The Federal Idea and its Contemporary Relevance

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary world, federalism as a political idea has become increasingly important. This arises from its potential as a way of peacefully reconciling unity and diversity within a single political system.

The reasons for this popularity can be found in the changing nature of the world leading to simultaneous pressures for both larger states and also for smaller ones. Modern developments in transportation, social communications, technology, industrial organisations, globalisation and knowledge-based and hence learning societies, have all contributed to this trend. Thus, there have developed two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives: the desire to build dynamic and efficient national or even supra-national modern states, and the search for distinctive identities. The former is generated by the goals and values shared by most Western and non-Western societies today: a desire for progress, a rising standard of living, social justice, influence in the world arena, participation in the global economic network, and a growing awareness of worldwide interdependence in an era that makes both mass destruction and mass construction possible. The latter arises from the desire for smaller, directly accountable, self-governing political units, more
responsive to the individual citizen, and from the desire to give expression to primary group attachments—linguistic and cultural ties, religious connections, historical traditions, and social practices—which provide the distinctive basis for a community’s sense of identity and yearning for self-determination.

Given the dual pressures throughout the world, for larger political units capable of fostering economic development and improved security on the one hand, and for smaller political units more sensitive to their electorates and capable of expressing local distinctiveness on the other, federal solutions have had an increasing appeal throughout the world. The reason for this is that federalism provides a technique of constitutional organisation that permits action by a shared government for certain common purposes in a larger political unit, combined together with autonomous action by smaller constituent units of government, directly and democratically responsible to their own electorates. As such, federal political systems provide the closest institutional approximation to the complex multicultural and multidimensional economic, social and political reality of the contemporary world.

These developments have contributed to the current interest in federalism, not as an ideology, but in terms of practical questions about how to organise the sharing and distribution of political powers in a way that will enable the common needs of people to be achieved while accommodating the diversity of their circumstances and preferences.

As a consequence, there are in the world today some two dozen countries that are federal in their character, claim to be federal, or exhibit the characteristics typical of federations. Indeed some 40% of the world’s population today lives in countries that can be considered, or claim to be federations, many of which are multicultural or even multinational in their composition.

During the past decade, especially, there has been an international burgeoning of interest in federalism. Political leaders, leading intellectuals and even some journalists are now increasingly speaking of federalism as a healthy, liberating and positive form of political organisation. Furthermore, Belgium, Spain, South Africa, Ethiopia and Italy appear to be emerging towards a variety of new and innovative federal forms. In a number of other countries, such as the United Kingdom, devolutionary processes have
incorporated some federal features, although by no means all the features of a full-fledged federation. Furthermore, the European Union (EU), with the addition of new member states, is in the process of evolving its own unique hybrid of confederal and federal institutions. Thus, everywhere, with changing world conditions, federal political systems have continued to evolve.

2. THE FEDERAL IDEA: THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES

Over the years there has been much scholarly debate about the definition of federalism. Definitions have varied from broad inclusive ones to narrow restrictive ones. The basic essence of federalism, as Daniel Elazar has noted, is the notion of two or more orders of government combining elements of ‘shared rule’ for some purposes and regional ‘self-rule’ for others. It is based on the objective of combining unity and diversity; i.e., of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union.¹

This basic idea has been expressed through a variety of federal institutional forms in which, by contrast to the single source of constitutional authority in unitary systems, there are two (or more) levels of government, combining elements of shared rule through common institutions with regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent units. Like Elazar, I have viewed the broad category of federal forms combining shared rule for some purposes and regional self-rule for others, as encompassing a wide range of institutional forms from constitutionally decentralised unions to confederacies and beyond. Within this broad genus of federal political systems, federations represent one distinct species in which neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived from the constitution rather than from another level of government, each is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing powers, and each is directly elected by its citizens.²

What basically distinguishes federations from decentralised unitary systems and from other federal forms such as confederations is that in unitary systems the governments of the constituent units ultimately derive their authority from the central government, and in confederations the central institutions ultimately derive
their authority from the constituent units and consist of delegates of those units. In a federation, however, each order government derives its authority, not from another order of government, but from the constitution and each relates directly (not through another government) to the citizens.

Consequently, the structural characteristics that distinguish federations as a specific form of federal system are the following:

- Two (or more) orders of government each acting directly on their citizens (rather than indirectly through the other order);
- A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority, and allocation of revenue resources between the orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine autonomy for each order;
- Provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided by a federal second chamber composed of representatives of the regional electorates, legislatures or governments;
- A supreme written constitution, not unilaterally amendable by one order of government, and requiring the consent not only of the federal legislature but also of a significance proportion of the constituent units through assent by their legislatures or by referendum majorities;
- An umpire (in the form of courts, or as in Switzerland provision for referendums) to rule on interpretation or a valid application of the constitution; and
- Processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where government responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap.

At the same time it should be noted that some political systems are hybrids combining characteristics of different kinds of political systems. Those that are predominately federations in their constitution and operation, but which include some federal government powers to override governments of constituent units—an arrangement more typical of a unitary system—have sometimes been described as “quasi-federations”. At different stages in their development Canada, India, Pakistan, Malaysia and South Africa have been so described. On the other hand Germany, while predominantly a federation, has a confederal element in the
Bundesrat, its federal second chamber, which is composed of instructed delegates of the Land governments. A hybrid, predominantly a confederation but with some features of a federation, is the European Union since Maastricht. Hybrids of various sorts occur because statesmen are often more interested in pragmatic political solutions than in theoretical purity.

In setting out the distinctive characteristics of a federation there are some further important points to note. First, there is the distinction between constitutional form and operational reality. In many political systems political practice has transformed the way the constitution operates. Therefore, to understand how a given federation or federal system operates, it is necessary to examine not only its constitutional law but also its political practices and processes. Significant characteristics of federal processes include:

- A strong disposition to democratic procedures since they presume the voluntary consent of citizens in the constituent units;
- Non-centralization as a principle expressed through multiple centres of political decision making;
- Open political bargaining as a major feature of the way in which decisions are arrived at; and
- A respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law since each order of government derives its authority from the constitution.

While certain structural features and political processes may be common in federations, it must be emphasised that federations have exhibited many variations in the application of the federal idea. There is no single ideal form of federation. Among the variations that can be identified among federations are those in:

- The degree of cultural or national diversity that they attempt to reconcile;
- The number, relative size and symmetry or asymmetry of the constituent units;
- The distribution of legislative and administrative responsibilities among governments;
- The allocation of taxing powers and financial resources;
- The degree of centralization, decentralization or non-centralization, and the degree of economic integration;
- The character and composition of their central institutions;
The processes and institutions for resolving conflicts and facilitating collaboration between interdependent governments;

The procedures for formal and informal adaptation and change; and

The roles of federal and constituent-unit governments in the conduct of international relations; and

The electoral system and number and character of political parties.

Ultimately federalism is a pragmatic and prudential technique whose applicability in different situations has depended upon the different forms in which it has been adopted or adapted, and even upon the development of new innovations in its application.

One further point about federal systems. Federal systems are a function not only of constitutions, but also of governments, and fundamentally of societies. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between federal societies, governments and constitutions in order to understand the dynamic interaction of these elements with each other. The motivations and interests within a society—which generate pressures both for political diversity and autonomy, on the one hand, and for common action on the other—the legal constitutional structure, and the actual operations, processes and practices of government, are all important considerations for understanding the operation of federations.

At one time, the study of federations tended to concentrate primarily on their legal frameworks. Scholars have come to realise, however, that a merely legalistic study of constitutions cannot adequately explain political patterns within federations. Indeed, the actual operation and practices of governments within federations have, in response to the play of social and political pressures, frequently diverged significantly from the formal relationships specified in the written legal documents. Scholars writing about federal systems have, therefore, become conscious of the importance of the social forces underlying federal systems.

But the view that federal institutions are merely the instrumentalities or expressions of federal societies, while an important corrective to purely legal and institutional analyses, is also too one-sided and oversimplifies the causal relationships. Constitutions and institutions, once created, themselves channel and shape societies. For example, in both the United States in 1789 and
Switzerland in 1848, the replacement of confederal structures by federal constitutions marked turning points enabling the more effective political reconciliation of pressures for diversity and unity within their societies.

The causal relationships among a federal society, its political institutions, and its political behaviours and processes are complex and dynamic. The causal impact is not simply unidirectional; rather, it involves two-way interactions with each factor influencing the other two. The pressures within a society may force a particular expression in its political institutions, processes and behaviour; but, in turn, these institutions and processes, once established, usually shape the society. They do this both by determining the channels in which the social pressures and political activities flow, and by establishing policies that modify the shape of society.

Thus, the relationships between a society, its constitution, and its political institutions and processes are dynamic and involve continual mutual interaction. It is not sufficient, in considering the experience of different federations, to review only the influence of social forces upon the adoption, design, modification, and subsequent operation of federal constitutional structures. Rather, it is also necessary to consider the influence those federal political structures—and the related political processes and practices—have had upon social loyalties, feelings and diversities. It is thus necessary to assess both how well the institutions in each federation reflect the particular social and political balance of forces within that society, and how effectively these institutions, once established, have channelled and influenced the articulation of unity and diversity within that polity.

3. THE VARYING POPULARITY OF THE FEDERAL SOLUTION DURING THE PAST CENTURY

One may identify roughly four distinct periods in the popularity of the federal solution during the past century:

(1) Prior to 1945

In the century and a half prior to 1945, federal or ostensibly federal regimes had been established in the United States (1780),
Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), Australia (1901), Germany (1871-1918) and also in Latin America in Venezuela (1811), Mexico (1824), Argentina (1853) and Brazil (1891). Nevertheless, prior to 1945, the general attitude, particularly in Europe and in Britain, appeared to be one of benign contempt for federal forms of government. Indeed, this attitude still prevails in some quarters in Britain today. Many viewed federation as simply an incomplete form of national government and a transitional mode of political organization, and, where adopted, to be a necessary concession made in exceptional cases to accommodate political divisiveness. The more ideologically inclined considered federalism to be a product of human prejudices or false consciousness preventing the realization of unity through such more compelling ideologies as radical individualism, classless solidarity or the General Will.

For example, writing in 1939, Harold Laski declared: “I infer in a word that the epoch of federalism is over” (The Obsolescence of Federalism,” 48 *New Republic* 367). Federation in its traditional form, with its compartmentalization of functions, legalism, rigidity and conservatism, was, he argued, unable to keep pace with the tempo of modern economic and political life that giant capitalism had evolved. He further suggested that federal systems were based on an outmoded economic philosophy, and were a severe handicap in an era when positive government action was required. Decentralized unitary government, he concluded was much more appropriate in the new conditions of the Twentieth Century. Even Sir Ivor Jennings, a noted British constitutionalist, who was an advisor in the establishment of several new federations within the Commonwealth during the immediate post-war period, did not hesitate to write that “nobody would have a federal constitution if he could possibly avoid it.”

(2) The Surge of Popularity Between 1945 and 1970

While up to 1945 the federal idea appeared to be on the defensive, the following two decades and a half saw a remarkable array of governments created or in the process of creation that claimed the designation ‘federal’. Indeed, only eight years after 1945, Max Beloff was able to assert that the federal idea was enjoying “a popularity such as it had never known before.” With this occurred a
burgeoning of comparative federal studies. This was the period when my own interest in the comparative study of federations was aroused during my studies at Oxford with K.C. Wheare, and led to my first book, *New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

Three factors contributed to this post-war surge in the popularity of federal solutions. One was the wartime success and post-war prosperity of the long-established federations such as the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia, coupled with their development into modern welfare states.

A second factor stemmed from the conditions accompanying the break-up of the European colonial empires in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. The colonial political boundaries rarely coincided with the distribution of racial, linguistic, ethnic and religious communities or with the locus of economic, geographic and historic interests. In the resulting clashes between the forces for integration and for disintegration, political leaders of independence movements and colonial administers alike saw in federal solutions a common ground for centralizers and provincialists. The result was a proliferation of federal experiments in these colonies or former colonies. These included India (1950), Pakistan (1956), Malaya (1948) and then Malaysia (1963), Nigeria (1954), Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953), the West Indies (1958), Indochina (1945-7), French West Africa and its successor, the Mali Federation (1959), and Indonesia (1945-9). In the same period, in South America where the federal structure of the United States had often been imitated, at least in form, new ostensibly federal constitutions were adopted (some short-lived) in Brazil (1946), Venezuela (1947) and Argentina (1949).

A third factor was the revival of interest in federal solutions in post-war Europe. World War II had shown the devastation that ultra-nationalism could cause, gaining salience for the federal idea, and progress in that direction began with the creation of the European Communities. At the same time, in 1945 in Austria the federal constitution of 1920 was reinstated making Austria once more a federation, Yugoslavia established a federal constitution in 1946, and in 1949 West Germany adopted a federal constitution.

Thus, the two decades and a half after 1945 proved to be the heyday of the federal idea. In both developed and developing
countries, the “federal solution” came to be regarded as the way of reconciling simultaneous desires for large political units required to build a dynamic modern state and smaller self-governing political units recognizing distinct identities. Not surprisingly, these developments produced a burgeoning of comparative federal studies by scholars such as Kenneth Wheare, A.W. Macmahon, Carl J. Friedrich, A.H. Birch, W.S. Livingston, and others including myself. Also the first establishment of academic centres specializing in federal studies occurred at Queen’s University in Canada in 1965 and Temple University in the United States in 1967.


From late in the 1960s on, it became increasingly clear, however, that federal political systems were not the panacea that many had, in the early years after 1945, imagined them to be. Most of the post-war federal experiments experienced difficulties and a number of these were abandoned or temporarily suspended. Examples were the continued internal tensions and frequent resort to emergency rule in India, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, the forcing out from Malaysia of Singapore, the Nigerian civil war and the subsequent prevalence there of military regimes, the dissolutions of the federations of the West Indies and of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the collapse of most of the French colonial federations.

These experiences indicated that even with the best of motives, there were limits to the appropriateness of federal solutions. In addition, the experience in Latin America, where many of the constitutions were federal in form but unitary in practice, added skepticism about the utility of federation as a practical approach in countries lacking a long tradition of respect for constitutional law.

In Europe the slow pace of progress towards integration, at least until the mid-1980s, also seemed to make the idea of a federal Europe more remote.

Even the classical federations of the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia were experiencing renewed internal tensions and a loss of momentum that reduced their attractiveness as
shining examples for others to follow. In the United States, the centralization of power through federal pre-emption of state and local authority, and the shifting of costs to state and local governments through unfunded or underfunded mandates, had created an apparent trend towards what became widely described as “coercive federalism”. Furthermore, the apparent abdication in 1985 by the Supreme Court of its role as an umpire within the federal system (Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 US 528 (1985)) raised questions, at least for a time, about the judicial protection of federalism within the American system.

Switzerland had remained relatively stable, but the long-drawn crisis over the Jura problem prior to its resolution, the problems of defining Switzerland’s future relationship with the European Community, and the prolonged unresolved debate for three decades over the renewal of the Swiss constitution raised concerns within the Swiss federation.

In Canada, the Quiet Revolution in Quebec during the 1960s, and the ensuing four rounds of mega-constitutional politics in 1963-71, 1976-82, 1987-90 and 1991-2 had produced three decades of severe internal tension. Aboriginal land claims, crises in federal-provincial financial relations, and the problems of defining the relative federal and provincial roles under the free-trade agreements with the United States, and later Mexico, created additional stresses.

In 1975, Australia experienced a constitutional crisis that raised questions about the fundamental compatibility of federal and of parliamentary responsible cabinet institutions. The result was a revival in some quarters in Australia of the debate about the value of federation.

Through most of this period West Germany remained relatively prosperous. Nevertheless, increasing attention was being drawn to the problems of revenue sharing and of the “joint decisions trap” entailed by its unique form of “interlocked federalism” requiring a high degree of co-decision making. Furthermore, the impact of membership in the European Union upon the relative roles of the Bund and the Länder was also a cause of concern.

At the end of this period, the disintegration of the former authoritarian centralized federations in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia exposed the limitations of these federal façades.
In such a context, one strand in the comparative studies of federations focused on the pathology of federal systems, examples being Thomas Franck, Ursula Hicks and some of my own writing. Nevertheless, others such as Ivo Duchacek, Preston King and especially Daniel Elazar provided perceptive insights into the character and variety of federal arrangements. Furthermore, the establishment of an International Association of Centers of Federal Studies in 1977 linking ten multidisciplinary centres, and shortly after of Publius, a journal specializing in federal studies, contributed during this period to intensified research on the operation of federal systems. In 1984, a second body for collaborative federal studies, the International Political Science Association Research Committee on Comparative Federalism, was established linking individual political scientists working in this area.

(4) The Resurgence in Enthusiasm for Federal Solutions During the Past Decade and a Half

In the 1990s, there developed a revival in the enthusiasm for federal political solutions. Outside the academic realm, political leaders and leading intellectuals have come increasingly to refer to federal systems as providing a liberating and positive form of political organization. Indeed, as I have already noted, by the turn of the century, it could be said that some 40 percent of the world’s population lived in some two dozen federations or countries that claimed to be federal. Furthermore, in a number of other countries some consideration was being given to the efficacy of incorporating some federal features, although not necessarily all the characteristics of a full-fledged federation. In Latin America, the restoration of federal regimes has occurred in a number of countries after periods of autocratic rule. In Asia, the economic progress of India showed that coalition-based federalism was a workable response to the problems of development. Elsewhere in the Third World and especially Africa, the failure of “strong leaders” to resolve persistent social and political problems, and the realization by such international bodies as the World Bank that decentralization was the preferred strategy for economic development, have contributed to a widespread renewal of interest in federal or at least devolutionary political solutions.
A number of other factors contributed to this trend. One was the widespread recognition that an increasingly global economy had unleashed centrifugal economic and political forces, weakening the traditional nation-state and strengthening both international and local pressures—a combined trend that Tom Courchene has called “glocalization”. Another was the changes in technology that were generating new, more federal, models of industrial organization with decentralized and flattened hierarchies involving non-centralized interactive networks. These developments have influenced the attitudes of people in favour of non-centralized political organization.

Developments in three political areas also appeared to have an impact. One was the resurgence of the classical federations which, despite the problems they had experienced in the preceding two decades, had nevertheless displayed a degree of flexibility and adaptability in responding to changing conditions. Another was the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These developments undermined the appeal of transformative ideologies and exposed the corruption, poverty and inefficiency characteristic of systematic and authoritarian centralization. A third was the progress made during this period in Europe’s apparent federal evolution with the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty and the broadening of the European Union to incorporate a much widened membership.

All of these factors have contributed to the renewed general interest in federal methods of organizing political relationships and distributing political powers in a way that would enable the common needs of people to be achieved while accommodating the diversity of their circumstance and preferences. It must be noted that this revival of interest in federal political systems beginning in the 1990s has differed, however, from the excessively enthusiastic proliferation of federations that occurred in the early decades after 1945. Experience since that period has led generally to a more cautious and sanguine approach.

There is one distinctive feature of this period, however. In previous eras federation was characterized as the result of political communities freely joining together or devolving to build something better. But in a number of cases today, federal systems are being proposed as a solution for warring communities. In countries
like Iraq, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Cyprus, instead of federation being advocated on grounds of providing mutual benefits, it is being advocated as a way of ending acute civil ethno-cultural conflict and of avoiding utter political collapse. The problem in these cases has been a lack of what previous experience has suggested are the prerequisites for an effective federal system: respect for constitutionalism, and a prevailing spirit of tolerance and compromise. Until these necessary underlying conditions are created, efforts to create sustainable federal systems are likely to prove simply futile. Much more effort to establish first the prerequisite conditions will be required in these cases.

A new development at the turn of the century has been the establishment, on the initiative of the Canadian federal government, of the international Forum of Federations. The Canadian government was convinced that there would be real value, particularly for practitioners in federations—statesmen, politicians and public servants—in organizing an opportunity to exchange information and learn from each other’s experience. Accordingly, it arranged a major international conference on federalism at Mont Tremblant in the autumn of 1999. Over 500 representatives from twenty-five countries, including the Presidents of the United States and Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada, participated. Major presentations and papers of the conference were subsequently published in the *International Social Science Journal*, special issue 167, 2001. Among the themes upon which the conference focused were social diversity and federation, economic and fiscal arrangements in federation, intergovernmental relations, and provision for the welfare state in federations. Such was the success of this conference, that is was decided to put the Forum of Federations on a permanent basis with its own international board (a board on which I was privileged to serve from its inception until 2006). Initially, the funding for the Forum came totally from the Canadian federal government. Although it still contributes the largest share, the Forum has now evolved to the point where governments in seven federations (Australia, Austria, Germany, India, Nigeria, Mexico and Switzerland) are sustaining members. A number of others are contemplating membership, and the current chairman of the Board is a former President of Switzerland.
Among the major activities of the Forum have been building international networks fostering the exchange of experience and information on best practices among practitioners in existing federations or countries with some federal features, and the sponsorship at three-yearly intervals of major international conferences of practitioners and academics on federalism. The second international conference was held at St. Gallen, Switzerland in 2002 with over 600 participants from more than 60 countries. The third was held in Brussels in 2005 with over 1000 participants from some 80 countries, and the fourth (for which I am the international advisor for the Indian government) is scheduled for November 2007 in New Delhi.

4. RECENT INNOVATIONS

Three recent innovations in the application of the federal idea require special comment. One is the creation of the hybrids. The hybrid character of the post-Maastricht institutional structure of the European Union combines, in an interesting way, features of both a confederation and of a federation. Among the confederal features are the intergovernmental character of the Council of Ministers; the distribution of Commissioners among the constituent nation-states and the role of the latter in nominating commissioners; the almost total reliance upon the constituent national governments for the implementation and administration of Union law; and the derivation of Union citizenship from citizenship in a member state.

Among the elements more typical of a federation, on the other hand, are the role of the Commission in proposing legislation; the use of qualified majorities rather than unanimity for many categories of legislation generated by the Council of Ministers; the role of the Council’s secretariat in developing more cohesive policy consideration than is typical of most international or confederal intergovernmental bodies; the expanding role of the European Parliament, which, under the new co-decision procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, has a veto power over about fifty percent of Community legislation; and the supremacy of Community law over the law of the member states.
The net effect of this hybrid of confederal and federal features is that, while member states have “pooled” their sovereignty and accepted increasing limitations on their power of independent decision—to a degree considerably greater even than in some federations—the common legislative and executive institutions still lack the characteristics of a federation in which the federal institutions clearly have their own direct electoral and fiscal base in relation to citizens. Not surprisingly, the resulting technocratic emphasis and “democratic deficit” has undermined public consent and support for the European Union. These are issues which remain to be addressed in the evolution of the European Union.

Another innovation that has come to the fore is the growing trend for federations themselves to become constituent members of even wider federations or supra-national organizations. In the contemporary effort to reconcile supra-national, national and regional impulses, there has been an emerging trend towards multi-level federal organization. Thirty-five years ago, Pennock suggested that multiple levels of political organization were desirable to maximize the realization of citizen preferences, although this had to be balanced against the additional costs of increased complexity. Now we have a growing, practical experience of federations within wider federations or supra-national organizations. Germany has been a pioneer in adjusting its internal federal relations to its membership in the European Union, but these experiences have also informed debates in Belgium, Spain and Austria, as members of the European Union. It is worth noting as well that, although NAFTA is only a free trade area and far from a federal organization, its three members are each federations. In Canada, for instance, the impact of NAFTA upon internal federal-provincial relations has been an important issue. This emerging experience demonstrates the need to study closely and learn from these examples in order to maximize the benefits of multi-level federal organization at supra-national, national, regional and local levels, while minimizing the costs of excessive complexity.

A third innovative, contemporary trend is the acceptance of constitutional asymmetry in the relationship of member units to federations or supra-national organizations as a means of facilitating political integration. Examples are found in Malaysia, India, Spain and Belgium. Another is the impact upon the European
Union of the Maastricht Treaty, whereby the European Union has taken significant steps towards becoming a Union of “variable speeds” and “variable geometry”. From its beginning as a federation, Canada has included, in relation to Quebec, some modest asymmetrical arrangements, and the debate over the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Consensus during the period 1978-92 turned to a significant degree on whether and how far this asymmetry should be increased. Perhaps the most complex current example of asymmetry in practice was displayed in Russia, in the Yeltsin period, by the then eighty-nine subjects of the Russian Federation, and this in spite of the formal symmetry set out in the new Russian Constitution. Constitutional asymmetry in the powers of constituent units, however, is not unique to federations: Italy and the United Kingdom also provide significant examples. Experience in the various federal examples suggests that constitutional asymmetry among constituent units within a federal system does introduce complexity and often severe problems; but for some federations, it has proved necessary as the only way to accommodate severely varied regional pressures for autonomy.

5. LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF FEDERATIONS

Let me conclude by noting that the experience of federal systems has taught us five major lessons. First, federal systems do provide a practical way of combining through representative institutions the benefits of both unity and diversity. For instance, the United States (1789), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), and Australia (1901) are among the longest continually operating constitutional systems anywhere in the world today. Furthermore, in recent years the United Nations has annually issued an Index of Human Development that uses a weighted average of life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrolment, and per capita gross domestic product to rank some 160 countries in terms of quality of life. This has consistently ranked four federations—Australia, Canada, the United States and Switzerland—among the top six countries in the world, and four others—Belgium, Austria, Spain and Germany—not far behind. Moreover, a number of recent empirical studies—including those of Arendt Lijphart (1984, 1999), an edited volume by Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt (2000), and John
Kincaid (2006)—have indicated that federal political systems have, on balance, actually facilitated political integration, democratic development and economic effectiveness better than non-federal systems. \(^\text{11}\)

Second, it is also clear, however, that federal systems are not a panacea for humanity’s political ills. Account must therefore also be taken of the pathology of federal systems, and of the particular types of federal structural arrangements and societal conditions and circumstances that have given rise to problems and stresses within federal systems.

Third, the degree to which a federal political system is effective depends very much upon the extent to which there is acceptance of the need to respect constitutional norms and structures, and an emphasis upon the spirit of tolerance and compromise. Where these are lacking—as they are currently, for instance, in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Iraq—it is futile to advocate federal solutions unless the necessary preconditions are established first. The dilemma is how such preconditions are to be established in a situation permeated by hostility.

Fourth, the extent to which a federal system can accommodate political realities depends not just on the adoption of federal arrangements, but on whether the particular form or variant of federal institutions that is adopted or evolved gives adequate expression to the demands and requirements of the particular society. There is no single, ideal federal form. Many variations are possible. Examples have been variations in the number and size of the constituent units; in the form and scope of the distribution of legislative and executive powers, and financial resources; in the degree of centralization; in the character and composition of their central institutions; and in the institutions and processes for resolving internal disputes. Ultimately, federalism is a pragmatic, prudential technique, the applicability of which may well depend upon the particular form in which it is adopted or adapted, or even on the development of new innovations in its application.

Fifth, it has been suggested by some commentators—Daniel Elazar is an example\(^\text{12}\)—that federations composed of different ethnic groups or nations may be unworkable or run the risk of suffering civil war. While these are certainly possibilities, the persistence of federal systems, despite evident difficulties, in such
multi-ethnic or multi-national countries as Switzerland, Canada, India and Malaysia, in my view indicates that, with appropriately designed institutions, federal systems can be sustained and prosper in such countries. In a number of significant cases where ethnic nationalism has been a crucial issue, federal devolution has in fact reduced tension by giving distinct groups a sense of security through their own self-government, thereby paradoxically contributing to greater harmony and unity.

While federal political systems are not universally appropriate, in many situations in the contemporary world they may be the only way of combining, through representative institutions, the benefits of both unity and diversity. Experience does indicate that countries with a federal form of government have often been difficult to govern; but then it has usually been because they were difficult countries to govern in the first place that they have adopted federal political institutions. And it is that which has made for me a lifetime spent on the comparative study of federal political systems so fascinating.

END NOTES


A LIFE DEDICATED TO PUBLIC SERVICE

RONALD L. WATTS, C.C., D. PHIL., LL.D., F.R.S.C.

Ronald L. Watts, is Principal Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Political Studies at Queen’s University where he has been a member of the academic staff since 1955 and was Principal and Vice-Chancellor 1974-1984. He is currently a Fellow and is a former Director of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University. He was President of the International Association of Centres for Federal Studies 1991-8, was a founding board member of the international Forum of Federations 2000-2006 and is currently a Fellow. He is a former Board Member and chairman of the Research Committee of the Institute for Research on Public Policy. On several occasions he has been a consultant to the Government of Canada during constitutional deliberations, most notably as a member of the Task Force on Canadian Unity (Pepin-Roberts) 1978-9, as consultant to the Federal-Provincial Relations Office in 1980-1, and as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Constitutional Development (Federal-Provincial Relations Office) 1991-2. He has also been an advisor to governments in several other countries including Uganda, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, and more recently Switzerland, Kenya, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, the Philippines and India. As a political scientist he has worked for over forty-eight years on the comparative study of federal systems and on Canadian federalism, and has written or edited over twenty-five books, monographs and reports and over ninety articles and chapters in books. His most recent book is Comparing Federal Systems of which the second edition was published in 1999. A French edition appeared in 2002, a Spanish edition appeared in 2006 and a version was translated into Arabic in 2006. A third edition is now in preparation. He has received five honourary degrees. He became an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1979 and was promoted to Companion of the Order of Canada in 2000.

Born: 10 March 1929, Karuizawa, Japan, to Canadian Anglican missionary parents

Education:

1943-8: Trinity College School, Port Hope
1948-52: Trinity College, University of Toronto
1952-54: Oriel College, Oxford
1959-61: Nuffield College, Oxford

Degrees:

B.A. Honours, University of Toronto:
Philosophy and History 1952
B.A. Honours, Oxford University:
Philosophy, Politics and Economics 1954
M.A., Oxford University:
Philosophy, Politics and Economics 1959
D. Phil., Oxford University:  
Political Studies 1963  
(Supervisor: K.C. Wheare)

Married: Donna Paisley (1954)

Current Appointment:  
1994-present: Principal Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Political Studies, Queen's University  
1993-present: Fellow, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University

Principal Academic Appointments:  
1989-1993: Director, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University  
1988-1989: Acting Director, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University  
1974-84: Principal and Vice-Chancellor of Queen’s University  
1969-74: Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science, Queen’s University  
1964-69: Assistant Dean then Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science, Queen’s University  
1965-94: Professor of Political Studies, Queen’s University  
1963-65: Associate Professor, Political Studies, Queen’s University  
1961-63: Assistant Professor, Political Studies, Queen’s University  
1955-61: Lecturer, Philosophy (political philosophy), Queen’s University

Other Academic and Public Appointments:  
2006-present: Fellow of the international Forum of Federations  
2006-7: Academic Advisor to the Organizing Committee, Government of India, for the Fourth International Conference on Federalism, New Delhi, November 2007.  
2004: Faculty member, Summer University on Federalism, Institut du Fédéralisme à l’université de Fribourg, Switzerland  
2003: Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London, United Kingdom.  
2002-2006: Member of Advisory Board on Devolution Studies of Economic and Social Research Council, United Kingdom.  
2002-present: Member of Editorial Sub-committee for Global Dialogue Project (joint IACFS/Forum of Federations project)  

2001: Member of delegation of Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (June).

2001: Speaker at New South Wales Centenary of Australian Federalism Forum, Sydney (July).

2001: Member of expert group of three academics (from Canada, Germany and Switzerland) to advise the President of Yugoslavia and the governments of Serbia and Montenegro on the restructuring of the Federation of Yugoslavia (October-November).

2000-2006: Member of the Board, international Forum of Federations and Chairman of its Program Committee.


2000-present: Member of Editorial Advisory Board of *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*.


2000: Faculty member, Summer University on Federalism, Institut du Fédéralisme de l’Université de Fribourg


1998-present: Chairman of the Scientific Council of the International Research and Consulting Centre of the Institut du Fédéralisme de l’Université de Fribourg, Switzerland.

1998-1999: Member of the Board, Committee for a Forum of Federations.

1997: Consultant on intergovernmental relations to the Department of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, South Africa, sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.


1996 (Feb.-March): Visiting Fellow, Centre for Constitutional Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, South Africa (as consultant for constitutional negotiations).

1995: Faculty member, Summer University on Federalism, Institut du Fédéralisme de l’université de Fribourg, Switzerland.

1994-1995: Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan.

1994-present: Member of International Advisory Committee, Summer University on Federalism, Institut du Fédéralisme de l’université de Fribourg, Switzerland.
1993 (Sept-Oct): Member of Canadian Mission visiting Russia to plan Canada-Russia Collaborative Federalism Project.

1993: Organizer of International Seminar Course on Federalism for Salzburg Seminars, Austria.


1991-1993: President, Canadian Association of Rhodes Scholars.

1990-1993: Member of Executive Council of American Political Science Association Organized Section on Federalism and Inter-governmental Relations.

1990 (June) Member of team of advisors to Premier Peterson (Ontario) for constitutional deliberations regarding ratification of the Meech Lake Accord.

1989-1996: Member of Advisory Council, Centre for Federal Studies, Leicester University, U.K.


1987: Member of Steering Committee and Theme Secretary, National Forum on Post-Secondary Education.

1986-7: Chairman, New Zealand Universities Review Committee.

1986-7: Member, Commonwealth Secretariat Advisory Committee on Distance Education.

1986-1991: Member, Selection Committee for Ontario Rhodes Scholarships

1985-1993: Board Member, Advisory Board of Canadian Studies Program, University of California, Berkeley.

1985-present: Member, International Political Science Association Research Committee on Comparative Federalism and Federation.


1985: Visitor, Nuffield College, Oxford (May - Dec.).

1983-7: Board Member, Canadian Association of Rhodes Scholars.

1983-84: Commissioner, Commission on Future Development of Universities of Ontario (Bovey).

1982-84: Council Member, Association of Commonwealth Universities.
1981: Member of Committee on the Future Role of Universities in Ontario (Fisher).
1980-88: Board Member, Donner Canadian Foundation.
1974-84: Member (Chairman 1979-81), Council of Ontario Universities.
1974-84: Member of Executive Committee, Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada.
1969: Ford Foundation Visiting Professor at University of Ife, Nigeria.
1968: Exchange Scholar, Australian National University, Canberra.
1955-58: Member: Selection Committee for Ontario Rhodes Scholarships.

Honours:
1952 Rhodes Scholar for Ontario (Oriel College, Oxford).
1967-68 Canada Council Leave Fellowship.
1979 Officer of the Order of Canada.
1983 Queen’s University Montreal Alumni: The Montreal Medal for “Makers of Queen’s”
1984 Hon. L.L.D., Trent University.
1984 Hon. L.L.D., Queen’s University.
1984 Queen’s University: Distinguished Service Award.
1984 Queen’s University Toronto Alumni: John Orr Award.
1986 Hon. L.L.D., Royal Military College.
1987 Hon. L.L.D., University of Western Ontario.
1992 125th Anniversary of Canada Commemorative Medal
1993 Distinguished Educators Award, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.
1994 Hon. L.L.D., Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan.
1997 Distinguished Scholar Award of the American Political Science Association Section on Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
1997 Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.
2000 Promotion to Companion of the Order of Canada
2003 Queen Elizabeth II Jubilee Commemorative Medal.
2003 First recipient of the Distinguished Federalism Scholar Award of the International Political Science Association Research Committee on Comparative Federalism and Federation.

PUBLICATIONS:

A. Books, Monographs and Reports


*Multicultural Societies and Federalism* (Study No. 8 published by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, 1970), pp. 203. (Also published in French translation.)


*Profile of a Decade: Queen’s University 1974-84* (Kingston: Queen’s University), pp. 52 and 21.


With Darrel R. Reid and Dwight Herperger, *Parallel Accords: The American Precendent* (Kingston, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations Queen’s University, 1990), pp. 70.


*The Institutions of a Federal State: Federalism and democracy as fundamental counterweighing principles* (Fribourg: Institute of Federalism, Euroregions, vol. 6, cahier 1, 1996), pp. 36.


B. Published Special Lectures:


*Canada after the Referendum* (The Asale E. and Maydell C. Palmer Lectures, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, March 9 & 10, 1993).


C. Reports of Commissions Served on:


The Task Force on Canadian Unity (Pepin-Robarts), *Coming to Terms: The Words of the Debate* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, February, 1979).

The Task Force on Canadian Unity (Pepin-Robarts), *A Time to Speak: The Views of the Public* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, March, 1979).


D. Chapters in Books:


E. Articles (since 1983):


“Fiscal Federalism in Canada, the United States and Germany,” with Robin Broadway (Working Paper of Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University), 2004, pp. 1-55.


