associated, first, with industrialization, and more recently with service industries, result in the need for more government involvement in providing services and passing new laws. More laws and more oversight require full-time professionals aided by assistants and leave little time for supplemental occupations to put food on the table. The most professional of legislatures, by most studies, are in the states that have urban and complex economies, such as California, New York, Michigan, and Massachusetts. Only states at the periphery of our national economy have the luxury of amateur legislatures, most notably many southern states.

We are uncertain as to what claims might be made for representation by those reformers who would seek to professionalize all state legislatures. What seems to be desired is more thoughtful and forward looking legislation. But states with professional legislatures, if they parallel Congress, may lose competitiveness and turnout of voters. This is true, of course, only if these trends in Congress are indeed derived from professionalization. Turnout is slightly lower in more professional states. Reelection victories are slightly more likely, but since so many incumbents win reelection even prior to professionalization, there is little room for an increase. Southern states have both low turnout and overwhelming incumbency advantage, but are unprofessionalized. Were they included in this analysis, the relationships would change substantially.

Using more recent incumbent victory data from 14 states (Jewell and Breaux 1988) and recent estimations of the professionalism of the state legislatures (Knight 1988) confirm the relationships. In 1984 the slope of incumbents winning increases to .22 and the correlation to .45. But interestingly, the winning margin of the victor declines in more professional legislatures (slope = -.49 and r = -.34), suggesting that there is no single dimension of competition that would include both percentage of incumbents winning and victor's margin of the vote.

**Turnover**

The failure of experienced legislators to return for another session, called turnover, is declining and is more common among less professional and southern states (Rosenthal 1974; Shin and Jackson 1979; Calvert 1979; Jewell 1982; Niemi and Winsky 1987; Squire 1992). In the past, many lawyers sought to become legislators for a brief period to help establish their practice. Now they can advertise, and serving in the legislature, especially a professional legislature, has become time-
The number of lawyers among state legislators is sharply down over recent years, from 22 percent in 1976 to 16 percent in 1986, especially in southern and middle Atlantic states (National Conference of State Legislatures 1986). Fewer lawyers serving briefly may account for some of the decreasing turnover. Also, the improved salaries associated with professional legislatures may increase willingness to make a career of being a state legislator.

Turnover fails to distinguish between whether incumbents lose or choose not to run. But in Congress, declining turnover is caused by a high percentage of incumbents winning reelection, suggesting one of two conclusions. Either representatives are doing a better job or electoral challenge, for whatever reason, is declining, potentially resulting in less responsiveness. Congressional election research suggests many origins for declining electoral challenge. Recent research in 14 states shows little trend over the period 1968 to 1986 in incumbents running for reelection or winning despite the clear evidence of decreased turnover noted above. Jewell and Breaux (1988) suggest that data prior to 1968 may be needed. Another explanation for this seeming contradiction is that, while all or most districts in the past experienced occasional retirement and incumbent defeats, more recently a few districts have experienced this repeatedly.

Microrepresentation

Certainly few would take exception to a study of whether a legislator reflects his or her constituents, or at least the majority of constituents' views, on a policy before voting for or against that policy. In the terminology of the day this is dyadic policy representation (Weissberg 1979; Eulau and Karp 1977). We would call this microrepresentation.

At the other extreme is representation largely as it has been discussed thus far in this chapter; what we would call macrorepresentation. The focus in macrorepresentation is on whether the entire legislature represents the entire public. While macrorepresentation may or may not be enough to satisfy democracy, it is probably the lack of data at the individual or dyadic level that most drives us to consider the macro or collective level. In such considerations, assumptions and available data are combined to make probably true assertions. Lawyers are noted to be numerous, and given the assumption that they have values distinct from nonlawyers, at the macro level we might conclude that the public is misrepresented. Some representatives are found to represent 500,000 people and others only 10,000. Again, we might conclude that the latter
representatives have an easier time representing their small number of constituents.

Unfortunately, many scholars of representation, and certainly most politicians and laymen, have little patience with the accumulation of our knowledge at the micro level. Sufficient opportunities to conduct and to complete studies probably would allow us to say what difference it would make in terms of microrepresentation whether a legislative house numbered 150 or three times that many. But the conviction that 1,500 representatives would yield better representation than 150 is probably correct, despite limited or even nonexistent confirmation. However, we should be cautious in our dependence on macrorepresentation studies (Hurley 1982).

We now turn to the state of our knowledge of microrepresentation-based studies. We will distinguish between research that largely is the result of research on Congress, which increasingly seems to be an institution that does not lend itself to generalization to other legislative bodies, such as state legislatures, and certainly not to city councils and school boards. Then we will consider research arising independently from the study of state legislatures, frequently the result of comparative analysis of multiple, if not all 50, states. Even the comparative study of Congress versus the parliaments of other developed democracies founders on the shoals of political party organization in such parliaments (Ragsdale 1983; Jewell 1982).

Ambition

Legislators' belief that their reelection chances hinge on how well they represent constituents' opinions will have little influence if the officeholders do not care to be reelected. Schlesinger has described the positive functions of political ambition, noting that "no more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political futures" (1966, 2). Politicians at the top of the political ladder usually try to continue in office for as long as possible. For example, presidents normally want to stay in office for their constitutionally allowed two terms. While a slight majority of states constitutionally restrict their governor to either a single four-year term or to two such terms, 58 percent of incumbent governors seek reelection (Jewell and Olson 1982, 213). However, this pattern is declining (Byle 1986).

Ambition for continuation is quite high in Congress. For example, of the 33 senators up for reelection in 1990, only three (9 percent) did not
seek reelection. The same year, only 23 (5 percent) of the 435 U.S. House members voluntarily retired from public life. Both of these seem fairly typical of recent elections (Hinckley 1986). Similar interest in seeking reelection is evident in state legislatures, as 78 percent of senators and 84 percent of lower house legislators in 14 states sought reelection in 1986 (Jewell and Breaux 1988). At least for state and national elective offices, those who hold these offices are ambitious to retain them.

One study of the San Francisco Bay area of California (Prewitt 1970), however, suggested that few city council members seek to remain in office. But voluntary retirement in California seems abnormal as a national report finds that 72 percent of incumbent city council members seek reelection (Karnig and Walter 1977). More recently, Luttbeg (1986) has found that 74 percent of Texas city council members and 68 percent of school board members have sought reelection. Our conclusion that incumbents are anxious to be reelected holds true even for lower-level offices in the United States. With the ambition seems to come the advantage for the incumbent, as Luttbeg (1986) finds that 84 percent of the city council incumbents and 79 percent of those on school boards win.

Turnover or retirement from the legislative body is seen both as desirable and undesirable. Observers of Congress often complain that the institution is handicapped by the presence of too many old men who refuse to give up their seats. Students of state legislatures offer the opposite complaint: that frequent retirements (often to seek higher office as well as to go back home) produce a depletion of experienced personnel. Our chief concern that the retiring legislator may be relatively indifferent to public opinion remains. Additionally, lower turnover may be associated with the lack of competition.

**Incumbency Advantage**

No doubt the most important finding from congressional research is that of the advantage increasingly enjoyed by the incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives in seeking reelection, perhaps too imprecisely described as the "vanishing marginals" (Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974; Cranor and Westphal 1978). Congressional research has focused on the importance of what Fiorina (1977) calls "bureaucratic unsticking services" that can be provided by members of Congress to encourage constituent support in elections (Mayhew 1974 initially suggested this). Yiannakis (1981), Fiorina (1981), Jacobson (1981), and

How Legislators See Their Roles

Several researchers have explored the various aspects of how legislators see their roles (e.g., Wahlke et al. 1962). But here we consider only how legislators see their role vis-à-vis their constituencies (representational roles). Three are identified, including the "trustee," a legislator who "sees himself as a free agent that as a premise of his decision-making behavior, claims to follow what he considers to be right or just, his convictions and principles, the dictates of his conscience" (Wahlke et al. 272). Moreover, the trustee is fully confident that his constituency expects him to behave in just that manner. The opposite conclusion from that of the trustee is held by the "delegate" who feels the opinions of constituents should be enacted even if they are contrary to his own. Finally, because the researchers found many representatives who claimed they needed to play delegate on some controversial issues while they could be trustees on others, a conditional or mixed role was defined, which they call the "politico."

Most legislators call themselves "trustees" (Wahlke et al. 1962; Jewell and Patterson 1986; Kuklinski and McCrone 1981; Friesema and Hedlund 1981). Thus delegates, who seem most likely to respond to constituent preferences, are in the minority in most legislatures. To be sure, many legislators would find it humiliating to admit to being merely the voice of others.
The sorting of legislators on the basis of their legislative roles is a significant enterprise only if their self-designated roles shape or affect their actual behavior. Theoretically, delegates should be more responsive to constituents' interests than trustees. Surprisingly, early studies suggested that this was often not the case. In a study of the Iowa legislature, Friesema and Hedlund (1981), for example, found that the roll call voting of delegates in proposing four constitutional amendments corresponded with the majority of their district's later vote on those amendments only 61 percent of the time. The correspondence for politicos was 72 percent and that for the seemingly unresponsive trustees was 76 percent. This also seems to hold outside of Iowa. Furthermore,

... the delegates, who verbally express a commitment to voting their districts' wishes, are less likely to vote the way they believe their constituents will vote than are the trustees who express a legitimacy and willingness to vote on the basis of criteria other than their constituents' wishes (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975).

A study in California gives further insight into this seemingly counter-intuitive finding. As California has frequent referendums and initiative votes, it is possible to divide legislative districts into those providing a consistent cue to the legislator by clearly voicing a liberal or a conservative response across these public votes and those that were less consistent in that on occasion they cast liberal votes and at other times conservative votes. Delegates achieve great consistency when they can get consistent cues from their constituents (Kuklinski and McCrone 1981).

Few representatives enjoy the information on their constituents provided by the frequent initiative votes in California. One might speculate that the franking privilege of Congress may allow constituent opinion polls, but there is great danger in using survey research to assess public opinion that nonopinion may obscure true public opinion. The votes on initiatives may thus be more accurate indications of public opinion. Lacking a source to learn constituent opinion, legislators elsewhere may, if motivated to be a delegate, prove worse at reflecting public opinion than the trustee.

A Comparative Study of Representation

Ragsdale suggests three features of legislative elections that bear on electoral responsiveness: (1) collective choice; (2) the extent of competi-
tive change or the opportunity voters have to change the composition of the legislatures; and (3) the patterns of voter preferences (i.e., the match between the campaign efforts and voter attitudes). Quoting Rose:

... many studies of voting terminate with statements about the preferences of individual voters. [but] the most important political phenomena are not individual choices, but the aggregate distribution of seat in the [legislature], affecting control of executive government, (1974, 8).

Ragsdale notes that the swing ratio (Tufte 1973) varies greatly in state legislatures (in New Jersey, one percent change in votes yields a 3.7 percent change in seats; in Michigan, 2.1; in New York, 1.3) (Tufte 1973, 350). Comparable ratios for the U. S. House of Representatives are 2.5; 3.0 for the U.S. Senate, (Dahl 1956); 2.8 for the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and 1.9 overall for the U. S. (Tufte). Ragsdale states further that "The size of the swing ratio also indicates the potential for turnover in the legislature. The smaller the swing ratio, the less responsive the partisan distribution of seats is to voter preferences, the less frequently turnover of a seat will occur" (1983, 350). Turnover varies greatly: in the U. S. (17 percent), Italy (18 percent), Britain (19 percent), Ireland (23 percent), the French Fifth Republic (36 percent), and Germany (25-30 percent) (Ragsdale, 351). Incumbents scare away challengers, or at least incumbency advantage holds across national boundaries, she notes. Incumbents win 90 percent of the time in Italy; 90 percent in Great Britain; and 87 percent in Ireland (Ragsdale 1983, 354). She also finds that the economy affects the electoral fortunes of the incumbents and in turn the competition among the parties (Ragsdale 1983, 367). Elections laws are of lesser importance. "The policies adopted, the activities of the members, and the institutional arrangements established proceed independent of the (legislative) election results." "Are elections rituals?" Ragsdale questions (1983, 370). She urges comparative legislative research to provide answers.

Conclusion

There has been no thorough study of how the process of representation works even in a single state. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of the process are evident. Studies of voting behavior, even those for other elective offices such as the president and Congress, show little close monitoring of the policymaking behavior of their representatives by constituents. While it is certainly atypical, some incumbents lose and
sometimes the majority party's candidate is defeated. Probably, more than anything else this "random terror" or "subjective anxiety," as Weissberg (1981) calls it, best accounts for the abiding concern of representatives with their reelection despite the evidence that incumbents almost always win. This being the case, we are likely to learn more studying the representatives than by studying the represented or public opinion. Two major efforts to gain insight into the world of the states' legislative representatives using in-depth interviewing suggest where and how we might go about such research (Rosenthal 1981; Jewell 1982).

The potential for a career on a small city council or in the U.S. House of Representatives differs greatly. City councils that offer little policymaking or income might well be expected to have more volunteers, with a resulting change in the representative process. The single-minded interest in gaining reelection and a long career noted both in congressional studies (Mayhew 1974) and in state legislatures (Rosenthal 1981; Jewell 1982) may be the result of a dynamic process in which power and salary attract the attention of a different type of candidate. This might be especially the case when the state legislature is professionalized. No doubt ambition is fundamental to the behavior of many state legislators and most members of Congress (Schlesinger 1966).

Incumbency advantage in seeking reelection seems likely to be undemocratic. Why should an incumbent assured of reelection fear the electoral consequences of being unresponsive to public opinion? Incumbency advantage, however, may be self-fulfilling as quality challengers may be discouraged from taking on the incumbent, especially one with extensive campaign funds. Interest groups, too, face the certainty of reelection of the incumbent with some ambivalence, especially legislators who are unsympathetic to their interests. Should they seek to unseat them and risk further alienating the incumbents, should the challengers fail; or should they bow to the inevitable and contribute to the unsympathetic incumbents? The heavy political action committee (PAC) contributions to incumbents all but assures that incumbents will be reelected.

It may be that incumbents learn a skill in presenting themselves favorably to constituents, or at least to those that matter. This, too, may insulate the incumbent. Finally, unless voters recall some very unfavorable aspect of the incumbent’s term, they will judge that the incumbent should be returned (Hinckley 1981).

Competition, not surprisingly, is still thought by both political scientists and apparently legislators as a driving force to assure represen-
tation. But it is not clear what is important about competition. Turnover, voluntary retirement by the incumbents, defeat of incumbents, closeness of both primary and general elections, and even institutional factors are nearly always used interchangeably in defining competition (Jewell 1982, 23-36). Certainly, it would seem imperative to research the relationship between competition and incumbency advantage, and, to distinguish, at least as a starting point, between the unresponsive incumbent who is mindful that the electorate is unlikely to bother to throw him or her out and the responsive incumbent who satisfies his or her constituents and thus wins repeated reelection.

Every legislature probably has several legislators who see urgent problems facing their state, if not their district, and strive to pass legislation to meet those problems. Some 17 states currently have or have had journalistic media that seek to identify such "best" legislators as well as their counterpart, "worst" legislators, whose presence in the legislature contributes nothing (Luttbeg 1992b). There seems to be agreement that some legislators are important to the quality of public policy in the state while others are not (Rosenthal 1981; Jewell 1982). As in the case of a governor exercising leadership rather than being responsive to constituents, one might well expect that an effective or "best" legislator may be less than responsive to district opinions. There has always been concern in a democracy that popular, if ineffective policy, may pass; this tension is evident in this literature. It may well be that quality or "best" legislators can only come from safe and secure districts; or perhaps quality or "best" legislators do face challenges but know how to overcome threats to their reelection.

Despite the variations evident among the American states in terms of their institutions of representation, the nature of their party systems, the resources that they have for coping with societal problems, and the nature of the societal problems they face, no state has ever been noted as more representative of its public than any other. Perhaps the variation is insufficient to affect differences. Or other factors, on which there must be little variation, must be more important. Of course, critics of American democracy would have suggestions in this regard.

If a selection must be made as to the relative importance of formal institutions of representation, informal institutions such as political parties and interest groups, or events and changes in society that affect the political system, it seems obvious that events drive other changes. As we have noted, professionalism in the legislature fundamentally alters that institution's performance. Similarly, strengthening the hand of the
governor also seems to make a difference in that institution's behavior. In turn it seems that both professionalism of the legislature and strengthening the governorship are driven by industrialization (Knight 1988; Luttbeg 1992b). Complex economies need a better functioning state government to make law for contemporary happenings by overriding common laws, to regulate the more complex economy, and to provide a safety net for injured or unprepared workers who are no longer able to be absorbed by an agrarian society.

This, in turn, seriously imperils either Canadian experience leading to innovations in the United States or vice versa. If events drive institutions and behavior, we cannot achieve improved democracy by changing institutions. Certainly there are many examples in the policies of the American states that would suggest that neither laws nor institutions have substantial impact on behavior that legislators sought to change. We are thinking immediately of innovations such as: (1) the merit or Missouri plan of selecting judges; (2) various efficiency of bureaucracy measures, such as planned program budgeting, or zero-based budgeting; and (3) laws that have had little impact (whatever their original intent), such as the 55 mile per hour speed limit, the 21-year-old drinking age, or prohibition of substances, alcoholic or otherwise.

This brings us to one final comment: there is no research on what causes members of the general public to comply with laws. In particular we are aware that compliance with the 55 mph speed limit varied widely across the states, with openness of geography effecting compliance rather than representativeness of institution or enforcement levels. Perhaps voluntary public compliance rather than representation should be our focus.

STATE BUREAUCRACIES AND REPRESENTATION

Introduction

A thorough understanding of the nature and types of representation afforded by state governments in the United States requires that state bureaucracies be taken into account. Why must state bureaucracies be considered? Four major factors have been listed as creating an environment in which bureaucracy becomes a major policymaking institution (Meier 1987). The first factor, the nature of American politics, contributes in two ways.
First, the political branches of government acquiesce in the policy making by bureaucracy. Second, by granting autonomy to bureaucratic institutions, political institutions grant legitimacy to bureaucratic institutions that they deny to themselves (Meier 1987, 48).

The second factor is the organization of government. The separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, plus the ability of each branch to check the powers of the others, contributes to a fragmented system. The third reason involves the demands of public policy. Bureaucracies are seen as being able to organize large projects, possess expert knowledge about public policy, and to provide fast, decisive decisions (Meier 1987, 50-52). The fourth reason involves the key role that bureaucracy plays in the implementation of policy. For numerous reasons, the policymaking process often produces legislation that is vague in terms of specific criteria to be utilized in the implementation phase. "The function of bureaucracy is to fill in the gaps of official policy, and this involves the exercise of discretion" (Meier 1987, 52). These unelected organizations are key to the implementation of policy.

Whether or not governors, legislatures, political parties, or interest groups are able to secure their policy goals depends, then, very substantially upon how administrators implement the policies that embody these goals (Elling 1983, 245).

Dimensions of Bureaucratic Representation

Any generalizations regarding the degree of representation provided by state government bureaucracies in the United States must be offered somewhat hesitantly. Rigorous empirical study of the decision-making activities of a random sample of state bureaucracies does not exist, although progress has been made via questionnaire data from agency heads (e.g., Abney and Lauth 1986). A more serious problem is that "representativeness means different things to different people and its employment with respect to the civil service presents an unfamiliar juxtaposition" (Krislov 1974, 22). In the subsequent pages, five aspects of the representation process are explored. The first four aspects focus on top administrators and other public sector employees within the bureaucracy. The degree of representation is evaluated in terms of selection, composition, attitudes, and behavior. The fifth aspect of the representation process focuses on the extent to which formal controls are
exerted by legislatures and governors to make the bureaucracy more responsive (Gormley 1989, I). An overview of the characteristics of state bureaucracies serves as a necessary prelude to our discussion.

Size and Characteristics of State Bureaucracies

State and local governments in the United States provide a wide range of services to their citizens. Carrying out these numerous responsibilities requires over 11,800,000 full-time equivalent employees. In 1986, 29 percent of these individuals were employed by state governments. Even though there were attempts to limit the growth in the size of government in the United States during the past decade, the number of state government employees increased an average of 23 percent between 1976 and 1986. In terms of labor/management relations, 37.4 percent of the states’ full-time employees belonged to an employee organization (e.g., employee unions) and in 1982, 31 percent of all state employees were represented by some type of bargaining units (U.S. Census 1982). These overall figures, however, hide significant differences among the states in terms of centralization of personnel, size and growth of bureaucracy, labor/management relations, distribution across different functional responsibilities, and the extent to which employment is concentrated at either the state or local levels of government.

State employees constitute more than 50 percent of the total state and local employees in three states—Hawaii (77 percent), Delaware (52 percent), and Alaska (51 percent). At the other extreme, a more decentralized system in which state employees are less than or equal to 25 percent of the total employment occurs in six states with large populations—California, Texas, New Jersey, Florida, Ohio, and Illinois.

The size of state bureaucracies varies between 10,000 plus in Wyoming to over 279,000 in California, a ratio of almost 28 to 1. However, when a comparison is made relative to the number of employees per 10,000 population, then the range is much narrower, varying between 104 in Pennsylvania to almost 400 in Hawaii. Why do some state have such a need for relatively larger bureaucracies? Two hypotheses easily come to mind. First, the greater the extent to which the total state and local government personnel is centralized at the state level, the higher the number of state employees per 10,000 population. Second, due to purported economies-of-scale it is hypothesized that the larger the state’s population, the lower the number of state employees per 10,000 population. Regression analysis indicates that one variable, the degree of
centralization of personnel, accounts for over 81 percent of the variation among the 50 states. However, somewhat surprisingly, regression analysis did not support the hypothesis that economies-of-scale exist for states with larger populations.

The size of the state governments' work forces has not remained static during recent years. Between 1976 and 1986, 48 of the 50 states experienced a net increase in employees, with a growth of at least 33 percent occurring in 11 states, while in another 31 states the state-level work force grew between 10 and 33 percent. Only West Virginia and Pennsylvania experienced net losses, and these were relatively mild (-.1 and - 4.6 percent, respectively). What factors account for the variable rates of state bureaucratic growth? A logical possibility is the change in the population of the state. The assumption is that greater increases in the state's population will result in greater demands for services, which in turn will necessitate greater increases in the size of the state's bureaucracy. The cases of Nevada and Pennsylvania suggest the plausibility of this argument. From 1974 to 1984, Nevada's population increased by an estimated 58.7 percent and between 1976 and 1986, the size of the state bureaucracy increased by 57.5 percent. At the other end of the spectrum, Pennsylvania's population increased by only .5 percent and the size of the state bureaucracy shrunk by 4.6 percent. When all 50 states are analyzed, however, only about 16 percent of the variation in the growth of the bureaucracy variable can be accounted for by the change in the state's population.

What policy responsibilities do state bureaucrats perform? At least one-half of all state employees in 47 of the 50 states are located in three functional categories: education, highways, and hospitals. The largest percentage of employees in 49 states (the exception is New York) are in the education field, and education employees account for over one-third of all state employees in 35 states. This finding is all the more important since it excludes those educators who are employed by local governments. Employees in a variety of state hospitals (e.g., mental health, mental retardation, medical) account for over 20 percent of the state work force in six states, with the largest number and percentage occurring in New York.

State Employees and Unions

A dramatic change has occurred in state public employee labor relations during roughly the past 20 years. "Prior to 1968 it was
generally believed that the First Amendment did not protect the right of public employees to organize labor unions; therefore, states were free to prohibit them" (Shafritz, Hyde, and Rosenbloom 1985, 287). State employees in some states were permitted to form employee associations which provided services such as health insurance, life insurance, and credit unions. Furthermore, "... they also engaged in legislative and executive branch lobbying activities in efforts to win favorable treatment for their members" (Kearney 1984, 26). Court decisions during the late 1960s changed the tenor of labor-management relations. "The right to organize has been established by the courts as a constitutional right of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments" (Nigro and Nigro 1981, 434). However, state governments are not required to engage in collective bargaining (Kearney 1984, 42, Nigro and Nigro 1981, 145).

Significant differences exist across the states when the percentage of full-time state employees who belong to an employee organization (i.e., union, association, federation, or council) and the total percentage of full- and part-time state employees who are represented by a recognized bargaining unit (whether or not they are members of the bargaining unit), again as of 1982, are examined. Grouping the states into one of six regions: Northeast, Pacific Coast, Midwest, Rocky Mountain, Border, and South, clarifies some of these differences. Public employees are more likely to be organized and represented by a bargaining unit in the states of the Northeast and Pacific regions. Southern states exhibit the smallest percentage of state employees represented by bargaining units, with the figure being zero or near zero for all states except Florida.

The bargaining rights for state employees have undergone significant changes between 1969 and the mid-1980s (Valetta and Freeman 1988, 404-06). In 1969, state employees faced either an outright ban on collective bargaining or no bargaining provision in 33 states while the legal duty to bargain existed in just seven states. The figures, as of 1984, were 16 and 24, respectively. The greatest change occurred in Florida, Montana, and Pennsylvania: no provision existed in 1969, but an explicit duty to bargain was written into law in all three states in 1984. In terms of regional differences, in all states in the Northeast and Pacific regions, except California, the duty of management and labor to bargain is at least implied in state law. Contract negotiations are least supported in southern states, save for the exceptional case of Florida.

In summary, significant variation exists in the size, growth, and union representation among the 50 states. The question is whether great
differences exist in terms of bureaucratic representation. The starting point for this analysis focuses on the methods of selecting personnel.

FORMAL REPRESENTATION

Throughout the history of the United States, at least three different sets of values—executive representation, neutral competence, and executive leadership—have been applied to the organization of state bureaucracy (Harrigan 1984, 233-36 using Kaufman 1956). The initial emphasis, based upon a Jacksonian notion of democracy, was on electing as many agency heads as possible in order to make them responsive to the citizens. However, the development of political machines along with the attendant incompetence, graft, and inefficiency led reformers to advocate the selection of agency heads by boards and commissions that were insulated from public pressure. In this system, the expectation was that services would be provided competently but in a politically neutral way. Recent reformers have emphasized executive leadership, including the appointment and removal of key state agency personnel directly by the governor in order to attain greater coherence in the operation of state programs (Harrigan 1984).

Selecting Department Heads

Aspects of all three sets of values are in evidence when examining the method by which state agency heads are chosen. Results indicate that significant variation exists among the states in terms of selecting leadership in 49 categories of state agencies. The Jacksonian emphasis on popular election has faded, with only three states (South Carolina, Mississippi, and North Dakota) choosing between one-fifth and one-fourth of these agency heads. Emphasis on neutral competence is most pronounced in 10 states where responsibility for more than 50 percent of the appointments rests with someone other than the governor. On the other hand, in 19 states the governor, with or without confirmation by another entity, appoints at least 50 percent of these top managers. In the remaining 21 states, no one pattern accounts for 50 percent or more of the total.

The method of selecting department heads also varies by type of agency. The heads of certain agencies tend to be popularly elected. For example, 42 of the 50 attorney generals are popularly elected, five are appointed by the governor, one is chosen by the state legislature, and one
is chosen by the state supreme court. In contrast, in no state is the head of the department of corrections or prisons chosen by the voting public. Rather, the modal method (N = 32) is for the governor to appoint the individual, with the approval of one or both houses of the legislature being necessary in 24 states. In the remaining 18 states, agency head or a board or commission makes the initial choice, and in eight of these the governor's approval is also required.

Recruiting and Selecting State Employees

The selection of state public employees can be understood using three somewhat distinct set of criteria: (1) patronage; (2) the civil service; and (3) representative bureaucracy (Kearney and Hays 1985, 61). In the spoils system, patronage is the guiding principle by which individuals are selected and retained. "Patronage is the capacity to appoint or dismiss public officials on the basis of political, usually partisan reasons, rather than professional qualifications or merit" (McFeeley 1981, 343). In the civil service system, emphasis shifts away from patronage to neutral competence criteria. The competence aspect is attained by having positions filled by competitive examinations that are constructed to "measure applicants ability and competence to do the job" (Moore 1985, 35). The neutral aspect is met by substantially eliminating political party loyalty as a reason for selection as well as mandating that removal should not be for partisan reasons.

The third perspective—representative bureaucracy—focuses on the socio-economic, racial, ethnic, and gender group origins of the individuals. "It is posited that representative bureaucracy assures an internal diversity of attitudes and interests that greatly increases the likelihood of broadly responsive public policies (Nigro and Nigro 1981, 230).

Two different processes are suggested to increase accountability and responsiveness. As Nigro and Nigro suggest, in passive representation, "policymaking officials within the bureaucracy must continuously interact with civil servants who by their presence symbolize and psychologically 'inform' the leadership about a wide (representative) spectrum of interests in the society at large" (Nigro and Nigro 1981, 232). Employees also have the opportunity to stymie suggested policies that would "adversely affect their counterparts in society." The consequence of this system is that the exercise of administrative authority is effectively channeled and limited (Nigro and Nigro 1981, 232). In the active representation perspective, public employees are seen as advocating policy preferences
"as a result of their socialization to values of the groups in society from which they come." Since no one group will dominate the policy process "negotiations and compromise will generate policies widely accepted to all the representative interests" (Nigro and Nigro 1981, 230). Using either the active or passive perspective of representative bureaucracy, emphasis is placed on increasing the number of minorities and women across all levels of occupations within state government bureaucracies.

Comprehensive histories of the recruitment and selection of public sector employees at the state level do not exist. A general observation, however, is that at least from roughly 1829 to the early 1880s, patronage was used extensively to staff state bureaucracies. In 1883, the U.S. Congress passed the Pendleton Act (also known as the Civil Service Reform Act). The creation of this federal merit system did not affect state governments. Rather, each state retained the right to establish its own laws regarding selection and retention of individuals and, although New York and Massachusetts adopted their own civil service laws within two years of the passage of the national act, "no new state civil service laws were approved during the next two decades" (Nigro and 1981, 8). A major change occurred in the late 1930s when "all states were required to have merit coverage for employees in federally supported programs" (McFeeley 1981, 345). Estimates are that by 1966, merit systems covered an average of 61 percent of state government employees, with the variation among states being between five and 100 percent among the 45 states included in the survey (calculated from Sigelman's data (1976) that came from Wortman and Myers' 1969 study). A more recent assessment is that 36 states had comprehensive merit systems, and the remainder had partial merit coverage by 1980 (Moore 1985, 43).

The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a resurgence in reform of civil service at the state level. Rather than focusing on diminishing the patronage aspects of the selection process, these reforms were "intended to insure that those civil servants now protected from political influence are 'meritorious'—that they perform their duties in an effective and efficient manner" (Argyle 1982, 163). Two additional observations about civil service systems are worth noting.

First, nonmeritorious considerations are still applied in some areas. "Patronage politics continues to flourish in some states within what formally appears to be a merit system, reflecting the ability of political traditions or 'culture' to overwhelm mere legal strictures" (Elling 1983, 255 citing Shafritz 1974).
Second, a concern has been raised that public sector unions, with their substantial growth during the 1960s and 1970s, would pose a possible threat to the merit system. Interestingly, "the evidence to date does not support the conclusion that collective bargaining and merit principles are incompatible. Public unions usually support civil service arrangements and oppose patronage practices" (Elling 1983, 263). The task of reconciling merit systems and representative bureaucracy is considered in the next section.

Representative Bureaucracy: A Review and Update

Numerous studies exist regarding the composition of state bureaucracies. One stream of research has concentrated on the characteristics of state agency heads (Wright and McAnaw 1965; Wright, Wagner, and McAnaw 1977; Hebert and Wright 1982; Dometrius 1984; Haas and Wright 1988), while another set focuses on the make-up of the entire state and local government work force (Cayer and Sigelman 1980; Meier 1978; Hutchins and Sigelman 1981; Elling 1983; Dometrius and Sigelman 1984; Sigelman 1976). Findings regarding changes in the composition of the agency heads in the 50 states are as follows:

1. In general, state agency heads today are younger than their counterparts of 20 years ago (Haas and Wright 1988).

2. There also appears to be a trend toward professionalism (Haas and Wright 1988). State administrators are better educated (with 61 percent holding a graduate degree), belong to more professional organizations, and are entering their first government position at an earlier age.

3. Women and blacks constituted only one to two percent of state agency heads, respectively, in the 1960s; however, by 1984, women and blacks, respectively, comprised 11 and 15 percent of the top positions in 27 agencies in the 50 states (Haas and Wright 1988, 271). Women are more likely to be key administrators in agencies dealing with aging, state library, human rights, secretary of state, and federal/state relations, while black agency heads are found predominantly in corrections, welfare, and personnel agencies (Haas and Wright 1988, 271-72).

4. Female and minority agency heads appear no less qualified than their white male counterparts (Dometrius 1984, 136).

5. Gubernatorial appointment is the most promising avenue for equal representation among top state leaders (Dometrius 1984, 136).
Key findings regarding changes in the composition of state and local employees would include:

1. After passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 by the U.S. Congress, the initial beneficiaries were women. "Both absolutely and proportionately, women's share of government jobs increased faster than that of males in each group except Spanish-surnames" (Cayer and Sigelman 1980, 444). Between 1973 and 1975, however, "in all groups except Indians, women actually lost salary ground to white males—a striking finding in light of the larger salary base from which white males began" (Cayer and Sigelman 1980, 448).

2. In the last 1970s, "relative to their proportion of a state's population, blacks are 'overrepresented' as full-time state and local government employees in about 40 states. The black representativeness ratio exceeds that for females in 42 of the reporting 48 states" (Elling 1983, 257).

3. In terms of descriptive representation in the 1970s, "women do well in the more traditional areas (such as the Southern states) precisely because minorities do so poorly there; the more progressive states, on the other hand, seem more responsive to demands for minority representation—a responsiveness which works to the disadvantage of women" (Sigelman 1976, 604 quoted in Elling 1983, 261).

4. In contrasting female and minority representation in state and local governments with the private sector using 1980 data, "state and local governments appear to have done a better job than the private sector in providing employment opportunities for minorities and women." However, "especially in professional-technical and office administrative positions, minorities and women remain badly underrepresented in both sectors" (Dometrius and Sigelman 1984, 242-43).

5. In terms of income, "it seems quite clear, then, that minorities and women are at a greater income disadvantage in the private sector than they are in state and local governments" (Dometrius and Sigelman 1984, 243).

In an attempt to update and expand on these earlier findings, data on women and minorities in state and local government for 1985 were examined. The extent to which women are judged to have adequate representation varies depending on which indicator is examined. If the total state and local government work force is analyzed, then as found in earlier studies, women tend to be significantly underrepresented, attaining 50 percent or more of the public sector jobs in only one state, Mississippi. However, if the analysis is confined to only those state and local government employees hired in 1985, then the representative ratio, or the
percentage of women in a given sector employee category divided by the percentage of women in each state’s population, exceeds one in 20 states. Women appear to make even greater strides if the analysis concentrates on just those hired for higher status positions (i.e., office administrator, professional, and technician) in 1985. Women achieve at least 50 percent of these positions in 31 states. Finally, women are extremely underrepresented as heads or directors of state agencies, occupying less than 20 percent of these positions. Females may be advancing through the levels of state bureaucracy, but they have not reached anything akin to parity at the apex.

Three additional observations seem worthwhile. First, states in the South, typically described as the most traditional sector of the country (Elazar 1972), are more likely than the rest of the country to employ a greater percentage of women as new hires of higher status positions. More confusing, perhaps, is that in four of the five deep South states where there is thought to be a greater emphasis on maintaining the status quo (Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama), women comprised at least 60 percent of these new hires. At the same time, however, in these four states women were severely underrepresented as agency heads.

Turning to the issue of minority employment (i.e., black, Hispanic, Asian, or Native American), we again see variation in the degree of representation depending on the indicator analyzed. When using either the total state and local government figure or the number of new hires in 1985, the representation ratio is greater than 1 in 30 and 1 in 36 states, respectively. However, when the focus shifts to inroads made by minorities in higher level public service positions, the results are less encouraging. The mean representation ratio slips to .86 for the 1985 higher status new hires and is only .09 for the state agency heads. As a group, minorities have not penetrated the upper echelons of state government to any significant extent.

An intriguing question is whether there is a general tendency for a state to exhibit a greater willingness to establish a representative bureaucracy encompassing both women and minorities. As expected, the correlations are positive and sizable (ranging between .388 and .622) among the percentage of females in state and local government, percentage of females in the 1985 new hires, and percentage of females in the 1985 higher status new hires. Correlation values are even larger, ranging between .676 and .842, for these three variables when percentage of minorities are examined. At the same time, unanticipated findings
abound. For example, for both females and minorities, the relationship between state agency heads and other indicators are either negative or relatively small. For whatever reasons, there is little or no translation of significant representation within state and local bureaucracies into the appointment or election of state agency heads.

A second unexpected finding is that there are few significant positive relationships between the representation scores of women and minorities. States in which women exhibit high representation ratios are not usually the same ones in which minorities have shown their greatest achievement. Therefore, any discussion about representative bureaucracy must not be structures in global terms but tied to specific social groups. The unanswered question is whether a representative bureaucracy provides more representation in terms of resulting public policy. Attitude similarity between bureaucrats and the mass public must be explored first in order to answer this question.

Potential Responsiveness

Potential responsiveness taps the extent to which mass attitudes and elite attitudes are congruent. Therefore, for governmental bureaucracies the underlying assumption is that "if the attitudes of administrators are similar to the attitudes held by the general public, the decisions administrators make will, in general, be responsive to the desires of the public" (Meier and Nigro 1976, 458). This approach is advocated when "a wide variety of public policies could satisfy particular public demands" (Gormley, Hoadley, and Williams 1983, 705).

To date, studies of the potential responsiveness have focused on comparisons between state bureaucrats and the mass public, citizen activists, and elected officials (i.e., state legislators and governors). In the most encompassing study, Uslaner and Weber (1983) examined the attitudes of the mass public, political party chairpersons, legislators, and state agency heads for 10 major public policy issues during the late 1960s and early 1970s. State agency heads appear to be the most liberal and "their progressive views stand out most prominently on ‘new liberalism’ issues dealing with public and private morality" (Uslaner and Weber 1983, 188). To what extent does changing the social composition of each elite group affect the degree of congruence? Interestingly, weighting each elite sample to make them as demographically similar as possible to the mass public did not make their attitudes significantly more representative of the mass public (Uslaner and Weber 1983, 190-91).
Gormley, Hoadley, and Williams (1983) provide a significant addition to this literature. They study the levels of attitudinal concurrence among public utility regulators and public utility staff, utility executives, government consumer advocates, and citizen activists in 12 states. A crucial distinction is made between issue priorities (i.e., the key substantive issues that utility commissions should be addressing) and priorities among eight values (e.g., clean air, economic development, etc.). Surprisingly, in terms of issue priorities, public utility commissioners have greater issue concurrence with citizen activists (including, for example, antinuclear activists, consumer advocates, community organizers) than with utility executives. On the other hand, in terms of value priorities, citizen activists have relatively low concurrence scores with commissioners, while scores with utility executives are significantly higher. A key point is that:

... the fact that decision makers identify the same important questions that citizens identify does not mean that they will reach the same answers. ... We might fear that agency responsiveness is little more than symbolic responsiveness. Unless citizens are able to shape value priorities as well as issue priorities, bureaucratic responsiveness is partial and incomplete (Gormley, Hoadley, and Williams 1983, 715-17).

Another approach to the issue of potential responsiveness is to determine the extent to which state agency personnel share priorities on a wide range of issues with officials elected by the mass public. In a survey of five states (Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, and Wisconsin), Daley found that in terms of 15 general policy priorities "there is adequate support present to claim that a substantial degree of homogeneity among governmental elites as to policy priorities exist" (1980, 13). Somewhat surprisingly, in four of the five states, administrative-legislative congruence is larger than that for either administrative-executive or executive-legislative pairings (1980, Table 3). In other words, at least in this study, the unelected bureaucrats exhibit a greater congruence with the elected state legislators than do either the two sets of elected officials or the two sets attached to the administrative branch (i.e., bureaucrats and executives). Preconceived notions that legislators and bureaucrats must by the nature of their position possess significantly different policy positions are cast into doubt. However, the level of this agreement does appear to vary somewhat by type of policy. For example, in terms of economic development policies, "legislators and bureaucrats tend to support traditional and industrial policies" (Carroll, Hyde, and Hudson
The difference occurs over innovative policies with bureaucrats being much less likely to support policies that are not "well-tested and uncontroversial" (Carroll, Hyde, and Hudson 1987, 337).

Bureaucratic Responsiveness: To Whom are They Responsive?

Which external actors are important to the state agencies? Are they the governor and state legislature, entities normally suggested as promoting the "democratic value of accountability" by requiring that "administration be subject to political control" (Abney and Lauth 1986a, 39)? Are the clientele groups, those nongovernmental actors most directly affected by agency activities, most likely to be influencing the agencies? In an interdependent federal system, what influence do actors at other levels of government (i.e., federal administrators, Congress and the president, local administrators, and local elected officials) have on state agency programs? It is difficult, obviously, to provide generalizations that apply to all agencies in all 50 states. However, a summary is provided based on findings from studies that provide comparative information across a wide range of states and agencies.

One set of studies focuses on the actual and preferred relative influence of the governor and state legislatures. Throughout a 20-year period, state agency heads preferred gubernatorial control, with this preference increasing during the past two decades. At the same time, we see a modest shift toward the governor in terms of actual control (Haas and Wright 1988, 147). Expanding the analysis to include interest groups and key actors from other levels of government does not alter the fact that "the external political environment of state agency heads would seem to be composed primarily of the legislature and the governor" (Abney and Lauth 1986a, 27).

A key question is the extent to which significant differences in perceived influence vary by state, by method of selecting the department head, or by the type of agency. For example, Abney and Lauth (1986a) have shown that there are significant differences among the states in terms of state agency heads ranking the governor as the most influential actor. A majority of state agency heads saw the governor as having greater influence on administrative departments, with the high being 91 percent in Maryland. Less than a quarter believe so in 14 states, with the low being 0 percent in Colorado and South Carolina (Abney and Lauth 1986a, 42-43). Method of selection is somewhat tied to this perceptual issue. The legislature is chosen as having the greatest impact
on their departments by 70 percent of those popularly elected, while the figure is 59 percent for those selected by boards, and a meager 35 percent for those department heads chosen by the governor (Abney and Lauth 1986, 66).

Recent research by Brudney and Hebert indicates that the influence of some external actors varies by type of agency. Across agencies, then, the general picture of the environment that emerges is one of relatively constant influence of the legislature and professional associations (albeit at quite discrepant levels), paired with substantial differences in the influence of the governor and clientele groups (1987, 194).

The legislature, for whatever reasons, appears to have a consistently significant amount of influence over all types of agencies. However, there are significant contrasts among other actors. For example, staff agencies, usually agencies created to "support the governor in gaining greater control over state administration, are closely tied to the governor," while clientele groups and professional associations exercise meager influence (1987, 194). Human resource agencies "are confronted by a 'packed' or 'dense' environment populated by influential actors" whereas independent agencies, created in large part to be free of excessive political involvement (e.g., post auditor, treasurer), "operate in the most quiescent environment, with relatively low influence exerted by all environmental actors" (1987, 194-95).

External Controls on the Bureaucracy

Several changes have been instituted during the last 20 years to make the bureaucracy more responsive. In order to enhance legislative oversight, state legislatures have adopted rule and regulation review and sunset laws (Hamm and Robertson 1981), plus over 40 states have "established some type of mechanism to assess the performance of state agencies and the effects of the programs they administer" (Jones 1987, 20). In addition, administrative procedure acts were adopted by several state legislatures (Renfrow et al. 1985 cited in Gormley 1989). Governors have utilized "state-level officers of management and budget to better coordinate and control state administrative agencies" (Gromley 1989, 7, citing Stone 1985). Cabinet and subcabinet systems were also adopted (Gormley 1989, 7, citing Bodman and Garry 1982). Finally, federal district judges have become "managers—of prisons, schools, homes for the mentally ill, and other state institutions. Confronted by
unconstitutional conditions in public institutions, a number of judges have invoked highly coercive and comprehensive remedies" (Gormley 1989, 10).

These changes are not viewed positively by all observers. Gormley (1989), for one, views a considerable number of these controls as coercive in nature and producing a series of unanticipated side-effects. Instead, he suggests that:

One solution is to rely less on control from above and more on control from below. Instead of depending on chief executives, legislators, and judges to control the bureaucracy, we could rely more upon citizens, citizens’ groups, ombudsmen, and governmental proxy advocates to represent broad, diffuse interests that historically have been under represented (Gormley 1989, 18).

For example, citizens or their proxy are represented directly at or on state regulatory bodies (e.g., public utility commissions, occupational licensing boards). This type of representation takes at least four forms—public hearing, public membership, ombudsman, and proxy advocacy.

What are the effects of these representational changes? The least intrusive alteration involves permitting greater citizen participation at public hearings. In one study of citizen participation in hearings held by the California Coastal Commission, the finding was that "most of the time citizens did not participate . . . although when they did, they were successful in increasing the denial rate" (Rosener 1982, 343). Studies of direct citizen membership on occupational licensing boards have not demonstrated significant changes in the overall behavior of these boards (Gormley 1986 summarizing Thain and Haydock 1983 and Schutz 1983). Indications are that the impact of ombudsman as a health care advocate is most useful in supplying necessary information to concerned decision makers, and "least effective in proposing changes in nursing home policies and regulations" (Gormley 1986, 188 citing Monk et al. 1982, 127-29). Proxy advocates are representatives of consumer interests in public utility matters located in attorney general’s offices or as independent agencies. They were ranked as being more influential on public utility commission proceedings than business groups other than utility companies, grassroots advocacy groups, municipalities, labor groups, and individual citizens, but less so than utility companies and public utilities commission staff (Gormley 1983, 139). Gormley’s conclusion about the representation revolution is that "the most striking finding to emerge from this review of the literature is that public representation in state regulation can promote substantive representation" (Gormley 1986, 190).
INTEREST GROUPS

Interest groups in the states provide an alternative channel of representation. In this conception, the linkage between citizens and officials is enhanced when citizens "actively communicate their expectations to decision makers. Decision makers, in response, attempt to satisfy demands" (Zeigler and Tucker 1978, 3). For a considerable number of scholars, organized interest group activity is "... the most important mode of communication between nongovernmental actors and state officials" (Zeigler and Tucker 1978, 85). At the same time, however, "... as vehicles of representation, interest groups are far from ideal... . The major problem is that they do not represent all segments of the population equally" (Thomas and Hrebenar 1990, 126).

How is the dispersal of authority under the federal system in the United States related to interest group impact? Zeigler and Peak, although cautioning that it is difficult to argue that federalism causes diversification of power, point out one possible pattern. "Groups which, although unsuccessful in achieving their goals on a national level, have established positions of power among state governments. One reason for this occurrence is the variation between the responsibilities of state legislatures as opposed to the national Congress" (Zeigler and Peak 1972, 44-45).

Variation in Interest Group Importance in States

The general conclusion among researchers of state politics is that interest group influence varies among the 50 states, although dispute arises over their relative importance. In Morehouse's evaluation of interest groups' strength during the 1970s, each state is assigned to one of three categories: strong (N = 22), moderately strong (N = 18), or weak (N = 10). Thomas and Hrebenar base their evaluation upon 50 single-state studies of interest groups conducted during the 1980s (Thomas and Hrebenar 1990). This classification system assigns each state to one of five categories.

**Dominant:** Those states in which interest groups are an "overwhelming and consistent influence on policy making" (N = 9).

**Complementary:** States where groups "tend to have to work in conjunction with or are constrained by other aspects of the political system" (N = 18).
Dominant/Complementary: States where interest groups "alternate between the two situations or are in the process of moving from one to the other" (N = 18).

Subordinate: States in which interest groups are "consistently subordinated to other aspects of the policy making process" (N = 0).

Complementary/Subordinate: States where interest groups alternate between the two (N = 5) (Thomas and Hrebenar 1990, 147-48).

State rankings also exist regarding group influence on the state agencies, state legislatures, and state governors, respectively (Abney and Lauth 1986b, Table 3). States in which groups are seen as having the greatest influence are assigned the rank of one with higher numbers indicating relatively lower levels of perceived influence. These evaluations were derived by Abney and Lauth from responses to a questionnaire from a total of 778 state government department heads across the 50 states. Finally, states are ranked using Nice's evaluation of interest groups' level of success in endorsing U.S. House and Senate candidates during the 1972-1978 period (Nice 1984, 187-88).

Do these different evaluations agree on the role played by interest groups in a particular state? Examples can be found where all six measures provide a similar evaluation (e.g., strong influence in Florida or Louisiana, weak influence in Rhode Island). Counter-examples (for example, South Carolina or Colorado) highlight apparent major discrepancies among these measures. A more fruitful endeavor involves an overall comparison of the evaluations for all 50 states. Here, the evidence is still somewhat mixed.

On the one hand, several of the evaluations are positively related. The evaluations by Morehouse and Thomas and Hrebenar tend to be similar, although noticeable differences do exist (e.g., Vermont and Maine). Spearman rank-order correlations among the three perceptual rankings of the legislatures, governors, and state agencies are positive, with the highest values obtained for legislature-agency values (r = .609), while the correlations were more modest for legislature-governor pairs (r = .344) and governor-agency pairs (r = .364). A very modest positive relationship exists between Nice's electoral success measure and the Morehouse and Thomas and Hrebenar values. On the other hand, the three perceptual evaluations provided by Abney and Lauth have either no relationship or a negative one with the Morehouse, Thomas, and Hrebenar and Nice values. The exact reasons for these differences cannot be explored in this paper. Suffice it to say, assigning values of influence to interest groups across the 50 states is not an easy task.
Trends in Interest Group Activity

Interest group activity has skyrocketed over the past two decades. This explosion is not due simply to the media covering the actions of a few groups that are noisy or interesting. At the national level, one recent study found that 40 percent of the groups lobbying in Washington, D.C., during the early 1980s (organizations listed in the Washington Representatives Directory) were founded since 1960 and 25 percent since 1970, and indications are that this trend continued during the Reagan presidency (Schlozman and Tierney 1983). Unfortunately, there is no precise indication of the growth of interest groups in the 50 states. However, fragmentary evidence suggests that the increase has been quite dramatic.

Illinois: "In 1986, a record number of lobbyists, 678, registered with the state. . . . That was nearly 300 more than registered 10 years ago" (Everson and Gove 1987, 5).

California: "In Sacramento, there are 762 registered lobbyists, up 37 percent from 10 years ago" (Moore 1987, 3020).

Kansas: ". . . in 1971 there were 211 lobbyists registered with the Secretary of State, all but a few representing only one group. By 1987, a decade and half later, 843 registrations were made by over 600 lobbyists" (Cigler and Kiel 1987, 6).

Florida: "During the 1975 legislative session, there were more than 2,050 registered lobbyists. By the end of the 1984-1986 biennial session, the number had more than doubled to 4,297" (Moore 1987, 3024).

Not only has there been an increase in the number of interest groups and lobbyists, but the diversity of the groups represented has also increased. Several years ago, a typical assessment of the breadth of interest groups represented was that "the range of lobbying in state legislatures is rather narrow" (Zeigler 1983, 99). Current evaluations point to an expanding system. For example, in Kansas in 1971, more than 50 percent of the lobbyists "were representatives of only six interests: medicine, business/industry, insurance, liquor (brewers and dealers), railroads and transportation, and utilities. While the interest group universe has nearly tripled during the past 15 years, the number of lobbyists representing these interests has grown more slowly" (Cigler and Kiel 1987, 7).
Which Interest Group Sectors are Influential?

The proliferation of groups has been accompanied by a significant increase in the range of interest groups that are seen as being important in the state political process. To test this hypothesis, data from the 1970s and 1980s are compared. The listings of significant interest groups compiled by Morehouse (1981, 108-12) were used for the 1970s data while the 1980s data are from Thomas and Hrebenar's evaluation of 50 state studies (1990). For the two time periods, all significant groups were coded into one of 43 sectors. These sectors, in turn, were assigned to one of seven major categories: (1) agriculture and extraction; (2) infrastructure and development; (3) nonindustrial economy; (4) labor and employees; (5) professionals; (6) units of government; and (7) noneconomic or cause oriented (see Appendix 1). The emphasis here is on the number of sectors represented, not the specific group. For example, in Utah during the 1970s, both the Farm Bureau Federation and the Farmers Union were listed as significant pressure groups. However, for our purposes, they constitute only one sector, namely agriculture.

The results suggest three observations about significant interest group sectors in the 1970s. First, the two largest categories are infrastructure/development and agriculture and extraction. As expected, the lower the degree of metropolitanism, the higher the scores for the agriculture and extraction sector. The pattern is not as linear for the infrastructure sector, although the trend is the reverse of that for agriculture and extraction. The second observation is that the greater the percent metropolitan, the higher the scores for significant groups in both nonindustrial and labor/employees sectors, groups commonly associated with a more diversified, nonagricultural economy. Finally, an unexpected pattern is that the overall scores do not increase as the percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas increases.

Comparing the 1980s with the 1970s data indicates the shifts that have occurred. First, looking at the overall scores, there is slightly more than a one sector increase across the two time periods, thus giving at least partial confirmation to the hypothesis. However, not all of the major categories of interest groups show this tendency toward increased importance. There has been a significant increase in the role played by labor unions and public employees, particularly educators. Professional and governmental sectors, registering meager scores in the Morehouse study, show relatively large proportionate increases. On the other hand, there is on average more than a 50 percent decrease in the number of
agriculture and extraction sectors, which is considered significant. This decrease holds for all five categories of metropolitanism, although the greatest scores are still found in the least metropolitan states. The scores for groups from infrastructure, nonindustrial, and noneconomic categories show little change across the two time periods.

Individual Interest Group Influence

The recent work by Thomas and Hrebenar (1990) provides an excellent base from which to make observations about specific group activity and influence. First, a considerable number of interests are both present and continually active in at least 40 states. The surprising aspects of this list are not only that so many interests are represented, but also their composition. As expected, included are the more traditional economic groups—individual business corporations, utility companies and associations, banks and financial institutions, insurance companies, business trade associations, hospital associations, farmers’ associations, agribusiness corporations, traditional labor unions, and labor associations. The “news” is that the remaining entrants represent the public sector or those employed in it—local government units, state departments, boards and commissions, public employee unions/associations, universities and colleges, school teachers unions/associations, and local government associations (Thomas and Hrebenar 1990, Table 4.2, 144-45).

Which groups are most influential? Again, using the Thomas and Hrebenar data, interest groups that are listed as being either most effective or at the second level of effectiveness in at least 25 of the 50 states are considered influential. Here, the traditional economic interests account for a majority of the entrants. However, school teachers’ organizations and general local government organizations signify the importance of the groups representing the public sector and its employees. Professional associations include doctors and lawyers.

Conclusion

Major changes in interest group representation have occurred in the states during the past 25 years. An appropriate summation suggests that: . . . a greater variety of interests are active than at any time in the past. Interested group leaders and lobbyists have become much more professionalized and the techniques of lobbying more wide-ranging and much more sophisticated. More and more mass-
based and non-traditional interests are scoring political success, while the whole lobbying process has been opened up to much greater public scrutiny. Yet we need to be careful not to assume that these changes, and particularly the expansion of group pluralism, have produced a major power shift among the various groups, interests, and lobbies. Although many of the outward appearances of the state capital interest group scene have changed beyond recognition, the hallmarks of success have remained very much the same (Thomas and Hrebenar 1989, 43)

STATE REPRESENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Introduction

How are the states' interests represented at the national level of government? One argument has been made that the authors of the U.S. Constitution provided for political integration by having the members of the U.S. Congress chosen upon the basis of geographical representation. "Perhaps the most important factor making possible political integration between the two levels is the scarcity of officials with a clearly defined identification with the national government" (Vines 1976, 7). U.S. senators were to be selected by the respective state legislatures, although this was modified to election by the state's voters with the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives was to be based upon the proportion of total U.S. population contained within each state. House members are selected within districts. "These districts, required by acts of Congress, need only be compact and contiguous and are drawn and specified by each state" (Vines 1976, 7).

The constitutional provisions, however, contain only the most formal outlines of this representation system. A more complete perspective is provided by taking into account organized entities in Washington, D.C., which represent state and local government interests and congressional support for state prerogatives.

Interest Organization

State and local governments have a presence in Washington, D.C., on both an individual and collective basis. Individual state and local governments often present their case to national officials. "A number of
states and localities have their own offices in the nation's capital, and subnational officials often contact national officials to request assistance, express complaints, or otherwise seek to influence decisions in Congress or the executive branch" (Nice 1987, 32). In addition, some state and local governments have sought representation by hiring lobbyists from a private or quasi-private concern (Sabato 1983, 170; Pelissero and England 1987, 70).

What specific services do these Washington-based representatives provide? The results of one study suggest that during the Reagan presidency there "appears to be the expansion of their roles from primary grantsmanship to broader representational services" (Pelissero and England 1987, 72). Providing information about policy changes in Washington to state and local officials is a key activity. In addition, "like most interest group representatives, however, lobbying and related activities are important aspects of their service assignments" (Pelissero and England 1987, 70).

From a collective interest perspective, a considerable amount of lobbying and information dissemination is provided by seven public interest groups, representing political and administrative generalists at the state and local levels of government. The five groups—National Governor's Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of Counties—are overt in their acknowledgment of being engaged in the active lobbying of Congress and administrative agencies (Wright 1988, 281-82). Two organizations, the International City Management Association and the Council of State Governments, "concentrate their activities and resources on research, publication, training, and service efforts for their members and clients" (Wright 1988, 282).

What impact do these organizations, acting collectively or individually, have on national policy outcomes? Assessments vary. On the one hand, the case has been made that "employing Washington-based representatives who seek jurisdictionally linked benefits for specific state and local governments appears to be an effective way of articulating interests of intergovernmental clients" (Pelissero and England 1987, 72). Less optimistic evaluations also exist. One observer recently noted that "state and local efforts to be represented at the national level are more diverse, difficult and depressingly frustrating than they were in the 1970s" (Walker 1989, 9). While lobbying during this period concentrated on grant programs, during the 1980s additional burdens were added such that
"state and local spokesmen must focus on three other major fronts: regulatory, taxation, and judicial" (Walker 1989, 9). Deil Wright, an astute student of intergovernmental relations, contends that "fragile and variable perhaps best describe the nature of the coalition as an effective policy influencing force on the national scene. Strong and solid describe most accurately the information, publication, and service base of the several Big Seven organizations" (1988, 283).

State Representation in Congress

One possible type of state representation, albeit difficult to measure, involves the members of Congress. A case could be made that members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate who have served in state legislatures or as the governor of a state may be more attuned to the question of state interests than those who do not have this experience. In 1988, more than 40 percent of the 535 members of Congress had some experience as a state legislator. The trend appears to be increasing for those legislators with this type of experience since "of the 50-member freshman class of the 100th Congress (1987-88), 31 are former state legislators—a total of 62 percent" (Lousion 1988, 41). The unanswered question is: "What effect does this experience have on representing state interests?" No study, to our knowledge, has focused on this issue.

However, research does exist that examines the voting behavior of congresspersons on issues pertaining to federalism. A recent study covering the 96th and 97th Congresses indicates that "although debates over a number of issues frequently invoke respect for state authority, the need for local flexibility, and the dangers of excessive centralization of authority, the principle of a circumspect regard for the distribution of power in the federal system is not a major concern manifested in these votes" (Hero 1987, 6). If the focus shifts to state delegations, rather than to the individual legislator, then significant variation is to be found, with some state delegations exhibiting substantially more support than others for federalism. However, there is little consistency in the level of state delegation support over time (Hero 1987, 7).

The Importance of Politics in State Representation

The nature of state representation in Washington has taken on added importance in the past few years given the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Garcia vs. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (1985). At issue is the protection afforded states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In this decision, the Court held that the states should not rely on the Tenth Amendment to guarantee a "sacred province of state autonomy," but instead should focus on the political process as the way to limit attempts by the federal government to enhance its power relative to that of the states. That is, "if the states ‘as states’ want protection within the constitutional system, they must look to Congress, not to the courts" (Howard 1989, 18). According to John Sununu, President Bush’s former White House Chief of Staff, "... this approach treats states as another special interest group, rather than as true partners in the federal system" (1989, 26). Consequently, states must involve themselves to an even greater degree in Washington politics in order to have their interests "represented."

CONCLUSION

Presumably the American states and the Canadian provinces play similar roles in their respective federal systems of government. To this point in our chapter, we have considered the states as individual governments and have sought to assess how they differ in the quality of representation that they afford their publics. We have found that there are many ways in which states might be assessed to be more representative. While we have not contributed to what impact such differences have, we have hopefully suggested that representation even within a given state is not a simple concept. And looking to the best performing states on each of our measures, we are struck by the fact that none clearly stands out as most representative. A federal system is thought to provide a release of pressures by allowing interests to persevere at a different level when they lose at one level of government. This may be, but one cannot move from state to state expecting some to be more responsive. This is not to say, however, that the mere availability of alternative governments does not relieve the public’s displeasure with the unresponsiveness of elected officials.

There is an enormous range of questions left unanswered in our analysis. Is one form of unresponsiveness in a government more important than another? If so, by focusing on it, could we find the sources of such responsiveness as well as its implications for the polity? Or we could focus on why state governments do not show extensive variation in representation, contrary to the expectations that differences would exist given the institutional variety among the states. Perhaps the
restrictions of the federal Constitution or traditions restrict real differences. Perhaps the close tie between available resources and pressing needs, as well as the competition among the states, restricts policy and responsiveness latitude. All of these issues are beyond this chapter's charge.

The bottom line question in this monograph is probably: What would happen to these North American democracies if their regional governments were to vanish overnight? Little that has been considered here strikes us as having direct relevance to such a question. In all probability what we see, both in Canada and the United States, is adaptation and accommodation to the institutions of government that were initially introduced for political reasons other than representation. Probably personal conservatism would best predict how anxious people would be, if for some reason, the provinces or states were to be abolished. Certainly there is nothing in our research literature that would predict what would happen.

A second underlying question is: "How do the states and provinces differ?" Again we take the position that we know too little. Certainly it is possible to enumerate differences, but which are important? Certainly the parliamentary system and strong political parties would be among everyone's list of differences. Is the Canadian case then just one of the political parties being even stronger than the strongest examples in the American states? Is the parliamentary system just an example of the strongest legislative and weakest executive branch? Is it possible, therefore, to include the provinces in comparisons with the states; to as one of the authors of this chapter hoped, "increase our N by 10?" We think not. Furthermore, the high salaries of provincial representatives and their substantial incumbency advantage in seeking reelection also might be taken to suggest the provinces are more extreme cases of our "professionalized" state legislatures. Again, we think such contortions are invalid. Probably until research is conducted on the interplay between regional and central governments in all federal democracies, we will not be able to conceptualize how comparable the states and provinces are.

Finally, there is a growing literature, in American political science at least, considering the competition among these regional governments both in the world of economy and for central government funds. Here the mere scalar differences between 50 states and 10 provinces may be important. Perhaps Ontario's economy is more important to Canada than is California's to the United States. Perhaps too, a national government can accommodate individual regional governments when there are only
10, but not when there are 50. All of this is most speculative, of course. But then, so is our endeavor to gain from each other's experiences.
REFERENCES


Hacker, Andrew. 1965. "Does a ‘Divisive’ Primary Harm a Candidate’s Election Chances?" American Political Science Review 59 (September): 105-10.


## APPENDIX 1

**Interest Groups Constituting Seven Major Categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category I: Agriculture &amp; Extraction</th>
<th>Category II: Infrastructure &amp; Development</th>
<th>Category III: Nonindustrial Economy</th>
<th>Category IV: Labor &amp; Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Traditional union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Livestock</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Retail/Service</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fishing</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>Nonteaching education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Forestry</td>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>University prof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mining</td>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>State/local gvt employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Oil and gas</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Alcohol production</td>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Liquor sales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category V: Professionals</td>
<td>Category VI: Units of Government</td>
<td>Category VII: Noneconomic Cause-Oriented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Doctors</td>
<td>General purpose local government</td>
<td>Women/minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lawyers</td>
<td>School districts</td>
<td>Senior citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Engineers/scientists</td>
<td>Other special districts</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other health care providers</td>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CPAs</td>
<td></td>
<td>NRA/hunters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td>League of Women Voters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Arguments concerning the legitimacy of democratic polities rest heavily on claims involving the quality of representative governance. These polities provide procedures for the regular participation of citizens in the selection of representatives, and these representatives should reflect the socio-economic and demographic composition of society and respond to public demands and needs (Pitkin 1967). In practice, these procedural, descriptive, and responsive meanings of representation are operationalized in the electoral process. The importance of elections as mechanisms by which voters authorize persons to act on their behalf and hold them accountable for their actions provides a compelling rationale for studying the attitudes and behavior of both the public and those politicians who seek their electoral favor.

In this chapter, we focus on the political attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of citizens of two of the world’s largest federal democracies, Canada and the United States. Most generally, we argue that representation is a circular process, the quality of which depends on the attitudes and actions of not only governing elites but also those who select them. In this regard, party organizations and leaders play pivotal roles in establishing the context of citizens’ use of elections for articulating demands, needs, and choices and in influencing public attitudes vital to the operation of representational processes and the healthy functioning of a democratic polity. Particularly important among these attitudes are party identification, political efficacy, and political trust (see, e.g., Almond and Verba 1963). Moreover, the reciprocal links between public
attitudes and elite behavior may have crucial systemic consequences. Representative democracy holds the promise of an upward spiral of mass-elite interactions that build a public attitudinal basis for enhanced citizen participation and a more vigorous implementation of elections and other representational processes (Macpherson 1977).

Canada and the United States constitute important cases for investigating the politics of representation in polycommunal societies with federal forms of government. Although, from the perspective of democratic theory, federalism may be viewed as an institutional device designed to enhance the quality of representation in large heterogeneous societies, both Canada and the United States have suffered from profound legitimacy crises intimately linked to a withdrawal of political support attendant upon negative judgments about the functioning of representational processes. Both countries are characterized by politically consequential societal divisions associated with race, ethnicity, language, and region that are only imperfectly accommodated by existing federal arrangements.

The federal contexts of the two countries differ in important ways. In Canada, decentralized de jure and de facto political authority, the salience of provincial governments in the policy process, and different federal and provincial party systems in the several provinces (e.g., Kornberg and Clarke 1982; Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke 1982, Ch. 2) create a highly complex political context in which public officials, parties, and elections perform important representational functions at different levels of government. The varying quality of this performance is conducive to differentiated public attitudes towards actors in the representative processes of subnational and national arenas. Indeed, such federal-provincial variations in attitudes suggest that Canadians effectively inhabit "two political worlds" (Elkins and Simeon 1980; Blake et al. 1985; see also Schwartz 1974; Simeon and Elkins 1974; Wilson 1974; Bell and Tepperman 1979). Given a different nationally oriented balance of federal-state relations and homogenizing political forces in the United States, the emergence of a "nationalized" American electorate has been detected but also questioned (e.g., Claggett, Flanagan, and Zingale 1984; Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987; Vertz, Freidreis, and Gibson 1987; Conway 1989). Accordingly, one might expect less regionally differentiated political attitudes in the United States than in Canada.

To investigate the public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that are crucial to the federal representative democracies of Canada and the United States, we employ national survey data, most of which have been
gathered in a lengthy series of periodic election studies. We rely primarily on data from the 1980 American and the 1984 Canadian election studies\(^1\) as both contain a range of useful variables and are of relatively recent vintage. Analyses of similar data from other electoral contexts strongly indicate that the 1980 and 1984 studies accurately portray important elements in the public political mind in the two countries.

Since we argue that relationships between parties and electorates are crucial to representative processes in all democratic polities regardless of whether they have federal or unitary forms of government, we first consider attitudes towards political parties at the national and subnational levels of the two federal systems. These analyses are followed by an investigation of citizens' feelings of political responsiveness and trust and relationships between these feelings, partisan orientations, and important socio-demographic cleavages. We then examine the determinants of electoral support for parties and political support for key institutions of representative government. We conclude by arguing that the actions of party elites at both the national and subnational levels of government in the two countries have powerfully influenced the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of their respective publics.

**PARTY IDENTIFICATION**

**Incidence**

According to Campbell et al. (1960, 122), "the political party serves as the group toward which the individual may develop an identification, positive or negative, of some degree of intensity." This now-familiar concept of party identification has been regularly measured in national

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\(^1\)The American National Election studies were conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. The 1984 Canadian National Election Study was conducted by Ronald Lambert, Steven Brown, James Curtis, Barry Kay, and John Wilson. The 1979 and 1980 Canadian Election studies were conducted by Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon Pammett. All survey data are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The principal investigators and the ICPSR are not responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here. The Political Support in Canada studies were conducted by Harold D. Clarke and Allan Komberg. Details concerning studies are available upon request.
Table 6.1. *Direction of Federal Party Identification in Canada, 1965-88*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Party Identification</th>
<th>1965&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1968&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1974&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1979&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1979&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>1980&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit/Creditists</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Identification</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>National Election Study  
<sup>b</sup>Social Change in Canada  
<sup>c</sup>Political Support in Canada  
<sup>d</sup>Missing data and "other" party identifiers removed

election surveys conducted in the United States since the early 1950s and in Canada since the mid-1960s.<sup>2</sup> Although vast majorities of Canadians

<sup>2</sup>The questions used to measure party identification at the federal level in Canada are: (a) "Thinking of *federal* politics, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative, NDP, Social Credit, or what?"; (b) "How strongly [party named] do you feel, very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly?"; (c) [If "refused," "don't know," "independent," or "none," in (a)] "Still thinking of *federal* politics, do you generally think of yourself as being a little closer to one of the parties than to the others?"; (d) [If "yes" in (c)] "Which party is that?" The questions used to measure party identification at the provincial level are identical, except that the list of parties varies according to the party systems in various provinces. The party identification questions in the Canadian surveys are very similar to those in the American studies (see, for example, the 1980
and Americans are not active participants in party organizations (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Kornberg, Smith, and Clarke 1979), the survey evidence shows that most do identify positively with political parties.

Over time, the distributions of party identification in the two countries have varied, albeit in different ways. Prior to the early 1980s, the proportions of Canadians manifesting an attachment to one of the three national parties showed impressive aggregate stability, with about two-fifths, slightly over one-quarter, and one-eighth favoring the Liberals, Progressive Conservatives, and New Democrats, respectively (see Table 6.1). The proportion of nonidentifiers\(^3\) also was quite stable, averaging slightly over 12 percent. Since 1983, however, increased volatility has been apparent—the PC’s share of identifiers increased sharply in 1983 and 1984 and then receded precipitously to pre-1983 levels before rebounding just before the 1988 election. Also noteworthy is the

\(^3\)The term "Independent" has little resonance in Canadian political discourse, and few respondents refer to themselves in this way in any survey.
decrease in Liberal identifiers and the increase in nonidentifiers, the latter comprising fully one-quarter of the electorate in 1986. Since the 1985-87 surveys were conducted in years when federal elections were not held, the substantial increment in nonidentifiers in these surveys may reflect the absence of mobilizing stimuli provided by national election campaigns. However, a surge in nonidentifiers did not occur in 1981 (another nonelection year) and, thus, the 1985-87 data may indicate a real decline in the intensity of affective feelings for the federal parties. In any event, it always has been the case that large majorities of Canadians do not have a strong identification with a national party. In 1984, for example, 24 percent stated that they had a "very strong" federal party identification. The comparable figure was only slightly greater (27 percent) a decade earlier.

The American pattern is both similar and different. Like Canadians, the vast majority of Americans have expressed at least a minimal sense of attachment to one of the two major national parties (see Table 6.2). Unlike Canadians, however, there is no evidence of marked discontinuities in the proportions of Americans identifying with particular parties. This is not to say that the proportions of Republican and Democratic identifiers has been perfectly stable, and over the long-term there is some evidence that the balance of identifiers has shifted, albeit irregularly, in favor of the Republicans. In 1956 at the start of the second Eisenhower administration, for example, 37 percent indicated at least a minimal sense of Republican party identification, and 50 percent were Democrats. In 1984 at the beginning of the second Reagan administration, 39 percent were Republican identifiers or "leaners," and 41 percent, Democrats. In 1988, the figures were 42 percent and 38 percent, respectively. More impressive, however, is the overall weakening of party ties, the bulk of which occurred between 1964 and 1976 (Table 6.2) (see also Beck 1984). The overall strength of party attachments neither eroded noticeably after 1976 nor reverted to earlier levels.

Stability

In its classic social-psychological conception, partisanship was assumed to be highly stable (Campbell et al. 1960; 127-37), an attachment that was formed early in life and subsequently served as a self-reinforcing "perceptual screen" influencing how voters saw and reacted to the political world. Party identification thus was analogous to social-
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democrat</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Republican</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

*American National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies/Survey Research, Center, University of Michigan.
group (i.e., religious, racial or ethnic, class) identifications. The stability or mutability of party identification is relevant for understanding the relationship between parties and society in the two countries and, accordingly, for evaluating parties' performance of representative functions. Stable partisan ties raise the possibility that specific parties are seen as the "representatives" of various enduring group interests. Unstable party identifications changing in response to the play of short-term forces in the political arena at particular points in time suggest that national parties are less likely to be perceived as performing collective representational tasks in a consistent fashion.

Given that large numbers of Canadians and Americans are not strongly identified with a national party, many also may lack durable partisan allegiances. The aggregate data in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 do not permit determination of the sources of observed over-time changes in the proportions of identifiers with various parties. Conversion (individual-level change) is one possibility, whereas replacement (change in the composition of the electorate) is another (see Butler and Stokes 1976). A time-series of cross-sectional surveys is sufficient to investigate replacement processes, but an accurate assessment of individual-level change requires panel data (Niemi, Katz, and, Newman 1980). Panel components have been included in several Canadian national surveys but in only a few American studies. The American data, however, are adequate to demonstrate that patterns of individual-level partisan change are quite different from those in Canada.

Partisan instability is an ongoing feature of the Canadian national and provincial party systems. Between 1980 and 1984, for example, only slightly over three-fifths of those surveyed in both years manifested directionally stable national party identifications. One-third changed their national party identifications, 21 percent switched from one party to another, and an additional 12 percent moved to or from nonidentification (see Figure 6.1). Panel data for the 1974-79, 1979-80, and 1984-88 periods show similarly high rates of national and provincial partisan instability (LeDuc et al. 1984; Clarke and Stewart 1987; Clarke and Kornberg 1989). At the national level, the principal difference between

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the most recent and the earlier panels involves the direction of partisan change. In the 1970s, interparty movement was multidirectional and thus aggregate support for the federal parties was largely undisturbed. In the early 1980s, however, the flow of partisans heavily favored the newly resurgent PCs (Kornberg and Clarke 1988). All of the Canadian panel data strongly indicate that movements in federal and provincial partisanship are products of short-term forces associated with salient issues and public judgments of the performance of parties and their leaders (Clarke and Stewart 1985, 1987; Kornberg and Clarke 1988; Archer 1987).

Although requisite data concerning the stability of state-level party identification is unavailable in the American case, the national U.S. pattern differs from that in Canada. As Figure 6.1 shows, the percentage of partisan switchers in the 1972-76 panel (the most recent interpresidential election year panel) is only 7 percent, with fully three-quarters of the panelists maintaining directionally stable party ties. However, many Americans do alter the strength of their partisanship, and often do so over relatively short periods of time. For the 1972-76 panel nearly one-third changed the intensity of their party identification and a further 13 percent moved to or from the pure Independent category. As for the rapidity of partisan change, the 1980 election-year panel shows that nearly one-
quarter changed the strength of their party identification over the January-June period and 10 percent went to or from pure Independence. The June-September and September-November components of this panel show that many of these persons changed the strength of their party ties again. In all of these panels, however, very few (e.g., 6 percent between January and June) actually crossed party lines. Although the American and Canadian patterns of partisan instability differ, the latter resembles the former in that variations in partisan attachments are affected by short-term forces associated with issues, candidate images, and party performance judgments (Page and Jones 1979; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983).

Consistency

Canada and the United States are federal systems. Federalism enables parties to perform representational roles at multiple levels of government and introduces localized contextual effects on people’s partisan attachments at both the national and subnational levels. Given the significance of the provinces in the Canadian federal system and the continuing salience of federal-provincial and interregional conflicts, it is hardly surprising that Canadian political scientists have devoted much more attention to gathering data on voters’ partisan attachments at the provincial level than their American colleagues have at the state level.

Many Canadians do not identify with the same party at the national and provincial levels (Clarke et al. 1979, Ch. 5; Clarke and Stewart 1987). The 1983 survey data are typical—only three-fifths of the electorate had the same party identification at both levels of government, and nearly one-quarter (23 percent) identified with different parties at the two levels (Figure 6.2. The incidence of such "split" identifications in this and other surveys varies across provinces, paralleling the degree of discontinuity in federal and provincial party systems. In 1983, for example, the percentage of split identifiers was 47 percent in British Columbia and 33 percent in Quebec, the two provinces where the federal and provincial party systems long have been very different. Elsewhere, national and subnational party-system differences are less acute, and the percentages of inconsistent identifiers are lower (Ontario, 15 percent; the Prairies, 12 percent; and the Atlantic provinces, 9 percent). Although these differences in partisanship may reflect ideologically "consistent" party choices by voters confronted with different choice sets in federal and provincial politics (Blake 1982), the fact remains that sizable
numbers of Canadians in all regions exhibit multiple partisan ties. Moreover, inconsistent partisan attachments are consequential; they increase the likelihood of partisan instability at both levels of government at later points in time (Clarke and Stewart 1987; Martinez 1989).

American data on subnational party identification are sparse, but available evidence suggests that split identification is a relatively infrequent phenomenon. For example, recent surveys reveal that 75 percent of the respondents in New Jersey and 79 percent of those in Louisiana held the same party identification at both the national and state levels, but only 4 percent and 5 percent, respectively, were split identifiers. The 1987 CPS Pilot Survey data also show impressive cross-level partisan consistency—6 percent held consistent national and state party identifications and only 3 percent were split identifiers.5 These

5The New Jersey survey was conducted by the Eagleton Poll at Rutgers University in the Spring of 1987. The Louisiana survey was conducted by the Division of Rural Sociology at Louisiana State University under Alan Acock’s direction at the same time. Details concerning both surveys are available upon request. The 1987 CPS Pilot Survey was made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The principal investigators and the
data gathered in the late 1980s strongly resemble those from the mid-1960s (Jennings and Niemi 1966). Thus, despite the plausibility of a general Republican-oriented realignment of presidential voting patterns, and the long-term growth of Republican strength in presidential voting in southern states, trends in electoral behavior have not been accompanied by a bifurcation of national and subnational party identifications such as that in Canada.

Party and Society

The existence and durability of linkages between political parties and social groups are important for understanding how parties actually do, and are seen to, perform representational functions. Observers long have noted the weakness of ties between political parties and social classes in Canada and the United States, and the failure of national parties to champion class-related issues and interests (Alford 1963; Epstein 1980). The image of Canadian and American national parties as "trans-class" or "nonclass" organizations frequently has been accompanied, however, by the caveat that they do have different "centers of gravity" or "core constituencies" in terms of class support, and they articulate issue priorities consistent with these differences. In the United States, the Democrats typically are seen as receiving differential support from the working class, whereas the Republicans are favored by the middle and upper classes. Consistent with their core class constituencies, the two parties have given priority to policies (e.g., unemployment versus inflation) that favor them (see Hibbs 1987). In Canada, although the two major parties' class images are murky, it is often argued that the Liberals and the PCs "tilt" toward "center-left" and "center-right" on the ideological spectrum, respectively (e.g., Alford 1963). The NDP is more clearly identified as a social democratic party favoring the working class, but its disadvantageous competitive position in national politics inhibits its ability to clarify and amplify the class dimension of electoral choice in this arena (Clarke, Stewart, and Zuk 1986).

Although the class images of the major American and Canadian parties are weak, these parties do have other group affinities. In Canada, the conventional wisdom stresses regional and ethnic/linguistic group affiliations, with the Liberals seen as being supported by and advocating

ICPSR are not responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
the interests of Francophones and Quebeckers (both Francophones and Anglophones). Since the late 1950s, the Conservatives have been seen as representing a core constituency centered in the Western provinces (Clarke et al. 1979, Ch. 4). In the United States, since the demise of the Democratic "solid South," the parties' images are not well defined in regional terms, but Republican strength (in presidential politics) in the South and West and Democratic strength in the Northeast are widely recognized. Perhaps more salient is the image of the Democrats as having strong support from, and consistently advocating economic, social, and civil rights policies that favor the interests of, black Americans.

To a considerable extent, public images of the group bases of support for the American and Canadian national parties are shaped by observations of election outcomes. Election results, however, can be misleading. In Canada, a single-member plurality electoral system consistently distorts the translation of parties' vote shares in various provinces and regions into seats won in the national parliament (e.g., Jackson, Jackson, and Baxter-Moore 1986, 433-34). This distortion, coupled with a Westminster-model parliamentary system and a tradition of one-party rather than coalition government, continually raises the possibility that geographically based group interests will not be represented in the governing and opposition parties' caucuses. In the United States, the electoral college system can exclude minorities in various states from the presidential selection process. Plurality elections for the Senate and House of Representatives, despite their geographic basis, raise similar problems for the representation of minorities concentrated in the more restricted geographic locales defined by states and congressional districts.

The above considerations indicate the need to investigate relationships between social groups and party identification at the individual level. In both countries, the group basis of party identification generally is remarkably weak. A regression analysis of the 1984 Canadian data shows that several socio-demographic variables and a class self-identification measure account for precious little variance in Liberal, PC, and NDP

6In the 1984 and 1988 federal elections the Progressive Conservatives did exceptionally well in Quebec. However, poll data indicate that PC support trailed well behind that for the Liberals in the interim between these contests. Also, although survey data show that identification with the federal Liberals has declined in Quebec, there is no indication of an enduring partisan realignment favoring the PCs. See Kornberg and Clarke 1988; Clarke and Kornberg 1989.
partisanship. Although several relationships are statistically significant and in the expected direction (e.g., Liberal strength among Québécois, PC strength in the Prairies, NDP strength among working class identifiers), the overall explanatory power of these and other predictor variables only ranges from a low of 5 percent for the PCs to a high of 8 percent for the Liberals (Table 6.3).

Moreover, despite the "Tory Tide" that washed over all parts of Canada in 1984 producing a result atypical of most recent election outcomes, data from the 1965-80 and 1988 surveys yield the same findings as those for the 1984 study. There are no secular trends toward a strengthening or weakening of the effects of the various socio-demographic variables (Clarke and Stewart 1992). Nor do provincial party identifications have a markedly stronger group basis. Popular images of group differences in party support notwithstanding, socio-demographic

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7The coding of party identification in Canada varies with which party is being considered. For example, in the analysis of Liberal identification, the scoring is: very strong Liberal = +3, fairly strong Liberal = +2, weak or leaning Liberal = +1, nonidentifier = 0, weak or leaning other party identifier = -1, fairly strong other party identifier = -2, and very strong other party identifier = -3. The codings of PC and NDP identification are analogous. The scoring of party identification in the American analyses is: strong Democrat = +6, weak Democrat = +5, leaning Democrat = +4, independent = +3, leaning Republican = +2, weak Republican = +1, and strong Republican = 0.

Regarding the independent variables in the analyses, education, income, and community size are ordinal scales, the categories of which vary slightly for the two countries (details available upon request). Occupation, union membership, gender, race, age, working-class identification, region (the United States), and region/ethnicity (Canada) are dichotomies. The codings are: gender - men = 0, women = +1; race - whites = 0, blacks = +1; union membership - no union member in household = 0, union member in household = +1; and working-class identification - others = 0, working-class identifiers = +1. Age is a set of dummy variables with the 66 and over group being the reference category. Region in the United States consists of dummy variables with the East as the reference category. Region/ethnicity in Canada also involves dummy variables with Ontario as the reference category.

8The variance explained in the regression analysis of provincial party identification varies from a low of 4.2 percent for the NDP in the Prairies to a high of 16.3 percent for the same party in British Columbia.
Table 6.3. Regression Analyses of Federal Party Identification by Sociodemographic Characteristics and Social Class Identification, Canada, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variables</th>
<th>Liberal B</th>
<th>PC B</th>
<th>NDP B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.05&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.04&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (Blue Collar)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.05&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.05&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.05&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.04&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Size</td>
<td>-.07&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-25</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.11&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.05&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec-French</td>
<td>.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.05&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec-Non-French</td>
<td>.07&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.03&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.04&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairies</td>
<td>-.17&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.16&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class Identification</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>-p<.001,  <sup>b</sup>-p<.01,  <sup>c</sup>-p<.05

B-standardized regression coefficient
characteristics provide minimal explanatory leverage for understanding national and provincial party identification in Canada. This weakness in the social basis of party support is longstanding and, as we will argue below, there are reasons to believe it will continue in the future.

The American situation is similar. The 1980 national election survey data show several anticipated relationships (e.g., working class identifiers, trade unionists, less well-educated persons, and those with lower incomes tend to be Democratic identifiers), but the overall effects are very weak ($R^2 = .13$) (Table 6.4, column 5). The strongest relationship involves the tendency for blacks to identify as Democrats, but even it and the continuing tendency for southerners to be Democratic identifiers (Republican voting in presidential elections notwithstanding) are insufficient to account for variance in party identification. The 1980 elections is not unique—the 1972, 1976, and 1984 surveys show substantially the same patterns.

Individual-level ties between society and party thus are very weak in both Canada and the United States. The tenuous nature of these linkages can be hypothesized to have important consequences for citizens’ perceptions of political representation. These perceptions are considered below.

**POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL TRUST**

Citizens’ perceptions of elected officials’ responsiveness to public needs and demands, and the former’s evaluations of the latter’s trustworthiness to manage the country’s affairs with probity and wisdom, are central to democratic political discourse. Given this centrality, it is important to measure these perceptions and evaluations and to investigate their relationships with support for those actors (politicians, parties, legislatures) that have critical fiducial responsibilities.

Beginning with pioneering American election studies in the 1950s, citizens’ perceptions of the responsiveness of elected representatives have usually been conceptualized and investigated as the "external" component of political efficacy. Closely allied with this component both conceptually and empirically is "internal" political efficacy, the feeling of being able to participate effectively in the political process (Lane 1959). Canadian and American data enable us to measure both internal and external
Table 6.4.  Regression Analyses of Political Efficacy, Political Trust, and Party Identification by Sociodemographic Characteristics, Social Class and Party Identifications, United States, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variables</th>
<th>Efficacy</th>
<th>Party Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal B</td>
<td>External B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.21&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (XSEI)</td>
<td>-.09&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>.06&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Size</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-25</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region: Atlantic</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class Identification</td>
<td>-.06&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.62&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>-p<.001, <sup>b</sup>-p<.01, <sup>c</sup>-p<.05
B-standardized regression coefficient
efficacy, and recent Canadian surveys allow us to do so at both the federal and provincial levels of government.\textsuperscript{9}

The federal nature of the American and Canadian politics has potentially important consequences for public political psychology. In particular, citizens may develop quite different feelings about representation at the national and subnational levels of government. In Canada, much of the oftentimes strident rhetoric concerning constitutional renewal suggests that, if federal and provincial political elites are to be believed, their government responds to the people, and politicians at the "other" level are "out of touch" (e.g., Cairns 1983). Self-serving claims by rival political elites notwithstanding, virtually nothing is known about the extent to which Canadians differentiate between government levels when forming judgments about the representational behavior of elected or other public officials.

Analyses of the federal and provincial political efficacy questions in the 1984 Canadian national election survey demonstrate that Canadians distinguish both types of efficacy by level of government. Confirmatory factor analyses (Long 1983) show that a measurement model of internal and external efficacy at the federal and provincial levels fits the data much better than do models in which the federal and provincial components of one or both types of efficacy are not defined.\textsuperscript{10} The correlation

\textsuperscript{9}The Canadian and American efficacy questions are worded identically. The Canadian federal-level statements are: (a) "Generally, those elected to Parliament in Ottawa soon lose touch with the people"; (b) "I don’t think that the federal government cares much what people like me think"; (c) "Sometimes, politics and government in Ottawa seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on"; (d) "People like me don’t have any say about what the federal government does." In the 1984 Canadian survey, respondents were asked if they "agree strongly," "agree," "disagree," or "disagree strongly" with each statement. The 1983 survey uses dichotomous "agree" and "disagree" categories. Items (a) and (b) are hypothesized to tap external efficacy whereas statements (c) and (d) are hypothesized to capture internal efficacy.

\textsuperscript{10}The confirmatory factor analyses are implemented using Joreskog and Sorbom’s LISREL VII program (1988). The four-factor (federal internal, federal external, provincial internal, provincial external) model best fits the data ($\chi^2_{16} = 16.01, p = .452$). Alternative models (e.g., one federal and one provincial factors, one internal and two external factors) have much larger $\chi^2$ values. As Joreskog and Sorbom (1988: 42) note, "[I]arge $\chi^2$ values correspond to bad fit and small $\chi^2$ values to good fit. The degrees of freedom serve as a standard by which to judge whether $\chi^2$ is large or small."
between federal and provincial internal efficacy (.83) is stronger than that between federal and provincial external efficacy (.63). Moreover, the strength of these correlations varies inversely with the degree of discontinuity between the federal and provincial party systems in various provinces (Acock et al. 1989). Such findings are quite sensible given the manifest differences between the national and provincial party systems in several provinces and the frequency of partisan inconsistency documented above. The structure of political efficacy in Canada, therefore, suggests that each level of the federal system be considered separately when assessing feelings of personal political competence and governmental responsiveness.

Such an assessment involving responses to the questions used to measure internal and external efficacy shows considerable inefficacy at both levels. In 1984, large majorities believed that both federal MPs and provincial MLAs soon "lose touch" with the people, the national and provincial governments do not care what people think, national and provincial politics often are too complicated to understand, and ordinary people do not have "any say" about what the two governments do (Figures 6.3.a, 6.3.b). Earlier studies show the same preponderance of negative responses and also suggest that perceptions of political responsiveness may have decreased (from already modest levels) since the late 1960s (Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke 1982, Ch. 3; Kornberg and Clarke 1992, Ch. 3).

The American data tell the same story. Unfortunately, the absence of separate national and state-level items does not permit us to determine if there is a "federal" structure to political efficacy in the United States. As noted, political efficacy is characterized by a distinction between personal political competence and perceptions of political responsiveness. Many Americans feel inefficacious in both senses. As Figure 6.3.c shows, in 1980 75 percent thought congressmen soon "lose touch," 55 percent believed public officials do not care what the public thinks, 71 percent thought politics was too complicated to comprehend, and 40 percent felt they had "no say" about what government does. Only the latter percentage differs substantially from the Canadian case where 63 percent and 58 percent believed their voice was not heard in federal and

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11Recent research has confirmed that feelings of political responsiveness and personal political competence (external and internal efficacy, respectively) are distinct but closely related in the minds of American voters (Acock, Clarke, and Stewart 1985).
Figure 6.3. Responses to Political Efficacy Statements, Canada and the United States

Federal Political Efficacy, Canada, 1984

Provincial Political Efficacy, Canada, 1984

Political Efficacy, United States, 1980
provincial politics, respectively. Again, the 1980 American efficacy data are typical of responses in other national surveys (Abramson 1983). Thus, in both the United States and Canada, many citizens believe that government is unresponsive and they have little influence over the course of political events.

Moreover, feelings of political ineffectiveness are not related to region of residence in either country. Again, interregional and federal-provincial conflict over the past two decades might lead one to believe that Canadians living in different regions would express sharply different feelings about the responsiveness of the federal government. Although the American case is not as obvious, a familiar theme in political discourse involves "distant" politicians in Washington favoring the "Eastern Establishment." There is, however, no evidence that region per se strongly influences political efficacy in either country, even without taking into account socio-economic variables that might create a spurious correlation between region and efficacy. As Figures 6.4a and 6.4b illustrate, mean levels of internal and external efficacy are very similar in all regions of both countries. Elite rhetoric aside, sources of variation in public feelings of political efficacy, as well as the generally low levels of efficacy, do not appear to be strongly related to perceptions of regional inequities in representation in either country.

In contemporary liberal democracies the division of political labor between elites and citizens rests on the latter trusting the former to respond to their needs and demands. Levels of political trust can be expected to influence perceptions of elites' responsiveness. To the extent that elites are responsive, trust in and support for them should be enhanced. Citizens' ability to hold unresponsive, untrustworthy elites accountable for their actions is a principal foundation of the legitimacy of a democratic political order (Macpherson 1977).

The 1980 American and the 1984 Canadian surveys contain questions that measure political trust, and the Canadian study differentiates between trust in federal and provincial political authorities. The data speak uneq-

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12 The Canadian and American trust questions are similar in theme but worded slightly differently and have different coding categories. The Canadian federal-level items are: (a) "Many people in the federal government are dishonest"; (b) "People in the federal government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes"; (c) "Most of the time we can trust people in the federal government to do what is right"; (d) "Most of the people running the government in Ottawa are smart people who usually know what they are doing." For each
Uivocally—many people in both countries question the character and competence of public officials, particularly with regard to the (mis)use of public monies. In Canada, fully 86 percent believed that "people in the federal government waste tax dollars," and 83 percent thought the same about their provincial counterparts. Large majorities also disagreed with the propositions that federal and provincial public officials are smart and can be trusted to do what is right, and substantial minorities perceived that officials at both levels are dishonest (Figure 6.5.a, 6.5.b). Although the American trust questions are somewhat different, the responses have the same negative tenor—governing elites are frequently seen as wasteful, dishonest, and lacking in probity and wisdom (Figure 6.5.c).

Answers to the political trust questions in these studies typify those from other surveys in both countries. Although it appears that levels of trust have declined in the United States since the 1960s, large numbers of Canadians and Americans consistently express distrust of political authorities (Abramson 1983; Kornberg and Clarke 1992, Ch. 3). Additionally, similar to the findings for political efficacy, regional differences in political trust are generally small, and no region has markedly higher or lower levels of trust (Figure 6.6). Given recent political history, the weak region-trust correlations in Canada are particularly noteworthy. A more detailed analysis shows that levels of trust in federal authorities are low in the Prairies and British Columbia, but not especially so, and are actually somewhat higher in Quebec than elsewhere. The problem of political trust in Canada is general, not regional, in nature.

Efficacy, Trust, and Partisanship

Relationships between party identification and political efficacy and trust constitute an important but neglected concern for understanding

statement, respondents were asked if they "agree strongly," "agree," "disagree," or "disagree strongly." Details concerning the analogous American items may be found in the 1980 ICPSR Codebook 1: 220-21.

A preliminary confirmatory factor analysis of the Canadian federal and provincial trust items suggests a four-factor solution in which items (a) and (b) at each level load on one factor and items (c) and (d) load on another. For this model, $\chi^2_{29} = 39.25, p < .001$. Since the meaning of the two trust factors at each level of government is unclear, the present analyses are based on global, additive, federal, and provincial indices.
Figure 6.4. Internal and External Political Efficacy in Canada and the United States by Region

A

Canada, 1984

BC

Prairies

Ontario

Quebec

Atlantic

Mean Score

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

External eta = .08
Internal eta = .08

B

United States, 1980

West

South

Midwest

East

Mean Score

0 1 2

External eta = .02
Internal eta = .04
Figure 6.5. *Responses to Political Trust Statements, Canada and the United States*

**Federal Political Trust Canada, 1984**

- Crooks
- Waste
- Do Right
- Smart

**Provincial Political Trust, Canada, 1984**

- Crooks
- Waste
- Do Right
- Smart

**Political Trust, United States, 1980**

- Crooks
- Waste
- Do Right
- Smart
Figure 6.6. Political Trust in Canada and the United States by Region

A

Federal Political Trust by Region, Canada, 1984

BC
Prairies
Ontario
Quebec
Atlantic

Mean Trust Score

B

Political Trust by Region, United States, 1980

West
South
Midwest
East

Mean Trust Score
political support in democratic politics. In such systems, we would expect that citizens who identify with incumbent parties also would manifest higher levels of external efficacy and political trust (Clarke and Acock 1989). These relationships, however, should not be overwhelmingly strong. That is, partisanship should not lead citizens to have blind faith in the party elites whom they support nor pervasive cynicism about those whom they oppose. Both uncritical confidence and its obverse impair citizens’ abilities to make informed judgments about elites’ performance and to hold them accountable for their (mis)deeds in office (Sniderman 1982). Such judgments are vital to the healthy functioning of a democratic order.

Analyses of the relationships between identification with governing versus opposition parties, on the one hand, and levels of external efficacy and trust, on the other, yield different results for the United States and Canada. In Canada, the relationships are virtually nonexistent at the federal level. This finding is perhaps attributable to the timing of the survey (immediately after the 1984 federal election) prompting some confusion about who respondents should think of when answering the efficacy and trust questions, i.e., were the "people in government" the outgoing Liberals or the incoming Conservatives? Suggestive in this regard are analyses using the 1983 survey data that were gathered in a nonelection context. The direction and strength of identification with the governing Liberals versus one of the opposition parties are related to both external efficacy and trust at the federal level. Although the relationships are not overwhelming, as anticipated, the highest levels of efficacy and trust occur among persons strongly identifying with the then governing Liberals (Figure 6.7.a). Similarly, the 1984 provincial analyses show that in every region identifiers with a governing provincial party have moderately stronger levels of provincial efficacy and trust than do those identifying with one of the opposition parties (Figure 6.7.b).

The American external efficacy and trust patterns are different. Regarding the former, the relationship between efficacy and partisanship is decidedly U-shaped, with the lowest efficacy expressed by nonparty identifiers, and the highest by strong Republicans (Figure 6.7.c). That nonidentifiers tend to have relatively low levels of efficacy also is evident in Canada, but the tendency is much more pronounced in the United States. The American trust analyses produce a more regular, if not monotonic, pattern across the seven-point party identification scale, with Democratic identifiers having the highest levels of trust. Again, these complexities may reflect the political context when the 1980 study was
Figure 6.7. External Political Efficacy and Political Trust by Party Identification, Canada and the United States

Note: Left vertical scale is for efficacy. Right vertical scale is for trust.
conducted. They also suggest the need for a more general multivariate investigation of the sources of political efficacy and political trust.

To this end, the efficacy and trust measures are regressed on the several socio-demographic variables used in the analyses of party identification. In Canada, formal education has the strongest effects on internal efficacy at both the federal and provincial levels, with well-educated persons being more efficacious (Table 6.5). Education also has relatively strong and positive associations with external efficacy at both levels of government. Other socio-economic variables are significant as well, with persons having higher incomes being more efficacious, and those having blue-collar occupations and working-class identifications being less so. Also, women have lower feelings of political competence and more negative perceptions of governmental responsiveness. Identification with the governing party positively affects perceptions of responsiveness at both the provincial and federal levels, with the provincial effect being the strongest of any of the predictors. The effect at the federal level is both relatively and absolutely weaker, and again is possibly an artifact of the timing of the 1984 survey. Finally, although significant regional/ethnic effects are present, region/ethnicity add less than 5 percent to the variance explained.

Contrariwise, virtually all of the socio-demographic predictors have insignificant effects on political trust (Table 6.6). Socio-economic characteristics generally are insignificant—the only exceptions being working-class identification, which is negatively related to trust at both the federal and provincial levels, and education, which is positively but weakly associated with federal trust. The region/ethnicity variables also have only minor effects. The strongest predictor of provincial trust is governing party identification. That this variable has little effect on federal trust again may reflect the circumstances of the 1984 data collection.

The American results generally mirror their Canadian counterparts. Education is the preeminent predictor of internal and external efficacy, and identification with the (governing) Democratic party has a modest (positive) impact. Region and other variables' effects are insignificant or very modest and, overall, the several predictors account for only a trivial amount of the variance in political trust. Overall, then, the analyses testify to the general weakness of regional or regional/ethnic effects on political efficacy and political trust in both federal systems. Below, we will demonstrate that region/ethnicity also has very weak relationships
Table 6.5.  Regression Analyses of Federal and Provincial Political Efficacy by Sociodemographic Characteristics, Social Class and Party Identifications, Canada, 1984

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a-p≤.001, b-p≤.01, c-p≤.05

B-standardized regression coefficient

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a-p $\leq .001$, b-p $\leq .01$, c-p $\leq .05$

B-standardized regression coefficient
with support for parties and other institutions of representative government in these systems.

**POLITICAL SUPPORT**

Electoral Choice

The deep and reinforcing regional and ethno-linguistic divisions in Canadian society and the consistent regional imbalance in party seat shares in successive federal elections might suggest to a casual observer that voting behavior is largely driven by societal cleavages. It would be easy to conclude that regional and ethnic divisions in the Canadian electorate are the functional equivalent of social class in postwar Britain and several continental European democracies (see, e.g., Butler and Stokes 1976; Epstein 1980: Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). This is not the case. Rather, the determinants of electoral support in Canada bear a striking resemblance to those in the United States—in a given election, party identification and short-term forces associated with party leaders and salient issues of the day assume crucial explanatory roles.

Stepwise multiple regressions of voting behavior in the 1984 Canadian and 1980 American national elections illustrate the relative explanatory power of region and other socio-demographic characteristics, party identification, party leader (candidate) images, and party preference on important issues. In these analyses, socio-demographic variables are entered first, and region/ethnicity (Canada) or region (the United States) is entered second. Entered next are working-class identifications, and finally party identification and measures of feelings about party leaders (candidates) and party preferences on salient issues. Since recent

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13 The dependent variables in the voting analyses are dichotomies, e.g., Liberal vote = +1, other party vote = 0. The use of such dichotomies suggests the appropriateness of probit or logit, rather than OLS regression, particularly if interest focuses on the statistical significance of the individual predictors. Since this is not our primary concern, and the utility of probit and logit $R^2$ estimates is problematic (see, e.g., Aldrich and Nelson 1984, 58-59), conventional OLS procedures are employed.

14 In both the Canadian and American analyses, the measure of feelings about party leaders is the difference between scores for leaders on 100-point thermometer scales. For Canada, the difference is between the score for the leader of the party voted for and the maximum score for leaders of other parties. For the
studies have demonstrated that party identification and feelings about leaders and issues have reciprocal causal linkages in both countries, the order of entry of these variables in a model of the vote is problematic. To demonstrate that both party identification and the leader (candidate)-issue variables make independent explanatory contributions, the regressions are run twice with the order of entry of these variables being reversed. Although this procedure does not generate unbiased estimates of the individual effects of the party identification, leader, and issue variables,\(^5\) it does provide an assessment of the explanatory power of the different types of predictors.

The Canadian results clearly show that socio-economic characteristics (education, income, occupation) do very little to explain voting for any of the three national parties. Significantly, the region/ethnicity variables also are extremely poor predictors. With all socio-demographic characteristics including region/ethnicity entered into the equations, the variance explained in Liberal, PC, and NDP voting is only 4.1 percent, 2.4 percent, and 6.5 percent, respectively (Figures 6.8.a, 6.8.b). Class identification contributes virtually no additional explanatory power. In contrast, identification with a political party, feelings about national party leaders, and attitudes involving parties’ issue positions collectively boost the explained variance to 49 percent for the Liberals, 56 percent for the PCs, and 54 percent for the NDP. Moreover, a reversal of the order of entry of party identification and the leader/issue variables (compare Figures 6.8.a and 6.8.b) demonstrates that both have independent direct effects. Party identification and the leader/issue variables share much of the explanatory variance, a finding suggestive of their reciprocal causal linkages in a properly specified model of electoral choice.

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United States, the difference is Carter’s score minus Reagan’s score. With respect to issues, for Canada, the variable used depends on the party voted for. As an example, for Liberal voting, the variable ranges from +3 (Liberal Party preferred on most important issue and issue "very important" to respondent’s vote) to 0 (no party closest or no important issue) to -3 (other party preferred and issue "very important"). For the United States, the scoring is +1 (Democrats preferred on most important problem), 0 (no party preferred or no important issue), and -1 (Republicans preferred on most important problem).

\(^5\)For such models, unbiased coefficient estimates typically are obtained using an instrumental variables’ technique, such as two-stage least squares. See, for example, Page and Jones (1979) and Archer (1987), respectively.
Figure 6.8. Explained Variance in Canadian Voting Behavior, 1984 Federal Election

A

Percent Explained

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Demo
Reg/Eth
Class Id
Federal Party Id
Leaders, Issues

Variable(s) Added to Equation

Liberal Voting
PC Voting
NDP Voting

B

Percent Explained

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Demo
Reg/Eth
Class Id
Leaders, Issues
Federal Party Id

Variable(s) Added to Equation

Liberal Voting
PC Voting
NDP Voting
The American results are very similar. Although the performance of region, other socio-demographic variables, and class identification in the United States is somewhat better than in Canada, these variables still account for precious little variance in either presidential or congressional voting (Figure 6.9). This finding occurs despite the variables' priority in the stepwise regressions. In contrast, party identification and candidate and issue orientations exert large effects at the presidential level and moderate effects at the congressional level.\textsuperscript{16} A reversal of the order of the entry of these latter sets of variables indicates that party identification and feelings about candidates and issues both make independent direct contributions to voting decisions.

Support for Political Authorities and Institutions

To understand the implications of Canadians' and Americans' low levels of political efficacy and trust, we examine the relationships between these two attitudes and support for the public officials and institutions that are central to representative government. In particular, if efficacy and trust are consequential, correlations between these attitudes and support for parliament and congress should be observed. Moreover, these relationships should be stronger in Canada than in the United States given differences in government structures in the two countries. In Canada, the fusion of executive and legislature should facilitate the attribution of responsibility for responsive and trustworthy behavior to governing (and opposition) parties in Parliament. Another elected branch of government (possibly in control of another political party) does not exist, and thereby cannot be held culpable for thwarting policies that address citizen needs and demands. In the United States, the separation of executive and legislature should inhibit the attribution of responsibility to a single institution.

The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that differences in government structures affect the relationships between political efficacy and trust, on the one hand, and institutional support, on the other. In both countries, efficacy and trust are related positively with legislative support, the latter being operationalized using 100-point thermometer scales, but the correlations are considerably stronger in Canada (Figure

\textsuperscript{16}The congressional voting results are included for only comparative purposes. A well-specified congressional-voting model would involve such variables as candidate incumbency and campaign expenditure.
Figure 6.9. *Explained Variance in American Voting Behavior, 1980 National Elections*

**A**

- *Demo*
- *Region*
- *Class*
- *1d Party*
- *1d Leaders, Issues*

Legend: □ President, ▪ Congress

Variable(s) Added to Equation

**B**

- *Demo*
- *Region*
- *Class*
- *Leaders, Issues*
- *Party Id*

Legend: □ President, ▪ Congress

Variable(s) Added to Equation
Figure 6.10. Support for Parliament and Congress by Political Efficacy and Political Trust, Canada and the United States

A

Parliament, Canada, 1984

Mean Support

70

60

50

40

30

Low Level of Efficacy/Trust High

Efficacy, eta = .26
Trust eta = .37

B

Congress, United States, 1980

Mean Support

90

80

70

60

50

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Level of Efficacy/Trust

Efficacy, eta = .11
Trust eta = .25
Moreover, Canadians and Americans hold strong expectations about their governments’ abilities to manage the national economy. Accordingly, assessments of "economic responsiveness" should be central to judgments of governing elites’ performance (e.g., Fiorina 1981). In Canada, such judgments would focus on the performance of elites in Parliament. In the United States, however, they would be cast less towards the actions of officials in Congress given that the president does and is perceived to have major responsibilities for management of the national macro-economy. Although differences in question wording in the American and Canadian surveys\(^{17}\) suggest the need for caution in interpreting the findings, there are positive relationships between public judgments about national economic performance and support for legislative institutions in both countries and, consistent with expectations, these relationships are stronger in Canada than in the United States (Figure 6.11).

It also is noteworthy that the relationships persist when controls are applied for socio-demographic characteristics that might affect support for legislatures, parties, other political institutions, and politicians considered as a group. As Table 6.7 reveals, in Canada, efficacy, trust, and economic performance evaluations have relatively large and statistically significant effects on support for Parliament and politicians, and the latter two variables have significant influences on support for parties. Net of these predictors and federal party identification, region/ethnicity weakly affects support. The American case is similar. Table 6.8 demonstrates that efficacy and trust influence support for Congress, as well as public evaluations of the performance of this institution, the presidency, and political parties. Economic performance evaluations are relevant as well, but socio-demographic variables have little impact.

**BROKERAGE PARTIES AND THE POLITICS OF LIMITED REPRESENTATION**

Public evaluations of political performance occupy a prominent place in theories of representative democracy. In Canada and the United States, many citizens feel that they are incapable of playing effective roles in the political process and that public officials are neither responsive nor

\(^{17}\)The question used in Canada links economic performance to the "federal government," whereas that employed in the United States involves evaluations of the progress of the national economy.
Figure 6.11. Support for Parliament and Congress by Evaluations of National Economic Performance, Canada and the United States

A

Support for Parliament, Canada, 1983.

Mean Support

Support for Congress, United States, 1980

B

Mean Support

* eta = .41

* eta = .16

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a-p<.001, b-p<.01, c-p<.05
B-standardized regression coefficient

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a-p≤.001, b-p≤.01, c-p≤.05
B-standardized regression coefficient
trustworthy. These feelings consistently appear in surveys conducted over the past two decades and are widespread, rather than group-specific, in both societies. Moreover, in Canada, dissatisfaction with the quality of representation is not confined to one level of the federal system. Feelings of efficacy and trust are structured by level of government but, in every region, they are strongly correlated and commonly negative at both levels.

The Canadian findings deserve comment because they contradict longstanding and often-articulated arguments that Canada’s political culture is deeply divided by reinforcing regional-ethno-linguistic cleavages (see, *inter alia*, Bell and Tepperman 1979; Elkins and Simeon 1980; Simeon and Elkins 1974; Smiley 1980; Schwartz 1974; Wilson 1974). Given the obvious importance of such cleavages in Canadian political life, these arguments have had a powerful appeal, and they have strongly influenced empirical research on mass political culture. The consequence has not been entirely salutary. Studies of public political attitudes, beliefs, and behavior frequently have suffered from a "forest-trees" syndrome—group differences have been emphasized and basic commonalities that transcend group boundaries have been downplayed or ignored.

The tendency to focus on what are often small group differences was given strong impetus by pioneering research conducted in the early and mid-1970s. For example, in one widely cited study, Simeon and Elkins (1974, 433) concluded that "there are strong differences among the citizens of Canadian provinces and among those of different language groups in some basic orientations to politics. Variations in political efficacy and political trust were especially marked." These conclusions are unwarranted. In fact, as analyses presented above illustrate, national survey data gathered over the past quarter-century repeatedly show that differences among regional and ethno-linguistic groups, even when statistically significant, are seldom strong. What is much more striking in such group comparisons is a widespread and shared negativism. Many Canadians in all regional and ethno-linguistic groups consistently express their distaste for politics and politicians and doubt the ability of ordinary citizens to influence governmental institutions and processes. In these regards, they resemble their American counterparts.

Importantly, the negative tenor of Canadians’ and Americans’ responses to survey questions concerning political efficacy and trust are not simply ritualistic and politically inconsequential (see Citrin 1974; Miller 1974a, 1974b). Citizen participation is fundamental to democratic
politics, and research in Canada, the United States, and other countries repeatedly has documented that feelings of efficacy and trust influence the likelihood that citizens will become politically active (see, e.g., Milbrath and Goel 1977; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Clarke, Kornberg, and Stewart 1985). To the extent that public involvement in various forms of political action is inhibited by a lack of requisite attitudes such as feelings of efficacy and trust, the quality of democratic political life is impoverished, and one of the key legitimizing principles of a representative democracy is undermined.

Moreover, similar to other systems of governance, the legitimacy of representative polities rests on public support. The analyses presented here and elsewhere (e.g., Clarke, Kornberg, and Stewart 1984) reveal that citizens' support for the crucial institutions of representative government, such as Parliament and Congress, as well as for the larger political regime and community, is related to evaluations of political elites' responsiveness and trustworthiness. Support, in turn, has important behavioral consequences, this being demonstrated perhaps most forcefully by the very strong correlation between support and voting behavior in the crucial 1980 sovereignty-association referendum in Quebec (Pamment et al. 1983).

Ultimately, then, explanations of the low levels of efficacy and trust among the Canadian and American publics are necessary. We suggest that an important consideration involves the nature of the party systems. In both countries, partisanship is mutable, and more so in Canada than in the United States, but even in the latter it demonstrates qualities of "bounded endogeneity." Party support is driven at any point in time by a complex of short-term forces associated with highly changeable images of party leaders and party issue performance. In contrast, the links between society and party are remarkably weak. At the level of individual voters, patterns of party identification and party voting do not tend to mirror socio-demographic differences, notably those involving region, ethnicity, or social class.

From a broader comparative perspective, it is noteworthy that in several western European countries, working-class identifications long have anchored left-of-center party support and thereby have contributed to the creation and reinforcement of psychological ties among society, party, and polity. In the United States and Canada, however, class identifications in general and working-class attachments in particular tend to be weak. For example, Canadian data show that only 4 percent of those in the 1974-79 panel consistently thought of themselves in class
terms and identified with the working class. Accordingly, such identifications do not serve as powerful linkages between socio-economic groups and political parties. Such weak or absent linkages over protracted periods of time may explain why many voters espouse negative views of the representational qualities of political parties and public officials.

The decoupling of society and polity in Canada and the United States is attributable, in part at least, to the behavior of political parties and party leaders at both the national and subnational levels of government. In their attempts to maximize public support by constructing broadly based coalitions that transcend salient societal cleavages in highly diverse socio-political milieus, party elites have opted for "brokerage politics" strategies (see, e.g., Page 1978; Clarke et al. 1984; Thorburn 1985). These strategies emphasize party leader personality and style and "quick-fix" solutions to societal problems as these are defined by highly mutable issue agendas. Unattractive leaders are quickly discarded, and controversial positional issues that threaten to imperil electoral success by dividing the electorate are downplayed or avoided entirely. Brokerage politics strategies have proven electoral utility in North American political settings, but they militate against the development of clearly defined, coherent, alternative policy programs, and inhibit the forging of society-party links that ground public perceptions of political representation and trust.

It is important to emphasize that the ubiquity of brokerage politics is not the product of ill-intentioned, conspiratorial political elites. On the contrary, brokerage strategies constitute rational responses to prevailing socio-political circumstances by competing groups of political actors who have strong incentives to maximize the currency of power, votes, in elections that determine their individual and collective political futures. Since the socio-political contexts that give rise to "brokerage politics" strategies in Canada and the United States change slowly, if at all, continued adherence to these strategies is highly likely. As a consequence, it is very probable that many Canadians and Americans in every region of their respective countries will continue to manifest attitudes and beliefs that are odds with the ideals of representative democracy.
REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

Traditional comparative analyses of federal systems have emphasized the jurisdictional relationship between general and regional governments involving elements of self-rule and shared rule that are constitutionally secured. But a preoccupation with intergovernmental relations within federations neglects a crucial dimension of the federal experience. Indeed, students of federal systems have noted that in virtually every federation special arrangements for the representation of territorial entities have been incorporated within the structure of the central institutions in order to accommodate the concerns of a variety of regional and minority groups (Smiley and Watts 1985, 35-61). Preston King (1982) has even gone so far as to suggest that the definitive characteristic of federations lies not in jurisdictional division but in the constitutional entrenchment of regional power within the central institutions. While a valuable corrective to formulations that focus exclusively or almost exclusively on the division of powers between national and state or provincial governments and on intergovernmental relations, King’s position surely overstates the case (Smiley and Watts 1985, 2-4). Nevertheless, virtually
every federal political system has attempted to accommodate and secure
the position of the regional units within the federation by both a
distribution of jurisdiction between the general and regional governments
and by arrangements intended to ensure that the interests of the regional
units—the interests of either the government or the residents of these
units—are channelled through and protected by the structures and
operations of the central government. The comparative study of the
character of representation in the United States and Canada addresses,
therefore, this fundamental aspect within the broader North American
Federalism Project.

For the purpose of a comparative overview of representation in the
two North American Federations, this chapter identifies eight sets of
issues: (1) the impact of the form of executive and representative
institutions upon federalism; (2) bicameralism and federalism; (3)
representation in the national bureaucracies; (4) the impact of the form of
the distribution of powers upon representation, policymaking, and
regional or national focus; (5) political parties, interest groups, and
federalism; (6) the control of the franchise and electoral laws; (7) the
head of state as a unifying symbol; and (8) patterns of convergence or
divergence between the two federations. Under each heading the main
focus will be on U.S.-Canada comparisons, but brief references to
comparisons with other federations will also be made to give added
perspective.

REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS, THE
EXECUTIVE AND FEDERALISM

The Separation or Fusion of Powers

The most important institutional difference between the United States
and Canada affecting the character of intergovernmental relations and also
the representation of regional views and the generation of consensus
within the national institutions is the impact of the separation of executive
and legislative powers in the United States and the fusion of these in
Canada (Watts 1987, 187-91; Smiley 1984; Lemco and Regenstreif 1984;
Sproule-Jones 1984). The modern federations that preceded Canada—the
United States and Switzerland—both incorporated the principle of the
separation of powers within each level of government as an integral
feature of federal organization. It was a Canadian innovation to combine
federalism with the institution of parliamentary cabinets, derived from its
British colonial heritage and a conscious desire to be non-American. Indeed, the Macdonald Commission in 1985 described the parliamentary system, federalism, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the three pillars of the Canadian constitutional system (Royal Commission on the Economic Union 1985, vol. 1, 14-23). It has long been recognized that the hybrid arrangement of combining parliamentary and federal institutions, subsequently followed in Australia and a number of other Commonwealth federations including India, Malaysia, and for a time, Pakistan and Nigeria, and adopted with modifications in Germany, has had a significant impact on the operation of federalism (Walker 1961; Watts 1970a, 15-22; Bowie and Friedrich 1954, 69-72, 86-87, 94-96, 96-99). Each of our chapters emphasizes this factor as an important key to the contrasts in the operation of federalism in the United States and Canada. In the United States power within each level of government is dispersed among a number of bodies who check and balance each other. In Canada the parliamentary executives, through rigid party discipline based on the potential power of dissolution, have produced within each level of government a concentration of power in the executives, and particularly the first ministers. These executive-centred institutions in Canada have affected the character of intergovernmental relations, the representation of regional viewpoints within the national institutions, and the processes for generating national cohesion.

Implications for the Character of Intergovernmental Relations

In the United States, the diffusion of authority within each order of government has enabled the development of many points of contact and interpenetration between the orders of government. It has also provided multiple cracks enhancing the access of interest groups to the political process. As noted in the Olson and Weber chapter, governmental cooperative arrangements have tended to be along programmatic lines involving the interaction of congressional subcommittees, federal agencies, state bureaucrats and legislators, city officials, and interest groups in a complex web of relationships (Elazar 1984, 47-108; Glendening and Reeves 1984, 68-124). Thus congressionalism has inhibited direct confrontation of federal and state governments. The administrative and political interpenetration between the levels of government has led to the description of intergovernmental relations in the United States in terms of "marble cake" federalism or, more recently, even "fruitcake federalism" (Grodzins 1967, 257; Wildavsky 1983, 182-86). As we have
seen in both American papers, state-national relations are both diverse and diffuse.

In Canada with its executive-centred parliamentary institutions, the dominance of the cabinets has made the executives the focus of relations between the two orders of government. This "executive federalism," as Donald Smiley has labelled it, has meant that intergovernmental relations have often operated in a manner not unlike international diplomacy (Smiley 1980, 91-119; Simeon 1972). The impact of executive federalism in Canada has led to four significant differences in the character of intergovernmental relations from those in the United States. First, the negotiation of intergovernmental relations has been left less to technicians. Instead, ministers and politicians, particularly the first ministers, have played a more prominent role. Second, there has been a tendency for individual projects for functional cooperation to be subsumed under more general arrangements for coordination. Third, there has been a tendency within each government for cooperative arrangements to be placed under the control of staff agencies exclusively concerned with intergovernmental affairs. Fourth, summit conferences of federal and provincial governmental leaders, exemplified by the regular meetings of the First Minister's Conference, have become the major and frequently used instrument for the resolution of problems in intergovernmental relations. (By comparison, when U.S. President George Bush met with the 50 U.S. state governors in 1989 to discuss education, it was only the third time in American history that such a meeting of "executive federalism" had taken place.) Interestingly, the same impact upon intergovernmental relations from the marriage of parliamentary institutions with federalism can be observed in those other federations that have adopted a similar hybrid (Watts 1989a, 1989b). Thus, in Canada, by contrast with the United States, intergovernmental relations have taken on a quasi-diplomatic character, and Canadian federalism has exhibited a more distinctly "layer cake" pattern.

The significance of these contrasting patterns of intergovernmental relations for representation within these two federations is clear in the much more prominent role that legislators and interest groups play in relations in the United States and in the dominance of executives and intergovernmental specialists in these processes in Canada. Congress, as a national representative body, plays a crucial role in the resolution of intergovernmental issues and in the design of intergovernmental programmes. By contrast in Canada, as the frustration of parliamentarians and members of provincial legislative assemblies over the ultimately
unsuccessful constitutional reform processes of the Meech Lake Accord during 1987-90 and the "Canada Round" during 1990-92 illustrated, it has been the first ministers and their specialist departments of intergovernmental relations that have dominated the resolution of intergovernmental relations and constitutional reform.

Implications for the Representation of Regional Views in National Institutions and the Generation of Federal Consensus

The difference in the form of the executive in the United States and Canada has also shaped the processes for accommodating and reconciling regional and minority interests within their national institutions. In the United States, the separation of powers, as stressed by Olson and Weber, has enabled the relatively effective representation and accommodation of state and local interests within Congress. This point is also discussed in the Hamm-Luttbeg chapter. Indeed, Daniel Elazar has argued that the representation of the state interests in Congress has been an important factor in preserving state integrity, vis-à-vis national executive power (Elazar 1984, 178). However, as a result of Supreme Court judgments, particularly Garcia, the constitutional doctrine of states rights has been eroded in favour of the protection of their interests through congressional representation (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 1985). This effective representation of state and local views within Congress has been due to two factors. One is the weakness in party discipline within both houses flowing from the separation of powers. The other is the possibility, where the cabinet is not responsible to the lower house, of making the Senate with its equal representation of the states at least as powerful as the House of Representatives.

In Canada, by contrast, the strict party discipline resulting from parliamentary government and the conventionally subordinate role of the Senate derived from the cabinet's responsibility to the House of Commons has affected the ability of Parliament as a whole to represent and accommodate regional interests. This has been further accentuated by the lack of legitimacy for the Senate as a regionally representative body because it is a centrally appointed second chamber. Although as Stewart has noted in his chapter, the regional caucuses within the parties in Parliament play a role in influencing policy (Thomas 1985, 72, 123-27), there are not the same opportunities for the visible expression and reconciliation of regional interests within Parliament as in Congress, nor are there institutional checks upon a government that has the support of
a majority within the House of Commons. Thus, the Canadian Parliament in its processes has been fundamentally majoritarian in character (Smiley 1987, 192; Royal Commission Economic Union 1985, 139-40). Consequently, whereas the United States Congress accommodates and resolves conflicting state interests on national issues through a variety of shifting coalitions, in Canada interest groups who feel they lack effective access in Ottawa have turned instead to the provincial premiers as the principal spokesmen of regional interests on the national scene. In Canada regional interests have become the source of heated contention at federal-provincial summit conferences, and it is in this arena that the primary efforts to reconcile them occur. To Prime Minister Trudeau's question "Who speaks for Canada?" the commonly understood answer now appears to be Premier Lougheed's response: "The eleven heads of government: the prime minister and the premiers."

To what degree any of the recently proposed reforms for an elected Senate would have altered the fundamental majoritarian characteristics of the Canadian system remains an open question. The case of Australia is instructive. There an elected upper house, the Senate, co-exists with an elected House of Representatives (counterpart to the Canadian House of Commons). While each Australian state is equally represented, voting behaviour in the Senate has long settled into a pattern determined by strong party discipline, cutting across state differences. In any case, neither the Australian nor a reformed Canadian Senate would provide the range of opportunities afforded by the American system for multiple access to decision makers.

**BICAMERALISM AND FEDERALISM**

**The Origins of Bicameralism in the Two Federations**

Students of federalism have often debated whether bicameralism is an essential yardstick of federalism (Duchacek 1987, 244-52). But while most stable federal systems have had bicameral federal legislatures, second chambers in federal systems have varied considerably in form, and two short-lived federations—Pakistan and Rhodesia and Nyasaland—had unicameral legislatures (Watts 1970c, 315-55; 1966, 255-65).

The origins of bicameralism in the United States lay in the Connecticut Compromise, an integral element in the federal system agreed upon at Philadelphia. The American founders agreed on a representation proportional to population in the lower house combined with an equal
representation of states, two per state, in the Senate to meet the concerns of the smaller states that their interests would be overridden in a Congress in which representation was based solely upon population (Federalist Papers). As originally established, the character of the Senate as a states’ house was also emphasized by the provision that senators were to be elected by the state legislatures. Furthermore, the bicameralism established in the United States was a true and full one because the two houses were equal in matters of legislation. No law could be enacted unless both houses agreed on the same text.

Canada in 1867 established a very different form of Senate. The issue of the form that it should take was a contentious one, six of 14 days at the Quebec Conference of 1864 being spent on it. Moreover, most members of the coalition from the Canadas thought of federalism largely in terms of composition of the central legislature—i.e., representation by population in the lower house and equal regional representation in the upper house—and hence the Senate rather than the division of powers preoccupied their attention (Waite 1962, 111). But they abandoned the principle of an elected upper house that had already been experimented with in the Canadas since 1855. In order not only to represent the interests of the regions and minorities, but also to protect the interests of property and to provide "sober second thought," the nominative principle was agreed upon. Thus a system was adopted in which senators were in effect appointed for life on the nomination of the prime minister. In addition, the principle of regional equality was applied not to provinces as such but to regional blocks, with initially 24 senators each from three regions—Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime provinces. Furthermore, although nominally the Senate had virtually equal legislative power with the House of Commons, the understanding right from the beginning that the cabinet would be responsible only to the House of Commons ensured that the Senate would occupy a politically subordinate role.

Canada is unique among federations in distributing representation in the federal second chamber in terms of regional blocks and in adopting the principle of central appointment (Smiley and Watts 1985, 52-59). The others have based representation in the second chamber either upon equal representation of states (e.g., U.S., Switzerland, Australia, Malaysia) or upon representation of states weighted to favour the smaller states
The method of appointment has generally been direct election (U.S. since 1913, Switzerland by individual choice of the cantons, and Australia), indirect election by state legislatures (India and Malaysia), or by state appointment (Germany). In terms of the relative power of the second chamber, Switzerland, because of the incorporation of the principle of the separation of powers, was able to follow the American example and make the two federal houses co-equal. Those federations that have combined federal and parliamentary institutions have all had to establish second chambers less powerful than the house to which the cabinet is responsible, although both Australia and Germany adopted special arrangements enabling their second chambers to exercise more than a suspensive veto (Smiley and Watts 1985, 54-55).

The Evolution of Bicameralism

While the American Senate originally may have been conceived as a house representing state governments, its evolution led to its transformation into a "national body." An important step in that evolution was the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 by which direct election replaced election by state legislatures. Now, with the direct election of senators and the lack of instruction from the states, the Senate is a forum for national interests as much as for state interests. Nevertheless, the lack of party discipline and the statewide constituency from which senators are elected means that the Senate is still very strongly representative of regional, state, and sectional interests.

In Canada, the combination of the political prominence of the House of Commons and the prevailing tendency of prime ministers to use Senate appointments to reward partisans for past political contributions, has undermined the political legitimacy of the Senate as a body representing the interests of the regions and minorities of Canada (Simpson 1988). Most Canadians seem to be agreed on the need for Senate reform, but reform has until now proven impossible largely because of lack of

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2 Note that in Switzerland and Malaysia the principle of state equality was modified by distinguishing in the former between full and half cantons and in the latter by adding a substantial number of appointed members.
agreement upon the shape that reform should take. Countless proposals have been advanced.³

In the continuing absence of Senate reform, it should be noted that the weakness of the Canadian Senate in representing regional and provincial interests, stressed by Stewart, has itself been a factor contributing to the prominence of the provincial premiers as spokesmen for provincial interests on the national scene. They have simply moved into the vacuum. Many of the proponents of Senate reform have seen it as a way of counterbalancing the prominence of the premiers in national affairs by creating an effective alternative set of representatives for regional interests within the national institutions (Smiley and Watts 1985, Ch. 3).

The other pressure for Senate reform in Canada comes from its anomalous composition. The Western provinces, which found themselves in a virtually permanent minority both in the Trudeau governments and again in the broad 1984 and 1988 Conservative majorities of the Mulroney government, have had no counterbalancing influence in the current Senate. The principle of representation by regional blocks has left the four Western provinces with representation only equal to each of Ontario and Quebec and less than that of the combined total of the four Atlantic provinces. This explains the seductive appeal in western Canada of proposals for a "Triple-E Senate" (discussed below) that would reinforce the clout of the Western provinces in national affairs. But neither this movement, nor the Macdonald Commission, which also pinned excessive faith on Senate reform as a solution to the problems of representational federalism in Canada, adequately faced up to the issue of how an effective elected Senate was to be reconciled with responsible cabinet government. That combination not only has made the Australian Senate more of a party house than a state house (as noted above), but has also been the source of constitutional crises in that federation (Smiley and Watts 1985, 54-55, 130-33; Smiley 1985, 13-20).

The Meech Lake Accord effort to achieve constitutional reform, 1987-90, initially began as an attempt to reconcile Quebec to the

constitutional reforms incorporated in the Constitution Act, 1982, to which Quebec had not been a signatory. Senate reform was not a priority for Quebec, but in order to have the agreement of other provinces, particularly the Western and Atlantic provinces, the drafters of the Meech Lake Accord included an interim role for provincial governments in appointing senators. At the same time the issue of overall Senate reform was explicitly placed on an agenda for future rounds of constitutional reform.

The accord did not receive the required ratification of all provinces within the time limit prescribed by the Constitution and thus failed to pass. In a last minute attempt to get the agreement of the last two legislatures in Manitoba and Newfoundland, agreement was tentatively reached in June 1990 upon a process to re-allocate Senate seats more equitably among the provinces, to provide for direct election of senators, and to adjust the Senate’s powers. This parallel agreement, however, also died with the Meech Lake Accord.

In the subsequent process of constitutional deliberations following the demise of Meech Lake, Senate Reform was a key part of the continuing negotiations. During the intergovernmental bargaining, a coalition of five provinces pushed forcefully for what they called a "Triple-E" reform of the Senate (for Elected, Equal provincial representation and Effective powers in relation to the House of Commons). Other provinces and the federal government, while conceding the need for an elected Senate, put forward proposals for an "equitable" Senate, with representation weighted in favour of the smaller provinces but not strictly equal in number, and with reduced powers for the Senate in comparison with the House of Commons. In August 1992 agreement was reached upon a Senate that would be directly elected and in which provinces would be equally represented. The powers of the proposed Senate would have been limited, however, by the requirement that for most ordinary legislation deadlocks would be broken by the requirement of a simple majority in a joint sitting where the substantially larger size of the House of Commons would have given it predominance. This latter provision, together with the promise of adjustments in the composition of the House of Commons to move rapidly to a more accurate representation according to population and a guarantee to Quebec of 25 percent of the seats in the Commons (which it currently possesses), was designed to reconcile the more populous provinces and Quebeckers to provincial equality in the Senate. In the event, the Charlottetown Agreement, of which those proposals were a basic element, failed to obtain endorsement in the Canada-wide
referendum held on 26 October, 1992, and therefore the current Senate remains unchanged.

**REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL BUREAUCRACIES**

**The Impact of the Form of Government**

The impact of the different forms of government with which federalism has been combined in the two federations has also been reflected in the traditions and representativeness of their public services. In the United States the public services have been more politicized and more entrepreneurial in their relations with both Congress and the states, and in developing intergovernmental programs. Furthermore, the close interaction of administrative agencies with their clientele groups has often made those agencies into influential representatives of the interests of these groups.

In Canada parliamentary traditions have put more emphasis upon the nonpartisan expertise of the public servants for whose policies the ministers themselves are ultimately responsible to Parliament than upon the representativeness of the public services. In the relations between public servants and ministers, there may be questions about who really formulates policy, but there is no question about the ultimate focus of political responsibility for decisions lying with ministers and the cabinet. Thus, although the Canadian federal bureaucracy is roughly representative in regional terms as Stewart tells us in his chapter, functional rather than regional factors have been the basis upon which the organization of the bureaucracy has been developed (Aucoin and Bakvis 1985, 57; Kernaghan 1985, 44-47; Smiley and Watts 1985, 55-58). Furthermore, as noted by Smith in his chapter, the predominance of executive federalism focused upon federal-provincial interaction has meant that governmental relations with interest groups have taken the form of consultation rather than negotiation (Kernaghan 1982, 89).

**The Impact of the Francophone Minority**

A socio-economic rather than institutional factor affecting the representative character of the bureaucracy in the United States and Canada in different ways is the size and distribution of minority ethnic populations. The most significant minority groups in the United States, the blacks and the Hispanics, each constitute less than 13 percent of the
total population and do not represent a majority in any state. The francophones, Canada's most significant single minority group, comprise 26 percent of the total population, and are strongly concentrated in one province, Quebec, where they form 80 percent of that province's population. There are significant francophone minorities elsewhere too, most notably New Brunswick and Ontario. This has led to the recognition of French as a second official language in Canada. Following the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Dunton-Laurendeau), which issued a series of reports during 1965-1970, (Royal Commission on Bilingualism Preliminary Report 1965, Book I 1964, Book II 1968, Book III 1969, Book IV 1970) there were efforts to provide federal services more broadly in both official languages, and attempts to make the federal bureaucracy more effectively bilingual both by increasing the francophone component and by French language training for nonfrancophone public servants.

The geographic concentration of the growing Hispanic population in particular states in the U.S. may in future raise issues similar to those that have been prominent in Canada. But in Canada to date the issue of bilingualism in relation to the composition and operation of the federal public service bears closer resemblance to those that have been prominent in such other multi-ethnic federations as Switzerland, India, and Nigeria (Watts 1970b, 67-72).

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND ITS RELATION TO REPRESENTATION AND POLICYMAKING

Jurisdictional Versus Functional Distribution of Powers

A fundamental feature of any federal system is the distribution of authority between the national and the state or provincial governments. But the form of the distribution of powers and the scope of authority assigned to each order of government varies significantly among federations, and this may have important implications for the character of representation appropriate in the national institutions and for the extent to which policymaking has a national or regional focus.

One important difference may lie in the distinction between what W. M. Chandler has called a "jurisdictional" and a "functional" distribution of powers, or what has elsewhere been called "legislative" and "administrative" federalism (Chandler 1987, 157-61; Smiley and Watts 1985, 45-47; Bowie and Friedrich 1954, 78-81). A "jurisdictional" or "legislative"
distribution of powers is one in which the object is to create two levels of jurisdiction, each with its own well-defined legislative and corresponding administrative authority. A "functional" or "administrative" distribution of powers is one that assigns the policy primacy or legislative authority of an area to one level of government while assigning responsibility for implementation or administration of that area to the other level of government.

In broad constitutional terms the United States and Canada, as well as Australia, belong to the former category, while Switzerland and Germany have a substantial degree of the latter in their distribution of authority. One might note that the newer Commonwealth federations established since 1945, particularly those in Asia, have also included significant elements of administrative federalism.

But what has been the significance of this for representation in relation to policymaking? It is perhaps significant that in both Germany and Switzerland, where for substantial areas legislation is a responsibility of the federal legislature and administration rests with the laender or the cantons, there has been constitutional provision for the representation of the constituent units in the national policymaking bodies. Examples are the prominent role of the Bundesrat in Germany and the provision for dual membership in the cantonal and federal legislatures in Switzerland. By contrast, the federations characterized constitutionally by jurisdictional federalism, including the United States and Canada, have no such formal provisions for the representation of state or provincial governments in the national legislature.

Having made this contrast, we must be cautious not to overdraw its implications. While the distribution of authority under the United States Constitution is "jurisdictional," in practice the growth of intergovernmental cooperative programs and the increasing responsibilities placed on the states to enforce national laws and administer national programs has meant that in practice there is a considerable "functional" character to the way in which policies are formulated by Congress and implemented by states and localities. This has made both Congress and the agencies, Olson and Weber note, centres not only for the activities of interest groups but indeed also for the intergovernmental lobbies (Beer 1987).

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4About one quarter of the members in each of the Swiss federal houses sit concurrently in a cantonal legislature or executive.
In Canada, criminal law is constitutionally allocated in "functional" terms representing an exception to the general pattern of constitutional assignment. The federal Parliament legislates the criminal code, but the provinces are fully responsible for administering it (Constitution Act 1867). Here, too, a considerable number of intergovernmental cooperative programmes have been developed. But the more limited extent of these and the influence of "executive federalism" have meant that representatives in Parliament have not been the focus for policymaking on this topic in the way in which the representatives in Congress have.

**Shared vs. Exclusive Powers and Their Implications**

In examining the significance of the form of the distribution of authority on representation and policymaking, one significant contrast between the United States and Canada is the extent to which this distribution has emphasized the extent of shared or exclusive authority. The United States Constitution identifies a considerable range of shared functions. Although the many concurrent areas of jurisdiction are potentially areas of federal control since federal law prevails in cases of conflict, the Constitution actually enumerates very few areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Moreover, as authors like Grodzins and Elazar have pointed out, shared rule has been a predominant characteristic of American federalism (Elazar 1984, 31-39, 51-54, 74-76, 88, 181-91). This has resulted in a growing number of state offices and officials in Washington.

The emphasis in the Canadian Constitution has been less on sharing and more on the formal demarcation of exclusive responsibilities. Indeed, the original British North America Act of 1867 (now Constitution Act, 1867) defined only two areas of concurrent jurisdiction: immigration and agriculture. But in practice, with the development of new governmental activities unforeseen in 1867, different aspects of the same broad area are now often dealt with by different levels of government. Nevertheless, the constitutional emphasis on the demarcation of exclusive responsibilities rather than upon shared responsibilities has had an impact on intergovernmental rivalry, the focus of judicial review and public attitudes. It has helped to reinforce the competitive character of "executive federalism" and the more "layer cake" nature of Canadian federalism. In turn this predominantly dualistic outlook may help to explain the considerable resistance that has met proposals for the representation of provincial governments within national institutions, such as those in the late 1970s
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for Senate reform in the direction of a "House of the Provinces," some of them based on the German Bundesrat model. These proposals often assumed that such an institution would contribute to more harmonious intergovernmental policymaking (Task Force on Canadian Unity 1979, 94-95). Critics, many with theoretical foundations in the public choice school, have argued against such institutional reforms directed at improving the basis for intergovernmental cooperation. In their view competitive federalism arising from clearly demarcated exclusive legislative roles for federal and provincial legislatures, is likely to be more efficient in serving the public interest than "the collusion" implicit in cooperative federalism (Breton 1985, 501-03).

POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND FEDERALISM

Political Parties

The literature on political parties in each of the two federations is extensive, but for purposes of comparison we might focus on four aspects in relation to the subject of representation: the organizational relationship between national and state or provincial party organizations, the degree of symmetry or asymmetry between national and state or provincial party alignments, the impact of party discipline upon the representation of interests within each level of government, and the pattern of political careers.

In terms of party organization, historically the national parties in the United States were loose confederations of state and local party organizations. This decentralized pattern of party organization contributed to the maintenance of noncentralized government and the prominence in Congress of state and local interests (Gibbins 1982, 119-44; Elazar 1984, 48). But as a result of the intraparty reforms of the 1970s and the developing practices of the 1980s, both parties have evolved from loose confederations to more federalized structures weakening to some extent state and local influence within the national parties (Weikin 1985; Truman 1984-85). Nevertheless, party organization is not yet as fully federalized as that in Canada. As Stewart and Smith both emphasize, what was once in Canada a more integrated relationship between the federal and provincial branches of the parties has become separated into two virtually autonomous layers of party organization (Smiley 1987, 103-23). This change has contributed to the more dualistic character of
federalism in Canada by contrast with the United States (Stevenson 1982, 180-83).

In both the United States and Canada there is a degree of asymmetry in the alignment of federal and state and federal and provincial political parties (Duchacek 1987, 336). In the United States, while there is a two-party competitive system in national politics, many states have either a competitive one-party rule or a three-or-more-party system. In Canada the federal three-party system is replicated in Ontario and Manitoba, but elsewhere there are enormous variations at the provincial level in the relative prominence of different parties including in the case of Quebec a strictly provincial Parti Québécois (Gibbins 1985, 271-74, 304). These parties have tended to reinforce the regional political distinctiveness of many of the provinces. Furthermore, there has also been an asymmetry in the regional strengths of the national parties over the last two decades. Indeed, this led to concerns about the lack of representation of the West in the Trudeau Liberal governments and of Quebec in the Clark Conservative government of 1979-80, as Stewart observes. Furthermore, there have been concerns about the way in which the electoral system has tended to distort representational perceptions of the polity (Smiley and Watts 1985, 98-101). This is discussed in our chapter on parties.

A contrast between American and Canadian political parties is the much higher degree of party discipline operating at both levels in Canada. A crucial factor here has been the impact of the separation of powers in the former and the fusion of powers in the latter, referred to earlier. Although in recent years regional caucuses have developed within the national parties in Ottawa, the strict party discipline that has characterized the House of Commons and the recent tendency of the senators to take party positions, has limited the visible expression and accommodation of regional and minority viewpoints within Parliament.

An area that illustrates the contrast in representational patterns in the two federations is the difference in the normal patterns of political careers. In the United States the most prestigious political positions are in Washington, and state politics and governships are one of the normal routes to the presidency. Throughout the electoral system of local, state, and national offices, a hierarchy of political careers is evident. Canada began at Confederation in 1867 with a very high proportion of members of Parliament with provincial or municipal electoral experience, but this proportion has been in steady decline to the point where less than a third of the members in recent Parliaments have held any previous elected office. Only rarely, Smith finds, have major federal political leaders been
drawn from the ranks of provincial premiers (Franks 1987, 72; Ward
1963, 123; Van Loon and Whittington 1987, 461; Gibbins 1985, 305).
Indeed, it has been the norm for many of Canada's most ambitious
politicians to fulfill their entire careers in provincial politics, and few
premiers have moved on into prominent federal government careers.

Interest Groups

The pervasive activity of interest groups in different levels of
government and the prominent role they play in Washington in relation
to congressional subcommittees and departments, bureaus and agencies,
whether in "iron triangles" or "issue networks," is a product of the
multiple cracks that federalism, the separation of powers and loose party
discipline provide (Grodzins 1966, 274-76; Cater 1964; Freeman 1965;

Analysts of the operation of interest groups in Canada have tended
to question the applicability of the "multiple crack" hypothesis in Canada
due to differences flowing from the absence of a separation of powers and
also due to the form of the distribution of powers between govern-
ments (Thorburn 1985, 60-68). The dominance of "executive federalism"
has limited the influence of interest groups in areas subject to federal-
provincial negotiation or has led to their co-option by one side or the
other (Simeon 1972, 144-45; Schultz 1977, 392-94). Generally, Canadian
interest groups seem to be smaller and less specialized than the American
and their national offices are less dominant. On the other hand, they
have had the advantage of being able to deal with less fragmented
governmental structures of decision making (Smiley 1984).

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Control of Franchise and Electoral Laws

An important factor influencing patterns of representation in the
United States is the control and operation of the franchise and electoral
laws. In virtually all modern federations except the United States, the
constitutions authorize the federal government to regulate elections to and
determine the qualifications of voters in relation to the national institu-
tions (Bowie and Friedrich 1954, 6). Usually state electoral matters have
been left to state election officials although in some instances, as in
Australia, federal law has come to impose uniformity on state elections (Bowie and Friedrich 1954, 30).

In the United States, however, initially many of the national electoral matters were left to state regulation thus emphasizing the noncentralization of national politics. Nevertheless, in recent decades a series of Supreme Court judgments following Baker v. Carr and the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and amendments in 1970, 1975, and 1982 have extended federal authority broadly into areas previously reserved to state and local governments (Landau 1965, 241-48; Cotrell 1986; Glendenning and Reeves 1984, 95-96). Thus, it might be said that the control of electoral laws in the United States has moved broadly from diversity to Court-imposed uniformity.

Canada has from the beginning followed the more broadly common pattern of control of electoral laws in federal systems. The first national election provisions were enacted by Parliament in the 1870s and constituency boundaries have been established by commissions operating under federal law. The provinces on the other hand have electoral systems governed by provincial electoral acts.

The addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the Constitution in 1982, binding on both orders of government, does, however, now impose certain standards in relation to citizenship rights (Constitution Act 1982). Recent court judgments in Canada have applied the charter to affect issues of representation and constituency boundaries in British Columbia and Saskatchewan.5 The courts have knocked down provincial constituency boundary changes as violating section 3 (right to vote) of the charter, reducing the latitude for rural overrepresentation. The trend of the courts in the U.S. to accommodate communities of interest has had no discernible impact as yet, however, on Canadian cases. Charter challenges on electoral spending and enfranchisement may also in time force a degree of uniformity on provincial electoral law (Hiebert 1989-90; Globe and Mail, July 20, 1988).

Impact of Electoral Systems

For elections to national legislatures both federations have used the single-member plurality system. Together they are unique among

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developed federations in avoiding any element of proportional representation. Olson and Weber comment that in the United States, the single-member plurality system combined with separate presidential elections, in which capturing the single post of the presidency requires a broad interregional coalition, has produced a national two-party system in which each party is a broad confederation seeking to encompass a wide variety of regional viewpoints.

In Canada the combination of the single-member plurality system with a parliamentary cabinet system has created some different effects. Indeed, during the 1970s and early 1980s a considerable literature developed in Canada, as noted by Stewart, on the distorting effect of the electoral system and its tendency to overrepresent parties receiving a majority vote within a region thereby exaggerating the degree of regional support or nonsupport for each national party (Cairns 1968; Gibbins 1985, 270-79). Not only did this deprive the Trudeau and Clark governments of effective caucus representation in Ottawa from certain regions, but it reinforced the public perceptions of regional political blocks within the country.

In recent years as a result of more broadly based critiques of the representativeness of national institutions, proportional representation has again been proposed in Canada as a means to allow for greater representation of gender and of various minority groups in society. During the constitutional debate of 1991-92, several proposals for Senate reform involved some element of proportional representation for elections to the Senate.  

UNIFYING SYMBOLS: THE HEAD OF STATE

The way in which the head of state serves as a unifying symbol contrasts sharply in the two federations: the United States has a political head of state and Canada a monarchical head of state.

As a result of the elected presidency in the United States in the place of a British style of monarchy, the president has come to serve as a focal point for American society. This fusion of roles can help the executive cultivate a supportive public opinion. On the other hand the conflicting

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6For a brief discussion of how Senate reform may partially meet perceived distortions in the federal electoral system in Canada, see Watts 1991, 320-31.
roles of national leader and party leader may sometimes undermine the degree to which the president can serve as a unifying symbol.

In two respects the American presidency serves an important representational role. First, the need to capture the single post has been an important factor in inducing a system of two parties each attempting to establish a broad enough coalition to achieve a majority. Furthermore, the electoral college pattern of counting votes in presidential elections has meant that candidates have sought not just a national majority but a series of majorities within states, thus emphasizing the importance of being sensitive to regional views. This process has been further accentuated by the increased importance of primaries in the nomination process. The second representational aspect of the presidency is the way in which usually the choice of a vice-presidential candidate has been based upon the imperative of a "balanced ticket," thus broadening through the pair of candidates the interregional appeal in electoral campaigns.

When Canadians rejected the notion of an elected president it was on the grounds that the monarchical principle would avoid what was thought to be a defect inherent in the American model: that partisan leadership of a political party would undermine the ability to serve as a unifying symbol (Macdonald 1865, 33). A sovereign would be seen as above party and thus serve as a source of unity within a diverse society. As the component of the Canadian population derived from British stock has over time declined from a majority position, increasingly the question has been raised whether the monarchy serves as a real source of unity in what is now clearly a plural society. To some extent this concern has been met by introducing a representational tradition into the appointment of governors-general. For a period, the position alternated between English and French Canadians, but with the appointment of Governor General Shreyer in 1974, a new pattern including in the rotation a Canadian of neither British or French origin appears to have become operative thus extending the representational symbolism of the post.

The closest Canada comes to an electoral process for national leadership is in the national party conventions to elect party leaders, although strictly speaking this does not relate to the head of state because party leadership is separated from that. Some elements of direct democracy by party members are beginning to take hold in some provincial parties. Recent national party leadership votes, however, have demonstrated no direct electoral role by party members and certainly no formal direct role by the provinces in comparison with the U.S. primaries and electoral college. Nonetheless regional input into the selection of
national party leaders is provided implicitly through the federal nature of the three major national parties and by candidate selection at the constituency level for national party conventions. In the conventions voting strengths by region are determined by party strength in the region so that, for example, the role of the Quebec delegates in electing national Liberal party leaders, or of Saskatchewan delegates in electing national N.D.P. leaders, is disproportionate to the general provincial populations. Also, all three national parties provide voting rights for their party’s members in provincial legislatures and for provincial party leaders (Courtney 1973, 106; Jackson, Jackson, and Baxter-Moore 1986, 453; Lele, Perlin, and Thorburn 1979, 77-88).

PATTERNS OF CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE

Since federal systems are always in a process of evolution, a question that arises in any comparative study is whether this evolution is in the direction of convergence or divergence. Both have in common the basic features usually attributed to federal systems and both, situated as neighbours on the North American continent, are subject to similar global political and economic pressures. One might therefore expect patterns of convergence. But at the same time there are divergent factors shaping the two federations: the geographical concentration in Canada of the most significant minority groups and their diffusion in the United States, contrasts in the degree to which the regional economies are integrated, and the differing geopolitical status of the two federations on the international scene. The institutional differences also shape the development of these federations: the separation of powers in the United States and the fusion of powers in Canada within each level of government, the form and scope of the authority distributed between the orders of government and the number and relative size of the constituent units.\footnote{For a more detailed discussion of these socio-economic and institutional factors see Watts 1987, 179-213.} We may well ask the question therefore whether the current trends in representation and policymaking within these two federations are moving towards convergence or divergence.

By way of conclusion to this chapter it is possible to offer several tentative suggestions. There are three broad areas where we might seek to determine whether there are patterns of convergence or divergence: (1)
the degree of legislative or judicial supremacy; (2) the extent of executive or legislative dominance; and (3) the tension between the demands for participatory democracy and effective government.

Legislative or Judicial Supremacy?

Historically the role of the courts in policymaking has been much stronger in the United States than in Canada with its notions of parliamentary rather than judicial supremacy. And, it has been argued that since the Warren Court the courts have transformed themselves from umpires into active players in the American federal system. Moreover, since nearly all the successful recent interventions of the Supreme Court have been at the expense of the state governments some have argued that this intervention has damaged the federal character of the system (Elazar 1984, 177, 242; Shapiro 1978, 182).

While Canada lags behind the United States in the degree of judicial supremacy, the constitutionalization of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 has clearly transferred a significant portion of policymaking authority from the legislatures to the judiciary. The opposition to the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Agreement of certain charter protected groups indicates the impact of the Charter in de-emphasizing the territorial dimension of issues in Canada. The Canadian judiciary are approaching the American in terms of political power and are likely to be relatively more powerful than they are now by the end of the century (Russell 1987-88). Arguably, the Charter may do more to Americanize Canadian political processes than the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement despite the attacks of Canadian nationalists on the latter.

But if in this area the pattern is one of general convergence, it is important not to overstate the case. The "notwithstanding clause" (section 33) in the Charter still provides federal and provincial legislatures with an opportunity to override important parts of the Charter and thereby reduce the potential impact of judicial review if public opinion will allow it. Furthermore, there are no signs that the Canadian Supreme Court will follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in the Garcia case in abandoning its classic role as an umpire in federal-provincial disputes (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 1985).
Executive or Legislative Dominance?

The issue of the relationship of the executive and legislature to each other and the degree to which one or the other may dominate is one that is raised in many contemporary political systems. In the United States the past two decades have seen concerns first about the tendency to an "imperial executive" and then in the post-Nixon years about the "imperilled executive." The Reagan years appear to have seen some restoration of the balance between the two (Salamon and Abramson 1984, 67). The tendency during much of the last two decades for the Republicans to control the presidency and the Democrats to control Congress has contributed during that period to a persistent tension between the two branches of national government.

In Canada by contrast, although at times the existence of minority governments has moderated the general pattern, the prevailing situation has been one of executive dominance with party discipline operating within the House of Commons and the provincial legislatures with even fewer exceptions than in Britain. There have been some efforts to strengthen Parliament by reforms, including a more effective committee system, but there is little sign of any real convergence with the American pattern. The Meech Lake Accord would, if anything, have constitutionalized "executive federalism," and many of the proposals advanced in the 1991-92 constitutional round would have had a similar effect. Conversely and paradoxically, constitutional reform in Canada could also have tilted the balance in favour of the legislatures. If, as a result of the Charlottetown Agreement in 1992, the Canadian Constitution had been amended to introduce an elected Senate with provincially equal representation and some significant power, then there might have been some modification of the legislative/executive balance within the Canadian Parliament. It seems unlikely that an elected Senate would have been dominated by the executive to the same degree as the House of Commons (indeed the Charlottetown proposals would have prohibited the current convention whereby senators can be appointed to cabinet, and this was expressly intended to increase the independence of senators from party discipline). Moreover the legitimacy of an elected Senate with substantial powers and more effectively representative of regional interests would probably have set up a powerful dynamic for intraparliamentary tension between the two houses, and this in turn would have had some impact upon executive dominance. Nevertheless, with the rejection of the Charlottetown Agreement in the referendum of October 26, 1992, the
character of executive dominance and hence of "executive federalism" is likely to remain as a sharp contrast to the United States.

Participatory Democracy or Effective Government?

In many political systems in the contemporary world the pressures both for more participatory democracy and for efficient and effective policymaking processes have come into tension with each other. Fifty years ago Harold Laski even went so far as to suggest that federalism in its traditional form, with its compartmenting of functions, rigidity, and inherent conservatism, was based on an outmoded economic philosophy and was obsolescent in an era when positive government action was required (Laski 1939, 367).

Concerns about the balance between genuine participatory democracy and efficient and effective policymaking have been prominent in both federations. In the United States the issue has been how to make policymaking more effective while preserving the democratic character of its institutions. In Canada the pressure has been from the other direction, to open up the executive-dominated political institutions with more opportunities for public and interest group participation in policymaking.

In the United States power in Congress has been very dispersed and decision making has tended to be individualistic. This has produced unusually democratic but slow working institutions. Moreover, the measures taken in the last two decades to open congressional activities to public scrutiny have made it harder for Congress to get work done and for leaders to lead. These factors combined with the constitutional checks and balances operating in the relationships within Congress and between Congress and the president have made effective action on such issues as the budget, debt reduction, and adjusting the economy to technological change and a highly competitive international trading environment extremely difficult. The crucial question then is whether in the last decade of the twentieth century the American democratic processes, which emphasize pluralism, participation, and accountability, and which have for so long enabled the United States to achieve both economic success and political stability, can continue to facilitate adaptation and change in the context of rapidly changing external and internal conditions.

In Canada concern about the balance between participatory democracy and effective policymaking comes from the other direction. The predominant position of the executives in both levels of government and
the prevalence of "executive federalism" have led to concerns. The apparent compliance of Parliament and the legislatures and the limitations upon the opportunities for the public and interest groups to influence policymaking and intergovernmental negotiations have been the subject of considerable public discussion. Much of the criticism of Parliament voiced before the Spicer Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future (1991) arose from just these issues (Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future 1991, 96-106).

These concerns have yet to result in significant changes in Canada's parliamentary institutions. The primary but not exclusive focus for such pressures has been on the "mega-politics" of constitutional reform, but it has also been felt elsewhere and has contributed to the general lowering in the credibility and expectations of the public with respect to their elected representatives and institutions.

Conclusion

The framework for comparison of the systems of representation for the two North American federations reveals some important trends towards convergence, but also the certainty of significant divergence for some time to come.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms introduced in 1982 has had the effect of reducing the legislative supremacy that had previously characterized Canada's parliamentary institutions in relation to the judiciary, thereby providing a trend converging towards the judicial supremacy of the American federation. There are pressures also in Canada towards lessening the executive dominance of government at the federal level, but to date little has been achieved in this direction. In any case, convergence in this respect will still be significantly limited by the parliamentary system contrasting with the more clearly separate powers of the executive and the legislature in the American congressional system. Finally, there are interests in both federations whose pressures may lead to a convergence in the balance between participatory democracy and effective government. In the U.S., critics advocate changes to make the democratic processes more effective in terms of decision making, while in Canada the pressure is to increase the democratic responsiveness of the federal institutions. In this respect, the grass appears greener—to both sides—on the other side of the fence. But while there are these converging pressures, the fundamental differences rooted in the contrasting parliamentary and congressional institutions and in the social,
economic, and political factors underlying their federal systems will continue to shape significantly the differences in the character of representation in these two federal systems.

These trends demonstrate that the constitutional and broader political environment in the two federal systems will continue to provide the dynamic for changes in the character of representation. Nonetheless, the various comparisons outlined in this chapter and the more detailed examination of representation in this volume stand as ample evidence of the key role played by the representative institutions in making federalism work in modern democratic societies.
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