because what happens in Chicago is so important to the State." Aristide Biciunas of CATS offers a different interpretation. He suggests that decisions are made at the state level because the decision making in the region is "checkmated"; there are so many different agendas that everything is nullified. The disagreements among local governments are reflected in the comment of Donald Kline, Executive Director of BACOG, which represents outlying communities, that CATS listens to powerful groups like the Northwest Municipal Conference, but not to less powerful groups or individuals. He thinks the "little guys" feel like everything is done before they become involved.

It is clear that the region has developed a very successful process for transportation planning that draws the relevant actors together, works smoothly, and is able to achieve consensus. The critics would argue that this is partly because the issues are not new or critical (most of the proposals have been around for years, and those battles are settled, and there will be no money available for controversial expensive projects anyway), and because the process is only that and is recognized as such by the participants. Final decisions are made in another arena. However, all would agree that the experience significantly enhances the regions representatives' ability to work together.

**THE STATUS OF REGIONAL PLANNING**

To develop a more general picture of the current status of planning for regional development and decision making and to inquire into the future of such planning we interviewed 16 knowledgeable persons from state government and the major regional organizations. They were very cooperative and responsive in the interviews, although there were some requests for anonymity on sensitive issues such as assessing the efficacy of competing agencies, and these requests have been honored. The results of these interviews are not presented as representative of the regional decision-making community or of the organizations where our respondents are employed. The results are the opinions of our respondents.
Current Issues

If we simply tally up the mentions of current major policy issues, two stand out: transportation and solid waste disposal. The transportation issue is in the forefront of awareness because of the recently completed 2010 Plan and because of the near crisis conditions of central city transit and suburban road congestion. Solid waste disposal by contrast is not being addressed on a regional basis but is being addressed everywhere in the region.

Only a small part of the concern for transportation is with the traditional issue of major new projects. Most of the concern among transportation providers is over securing adequate funds to both maintain the existing system and to accomplish already agreed upon extensions. Managing the balance between maintenance and expansion needs appears especially crucial in transit service. The second most common concern is with managing suburban traffic congestion due to increased development and the changing job and residence location patterns resulting in much more intersuburban and city to suburb work commuting.

Solid waste disposal is a major current issue because existing landfills are approaching capacity and because of the difficulty of locating new facilities for landfill or incineration. Waste disposal has been made a planning issue by the state legislature's requiring counties to prepare comprehensive solid waste management plans in 1991 and implement them by 1992. The law requires that all disposal methods be considered and that the county recycle 25 percent of its waste within five years. NIPC is credited with playing an important communication and coordination role on this issue, but all respondents agree that there are no regional approaches being developed. The planning will require county-municipal cooperation, and our respondents think this may be difficult. In Cook County the three municipal associations are developing plans for their constituents with little interaction or countywide coordination. In DuPage County the Solid Waste Committee composed of only county board members was changed by the state (Public Act 85-14) in 1987 to require equal county and municipal representation. A resulting draft plan has encountered stiff opposition to siting of proposed landfill and incineration facilities and has spawned an active oppositional citizen's group.

Two basic characteristics of development decision making in the region are demonstrated in these issues. One is that the major agencies and local governments have a strong tendency to "go it alone" on issues. For example, John Gaudette of the RTA stressed that whatever decision
is reached on transit funding priorities, it will be made by the RTA Board and no one else. The other decision-making characteristic is that the state legislature is the place where local governments go to settle regional and subregional issues. Closely related to these characteristics of decision making are two characteristics of implementation. The multi-issue regional agencies are given very little influence, and there is heavy reliance on special districts to solve problems as they arise. The waste disposal requirements appear likely to generate a new set of such special-purpose organizations.

There are two further issues that get frequent mention, about half as often as transportation and solid waste disposal. These are water quality and distribution and affordable housing in the suburbs.

What is the Future Regional Agenda?

We explored the possible future agenda of regional development issues indirectly by asking what issues are currently left out of the regional planning and decision-making process and, directly, by asking what issues our respondents thought would require cooperative planning over the next 10 years. One issue stands out on the list of those currently left out. That issue is affordable housing in the suburbs. It was raised and discussed in a variety of ways and almost always linked with the changing distribution of job opportunities. The issue might be best called the housing/jobs imbalance problem. Employment opportunities have been growing rapidly in the suburbs, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, and housing that could be afforded by people holding those jobs is not available and not being produced in the suburbs.

The only other issue to get much mention as a current problem not being actively considered is regional economic development. Our respondents mentioned the lack of any regional agency with a clear mandate and authority to address economic development and were critical of the state government, particularly the Department of Commerce and Community Development, for failure to perform adequately on this issue.

Turning to the discussion of a future regional planning agenda, two issues stand out clearly: solid waste disposal and the housing/jobs balance. State legislation has placed solid waste planning and implementation responsibility with the counties. Our respondents see this as an issue that will remain at the top of the regional agenda because of the cost of exporting waste and the difficulty of resolving conflicts over siting of facilities within the region.
The housing/jobs balance issue is also seen as centered in the conflict between local and regional perspectives. This is supported by NIPC's experience some years ago when they attempted to address fair and affordable housing policies with their member organizations. The results were clearly negative and cost NIPC much goodwill. Most of our respondents thought affordable housing should be addressed as a regional issue, but most also said they thought it would not be addressed regionally because it involves so many difficult issues, including racial and social discrimination, adequacy of property revenues to support development, local land-use regulation, and self-determination of the character of communities.

Three issues shared the second rank of projections for the next decade's agenda: water quality and quantity, air quality, and the balance between the maintenance of existing regional infrastructure and investment in new infrastructure. NIPC has been active in the past decade providing leadership in groundwater, stream, and wetlands protection. Lake and DuPage Counties have also been active and take credit for joint action resulting in state legislation for county storm water management planning. Because increased development will force more reliance on Lake Michigan water in the suburbs, access to lake water and control of its distribution have become major political issues. Lake County has joined with several suburban municipalities to create a water commission that would distribute lake water directly to the suburbs, freeing them from reliance on purchases from lakeside municipalities. In DuPage County access to lake water is crucial for further land development because local communities have been forced to rely on deep wells with limited and declining quantity and quality of water. In 1984 a multimunicipality commission in DuPage was contracting with Chicago for delivery of lake water. DuPage County went to the state legislature to try to get county control over all distribution of lake water in the county. In a counter move the municipalities succeeded in getting an amended bill in 1985 that created the independent DuPage Water Commission with half the members appointed by the county board and half by municipalities. The commission is now involved in a $379 million pipeline project to distribute lake water in the county.

Air quality has become a pressing issue because the USEPA has rejected the state's plan and is preparing its own for the Chicago region. This has caused considerable uncertainty and apprehension. The balance between funding maintenance and new infrastructure investments is seen as critical by both the service providing agencies and local governments
and reflects concern about adequacy of state and local tax revenues to maintain the quality of public facilities and services. None of these top issues on the future agenda involve major new regional facilities. The most frequently mentioned facility issue is the possibility of a third regional airport. After that there is some mention of adding to the region’s transit system.

So our respondents expect environmental issues (waste disposal, water, and air quality), financing existing infrastructure dependent services, and the politically difficult issue of affordable suburban housing to head the regional agenda in the next decade. Except for housing, the future agenda is much like the current agenda. And regional economic development has again been left off the list.

What Works?

The two agencies most admired by our respondents are the RTA and NIPC. The RTA is seen as very successful, following its reorganization, in bringing some coherence to regional transit services and providing a responsible financial and decision-making environment for transit. NIPC is valued as an information source and as a regional forum where issues are raised and views are exchanged. There is, however, considerable ambivalence about NIPC. For some it seems like a love/hate relationship. They like what NIPC does, but they don’t want it to do much. Donald Kline, Executive Director of the Barrington Area COG, captured the dilemma. He admires NIPC, but says, as do others, that it is "a toothless tiger." He wishes NIPC had more power, but acknowledges that his constituent municipalities are not in agreement. Although commended, NIPC was mentioned as often on the list of things that don’t work as it was on the list of things that do. Both those that judged NIPC positively and negatively agree that NIPC is too weak, and each group is split on whether it should be stronger.

Municipal associations were also mentioned several times as an example of what works. They were credited especially with representing the interests of their constituents before the state legislature and for developing cooperative and sharing programs (on purchasing, services, etc.) among their members. The state legislature received almost as many mentions on the list of which organizations are effective in resolving regional issues.

The pattern that emerges from our respondents is that regional agencies are most accepted if they have single issue, operational
responsibilities; local autonomy is maintained through voluntary cooperation in multi-issue agencies whose mandate is clearly to represent the interests of the constituents; and the state legislature is a comfortable arena for settling issues.

Needed Organizational Change

Our respondents were nearly unanimous in agreeing that the present organizational base for resolving regional issues is inadequate for dealing with the issues that will have to be resolved in the next decade. The suggestion most often made for change was the creation of a strong comprehensive regional agency. Specific suggestions ranged from some form of regional government to a strengthened NIPC. However, the second most common suggestion was to seek greater voluntary cooperation among regional actors with emphasis on an issue by issue approach to determining participants and roles. And the third most common suggestion was to increase the state’s leadership in regional decision making. The final suggestion, receiving limited support, was to strengthen local autonomy. Since the totals tallied for the first three suggestions were very close, it appears that our respondents are quite divided about how to effect the change in regional decision making they agree is needed.

CONCLUSION

The current practice of decision making on regional issues in the Chicago metropolitan area could be described as chaotic, where there is no consistency in how issues are raised and resolved. But such a description is too vague and fails to give the credit due to NIPC and others for their efforts to shape a regional agenda. Alternatively, current practice might be described as an ideal pluralist democracy, where all parties are heard at their discretion and their needs heeded. This political science textbook description is also inaccurate because political jurisdictions have very unequal influence in planning. Some groups, notably racial minorities, needs are not met; and general needs that are in the interest of the whole region, but engender competition, are not effectively addressed. Current decision-making practice does not even approach the rational planning ideal of open, comprehensive, and binding discussions and decisions on goals and alternatives.

The most mature regional decision-making process, transportation planning, somewhat resembles the political scientist’s conception of
"partisan mutual adjustment" to the extent that there is clear negotiation and compromise among the major participants. But even that process is faulted for not adequately treating the fundamental questions of the balance between highway and transit service, between maintenance and new investment, and between environmental protection and growth. And not all the affected groups think the process is representative.

The present pattern of initiative and action can be likened to a tug of war played with a spider web instead of a rope, with many players pulling and hauling the several strands, some in concert, some in opposition, depending on the issue. But almost never enough of them together for long enough to move in any direction. As things are presently organized, effective leadership is impossible. Some might liken this to the political scientist's concept of incrementalism were movement is in small, cautious steps. But this is more nearly a stalemate where even small steps are seldom achieved.

Now leadership is divided both by role and by issue. On the subject of role, Tom Berkshire of the governor's office stated the role division with which most of our respondents seem to agree: the state legislature is good for resolving issues but not for raising them; NIPC is good at bringing up issues. NIPC has been placed in the difficult role of being the region's conscience. It raises the problematic issues. If NIPC were in a strong position to follow through on its initiative with independent fact finding and analysis, it could offer some incentive to other actors for their participation in finding solutions and could legitimately advocate the region's interests before federal, state, and local lawmakers and regulators. Then NIPC could exercise the needed leadership. However, it has none of these attributes.

Its financial dependence on voluntary contributions is the clearest symptom of NIPC's dilemma. According to Larry Christmas, Executive Director, NIPC is one of only seven regional councils serving the nation's 25 largest metropolitan areas that do not receive regular funding through state appropriation, a direct tax levy or rebate, or state mandated local government contributions. To its credit NIPC currently raises a very substantial 38 percent of its revenue from voluntary contributions and from selling services locally. This shows the positive regard of local actors for the agency, but also indicates its vulnerability. NIPC has neither the level nor certainty of funding required to carry out a strong leadership role.

Probably the major change in issue leadership during the past decade has been the increase in municipal associations and county activity on
subregional issues. Unfortunately the associations and county interests are often at odds, and there is considerable struggle between them. As in the DuPage water commission example, the state legislature is the arena where these conflicts are resolved. The state does not play a leadership role on regional issues, however. It simply reacts to local pressures. There is no effective state planning for the Chicago region, even across state provided services (Hemmens 1988).

A skeptic might ask whether the weakness of the region in settling internal issues is important. Are there significant regional issues that are not met? In its attempt to develop a truly regional rather than Chicago-based agenda, the Metropolitan Planning Council surveyed the region about regional issues. They found that transportation is considered the only problem that can’t be solved by the localities (Metropolitan Planning Commission 1987). MPC has essentially given up on developing a regional program. Mary Decker, MPC Executive Director, summarized the difficulties: the region is too large; it is hard to fund suburban studies; and it is hard to find problems you can do something about. Larry Christmas, NIPC Executive Director, agrees that the large size and diversity of the region supports fragmented decision making.

But Larry Christmas, Mary Decker, and almost all of our respondents point to the existing unresolved problems and the unaddressed issues relevant to the region’s future as evidence of the need for better planning and decision making. Regional economic development is perhaps the most important of the unaddressed issues. There is general agreement that the state and its Department of Commerce and Community Affairs have failed to provide leadership on these issues, or even adequate marketing of the region. As discussed in the introductory section, the continued strength and competitive position of the Chicago area economy is an open issue, and not simply a central city or suburban issue, but a joint one.

Options

Given the present situation and the political history of the region, three scenarios of future organization for planning and decision making seem possible.

The first scenario is development of a strong regional agency. This could be accomplished by combining NIPC and CATS and possibly some parts of other existing regional agencies. Such an agency would have the benefit of building on past experience, custody of acknowledged regional issues, and, perhaps most important, the incentive for cooperation created
by access to federal grant funds. It would need mandated funding to be effective. It would also require that the state yield to the region some of the power it now holds. The transportation planning process is successful in part because the cost of failure in loss of federal dollars is high. Similar sticks and carrots are not available on other issues. By granting increased regional autonomy but requiring regional agreement, the state could create similar sticks and carrots with state and federal pass-through funds. However, the tradition of local home rule, diversity of issues, and established issue constituencies would be major obstacles to the success of such an agency.

The second scenario features strengthened subregional planning, focused on county government. This would require county home rule and an increased role for counties in service provision and development regulation. Regional issues would still require a council of counties to resolve disputes and reduce conflict in the state legislature. This scenario runs counter to the established practice of municipal home rule and would run head-on into the growing power of municipal associations. It would also produce very unevenly matched regional partners. DuPage and Lake would emerge as very strong counties. The non-Chicago portion of Cook, which is physically divided into north and south sections by Chicago, would be difficult to govern integrally. The alternative of combining the city of Chicago and the remainder of Cook County into a single unit would increase the unevenness among regional partners, and would be politically improbable at best.

The third scenario is for the state to increase its role as regional policy leader. From a bureaucratic perspective this looks like a sensible proposition. State services are regionalized now, but these regions do not conform with the Chicago metropolitan region or with each other. State operations could be improved by more sensible regionalization. And regionalization of the state executive's policy process would promote a more consistent approach to Chicago region issues and to those of other parts of the state. A regional policy structure, however, goes against the entrenched rural/urban, suburb/big city divisions in the state. Also, while the Chicago suburbs look to the legislature as a participatory setting for resolving their issues, they are not likely to turn more of their interests over to the state executive. Nor is Chicago likely to agree to such a change.

Each of these scenarios has obvious strengths and weaknesses. None is clearly feasible because there are strong forces or traditions opposed.
In summing up the situation, it seems to us that three important actors are failing to meet their responsibilities. The state executive branch’s shortcomings have already been discussed. Second, the city of Chicago is a quiet giant on regional issues. Recent city policy has understandably emphasized internal economic development, but the evolution of a new regional balance of jobs and housing can’t be forestalled, and it might be guided to everyone’s betterment. Chicago, with a large cadre of traditionally loyal legislators, has preferred to battle and bargain in the state legislature, forming varied alliances with other groups. A recent analysis of intergovernmental activity in the region found that "Chicago’s involvement with suburban governments is minimal to nonexistent" (Banovetz 1988, 28). Third, the private sector, through the activities of the nonprofits, has been ineffective in addressing regional issues, except within the United Way/Crusade of Mercy arena, and even there regional efforts are limited primarily to fund raising. The Regional Partnership is the most recent effort to form a private/public agenda for the region. It is inadequately funded and staffed, but it continues to try. Its newest approach, started in July 1989, is to hold Briefing Councils for the directors of regional organizations, covering state legislation among other issues. But it lacks the broad base and political legitimacy to be an effective leadership organization.

Each of these three has the opportunity to break the existing stalemate on regional development. A prerequisite for effective, practical change is the election of a Chicago mayor and an Illinois governor who share common interests and see that they have common problems. This has not been the case for more than a decade. No substantial, permanent changes are possible, however, until a regional perspective is developed and widely shared.
INTERVIEWS

Rita Athis, Assistant Director, Northwest Municipal Conference
David Baker, Executive Director, Illinois State Chamber of Commerce
David Bennet, Executive Director, West Central Municipal Conference
Thomas Berkshire, Governor’s Office, Springfield
Aristide Biciunas, Executive Director, CATS
Robert Chave, Director, Lake County Planning Commission
Lawrence Christmas, Executive Director, NIPC
Mary Decker, Executive Director, MPC
Robert Duboe, Assistant Planning Analyst, CATS
William Dugan, Transportation Planner, Northwest Municipal Conference
Peter Elliot, Director of Work Program Development, CATS
James Ford, Director of Intergovernmental Relations, NIPC
John Gaudette, Assistant Executive Director for Program and Capital Development, RTA
Elizabeth Hollander, Commissioner of Planning, City of Chicago
Donald Kline, Executive Director, Barrington Area Council of Governments
Phillip Peters, Director of Planning, NIPC
Beth Ruyle, Executive Director, South Suburban Mayors and Managers Association
Theodore Weigle, Executive Director, RTA
Kermit Wies, Associate Program Planner, CATS
Paula Wolff, Director of Programs and Policy, Governor’s Office
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Planning and Servicing the Greater Toronto Area: The Interplay of Provincial and Municipal Interests

Frances Frisken
York University

INTRODUCTION

The name Metropolitan Toronto is virtually synonymous in North America with effective metropolitan administration. The creation of a federated form of metropolitan government for the city of Toronto and its 12 suburbs in 1953 and the rapidity with which it was able to overcome serious public service deficiencies made the Toronto model an object of admiration for students of metropolitan affairs throughout the continent. To some observers, the area seemed to have achieved the ideal administrative arrangement for the large, multimunicipal urban complex: a system of government that preserved the existence and integrity of local units while allowing for the coordinated and effective treatment of areawide servicing needs (Committee for Economic Development 1970, 70-81).

One of the few certainties about the nature and pace of metropolitan development in market-driven economies, however, is that metropolitan growth soon spills over political boundaries created to contain it. The city of New York expanded from 44 to 299 square miles in 1898 through

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a consolidation with Brooklyn and four suburban counties (Adams 1974, 250). It has remained the same size ever since. The city of Chicago grew more slowly, by successive annexations, from 36 square miles in 1870 to its present 224 square miles, a size it had achieved by 1950 (Jackson 1972, 445). In 1986, both cities were the cores of metropolitan areas of nearly 4,000 square miles. Similar processes have been at work in the Toronto metropolis. Metropolitan Toronto, with 240 square miles, is now the central city of a provincially defined Greater Toronto Area (GTA) more than 10 times that size. Thus its government is no longer in a position to undertake regional planning or provide major urban services to the whole of the Toronto-centered metropolis. The only government able to perform those functions is the provincial (Ontario) government, which under the Canadian constitution has full responsibility for municipal affairs.

This paper focuses on the way the Ontario government is exercising its responsibility for managing the development of the Toronto metropolis. Such a focus not only accords with current reality but also permits examination of an issue that often arises in comparisons of governmental responses to metropolitan expansion in Canada and the United States: that of the relative autonomy of local governments in the two countries. Some writers have cited the creation of metropolitan or regional governments in several Canadian provinces as evidence that provincial governments are more willing and better able than state governments to act on urban problems as they arise, thereby avoiding the more severe problems associated with metropolitan area growth in the United States (Goldberg and Mercer 1986, 197-98; Robinson 1986, 247-48). There are others who argue, however, that provincial hegemony in local affairs has had the negative effect of preventing Canadian local governments from acting in the best interests of their own communities (Fish 1976; Bird and Slack 1983). The more directly involved provincial governments become in matters formerly delegated to local units, the more such criticisms are heard.

This paper deals with these issues in two ways. First, it shows that the powers the Ontario government has kept in its own hands have given it impressive legal and institutional potential to influence the way the Toronto area develops. Second, the paper uses case study evidence to show that local politics and the activities of local governments are not irrelevant to an understanding of the way the Toronto area has developed in the past and is likely to develop in the future. Local actions and priorities can in fact be as much a constraint on the way a provincial
government responds to areawide issues as provincial laws and regulations can act as constraints on local self-determination.

THE GREATER TORONTO AREA

The term Metropolitan Toronto signifies the jurisdictional entity established in 1953 to take in the city of Toronto and the 12 (now five) suburban municipalities surrounding it. It does not signify the current extent of Toronto-related development. Even the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), as defined by Statistics Canada, fails to serve that purpose. Instead, both the provincial and Metropolitan Toronto governments have drawn the boundaries of the Toronto metropolis to encompass most of the Oshawa CMA on the east and part of the Hamilton CMA on the west. This larger area takes in Metropolitan Toronto and four two-tier regional municipalities (Durham on the east, York on the north, Peel and Halton on the west) established by the province between 1971 and 1974 as part of a large-scale reorganization of the area’s local governments (Map 4.1). Metropolitan Toronto planners refer to this entity as the Toronto Region; provincial officials as the Greater Toronto Area. Because the regional municipalities are often referred to as "regions," a source of possible confusion, the name Greater Toronto Area (or GTA) is used in this paper.

With just over 2,700 square miles the GTA occupies only 0.3 percent of Ontario’s total land area but in 1991 contained 41.6 percent of the province’s population, up from 33.8 percent in 1961. From 1961-91 the GTA’s share of the population of Canada rose from 11.5 percent to 15.4 percent. Projections based on current trends suggest that the area will have about 5.3 million people in 2011, at which time it will account for about 45 percent of the Ontario population (Ontario Ministry of Treasury and Economics, Office of Economic Policy 1989, 15).

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1While most provincial ministries have accepted the five-region definition as the basis for analysis of GTA trends and the development of policy instruments to manage them, the provincial Ministry of Transportation has sponsored at least two studies that include a sixth region, Hamilton-Wentworth, which encircles the western end of Lake Ontario, (Frisken with McAree 1989; Transit Advisory Group, 1987).
THE TORONTO METROPOLITAN AREA: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARY DEFINITIONS
Nearly 92 percent of the GTA’s 1991 population of 4.2 million lived in Metro Toronto and 11 nearby municipalities comprising less than 40 percent of the GTA’s land area. Thus, there is still considerable room for new settlement within currently recognized boundaries of the Toronto metropolis. Nonetheless, the area’s population is becoming increasingly decentralized. Until 1971 Metropolitan Toronto absorbed the bulk of the area’s new population growth, at the rate of about 50,000 persons per year, but after that date its growth dropped off sharply. While the GTA has continued to absorb more than 50,000 persons per year since 1971, most of that growth has occurred outside Metro Toronto. Consequently Metro’s share of the area’s population fell from 77.0 percent in 1961 to 54 percent in 1991.

Projections based on current trends indicate that Metro’s population (which currently stands at about 2.3 million) will grow little and may even decline by the year 2011 while the GTA continues to grow by slightly less than its current rate (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Research and Policy Division 1989, 13). The provincial government has nonetheless accepted a Metro Planning Department population target for the year 2011 of 2.5 million, a figure that assumes that Metro will be able to encourage a substantial increase in in-migration and the production of new housing. Even if Metro succeeds in doing so, it is expected to account for less than half the area’s population by 2011.

The change occurring in Metro Toronto’s relative position in the Greater Toronto Area is parallel to the change that occurred in the relationship of the city of Toronto to the rest of Metro at an earlier time. In 1951, just before the creation of Metropolitan Toronto, the city had about 676,000 people, or 60 percent of the population of the 13 municipalities. In 1991 the city had 635,000 people, or 28 percent of the population of Metropolitan Toronto and only 15 percent of the population of the GTA.

Declines in Metro’s and the city’s relative positions in terms of population size have not been accompanied by signs of the economic decline that has afflicted other North American cities whose populations have been overtaken or surpassed by their suburbs (Gluck and Meister 1979, Teaford 1979). Rather, patterns and trends in the location of GTA employment indicate that both Metro and its core city are leading

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2Between 1986 and 1991, the average population increase rose to just over 100,000 persons per year.
participants in the development of the GTA economy and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

**Economic Activity**

In the words of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, "The Toronto Region is the economic heartland of the country, accounting for nearly two out of every 10 jobs in Canada and more than four of every 10 jobs in Ontario" (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Policy Development Division 1986a, 39). The importance of the GTA to both Ontario’s and Canada’s economy is clearly illustrated by figures compiled from 1985 Statistics Canada data (Table 4.1) showing the Toronto CMA’s share of employment exceeding its share of population for most employment categories. They also attest to a high degree of diversification, a characteristic that has made the area less vulnerable, though by no means immune, to the effects of recession than other parts of the country.

Like metropolitan areas throughout the continent, the Greater Toronto Area is participating in two important trends having far-reaching implications for government policy. One is a gradual shift of employment, particularly manufacturing employment, from central to peripheral locations. The second is a decline in manufacturing sector and an increase in office and service sector jobs. While industrial decline seems to represent a generalized decline affecting the country as a whole, rather than a shift of industry away from the GTA to other parts of the country (Gertler 1985), a shift of industry out of the city of Toronto and, more recently, out of Metropolitan Toronto has given rise to concern in planning and academic circles (City of Toronto Planning Board 1974; Norcliffe and Goldrick 1986; Muszynski 1985). Metropolitan Toronto’s share of total manufacturing employment in the Toronto CMA fell from 78 percent to 71 percent between 1971 and 1981. During the same period employment in manufacturing industries grew by 26.8 percent in the CMA as a whole but by only 15.5 percent in Metro Toronto (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Policy Development Division 1986b, 55). Within Metropolitan Toronto, manufacturing and warehouse employment declined by 10.8 percent between 1981 and 1985 and is expected to decline by a further 9 percent by 2011. On the other hand, Metro is expected to gain jobs in all other categories (office, retail, service, institutional, and "footloose"), with the largest gain (78 percent) occurring in the office sector.
Table 4.1. *Toronto CMA Employment and Population, 1985, as Percentage of Ontario's and Canada's*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Communication, and Utilities</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community, Business, and Personal Services</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods Producing</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Producing</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population: 35.1  12.5

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Policy Development Division, 1986a: 40. (Based on Statistics Canada Catalogues 72-002, 91-210, 91-211, 1985.)

Current trends in the area's economic development mean that the GTA's core municipalities have become increasingly reliant on their ability to attract office-based activities. By the beginning of 1988, Metropolitan Toronto’s 112.5 million square feet of office space accounted for 89.3 percent of all office space in the GTA. Two-thirds of Metro’s and over half of GTA office supply was located in the city of Toronto (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department Research Division 1989, 22). And while both Metro and the city have experienced a decline in their share of GTA office space, they have nonetheless been absorbing a substantial share of GTA growth in this sector. Steady growth in office space and office jobs within Metropolitan Toronto has meant that Metro’s 69.8 percent share of the area’s employment in 1981 was higher than its share of the area’s population (62.5 percent) and is expected to remain so at least until 2011.

The impacts of rapid growth, the location of an increasing share of the area’s population and employment outside Metropolitan Toronto, and the growing importance of the office and service sectors to the area’s economy are trends fueling the planning and policy deliberations of all
governments operating in the GTA. The issues that have thus far attracted the greatest attention include problems of solid waste management, transportation, and an emerging need for increased sewer and water capacity in Metro Toronto and the regions of York and Halton.

The only social issue to attract much attention so far is an areawide shortage of "affordable" housing for low- and moderate-income residents. Social issues attract less attention in the Toronto area than they do in United States cities at least partly because the central city does not have badly deteriorated districts characterized by high concentrations of impoverished families and the problems associated with them. Instead, high demand for housing in Metropolitan Toronto, including the core city, has meant the conversion of many older districts to middle-class use. Public housing is scattered widely throughout Metro, not confined exclusively to the core city. In addition, the provincial grant structure and the allocation of local responsibility for education, policing, and social services to the metropolitan or regional levels of government have helped reduce intermunicipal fiscal and service disparities not only within Metro but in the GTA as a whole. For all these reasons the social problems associated with urban growth and decline have been less evident and therefore less likely to attract media attention or generate public demands for government action. Nonetheless a sharp rise in unemployment and welfare caseloads in the early 1990s, cutbacks in federal transfer payments to the provinces, and the 1990 electoral victory of the moderately socialist New Democratic party (for the first time in the province's history) have given social issues greater prominence in debates about the area's future. Those debates involve numerous representatives of a provincial-local governmental system that is steadily becoming more complex.

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

The Provincial Government and Its Agencies

The unit of government with greatest potential to influence development patterns and the provision of services in the Greater Toronto Area is the provincial cabinet, a body composed of the provincial premier (the leader of the majority party) and ministers chosen from among elected members of his or her party (Bell and Pascoe 1988). While cabinet decisions have to be ratified by the legislature before becoming law, party discipline makes ratification a foregone conclusion as long as one party
holds a majority of seats in the legislature. Elected members of the provincial parliament (MPPs) are able to influence provincial policymaking only within the confines of the party caucus and through their membership on parliamentary committees.

Two powerful committees, the Policy and Priorities Board and the Management Board of Cabinet, are respectively responsible for providing the cabinet with advice about policy and for overseeing the allocation of provincial resources. These two committees are expected to review and coordinate policy proposals and funding requests coming from the various ministries, as well as make recommendations as to their order of priority. Of approximately 30 provincial ministries, 10 have been closely involved in GTA planning and servicing issues. The most prominent of these are the Ministries of Transportation, Municipal Affairs, Environment, Housing, and Treasury and Economics. The others include the Ministries of Education, Community and Social Services, Agriculture and Food, Health, and Natural Resources.

A newcomer among provincial agencies concerned with Toronto area development is the Office of the Greater Toronto Area, headed by a Deputy Minister. The OGTA was established in 1988 within the Ministry of Treasury and Economics and then shifted in 1989 into the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. After taking office in 1990 the New Democratic government shifted it into the Ministry of the Environment, a move attesting to the importance that the new government was assigning to environmental issues, particularly those having to do with solid waste management. The OGTA has no legislative mandate but rather defines its role as one of (a) fostering communication among units and levels of government with an interest in the area’s future development, (b) seeking solutions to immediate problems that no single government can solve on its own, and (c) helping governments in the area "develop a consensus on what the Greater Toronto Area should look like 20 years from now" (Office of the Greater Toronto Area 1989).

Another unit of provincial government with a decisive voice in GTA development is the Ontario Municipal Board, an appointed tribunal with broad powers to decide issues of municipal administration. Among the most important of its powers are the authority to hear appeals of municipal planning decisions and to approve municipal capital expenditures. Because most planning decisions of any substance are appealed, the OMB’s power to decide the pace and pattern of development in the GTA is formidable. An OMB decision is final unless the government has
already declared that it has an interest in the matter at issue, in which
case it can be overturned by the cabinet.

The Environmental Assessment Board and the Environmental Appeal
Board provide two additional avenues for public appeal of planning and
development decisions and may thus have substantial influence on the
way governments respond to growth. The job of the first is to facilitate
public input regarding projects having "significant environmental impact,"
and to conduct public hearings on matters related to such projects (Bell
and Pascoe 1988, 92). The Environmental Appeal Board hears appeals
of Ministry of Environment or local health board decisions having
implications for air, soil, or water quality.

In addition to the work being done by these and other provincial
agencies, discussions and debates about planning and public services in
the GTA are taking place within a number of hybrid organizations that
allow for varying degrees of municipal involvement. Principal among
these organizations are:

1. The Interim Waste Authority Limited (IWA), a crown agency
established by the provincial government in April 1991 to identify new
solid waste disposal sites for Metro, York, Peel, and Durham regions.
The new agency replaced a Solid Waste Interim Steering Committee
composed of provincial, regional, and local officials. Its management
board consists of four senior civil servants who report to the Deputy
Minister for the Greater Toronto Area. Opportunities for local involve-
ment have been limited to (1) requests that municipal officials comment
on documents prepared by IWA staff and (2) a series of open houses and
workshops for the general public. The Minister of the Environment has
said, however, that the authority is a one-time response to a serious
deficiency of waste disposal capacity in the GTA, and that the govern-
ment intends to make regional governments responsible for waste
management and reduction as soon as that problem is solved.

2. The Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority, composed of the
chairs of Metropolitan Toronto and the regions of Durham, York, Peel,
Halton, and Hamilton Wentworth, and chaired by a provincial appointee.
It operates the GO-Transit commuter system, a network of rail and bus
lines radiating from Metropolitan Toronto to cities and towns in all parts
of the GTA. The provincial government pays the system's operating
deficit and must approve all extensions to it.

3. A Greater Toronto Coordinating Committee (GTCC) established
in 1987 after the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs urged the govern-
ment to improve its capacity to deal comprehensively with pressures
created by rapid growth outside Metropolitan Toronto. While the chair of this body is appointed by the provincial government, its members consist of the Chief Executive Officers of Metropolitan Toronto, the four regions, the city of Toronto, and seven local municipalities bordering on Metro. It was this committee that persuaded the government to set up the Office of the Greater Toronto Area (OGTA).

4. The Greater Toronto Area Transportation Planning Forum, assembled in 1986 by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Ministry of Transportation) to involve local officials in discussions about the allocation of provincial funds for major transportation improvements. The forum holds regular meetings of provincial planning and transportation officials and their consultant advisers.

5. The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority and several other conservation authorities that manage watersheds within different sections of the GTA. The MTRCA has 53 members, 25 from Metro and 25 appointed by three regional governments (Peel, York, and Durham) and two rural townships lying north of the Peel boundary. The provincial government appoints three members to this and other conservation authorities and pays up to 55 percent of their costs. The MTRCA is not only the largest but also the best funded of Ontario's 38 authorities because it can draw on Metropolitan Toronto's healthy tax base for much of its local funding. Consequently it has been able to acquire 26,000 acres (about 40.6 square miles) of land in the south-central portion of the GTA, some of which it has turned over to member municipalities to manage for recreational purposes. Its authority to regulate the use of both publicly and privately owned lands in watershed areas allows it to influence the land-use plans of municipalities and private developers.

6. The Niagara Escarpment Commission (NEC). The province created this special purpose body in 1973 to prepare a plan governing the use of lands on and bordering the Niagara Escarpment, a distinctive height of land that once formed the outer rim of a shallow sea covering parts of what are now the states of New York, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and the Province of Ontario. The escarpment stretches over 450 miles of southwestern Ontario, with part of it cutting a diagonal path through the Regional Municipalities of Halton and Peel. The NEC's authority to administer the Niagara Escarpment Plan, completed in 1983, allows it to require local municipalities to make their official plans and zoning bylaws conform to it. Recommendations on proposed amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Plan must go to the Minister of Municipal Affairs for final decision.
The NEC has 17 members, all appointed by the provincial government. Nine are chosen to represent "the public at large," eight are selected from a list of names drawn up by the councils of the regional municipalities and counties through which the escarpment passes. This power of appointment essentially makes the NEC an agent of the Minister of Municipal Affairs, despite its "arms-length" status, its land-use control powers, and its municipal representation.

While municipal officials participate directly in some agencies concerned with immediate and long-term development and servicing issues in the GTA and are able to offer advice to others, there is nothing to compel provincial officials to take their preferences into account in deciding which policies to adopt or which programs to fund. Thus, it would seem that the provincial government has all the authority and the administrative capability it needs to decide how the region will develop. Nonetheless the Office of the Greater Toronto Area claims the history of planning initiatives has demonstrated that any plan—no matter how well thought out—will succeed only if it has the support and commitment of the Regional and Local Councils, as well as the Provincial Government (OGTA 1989).

It would be premature, therefore, to conclude that the province is in complete control of planning and servicing decisions in the Greater Toronto Area without looking more closely at the process by which those decisions are made. To do this it is first necessary to describe the other governments that may become involved in that process.

Local Governments

While still a long way from possessing the vast number of local governments that exist in larger metropolitan areas in the United States, the GTA has not entirely escaped local political fragmentation and administrative complexity. To begin with, the area is partitioned into the five "regional municipalities," in which local government responsibilities are divided between upper-tier councils and the councils of 30 lower-tier units. Six of these lower-tier "area municipalities" are in Metropolitan Toronto, the others are distributed among the four suburban regions as follows: Durham, eight; York, nine; Peel, three; and Halton, four. Nonetheless, the number of local municipalities in the area is less than half the number that existed in 1966, when the provincial government began a process of municipal consolidation that reduced the number of municipalities in Metropolitan Toronto from 13 to six. Consolidation of
small units into larger units was also a feature of regional government formation in 1971 and 1974.

The mode of selecting members for upper-tier councils varies from region to region. The most common method is "double direct election," whereby municipal voters elect some persons to serve on both local and regional councils at the same time. Other regional councillors hold their position by virtue of their local office. Until 1985, most Metro councillors were chosen by a system of indirect election, meaning that persons elected to local councils were either selected to serve on the upper-tier body or automatically become upper-tier councillors by virtue of winning the larger majority in a two-member ward. The city of Toronto began to elect Metro Council members directly in 1985. In 1988 the provincial government legislated a system of direct election for the whole of Metro. Only the six local mayors continue to sit on Metro Council ex officio.

The change to direct election of metropolitan councillors was the third major change in the government of this inner region since World War II. The first was the creation of Metropolitan Toronto itself, which began with a 25-member council made up of 12 members from the city, one member from each of its 12 suburbs, and a chair appointed in the first instance by the provincial government and subsequently chosen by Metro Council. The second major change, a substantial reorganization of the Metro system in 1967, not only saw the consolidation of Metro’s 13 municipalities into six but also instituted a system of representation based on population. The change immediately put the city of Toronto in a minority position on Metro Council, with 12 members to the suburbs’ 20.

The province has made successive adjustments in Metro’s system of representation to reflect suburban growth, with the result that the city’s share of Metro representation has continued to decline. The newly instituted, directly elected Metropolitan Council has 34 wards, nine of them within the city of Toronto. Nonetheless city of Toronto representatives have retained a strong and usually influential voice in the metropolitan federation because of the strength of the city’s economy and the city’s healthy assessment base, which gives it the highest per capita assessment in Metro. Because each municipality contributes to Metro Council and Metro School Board budgets on the basis of assessment rather than population, the city, with 30 percent of the Metro population in 1986, contributed 40.4 percent of upper-tier revenues (Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 1986, 56, 84). This method of allocating regional costs among local municipalities has been extended to the suburban regional municipalities.
The other five municipalities in Metro (East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, and York) vary substantially in population size and per capita assessment. While metropolitan government has reduced disparities among them by assigning a larger share of the costs of areawide services to the wealthier municipalities, it has not eliminated competition among them for new development nor allowed the area to escape conflicts over growth-related activities (highway building, urban renewal and redevelopment, location of publicly assisted housing). Over time, however, the six municipalities have become more like each other as the suburbs have become more fully developed and their populations more heterogeneous (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto 1979, 1980). What has become increasingly apparent is that Metro as a whole is in competition with its regional neighbors (and their member municipalities) for population, economic investment, and provincial funds for infrastructure.

Within the two-tier municipalities, most responsibilities are shared to varying degrees between the two levels of government, with only a few assigned exclusively to one level or the other. In general, upper-level councils are responsible for major capital infrastructure (trunk water and sewer lines, arterial roads, waste disposal), while local councils provide similar services (water distribution, local sewage collection, local streets, garbage collection) to their own residents. Planning is also a shared responsibility, a characteristic of two-level local government that has probably been the source of more confusion and dissension than any other feature, as will be discussed in more detail later. Regional governments administer most social services, although the city of Toronto operates the most extensive social housing program in the GTA. Policing is nominally a regional responsibility but is in fact administered by regional boards of police commissioners consisting of three members appointed by the provincial government and two members appointed by regional councils.

An important difference between Metropolitan Toronto and its regional neighbors is that within Metro public transit has always been an upper-level responsibility, administered by a five-member Toronto Transit Commission to which Metro appoints members and provides the local share of operating subsidy. (The local share is roughly equal to the subsidy given by the province). In the regions public transit has remained a responsibility of the local municipalities, an arrangement that has added greatly to the difficulties of developing a coordinated areawide transit system.
All the regions have systems of educational governance that function independently of their municipal councils. Metro Toronto has both a Metropolitan Board of Education, which finances the schools out of an assessment-based levy on local municipalities (which collect the taxes) and provincial grants, and local school boards, which operate the schools. In the regions public education is administered by regional boards of education with members elected in the lower-tier municipalities on the basis of population.

The only other elected bodies that operate in the area, and then only in some municipalities, are hydro-electric or public utility commissions. There is a large number of appointed special-purpose bodies, however, at both the regional and local levels. By far the most prominent of these is Metro’s Toronto Transit Commission, which manages an extensive network of subway, bus, streetcar, and light rail rapid transit lines. Under its founding legislation the TTC was composed entirely of appointees who held no elected office. Throughout its existence it has been subject to periodic attempts to make it more directly accountable to Metro Council, and these have gradually eroded its independent status. In 1970 the provincial government passed a legislative amendment allowing Metro Council to appoint all five members of the transit commission from among its own members. Council continued to appoint citizen members (some of them former politicians) until 1989, when it opted for a board made up entirely of sitting council members.

The recent change in the composition of the TTC is symptomatic of a more general tendency in local government in Ontario—a gradual rejection of institutional arrangements that conform to the "apolitical ideal" of progressive reformers (who advocated the protection of politically sensitive or costly public services from interference by elected councils) in favor of arrangements that increase the powers of persons elected at the ward or district level. Nonetheless local and regional special purpose bodies still administer such services as policing, libraries, public health, Children’s Aid, assisted housing of various types, public arenas, and so forth. Some of them have members appointed by municipalities; some operate with boards made up of provincial and local appointees in various combinations. The provincial government has also created special authorities to administer GO Transit and waste management for the entire GTA and has proposed the creation of a Crown corporation to administer provincial grants and loans for the construction of new sewer and water facilities in rapid growth areas. All these
agencies both add to the complexity of the local government system and increase the difficulty of coherent policy formulation and coordination.

The Federal Government in the Background

A frequently noted difference between the situation of municipalities in Canada and the United States is the much less obtrusive role played by the federal government in urban affairs in Canada. The federal government tried to develop a capacity for broadly based urban research and coordination by creating a Ministry of State for Urban Affairs in 1971, but the agency survived only eight years. Otherwise, the federal government has refrained from becoming directly involved in urban policymaking. Its insistence that the provinces have constitutionally assigned responsibility for municipal affairs accords with the position vigorously promoted by some provincial governments, especially those of Ontario and Quebec. The only federal agency with an acknowledged interest in the way cities develop is the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), a crown corporation that administers nationally financed housing programs. Formerly it administered those programs in partnership with provincial governments (while paying the larger share of the costs). In recent years it has tended to turn over full administrative and greater financial responsibility to the provinces, which decide which municipal and privately sponsored programs to support. The federal government’s principal means of influencing this process is by deciding how funds are allocated among programs and provinces.

Despite its noninterventionist stance, there are many ways in which the federal government influences urban development. It makes large transfers to provincial governments, which absorb them into budgets from which they make grants to municipalities. Any change in federal funding levels or funding formulae is likely to induce changes in the amount or type of provincial transfers to municipalities. Federal responsibility for interprovincial transportation allows it to make decisions (like those relating to airport location or expansion) with enormous potential for influencing the way metropolitan areas develop. Extensive land holdings in urban areas are another source of influence. Ownership of harbor-related land on the Toronto lakeshore, for example, has made the federal government a somewhat reluctant partner in a large-scale appraisal of the future of lands along the Metropolitan Toronto waterfront. Events leading to that appraisal illustrate the way all levels of government may become entangled in land-use planning decisions with major implications
for the future development and character of a large urban region like the GTA.

Federal involvement in waterfront planning stems from a 1972 decision by the Liberal government in Ottawa to make available to the city of Toronto more than 100 acres of federally owned waterfront land for recreational use. Soon afterward it announced that it would fund activities on the site for only five years, after which time the district would have to be self-supporting. It then tried to distance itself from the site by turning over its management to the appointed board of a newly created crown agency, Harbourfront Corporation. The corporation adopted a development plan to which the city gave little attention, asking only that it provide the city with additional housing and maintain its recreational programs without imposing new costs on the city tax base. When the results of the Harbourfront plan began to materialize in the form of high rise apartment towers cutting off the city from the lake, critics therefore attacked both the city government for its failure to exercise sufficient planning control and the federal government for failing to pay enough attention to the agency it had created.

The federal government responded to the Harbourfront dispute by setting up a one-man Royal Commission to review not only the way Harbourfront lands had been managed but also matters related to the development of the entire Metropolitan Toronto waterfront. Not only its ownership of waterfront lands but also its responsibility for monitoring the environmental impacts of development along inland waterways justified a study of this scope. Its action immediately prompted the provincial, metropolitan, and city governments to develop or enhance their capacities for waterfront planning and regulation. This activity has added another dimension to the complex intergovernmental arrangements with which the Office of the Greater Toronto Area must deal in trying to develop "a consensus on what the Greater Toronto Area should look like 20 years from now."

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO REGIONAL MANAGEMENT

A key element of the OGTA's consensus-building strategy is a consultant's study of the relative advantages and disadvantages of three conceptual models for the area's future development. The study assessed these models using a number of criteria, including costs of public services and implications for environmental quality, energy consumption,
opportunities for economic growth, the ability to achieve sustainable development, conservation of the regional and global environment, and "quality of life for those living and working in the GTA and areas surrounding it" (IBI Group 1990, S-1). The models have become important foci of discussions and debates both among and within local and provincial agencies with an interest in the way the area evolves. They are:

1. **Spread.** This option, "representing a continuation of existing trends," implies substantial population growth in the suburbs, dispersed at a relatively low density, but with continuing concentration of office development in downtown Toronto and in subcenters both inside and outside Metro;

2. **Central.** This concept calls for substantial intensification of both population and commercial growth in the presently built-up parts of the GTA and a significant reduction in the rate of growth outside existing urban boundaries;

3. **Nodal.** This is an intermediate concept allowing growth to occur around existing communities but in a more compact form than in the past, in the interest of reducing the rate of consumption of undeveloped land.

The consultant's analysis suggests that the "central" option is the one that best meets the evaluation criteria. There are few who believe, however, that the government would be willing to exercise the amount of regulatory control needed to bring it about. On the other hand, there is widespread agreement within the GTA that the "spread" alternative is the least desirable future for the area, even if it is the one that public and private interests have been pursuing up to the present time. The compromise alternative is thus the "nodal" option, which would allow suburban municipalities outside Metro to continue to expand but in a more controlled and concentrated way than in the past. Government officials have been careful to emphasize, however, that they have neither the intention nor the desire to impose a "plan" on the area. What they are doing, they insist, is promoting an areawide "strategy" that will allow for continuing growth while maintaining a satisfactory "quality of life" for area residents. The emphasis is on "coordination" of the plans of local governments and provincial ministries to achieve a mutually agreed-on result; on "consultation" and "cooperation"; it is not on "planning."

 Provincial officials insist that they are not in the business of producing a GTA plan because past experience has told them that provincial efforts to plan for the area imply high political and financial
costs. That perception has nothing to do with political party fortunes or ideology. Rather it was passed on to the Liberal government that undertook the GTA initiatives and to the NDP government that is pursuing them by officials who worked for the Progressive Conservative government that left office in 1985. During its 42 consecutive years in office, that government intervened radically in the area’s governmental system on a number of occasions. Not only did it create Metropolitan Toronto in 1953 but it also initiated, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the most comprehensive program of local government reform ever attempted in Ontario. One element of that program was a conceptual proposal for the way the Toronto-Centered Region should develop (Ontario Department of Treasury and Economics 1970). The fate of that proposal and other elements of local government reform helps to account for the cautious approach that the Liberal and then the NDP governments have adopted in devising policies for the GTA.

The Brief Life of the Toronto-Centered Region

The Toronto-Centered Region (TCR) proposal (which provincial officials always insisted was a concept and not a plan) was adopted as government policy in 1971 and has never been formally repudiated. It served as a basis for provincial decision making in only a few instances, however, and was more typically honored in the breach than in the observance. Nonetheless it has contributed to a few decisions that help form the context in which provincial and municipal decision makers operate and for that reason remains relevant to an understanding of land use and public servicing options being discussed by governments in the GTA.

The TCR concept evolved out of two earlier provincial initiatives. The first was a 1966 regional economic development program for which the government divided the province into 10 economic regions for the purposes of regional planning and the design of programs aimed at reducing large intraprovincial disparities in wealth and rate of economic growth. The second was the provincially sponsored Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study (MTARTS) launched early in 1963 for an area slightly larger than the GTA as presently defined. That study’s principal conclusion was that it was not possible to plan a transportation system for the area without some knowledge of how the area was going to develop. Consequently it devoted most of its final report to a discussion of alternative land-use scenarios for the Toronto Region,
beginning with a discussion of a Trends Plan based on an extrapolation of existing municipal plans and policies (Ontario, Department of Municipal Affairs 1967). The Trends Plan, the study pointed out, implied the loss of good agricultural land; the absorption of natural landmarks (like the Niagara Escarpment) by urban expansion; the merging of existing towns and the steady outward spread of low-density residential development that would become increasingly costly to serve. As alternatives it outlined four "Goals" plans for the region, each having features to circumvent future problems implied by existing trends. Provincial planners incorporated elements of all these plans into the TCR concept.

The Toronto-Centered Region proposal took in a section of southern Ontario almost three times the size of the GTA. It was a Development Concept aimed at relieving a number of problems identified with the pattern and rapid rate of growth in and around Metropolitan Toronto. These problems included:

1. A tendency for growth in the region to gravitate to the metropolitan core and to the south and southwest of that core, but not to the north and east.

2. A tendency for new development in the province to gravitate to Metropolitan Toronto and areas to its west and southwest, bypassing other parts of the province.

3. A loss of agricultural and recreational areas as the result of the rapid suburbanization of territory within commuting distance of Metropolitan Toronto.

4. Pressures on existing urban services and the high costs of providing new trunk services to a scattered population.

The TCR concept sought to counter these problems by

1. dividing the Region into three zones: an urbanized southern zone (Zone 1) along the lakeshore; an intermediate zone (Zone 2) just outside this urbanized zone but within easy commuting distance of it; and a peripheral zone (Zone 3) beyond Zone 2 but still within Metropolitan Toronto's sphere of influence. According to the concept, growth would be accommodated within Zones 1 and 3 but discouraged in Zone 2 (except in selected communities along the main north-south corridor leading out of Toronto) in the interest of preserving land for agricultural and recreational use.

2. recommending that growth in the southern, urbanized zone be channelled into two tiers of well-defined municipalities: one tier close to the lake, the other further north and separated from the lakeshore "by a
parkway belt of open space with mainly nonurban uses, but containing high performance interurban transportation and other trunk services."

3. emphasizing the need to stimulate development to the east and northeast of Metropolitan Toronto to help balance growth occurring on the west and to improve Metropolitan Toronto’s connections with less prosperous parts of the province.

The government indicated an intention to incorporate TCR principles and objectives into a more detailed land-use planning strategy for southern Ontario, which in turn would be a component of a comprehensive planning policy for the entire province. In 1973 it passed an *Ontario Planning and Development Act* outlining a step-by-step process for preparing a regional plan (Perry 1974, 39). Two other pieces of legislation passed that same year seemed to be additional steps toward an ongoing provincial planning program. *The Parkway Belt Planning and Development Act* allowed the government to implement a system of parkway belts and multiple-use corridors around Metropolitan Toronto, as had been proposed in the TCR concept. *The Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act* created the Niagara Escarpment Commission and empowered it to produce a plan for the escarpment and adjoining lands (2,000 square miles in total) with a view to their preservation as a continuous natural environment.

No provincial plan for the southern Ontario region, nor indeed for any other part of Ontario, ever appeared. Even before passing its regional planning legislation the government had displayed ambivalence about the concept. On the one hand it had persuaded the federal government to choose a site to the east of Metro for a proposed new airport and had purchased land immediately to the south of that site for a self-contained residential community. On the other hand it had agreed to land-use proposals to the north and west of Metro that violated TCR principles. These violations were noted in the 1974 report of a task force made up of provincial, Metropolitan Toronto, and regional government officials set up to review and refine the concept. It was the task force’s conclusion that "The Government of Ontario is in fact now faced with a major decision: To reaffirm the TCR policy, or to abandon it" (Ontario, Central Ontario Lakeshore Urban Complex Task Force 1974, 48).

The government instead allowed the plan to languish. In 1975 it announced that it would not finance roads or other services to the new airport site, forcing the federal government to shelve the project. It persisted until 1980 with the planning of the proposed new town on Metro’s eastern boundary but then abandoned that as well, saying it
would go ahead only if the province and the Region of Durham were able to attract industry to the area. In the meantime the rate of growth to the west and north of Metro (some of it in Zone 2 lands targeted for recreational or agricultural use) has exceeded the rate of growth to the east ever since TCR became government policy.

Explanations for the failure of the Toronto-Centered Region Concept to shape government policy highlight the constraints perceived by government officials who are currently trying to devise a workable "strategy" for GTA development (Bordessa and Cameron 1982; Macdonald 1982; Richardson 1981). Intense opposition from powerful private interests was one explanation for the government's loss of interest. By the time the TCR concept had become provincial policy, virtually all land within a 30-mile radius of the city of Toronto was in the hands of or under option to private land developers. Those outside the urban development boundary (Zone 1) became an immediate and persistent source of pressure on government to change that boundary to allow their lands to be developed. The first to succeed was a developer whose land holdings were situated in the provincial premier's riding.

Second, the concept was incompatible with the mandates and activities of some of the province's own agencies. One of these was the Ontario Water Resources Commission, established in the mid-1950s to manage water quality, water supply, and purification. In 1968 the OWRC signed an agreement to provide municipalities immediately west of Metropolitan Toronto with facilities having enough capacity to allow them to develop to an overall density of 20 persons per acre (Urban Development Institute Ontario 1989, 11). Because most of the land to be served was already owned by private land development companies, the servicing agreement resulted in a rash of proposals for new development, many of which had been approved or were being processed when TCR appeared in 1970.

In 1972, the provincial government absorbed the OWRC into a new Ministry of the Environment, which began negotiations with the Regions of York (created in 1971) and Durham (created in 1974) for a second major trunk sewer and sewage treatment scheme for the two regions. The completion of this scheme in the late 1970s led to an intensification of development activity to the north of Metro, in areas designated by TCR for agricultural or recreational purposes.

Another provincial action that conflicted with the goals of the TCR plan was the initiation of the GO Transit commuter system in 1967. Originally introduced in an east-west corridor along the shore of Lake
Ontario, the system has expanded to provide service between Metro Toronto and communities to the north-west, north, and north-east as well. Its primary function is to bring commuters from these suburban communities to downtown Toronto, a mandate that conflicts with the TCR goals of population and employment decentralization.

High housing costs and a shortage of housing for low- and moderate-income households also generated government activities that proved to be inconsistent with TCR objectives. An Advisory Task Force on Housing Policy appointed in 1972 identified a shortage of serviced land and high servicing and development standards as factors responsible for the situation (Ontario, Advisory Task Force on Housing Policy 1973). The government acted on its recommendations by setting up an Ontario Housing Action Program (OHAP) and a Ministry of Housing with mandates to speed up the production of moderately priced housing in high need areas—a goal that did not accord well with efforts to control new development or place restrictions on where it could go.

Third, municipal governments were often as resistant as private land developers and provincial officials to TCR objectives they perceived to conflict with their own growth aspirations or jurisdictional responsibilities. The newly created region of York, much of it targeted to remain in agricultural and recreational use, took immediate exception to the maximum urban population figure of 250,000 (for the year 2000) allocated to it by TCR planners. This allocation became a central issue in negotiations about the provision of trunk sewer facilities for the region, with York insisting that a population of that size would not return enough in taxes to cover the cost of the scheme. If the province wanted the region to retain its rural character, York politicians maintained, it would have to pay the extra costs. York wanted the urban population allocation raised to about 750,000. In the end the parties compromised on a figure of 500,000, and the sewage system was designed to handle a population of that size. The region’s population had gone over the 500,000 limit by 1991.

Not all municipalities wanted to grow, and those that did not also found reasons to oppose the TCR concept. To the east of Metro, in Durham region, local interests opposed the province’s "go east" policy, with its implications of accelerated urban development and alteration of the region’s predominantly rural character. Opposition focused particularly on the federal government’s plan to build a new airport to the northeast of Metro and provided a justification for the province’s 1975 decision not to provide services to the airport site.
A decline in the government's political fortunes is a fourth explanation for its loss of enthusiasm for TCR. The 1975 provincial election saw the Progressive Conservatives fail to win an absolute majority for the first time since coming to office in 1943. The results of a second election, in 1977, were similar. Thus for six years the PCs could govern only with the support of one of the two opposition parties, the Liberals or the New Democrats. Various forms of government intervention in municipal affairs were among the explanations advanced for the party's fall from favor. One of these was the regional government program (11 such governments were in place by 1975), which had aroused intense local opposition in some districts, and which was confused in the public's mind with regional planning. The increase in provincial intervention at the municipal level had also generated a strong reaction from local politicians, who maintained that the province was meddling unnecessarily in matters better handled at the local level.

Finally, the government was having to re-examine its position from a financial as well as a political perspective. Rising government expenditure and the increasing cost of servicing the provincial debt prompted the government in 1975 to create a special committee, chaired by the treasurer of Ontario, to consider ways to economize. Its recommendations, while not directly related to regional planning, did call for an end to the regional government program (because of its high costs) and for ways to control increases in provincial assistance to municipalities (Ontario, The Special Program Review 1975, 192-226). This report appeared just as the provincial economy entered a period of slower growth, giving rise to concerns about unemployment and a decline in provincial tax revenues. Increasing preoccupation with the state of the economy meant that any residual government interest in growth management quickly gave way to a willingness to accommodate new development in any locations it might choose to go.

The various reasons used to explain the Ontario government's failure to adhere to the TCR policy can be summarized as an unwillingness to follow a course of action that conflicted with the aspirations and activities of private sector interests and with the government agencies that were most responsive to private sector demands or heavily dependent on private sector investment. Those agencies existed within both the provincial and municipal governments and often worked closely together (especially with respect to sewage disposal and water facilities) to ensure that government activities maintained rather than counteracted prevailing development trends. As a result, the pattern of settlement in the GTA
today is more like that described in the MTARTS Trends plan, which based its predicted land-use pattern on the plans of area municipalities in the 1960s, than it is like the patterns outlined in the TCR concept or its 1974 update.

There are only three remnants of the province’s incursion into regional planning that remain relevant to current efforts to develop a strategy for future GTA development. One is the existence of segments of Parkway Belt in Peel and York regions. A good deal of land included in the Parkway Belt Plan, approved in 1978, has nonetheless been released for development. Government officials refer to what remains as a "Utility Corridor" in order to dispel residual expectations that it will serve open space uses.

A second remaining element of the TCR initiative is the Niagara Escarpment Plan, which partially protects lands for agricultural and recreational use in the GTA’s rapidly growing western section (Halton and Peel regions). While the plan has managed to preserve the escarpment itself, it also has been subject to frequent amendments to allow residential development or other urban uses on contiguous lands originally designated as "natural" or "rural."

Finally, the provincial government still owns 9,000 acres of undeveloped land in Durham Region, south of land expropriated but not used for a new airport in the early 1970s. Growing concerns with a shortage of "affordable" housing in the GTA in the late 1980s prompted the government to revive its earlier intention to devote the site to the development of a model community (Seaton) featuring a mix of housing (both publicly and privately provided) for a range of income groups, densities high enough to support a good public transit system, an emphasis on conservation of land and natural resources, and the provision of employment opportunities for a substantial share of local residents. The economic slowdown and a sharp drop in housing prices in the early 1990s have once again made Seaton’s future uncertain.

Apart from the lingering influence of the Parkway Belt, the Niagara Escarpment Plan and the Seaton site on provincial and municipal policy making in the GTA, the area’s development pattern has been determined largely by the land-use policies of the local and, to a much lesser extent, regional municipalities. Thus, the declared intention of provincial agencies to produce a strategy that takes account of the plans and programs of the various governments at work in the area makes it important to examine the nature of those local planning activities.
Regional and Local Planning

The basis for all municipal planning in the province of Ontario is The Planning Act, legislation that dates back to the 1940s but has undergone substantial revisions since that time. Significant changes begun in the mid-1970s and consolidated in a major revision of The Planning Act in 1983 have removed the requirement that municipalities submit all planning decisions either to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs or to the OMB for approval. Instead, they allow the province to delegate most of its approval powers to regional councils that ask for such delegation, or to county or local councils in areas where regional governments do not exist. The only constraint on this power of delegation is a proviso that a municipality (including a regional municipality) cannot give final approval to its own official plan. The new procedures also require municipal councils to inform the public fully about planning matters under consideration: to hold public meetings to discuss official plans, official plan amendments, and zoning bylaws; and to inform all agencies that "council considers may have an interest" in planning matters under consideration. Persons or agencies that disagree with a local planning decision may appeal it to the Ontario Municipal Board.

The stated purpose of changes in the provincial planning system was to enhance local responsibility in planning. Countering this gesture toward heightened local autonomy, however, the revised Planning Act for the first time spelled out a number of "matters of provincial interest" that would justify government intervention in municipal planning. These matters include environmental protection; energy conservation; provision of major services; the health and safety of the population; the equitable distribution of educational, health, and other social facilities; and the financial viability of the government and its municipalities. The Minister of Municipal Affairs may use any of these matters as a basis for appealing local planning decisions to the Ontario Municipal Board. A board decision on such a matter does not come into effect until the provincial cabinet has confirmed it. This section of the act was a response to a frequently heard criticism that the province failed to make clear its interest in municipal planning or the basis for its objections or amendments to municipal plans.

The "matters of provincial interest" included in the act are worded so generally that they leave the province wide latitude for seeking changes in municipal planning decisions to which one or another provincial agency raises objections. When an OMB decision challenged the
province's right to use that latitude in a matter for which it had not issued specific guidelines, the province simply amended its planning legislation to make it possible to "declare any matter to be of provincial interest, whether or not there is an approved provincial policy statement on that matter" (Farrow 1989, 5). The tendency, therefore, has been for Ontario's planning legislation to become increasingly explicit in specifying the government's right to override local planning decisions that it considers inconsistent with its own goals.

The Planning Act spells out the planning responsibilities of all municipalities (regional and local), beginning with the responsibility to produce an official plan. A municipal plan becomes official when it receives approval from the Minister of Municipal Affairs or his or her delegate. The act does not require municipalities to produce an official plan but it does require that municipal public works and municipal bylaws conform to municipal plans once they are in place. Lack of an official plan may weaken a municipality's ability to defend its position in planning disputes that go before the OMB.

Other matters covered by The Planning Act include "community improvement" (the successor to urban renewal); land-use controls, and plans of subdivision. In all cases the act describes procedures for preparing and securing approval of plans and for appealing planning decisions to the OMB. It does not specify what a plan should look like, however, nor does it require municipalities to adhere to uniform planning standards. It simply describes an official plan as "a document... containing objectives and policies established primarily to provide guidance for the physical development of a municipality or a part thereof... while having regard to relevant social, economic and environmental matters." Thus it allows municipalities substantial scope to decide the content and purpose of their own plans, but always in the knowledge that their decisions can be changed by the OMB or even by the provincial cabinet if they contravene a declared "matter of provincial interest."

This possibility makes it expedient for municipal planners and politicians to determine, through negotiations with provincial officials and a study of past OMB decisions, what is and what is not likely to be acceptable to provincial authorities. Thus the decisions that emerge from the planning process, whether or not they go to the province for review or to the OMB for adjudication, can be viewed as policy statements carrying the stamp of provincial approval. By extension, the accumulation of plans prepared by GTA municipalities constitute a government-sanctioned blueprint for the area's development. To be able to describe
that blueprint, we must look at the state of planning in each of the five two-tier regions.

Planning in Metropolitan Toronto

The TCR concept was not the first attempt in the Greater Toronto Area to produce a cohesive, long-range strategy for the area’s development. The first governmental body to undertake that task was the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board (MTPB), an appointed unit established at the time of Metropolitan Toronto’s creation and instructed to produce an official plan for Metropolitan Toronto (240 square miles) and an additional 480 square miles of predominantly rural territory outside its boundaries. The MTPB reported to Metropolitan Toronto Council, which was expected to adopt a plan and submit it to the provincial government for approval.

The decision to make a Metropolitan Toronto agency responsible for planning an area three times Metro’s size was based on the advice of Lorne Cumming, the OMB chair who recommended Metropolitan Toronto’s form of government. Cumming argued that metropolitan planning should encompass territory into which Metro was likely to expand (Ontario Municipal Board 1953, 70). The attempt failed, for Metropolitan Toronto did not manage to adopt a plan and send it forward to the provincial government until after it had lost its authority to plan for its hinterland to the four regional governments created in 1971 and 1974.

Although Metropolitan Toronto functioned without an official plan until 1980, planning has been an important activity throughout its history. Initial planning activity resulted in 1959 in a massive draft official plan that dealt in detail with those matters identified in the Metropolitan Toronto Act to fall within Metro Toronto’s planning jurisdiction: land uses; sanitation; green belts and park areas; and roads and public transportation. Because the plan’s detailed treatment of these matters provided many opportunities for criticism the document made little headway in the political arena. The next draft plan, issued in 1965, was a much briefer and more generally worded document. Neither this nor the earlier draft were attempts to plot a radical restructuring of the area’s development pattern. Rather, both documents sought to accommodate and facilitate private sector decisions, which they depicted as the primary determinants of the area’s development, by providing for orderly expansion and the provision of appropriate infrastructure. They also
incorporated the planning objectives of other metropolitan agencies and local municipalities.

By 1965 Metro had adopted several elements of the proposed plan as statements of policy, including a sewage disposal plan, a water supply plan, a parks plan, a conservation plan, substantial portions of a proposed roads and transit plan, and the basic principles of a public housing plan (Comay 1964, 21). It decided not to seek "official" status for the plan itself, however, but instead adopted it as a "statement of policy," and continued to function on that basis for the next 15 years. Even though metropolitan planners had maintained close liaison with local planners and usually deferred to local planning objectives, local opposition to metropolitan planning was the principal reason for Metro Toronto’s failure to adopt an official plan. For municipalities, the basic problem with metropolitan planning was a provincial requirement that local plans would have to be brought into conformity with the metropolitan plan once it had been approved. Municipalities outside Metro’s boundaries objected to the idea that Metro Council, on which they had no representation, would be the agency that determined the areawide pattern to which they would have to conform. Members of Metro Council, all of them representing local councils, also had little enthusiasm for surrendering planning authority to another level of government.

Despite Metropolitan Toronto’s failure to produce an "official plan" during its formative years, planning documents specified a number of planning principles or criteria that are consistent with the way Metropolitan Toronto has developed (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board 1959, S3-S4; 1965, 3). These included an emphasis on preserving the central area (downtown Toronto) as the region’s main commercial and cultural center; the promotion of secondary centers of commercial and high-density residential uses near focal points on the transportation system; the location of employment sites in all parts of the area so that people would have the opportunity to live close to their work; the provision of housing at different densities and for households of all income levels throughout the planning area (i.e., in the suburbs as well as the central city); and a transportation system that assigned a significant role to new transit facilities as well as to roads. In addition, planning proposals promoted an orderly pace and compact pattern of development by specifying an outer boundary for urban development and proposing that new areas should be opened up for development only when they were assured of a complete range of urban services.
The development of Metropolitan Toronto has been characterized by the maintenance of a strong central city; higher suburban densities than are found in most North American metropolitan areas; a diversity of land uses in all area municipalities; the dispersal of publicly assisted, low-income housing throughout the suburbs; and a transportation system in which public transit (subways, light rapid transit, and an extensive bus network) has played a prominent role. While these characteristics conform to the principles and criteria outlined in early Metropolitan Toronto planning documents, it is impossible to distinguish the influence of metropolitan planning on the area’s development from the influence of several other important factors. These include:

1. the incentive given Metro’s suburban members to support measures of benefit to the central city by a financial arrangement that bases contributions to Metro on assessment rather than population;

2. the relatively large size of the area’s five suburbs (particularly the outer suburbs of Etobicoke, North York, and Scarborough), which enhanced their ability to accommodate a large variety of residential and employment activities;

3. suburban enthusiasm in the 1960s for high-density residential buildings, which were perceived to yield more in revenues than they cost to serve;

4. provincial regulations enacted during the 1950s that subjected septic tank development to strict environmental controls. These not only helped to contain new growth within Metro but also meant that the outward spread of development would keep pace with the outward extension of lake-oriented sewer and water services;

5. a strong provincial role in the provision of publicly assisted family housing for a few years after 1964 (discussed later in this paper);

6. the success of Metro’s first subway, opened the year Metro began, and built largely with funds accumulated by the Toronto Transit Commission during World War II. The subway’s early success not only influenced transportation planning in Metro but also undoubtedly contributed to the continuing economic strength of the core city (Frisken 1991).

The official plan that Metro approved in 1980 restated most of the principles of earlier plans. It gave particular emphasis to the need to increase residential densities in order to provide new housing inside Metropolitan Toronto. It also emphasized the idea of multi-use subcenters to supplement the central area of the city, which it nonetheless expected to "remain the pre-eminent business, cultural, governmental,
recreational and management center of the Metropolitan Region" (The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 1980, 15). Its stated aim was to achieve "a multi-centered urban structure" which could "be achieved through the development of Metropolitan Centers along rapid transit facilities" (italics in original).

Work on the 1980 plan began in the early 1970s with a comprehensive review of the metropolitan transportation plan, which was by then seriously at variance with the way the area’s transportation system had actually evolved. In particular, city-based opposition to a major highway (the Spadina Expressway) linking downtown Toronto with suburban North York had persuaded the provincial cabinet to withhold support from the project and substantially increase its support to urban mass transit. The expressway revolt was part of a larger reaction to the perceived impacts on the city of the area’s rapid development, impacts that included a proliferation of high rise office towers in the core, increasingly congested transportation facilities, and the threat posed by core expansion and residential redevelopment to downtown neighborhoods. In 1973 a recently elected "reform" city council initiated a Central Area Plan Review leading to a revised downtown plan that proposed limiting growth in the central area to the capacity of the existing transportation system (Frisken 1988, 20-52). It also explicitly favored the decentralization of some downtown functions to concentrated development nodes in the suburbs.

By the 1970s some of the suburbs as well as the central city were advocating a more decentralized urban structure. North York and Scarborough, the two largest suburbs, were particularly interested in developing "downtowns" of their own. This correspondence between local and metropolitan planning goals reflects a tendency, already apparent in metropolitan planning during Metro’s first decade, for local planning goals and preferences to set the metropolitan planning agenda, in direct contradiction to the hierarchical planning relationship specified in the Metropolitan Toronto Act (Comay 1964, 14-15). Both the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board and the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department that replaced it in 1974 have tried to construct statements of areawide purpose that accommodate and reconcile the objectives already incorporated in local plans. Beyond that their principal roles have been to provide assistance to local planners when requested to do so (a function that has essentially disappeared as local planning staffs have grown in size and capability), identify emerging issues, and compile
information that can be used for both metropolitan and local planning purposes.

The evolution of planning relationships between Metropolitan Toronto and its member municipalities was characterized in Metro’s early years by disagreements between Metro and city of Toronto planners over housing and urban renewal issues, and between Metro Council and city neighborhood groups over transportation issues. (Kaplan 1982, 698-723). Such disagreements have lessened as Metro’s suburbs have matured and become more like the city in their socio-economic characteristics. Nonetheless the local municipalities have become no more willing than formerly to surrender to Metro the power to decide in detail how the area is to develop. The 1980 plan is a "structure" rather than a land-use plan. That means, in the words of one metropolitan official, that it is limited to a consideration of "the broad distribution of population, households and employment activities" and the infrastructure of major physical services for which Metro is responsible (Rust D’Eye 1989, 25). It is concerned with "varying patterns of centralization and decentralization of population and employment," but leaves it up to local municipalities to determine how such a pattern is to be achieved. It is "intended to interact smoothly with area municipal official plans, rather than to mandate changes to them," sets out "principles and hoped-for or anticipated results, without the inclusion of ... mandatory planning requirements," makes no attempt "to separate "Metropolitan interests" from local ones"; and leaves municipalities "directly responsible for the designation of land uses, zoning and development control."

Despite the high degree of generality of the 1980 plan, Metro Council adopted it only because the provincial government insisted it had to have a plan, and only after it had removed a number of contentious elements included in earlier drafts. One such element was a transportation network designed to support the plan’s most fundamental principle: the multinodal urban structure. A proposal for a network of light-rail transit lines linking centers with each other and with downtown Toronto emerged several years later, after prolonged negotiations among Metro, the TTC, and local municipalities. This proposal was less a plan than a shopping list that linked together and assigned different levels of priority to the transit improvements favored by each of Metro’s member municipalities (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department and Toronto Transit Commission 1986).

While the acquisition of an official plan has not moved Metro Toronto perceptibly closer to the hierarchical planning relationship
prescribed in the Metropolitan Toronto Act, it has given Metro a legal basis for appealing local planning decisions to the OMB on the grounds that they conflict with metropolitan interests. Not only has Metro been reluctant to use this power, but in two of three cases where it has done so the OMB has ruled against Metro and in favor of the local council (Rust d'Eye 1989, 50-55). Thus, Metro's role in shaping the development of the inner part of the GTA continues to depend on the ability of its planning staff to secure agreement on planning principles from the staff of local municipalities and the ability of local planners to persuade elected politicians to incorporate such principles into local plans.

The planning principle that has been most readily adopted by Metro's member municipalities is that of promoting the development of mixed-use commercial/residential nodes at or near rapid transit stations. The development of North York and Scarborough city centers is well-advanced; centers for York and Etobicoke are still in the planning stage. The city of Toronto continues to pay lip service to the idea of commercial decentralization while allowing intensive redevelopment of property in or near the downtown.

Continued development of Toronto's central area is one of the concerns being addressed by both city and metropolitan planners in recently undertaken reviews of their official plans. Not only new office/commercial development but also the construction of a major sports stadium in downtown Toronto are expected to put considerable stress on transportation facilities serving the core. Yet city officials are much more willing to approve sites for high density office and commercial use and for major entertainment facilities than they are to sanction additions or improvements to roads or rail transit lines.

A second concern is that decentralization of core area activities has not only contributed to the development of transit-oriented nodal centers but has also resulted in widespread dispersal of industrial and office employment to less accessible parts of Metropolitan Toronto. According to city of Toronto calculations, two-thirds of suburban office space in 1986 was auto-oriented (City of Toronto Planning and Development Department 1986, 50). An increasing use of automobiles for travel within Metropolitan Toronto and into downtown Toronto is not only a consequence of the decentralization and dispersal of activities within Metro itself but also results from the increasing amount of travel into Metro Toronto from the regions outside. Both Metro and city of Toronto officials are trying to come to terms with Metro's recently recognized "central city" status and to convey what that status means to local
politicians. Complicating their task at the metropolitan level is the fact that members of Metro Council, the beneficiaries of the new system of direct election introduced in 1989, are still trying to develop a sense of identity and purpose that distinguishes them from members of local councils, on which many of them served in the past.

The change in Metro Council convinced Metro planning staff of the need for a completely new Metropolitan Toronto plan that would more clearly specify the nature of metropolitan interests and distinguish them from those of local municipalities. In working toward this objective, they prepared a number of reports aimed at making stronger and more specific some of the objectives contained in the 1980 plan or documents that preceded it. This work culminated in a new Draft Official Plan proposing a "reurbanization strategy" to bring about an increase of 300,000 in Metropolitan Toronto’s population by the year 2011 in the interest of making better use of available service infrastructure, slowing down the rate of suburban expansion and allowing more people to live closer to their jobs (The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto 1992).

A shortage of vacant land is a serious constraint on Metropolitan Toronto’s ability to increase its population by increasing the size of its housing supply. Metropolitan Toronto is almost completely developed, which means that new housing will have to be secured through redevelopment at higher densities, residential infilling (construction of new dwellings on vacant or underused sites), and the conversion of large units into smaller units (Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Policy Development Division 1987). Any proposal to redevelop or increase densities on property in or near existing residential neighborhoods tends to be a source of intense political conflict in Metropolitan Toronto and thus commands little support from local councils and local politicians.

As has frequently been the case in Metro’s planning history, the city of Toronto has taken the lead in seeking solutions to these problems by converting underused industrial lands to residential use and by allowing developers of downtown office space to build to higher densities in exchange for land suitable for housing elsewhere in the city. The city has a strong interest in increasing its residential component because of its desire to limit the amount of commuter traffic coming into the city. Thus its planners are now looking favorably on a proposal that the city make its approval of new employment sites conditional on the rate of production of housing within the city (Nowlan 1989). Also attracting considerable attention from both city and Metro planners is a proposal, known as
the "Main Streets" concept, calling for zoning changes that would allow lands bordering shopping streets and major arterials to be redeveloped with buildings of five or six stories (instead of the usual two) containing both commercial and residential units.

Metro Council decisions have indicated an increasing willingness on the part of councillors to accept the principle of intensification and approve policies that will support it. Only time will tell, however, how far the city of Toronto and other Metro Toronto municipalities are prepared to go to allow the substantial changes in residential structure that will enable Metro to accommodate a significant share of the GTA's future population growth.

Planning in The Regional Municipalities

An interest in encouraging better, more comprehensive land-use planning in the more urbanized parts of the province was one of the government's justifications for creating two-tier regional governments between 1969 and 1974. Legislation establishing those governments contained a requirement that each should produce a regional plan within its first three years of operation, after which all local plans would have to conform to it. Of the four regional municipalities surrounding Metropolitan Toronto, only Durham and Halton Regions have managed to produce official plans, both of them within the allotted time limit.

The difficulties preventing the adoption of official plans in the fast-growing regional municipalities of York and Peel have been similar to the difficulties that prevented Metro Toronto from acquiring an official plan for more than 35 years. Reluctance of local councils to surrender control over their development choices to a second tier of government has been paramount among the constraints on regional planning. A second constraint has been uncertainty among planners and politicians about the nature of and requirements for regional plans, and how they are to differ from local plans. Provincial planning legislation and planning guidelines have never tried to make a distinction. A third constraint was the loss of enthusiasm for regional government among provincial officials after 1974. Not only had some of the regional governments proved to be politically unpopular but they also helped increase local government costs and demands for financial support from the province. While cost increases in reorganized areas often resulted from a backlog of unmet servicing needs, they made regional government a target of those for whom reductions in provincial debt and provincial spending became the primary
objectives of government policy in the late 1970s (Ontario, The Special Program Review 1975, 194-208). The government's disaffection with the regional government program made it less inclined to insist that regional governments fulfill their planning responsibilities.

The absence of provincial directives has left it up to each regional council to decide whether to adopt and seek provincial approval for an official plan and to specify what it will contain. Consequently the experience with regional planning, both in process and in planning outcome, has varied from region to region. The two regions (Durham and Halton) with official plans have been less subject to intense development pressures than the two that have failed to produce them; Durham because it comprises the eastern sector of an area in which development pressures have always tended toward the west, Halton because it is separated from Metropolitan Toronto by Peel region. Both Durham and Halton also have planning directors who made early decisions to produce official plans and then persuaded their own staff, local councils, and the public to accept their views of what such plans should consist of.

A common feature of the plans of both regions is an emphasis on general policies that point to a preferred regional structure. The Durham plan favors the development of "central areas" containing a mixture of land uses. The policy aims at the preservation and enhancement of the downtowns or main streets of local municipalities in preference to the development of shopping malls on their outskirts. In one case, however, the plan designates an existing shopping center as a "central area" for a municipality lacking a downtown and in another has made the "central area" large enough to encompass both the old downtown and a newer shopping center about a mile away. Apart from this "central area" focus, the Durham plan seeks to preserve the distinctive character of the region's member municipalities by designating lands between them for agriculture.

Official plan policies in Halton Region have taken account of the need to protect two major provincial initiatives: the Niagara Escarpment Plan and the Parkway Belt West. Nonetheless regional planners have recently completed an Urban Structure Review that favors an extension of the urban development boundary of the town of Milton, in the center of the region, to open up an additional 15,000 acres for development. The area recommended for development may include a section of land presently reserved for agriculture in the Escarpment Plan.
Of the three regional official plans that now exist in the GTA, that of Durham goes furthest in specifying details of density and land uses—specifications to which local municipalities are legally required to conform (Hollo 1989, 14). The tendency of regional plans—both those that have been adopted and those still in the draft stage—is to maintain a level of generality that leaves local municipalities free to decide the specifics of land development. Their principal concern is with matters defined in provincial legislation as "regional responsibilities," such as major public works and transportation facilities. Regional review of local subdivision plans—a responsibility that the province delegated to the regions when they were created—tends to concentrate on their implications for regional services rather than their implications for the regional land-use pattern. And even the preferences of local municipalities—either to grow or not to grow—can have major impacts on regional planning decisions. In Halton, for example, the decision to enlarge Milton’s urban boundary took account both of Milton’s desire to grow and the desire of the two lakeshore communities, Oakville and Burlington, to limit their rate of expansion. The decision means that both the region and the province will pay higher costs to bring lake-based services to areas opened up for residential development.

The strength of local municipalities and local planning priorities has been particularly evident in the regional municipalities of Peel and York, where the regional councils have not yet approved official plans. Regional politics in Peel have been dominated by the city of Mississauga which, with 63 percent of the region’s population, is the most fully developed of the region’s three municipalities. The mayor and several members of Mississauga Council have opposed regional government from the beginning and have kept up a determined campaign to prevent regional staff from playing a meaningful role in planning and development. Interpersonal conflicts between senior staff members at the regional and local levels have further weakened the effectiveness of regional planners.

The least cohesive of the five upper-tier regions, however, is the regional municipality of York, immediately to the north of Metropolitan Toronto. The irony of York’s situation is that it was the only region to emerge from a locally initiated and conducted local government review leading to a request for regional government (Regional Municipality of York 1988, 19-21). Other regional governments were imposed by the province, sometimes on the basis of and sometimes in contravention of
recommendations of provincially sponsored reviews of their local
government systems (Feldman 1974, 14-17).

The creation of regional government for York, as for most other parts
of the province where reorganization took place, involved giving new
responsibilities and new sources of revenue to an existing county
government as well as consolidating small municipalities into larger, more
viable units. Local officials in York Region sought the change in
reaction to the growing strength and territorial aspirations of Metro
Toronto. Not only did they resent the inclusion of large portions of the
county in the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Area but they also feared
that growth pressures would generate irresistible pressure for Metro to
absorb the urbanized municipalities in the southern part of York County,
just to the north of Metro, leaving the rest of the county with a seriously
diminished tax base. Once regional government was in place and the
Metro threat removed, local interests reasserted themselves. Resistance
to regional planning was so obstructive that in 1977 the entire regional
planning staff resigned, and the department had to be reconstituted.

Even local planning in York Region has failed to keep up with the
pace of development, which has already gone beyond the urban bound-
aries specified in the plans of the region’s southern municipalities. The
most important influence on land-use decisions in the region is the
location and capacity of the York Durham servicing scheme, the "big
pipe" that provides the region with sewage treatment and disposal
facilities based on Lake Ontario. Municipalities with access to that
facility have experienced rapid growth; others have not been able to
develop so rapidly. Thus there is a clear distinction within the region
between five rapidly urbanizing towns and four rural or semirural
townships, a distinction that influences regional politics. Planning
policies adopted by some of the local municipalities—particularly the
southern municipalities of Vaughan and Markham—have further
intensified the region’s fragmentation by maintaining undeveloped open
space between preconsolidation communities as a way of maintaining
their character and spatial integrity. The town of Vaughan represents an
extreme example of local refusal to adapt to reorganization. Rather than
producing an official plan for the town as a whole, its council has
approved separate plans for four districts comprising preconsolidation
towns and villages.
Planning in the Five Regions: An Overview

The existence of regional government and mandated regional planning in the Greater Toronto Area has done little to reduce the influence of local governments on the area’s physical development. In the words of one observer,

in a dispute between the upper and lower tier, the lower tier municipality will generally win in the long run, and particularly in the political sense, because the lower tier has the luxury of being specific, and somewhat closer to the electorate. (Hollo 1989, 8).

The existence of a regional plan may strengthen the ability of regional officials to argue for the "regional interest" before provincial agencies, but it does not guarantee it.

The creation of regional governments has not been without consequence for planning in the Greater Toronto Area, however. Probably the most important function performed by regional planning staff is that of providing local planners with information that they would otherwise find difficult to get because of limited resources. Where regional planners enjoy a good relationship with their local counterparts, they can also inject greater awareness of regional interests into local planning and strengthen the case for planning ideas with both local and regional councils. Finally, all the GTA’s regional governments except Metropolitan Toronto have assumed responsibility for reviewing plans of subdivision and condominiums, a responsibility that in principle gives them control over the rate and pattern of new development. In actual fact, however, regional councils have agreed to take over this responsibility from the province because their locally elected members believe that it means less, not more, outside intervention in local land-use decisions.

The subservience of regional planning to local priorities and aspirations has meant that few parts of the region offer a coherent vision of the way the Toronto metropolis is or should be developing. Metropolitan Toronto, with its structure plan based on transit-linked nodes, has gone furthest in providing its member municipalities with a planning framework. The idea of developing mixed-use centers has found its way into the plans of some other GTA municipalities, most notably Mississauga, but usually with little thought as to how these should be linked to or by the regional (GO) transit system. There is also a concern evident in many plans with preserving or enhancing the historic downtowns of local municipalities, though usually without precluding the development of
peripheral shopping centers. Finally, local and regional plans outside Metro have exerted some control over "sprawl" by designating "urban development boundaries" to separate areas targeted for future development from their rural surroundings. These boundaries are not inviolate; they are moved outward as growth pressures build up, sometimes without waiting for an official plan amendment.

WHITHER THE GTA?

Thirty years of experience with regional planning in southern Ontario makes it possible to identify a number of obstacles that will have to be overcome by any serious provincial attempt to exercise control over this fast-growing metropolitan area. The first is a lack of agreement among the five regions and their member municipalities. Apart from a general interest in promoting nodal developments with a mixture of land uses (including residential), there is little in local plans to suggest the outlines of a coherent, long-range strategy for the area's future growth. What exists is a confusing amalgamation of the plans of separate and distinctive municipalities, most of which want to grow, a few of which do not. Those that want to grow are competing with each other for allocations of projected GTA population increases, for provincially funded infrastructure improvements, and for new or relocated industrial, commercial, and office development.

A second obstacle to the development of a workable provincial strategy is the vigor with which municipal councils claim the right to decide the nature and rate of development within their own boundaries, despite legislated requirements that their decisions conform to regional (where they exist) and provincial planning priorities. Municipal assertiveness has not only made regional planning an activity conducted largely in response or reaction to local planning, it has also made the provincial government reluctant to appear to be dictating how or where municipalities shall grow.

A third obstacle to the success of provincial initiatives is fragmentation and competition within the provincial bureaucracy. The government has identified 10 separate ministries as having a direct interest in the way the Greater Toronto Area develops. Each of these has its own mandate and a set of programs to carry it out; its own priorities for new investment; its own way of assessing and responding to pressures of urban growth and expansion; and its own set of external supporters and detractors. These ministries and their component departments have
traditionally been more inclined to compete among themselves for budget allocations and cabinet approval for pet projects than to engage in the dialogue and make the compromises needed to arrive at a common strategy.

Fourth, government attempts to respond directly to growth pressures in the GTA have to overcome a generalized antipathy to the Toronto area and its rate of development in the rest of the province. Provincial politicians from outside the area are less likely to view GTA growth and expansion as challenges to be met than as threats to the long-term viability of their own districts. As the GTA absorbs an increasing share of the province’s jobs and people, the "Hogtown" epithet once applied to the city of Toronto can be extended to take in the entire area. Thus provincial cabinet ministers who want to address GTA problems have to convince elected members of their own party to support proposals that seem to bring no benefits to outlying constituencies.

Finally, the government must deal with the inescapable problem of responding to infinite demands with a finite budget. Not only do proposals for new infrastructure and community services in the GTA have to compete with similar proposals from other parts of the province; they also compete with demands for increased expenditure on health care facilities, education (particularly postsecondary education), and other social services.

In light of these major obstacles to the development of a provincial strategy for the GTA’s future development, it is not surprising that the government was slow to acknowledge pressures stemming from GTA growth or to set up organizations to deal with them. The obstacles also help explain why the organizations it has set up have adopted a low-key, deliberative approach to their assignment, emphasizing the need for cooperation and coordination rather than areawide management or direction. Even this approach has its pitfalls, however, for it leaves the government open to charges that it is attempting to create a new level of government that operates in secret and has no direct accountability to area voters (Mackie 1989).

A measure of the success of the government’s strategy for dealing with GTA issues will be its ability to alleviate the area’s major problems without alienating too many government supporters. The problem that has tended to dominate regional discussions and has absorbed most of the OGTA’s attention since its formation is that of finding a way to dispose of the area’s enormous output of solid waste. While this problem stimulates intense political activity in communities close to potential
landfill sites, it has also generated substantial willingness among regional officials to cooperate in finding a solution. Whereas local opponents of potential sites in the suburban regions like to depict the problem as one that Metro is trying to foist on its hapless neighbors, regional officials acknowledge that they are also running out of waste disposal capacity (Gilbert 1989). In considering possible solutions to the problem, they must contend not only with local opponents but also with the terms of the province's Environmental Assessment Act, which allows opposition to be prolonged through numerous hearings and legal appeals. Indicative of the dilemma in which provincial and regional officials find themselves was the 1991 decision of the Minister of the Environment, an adamant supporter of the environmental assessment process when she was a member of the opposition, to approve as "an emergency measure" the expansion of two existing dumps without an environmental assessment (The Globe and Mail, June 27, 1991).

Most public officials in the GTA are also in general agreement that there is a need to improve the area's transportation system, although they are not always able to agree on priorities. The number of daily person trips throughout the GTA has been increasing at an even faster rate than the number of people living in the area, placing increasing demands on the area's transportation facilities, particularly its road system. The number of automobiles and trucks crossing the boundary between Metro and the surrounding regions has more than doubled since 1975 (from .58 to 1.2 million), generating intense suburban pressure on the province to provide new road and commuter rail facilities. The most serious source of disagreement concerns the relative priority to be given demands by Metropolitan Toronto for new capital subsidies to build transit lines to support its multicentered urban structure and demands from suburban regions for more spending on highways, commuter rail, and local bus services.

The NDP government has largely endorsed a program of transportation investments proposed by its Liberal forerunner as a way of achieving balance among competing demands for scarce transportation dollars. Those investments entail both the construction of a major east-west highway through York and into Durham Region to the north of Metro and a 10-year program to expand service on some GO transit routes serving the outer suburbs. In addition, the government has agreed to help finance extensions to several TTC subway and light rail transit lines. GTA residents and businesses will pay most of the costs of these transportation investments through a commercial concentration levy of
$1.00 per square foot on owners of large commercial structures, parking lots and parking garages in the area, and through a surcharge on motor vehicle registration fees. The government has also told Metro that its future eligibility for new transit investment will depend partly on a demonstrated willingness to accommodate higher residential densities and partly on Metro’s ability to persuade the private sector to contribute to new rapid transit lines. Metro planners have taken at least the first of these strictures seriously and have stepped up their efforts to promote higher density residential development in transit-accessible locations throughout Metropolitan Toronto.

While the transportation issue does pose a threat to a cooperative strategy, therefore, it is one that allows the province to reduce the possibility of conflict by making concessions to all contenders. It is also one for which it is relatively easy to allocate costs to beneficiaries. An issue that is more intractable because it is less amenable to compromise is that of increasing the supply of "affordable" housing for families of low- and moderate-income in all parts of the GTA. This issue is not a new one for the area. One reason for the creation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953 was a shortage of low and moderately priced housing to accommodate workers in the area’s rapidly growing industrial sector, combined with suburban reluctance or inability to finance services that would make such housing possible.

The government of Metropolitan Toronto removed constraints on suburban development by constructing new sewers, water lines, roads, and schools in the suburbs. Its planners encouraged the provision of suburban housing for a range of income groups, a principle that most suburban governments recognized by zoning some areas for multiple-unit housing. Metro also helped achieve an areawide distribution of publicly assisted family housing, especially after 1964 when the provincial government made Metro Council the only local government in the metropolitan federation with authority to negotiate for such housing. At the same time the province set up its own agency, the Ontario Housing Corporation, to build housing, both for rent and sale, by drawing on loan funds made available in the 1964 National Housing Act. The outcome of this arrangement was impressive. By 1973 Metro, with 24 percent of the province’s population, had about 60 percent of its total supply of family public housing (Rose 1980; 175).

Like public housing throughout the continent, OHC housing (much of it in the form of apartments and townhouses) encountered intense public criticism and resistance. By the early 1970s the federal govern-
ment had virtually ceased supporting such housing, substituting for it programs, like assisted home ownership and co-operative and nonprofit rental housing, that distributed government housing benefits over a much wider spectrum of family incomes.

GTA municipalities responded to the new programs in a variety of ways. The city of Toronto set up its own nonprofit housing corporation, Cityhome, to draw on federal and provincial funds to produce housing for a variety of users, at least 25 percent of whom qualify for rent subsidies. Since its inception in 1974, Cityhome has produced more than 6,000 units of housing. Metropolitan Toronto has its own nonprofit housing corporation that builds housing in other parts of Metro but its production of family housing has been much less than the city's. Thus it has not been able to secure a "fair share" distribution of publicly assisted family housing units throughout Metropolitan Toronto, even though such a distribution is a stated goal of Metro's 1980 plan. The issue that has gained greater prominence, however, has been the limited production of low and moderately priced family housing in municipalities outside Metro Toronto. The regional municipality of Peel was the only suburban jurisdiction to join the city and Metro Toronto in setting up a nonprofit housing corporation in the 1970s. Other suburban regions have established nonprofit housing corporations only in the last few years. Most lower-tier suburban municipalities have not only resisted becoming involved in government-assisted housing programs but some of them have also refused to allow the construction of private housing that would be affordable to workers in the industries they are striving to attract.

High housing costs and a shortage of rental housing both inside and outside Metropolitan Toronto are seen not only as problems for individuals and households of low-to-moderate income but also as threats to the GTA economy, insofar as they may discourage new investment in the area. There is widespread agreement that this is a problem that only the province can solve. It is unlikely that this would be so if the city of Toronto or even Metro as a whole were performing the traditional central city function of providing low-cost accommodation in deteriorated residential districts. But high demand for housing in Metro Toronto has meant that housing in older districts has undergone continual renovation or been replaced by newer structures. Even the city of Toronto program has been hard-pressed to produce enough low and moderately priced rental units to replace those lost to private renovation.

High land and building costs, rising interest rates and provincial rent controls are among reasons commonly given for high housing costs in the
GTa. There has been a noticeable tendency, however, for builders to specialize in the production of high value units—large single family homes, luxury apartments and condominiums—at least partly because of the greater ease of getting plans for such housing approved by local councils. The town of Vaughan, just outside Metro’s northern boundary, has been particularly aggressive in its use and defense of planning measures (like large lot zoning) to exclude all but expensive single family homes. It has thus helped focus attention on the impact of suburban planning practices on the area’s housing crisis (Fine 1988).

The province’s Liberal government responded in 1989 to the crisis in housing "affordability" in the GTA and other Ontario cities by declaring the provision of "affordable" housing in new municipal subdivisions to be "a matter of provincial interest." This move gave the cabinet the right to reject municipal plans of subdivision even if they have been approved by the Ontario Municipal Board. As with all policy initiatives, the government announced its new policy in the form of a statement circulated among provincial municipalities and ministries for comment prior to its incorporation (with revisions) into The Planning Act (Hosek and Eakins, n.d. and 1989). This process of municipal consultation resulted in a number of significant changes in the wording of the policy. The proposed policy specified, for example, that "at least 25 percent of total housing units from new residential development and residential intensification" in the GTA should be "affordable," half of it to households with incomes up to the 30th percentile and half to households "with incomes between the 30th and 60th percentiles." The policy statement as finally adopted requires that 25 percent of all new housing built in GTA municipalities be "affordable" to "households within the lowest 60 percent of the income distribution," thereby relieving municipalities of responsibility for accommodating households at the bottom end of the income scale. It also says that this type of housing "is not necessarily [to be] included in every application for New Residential Development or Residential intensification."

The tendency in provincial policy development, then, has been to remove language that implies a direct assault on specific municipal planning practices and to leave it up to municipalities in the first instance to decide how provincial policy will be implemented. The province also

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3"Affordability" was defined to signify "annual housing costs . . . which do not exceed 30 percent of gross annual household income."
looks to regional councils to take the lead in developing regional housing policy and then to seek compliance from local municipalities through the subdivision approval process, without acknowledging the limited ability of regional agencies to influence local planning decisions. Thus the success of both public and private initiatives will depend on the willingness of municipalities to give planning approval to proposals that include an "affordable housing" component or, failing that, on the willingness of the provincial government to use its authority to intervene in local planning or to use its infrastructure funding to persuade local governments to comply with provincial policy.

CONCLUSION

Government of Ontario responses to growth and development in the Toronto metropolis attest to the pre-eminent place occupied by provincial governments in the management of Canada's municipal affairs. The Ontario government has acknowledged its responsibility in the Greater Toronto Area not only by making its agencies responsible for locating and building major services but also by establishing a variety of forums and institutions to pay specific attention to GTA concerns. The institutions established to deal with growth-related problems at the present stage of development in the Toronto metropolis are very different, however, from the federated system of local government established for Metropolitan Toronto in 1953 and used as a model for regional governments set up in 1971 and 1974. They have no formal mandates to plan, provide areawide services, or allocate resources among competing functional requirements and local jurisdictions. Rather they have defined their role to be one of promoting discussion, coordination, and, if possible, cooperation among and between a large number of local and provincial agencies with an interest in the way the area develops.

The approach taken by the Ontario government to the management of growth in the Greater Toronto Area rests on a realistic assessment of the limitations of regional planning as a device for structuring and channelling metropolitan growth and development. While regional planning has been treated as an important, even essential, element of government activity in the Toronto area for nearly 50 years, it has worked most successfully as a means of formulating general planning principles that show how private interests and local governments can reconcile their development aspirations with other community objectives. It has had
limited effectiveness as a device for formulating comprehensive land-use frameworks to which public and private interests are willing to conform.

As Robert Wood found for the New York metropolitan region 40 years ago, the government agencies with greatest potential for influencing the form of the Greater Toronto Area are those that provide the major public services (trunk sewer and water, highways and rail transit) that either facilitate suburban development or influence the use value of alternative locations within the area (Wood 1964, 125-88). These agencies usually act in response to the pressures of major private investors and growth-hungry municipal governments, not out of any intention to channel growth in a predetermined way. There is an important difference, however, between the Toronto situation and the one Wood described. It is the extent to which the provincial government has kept responsibility for areawide services in the hands of its own ministries or of agencies closely controlled by them, thereby enhancing its ability not only to coordinate servicing decisions but even to use them to promote its own objectives.

How extensively the province will use its control over regional services to promote provincially defined interests remains an open question. While the provincial government has virtually unlimited legal authority to require local compliance with government-stated priorities, it has seldom used that authority to override local planning preferences. In addition, it has always been ready to modify its policies to accommodate local objections and local priorities when it has seemed politically expedient to do so. Because such priorities tend to vary according to the location of municipalities within the area, their population characteristics and their rates of development, the government’s role has been less one of managing the activities of local governments than one of trying to work out compromises among competing local interests. That failing, its choice among the competing claims of local governments and local interest groups is more likely to be based on considerations of their relative costs and benefits to the provincial economy or their political costs and benefits to the government than on any concept of what constitutes an ideal or even a preferable pattern of metropolitan growth from an environmental and social perspective.
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In 1977 the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities reached the 10-year mark, having supplanted an earlier regional planning effort that also lasted for 10 years. The council was, at that time, widely studied and frequently lauded for having successfully addressed such regional planning issues as long-range airport needs, regional sewer concerns, and control of "leapfrog" development (Baldinger 1971; Harrigan and Johnson 1978; Naftalin 1986). By the late 1980s, this situation had changed somewhat. The Metropolitan Council found itself being criticized for trying to do many different things, even by staunch long-time supporters (Citizen's League 1984). While attentive critics argued that the council had become ineffective, most people in the Twin Cities probably still could not describe what exactly the council did, even if pressed.

Part of this perceived transformation was no doubt due to the Metropolitan Council becoming a regular "player" in Twin Cities decision-making circuit—by 1985 (or earlier) it was no longer new or special. Another part was undoubtedly related to the physical expansion of the metropolitan area; newly developing (and fast-growing) suburbs saw the council not as an agent of assistance, but as an obstruction. Typical late 1980s conflicts surrounding downtown redevelopment, suburban gridlock, and competition between central cities and their suburbs arose in the Twin Cities, just as in metropolitan areas without any regional planning mechanism. Three decades of planning for the Twin Cities have not significantly slowed outer urban growth, nor stemmed the tide of problems that came with it. Such observations leave us in 1990 asking: what has been the impact of regional government in
the Twin Cities? How has this area evolved differently because of the Metropolitan Council?

The Twin Cities shares with Winnipeg some of the worst weather experienced by major North American cities—cold winters and hot summers, with temperature differentials of 125 degrees Fahrenheit separating the two. And like Winnipeg, this is a relatively isolated metropolitan area; there are no nearby competitors, at least none closer than 400 miles. Whether either of these traits has contributed to regional instincts is debatable. Many have argued that the Twin Cities’ isolation has in part forced this metro area to be creative and enterprising (Borchert 1988). Of such necessities are innovations like regional government born.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWIN CITIES

Why has a relatively successful metropolitan structure been able to function in an area with two central cities? The usual answer to this question is that it is because there are two cities, and because together they hold only about 30 percent of the region’s total population, that such a structure works for the Twin Cities. Unlike most American metropolitan areas, there is no single focus for opposition in this region, and neither city has been able to consistently dominate regional discussions in recent generations. In contrast to years past, Minneapolis and St. Paul have been more likely to cooperate on many issues during the past decade than to compete. In some ways both cities now view the suburbs as the greatest competition that each has, and most of the suburbs view one another as competition as well. Not surprisingly, the lack of a single point of reference goes a long way toward diluting the long-standing hostility toward the city that exists in such metropolitan areas as Chicago or Boston.

Two compelling explanations together account for the existence of the Twin Cities and for the spirit that seems to have preceded the emergence of a metropolitan structure. One is geographic, the other is cultural. Close observers of this region have long argued that because of the Mississippi River and its topography, two cities had to exist here (Abler 1976). St. Paul was founded in the early 1830s as an outlier of a minimal U.S. government presence at Fort Snelling. This was the effective head of navigation on the Mississippi, the place where river traffic heading north had to stop if any goods were to be unloaded. Later in the 19th century it was the place where north- and west-bound trains
along the Mississippi turned inland—the steep river bluffs and lack of flood plain upstream from St. Paul’s core precluded any rail lines locating there. Minneapolis had a later and different history. Initial settlement took place in the early 1840s, but only on the east bank of the Mississippi; the other side was off-limits until an 1851 treaty with the Sioux tribe. From the beginning, Minneapolis presented a strong industrial potential. The water power of St. Anthony Falls, at over 50 feet the largest drop along the entire length of the Mississippi, sat right next to the site where the center of Minneapolis grew. This location, 10 miles upstream from St. Paul, was enormously attractive to investors looking for cheap power. In the early days the distance between the two places was enough to forestall serious thought of municipal convergence, so the two cities grew separately, differently, and eventually grew together spatially, though not politically.

The cultural explanation for the Twin Cities’ cooperative spirit stems in part from the immigration patterns that obtained over a long period. In 1980 the Twin Cities was the most homogeneous of the largest 30 major American metropolitan areas, with a total minority population of about 12 percent (Borchert 1988). Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the late twentieth century, migrants to this area came primarily from Northern and Western Europe, from rural areas of the Northeast, and from Canada. St. Paul and Minneapolis were located well off the beaten path of most streams of American urban migration: migrants from the Eastern U.S. had to bypass Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland to get here, and blacks from the rural South could more easily get to any of these other cities. Reaching this part of the country by rail from the South involved at least one change of train. Anyone bypassing Chicago or other Midwestern cities for Minneapolis or St. Paul had to know something about, or someone from, this area.

Consequently, most who came here hailed from a relatively fewer places and arguably had more in common to begin with. An example of this might be found in the cooperative movement that flourished in the Upper Midwest in the early 20th century (co-op creameries, co-op rural electrification efforts, etc.), and that to some degree remains strong today. In the Twin Cities proper this cooperative spirit was visible in the efforts of competing businessmen working together in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to endow arts museums, symphony orchestras, and other cultural institutions (Borchert, et al. 1983). It is also visible in more recent efforts to create low- and moderate-income housing alternatives: excepting New York City, Minneapolis has a larger per capita share of
co-op and mutual housing efforts than any other American metro area. Whether because of common ethnic roots or because of shared acquired values, people in this area have long worked together to improve life for everyone here. And it seems that investment in these communities has paid off in many different ways. For example, there is good contemporary evidence that people from the Twin Cities (even relative newcomers) are reluctant to leave here for other places when corporate transfers are discussed.

Historically, the Twin Cities has prospered, but not evenly. Early industries that relied on the river—saw milling, flour milling, and goods transporting—were in decline within a few decades of starting up, despite efforts to support them through such things as the federal government making Minneapolis a port by constructing a lock and dam in the 1960s. In the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, neither city was regarded as much of a positive role model. St. Paul freely harbored gangsters from Chicago as long as they behaved while in town. Minneapolis was such a staunch enemy of union activity that a mid-1930s Teamsters strike led to physical battle on downtown streets between strikers and the scions of some of the city’s "first families" (Fortune 1936).

After World War II, the fortunes of the Twin Cities began to change in a beneficial way. A sizeable investment base and a well-trained, hardworking population combined with local creativity and entrepreneurship to position the area for economic growth. Unlike the spurt of postwar development in most sunbelt cities, fed largely by federal defense spending in amenity locations, most of the Twin Cities’ economic growth was locally generated. Established old-line companies like Pillsbury, General Mills, and 3M successfully diversified into the conglomerates that they are today. A small 1950s company like Dayton’s was able to ride the shopping center/discount retailing boom and to parlay an early friendly merger to become Dayton-Hudson, currently one of the nation’s largest retailers. Meanwhile, technological advances provided opportunities for newer companies like Control Data, Medtronic, and scores of other high-tech offspring. The presence of the state’s major research university in the center of Minneapolis had much to do with the high-tech explosion, and as we know about urban growth in other places, the university and the state government were also important job-generators here. Needless to say, all of this economic growth stimulated physical expansion well beyond the boundaries of both cities. (See Map 5.1.) Eventually the dimensions of physical expansion led to thinking about limits and finally led to intergovernmental cooperation.
Map 5.1.  The Twin Cities Metropolitan Area (7 counties)
GOVERNANCE IN THE TWIN CITIES

Like most metropolitan areas in the United States, municipal governance in the Twin Cities is fragmented along many different lines. Governance and management are a tangle of co-existing and sometimes conflicting interests: separate city and individual suburban municipal governments, county governments, and the state government, in addition to dozens of locally controlled school, police, park, and other authorities. A recent count enumerated 272 separate local governmental units: 7 counties, 138 cities, 50 townships, 49 school districts, 6 metropolitan agencies, and 22 special purpose jurisdictions (Naftalin 1986).

The presence of the federal government in the Twin Cities is perceived to be limited, as in most other American cities. Yet, most citizens of this area interact with the federal government regularly, in such ways as visits to the post office, requests for passports or for social security information, dealings with the IRS, and boating on the Mississippi’s federal "scenic" waterway. The U.S. Defense Department is locally represented by recruiting offices, by an army reserve post, and by the Corps of Engineers, which operates the locks and dams on the Mississippi. The Federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is based in the Twin Cities. Not surprising for a metropolitan area serving a large farming region, the agriculture department is well represented in the Twin Cities. So is the Interior Department through its Bureau of Indian Affairs (Minneapolis has one of the largest per capita urban Indian populations in the U.S.). We drive on interstate freeways that were largely paid for by federal dollars, and fly into and out of an airport operating by FAA regulations, and every check we write is cleared through the Federal Reserve Bank. Still, most people would probably say that, apart from taxes, the federal government treads lightly on most of the citizenry.

A different perspective accrues to the state government, which is widely observed at close range, largely because St. Paul is the state capital. Most Twin Cities residents are keenly aware that the state is involved in their lives, if only at the level of licensing them to drive, registering their vehicles, and granting licenses for leisure-time activities such as fishing and hunting. The Department of Natural Resources, which maintains and oversees an extensive state park system, as well as thousands of lakes, is a well-known entity to most Twin Citians. Cultural institutions like the Minnesota Zoo and the Historical Society are overseen by the state. Most of those seeking higher education in the metro area attend the University of Minnesota or one of the state
universities, and expenditures for higher education are one of the highest priorities in the bi-annual funding session of the state legislature. Parents of elementary and high school age students are increasingly knowledgeable about the state’s important role in funding local school systems, though the state Department of Education does not involve itself in day-to-day school operations or decision making. In recent years Minnesota, like most of the other states, has gone looking for new economic development prospects, and such efforts have become a major focus of state government. This has led to state-funded initiatives of various kinds, though seldom are such efforts focused on the prosperous Twin Cities region.

Regulations formulated at the state level govern concerns in the social service arena, such as health (hospital oversight) and job training, while certification of professionals such as doctors and lawyers is also a state responsibility. We rely upon the state government to regulate the public utilities that we all use, through monitoring rate increases and establishing whether or not new power plants are needed; and monitoring pollution of all kinds—perhaps most important these days is the volatile issue of ground-water sources that are vulnerable to agricultural run-off (especially on the metropolitan area’s perimeter, where extensive farming still occurs). These issues are often contentious, and they frequently lead into the state’s judicial system, though most local residents are less likely to be aware of the separate responsibilities of the differing levels of courts. In contrast, Twin Citians are certainly aware of the state’s role in relieving them of their tax money. In "high-tax" Minnesota, this is the issue that most provokes various local constituencies, from individual and corporate property owners to businesses that view the relatively high state-mandated worker’s compensation levels as an unfair burden to their bottom lines. For the Twin Cities in recent years, tax disparities between the metropolitan region and the rest of the state have generated such an outcry that the governor has called a special session of the legislature this fall to address this concern. Whatever the outcome, we can be assured that local residents will continue to view many aspects of state government with suspicion. But it is important to recognize that, while the state looms as a large presence to Twin Cities residents, there is little need for most people to interact with the state or its representatives regularly—again, apart from paying taxes.

Setting aside the issue of metropolitan government for the moment, we next arrive at the level of local government in the Twin Cities. Here the situation becomes more complex, for not only are there two cities
with separate mayors and city councils, but most of the surrounding suburbs also have their own individual mayors and many have councils. As in most U.S. metropolitan areas, there is enormous duplication of activities in managing the Twin Cities. Each municipality not only has an independent governance structure, but also independent planning and zoning regulations, school districts, and usually an independent police and fire protection system. The subunits of the metropolitan area are obviously brought together through infrastructure systems like roads, sewers and water lines, and through communications systems like newspapers, television and radio services, and telephone lines. But in the daily decisions that people make about their lives, there is more separation than cohesion at times.

Together the two central cities contain less than one-third of the region’s population, yet they have the region’s most complex administrative arrangements. Both cities have a mayor and city council, though predictably, their systems are quite different. St. Paul has a "strong mayor" government, with a part-time seven-member council, and all major departments report to the mayor. At times when the mayor is a strong personality (as during the past dozen years with George Latimer), it seems as if every decision emanates from that office. For years the city council had little to do but ratify the mayor’s decisions, and until very recently the council members were all at-large representatives. Minneapolis has a 13-member "strong council/weak mayor" system that almost guarantees conflict because most department heads report to the full-time city council members, who also serve as commissioners of the city’s development agency. Both cities have elected school boards with independent taxing authority, and Minneapolis’ government is further complicated by two other independently elected boards (one for parks, one for the library) that also can raise taxes. Residents are made aware of the authority of each city in many ways, from parking tickets and towing regulations, to actions of the police, to housing inspections and restrictions on land use. Recently, as concerns about drugs and associated crime have escalated, city officials have broken down crack houses and set up a system to monitor vacant houses for drug-related activities. There are now programs in place in both cities to do such things as keeping tabs on housing vacancies, and working with community groups to get vacant houses recycled. This one example illustrates how closely local government is entwined in the lives of many of its citizens; many others could be added that would underscore the same point.
The suburban municipalities duplicate many functions of the governments of Minneapolis and St. Paul, usually in a much smaller and arguably more efficient fashion. Even the largest of the surrounding communities—for example, Bloomington, which is now considered a central city by the census bureau—have only part-time executives, and their full-time administrative staff spend most of their time on issues connected with planning and zoning. As in many other metropolitan areas in recent years, the long-assumed distinctions between city and suburb in the Twin Cities are becoming blurred. As several suburbs have struggled with problems like aging populations and declining school enrollments, problems all too familiar to Minneapolis and St. Paul in recent decades, perceptions of limited kinship (at least between the central cities and inner-ring suburbs) begin to surface. Such notions are limited of course by the reality of differing property tax situations and by nervousness about the unlikely prospect of cross-jurisdictional busing to achieve school desegregation.

Between the state government and the local level lie the least understood administrative layers in the Twin Cities: the county and metropolitan arenas. This region contains seven counties, and each has myriad responsibilities connected with overseeing state-mandated, and some federal, programs. Hospitals, jails, and courts operate under county auspices, as do most other providers of social services. County officials are the conduit through which welfare money is distributed, and through which programs for abused children and other vulnerable populations are authorized. County commissioners have recently had to become knowledgeable about infrastructure issues like waste incineration and light rail transit, as this region spends millions on planning and constructing new facilities. Despite the general public’s lack of knowledge about the role that the counties play in this region, it is clear that their involvement in policy issues of all kinds is increasing.

A quick glance at specific counties illustrates the complexity and delicacy of local intergovernmental relations. Hennepin County, which contains Minneapolis, is the largest of the seven with nearly half of the region’s total population (1 million out of 2.3 million). The seven extremely political Hennepin County commissioners, most of whom see themselves as eventual contenders for higher office, have recently stirred controversy with great abandon. Hennepin County started planning a light rail system to serve Minneapolis and its suburbs long before consulting with other counties about cooperation on building a system. Even now, with discussion of specific routes underway, Ramsey County
(and St. Paul) have only belatedly been recognized as interested parties. Hennepin County also took on Minneapolis over the siting of a major new waste-to-energy plant. Suburban resistance combined with traffic data to suggest a site on the Minneapolis riverfront. Vocal city opposition derailed that site, but left as the only option some unused industrial land on the fringe of downtown, where the new facility now sits, despite city worries about toxic particulates swirling around in highrise down drafts. Dakota County (south of St. Paul) is the fastest growing county in the region, and as such generates conflicts with the more built-up Ramsey County. One of the longest running disputes concerned a freeway link-up that would speed the travel of Dakota County commuters, and which Ramsey County resisted on behalf of St. Paul residents who lobbied against the increased noise and traffic. This freeway link is now nearing completion after a decade-long disagreement, including a court challenge.

Part of the responsibility for sorting out these and other conflicts rests with the Metropolitan Council, the final layer of administration/governance in the Twin Cities. That such major conflicts arise, despite the presence of a regional planning authority, underscores the difficulty of infusing a regional perspective into most local issues. The Metropolitan Council has now been around for over 20 years, having been created by the Minnesota state legislature in 1967. Its original charge was to coordinate long-range plans for the metro area and to recommend policies to local governments, specifically county boards and city councils. The Metro Council is also charged with reviewing proposed projects or activities that have "metropolitan significance," either at its own discretion or by request of citizens or other agencies.

The first metropolitan issues that the council had to face were physical planning ones—the acknowledged problems of sewage disposal and water pollution. It is important to underscore that the council was to work with other levels of government to adopt and implement regional policies; that is a large part of its success. Some observers and proponents of the council have acclaimed it over the years, calling it "unusually promising" and "somewhat extraordinary" for negotiating the treacherous shoals of metropolitan cooperation (Naftalin 1986; Harrigan and Johnson 1978). Others, including most ordinary citizens, still have difficulty trying to define exactly what the council is.

One should note that the Metropolitan Council did not arrive *sui generis* in 1967. It replaced the earlier Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC), created by the legislature in 1957, which functioned much
like the traditional "council of governments" voluntary association, without any enforcement powers. Prior to and contemporaneous with the MPC, there were several other efforts to deliver services on a regional basis, all established by the state legislature: the Twin Cities Sanitary District (1933) was to coordinate sewers for the two central cities; the Metropolitan Airports Commission (1943) was to dissuade each city from building its own airport, and focus on one site; the Metropolitan Area Sports Commission (1956) was to build and operate a suburban football/baseball stadium; and the Metropolitan Mosquito Control District (1958), whose function is fairly self-evident. Long-time observers have argued that a regional impulse, recognizing that there were limits to what each municipality could do, was alive and well long before the council was created (Naftalin and Brandl 1980).

There are a few salient facts that help in understanding the role of the Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities: (1) It was created by, and reports to, the state legislature. The council may claim that local governments are its audience, but political realities argue differently. (2) None of the 17 council members (including its chair) is elected. All are appointed by the governor, usually in consultation with the state legislators whose districts a member will represent. (3) The council has, by design, very little operating authority. It oversees and approves the budgets of the operating commissions: the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission (MWCC), the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC), and others. But most of its charge is review and oversight, particularly of long-range capital expenditures. It was this oversight function that got the council up and running, that provided it a forum, and that helped achieve many of its early successes. These first two factors explain why the Metropolitan Council has no real leverage—being appointed, its members are virtually unknown (except to a few politicians), and they have no real constituency. Though a bill to have council members elected has been introduced in nearly every legislative session since its creation, it has always failed. The third factor goes to the heart of perceptions about the council's effectiveness—apart from planning, what is it supposed to do? In this question lies much potential conflict; the legislature wants the council to insulate it from the concerns of Twin Cities residents, but the council has no direct connection to residents, and little ability to get any.

Finally there is the fact that the council was created to deal with very real physical development issues. In the late 1960s the Twin Cities had a full plate of development problems: how and where to dispose of
sewage and solid waste; whether and where to build a new airport; how
to salvage the privately owned transit system; how to ensure that open
space would be either reserved or provided for in rapidly developing
areas; and how to balance growth at the edge with decline in the central
cities. In retrospect, the council's responses to these issues were
predictable, and occasionally remarkable. But these issues were all ones
that were amenable to study, consultation, and eventual solution, and their
urgency gave the council a great deal to do very quickly. Most of them
were resolved within 10 years. As the brunt of regional concerns shifted
from physical development to social issues like education, child care, and
the whole set of concerns that revolve around extremely disadvantaged
populations, solutions became more difficult and the exact role of the
council in responding to them became less clear.

CASE STUDIES

Quite a lot has already been written about the working out of "metropo-
lar issues" in the Twin Cities area, specifically with reference to the
origin of the Metropolitan Council (Baldinger 1971; Harrigan and
Johnson 1978). There is no need to replicate that here, nor is there space
to detail everything the council has done in 20 years. Suffice it to say
that many important concerns have been dealt with in a positive way
through the existence of a metropolitanwide agency. But having a
metropolitan authority in the Twin Cities area has certainly not resolved
all of the region's problems. This section will attempt to shed some light
on the workings of the Metropolitan Council by examining some of the
issues that it has addressed, both more and less successfully. The intent
is not to delve deeply into one or two issues, but to delineate broadly
several areas that may lead to thoughtful comparisons.

Past Successes

Let's begin with what has worked well. Early on the Metropolitan
Council took on the question of a new airport. In 1969 and 1970 the
Airports Commission proposed a second large airport at Ham Lake, north
of the Twin Cities. The council vetoed both proposals, contending that
the evidence did not demonstrate a need for a second facility at the time.
This decision effectively forced an upgrading of the existing airport
immediately south of the cities instead and began the process of turning
it into a true international facility. For almost 20 years, through several
large expansions of the MSP airport, this decision has held. Only in the past year, and this time initiated in part by the council, has serious discussion of the need for a new airport surfaced once again. It is too early to say what the outcome will be—further upgrading and significant expansion of the existing airport, or a new one in an as-yet-undetermined site. It is typical of the council’s operations that this issue has been framed as a task force study problem, with wide-ranging consultation and public hearings prior to any decision being reached by the council.

A similar situation obtained with respect to the late 1960s crisis surrounding sewer extensions and capacity limits. In 1969 the legislature authorized the council to develop a comprehensive system for sewage disposal, and it established a Metropolitan Sewer Board (now MWCC) to carry it out as an agent of the council. After some initial conflict and misunderstanding between these two groups, the council was charged in 1974 with developing a sewer policy for the metro region. This decision had a dual purpose: it gave the Metropolitan Council some needed authority to implement its planned regional development framework; and it would become the primary mechanism for bringing the quality of regional rivers and lakes up to those set in the 1972 Federal Pollution Control Act. For the past 15 years there has been steady progress in most aspects of sewage disposal—extensions have been limited to previously delineated areas, outdated sewer lines have been replaced, sewer separation is nearly complete even for the central cities, and the quality of even the Mississippi River water has been improved. The operation of a regional sewer/water system is now taken for granted. Conflicts arose during the 1988 drought about possible water provision for the Twin Cities, but it was limited to disagreements at the state level about draining the northern lakes for Twin Cities’ residential use. Within the metropolitan region, there was near-unanimous foregoing of lawn watering and car washing, with little intraregional complaint.

Development Framework

At a macro level two policies of metropolitan significance have been developed, largely through the efforts of the Metropolitan Council and its supporters. The first was the “Metropolitan Development Guide,” which began to be adopted in sections beginning in 1973. The guide was a major state-mandated planning tool, with chapters on recreation, health care, and virtually every other subject likely to have any impact on the metropolitan area. The focus here will be on the "development frame-
work" portion of the guide (adopted in 1975), the section that would
determine the path of future physical development surrounding the Twin
Cities. The development framework was intended to rationalize and
contain the costs of new construction by channeling growth into
predetermined areas. It also had as subsidiary goals all of the following:
to preserve the natural environment; to expand people’s social choices
and lower the concentration of minorities in central city neighborhoods;
to diversify regional economic growth and equitably finance public
services; and to get more citizens involved in regional governance
(Harrigan and Johnson 1978).

The Development Framework outlined five distinct planning regions,
three of which constituted the Metropolitan Urban Services Area
(MUSA): the two central cities, the fully developed suburban areas, and
the areas of planned urbanization. Outside the MUSA line were the two
areas that were to be protected from urban sprawl—rural trade centers
and freestanding growth centers (small towns on the region’s periphery),
and the rural service area (those portions of the metro area still in agri-
cultural use). In essence the Development Guide dictated that the central
cities and developed suburbs be completely filled in, or reused, before
urban use of agricultural land would be permitted. The council had
several tools available to enforce the dictates of the Development Guide:
(1) a 1976 Land Planning Act that stated where, when, and under what
conditions services such as sewers, transit, and parks would be extended
to unserved portions of the metro area; (2) an upgraded septic-tank
regulation by the state Pollution Control Agency; (3) its authority to
review long-term plans and capital budgets of the metropolitan com-
missions, and to suspend action on any that do not conform to the guide; (4)
its overall review authority for discretionary grants, certificates of need,
and for a time, the federal A-95 review power as well.

Fifteen or so years after the appearance of the Development Guide,
it seems reasonable to ask how well has it worked. The invariable
answer is that it depends on who is asked the question. From the
perspective of the two central cities, it has been reasonably successful in
helping to promote the cities’ own redevelopment ambitions. From the
mid-1970s to the early 1980s there was at least $2-$3 billion of public
and private investment in the inner areas of the two cities, much but not
all of it in the two downtowns (Borchert 1988). John Borchert has
estimated that perhaps one-third of the total new construction in the
metropolitan area in these years was also in the two central cit-
ies—encompassing nearly half of the regional office space expansion in
the 1970s and more than half of that estimated for the 1980s. This proportion is even more striking when we recognize that throughout this period both cities have continued to lose population (at about a 15 percent level of decline per decade).

Overall, the council’s development policies have certainly not stemmed either suburban population growth or investment to any appreciable degree. The population growth rates of most suburban areas closest to the central cities slowed dramatically through the 1970s—Edina and St. Louis Park, two of the older western suburban communities, respectively gained 4 percent and lost 13 percent of their 1970 populations by 1980. At the same time, outer suburban areas were booming, with a developing area like Burnsville growing by 79 percent, while brand new communities like Maple Grove and Eagan grew from farmland at rates of 326 percent and over 2000 percent between 1970 and 1980. (See Table 5.1.) Most, if not all, of this growth occurred within the predetermined limits of "planned urbanization." The areas most obviously affected by the Metropolitan Council’s development policies have perhaps been the older inner-ring suburbs. Many of these now have entire sections with much higher density development than anyone would have predicted 15 years ago, even including some highrise office and residential towers. One cannot of course say with certainty that this intensification of inner suburban land use is entirely owing to extant public land-use policies and is unrelated to land prices and cultural preferences. As freeway improvements and new connectors have appeared, the desirability of land that was once hopelessly far from either downtown has escalated enormously, not just in the Twin Cities. The Development Guide’s policies, at the very least, have ratified some changing economic perceptions that emanated out of the early 1970s fuel crisis, and may be partially accountable for some of the more intense development patterns in some close-in suburbs with good freeway locations. (See Tables 5.2-4.)

What the Development Guide has done most successfully has been to prevent certain kinds of leapfrog development within the seven-county metropolitan area, largely by limiting sewer and water extensions onto working farmland. This achievement, though consistent with stated goals, has been something of a mixed blessing from a larger regional perspective—and it has also served to underscore the practical limits of the council’s planning efforts. The council’s authority extends only to the seven-county metropolitan area, but development pressures have expanded well beyond this point, particularly on the eastern and far northwestern
Table 5.1. *Population Change in Twin Cities Metro Counties 1940-1990 (By Percent)*

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<td>Scott</td>
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Population Change in Selected Metro Suburbs and Central Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Pop. 1975</th>
<th>Pop. 1980</th>
<th>Pop. 1985</th>
<th>Pop. 1990</th>
<th>% Change 1975-1990</th>
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<td>Apple Valley</td>
<td>Dakota</td>
<td>15,160</td>
<td>21,818</td>
<td>27,172</td>
<td>34,598</td>
<td>228</td>
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<td>Burnsville</td>
<td>Dakota</td>
<td>27,807</td>
<td>35,674</td>
<td>40,115</td>
<td>51,288</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>Edina</td>
<td>Hennepin</td>
<td>45,059.5</td>
<td>46,073</td>
<td>44,940</td>
<td>47,070</td>
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<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>Hennepin</td>
<td>402,675.5</td>
<td>370,951</td>
<td>362,090</td>
<td>368,383</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul</td>
<td>Ramsey</td>
<td>290,048</td>
<td>270,230</td>
<td>267,810</td>
<td>272,235</td>
<td>(7)</td>
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<td>Robbinsdale</td>
<td>Hennepin</td>
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<td>14,422</td>
<td>14,060</td>
<td>14,396</td>
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<td>Anoka</td>
<td>14,466</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blaine</td>
<td>Anoka</td>
<td>24,563</td>
<td>28,558</td>
<td>33,840</td>
<td>38,975</td>
<td>59</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Minnesota

edges of the metro area. For example, the largely rural Wright and Sherburne counties that abut the northwest boundary of the metro area had small towns within them that grew by 50-60 percent between 1970 and 1980, *before* direct interstate freeway connections linked them to the core of the metro area. (See Map 5.2.) It is widely expected that the
Map 5.2.  Seven County Metropolitan Area and Neighboring Counties
<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
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<td>Total for all categories</td>
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<td>12,654</td>
<td>18,450</td>
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<td>% Change 1980-88</td>
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### Table 5.3. Selected Property Values in Twin Cities Communities

#### Value of Residential Property
(Adjusted to 1988 dollars)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apple Valley</td>
<td>$204,991,892</td>
<td>$404,710,460</td>
<td>$590,547,601</td>
<td>$875,704,840</td>
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<td>Edina</td>
<td>$1,358,356,929</td>
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<td>$2,016,287,956</td>
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<td>$4,932,086,992</td>
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<td>$331,296,420</td>
<td>$330,370,611</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$274,875,484</td>
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#### Value of Industrial and Commercial Property
(Adjusted to 1988 dollars)

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<td>Apple Valley</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>$2,175,786,269</td>
<td>$2,013,727,408</td>
<td>$3,398,939,048</td>
<td>$4,219,057,979</td>
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<td>$1,561,670,368</td>
<td>$1,802,511,912</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbinsdale</td>
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### Value of Agricultural, Timer, and Vacant Land

(Adjusted to 1988 dollars)

- **Apple Valley**
  - Agricultural, timber, & vacant: $11,597,128
  - Residential: $204,991,892
  - Industrial and commercial: $17,982,338
  - Total: $236,138,402
  - % Change: 102

- **Burnsville**
  - Agricultural, timber, & vacant: $21,977,283
  - Residential: $502,648,020
  - Industrial and commercial: $141,102,245
  - Total: $737,374,139
  - % Change: 201

- **Edina**
  - Agricultural, timber, & vacant: $23,607,953
  - Residential: $1,358,356,929
  - Industrial and commercial: $420,059,140
  - Total: $1,804,730,530
  - % Change: 70
Table 5.4.  Selected Property Values in Twin Cities (All property)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Total Value of all Real Property Per Square Mile
(Adjusted to 1988 dollars)

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1990 census will underscore continued strong population growth in adjacent counties, including St. Croix and Pierce Counties in Wisconsin, which border the metropolitan area across the state boundary to the east. There is little or nothing that even the most sophisticated policy can do to control growth beyond the region's boundaries. So the Metropolitan Council has to live with the frustrating knowledge that the effective metropolitan area has outgrown its reaches, and that it is not at all likely that its own range of authority will be extended.

**Fiscal Disparities Act**

The second important tool for rationalizing the causes and effects of regional locational choices has been the Fiscal Disparities Act, passed by the legislature in 1974. This was not a Metropolitan Council policy per se; the council had no mandate to involve itself with overall fiscal operations or budgeting for the region. Still, the fiscal disparities law is quite consistent with the long-range planning goals set by the council, and in light of its operations, it has moved the council further and further toward overall regional fiscal planning.

The fiscal disparities legislation mandated tax-base sharing throughout the metropolitan area. It was intended to remove the impact that accidents of location have on local units of government. The law set 1971 as a base year and stipulated that 40 percent of the net gain in tax revenues generated by new commercial and industrial development would go into a pool. This money would then be shared by units of government that could not generate new development of their own, according to a formula based on population weighted by every jurisdiction's fiscal capacity. What this meant in practice was that some of the financial benefits accruing to fast-growing suburban areas would partially devolve on less advantaged areas, including, for a time, both central cities. In 1980, 13 percent of the region's tax base ($328 million) was being shared, and most officials expected that this percentage would continue to grow (Naftalin and Brandl 1980). In practice, the bulk of these funds has gone to built-up suburbs that are predominantly residential and to growing suburbs with little industry. Both Minneapolis and St. Paul were net gainers in the early years of fiscal disparities financing, but as new downtown developments have increased their property tax bases, they have become net contributors in recent years.
Subsidized Housing

Another arena in which the decisions of the Metropolitan Council have been influential is that of helping to disperse subsidized housing fairly widely throughout the metropolitan area. This policy was a step away from the traditional physical development concerns of the early Metropolitan Council, and it was one that, to some degree, raised local government concerns about the propriety of the actions taken by the unelected council members. Like most other metropolitan areas in the U.S., the bulk of low-income housing constructed with federal subsidies in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s—outright public housing units as well as other sorts of subsidized housing units—was concentrated in the central cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis. Unlike many other U.S. metropolitan areas, however, most of the public housing and other subsidized units in the two central cities did not consist of the densely packed highrise towers made infamous when St. Louis imploded the Pruitt-Igoe project. Still, as in most other U.S. metropolitan areas, leaders in the two central cities had bemoaned what they identified as the unfair concentration of poor people for whom they then had to provide services. This concern meshed with observations made by advocates for the poor that the central cities were losing unskilled jobs, which were increasingly located in the suburbs, well away from the traditional areas that poor unskilled workers lived in or had access to.

Beginning in the late 1970s the Metro Council began a conscious policy of requiring that subsidized housing be scattered throughout the entire metropolitan area, rather than continuing to be concentrated in the two cities. There were many reasons for this new initiative: concerns about the regional supply of housing (amount, location, and cost), and the changing demographics of housing consumers; concerns about people’s locational choices relative to constrained energy supplies (this has turned out to be a nonissue so far); specific concerns about the restricted choices of housing options, particularly for poor people; recognition that young people at many income levels could not afford to buy the kinds of houses that they’d grown up in. Given this wide range of concerns, the council chose to try to influence some portions of these equations where it could. As the review agency for federal sewer, water, and road-building dollars, the council had a "carrot" that it could use to encourage municipalities to accept some of its wisdom on this issue.

Many municipalities throughout the area were fairly sanguine about the disbursement issue, since many suburbs had already created some
subsidized housing units for the elderly, and no one felt threatened by anyone’s poor grandma. But real concerns and real objections emerged when it became obvious that the council meant that subsidized family housing had to be scattered along with the elderly units. (The formal requirement was that no more than 60 percent of all new family subsidized housing could be built in the two central cities.) Suddenly the specter of major social dislocation arose, for many believed that this requirement implied that large numbers of poor minority families would now move into the mostly white Twin Cities suburbs, threatening property values, perceptions about prestigious schools, and innate feelings of security. Many suburban municipalities felt that they were already doing enough in the subsidized housing arena and that an unelected group of officials had no right dictating to local governments. (Remember that one of the council’s original charges was to recommend policies to local governments; no where did it say that the council should make local governments do what they were opposed to). Some suburban officials even got very defensive, going so far as to announce that they would do without federal funds rather than cave in to what they perceived as an intolerable intrusion in local affairs. Interestingly, there was even some opposition to the policy within the central city low-income community—here the concern was that the new policy would force people to move away from parts of the city where they felt comfortable, where they had a support network and nearby access to needed services.

Today far more suburban communities provide subsidized housing than did so in the early 1970s: 93 municipalities in 1986 versus 54 in 1971, despite steadily declining federal dollars to produce subsidized housing throughout the 1980s. Since 1983, over three times as many Section 8 new construction dollars have been spent in the suburbs than in St. Paul and Minneapolis combined, and this disproportionate allocation of resources has over time substantially altered the cumulative subsidized housing picture. In 1971 the two central cities held 90 percent of all subsidized units in the region, but by 1986 their combined allotment had decreased to 60 percent of the total; at the same time the suburban allocation had increased from 10 percent to 40 percent of the total (Vail and Zimbro 1986). And excepting only Scott and Carver counties, still the most rural parts of the metropolitan area, virtually all of the communities that had or have subsidized elderly projects have now built subsidized family projects as well.

In the years since the council’s implementation of the subsidized housing dispersal policy, some but not all of the misperceptions have
been laid to rest. Early opponents of the policy never considered the economic toll that divorce and nonpayment of child support might have on young people who grew up in their own communities. For example, studies have demonstrated that most who reside in subsidized suburban units come from the local community. In one suburb that boasts the state’s third highest median income, only 22 percent of the residents of a 126-unit mixed project (family/elderly/handicapped) come from either Minneapolis or St. Paul (Star and Tribune, Sept. 4, 1989). In this and other projects there are sizeable nonhousing resources devoted to improving the lives of residents, including adult education classes and field trips for the children. Still, there are obvious problems. While suburban subsidized housing seldom resembles classic central city projects, neither does it look much like nearby single family houses. Children who live in these units, who likely lack the most current fashion statements are sometimes stigmatized by other children; many of the single mothers who head these households feel embarrassed about using food stamps in local grocery stores; and there are strong local perceptions that increases in crime rates accompany the existence of subsidized family housing (Star and Tribune, Sept. 4, 1989).

But the most intransient current problem associated with both suburban and central city subsidized units is unrelated to location or to who lives there. Rather, a timebomb ticks away in the form of guidelines under which much of this housing was constructed. According to the regulations, the private developers of hundreds of thousands of subsidized units nationwide can prepay their federal mortgages beginning in 1990. When they do, the rents they charge will no longer be subject to any limits, and many households currently occupying subsidized units will be forced out. The units most threatened are precisely those in desirable locations, such as the fast-growing Twin Cities suburbs. There is little that the Metropolitan Council or any other agency can do to forestall the likely loss of much of this housing supply, short of intervening with mountains of cash to buy out developers—a tactic that one or two community development groups in Minneapolis are attempting for extremely endangered projects, with the city’s assistance. The difficulties presented by this situation clearly underscore some of the limits of regional planning efforts (at least those accomplished with federal financial assistance). There are few guarantees in this business, and no local or regional agency can hope to replace or replicate large-scale resources lost at the federal level.
The Metropolitan Council has not succeeded in everything it has attempted, but these three issues reasonably represent the challenges and the choices that the council has made over the past 20 years. Seldom have the council's policies been successfully argued or overturned, and that may be one measure of its success. Still, there is a sense that as the physical limits of the region expand beyond the seven-county reach of the Development Guide, there will be more and more dilemmas that the council simply cannot resolve under its current legislative charter.

Present Challenges

Several concerns of recent years highlight the still evolving regionalization that the greater Twin Cities area is now experiencing. And these evolving regional concerns and issues portend difficulties for the Metropolitan Council, apart from its physically delimited mandate. To the great surprise of many, and despite over 20 years of highly regarded planning experience, the regional arrangements and understandings are still not settled in the Twin Cities. As one of the few large metropolitan areas outside the Sunbelt that is still growing (something that few might have predicted 20 years ago), the Twin Cities area finds itself still facing issues that were thought to have been resolved, as well as having to meet new challenges.

A sample of this new understanding of the Twin Cities began to appear in the early 1980s. On the heels of a serious economic downturn that seemed to affect the entire state of Minnesota except the Twin Cities, talk of a dual economy began. This new discussion clearly distinguished between the bullish economy of the metropolitan region and everything else. Declining prices for land and crops throughout southern and western Minnesota eroded confidence in the agricultural sector just as the industrial potential of the Iron Range faded away. More and more Minnesotans came to realize that their own hopes for jobs and better lives depended on the continued success of the metropolitan area, and this created bad feelings in the nonmetropolitan areas of Minnesota as well as a great deal of pressure for the Twin Cities area. It also led, in part, to the Twin Cities redefining its own idea of itself and created some jurisdictional problems for the Metropolitan Council.

Within a short space of time in the early 1980s, a widespread recognition arose that a regional reorientation was underway. The entire region was viewed as being in competition with other successful North American metropolitan areas, especially for new jobs and new invest-
ments. This was quite a leap from the reigning perceptions of earlier decades when St. Paul and Minneapolis were often locked in competition for just about everything. In a metropolitan region that had prospered for over a century relying largely on its own growth and that of its hinterland, this new understanding caused inevitable conflict. It came at a time when Minneapolis and St. Paul had reined in most of their directly competitive instincts, with each city instead now viewing many of the suburban municipalities suspiciously. It was no great surprise that the newly perceived need for all players in the metropolitan arena to cooperate was not immediately and warmly embraced.

The best indicator of the region's growing sense of importance and the internal conflicts generated by this came with the nearly simultaneous talk about the need for a world trade center, for a "state-of-the-art" convention center, and for the largest shopping center/entertainment complex in the world—only the latter of which had an identified location attached. It did not help that the vision of all of these new additions to the region's landscape and job base followed in the wake of an acrimonious battle between Minneapolis and Bloomington over the siting of a new football/baseball stadium. Supporters of a Minneapolis site won the right to build a domed stadium, but in the process antagonized local community groups as well as the city of Bloomington, which faced losing the existing football/baseball stadium built over 20 years earlier. The prospect of multiple large new facilities started the competitive juices flowing in Minneapolis, and in St. Paul and in Bloomington, each of which wanted at least one if not all of the new projects.

The Metropolitan Council was drawn in when it was asked to review in turn the "regional significance" of the world trade center, the convention center, and what came to be called the "mega-mall." The council did not have much prior experience in determining what regional significance a particular building or set of buildings might have; its major past participation in this kind of determination was largely limited to performing needs assessments for new hospitals. It was also quite clear that there was little the council could do to halt the locational conflict. If it found a negative regional effect, it still had no real power or authority to prevent the construction of whatever facility was being considered. The only real recourse was to appeal to the legislature to deny funding for these projects. In addition, it was not at all clear that any of the cities would accept a negative finding without challenge, given the investment and jobs base that was at stake.
The council conducted rather perfunctory reviews of the world trade center and of the convention center. The primary concern revolved around the pressure that each project would exert on the region's highways, and whether capacity needed to be increased to accommodate any of these projects. Essentially the council ended up declaring that there was no regional significance to these projects, at least none that would adversely affect the rest of the metropolitan area. Astute observers found some irony in this, since both projects had been touted as being crucially important to the future of the entire state.

To the casual observer it undoubtedly looked as if a trade-off of some sort had been made. St. Paul got the world trade center (opened for business in 1987) and Minneapolis got the convention center (now completed, but partially opened in summer 1989). Though each city submitted a fairly weak proposal for the other's project, each finally received the project that it most wanted. These two cities then turned around and worked together to try to prevent Bloomington from becoming the site of the mega-mall. There was perhaps more at stake for all of the players in the mega-mall project—the world trade center was really just another large office building, despite its international pretensions, and the convention center was really only intended to be a larger, more up-to-date version of the facility that Minneapolis already had. And while the convention center would eventually involve a hotel and other new facilities, and would likely draw some business away from St. Paul's Civic Center, the entire complex would not significantly rearrange the existing situation whereby most major conventions went to Minneapolis.

Bloomington's mega-mall was to be built on the site of the former Metropolitan Stadium, an irony that was not entirely lost on Minneapolis politicians. With its amusement park, office space, and projected 600-800 stores (including anchor tenants new to the Twin Cities), it posed a real threat to both downtowns, as well as to other shopping centers near and far. In addition to the mega-mall's potential negative impact on retailing throughout the metropolitan area, there was serious and reasonable concern about its effect on the already overcrowded beltline freeway separating its site from that of area's international airport. Promoters of the mega-mall (the Ghermezian brothers who had recently built a similar behemoth shopping center in Edmonton) maintained that the new mall would draw in so many new visitors (second only to the Disney centers) that existing retailers need not worry. They further contended that, because Minnesota was so fortunate to have this development, the state should gratefully supply any and all road improvements.
The Metropolitan Council’s "significance" review of the Bloomington project was a good deal more thorough than the other projects, if only because this was clearly to be a major new addition to the Twin Cities. There was also added pressure from all of the public and private interests that were opposed to a development of this size and kind, as well as from its supporters, including the governor of Minnesota. For a time there was a frenzy of discussion about the likely impacts of the project, on the editorial pages and among the Twin Cities’ numerous public policy interest groups. Despite the clamor and widespread opposition—including some from Bloomington citizens wary of the bonding arrangements that city was about to make—the council’s report finally found no reason to discourage the construction of the mega-mall. It noted the traffic problems that the new project would exacerbate, but even this was not seen as sufficient reason for a negative finding.

It is an interesting exercise to speculate about what the outcome might have been, had the council determined that the mega-mall’s regional impact was too great. Most would probably agree that the effect would have been negligible and that the mega-mall would eventually have been built anyway. (Construction finally began in the summer of 1989, with commitments from four national retailers in hand, and after a major U.S. mall developer was brought in to assume a partnership role.) It is not clear that the council’s opposition could have survived Bloomington’s almost certain legal challenge, or that its influence might not have been diminished even more by opposing something that the governor enthusiastically supported. Moreover, it is still unclear what the ultimate effect of the mega-mall (now christened the "Mall of America") will be on the local retailing scene. Despite consultants’ glowing predictions that the mall will draw 40 million tourists, and despite one analyst’s amazing description of the Twin Cities as "undermalled," local skeptics worry that if the mega-mall succeeds several local regional malls will be decimated, and both of the downtowns will also be adversely affected. Battle lines have already been drawn: Dayton’s, the area’s local retailing giant, refused to participate in the new mall, and has instead significantly expanded and upgraded two of its suburban stores (having revamped both of its downtown stores); the contest with Minneapolis continues unabated, with the downtown transforming itself into the Upper Midwest’s "upscale" retail center (Saks Fifth Avenue and the country’s second largest Polo store have opened, as has Nieman Marcus). If anything, this situation highlights the Metropolitan Council’s problematic stance when it tries to sort out locational decisions over which there are
conflicts. The agency's all-too-apparent lack of enforcement power renders it almost useless at times like these; someone is bound to challenge whatever decision the council makes, and there is always the possibility of appeal to the legislature.

Another major issue that the Metropolitan Council has addressed in recent years is whether the Twin Cities International Airport will be able to meet the travel demands of the 21st century. For policymakers, the knowledge that between 1980 and 1985 passenger traffic at Twin Cities International had increased at more than twice the national average was a red flag (Airport Adequacy Task Force 1988). If this rate of expansion were to continue, then the current airport would soon be obsolete. If there were to be a new airport built, it would be far into the future and would have a major regional impact. It would also represent a major regional investment, so regionwide advance discussion and deliberation by the regional planning agency seemed entirely appropriate.

Unlike the projects discussed above, the question of airport adequacy, along with discussion of the potential need for a new airport, is quite consistent with the Metro Council's traditional long-range planning efforts. Another, perhaps crucial, difference is the fact that the legislature requested this study long in advance of the need for a final decision; the council was not having to respond to an immediate locational problem or choice.

In the years since airline deregulation the Twin Cities airport has become a touchstone for conflict, particularly surrounding the issue of significantly increased noise over nearby residential areas. The mid-1980s merger of Republic Airlines and Northwest Airlines turned the Twin Cities into a major hub for Northwest and also created a near-monopoly situation for air travelers. The Metro Council had not been a major arbiter of the noise issue, nor had it been much involved in the merger discussion and all the ancillary concerns that accompanied it. Because any discussion involving the airport was obviously going to become a highly politicized, it surprised many when the council took on the question of the airport's future. The council had come to be thought of as an administrative agency, so the reassertion of its planning function was a bit anomalous.

Being a planning agency, the Metropolitan Council approached the airport adequacy question in a very methodical way. A 35-member task force with wide-ranging representation from the community was created and charged with the task of studying the adequacy issue for eight months and reporting back to the council with its recommendations. The
council would then hold public hearings and forward its own recommendations to the legislature. The council recognized that its work was really very preliminary and that the legislature rather than the council would be making the final decision; still, by shaping the study and shaping the questions that were asked, the council would stand to play a major role in whatever decision finally got made.

The task force began its work in February of 1988, with representatives from the airlines, from all levels of government, from business, from local communities, and from the general public. It reached far and wide for experts and consultants on everything from forecasting future travel trends to thinking about how the current airport site should be used if a new facility were built. Throughout the process the task force asked four key questions: Will air traffic outstrip the present system, and when might that happen? What level of service does the region want and expect? What are the consequences (economic, social, environmental) of failing to meet demand? Should the region start land-banking for a new airport or not (Apogee Research 1988)? Several realities were ever-present: (1) no one could say with certainty what 21st century travel patterns might be, particularly given possible technological changes and improvements; (2) the cost of doing nothing would be high, particularly if air travel needs could not be met; (3) the cost of making the wrong assumptions would be even higher, particularly for the region’s long-range economic prospects. After much discussion, forecasting, and producing reams of reports, the Task Force emerged in late 1988 with its findings. Among them:

- the health of the metropolitan area, and of a large multi-state region, depends on good air service,
- it is highly likely that demand will exceed capacity at the current airport within 10 years,
- the metropolitan area will risk economic losses if airport capacity is not expanded within 30 years,
- significant physical constraints will prohibit sufficient expansion of the current facility, and
- it is likely that noise (and complaints about noise) will continue to increase, despite the introduction of quieter airplanes (Airport Adequacy Task Force 1988).

The task force recommended continuous monitoring of demand trends at the airport and also proposed a two-track planning strategy. It recognized the immediate need to improve the airport’s current congestion by proposing that a new north-south runway be built by the mid-1990s. It
looked toward future needs by recommending that the Metro Council and the Airports Commission initiate a search and site selection process for a new airport by 1995, with an eye toward building a new facility after the year 2005, should that become necessary. It also recommended that the Metro Council and the Airports Commission adopt an intergovernmental agreement by the end of 1989 that would specify what each agency’s areas of responsibility would be.

The task force’s thoughtful and sensible deliberations smoothed over many of the controversies surrounding any discussion of the airport, but its final report spurred both anger and debate. The idea of expanding the current airport is anathema to almost all who live nearby, in particular to residents of Richfield, some of whose homes would be taken to accommodate the expansion. The idea of relocating the airport, while appealing to residents affected by noise, poses problems for nearby businesses that depend on airport traffic, as well as for businesses in both downtowns that are well-served by the current facility. There is no doubt that any new airport will be much further away, making accessibility to it for much of the region more difficult, and even raising the question opens possibilities that alarm many residents. At the moment there are three sites being considered, two in the far southern portion of the metro area, and one to the north—all are being resisted by local forces. The proposal for selecting the site north of the far northeastern edge of the seven-county metro area is especially problematic. Discussion is being framed largely as an economic development tool for northern Minnesota (the dual economy discussion revisited).

The response from most in the metropolitan area has been disdain or disbelief—it seemed preposterous on the face of it to think of a new airport 25-75 miles away, and farthest away from the largest concentration of people in the region. Residents in the area near the proposed site, largely farmers and small town residents, were extremely negative, claiming it would destroy their way of life, and that they would resist the intrusion of noise and traffic that an airport would surely bring. The difficulty with this particular proposal, and one reason why it may not languish, is that the affected area is represented by a congressman who sits on the House transportation committee, and who apparently thinks this is a fine way to draw new resources into the northern part of the state. Should such considerations begin to affect future airport discussions, they will defeat the purpose of the task force’s work, and raise even stronger questions about the efficacy of long-range planning in the Twin Cities region.
There are many other issues of regional magnitude that the Metro Council could take on, but likely will not. Probably the most important, the most difficult, and the issue least likely to be confronted on a regional scale, is public education and the perceived/real imbalances between the central city and suburban school districts. Despite a national reputation for strong public schools, Minnesota has lately come to face educational challenges akin to those in other parts of the country. This is perhaps best exemplified by the current Minneapolis situation: with a minority population of about 22 percent, the public schools have now reached a combined minority enrollment (black, Asian, American Indian) of over 50 percent, with all of the problems for continued segregation that such figures imply—and St. Paul’s situation is not radically different. More of the children in public schools, white as well as minority, are from single-parent households, and many are economically as well as educationally disadvantaged. While the state government has leapt into the education fray with incentives for open enrollment, allowing parents (with some restrictions) to choose schools regardless of district of residence, there are few who believe that this will be enough to maintain a reasonable level of desegregation in the central cities or to promote more integration in the suburban districts.

Other social concerns, largely national in scope, affect certain parts of the region—the core areas of the two cities—more than others. Difficult issues abound: growing numbers of homeless people, increases in teenage pregnancies, decreasing educational attainments for low-income children, and the presence of "crack" and other drugs that torment and tear apart entire neighborhoods. It should not surprise us that the Metropolitan Council, or any other local unit of government, is reluctant to tackle problems that resist even federal intervention. Almost none of these are exclusively the problems of just Minneapolis and St. Paul, though most of the local discussion leaves an impression that the suburbs are largely untouched. Unfortunately, most of these issues are not amenable to local or regional solutions, particularly if the widespread perception is that the problem is limited to only a portion of the metropolitan area. But it is also obvious that energy for new social improvements will have to come from local initiatives, because local areas live with the consequences of these problems. What is unclear in all of this is the role there might be for the Metropolitan Council, or for any other regional institutional structure with no real enforcement powers. Should the council ever become elected, or have its persuasive powers restored to the level of the 1960s and 1970s, some creative discussion of
these problems—along the lines of the subsidized housing initiatives—might become possible. No one locally expects this to happen anytime soon.

CONCLUSION

Many, perhaps competing, conclusions about the Twin Cities' metropolitan arrangements may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. One disheartening aspect for long-time observers of the local scene is the sheer amount of time that seems to go into maintaining what metropolitan consensus we have. Virtually every major policy issue in the Twin Cities has been given a life of its own through endless study and debate, and one wonders when concerned citizens will run out of energy to carry on the necessarily time-consuming process of achieving consensus.

The fragility of the regional relationships that have evolved in the Twin Cities is evident. A system that was created to respond to clear physical development concerns of the 1960s has had some difficulty responding to the more diversified concerns of the late 1980s. Despite many years of de jure metropolitan cooperation, there is a de facto lack of consensus on many issues that have metropolitan significance. Challenges to the current arrangements are abundant, among the strongest being the spatial growth of the Twin Cities area and the increasing role that the counties are being asked to play in programmatic and policy areas (especially Hennepin County with half of the entire metropolitan population).

Another possible view of the Metropolitan Council’s experience over the past 20 years might hold that it has in some ways succeeded too well. The early and important successes of the council may have locked it and its constituents into predetermined ideas about what it does or should do. It will be an enormous challenge for the council to refocus or reshape the general understanding that most in the region have of it. Many issues now facing the region and the council are far beyond the purview established by the council 20 years ago. These new issues threaten to overtake the traditional planning concerns overseen by the council, even as the planning issues themselves continue to expand. This places the council in the challenging position of having to grow in many directions at once, if it is to continue to have any regional influence.

Whether or not the early and eager metropolitanizing instincts of the Twin Cities can be maintained, duplicated, or revived, or whether the entire enterprise will wither away from disinterest, irrelevance, or open
challenge, is a question that needs an answer in the near future. That answer, when it comes, will likely not emanate from the Metropolitan Council itself. The severity of this situation came into clear focus in early 1991 when the new Republican governor of Minnesota essentially gave the council a two-year deadline in which to figure out its purpose or he would propose its abolition. In response, the council and its staff are now increasing their visibility vis-à-vis local units of government and have once again embarked on a series of long-range planning discussions. Probably, the state legislature, local municipalities, the counties, and even areas beyond the current limits of Metropolitan Council authority, will provide whatever assessment of the council that is forthcoming, and will determine the future status of whatever metropolitan arrangements continue as the Twin Cities moves into the 21st century.