REFERENCES


Edmonton: Planning in the Metropolitan Region

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Edmonton, the capital of Alberta, is located on the North Saskatchewan River almost at the geographical center of the province. It is the most northerly city of its size in Canada. The topography of the surrounding region is characterized by river valleys and creek ravines with high escarpments, rolling and hilly terrain to the west of the city, gently rolling terrain to the southeast, and level to undulating land in the remainder of the area.

The city is surrounded by rich agricultural lands that are found in a crescent-shaped area beginning southwest of the city, proceeding to the north and around to the east. The level, undulating lands—some of the best of the province’s Chernozemic soils (grades A and B) found throughout 65 percent of the region are especially suited for crop production and dairy farming. In addition, there are valuable natural resources consisting of coal, sand, gravel, and most importantly, large quantities of conventional oil and natural gas that were discovered in the late 1940s throughout the region. These discoveries were major factors in the transformation of Alberta’s economy and provided the impetus for the rapid urbanization of the region (Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission 1984, 1).

The economy of the area has always been dependent on key staples, beginning with furs, then grain and animal products, and most recently petroleum, natural gas, and wood pulp. Significant development of secondary industry did not occur until after World War II. Presently, the region has one of the largest concentrations of manufacturing in western Canada, comprised of "basic goods" such as petroleum, coal, and chemical products that are marketed in the United States and eastern Canada. "Nonbasic" manufacturing serving the western Canadian market consists of food and beverage industries, metal fabricating, printing,
textiles, clothing, wood products, and furniture. The rapidly expanding tertiary sector of the economy consisting of transportation, communications, utilities, as well as the retail and service trades such as finance, insurance, real estate, business services, public administration, and defense has experienced dramatic growth since 1970. With the urbanization of the region and the diversification of the economy, employment in the primary sector declined from approximately 8 percent in 1961 to 3.7 percent in 1981. Today, less than 2 percent of the area's labor force is in agriculture, which remains the most land intensive component of the economy (Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission 1984, 62).

COMMUNITIES OF THE EDMONTON SUBREGION

The development of the metropolitan region is distinctly unicentric. The city of Edmonton by virtue of its size, diverse functions, power, and influence, dominates the region. Several smaller cities, towns, villages, and hamlets, many of which functioned initially as service centers for an agricultural economy, are arranged in a concentric pattern around the city. The development and growth of some of the newer urban and suburban centers occurred after the discovery of oil.

The "inner metropolitan area" consists of Edmonton, the historic city of Saint Albert just beyond its northwest border, and the "hamlet" of Sherwood Park, a comparatively new community approximately five miles beyond the city's eastern boundary. Saint Albert's history goes back to 1861, when a Roman Catholic Mission settlement was established there. It has functioned as an important center for church administration in western Canada ever since. It became a village in 1899, a town in 1904, a "New Town" in 1957, reverted to town status in 1962, and became a city in 1977. Its population increased seven-fold between 1957 and 1966, from 1,350 to 9,700 persons. By 1990 its population had quadrupled and stood at 40,707 persons (Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission, winter 90/91, 5). It functions today essentially as a "dormitory residential suburb" for the region, with most of its labor force employed in the city of Edmonton. The hamlet of Sherwood Park, an unincorporated "urban center" of almost 35,000 persons, owes its existence to a controversial 1955 agreement signed between several developers and the Municipal District of Strathcona. Despite strong objections voiced by the city of Edmonton to the creation of a new town on 15 quarter sections of farm land just beyond "Refinery
Row" on its eastern boundary, the Department of Municipal Affairs approved its development. Today, the hamlet remains as an unincorporated "dormitory suburb" governed by the rural county of Strathcona.

The "outer metropolitan area," which grew significantly in the late sixties and early seventies, consists of several communities within 30 miles of the city center. Most of the growth can be attributed to the availability of low-priced, serviceable land for housing during a time when there were shortages of reasonably priced residential lots in the city of Edmonton. The growth of Leduc, Fort Saskatchewan, Spruce Grove, Stony Plain, and Morinville in this period was mainly in the residential sector with very little in the industrial/commercial sector (Alberta, Dept. of Municipal Affairs 1969).

The town of Devon, about 20 miles southwest of Edmonton, in the heart of the Leduc oil field, had its beginnings in the late forties as a company town established by Imperial Oil to house the sudden influx of workers to the area. To the south and west of the town are the communities of Calmar and Thorsby. Further southwest, well beyond Edmonton's commuter shed, lies the oil town of Drayton Valley, which was included within the Edmonton Regional Planning District until the early '80s. North of Saint Albert are the towns of Morinville and Legal. East of them are the communities of Bon Accord, Gibbons, and Redwater. The latter, located close to a major oil field, is somewhat beyond commuting distance of Edmonton. To the south and east of the hamlet of Sherwood Park is the rapidly expanding dormitory suburb of Beaumont, while several miles beyond lies the tiny village of New Sarepta. Three rural counties, Leduc, Parkland, and Strathcona, and the Municipal District of Sturgeon form a part of the outer metropolitan area. Within the region there are also two Indian reserves, one on Edmonton's western boundary and the other immediately west of Morinville; an international airport between Edmonton and Leduc;and a Canadian Air Forces Base in Namao, along Edmonton's northern periphery. Local autonomy, long fostered by the provincial government, is one of the overriding features of the political architecture of the region. Edmonton's dominance as a commercial and governmental centre with overwhelming influence is feared and resisted by many of the region's smaller communities. Local officials admit that although the communities are interdependent in many ways, their residents continue to be parochial and lack a "sense of region." This reality poses significant problems for planning at the metropolitan level. It is not only asymmetrical relationships between Edmonton and the smaller communities that pose obstacles to regional
Map 6.1. Edmonton Region Planning Area

Edmonton Regional Planning Commission

Preliminary Regional Plan Metropolitan Part
cooperation, but also disagreements among the smaller municipalities. Recent land annexation conflicts between the county of Strathcona and the city of Fort Saskatchewan have strained otherwise, long-standing, collaborative relationships. The city proposed to annex additional land for industrial zoning south and east of the city. The county of Strathcona objected to the annexation as an intrusion on property that it wanted for its own industrial development. In the spring of 1991 the provincial cabinet ruled that the city could annex the land but would have to share the tax revenue derived from it with the county (City of Fort Saskatchewan, Minutes of Regular Council Meeting, March 25, 1989; EMRPC, Metro Planning Review, Spring 1991). A short distance away, the city of Leduc has had an ongoing disagreement with the county of Leduc and several smaller communities over the use of its city-financed services by noncity residents. Some of the latter are settled in areas zoned "country residential" where, apart from roads and electricity, there is a complete absence of urban services (interview with Leduc Mayor Oscar Klack, July 24, 1989). Throughout the region as a whole the conversion of prime agricultural land to "country residential," under provisions of a provincial act that had as its initial purpose assisting veterans in acquiring small land holdings to supplement wages, has caused both concern and controversy. As of 1984, "country residential" land use, with parcels averaging 5.2 acres, absorbed about 60,800 acres of land in the metropolitan region within commuting range of Edmonton. Approximately one third of this land is rated as Class 1, 2, and 3 land for agricultural capability. Many officials in Edmonton and other established communities view country residential as one of the most inefficient and reckless land uses permitted in the area. Comparatively, country residential land use equals in territory all the land used currently by urban municipalities in the region (EMRPC 1984, 96-97). The most controversial issues pitting Edmonton against its neighboring communities in the last quarter century has involved boundaries and governance of the region as a whole (Hanson 1956; McNally Royal Commission 1956).

POPULATION GROWTH AND CHARACTERISTICS

Population growth in Edmonton and surrounding regions reflects the city's changing role over the years as a staples service center for furs, agriculture, and mining (petroleum and natural gas). Wide fluctuations in the economy of the region are reflected in population growth during the past 90 years. Throughout the region responses of local governments
to buoyant economic conditions and rapid population growth varied, but
in the main they sought to make land available and committed themselves
to the provision of the basic infrastructure and the usual range of essential
services. In early times investments in these areas were based largely on
sheer speculation whereas in more recent years computer-generated
growth scenarios provide their justification. Because the economy of the
province is largely staples-dependent, changes in levels of economic
activity can occur suddenly and with little warning.

As the economy of such a region enters a "bust" phase, local govern-
ments frequently are faced with financial commitments far in excess of
projected revenues, leaving them with two undesirable options, either
increasing taxes or reducing the levels of service. The three pivotal
periods in the history of Edmonton and the region were the years between
1910-1913, the era from the beginning of World War II to 1957, and the
decade of the "oil price revolutions" from 1971 to 1981.

Edmonton's population of 2,626 in 1901 grew to 27,000 in 1909 and
almost tripled by 1914 when it reached 72,516. The peak years of the
land and railway induced boom were 1911 and 1912, when the increase
amounted to 98 percent! This included the population of the town of
Strathcona, which had amalgamated with Edmonton in 1912. With the
collapse of the boom, the city's population plunged 27.5 percent by 1916,
not to surpass its peak again until 1929. With the onset of the Great
Depression, Edmonton experienced virtually no growth as an estimated
250,000 persons outmigrated from Alberta to other areas of Canada. A
sudden increase in growth occurred during World War II when the city
in 1942 became a strategic center for northern military operations that
included the building of the Alaska Highway. Following the war and its
"mini-boom" Alberta faced a bleak economic future with a very real
likelihood of outmigration of its citizens.

The discovery of oil in the Leduc field in 1947 provided the pivotal
event that led to an uninterrupted, if sometimes uneven, period of growth
in the province. From 1925 to 1947 the average rate of population
increase was 2.8 percent, with variations in the rate ranging from a -0.8
percent decrease in 1932 to a 9.1 percent increase in 1943. Growth after
1947 continued its upward trend, subject to variations in the rate of
economic activity. It was during the "oil price revolution" of the 1970s
that growth peaked with about 24,000 persons added to the metropolitan
population each year. The end of the oil and real estate mega-boom
years in 1981 brought an economic recession to the area. As the flow of
immigrants diminished radically and outmigration increased, population
Figure 6.1.  *Edmonton Population 1899-1990*

Source: City Assessors Dept
growth through the eighties was limited largely to natural increase. It was not until 1990 that Alberta experienced once again at least three consecutive quarters of growth due to immigration.

**DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION GROWTH IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA**

Over 90 percent of the region’s growth resides in urban municipalities that range in size from less than 500 in New Sarepta to over a half million persons in the city of Edmonton. Although fluctuations in the urban segment of the population have been minor, there has been a shift in the way in which it has been distributed within the region. Between 1961 and 1971 the city of Edmonton housed about 85 percent of the total population of the area, but by 1981 this had declined to 74 percent as nearby surrounding municipalities captured about 17 percent of the region’s growth. In the early eighties, following debate over a highly controversial annexation proposal submitted by Edmonton, the minister of municipal affairs suggested that 75 percent of future population growth should be concentrated in the city. (Alberta Order in Council issued upon the recommendation of the Minister of Municipal Affairs, December 31, 1981.)

In 1961 there were 98,000 private households in the metropolitan region. By 1981 there was a 150 percent increase in this sector. The major change during the period was the decline in average household size from 3.9 persons in 1961 to 3.4 in 1976 and to 2.8 in 1981. In Edmonton the average household size declined to 2.7 whereas smaller centers and rural municipalities tended to have larger households. The trend toward lower average household size coupled with an ongoing preference for owner-occupied, single, detached, family homes in low density developments had a significant impact on land use. By 1981, because of lowering of household size the region needed 65,000 more housing units than would have been the case if household size had remained at the 1961 levels (Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission 1986).
EDMONTON’S EARLY YEARS

Physical Economic and Social Forces that Shaped City and Region

Recent discoveries reveal that Edmonton’s river valley setting attracted settlement about five thousand years ago when it served as a gathering place for roving bands of hunters. Edmonton’s modern history may be traced to 1754 when it is believed that the explorer Anthony Henday wintered at the site. By the 1790s a series of fortified fur trading posts of the North West Company and the Hudson Bay Company were established in the region. When the two companies amalgamated in 1821, Edmonton House became the leading fur trading center for all the western prairies (MacGregor 1981, 49).

It was not until the late 1800s that settlement began to take place beyond the river fort, albeit slowly. A survey done for the Department of the Interior of the Dominion Lands Office dated May 25, 1883, shows that the original core settlement consisted of 45 property owners, each with a pie-sliced portion of the river frontage. In addition, the Hudson Bay Company had a very sizeable reserve of land beyond its fort to the north (City of Edmonton 1967, 13). By 1910 the city had "adopted the standard Grid Dominion Land Survey pattern for streets and parks and extended this form beyond the river lots, which themselves projected about a mile from each bank of the river. Superimposed on this pattern is a system of diagonal arterial streets that trace the routes of the original paths and trails into the City" (City of Edmonton 1967, 13).

The pace of settlement remained slow until the coming of the railways. Although the North Saskatchewan River provided Edmonton with steamboat passage to Winnipeg, the waterway, "with its shallows, current and shifting sand bars, made overland trails necessary in the pre-railway era" (Careless 1977, 127). The historian Careless notes that Edmonton like other prairie cities as well as Vancouver, the coastal city, "were to a critical degree creations of the railway, a fact that marks them off in a significant way from the older communities of eastern Canada" (Careless 1977, 129). Edmontonians who had hoped that theirs would be the first city in Alberta to be served by a transcontinental railway were deeply disappointed when the federal government, after some wavering, decided to build the Canadian Pacific Railway along a southern route to Calgary and then across the mountains to Vancouver. The first trains arrived in Calgary in 1883. It was nine years later that the Calgary and
Edmonton Railway was completed as far as Strathcona on the south side of the North Saskatchewan River. By 1902 the Edmonton, Yukon, and Pacific Railway crossed the Low Level Bridge and connected the city with the Calgary and Edmonton Railway. In 1905 Edmontonians were triply blessed—the transcontinental Canadian Northern Railway arrived, Alberta was granted provincial status, and Edmonton was chosen after much political jockeying to be its capital. In 1913 the Canadian Pacific Railway extended the C & E R line across the North Saskatchewan River to a terminal at Jasper Avenue and 109th street and the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, with a route from Winnipeg to Prince Rupert gave the city a second transcontinental railway in 1914. Unfortunately this also marked the first year of the collapse of the economic boom that had been fueled by the arrival of the railways.

Edmonton's dramatic growth from a fur-trading post to a sizeable urban community sparked a wave of boosterism typical of early city development on the prairie west. As the railways brought a flood of settlers to the area to farm the rich black soils of the region or to labor within the city the growing dominance of Edmonton as an agricultural service and railway hub was well established. If Canada was the "land of opportunity," Edmonton was certainly the heart of the "Last Best West" where newcomers could secure 160 acres of land free and undertake any style of farming they wished (Scott 1910). As early as 1910, Edmonton was heralded as "The coming Metropolis of the Canadian Northwest. The Gateway to the Mystic Northland . . . and the market place of one of the richest areas in the world" (Edmonton Journal). Although it still had the "greatest traffic in raw furs on the continent," now "the keynote is struck when the magic word LAND is mentioned" (Edmonton Journal). As the boom reached its full bloom in 1912 the city's mayor declared in the anniversary issue of the Edmonton Bulletin that given its location in the midst of a fertile land, role as a staging center for the settlement of the great Peace River country, potential for industrial development, and the special advantage of municipally owned services such as water, electric light, and power, it was destined that there be a greater Edmonton (Edmonton Bulletin 1912). The city's regional advantage, combined with the business acumen of "Land Men eager to exert all legitimate and trustworthy efforts to build up their business, and "wide awake and progressive men and capitalists (who) recognized the opportunities . . . " would assure Edmonton's future greatness as the "metropolis of the North Country, the Winnipeg of the far North-West" (Edmonton Bulletin 1912). By 1914 the boom, with all
the dreams of urban greatness it had spawned had run its course, leaving in its wake a legacy of unused lots and a huge civic debt.

Weaver, in an essay on Edmonton's "perilous course" between 1904-1929 writes, "In the golden year of the prairie boom, 1912, Edmonton consisted of as much fancy as fact. The city maps, bait for real estate speculators, sketched in streets that did not even exist—some never would" (Weaver, n.d.). In his classic study of urban government in Alberta, Hanson referring to the effect of the boom on city boundaries wrote, "The question of boundaries and area caused difficulties then as now. One of the members of the first Alberta legislature once said that all a place needed to qualify as a town was an optimist to draw an imaginary line and to call it Crystal City . . . some promoters even advertised lots outside boundaries of cities and towns as parts of such centers . . . . In Edmonton in 1913 even lots in the North Saskatchewan River were sold to unsuspecting buyers in Eastern Canada and the United States" (Hanson 1956).

In addition to the outmigation of residents after the boom, Edmonton experienced a dramatic devaluation of its real estate sector. In anticipation of unlimited city growth, owners of land in the region subdivided their properties and requested the city to extend services to them. When real estate values collapsed they had but two options, either to hold on to these properties in expectation of a revival in the market at some future date or simply abandon them. Most chose the latter course with the result that the city ended up as a major landholder through tax forfeitures. The city tried repeatedly to sell off the land but found virtually no buyers for the 44,348 lots or parcels repossessed between 1918 and 1927. In 1937, during the depth of the depression, the author of a brief prepared by several cities of Alberta for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations reported that as of December 31, 1936, "the total number of parcels of land forfeited to the City of Edmonton stood at 56,743, the assessed value being $10,279,032. The total lots contained within the City limits amount to 110,000 and from this it will be seen that the physical basis of taxation available to the City has now shrunk to 53,257 lots" (Duggan 1938). In 1914, the assessment of land based on the Single Property Tax (i.e., only on land, with buildings and improvements exempt), amounted to $191,283,970. By 1937, as a result of progressive reductions, Edmonton land assessment had shrunk to $24,018, 515, even when buildings and improvements were included. Such was the effect of the depression's deflation (Duggan 1938)! Apart from the annexation of a .3 square mile of land in 1917, the city had acquired
enough land after the boom years to last it until 1947 when it again began annexing land along its periphery (City of Edmonton Planning Department 1972).

In appraising the nature and functions of early governance in western cities, Careless found that even in the smallest communities where face-to-face interaction was a daily occurrence "municipal elites" emerged with links to prominent merchants, lawyers, and "lesser entrepreneurs" (Careless 1977). Edmonton incorporated as a town in 1892 when its area encompassed 2,168 acres of land along the north side of the North Saskatchewan River, and its population numbered 700 persons. In 1904 the town applied to the Northwest Legislature for incorporation as a city, and a new charter was given it along with an additional 2,400 acres. The civic leaders, drawn predominantly from the city’s merchant class, were committed to ideas put forth by the municipal reform movement in the United States and chose a Council-Commission Board of government. It featured an elected "nonpartisan" council that delegated administrative powers to several commissioners.

A major feature of the city’s early government was the municipal ownership of utilities. Civic leaders, claiming that such ownership would assure a high moral tone in city politics, as well as provide superior, efficient service to the citizens, decided that the city should own all utilities except natural gas. The city took over a privately held electric utility, the forerunner of today’s Edmonton Power Company, began operating a publicly owned telephone service, appropriately named, Edmonton Telephone, and requested permission from the provincial government to establish a city-owned streetcar system. In 1908, the senior government passed the Edmonton Tramway Act, which authorized the city to establish a tramway system and extend its lines to any point "not more than 80 miles from existing boundaries" (Province of Alberta 1908). The system, operated as a public service utility, had an immediate and significant impact on consolidating patterns of residential settlement within the city. It was greeted with much enthusiasm by land owners and real estate speculators who viewed the system’s expansion as a prime means for enhancing their property values. By 1910, Edmonton had built 2.25 miles of street railways, purchased 13 streetcars, and transported 2,299,762 riders. By the end of the boom in mid-1913 the system had expanded to 40 miles of track with 66 streetcars and an annual ridership of 17,000,000. It is of interest to note that by 1939, the year in which the trackage of the system peaked, Edmonton had built only an additional 16 miles of track in the intervening years. During the boom years growth
in other parts of the urban infrastructure proceeded at breath-taking pace. Street paving, installation of water mains and sewers, and extension of sidewalks all reflected boom-time growth (*Edmonton Journal* 1913).

Edmonton’s civic boosters did have some very tangible evidence to support their dreams of the city’s future greatness. Property assessment grew from $6,620,985 in 1905 to $180,000,000 in 1913 (*Edmonton Journal* 1913). According to Hanson, by the end of the boom years Alberta was left with “highly developed local government services. The cities, especially, had constructed facilities which were to prove adequate for decades” (Hanson 1956). For Edmonton, the facilities did not come without a very heavy price. By mid-1913 the city had piled up a debt of $22,313,968!

The excesses of speculative activity in Edmonton and Calgary during the boom years did not go unnoticed by the provincial government, which took several initiatives aimed at monitoring and regulating growth in the cities. In order to reign in the speculators and would-be developers the government took steps to standardize practices related to land use and development throughout the entire province. It passed a series of acts aimed at rationalizing the process of town and city building and asserted its legislative responsibility for the spatial ordering of villages, towns, and cities.

**Planning Legislation and Urban Growth: 1912-1945**

In 1912, Alberta’s government enacted legislation that distinguished between town and municipal organization, established a Department of Municipal Affairs to implement the Town Act, a Rural Municipal Districts Act, a Village Act, and an Improvement District Act. The Department of Municipal Affairs undertook the responsibility for regulating municipal records and auditing local governments thus establishing uniform expectations of local officials throughout the province. By passing the first Town Planning Act in 1913 the government provided the legislation that when implemented at the local level, would limit unbridled land speculation (Province of Alberta 1913).

By passing legislation related to town and rural development the provincial government was carrying out the responsibilities decreed by the BNA Act of 1867. Urban and rural municipalities are creatures of the province with delegated responsibilities. Local government constitutes a subordinate "third order" of governance in the Canadian federal system. A "fourth order" may exist in the form of school and library boards,
utility districts, planning commissions, etc., but these also, like municipal
governments, are subject to the authority of the provincial government.

In Alberta, all provincial administrations, although possessing
ultimate authority over local urban and rural municipalities, gave the
latter wide latitude with respect to local development. According to
Masson, this philosophical commitment to local autonomy prevented the
province from evolving a provincewide plan for coping with problems
created by rapid urbanization, especially in recent years. At the same
time, the commitment to local autonomy served the province well. "The
provincial government realized that a strong network of local govern-
ments would relieve pressure on the province to provide public goods and
services" (Masson 1985).

The Town Planning Act of 1913 gave the minister of municipal
affairs wide-ranging powers. Its intent was clearly to centralize authority
for planning in the provincial government. Prior to the creation of the
department there had been some controls governing the spatial ordering
of cities. For example, at the time of Edmonton’s incorporation in 1904
a grid system of street alignment was already in place. In 1906, the
province enacted regulations with respect to water mains, sewers, fire
access, and telephone post location. Streets and back lanes were to be
included in all subdivision plans, and city engineers had to approve the
entire plan. The Land Titles Act of 1906 required that streets be at least
60 feet wide and with a back lane width of 20 feet. Lanes were to
provide rear access to every lot in a subdivision (Bettison et al. 1975,
17).

The Town Planning Act passed in 1913 reflected ideas that emerged
from a growing body of planning theory that had developed in England
and the United States up to that year. Town Planning Schemes had as
their goal the rational ordering of urban space. The schemes would
secure "suitable provision for traffic, proper sanitary conditions, amenity
and convenience in connection with layout of streets and use of the land
and of any neighboring lands for building or other purposes" (Province
of Alberta 1913). Further, land likely to be used for building purposes"
could be designated for "open spaces, roads, streets, parks, pleasure or
recreation grounds," with the minister of municipal affairs exercising final
authority as to use. Town Planning Schemes were to be implemented by
a designated "responsible authority," and approved by the minister. The
"responsible authority" could be a local town or city council or "a body
constituted specially for the purpose of the scheme." This body or
commission was to have no fewer than five and not more than 10 members approved by the minister.

One section of the act addressed the issue of financial enhancement or loss suffered by parties when a town planning scheme was implemented. In order to limit speculative profiteering by property owners whose land would be enhanced through such a scheme, one-half of the financial gain could be appropriated by the "responsible authority." Property owners who were injuriously affected by the implementation of the scheme could apply for compensation that was limited to the actual value of the property. Double compensation or damages were not permitted.

The overriding thrust of Alberta's town planning schemes was to effect the ordering of urban social space in the interests of economic efficiency. The "ineconomic features" of the act were the provisions for parks and open spaces as a part of the aesthetic ordering designed to mitigate the boredom of much established grid development. Thomas Adams, the English utilitarian planner, whose ideas had a profound influence on Canadian planning in the early twentieth century, conceded that complementary to planning for efficiency of the "business side of a city is the provision of satisfactory and healthy living conditions for the people" (Masson 1985, 255).

The Town Planning Act vested in the minister of municipal affairs broad-ranging powers over municipal planning and entrusted his office with the resolution of conflicts arising in implementing town planning schemes. The act, designed, among other things to stop rampant real estate speculation of the boom years, gave considerable leeway for planning to local authorities while retaining ultimate control in the hands of the provincial government. What the act failed to do was to provide specific guidelines for its implementation. The issue became moot when the economic boom ended. It would be a long time before Edmonton would be faced with problems of growth and expansion.

Minor revisions to the act were made in 1922 that clarified the role of the minister of municipal affairs in local planning and expanded the role of the office in the planning process. Reflecting pressures for what may be called the "aesthetic ordering" of town and country development the government passed in 1928 "An Act to Facilitate Town Planning and the Preservation of the Natural Beauties of the Province" (Province of Alberta 1928, 149). The United Farmers Women of Alberta was the interest group that was concerned about the countryside "being desecrated by billboards and hoardings and the increasing commercialization" of the province's highways. The act established a "Town and Rural Planning
Advisory Board" whose role was to cooperate with local authorities in formulating town planning schemes, advising the minister as to regulations and plans for subdivisions, assisting and advising rural authorities "in devising ways and means of preserving the natural beauty of the locality and ensuring the new buildings and erections shall be so designed and located that the same shall not bar the amenities of the locality" and "to promote in any community a pride in the amenities of the neighborhood" (Province of Alberta 1928, 149-50). Other purposes of the act involved regulating gasoline filling stations, garages, and rest stops along highways, the siting of tourist camps, prohibition of regulations of signs or notices along highways, fixing fees for sign boards, and general oversight of any land acquired for parks. The board could, with the approval of the lieutenant-governor in council acquire land for the purpose of preserving places of natural beauty or historic interest (Province of Alberta 1928, 152). Many of the provisions of this act were included in the "Town Planning and Preservation of Natural Beauty Act" passed a year later. The 1929 act gave local authorities power to appoint a Town Planning Commission of three, six, or nine members, which in addition to preparing town planning schemes would also administer zoning bylaws. Section 30 of the act made provision for local authorities to enact zoning legislation. The laws were to designate differing land uses of an area, govern building bulk, height, and square footage, define the size of yards, courts, and open spaces, establish maximum densities for each area, regulate classes of industries, housing type, public and semipublic buildings, control architectural design, character, and appearance of buildings in each district, and assure the local authority that adequate light, water, sewerage, street, transit, and other facilities were provided for proposed developments (Province of Alberta 1929, 395-96). The cities of Edmonton and Calgary as well as 30-odd smaller municipalities adopted zoning bylaws shortly after the act was passed (Dant c. 1963-64).

Most significantly, the act enabled two or more adjoining municipalities to appoint a Regional Planning Commission consisting of not more than three representatives from each member jurisdiction. This commission could be authorized to assume responsibility for carrying out official town plans or schemes where development crossed jurisdictional lines (Province of Alberta 1929, 391). It was not until 1950 that the first such commission was established in the Edmonton region. With the onset of the Great Depression, as urban growth remained stagnant, the provincial planning office was closed as an austerity measure.
In 1933, Edmonton issued its first Zoning Bylaw Map, which designated for the first time specific land uses within the city. At the time the city possessed much land that it had obtained through tax forfeitures. The full consequence of the acquisition of these surplus lots was not to be realized until the late forties and early fifties when their availability enabled the city to direct growth towards a tight, unicentric urban form in the postwar period.

With the outbreak of the Second World War the region benefited from the wartime economy in several ways. The surge in agricultural prices and the evolution of Edmonton as a major operations center for the Alcan Highway, the Alaska-Siberian Airlift, and the Canol Oil Pipeline project led to a mini-boom in the area. The shortage of housing became apparent immediately. The passage of the National Housing Act of 1944 by the federal government and the creation of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, which guaranteed privately financed mortgages made for the purposes of residential urban construction set the stage for a strong housing market in the city during the postwar period. A regional CMHC office was established in Alberta in 1946.

Although in Canada the provincial authority over municipal affairs is paramount, policies of the federal government relating to railways and freight rates, housing, monetary and fiscal matters, airports, defense installations and army bases, regional development, and environmental concerns all have major implications for local and regional development. Additionally, the federal government's land holdings and buildings constitute a formidable presence in most major urban centers. The influence of the CMHC, however, is by far one of most significant for local development.

Revisions of the Town Planning Act in 1942 incorporated amendments made during the late thirties such as the 1937 provision requiring provincial authorization before a subdivision plan of more than 10 lots could be sold. The Provincial Planning Board had to be assured that the subdivision was registered for the purpose of residential construction to be undertaken within a "reasonable time." As wartime housing shortages became apparent the provincial government sought to limit the amount of land that might be obtained and held for speculative purposes. The action had the effect of controlling the direction of urban development within the major cities of the province. At the end of the war, anticipating the growing housing needs of veterans and their families, an amendment to the act increased subdivision size to 50 lots before requiring Planning Board approval.
Planning legislation in Alberta from 1913 to the end of the Second World War reflected the desire to order urban space efficiently. Wildly speculative activity during Edmonton’s first boom prompted the government to control by legislation the "ineconomical" uses of urban land. Through planning the government tried to restore some semblance of credibility to the development process and thus reassure would-be investors. According to Noel Dant, who came to Edmonton from England in 1949 to become the city’s first director of planning, both rural-based governments of the United Farmers and Social Credit parties had enacted over the years "perhaps the most progressive social planning legislation in this western hemisphere" (Dant c. 1963-64, 1).

Evolution of Regional Planning in Alberta, 1945-1990

The discovery of oil in 1947 in the Leduc field, 15 miles southwest of Edmonton, was the singular event that transformed Alberta’s economy and hastened significantly the pace of urbanization within the province. The impact of frenetic, oil-related activity was felt immediately in Edmonton and the surrounding region. Virtually every sector of the urban infrastructure—housing, schools, roadways, transportation, and public administration—was woefully inadequate to meet the demand created by rapid economic growth.

In a series of ad hoc responses to growth pressures for example, Edmonton’s city council found it necessary to amend the 1933 zoning bylaws six times in 1946, three times in 1947, seven times in 1948 and 19 times in 1949. Private developers scurried to buy and subdivide land along the city’s boundaries and either requested annexation to the city or proposed land uses that were inappropriate for the area. In 1948, the provincial government amended the planning act to include "Interim Zoning Regulations in New Subdivisions," which was intended to assist cities in gaining some control over areas not covered by zoning bylaws.

In 1949, because of widespread citizen dissatisfaction with the city’s antiquated planning processes, Edmonton moved to establish a city planning department and appointed Noel Dant as its first, full-time city planner. When Dant arrived he found an out-of-date master plan for major streets for the city, an ineffective zoning bylaw, and an advisory Town Planning Commission made up of unpaid lay citizens whose advice was seldom taken seriously by key city departments. Dant, together with McGill University Professors Spence-Sales and John Bland as well as the provincial planning director, after reviewing the wide-ranging problems
confronting urban and rural development in the province authored a new Town and Rural Planning Act. By adding the word "rural" in the 1950 act they acknowledged the interdependence of rural and urban development in a region. The act called for a District Planning Commission to be established to help plan and give advice at the regional level with the ultimate objective of producing a regional plan or areawide scheme. In order to respond to pressures for immediate development in a region the act enabled local authorities to issue "interim development orders" and thus impose some control over land uses.

The District Planning Commission consisted of members appointed by contiguous municipalities as well as three members representing the province appointed by the Provincial Planning Advisory Board. The commissions were to act in an advisory capacity on planning matters of common concern to at least two member municipalities. Cities were permitted to create Technical Planning Boards and Planning Advisory Commissions, the latter made up of representatives of the public. Master plans were now to be designated as "General Plans" rather than "official schemes." In 1953, the District Planning Commissions were given powers to become the approving authorities of land subdivision where no local planning board had been formed.

The 1957 Town and Rural Planning Act described in some detail the major characteristics of district general plans, the key one being to "secure the orderly and economical development of the district planning area as a whole." In formulating a district general plan the commission was to "divide the district planning area or any part thereof into zones of permitted land-use categories, including low-density agricultural, high-density agricultural, small-holding, country residence, highway commercial, district recreational, general urban, new general urban, and major industrial zones, or any of these and such other zones as the commission may deem necessary and essential for the purpose of the plan." In addition, commissions were empowered to "establish stages, sequence, or order of priority of development for and within each zone" (Province of Alberta 1957, 495).

By 1963, due to the enormous increase in development proposals and the perception that the 1957 act was unduly cumbersome in its regulatory requirements, the minister of municipal affairs ordered the preparation of a new act. The Planning Act of 1963 had as its general aim, guiding and regulating "the public and private use of land so that public projects, such as the provision of roads, streets, utilities, schools and other necessary services, may be properly coordinated and carried out in an economical
and orderly manner and so that private owners may utilize or develop their land to their best advantage provided that in doing so they do not injuriously affect their neighbors or the interests of the public generally (Dant c. 1963-64, 7). Simplification of the development process mollified the concerns of would-be developers. By vesting primary decision-making powers over planning in elected, not appointed representatives or administrators, the public interest would be protected.

Three provisions of the act dealt explicitly with the issue of the "rights of individuals": (a euphemism for developer interests) and "the public interest." First, relevant authorities were required "to consider how specific projects or proposals may affect the general development of an area and the welfare of the community at large." Second, it gave owners the right "to contest planning decisions that may unjustly or unnecessarily restrict or deny them the most convenient or profitable use of their land." Third, it made explicit "the right of other persons to object against proposed developments that may injuriously affect their interest" (Dant c. 1963-64, 7).

The act also clarified the role of regional planning commissions. They were entrusted with studying "the resources and development of the regional planning area, with a view to preparing a regional plan." In order to exercise control over development while a full regional plan was under study, the commission could prepare a "preliminary regional plan" (Dant c. 1963-64, 7).

The Provincial Planning Board, which advised the minister of municipal affairs on planning matters and appeals, could "conduct studies with respect to the physical, economic, and social aspects of development and prepare reports on metropolitan growth, the planning of new towns, and any other matters related to the development of any part of the Province" (Province of Alberta 1963).

The 1963 act proved no less cumbersome in terms of administration than its predecessor. In order to facilitate development within the city of Edmonton its Planning Department began to prepare "outline plans" that provided a detailed, diagrammatic document specifying conditions for development of a specific area. City planners and developers had frequent conflicts, but the city retained tight control over the development process because it had large areas of developable land within its boundaries. Because much of this land that had been acquired years earlier through tax forfeitures was scattered throughout the Edmonton, the city assumed responsibility for servicing it.
Amendments to the act over the years were incorporated in the new Planning Act of 1977. This act sought to address the issues of explosive growth that were affecting Alberta's two major cities as well as the fast growing communities just beyond the cities' boundaries and those near major energy or transportation corridors in the province. The broad purpose of the act and its regulations was "to provide means whereby plans and related measures may be prepared and adopted to (1) achieve the orderly, economical, and beneficial development and use of land and patterns of land settlement, and (2) maintain and improve the quality of the physical environment within which patterns of human settlement are situated in Alberta, without infringing on the rights of individuals except to the extent that it is necessary for the greater public interest" (Masson 1985, 264). The act explicitly recognizes for the first time concerns expressed by environmentalists while at the same time being deliberately vague about the meaning of "the greater public interest." The latter seems to have been aimed at reassuring the province's major resource industries that when a conflict arose the government would accommodate their needs.

In 1980, the Planning Act called for each Regional Planning Commission to prepare a regional plan by December 31, 1982. In order to give coherence to all planning in a region, the government declared that the regional plan would be the primary planning document in a hierarchy of plans authorized by the act. Section 54 of the act declares, "(1) When a regional plan has been ratified by the Minister, no local authority shall enact any by-law, take any action or authorize any development that is inconsistent with the regional plan. (2) Every statutory plan, replotting scheme and land use by-law, every action taken or thing done by a local authority, regional planning commission or council, and every decision of a municipal planning commission, development appeal board or development officer shall conform to the regional plan" (Province of Alberta 1980, 29).

The first Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Plan as required by the act was issued in 1984. It marked the culmination of three and a half decades of effort to assure the "orderly and economic development of the region." The plan encompasses a range of laudable objectives for spatial ordering, urban settlement and land use, balanced economic growth, fringe area planning, rural settlement and land use, economic and industrial development, agriculture, extractive resource utilization, environmental protection, recreation land use, and transportation and utilities corridors. Overriding objectives of the regional plan involve
reducing redundancy in the metropolitan infrastructure, sharing the costs as well as the benefits of economic development of the region, providing equitable levels of services, and service delivery systems. The 1984 Regional Plan was conceived in a period of explosive growth so it is not surprising that an overriding concern is with efficient accommodation of anticipated rapid development. It identified the central planning issue as "the management of growth and changes. All levels of government have become aware of the need to manage growth in order to ensure that the economic, social, and cultural benefits, which accrue from such growth, are fully realized and equitably distributed" (EMRPC 1984, 1).

In a general way the plan attempts to reconcile a multiplicity of diverse interests of rural and urban municipalities, addresses the reservations of major land owners and developers, and attempts to balance an ongoing commitment to local autonomy with the need for the most efficient possible development at the regional level. From the perspective of the provincial government the regional plan provides a mechanism for resolving at the local level many of the day-to-day controversies over regional growth. When the Alberta government appointed the Edmonton District Commission (since renamed twice as the Edmonton Regional Planning Commission and the Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission), it did so with the belief that the commission would be the primary vehicle for resolving land-use disputes in the region. It took 34 years for the commission to produce a regional plan that was acceptable to the city of Edmonton, the other urban and rural municipalities, the Alberta Planning Board, and the minister of municipal affairs. During those years the inaction of a weak commission that could propose but not implement recommendations had mixed results in effecting the nature and direction of metropolitan development. In general, urban and rural municipalities surrounding Edmonton evaluate the overall performance of the commission favorably, while many of the city's officials view commission policies and actions as ineffectual and even detrimental to Edmonton's interests (Alberta Assn. of Municipal Districts ... 1980). The provincial government's commitment to regional planning tempered moves towards the creation of a unicity or a two-tiered system of government for the metropolitan area. The reluctance of every provincial government to opt for either alternative may be due to fears of the political power a regional government in its own backyard might wield. Whatever efficiencies in urban services and infrastructural development may have been gained through a regional administration
were outweighed by the province’s ongoing strong commitment to local autonomy.

Planning the Region: Planner’s Dreams or City Nightmares

"There is no doubt that the rather sudden emergence of regional planning in Alberta in 1949 was in response to the urban flood released by the rapid and large-scale development of oil and gas resources. Edmonton newspaper reports of the period bristle with comments about "mushroom growth," the city "bursting at its seams," the "disgrace of fringe area development" and with many expressions of civic helplessness. The establishment of advisory regional planning authorities, in this period, in broadly defined city centered regions was an attempt to deal, in an orderly and economic way, with all those uses that are generated in the city but invade the open country," wrote Leonard Gertler, one of the first professional planners of Edmonton’s District Planning Commission (Gertler 1968). This DPC, the first regional one to be established by the province, consisted of representatives from the city of Edmonton, eight additional urban municipalities, and five municipal districts. Over the next 30 years the commission would grow to include 48 urban and rural municipalities, composed of two cities, one municipal district, four counties, 11 towns, 10 villages, and 20 summer villages.

From its inception the provincial government structured the membership to favor rural over city representation. Because proportionate representation would have given the city up to four-fifths of the voting power on the commission the government concluded that such an overwhelming representation of city interest would work to the disadvantage of the many smaller urban and rural areas. Over the years the credibility of the Commission’s policies was called into question frequently by Edmonton’s representatives, city officials, and the press. A review of some of the key regional growth issues between 1950 and 1990 reveals that from its beginnings many of the policies favored by the commission could be viewed as seeking Edmonton’s containment while favoring growth in the surrounding communities.

Disorderly Fringe Growth or Satellite Cities

The most urgent issue confronting the first District Commission in 1950 was the unplanned, disorderly development occurring just beyond the city’s boundaries. Inadequately serviced, low quality, unplanned
development was especially common in two communities on Edmonton's periphery, Jasper Place to the west and Beverly to the northeast. The city attempted to accommodate growth through a long-standing policy of annexing land along its boundaries. City officials, committed to maintaining a strong and vital city center, feared random growth that might leapfrog beyond its boundaries.

One of the first tasks of the District Commission was preparing plans for the mushrooming developments along Edmonton's borders. Because these were beginning to strain the existing street and roadway system the commission sketched out the location of an Outer Ring Road as well as Orbital Roads in relation to the city of Edmonton. The road lay-out was essential in order to obtain rights of way as well as give guidance to municipal officials, land owners, and developers as to the direction of possible future development. It was in the debate over the location of roadways that some commission members suggested the creation of satellite or "new towns" as a possible solution to problems created by random growth along Edmonton's borders. Satellite towns, some distance from the city, could be established as well-balanced communities. The idea, derived from and reflecting a very different experience in England, was endorsed by the commission, "as being a reasonable and logical solution to those complex urban and regional problems stemming from over-population and over-development of an urban agglomeration such as is being built up around Edmonton City now" (Edmonton Dist. Planning Commission 1951). Edmonton, with a population at the time of a little more than 150,000, hardly fit the mold of the kind of city that should be decentralized. Nevertheless, the commitment to decentralization in satellite towns was adopted as a goal by some commission members who viewed them as a solution to fringe development. Edmonton's commission members and officials on the other hand, intent on accommodating most new residential and commercial growth within the expanded borders of the city, viewed the satellite city idea with disdain and fear.

The first major test for the city and the District Commission occurred in 1950 when a landowner, developers, and the Municipal District of Strathcona submitted a proposal for the development of Campbelltown on 15 quarter sections of land in an area approximately five miles beyond Edmonton's eastern boundary. The project was vigorously opposed by the city and the towns of Beverly and Jasper Place. Campbelltown, later to be called Sherwood Park, had all the characteristics of a dormitory suburb and virtually none of those of a well-balanced satellite city. During the ensuing controversy the Municipal District of Strathcona
withdrew as a member of the DPC and effectively removed the issue from the planning commission's agenda. The Provincial Planning Advisory Board and the minister of municipal affairs, who held ultimate authority over the development gave Strathcona approval to proceed with the project. In the commission debates, Leonard Gertler, now its executive director, opposed the project and pointed out that sufficient land existed in the southeast quadrant of Edmonton for residential development, growth would be preferred in older existing towns of the regions that were more distant from the city and already had made substantial investments in their urban infrastructure, the proposed area had neither a water supply nor a railroad connection which would make for the development of a balanced (residential and commercial) tax-base possible, and the establishment of Campbelltown could lead to development pressures in contiguous areas, creating undesirable urban sprawl (Edmonton Dist. Planning Commission 1953-54). The hamlet was built and, as predicted by Gertler, has become an upscale, single-family, residential dormitory on Edmonton's outskirts with virtually no industrial development, no significant employment base for its residents, and governed by the rural county of Strathcona. At the time the hamlet was approved, the county was the primary beneficiary of industrial taxes from the region's major oil refining complex known as Refinery Row, a revenue source very much sought after by the city of Edmonton.

**Tax Inequities and "Metropolitan Tragedies"**

The provincial government, recognizing that patterns of urban development in the Edmonton and Calgary regions had led to great financial disparities among communities, established in 1954 a Royal Commission to examine the "administration and financing of school and municipal services in the City of Edmonton and surrounding areas, and the City of Calgary and surrounding areas." It suggested the commission recommend "the boundaries and the form of local government which will most adequately and equitably provide for the orderly development of school and municipal services," and "to recommend any practical measures which may be taken in the interest of the ratepayers and citizens . . . " (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Development of Calgary and Edmonton 1956, 1V).

The McNally Commission Report represents one of the most thorough studies ever done of Alberta's two metropolitan regions. It has had a lasting influence on debates over urban growth, municipal
governance, and finance in the Edmonton region. Population growth, rising city indebtedness, lack of new sources of city revenue, the physical condition and fiscal stress of fringe communities, tax-base inequalities within the metropolitan area, and forms of urban governance were the key issues discussed by the McNally Commission.

Analyzing the Edmonton area, the commission found that the city had on its borders two communities, Jasper Place and Beverly, which were peopled by low-income families, living in poor housing, provided with inadequate municipal services, and had very limited fire and police protection. The property tax-base of these fiscally-stressed communities was insufficient to fund existing, below standard services, let alone make improvements in them. Neither community had any industrial or commercial tax revenue. The contrast between the assessment poverty of these two communities and the county of Strathcona was striking. The latter, largely because of Refinery Row taxes, had a per capita assessment of $4,570. That of Jasper Place was $540 and Beverly's was $650. These were truly communities of the working poor who the commission found chose to live in lower-priced, substandard housing that they could call their own rather than rent better accommodation in the city.

After a thorough review of inequities in municipal services, school tax bases, transportation, and other services in the Edmonton and Calgary regions, the commission concluded that,

1. It is unjust and inequitable that wide variations in the tax base should exist among the local governing bodies that comprise a metropolitan area where that area is one economic unit.

2. A metropolitan area that is in fact one economic and social unit can ordinarily be more efficiently and effectively governed by one central municipal authority than by a multiplicity of governing bodies (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Development 1956, 5).

In the Edmonton region "It is the disparity in the tax base that emphasizes that tax wealth of one municipal unit in the metropolitan area as against the tax poverty of another. Again, it is this disparity that accounts for the total absence of or inadequacy of normal municipal services on the fringes, resulting in marked inequalities" (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Development 1956, 13). The commission's solution to the disparities and inefficiencies in the inner metropolitan area was the amalgamation by Edmonton of the towns of Jasper Place and Beverly, the annexation of the Refinery Row area within the municipality of Strathcona, and the new community of Cambelltown thereby creating a single
city. It was unequivocal in its conviction that allowing another new city to develop on Edmonton's eastern boundary, "independent of, and duplicating the existing city . . . would constitute nothing short of a metropolitan tragedy. . . . The spectre of a second city being actively promoted just beyond Edmonton’s eastern outskirts at present is a negation of careful metropolitan planning" (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Development 1956, 35).

The report included specific recommendations for the planning of the metropolitan area and its fringe communities that dealt with regional representation on the District Planning Commission, preparation of a district general plan, the continued use of the "interim development control" mechanism pending the completion of the plan, and the designation of the Provincial Planning Advisory Board as the final appeal body.

The provincial government accepted the recommendation to amalgamate the towns of Jasper Place and Beverly within the city of Edmonton but disagreed with the McNally proposal to annex the industrial areas of Strathcona County and Campbelltown to Edmonton. For the city the "metropolitan tragedy" was compounded when it assumed the problems of two tax-poor communities without the new revenue sources it had hoped to derive from the industrial areas of Strathcona County.

The commission's analysis of city revenues pointed out that although the province received all the royalties and leasing fees from the oil and natural gas development, it was the cities, towns, and villages of the province that bore the cost of rapid, resource-induced growth. The provincial government responded to this criticism by establishing a grant program to help impacted communities pay for some of the costs of such growth.

In 1957, the status of the District Planning Commission changed from an advisory to a zoning body. Its expanded role included providing technical advice to numerous municipalities (except to Edmonton, which had its own Planning Department), preparation of bylaws and general plans. As the outer metropolitan area gained an increasing percentage of regional growth the commission began to articulate a policy of "decentralized concentration." Increasing development in the municipalities of the outer ring required far more intermunicipal agreement regarding such matters as zoning, utilities, roads and intersections. By 1960, almost all development outside Edmonton's boundaries was highly land-intensive, single-family residential. The new developments were perceived by everyone as "better" in terms of housing structural strength and design,
although houses were excessively standardized and presented a tract appearance. Aesthetic ordering of space in village, town, and city was swept away by the exigencies of rapid expansion.

Dreams of Megacity and the Annexation Battles

The emerging pattern of regional growth in the sixties and seventies prompted the city of Edmonton to undertake a series of initiatives that would resolve issues related both to boundaries and governance in the area. In 1967 Eric Hanson, one of Alberta’s foremost authorities on local government, prepared a report for the city of Edmonton that came to conclusions very similar to those of the Royal Commission headed by McNally. He recommended the annexation of Sherwood Park and the industrial area east of the city, the amalgamation of the town of Saint Albert, and the acquisition of enough additional land “to permit the planning and provision of a continuous supply of residential housing to provide room for industrial expansion, and to create a pleasant physical environment” (Council of City of Edmonton 1973, 6-8). The enlarged city of Edmonton would have a unitary government.

The shortage of low-priced, serviced land for housing in Edmonton in the late sixties increased pressures on city officials to annex more land along its borders. Through a unique arrangement between the city and the Alberta Housing Corporation a public land bank was created in the south-eastern quadrant of the city to be used for new housing. Enough land was set aside for a residential community of 100,000 people housed in a mix of single- and multi-family dwellings. The concept of a “suburb within the city” planned around several “neighborhood units” accommodating a range of socio-economic groups was a novel one. Mill Woods, as the development was named, relieved some of the immediate pressures within the city for affordable housing.

The seventies proved to be one of the most turbulent and unsettling periods of urban growth in the region. The impact of the oil price revolutions was felt almost immediately in the area. Explosive population growth contributed to drastic shortages of housing. The city needed land for expansion, and its leaders hoped that the Lougheed’s Progressive Conservative government, far more representative of the new “urban elites,” would respond favorably to their plans for metropolitan government. In 1972, Edmonton’s mayor declared, “I hope the provincial government will see that the best solution for this city to progress is under a single government. It is unlikely the nearby self-governing
municipalities will agree to voluntarily let themselves be merged into an expanded City of Edmonton. Only the province can force the issue" (Financial Post May 20, 1972).

In a brief submitted to the minister of municipal affairs in 1973, the city made a formal case for boundary adjustments, noting that the new government did not need to be bound by the policies of previous administrations. "The incipient confusion and frustration of proliferating authorities in the Edmonton area require provincial attention. Examples abound in other jurisdictions of the destructive force of a fragmented jurisdiction run wild, which renders local government impotent" (Council of the City of Edmonton 1973, ii-iii). The city recommended that the province accept the adjustments of municipal boundaries essentially along the same lines proposed in the Hanson report and argued that "... the best form of the future of the City is a single municipality, encompassing the whole urban unit, with a single local government which includes in its organization localized focii of citizen interest" (Council of the City of Edmonton 1973).

Support for a unitary system of government came also from the Alberta Land Forum, which had been established by the province to make a thorough study of land-use issues in urban areas. The forum noted that Edmonton was bearing the major impact of development in the surrounding dormitory suburbs while deriving virtually no benefits. "It is the opinion of the Forum that the City of Edmonton should be accorded adequate influence over development in its region. The most desirable way to achieve the necessary influence ... is within a unitary system of local government for the metropolitan region" (Alberta Land Use Forum 1974, 68). The forum suggested that in the absence of unitary government a newly constituted Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission with Edmonton having a majority of the votes could help direct area growth in ways less detrimental to the city.

The conflict between Edmonton and the Regional Planning Commission came to a head during a major Growth Alternatives Study funded by the Provincial Planning Board and conducted by the commission. The studies focused on major issues of regional growth ranging from investments in utilities and services, housing, transportation, education, health and recreation, public safety, and human welfare. The study recommendations reflected the commission's bias for "decentralized concentration." Proponents for decentralization argued that such a policy maximized diversity of quality of life choices, which meant living in diverse communities, i.e., suburbs outside the city. The city claimed that
efficiency benefits in the region should be paramount and could be obtained only through greater centralization. The commission suggested that future area planning policies should weigh carefully the need for local autonomy, balanced growth, and quality of public services. It favored the development of a city-centered region surrounded by several self-sufficient communities, with the commission as the main forum for intermunicipal cooperation (Alberta Land Use Forum 1974, 69). The city, which favored an immediate move to a unitary government, opposed the Growth Study conclusions and subsequently, on the advice of the minister of municipal affairs, applied to the Local Authorities Board in 1979 to annex and place under single governance most of the growth areas of the region, creating in the process a megacity especially in terms of total area.

After a long and costly hearing where 12,000 pages of transcript were recorded, over 300 exhibits filed, and over seven million dollars spent, the Local Authorities Board recommended the expansion of Edmonton’s boundaries in all directions to include Sherwood Park and Saint Albert. However, when the government received the report it decided to have it debated in the legislative assembly. Members representing areas to be annexed such as Sherwood Park and Saint Albert, while agreeing that Edmonton needed more land for residential and industrial development, also argued that their communities remain autonomous. In June 1981, the provincial cabinet rendered its decision that gave the city much of what it wanted in territory without disturbing the local autonomy of neighboring communities. A total of 86,000 acres of land were added to the city’s area, enough for 30 to 40 years of development at 1980s rapid pace of growth. Additionally, a 30,000 acre public land bank was created northeast of Edmonton for future expansion.

The government rejected both a two-tier government as well as Edmonton’s request for unitary governance of a megacity. The minister of municipal affairs pointed out that the annexation decision gave Edmonton about 19 percent of Strathcona’s assessment, 17 percent of the tax-base of the Municipal District of Sturgeon, and 12 percent of that of the county of Parkland.

The cabinet also directed the newly named Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission to incorporate policies that would achieve five broad objectives: (1) growth was to be city-centered with Edmonton to continue as the dominant center of the region containing 75 percent of the population; (2) remaining population growth was to be focused in the inner metropolitan area and other existing urban municipalities; no new
towns that had been proposed in the 1970s would be permitted; (3) an unduly dispersed pattern of residential, industrial, and other types of human settlement was to be avoided; (4) better agricultural land was to be conserved along with wise use of other natural resources; and (5) the land-use pattern in the region was to provide transportation and utility services so as to reinforce the city-centered region.

The government's new policy tempered the Regional Commission's long-standing preference for "decentralized concentration." Especially contentious was the government's proposal that Edmonton should capture 75 percent of the future population growth in the area. One of the city's commission representatives declared that the government's action assured that "This . . . will be a city-centered region, not city dominated but city-centered metropolitan in nature. As such the issues will be of a more consistent urban nature and we will be required to develop new skills to deal with them" (Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission 1982). The annexation decision giving Edmonton responsibility over a much larger territory reduced significantly the workload of the Regional Commission. Statements of provincial officials at the time made clear that the government would act independently and far more forcefully in resolving future regional land-use controversies.

Further, the government declared that it would receive no annexation decisions unless they covered at least 15 years of future growth. Many local authorities had received numerous development applications from landowners in fringe areas who hoped to enhance land values. If all requests for annexations between 1976 and 1980 had been honored the city would have grown by 360,000 acres, enough for about 1 million homes housing over 2 million persons! Ironically, about the time that the government made its annexation decision, the provincial economy nose-dived, and the eighties' recession set in eliminating many of the issues posed by boom-time growth.

Noting the need for the coordination of certain services throughout the region the provincial government passed a Regional Municipal Services Act, which provided for a Regional Services Commission. This commission would assume responsibility for the provision of water, sewer, storm drainage, and solid waste disposal in municipalities outside Edmonton. The commission was empowered to "acquire, finance, construct, operate, and dispose of water lines, sanitary or storm sewer lines, and water, waste, and sanitary or storm sewerage plants and facilities" (Province of Alberta 1981, 3-4). The city of Edmonton, the major provider of several utilities within the region, opted not to be a
member of the Regional Services Commission. This government action represented a significant step in rationalizing the service delivery systems of the region.

Roadways, Highways, Freeways, and Light Rail Transit

One of the most urgent problems of rapidly growing urban municipalities is the movement of goods and people throughout a region. In 1961, the District Planning Commission undertook the Metropolitan Edmonton Transportation Study, a project that had significant implications for the nature and direction of regional growth. Representatives of the province, the city of Edmonton, towns, and rural municipalities attempted to forecast the roadway, highway, and freeway needs of the region for the next 20 years. Deconcentration and decentralization of population in the region were furthered by widespread automobile usage that made dispersal easy. The commission’s stated policy was to encourage a concentrated central area complemented by strong subcenters in the suburban areas and district towns. Because freeways on the continent had become increasingly popular it is not surprising that they were proposed for the region. Among the most controversial suggestions was the routing of major freeways through the scenic McKinnon and Mill Creek ravines as well as creating a downtown freeway loop around the city center (not unlike the San Francisco Embarcadero), which would be linked to five radial freeways. Edmonton’s council accepted the study recommendations for what may be described as the “Los Angelization” of the city and the surrounding region. However, as the full political, economic, aesthetic, and environmental implications of the elevated freeway loop and its connector freeways became known, enthusiasm for the projects receded leading to a search for other alternatives. One of these was some form of mass rail transit.

Although the city of Edmonton had a well-developed electric trolley and diesel bus system there was a steady decline in ridership and increasing use of automobiles by the center city work force. City-commissioned studies in the sixties showed that mass rail transit as an alternative form of travel would become highly popular with persons travelling to the city center area. A study done by Bechtel proposed a grade-separated, heavy rail transit system for the city. Its high cost was enough to dissuade city officials about its feasibility.

The city’s plans for a “balanced transit strategy” incorporating some form of light rail transit were given a boost when the Canadian National
Railway decided to relocate its central city terminal to the city’s outskirts thereby eliminating the need for its railway right of way. The right of way following a northeast/southwest alignment seemed ideal for light rail corridor purposes because it had the potential of connecting the city with several major "activity centers" along its route.

The evolving "balanced transportation strategy" integrating light rail, buses, and automobiles was attractive on several counts. It would reduce fuel consumption, eliminate the need for new parking garages in the city center, reduce street and roadway congestion, and could lead to new commercial as well as residential development along Light Rail Transit routes. During the time Edmonton was considering the development of mass rail transit the federal government put forth proposals for tri-level approaches to addressing urban problems in Canada and established a Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. Some advocates of rail transit at the local level believed that there might even be the possibility of federal capital assistance for the development of new modes of urban transit.

The boom time growth of the seventies convinced local officials in Edmonton that their plans to create a strong viable city center where commercial, governmental, and cultural activities would be concentrated would be aided significantly by a light rail transit system. An "automobile oriented" transit strategy could lead to the strangulation of the downtown area thereby decreasing its attractiveness.

In 1970 the provincial government passed a City Transportation Act that was aimed at helping Calgary and Edmonton develop an integrated transportation system, which would meet each city’s needs. Although the act made provision for sharing costs of capital investments, the minister of highways stated that "rapid transit is too rich for the blood of the provincial government right now" (Bettison et al. 1975, 405). Some time later he suggested that it would be foolhardy to let the center of the city strangle to the point that real estate values would decline.

By August of 1973, Edmonton’s city council, after reviewing the conclusions of numerous studies, moved to establish a rapid transit system and allocated money for engineering studies. Despite warnings that the capital costs of such a system would be higher than projected and operating revenues lower than anticipated, the city proceeded with the construction of a light rail transit system in 1974 (Thomas 1985).

Once begun, the city found a friend and benefactor in the provincial government, which embarked on an extensive program of upgrading the province’s transportation needs and allocated a $7.50 per capita grant to cities that were designated for public transit. Edmonton committed all
funds received to its light rail project. By the time the city completed the first five miles of the LRT system the province had provided a total of 45 million in grants or approximately two-thirds of the system’s cost. The city justified its need for this assistance by noting that Alberta’s boom economy had created the traffic problems in the first place. By 1978, 50 percent of all the municipal debt Edmonton had amassed was attributable to the cost of LRT construction.

The enthusiasm that greeted the opening of the light rail transit system in Edmonton, the first of its kind on the continent built in the postwar period, was dampened by the realization that the city’s transit system was burdened with huge construction debts and future operating deficits. The provincial government, troubled by the city’s transit expenditures, imposed new conditions on the city before it could expand the system, which involved a thorough review of capital and operating revenue. Studies conducted in 1979 revealed that the system was operating well below capacity. Although three years later ridership on the system had increased, it was obvious that transit revenues would be insufficient to meet either capital or operating costs. Once again the provincial government, awash with oil revenues, came to the city’s rescue.

As the recession of the eighties spread throughout the provincial economy the future of Edmonton’s light rail transit system was in doubt. Cabinet ministers grumbled about excessive costs involved in extending the system and its high operating budget. However, after investing $250 million dollars in the system by 1984 the province had invested so much that abandoning it was politically unpalatable. It has since allocated funds annually for the gradual extension of the system to the government center and beyond to the university.

Edmonton’s light rail transit system is a prime example of the proactive role the provincial government played in accommodating growth within the city of Edmonton. It represents one of the most visible legacies of the oil boom years. Additionally the system helps the city preserve its unicentric form and contributes significantly to the maintenance of a vital city center. Edmontonians continue to point with pride to their light rail transit system, which has become a prototype for other similar systems on the continent.
CONCLUSION

In Alberta, the origins of metropolitan planning can be found in early town planning legislation intended to curb speculative development during a period of boom-time growth in Edmonton and Calgary. In the 1950s as the provincial economy was being transformed from an agricultural one to a resource-based one the government responded by establishing District Planning Commissions to help resolve conflicts over land use and attempt to rationalize urban and rural development. In the opinion of many planners, Alberta’s governments, although having as their political base in the rural areas of the province, responded to the needs of urban communities with diverse planning initiatives. In many instances Alberta’s planning for its neighborhoods was progressive and forward-looking.

Although the province retained the ultimate control in planning matters, all governments were committed to the belief in strong local autonomy, a commitment that often stood in the way of effective regional planning. When crises of an unresolvable kind came to the fore, the government would take the initiative to resolve them. Regional planning in the Edmonton metropolitan area was affected significantly and frequently adversely by the asymmetrical relationship between Edmonton, a large dominant urban center and several small towns, villages, hamlets, and rural municipalities. The relationships between the regional planning commissions with heavy representation from the smaller centers and the city were often strained as were the relations between the city and the provincial government. From its inception the District Planning Commission favored a regional growth policy of "decentralized concentration" while Edmonton desired to expand its own population and territory with the objective eventually of establishing a unicity for the area. Provincial policies and commission actions tended to work towards Edmonton’s containment. The provincial government resisted all proposals for regional government, likely out of fear of the influence such a unified government in its own backyard might have on provincial politics. By emphasizing repeatedly its commitment to local autonomy of the communities within the region, the government was quite willing to accept the inefficiencies and redundancies that followed from the policy.
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Urban Growth Decision Making in the Houston Area

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INTRODUCTION

Houston has the popular reputation of being a uniquely governed city, and evidence abounds to support that perception. Planning and zoning are standard fare for all U.S. central cities, yet Houston eschewed zoning until the 1990s. The typical picture of metropolitan America is an atomized pattern of municipal governments where a central city is surrounded by a number of suburban cities, but Houston dominates other area cities territorially and politically. After World War II, U.S. cities became more "bureaucratic" as demands for public services increased (Salamon 1977, 424-25), but Houston continued to support a free market, laissez-faire doctrine that allowed private developers to shape urban growth. Many central cities experienced precipitous economic decline in the 1970s. Houston didn’t.

Popular images are sometimes misguided. Houston is really an enigma. It is a city where certain unique characteristics blend with features found in all U.S. central cities and metropolitan areas. From one perspective, therefore, Houston’s growth is characterized by many of the same conditions operating in other cities. Consider how economic cycles, demographic trends, territorial concerns, and governmental issues of cities across the U.S. apply in Houston.

This essay is largely based on Robert D. Thomas and Richard W. Murray’s recent book Progrowth Politics—Change and Governance in Houston (Berkeley, California: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1991).
Economic Cycles

Economic cycles are usually part of a city's economy as evidenced by prosperity and severe decline in Seattle; sustained prosperity from 1800 to 1950 in New York; and, sharp decline over the last 25 years in Buffalo. Houston experienced each of these patterns in the twentieth century. As measured by private-sector employment, through the 1960s Houston had a steady, although not spectacular, pattern of economic growth. In the 1970s, Houston's economy—bolstered by sharp increases in oil prices—skyrocketed (e.g., an average of 75,000 jobs a year were added to the metropolitan area's labor force from 1979 to 1982). After reaching a pinnacle in the early 1980s, the economy took a roller coaster ride after oil prices plummeted. For example, between 1983 and 1987, 200,000 net jobs were lost, then 35,000 jobs were added in 1988.

Demographic Trends

Demographic shifts accompany economic changes. In Houston and in other areas, a variety of problems result from people constantly redistributing themselves across the urban landscape. During Houston's economic boom in the 1970s, for example, immigration of numerous white and blue collar workers from other parts of the U.S. contributed to traffic and mobility problems, pollution, and overused infrastructures. These problems lingered into the 1980s and were further intensified when an economic downturn brought revenue shortfalls caused by the outmigration of "richer" workers attracted to the earlier boom. Immigration did not cease, however. Since 1978, more than 100,000 southeastern Asians and ever-increasing numbers of Central Americans have moved into Houston creating an entirely different set of public needs.

Territorial Concerns

Territorial issues are an ever-present part of urban growth decision making. Public officials must constantly grapple with political boundary problems because economic and demographic growth broach territorially established political boundaries with impunity. On the other hand, since these boundaries encapsulate certain economic activities and demographic patterns, urban growth (and decline) issues almost always have territorial components such as city-suburban authorities; representational divisions;
new incorporations; occasional consolidations; and the creation of new special-purpose governments.

Government's Role in Urban Growth

As local officials face more severe problems, they have turned to the state and/or the national government for assistance. Hence, over time localities not only rely on more and more intergovernmental funding but also must subject their decisions to scrutiny by state and national officials. Government's role in urban growth decision making in all arenas thus changes over time as different needs arise, yet government is more than just an instrument serving the community's economic and social needs. The relationship between government and urban growth is symbiotic. Government establishes the general "rules of the game" for urban growth by direct intervention and regulation, by facilitating certain interests, or by benign neglect. These rules usually vary depending on temporal circumstances. At one point in time, they may facilitate private-sector investments and capital improvements; while, at another point in time, they may stimulate economic growth through public financing of infrastructure developments or regulate growth through land-use planning requirements. As the urban area develops, these patterns become more complex and more intergovernmental. That is to say, while local decision makers still have the ability to determine their area's growth priorities, their decisions become more vulnerable to "rules" established outside their own governing institutions. This means urban growth decision making is increasingly characterized by a paradox: ability in the context of vulnerability.

This paradox of urban growth decision making is examined in Houston by describing the general role of the public sector in urban growth decision making since World War II; and by analyzing how that role has changed and why.

THE HOUSTON METROPOLITAN AREA

The city of Houston is located within the U.S. census-defined Houston-Galveston-Brazonia, TX, Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA). This CMSA includes seven counties (Brazonia, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty, Montgomery, and Waller), covers 7,151 square miles of the upper Gulf Coast of Texas, and has a population of 3,711,043 with a civilian labor force in 1986 of 1,800,697. The bulk of
the CMSA’s population and economic activity is in Harris County. Its 1,734 square miles covers 24.2 percent of the CMSA, and within its boundaries are 76 percent of the CMSA’s population and 78.9 percent of the area’s civilian labor force. At the core of Harris County, as shown in Map 7.1, is the city of Houston, which has 61.2 percent of the county’s population and 58 percent of its labor force.

These characteristics of the CMSA indicate that most social, economic, and political activities are centered generally in Harris County and specifically in Houston; therefore, the central focus of this analysis is necessarily on the county and the central city. What factors then shape urban growth decision making in the metropolitan area?

CENTRAL CITY DOMINANCE

Houston is the dominant political jurisdiction in Harris County. As used here, dominance means more than legal and administrative control. Even though Houston does not enjoy a superior legal and administrative position in many intermetropolitan relationships concerning urban growth, a number of factors provide Houston with circumstantial opportunities to be more effective than other jurisdictions. Some of these opportunities have diminished in the 1980s, but Houston is still the dominant governmental entity in the area.

Territorial Size

The most distinguishing territorial feature of American metropolitan areas is a central city encircled by numerous suburban cities; a characteristic that has been identified as one of the root causes of central city decline (Jackson 1972). When a city can no longer capture fringe area growth, it increasingly becomes socio-economically and racially segregated. Wealthier and better educated citizens, who are also mostly white, settle in the suburbs to escape a multitude of inner-city problems affecting the quality of life (e.g., crime, congestion, and pollution). Central cities then confront an eroding tax base and a heavier concentration of racial minorities who cannot flee the decay and deterioration that are inevitable when service demands increase, while the resources to meet such needs shrink.

Most central cities resemble St. Louis, locked-in by more than 100 municipalities, where one city’s limits blur into the next. Houston, on the other hand, is less territorially closed-in at the present time. It enjoys
Map 7.1.  The Houston Metropolitan Area

- Houston’s City Limits
- Houston’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (ETJ)
territorial dominance over other governments, even though governmental
fragmentation is still prevalent. For example, Houston is largely in Harris
County, and overlaying its borders are countywide hospital and flood
control districts and an areawide metropolitan transit authority (MTA).
Jutting in-and-out of the city’s limits are four junior college districts and
19 independent school districts. Outside Houston’s corporate limits are
about 400 special-purpose municipal utility districts (MUDs) providing
services to residential, commercial, and industrial developments in
unincorporated areas. As shown in Map 7.1, Houston is the municipal
giant (e.g., Houston is 2.6 times larger than the combined land areas of
the other 32 Harris County cities).

Several economic and political realities are enhanced by Houston’s
territorial size. Most corporate and commercial developments are located
either inside Houston or in its extraterritorial jurisdiction (defined below).
Even the Houston Ship Channel in eastern Harris County, which contains
the bulk of the metropolitan area’s heavy industry, is subject to annex-
ation by Houston. Politically, Houston voters elect a majority of local
state legislators and other officials. Three of Harris County’s four
commissioner districts, for example, are mostly inside Houston. The
county pattern is also true of state legislative seats: city voters comprise
a majority of the electors in four of six state senate districts—all largely
in Harris County—and in 20 of 26 house districts—all in Harris County.

Home-Rule Authority for Cities

The Texas Constitution authorizes the incorporation of two classes of
cities: general law and home-rule. Before a home-rule amendment was
ratified in 1912, cities had to attain their charters from the legislature.
After 1912, home-rule charters could be adopted by a majority vote in
cities over 5,000 in population. Home-rule cities have some distinctive
advantages over general law cities. For one, they have more extensive
authorities to tax and incur debt, define internal structures, offer services,
and expand their borders. This means Houston and the other 11
home-rule cities in Harris County are considerably more autonomous than
the 21 general law cities. Second, the 1912 amendment gave home-rule
city mayors, with their councils’ approval, the legal foundation to annex
land by simple ordinance-action—one of the most liberal processes for
city expansion in the U.S. Prior to 1963, home-rule cities could expand
their boundaries whenever their officials wished without interference or
supervision from the state legislature or bureaucracy, without seeking
voter approval, and without assuming the burden of service delivery to citizens. "First-in-time, first-in-right" was the legal tenet guiding annexations. That is to say, if a city passed an annexation ordinance on a first-reading, it had a superior legal claim to the designated territory even if it did not complete the ordinance process. State courts upheld this tenet by ruling that within an area claimed by a city's annexation ordinance on first reading, no new incorporations or annexations by other cities could occur (McCorkle 1963, 13, 14). Under these legal conditions, the state legislature and bureaucracy remained out-of-the fray if and when territorial disputes arose, leaving their settlement to city negotiations or court decisions.

The Municipal Annexation Act (MAA) of 1963 finally gave some state direction to city annexations. First, it merely formalized annexation procedures that had informally evolved under the broad guidelines of the 1912 home-rule amendment (e.g., authority to annex without voter approval; to settle territorial disputes locally or, failing that, go to court). Second, it required annexing cities to meet procedural and servicing responsibilities (e.g., public hearings; completion of annexations within 90 days; equivalent services to annexed areas within three years) (The State of Texas 1963, 447-545). Third, in a given calendar year, a city can annex no more than 10 percent of its corporate limits; however, unused territory may be accumulated from year-to-year, so long as it never exceeds 30 percent of a city's size.

These new requirements were seen as concessions to suburban interests, and they did slow large-scale annexations by home-rule cities. On the other hand, the MAA solidified Houston's territorial dominance by creating extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) authority for home-rule cities. A city's ETJ extends from one-half to five-miles beyond its corporate boundaries depending on its population. Cities with 100,000 or more residents are given a five-mile reach. Since the ETJ is measured from a city's corporate limits, each time a city annexes its ETJ expands proportionately. In its ETJ, a city can impose subdivision regulations, approve the creation of MUDs, designate tax-exempt "industrial districts," and prohibit new incorporations (The State of Texas 1963, 447-545).

Houston's ETJ presently blankets almost all the unincorporated land in Harris County, plus portions of six other counties, including rapidly urbanizing parts of south Montgomery County and eastern Fort Bend County. As shown in Table 7.1, only Pasadena and Baytown have populations (119,363 and 63,850, respectively) that afford them a substantive ETJ, but the geography of these cities constrains that legal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Legal Authority</th>
<th>Form of Government</th>
<th>ETJ Authority</th>
<th>Land Area</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>% Changes</td>
<td>(miles)</td>
<td>(sq. miles)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>1,594,086</td>
<td>1,728,910</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>556.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surrounded by Houston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellaire</td>
<td>14,950</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>-3.01</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunker Hill Village</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>3,610</td>
<td>-3.73</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galena Park</td>
<td>9,879</td>
<td>10,040</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hedwig Village</td>
<td>2,506</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>15.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hilshire Village</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humble</td>
<td>6,729</td>
<td>12,220</td>
<td>81.60</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunter's Creek Village</td>
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<td>4,570</td>
<td>8.42</td>
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<td>MC</td>
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<td>Jacinto City</td>
<td>8,953</td>
<td>11,130</td>
<td>24.32</td>
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<td>Pinney Point</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>11.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Houston</td>
<td>13,293</td>
<td>14,450</td>
<td>8.70</td>
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<td>Southside Place</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring Valley Village</td>
<td>3,353</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>-11.42</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>West University Place</td>
<td>12,010</td>
<td>13,340</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encircled by Houston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey Village</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>5,230</td>
<td>28.06</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katy*</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>10,610</td>
<td>137.09</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pearland*</td>
<td>13,996</td>
<td>17,020</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>CM</td>
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Notes:
- * indicates unincorporated areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Land Area</th>
<th>Growth Limit</th>
<th>MC</th>
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<th>Code</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Abutted by Houston</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deer Park</td>
<td>22,648</td>
<td>25,380</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>CM</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Largo</td>
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<td>3,260</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>La Porte</td>
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<td>25,030</td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomax</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Point</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nassau Bay</td>
<td>4,526</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>112,560</td>
<td>118,050</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabrook</td>
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<td>5,070</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoreacres</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Baytown</td>
<td>56,923</td>
<td>62,770</td>
<td>10.27</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>Missouri City*</td>
<td>24,533</td>
<td>32,020</td>
<td>30.52</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stafford*</td>
<td>4,755</td>
<td>5,920</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*City is only partly in Harris County, but the population and land area is for the entire municipality.


*Cities surrounded by Houston do not have ETJs; those encircled by Houston's ETJ must negotiate with Houston if they wish to expand; those abutted by Houston have only limited places to grow.

*Houston and Harris County Atlas* (Houston: Key Maps, 1980).

Data for these cities are not available.
authority. Cities to the east and southeast of Houston, including Pasadena and Baytown, are almost entirely hemmed in between Houston and Galveston Bay. Elsewhere in Harris County, 13 cities are enclaves within Houston and do not have ETJs. Five other cities are forced to negotiate with Houston (or go to court) if they want to expand because they are encircled by Houston’s ETJ. Three cities (Stafford, Missouri City, and Baytown) can grow into other counties but not into Houston’s ETJ.

Population changes, in both incorporated and unincorporated areas, between 1970 and 1980 illustrate the consequences of Houston’s territorial control over other Harris County cities. Most of the county’s population growth took place either in the city of Houston or in its ETJ. During the 1970s, for example, Houston had 51.7 percent (or 345,057) of Harris County’s population growth of 667,632. The unincorporated portions of the county—almost all of which is in Houston’s ETJ—gained 37.9 percent (or 252,901) of the total. Thus, 89.6 percent of the county’s growth took place inside Houston and its ETJ. The county’s other 32 cities attained only 10.4 percent of the total (69,674).

Since Houston restricts the territorial growth of the county’s other cities, their populations must expand within fixed boundaries. Houston, on the other hand, has enormous potential for growth, not only within its corporate limits, but also in its vast ETJ. Houston’s dominant territorial place in the region is vividly illustrated when we consider its population potential. While Houston’s 1980 population of 1,594,086 represents 55 percent of the population of the CMSA, Houston’s ETJ gives it the potential of expanding to 75 percent of the total CMSA population.

Suburban Authorities

To support growth in unincorporated areas, an infrastructure of roads, drainage, water, and sewer must be developed. Generally, an array of service deliverers responds to these needs. Among the service deliverers in the Houston metropolitan area are Harris County, independent school districts, and municipal utility districts. These governmental authorities do not impede Houston’s dominance over growth decision making in the area.

Harris County

Harris County would seem to be the appropriate government to deal with metropolitanwide problems, since it is such a large territorial unit.
However, county officials have limited legal authority, which restricts them from competing with their Houston counterparts in urban growth decision making. The Texas Constitution provides for a traditional county structure. All Texas counties are administrative arms of the state government. Since county officials do not have ordinance-making authority, their activities are largely determined by the mixture of state tasks they are obligated to perform such as operating the courts, supervising the jails, administering elections, building and maintaining roads, establishing libraries and parks, and tending to a bevy of housekeeping functions. These tasks generally supplement and support, not supplant, city functions. Indeed, county commissioners see their service role as one that is in addition to, not in place of, city services.¹

County officials are also limited in taking an active political role in areawide growth decisions by the internal organizational arrangement of county government. Harris County operates with a fragmented, multiple-executive structure. Each commissioner has a special service responsibility and a voting constituency. Each is only loosely tied to the commissioners court, the central governing body. While the commissioners court has administrative authority over a number of service areas, its control is very diffused. As county services have expanded in Harris County because of urbanization, each commissioner has taken primary responsibility for certain departments (e.g., welfare or mental health) and oversees that specific function without interference from other commissioners. Furthermore, county business is parceled out to a number of boards and commissions whose citizen-members—although appointed either by the court wholly or jointly by the court and other local governments—are farther removed from commissioner court supervision.

Commissioners thus operate more as independent ward politicians than as a collective decision-making body. Ward politics and particularism characterize their precinct activities. This is reinforced in commissioners’ relations with land developers because the primary tool a commissioner has to develop a constituency is a road maintenance fund. How and where a commissioner uses these funds is, of course, important to developers.

What has emerged are close ties between commissioners and developers. County government has generally been a reactive force in responding to growth. The political welfare of both commissioners and

¹Based on interviews with selected county officials.
private economic interests depends on maintaining existing structures and organizations. As one commissioner put it: "Commissioners are very cooperative with developers. They initiate, we respond." Another observer summarized the consensus of opinion on the relationship between developers and Harris County’s government this way: "When developers speak, commissioners listen. If they don’t [listen], commissioners are usually in a precarious political position."

Independent School Districts

Frederick M. Wirt (1975, 129) argues that school districts "have traditionally represented diminished responsibility for suburban government," a phenomenon he refers to as "the lateral axis of suburban autonomy." Wirt says that special districts, of which school districts are "prototypical," diminish suburban governments’ responsibilities, thus making it easier for incorporated suburbs to develop and thrive.

The structure of independent school districts in the Houston area also diminishes responsibilities, not of the suburban governments but of the city of Houston. Houston is the main beneficiary of independent school districts, principally because its boundaries are not linked to school district boundaries.

There are 23 independent school districts in Harris County. These districts lie either wholly or partially within the city of Houston. As unincorporated areas have been engulfed by Houston’s annexations, independent school districts continue to provide educational services in neighborhood or near-neighborhood schools. Houston’s annexations are thus more palatable to suburbanites, because their schools are not disrupted when they become Houstonians.

Independent school districts also shield Houston from certain fiscal burdens. In other states, a major roadblock to annexation is when "the city government has responsibility for school financing without substantial equalization from the state" (U.S. ACTR 1973, 21). Being able to move freely across school district boundaries, Houston does not have to assume the fiscal burdens of educational services; thus it avoids not only the political problems associated with the upheaval of existing schools but also the fiscal problems of financing public education.
Municipal Utility Districts

Diverse approaches to suburban service needs are taken in metropolitan areas. For example, in four major Texas areas—Houston, Dallas-Ft. Worth, San Antonio, and Austin—municipal services, water districts, private water companies, and regional agencies are used (Texas Legislature 1975). Each of these service approaches has a differential impact on the central city’s control over suburban developments. Extending municipal services to suburban residents—the principal method used in Austin and Dallas-Ft. Worth—allows the city to impose its standards on suburban developments, but the city faces the thorny issue of financing capital construction outside its boundaries (e.g., as the project manager of suburban utility construction, the city is obligated to bureaucratic and service costs). If MUDs prevail, as they do in Houston, the city forgoes direct control, but does not have to provide upfront capital-construction funding for infrastructure developments. The type of service delivery system in operation directly impacts decisions about suburban growth and where city decision makers fit into the process. If the central city is the service provider, groundwork is laid for future annexation. If another device is used, central city officials must cooperate with the service provider, or allow the seeds of suburban incorporations to be planted. Since Texas central cities enjoy extensive ETJ authority, there is usually a close alliance between the city and suburban entities.

THE USE OF MUDs IN HARRIS COUNTY

State Authority for MUDs

The legal antecedents for MUDs are two amendments to the Texas Constitution ratified in 1904 and in 1917. Each was designed to give ranchers and farmers the financial means to deal with flooding, drainage, and conservation problems. The 1904 amendment allowed landowners to establish taxing districts to finance water conservation and reclamation projects, but prohibited bonded indebtedness from exceeding 25 percent of a district’s real property value. The 1917 amendment deleted that limitation and allowed land owners to have unlimited and unrestricted debt financing for flood control, drainage, irrigation, and power projects (Texas Constitution). Not even cities and counties have this much financial latitude! On a simple majority vote of resident taxpayers, the
1917 amendment extended exclusive authority to landowners to create a taxing district to make improvements.\(^2\)

The principle is certainly sound—those who benefit, pay—and works on a proportionate basis for rural areas. However, the benefits are skewed when applied to urban developments, particularly in their early stages, because the developer as the initial landowner can use publicly generated revenues through district debt financing to make land improvements. Developers' investment risks are minimized in relationship to benefits simply because those risks are transferred to a public entity, the district.

Over the years, the legislature has expanded the constitutional authority for districts to urban land developments. Fresh Water Supply Districts (FWSDs)—authorized to conserve, transport, and distribute fresh water supplies—were the first districts used to provide urban-type services. Water Control and Improvement Districts (WCID)—authorized to provide for "domestic and commercial water supply, sewage disposal, drainage, irrigation, reclamation and conservation"—became an ideal development tool (Schroer 1971). Developers found that the WCID legislation allowed them to sell bonds before the construction of facilities, thus providing public capital funding to build these facilities (Mitchell 1972, 20). The process came full-circle with the enactment of the Municipal Utilities Act of 1971, which updated the WCID statute by directly applying the district concept to urban development.

Land developers received the most direct support in two specific ways. First, the MUD Act linked district creation to "project feasibility" and "land benefits." By tying a project's feasibility to its land benefits, the legislature "recognized that water districts used by developers have no people at [the] time of [their] creation" (Texas Legislature). Second, the MUD Act allowed districts to carry out a broader array of urban development functions than WCIDs, which include: (1) water supply for all beneficial uses; (2) waste disposal services; (3) all forms of drainage; (4) irrigation; (5) alteration of land elevations; (6) navigate coastal and

\(^2\)The 1904 amendment required a two-thirds vote of taxpayers, while the 1917 amendment modified the voting requirement to a simple majority. Also, the political status of districts was enhanced when the Texas Court of Appeals ruled in *Baker v. Jefferson County WCID #1*, 277, S.W. 2d 130 (1955) that a Water Control and Improvement District, legislated under the 1917 amendment, was a political subdivision of the state, like a city or county.
inland waters; and (7) parks and recreational facilities (Texas Water Code, 297).

The Developers’ Role in Creating Districts

The state of Texas allows water districts to be created by special acts of the legislature, by the Texas Water Commission (TWC), or by the county. Before the MUD Act of 1971, developers used the legislative process extensively because they found the TWC route too cumbersome. After the MUD Act broadened the scope of district authority for urban purposes and eliminated many of the previous difficulties associated with bureaucratic creation, developers used the TWC process almost exclusively. For example, Table 7.2 shows that before the MUD Act went into effect in 1972, the TWC authorized 93 districts in Harris County compared with 149 originated by the legislature. Since 1972, these numbers were reversed with the TWC establishing 285 districts during this period and the legislature creating only 8.

Changes enacted in the 1971 MUD Act and in 1973 in the 63rd session of the legislature (e.g., more uniform administrative standards in the TWC’s review of developers’ applications for district creations) have significantly affected the state approval process for creating water districts. However, these did not alter the developer’s role in district creation nor his control over district operations in their formative years. As indicated above, the MUD Act solidified the developer’s “right” to use district bonds to improve undeveloped land; and the developer still determines a district’s location, its size, initial board of directors, and bonded indebtedness.

A Governor’s Report (1975) gives a succinct account of the developer’s control.

Developers control their districts from inception until subdivision lot owners take over two or three years later. They draw the district boundaries, put the first voters on the property, tell them

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3 Presently, the Commissioners Court seldom is involved in district creation because its process is too complicated and time consuming for developers.

4 The Texas Water Rights Commission (TWRC) was the predecessor to the TWC. Prior to 1977, the TWRC was a separate agency. In 1977, the TWRC was consolidated with the Texas Water Development Board and the Texas Water Quality Board to form the Texas Department of Water Resources.
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Source: Data compiled from Texas Water Commission records, 1949 to Nov. 1984.
*Through Nov. 8, 1984 only.
how to vote, specify the bond amounts, and identify who will serve as district directors. Everyone in the act—voters, directors, and the district itself—is the captive of the developer, doing his bidding to provide sewer and water services for a private developer. Under such circumstances, governmental procedures tend to be secret and even farcical, e.g., approval of several millions of dollars of district bonds in a district-wide election by a vote of 3 to 0.

This report was published in 1975, but remains descriptive of how districts are used to aid and abet the economic aims of land developers. This does not mean the TWC, the city of Houston, or other public entities assume a passive role in the creation and operation of districts. To the contrary, there has been an ever-evolving governmental role in the past decade, although it still facilitates land developers’ economic aims.

Developers used the legislative method extensively prior to the enactment of the MUD Act, because the legislature could form any type of district it desired so long as it conformed to the requirements of the 1917 amendment. A special water district bill had to include only those provisions from the Texas Water Code that its sponsors felt were necessary for passage. District legislation could be designed to fit a developer’s particular circumstances rather than adhere to uniform standards. Consequently, special act districts were established without adequate financial information, virtually no consideration of district location, and no planning requirements (Schroer 1971; Lawson 1977).

In the early 1970s, a number of developers’ abuses of water districts for their own gain came to a boiling point. After Houston’s 1956 around-the-city annexation took in 26 water districts, an audit of the operations of the newly annexed districts found a number of questionable financial activities (e.g., excessive developer profits, misuse of funds, and incomplete financial reporting) (Houston Post, Oct. 8, 1958). During the 1960s, districts continued to be scrutinized, especially the way in which legislatively created districts circumvented a number of legal requirements that normally faced water districts (Katz 1972, 160-73). As the district creation process became more controversial, state representatives from Harris County became reluctant to sponsor water district legislation. Then, in 1973, the creation of special act legislation was virtually halted with the enactment of 13 reform bills by the 63d session of the legislature. The most important of these reforms that operated as a disincentive to the creation of special act districts was the power given the TWC to regulate water districts established by the legislature.
These reforms extended TWC’s regulatory authority to various phases of district organization and administration. Among other things, they allowed TWC to increase penalties for districts that failed to file required reports, to conduct audits of their financial statements, and to standardize procedures for organizing districts. The latter authority reduced the developer’s control over key administrative positions of the district. For example, TWC prohibited persons related to or employed by the developer from serving as a district’s tax assessor and collector or board member within two years of district creation.

Figure 7.1 illustrates how developers—along with bankers, financial advisors/brokers, engineers, and lawyers are at the center of the process in the creation and formative years of a district. Developers decide to prepare land in the unincorporated suburbs for subdivision or commercial or industrial projects. Armed with a plan designed by a consulting engineer, the land is prepared for construction development by platting lots, paving streets, and installing minimal water, sewer, and drainage facilities.

How to finance these facilities is the most immediate problem for the developer. Prior to 1974, the developer could time a project so that an interest-only loan would suffice until a district was created to issue bonds. At that point, the developer would repay the loan and rapidly build the needed infrastructures; an extremely advantageous method to fund 100 percent of needed improvements with district bonds.

After the 1974 recession, the TWC diminished some of the leverage features of district bonds. Many developers faced financial difficulties, putting a number of districts on the verge of bankruptcy. If a district were to default on its bonds, residents would lose their homes and be saddled with the district’s indebtedness. To ease this situation, the TWC established a rule requiring developers to finance 30 percent of the "construction costs for all water, sewer, and drainage facilities including attendant engineering expenses and fees."

However, the impact of the ruling was softened by two qualifications. First, the TWC could use its discretion in applying the rule, "if [it] determines [project] feasibility is not dependent upon developer contributions." Second, some costly infrastructures (e.g., wastewater treatment plants, main and trunk lines linking a district’s facilities with another system, and water lines used on a regional basis) are exempted from the rule (Texas Water Development Board).

A public process of district approval occurs coincidental with or immediately following the developer’s initial start of a project. The first
Figure 7.1.  The Private and Public Process of MUD Creation

1. Developer seeks Swing Loan (Bank)
   - Project Plan (Engineer)

2. Initial Land Preparation (Streets, Utilities, Lots)

3. Preparation of Petition to City of Houston (Lawyer)

4. Preparation of Application to TWC (Lawyer/Engineer)

5. Informal Meetings With City Planning

6. City Water Review Committee

7. Planning Commission Review/Approval

8. Council Ordinance

9. Technical Review By TWC

10. TWC Hearing

11. TWC Approval

12. District Confirmation Election

13. District Directors Chosen

14. Preparation of Bond Application (Financial Advisory/Lawyer)

15. City Review

16. TWC Review

17. Bond Issuance (Financial Advisory/Broker)

18. Developer Able to Repay Swing Loan

19. Extensive Construction of Infrastructures

20. Lots Sold/Construction of Homes (Builders/Realtor/ Others)

21. Homeowners Assume Debt Obligation As They Move Into New Homes
contact the developer has with a governmental agency comes in informal discussions with Houston bureaucrats in the Departments of Public Works and Planning. These cooperative meetings involve city officials advising developers about potential problems that may arise in the city's district approval process. The criteria applied are whether or not the developer's planned project meets Houston's standards for districts such as guidelines for building and operating facilities, plat recording, and various certifications. The developer and city officials are usually mutually supportive of one another's needs in these face-to-face meetings.

The most extensive city review of a developer's plans occurs in the Water District Review Committee (WDRC). This is a bureaucratic committee with representatives from the Departments of Public Works, Health, Planning, Solid Waste, Aviation, and Legal. A sanitation engineer from the Harris County Health Department is also a member. Neither the developer nor his representatives participates in the WDRC's discussions.

Before explaining the current city process, it is necessary to step back momentarily to see what the city did before the creation of the WDRC. During the "boom" years of the 1970s and early 1980s, growth overwhelmed the city's review process. In the words of a WDRC member, "we had more than we could say grace over!" City departments did not—perhaps because they could not—closely examine crucial aspects of developers' applications. For example, city officials glossed over whether or not the wastewater treatment plant of a proposed district could adequately handle long-term needs; consequently, as subdivisions grew, many "package plants" were used far in excess of their maximum loads. Also, city officials did not pay attention to the siting of district facilities, which later meant the city could not integrate these facilities into a regional wastewater or water supply system.

The review process was cumbersome and time consuming for developers, even though city officials were supportive of district starts. The Texas Water Code required Houston to complete its district review in 120-days, and a wait of the full 120 days for developers was not uncommon. Compliance with this requirement was (and still is) of major concern to Houston officials; because, if a response is not given in the allotted time, a majority of electors in a district can petition Houston's

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5The following analysis of Houston's review process before and after the creation of the WDRC is based on interviews with members of the WDRC.
council to make services available. The WDRC was created to streamline the city's review process and assure compliance with the 120-day rule. The timing problem has taken on added significance lately because the requirement for completion was lowered to 90 days in 1987 and to 60 days in 1988.

Houston's policy to encourage MUD development in its ETJ as a means of financing the construction of an urban infrastructure is as strong today as it was in the past. Yet, a slowdown in economic growth has allowed the city to "catch up" and more closely examine developers' plans. Since the city can now better manage the flow of district applications, the WDRC focuses on districts meeting technical requirements as follows: public works (engineering specifications), planning (plats), aviation (noise and "airport" zones), health (discharge permits and inspections), and legal (water code compliance).

Underlying the more specific technical review is a broader concern that proposed developments do not get out of hand in accommodating present and future wastewater treatment demands, water supplies, and debt obligations. Of utmost concern to the WDRC is future integration of a district's wastewater treatment system and water supply facilities with the city's system. Therefore, the WDRC focuses on whether or not a proposed district's facilities duplicate or otherwise impede existing facilities. If so, city officials may encourage the developer to cooperate with neighboring districts. The guiding norm for city bureaucrats is to coordinate the development of district water supplies and treatment facilities with the aim of integrating them with a regional city system, if and when annexation occurs. The watchwords are coordination, integration, and regionalization.

Once a developer's petition goes through the WDRC, Houston's council must enact an ordinance legitimizing the district. Occasionally, early in the review process, an individual council member may discuss a district proposal with selected WDRC members. The WDRC is very receptive to council concerns and tries to deal with them in its review. Hence, rarely do council members' reservations linger beyond the early discussion stages of the review.

Overall, the TWC's approval process—just as the city's—is geared to accommodate the developer's interests. MUDs are originated by a petition to the TWC from a majority of the property owners—or 50 persons, whichever is less—within the boundaries of the proposed district. Since "majority" is defined as value of land, one property owner (usually the developer) can initiate the application if his land is valued at more
than that of all others combined. During the economic "boom" of the 1970s and early 1980s, developers sometimes "created" land owners by deeding lots to personal friends or employees allowing these "owners," rather than the developer, to initiate the district: a ploy that enabled the developer to hand-pick the same individuals as temporary district board members.\(^6\) In the approval process, the TWC names five temporary district directors, who are almost always nominated by the developer. In most cases, the few property owners placed on the land by the developer are the only property owners (rather, in this example, property "holders," because the developer holds a lien on their lots), they have no competition in becoming district directors.

A final step in district creation is a confirmation election for the district's board of directors. Before that election can occur, the developer must get residents into the subdivision, which requires the platting of lots, the construction of streets and utilities, and the construction of a few houses. The first houses in a subdivision are called "water district houses." The buyer takes a substantial risk in purchasing one of these houses. If the developer's project fails (which means the district would also fail), the first homeowners risk their entire investment. On the other hand, with successful projects, which most have been, these homeowners make a large profit because "water district houses" are bought at near cost. Buyers of these homes, typically, understand the risks; and in the past, they were often directly associated with the developer.

District confirmation elections are usually pro forma, with homeowners favoring district creation. Since there are usually only a few homeowners in a subdivision when confirmation elections are held, district boards are constituted by a vote of fewer than 10 residents. Nonetheless, the confirmation vote is very important to the developer, because it involves the formal approval of the district's five directors and establishes an upper ceiling of bonded indebtedness. No bonds are sold at this time, but the approval allows the process to proceed rapidly to bond financing, which, in turn, means the developer can proceed rapidly to construction.

Once the legal structure of the district is in place, the developer starts the application process for a bond sale. Residents of the district are responsible for bond indebtedness, yet the financing of district facilities

\(^6\)The following analysis of the TWC's review process is based on interviews with selected officials in the Texas Department of Water Resources.
continues to remain with the developer outside resident’s control. To receive reimbursement for out-of-pocket construction costs, the developer wants to start the bond application process as soon as possible. A bond application to the TWC is required. It is reviewed by engineers in the TWC’s District Permits section. The developer is asked to provide technical data such as the purpose of the bond issue, the extent of proposed developments, connections and improvements, the total authorization amount of the bonds, any usual features of the development, and any financial history of the district that might affect repayment of the bonds. The application does not require any input from resident homeowners, who are the ones responsible for repaying the bonds.

After district creation, the bond application process is the most important and critical step to ensure the developer’s success. An unsuccessful application would force the developer to finance utility construction—an unlikely occurrence—or abandon the project. The developer usually does not have to make the choice, because most applications are approved.

Bond applications normally go through the process more quickly and with less scrutiny from TWC engineers if substantial preconstruction of water and sewer facilities has occurred. Having a portion of these facilities completed when the application is submitted indicates to the TWC that the developer is financially stable and capable of following through with the planned project. It also indicates to the TWC that the developer can comply with the 30 percent rule.

Second, using water district bonds to finance facilities, the developer passes on much of the risk of development to others by deferring to them initial and long-term obligations. Just as in all business enterprises, the

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7 Water district bonds are tax exempt. These bonds sell at higher rates than municipal bonds (e.g., they are seldom backed by the full faith and credit of a district). However, they are marketed at lower interest rates than private bonds, which the developer would have to sell in the general market without their availability.

8 A cursory examination of the TWC records indicates bond applications are rarely disapproved. For example, in fiscal year 1977, of the 103 applications submitted to the TWC not one was rejected. The 1977 record is not an unusual one (Texas Water Rights Commission, Thirty-third Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1977, A-48, A-54.

9 Interview with water district attorney of Fullbright and Jaworski, Houston, TX.
developer invests his assets, time, and reputation in a project. However, soon after he does so, the water district assists him in passing the burden to others. Some of the water district’s upfront costs can be transferred to builders to whom the developer sells lots. The faster houses are constructed and sold, the faster the developer’s initial costs can be recouped. Moreover, as houses are sold the bond obligation is spread over a larger number of residents. While district bonds support the costs of development, the developer is absolved of assuming the obligation for this debt even during the start-up phases of a project. The developer is at the center of all initial district activities and functions by (1) hiring the engineer to design district facilities; (2) selecting the attorney to establish the legal structure of the district and to make it a public entity; (3) determining who the first directors will be; (4) controlling when and by whom the bonds will be marketed; and (5) supervising construction. But homeowners assume the obligation for paying back the bonds as developments pass into their "public" control.

Summary

MUDs are empowered by the state to provide public services, to raise revenues, and to have a governing board. They surround Houston on all sides of its borders. As Table 7.2 shows, the number of districts has steadily increased in the postwar years; and starting in the mid-1960s, they proliferated rapidly each year thereafter.

Districts are territorially and fiscally important to developers and public entities, especially Houston. Individual districts are usually very small, but collectively they blanket a sizable part of Harris County’s unincorporated territory and provide basic service to much of the population living in those areas. As shown in Table 7.2, districts are also financially significant (e.g., over a 35-year period over $2.2 billion in district bonds was authorized to provide capital for suburban developments).

Since MUDs are the principal service system used in Houston’s ETJ, they take on added significance in the area’s growth, especially in contributing to Houston’s enormous territorial growth since World War II. Districts provide land developers with a substantial amount of capital to build service facilities to support residential, commercial, and industrial projects, effectively allowing them to use districts as extensions of their own businesses to finance this construction. As a result, suburban
development is essentially shaped by the happenstance of economic conditions, land ownership, and developers' plans.

MUD use does not intrude on Houston's authority, so city officials have encouraged and supported their use by private developers. Districts lessen political and fiscal responsibilities for the public, generally, and city and county governments, specifically. The boundaries of districts may be tailor-fitted to the developer's land, thus neither the city nor the county is obligated to finance capital construction costs of facilities to serve general areas of development. Basic service structures are built and financed neighborhood-by-neighborhood without increasing city or county debt; without diminishing city or county authorities (MUDs are service units, not regulatory ones); and without obligating the public at-large to pay for fringe area developments. Once suburban developments have reached a favorable debt-to-tax ratio, Houston has annexed.

THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE IN METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT

Houston grew steadily over the first 100 years of its existence, reaching a size of 72.8 square miles by 1940. After World War II, circumstances abruptly changed. As shown in Table 7.3, from 1949 to 1956, Houston's size quadrupled to 349.4 square miles. Through the 1960s and 1970s, Houston continued to expand its borders, although at a decelerated pace. Today, Houston sprawls across 579.6 square miles, an area roughly equivalent to the combined sizes of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia.

Annexations through the postwar era have had a profound impact on Houston's population size. As shown in Table 7.4, if Houston's 1940 boundaries were in place today, its 1980 population would have been 76 percent smaller (385,000 compared with 1,593,000). Furthermore, Houston's 1940 population of 384,514 would have decreased to 375,467 by 1980. In effect, without the opportunity to annex over the last four decades, Houston's population growth would have resembled other locked-in central cities.

Since World War II, Houston's annexations have evolved through three stages. First, through the 1950s, massive, around-the-city annexations were undertaken to gain control of surrounding territory. Second, in the 1960s through the mid-1970s, protective annexations occurred to surround important resources (e.g., Lake Houston) and to control an existing and future tax base (e.g., the evolving developments of southeast
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Area Annexed (Square Miles)</th>
<th>City Total (Square Miles)</th>
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<td>163.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>164.2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(Brock Park);</td>
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<td>19.8</td>
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<td>542.4&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kathy Whitmire</td>
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1984  574.5
1986  579.4

*Takes into account areas deannexed in this year.
*Total for annexations and deannexations.

Table 7.4. Population Comparisons for Houston’s City Limits By Decade

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<td>1970-79 Annexations</td>
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<td>596</td>
<td>938</td>
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<td>1,593</td>
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*Source:* U.S. Bureau of Census as disaggregated by city of Houston Department of Planning and Development, Research Section. (This is a slight revision of data presented by Margaret K. Purser and Mary P. Beeman, "Implementing Equality: The Voting Rights Act and Its Impact on Municipal Government," paper presented at the Southwestern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Dallas, Texas, March 18-21, 1987.)

Harris County). Third, in the 1970s and 1980s, annexations became more selective and piecemeal. During each stage, political compromises determined the territorial patterns of cities in the area; however, such compromises became more difficult to attain locally. In the initial stage, territorial disputes were settled almost entirely in the local arena or in the courts. In the second and third stages, other governments became involved. Today, the territorial development of cities in Harris County is a complex intergovernmental process.
Stage I: Massive, Around-the-City, Annexations

Since the late 1940s, annexation plans have been designed and led through the political process by Houston's mayors. Mayor Oscar Holcombe's aggressive use of the city's annexation authority in the massive 1949 and 1956 annexations became the prototype for future mayors. Holcombe leadership in reshaping city government was also important. After his election in 1947, Holcombe obtained voter approval of a charter change that abolished the city manager position and established the mayor as chief executive with extensive appointment and budgeting powers. Since that change, the key public decisions about annexations have been made in the mayor's office.\(^\text{10}\)

Using his newly acquired authority, Holcombe moved swiftly to curb suburb city development in 1949 and 1956. In each of these years, he presented plans to the council that proposed doubling the city's size. The council immediately adopted the 1949 and 1956 proposals on a first reading. As shown in Map 7.2, these two annexations doubled and redoubled the city's territorial size in less than 10 years.

For Holcombe and other city leaders, suburban city development had to be prevented. The prevailing attitude was a "bigger Houston is a better, more economically prosperous Houston." The appeal for public support in both 1949 and 1956 was based on civic pride and competitiveness to make Houston the growth capital of Texas and the South. For example, in 1956, Holcombe argued that the massive annexation was needed to reflect the "true growth situation" of Houston. He argued that

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\(^{10}\) Houston received its charter from the legislature in 1905. A commission-style of government was established with four aldermen to fill designated administrative positions (e.g., tax and land; streets and bridges; water; and fire). Severe polio and diphtheria epidemics struck Houston in the early 1940s. A laggard governmental response was blamed on a patronage-laden commission government. Voters then approved an amendment to the charter to create a council-manager form of government in 1942. The eight-member, at-large council appointed the manager and acted like a board of directors. The mayor was little more than a ceremonial figure. After only four years, the manager-system was replaced by a strong-mayor government by simply taking the manager's charter powers and giving them to the mayor. A strong-mayor, eight-member council arrangement remained until 1979, when the council was enlarged to 14 members (nine elected from districts and five elected at-large).
Map 7.2. *Houston Annexations*
unincorporated areas were growing faster than the city, which was discouraging corporate growth in Houston. Holcombe reasoned, since corporations base their location decisions on indices such as building permits and since building permits are required only inside the city, rapid suburban growth diminished Houston’s chance of capturing the amount of corporate growth that it should. The public, along with its leadership, felt that Houston should be the growth capital. Annexation was the most optimal method to continue Houston’s growth rate.

During Houston’s 1949 annexation, suburbanites in a number of communities formed committees to support being annexed by Houston, reasoning that "better" services were available in the central city. Additional annexations by Houston seemed to portend a more integrated service structure for the metropolitan area, but ironically it had an opposite affect. Twelve suburban cities immediately began capital improvement programs to quiet citizen complaints. The most extensive programs were initiated by cities most directly affected by Houston’s annexations.

Houston also felt pressured to provide new services. Industrial, commercial, and residential developments outside Houston had to be supported by basic water, sewer, and drainage facilities not provided by Harris County. As explained above, MUDs are the principal public entity providing these services in the unincorporated environs.

With the 1956 annexation, water districts became an especially thorny problem for Houston officials. As noted, districts support suburban developments without obligating Houston to capital improvement costs. When Houston annexes and assumes the bonded indebtedness of districts along with their facilities, that can be either good or bad. In the mid-1950s, the consequences were mostly bad. Houston officials felt they could not profitably annex many of the new districts, but neither could they wait for suburbanization to encircle the city. The latter consideration prevailed, and districts were annexed.

Twenty-six districts with bond indebtedness totaling $36.5 million were taken in the 1956 annexation, but only nine districts with indebtedness of $4.25 million were annexed in 1949. Many Houstonians, generally supportive of the annexation, were outraged by the assumption of this debt. Mayor Holcombe tried to still their concerns by producing evidence to show that taxes from the new areas offset the city’s costs in servicing district bonds. He did not indicate, however, that over the next several years, city services would have to be extended to the new subdivisions.
Problems of implementing the 1956 annexation (e.g., servicing the water districts and the land area acquired) influenced the annexation strategy of Mayor Lewis Cutrer, Holcombe’s successor.

Doubling Houston’s size twice in less than 10 years created a political dilemma for city officials. Rather than operate under city codes and restrictions, private developers hopscotched across large tracts of undeveloped land inside Houston to build homes, businesses, and industries in unincorporated areas. A rash of water districts was created to finance services for these developments. By the late 1950s, unincorporated areas were again growing more rapidly than Houston.

Changing economic and political conditions necessitated a new annexation approach. Mayor Cutrer was still committed to city growth, just like his predecessor. The consequences of enormous land acquisitions, however, forced him to arrive at this goal through different means. In response to the problems of implementing the 1956 annexation, Cutrer and the council adopted a new annexation policy. While the cornerstone of the new policy was a reaffirmation of earlier policy that annexations should be used to protect the city’s territorial integrity, it departed from Holcombe’s approach by advocating more deliberate, planned annexations. It held that land should be annexed before it is subdivided to ensure the enforcement of city building codes, the integration of suburban water and sewer systems with city facilities, and the prevention of new incorporations. Cutrer said the new policy was needed to stop the proliferation of water districts and to force developers to start projects inside the city or pay a share of the cost of capital improvements in the county. Otherwise, Houston would have to assume large debts when these areas were annexed or face new suburban incorporations if they did not annex.

Stage II: Protective Annexations

The new annexation policy was short-lived. The 1949 and 1956 annexations established Houston’s geographic dominance over other Harris County cities and effectively stopped new incorporations; however, lucrative tax plums of existing and planned developments in unincorporated areas were still outside Houston’s jurisdiction. The tax potential of these developments did not escape the watchful eyes of suburban leaders who wanted their communities to grow and reap the benefits of economic development just as Houston was doing.
In 1960, suburbanites demonstrated they too could use their annexation authority aggressively. On June 6, 1960, the councils of Pasadena, Lomax, LaPorte, and Deer Park passed annexation ordinances annexing 106 square miles of territory in southeast Harris County. Pasadena claimed 77 square miles; LaPorte, 20; Deer Park, 2; and Lomax, 7. Following the four cities' annexations, a number of small Gulf Coast cities in other counties passed ordinances expanding their limits by hundreds of square miles. The most extraordinary example was in Nederland, a 4.3 square mile city in Jefferson County, whose council planned to annex 655 square miles.

These annexations precipitated a state legislative investigation into the annexation authority of home-rule cities. That investigation had both short- and long-term consequences on Houston's annexations. It began the formulation of the MAA of 1963. Anticipating the MAA passage, Cutrer downplayed the significance of the annexations of neighboring cities. Cutrer felt any large-scale annexation by Houston in reaction to those annexations would hasten legislative controls, especially since suburban interests were finding sympathy from small town and rural legislators.

Cutrer thus fashioned a two-step strategy. He wanted to quell opposition to his annexation policy within the city, and he wanted to avoid an outright confrontation with suburban city leaders. To hold his own ranks together, he assured the council that Houston had a superior legal claim to the territories annexed by the suburban cities because one city—Pasadena—has illegally broached Houston's boundaries when it annexed land in southeast Harris County. Second, Cutrer sought a compromise with the four cities' mayors by offering to relinquish some of the territory Houston had acquired in 1949, if the mayors gave up part of their annexed land.

Cutrer's strategy received a cold reception from council members and prominent civic leaders. Some segments of Houston's leadership advocated a "Holcombe" response. Their solution was to annex the entire county! The council rejected Cutrer's argument that Houston could afford to negotiate because it enjoyed a superior legal position. "If we have such a strong legal position," they reasoned, "why should we give up anything?" Three council members, therefore, introduced a plan to annex 34 square miles of the same territory that Pasadena had claimed. Also introduced at the same session was an ordinance to annex all of Harris County. Although Cutrer argued vehemently that the 34 square mile annexation was unnecessary (i.e., if Houston's legal position was
secure, then Pasadena’s annexation was illegal; but if it was not, then Pasadena had a first-right claim to the land anyway), he finally agreed to this annexation when the council came close to adopting the countywide proposal.

With this, the four mayors broke off negotiations with Cutrer. To make matters worse, only hours after Houston’s council rejected the countywide proposal, Tomball, a small community in northwest Harris County, annexed a sizable tract of land. The next morning the council of Baytown, a small industrial city to the east of Houston, passed a 110 square mile annexation plan. Forty of these square miles were in Harris County and included industrial areas along the Houston Ship Channel. Houston’s council immediately reconvened and passed on first reading the countywide proposal over Cutrer’s objections. The countywide annexation changed the scope of the controversy. It foreclosed hopes of a negotiated settlement. All sides prepared for a protracted battle, which would now shift to the courts.

After a series of court cases, Houston’s superior legal claim to the land was upheld. These court cases and the 1963 legislative actions settled the legal and political issues surrounding the June 1960 annexations. Houston’s claim to the developments of southeast Harris County was solidified in its court battles with Pasadena and the other Harris County cities. The ETJ provision of the MAA gave Houston the same control over the metropolitan area that was enjoyed with the countywide annexation. (Houston ensured its countywide control by annexing 10-foot strips along major highways to extend its ETJ control over the entire county.) Still, Houston had to be concerned with metropolitan growth. Subdivisions, industrial plants, and commercial enterprises were sprouting on all sides of the city.

These growth conditions necessitated protective annexations around the city. Mayor Lewis Welch proposed, first, annexing a narrow 21.4 mile-long strip extending eastward from the southeast corner of the city all the way to Galveston Bay. This strip would encircle the all-important southeast Harris County developments. Next, Welch’s plan advocated annexing another 87 square miles including: 50.8 square miles to the north and northeast to encircle Lake Houston, the city of Humble, and fringe developments around the planned airport; and four tracts on the west and southwest sides totaling 36.1 square miles. (See Map 7.3.)

While the 1965 annexation was intended to accomplish what earlier ones had (expansion and protection of the tax base, prevention of new
Map 7.3. *Houston’s 1965 Annexations to Protect Resources and Territory*
incorporations and continued growth), new and more complicated reasons motivated Welch’s proposal. First, there was a need to protect Houston’s surface water supply. City officials could not tolerate the deterioration of Lake Houston, which was a distinct possibility without the imposition of some pollution control standards. Second, there was a need to ensure the success of the city’s new intercontinental airport. Third, the MAA created overlapping ETJs for some Harris County cities, and unincorporated areas outside any city’s jurisdiction. Aggressive annexation of selected areas would prevent encroachment by other home-rule cities. The annexation in southeast Harris County would solidify Houston’s control over the southeast development around NASA—Johnson Space Center—by preventing future annexations by Pasadena, Deer Park, LaPorte, or other home-rule cities. It would also give Houston control over Bayport, a community that was attempting to incorporate, and the huge Humble Oil and Refining Company’s Bayport project near NASA.

Stage III: Piecemeal Annexations

Many city officials still prefer to capture suburban growth in much the same fashion as it had been done during the first stage. As a top planning official put it: "Large-scale annexations are being planned for in the future, especially after the 1990 census." However, certain political realities now prevent that from happening. With large-scale annexations, Houston would face horrendous service delivery cost problems (indeed some areas taken in 1956 still do not have city water services). Next, a large and growing suburban population would undoubtedly unleash a strong legislative protest, thus adding to the stakes. Then, there would be strong opposition from innercity minorities who do not want their growing political strength diluted. Cumulatively, these factors have forced Houston to undertake smaller, piecemeal annexations over the last decade. Perhaps the single most important impediment to

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11The annexation was necessary to acquire federal dollars for airport construction. To meet federal conditions, the city had to establish a protective zone around the airport to ensure safe air operations. Although Houston had a long history of rejecting all forms of zoning and city officials had foregone federal dollars for public housing because of zoning requirements, federal funds were considered crucial to the airport’s immediate success. Mayor Welch and other city leaders were willing to set aside their aversion to federal strings in the case of capital construction funding.
Houston's continued use of annexation will come from the application of the U.S. Voting Rights Act.

APPLYING THE U.S. VOTING RIGHTS ACTS

Texas was not included under the provisions of the 1965 U.S. Voting Rights Act (VRA) or its 1970 extension. In 1975, the VRA was extended to Texas, and the state became an active source of VRA disputes. Of 7,470 electoral changes reviewed in 1975, 4,694 (62.8 percent) were from Texas (Cotrell 1980). Section 5 of the VRA says that changes in a local government's electoral system cannot be altered without prior approval of the U.S. attorney general or a declaratory judgment from the district court for the District of Columbia (Public Law No. 89-110, 1965). In practice, most localities have submitted proposed changes to the attorney general and have only gone to court if their plan was rejected (Zimmerman 1978, 621-60). The amendments in 1975 not only extended the act's provisions to Texas but also made a significant change in Section 5 by making it applicable to language minorities as well as blacks.

This change has become a stumbling block to large-scale annexations by Houston, because it prevents alterations in the city population that diminish minority voting strength or minority representation in the councils of government. When these circumstances are considered in light of Houston's 1980 population that was 46 percent minorities (28 percent blacks and 18 percent Mexican American), then the impact is apparent. Furthermore, when Asians reach five percent of the population, which will likely happen after the 1990 census, they must also be considered.

Houston's At-Large Council System

Since 1942, Houston's charter required the at-large election of all eight council members. (Five, however, had to live in and "represent" geographic areas.) Minorities, thus, had to compete against a citywide, white-dominated, electorate with a history of racial voting with regard to minority candidates. Like other cities with similar systems, Houston's at-large elections, citywide voting majorities, and traditions of racial voting severely disadvantaged minority candidates (Jones 1976, 345-56; Karnig 1976, 223-42). Houston's practice of annexing large suburban areas has also worked against minorities' efforts to gain electoral power.
Postwar annexations added white suburbs to Houston and moderated the proportionate growth of minorities inside the city, preventing minorities from gaining significant voting power. Houston’s widespread use of annexations, thus, have placed minorities in a somewhat different situation from their counterparts in New Orleans, Atlanta, Chicago, and Birmingham where minorities (blacks) have been able to win citywide elections despite racial voting patterns.

Despite the council’s weak role in city governance, critics made it the focal point for political reform. Blacks and Mexican Americans consistently emphasized the underrepresentation of minorities on the council. Other groups, convinced that a reformed council would make city government more responsive to their concerns, joined with minorities in attacking the representation of the council.

Initiative for council reform originated in several diverse ways. Starting in the late 1950s, proposals were made for single-member districts. These efforts intensified in the early 1970s when mayoral candidates began raising the single-member district issue and pledged to work for such a structure if elected. Finally, proponents of the district concept mounted petition drives in an effort to require a public vote. None of these efforts was successful.

Council members were understandably reluctant to change the election system under which they had won and held their seats. The council did allow a nonbinding straw vote on single-member districts to be placed on the 1975 city ballot. The proposal was approved by 54.8 percent of those voting. While blacks and Mexican Americans favored the change by almost 3 to 1, whites were slightly opposed. The council ignored the results. After all, the at-large system worked well for the incumbents, especially since each lacked a partisan or neighborhood political base from which to launch a winning campaign in smaller districts. The council’s reluctance to act meant that reform advocates faced an arduous task locally. Thus, they sought assistance outside Houston to secure internal reforms.

The first step in the extracommunity process occurred in federal court. The impetus was the election of Mayor Fred Hofheinz in 1973. He campaigned for council reform, and he was elected with black support. Advocates for council reform thought the time was ripe; therefore, they challenged the city’s at-large council system in federal court. The legal avenue was the principle of equal protection of the law as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Westbury v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims (376 U.S. 1, 1964 and 377 U.S. 533, 1964). Their
efforts were immediately stymied when the judge delayed hearing the case—a delay that lasted three years. The 1975 changes in the VRA allowed the plaintiffs in the pending lawsuit—just 15 days after the VRA’s provisions became effective in Texas—to file a second suit charging that the city of Houston had violated the VRA by not seeking approval by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for various annexations since 1972. The suit asked that (1) the city be enjoined from holding its 1975 general election; (2) the DOJ object to the annexations because they diluted minority voting strength; and (3) Houston be required to revise its charter to allow future councils to be elected from single-member districts.

Houston survived this challenge. The DOJ chose not to enter the suit. In 1976, DOJ officials informed the city that it would not object to its annexations and would require no change in its council election system. When the court case was finally heard in late 1976, Houston’s attorneys countered charges that the at-large system was inherently discriminatory or that it placed insurmountable obstacles to the election of minority candidates. The city’s position was that while few minorities were elected under the at-large system, that did not diminish city services to these groups because all members of the council had to be responsive to minority voters since they constituted a sizable part of the electorate. The trial judge sided with the city, concluding that the plaintiffs had "failed to prove that the city discriminates against minorities in providing city services or that minorities are denied access to processes of city government" (Houston Chronicle, March 8, 1977, 1).

Houston’s 1977 and 1978 Annexations

Certain policy pursuits have a momentum of their own. That was certainly true of Houston’s postwar annexation policy. Territorial growth was deemed to be a vital part of Houston’s continued progress, especially since new developments were sprouting all around Houston. Houston officials were alarmed by this occurrence. The potential of suburban encirclement anywhere on Houston’s borders, loss of the city’s future tax base, and increased minority numbers in the inner city—all perceived to be avoidable through annexations of unincorporated areas—led to a series of annexation proposals at the end of 1977 by outgoing Mayor Fred Hofheinz. These proposals were then supported in 1978 by Hofheinz’s successor, Jim McConn. The council approved an annexation plan to take in about 75 square miles of territory containing more than 150,000
people, most of whom where middle-income whites. This action was strongly supported by the Chamber of Commerce and established business interests.

Houston's desire for territory overrode some changed circumstances. Business and developer interests, traditionally in favor of annexations, strongly pressured council to act decisively. Furthermore, the mayor and council were not concerned about legal complications, because the legal department had assured them that Houston was not covered by the VRA and did not need DOJ approval for the annexation. Therefore, the city did not even submit its 1977 and 1978 annexation plans to the DOJ for review and clearance.

The opportunity was thus ripe for the proponents of single-member districts to seek a solution through the courts. In the summer of 1978, the plaintiffs in the earlier suit on appeal in the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court urged the DOJ to use the VRA to block Houston's annexations. The DOJ, accepting their premise, joined the plaintiffs by asking the appeals court to vacate the earlier decision that upheld Houston's at-large elections (*Houston Post*, September 14, 1978;: 1). One week later, the DOJ filed suit against the city for failing to secure approval for the 1977 and 1978 annexation plans and then blocked all municipal elections until the issue could be settled.

After six months of review, the DOJ formally objected to the annexations on the ground that they had reduced minority voting percentages. The head of the civil rights division of the DOJ, Drew Days III, informed Houston officials that the DOJ would consider withdrawing its objection if the city adopted a system "in which blacks and Mexican Americans are afforded representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength." Days indicated that such representation "would include the election of some (not all) city council members from single-member districts, if the districts are fairly drawn and if the number of districts is sufficient to enable both blacks and Mexican Americans to elect candidates of their choice" (letter of Attorney General Edward H. Levy, April 2, 1976).

**Adoption of the Nine-Five Council Plan**

The DOJ's decision started a process of local negotiations to change Houston's council. The solution emerged from the mayor and council and traditional power brokers in the city—not from the advocates of council reform. Understanding that change was inevitable, the mayor and council tried to devise what they regarded as the best solution. What
they came up with was a plan for a mixed council of nine members elected from districts and five members elected at-large. But, while they understood that change had to come, they did not give up trying to hold onto the status quo. When the city council scheduled an August 11, 1979 vote on the 9-5 plan, it also attempted to put another proposition on the same ballot to retain the existing system. Acting as the referee, the DOJ refused to allow voting on anything except the 9-5 plan. Tactically, the DOJ put its stamp of approval on the 9-5 plan.

In a strange twist of circumstances, almost all of the long-established opponents to the council change lined up to campaign for the proposed change. These champions of the 9-5 plan included such earlier stalwarts of no-change as business leaders, the Chamber of Commerce, and the mayor and council. However, most of the reform advocates who had worked long and hard to come to this point now found themselves opposed to the council change. Blacks and Mexican Americans—joined by labor leaders, neighborhood activists, and recently annexed suburbanites—wanted a 20-member council with at least 16 district seats.

In the campaign that ensued, local political clout was the decisive factor, not DOJ intervention. On the one hand, the 9-5 opponents were at a severe disadvantage, as they had been historically when they attempted to contest citywide elections. They hastily put together a "Citizens Coalition for Responsive Government," but could raise only $4,595. They could not even buy a 30-second, prime time TV commercial. On the other hand, a blue-ribbon group of Houston's most prominent business leaders was assembled. That group quickly raised almost $200,000 to put together a media campaign supporting the charter change. These efforts were supported by many large business firms that urged their employees to vote for the proposal.

The die was cast. On election day, with only an 11 percent turnout of eligible voters, the 9-5 plan passed almost 2-to-1. As shown in Table 7.5, the margin of victory was attributable to the far heavier turnout in affluent and middle-class white areas (22 and 13 percent) than elsewhere in the city. Moreover, despite the favorable vote, the electorate voted along racial lines. The plan was opposed by 91 percent of the blacks and 77 percent of the Mexican Americans who voted. On the other hand, whites strongly favored the plan, except those whites in newly annexed areas: Clear Lake, where 92 percent opposed and Alief, where 53 percent opposed.
Table 7.5. Voting Patterns on the Nine-Five Council Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct groupings</th>
<th>Percent turnout</th>
<th>Percent for</th>
<th>Percent against</th>
<th>N precincts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affluent white</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class white</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class white</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous black</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominantly Mexican American</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Totals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last remaining step was to draw district lines. Again, the DOJ largely left the decision to the city’s traditional power brokers, although the DOJ retained its position as rules interpreter. With the aid of three outside consultants (recommended by DOJ staff), Houston drew various district plans. Each was based on population estimates for 1979, which had the effect of shifting more representation to fast-growing suburbs, rather than on official 1970 census counts, which would have favored minorities. Although strong objections came from blacks and Mexican Americans, the DOJ approved the city’s district plan even though the plan did not maximize minority political influence.

CONCLUSIONS

The activities of government during the development of the Houston metropolitan area since World War II have generally facilitated the objectives of private economic interests. Government initiatives and responses were interrelated in most cases with the marketplace activities of private economic interests. Yet, government was not passive: it established the "rules of the game" to allow marketplace activities to be the driving force behind local decisions.

As the preceding analysis has shown, Texas constitutional and statutory authorities were extraordinarily beneficial in providing a setting for local governance to support the economic and territorial objectives of land developers and the city of Houston. In many ways through such constitutional authority as home-rule and MUD creations, opportunities
were provided for economic interests to maximize their objectives. Legislative extension of these authorities in the MAA of 1963, various acts related to the creation of water districts, as well as others established a framework within which the courts and bureaucracy could legitimize and sustain economic initiatives.

Several consequences have resulted from these arrangements. First, various types of local governments respond to urban growth. As shown above, suburbanization in the Houston metropolitan area is serviced by activities of the state, county, city, and special districts. Furthermore, public authorities are in a cooperative relationship with private interests (e.g., land developers), thus an integration of public and private interests occurs out of this diverse response to urban growth. This is a relative rather than an absolute integration. Jacob and Teune (1964, 7) tell us "political integration [is not] a specific condition that exists or does not exist [rather it is] a set of relationships which are more or less integrated, or a progression of events leading to an increase or decrease of integration."

Second, through most of the postwar years, Houston has dominated urban growth decision making. Governing "rules"—derived mainly from the Texas Constitution and statutes and embellished locally—have created a context for the city of Houston to be the center of urban growth decision making. Several key factors contribute to Houston's dominance. For one, county governments in Texas are subordinate to home-rule cities in urban growth decision making mainly because they operate under nineteenth century structures and processes. Next, a system of independent school districts and special-purpose districts, on one hand, diminish the central city's suburban infrastructure responsibilities (e.g., the city does not participate in the cost of providing water, sewer, drainage, roads, as well as others); but, on the other hand, does not prevent the city from either annexing across suburban jurisdictions (e.g., when Houston annexes, independent school districts remain intact) or absorbing districts into its jurisdiction (e.g., when the city annexes, MUDs are abolished and Houston acquires their assets and liabilities).

Third, private economic interests (e.g., land developers) have been able to focus on Houston city government and politics (or city hall decision making) to advocate their causes, rather than on numerous incorporated suburban cities. The structure of suburban governments that has facilitated Houston's political dominance has also prevented suburbanites from gaining political control over growth and development policies in their own areas—a typical occurrence in many metropolitan
areas. As urban populations across the U.S. dispersed rapidly in the 20th century, suburban areas incorporated and typically gained legal powers equal to those of central cities. Suburban communities often used their autonomy to practice a politics of exclusion, designed to preserve local privilege or segregation (Judd 1979, 365). A fragmentation of local governmental structure and dispersal of local authority made it difficult for business and other economic interests usually based in central cities to extend their influence throughout the entire metropolitan area.

Houston business leaders and other economic interests have not encountered this difficulty. Just as in other urban areas, the Houston metropolitan area population dispersed outside the central city. Although developers’ use of MUDs contributed to suburban sprawl, Houston’s aggressive annexations in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s stifled new incorporations and brought suburban growth into the city’s borders. When annexations were slowed in the 1970s, Houston had extraterritorial jurisdiction to block new incorporations where developments were located or could occur. Thus, unlike what happened in many other metropolitan areas, suburban-central city conflicts were largely avoided because there were no serious challenges to city political dominance over the metropolitan area. Consequently, business and economic interests centered their attention on city politics. Urban growth decision making thus largely came down to what was decided within the city of Houston, greatly enhancing the political influence of those who could capture positions of power in the city, especially the mayor’s office.

The structure of suburban authorities coupled with Houston’s home-rule authority, the ability to annex, and extensive ETJ control creates the framework for urban growth decision making. However, as illustrated, this framework is changing. On one hand, some changes have been slow and subtle. In the use of MUDs, for example, initially developers had almost a free-rein to do as they wished. Then, more controls were imposed by both the state and the city. On the other hand, some changes have been abrupt, such as the application of the VRA. But, even when the VRA was applied, Houston officials still decided the details of the change (e.g., a nine-five plan), although their decision was subjected to "outside" rules monitored by national bureaucrats.
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Chapter 8

Governing Metropolitan Vancouver: Regional Intergovernmental Relations in British Columbia

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Patrick J. Smith  
Simon Fraser University

INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of public policymaking and local intergovernmental relations offer important foci for the comparative analysis of governance in North America's metropolitan regions. This chapter examines several key issues of public policymaking and process confronting urban development in metropolitan Vancouver; it assesses obstacles to effective governance in the metropolitan region; and it places these public policy

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developments in the context of local-senior governmental relations in British Columbia (B.C.) and Canada.

BACKGROUND

Jane Jacobs contends that "city regions are not defined by natural boundaries," rather they are "artifacts of the cities at their nuclei" (Jacobs 1984, 45). In the same way, "metropolitan Vancouver" is a social fact, with the city of Vancouver at its center. The region exists independently of its governance; and, indeed, the governing of the Vancouver metropolitan area has often been substantially at odds with its social reality, though increasingly there is recognition that this need not be—and might not appropriately be—the case. This was illustrated during the campaign for the October 17, 1991, B.C. General Election, in policy statements by candidates for all parties and by municipal politicians. These included consistent "pitches" for a return/expansion of regional powers to the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) (Lee 1991).

In Canada, regional and local authorities are constitutional "creatures" of the provinces (Jones 1988; Smith 1988). While most are created by provisions of general municipal legislation, in British Columbia there are separate legislative enactments such as the City of Vancouver Charter and amendments such as those to the Municipal Act creating Regional Districts after 1965.

British Columbia, on the Pacific Coast, is Canada’s third most populous province—3,131,700 citizens—representing approximately 12 percent of the total Canadian population (British Columbia, Ministry of Finance 1991). It is also Canada’s third largest province (948,600 square kms), slightly larger than the states of Washington, Oregon, and California combined. Yet despite this size, 83 percent (almost 2.6 million) of the provincial population resides in 149 incorporated municipalities encompassing less than one percent of provincial territory (Canada, Statistics 1991).

Over half (1,711,915, 54.7 percent) the citizens of the province reside in the "Lower Mainland"—comprising four regional districts along the Fraser River Valley adjacent to Vancouver. This Lower Mainland is bounded on the south by the U.S. border, on the north by mountains that extend virtually without interruption to Alaska, and on the east by similar mountain ranges; its western extremity, including the city of Vancouver, is the gulf waters of the Pacific Ocean. In Jacobs’ terms, this Lower Mainland forms one coherent city region (Jacobs 1984, 45-58).
Most of the Vancouver metropolitan area is contained within the Greater Vancouver Regional District. Established in 1967, the GVRD is currently an amalgam of 18 municipalities and three unincorporated electoral areas, covering just under 3,000 sq. km at the mouth of the Fraser River. The Greater Vancouver Region contains a little under half (1,477,760 million, 47.2 percent) of the provincial population and a majority (eight of 12) of the largest (over 50,000 population) local authorities in the province. As of the October 17, 1991 B.C. General Election, the Vancouver metropolitan region has 35 of the 75 legislative seats, 47 percent of the provincial total. The current GVRD has 33 seats, 44 percent of the provincial total.

The Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) is slightly larger than the GVRD. It is projected that this Vancouver region will grow to 1.8 million by the end of the century—and 2.5 million by 2040. Apart from the 18 municipalities and three electoral areas in the GVRD, three additional municipalities (Pitt Meadows, Maple Ridge, and Matsqui) belong for specific (water/sewage and/or parks) service functions. Current discussions suggest that the first two of these will join the GVRD, making the GVRD and the Vancouver CMA essentially the same (GVRD 1989b).

The somewhat larger "Pacific Fraser" region, utilized by Seelig and Artibise, is currently 1.7 million, with anticipated population growth to 2.7 million by 2010 (Seelig and Artibise 1991). The region is larger than the current Vancouver CMA; it includes the rest of the Lower Mainland, B.C.'s adjacent Sunshine Coast, and the area north/northwest of Vancouver, including the destination resort of Whistler. Other local notables have projected much more substantial population growth over the next 60 years—up to 10 million in one extreme case (Lee and Kines 1989). Whatever its growth potential, the fastest growing areas in the Vancouver metropolis are in the Fraser Valley suburbs within and beyond the eastern boundaries of the GVRD. By 2010, for example, GVRD projections have the Greater Vancouver suburb of Surrey surpassing the central city Vancouver, 550,000 to 540,000. Adjacent non-GVRD outer suburbs, such as Maple Ridge, Mission, Abbotsford/Matsqui, and Chilliwack are among the fastest growing areas in the province. Such growth will still result in a population density of only 493 persons per sq. km, compared with 3,467 for Metro Toronto and 6,591 for Montreal (GVRD 1990d).

Since its initial settlement more than a hundred years ago—the city of Vancouver was incorporated in 1886—the Lower Mainland has
Map 8.1.  GVRD Plus the Central Fraser Valley District and the Dewdney-Allouette Regional District Form Three Regional Districts in the Lower Mainland Valley
developed a distinctive cultural base—socially, economically, and politically. Metropolitan Vancouver residents are different from residents, for example, of the Peace River region in northern British Columbia (Dyck 1986, 511-12; Morley, et al. 1983). As elsewhere, this political culture is an important basis of the "local" political system. This is evident in such factors as the ethnic makeup of the region's population, which has become increasingly multicultural—almost half the public school population of Vancouver has English as a second language (Smith 1991). It is also demonstrated in the development of metropolitan Vancouver's economy. Much of the province's economy is resource extractive, with heavy reliance on logging, mining, and fishing. The economic base of the Lower Mainland, on the other hand, is increasingly service-oriented, with a strong reliance on personal and corporate services, including tourism, and provincewide distribution of goods and services. With its significant multicultural population, a more globally oriented regional economy, and its Pacific port location (the Port of Vancouver is the second busiest in North America), metropolitan Vancouver has become an international city (Cohn, Merrifield, and Smith 1989; Smith 1992).

Most of the best arable land in British Columbia is found in the Lower Mainland. Only one-quarter of the land in the province is suitable for any form of farming. Thus, the potential for policy conflicts and the necessity of devising regional solutions to resolve urban development problems—on such issues as land use, transportation, water, waste management, health, or parks and open space—become immediately apparent.

Three areas where policy dilemmas exist—on land-use planning, transportation, and parks/open space policy—form the case bases for this study of metropolitan Vancouver governance. The premise argued here is that metropolitan governance has emerged in place of metropolitan government in the Vancouver region: that is, metropolitanwide services and their spatial implications are managed regionally in the absence of metropolitan government. In certain instances, as the cases demonstrate, this involves local definitions of regional solutions to service challenges; in other cases, the provincial government has set regional policy solutions; and in still other situations, the regional district acts as the primary policy instigator. It is also the case that in metropolitan settings such as Vancouver, the federal government often has an important involvement (Oberlander and Symonds 1988).
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN GREATER VANCOUVER

In Vancouver, service challenges requiring regional solutions were apparent within 20 years of the city’s 1886 incorporation. By 1911, the inability of the adjacent municipalities of Vancouver, Point Grey, South Vancouver, and Burnaby to respond individually to sewage treatment problems created the local impetus for a regional response. The municipalities established the Burrard Peninsula Joint Sewerage Committee; they funded a study that recommended "an ongoing cooperative response," and by 1914 had convinced the provincial government to create a Joint Sewerage and Drainage Board (GVRD 1979).

Other regional special-purpose agencies were established later: in 1926 the Greater Vancouver Water District and from 1936-1948 four area health/hospital boards (Higgins 1979, 124-62; Bish 1990, 35-62). In 1948, under provisions of the Municipal Act allowing for contiguous local authorities in a metropolitan area to develop a joint land-use planning capacity, the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board (LMRPB) was established. Tennant and Zirnhelt have persuasively argued that the proliferation and success of these early joint boards and authorities led the way to provincial consideration of more regional solutions to urban development problems, particularly with regard to their application in metropolitan Vancouver (Tennant and Zirnhelt 1973, 124-38).

Perhaps the most successful of the special regional authorities was the LMRPB. The Social Credit provincial government led by W. A. C. Bennett (first elected in 1952) had the advantage of reviewing the early experience of metropolitan government in Ontario. In 1957, community and regional planning provisions were added to the Municipal Act that empowered the minister to direct adjacent municipalities in metropolitan areas to establish a joint committee "to study and report on such matters of an intermunicipal nature as shall be set out by the Minister. . . ." The LMRPB was able to produce an official regional plan for the Lower Mainland, but as the LMRPB was moving toward this success in the mid 1960s, the provincial government, perhaps feeling threatened, determined that administrative and political diffusion was a more appropriate response. Accordingly, a regional district system for the entire province was created in 1965-67. As stated by Municipal Affairs Minister Dan Campbell, the B.C. government’s intention was clear: "Regional districts are not conceived as a fourth level of government, but as a functional
rather than a political amalgamation" (British Columbia, Department of Municipal Affairs 1972).

As a result, the Lower Mainland was divided into four separate regions. Within the GVRD (originally incorporated as the Regional District of Fraser Burrard on June 29, 1967), as elsewhere in the system, there were two types of functions. First, there were mandated functions, including general planning for the region as well as governing the hospital district. In Greater Vancouver, mandated functions also included Water Board and Sewage and Drainage District responsibilities. Second, there were 78 voluntary functions. Each district could choose the ones it wished to perform (British Columbia 1989d).

In the context of these changing and evolving regional administrative responsibilities, this study will assess the interplay of local, regional, and senior (provincial and federal) authorities in dealing with urban development in the Lower Mainland and in governing metropolitan Vancouver. The reality that emerges is one of considerable governmental interplay, at times in conflict, at times cooperative, and in some instances benignly neglectful by local or senior authority: in Greater Vancouver, the federal government is the largest single employer and its largest single landowner; its activities range from responsibility for the Port of Vancouver, to acting as landlord for Granville Island Market, parts of the North Shore mountains, veterans’ hospitals, military bases, and regional offices for federal departments and crown agencies. And while its constitutional authority on regional issues is limited, its market influence is considerable—for example, through the airport and sea port. The provincial government has chosen to locate an extensive array of its ministries and crown corporations in Greater Vancouver. It also has a long and continuing capacity and inclination to be an active policy player in the Vancouver region—on transportation, land-use planning, trade and investment, and strategic land ownership. Local governments have generally recognized the benefits of regional solutions to metropolitan policy challenges. All of this interplay across divergent policy fields has produced policies that operate at cross purposes, as well as demonstrations of intergovernmental cooperation and policy agreement. It has also shown the capacity of one level of government to constrain and frustrate another (Swainson 1983).
CASE ONE: TRANSPORTATION PLANNING AND POLICYMAKING

Vancouver-area transportation planning can be divided into four eras. First, there was an early mass transit era, which began in 1890 with state of the art streetcar technology. Despite initial financial difficulties, by 1897 the private B.C. Electric Railway Company was providing profitable interurban public transportation from Vancouver, through Burnaby to New Westminster, 21 kilometres away. At its peak, 300 streetcars operated on over 1,800 miles of track (Metro Transit Operating Company 1980-81).

Second, there was the trolley bus era, which provided the link between streetcars and recent transportation policy choices. Although some streetcars continued until 1955, by World War II they were being replaced by trolley buses. In 1946, 146 million passengers used the system.

Third, there was the era of the private automobile. It had two antecedents: (a) the commitment of the Social Credit government (1952-72) to expand significantly the provincial highway network; and (b) the 1961 "provincialization" of B.C. Electric. Yet B.C. Hydro did not see its public bus system as having a high priority. Coupled with the general provincial emphasis on highways, the result was a transit system that declined substantially for a decade.

In Greater Vancouver, the policies of encouraging private automobile use and allowing public transit to decline culminated in 1966 with proposals to build a freeway system, mimicking urban transportation policy choices throughout North America. One of the proposed Vancouver-area freeways was to go through the long-established Chinatown, North America's second largest, adjacent to downtown Vancouver. The Chinese community, and other freeway opponents were quick to mobilize in opposition. The ensuing "Great Freeway Debate" created considerable public pressure against provincial and municipal officials supporting the freeway/automobile option. In retrospect, "the freeway debate was a turning point in the history of metropolitan Vancouver transportation" (Kopystynski and Powlowski 1980, 33-6). Certainly the debate, led by local communities in the region, about the implications of unrestrained automobile use, represented a fortuitous opportunity for those wishing a re-examination of transportation policy options in metropolitan Vancouver. Vancouver City Council, together with the Town Planning Commission, fully supported the freeway option.
However, the Town Planning Commission chair, H. P. Oberlander, resigned over this issue to lead the antifreeway forces. Shortly thereafter, they formed The Electors Action Movement (TEAM)—a local political party that controlled Vancouver City Council from 1968-74. An early TEAM member, Mike Harcourt, was elected to city council, subsequently became mayor, and is now B.C. premier.

The fourth era, the re-emergence of public transit, began with defeat of the freeway proponents. In Greater Vancouver this resulted in at least half a dozen transportation studies between the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1972. All recommended an increased provincial role in this transportation policy field and consideration of additional public transit options, such as rapid transit for Greater Vancouver (Lea 1967, 1968; Wooster 1968; Cather 1970; Kelly Report 1971; Parkinson Report 1971). With the election of the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP) government (1972-1975), provincial involvement in metropolitan transportation planning did increase significantly. Under the NDP, the public transportation system was expanded and upgraded considerably; one result of this was a greatly increased transit system deficit (Metro Transit Operating Company 1980-81, 6). To oversee this broadened role, the NDP provincial government centralized planning and policymaking with the creation of the Bureau of Transit Services (BTS). The mandate of BTS was "to study transit needs, financing, purchasing and operations" of public transit in the province.

Regional transportation and transit were not functions assigned to the GVRD in 1967. However, as a service it was seen as an integral part of the GVRD’s Livable Region Plan (LRP) developed in the early/mid 1970s. (See Case Three below.) The GVRD had requested the transportation planning function from the outgoing Socred government in 1972; the NDP response through BTS was to create a more obvious provincial role in both developing and operating transit systems throughout the province.

After the return of the Social Credit Government to power, the Municipal Affairs Minister Bill Vander Zalm introduced legislation in 1978 further consolidating and expanding the province’s authority by creating the Urban Transit Authority (UTA), a crown agency, to oversee all transit planning and financing in the province. The legislation also gave the minister the power to designate local/regional operating authorities. While the UTA simply represented a shift in transit responsibility from one provincial agency to another, Vander Zalm did respond to further GVRD requests for authority in this policy field with
an announcement that this would occur by April 1979. Before this date, however, the provincial government announced the creation of a second agency—the Metro Transit Operating Company (MTOC)—to operate the public transit systems in Greater Vancouver and the Capital Region of Victoria.

Over this 1978-79 period, the GVRD Board discussed and ultimately rejected the Provincial Transit Financing Formula as established under the UTA bill. However, in spring 1980, the UTA and Greater Vancouver signed a Transit Service Agreement, stating that responsibility was to be shared jointly among the GVRD, UTA, and MTOC. This became known as the three-headed monster because of the coordinating conflicts (Smith 1986, 11-2).

A GVRD Review Committee in 1982 indicated six specific areas of local concern about public transit:
1. A lack of clarity at political and staff levels as to the roles and responsibilities of each of the three parties to the agreement.
2. Virtually no public accountability.
3. A lack of flexibility on the part of the GVRD to improve transit quality and performance or to act independently regarding fiscal responsibility.
4. An unnecessarily complex procedure for modifying the transit service levels and costs.
5. A duplication of staff within the agencies.
6. A general lack of local autonomy in dealing with regional issues such as labor relations, financial accounting, and transit system identity.

As a result of this concern over "responsibility, accessibility, accountability, operational efficiency and coordination ability," the GVRD proposed a Regional Transit Authority, under direction of a board with three GVRD and three provincial government appointees, and a seventh director mutually agreeable to both (GVRD 1982). Within months, the province took up the issue, but not in ways anticipated or supported by the GVRD. In June 1982, the UTA was replaced by a new provincial agency, B.C. Transit. The change was justified on the grounds that "the province funds public transit systems that operate in rural areas as well as urban areas" (Vander Zalm 1982). The "new" B.C. Transit agency recommended removal of any transit service responsibility from the GVRD (and other regional districts). Despite ministerial denials (Vancouver Sun 12/11/82) and local/regional opposition to the proposal, this occurred between January and April 1983. The GVRD response, as expressed by its chair, was that the provincial "government's main
interest in transit is to get as much credit as they can and reduce the cost of exposure" (The Province 1/10/83). From April 1, 1983, the provincial agency, B.C. Transit, had responsibility for transit planning in the Lower Mainland region.

The subsequent creation of a Regional Transit Commission by the province, consisting of provincially appointed local mayors or aldermen was an attempt to provide some opportunity for local involvement. Nevertheless, former GVRD Transit Commission Chairman Bob Bose called the shift in transit function to the province "arbitrary" and "highly undemocratic"; the result was nothing short of "a crisis" for local input and control (Bose 1983). The response of B.C. Transit was that a changed and smaller board would "bring transit more to the people" (from interview notes with B.C. Transit official, May 2, 1983).

Subsequent developments offered some support for the contention that the shift toward more centralized provincial control was, and would be, substantial. For example, in March 1985, the Greater Vancouver Regional Transit Commission responded bitterly to the provincial announcement of a rise in regional bus fares. The regional commission criticized the province for forcing it "to take the heat for a decision that was essentially made in Victoria." Richmond Mayor and Regional Commissioner Gil Blair argued that he found "it repugnant to sit here and have to make a decision after other bodies have made the decisions leaving us no other choice" (Vancouver Sun 3/13/85).

A final factor illustrating the province's dominance in this fourth era was its unilateral commitment in 1979 to build an Advanced/Automated Light Rapid Transit (ALRT) system. Its technology, timetable, and planning were centrally controlled and tied to the province's sponsorship of Vancouver's Expo '86, a world exposition with transportation as its central theme.

One rationale for the continued centralization of the transit planning function in metropolitan Vancouver was that it limited the capacity of local and regional authorities to "frustrate" the senior government's intention to complete its ALRT project in time for Expo '86. The route chosen—apart from providing access to two areas of the Expo site—connected Vancouver with Burnaby and New Westminster, a total of 21 kilometres through the core of the metropolitan region. This route provided an effective framework for the regional town center concept of the Livable Region Plan (LRP); in this sense, ALRT substantially implemented the LRP in a part of the GVRD, if not by explicit design, at least by benign default.
Recent Developments in Transportation Policy in Greater Vancouver

There have been four significant subsequent developments in transportation planning in metropolitan Vancouver. They highlight differing dimensions of the governing—and intergovernmental—framework of the urban region. Each will be treated in turn.

The Metropolitan Transportation of Hazardous Goods: Tri-Level Cooperation Promised

Between 1983 and 1986, the Canadian Transport Commission held a series of hearings—through its Railway Transport Committee—on the rail routing of hazardous materials to the Vancouver port area, and within the metropolitan region. These hearings led to the conclusion that broader questions about all forms of movement of dangerous goods went beyond the Rail Transport Committee’s jurisdiction and to the recommendation that all levels of government and all interested publics develop a comprehensive plan regarding the transportation of hazardous goods throughout the Lower Mainland region.

The result was a Tri-Level Government Task Force to conduct the first such comprehensive study in the Vancouver metropolitan region. It was chaired by the Federal Department of Transport, with representation from the B.C. Ministry of Transportation and Highways. Local government representation on the task force was through the GVRD. Its objective was "to collect information necessary to understand and comment on the existing transportation of dangerous goods system and, using this information, to recommend ways of developing and maintaining a comprehensive plan for future movement of dangerous goods" (North Vancouver District 1989; British Columbia, Ministry of Regional Development 1989b, 6).

The Task Force established four working groups—one on road, rail, marine, and emergency response. These working groups included representation from the three levels of government and others concerned about the issue of safe transportation of dangerous goods in the region. Throughout 1987-88 a series of public hearings were also held; and public polling and newsletter distribution in the region solicited further public comment (Canada, Transport Canada 1989b; Port of Vancouver 1989).

The result of this multilevel consultation was broad agreement on the task force report, Vancouver Area Transportation of Dangerous Goods
Study, published in July 1988. The tri-level governmental cooperation on this transportation policy problem has led to ongoing intergovernmental involvement through a tri-level council (of federal, provincial, and local [GVRD] governmental representatives). As a process, it represented not only cooperation promised, but cooperation delivered. It also contributed to provincial-municipal dialogue on other dimensions of transportation policy in the region (British Columbia, Legislative Assembly Debates 1989a).


In the autumn of 1986, with the election of the Vander Zalm/Socred Government, a number of policy studies were undertaken. Following this initial thrust, provincial ministries carried out major reviews of their responsibilities. Much of this was subsequently ignored in a provincial pattern of policy gambling and surprise. For example, the B.C. Ministry of Transportation and Highways carried out such a comprehensive review in 1988. The result was an 18-volume report: "A Transportation Planning Overview for the Province of British Columbia." It reviewed transit, rail, marine, air, and highway systems. Among its recommendations were proposals that each of the eight Economic Development Regions (EDRs) established by the Vander Zalm government undertake a more in-depth study to: (a) establish regional transportation strategies that will serve as the blueprint for future expansion of the existing transportation networks; and (b) identify the priority transportation infrastructure projects that should be undertaken in the short term and that are consistent with the strategy in the long term (Greater Vancouver Transportation Task Force 1989). The urgency for metropolitan Vancouver was reflected in the fact that the last comprehensive regional transportation study had taken place in 1954, during the early period of the LMRPB planning mandate.

The Economic Development Region for the Vancouver area includes the GVRD, and the three other regional districts of the Fraser Valley, as well as the Sunshine Coast, north of Vancouver. The transportation mandate, as defined by the minister, was:

- to prepare an integrated transportation strategy for the Greater Vancouver Region which will encourage orderly economic development at the lowest possible cost to taxpayers and system users in a manner consistent with the maintenance of liveability and environmental quality (Veitch 1989).
Map 8.3. *Existing Regional Road Network*
Phase I of the study was to report on (1) a transportation strategy, (2) a 2001 transportation plan, and (3) the setting of short-term priorities within three months (by July 1989) to feed into the provincial Ministry of Transportation and Highways budgeting cycle for fiscal 1990/91. The time frame for this initial phase established by the province, presented the first problem. While apparently consultative and representative, the task force report—entitled *Freedom to Move*—provoked considerable opposition from the local/regional governing units in the metropolitan area. The report noted this problem: "This time frame meant that a full metropolitan area... transportation study, which normally would take 12 to 18 months to undertake, had to be completed in approximately three months" (Greater Vancouver Transportation Task Force 1989). As a result, many of the tasks intended for Phase I were postponed to Phase II (originally scheduled to commence in August/September 1989). It also meant that the task force did not engage in any significant debates.

According to one task force member, the process was also flawed by a fundamental paradigm problem: "a campus pathway planning model" may be appropriate for Spuzzum (B.C.'s archetypical community of one hundred) but not for a major metropolitan centre”—certainly not when tied to an inadequate timetable.

These pressures resulted in a final report that was isolated from many of the communities it was to represent; it was also, according to one task force member, "unjustified by data" and too detailed for a process that lacked agreement. It was prepared and released without the agreement of a number of committee members. (interview, Greater Vancouver Transportation Task Force member, October 13, 1989.) Interestingly, it was completed under the direction of then GVRD Manager Mike O'Connor. O'Connor had been second in charge of B.C. Transit prior to his appointment to the GVRD. Within months of the task force report, he moved back to the provincial agency, B.C. Transit, as its president.

This provincial effort to control the agenda proved inadequate, and the report—with $2 billion in planned spending over 10 years—was opposed by a large number of local authorities in the Greater Vancouver region (Fraser and Turnbull 1989; Horn 1989). Many municipalities agreed with specific aspects of the final report; few found it supportable as a whole. Phase II did not begin in August-September 1989 as originally planned. Negative reactions to Phase I caused initial issues to be re-opened.

Phase II was to develop a longer term transportation strategy—including "Strategic plans (for) . . . air, rail and marine modes;
investigate the relationship between, and impacts of, alternative land use scenarios and transportation networks; and establish a regionwide road network to provide continuity between adjacent municipalities for all freeways, expressways, arterial roads or municipal roads." It also anticipated "an ongoing transportation planning process that will enable all three levels of government to work together cooperatively to continually plan ... Greater Vancouver's transportation system" (Greater Vancouver Transportation Task Force 1989, 3). There was little indication of such cooperation in the provincially sponsored *Freedom to Move* policy initiative.

*Recent Policy Development on Regional Rapid Transit: Policy Cooperation Lost*

If the Vander Zalm government's actions concerning *Freedom to Move* meant consultation postponed, its response to regional rapid transit needs in Greater Vancouver represented consultation lost. The stated intention of various reviews of transportation in the metropolitan region was to be consistent with the *Livable Region Strategy for the 1990s*, a GVRD update of its Livable Region Strategy (LRS), originally stated in 1976. The overall goal of the LRS was "to maintain Greater Vancouver's livability as it grows and develops." The 1990s update of the LRS planning guide sought to maintain a "healthy and safe region," "a region of diversity and vitality," an "equitable," "efficient" and accessible region; its transportation strategy to do this placed considerable emphasis on "improvements to the public transit system and programs to encourage its increased use" (Greater Vancouver Transportation Task Force 1989).

Yet subsequent to the *Freedom to Move* report, the premier and minister of municipal affairs invited all the mayors and other local/regional government representatives to "a major transit announcement." Rather than confirm earlier discussions about conventional rail links to some northeastern metropolitan communities and an extension of the existing rapid transit lines to faster growing areas such as Coquitlam, (which had returned opposition members to the B.C. legislature), the premier announced $1 billion in provincial expenditure for a skytrain extension across the Fraser River into Surrey, the constituency of Municipal Affairs Minister Rita Johnston. The premier also announced up to $750 million for a new skytrain link into his own Richmond constituency (by 1995). The latter new link was to have preferred emphasis over the previously discussed link to Burnaby (1995, $210
Map 8.4. Existing Regional Transit Network
million) with no timetable for an extension to Coquitlam (British Columbia, *Provincial Report* 1989c).

This five-year timetable, geared to Socred ministerial ridings, did not reflect at all the GVRD priorities on rapid transit. In addition, the premier included a Burrard Inlet marine rapid transit service. This highlighted the lack of provincial governmental forethought in its transit planning for the region. As the mayor of Port Moody indicated, in 20 years of discussion, no proposals for such a sea-based link had been seriously considered. During the previous federal general election, a multimillion dollar support package had been offered by the federal government to develop a several-year test of commuter rail from that part of the region. The latter had been rejected by the province. The process and the result ran entirely counter to the spring 1989 "Partnership in Transportation Planning" signed by the GVRD and the provincial government. Rather than "working together"—the partnership’s logo—to achieve "a comprehensive transportation plan (as) an urgent priority for Greater Vancouver if the region is to maintain the high quality of services, and living standards," (British Columbia, Ministry of Regional Development/GVRD 1989b) the province had reverted to a paternalistic approach. Between March and summer 1989, the policy process had shifted from "an open, consultative process . . . [with] cooperation between the municipalities, the GVRD, the Ministry of Transportation and Highways, B.C. Transit, port and airport authorities and other participants," (Ibid.) to one where the "cooperative approach" had been abandoned by the senior authority, and the regionally determined needs had been ignored.

*The Johnston Interlude, The Harcourt Start*

On April 2, 1991, Premier Bill Vander Zalm resigned over conflicts of interest. His Minister of Transportation (and formerly of Municipal Affairs), Rita Johnston, succeeded him in the final months of the government’s five-year term. Johnston made some efforts to distance herself from her former political mentor, but without success. She had an opportunity to respond to the extensive summer 1990 process of community consultation on metropolitan Vancouver that culminated in documents entitled *Choosing Our Future* (GVRD 1990a), and *Creating Our Future* (GVRD 1990b, 1990c), issued in the later summer of 1990. The consultations involved examinations of regional policy options on the quality of community life, affordable housing, regional town centers, the
metropolitan land supply (including its agricultural uses), metropolitan transportation, and urban futures.

The Johnston government, however, continued the rapid transit priorities of the Vander Zalm era. Advisory committees on skytrain extensions were established; all ran into local opposition. For example, it was alleged that one route choice had been predetermined by the provincial government; a leaked document indicated the consultative process had been "cooked." (See Burnaby Now, various articles, summer 1991.) The early fall 1991 general election put on hold major decision making for most of these transportation initiatives. For Premier Johnston "the bottom line [was] that the provincial government must have a very strong voice considering the substantial amount it contributes to transit in the Lower Mainland." Rita Johnston lost the governmental majority and her own seat in the October 1991 provincial general election.

The newly elected provincial NDP government, led by former Vancouver Mayor Mike Harcourt, faces many of the same challenges. As a critic of the expensive ALRT system imposed on the city by the province, Harcourt may reflect a different view of local authority over such matters. If so, he will confront a metropolitan region with a clearer view of its developing future. The GVRD, now chaired by Vancouver Mayor Gordon Campbell, has initiated major policy plans in 1990-91: the Creating Our Future policy statement established 54 priorities for "A More Livable Region"—at least 19 of which had transportation components (GVRD 1990c).

Many of these regional transportation policy priorities relate to expansion of rapid and public transit, and developing a more "co-operative transportation process with the provincial government and its agencies" (GVRD 1990c). More importantly, "the region’s municipal leaders want the management and operation of public transit in this area turned over to the Greater Vancouver Regional District so there is control and accountability at the local level" (Mills 1991). In unanimously endorsing the idea that transit should be a regional district function, the GVRD supported the conclusions of a consultant’s report prepared by a former vice president (planning) of B.C. Transit. He concluded that "effective and responsible transit management in Greater Vancouver ha[d] been hampered by conflict between provincial and local representatives almost from the time the system was removed from B.C. Hydro in the late '70s" (GVRD News August-October 1991).

The report also argued that:
The residents of the region deserve a transit system that is responsive to their concerns and can be coordinated with an overall strategy to address the multitude of urban structure and metropolitan development issues facing the Lower Mainland over the next decade.

The regional district provides the best mechanism to achieve regional transportation coordination in concert with an overall regional strategy. . . . It can provide the autonomy that the regional transit system requires to make "appropriate transit decisions."

A transit system that functions within the framework of regional authority will be more accountable than a transit system that exists outside the regional district's jurisdiction (Mills 1991). Whatever the outcome, there is some expectation that dealing with a premier who was a former Vancouver mayor and GVRD director will produce more local-regional-provincial cooperation than was previously the case with two Social Credit premiers who had served as ministers of municipal affairs as well as Surrey aldermen. Harcourt represents center city, regional core issues, whereas Vander Zalm and Johnston were rooted ideologically in suburbia.

CASE TWO: REGIONAL PARKS AND OPEN SPACE POLICYMAKING

In contrast to its role in transportation, the GVRD has considerable policymaking autonomy concerning regional parks and open space. By 1992, it had created 16 regional parks, with 10,000 hectares of open/green space, including mountain, river-valley, island, farmland, and ocean-front habitats, both within and beyond its boundaries. Providing parks and open space has been one of the most successful regional functions. It has also become the largest, with 23 municipalities and electoral areas participating, including a number from outside the GVRD itself (GVRD 1990c, 1990d).

The GVRD parks function has its origins in the provincial Regional Parks Act, 1965. The act provided regional districts with the authority to acquire public parkland on a regional basis. A goal established at that time was that by the year 2000 the Lower Mainland should have a developed and operating system of regional parks to complement local and provincial parks in meeting the needs of area residents. Throughout the years, the regional role of GVRD parks has changed: while GVRD
has been a "retailer" of regional park services to the general public, and a "wholesaler" in land acquisition, planning, development, and maintenance of such parks, it has also become the primary developer of open/green space for the whole Lower Mainland. The designation of open space has shaped the metropolitan region and established its limits while providing a rational system of outdoor recreation.

The provision of regional parks has involved policy decisions in land use at the local, provincial—and occasionally, the federal—levels of government. Often, it has also reflected preferences of the public: at times, private property and native land claims also were central factors. All of this provided ample scope for conflicting interests, yet regional open/green space policymaking in metropolitan Vancouver has seldom been confrontational. Green is "good" and more is better.

Parks Governance

The acquisition of parkland, and its development, maintenance, and management, form an integral part of local and regional governance in metropolitan Vancouver. As the population of urban areas spilled over their historic boundaries, parkland had to be acquired beyond their boundaries leading to the need to create a regional or metropolitan scale park agency. Initially it stood alone as a means of park management, but increasingly the parks function was grouped with other areawide public activities such as water or sewage, constituting a means of metropolitan governance for selected functions. Governance for parkland and its integrated use encouraged cooperation with other related functions leading to increased efficiencies in service provision and growing responsiveness to public demands in terms of locational preferences and priorities. Parkland and its function-specific administration at the metropolitan/regional level became a desirable and readily accepted central element in the apparatus of governance without unduly threatening local government responsibilities for parkland and its increasing use, even when it began to supersede localities. The GVRD park system was built on the initial work of the LMRPB, with early cooperation by the provincial government. In 1966, the Regional Parks Plan for the Lower Mainland region set forth desired acquisition goals and a framework for their achievement (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board 1966). New sections of the Municipal Act, passed with the Regional Parks Act in 1965, provided a 1/3 provincial—2/3 municipal cost-sharing regime for
capital expenditures on regional parks acquisition and development. The GVRD inherited the regional park responsibility in 1967.

Many of the policies for regional parks and open space that have developed over the years reflect the basic outline for a park system described in the Regional Parks Plan of 1966. The plan proposed incorporating provincial and municipal parks into an integrated new system. Parks were to include typical Lower Mainland natural landscapes situated close to regional town centers, interconnected by trails wherever possible (GVRD 1980b). Some park land has been acquired from private owners. Other important parcels have been conveyed or leased to the GVRD by municipalities and by the federal and provincial governments. The GVRD does not pay for publicly owned land. Recently, community nonprofit groups have become increasingly important in assisting with the acquisition and development of new land (GVRD 1976, 1985).

The existing political structure of Greater Vancouver Regional Parks (GVRP) reflects the 1966 Parks Plan philosophy that regional parks should "have strong local representation to guide . . . park policies" (Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board 1966). Locally elected politicians are appointed by their councils to represent their constituencies at the regional level. There, the GVRD's governing body—the board of directors—appoints municipal representatives to the committees through which the board operates. The Parks Committee is part of this committee system. Its members meet monthly and make recommendations to the board regarding the acquisition and management of regional park property (interview, Rick Hankin, Manager, Greater Vancouver Regional Parks, April 1989).

Financing Regional Parks

The Regional Parks Act

Financing for operating and capital expenditures is governed by the Regional Parks Act, which provides a district with the authority to generate and expend funds to sustain the function (GVRD 1985). Operating funds are requisitioned from member municipalities through the property tax. Initially, funds for land acquisition were derived from an annual budget based on a levy of 0.25 mills plus one-third contribution from the provincial government. By 1970, rapidly increasing land values created a need to accelerate land acquisition, and the GVRD board (after repeated efforts on the part of the Parks Committee) voted to increase the
levy to 0.35 mills. A further source of revenue became available in 1972 when the act was amended to authorize park districts to borrow money for acquisition or development. But provincial costsharing, the major incentive for the GVRD to take on the regional parks function, was being gradually reduced by 1979, and was discontinued completely by 1982 as economic conditions deteriorated (interview with Rick Hankin).

Though the cost per capita for regional parks has grown since 1970, it still remains far below municipal expenditures for parks and recreation. For example, per capita expenditures in 1970 were $1.50 per resident; by 1984 they had risen to $2.40, and in 1988, to $4.00. By comparison, municipalities in 1985 were spending, on average, about $60.00 per resident on local parks and recreation (GVRD 1985).

Intergovernmental Relations in Parks Governance

While the intention of regional parks was to complement local and senior policies and programs, Greater Vancouver Regional Parks has come to predominate. Where the shift began to emerge was on park development. Consequently, while local authorities continued to spend more on parks/recreational budgets, many began to assume that the acquisition of large parks was the role of the regional district.

This was the case in Langley (population 70,000). Here, in response to considerable local pressure to be more involved in parks and green-space, the municipality undertook in the summer of 1990 an extensive survey of its citizens. The survey determined that there was strong citizen support for maintenance of the rural quality and natural attributes of the area. To implement this, the municipality held a series of public meetings in autumn 1990. The local consultative process showed that there had been no area green-space inventory. With urban development pressures amongst the strongest in the province, Langley responded to criticism from local groups such as the Field Naturalists about lack of local green space concern by referring to the GVRD’s Campbell Valley Regional Park located within the municipality. Here, the success of regional district park planning allowed for some local abrogation of its “complementary” park responsibilities. This was not always the case; nor was it true that the province was always a benign actor.

Burnaby, an inner suburb adjacent to Vancouver, has worked in concert with GVRP in the creation and operation of the Burnaby Lake regional park. Burnaby leased all of its Burnaby Lake lands to the GVRD; the GVRD agreed to purchase all privately owned lands within
the designated park's boundaries, and Burnaby convinced the federal
government to release .4 acres of adjacent land expropriated from the
municipality during World War II for a veterans' hospital.

Adjacent to Burnaby Lake is Deer Lake, the single most important
recreational body of water in the municipality. Part of this area also
housed the Oakalla prison farm, which dated from the late 19th century.
The municipality, and the GVRD, had designated this Oakalla land as
part of the regional park system. After years of public lobbying by the
municipality, and extensive local pressure to remove this Lower Mainland
Regional Correctional Center, the province promised to close down the
facility in 1978. It deeded 158 acres between Deer Lake and the Oakalla
prison to Burnaby with the proviso that this land be kept as parkland in
perpetuity; it also stipulated that the municipality dedicate all of its Deer
Lake land for park purposes. The land was transferred to the municipali-
ty as a result of the provincial government accepting the recommendation
of a committee it had formed to look into the disposition of the Oakalla
lands. Having acquired all but 68 acres of the Oakalla lands, and a
mandate from the Burnaby electorate to set aside the Deer Lake/Oakalla
lands for park use only, Burnaby proceeded—in consultation with the
public and the GVRD—to plan for an integrated regional town cen-
ter/regional park system (District of Burnaby 1980).

In September 1982, the premier announced, to the astonishment of
Burnaby officials and residents, the closure of Oakalla prison by 1986 to
make way for a multimillion dollar 640-acre residential and parkland
development. The area extended well beyond the municipal designated
park boundaries, taking in both private and public lands. The provincial
Deer Lake/Oakalla Lands Project called for 1,800 residential units, a golf
course, and a network of trails throughout the valley farmland (Powers
and Fralic 1988). In his announcement, the premier talked of the
"handsome profit" the project would earn for the province. He estimated
the development would generate $150 million of revenue providing a
"substantial excess of revenue over expenditures"—a share of which
would be allocated to Burnaby in return for which the municipality would
be required to forego its own plans (District of Burnaby 1980, 1988).

The announcement was met with anger and disbelief. Over 80
percent of the total land contained within the provincial project area
belonged to the municipality, yet there had been no discussion with
Burnaby officials nor had there been any inkling that even the remaining
Oakalla lands would be developed for anything other than a park. Few
local officials shared the premier's view that the project represented a
"partnership for progress between Victoria and Burnaby." Burnaby's mayor, a Social Credit supporter, did not oppose the project. From his perspective, the municipality could only afford to develop its plan incrementally. He viewed the housing development as the "... engine that created the money to develop the park" (Powers and Fralic 1988).

For most, the announcement resembled earlier encounters with the senior government when Burnaby had been coerced to give up substantial areas of parkland for provincial priorities and had gained little in return. As for the public, residents living in the vicinity of the correctional center stated that the prison's barbed wire fencing—along with wide open spaces and grass and trees, and a spectacular, unobstructed view of Burnaby Mountain and the mountains of the North Shore—were preferable to the high density housing proposed for the provincial project; others resented the provincial government bypassing officials they had elected and interfering in matters of local concern (Morton 1982).

Faced with such provincial-government attitudes, municipal staff decided that the partnership concept had some merit and concluded there might be a way of working with the province to relocate the Oakalla prison, protect park areas, provide additional housing, and share in the profit from the development of Deer Lake Park, provided the development was compatible with Burnaby's and the GVRD's regional town/park system. If the municipality could strike a bargain with the province, park development and improvements could begin more quickly than would be possible under the municipality's "pay as you go" approach (District of Burnaby 1982). Burnaby proposed an alternative plan with an equitable sharing of cost and revenue as well as a sharing of park development costs. In return for a scaled-down housing development on the Oakalla lands, the municipality would make available to the province 158 acres of undeveloped land that it had been banking for future residential development. It would be developed for housing on the same cost-revenue sharing basis.

The next four years were a period of ongoing discussion—and bargaining—between Burnaby municipal planners and the provincial government. By 1986, a substantially altered provincial proposal was presented to Burnaby Council for its consideration (District of Burnaby 1986). Housing development was reduced from 1,800 high-density units to 610 low-density units to be located on the remaining 68-acre site of the prison facility. Traversing the location was to be a major landscaped public walkway providing access from the regional town center/Metro-town to Deer Lake, all of which would complement the regional park
function of Burnaby Lake. The 158 acres deeded to Burnaby were designated parkland to be developed to Burnaby's specifications, and ongoing negotiations were to address Burnaby's share of the revenue. Perhaps most important from Burnaby's (and the region's) perspective was that the whole proposal was contingent upon the construction of three new separate correctional facilities in the Lower Mainland region and the demolition of Oakalla in 1991 (District of Burnaby 1988). "Over the years the residents of Burnaby have been promised these institutions would be closed and the Oakalla Lands would be made available to the municipality. The promise has been made and broken, time and time again" (Robinson 1982). Oakalla prison was finally demolished in 1992.

Burnaby's ability to maintain the integrity of its long-range planning for the Central Valley Regional Park System seemed to rest on several factors. Unlike the remote provincial designers, Burnaby officials were well acquainted with local issues and public preferences. This knowledge proved to be a distinct advantage in the bargaining process for a new provincial plan. Faced with the potential of having the senior government's will imposed on them, Burnaby was determined to formulate an alternative proposal that would be compatible with municipal aspirations while retaining some of the elements of the provincially inspired plan—one which could provide the municipality with resources to develop its own plans. Burnaby planners also recognized that the development of an integrated local/regional park system providing public open spaces for citizens was dependent not only on senior government, but on citizen support as well. The public, which since the early 1970s had input in the planning process through public hearings, written submissions and open houses, rejected the imposition of the senior government plan that ignored their wishes (Burnaby Today 12/20/82). In this they were aided by the earlier deeding of some of the property as municipal parkland. This provided a stronger legal basis for Burnaby's plan. As a result of these conditions, the local government was able to outmaneuver the province on an important park issue. In other instances, senior governmental cooperation has been more complementary.

Regional Parks and the Livable Region Plan(s)

The regional park concept outlined in the 1966 parks plan became part of the GVRD's 1976 Livable Region Plan (LRP). The goal of the LRP was to ensure that rapid population growth of Greater Vancouver, the major urban center of the Lower Mainland, did not diminish its own
and the region's "livability." The strategy was to create regional town centers to encourage residential development and job creation in outlying municipalities that would provide an alternative to downtown Vancouver concentration. A significant feature of the program was the protection and enhancement, wherever possible, of natural open spaces for public recreational use (GVRD 1980a).

When the GVRD undertook its major review of the LRP in late 1989-early 1990, these principles continued to guide its policy choices. Through its extensive Choosing Our Future consultative process, the region developed a regional agenda—with "made in Vancouver solutions"—for joint action.

These included a strong commitment to "protect wilderness, park and agricultural land" to ensure "a more livable and healthier region" (from a September 1990 letter from the GVRD chair to all member municipalities). To do so, the GVRD has spearheaded a policy of "urban containment to distinguish developed areas from permanently reserved wilderness, parks, wetlands, watersheds, wildlife habitat and farmland" through creation of a Green Zone (GVRD 1990c).

Protecting migratory flyways; establishing a Land Conservation Trust Fund; encouraging the inclusion of wetlands, wilderness, and rural planning for agriculture and urban forestry in official community plans; and developing wildlife sanctuaries were all park-related steps in the 54-point Strategy for Regional Livability. Many of the regional initiatives involved local governmental action. Local and regional work on the new LRP for the 1990s and beyond did not anticipate extensive involvement by the province. The reality was that, with few exceptions, the GVRD had come to dominate greenspace planning in the Lower Mainland. This may be all the more significant when other aspects of land-use planning are considered. Here the policy discourse has been more contentious.

CASE THREE: LAND-USE PLANNING AND POLICYMAKING

Regional land-use planning for the Lower Mainland began in 1937 when six metropolitan municipalities (Vancouver, Burnaby, Coquitlam, Port Moody, North and West Vancouver) created a voluntary planning association for the Lower Mainland. Although significantly preceding the creation of the GVRD, it underwent considerable changes in response to the challenge posed by major flooding in the Fraser River Valley in 1948. Yet despite these changes in legislation and locus of responsibility,
Map 8.5. Regional Parks and Green Zones
regional planning has continued to the present. On the themes of regional governance and jurisdictional interplay, the local responses to senior governmental ambivalence and hostility to regional initiatives in the field of planning provide a significant index of local governing capacity.

The LMRPB and Regional Planning

Under the LMRPB, established in 1949, regional planning in the Lower Mainland focused on the preparation of a plan for the entire area and making it binding on the municipalities through its official status. An "Official Regional Plan" (ORP) was defined under the Municipal Act as "a general scheme without detail for the projected use of land within the regional district" that had been approved as such by the regional board. An ORP was seen as a preventive policy or enactment, so no development could be undertaken in opposition to it; it prevented changes in land use within and between designated areas; it did not require or authorize any positive steps, public or private, to implement the stated objectives of the plan. Prior to 1983, the Municipal Act stated "neither the Regional Board nor the Council ... of a member municipality ... shall enact any provision or initiate any works which would impede the ultimate objectives of the regional plan," but the plan "does not commit the Regional Board or a Council ... or any other administrative body, to undertake any of the projects therein suggested or outlined."

Each municipality in the area—there were 28 in all—was required to nominate a member to the regional board. The board was empowered to hire staff, to prepare and publish reports, and for these purposes, to collect a per capita levy from the member municipalities to meet its annual budget. In 1963, the official response plan, "Change and Challenge," was initiated by the board. Early in 1965, the board and its staff consulted with the municipalities in the region on the maps, text, and schedule of the regional plan. During 1966, the board carried out a broadly based formal review of the plan in light of the reaction of the municipal councils and the general public. The plan was reconsidered, incorporating a number of amendments and subsequently formally considered by the member municipal councils. On August 8, 1966, the board received notice that the plan had received the necessary approval of two-thirds of the Lower Mainland municipalities and thereby became the official regional plan—a major achievement.

While the plan established a significant framework for regional and local land-use development and achieved the original purpose of the
LMRPB, its very success led to friction, jealousy in local bureaucracies, and conflict with the provincial government. In fact, it began to threaten provincial authority.

In the period 1965-68, some board and staff members of LMRPB became critics of the provincial government concerning a number of provincial land-use decisions at variance with the newly adopted official regional plan. Here the LMRPB was instrumental in changing some public policies but at a political price. In addition, the LMRPB was critical of the ministry of municipal affairs program of creating regional districts that had begun in 1965.

As a result of such intergovernmental friction, the demise of the LMRPB was sealed in the late 1960s. Without much warning or public debate, it was dissolved in 1968 by the minister of municipal affairs. Its territorial responsibilities were divided among the four regional districts created within the Lower Mainland. One outcome of the regional-provincial disputes was that the professional staff of the LMRPB were not taken on by the new regional districts. The LMRPB went so far as to offer its staff publicly to the GVRD; neither the minister nor local municipal officials responded favorably. Ironically, the only professionals fully familiar with planning in the area, long-term employees of the LMRPB, were not hired by the GVRD, although the original regional planning authority was transferred to it. Nevertheless, the success of the LMRPB in fulfilling its mandate—and the success of other regional single-purpose authorities such as hospital boards, water, sewage and drainage districts—had a distinct impact on provincial policymakers. More importantly, the legacy of the LMRPB experience was to ensure that regional land-use planning remained central to governance in metropolitan Vancouver and the rest of the Lower Mainland.

The GVRD and Regional Planning

After the creation of regional districts in the mid 1960s, the planning activities and responsibilities in the region fell into five major categories:
1. providing local planning services to electoral areas;
2. providing advisory opinions to the B.C. Land Commission concerning release of land from the agricultural land reserve (ALR) within the region after 1973;
3. maintaining the official regional plan inherited from the LMRPB;
4. developing a "Livable Region Program";
5. developing proposals concerning future public transport within the region.

Between 1967-69 and 1983, the GVRD operated visibly like a level of government despite provincial denials of such status. Its planning role was substantial and involved working with provincial agencies and local authorities. Two examples stand out as illustrations: (1) its interaction with the provincial Agricultural Land Commission, and (2) its development of a Livable Region Program in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, it was the confluence of these two aspects of regional planning, and an ongoing GVRD-provincial government land-use dispute that ended regional planning authority for the GVRD (and as a byproduct for the 28 other regional districts in B.C.).

The GVRD and the Agricultural Land Reserve

In 1973 the Agricultural Land Commission was created by the NDP government led by Premier Dave Barrett (1972-75) as a provincial agency to administer the use of all arable lands in the province. Since then, designated agricultural land is held in a provincewide reserve system, and its use is regulated jointly with respective municipal councils. In the Lower Mainland, originally the ORP designated the lands reserved for agricultural use. To jointly regulate the ALR, the Municipal Act had to be amended to link land-use zoning under ORP with the arable-land-reserve designation. If an amendment to the ORP was called for, the new land use was first approved by the municipal council concerned and then submitted to the GVRD and ALC for advice and final approval. The regional planning function, local zoning approval, and the agricultural land reserve system initially worked well together. One significant reason was that Mr. W. T. Lane, who had been chair of the Agricultural Land Commission since its inception, in 1975 became the director of development for the GVRD and personally initiated policy coordination and continuing consultation on development proposals affecting regional planning issues and arable land designation (interview, W. Lane, July 1988).

Agricultural Land Commission System

The Land Commission Act of 1973 was one of the most dramatic and comprehensive legislative attempts to control the use of arable land introduced anywhere in North America. The act authorized the creation
of a commission of not less than five members with powers to designate agricultural land (with the ultimate approval of the provincial cabinet) and to restrict its use to farming. The Agricultural Land Commission had four major objectives:

1. to preserve agricultural land for farm use;
2. to preserve greenbelt land in and around urban areas;
3. to preserve land banks for urban and industrial development; and
4. to preserve parkland for recreational use (Land Commission Act, section 7[1]).

The creation of agricultural land reserves throughout B.C. involved all the regional districts. Each of the 28 regional districts was given the responsibility of identifying, reviewing, and designating agricultural land reserves within its boundaries and within the context of its own integrated land-use plan, with the advice and financial assistance of the commission. The latter could amend any proposed plan if deemed desirable, with the approval of cabinet, after holding public hearings. After approval of the plan by cabinet, the commission was empowered to designate the land therein as an agricultural land reserve. Appeals for exclusion of land parcels from an agricultural land reserve were to be divided into two basic categories: those from the municipalities, the regional districts, or the commission itself (the government-to-government appeals) and those from individuals (usually land owners). Under section 9(1) requests for exclusions by a municipality, regional district, or the commission itself would be decided by cabinet. With respect to appeals from individuals, section 9(2) of the act states that "an owner aggrieved by a designation of the commission could make an application to the commission to have the land excluded from the ALR." Here a public hearing was required. The provincial cabinet was seen as the final arbiter of agricultural land reserve designation; and as the final authority in appeals for exclusions requested by the municipalities, the regional districts, the commission, or individuals. Under the Social Credit Government elected in 1975, the use of appeals to cabinet became more frequent. This "political" dimension became more contentious over the next seven years. To ensure cabinet's role was clear, the Agricultural Land Commission Act was amended, for example in 1977, to narrow the scope of the ALC's powers and purview. This ALC role was seen as particularly important in the Lower Mainland. In 1972, the conversion of arable land for urban use had reached approximately 4,000 hectares per year, one quarter of it in the Vancouver region.
The province's solution was to propose a stronger role for itself. In September 1980, the Minister of Municipal Affairs Bill Vander Zalm addressed the annual convention of the Union of B.C. Municipalities (UBCM) and proposed a new Land Use Act. The act was to reform the regional planning process throughout the province. Under the act the minister was to exercise ultimate control over almost all local land-use planning and zoning. Regional planning functions were to be taken over by new "regional coordinating committees" formed by officials appointed by the provincial government's Environment and Land Use Committee. In the minister's view the Land Use Act would ameliorate many existing problems in the Land Use and Agricultural Land Reserve System of B.C.: "ever since I became involved in the development approval process . . . I recognized certain resolvable problems with the system . . . I became more and more convinced that the land development regulation system could better serve the needs of British Columbians if some necessary, but fundamental changes were initiated" (Ministerial Statement, Land Use Act, September 15, 1980). The new act was to rectify problems in two areas: "provincial land-use planning" and "local government planning." At the provincial land-use level, Vander Zalm sought to establish a system that would coordinate provincial land-use planning on an interministry basis. When Vander Zalm first proposed his legislation, it was this clause that municipal leaders supported. However, due to strong opposition by his cabinet ministers, it was eventually removed.

The second problem that the Land Use Act was to ameliorate was the local land-use planning process. In broad terms, regulations under the Land Use Act would supersede regional plans. The municipal and regional district response to the changes was understandably negative. Many municipal and regional representatives perceived them as a move by the province to centralize land-use planning. It can also be added that this governmental policy would circumvent the traditional legislative process; instead of policies based on legislation this act provided for cabinet governance by regulation. According to the solicitor for the UBCM "there is no limitation on the government or the Ministers or Cabinet as to the type or form of regulations they may make" (Pearce 1980). This particular Vander Zalm initiative did not come to fruition, since on July 29, 1982 the provincial legislative session ended without passage of the proposed Land Use Act. The cabinet rejection—allowing the bill to die on the order paper—resulted in Vander Zalm's resignation, who called his cabinet colleagues "gutless."
Continuing differences between the province and the GVRD came to a head over a particular ALR exclusion proposal in the metropolitan suburb of Delta. Over several years, George Spetifore, a Social Credit supporter and agricultural land owner, together with local developers including the area's legislative assembly member, had sought an exclusion for a substantial farm area to allow extensive housing development. Provincial cabinet support for the proposal confronted GVRD opposition. The province's response in October 1983 to this local/regional frustration of its policy wishes was to strip regional districts of their planning and zoning authority (Magnusson, et al. 1984; Allen and Rosenbluh 1986). All regional plans and official regional plans prepared or designated before passage of the legislation were canceled. The rationale of the new Minister of Municipal Affairs Bill Ritchie was that "In view of the number of comprehensive municipal plans now in place, and which are the most important means of defining a community's planning objectives, the official regional plans have become an unnecessary level of land-use control" (Ritchie 1980). For GVRD officials, the issue was different: the act was "a move of retribution over the Spetifore land issue" where the GVRD opposed a cabinet decision to have this agricultural land removed from the ALR (Kirstein 1980).

Interestingly, although there were subsequent changes in ownership, the Spetifore lands were not developed as planned despite the provincial declaration of regional plans as null and void. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, the issue continued. In the summer of 1989, Delta Municipality held the largest public hearing in B.C. history—25 nights, 400 presentations and over 2,000 written submissions. This followed a disagreement between then Premier Bill Vander Zalm and his cabinet colleague, the MLA for Vancouver South, who questioned the accuracy of previous information made available to cabinet. Even the relevant federal minister became involved, calling for a one-year moratorium on "Spetifore Land" development—because of its potential impact on the Pacific (migratory bird) Flyway. The development plan was defeated by Delta Council on August 8, 1989. Subsequently, most of the earlier prodevelopment council was defeated in municipal elections. The impact of earlier regional planning with its provisions for agricultural land had an ongoing impact despite loss of planning authority in the region.
The Livable Region Plan(s)

As the inheritor of major portions of the LMRPB's official regional plan for the Lower Mainland, the GVRD undertook its own process of developing a planning strategy in the late '60s-early '70s.

In 1975, the GVRD adopted the Livable Region Plan (LRP). The LRP sought to create guidelines—based on forecasts, citizen preferences, and economic conditions—for the future development of the Lower Mainland. The LRP was distinct from the ORP; the LRP was intended to be pro-active and dynamic enough to respond to changes. Harry Lash, the GVRD's first director of planning and initiator of the LRP, depicted the LRP as flowing from "a new process, a different kind of planning" in which the interaction of public, planners, and politicians resulted in a set of strategies for dealing with regional growth.

The LRP centered upon five strategies that would manage growth within the GVRD:
1. establishing "job targets" for the various core areas,
2. establishing "regional town centers" as growth poles,
3. allocating residential growth consistent with services and jobs,
4. preserving farmland, parkland, and significant views, and
5. establishing a system of light rapid transit as the key to achievement of the other four strategies.

The LRP had the widespread support of the metropolitan community based on an extensive citizen participation process. It had a lasting impact on regional development decisions between 1976-1983, particularly the "Regional Town Centers" concept and their strategic locations throughout the GVRD. This has had a lasting imprint on regional urban development in metropolitan Vancouver. This was demonstrated in continuing GVRD support for regional agricultural land. It was also shown in the continuing capacity to plan regionally, even after the 1983 loss of regional planning authority.

Over the rest of the 1980s, the consensus achieved throughout the LRP process in the 1970s "helped shape the region and focus action" (GVRD 1990b), with encouragement from the GVRD Development (formerly Planning) Services Department. Its successes included identifying the alignment of the regional rapid transit system, encouraging regional town centers as foci for higher density development and rapid transit in suburban communities, and acquiring regional parks. Improvements in air quality and waste disposal and treatment were also byproducts of the LRP strategy.
By spring 1989, the GVRD had concluded that a major update of the LRP was needed because of the changes to the region. In March, "The Livable Region: A Strategy for the 1990s" was published to initiate this discussion. In July, the board approved seven broad "Livability Goals" to start the formal consultative process:
1. A Region in Nature—a blending of urban development and the natural environment;
2. An Economy of Growth and Change—a blend of livability with economic growth and diversity in an interdependent world;
3. Accessibility for People and Goods—ease of communication, e.g., job-home links etc.;
4. A Healthy and Safe Region—such as air and water quality, good social services, functional space patterns, etc.;
5. A Region of Diversity and Vitality—to support and enhance physical and social diversity;
6. An Equitable Region—sharing the region’s livability across all communities;
7. An Efficient Region—with effective spending and intergovernmental cooperation amongst municipal and with senior levels (GVRD 1989a).

This was followed by the Choosing Our Future consultative process in 1989-90. The process included a series of seven regional challenge seminars (on urban mobility, the environment, culture, health and aging, urban design and suburban development, changing values, and community life), a forum, six community meetings, and a number of research reports.

Late in 1990, the GVRD’s Creating Our Future revision to the Livable Region Plan set out 54 steps to maintaining and ensuring a more livable region. These included limiting private automobile use; creating a better housing-jobs balance through the creation of "complete communities" that use land wisely; conserving land resources, including agriculture, with an appropriate and accessible "green" mix; all within a region of good air and water quality, with environmentally appropriate waste treatment, disposal, and recycling. That the GVRD achieved such policy consensus without formal planning authority attests to the thesis that planning regionally has been established as a staple of governance in the metropolitan Vancouver region.
Map 8.6. Regional Centres
CONCLUSION

Evidence from the case studies suggests that the tri-level process amongst local, provincial, and federal governments is the appropriate response to the conundrum of metropolitan governance. In this, the regional districts (in current or perhaps altered form), will have an important policy role. It is entirely possible to talk of regional governance in metropolitan Vancouver as a viable alternative to more traditional forms of regional government. A regional government would have the following five characteristics: (1) representation, (2) revenue-raising capacity, (3) autonomy, (4) authority, and (5) the capacity to coordinate. It is this coordination of multiple functions, enabling priority establishment and budgetary trade-offs, that characterizes government (Oberlander 1991).

Former Municipal Affairs Minister Don Campbell is right when he assigns a "B+ moving to an A" in his assessment of the GVRD. It is not a full-fledged regional government. It does, however, play an important—even central—role in the governance of the metropolitan Vancouver region. The case evidence demonstrates that transit and transportation, parks and green space, land-use planning and other vital public services are administered supramunicipally, on a regional area basis without a coordinated accountability to a single representative government (and in the absence of a metropolitan government).

In some instances, local governments are the essential (though not necessarily exclusive) decision makers. In many cases the federal government has a significant regional role. In other circumstances, the province is the key determiner. For example, at its first cabinet meeting on November 6, 1991, the new NDP provincial government dealt with the Agricultural Land Reserve as the first priority. The Minister of Agriculture announced the rescinding of golf course building permits on prime agricultural land, the strengthening of the ALR, and elimination of appeals to Cabinet—"to end abuses of the ALR." His cabinet colleague, the Minister of Finance and Crown Corporations, proposed a rethinking of skytrain extensions into Surrey and Richmond. One additional station is to be built to link skytrain to the Surrey regional town centre but the new priority has become its extension into the eastern NDP-represented suburbs such as Coquitlam. The Minister of Municipal Affairs has consideration of regional planning authority on his current agenda.

In a considerable number of policy areas, the regional district has performed the central function of establishing an idea or concept for an
urban regional forum in metropolitan Vancouver. Its role has involved the public as a regional constituency in the formulation and reformulation of policy consensus on urban development for the Vancouver Lower Mainland—from the Burrard Peninsula Joint Sewage Committee of 1911 to recent tri-level governmental cooperation on air and water quality, waste treatment and disposal, transit, land use, and green space. In the case of governance in metropolitan Vancouver, that regional consensus was achieved early, maintained consistently, and has formed the basis of a system of regional governance where livability and its preservation is the watchword of regional policy formulation, whatever level of government is involved. With that policy consensus, regional governance has established itself as a formidable alternative to metropolitan government in the Vancouver region.
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Governance of the
San Francisco Bay Area

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The San Francisco Bay Area is again undergoing a conscious, soul-searching but wrenching effort to reorganize its governance. For a decade and a half between 1959 and 1975, a succession of similar efforts failed to produce anything resembling a multipurpose regional government. The present activity is likely to persist for at least a decade. Regardless of any formal institutional outcome, the debate and accompanying adjustments among existing governmental agencies—national, state, regional, and local—will affect the governance of the Bay Area and, perhaps, set the stage for another round of structural and accommodative relationships among governments and with the private sector (ABAG 1966; Detling and Bacon 1977; V. Jones 1973, 1974).

WHAT IS THE BAY AREA?

The Bay Area by common usage consists of the nine counties touching San Francisco Bay, San Pablo Bay, and Suisun Bay: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma (see Map 9.1). The 1990 population of the Bay Area is 6,023,577 (see Table 9.1). It is more populous than 80 percent of the American states, than all Canadian provinces except Ontario and Quebec, than many nations. The area contains approximately 7,000 square miles—almost as large as Massachusetts.
Map 9.1. San Francisco Bay Region
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<tbody>
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<td>Alameda</td>
<td>1,105,379</td>
<td>1,279,182</td>
<td>173,803</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contra Costa</td>
<td>656,331</td>
<td>803,732</td>
<td>147,401</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td>222,592</td>
<td>230,096</td>
<td>7,504</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napa</td>
<td>99,199</td>
<td>110,765</td>
<td>11,566</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>678,974</td>
<td>723,959</td>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Mateo</td>
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<td>649,623</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
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<td>1,497,577</td>
<td>202,506</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solano</td>
<td>235,203</td>
<td>340,421</td>
<td>105,218</td>
<td>44.7</td>
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<td>Sonoma</td>
<td>299,681</td>
<td>388,222</td>
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<td>Bay Area</td>
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The Bay Area, then, is by no means a compact single-centered metropolis. It is rather a multinucleated regional community comprised of local and subregional communities extending approximately 150 miles from Cloverdale in the north to Gilroy in the south and 50 miles from Dixon in the east to the Pacific Ocean. There is no single dominating central city, although San Francisco remains the symbolic center and the actual center of financial and related service activities in Northern California and much of the West (James Vance 1964; Jean Vance 1976; ABAG 1989, 1991b, 1991c; Bay Area Council and McKinsey 1986; Brady 1987; Davis and Langlois 1963; Hoerter and Wiselman 1986; Kroll 1984; Kroll and Eurengil 1989; O'Connor and Blakely 1988; Rothblatt and Garr 1986). Since 1988, San Francisco is no longer the largest city in the Bay Area, relinquishing that position to San Jose. It is still, however, along with Silicon Valley in the San Jose area, a major job center for the region.

Do the nine counties constitute a single metropolitan region (Davis and Langlois 1963; James Vance 1964)? Some residents of counties on the fringe assert that they are distinctive metropolitan areas. Sometimes this claim is based on the size of the population—as in Santa Clara County (Elder 1989), in distance from the more highly urbanized portions of the region, or in differences in land uses and lifestyles of the North Bay counties (Napa, Solano, Sonoma). To say that Cloverdale has little in common with Gilroy, 150 miles to the south, does not mean that Sonoma and Santa Clara Counties, for instance, are not integral parts of the same metropolitan complex (Meltzer 1984). In a region of over six million people living in an area of 7,000 square miles, there are many subregions, few covering the entire region, but with many overlapping relationships. Thus, very few residents of Santa Clara County commute to Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, Solano, and Sonoma Counties, and vice versa. But there is a sizeable commutation between Santa Clara County and Alameda County and between Alameda County and Solano County. The West Bay (Marin, San Mateo, and especially San Francisco Counties) and the East Bay (Alameda and Contra Costa Counties) interact through commutation with all of the nine counties.

Furthermore, the local governments, including special districts of the nine counties, have developed many formal and informal relationships with each other. Some of the formal institutional relationships involve all nine counties, such as the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). The Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) covers all but
the northern portions of two counties, others involve two or three adjoining counties, and still other subregional institutions are within a single county. These are political relationships that Kingsley Davis and Eleanor Langlois did not consider when they asserted that "The nine-county area is not a meaningful unit in any economic and social sense and has no significance when used over time as if it were such a unit" (Davis and Langlois 1963).

The Bureau of the Census divides the Bay Area (which it calls the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area) into six primary metropolitan statistical areas: (1) San Francisco, Marin, and San Mateo counties; (2) Oakland (Alameda and Contra Cosa Counties); (3) San Jose-Palo Alto (Santa Clara County); (4) Santa Rosa-Petaluma (Sonoma County); (5) Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa (Napa and Solano Counties); and (6) Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz County). Santa Cruz is not traditionally considered to be part of the Bay Area—its local governments belong to the Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments. However, Santa Cruz, Monterey, and the nonmetropolitan county of San Benito are part of the Silicon Valley labor market area. The number of commuters will undoubtedly increase during the next decade.

There are four major subregions in the Bay Area: West Bay consists of San Francisco and San Mateo counties. (We include Marin County in the North Bay subregion). South Bay is Santa Clara County. East Bay contains Alameda and Contra Costa Counties and North Bay Marin, Sonoma, Napa, and Solano Counties.

It is certain that any legislation proposed by Bay Vision Action Coalition, and quite likely any other legislation originating outside the Bay Area, will provide for subregions as intermediaries between local governments and any proposed regional agency. Each of the nine counties for some purposes, is a politically active subregion. County officials in the Bay Area (but not in the California County Supervisors Association) no longer insist that county governments can serve as regional governments. Nevertheless, state legislation, for instance, on solid waste disposal, air quality, and transportation, increasingly uses the county as a unit for planning and implementation. The County Congestion Management Agencies (CMA), established in 1990 under Proposition 111, may well be recognized as the principal subregional planning agency. Thus each of the nine counties would be the principal territorial subplanning unit, involving all local governments within the county. However, other overlapping plates of subregional planning and action jurisdiction will be needed for special and multiple purposes. Two
Illustrations are the I-80 corridor in western Alameda and Contra Costa Counties and the 101 corridor in Marin and Sonoma Counties. There will be many needs and possibilities for *ad hoc* subregions, some larger, some smaller than the county.

**West Bay**

San Francisco has remained the symbolic center of the region, even though it is no longer "the City" to which seekers of culture, recreation, merchandise, professional services, and specialty restaurants must go to satisfy their needs and desires. As in other metropolitan areas, San Francisco's proportion of regional jobs, housing, population, educational and cultural institutions, retail, wholesale, manufacturing, transportation, and service firms has been declining. Nevertheless, there is a higher concentration of most of these activities in a smaller compact land area than anywhere else in the region. The dispersion of people and activities over so many other municipalities means that "what is left in San Francisco" constitutes the largest single shopping and recreation center in the region (even though San Francisco's taxable sales decreased from 22.3 percent in 1970 to 13.5 percent in 1989 of the Bay Area total) (ABAG 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c). San Jose, with a land area of 173 square miles, as compared with the 49 square miles of San Francisco, and with a larger and more rapidly growing population as well as a larger concentration of jobs, does not yet fill this regional role. Yet the basic characteristic of the region is increasing dispersion in and around new and expanding older centers. The Bay Area is not a region made up of a central city and its suburban hinterland. It can best be understood as a region of overlapping subregions—larger overlapping plates for some characteristics, such as the San Francisco and Santa Clara County labor markets and smaller overlapping plates for such activities as retail shopping.

In 1990, there were approximately 590,000 jobs in San Francisco, but only 420,000 employed residents—an excess of 188,000 jobs to be filled by commuters (ABAG 1989). In fact, there are many more commuters since some of the employed residents work outside San Francisco. However, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission reports that residents of the city have the shortest average commute of any transportation subarea in the region. The city has the heaviest transit service both inside and from outside its boundaries.
Corporate job relocation was high during the 1980s—mostly into industrial and commercial parks in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties. In 1990, the Bank of America announced the relocation of over 2,000 of its employees into Solano County—a rapidly growing Bay Area county half-way between San Francisco and Sacramento. ABAG projects that: By the end of 1986, most of these shifts were substantially complete. Between 1987 and 1990, trends indicate that San Francisco's total employment will increase by about 18,000 new jobs or 6,000 new jobs annually. Most of this growth is occurring in four broad sectors: Business Services, Legal Services, Retail Trade and Hotels. Job losses continue in Finance and Communications and most of Manufacturing. Between 1990 and 2005, job demand in San Francisco County is expected to rise by 93,000 new jobs or about 6,200 new jobs annually. In terms of overall regional growth, San Francisco County will rank fourth in the Bay Area in job demand. Santa Clara will lead the region, followed by Alameda and Contra Costa counties (ABAG 1989, 180).

There is no indication that any other center will replace San Francisco as the site or the producer of major region-serving activities. Golden Gate Park is used by regional residents as well as tourists and San Franciscans. The U.S. Parks Service operates a park along the Marina and the western shore of the city and will take over the Presidio (to be closed as an Army post) in a few years. San Francisco sells water from the Sierras to 30 suburban municipalities and water districts in San Mateo and parts of Alameda and Santa Clara Counties. It also operates in San Mateo County the major international airport in northern California. In fact, it buries its dead and houses its prisoners and juvenile delinquents in San Mateo County—from which it was separated and established as a consolidated city and county in 1856.

San Mateo County to the south of San Francisco is oriented in two directions—north to San Francisco and south to Silicon Valley in Santa Clara County. The largest employment center is San Francisco's international airport—with no residents and 19,560 workers. There are six municipalities with 88,390 jobs and only 81,800 employed residents. The remaining 14 municipalities and their immediately surrounding spheres of influence are bedroom communities—276,200 employed residents and only 165,370 jobs. In the county as a whole, 54,400 of its employed residents work outside the county. Of course, the number of people who commute to work is much larger as people travel to jobs within their
municipality, into other county municipalities, and to other counties. Net commutation data do not measure gross commuting (ABAG 1989).

According to an MTC survey of average distance to work, northern San Mateo County ranks tenth, southern county twelfth, and central county municipalities rank fifteenth among surveyed subareas of the region.

South Bay

Santa Clara County, south of San Mateo and Alameda Counties, has a strong labor market association with the northern part of San Benito and Monterey Counties and with Santa Cruz County to the west. In fact, since 1980 Santa Cruz County has been included by the Bureau of the Census-Office of Management and Budget along with the traditional nine counties as a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. Santa Clara County is more strongly tied, however, to the Bay Area. Still, one might have expected it to behave like San Diego County in asserting its political independence of the larger Los Angeles urban region. There has been some talk along these lines—witness the editorial in the San Jose Mercury News of March 11, 1990:

By defining this region as the traditional nine-county Bay Area, [Assembly Speaker] Brown missed an important point: It's far more practical, given commute patterns and other realities, to think in terms of two regions, with San Jose as the hub of one which extends well into Monterey and San Benito counties.

A recent poll in the county shows that 37 percent of telephone respondents accept the nine counties as the Bay Area; 40 percent thought the region should be smaller—either Santa Clara only or Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties. Only 6 percent would define the region as Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and San Benito Counties. If we combine those who look upon the nine counties and those who prefer a Santa Clara-San Mateo Counties region, we find that 56 percent or 70 percent of those who have an opinion have oriented toward the Bay (Elder 1989).

Furthermore, the strongest support for regionalism in the Bay Area has come from public officials in Santa Clara County, San Jose, and other county municipalities. County Supervisor Rod Diridon, not supported by all of his fellow local government officials, has provided local government leadership in sponsoring the creation and work of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission—a broad-based commission established in 1989 to develop a vision and plan of action for improving the quality of the Bay
Area in the year 2020. The city of San Jose, alone among the larger Bay Area cities, is very active in the Bay Vision Action Coalition. San Jose’s mayor, city manager, and other officials personally participate in the work of the Coalition. Local officials have been supported and assisted by the Santa Clara County Manufacturers Group. Members of the group have been active in the Bay Vision 2020 Commission (Peter Lydon 1992).

The San Jose area is a world center of high technology covering over 1,300 square miles and possessing all the political, social, economic, and physical complexities of most major American metropolitan areas (Rothblatt 1990). During the 1950-80 period, the metropolitan population grew from 290,500 to 1,295,000 (346 percent), making it one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the nation. The city of San Jose itself grew even more spectacularly from a modestly sized agricultural processing center of 95,300 in 1950 to 628,300 in 1980—or an increase of 559 percent.

This expansion has transformed Santa Clara County from an agriculturally oriented valley to an international center of technological innovation called "Silicon Valley." The San Jose area became the most dynamic engine of economic development for the entire San Francisco Bay Region as it generated nearly one-half of the region’s total employment growth between 1970 and 1980 (Schoop 1986).

As the economy of Silicon Valley matures and diversifies, substantial new employment opportunities are expected to be generated in such areas as services and retail and wholesale trade (Brady 1989). Indeed, the Association of Bay Area Governments (1989) projects that nearly 250,000 new jobs (about a 28 percent increase) will be created in the San Jose area during the 1990-2005 period. However, during the current recession, new jobs decreased by 1.92 percent in Santa Clara County while they increased by 3.36 percent in Sonoma County.

By 1989, the city of San Jose’s population grew to 738,400, enabling it to overtake San Francisco as the most populous city in the Bay Area and to become the twelfth largest city in the United States. The San Jose area contains over 80 governmental units—15 cities, 37 school districts, and numerous park, sewer, water, and other overlapping entities. In actuality, the subregion is even more complex politically, since many private groups representing various business, environmental, cultural, and other interests are often involved in metropolitan issues, as are a growing number of governmental units outside the county that are providing housing for the expanding San Jose area. For example, in 1985, about 125,000 persons commuted daily to Santa Clara County from the five
surrounding counties (Alameda, San Benito, Monterey, Santa Cruz, and San Mateo) (Santa Clara County Transportation Agency 1985). This process of metropolitan expansion is likely to continue not only because of global forces of economic dispersion (Castells 1985; Hall and Markusen 1985), but also because of the 1978 Proposition 13 tax change in California that encourages in-lying local governments to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas (Dowall 1984). In addition, this pressure for decentralization is being reinforced by the large numbers of baby boomers who are now entering the low-density single-family housing market.

During the past two decades, the expanding Bay Area economy has been generating employment opportunities at a substantially faster rate than new housing, and reasonably affordable housing has been located at increasing distances from centers of employment. This trend is especially pronounced in Santa Clara County. Most of the electronics-related employment opportunities in the Bay Area have developed in the northern portion of the county near the original centers of technological innovation of Stanford University and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), while the bulk of the housing has been provided increasingly in the southern part of the county or in adjacent counties where land is most readily available and is relatively less expensive. This widening supply-spatial gap has been bidding up the cost of housing dramatically and has resulted in severe traffic congestion, air pollution, and fiscal inequities in the region (Saxenian 1985; Cervero 1986).

Silicon Valley is one of the highest cost-of-living areas in the nation, and it is under increasing pressure to relocate much of its low-wage manufacturing activities to less costly regions in the United States and abroad (Hall and Markusen 1985; Saxenian 1985). For example, in 1975, there were 501,600 jobs in Santa Clara County and 411,500 housing units (Rothblatt 1982). During the 1975-85 period, about 318,000 new jobs were created, while only 74,850 new homes were constructed in the county (ABAG 1987). This gap between the number of jobs generated and the number of housing units supplied has created an enormous shortage of housing in Silicon Valley that affects people at every economic level—particularly low- and moderate-income families. In 1988, Santa Clara County was the fourth most expensive metropolitan housing rental market in the United States (McLeod 1988). Unfortunately, this jobs/housing imbalance is expected to worsen in the decades ahead, impacting the social, environmental, and economic functioning of
this metropolitan community (ABAG 1987; Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Brady 1989).

Finally, the bifurcated labor force characteristic of high-tech areas is split between the affluent white-male professional and managerial staff, and low-wage predominantly female ethnic production workers (Saxenian 1985). This pattern is spatially manifested by the increasingly socially separated residential areas in Silicon Valley (United Way of Santa Clara County 1987). When we consider that in Santa Clara County, the high school dropout rate for Hispanic youth approached 50 percent in 1985 (Santa Clara County Board of Education 1986), and that many of the entry-level production jobs at jeopardy due to global competition are held by low-income minority workers, a disturbing picture emerges of widening economic disparities and growing social instability (Larimer 1987).

East Bay

Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, with a combined population of over 2,000,000 people, not only house many workers employed in Silicon Valley, but contain bedroom communities for commuters to San Francisco and San Mateo Counties. At the same time, there is much cross-commuting within and between the two counties—especially to Oakland and newly developed office centers in southern Alameda County and all along the I-680 corridor running from San Jose in the south to Walnut Creek and Concord and a heavy industrial complex on San Pablo Bay and the Carquinez Straits (ABAG 1989).

As in San Jose, there is talk in Oakland of a metropolitan area independent of San Francisco. A recent example is the assertion of Professor Edward Blakely, of the Department of City and Regional Planning, University of California, Berkeley, and founder of the University-Oakland Metropolitan Forum, that Oakland’s economic health is no longer tied primarily to a declining San Francisco:

Oakland should tie its future to the north and east, Contra Costa County and the San Joaquin Valley. He sees Oakland as the center of capital and transportation for the central valley, one of the fastest growing areas of the county (Daniel S. Levine, Oakland Tribune, May 11, 1991).

The increase in commuting from the central valley to Bay Area jobs has worried officials in adjacent Stockton and Modesto metropolitan areas. The mayor of Modesto and the Stanislaus County Council of
Governments have requested Bay Vision 2020, ABAG, and MTC to consider the effect of Bay Area policies on adjacent counties. Already, Bay Area workers are seeking affordable housing outside the Bay Area, and ABAG projects that by 2005, over 292,000 workers will have to commute into the nine-county San Francisco Bay Region (ABAG 1989). Five of the 10 Bay Area transportation subcorridors are in the East Bay. They are expected to generate during the 1990-2005 period 271,570 new jobs but only 236,200 new workers. The transportation facilities of these five corridors not only serve the East Bay, but also transport commuters to San Francisco and the Silicon Valley. Also, as jobs move from the Bay Area into surrounding counties, the corridors will have to transport reverse commuters as well as provide cross-community mobility within the Bay Area (ABAG 1989). If the proposed toll-road in eastern Contra Costa County connecting Silicon Valley with Interstate 80 in Solano County is constructed, a new major corridor of manufacturing, service, and trade centers could develop to serve not only the Bay Area (especially Solano, Contra Costa, Alameda, and Santa Clara Counties), but the adjacent central valley metropolitan areas.

The southern part of Alameda County and the central part of Contra Costa County have attracted large numbers of office jobs from San Francisco and related heavy traffic congestion. In the next decade, the fastest development of both jobs and housing will be in the eastern and southern parts of the two counties. At the same time, Silicon Valley will continue to import an increasing number of workers from newer housing developments in the undeveloped portion of the East Bay.

The East Bay firestorm in October 1991 destroyed over two square miles of houses and apartment buildings in the Berkeley and Oakland Hills. The fire only two years after the Loma Prieta earthquake is important not only for the lives lost, the thousands of homeless people, and the property damage but for the warning that uncontrollable natural forces, such as earthquakes, long periodic droughts, and hot high winds from the eastward central valleys, known as Santa Anas, are eternal dangers that must be faced in California. Governments, businesses, and the public will also have to face questions of response during the catastrophe, as well as longer range questions of land use, building and landscape controls, and water supply and conservation.
North Bay

The North Bay, consisting of Marin, Sonoma, Napa, and Solano Counties, is the largest in area and smallest in population. Its 1990 population of 839,408 constitutes only 13.9 percent of the Bay Area population. It is, however, growing very rapidly—one-fourth of the increase in population for the region between 1980 and 1990 was in the North Bay—equal to the growth of Silicon Valley (Santa Clara County). Its rate of growth has been consistently high—approximately 30 percent or more in each of the past five decades. ABAG estimates that between 1990 and 2005, the number of jobs in the three counties will increase by more than 132,000: 64,000 in Sonoma, 61,000 in Solano, and 7,100 in Napa. Population is expected to increase even more rapidly. ABAG projects an increase of over 291,000 persons, of whom 157,000 will be employed. It is estimated that net commutation into other counties will be approximately 13,000. This low net commutation rate indicates an expectation of a large increase in North Bay jobs (ABAG 1989).

In fact, the North Bay looks not only to the central Bay Area but part of it (Solano County) is also developing interdependencies with the large and fast growing Sacramento region in the central valley. Napa County is well-known for its wines and southern California tourists, its rural and agricultural lands in the north, and urban areas around the city of Napa. Between Vallejo and Fairfield in Solano County and the city of Napa, American Canyon voted in 1991 to incorporate as a municipality. Sonoma County, from Santa Rosa south, is developing as a small industrial economy and as a bedroom for commuters to jobs in Marin County and San Francisco. Santa Rosa in Sonoma County is developing into a major urban center. Just north of Santa Rosa, Windsor voted in 1991 to incorporate as a city.

The position of many North Bay residents is that they can neither live with nor without the Bay Area. The most often expressed view is that the mature high density communities to the south, now experiencing the inconveniences of a major metropolis, are determined to keep the North Bay in perpetual open space for their own enjoyment.

The Solano County Board of Supervisors refused to join ABAG for many years, and for several years Sonoma County withdrew from ABAG. It rejoined ABAG only after unsuccessful attempts to get the state government to recognize it as part of a north coast council of governments. At the same time, however, its municipalities were active members of ABAG. The attitude toward Bay Area regionalism of many
residents and leaders of the North Bay is well expressed in a letter from the mayor of Calistoga to the Bay Vision 2020 Commission:

... the County of Napa is an agricultural county. ... Southern Napa County has many residents who commute to jobs out of the county, and is more linked to the urban centers. With that stronger link comes increased traffic congestion, pollution, housing difficulties, noise issues, and a myriad other urban concerns. The northern end of the county has a far different set of problems and concerns than does the south county. While the northern part of the county is still linked to the Bay Area, the problems confronting the Up-Valley and Pope Valley are different. ... Small size and agricultural orientation make members of the City Council of the City of Calistoga fear that they will be overwhelmed by loud urban voices from more metropolitan areas.

The North Bay counties and their municipalities led the successful effort at the November 1991 general assembly of ABAG to reject endorsement of an earlier executive board resolution, modifying slightly the Bay Vision 2020 proposal to consolidate ABAG with MTC and the BAAQMD. They were, of course, supported by many municipal representatives from other parts of the Bay Area. In effect, the general assembly voted for ABAG to come up with its own proposal for regional governance to be presented to the general assembly in March 1992.

We include Marin County in the North Bay although it is more definitely a bedroom county for commuters to San Francisco than is any of the other three North Bay counties. The interdependencies between Marin and Sonoma counties are increasing as residents from the north commute to jobs in Marin County and along highway 101 to jobs in San Francisco. Political and other leaders in both counties are aware of intercounty dependencies—witness the unhappiness in the Marin County Board of Supervisors over the proposal for most of Marin County to share a state assembly district with San Francisco. The county supervisors prefer to be joined in a district with Sonoma County.

CURRENT CONCERN OVER GROWTH MANAGEMENT

Unlike previous efforts to create a multipurpose regional agency when Bay Area interests had to go it alone in the state legislature against opposition from the Central Valley and southern California, there is now statewide concern over traffic congestion, water supply and distribution,
water quality, air quality, open space, preservation of agricultural lands, and natural resources.

Six bills have been introduced in the 1991 session of the legislature. AB3 by Willie Brown, a Democrat from San Francisco and speaker of the assembly, would establish a State Growth Management Commission and seven directly elected regional development and infrastructure agencies. The Bay Area region would consist of all of the nine counties except for the northern portion of Sonoma County. Each regional development and infrastructure agency, except in San Diego County, would be governed by a directly elected board of 13 members. In San Diego, the Regional Planning and Growth Management Review Board, established in 1988 by electoral approval of Proposition C and consisting of the executive board of the San Diego Association of Governments, would be recognized as the regional development and infrastructure agency. In any of the other six regions, locally developed plans for a regional agency could be substituted for the regional agency requirements of AB3. This was an open invitation to the Bay Vision 2020 Commission and its local governments, business, and environmental sponsors to use the Brown bill as the vehicle for legislative authorization of its proposal.

Similar to the Bay Vision 2020 proposal, but with significant differences, the Bay Area regional agency under AB3 would have three years in which to develop a plan for the consolidation of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD), and perhaps the Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB). In the interim, the planning functions of all four agencies would be immediately merged, but nonplanning functions would remain with the respective agencies. Subregional planning agencies may be created for each county.

A 19-member State Growth Management Commission, appointed by the governor from nominees submitted by specified local governmental and water district associations, farmers organizations, building industry and realtors, State Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers Association, labor, affordable housing organizations, and environmental groups would develop a State Conservation and Development Plan. It would negotiate rectification of inconsistencies between the state plan and regional and local plans, with final power of approval or disapproval vested in the state commission.
SB907, introduced by Senator McCorquedale, Democrat from Santa Clara County, authorizes with voter approval the creation of regional fiscal authorities. Section 54722.10 would instruct each authority to ascertain the effect of the present allocation of property and sales taxes on land-use decisions by local governments. If the result of current allocations were determined to result in an imbalance between jobs and housing, it could rectify the situation by offering the sharing of up to one-half the revenue from new developments as an incentive to rectify the imbalance.

Senator Bergeson's bill (SB434) would require the governor, through the Office of Planning and Research, to develop and maintain California growth management policies. Cities and counties would be authorized to create regional fiscal authorities "to implement planning and development on a regional basis consistent with California growth management policies." No regional fiscal authority could operate without the governor's certification that the regional authority is "likely to implement the California growth management policies" and develop boundaries within which development would be permitted, a tax sharing agreement, and a regional fiscal plan consistent with California growth management policies. State agencies would be required to give preference in the allocation of state bond money or other discretionary funds to regional and local projects found to be consistent with the California growth management policies.

AB76, introduced by Assembly Member Farr, Democrat (Monterey), would replace the Office of Planning and Research with two new agencies: an Office of Research to assist the governor and a State Planning Agency. Assisted by a State Planning Advisory Council, the State Planning Agency would prepare a biennial statewide planning report to the governor and the state legislature. A separate Department of Environmental and Plan Review would be created to review regional and local plans for their "conformance" with the State Planning Report.

SB929 (Senator Presley, Democrat, Riverside County) establishes 11 growth management policies to be incorporated into a state plan by a 15-member California Conservation and Development Commission. The commission would consist of nine state officials, three appointed by the governor to represent counties, cities, and regional agencies, three appointed by the speaker of the assembly to represent business, agriculture, and minorities, and three appointed by the Rules Committee of the Senate to represent housing, planning, and environmentalists.
The state commission would prepare reorganization guidelines for regional agencies, review proposed reorganization of regional agencies, and institute regional reorganization if regional agencies fail to develop an acceptable reorganization by January 1, 1996. The bill specifies that land be classified into six "tiers" and that regional and subregional plans stimulate growth in tiers suitable for redevelopment, facilitate planned urbanization in the remainder of central cities and in existing suburbs and rural towns suitable for planned urban growth, avoid premature urbanization, and prevent urbanization of agriculture, other productive resource lands, and environmentally important areas.

Finally, the Morgan bill (SB797), which originally embodied the recommendations of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission. It was designed as a holding operation and in May 1992 was completely amended as a result of extended negotiations among local governments and business and environmental groups.

All of these bills have moved from the house of origin to the other house of the legislature and thus are alive in the 1992 session. But Governor Wilson requested that all legislative action be delayed until he received in December 1991 the report of his Growth Management Council. Unlike his three predecessors, Governor Wilson is very interested in environmental protection and growth management. He is on record, however, in opposition to state-mandated regional agencies. His position has undoubtedly encouraged local officials in the Bay Area to push for stronger local government control over Bay Vision 2020’s proposed regional commission. His official position, however, is still unannounced. It is unlikely that any action will be taken before 1993. State, national, and local election campaigns will dominate everyone’s attention until after November. The new legislature, in which all members of the Assembly and half of the Senate, will have been elected or re-elected from newly drawn districts, will also face a huge budget deficit, re-organization of welfare and health-care systems, a declining or sluggish economy, ethnic unrest and the beginning of positioning for a gubernatorial election in 1994 and a presidential election in 1996. This is the context in which the Morgan bill will be debated and acted upon.

Local government officials, businesspersons, and environmentalists joined together in 1989 to create and support the Bay Vision 2020 Commission. The commission is composed of 31 members (none of whom were local government officials) appointed by its sponsors from all nine Bay Area counties. They are supposed to represent environmentalists, ethnic minorities, business, manufacturers, agriculture, labor, and
developers. The commission report issued on June 1, 1991, recommend-
ed the merger of the Association of Bay Area Governments, the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District into a Bay Area Regional Commission (Bay Vision

The regional commission would, under the Bay Vision 2020 plan,
consist of 60 percent elected local officials selected by and from mayors,
councilpersons, and county supervisors and 40 percent nonpublic
members selected by an ad hoc selection committee.

The regional commission would be an interim body like the original
Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) and the State
Coastal Commission. It would have three years in which to develop a
regional plan for transportation, air quality, open space, and other
regionally significant land uses. In the fourth year, the draft plan and
other recommendations would be submitted to the legislature and the
governor for their approval and for the enactment of legislation enabling
the regional commission to implement the regional plan. However, all
authority now exercised by MTC, BAAQMD, and ABAG would be
exercised by the regional commission.

After Bay Vision 2020 submitted its report in early 1991, it continued
in existence, but became inactive, except for occasional meetings to hear
reports on the Action Coalition's progress. Some of its members along
with its sponsors from local government, the Bay Area Council, and the
Greenbelt Alliance formed the Bay Vision Action Coalition to fine tune
the commission’s recommendations and develop legislation for the 1992
session. The Action Coalition rewrote (or fine tuned) all the recommen-
dations of Bay Vision 2020 except the basic one to consolidate the
Association of Bay Area Governments, the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District.

Early in its deliberations, it was decided that elected local officials
should make up two-thirds of the interim regional commission. Many
local officials are still insisting that all its members be mayors, council-
persons, and county supervisors. The ABAG executive board proposed
a regional board with 80 percent elected officials. However, this proposal
was rejected at the ABAG General Assembly November 1991, in April
1992, and again in October 1992. A resolution was passed demanding
that the regional board consist only of local elected officials (ABAG
1991g).

There are deep differences among local officials over representation
of cities and counties and of small suburbs and large cities. These
differences overlay differences over representation and regional policy among environmentalists, developers, and their allies among building contractors and labor, nongrowth and slow-growth proponents, various types of agricultural interests, farmers who wish to sell their land for development and proponents of open space, proponents of denser urban housing and cheaper, more spacious housing on the periphery and even beyond the Bay Area, proponents and opponents of restrictions on the use of automobiles, as well as of larger concentrations of ethnic minorities. Whether these interests can be satisfied by any representational scheme is yet unknown.

The Bay Vision Action Coalition must also develop a scheme for the orderly transition of the three agencies into a single regional agency. Of the three agencies, only ABAG has taken a formal position in support of consolidation. The Action Coalition now proposes in the Morgan bill that each of the agencies continue to exercise all their functions, except regional planning, for the first year. During this period, the regional commission would begin to prepare a regional plan and to negotiate the consolidation itself. At the end of the first year, it would assume all the authority of ABAG, MTC, and the Air Board.

The scope of its regional planning, as well as the relation of local, subregional, and other functional planning to regional planning will continue to be the major focus of disagreement. A major question is the extent of regional control over "regionally significant" (what is regionally significant?) changes in land use during the interim period while a regional plan is being developed and reviewed by local governments, the governor, and the state legislature. Some people fear that in the absence of such interim review, local governments would permit a flood of developments before the regional plan is adopted by the regional council and approved by the governor and legislature. However, to exercise such interim controls before regional plans have been completed and regulations adopted appears to many other people as ad hoc and arbitrary. Both the Bay Conservation and Development Commission and the State Coastal Commission regulated development while regional plans were being developed.

The Regional Planning Committee of ABAG has been debating regional growth management policies for several years (ABAG 1991d). These materials, as well as the report of Bay Vision 2020, have been used by a subcommittee of the Action Coalition to develop a recommended regional planning framework. The essence of the proposal is to draw urban growth boundaries around existing urban areas and to forbid
development outside such boundaries that threaten agriculture, open space, and the natural environment. Within urban boundaries, development would be encouraged through public and private investment in infrastructure, affordable housing near jobs, new job-producing activities near housing, discouragement of long distance commuting, and development of alternatives to single occupancy automobile traffic.

A *San Francisco Chronicle* poll released in September 1991 shows strong popular support (74 percent) for the consolidation of ABAG, MTC, and the BAAQMD. An earlier poll showed that only 49 percent of the respondents favored creation of such a regional agency. However, "great unease" was expressed over regional control of housing development. A survey of local elected officials and other leaders conducted in 1990 by the League of Women Voters of the Bay Area while Bay Vision 2020 Commission was deliberating but before its report was issued showed strong support among local officials for regional air quality controls (73 percent), airport planning (66 percent), Bay fill (67 percent), solid waste management (62 percent), transportation (65 percent), water quality (69 percent), and water supply (51 percent). Only 21 percent favored regional zoning and land-use controls but 58 percent favored regional advisory land-use authority. Moreover, only 53 percent of nonlocally elected respondents favored regional zoning and land-use controls. Two-thirds favored mandatory regional growth management. Required fair share housing was favored by only 34 percent of locally elected officials and by 55 percent of other respondents (League of Women Voters of the Bay Area 1991b).

The Bay Vision 2020 Commission and the Bay Vision Coalition represent several strands of interest, ideology, temperament, and experience in Bay Area affairs—many of which are continuations or resurgences of positions held strongly enough to prevent legislative action only 15 years ago. One determinative division at that time that still exists today is over the proper or desirable role of cities, counties, and special districts in a multipurpose regional agency. Another example is the different emphasis placed by the Bay Area Council representing large industries and the Greenbelt Alliance on the importance—where they conflict as they frequently do—of suburban housing and the preservation of agricultural and other open spaces (Peter Lydon 1992).

There is then a renewed public concern with the condition of regional and local transportation, housing, air and water pollution, the homeless, open space, and recreational facilities (Viviano 1989a; Rapaport 1992a). Throughout the 20th century, there have been periodic efforts in the San
Francisco Bay Area to establish major regional special-purpose districts and to create some form of limited but authoritative multiple-purpose regional government.

While many special-purpose districts and agencies have been established, all attempts to create a multiple-purpose regional agency have been unsuccessful—from the efforts of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce in 1910 to create a single regional municipality based on the borough system of Greater New York City, through continuous annual efforts, under the leadership of Assemblyman John Knox, between 1967 and 1975 to enact legislation to create an authoritative regional planning and land-use control agency (V. Jones 1973, 1974; M. Scott 1985; S. Scott and Bollens 1968; Wollenberg 1985). For almost a century, periods of intense activity have been interspersed with periods of recuperation, of acquiescence in the status quo, or of resort to incremental use of special-purpose agencies. As one staff member of the California State Office of Planning and Research stated, "the Bay Area, with a tradition of unification attempts, is quietly biding its time for a more propitious hour" (California Office of Planning and Research 1979). Has that hour arrived?

Whatever may emerge from these renewed activities, it should be recognized that the interdependent and many times conflicting interests that constitute the metropolis are still alive. For instance, no one interested in the governance of the Bay Area should forget how two lobbying groups (COLAB, the Coalition of Labor and Business, and the California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance) supported by construction contractors, labor unions, and other construction-related entities successfully persuaded ABAG through pressure on city councils and boards of supervisors to eliminate all land-use control measures from its Regional Environmental Management Plan (Huth 1977). Progrowth and environmental groups, such as the Sierra Club and the Green Belt Alliance, are engaged today in conflict not only with each other but with cities, counties, and special districts, as well as state and national agencies, over land-use controls. In fact, the issues are debated widely throughout the Bay Area not only as they impinge upon or are affected by land-use controls. There are many proposals, much discussion, and some decisions on transportation, water supply and distribution, sewage and waste disposal, water quality, air quality, environmental protection, and many other activities—private and public—that affect the lives and livelihood of over six million people, and constrain or encourage developmental uses of land (Rapaport 1992b).
The institutional capacity of local government should be considered in an interorganizational context. Whatever reconstruction of local government may be undertaken, the metropolis will continue to be governed by political and administrative actions of private, governmental, and quasi-public/quasi-private organizations in an interorganizational ecology of metropolitan regions (Rondinelli 1978; V. Jones 1979; Meltzer 1984; Self 1982; Chisholm 1989; Landau and Stout 1979; Landau, Chisholm, and Webber 1980; Hamilton and Landau 1991; Kirlin 1989).

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Questions about the institutional capacity of local government must be considered in an interorganizational context of local governments, state and national agencies, and nonpublic profit and nonprofit corporations and associations. Whatever reconstruction of local government may be undertaken, if any, the metropolis will continue to be governed by political and administrative actions of private, governmental, and quasi-public/quasi-private organizations. The governance of the Bay Area is a mixture of public and private actions. Within the public sector, it is a mixture of federal, state, and local governmental actions. Within the local governmental sector, it is a mixture of actions taken by hundreds of local units—large cities, small cities, large and small counties, regional special-purpose agencies, subregional districts, and special suburban neighborhood governments called fire districts, sewer districts, police districts, etc. (V. Jones 1973, 1974, 1979).

There are hundreds of independent local government agencies in the Bay Area: 8 counties, 1 consolidated city and county (San Francisco), 100 municipalities, 383 independent special districts, and 180 school districts. Two new municipalities will be incorporated on January 1, 1993: Windsor, north of Santa Rosa, and American Canyon, southeast of Napa. In addition, there are 199 so-called special districts with county boards of supervisors acting as their governing body and 33 with city councils as governing bodies. The state of California and the United States are also involved directly and indirectly in the governance of the Bay Area. Both are as functionally and territorially fragmented as local government. Although, as in Canada, local governments are creatures of the state, home rule has been embodied in many constitutional and statutory provisions as well as in long-established practices and understandings. The latter are important as political constraints. There are no significant constitutional constraints to hinder the legislature in creating
more special-purpose agencies in consolidating or abolishing existing ones, or in establishing a multipurpose regional agency to exercise power over regional affairs (V. Jones 1974, 1988).

Home rule as an article of faith and practice is not held as tightly now by city and county officials as it was before the 1970s. This is partly due to learning from experience that many modern problems cannot be adequately managed by cities acting alone. It is also a pragmatic adjustment to the involvement of national and state governments in metropolitan affairs. As Kingsley Davis and Eleanor Langlois said 30 years ago: "The trouble with treating the Bay Area complex as an independent unit is that it is not independent. The Bay Area is an integral part of the state's and nation's economy" (Davis and Langlois 1963).

National legislation, with national agencies to formulate rules, provides some funding, imposes sanctions, provides incentives for compliance, and imposes basic constraints upon local governments. One need only mention the Clean Air Act, the Safe Water Act, the National Transportation Act, the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers over navigable waters (dredging and filling of the Bay). The present configuration of the region has been greatly influenced by the national interstate highway system, funds for local transit, provisions of tax law for deduction of interests on home mortgage payments, underwriting of mortgages, subsidies for sewage treatment works, and other facilities.

In many respects, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the Air Quality Management District are agents of the national government. In fact, they are good examples of a governmental agency serving all levels of government. It is a means by which authority and power are shared in our federal system. This is possible in the United States but not in Canada because American local and regional governments deal directly with the national government. However, current national policy is to deal increasingly through the state government as an intermediary. Nevertheless, MTC and the U.S. Department of Transportation deal both formally and informally with each other. MTC is the official regional transportation planning agency for both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the California Transportation Commission. All requests for national funds for local or regional highway or transit projects must be reviewed by MTC for consistency with the Regional Transportation Plan.

It is significant for informal relationships that San Francisco is the regional headquarters for federal agencies in California, Nevada, and Hawaii. Until 1980, a Federal Regional Council attempted to develop
and oversee national government activities in the region and to establish and maintain liaison with states, metropolitan agencies, and localities. There is need for such a forum at both statewide and regional levels. Bay Vision 2020 did not concern itself with such intergovernmental relations.

In addition to the authority of the state over its local agencies, it is engaged in planning, promoting, and regulating many activities of Bay Area residents and organizations. The scope of state involvement is illustrated by the requirement in AB4242 that regional plans be consistent with the California Clean Air Act, state water quality standards, the Congestion Management Plan Act, the Integrated Waste Management Act, state housing allocation requirements, the proposed State Conservation and Development Plan, and the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

GENERAL PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

There are 100 incorporated municipalities in the Bay Area. Eleven are designated as central cities of the five primary metropolitan areas that make up the Bay Area portion of what the U.S. Bureau of the Census calls "the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose Metropolitan Statistical Area." Only the three largest are popularly considered as economic and social centers, but the other eight as well as dozens of cities function as real "centers" for subregions. Unlike most metropolitan areas in the United States where the median size of municipalities is well below 2,500, in the Bay Area the median size is 27,500. The upper quartile runs from 54,000 to 750,000, and the lower quartile from 2,400 (excluding Colma, pop. 731, the site in San Mateo County of San Francisco cemeteries) to 8,700. There are 72 cities with populations larger than 10,000; 55 larger than 25,000; 27 in excess of 50,000, and nine cities of 100,000 or more population.

Not only are most municipalities large enough to play a full independent/interdependent role, but the position of most of them is enhanced by the fact that they were originally organized early in Bay Area history as distinctively and geographically independent entities. Only since the 1906 earthquake and especially during the postwar years have they been joined together by annexation of the rapid growth of their own suburbs and by incorporation of new municipalities (M. Scott 1985; James Vance 1964; Davis and Langlois 1963). Five were incorporated before 1860, 30 by the end of the century, and 56 by the end of World War II.
Central city-suburban relationships are not only important at the present time, they are likely to become even more important as the suburbs continue to increase at a rapid rate and the central cities continue to lose population or increase at a much lower rate. Reapportionment of legislative and congressional seats after the 1990 census has increased the proportion of suburbanites in the state legislature and in Congress.

Minorities are large enough and articulate enough to be a major political force in the Bay Area as well as in the cities where they are concentrated. Many of them are disadvantaged and their concentration creates the social disparities between central cities and suburbs that is coming to be recognized as a regional problem.

The mayor and councilmembers of Oakland, and especially the mayor and supervisors of San Francisco, considering the high stakes of their residents and businesspersons in regional developments, have played a relatively small role in ABAG. Only San Jose has attempted to develop a strategy for regional satisfaction of big city interests. There is a magnificent opportunity for central city and suburb to trade off interests in the development of regional policies. It appears that the central city has the most to gain and the most to lose through regional developments and accommodations. With the shift of population and votes to the suburbs likely to be accentuated in the coming decades, it seems appropriate, in fact, imperative, for the central cities to give up their traditional role of reacting to events and take the initiative in developing regional policies and organizing the regional accommodations necessary to adopt and implement them.

The regional conflict is not a simple dichotomous one of suburb versus central city. In the first place, no central city is homogeneous. Groups within central cities and in some suburbs often have mutual interests. Second, local governments and other groups within the three largest cities will often disagree. And in the third place, suburbia is divided among itself on any issue that may arise. This is why it is needless to fear, as some environmentalists have, that city and county officials will present a monolithic front on regional issues.

**REGIONAL SPECIAL DISTRICTS**

The most important regional and multicounty special-purpose bodies are the East Bay Municipal Utility District (1923), Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District (1928), California Toll Bridge Authority (1929), East Bay Regional Park District (1934), San Francisco
Regional Water Pollution Control Board (1967), Bay Area Air Quality Management District (1955), Alameda-Contra Costa Counties Transit District (1955), San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (1957), North Bay Cooperative Library System (1960), Bay Conservation and Development Commission (1965), Bay Area Regional Water Control Board (1967), Peninsula Library System (1970), Metropolitan Transportation Commission (1971), Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District (1972), East Bay Dischargers Authority (1974), Livermore-Amador Valley Water Management Agency (1974), South Bay Cooperative Library System (1975), Bay Area Library and Information System (1978), Bay Area Dischargers Authority (1984), and Tri-Valley Water Authority (1986) (League of Women Voters of the Bay Area 1990a). There have been a few unsuccessful attempts to create other regional special-purpose agencies, the most notable being the failure in the '60s and '70s to create a Golden Gate Authority to manage airport, bridge, and harbor facilities, a regional planning district, and a district to regulate the conversion of open space to other uses. Under the Bay Vision 2020 proposal, three of these special-purpose agencies would be consolidated: ABAG, MTC, and BAAQMD.

Association of Bay Area Governments

The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) was created in February 1961, largely in response to two perceived threats to cities and counties: Governor Pat Brown’s interest in regional government and a bill in the legislature (supported by the Bay Area Council) to create a Golden Gate Transportation Authority (patterned after the Port of New York Authority) to manage regional ports, airports, and bridges. It was also recognized by some local officials that the physical, economic, and social well-being of the entire Bay region and of its individual communities required areawide cooperation and coordination of policies, plans, and services (V. Jones 1973).

The primary function of the association is to provide a framework for cities and counties to deal with regional problems on a cooperative, coordinating basis. The association is not in itself a "government," but it is a legal agency established by contractual agreement between member cities and counties acting under the authority of the joint Exercise of Powers Act. The act authorizes two or more governments, including state and federal agencies, to exercise jointly any power that they could exercise separately.
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNING BODIES
OF ABAG, MTC, AND BAAQMD

ABAG has a complicated governing structure: a large general assembly in which each member government has a single representative with a single vote (Metropolitan Transportation Commission 1991a; League of Women Voters of the Bay Area 1990a). Currently there are nine county representatives and 92 municipal representatives. However, on issues decided by a roll call there must be a majority vote among county representatives present and also among municipal representatives. The general assembly meets at least once a year to approve the budget, to amend the bylaws, and to act upon any other matter on the agenda or raised on the floor. The business part of the general assembly meeting is usually short and most of the session consists of a program of invited speakers discussing a stated topic. Sometimes, however, action at general assembly meetings is decisive as, for example, on the various Knox bills between 1969 and 1975 to create a regional agency and in 1977 to modify and approve a regional environmental management plan. The general assembly in November 1991 rejected the recommendations of the executive board with respect to the Bay Vision 2020 report (ABAG 1991e, 1991g).

The president and vice president of ABAG are elected by a secret ballot of all city councilpersons and county supervisors—an electoral college of over 500 local elected officials. An executive board of 35 members is appointed by and from elective local government officials: 20 from cities, 14 from counties, and one alternating between the "city of San Francisco," aka the mayor, and the "county of San Francisco," aka the board of supervisors (the legislative body of the consolidated city and county of San Francisco). The mayor's appointee may be an appointed official. The cities of Oakland and San Jose have permanent seats, three each. All other municipal seats rotate among other municipalities. They are selected by the mayors conference of each county and the county members by and from each county board of supervisors (League of Women Voters of the Bay Area 1991a). The U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, Region IX is a nonvoting member. Each county has at least two seats—one municipal and one county. Seats are roughly allocated by population, but the one county-two seats rule ensures wide disproportionality. For instance, the population equality index (a county's share of seats divided by its share of the Bay Area population) for Napa County is 317 and for Santa Clara County 80 (see Table 9.2).
Table 9.2. Distribution of Seats on Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), and Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD): 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County or Agency</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>% Distribution of Population, 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABAG</td>
<td>MTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solano</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Association of Bay Area Governments</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay Conservation and Development Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*RNumbers do not add up to total due to rounding*

*Regional Average*

*Combined ABAG and BCDC figure*

ABAG, as stated in its name, is an association of local governments. It was created in 1961 through a joint powers agreement, which under California law can authorize two or more governmental units to perform jointly any function that they may perform by themselves. It is doubtful, however, that a joint powers agency can, without specific statutory authority, levy a tax, impose a fee, or regulate the use of property. This meant, for example, back in the 1960s, that the only means ABAG could use to regulate the filling of the Bay or the use of land on its shore was
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ABAG</th>
<th>MTC</th>
<th>BAAQMD</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>ABAG</th>
<th>MTC</th>
<th>BAAQMD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td></td>
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<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
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<td>394</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.9</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0.1

99.9\(^a\) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100\(^b\) 100\(^b\) 100\(^b\) 100\(^b\)

The table above shows the distribution of seats and population equality index among the ABAG, MTC, and BAAQMD. The numbers indicate the percentage of seats and population equality. The table is used to persuade all counties and cities touching the Bay to enact a common ordinance to that effect. Assuming that unanimous action would have been politically possible, it would have taken months, perhaps years, to negotiate the terms of an acceptable ordinance and subsequent regulations. Since unanimity was required, a single city or a single county could have vetoed any proposed regional land-use policy for the Bay and its shoreline. This situation left the way wide open for the Save the Bay Association and other environmental groups to lobby successfully for the creation by the legislature of a state special-purpose agency, the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC).
ABAG was not created by the cities and counties of the region to be a government. It was designed as a forum for the discussion of matters affecting more than one city or county, for the development and analysis of information about interlocal problems, and for the development of recommendations to its members for individual or collective action to solve such problems. ABAG has gone through three planning phases. The first phase lasted only a few years while local planning officials were asked to contribute their time to pasting together on a map a mosaic of county and municipal plans. This phase ended around 1963 when local officials tired of the extra work and when it became clear that such a mosaic of local plans would be useless in the emerging transportation planning being developed, encouraged, and, in some instances, required by the United States government. ABAG agreed then to hire its own planning staff and to prepare a regional plan along the lines of a typical master plan document and maps. Comprehensive planning was the watchword (Kent 1963).

In 1970, the ABAG General Assembly approved a comprehensive regional plan. Much of the debate was about whether the plan, if adopted, would override inconsistent provisions of local plans. In fear that it might override local plans, the general assembly refused to adopt the plan but instead voted to approve it (ABAG 1970, 1986b; Hamilton 1965). As if it would make any substantive difference!

Two provisions were important and long-reaching (they are still being debated in 1991): a recommendation that 3,400,000 acres be kept permanently as open space and that growth be managed by directing growth into existing urbanized centers. Twenty years later (1990), these two provisions are the anchor points in the Bay Vision 2020 Commission’s vision of the next three decades of growth management. (It should be pointed out that the 1970 regional plan anticipated much higher population growth than occurred: 6,200,000 by 1980 and 7,500,000 by 1990). Mel Scott evaluated the regional plan in these words:

Of paramount interest was the evidence of a dramatically changed perspective on the part of locally elected officials. . . . The plan of course embodied compromises made at the insistence of various local governments [and, it may be added, of various private interests working through local governments], and it had not been refined to the degree desired by the highly competent planning staff. Still the document presented more of a consensus than might have been thought possible a few years earlier. . . . It was . . . more a symbol of progress toward regional unity than a
plan all communities in the region intended to consider seriously as they made controversial decisions on development proposals. Certainly there was no rush to alter local plans and local zoning ordinances to conform with the general scheme. . . . (M. Scott 1985).

The third and current phase of regional planning by ABAG began after Revan Tranter became executive director in 1972. In place of a single comprehensive plan, specific issues are examined as they arise and followed through to a policy decision by the executive board and the general assembly. Each major decision is explained in a document and assembled with analyses of other major policies in loose-leaf form under the title of the Regional Plan.

The current planning process (a kind of strategic planning) consists of four activities that are both consecutive and overlapping. The planning agenda arises from reactions to acknowledged problems or crises and from deliberate attempts to anticipate problems. Again, the agenda is developed formally and informally through a network of governmental and nongovernmental interests. Much of the agenda is dictated by the expressed or anticipated concerns of local, regional, state, and national agencies (ABAG 1980, 1986b, 1988a; Heitman 1982).

The second planning activity of ABAG is the collection of information and the analysis of data for use by ABAG, MTC, and the BAAQMD, cities, counties, special districts, and the public (ABAG 1985, 1988b, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Brady 1985, 1987, 1989; MTC, ABAG and California State Department of Transportation 1991). The centerpiece of this activity is the development of projected changes in population, households, jobs, and dwelling units for 5, 10, and 15 years. Projections are usually updated every two years. They are used by ABAG, MTC, and BAAQMD in developing transportation plans and air quality regulations. They also are used widely by local governments and the private sector. State construction in the Bay Area must be consistent with ABAG projections if approved by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs. No local conformance is required by state law (ABAG 1989).

ABAG's revision of its biennial projections now underway is especially important because of the availability of 1990 census data. Calibrations of projections with new census returns are especially useful in the few years after the decennial census and become progressively less useful as the decade unfolds. ABAG will also prepare special studies of the changes between 1980 and 1990. It will, as a census clearinghouse, make available at cost to public and private organizations recapitulations
of census data by cities, counties, census tracts, and combinations of tracts into recognized and ad hoc subregions.

The third planning activity of ABAG is debate over regional issues leading to new or modified regional policies adopted by the executive board and the general assembly. Most of this debate, leading to recommendations to the executive board, is conducted in the Regional Planning Committee (ABAG 1988a, 1991d, 1991e; Binger 1991). The committee consists of local officials from each of the nine counties and public members representing business, economic development, environment, housing, labor, minorities, recreation/open space, special districts, and the "public interest." The presidents of both the Bay Area Council and of the Greenbelt Alliance, nonpublic sponsors, of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission, are members of the Regional Planning Committee. The debate is continued, of course, when a committee recommendation reaches the executive board or, occasionally, the general assembly.

During the past decade, the Regional Planning Committee has developed policies dealing with a regional system of trails, water quality, earthquake safety, air quality, hazardous spills, solid waste management, jobs and economic development, and housing. During 1991, the committee and ABAG staff have given primary attention to developing proposals and commenting upon the recommendations of the Bay Vision 2020 commission. This activity has quickened since the commission recommended that ABAG, MTC, and the BAAQMD be consolidated into an interim commission to draft a regional plan. The ABAG staff has supplemented the work of a small staff of the Bay Vision Action Coalition (the cosponsors of Bay Vision 2020) as it develops specific legislation for introduction in the 1992 session of the state legislature.

The fourth planning activity of ABAG is the effort to secure implementation of its general plan and specific policies. ABAG has no statutory authority to implement its policies, although under a joint exercise of powers agreement it could assume nonregulatory functions common to cities and counties. Examples of this are its Training Institute, Worker's Compensation agreements, Pooled Liability Assurance Network, Fixed-Rate Credit Pooling Program and its Health Benefits Trust (ABAG 1980; MTC, ABAG, and California State Department of Transportation 1991). These joint programs also generate additional revenue for ABAG.

Implementation must be achieved through persuasion, development, analysis, and dissemination of information. This is both a technical and political game. Preaching is not enough. Time, understanding of the
situation and of the region, and collaboration with state and national agencies and with many persons, industries, and other organizations in the private sector are necessary. The nature of such demands on staff and public officials involved in ABAG is apparent from examination of one observer's (Rothblatt 1982, 1989) list of the characteristics of effective nonauthoritative planning:

1. **Openness.** Enable the various points of view of the major individuals, groups, and organizations (actors) involved with a metropolitan planning problem to be expressed to public decision makers.

2. **Broad representation.** Provide the professional skills and resources needed to assure that all actors involved are represented accurately, competently, and vigorously.

3. **Fairness.** Establish a system of inquiry that treats all actors equally, especially in terms of resources (including time) made available to each actor for research, planning, and presentation.

4. **Hostility reduction.** Provide a decision-making environment that would help to de-escalate the hostility and alienation that could develop between conflicting actors so as to enable each actor to consider more objectively the views of others.

5. **Provide information.** Present each view, together with supporting documentation and analysis, in a manner that helps clarify the issues involved and provide useful information for all parties concerned.

6. **Encourage broad citizen participation.** Expose the metropolitan community to the range of views on regional problems, and provide a means of registering their preferences for the resolution of these problems.

7. **Responsiveness.** Create a setting that would induce decision makers to really listen to, consider, and be responsive to the concerns and proposals of the actors directly involved, and to the metropolitan public.

An organization plays an authoritative role in a community through its goals, its ability to recognize problems and marshall its resources and those of others to deal with them, the quality and sufficiency of the information it collects and disseminates, the validity of analyses, its ability to develop consensus and to follow through by persuasion. ABAG can, without any statutory authority to force compliance with its policies, develop and orchestrate concerted action among a multitude of public and private agencies (often in conflict with each other) to: (a) define regional issues; (b) recognize their importance; (c) identify alternative ways of addressing problems; (d) consider the social, economic, and political
advantages and disadvantages of the alternative solutions; (e) identify and weigh the likely impact in the short, intermediate, and long term of each alternative policy and program on other local, regional, state, and national goals and activities; (f) recognize and correct policies and programs when unintended consequences and other errors occur; and (g) support whatever measures are necessary to implement accepted regional policies by private parties and governmental agencies at all levels—local, regional, state, and national.

It is easier to order people, organizations, and governments to do or refrain from doing something than to convince and persuade them to cooperate. Frequently, however, the issuance of "binding" orders leads to a delusion of authority in the absence of effective compliance. The ritual of symbolic compliance is deeply imbedded in our culture. Therefore, as difficult and expensive as it may be, ABAG or any successor regional agency is more likely to be successful to the degree that its actions are convincing and persuasive, even though it may issue cease and desist orders. Even in hierarchial organizations, "to manage is not to control" (Landau and Stout 1979). In the complex Bay Area with myriads of independent but interdependent actors, whatever the structure, however hierarchical it may appear on paper, diplomacy must permeate the activities of a regional planning agency.

**BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT (BAAQMD)**

If ABAG is able only to give advice and, perhaps, to persuade others to follow that advice, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) and, especially, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) have authority respectively to determine how state and federal funds are to be spent and to regulate what people, governments, and businesses do if their behavior affects air quality. Both agencies, although they are governed by boards consisting of city and county officials, are in effect regional agencies implementing state and national programs.

The board of the Bay Area Air Quality Management District has a membership of 21. State law prescribes that counties with a population of under 300,000 (Marin, Napa) shall appoint one member; those between 300,000 and 750,000 (San Francisco, San Mateo, Solano, and Sonoma) two members; 750,000 and 1,000,000 (Contra Costa) three members; and over 1,000,000 (Alameda and Santa Clara) four members. Again, Santa
Clara County is underrepresented with a population equality index of 80, but the index for Contra Costa is even lower at 75.

The regional air control board has been implementing national Clean Air Acts since 1970, including its 1977 amendments. Congress has, after five years of debate, strengthened national requirements by passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act. It is considerably stronger than the earlier act, but no one knows exactly what its 500 pages require until EPA issues detailed regulations or guidelines. In the gap between the expiration in 1987 of the 1977 national Clean Air Act and the new Act of 1990, California enacted its own Clean Air Act. It is more stringent than the federal act. For instance, the national government standard allows 12 parts per hundred million of ozone as compared with a state standard of 9 parts per hundred million. The federal standard for carbon monoxide is 9.5 parts per million while the state standard is 9 parts per million.

The California Air Resources Board controls mobile sources of air pollution, largely through requiring installation, inspection, and repair of catalytic convertors on trucks and automobiles. All new motor vehicles sold in the state must meet higher standards than those required by federal law.

Regulating stationary sources of air pollution is the responsibility of regional and local air control agencies, such as the BAAQCD. This is done through the adoption of regulations to reduce nonvehicular pollution and implementation through the issuance of construction and operation permits. The BAAQCD also prepares a regional pollution control element, which, after approval by the state Air Resources Board, is incorporated into a federally required State Implementation Plan. The district, in collaboration with ABAG and MTC, adopted in October 1991 a new regional Clean Air Plan to replace the 1982 plan.

The district under the California Clean Air Act now has authority to regulate or mitigate emissions from any structure "which generates or attracts mobile source activity that results in emissions of any pollutant":

The state Air Resources Board lists employment sites, shopping centers, schools, sports facilities, housing developments, airports, and commercial or industrial development as examples of indirect sources. According to the Air Resources Board, freeways are not indirect sources (Morrison and Foerster August 1991a).

This authority to regulate indirect sources has led some participants, mostly local government officials and the Bay Area Council, to insist that Bay Vision 2020's proposed regional agency would need no new authority to control land use. The ABAG Executive Board recommends
that the powers of the interim regional agency be limited to those that the three agencies to be merged currently possess.

In fact, the 1991 Clean Air Plan that the BAAQMD adopted on October 30, 1991, was prepared under the direction of the three agencies Bay Vision proposes to merge: MTC, ABAG, and BAAQMD. Under memoranda of agreement, the Joint Air Quality Policy Committee (JAQPC) consists of the chair and two other members of each agency and is supported by an Inter-Agency Management Committee and a Joint Technical Staff. Some commentators question whether a formal merger of the three agencies would be able to accomplish anything the present collaborative groups cannot do (Hamilton and Landau 1991). Proponents of the merger insist that the legal responsibility for the adoption of a Clean Air Plan lies solely with the BAAQMD and that with new requirements to incorporate transportation measures and land-use controls into the Clean Air Plan make it desirable for ABAG and MTC, with their expertise and their constituencies, to be brought directly into a new regional planning and implementation agency. This is the core of the debate that is developing and is moving to the gubernatorial-legislative level in 1992.

State legislation now gives the BAAQMD, under supervision of the state Air Resources Board, authority to adopt both transportation control measures and land-use controls. Whatever it does will have to be acceptable to several state and federal agencies and probably to state and federal courts. Litigation has become a major policymaking process during the past 30 years (Kagan 1990).

State law authorizes BAAQMD to adopt and enforce acceptable transportation control measures (TCM) developed by MTC. The state Air Resources Board lists as "reasonably available" the following type of transportation control measures:

1. Employer-based trip reduction rules.
2. Trip reduction rules for other sources that attract vehicle trips.
3. Management of parking supply and pricing.
4. Regional high occupancy vehicle system plans and implementation programs (carpool and bus lanes).
5. Comprehensive transit improvements programs for bus and rail.
6. Land development policies that support reductions in vehicle trips.

According to the BAAQMD, the 1991 Clean Air Plan "includes indirect source controls" and all of the above "reasonably available" TCMs, plus other feasible transportation measures from the TCM task force process, as necessary to achieve the 1.5 average vehicle ridership target in the
California Clean Air Act (BAAQMD, June 18, 1991). Morrison and Foerster report that:

the District Counsel for the BAAQMD has advised the BAAQMD that it has the authority to limit parking spaces and indirectly impose parking fees as a TCM under the indirect source control program (Morrison and Foerster 1991b).

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

The third regional agency proposed by the Bay Vision 2020 Commission to be merged into a new regional agency is the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). The governing board is composed of 14 county supervisors and city councilpersons or mayors. Board members have at times served on one or both of the other regional agencies, sometimes simultaneously. MTC was established by statute in 1970 (D. Jones et al. 1974; D. Jones 1976). In all other metropolitan regions of the state, the regional council of governments acts as the regional transportation planning authority.

ABAG appoints one member who is also a locally elected official and BCDC appoints one member. There are also three nonvoting members, one each appointed by the California Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Santa Clara County has a population equality index of only 57 on the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and Napa County again has the most disproportionate share of seats with an index of 317. Two members are appointed from Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara Counties and one each from Marin, Napa, Solano, and Sonoma Counties. ABAG and BCDC each appoint a member. The ABAG appointee will always be a locally elected official. The BCDC appointee could be a local official, but the current appointee is Angelo Siracusa, president of the Bay Area Council (a regional association of large businesses and a cosponsor of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission).

MTC is recognized by both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the state of California as the metropolitan planning organization for the Bay Area. Its principal purpose is to prepare a Regional Transportation Plan (first adopted in 1973), revise it annually, and direct and monitor its implementation through review of applications for state and federal assistance and the allocation of state and federal discretionary funds:
MTC's transportation planning process can be simply defined as (1) identification of problems or concerns; (2) analysis of issues, alternatives, and recommendations of solutions; (3) adoption of recommendations as part of the regional planning documents . . . ; (4) allocation of funds; and (5) evaluation of results (MTC, ABAG, and California State Department of Transportation 1991).

In preparing the plan, MTC works closely with ABAG, BAAQCD, BCDC, the California Transportation Commission, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the transit operating agencies in the Bay Area. The Regional Transportation Plan includes short- and long-range schedules of construction, maintenance, and operation priorities. Airport planning is conducted jointly with ABAG, BCDC, and airport operators; seaport planning with BCDC and seaport managers; air quality planning with ABAG and BAAQCD. Each of these planning activities has led to the development of joint institutional arrangements among the participating parties. For instance, the Seaport Planning Advisory Committee consists of members from MTC, ABAG, BCDC, Caltrans, the U.S. Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Maritime Administration, six Bay Area ports and two nongovernmental organizations, the Bay Area Council, and the Save San Francisco Bay Association.

The most significant joint institutional venture, in light of the Bay Vision 2020 recommendation that the three agencies be consolidated, is the nine-member Joint Air Quality Policy Committee, consisting of three board members from ABAG, MTC, and the BAAQMD. An interagency management committee known as the "troika" consists of top executives from each of the three agencies and directs a joint technical staff. These two joint committees have completed work on the 1991 Clean Air Plan that must be approved by the state Air Resources Board and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Two other joint arrangements among transit operators play a very important role in transportation planning and in implementing the integrative and coordinative provisions of the regional transportation plan: the Regional Transit Association representing seven major transit operators, and the Transit Operator Coordinating Council representing 11 transit operators. They advise MTC about allocations of transit funds and financial, coordination, and operational matters. The members of the two groups have established many informal relationships, thus mitigating some of the so-called disadvantages of multiple ownership and operation of transit services (Chisholm 1989). MTC is required by statute to evaluate the performance of operators and to analyze their budgets.
In 1991-92, MTC will review and negotiate desired changes in county congestion management plans (CMP). Projects in CMPs inconsistent with MTC regional transportation plans are ineligible for state or federal highway funds. County congestion management agencies are required in all urbanized counties (i.e., counties that contain or are parts of census designated urbanized areas) after voter approval of Proposition 111 in 1990. In Santa Clara County, the core of a congestion management agency was established even before Proposition 111 after extensive negotiations among city and county officials who were members of the County Transportation Commission and the Golden Triangle Task Force. In April 1991, the agency was converted into a joint powers agency. Proposition 111 requires a county congestion management plan approved by MTC before local governments in the county may receive gas tax funds levied in the proposition (Santa Clara County Congestion Management Agency 1991a, 1991b, 1991c).

The Santa Clara County agency says that its new approach is "multidisciplinary and multimodal" designed to provide "new transit facilities . . ., increased and more efficient transit services . . ., improved land use decision making . . ., reduced demand on the current system, as well as building additional roads" (Santa Clara County Congestion Management Agency 1991a). The governing board consists of 10 local officials representing cities and two county supervisors, one of whom also represents the county transit district.

The congestion agency functions as a subregion of MTC, thus serving as a prototype of the subregional bodies proposed by the Bay Vision 2020 Commission:

In the light of current regional initiatives, there is an additional incentive to create an effective congestion management program. The transportation-related requirements of the California Clean Air Act (AB2595, Sher) will require that cities and counties implement transportation control measures (TCMs) to attain and maintain the state's air quality standard. Whether the final measures in the Clean Air Plan will reflect Southern California's centralized, draconian approach or reflect local initiative is largely dependent on cities and counties coordinated response to the draft Clean Air Plan. Coordinating this response through congestion management agencies wherever feasible will allow jurisdictions to tailor TCMs to the specific needs of the area rather than complying with multiple (and potentially conflicting)
requirements from different levels of government (Santa Clara County Congestion Management Agency 1991a).

The CMA not only becomes an intermediate planning and monitoring agency between local governments and MTC and BAAQMD with respect to transportation and air quality, but it is required to develop a program: ... to analyze the impact of land use decisions made by local jurisdictions on regional transportation systems, including an estimate of the cost of mitigating those impacts (California Government Code 1991).

This provision will provide an opportunity for MTC and BAAQMD, in reviewing county congestion management plans to delegate their analysis and control of indirect sources of air pollution.

NONPUBLIC SECTOR

We will pay particular attention to the regional significance of the organization and activities of four nongovernmental associations: the Bay Area Council, the Greenbelt Alliance, the Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group, and the League of Women Voters of the Bay Area. However, there are thousands of other organizations, few of which operate throughout the entire Bay Area. They are actively engaged in its economy, in providing cultural outlets and social services, and in monitoring other private and public agencies as their actions affect the environment, consumer interests, or the ideological values of other Bay Area organizations. We have already mentioned COLAB, an alliance of construction industries and labor unions organized to fight the inclusion of land-use controls in ABAG's environmental management plan. Scores of public and private agencies involved in debate, bargaining, and decision making on a new airport, open space, and recreation facilities, low- and moderate-income housing, and surface transportation have been identified in the San Jose sector of the Bay Area (Rothblatt 1989). Lorri Fien (1990) counts 775 business, professional, and trade associations in San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa Counties.

A 1982-83 survey by the Urban Institute identified 3,379 nonprofit human service agencies operating in the five central counties of the Bay Area (Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo Counties). Annual expenditures were $1.2 billion. They employed 35,000 people in addition to the use of a large number of volunteers, making them collectively a major regional employer. Almost half of their funding came from governments. "Governmental support plays a
particularly important role in the funding of agencies concentrating in the fields of employment, housing and community development, legal services, and social services" (Harder, Musselwhite, and Salamon 1984).

Greenbelt Alliance

Environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, were very active in the early '70s in supporting the creation of a regional planning agency. The Sierra Club, however, under Dwight Steele's leadership refused to alter its opposition to allow city and county officials to be on the governing board of such an agency. Significantly he has changed his position on direct election—saying frequently in Bay Vision 2020 sessions that it was a mistake in the 1970s to allow a division over the composition of regional governing board to defeat the Knox bills.

Today, the Bay Area's major land conservation organization is the Greenbelt Alliance (GA). Founded in 1958 as Citizens for Recreation and Parks, and then called People for Open Space (POS) after 1969 (People for Open Space, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1988), the Greenbelt Alliance is a merger in 1987 of POS and the Greenbelt Congress. It is a nonprofit, tax-deductible organization with over 2,000 members throughout the Bay Area and with offices in San Francisco and San Jose. With a 1988 budget in excess of half a million dollars, it receives the bulk of its funding from grants (46 percent), individual and organizational support (29 percent), membership dues (14 percent), and special events (8 percent) (Greenbelt Alliance 1988).

While preservation of open space has been its major objective, it has recently broadened its mission. It believes that an enduring Greenbelt can only exist successfully in harmony with a compact metropolis:

... an urban framework that serves Bay Area residents' social and economic needs without perpetually expanding onto the region's open space. And more, we urgently believe it is the Bay Area's traditional urban structure—a tightly interwoven mesh of commerce and residence around and near the Bay—that serves these purposes far better than any other that they have uncovered (especially the featureless suburban sprawl that now threatens to blanket the region's precious landscape) (Greenbelt Alliance 1989).

The alliance presents a strategic plan to "revive and enhance the long-standing metropolitan structure of the Bay Area, ensuring that it does not overtake the region's ecological resources." To accomplish this, it
proposes to establish permanent boundaries around designated open spaces, increase the density of residential, commercial, and industrial uses of existing urban areas, improve public transit, restrict the development of new water and sewer facilities, remove fiscal incentives that encourage local governments to favor industrial and commercial development over housing, and "devise limited-function governing mechanisms that enable Bay Area citizens to address regionwide problems" (Greenbelt Alliance 1989). It has also become directly involved in influencing local communities and decision makers to support policies protecting open space throughout the region, such as the 1987 general plan revisions in Contra Costa, Alameda, and Sonoma Counties. At the same time that the alliance has increased its visibility and general influence with the public and local decision makers, it has also become strategically involved in the policymaking processes of regional and state institutions concerned with Bay Area land use and transportation planning and development. For example, Larry Orman, the alliance's executive director, is a member of the Regional Planning Committee of the Association of Bay Area Governments and is active in the Bay Area Regional Issues Forum. He was a key participant in negotiations leading to creation of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission and is an important leader in the Bay Vision Action Coalition.

In addition, the Greenbelt Alliance has begun to develop cooperative efforts with some of the most influential representatives of the region's private sector, such as the Bay Area Council. Thus, the Greenbelt Alliance, with growing linkages to other organizations, support, and resources, and armed with its vision of the future will be a major actor in creating new regional development policy in the years ahead.

The Bay Area Council

The Bay Area Council (BAC) is a business-sponsored organization created "to provide a forum for consensus building and a platform for regional leadership" (Bay Area Council, 1988a). Most of the council's approximately 250 members represent major corporations in the Bay Area. BAC's million dollar annual budget is supported primarily from member dues that range from $600 to $28,000 annually. In addition, the council receives grants from other sources, such as the San Francisco Foundation, for special projects.

From the Bay Area Council's perspective, the consequences of metropolitanwide growth, such as mounting traffic congestion, declining
supply of affordable housing, increasing deterioration of the environment, and expanding opposition to economic development, are serious impediments to continued economic growth (Bay Area Council 1988a). As Bay Area residents have perceived a decline in their quality of life, they have become increasingly negative about inefficient growth and the financing of community services (Dowall 1984). Consequently, Bay Area residents have approved most of the 48 growth measures proposed on local ballots during the 1980s (Viviano 1989). In 1986, San Francisco itself became the first major U.S. city to limit annual office space development.

The council believes that the deconcentration of jobs could be turned into an opportunity for expanding the economy, increasing the supply of housing, and opening access to recreation while lessening central city congestion (Bay Area Council 1988b). It proposes action to provide a better balance of jobs and housing; more focused development of housing and employment centers; increased funding for infrastructure; better coordination of infrastructure and land-use decisions; and improved fiscal incentives that will induce cooperative local development policies. Most important of all, BAC believes that a new framework should be established for dealing with regional growth problems that transcend the boundaries and resources of local governments.

For more than four decades, the Bay Area Council has served as both a booster for the regional economy and as a catalyst for finding solutions to problems affecting the Bay Area. However, in recent years, the council has come to advocate greater involvement of the private sector in finding solutions to regionwide problems.

Working through its influential members, BAC tries to bridge the gap between the public and private sectors. It also facilitates the cooperation of leaders in the private sector to work with others, including government officials, on issues, solutions, and strategies dealing with the perplexing concerns facing the future development of the Bay region. Bay Area Council’s president, Angelo Siracusa, is a member of other influential organizations concerned with policy formulation for Bay Area development, such as the Regional Planning Committee of the Association of Bay Area Governments, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and the San Francisco Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission. In conjunction with the Greenbelt Alliance, the Bay Area Council cosponsored the Regional Issues Forum, a diverse assembly of public and private individuals concerned with growth-related issues in the Bay Area. The forum was an important factor in developing the consensus leading to the Bay Vision 2020 Commission.
In 1988, the council cosponsored with ABAG a 26-member group of the Bay Area's top government, business, and university leaders to frame and oversee an ambitious program to develop the regional economy. The forum recently published a report, The Bay Area Economy: A Region at Risk (1989), which analyzes the problems and long-term opportunities associated with the region's economic development.

The Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group

The Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group (SCCMG) was established in 1978 by leading high-tech corporations in the San Jose area (such as Hewlett Packard, IBM, and Lockheed) to deal with the emerging regional problems threatening the economic viability of Silicon Valley. Presently, SCCMG represents more than 90 companies employing about 200,000 people in Santa Clara County.

In the words of its chair, William Terry, SCCMG's major objectives are:

... to identify issues that affect employees as well as the efficient management of business; to communicate these issues within member companies and to develop proposals for appropriate action; and to work with elected and appointed officials to form and influence public policy for the benefit of the people of Santa Clara County (Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group 1988a).

Transportation and the environment are perceived by the SCCMG to be the major problems in Santa Clara County. Its primary environmental concern is the reduction in the quality of drinking water in the valley as a result of excessive manufacturing and industrial activity.

The Manufacturing Group's approach has been to work with the local governments in identifying and generating solutions for specific problems, similar to the growing use of public-private partnerships employed in many urban areas in the nation (Goldstein and Bergman 1986; Weaver and Dennert 1987). By focusing attention on specific issues and developing a close rapport with both governmental units and major firms, the SCCMG has been successful as broker and mediator (Rothblatt 1989).

In 1984 SCCMG formed its own task force to study ways of funding needed improvements to heavily congested roads and successfully organized the movement for the county to tax itself to pay for highway improvements. Subsequently, voters in Santa Clara County passed Measure A, which is expected to raise an estimated $1 billion for
highway improvements through a half-cent countywide sales tax increase. "A coalition composed of high-tech industry development interests and the Chamber of Commerce then waged a $641,000 promotional campaign, and voters endorsed the measure with 56% of the vote" (Whalen 1989). In the absence of federal and state highway support, Measure A became a model technique for generating funding for local or regional transportation projects. Indeed, since the passage of Measure A, two other counties in the Bay Area, Contra Costa and San Mateo, have passed similar measures.

The Manufacturing Group also believes that redressing the jobs/housing imbalance requires not only transportation improvements but related land-use policies that bring housing closer to jobs. Thus, after years of research and negotiations, the SCCMG helped to facilitate the agreement in 1986 of Santa Clara County and six cities (Santa Clara, Milpitas, Mountain View, Palo Alto, San Jose, and Sunnyvale) to establish a new multijurisdictional planning institution, the Golden Triangle Task Force. However, the city of Santa Clara has withdrawn from the task force, and two other cities, Fremont in Alameda County and Cupertino, refused to join.

Nevertheless, a Golden Triangle Plan was developed that limits industrial development and provides for about 65,000 much needed new housing units near existing employment centers (Santa Clara County Golden Triangle Task Force 1987). The Golden Triangle Task Force has also adopted policies on growth management, housing expansion, capital improvements, and transportation demand management. While many differences among the cities still need to be resolved before the plan can be fully implemented, this effort represents an important beginning in subregional planning in the Bay Area (Rothblatt 1990). Indeed, the cooperative work of the Golden Task Force provided the basis for Santa Clara County's highly developed Congestion Management Agency.

Since the major environmental concern of the SCCMG is the quality of the valley's drinking water, it sponsored the Santa Clara County Clean Water Task Force in 1984 to encourage and support activities by member industries in Silicon Valley to protect and conserve drinking water. With the help of SCCMG leadership, high-tech industry in Santa Clara County spent more than $175 million between January 1982 and July 1987 for the prevention and cleanup of groundwater contamination. They drafted with public officials the Hazardous Material Management Ordinance to mandate the correction of conditions that led to contamination. This ordinance has since become a model for state and federal regulations.
The large high-tech companies represented by SCCMG provide many of the jobs and much of the tax base that sustain local communities. This economic power has, of course, greatly enhanced the political influence of the Manufacturing Group on the public and private sectors in Santa Clara County. And since this county is a major engine of economic development for the entire Bay Region, generating nearly one half of the region's total employment growth between 1970 and 1980 (Schoop 1986), and more than 25 percent during the 1980s, the Manufacturing Group is also an actor of growing regional significance.

League of Women Voter's of the Bay Area (LWVBA)

The role of the LWVBA in the current debate and interorganizational negotiations over restructuring the governmental system of the Bay Area is as yet unclear. Its president and former president are on the Bay Vision 2020 Commission. There is no doubt that it will play an active and influential role in the debate and decisions of the next few years. It was a major actor in the Knox bills controversies in the '60s and '70s, at first holding out firmly along with the Sierra Club for a directly elected regional multipurpose agency. It finally, and reluctantly on the part of some active members, shifted its position to support a regional agency with half its members directly elected and half appointed by city and county officials (V. Jones 1974; Rapaport 1992a).

After several abortive attempts in the 1950s to create a regional league, the League of Women Voters of the Bay Area was established in 1961. Today all 23 local leagues belong. ABAG was created in the same year and the LWVBA has monitored and reported the meetings and activities of it and other regional agencies, first in the Bay Area Observer and now in the Bay Area Monitor. Six regional public agencies (Metropolitan Transportation Commission, Bay Area Rapid Transit District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, East Bay Regional Park District, and the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District) support the preparation and publication of the Monitor.

In addition to participation in the activities of these Bay Area agencies, LWVBA provides important regional information to the public. For example, it publishes an annual directory of public officials in the Bay Area and conducts a variety of studies (League of Women Voters of the Bay Area 1991a). One such study, the LWVBA Regional Governance Evaluation Project, was conducted in December 1990 to explore alternatives to the Bay Area's governance system and found strong...
support by Bay Area leaders for establishing a new Regional Umbrella Agency (League of Women Voters of the Bay Area 1991b, 1991c).

CONCLUSION

We can see now a widespread recognition among many public and private organizations that there are serious public problems with extra-local and, in many cases, regionwide ramifications and that we need some means of considering and acting upon the external effects of the action, or lack of action, of hundreds of particular organizations. The major private organizations are still committed to their particular interests (e.g., open space, affordable housing near jobs, economic development), but they are pushing for these objectives in a regional context and with a willingness to collaborate with each other and with public agencies. At the same time, local governments and regional special-purpose agencies operating through ABAG and MTC have abandoned the idealistic, but ineffectual, long-term comprehensive approach of the 1960s and 1970s for a strategic process of dealing with issues as they arise. In the real world, however, no issue arises in isolation from other issues and therefore cannot be kept isolated until it is resolved.

What will come from the private-public collaboration in the wake of Bay Vision 2020 in the years ahead and from the legislative and perhaps electoral struggles to follow is unknown. But the very process of collaboration will probably leave its mark. It may set the stage for more effective collaboration and metropolitan governance of the Bay Area well into the twenty-first century.
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Chapter 10

Summary and Conclusions

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While nearly every North American metropolitan area has some form of regional institutional arrangement to at least consider metropolitan issues (see Table 10.1), few of these institutions have the authority to govern. Our study confirms the view held by Goldberg and Mercer (1986) that Canadian metropolitan areas generally have more highly developed collective regional governance systems than their American counterparts. This seems to be true despite the great regional and developmental variations in Canada that have generated a rich diversity in political styles, from the more free wheeling resource-oriented province of Alberta, to the more established centers of Ontario and Quebec.

It is also true that even the most highly regarded Canadian metropolitan governments are not without their limitations. Clearly, Metro Toronto, established in 1954, has been one of the most effective two-tiered metropolitan governments in North America, rationally guiding development and infrastructure within its domain (Nowlan and Stewart 1991). Yet, most of the growth since the 1970s in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) has occurred beyond the boundaries and control of Metro Toronto. Although the Toronto area, with its 1990 population of 3,752,000, does not have the large number of local governments found in U.S. urban areas, Frances Frisken in her essay observes, "the GTA has not entirely escaped local political fragmentation and administrative complexity." Metro Toronto is surrounded by four outlying regional municipalities containing a total of 24 municipalities making development decision making increasingly difficult within the GTA, especially when a number of these entities do not even have an agreed upon development plan. Indeed, as Frisken goes on to conclude about the Toronto region:

What has become increasingly apparent is that Metro as a whole is in competition with its regional neighbors (and their member
Table 10.1. Sample Canadian and United States Metropolitan Planning Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Regional Planning Agency (year created)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Metropolitan Toronto (1953)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Montreal Urban Community (1970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Greater Vancouver Regional District (1968)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (1957)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>Metropolitan Area Planning Council (1963)</td>
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<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Association of Bay Area Governments (1961)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Houston-Galveston Area Council (1966)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (1967)</td>
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1The Montreal Urban Community replaced the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation, which in turn replaced the Montreal Metropolitan Commission, which was established in 1921.

2The Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission replaced the Edmonton Regional Planning Commission, which was created in 1950.

3Voluntary association of local governments.

municipalities) for population, economic investment and provincial funds for infrastructure.

In addition, Canadian metropolitan governments are not entirely autonomous within their own boundaries. The provincial cabinet, with its broad powers of providing social and infrastructure services and reviewing land-use decisions, still has the greatest potential to influence the character of public services and settlement patterns within a metropolitan region. This potential far exceeds the authority exercised by American states, which have usually given considerable deference to local governments, including home rule powers. Yet, in recent years the province of Ontario appears to have been reluctant to impose a clear development strategy for the Toronto area and has seldom overridden local planning preferences. The growing political influence of the
expanding suburban areas and the concern of other portions of the province threatened by Toronto's growing economic power have directed provincial resources for infrastructure and community services away from Metro to other areas. Thus, while the province of Ontario took great initiative in establishing Metro in the 1950s and reorganizing it with some political consolidation and directly elected representation during the following three decades, the province has become primarily a regionwide and provincewide mediator and consensus builder in recent years.

When we examine Montreal, we see a similar pattern of provincial behavior to the Toronto case. As the second largest French-speaking city in the industrialized world, with a 1990 metropolitan area population of 3,068,000, and as the cultural and economic capital of Quebec, Montreal itself plays a distinctive role without parallel in the rest of Canada. Yet, the function of ethnicity and history in Montreal metropolitan politics are somewhat akin to those in the Boston region.

The regional government in the Montreal area, the Montreal Urban Community (MUC), was established in 1970 primarily to rationalize transportation and police services. Initially, there were hopes that the MUC, which now represents Montreal and 28 much smaller communities, would become a strong metropolitan government with broad powers to implement a vision for the region (Sancton 1988). However, because of the political tensions between Montreal and these other cities (many of which are primarily anglophone), and because of the community council's requirement for double approvals (by the council and the city of Montreal) for action, MUC's activities have been greatly constrained. As Marie-Odile Trepanier states:

MUC's functions, except for police and transit, tended to be limited to noncontroversial technical matters such as sewage collectors or air pollution control.

From the outset, MUC boundaries were obsolete encompassing only about 71 percent of the metropolitan population in 1971, and dropping to 60 percent by 1986. The approximately 70 municipalities in the most rapidly growing part of the region, the outlying suburban ring, continue to increase their influence with the Quebec provincial government for public investment in infrastructure and other public services. For example, a major highway planned to link the Montreal area with the Ottawa region will be rerouted away from the city of Montreal to serve instead suburban areas (Simaerd 1989). Thus, like the Toronto case, the Quebec province seems to be involved in the politics of allocation and
building a metropolitan consensus. As Trepanier put it, "the provincial role has become more of a facilitator than simply a mandator."

The Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), established in 1969, also showed great promise as a metropolitan government. It not only had a mandated planning function for the Vancouver region comprised of 18 municipalities and 1.5 million inhabitants, but also delivered a wide range of services to the area, such as water supply and hospital facilities. GVRD's board of directors consists of 28 members representing municipal and incorporated districts that were initially free to "opt out" of a particular function of a district. Thus, the board in fact had a voluntary characteristic by functional activity.

During its first decade and a half of functioning with uncertain provincial support, the GVRD generated a sophisticated regional planning process to guide development for an extended regional area through its Livable Region Programme, which dealt with such issues as jobs/housing balance, employment, open space, rapid transit, and growth management. Yet, a series of conflicts with the provincial government as well as shifts to a more conservative provincial cabinet led to the removal of GVRD's regional planning authority in 1983. Consequently, the GVRD was left essentially as an elaborate service district, not a new level of government.

Still, the GVRD continues to have informal influence on regional development because of its past work, prestige, and ongoing leadership in such important planning activities as the 1990 update of the Livable Regional Plan, "Creating Our Future"—a set of broadly agreed upon policies for ensuring a more environmentally balanced metropolitan area. In this regard, Oberlander and Smith conclude in their essay:

That the GVRD achieved such policy consensus without formal planning authority attests to the thesis that planning regionally has been established as a staple of governance in the metropolitan Vancouver region.

Thus, even without its formal authority, GVRD is the only institution in the Vancouver metropolitan area with the capacity to plan regionally, if not govern regionally.

As a newly developing resource oriented region, the Edmonton metropolitan area is more market oriented than our other Canadian study areas. Spurred by the post World War II petroleum boom, Edmonton's population increased five fold to 785,600 during the 1947-86 period, while the entire metropolitan area nearly quadrupled to 785,000. By 1990, its metropolitan area population reached 824,000 covering 1,599 square miles.
Like several emerging cities in America's sunbelt, Edmonton's growth was reinforced with vigorous boosterism and governmental reformism, which pushed for extensive annexation of surrounding areas. That is, there was a drive to create a larger central city that would increase the economic importance of Edmonton and rationalize metropolitan government. Thus, between 1947 and 1981 Edmonton grew from about 40 to 234 square miles in area. In fact, its last large annexation proposal, which was only partially approved (due to opposition of adjacent municipalities) by the province in 1981, would have increased Edmonton's size to 888 square miles. Ted Thomas describes this annexation showdown in his essay:

The provincial government resisted all proposals for regional government, likely out of fears of the influence such a unified government in its own backyard might have on provincial politics. By emphasizing repeatedly its commitment to local autonomy of the communities within the region, the government was quite willing to accept the inefficiencies and redundancies which followed from the policy.

After more than two decades of rivalry between Edmonton and its neighbors over economic development and annexation issues, the Alberta cabinet established the Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission (EMRPC) in 1981. EMPRC's boundaries include four rural and 15 urban municipalities in a 2,576 square mile area.

The commission's mandate is to "plan for the orderly development of the region . . ." (EMRPC 1987, 6). Its main functions are: prepare and administer a regional plan; provide advice and assistance to municipalities when requested; act as the subdivision approving authority for the region; provide advice and recommendations on annexation matters; and seek and encourage public participation in the planning of the Edmonton region.

As part of its ongoing operations, the commission often serves as a center for coordinating the planning activities undertaken by other levels of government. The EMRPC guides growth and development matters of local and regional significance. The commission works closely with municipalities by providing advice on land-use matters, but, except for subdivision approvals, serves in an advisory capacity only. The current goals and objectives of the commission concern enhancing the commission's role as an intermunicipal forum.

Yet, beyond its advisory capacity, the EMRPC seemed likely to run into major problems planning for the region. With the city of Edmonton
possessing 80 percent of the region’s population with only one-third of the votes, and the other rival municipalities having the remaining votes, it has been extremely difficult for the commission to build a consensus for effective action. As Ted Thomas concludes:

The relationships between the regional planning commission with heavy representation from the smaller centers and the city were often strained as were the relations between the city and the provincial government.

In this respect the governance of the Edmonton area is again like those in American sunbelt metropolitan regions, such as the Houston area.

When we turn our attention to the American metropolitan areas, we find similar variety in institutional form, but far less success, in regional governance compared to the Canadian experience. The Chicago area, with its 8,066,000 residents in 1990 covering 5,660 square miles, brings the Canadian-U.S. differences into sharp relief. This third most populous metropolitan area in North America has, as Hemmens and McBride point out, "over 1,250 governments . . . making it one of the most intensely governed regions in the country.” And while there are regional planning institutions in the Chicago area, such as the Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission (NIPC) for general planning and the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) for transportation planning, they have almost no authority to implement their plans. True, NIPC and CATS do provide useful information, technical assistance, and regional images and serve as vehicles for metropolitanwide cooperation. But few of their planning proposals have been accepted by the various cities, counties, and special districts that they serve and by which they are governed. Indeed, as Hemmens and McBride observe about the first long range CATS-NIPC transportation plan of 1962:

Almost none of the plan’s recommendations for freeway and transit network improvements have since become part of the region’s infrastructure.

Established in 1957 with 32 commissioners reflecting regional and statewide interests, NIPC has no taxing authority and raises funds by contracting specialized planning services and through contributions of local governments in the region. In addition to CATS, NIPC’s planning activities have to be coordinated with other influential regional special districts that provide important services, such as public transportation and sewers. At the same time, the city of Chicago and several subregional planning efforts in the form of outlying counties and suburban councils of government have also developed policies for major portions of the
metropolitan area. These diverse public institutions coupled with private sector interests filtered through nonprofit organizations, such as the Metropolitan Planning Council, make regionwide consensus building very difficult but very important for almost anything implemented the area.

Major cleavages also exist along race and class lines that are reflected in the geopolitics of the region. Chicago, with its 1990 population 39.1 percent black and 19.6 percent hispanic residing in clearly defined minority neighborhoods, is perhaps one of the most segregated cities in the United States. Rivalry among the various neighborhoods for jobs, housing, and public services represents important controversies within the city, and competition between Chicago and the outlying suburbs for economic development, tax revenues, and public resources delineate major points of conflict within the region (Bennett, et al. 1987).

Thus, only the most crucial areawide problems are dealt with at the regional level, such as coping with excessive transportation congestion. For this reason, a considerable amount of cooperation was experienced by almost all parties concerned in the most recent NEPC-CATS sponsored transportation planning process (2010 TSP Plan) for necessary highway and transit improvements. Indeed, surveys undertaken in 1987 indicated that a majority of the regional population believe that transportation is the only problem that can’t be solved by localities independently.

Yet, for most issues Hemmens and McBride characterize decision making in the Chicago area as "chaos, where there is no consistency in how issues are raised or resolved." And since potentially major actors, such as a regional planning institution and the state government, are unable or unwilling to provide leadership for the Chicago area to help resolve these issues, the result is usually inaction.

While representing the oldest U.S. metropolitan area in our study, the Boston region seems to experience governance problems similar to those in much of metropolitan America. With its 1990 population of 4,172,000 over 2,429 square miles, the Boston area has over 100 cities and towns, five counties, and dozens of school and special districts.

Despite numerous attempts to create some form of metropolitan government for the Boston region since the 1880s, none has been established. Instead, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts created the first American regional special district in 1889, the Metropolitan Sewer District, and many others over the years for such activities as parks and transportation. It wasn’t until 1963 that the state established a regional planning institution for the Boston area, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC).
With the arrival of Irish Catholic immigrants starting to dominate Boston's population in the mid-nineteenth century, the old line Yankee protestant population tried to control Boston and its metropolitan area from the statehouse and eventually from local suburban government. This political cleavage continues on today with perhaps even greater intensity with the emergence of a significant minority group population in Boston (25.6 percent black and 10.8 percent hispanic in 1990) in recent decades. Thus, it is not surprising that historically regional services were provided by state dominated special districts. It is also not surprising that MAPC, the first regional planning agency for the area, was established as an extension of state government requiring representation of all local governments in the region (now 101) and state agencies and special districts, and having purely advisory planning functions. As Mark Gelfand observes about the state in his essay:

It might have imposed metropolitan government upon the region, but chose not to do so because this would have created a major rival to its own authority.

After nearly three decades, MAPC finally developed enough of a consensus to adopt its first comprehensive regional plan *Metro Plan 2000* in spring 1990. However, it remains to be seen if the plan, which calls for more focused development and efficient infrastructive provision as well as a strengthened regional planning agency, will receive the support for its implementation by local and state government.

Clearly, the San Francisco Bay Area has a regional geography and settlement pattern quite different from those in most major North American metropolitan areas. While its development is dispersed around a 100-mile-long bay, the region is focused on three major central cities—San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose—each competing for its share of political, economic, and cultural resources.

Yet, similar to many American metropolitan areas, it has a decentralized multinucleated political and physical settlement pattern. With its 1990 population of 6,253,000 over a 7,403 square mile area, it is host to 602 units of government including 100 cities, 10 counties, and hundreds of special districts.

The most comprehensive look at regional planning for the Bay Area has been undertaken by the region's council of governments, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). Created in 1961, ABAG's organization is provided by contractual agreement between member cities and counties acting under the authority of the joint Exercise of Powers Act of the state of California. Its membership
includes 92 cities and nine counties, which send representatives and dues to the organization.

Jones and Rothblatt indicate in their essay that ABAG's primary function is:

to provide a framework for dealing with regional problems on a cooperative, coordinating basis. The Association is not in itself a "government," but it is a legal agency . . . designed as a forum for the discussion of matters affecting more than one city and county.

In addition to providing information and a forum for regional concerns, ABAG has the responsibility to create a regional plan in concert with other regional institutions, especially the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). Its plan, produced in 1970 and amended in 1980, called for a "City Center Region" that would focus increased housing density development near existing urban areas and provide open space buffers between cities. However, in the absence of authority to implement these policies, ABAG's plan met with very limited success. During the 1970s and '80s, housing densities did not increase, and urban sprawl continued to consume open space and generate traffic congestion at an alarming rate. This process of metropolitan expansion was reinforced by the 1978 Proposition 13 tax change in California, which encourages inlaying local governments to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas. As a recent evaluation of ABAG's regional plan indicated (ABAG 1986, 3):

Today, what remains of open space is increasingly under development pressures. Annually, regional growth is consuming close to 7,000 acres of undeveloped land. It is only a matter of time before the remaining buffers will disappear.

Another problem facing ABAG has been the drastic cutback of its federal funding that decreased from 85 to 13 percent of its annual budget during the 1976-86 period. As a result it has expanded its activities by providing many revenue-generating services to local governments, such as group liability insurance, credit pooling, and technical training. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of ABAG's staff work on these activities in order to support the remaining staff engaged in regional planning activities. Despite the revenues from these services, ABAG does not have the staff to fully conduct the comprehensive studies and persuasive planning required for traditional regional planning and implementation.
In addition, the expanding region has become more complex and difficult to plan for.

In order to economize on its limited resources, ABAG appears to have shifted to a strategic planning approach involving identifying specific regional problems and generating realistic solutions. Jones and Rothblatt observe this about ABAG's new approach:

The current planning process (a kind of strategic planning) consists of ... activities which are both consecutive and overlapping. The planning agenda arises from reactions to acknowledged problems or crises and from deliberate attempts to anticipate problems.

Meanwhile, the automobile-oriented transportation system continues to experience mounting near-gridlock conditions, such that recent surveys have identified traffic congestion as the leading problem concerning Bay Area residents. In the absence of an enforceable regional plan, many planning activities have been undertaken by numerous public and private actors at varying scales of operation: growth limiting regulations beyond normal land-use controls have been adopted by more than half of the region's local governments; several subregional organizations of local governments and counties have attempted to limit automobile use, through such measures as transportation demand management ordinances; Bay Area-wide organizations representing the private sector, environmental groups, and other interests, such as the Bay Area Council, the Greenbelt Alliance, and Bay Vision 2020, have been generating their own long-term comprehensive regional plans; and at the state level, legislation and initiatives have been passed to help reduce air pollution and transportation congestion.

What we may be witnessing in the Bay Area appears to be a new collaboration of public and private interests to cope with urgent metropolitan problems of broad concern. This collaboration may be setting the stage for effective regional management in the future. As the Bay Area Council President Angelo Siracusa expressed (Bay Area Council 1988, 1):

Working with the Association of Bay Area Governments, the Bay Area Council formed an important new regional economic development effort aimed at the long-term health of the region's economy. Made up of the region's top leaders, from the public and private sectors, the Bay Area Economic Forum will provide a unique opportunity for the Bay Area to work towards regional consensus on public policy issues affecting our economy.
Thus, it appears that a new public-private partnership is likely to be the basis of any new regionalism in the Bay Area.

Like other American sunbelt regions, the Houston area has grown rapidly since the end of World War II especially with the rise in oil prices during the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the population in the metropolitan area had increased to 3.0 million, and Houston with 1.7 million persons became the fourth most populous city in North America in 1983. Growth has come from extensive annexation of adjacent areas as well as from migration and natural increase.

Similar to Edmonton, Houston was a newly emerging city located next to large tracts of unincorporated land when it launched its annexation drive. Employing its extraterritorial jurisdictional (ETJ) authority provided by the state legislature since 1963, Houston was able to control development beyond its boundaries and annex as much as 10 percent of its area annually. The growth of Houston through annexation has been dramatic. Houston’s land area increased from 160 square miles in 1950 to 434 square miles in 1970, and to 556 square miles in 1980. And this geographic expansion enabled Houston to capture the lion’s share of regional growth so that by 1980 Houston had a majority of the metropolitan population within its boundaries—the only central city of the 10 most populous urban regions in the U.S. to do so.

Houston’s annexation process was also greatly facilitated by utility districts created by the state legislature to provide services for suburban development of nearby unincorporated land. Since the mid 1960s, this was especially the case with the state’s creation of Municipal Utility Districts (MUDs) as they established a privatized mechanism to provide infrastructure for outlying residential and commercial development without burdening Houston with front end financing. Then, when all was developed, Houston would annex. Through annexation of these districts, Houston has been able to escape the plight experienced by other major cities surrounded by many incorporated suburban municipalities. Houston has maintained a sound tax base by annexing the fleeing middle class right back into the city.

Since the late 1960s, Houston’s population growth has been matched by increments in the built environment. From 1970 to 1985, no less than 361 large office buildings were constructed, representing 80 percent of all existing buildings by 1985. Housed in Houston’s major buildings are the white-collar staffs of the oil and gas companies and allied support companies such as law firms, accounting firms, and banks. Houston has
been called the "oil capital of the world" because of the substantial investments of oil, gas, and petrochemical companies in the area.

Houston’s growth has not occurred without conflict. Certain minority communities have suffered as a result of the growth plans of the predominantly white business elite. The initial decisions leading to destruction of minority residential communities were made by white leaders in the interest of business-oriented growth (Fisher 1990). In addition, the Houston area experienced a fiscal crisis in 1983. Houston found its expenditures rising much more rapidly than tax revenues. The crisis has been partially attributed to the oil/gas recession that hit Houston in 1982 and partially to the costs of growth. The Houston area faced possible service cutbacks, a situation brought about by the increased costs of services (and increased level of spending), and lack of planning by government officials.

However, the city was already experiencing problems by 1978. Because of the tremendous growth of population and land areas away from the inner city, Houston has been unable to maintain and upgrade the infrastructure of the inner city. In addition, when MUD’s are annexed, the city often faces substantial expenditures to provide adequate facilities to replace poorly built, or poorly maintained, facilities previously constructed.

Another important constraint has been placed on Houston’s annexation policies—a 1978 U.S. Department of Justice requirement to make its city council more representative of its minority population by shifting from an at-large to a partially district city council. This resulted in the election of some minority councilpersons who do not want their numbers further diluted by annexing predominantly white suburbs (Harrigan 1989).

The Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) is the regionwide voluntary association of local governments and local elected officials in the 13-county Houston-Galveston area (Gulf Coast Planning Region). It serves a vast area of 12,500 square miles, which contained over 3,700,000 people in 1985 (the smaller Houston PMSA has an area of 7,151 square miles and had a 1990 population of 3,711,000). H-GAC was organized in 1966 by local elected officials after authorization by state enabling legislation.

H-GAC’s mission is "to serve as the instrument of local government cooperation in promoting the region’s orderly development and the safety and welfare of its citizens" (H-GAC 1988, 4). H-GAC is the regional organization through which local governments consider regional issues and cooperate in dealing with areawide problems. In 1987, H-GAC’s
membership reached a record high of 147 local governments—all 13 county governments, 107 cities, 18 school districts, and nine soil and water conservation districts. Membership is voluntary, but all major general-purpose local governments in the region are members.

H-GAC is governed by local elected officials who are selected by, and responsible to, the local governments that are members of the council. Member local governments annually designate their representatives to H-GAC's General Assembly, which meets at least once a year. A 26-member board of directors (all locally elected officials) provides more specific guidance and policymaking through its regular monthly meetings. Member local governments pay annual dues based generally on population. These funds are supplemented by appropriations and grants from the state of Texas and contracts and grants from the federal government.

Currently, H-GAC's major activity is the establishment of a program to help local governments in their economic development efforts to diversify the regional economy. Another goal of H-GAC is to enhance the regional quality of life by helping local governments improve law enforcement, water and air quality, and transportation services. Like other COGs, H-GAC reviews grant and loan applications, determining the program's consistency with regional planning goals, and sends comments to the funding agencies.

Although H-GAC has no enforcement powers, the council does endorse or oppose federal grants to local governments, and this sometimes determines whether or not the governments will receive the grants. However, as a voluntary association of local governments, H-GAC was created to serve local governments, which retain the real decision-making power.

Indeed, Houston's political and business influence alone has had an overpowering influence on the metropolitan development. As Robert Thomas concludes about Houston's regional influence in his essay:

The activities of government during the development of the Houston metropolitan area since World War II have generally facilitated the objectives of private economic interests.

Houston has dominated urban growth decision-making.

Time will tell, however, whether or not Houston will be able to maintain its dominance over the region. With annexation becoming increasingly unattractive, the balance of population growth and political influence may yet shift to the outlying suburban areas.
In many ways the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area is like most large U.S. urban regions. With its 1990 population of 2,464,000 over 5,049 square miles embracing 272 local government units, the Twin Cities region looks as politically complex as the next American metro area. In fact, having two central cities often in competition with one another as well as with the surrounding suburbs, the political structure of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area appears to be quite dispersed, American style.

Yet, upon closer examination, the Twin Cities area is the most Canadian of our U.S. study regions. With its relatively homogeneous population from publicly oriented northern European backgrounds and small minority populations (central cities had 10.6 percent black and 2.9 percent hispanic in 1990), its citizens seemed to arrive at a regional planning consensus more easily than most American metropolitan areas. Indeed, it is widely believed that it was this consensus-building characteristic that enabled the state of Minnesota to establish what is perhaps the most successful experiment in metropolitan governance in the United States—the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities.

Prompted by metropolitan area initiative, the council was created by the Minnesota legislature in 1967, replacing a largely ineffective advisory regional planning commission called the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The Metropolitan Council’s mission is to coordinate the planning and development of the Twin Cities area—a responsibility that has expanded over the years to include not just physical development and transportation issues but social programs, such as subsidized housing. However, the council is not truly a level of general government. The state legislature establishes the council’s taxing power and responsibilities that usually are limited to functions that cannot be performed by city and county governments. In fact, regional services are provided by other metropolitan agencies, such as transit and waste control commissions. The council provides the regional oversight and coordination of these services.

Instead of representing local governments and special districts, as the previous Metropolitan Planning Commission had done, the governor of Minnesota appoints the members of the metropolitan council. In the beginning pairs of state senatorial districts were used for representation, but the Metropolitan Reorganization Act of 1974 redefined the districts, and now distinctive boundaries are served. The 1974 act also increased the number of council members from the original 15 to 17. Except for
the council chair who was to represent the area as a whole, each member
would represent, on a one-person/one-vote basis, a particular district.

Thus, the basic task of the council is to represent regional interests
in certain designated areas over that of the more narrow local interests.
To ensure that the council would not become the captive of local
governments was one of the major reasons why council membership was
not comprised of local government officials who might reflect only
parochial viewpoints.

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council has also made considerable
contributions toward financial equalization. Legislation in 1974 passed
the fiscal disparities law, and although the law is not directly related to
the Metropolitan Council, without it there would be great difficulty in
implementing regional land-use policies. This is because the law, by
dividing the commercial/industrial tax base among the communities in the
area, reduces the communities’ incentive to compete for such develop-
ment. Tax-base sharing requires each community to contribute 40 percent
of its commercial/industrial tax base growth since 1971 into a metropoli-
tan pool that is then redistributed according to each community’s
population and overall tax base.

Additional legislation further expanded the council’s authority to
review the metropolitan significance of major public and private projects,
which meant it could block major development proposals that conflicted
with its regional plan called the Development Guide. This authority
included local applications for federal and state assistance.

Clearly, the regional gains for the Twin Cities area have been real
and positive, and the following outcomes are directly attributable to the
Metropolitan Council (Whiting 1984):

• resolving complex regional problems,
• distributing equitably regional tax revenues and social resources, such
  as subsidized housing,
• overseeing basic metropolitan services,
• generating a comprehensive regional plan,
• preventing such costly and unneeded capital undertakings as
  excessively heavy rail transportation system,
• providing information about the region and its needs.

The council’s success can be attributed to its broad role
maker rather than being caught up in the details of a serv
Also, with state-backed revenue and taxing authority, it ;
on the uncertainties and political pressures of voluntar
membership. In addition, many of the council’s po
digestible in that they were awarded incrementally by the state legislature over a number of years.

Yet, the council has had its limitations. It was sometimes bypassed in the making of important facility decisions, such as the location of a domed stadium, shopping mall, and trade centers (Whiting 1984); and its development policies have not stopped the continued decentralization of the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Indeed, as Judith Martin points out in her essay:

The council's authority extends only to the seven-county metropolitan area, but development pressures have expanded well beyond this point. . . . There is little or nothing that even the most sophisticated policy can do to control growth beyond the region's boundaries. So the Metropolitan Council has to live with the frustrating knowledge that the effective metropolitan area has outgrown its reaches, and that it is not at all likely that its own range of authority will be extended.

Nor has the council resolved serious problems in the Twin Cities region that exist elsewhere, such as suburban gridlock, increasing poverty and social tensions in the central cities, and central city-suburban competition. Thus, it is still an open question as to how well the council will handle the emerging increasingly diverse and less manageable metropolitan problems of the 21st century.

CONCLUSIONS

As the preceding summary indicates, a diverse pattern of metropolitan governance emerges in both countries reflecting the wide spectrum of regional and cultural qualities of these continental scale societies. However, the relative political dominance of the provincial government in local policymaking under the Canadian federal system (L'Heureux 1985) has caused more robust metropolitan governmental and planning institutions to be established in Canada than in the United States. And it seems likely that the importance of provincial authority and influence that has developed in the Canadian federation since World War II will continue, if not increase, because of proposed constitutional reforms in the foreseeable future (Smiley 1987, 1989; Fraser 1992).

At one extreme, the Chicago region with over 1,200 units of competing local government and no formal centralized metropolitan government with authority seems virtually unmanageable. Yet, Hemmens and McBride found that coalitions can be formed incrementally to build
a consensus to deal with a critical problem, such as traffic congestion, and apparently enough adjustments are made to the system so that the region continues to function and grow.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have Canadian urban areas, such as metropolitan Toronto possessing one provincial office for the greater region, five two-tiered governments, and only 30 local municipalities. And while each province has some form of municipal fiscal equalization, Frisken and Trepanier found in Toronto and Montreal that there is increasing competition among Canadian local governments for economic development, population, provincial funds, and infrastructure despite the presence of metropolitan government.

How then can we explain these differences and similarities we’ve encountered? Are they the result of factors Andrew Sancton in his introductory essay hypothesized about the differences between the two countries: national and/or regional social, economic and cultural characteristics; and contrasting conscious public policies shaping urban development? Or are our findings due to global social and economic forces?

While more similar to one another than most western democracies (Birch 1986), it seems clear that there are significant longstanding differences in political culture between Canada and the United States. As Lipset (1990, 225) observed in his comparative study of values and institutions in both countries:

The United States and Canada remain two nations formed around sharply different organizing principles. Their basic myths vary considerably, and national ethoses and structures are determined in large part by such images. One nation’s institutions reflect the effort to apply universalistic principles emphasizing competitive individualism and egalitarianism, while the other’s are an outgrowth of a particularistic compact to preserve linguistic and provincial cultures and rights and elitism. Ironically, . . . the conservative effort has stimulated an emphasis on group rights and benefits for the less privileged; the liberal one continues to stress more concern for the individual but exhibits less interest in those who are poor and outcast.

No doubt some of these differences have influenced policymaking for, and the character of, metropolitan areas in both countries. As Goldberg and Mercer (1986) argue, the high degree of American metropolitan political fragmentation reflects the more individualistic market orientation of the American political ethos and makes centralized
metropolitan planning and management more difficult in the United States than in Canada where there is a greater value placed on collective and government action. In addition, it's suggested that the greater racial homogeneity and tolerance of cultural diversity and the more supportive safety net of social and economic assistance for the disadvantaged in Canada has made its central cities safer and more livable for traditional families than those in the United States (Feldman and Goldberg 1987). Indeed, Canadian central cities have been shown to be more fiscally and economically viable (with provincial support), and have more compact development and better infrastructure, such as transit facilities, than their American counterparts (Goldberg and Mercer 1986; Artibise 1988).

Yet, while the general tendency of American fragmentation of local government is corroborated by our study (see Table 10.2), and that such fragmentation is nationally on the rise (see Table 10.3), there are striking variations. For examples, the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, which was found to be the most fragmented U.S. region (in terms of local governments per million population), has the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council—the most "Canadian-like" centralized metropolitan governance system of our American study areas; and on the Canadian side, Montreal, which was found to be the most fragmented of the Canadian regions, has the Montreal Urban Community—a well-established metropolitan government, which, by American standards, is quite strong.

And as cited earlier, despite fewer units of local government to coordinate and the centralizing authority of metropolitan government, Canadian central city-suburban conflicts over development and public resources have been increasing in recent decades. This is the case because during the past 20 years the bulk of metropolitan development and population growth has occurred in the outlying suburban areas, often beyond the boundaries of metropolitan governments—boundaries that provincial governments have been reluctant to extend because of concerns over the potential political influence of expanding metropolitan governments. In some ways, the central-city suburban competition could become more pronounced in Canada since the fewer governmental units are more populous and potentially more influential than those in the U.S. and some, like the regional municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, may become more politically formidable than their smaller-sized American counterparts. And despite strong provincial resistance, Canadian local governments appear to be increasing their pressure for more autonomy and resources (L'Heureux 1985; Woodside 1990).
### Table 10.2. Sample Canadian and United States Metropolitan Area Characteristics: 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>1990 Pop. (Thous.)</th>
<th>Area (Sq. Miles)</th>
<th>Pop. Density (Pop./Sq. Mile)</th>
<th>Local Govt. (Municipal. &amp; Counties)</th>
<th>Govt. Density (L.Govt./Mpop)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada (estimated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>3,068</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>2,298</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>8,066</td>
<td>5,660</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>4,172</td>
<td>2,429</td>
<td>1,718</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>6,253</td>
<td>7,403</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>7,151</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>5,049</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>4,933</td>
<td>5,538</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include school and special districts, and regional municipalities.

bTen county U.S. Census definition of the Bay Area.


At the same time, the fragmented, highly decentralized pattern of American metropolitan policymaking and physical development has come under increasing U.S. criticism as its heavy automobile dependency has been causing near gridlock congestion with a corresponding decline in environmental quality. As a result, a spate of subregional, regional, and statewide growth management efforts have emerged throughout much of the urbanized United States. Our own Chicago and San Francisco case
Table 10.3.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Units In Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>1977 No.</th>
<th>1977 Per Metro Area</th>
<th>1987 No.</th>
<th>1987 Per Metro Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13,259</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Districts</td>
<td>9,580</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12,690</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Districts</td>
<td>5,220</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5,975</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,869</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>31,924</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Studies revealed the emergence of multijurisdictional subregional planning institutions to manage urban growth. In fact, during the 1970-90 period, no fewer than 14 states have adopted some form of growth management policies involving the improvement of transportation, environmental quality, and/or land development, at the local, regional, and state levels of government (DeGrove 1989; Chinitz 1990; Turner 1990).

With regard to social diversity, it does appear that Canada’s relative social homogeneity has made collective action including spatial redistribution policies for such services as social housing more feasible in its central cities. Indeed, the only American study area with any metropolitan governmental success—the Minneapolis-St. Paul area—had the most homogeneous population of our U.S. study regions, during the 1960s when major innovations in its metropolitan governance system occurred.

Although Canada has long had a culturally diverse population regionally (Fallis 1990), it has become more racially and culturally diverse within regions, as recent immigration patterns have settled increasing numbers of newcomers from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America (Lipset 1990). Much of this settlement has occurred in Canada’s major urban areas so that by 1986 substantial portions of the metropolitan populations were foreign born: Toronto 36.3 percent; Montreal 15.9 percent; Vancouver 28.8 percent; and Edmonton 18.4 percent (Malcolm
1990). As a consequence of this increasing diversity, groups have emerged to represent Canada’s newest immigrants generating a new level of political divisiveness and social backlash in major urban areas (Lipset 1990; Malcolm 1990) and a recent study of all of Canada’s CMAs reveal a "deepening residential segregation as measured by declared ethnic origin and by income" (Bourne 1989, 325). Thus, while neighborhood activism has been vigorous in Canadian cities, such as community involvement with housing, urban renewal, and highway projects in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver during the urban reform movement in the 1960s and early 1970s-(Harris 1987; Leveillee and Leonard 1987; Caulfield 1988), this recent community action process appears to be more pronounced along racial and ethnic lines than in the past.

A strong indication of this growing Canadian urban divisiveness was the May 1992 rampaging of downtown Toronto by demonstrators protesting the fatal shooting of a black man by a white Metro Toronto police officer and the treatment of blacks in the Canadian justice system (Abbate 1992). In addition, serious confrontations have been developing between native Canadian groups and public authorities over land and water rights. In a recent outbreak involving armed Mohawk Indians near Montreal, a Quebec police officer was killed and a major bridge was blocked for several weeks. One observer reported that "some Indian leaders have compared the resort to armed defiance in Quebec to the rioting that swept black ghettos of America in the 1960s" (Burns 1990).

And while in the United States there is some evidence of a slight lessening of residential segregation in certain western metro areas, such as the San Francisco region (Miller and Quigly 1990), substantial inequalities persist in most American urban areas (Beauregard 1990). The Fainsteins (1989) argue that despite the emergence of black political leadership in many of the largest U.S. cities, the American black community is just as segregated as before and has actually lost economic ground with respect to the white population during the 1970s and '80s. Indeed, Wilson (1989), Downs (1991), and Galster (1991) suggest that, in the absence of appropriate programs to assist the most disadvantaged, the poverty in black ghettos could be perpetuated indefinitely in American central cities. Unfortunately, it took the recent riots, protesting the plight of disadvantaged minorities in Los Angeles and other American cities and resulting in dozens of deaths and over a billion dollars in property damage, to generate a renewed national interest in the problems of the central city poor in the form of new federal urban aid legislation (Krauss 1992) and an important 1992 electoral issue (Roberts 1992).
When we examine the policymaking process, it seems clear that provincial government has substantially moderated its support for metropolitan government. In each of our Canadian case studies, the provincial government has either not supported metropolitan government to the extent that its territorial authority kept pace with regional development, or, in the case of Vancouver, actually rescinded authority. Such constraints on metropolitanism placed by a senior level of government (the province or state) is similar to the long-standing plight of U.S. regional institutions (Wright 1988) and documented by Hemmens and McBride, Gelfand, and Martin in our Chicago, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul case studies. This shifting of provincial roles has transformed each province into, as Trepanier stated, "a facilitator rather than simply a mandator," clearly reflecting the growing development and political influence of outlying suburban communities. Apart from changes in the Canadian political value system that might divert resources away from central cities as Friskens (1986) fears, the sheer weight of the growing suburban influence would divert provincial resources to outlying areas.

But some of Friskens’s fears may be well founded. It does appear that in addition to growing suburban influence, there has been a rapid shift favoring the market mechanism in Canadian political values. The 1984 election of the Progressive Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney and the passage of the free trade agreement with the United States in 1988 are symptomatic of the Canadian movement toward Anglo-American political conservatism and the increasing market orientation of Canadian political values (Cooper, et al. 1988; Cannon 1989). In addition, the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 that encourages constitutional litigation about individual rights similar to that found in the United States. While rapid change on the part of the Canadian judiciary in land-use matters is not yet evident (Feldman and Goldberg 1987), in the long run judicial changes are likely to make "Canada a more individualistic and litigious culture" (Lipset 1990, 225).

Thus, our Canadian cases demonstrated that during the past decade provincial governments have been less willing to intervene in the political market place of their urban areas. However, it seems likely that provincial governments will not relinquish their potential authority to initiate strong metropolitan guidance, and will not completely abandon policies assisting the central city, such as municipal fiscal equalization and social services, since such policies clearly reflect the long-standing social equity values deeply ingrained in Canada’s political culture. For
example, recent policies within urban regions, such as Toronto and Vancouver, clearly demonstrate the ongoing Canadian commitment to strengthen the central city and limit suburban sprawl (Artibise 1988; Bourne 1992).

Of course, business and other interests have long urged provincial and municipal governments to encourage investment in the major economic centers—the central cities (Dyck 1986; Leveillee and Leonard 1987; Leo and Felton 1990). But as industrial and commercial activity began to decentralize (following residential development), the influence pattern has clearly been altered and directed more toward servicing outlying shopping centers, industrial parks, and office centers. Yet, with the possible exception of Montreal, there is little evidence in our Canadian case studies of private or nonprofit interests being directly incorporated into the broad regional planning process, that is, beyond lobbying as narrow special interest groups.

In contrast, in the United States there appears to be a growing tendency for public and private interests to collaborate on solving pressing metropolitan problems of great mutual concern (Weaver and Dennert 1987). In what may be a new form of American regional corporatism, the major private sector organizations appear to have become "public-like"—behaving more like public institutions than private firms with a telescopic lengthening of their time horizons and broadening of their views about regional development and the public good. For examples, the organizations representing major business interests, such as the Bay Area Council and the Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group in the San Francisco Area and the Metropolitan Planning Council in the Chicago region are heavily involved in metropolitan planning activities. A similar pattern has emerged among nonprofit environmental groups in the Bay Area in the form of the Greenbelt Alliance, which has joined with business interests to create a development strategy for the entire region, Bay Vision 2020 (1991).

At the same time, some of the American public regional institutions, such as ABAG in the San Francisco region and NIPC in the Chicago area, are marketing extensive services to communities while retreating from the idealistic, but ineffectual, long-term comprehensive approach for a more practical strategic planning process with shared local-regional responsibilities. Accordingly, these public institutions seem to have become "privatized"—behaving more like private firms than public institutions.
While these two sets of U.S. organizations are unlikely to become identical because of the differences in accountability between public and private entities, a substantial convergence of their views and methods is clearly underway. A question remains, however, whether this new public-private collaboration is a coalition created solely for the purpose of short-term crisis management in the absence of a viable metropolitan guidance system, or truly the beginning of a new institutional arrangement designed for conducting effective long-term regional planning.

As mentioned earlier, over a dozen American states have adopted growth management laws designed to rationalize land use, infrastructure provision, and protect the environment. Some of these policies, such as those in Oregon and Florida, have established new metropolitan planning institutions with local planning review responsibilities (DeGroove 1989; Bollens 1992). Although the full powers of these new regional institutions will be tested eventually in the courts, an American movement toward effective metropolitan guidance systems is clearly underway.

When we consider global social and economic forces impinging on the urban systems of advanced democracies during the past two decades, one overall pattern clearly emerges: decentralization of people and jobs (Hall 1990). Clearly, every metropolitan area we examined in our study in both Canada and the United States exhibited substantial decentralization of population, economic activity, and political influence to outlying areas. Even the urban regions having the most advanced forms of metropolitan governance, such as those in the Toronto and Minneapolis-St. Paul regions, were unable to contain and control this rapidly expanding growth. Indeed, studies of recent development of major urban areas throughout Canada, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have clearly documented this decentralization pattern (Cherry 1984; Blumenfeld 1986; Bourne 1989; Garreau 1991; Zheng 1991; Maser 1992).

Many researchers of urban systems in the industrialized world agree that some form of evolutionary process may be at work (Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Dwyer 1987; Hall 1990; Alonso 1991). The theories suggest that the initial stages of development occur around a few favored growing areas that attract great concentrations of investment, population, and resources in order to create economies of agglomeration necessary for improved efficiency in the production, distribution, and consumption of desired goods and services.

As shown in Table 10.4, a model of metropolitan development emerges with the first stage representing "concentration," which involves
Table 10.4. A Model of Metropolitan Development Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>RING</td>
<td>METROPOLITAN AREA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Absolute Centralization</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relative Centralization</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Relative Decentralization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Absolute Decentralization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


the "polarization effects"—the growth of large urban centers that dominate and drain the hinterlands of people, resources, and capital. Gradually, "trickling down effects" result from diseconomies of scale in large urban areas (e.g., traffic congestion, overcrowding, high land costs, pollution) and new investment opportunities in other regions, and government policies to redirect economic growth away from heavily developed areas overtake the "polarization effects" and a process of decentralization sets in. At first, decentralization will manifest itself with the growth and subsequent dominance of suburban rings, then with the decline of the central cities, and finally with population and economic dispersal away from the older or larger metropolitan areas to new growth poles in smaller urban regions and to outlying, less-developed areas.

According to this model, the United States is functioning around Type 5, Absolute Decentralization, and Canada is moving toward Type 4, Relative Decentralization. However, because the global economy is becoming more competitive and open, the metropolitan decentralization process may be accelerating. That is, as our urban markets expand and become more competitive, firms in these markets must not only become more efficient themselves, but also must function in a well-managed and supportive metropolitan environment. Thus, the slightest diseconomies
in an urban region, such as increased traffic congestion and housing prices, begin to induce firms to move to less costly areas. In the advanced societies, the breadth of location and high quality of infrastructure can accommodate this decentralization while the reverse is true for the less developed countries or regions.

Some observers, like Bish and Nourse (1975), Chisholm (1989), and Parks and Oakerson (1989), argue that such a decentralized system of public service provision is more adaptive to rapidly changing conditions, and often more efficient in terms of local consumer satisfaction, than a centralized hierarchical pattern of urban development and authority. In fact, Peter Gordon and his colleagues (1989) found that this decentralization process has generated polycentric metropolitan structures that have enabled the largest urban areas in the United States to grow significantly in recent decades while actually shortening the average commuting times.

This process of metropolitan decentralization is likely to continue, not only because of global economic forces of dispersion and deconcentration, but also because of the emergence of what Manuel Castells (1990) calls the "Informational City"—the spreading out and restructuring of urban activities in space due to our increasing capacity of substituting communication of information for transportation of goods and people. In addition, this pressure for decentralization is being reinforced further by the large numbers of baby boomers who are still entering the low-density single family housing market (Dowall 1984; Moore 1991). Such housing preferences are often related to a desire for living outside the large central cities, in smaller communities where it is easier to control socially sensitive public services, such as schools and police (Rothblatt 1982; Oakerson 1989; Hughes 1991).

Finally, a competitive spirit also exists among the local governments vying to capture revenue enhancing commercial and industrial activities. In the absence of a metropolitanwide taxsharing mechanism, in the United States (excepting the Twin Cities area), and in the presence of a partial fiscal municipal equalization in Canada, it is difficult to convince many communities to forgo the potential revenues from commercial and industrial activity and accept the much needed, but less tax rewarding, residential development (Kitchen and McMillan 1985; Rothblatt and Garr 1986). Consequently, there is a tendency for in-lying local governments to try to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas (Dowall 1984).
In the face of these overwhelming forces of metropolitan decentralization, most of which are related to long-term global social, economic, and technological factors, much of the metropolitan development pattern may be beyond the control of regional or even national public policy. It therefore seems likely that settlement patterns of major metropolitan regions of advanced economies will become more similar as they continue to decentralize in a multinucleated fashion.

Yet, there are some policy choices available that can help to rationalize what appears to be the inevitable continuation of metropolitan decentralization. First, for each metropolitan area, there needs to be some overarching flexible institutional arrangement with the capacity to build a consensus for a comprehensive long-term shared image of where the region is, and where it should be going. This would require strong incentives for the broad participation of, and power sharing among, all interested public, private, and nonprofit organizations within the region. Second, it would be essential to involve the participation of the next higher level of government (province or state) so as to provide appropriate devolution of power, coordination, and administrative processes for dealing with the eventual expansion of development beyond the initial geographic boundaries of the regional institution. Third, this institutional arrangement should also have appropriate authority, resources, and incentives to help implement regionally approved policies. In addition to a council/commission decision process, this would need some built in procedure for dispute resolution leading to binding agreements, such as mediation and arbitration. Finally, it will be important to have some mechanism for metropolitanwide property tax and general revenue sharing so as to minimize interjurisdictional competition and public service inequities that can distort development patterns and undercut regional consensus building.

Clearly, the province or state has the ability to devolve the appropriate authority to a metropolitan institution and modify local government tax policies. Our study has shown that, while the Canadian metropolitan management system is far more developed along these lines than the United States, Canadian metropolitan areas are becoming institutionally out-stripped by the decentralization process, both in regional planning authority and in tax equalization policies (Frisken 1986). Consequently, Canadian provincial government may be moving toward more flexible regional planning institutions, with the ability to mediate between increasingly diverse communities and interests in expanding metropolitan areas,
such as Ontario’s Office of the Greater Toronto Area established in 1988 to foster regional cooperation in the GTA.

At the same time, there is a movement to structure the highly decentralized American settlement and authority pattern at the state or substate level with urban growth management policies. Recent efforts in the United States have already tried to centralize metropolitan policymaking, such as the 1985 Florida Growth Management Act requiring infrastructure provision (often with regional implications) concurrent with new local development, and compact urban expansion; and the 1990 measure (Proposition 111) passed in California requiring metropolitan congestion management plans from local communities in order for them to be eligible for state funding (DeGrove 1989; Fulton 1990; Bollens 1992).

In sum, it appears that the character of metropolitan development and each country’s institutional response to it are converging. The trends we have observed do not represent the "Americanization" of Canadian urban public policy or the "Canadianization" of U.S. metropolitan planning, but rather the globalization of urban development and corresponding governmental adaptation.

To be sure, some differences exist between urban areas in both countries related to national character and conscious public policies as we hypothesized. For example, it appears that Canada has been better able to nurture more economically viable, safer, and livable central cities than the U.S. Yet, another Canadian-U.S. comparative study by Feldman and Goldberg (1987, 277) determined that:

At the macroscopic level the systemic contrasts are as real as they are apparent. . . . Yet, microscopically, the powerful explanations gag at their foundations: Boston is more planned, controlled, even "governed" than Montreal. . . . And even with metropolitan government, Toronto is no more successful containing the urban fringe than officials in Oregon trying to preserve the Willamette Valley. The conventional wisdom comparing Canada and the United States, in light of findings here, needs long and hard rethinking.

Thus, while Lipset concludes that "Canadians and Americans will never be alike" (1990, 227), our study suggests that in the long-run the development and governance of their metropolitan areas may be.
REFERENCES


Summary and Conclusions


Summary and Conclusions

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