INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION: The Paradox of the Late Twentieth Century

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Editors

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PREFACE

This collection of papers on integration and fragmentation, the paradox of the late twentieth century, is the by-product of a plenary session on the same topic, which took place on 7 June 1993, at Carleton University in Ottawa, during the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association.

The organization of the plenary session and the publication of the book were made possible through the financial support of a number of institutions. It is with great pleasure that we express our gratitude towards the Department of the Secretary of State (now Department of Canadian Heritage) of the Government of Canada, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Government of Ontario, and the British Council in Ottawa.

We would also like to acknowledge the administrative support of the CPSA office in Ottawa, provided with the usual professionalism by Joan Pond and Michelle Hopkins. As chair of the Program Committee for the CPSA meeting, Stéphane Dion originated the idea of the plenary session and did much more than what was required, considering his other duties, to make sure that this project would see the light of day.

We wish to express our thanks to Sylvia Bashevkin, who did a great job as moderator during the plenary session. Thanks also to Patricia Candido and Mary Kennedy at the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations for preparing this book for publication.

Douglas Brown and Guy Laforest
La fin du vingtième siècle est témoin de ce qui semble être un entrelacement paradoxal des processus et des phénomènes politiques. D’une part, au niveau mondial, nous sommes témoin d’une marche vers l’intégration politique. D’autre part, il y a tous les cas de fragmentation d’États qui se sont produits au cours des dernières années, générés le plus souvent par des mouvements d’auto-détermination nationale. Comment peut-on expliquer ce paradoxe? Ce recueil d’articles réfléchit sur la nature et les conséquences de transformations mondiales telles la fin de la guerre froide, l’intégration européenne, l’effondrement de l’Union soviétique et la montée un peu partout de mouvements nationalistes. Ils examinent la relation entre le libéralisme et le nationalisme, les conséquences de la mondialisation économique pour l’auto-détermination nationale et l’équité sociale, les tensions entre «consommatisme» mondial et citoyenneté nationale, ainsi que les conséquences qu’ont des États plus «modérés» pour des citoyens plus «exigeants».

Ainsi, ces articles examinent le phénomène de la mondialisation et comment il dépasse et alimente tout à la fois le nationalisme. L’intégration économique et culturelle amène l’intégration politique, mais génère également une réaction aux effets négatifs du «consommatisme» universel et des forces du marché. Le nationalisme y est disséqué tant comme conséquence que comme réaction à l’individualisme libéral. L’exploration de ces thèmes est faite, par tous les auteurs qui incluent deux commentateurs canadiens, avec de nombreuses références aux nationalismes québécois et «canadien-anglais» de même qu’à l’avenir de la fédération canadienne face à l’intégration mondiale.
ABSTRACT

The late twentieth century is witness to the seemingly paradoxical entwinement of political processes and phenomena. On the one hand, we are witnessing at the global level a march towards political integration. On the other hand there are the numerous instances of fragmentation of states that have occurred in recent years, driven for the most part by movements for national self-determination. How do we explain this paradox? This collection of essays reflects on the nature and consequences of such recent global transformations as the end of the Cold War, integration in Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of nationalist movements everywhere. They examine the relationship between liberalism and nationalism, the consequences of economic globalization for national self-determination and social equity, the tensions between global consumerism and national citizenship, and the consequences of more “gentle” states for “demanding” citizens.

Thus these papers examine the phenomenon of globalization, and how it is both by-passing and fuelling nationalism. Economic and cultural integration drives political integration, but also drives a reaction to the downsides of universal “consumerism” and market forces. Nationalism is dissected as both consequence and reaction to liberal individualism. In exploring these themes all of the authors, including two special Canadian commentators, make numerous references to both Quebec and “English Canadian” nationalism and the fate of the Canadian federation in global integration.
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Introduction

Guy Laforest

Much has changed in the world since that fateful night of 9 November 1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed and carried in its downfall numerous pillars of the communist order. Germany is now reunited after more than 40 years of division. Marxism-Leninism has been dealt irreparable blows in Central and Eastern Europe. A truncated and impoverished Soviet Union, in the midst of considerable political and social disarray, has been replaced by a community of independent states, in which the Federation of Russia, plagued by internal turmoil, remains the dominant player. The Baltic States are now independent nations. In a peaceful, albeit bitter, process, Czechoslovakia lost its unity when it was partitioned into two republics, the Czech and Slovak polities. Alas, the same cannot be said about Yugoslavia. There, the dismantlement of the federation has occurred in a succession of merciless wars culminating with the tragedy of ethnic purification currently going on in Bosnia.

During the same period, Western Europe has continued its journey towards economic and political integration. Despite serious setbacks in Denmark, England and France, the Maastricht Treaty has been ratified, leading to the replacement of the Economic Community by the European Union. New members, such as Austria, are likely to join the Union in the next few years. On the other side of the Atlantic, the North American Free Trade Agreement has been ratified by the governments and parliaments of the United States, Canada and Mexico. Still on the economic front, the Uruguay Round of talks on trade and tariffs has been successfully completed. The new agreement will accelerate the pace of market globalization.

This collection of papers is an attempt to reflect upon the nature and the consequences of these recent transformations in our world. The basic intuition leading to its organization was the seemingly paradoxical entwinement of processes and phenomena occurring in the late twentieth century. On the one
hand, we are witnessing at the global level a march towards political integration, economic globalization and cultural homogenization. "It's a small world after all," as they say in the universe of Disney, in Florida as well as in Marne-la-Vallée. However, on the other hand, the tune of integration and "rapprochement" is accompanied by another kind of music, with its own crescendos, structured around the numerous instances of political fragmentation that have also occurred in recent years. Many states are singing the praises of union, while others are perishing or are being threatened because nations and peoples in their midst are preferring the advantages of disunion. Moreover, and therein lies possibly the real paradox, the pulls of integration and fragmentation can be felt simultaneously by the same states. Belgium, of course, provides a paradigmatic example of the latter phenomenon. Brussels is at once the political centre of the European Union, and the capital of a state undergoing a process of federalization in order to withstand even more radical changes orchestrated by Flemish nationalists. In 1993, the city of Antwerp (Antwerpen for some, Anvers for the others) clearly illustrated the paradox. More than ever, its great harbour continued to symbolize Belgium’s place in the world of economic globalization. In 1993, Antwerp, the home of Rubens, was the cultural capital of Europe. To complete the picture, one must add that Antwerp has played an eminent role in the Flemish cultural and linguistic revival, and that ultra-nationalists have recently become quite prominent in the political life of the city.

Thus, to summarize, the simultaneous occurrence of integration and fragmentation constitutes a significant challenge for our understanding, one that should urgently attract the attention of political scientists. Whatever its merits, such was the belief that led to the organization of a plenary session of the Canadian Political Science Association, which was held in early June 1993 at Carleton University in Ottawa, under the auspices of the Learned Societies of Canada. As chair of the Program Committee for the CPSA Meeting, Stéphane Dion initiated the idea of such a plenary session and supported us in our endeavours. The president of the Association in 1993, Vince Seymour Wilson, was also very helpful with his advice and enthusiasm. Before describing in further detail the special session, I wish to say a few words about the Canadian Political Science Association, its members, and the kind of atmosphere in June 1993 in Ottawa.

It was no mere coincidence that decisionmakers on the CPSA Board should consider setting up a special plenary session at their annual meeting on the issue of integration and fragmentation. Nor was it at all surprising that more than 150 of our members should opt in favour of another round of lectures, rather than yielding to the charms of a lovely early summer evening. Canadian political scientists — and those among them, like myself, who see their identity as Québécois first and foremost are no strangers to the paradox that had to be dissected on this occasion. As citizens, we belong to a country which is fully
aboard the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Mexico. About five years ago, most of us were involved, in one way or another, in the great debate during the federal election of 1988 on the issue of the original Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Thus, as citizens, we all share an experience of what is seen here as "integration." In addition, as citizens of a bilingual, plurinational and multicultural federation, we also share memories — threats for some, missed opportunities for others — that can appropriately be brought together as experiences of, or with, "fragmentation": the 1980 Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association; the 1981-82 constitutional patriation; the Meech Lake saga (1987-90); and the Canada Round of constitutional discussions that led to the country-wide referendum (Quebec held a referendum on the same day, with the same question, but applied its own set of rules) of 26 October 1992.

All in all, these experiences of integration and fragmentation provided political scientists in Canada with an ideal background for a plenary session attempting to scrutinize the worldwide relevance of these phenomena. Pondering the history of their own scientific community, CPSA members would be wise to interpret it as a balancing act, never completely achieved, to find the proper equilibrium between those very same centripetal and centrifugal forces that are operating in the world at large. The spirit of dialogue and intellectual openness which presided over our plenary session of June 1993 in Ottawa, it may be argued, gives a good indication of the kind of pluralistic milieu the CPSA has been over the years. This achievement, seriously tested at times in the past 30 years, brings honour to the Association and all its members. For this, we have every reason to be thankful to the generation of Léon Dion, Jean Laponce, John Meisel, Donald Smiley, Ronald Watts, and many others. It is not, however, the kind of achievement that endures while being only passively and inwardly cherished. It has to be nurtured by deeds.

Reaffirming, as I thought appropriate to do here, the value of such an open-minded milieu, as one element of a thriving public sphere in a complex society like ours, is one such deed, albeit a very minor one. Should the Canadian ship of state navigate treacherous waters in the next few years, political scientists of various backgrounds ought to take good care of their common heritage.

To discuss the twin processes of integration and fragmentation, four scholars were invited to give a lecture at our plenary session of June 1993. I list them here in the order of their appearance in the table of contents of this book: Professor Murray Forsyth, Director of the Centre for Federal Studies, University of Leicester; Professor Jane Jenson, at the time from Carleton University but now teaching political science at the Université de Montréal; Professor John Kincaid, Executive Director of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in Washington, DC and editor of Publius: The Journal of Federalism;
and Professor Kenneth Minogue, from the Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science. These four persons submitted papers prior to the plenary session, and presented to our audience overviews, excerpts and the main conclusions of their papers. The main papers in this book are the revised papers of these four authors. To compare and discuss the various perspectives presented at the plenary session, we sought the contributions of Professor Stéphane Dion, from Université de Montréal (whose idea this session was in the first place), and Sylvia Bashevkin (the current president of the CPSA).

Rather than offering here a thorough synthesis and a discussion of the various papers — tasks which are more ably accomplished in the comments of Sylvia Bashevkin and Stéphane Dion — I shall simply outline a number of elements. The list is obviously not exhaustive, and has no other pretension than that of an invitation. First, Murray Forsyth studies the historical and theoretical relationship between liberalism and nationalism. He proposes a three-tiered typology of the latter doctrine: liberal-nationalism, cultural nationalism and state-engendered nationalism. He enumerated conditions required for multinational federations to stave off further fragmentation. Next, Jane Jenson discusses at length various dimensions of globalization, insisting on their consequences for nationalist movements. She shows how Quebec, English Canada and the Aboriginal Peoples are reinventing their national identities, sometimes in serious conflict with one another, in the context of globalization. Then John Kincaid offers both a topography of integration and fragmentation in the contemporary world, and a typology of the forms of integration that are available when states have to react to the tension between global consumership and citizenship. Finally, Kenneth Minogue challenges head-on the existence of a paradox between globalization and nationalist fragmentation. He suggests that the real paradox, if one is indeed required, resides in the ingratitude of citizens towards modern states, precisely at a time when those states have become much more generous and gentle with their populations. Minogue helps us to understand the renewed relevance of national allegiances when states are becoming weaker and weaker.

As a citizen and as a political scientist, I must confess that my interest for the topic of this book is more than a passing one and merits a few supplementary remarks. First, I must note that Quebec is indeed as vulnerable to the phenomenon of fragmentation discussed in the Canadian contexts by Jane Jenson and Sylvia Bashevkin. Second, I would claim that the multinational nature of Canada, frequently acknowledged by academics and intellectuals, is not recognized officially, either by the constitution or by federal political parties and by their leaders.

My last point concerns our scientific community as a whole. It seems to me that in the world as it has been transformed since 1989, political scientists in
Canada and Quebec can find a huge opportunity to generalize from the situation of their country in order to make a significant contribution to the development of their discipline. The paradox between integration and fragmentation in the late twentieth century is only one in a series of questions that can be addressed through the understanding of our predicament: What are the conditions for successful mega-constitutionalism? Why, as Stéphane Dion argues, are secessions rare, and when they do occur, why do they occur? What forms of citizenship are appropriate for national minorities? How can liberalism deal with the re-emergence of nationalism? What lessons can be drawn from recent secessionist experiences? What will be the fate of federalism in the twenty-first century?

I am sure readers will formulate their own lists of questions, and I thank all participants in our plenary session, as well as contributors to this book. They forced our minds to accomplish the enquiry for which they were created.
Towards the Reconciliation of Nationalism and Liberalism

*Murray Forsyth*

The resurgence of nationalism in recent decades, and more especially since the ending of the Cold War, has compelled political theorists to look afresh at the basic postulates of the state. Theoretical debate during the Cold War years tended to mirror the international conflict. Argument centred on the relative merits of a body politic in which the least possible political constraint was placed on the individual’s freedom of choice, and a body politic in which the subjective freedom of the individual was actively restrained in the name of common or collective goals.

Liberals of course favoured the first alternative, indeed an emphasis on the unrestricted subjective choice of the individual came to be the distinguishing characteristic of Western liberalism as it developed in the context of the Cold War. It was supported by two kinds of argument. The first, and more traditional, is best exemplified by Isaiah Berlin’s classic defence of “negative liberty” in 1958. It was based on a philosophical examination of the nature of individual liberty. This kind of argument was supplemented, from about the 1970s onwards, by a mode of reasoning which owed more to economics, and which advocated the contraction and hedging-in of state activity to enable the greatest possible expansion of market decisionmaking within and between states. Milton Friedman, though his ideas date from well before the 1970s, is perhaps the writer most closely identified with this tendency, while F.A. Hayek is perhaps the thinker who best represents the conjunction of the two streams of thought.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allied states, and the ending of the great ideological duel between East and West, the theoretical debate has lost much of its impetus. The collectivist case, in its most extreme variation, has
been dealt such a formidable blow by practice and the free or market society school seems to have been so conclusively vindicated by history, that the debate is in danger of turning into a monologue on the blessings of transferring more and more areas of public or state direction to the free play of the market and untrammelled private choice. Liberalism of a certain kind, as a counter-program against totalitarianism, is celebrating its triumph.

Even before the Cold War ended, however, new issues were cutting across the main line or theme of theoretical debate, and, of these new issues, nationalism has become perhaps the most significant and formidable. The questions I wish to pose in this paper are the following. How well is liberalism, in its modern form, equipped to cope with the renascence of nationalism? How should liberals regard and react to this phenomenon? Must nationalism, with its own "collectivist" overtones, be regarded with profound suspicion, as the new enemy of the liberal ideal? Or is there scope for a rapprochement between these two influential doctrines? Canada, where the confrontation between liberalism and nationalism has been remarkably articulate — I am thinking primarily of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s powerful denunciations of nationalism, and the responses to them of Québécois nationalists, such as the late Marcel Rioux — and where it reaches back well before the ending of the Cold War, seems a particularly appropriate country in which to raise these issues. I shall argue that liberalism must dig back into its roots, and must develop a broader, richer content than it has in its struggle with communism and totalitarianism, if its response to nationalism is to be “adequate” (to borrow a term from the late R. N. Berki) to the new political reality that confronts it.

Kenneth Minogue, in his paper, warns rightly of the danger of sinking into “the morass which is the academic understanding of nationalism.” I share much of his apprehension, but at the same time I do not believe that the attempt to gain a clear academic understanding of nationalism should be abandoned for this reason: the subject is far too important. We must risk the Grimpen Mire — as Holmes might have said — if we are to track our quarry to its lair.

The argument that follows will therefore take the form of an analysis of nationalism that will seek to identify where and at what points it diverges, and at what points it overlaps and coincides with liberalism. In making this analysis I wish to distinguish between three basic forms of nationalism — a distinction that owes much to previous writers on the subject, but which I hope will open some fresh perspectives as well. The three forms are national-liberalism (which could as easily have been called liberal-nationalism), ethnic-cultural nationalism, and state-engendered nationalism. I had originally intended to add a fourth form, “economic nationalism,” but on reflection it seemed more fruitful to see each of the three forms as possessing an economic dimension, than to create a separate “economic” category. I shall touch on the relationship between federalism and nationalism at the end.
Towards the Reconciliation of Nationalism and Liberalism

There are, of course, several writers who so define the term "nationalism" that it refers only to one kind of phenomenon — for example, ethnic-cultural movements, or separatist movements designed to create new, sovereign, independent states. They prefer to use other terms, for example "patriotism," "solidarity," or "state-building" for other, apparently "nationalist" phenomena. Again, some writers use the word "nationalism" to refer solely to an aggressive and imperialist movement, the collective assertion of superiority over others.

All these usages seem, in the last resort, unhelpful, either because they fail to face squarely the historical evidence regarding the employment of the words "national" and "nationalism," or because they seal off the very question one wishes to ask (is nationalism necessarily evil?), or because they prevent one from seeing clearly that it is often the clash and convergence of different forms of "nationalism" that lie at the very heart of the "national problem."

NATIONAL-LIBERALISM

It has often been asserted that when nationalism emerged in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, it moved in harness with liberalism for a short time, but that then the two movements diverged. The alliance between nationalism and liberalism is seen, in other words, as fleeting and contingent. I wish to question this kind of interpretation, and to insist on the early identity of liberalism and nationalism, and the continuing historical significance of this identity. "National-liberalism," as I shall call it, is one of the persistent forms of nationalism, and, like so many movements, can be seen most clearly in its earliest manifestations.

It is worth recalling the nature of the identity. The great revolutionary movement that took place in France in 1789 was concerned first and foremost with establishing the French state on a new basis of legitimacy, that of the "nation." As the Abbé Sieyes, one of the leaders of the movement, wrote in August 1788, patriotic and enlightened citizens "finally see the moment arrive for us to become a nation." What he meant by this was that the French people, hitherto divided and fragmented by a host of legally entrenched social and regional inequalities and privileges, had now to come together as one unity of equal citizens, and then to constitute a government that would govern them as one equal unity.

The transformation, in June 1789, of the old tripartite Estates-General into a single National Constituent Assembly, with the task of constituting a representative political system for the whole country, expressed the core, at least in

constitutional terms, of this movement. The notion of the people or nation as the “constituent power” was here articulated fully and unequivocally — far more clearly, incidentally, than in the contemporaneous American Revolution. This notion of the people as the constituent power was itself the precipitate of the “social contract” doctrine that had arisen in Europe in the seventeenth century, a doctrine that contained within itself the principle that the state should be based on, and constituted by, the people, the latter being conceived as a political unity of free and equal individuals. Today, when social contract theory is interpreted and employed — by liberals — to justify all manner of hypotheti-
cal social orders, often of a very loose-knit variety, the original historical significance of the doctrine — as the spur, not to a looser but to a tighter union — deserves to be underlined.

“Nation” here, then, meant the political unity formed by individuals with equal rights, as distinct from a political union of groups or territories, or a political union formed by empire or conquest. In a sense it was the antithesis of what today is called a “federal” union. This can be illustrated by an event that seems at first sight to contradict it. One year after the storming of the Bastille, on 14 July 1790, there took place in Paris the famous Fête de la Fédération — a huge gathering of some 60,000 “federalists” drawn from every corner of France, together with the King, the deputies of the National Assembly, representatives of the army and navy, 300 clergy, and some 400,000 spectators. At the centre of the gathering stood the “altar of the fatherland” and the core of the ceremony was an oath sworn by the assembled multitude to be faithful to “the nation, the law, and the King,” followed by a further oath, this time made by the King, to uphold the new constitution that was being drafted by the National Assembly. It is clear from this ceremony that the foedus or covenant being made here had nothing to do with the construction of a federal polity, as it is commonly understood today. It was rather intended to be or to symbolize the fundamental social compact founding one people or nation — indeed it was probably the nearest that the idea of the social contract has ever come to being transmuted into a visible act.

It is sometimes maintained that the French Revolution was not an example of nationalism, but of internationalism, or more precisely, of cosmopolitan individualism, in a word, a movement to assert the universal rights of man, and hence liberal in contrast to national. The British historian Seeley, for example, wrote that the French Revolution “was cosmopolitan and impatient of tradition, whereas nationality rests on a principle of exclusiveness and a pious reverence for ancestry.” Proponents of this interpretation tend to point to the abstract, universalist language of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of

August 1789, and sometimes to the even more abstract and universalist language of Robespierre's proposed Declaration of Rights of 1793, as well as to the fact that certain foreigners were granted the right to sit in the French revolutionary assemblies, the best known examples being the Prussian, Anarcharsis Cloots, and the Englishman, Thomas Paine.

Clearly there was a "cosmopolitan" element in the Revolution, but it has to be seen in its true perspective. The language of the Declaration of Rights of 1789 does not controvert the fact that the most significant achievement of the early years of the Revolution was the transformation of France into a nation in the sense described above. The Declaration was essentially a statement by the newly-formed National Constituent Assembly of the principles and ends of the structure of government that it was about to constitute for France. It was liberal and national simultaneously, a continuation of the main movement, and not an appeal for the founding of some kind of world unity of individuals, or a world state. Moreover, when the French nation began to look beyond its borders, in 1791-92, and to adopt a crusading, ideological stance towards the rest of Europe, this represented, not so much a rejection of the earlier nationalism, as a heightening and intensifying of it. The newly-created French nation was now seen as having a special external mission, that of spreading to other countries the ideals that it had implemented at home. "Les Français donneront au monde et la paix et la liberté," as one of the revolutionary songs put it.3 Universalism and nationalism here went hand in hand — as they have so often subsequently (one need think only of American foreign policy, both past and present).

A genuinely anti-national or non-national cosmopolitanism, that subordinated everything to the creation universally of an order based on mutual respect for the rights of man and citizen can certainly be seen in Robespierre's doctrines. It grew, significantly, into the theory and practice of the Terror (1793-94). It can also be seen in the extravagant ideas of Anarcharsis Cloots (executed during the period of the Terror), and in the life and ideals of Paine (who came close to destruction during the Terror). The crux is that cosmopolitanism of this kind was not the driving force of the Revolution of 1789, but a subsequent and temporary ex crescense of it.4

"National-liberalism" has been defined here as an intensified sense of unity and equality among individuals living within the same political boundaries, which chafes at existing barriers frustrating unity, and tends to produce

constitutional changes reflecting the heightened sense of unity and equality. As the French example demonstrates, this development often has a politico-economic counterpart. The French Revolution did not only sweep away all political and social privileges, it swept away all tariffs, tolls, and other barriers to the movement of goods and persons within France, and moved tariffs outwards so that they coincided with the external frontier of the country. At the same time it created a common, national obligation to pay taxes to maintain the new national government. In other words, it created a single, enclosed economic space and an economic citizenship — indeed an economic nation — at the same time as it created a new political citizenship and a political nation. It was not “free trading” in the extreme sense upheld by the “Manchester School” and some contemporary liberals, according to which the very idea of a “national economy” is a snare and a delusion; rather it intensified the distinction between the “inner” and “outer” economy of the country.

The “national-liberalism” that manifested itself politically and economically in the early years of the French Revolution has been an immensely influential idée-force not only in Europe but elsewhere since that time. It remains an inspirational principle in the world today — despite the lack of attention accorded to it in so much of the writing of the liberal theorists of the Cold War epoch. In South Africa, for example, the persistent efforts to break down all the old barriers and divisions between individuals and to found a united South African state based on one South African people, equal in rights, can be seen as belonging to this same tradition. In Canada the increasingly vocal claim that the constitution “belongs to the sovereign people,” who are the rightful constituent power, is an expression of the same nationalist tradition. In the European Community, despite the strenuous efforts of the European Parliament, it cannot be said that there has developed a strong, grass-roots movement to form one European people. What one does see, however, is a remarkably bold effort, from above — that is, from the European institutions, in particular the Commission — to create a single “economic nation” out of many diverse ones, and hence to realize what I have called the politico-economic ideal of national-liberalism ahead of, and indeed separately from, the constitutional ideal.

This fact reminds us that national-liberalism has many points of convergence with “state-engendered” nationalism, which will be considered later. They can at times seem like the same movement, driven from “below,” by the people, in the first instance, and from “above,” by government, in the second. Before treating state-engendered nationalism, however, it is necessary to consider another variety of nationalism.

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ETHNIC-CULTURAL NATIONALISM

Emerging into prominence at almost the same time as national-liberalism, but on the basis of a rather different constellation of sentiments and ideas, is ethnic or cultural nationalism, in which the linguistic factor is usually of vast significance. In what sense, if any, is this a liberal phenomenon?

For many commentators — especially liberal and Marxist ones — ethnic or cultural nationalism is seen as something retrograde. More specifically, it is seen as something destined to fade into the background as humanity progresses towards rationalism and enlightenment, and “species man” emerges, universal and free-wheeling, liberated at last from all limited and limiting “tribal” ties with particular places or particular peoples. For Marxists, and for certain liberals, including many of the Cold War vintage, capitalism is the force that will strip away all national differences. For many liberals capitalist man is species man; for Marxists, of course, a further step has to be taken.

Karl Popper, one of the first great protagonists of the liberal “open society” against the “closed” totalitarian society, provides a good résumé of a pervasive liberal attitude to ethnic-cultural nationalism when he writes: “Nationalism appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostalgic desire to be relieved from the strain of individual responsibility which it attempts to replace by a collective or group responsibility.” And later: “None of the theories which maintain that a nation is united by a common origin, or a common history, is acceptable, or applicable in practice. The principle of the national state is not only inapplicable but it has never been clearly conceived. It is a myth. It is an irrational, a romantic and Utopian dream, a dream of naturalism and of tribal collectivism.”

F.A. Hayek, another prominent liberal propagandist of the Cold War epoch is even more extreme, though not more consistent. For him the idea or concept that has the first and strongest claim on man’s loyalty — to which indeed, he says, we owe “blind obedience” — is the “Great Society,” or the anonymous, impersonal processes of what is more conventionally termed the “world market.” All our obligations to particular communities, or to political unities, whether to state or to nation or both, must give way before this higher moral duty to universal exchange processes. Hayek is an individualist, cosmopolitan, utopian in the most thoroughgoing sense of these terms, rather like Anarcharsis Cloots. Not only all nations, but all particular political communities, all notions of “us” and “them,” of “ours” and “yours” (but not of “mine” and “thine”), in

fact all politics, are, for him, but relics of "tribalism." His ideology is the ne plus ultra of liberalism as a counter-program to totalitarianism.

Isaiah Berlin, it must be noted, takes a rather different and, it may be suggested, sounder stance. He is concerned primarily to ask why the immensely powerful movement of nationalism has been relatively neglected and underestimated by significant thinkers. He sees nationalism as a "dangerous" force, but categorizes it dispassionately, and concludes cautiously: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that no political movement today, at any rate outside the western world, seems likely to succeed unless it allies itself to national sentiment."8

Berlin's inquiry and conclusion seem far more conducive to understanding than the scornful and dismissive approach of Popper and Hayek. Indeed developments in the Western world over the past ten years make his conclusion seem unduly tentative.

Taking a longer view, the weight of empirical, historical evidence flies directly in the face of the doctrine of the elimination of ethnic nationalism by capitalism. Looking at Europe, for example, the history of the past two hundred years can be seen as displaying, not the gradual disappearance, but the gradual and relentless unfolding of the ethnic-cultural national idea. It reached a first peak in 1848; it entered into a new phase of intensity after 1870; it reached a second peak at the end of the First World War, when its legitimacy was formally acknowledged; it then accentuated into a fanatical, extreme form in the 1930s; it was overlaid and to a large degree frozen by the ideological conflict of the Cold War; but then re-emerged as this conflict ended, and indeed played a significant part in its ending. "In the political field," wrote Borkenau in 1939, "nationalism is the fact against which the Marxist theory breaks itself."9 It could also be called the fact against which liberal theory, or at least a certain kind of liberal theory, breaks itself. Capitalism and ethnic nationalism have been Siamese twins from the start.

To some, of course, ethnic-cultural nationalism is accepted as a reality, but is nonetheless explained as a secondary, rather than a primary phenomenon. In other words it is argued that ethnic or cultural nationalism is the mobilization or manipulation or even the invention of ethnic and cultural differences for purposes which are not ethnic or cultural at all, but "political." By "political" is meant the "power" aims or interests of particular individuals, parties, or classes. Following this line of thinking, it becomes the task of the analyst to "unmask" the ethnic or cultural rhetoric, symbolism, or "myth-making," and to


expose the real political forces at work. The “ politicization” of ethnic and cultural differences is here seen as the deliberate utilization or creation of these factors for distinct “political” ends.

While it would be foolish to deny that ethnic-cultural nationalism can be, and has been manipulated, and indeed that, in certain circumstances ethnic-cultural distinguishing marks have been artificially produced, an interpretation that starts from, and is based on the assumption of manipulation and invention, does not so much explain the immense power of the appeal to ethnic and cultural consciousness, as avoid the issue.

The first step must surely be to recognize that ethnic-cultural factors, gross or subtle, have always provided one of the lines of demarcation and differentiation running through humanity. This does not commit one to the often ridiculed position that there are immutable, scientifically ascertainable, “national characteristics.” Nor does it imply that the lines of ethnic-cultural division are always made up of the same ingredients in the same proportions—linguistic, racial, religious, hereditary, and so on. Finally, it in no way implies that the lines of demarcation have always been, or must necessarily be “political.” They may remain for long periods what they are at root, namely ethnic and cultural.

The question thus becomes: When do pre-existing ethnic-cultural divisions become “political”? Here the definition of what one means by “political” is clearly crucial. Carl Schmitt’s definition, which identifies the “political” with the intensification of a particular, given, antithesis into a “friend-enemy” distinction, seems the most illuminating. In Schmitt’s words: “The political can draw its strength from the most diverse areas of human life, from religious, economic, moral and other antitheses; it does not refer to a particular area of activity, but only to the level of intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings, whose motives can be religious, national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of some other kind, and can cause different unions and divisions at different times. The real friend-enemy grouping is by its nature so strong and decisive, that in the very moment that a non-political antithesis causes this grouping it replaces its hitherto “purely” religious, “purely” economic, “purely” cultural criteria and motives, and becomes subject to the completely new, specific, and from the “purely” religious, “purely” economic, and any other “pure” standpoint, often highly inconsistent and “irrational” conditions and consequences of what is now a political situation.10

Schmitt’s conception has the merit of heading off the temptation always to look for ulterior motives behind ethnic-cultural nationalism, to see it always as an instrument of something else. It also makes plain that ethnic-cultural

nationalism is not simply a demand by certain individuals for individual rights, relating to language, education, and so on. It is the assertion of a collective will, of a unity distinguishing itself from outsiders, of a real or aspirant "body politic" — though not necessarily or inevitably the will to be a fully fledged, independent "state."

It is impossible here to explore all the reasons why this kind of intensification of ethnic-cultural differences has taken place over and over again in the modern world. Clearly a threat posed to the continuation of the difference is the commonest stimulus to its emergence. Direct invasion or aggression, the application of policies of linguistic or religious assimilation to the group concerned, the large-scale immigration of people of a different ethnic-cultural background, whether for economic or other reasons, the intensification of economic control of the life of the group by outsiders — all these can and have been at the root of a national risorgimento. The increased rationalization or functionalization of human activity, the increased mobility of labour and capital, the restless dynamism of productive forces — in a word, capitalism as it has developed since the late eighteenth century — must be seen as a highly important general factor behind these more specific ones, helping to politicize ethnic-cultural differences as they have never been politicized before, and leading to the "Siamese twin" relationship already mentioned.

Often a risorgimento begins as little more than an instinctive action to ward off some impending danger or threat. But ideas, too, can and do play a significant role. Instinctive action by human beings always seeks legitimation, and legitimation reinforces action. Two kinds of legitimating ideas have tended to accompany ethnic-cultural nationalism. One is of a historical nature. It seeks to prove and demonstrate, by reference to the past, the duration, the territorial claims, the literary, political and economic achievements, and the originality and uniqueness of the ethnic and cultural group concerned. This is legitimation through an appeal to tradition. What is, and has been, and has made its own unique contribution, must not be allowed to disappear, but must assert itself against that which threatens it. The logical distinction between "is" and "ought," so dear to philosophy, has no relevance here.

The other kind of theory appeals more generally to the nature of man and of the just polity. It can be found for the first time, and perhaps most eloquently, in the unsystematic but highly suggestive writings of J.G. Herder, whose ideas exerted a powerful influence on national movements, particularly those of the Slavic peoples, in nineteenth-century Europe. It is worth pausing to ponder these ideas. Too often they are unconsciously or deliberately caricatured by commentators of a liberal persuasion, as if they were simply the arbitrary "inventions" of a crank, without much connection with reality.

The theory is rooted in the idea that the family, rather than the individual, is the original, "natural" unity, and that the ethnic-cultural groupings that are
scattered round the world are, so to speak, extended family-type associations, that have grown out of, and separated out from the original human family. The individual human being is always a part of one of these wider associations, whether he is fully conscious of it or not, whether he accepts it or not. The ethnic-cultural "nation" is hence prior to the individual, in the sense that it is not something that individuals invent, but something that the individual is born into, and that expresses itself in and through individuals. Man as the idealist philosophers conceive him, that is to say as an "ego" or "I" that distinguishes itself from its environment, and is "free," is here seen as nothing more than an abstract essence. In actual reality the "ego" always thinks and feels in a specific way, a way determined by a particular ethnic, cultural and linguistic background. No individual, to borrow Hegel's phrase, can leap beyond the spirit of his nation any more than he can leap beyond the earth. The individual thus finds his or her identity not by trying fruitlessly to separate himself or herself from this spirit, but precisely by identifying with it.

The state, according to this doctrine, is not natural and God-given, like the nation, but is something artificial and man-made. States as they have developed historically have become divorced from the natural unit of the nation; through the arbitrariness of war, conquest, dynastic policies, or diplomacy, they have come to yoke together or to divide nations, and have sometimes tried to destroy them. This tendency must be reversed. States should be realigned and reconstituted so that they conform to the natural substratum of the nation; they should become again what they were always meant to be, agencies or instruments for the protection and welfare of ethnic-cultural unities. Thus, according to this vision, not only should the individual person become rooted in the nation, the state should become so too. It should be noted too that this form of nationalism, like the previous one, has its own economic component or concomitant: part of the state's function is to increase the control of the ethnic-cultural nation over its economic destiny. The "nostrification" of the economy, as it was called in central Europe in the 1920s, is part of the program of ethnic nationalism.

At first sight, when one compares this doctrine of the nation-state with the national-liberal one that was described earlier, they seem to be radically and irreconcilably opposed to one another. Both argue that the true basis of legitimacy of the state is the "nation." But the national-liberal doctrine is rationalist in tone; it conceives of the nation as a compacted unity of free and equal individuals, and the essential task of the nation to be the constitution of a state that represents this equal union, and will secure and enhance the rights of those who combine to form it. It stresses man's inherent freedom. The other theory is romantic in tone; it conceives of the nation as a pre-existing, qualitatively distinct, ethnic-cultural unity, with which the individual should identify himself. It considers the essential task of this unity to be the establishment of a state
that will represent, defend and advance the welfare of this particular grouping. It stresses man’s inherent determinism.

Looking more closely, however, one wonders whether the gap between the two doctrines is as deep and wide as it seems. Is it not rather a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind? Does either side really believe that man is wholly free or wholly determined? In more concrete terms, the French in 1789 may have argued in the rationalist language of a nation of equal citizens, but did they not tacitly assume that this nation was a nation of people who were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically French? Was not the whole elaborate structure of parliamentary representation contained in the new unitary constitution of 1791 based on the assumption of a monolingual people? Is not the quintessentially liberal idea of rule in and through a single parliamentary chamber, elected by a uniform system of suffrage, and deciding by alternating or changing majorities, based on this assumption? Did not John Stuart Mill expressly state as much? And did not Lord Acton, who appears at first (in his famous essay on *Nationality*) to be staunchly opposed to Mill on this, actually agree with him when he wrote, in that essay, that the “parliamentary system ... presupposes the unity of the people”?¹¹

Turning to the other side, those who struggled to unite and liberate the ethnic-cultural nationalities of Europe may have used romantic imagery, but what kind of constitution did most of them seek to establish once unity and freedom had been achieved? Was it not in practice a constitution similar to the French, based on equal rights and parliamentary institutions? Is not this the system that the struggling nationalities of today, in Europe and elsewhere would like to establish?

The nation theoretically conceived by social compact theory and the empirical nation based on a shared culture thus have tended often to mean in practice the same thing. It would be wrong, however, to say that they always coincide. The tension between the idea of one South African nation advanced by the African National Congress and the idea of a historic Zulu nation advanced by Inkatha illustrates the kind of opposition that can and does occur. In Canada there is a similar type of tension between those who believe in one, equal Canadian people, and those who believe that the Quebec nation forms a distinct corporate entity within Canada.

Furthermore, as everybody knows, ethnic-cultural nationalism can and has been taken to an extreme in which the objective of maintaining complete unity within and achieving maximum freedom without absorbs every other end. Pursuing this goal it ignores or sweeps aside the rights of the individual, the rights of political opposition, the rights of local government, the rights of

smaller ethnic nationalities in its midst, and tends to congeal into some kind of plebiscitary "national" dictatorship. In this form it snaps all connecting threads with liberalism.

But the question remains: Is this anti-liberalism the ineluctable destiny of ethnic-cultural nationalism, or is it an aberration? Is this its essence, or its distortion? I would suggest that it is the latter, and that it should not always be judged in terms of its extreme. After all, liberalism too can take an extreme form, the form of egoistic anarchy. Is anarchy therefore the essence of liberalism, or its distortion? Is it fair to compare the mean of one movement with the extreme of another, or should one not always compare extreme with extreme and mean with mean?

STATE-ENGENDERED NATIONALISM

National-liberalism and ethnic-cultural nationalism do not exhaust the forms of nationalism. There remains a third variety, which is probably the most difficult of all to define clearly or succinctly. It may perhaps be called the nationalism engendered by state structures, or what Lord Acton called the "nationality formed by the State." (It might alternatively be called the nationalism engendered by "political nationality," but in view of the previous discussion, this terminology could lead to confusion.) It is of enormous importance in relation to state structures that have been built up in the process of overseas empire; of states whose citizenry has been created largely by the immigration of people of different ethnic-cultural backgrounds; and of federal states or unions. Nor can it be entirely separated from liberal-nationalism; the two are often closely entwined. It can be distinguished from ethnic-cultural nationalism in that it does not refer to nationalism engendered by state structures that are based unequivocally on a single ethnic-cultural unity, but to state structures that are not so based.

How does one begin to explain this phenomenon? Clearly a consideration of the meaning of "state structures" is necessary as a preliminary. If one defines them rather crudely as institutions with the right and power to provide for the defence and welfare of groups of people, then it is clear that they are established according to a logic that does not necessarily coincide either with the logic of the doctrine of ethnic nationalism, or with that of liberal-nationalism. The logic of state structures is quite simply the logic of providing effective defence and providing effective welfare for those subject to them — two things determined by a host of changing factors and relativities. The logic of state structures is the logic of the concrete situation.

Thus a common and profound challenge — usually a threat to inner or outer security or some form of economic challenge, or both combined — can push
peoples of different ethnic-cultural background, and sharing no profound sense of national unity in the liberal-national sense, to come together in some form of lasting union, and to erect common state structures. The intensification of the inner-outer boundary that (as we have seen) represents the emergence of a "political body" need not only manifest itself in the form of a particular non-political unity, for example, an ethnic-cultural group, coalescing into a political one. It may also take the form of two or more unities (which may or may not be already politically organized) combining together to form a common political frontier in the face of a common challenge. The yoking together of different ethnicities under a single sceptre thus does not deserve always to be seen as the "arbitrary" result of war, conquest, or diplomacy, as Herder and his followers tended to assume. It may well be the expression of a perfectly valid logic or rational necessity, namely the logic of defence and welfare.

This leads to a second observation, which is that people, however different, who are subject to a common state structure, and enclosed within a common political boundary — for whatever reasons these may have been established — tend to develop some sense of identity with each other, and with the territory concerned, and often with the common government as well. As David Hume wrote: "Where a number of men are united together into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce and government that, together with the same speech or language, they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual."12 It is interesting that Hume here seems to think (it is not entirely clear) of a common language emerging from the fact of political union.

A common government established over disparate "peoples," however loose and confederal that government may be, is simultaneously the creation of an incipient nation embracing all the peoples concerned. The makers of the American Union, of the Canadian Confederation, and of the Union of South Africa, all saw in the structure of union itself the first step in the creation of an American, a Canadian, and a South African nation. The European Community, loose and confederal as it is, marks the establishment of an incipient European nation. It links together the citizens of its member states by common laws relating to all manner of day-to-day economic activity, thus making them "one" in one important respect.

Not only is there a tendency for state institutions, by their very existence, to engender a sense of national identity, there is also a tendency on the part of rulers or governments actively to encourage and promote such a sense of national identity. Some of these measures come close to those that are involved

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in liberal-nationalism, for example the guarantee of equal rights for all citizens throughout the state, and the creation of a single economic space. But others are aimed more at the heart than the head: flags, anthems, festivals and commemorations, symbolic actions and undertakings, appeals to historic traditions and so on. Again we must ask, should liberals reject and despise such apparently "irrational" measures?

In a powerful essay published in 1965, Pierre Trudeau attacked the appeal to the emotions that was involved in nationalism. He was concerned primarily with the escalating national appeals made on the one hand by the Canadian federal government and on the other by the province of Quebec. The only way out of this spiral, he believed, was "cold, unemotional rationality."\(^\text{13}\) There is much to be said for his argument on this point. But Trudeau went further and advanced the more general proposition that appeals to national emotions both could and should be dispensed with as societies advanced. He envisaged their replacement by a purely rational or "functional" approach to the problems of government.

Trudeau's faith in the capacity of political systems to sustain themselves with no purchase on the emotions of those they govern seems unwarranted. Rule, or government, or a state, that is based wholly on each citizen's (or, in a federal system, each province's) self-conscious calculus of benefits received or penalties avoided would be a slow-moving, fractious thing, unable to carry out its tasks effectively. The calculus of self-interest needs the cement of an instinctive, habitual attachment to the "whole," if political institutions are to fulfil their ends, and this cement is another term for national feeling or sentiment. Burke put the matter in a nutshell when he wrote that "public affections, combined with manners, are required sometimes as supplements, sometimes as correctives, always as aids to law."\(^\text{14}\) When nationhood, in the sense of instinctive loyalty becomes firmly established then the rule characteristic of a body politic ceases to be merely a matter of external force, or of external law, but something more intimate and reciprocal. States rely on such loyalty in time of crisis. Is it not inevitable that they should seek also to instil it?


CONCLUDING REMARKS, WITH A SIDE GLANCE AT FEDERALISM

The main aim of this paper has been to map out the contours of nationalism and liberalism, and to try to demonstrate that there is a greater measure of overlap and congruence between them than is usually acknowledged, without losing sight of the areas where they come into conflict. The contemptuous and dismissive approach adopted towards nationalism by many liberal thinkers—epitomized in the term "tribalism" so often used by them—is profoundly inadequate. The idea that liberal regimes can function and flourish in a "nation-free" world is a myth.

Nationalism is a complex phenomenon, and the "national problem" is generally the result of different forms of nationalism coming into conflict with one another. The three types of nationalism that have been identified in this paper do not simply co-exist, side by side, each in their own purity, in the world of reality. They interact, overlap, and sometimes collide. The pursuit of one will often provoke another. The conflict between them can probably never be eliminated, but it can doubtless be moderated, in certain situations, by institutional forms and processes.

Federalism is one such institutional moderator of the "national problem." It is not the antithesis of nationalism, as some of its more ardent protagonists maintain. Nor is it a cure-all, as Canadians are fully aware. Nonetheless a federal system has the great merit of facilitating the establishment of a body politic of sufficient size to fulfil effectively the defence and welfare objectives of the modern state, while at the same time providing a political identity for the ethnic nationalities that compose it, thus helping to ease at least one particular tension.

It must be noted that a federal system, by definition, cannot completely satisfy the demands of national-liberalism, as described above. In other words, the constituent power of a genuinely federal system cannot be simply the people as one unity of equal individuals acting by some form of mediate (representative) or immediate majority vote; the provinces or states as corporate political entities must also be a part of the constituent power. Should the citizens of a federal system develop, over time, such a close sense of identity that federal lines of division are felt to be unnatural constrictions on the expression of the national will, then the logical way forward is to transform the system into some form of unitary one.

Finally, the central government of a federal system cannot escape the necessity of encouraging the development of a national sentiment, that is to say, of a sense of loyalty to the "whole." This is why assertions that federal systems, such as the European Community represent a step "beyond the nation-state" and must be treated with caution. Certainly they represent a step beyond the
existing nation-states, but they do not represent a step beyond the nexus of state and nation as such. Already "Europe" has its flag and anthem.

This indeed is the truly critical point in the relationship between federal systems — particularly those in which the component units incorporate different ethnic or state-formed nations — and nationalism. For the nationhood encouraged by the federal centre may well provoke a counter-nationalism in the parts, and then a damaging escalation of nationalisms. How can this be averted? At the risk of oversimplifying, it may be said that there are two maxims that have to be followed religiously. First, it must continually be made clear that the sense of national identity encouraged by the centre is intended to complement and to relativize, but not to eliminate existing national sentiments at the regional level. Second, the nationality upheld by the centre must be sensitively articulated so that it represents, and is seen to represent, a higher synthesis of all the national sentiments that exist at the regional level, and is not merely the expression of one or some vis-à-vis the others.
Mapping, Naming, and Remembering:
Globalization at the End of
the Twentieth Century

Jane Jenson

In the simplest terms, economic, political and social relations have been “global” for the last 500 years. When Christopher Columbus set sail to prove his contention that the globe was indeed a globe — and therefore he would not fall over the edge — he began a process that we still struggle to comprehend today.

As any school child of the 1950s would tell you, Columbus “discovered” lands, thereby putting them on the map. As he claimed them for his European state-in-becoming, Columbus labelled the lands and the peoples living in them, assigning names comprehensible to outsiders. This vision of history is one in which Europeans supposedly pushed the frontiers of the unknown, to discover, claim and settle the “empty” lands, thereby bringing European culture, technology and political power to the “uncivilized.”

This vision is no longer hegemonic. The gaps, silences and contradictions of this story have been forcefully argued in recent years, as indigenous peoples in the “new world” point out that the land did not need to be discovered; they knew it well. Moreover, they did not need to be named by European outsiders; they already had their names. The political struggles of Aboriginal Peoples to re-present the history of global relations is only one reminder, however, that the way we remember is highly contested.

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Historical memory is a terrain of struggle, because in the modern world claims for new rights and recognition are so often grounded in memories of past events. To remember, moreover, involves locating one’s community in space— that is, mapping. Every community must also name itself.

This paper contends, and will illustrate throughout, that while the forms of globalization at this fin de siècle are new, they also involve processes of re-drawing maps, re-naming places and peoples, and re-writing history that Columbus, his predecessors and his successors undertook, although in substance they sometimes reject post-Columbian forms. These new patterns of economic and political globalization at the end of the twentieth century are accompanied, in many parts of the world, by revitalized and modernized nationalist movements and nationalist claims. New maps, new names, and new stories about the past are therefore part of the globalization that we are experiencing.

An essential aspect of global relations for the last 200 years has been the tendency to represent the globe as a space of nation-states (and their dependencies), and to name the peoples occupying those spaces as nations. The nationalist discourse which is most frequently deployed in order to draw borders on the map—to identify an “us” and exclude the “others”—emerged first in the Americas (Anderson 1991, 193). Indeed, the rupture of 1776 involved a profound shift in the way in which claims would be made in the future. A people claimed the right to a sovereign state and self-government, on the basis of universal rights. The foundation of the claim was joint occupancy of a delimited territory. While the residents of New England or New York felt no compulsion to repudiate completely their historical cultural connection to Europe, their self-proclamation was to be a new state for a people who shared space.

Throughout the nineteenth century each nation has generated its own biography by imagining its own community (Anderson 1991, 205). Nations name themselves, and in doing so create stories about space and time. Some of these names, and the maps that follow from them, endure in time; others are subject to profound contestation by those living in the same space who refuse to read the map in the same way and who certainly remember another story, with quite different heroes and villains.¹

In the constitutional debates that have consumed so much of Canada’s political energies over the last decade, much was at stake. Indeed, the very names of the actors and the number of nations were being contested. Moreover, different maps were used and certainly different histories were recounted. Such

¹ Obviously, there are often many on the “outside” who also contest the story, claiming the same territory for themselves and going to war over such disputes. While important, this paper looks primarily on the inside, ignoring wars between states.
variation followed from important political interventions of the three different nationalist movements currently present in Canada: Québécois nationalism, "English Canadian" nationalism, and the nationalism of Aboriginal Peoples. All three rejected much of the federal government’s original proposals for constitutional reform and demanded a document that took them into account.

This paper examines the politics of these three movements in order to illustrate the ways in which processes of globalization are creating new possibilities for nationalist movements to make claims to new rights, including those of citizenship. While all three of the movements date from the late 1960s, they have gained new strength and political power in the debates about economic and political restructuring in the late 1980s and 1990s. In particular, the paper will argue that in recent constitutional debates a central issue which these three nationalist movements addressed was the capacity of the national state to regulate within the territory of Canada. The movements challenged traditional notions of sovereignty and the capacity of the Canadian state to exercise it. All three proposed a reconfiguration of space, by agitating for decentralization or for new transnational linkages. Therefore, the story of these three nationalist movements illustrates the ways in which globalization both generates challenges to existing practices of, inter alia, states and nationalist movements and opens space for new political practice, with a redefinition of citizenship as one of the outcomes.

A MUSICAL MOMENT ...

Residents of Canada are intimately familiar with these processes of naming, mapping and remembering. We need little reminding that nations are communities which exist not only in “reality” but also in “collective memory” and that they are brought into being by the deployment of symbols. The briefest recollection of patriotic songs serves to remind us that all nationalisms are social constructions. The Maple Leaf Forever (1867), for example, began with a map of the globe, locating Canada with reference both to Britain and the

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2 It is worth noting the extent to which analysts of Québécois nationalisms, no matter their general theoretical approach, stress the historical variation in names used to identify the same people, and the contribution of politics to representations and collective identities. See, inter alia, Dion’s systems analysis (1976, 17-18), Monière’s materialism (1979, 33-35), and Balthazar communication/mobilizational model (1986, 21-23), all of which provide analyses of nationalisms rich in historical contingency and politics in order to understand the collective identity of those who now name themselves Québécois. Many studies of Aboriginal Peoples also stress the identity-generating aspects of politics. See, inter alia, Chartrand (1991) and Sawchuk (1992).
Such processes of globalization are generating new feelings of solidarity, political ties, and practices. They often, too, are actions that challenge national states’ capacity to behave as they did in the past. While there are many significant consequences to this process of political globalization, this paper focuses on only one — the emergence of new understandings of citizenship, of who has citizen rights, and of how citizenship claims can be made. Moreover, it does so by examining the connections between economic processes of globalization, the implications of such for national states, and the emergence of new discourses of nationalism, bringing new claims to citizenship. These latter imply new practices of naming, mapping and remembering.

To begin to untangle all these connections, I start from the notion of time-space compression as developed by, inter alia, David Harvey (1989) and Anthony Giddens (1990). For both authors, modernity was characterized by a homogenization of time, as local and specific time-keeping was replaced by shared notions of time measured mechanically. Also essential was the emergence of a shared conception of space, based on Mercator maps. Thus modernity, which also brought the extension of capitalist social relations and exchange relations throughout most of the world, generated a process in which people could develop links “between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face to face interaction.” (Giddens 1990, 18)

For Anderson, one central result of such representations was the capacity to imagine national communities (1990, chap. 10). The new technology of states — cartography, census-taking, museum-building — allowed communities to represent themselves to themselves in abstract ways. Thus, nation-states were both a product of this new thinking about time and space and an essential support for it via their action generating a sense of community, which is one of the essential components of citizenship (Kymlicka 1992). In the post-free trade states of the late nineteenth century, issues of sovereignty were linked to a discourse of citizenship. These led simultaneously to a mapping schema that stressed nation-states, and a system of names for those who had civil rights, could participate in politics, and shared in social solidarity; citizens within the borders of states were those with such rights. Those without such rights were not full citizens.

These representations were founded on another aspect of state action in the later decades of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth. In these years, states took on more and more responsibility for regulating each country’s economy and for promoting a development strategy. Even before Keynesianism became the watchword of macroeconomists in much of the advanced capitalist world, the laissez-faire economy and nightwatchmen state were challenged to

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6 In doing so I am relying on an analysis developed for Breton and Jenson (1992).
develop instruments adequate to overseeing economic growth and market extension so as to facilitate development. Later lessons drawn from the experience of the 1930s and 1940s were the need for an intensification of the involvement of the national state in managing economic regulation in the mixed economies of the post-1945 North.

The model of development which took form after 1945, with which Canada’s postwar economy shared many characteristics, has been termed “Fordist.” The foundation of the model was rising rates of productivity in the principal sectors of the economy (which were those of mass production) accompanied by a matching rise in rates of consumption. Labour processes were based on a strict division between intellectual and manual labour, with the latter employed on assembly lines. Accompanying this structure of accumulation was a regulatory regime which was constructed out of collective bargaining and state policies and usually had three components: collective agreements between management and labour which moved much of wage-setting out of competition; minimum wages established by the state which sustained purchasing power; and social programs which provided income to citizens outside the labour force, whether temporarily or permanently. In most countries, this package was represented by policymakers and politicians in the economic language of Keynes.

For almost 20 years northern economies experienced high growth, despite periodic slowdowns or recessions. The motor of this expansion was Fordist industrial sectors producing primarily for the internal market. International trade was of much less importance in each country’s model of development than was the deepening of the internal market. This moment of the Golden Age of Fordism, coincided with economic maps which highlighted national states, whose borders were defined by patterns of dense economic interactions and activities which occurred within them.

By the late 1960s, and then clearly after 1973, the compression of time and space which we associate with globalization entered a new phase and the maps began to alter. Most obvious were new patterns of intensified and

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7 The description of the “Golden Age of Fordism” used here, unless otherwise indicated, is drawn primarily from Lipietz (1987, chap. 2). For the characteristics of Canada’s “permeable Fordism” see Jenson (1989).

8 That the phase was “clear” is obviously a benefit of hindsight. In the early and mid-1970s most governments, confronted with that Keynesian impossibility of stagnation, cast about for solutions. Their efforts usually took familiar forms of attempting job creation, raising spending, etc. Nevertheless, even then a certain consensus within international institutions, like the OECD and then the G7, that tighter monetary policy was needed and countries began to attempt to tighten spending as well as the money supply. By the 1980s, and especially after the spectacular failure of neo-Keynesianism between 1981-83 in France, a consensus about the problem, if not the solution, of the dangers of government spending led
interconnected relations of production and trade. As transnational corporations sought to increase, or at least maintain, rates of productivity in the face of the decline they were experiencing in the 1970s and which was generating a crisis in profitability, production practices shifted. For some, this meant moving to low-wage sites in the south. For other corporations, the decision was to increase productivity in the north by adapting new technologies and labour processes. Yet others attempted to escape some of the taxes and other costs imposed by states in order to finance the social programs and other expenditures that underpinned the Fordist model of development.

In all of this, international trade of components and final products obviously became more important. Internal markets no longer dominated economic activity. Final demand was not located there. Moreover, mobile firms had no reason to stay if they found costs too high. Equally important was the economic "leakiness" that accompanied international trade; Keynesian stimulation made little sense when the additional income meant job-creation outside the country as higher demand brought increased imports. Supply-side economics seemed a better bet (Jessop 1993, 9). In other words, strategies for encouraging competitive international trade rather than regulating domestic demand became the focus of state economic policy (Drache and Gertler 1991, 5-7).

In all of this, states began to redefine their roles vis à vis not only the market and international trade but also their citizens.

GLOBALIZATION AND STATES

A major victim of these new patterns of economic globalization has been the nation-state, whose capacity to regulate the national economy either by regulation or Keynesian practice has been significantly reduced. Left-wing as well as right-wing governments are now seeking workable solutions to the problems posed by increased capital mobility and by "leaky" economies in which the benefits of government spending are often simply exported, as well as by intractable unemployment as industry sheds workers and services supply more "bad" than "good jobs." These have all meant increasing costs and declining revenues for states.

A frequent casualty of states' search for solutions is spending on the "welfare state." Such social spending was demanded in the 1930s and 1940s, most often by left-wing parties, as recognition of the social and economic rights of citizens to equity in class societies. And, in those countries with strong Left movements, welfare spending was high, programs were universal and a narrowing of

to a discourse of the market-as-regulator which effectively laid the Keynesian orthodoxies to rest, with rare exceptions (such as Ontario for a time after 1990).
inequalities occurred (Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, even governments of centrist or right-wing parties spent to sustain the regulatory regime.

An important consequence of such spending, as well as of the emphasis on deepening the internal market, was the solidification of national ties of "universal" citizenship. Citizen rights stretched to incorporate the economic and social in many countries (Marshall 1965 [1949]). For T.H. Marshall, who wrote at the beginning of the Fordist Golden Age:

the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal democratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the common life of society. Where any of these rights are violated, people will be marginalized (Kymlicka 1992, 3).

At this time, national-level programs replaced subnational "experiments" or locally-administered charities. Thus the traditional foundations of citizenship in civil and political rights were widened to incorporate country-wide social programs, presented in popular discourse if not as an expression of citizens' rights at least as a reflection of community solidarity. While such programs may have performed double-duty as Keynesian stabilizers, they did nonetheless explicitly provide a representation of a national citizenship.

These programs named citizens, by identifying all citizens having "the right to" (ayant le droit de) health care, unemployment insurance, education, and family benefits, as well as to political participation and to civil protections. Moreover, they contributed to the re-drawing of maps. Church-provided charity which had linked, for example, all Catholics to Rome, was replaced as was municipal responsibility for poor relief. National programs began to take shape, as access to social programs became a part of national-level social and

9 In Canada, for example, the institutional foundation for a national market in labour took form in the 1940s with unemployment insurance programs. By the 1960s, which is really the moment of the Golden Age of Fordism, "portable" pensions, a national health-care system (administered by the provinces), etc. were instituted, often based on the experiments earlier developed by one or more provinces. These were also the years in which country-wide cultural institutions and non-colonial symbols came to the fore as an expression of Canadian citizenship (Jenson 1992b, 211-13).

10 It might appear that, at least in Canada, these programs were not "really" national because they were within the constitutional responsibility of the provinces. Nevertheless, the history of program development most often reveals federal initiative and insistence on minimal standards, in exchange for its role in financing the programs. This reliance on representation and debate about social policy within federalism rather than the party system was one of the reasons the crisis of Canada's Fordist model of development was also a political crisis of federalism (Jenson 1989).
economic citizenship, replacing programs that had been local or transnational. Along with cultural institutions representing the "national," such economic institutions of the postwar years were central symbols of national integration, as well as mechanisms for assuring it.\footnote{11 Recognizing that such programs were considered to express the "nation" makes sense of the English-Canadian nationalists' argument in the free trade debate of 1987-88 that the threat to medicare was a threat to sovereignty and the nation (Breton and Jenson 1991).}

It is these economic institutions which the post-1973 economic crisis and subsequent restructuring has placed in question, if not necessarily total jeopardy. In Canada, for example, the Tory government moved quickly after 1984 to redefine the meaning of Unemployment Insurance. As job creation and counter-cyclical intervention gave way to attention to training, the notion of social solidarity which justified tax dollars going to support the unemployed gave way to a new discourse. The state's responsibility became one of arming Canadian workers to help their firms compete in the global marketplace. At the same time, responsibility for job creation shifted from the state to corporations in this discourse. Similarly, albeit somewhat later, the meaning of state spending on social programs was altered. According to the federal government, such spending had to be decreased, in order to control the deficit. One way to do so was to eliminate universal programs, like family allowances, which had gone to all citizens no matter their income. An even more significant shift came with that government's decision to "cap CAP," to limit its transfers to the provinces to cover the costs of the Canada Assistance Program. This change in funding marked dramatically an ongoing practice of "offloading" not only costs — at a time when demand for welfare spending was rising — but also responsibility (Rice and Prince 1993). The shared-cost format, which had generated national standards for programs provided provincially began to give away, and not surprisingly provinces began to try to set their own standards and redesign programs. At the same time, in another important package of reforms of the public sector, the federal government began developing market-based, output-oriented and service-focused forms of public administration whose rhetoric addresses individuals as customers or clients rather than citizens (Phillips 1993, 2, 13).

In all this the state began to eschew the universalism which was the hallmark of many of the postwar social programs which provided "rights" rather than means-tested assistance. The language of equality (which generated talk of social and economic rights) disappeared as the discourse of competitiveness provided a rationale for state spending to be both modelled on the market and responsive to its needs. Thus, even when state spending or program access was not reduced, there had been an important shift in philosophy and discourse. This
difference was clear in the 1991-92 constitutional debate where the federal government offered a market-based "economic union," but initially refused to accept the proposal by the Ontario NDP and other progressive groups for a social charter and national standards which would have entrenched postwar notions of pan-Canadian citizenship in the constitution. The philosophical differences about states and citizens were clear in that debate (Smith, 1993).

Waning commitment to the public sector of the economy as a site for generating equity and citizenship has been accompanied by a resurgence of attention to subnational economic units as substitutes for national-level regulation, albeit in new ways. Such attention is also a consequence of the economic globalization described here.

Analyses of the crisis of Fordism have uncovered a reconfiguration of the relationship between the private and public sectors, such that alliances between public institutions (especially local or regional governments and universities) and corporations have become one of the forms of post-Fordist restructuring. In essence, regional economies have organized around growth poles in which the regional state often plays a facilitating role, if it is not more actively involved in promotion of economic activity (Kaplinsky 1993; Andrew et al. 1993).

One aspect of this process is the insistence by the subnational state on gaining control over many of those levers of economic development that the national state controlled in the Fordist years. Whether the goal is to deploy large capital funds or to control education and training, the subnational states have claimed a right to manage the central levers of economic development. Some times the subnational state has done so with enthusiasm because such transfers are seen as a necessary part of a subnational economic and social project. At other times, however, subnational governments want the central government to maintain its responsibility for national standards and citizenship, and for funding. In Canada Quebec falls into the former group while New Democratic Party-led Ontario is an example of the latter.

Such denationalization of economies has been accompanied, in Europe and North America, by the appearance of supra-national entities, such as the 1988 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the U.S., or the European Community. While the former is simply a trading bloc and silent about creating new political and social institutions, the latter is more ambitious. The most eloquent promoters of Europe have attempted to incorporate a new social charter setting out "European" social rights (Ross 1993, 51ff.). Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty includes a grounding for European citizenship. Both of these regional agreements involve, however, new constraints on the regulatory powers of the national level. They differ only over whether the powers are transferred to the market or another level in a multitier system of governance (Jenson 1992a).
Clearly the move of states towards more trade-oriented policy and declining enthusiasm for demand management and redistribution has had consequences for popular meanings of citizenship. Maps have been altered, as the "national" declines in importance, replaced by attention to the international (competitiveness) and the subnational (off-loading and termination of "universal" programs). How do these initiatives for economic and political restructuring relate to the processes of mapping, naming and remembering undertaken by nationalist movements? The answer to this question is the focus of the next section of this paper.

RECONFIGURING THE MAPS: NATIONALISMS IN CANADA

This paper began with the observation that nationalist discourses, deployed by nationalist movements, are social constructions. As such, there is likely to be much indeterminacy in them, both across time and in different cases. Even if "nation-ness remains the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time" (Anderson 1991, 3), definition of the nation can vary widely and nationalism can be used to realize many different ends. It is the strategic choices of collective actors or social movements that generate the style of making claims in the name of the imagined community (Jenson 1993). Moreover, the political expressions of nationalism are more likely to change in response to altered economic and social conditions, especially those that have implications for a redefinition of citizenship. Moments of economic and social turbulence, in which the universe of political discourse is in disarray, enlarge the space for innovation by social actors. Thus, the three nationalist movements examined in this paper have all had to respond to, and in doing so have made important contributions to, the political turbulence, especially the state’s response, which has accompanied globalization in the economic realm.12

Quebec has housed nationalist movements since the nineteenth century, but these have not always named themselves nor mapped the territory in the same way. As the original words of O Canada! make clear, Canadiens was an early designation, then becoming canadien-français. The homeland of this people, even if centred around the St-Laurent, was all of Canada. Then, with the Quiet

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12 This paper is not arguing that the simple presence of a nationalist movement results in it having political power. Nor is it saying that all three movements examined here have been equally powerful. The power resources of a movement depend upon its allies and institutional location (Jenson 1993). The result is that some movements have very little power, despite the resonance in Canada of nationalist discourse. See, for example, Melanson (1993) on the nationalist movement of Acadie.
Revolution the name changed again, to Québécois (Balthazar 1986). Therefore, despite the observation that there has been an enduring nationalist project of French-speaking residents of Canada to preserve their language and culture, there have always been competing ways of imagining how to achieve this end, with different political strategies for doing so.

Beginning in the 1960s the neonationalist project of the Québécois challenged the logic of pan-Canadian citizenship, because a central demand was for control over social programs by the Quebec government. As social institutions were taken away from the Church and became public, and the Quebec state became the expression of Québécois aspirations (l'État, c'est nous); it competed with the federal government for the expression of citizenship (Balthazar 1986, 124-27 and chap. 7). Beginning with Jean Lesage, provincial politicians of all parties described the Quebec state as the locale for realizing the collective aspirations of the people. This was nationalism more than it was social democracy or Keynesianism. And it was state building, not province building. Therefore, and not surprisingly, a concept of citoyens québécois took hold (Simard 1993, 161).

The impact of these discursive changes within Quebec was somewhat attenuated as long as the federal government maintained an alternative vision of pan-Canadian citizenship, in which Québécois were addressed as francophones. That project, however, lost resonance with the change in the federal government in 1984, although it had already begun to falter in the previous years, as the state began to respond to the processes of globalization described above and as intense conflict about citizenship surrounded the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The content of that document, intended by its originators to be the highest expression of individual rights, was contested from the beginning by those, including the Québécois neonationalists, who sought to protect collective rights.

By the 1990s, while all neonationalists agree that Quebec is a nation, wings within the movement make different claims to rights and powers in the name of that nation.13 One important tendency within the movement is obviously the indépendantiste project. While sharing with other wings certain practices, including the use of the name Québécois, there are significant differences. The basic claim of the indépendantistes is to sovereignty. A second wing of the movement, that of federalist nationalists, is willing to grant that the constitution of Canada can be a locale of recognition, but only if that document accepts collective and societal difference, by designating Quebec as a distinct society.

and transferring a substantial amount of state power to the province. A third position is one that insists that in the definition of fundamental issues of citizenship and nationhood only the institutions of the Quebec state can legitimately speak for Quebec and recognize its societal diversity.¹⁴

For Québécois nationalists of whatever wing, a powerful Quebec state is important for much more than symbolic reasons. In the last decades of economic turbulence, nationalists have sought control over new levers of economic policy — symbolized but not confined to the call for control over training and unemployment insurance — so that the Quebec state can effectively participate in the development of the economy and society of the province (Balthazar 1991). In the economic realm, there has been a new convergence. Both the Quebec Liberals and the Parti Québécois seek to promote a route through restructuring led by the Quebec bourgeoisie, in particular as it is represented by the “entrepreneurial heroes” of Québec Inc. In Quebec neoliberalism, promoted by the current Liberal government and by the Parti Québécois under the leadership of economist Jacques Parizeau, maintains a commitment to state participation in, if not necessarily leadership of, the development of the province (Pelletier 1991).

Such thinking differentiates the nationalist-inspired efforts to relocate Quebec in the global economy from the neoliberal, exclusively market-based project of the federal government (Breton and Jenson 1991, 84-85). Much of neonationalism in Quebec is an explicitly outward-looking perspective, cognizant of the needs of international competitiveness. Thus free trade is embraced as a positive force for economic development. At the same time, the provincial state is pursuing an industrial strategy which continues to identify the development of Quebec industry as a response to the post-Fordist future of regional blocs. Therefore, for all wings of the nationalist movement a motive for seeking greater economic powers is to insulate the regional economy from the impact of decisions taken at the federal level which do not correspond to the movement’s preferences for post-Fordism. Directly counter to that strategy, and therefore opposed by many Québécois nationalists in 1991-92, were the federal government’s efforts to maintain — or develop — national economic institutions by directing the “economic union.” Opposition to the federal govern-

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¹⁴ The Parti Québécois obviously represents the first position. The Quebec Liberal party houses many who share the second position, while the third can be seen in the recent statement of intellectuals in Le Devoir, 25 April 1993 (also, Laforest 1991). This characterization of the wings of the movement is based on their positions on political institutions and citizenship. There are obviously other ways of describing the movement. For ones based on more ideological distinctions see Dion (1976).
ment’s proposals were strong in Quebec, even from the ranks of neoliberals who were otherwise enthusiastic about “less state” (Smith 1993, 94-95).

Quebec nationalists of the 1990s have targeted the economic levers considered necessary to build a viable post-Fordist economy and resist efforts to maintain the vestiges of a “universal” Canadian citizenship. The goal is to assure that the social and economic situation of the Québécois will not only be administered but fashioned by the Quebec state, sovereign or not, in a strong regional economy. Thus, while the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 had very little say about the division of powers, by the time of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission and the Allaire Report of the Quebec Liberals, the issue was central (Simard 1993, 161).

With this activist nationalist project and model, the imaginary of the Quebec nation has become dominant. The pan-Canadian idea of a single country defined around a linguistic duality is no longer hegemonic. In its place there is now a clear representation of the Quebec nation, facing an “other.” As the Québécois worked to name themselves as a nation, they perforce generated a mirror image of the “other.” Originally, this other was “English Canada,” appropriate to a dualistic and language-based reading of Canadian history. Recently, that other has become for the indépendantistes simply Canada and for the federalist nationalists, the “rest of Canada.”

The map has also been quite clearly re-drawn. Since the rise of Québécois nationalism in the 1960s, the community imagined by that movement has been centred in the province of Quebec, adopting its territory as the homeland of the people. The nation-building project is to arm that community with the resources necessary to allow the community to thrive.

Given the embrace of free trade by the Quebec state and the nationalists who support it, it is not surprising that the last decade has been one of rising discord between Québécois nationalists and those of the rest of Canada (Resnick 1990; Bashevkin 1991, 162-64; Simard 1993, 155-59). The latter’s nationalism is the least well defined of the three considered in this paper. Indeed, it lacks a name for itself. Sometimes it is termed the nationalism of “English Canada,” always in quotation marks (see, for example, Granatstein and McNaught 1991; McCall et al. 1992).

This name has several problems. One is the association with English origin, totally inappropriate in the current polyethnic and multiracial society. Another is that it is sometimes the preferred term — of abuse — for angry Québécois nationalists. Recently, and with a certain irony, some people have begun to term it ROC. This name derives from the habit of federalists in Quebec of speaking of “Quebec and the rest of Canada” (whereas indépendantistes speak of
"Quebec and Canada”). Most common, however, is the continued tradition of using a linguistically based designation. Thus, Barlow and Campbell say:

We must redefine our concepts of sovereignty and nationhood in order to establish institutional relations among members of the three founding nations of Canada: aboriginal [sic], French-, and English-speaking. To do so, we will need to reverse our one-dimensional definition of a single nation. Our survival and emancipation will depend on our ability to build on well-defined aboriginal, French-, and multi-cultural English-speaking national identities and to channel the creative energies of those parts into a cohesive entity called Canada. (1991, 144)

The first manifestation of this nationalism, at a time when its promoters were self-named “economic nationalists,” was in the mobilization against foreign investment and cultural domination by the United States in the late 1960s and through the 1970s (Resnick 1977, 147ff). Concerns about the loss of sovereignty following from economic integration, via links of trade, direct investment and other economic ties, have fuelled the movement since, even as these nationalists have come to be housed within the social movements, especially the women’s and labour movements (Bashevkin 1991, chap. 1). She has also done a definitive study of the role of NAC, as a part of the nationalist movement, in opposing free trade (1991, chap. 6).

Globalization has most obviously posed problems for this nationalist movement. Opposition to the government’s market-based economic restructuring, especially in the long run up to the 1988 free trade election, and intervention in the constitutional debates of 1991-92 have been the major areas of action of these nationalists. The economic and cultural sovereignty of Canada remains the focus of those who directly attack the neoconservative agenda of the Mulroney Conservatives (see, for example, Barlow and Campbell 1991, chap. 3). Much of what the state has been doing, as described above, is a direct assault on the most valued content of their identity as Canadians. Moreover, the reality of weakened state capacity to regulate and the transnationalization of much economic activity has forced a reassessment of the exclusive focus on Canada.

The collective identity mobilized by this nationalist movement is one that has always recognized distinctiveness by counterposing the Canadian experi-

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15 Cairns (1993, passim) uses ROC as the adjective for “English Canadian” nationalism. He also terms it “essentially ... Canadian nationalism in retreat, besieged by rival Québécois and aboriginal [sic] nationalisms” (186). This section of my paper argues not that it is in retreat but that it is suffering from what Simard correctly labels “angoisse” (1993, 157) as it attempts to come to grips with the new circumstances of globalization. This is still a work in progress; it is too soon to say whether naming and mapping will generate a “three-nations” vision (Jenson 1993).
ence to that of the United States. Canada as a “distinct society” is one differentiated from the United States, as this quotation from Tony Clarke, chair of the Action Canada Network indicates:

Those characteristics that have long distinguished Canada from the United States — such as greater emphasis on communal values, collective rights, environmental preservation, public enterprise — should be key elements in defining ourselves as a distinct society. (quoted in Barlow and Campbell 1991, 147)

No matter the relatively weak welfare state built after 1945, central to the vision of Canada of these English Canadian nationalists are the social programs of the Keynesian era, especially medicare. They provide the distinction that makes it relevant to preserve sovereignty and mobilize against the market-based and trade-driven policies of the Tories.

Clearly, then, the map used by this movement is one in which Canada stands out from its neighbour to the south. Nonetheless, as the break with Québécois nationalism after the 1988 election has taken its toll — and Canada’s geographic extent is in doubt — and as the need for political alliances with other opponents of free trade in both the U.S. and Mexico has been recognized, the boundaries of the map have become more blurred and more continental.

In the debates about free trade the nationalist movement has faced pressures to rethink positions elaborated exclusively in terms of “sovereignty” and protection of Canada from the U.S. It has had to come to terms — with greater or lesser success — with the inability to block completely the move towards a North American regional economy (Jenson and Mahon 1993a, 85-86). At the same time, it has been challenged to develop an analysis of the transnational processes — pollution, for example — which require new forms of regulation. Mobilization in opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in groups like Common Frontiers which bring together activists from the three countries, reflect the response of this nationalist movement to the new conditions of globalization, and the new maps it brings (Barlow and Campbell 1991, 203-204). Notions of citizenship also change when such mobilization brings discussions of a “social charter” at the North American level.

There is another way in which this nationalist movement has also begun to change, and to alter its understandings of citizenship in this moment of political turbulence. Because the nationalists have come to be housed in the social movements of the popular sector, there is a strong tendency to represent the country to itself in categorial terms and to mount a critique of the democratic deficit in liberal democratic politics with reference to its impact on particular categories of the population, for example, women, the disabled, gays and lesbians, or the poor. Thus, the encompassing name “Canadian” has given way to categorial designations, whether in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, sexual
In particular, notions of a postwar universalistic citizenship have given way to one of citizenship founded on categorial equity, with rights following from differences as much as similarities (Jenson, 1992b, 218-222; Kymlicka 1992, 28-30). Histories of bias, oppression, and victimization underpin the claims of such groups for new citizenship rights. As the split between the National Action Committee on the Status of Women and the labour movement in the 1992 Referendum campaign signalled, claims to categorial equity sometimes make it difficult to construct consensus around pan-Canadian and universalistic citizenship; the 1988 working coalition in opposition to the FTA may have been more the exception than the rule (Bashevkin 1991, chap. 6).

Aboriginal Peoples have also mounted important challenges to postwar understandings of citizenship. The nation-to-nation discourse which had been used through the nineteenth century, was less utilized in the first half of the twentieth as the consequences of political disempowerment and economic catastrophe devastated aboriginal communities. Moreover, the "universalist" definition of citizenship after 1945 made collective claims difficult to mobilize. But aboriginal nationalism revitalized in part as a consequence of the mobilization in opposition to the "individual rights" vision of assimilation sketched in the 1969 White Paper on Indian Affairs (Weaver 1981, chap. 7). Their claims to collective rights were founded on a discourse of self-determination similar to that used by Québécois nationalists (Kymlicka 1992, 30; Jenson 1993). Indeed, from the 1960s on spokespersons for aboriginal groups made explicit comparisons between their demands and those of the Québécois. And in a similar vein, the "termination" of special rights for Aboriginal Peoples was linked, especially by Liberals in power after 1968, to opposition to "special status" for Quebec (Weaver 1981, 179).

At issue after 1969 was the meaning of equality in a liberal society. Aboriginal Peoples were claiming more than simple equality. They were demanding to be "citizens plus." They expected services from the federal and provincial governments that other citizens received, but in addition, their historical standing as nations, with or without treaties, gave them rights that others did not have. In particular, Aboriginal Peoples claimed the inherent right to self-

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16 Movements promoting these collective identities have had a substantial place in the universe of political discourse since the 1980s. Visible minorities, women, immigrants, the labour movement, and church-based communities gained confidence, strength, and power from the non-party politics of the popular sector. These social movements and interest groups often act in coalition in the Action Canada network, by-passing the party system, whose capacity to present alternatives was at a new low in the 1980s (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1991, chap. 1). For an excellent discussion of the importance of "identity work" for Aboriginal Peoples see Sawchuk (1992) as well as Chartrand (1991).
government, a claim that was particularly powerful in the 1991-92 round of constitutional negotiations.

In making nationalist claims Aboriginal Peoples refuse the mirror that has long been held up to them, insisting instead on alternative images which reflect both Quebec and the rest of Canada in much more fragmented ways. Boundaries have shifted as public discourse has opened to accommodate other understandings of Canadian history, in which more than two nations participate. They have begun to deploy a nationalist discourse as a way of generating solidarity across many nations, peoples, and rural and urban areas (Chartrand 1993). The common cultural markers noted by this movement are not only aboriginal culture but also the colonial experience. Therefore, the national identity of Aboriginal is an anti-colonial one, based on a rejection of the names imposed by the colonizers.

The map has also been reconfigured, with Canada located with reference to its colonial history, and as a territory in which many nations' claims to land were rendered invisible by the white settlers' drive to create a single entity called "Canada." Aboriginal Peoples locate themselves, in turn, in relation to other indigenous peoples, overlaying the map used by "Europeans" with one of their own. In this way they promote their own vision of history, in which indigenous peoples reappear and "founding" groups are styled as colonizers and invaders.

Armed with their names and this map Aboriginal Peoples are empowered to make claims well beyond the border of Canada. In demanding recognition of a new relationship with the Canadian state, Aboriginal Peoples have increasingly begun to base their claims on peoples' right to national self-determination as defined in international law (Jhappan 1992). In doing so, they have found support in international institutions and among groups that are willing to recognize their claim to being peoples. The permeability of national societies to outsiders, which is part of the globalization process, clearly aids Aboriginal Peoples in such actions.

Aboriginal Peoples are clearly challenging existing understandings of citizenship when they reject both the sovereignty of Canada (or an independent Quebec) and the supposed universalism of citizenship rights. Seeking status as "citizens plus," they are also claiming self-government rights as a people, strongly rejecting any efforts to re-define citizenship in ways that would designate them an ethnic or racial group (Chartrand 1993).

At the same time, an aspect of economic globalization has also provided support to this vision of nationalism. There has been an exposure, by ecologists in both the north and the south, of the ecological costs of the mass production and mass consumption economics of Fordism (Mahon 1993). Aboriginal Peoples have thus found new allies among ecologists supporting their claims for their right to control economic development in their traditional territories.
CONCLUSIONS

From this rapid overview of the three nationalist movements currently playing an active role in Canadian politics, a number of observations emerge. First is that the movements do not share a common discourse. Indeed, they name both themselves and their significant "other" in quite different ways. In no case does a nationalist movement represent itself in exactly the same terms as another movement represents it. A second observation is that the representations of each movement have changed over time, as they have confronted different circumstances. Third, all three of the nationalist movements have pressed for new conceptions of citizenship and rights.

New economic relations, bringing an intensification of international trade, a geographical restructuring of production, and a shift in state regulatory capacity, have evoked responses from these nationalist movements, altering the names, maps and histories. Quebec nationalists have chosen to embrace the development of regional trading blocs, in large part because they also seem to come with space for subnational governments to make new alliances with "their" corporations, labour movements, and citizens. Canadian nationalists have struggled to make sense of the new regional economy, uncertain how to incorporate the new conditions into a political identity and practice so long centred on concerns about sovereignty and national distinctiveness. Aboriginal nationalists have learned to make use of the spaces of political globalization, in order to assert their right to be recognized as peoples and to control their economic destinies at a time when the Fordist assumptions about nature's bounty are clearly challenged by the ecological fragility which post-Fordism will have to face.

Thus, Columbus' voyage of faith in the "global" continues to generate consequences. The economic, social and political turbulence at the end of this century is a continuation of the politics of naming, mapping and remembering which his voyage to "find" lands and peoples in the name of European states set in motion. As so many have done before, we will struggle and confront these consequences, even into the twenty-first century.

17 For example, the "two nations" discourse of the Québécois cannot accommodate aboriginal nationalism, and there is a tendency to designate them in racial or ethnic terms, a naming process that Aboriginal Peoples vehemently reject. (Chartrand 1993, 237-239).
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Appendix A

THE MAPLE LEAF FOREVER

– Alexander Muir
1867

In days of yore, from Britain’s shore,
Wolfe, the dauntless hero, came
And planted firm Britannia’s flag
On Canada’s fair domain.
Here may it wave, our boast, our pride,
And joined in love together
The Thistle, Shamrock, Rose entwine
The Maple Leaf forever.

At Queenston Heights and Lundy’s Lane
Our brave fathers, side by side,
For freedom, homes, and loved ones dear
Firmly stood and nobly died;
And those dear rights which they maintained
We swear to yield them never!
Our watchword ever more shall be
The Maple Leaf forever!

Our fair Dominion now extends
From Cape Race to Nootka Sound;
May peace forever be our lot,
And plenteous store abound:
And may those ties of love be ours
Which discord cannot sever,
And flourish green o’er Freedom’s home
The Maple Leaf forever!
Appendix A (cont’d.)

O CANADA!

—A.B. Routhier
1880

O Canada! Terre de nos aïeux,
Ton front est ceint de fleurons glorieux!
Car ton bras sait porter l’épée,
Il sait porter la croix!
Ton histoire est une épopée
Des plus brillants exploits,
Et ta valeur,
de foi trempée,
Protègera nos foyers et nos droits.

Sous l’œil de Dieu, près du fleuve géant,
Le Canadien grandit en espérant.
Il est né d’une race fière,
Béni fut son berceau;
Le ciel a marqué sa carrière
Dans ce monde nouveau,
Toujours guidé par sa lumière
Il garde l’honneur de son drapeau.

De son patron, précurseur du vrai Dieu,
Il porte au front l’auréole de feu,
Ennemi de la tyrannie,
Mais plein de loyauté,
Il veut garder dans l’harmonie
Sa fière liberté,
Et par l’effort de son génie,
Sur notre sol asseoir la vérité.
Appendix A (cont'd.)

O CANADA!

– Stanley Weir
1908

O Canada! Our home and native land!
True patriot-love in all thy sons command.
With glowing hearts we see thee rise,
The True North, strong and free,
And stand on guard, O Canada,
We stand on guard for thee.

REFRAIN:

O Canada, glorious and free!
We stand on guard, we stand on guard for thee.
O Canada, we stand on guard for thee.

O Canada! Where pines and maples grow,
Great prairies spread and lordly rivers flow,
How dear to us thy broad domain,
From East to Western Sea,
Thou land of hope for all who toil!
Thou True North, strong and free!

O Canada! Beneath thy shining skies
May stalwart sons and gentle maidens rise,
To keep thee steadfast through the years
From East to Western Sea,
Our own beloved native land,
Our True North strong and free!

From: Edith Fowke, Alan Mills and Helmut Blume, Canada's Story in Song (Toronto: Gage, 1960)
Appendix B

THE CANADA CLAUSE IN THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD

1. The Constitution Act, 1867 is amended by adding thereto, immediately after section 1 thereof, the following section:

Canada Clause 2. (1) The Constitution of Canada, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the following fundamental characteristics:

(a) Canada is a democracy committed to a parliamentary and federal system of government and to the rule of law;

(b) the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern this land, have the right to promote their languages, cultures and traditions and to ensure the integrity of their societies, and their governments constitute one of three orders of government in Canada;

(c) Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society, which includes a French-speaking majority, a unique culture and a civil law tradition;

(d) Canadians and their governments are committed to the vitality and development of official language minority communities throughout Canada;

(e) Canadians are committed to racial and ethnic equality in a society that includes citizens from many lands who have contributed, and continue to contribute, to the building of a strong Canada that reflects its cultural and racial diversity;

(f) Canadians are committed to a respect for individual and collective human rights and freedoms of all people;

(g) Canadians are committed to the equality of female and male persons; and

(h) Canadians confirm the principle of the equality of the provinces at the same time as recognizing their diverse characteristics.
Peoples, Persons, and Places in Flux: International Integration versus National Fragmentation

John Kincaid

Accelerated international integration during the late twentieth century has raised grave questions about the future of the nation-state. The possible breakup of Belgium and Canada, regional fracturing in Italy and Spain, secession and warfare in the Balkans, the disintegration of Lebanon, assertions of ethnic nationalism, regional consciousness and religious revivalism, regional and local government forays into foreign affairs, large-scale movements of people across borders, and other forces having centrifugal effects on nation-states all seem to point to a paradox of disintegration, or national fragmentation, in the face of global integration.

This paradox, however, may be a coincidence of largely unrelated phenomena because international integration has differential effects on regions and nation-states, while national fragmentation is a function of various factors. As Stanley Hoffmann suggests, “Every international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units.”1 The contemporary world is marked by significant changes in historic relationships between peoples,

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1 Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, 95 (Summer 1966): 864 (emphasis in original).
persons, and places, but a casual relation between international integration and national fragmentation is not clearly apparent.

There is also a problem of defining terms. International integration occurs along economic, political, military, social, and cultural lines at variable rates and to varying degrees in different places. In addition, some observers see integration as a process, while others view it as an end product. Furthermore, there are vastly different perceptions and conceptions of international integration as between, let us say, a Jacques Delors and an Ayatollah Khomeni, as well as many others.

For this paper, international integration is construed generally as the growing worldwide access of persons to each other and to the goods, services, and ideas increasingly available in a global marketplace characterized by freer intercourse, greater interdependence, more authoritative governing institutions, and emergent concerns of a common nature (e.g., environmental protection). Although the world has been integrating in this sense since Ferdinand Magellan's surviving crew circumnavigated the globe, quantitative technological developments and incremental political developments since World War II have generated qualitative differences in the nature and speed of integration.

National fragmentation lends itself to very different definitions. In the following section, national fragmentation is construed literally as the break-up of a nation-state. This, however, is a severe measure. National fragmentation might also be defined, from a unitary or nationalist perspective, as decentralization, devolution, regionalization, or movement towards a federal system, confederation, federacy, or some other loose association short of divorce, especially if a looser association is structured along ethnic, racial, religious, and/or linguistic lines. In addition, national fragmentation might be defined as reduced national sovereignty arising from assignments of powers to international authorities and from global forces exerting centrifugal pressures on national governments. This outcome is embedded in classic definitions of integration as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."² Such definitions, however, are slippery, and make national fragmentation all the more difficult to relate to international integration.

A further difficulty is the extent to which international integration may be seen as fragmenting the cultural spaces defined by nation-states, namely, nationality. For many national communities, nationality and nation-state are virtually synonymous. Consequently, international cultural, economic, and

demographic forces that may seem to adulterate the cultural integrity of a nationality may also be perceived as fragmenting the nation-state, even though the institutional nation-state remains intact. If, let us say, Germany were to become genuinely multicultural as a result of foreign cultural influences and massive immigration, would Germany still be Germany?

Thus, the seeming paradox of international integration and national fragmentation poses significant analytic problems. This becomes more apparent if one surveys actual world developments.

**WHO’S IN AND WHO’S OUT OF THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE?**

The following survey seeks to illustrate the variability of global integration and the possible connections between international integration and national fragmentation. The economic reality framing this survey is that, of the world’s nearly $20 trillion GNP in 1991, the European Community (EC) accounted for $6.5 trillion (U.S.), the United States for $5.5 trillion, and Japan for $3.4 trillion. If future growth rates track those of the past decade, no other region or nation-state will catch up with the EC, U.S., or Japan during the next two decades. Measured in terms of GNP, moreover, corporations accounted for 57 of the world’s leading 100 economic powers.

**AFRICA**

In most of Africa, international integration means, among other things, economic dependence on developed nation-states; safe nature preserves and resorts for tourists; exposure on international television of civil violence and mass starvation; humanitarian expeditions from the developed world; and the right of each nation-state to vote in the United Nations. Otherwise, Africa is not well integrated into the global economy, nor is Africa influential in global political integration. Eighteen of the world’s 25 poorest countries are in Africa. Excluding South Africa, the total GDP of sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of some 450 million, is no larger than the GDP of Belgium, which has some 11 million people.3

At the same time, national fragmentation is not widespread, largely because most of Africa’s polyglot nation-states have been held intact by dictatorial regimes. Many of these regimes have been remarkably durable, such as Mobutu of Zaire, who has held power since 1965, after United Nations’ forces

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suppressed secessionist Katanga. Many of the nationalist leaders who emerged from the anti-colonial movements valued political control and unitarism more than political freedom and democratic pluralism. Although African nationalists "were among the leaders in developing the post-1945 'right' to self-determination" of all peoples against colonization, most of them rejected ethnic self-determination in favour of nation-state self-determination and national unification of ethnic heterogeneity. For these and other reasons, attempts to establish viable pan-African institutions as well as federal arrangements within and between nation-states have not been notably successful.

Another barrier to integration may be Africa's high public consumption and government ownership or domination of economies. Such practices tend to produce corruption, bureaucratic inertia, and complex rules that militate against foreign investment and entrepreneurial engagement with the world economy. Furthermore, centralized revenue systems may starve the peripheries of public investment and stifle responsible regional tax and spending policies by subsidizing political bosses. Although many African nation-states have been somewhat integrated by foreign aid, this assistance may also reinforce their isolation from global markets. Africa produces only about 1 percent of the world's GDP.

A further barrier to integration appears to be Africa's rapid population growth, from some 281 million people in 1960 to 647 million in 1990. The tremendous pressure exerted by this growth on governments, economies, and natural resources retards economic development. Explosive population growth also exacerbates social control problems, thus reinforcing the authoritarian propensities of Africa's national governments.

The immediate factor precipitating the national fragmentation evident in the Horn of Africa has been the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, thereby, the withdrawal of superpower support for client states, such as Ethiopia and Somalia. Otherwise, the civil war in Sudan cannot be attributed to international integration, nor can most other intranational conflicts in Africa, except perhaps South Africa, where the world has pressured the white regime to accept black majority rule, and Angola, where civil war was fed by superpower rivalry and by South Africa. In a number of countries, such as Cameroon and Nigeria, the principal destabilizing cleavage is between Muslims and non-Muslims. In Cameroon, for example, the anglophone and English-speaking South has been resisting "Frenchification" by the dominant Muslim and francophone north.

Perhaps new leaders and entrepreneurs emerging from post-colonial generations, for whom domestic repression rather than foreign oppression has been their dominant experience, may press for political freedoms and pluralist democracy, but collapses of Africa’s dictatorial regimes are likely to unleash many centrifugal forces propelled more by ancient autonomy claims and current grievances than by modern conceptions of liberalism, individualism, egalitarianism, and globalism. The combination of cosmopolitanism and localism needed to foster international economic integration and intranational democratic and pluralist integration may be difficult to achieve in much of Africa for the foreseeable future.

MIDDLE EAST

Global economic integration is well underway in the Middle East, though in varying degrees among the region’s nation-states. Were it not for the value of oil and resistance to Israel, most of the region’s nation-states would be poor desert kingdoms and theocracies. Only Lebanon and Turkey have officially disestablished Islam, although legal systems modeled after European codes have been enacted by most Middle Eastern governments.

Except for Lebanon, national fragmentation is not prevalent, largely because the superpowers and Israel have had strong interests in maintaining nation-state stability in the region, while national elites have had strong interests in maintaining autocratic rule. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, the United States did not seek to precipitate Iraq’s disintegration. Most of the nation-states in the Middle East are recent products of Western intervention to remodel the region along European lines. The very artificiality of most of these nation-states creates strong incentives for autocratic rule. Most of these nation-states are polyglot as well, embracing suppressed or displaced nationalities, such as the Kurds, who lost out in the West’s division of the region into nation-states, and minority groups, such as the Copts and Nubians in Egypt.

International integration does threaten the stability of many of these nation-states because integration is associated with Western values. The death fatwa issued from Iran against Salman Rushdie reflects the deep threat felt in some Islamic quarters (as well as, from a Western perspective, the underside of globalism). The defeat of the great Muslim world, which stretched from Central Asia to Spain, by Western Christendom is a recent memory rubbed raw by the British and French “mandate system” that followed the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, by Western support for Israel, and by apparent Western

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indifference to the fate of Muslims in Bosnia. The autocratic elites of these nation-states must stand, or at least appear to stand, therefore, for Islamic values against Western globalization in order to ward off the disruptive forces of pan-Arabist Islamic fundamentalism.

ASIA

Global economic integration is well underway in many parts of Asia, and the consumer culture associated with integration is often conspicuously apparent. In a 1993 survey, for example, U.S. films accounted for three of the top ten screen hits in China, five of the ten in Taiwan, eight of the ten in Hong Kong, nine of the ten in Singapore, eight of the ten in Japan, and five of the top eight in South Korea. U.S. and other Western writers were less dominant in book sales, although in China, July Zhou’s A Chinese Lady in Manhattan led the bestsellers at bookstands while the New China News Agency reported Dialectical and Historical Materialism to be the country’s top seller.

A striking characteristic of Asia’s economic “tigers” has been export promotion, which has stimulated the manufacturing and technological developments needed for economic growth. In contrast, many countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East have relied on exports of natural resources and agricultural commodities, both of which are subject to long-term price depressions (e.g., oil). Many national governments in these regions have also relied on foreign aid and foreign borrowing while pursuing import-substitution policies, which encourage the formation of protected, subsidized, and state-owned enterprises that are often inefficient and unattractive to export markets.

It does not appear to be coincidental, therefore, that the Asian “tigers” are much more integrated into all facets of the global economy. To produce exports, these countries aggressively acquired the foreign skills needed for modern manufacturing and studied foreign consumer preferences and market practices in order to sell their manufactured goods abroad. The Japanese, of course, were very successful in penetrating the American consumer market, even rivaling the once world-dominant U.S. automotive industry. Japan’s share of the U.S. automobile market reached 30 percent in 1991 (then dropping to 25 percent in 1993).

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Of the world’s five nations with the greatest purchasing power in 1990 — the United States, China, Japan, Germany, and India, respectively — three are located in Asia. Two of the great nation-states of the region, moreover — Australia and Japan — are full partners in global integration, and neither nation is under serious threat of national fragmentation. China, which experienced a 9.5 percent average annual GDP growth rate from 1980 to 1990, is becoming integrated into the global economy. However, its leading secessionist prospect, Tibet, is not a function of this integration but of historic injustice. Otherwise, in Asia, national reintegration is as much a part of the agenda as potential disintegration: namely, the recent reunification of Vietnam; the continuing division of North and South Korea; the reintegration of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and perhaps Taiwan; and the dispute over Japanese islands controlled by Russia and the United States. In addition, Australia and New Zealand are entering a closer economic relationship, and greater integration of Asia’s Pacific rim countries seems inevitable.

The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 and the forces of potential fragmentation operating in India, Sri Lanka, and several other nations have had little to do with contemporary global integration. Many of these secessionist issues stem from earlier periods of international colonial integration. Colonialism often introduced or exacerbated divisions among groups while seeking to unify disparate peoples and jurisdictions within single-state boundaries. Western images of Asia promulgated during the colonial era also influenced many Asian self-perceptions, producing distorted views of history and heightened cultural conflict. One feature “of the contemporary revival of Hindu extremism” in India, argues Amartya Sen, “is its utterly ahistorical nature, which permits reinventions of the past to suit the demands of political expediency.... The selective alienation of India from a very substantial part of its own past has been nourished by the asymmetrical relation between India and the West. And it is the rationalist part of India’s tradition that has been most affected by this alienation.”

Yet, there are pockets of vigorous growth and global integration, such as Bangalore, India’s “Silicon Valley.” According to the editor of the local edition of The Times of India, “In Bangalore, the old traditions of the empire are still intact. This city is totally unapologetic about its ties to the West, and that’s why the West is so at ease here. It’s a mood that promotes development.”

13 John Ward Anderson, “Indians, Foreigners Build Silicon Valley in Bangalore,” The
Contemporary globalism may exacerbate intranational tensions by introducing more divisive cultural messages, some of which challenge the foundations of certain cultures, such as the role of women in society. In addition, the ability of global media, such as the BBC and CNN, to broadcast localized intergroup violence while it is occurring can spark contagious violence. When Hindu destruction of a mosque was broadcast internationally in December 1992, rioting broke out in some 65 communities in India, killing some 2,000 people. International economic integration may also aggravate intranational disputes about allocations of economic resources among groups and jurisdictions. Secessionist pressure in India, for example, has come from the comparatively high-income Punjab as well as the much poorer Kashmir.

LATIN AMERICA

Global economic and cultural integration appears to be accelerating in Latin America, with hardly a ripple effect thus far on the territorial integrity of the region's nation-states. Simon Bolivar had proclaimed that because "this new world has a single origin, a single language and religion," it needed "a single government to unite" the new-born states into a confederation; however, the separate national independence campaigns of about 1811 to 1825 did not forge a common bond. Subsequent fear of the "northern colossus" also failed to provide a firm basis for a Confederation of American States at the Congress of Panama (1846) and later assemblies. Yet, proponents of union continued to invoke this fear. As Raul Haya de la Torre, founder of the Peru-based Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, put it in 1925: "one of the most important projects of imperialism is to maintain our America divided. Latin America united, federal, would make one of the world's most powerful countries and would be regarded as a danger for the imperialist Yankees."14

An inability to institutionalize democratic regimes also inhibited union, as national dictators and military establishments protected their power bases. In addition, Latin American leaders and intellectuals generated many revolutionary ideologies with threatening continental pretensions, such as Peronism in Argentina, Varguism in Brazil, socialism in Chile, Marxism in Cuba, Cardenism in Mexico, and aprismo in Peru. As a result of these and other factors, the Organization of American States and the Latin American Free Trade Association proved to be of limited effectiveness and popularity.

Recent movements towards democratization and pragmatic integration into the global economy, however, seem to be providing more favourable bases for

continental integration. Argentina and Brazil signed a *Programa de Integracion Argentino-Brasileña* in 1986, to which Paraguay and Uruguay signed on in 1991 in the Treaty of Asuncion. Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela intend to create a free-trade zone by 1994, and the Andean Pact countries are attempting to create a common market by 1995. Efforts also are being made to revive the Central American Common Market consisting of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Mexico, which now has one of the region's most dynamic economies, is emerging as a force for integration, and some of the region's integrating activity reflects an expectation that the North American Free Trade Agreement can be extended to Latin America.

Many barriers to integration remain, however, including military and quasi-military rule in some nations, severe poverty and underdevelopment, and the conflict in Peru triggered by a relic of Marxism-Maoism. Another barrier is the contest between legitimate and illegitimate integration, reflected in the battle between drug merchants in Colombia, who supply the underside of the global economy, while the national government, under pressure from the United States, seeks to integrate Colombia into the topside of the global economy. Cuba remains somewhat of a pariah, but when Castro leaves the scene, Cubans are likely to press for the island's integration into hemispheric arrangements.

**NORTH AMERICA**

In North America, the superpower that has played the pivotal role in international integration is not confronted with national fragmentation, although it is experiencing society-wide conflict over "multiculturalism" and lifestyle choices. The only state that has given some official attention to secession from the United States in recent memory has been Alaska, some of whose white citizens regard the federal government as a distant semi-colonial power. Some native Hawaiians have advocated a reconstitution of Hawaii as "a nation within a nation," while others have urged secession. Yet, Puerto Rico recently elected a governor who advocates statehood for the commonwealth in the American union, and voters in the Republic of Palau approved a Compact of Free Association with the United States, thus ending the United Nations' last trusteeship. Otherwise, U.S. states have more offices in Tokyo than they have in Washington, D.C., though none of them are agitating for annexation to Japan.

International integration is not threatening to most Americans because they believe they benignly dominate the process. For them, global integration is associated with universal democratic and human rights ideas; the consumer culture underlying integration is substantially American; the prevailing language of integration is English; and the United States itself is an amalgam of peoples from all parts of the world — so much so that most Americans do not see themselves as having an American nationality culture. The rest of the world
may recognize and, in some quarters, detest what they regard as American culture, but when Americans see themselves as having a culture, it tends to be their ethnic heritage, to the extent they can identify or reinvent it. Otherwise, the universal “truths” believed to underlie the United States — life, liberty, equality, property, consent of the governed, and the pursuit of happiness — are seen as transcending culture, thus providing for civic unity while accommodating cultural diversity.¹⁵

Resistance to integration tends to be expressed as opposition to “unfair” economic competition from other nations, “unfair” burdens of responsibility for world order, and, more recently, inadequate human rights and environmental protection in many nations. Even so, these contentions are subject to vigorous debate and do not necessarily herald a new isolationism; instead, they reflect economic and political concerns about the terms of global integration.

The current economic difficulties of the United States, as well as Canada, have dampened public enthusiasm for new political steps towards international integration. Most salient is sizable opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), elicited primarily by fears of job losses to low-wage Mexico.¹⁶ Many Canadians fear economic losses both to the U.S. and to Mexico. Steps towards integration in the EC have also become sluggish as member states try to resolve their own economic problems. In addition, most of the national governments of the Western democracies, as well as Japan, are experiencing crises of public confidence and legitimacy, which have produced voter reservations and resistance to government plans for further international integration.

Although these discontents are probably temporary obstacles to integration, they suggest that a certain national cohesion arising from public confidence in national governments and national economies is necessary to induce voters to risk ceding elements of national sovereignty to international institutions. In both North America and Western Europe, no current national government inspires sufficient confidence at home or abroad to exercise persuasive leadership for further regional integration. Americans are not likely to look to Canada or Mexico for leadership on NAFTA, and in the EC, the leaders of the major national governments — France, Germany, and Great Britain — do not inspire confidence in their ability to make EC institutions work better than their own national institutions.

In North America, of course, Canada faces the possible secession of Quebec. Quebec’s French-speaking citizens regard themselves as one of the founding peoples of Canada, not as immigrants obligated to assimilate into an English-


¹⁶ As Ross Perot has put it, if NAFTA is approved, Americans will hear “a giant sucking sound” as jobs rush to Mexico.
speaking polity. French Canadians have tended to see the confederation as a pact between two nations.\textsuperscript{17} Many factors have shaped this dispute over the nature of Canada and Quebec's status, but in this case, international economic integration appears to have had a dampening effect on fragmentation because independence for Quebec, coupled with Quebec's geographic location, would complicate, if not pose barriers to, North American free trade. The uncertain status of a sovereign Quebec under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the prospective North American Free Trade Agreement also poses a risk for Quebec secession. In addition, hopes for a special relationship of any economic or political substance with France dim with every step towards Western European union.

At the same time, the anglo-oriented consumer culture spread by economic integration, and the corrosive effects of consumerism on traditional cultural fortresses — such as the local community club and church — threaten to fragment Quebec's French cultural space; consequently, nationalists have sought to employ state powers to preserve that space even while remaining robust players in the North American and global economies. The EC also has sought to preserve cultural spaces by reserving cultural competencies to member states in matters of national identity.

Juggling global economic integration and state-based cultural preservation is difficult, however, and legal manoeuvres to protect cultural spaces against Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Michelin, Michael Jackson, Mickey Mouse, and McDonald's run afoul of intensifying international norms of universal rights. Although non-binding, the 1993 declaration by the U.N. Center for Human Rights that Quebec's laws requiring French-only business signs violate freedom of expression signaled the growing tension between global individual rights and local nationality rights.

The outcome of the Quebec-Canada dispute\textsuperscript{18} may influence the future of international integration and national fragmentation. Canada is widely viewed as a benign, prosperous, democratic nation, which is struggling with territorially based issues of linguistic and multinational accommodation common to most nation-states. Canada also has sought to address aboriginal rights, as in its authorization of the self-governing aboriginal territory, Nunavut. Hence, Canada is a more relevant bellwether than the United States for worldwide


issues of national territorial integration and disintegration. If Canada breaks up, can less democratic, less developed, and more communally diverse nations be expected to resolve their centrifugal multinational problems within a liberal, democratic framework? At best, a peaceful fragmentation of Canada would serve as a model of civil divorce in a world largely less civil than Canada.

Otherwise, the paradox of international integration and national fragmentation is not unambiguously at work in North America. Economic integration is occurring thus far without national fragmentation, and does not in itself appear to be an incentive for fragmentation. Unlike Western Europe, moreover, economic integration is not viewed as economic union, and there are no serious proposals for a political union of Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Instead, the "states" experiencing the most constraints on their autonomy under free-trade rules are the U.S. states and the Canadian provinces. Mexico's states are likely to experience more independent power, however, as a result of intranational decentralization arising from democratization and free trade.

EUROPE

The one region where the paradox seems most operative is greater Europe. Yet, even there, qualifications are necessary. The fragmentation of the USSR into 15 nation-states reflected the fall of the Russian empire. The USSR was not well integrated into the global economy and its cultural values, and could not very well become integrated without radically altering its political system and, thereby, enabling its subordinate states to disengage from the artificial federal union. The USSR and its "captive nations" could not, by definition, mesh legitimately with the global marketplace because of communism. The USSR as well as the federal systems of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were dominated by one-party hierarchies, which lacked, among other things, the norms, rules, and institutions of democratic intergovernmental negotiation and dispute resolution needed to sustain a free federation. The fact that the USSR disintegrated during an era of international integration does not obviate the fact that the Russian empire, like all empires, would surely have disintegrated in the long run.

Aside from the crushing economic weight of military competition with the United States, however, several factors associated with global integration appear to have hastened the collapse. Modern technology allowed many goods and ideas to penetrate the USSR, heightening awareness of the backwardness of Soviet life, especially in human rights, environmental protection, and consumer wealth. Although issues of rights and environmentalism have received prominent attention among intellectuals and political leaders, consumer aspirations had a substantial impact on the general population, especially young people. Rock music alone posed a formidable challenge to the communist
establishment, which sought to censor the music, require musicians to pass Marxist tests, and compose ideologically correct rock’n roll.\textsuperscript{19} Communism itself emphasized material wealth, but could not deliver the goods.

The region in which the paradox of international integration and national fragmentation appears to be most acute is Eastern Europe where virtually every continuing and new nation-state wishes to join the EC. Yet, even there, the picture is mixed. The national fragmentation witnessed thus far has been primarily the result of the collapse of the USSR, which lifted the lid on authoritarianism that held disparate peoples together in polyglot nation-states. The fragmentation, moreover, has occurred primarily in the Balkans, a region of historic instability.\textsuperscript{20} It is also in this region that a number of nationality groups were forced into shotgun marriages with other groups in nation-states created by the Allies seeking a buffer against Russian Bolshevism after the First World War. There are many old scores to be settled in the region.

Furthermore, most of the region’s ethnonationalist leaders are former communists seeking to re-legitimize their power. Given that the old regimes repressed both nationality rights and consumership rights, legitimation requires these leaders to attend to the localism associated with national citizenship while also laying claim to the cosmopolitanism associated with global consumership. It should not be paradoxical, therefore, that places like Slovenia would desire secession from Yugoslavia and accession to the EC, along with Poland and other neighbouring nation-states.

Otherwise, Germany has been reunited, and a number of other Eastern European nation-states are not experiencing fragmentation, although most are coping with ethnic conflict and severe economic problems. Indeed, the desire for integration with Western Europe could dampen national fragmentation because the best prospects for early accession are likely to be countries that remain intact and show progress towards meeting EC economic and political standards. The second category of candidates for integration are likely to be breakaway nation-states that effect genteel divorces. Least favoured are likely to be nation-states that emerge from a bloody conflict as victors or victims.

Both Russia and Western Europe are in a quandary about how to cope with fragmentation in the Balkans. International recognition of seceding states invites more secession, and acceptance of states that engage in violent secession or repression of secession implicitly legitimizes civil violence. Open support for secession also risks lending credence to secessionist and local autonomy movements in Russia and Western Europe. Russia may be a still disintegrating


empire. Maintaining unity as a federation or confederation is one of Russia’s most critical constitutional issues. In Western Europe, aside from such outstanding problems as Northern Ireland, economic and political union are engendering regional restiveness as well.

It is in Western Europe — the ideological home of the nation-state — that the seeming paradox of international integration and national fragmentation seems most apparent because a peaceful process of economic and political union among democratic countries is necessarily accompanied by questions about the future of the nation-state and of national identities. If Paris, Bonn, Madrid, Rome, London, and so on cede powers to Brussels and also devolve powers to their regions, as many are doing, what will remain of the national government and, thereby, of the nation-state?\footnote{L.J. Sharpe, ed., \textit{The Rise in Meso Government in Europe} (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1993).} To the extent that human identities are attached to these nation-states, then with what jurisdictions will persons identify under conditions of economic and political union?

The Maastricht Treaty (Part Two) establishes the concept of European citizenship, thus taking a significant legal step towards a possible redefinition of nationality groups as ethnic groups and of nation-states as constituent states. Dual citizenship in the United States, for example, gradually lost its sociopolitical dualism, even while retaining some legal dualism, as persons came to identify as citizens of the United States and as residents of a constituent state. In Europe, however, the citizenship issue is more dualistic because, unlike the United States and most other immigrant polities, which base citizenship on \textit{jus soli}, most EC member states base citizenship on \textit{jus sanguinis}.\footnote{William Rogers Brubaker, ed., \textit{Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989); see also, Elizabeth Meehan, \textit{Citizenship and the European Community} (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1993).} Hence, the free migration essential to a common market and political union is made costly by restrictions on the rights of resident aliens necessitated by \textit{jus sanguinis}. As a 1988 commission report complained, the nearly five million Community citizens who have migrated from their home states to other member states “are deprived of the right to vote in local elections simply because they are no longer in their Member State of nationality.”\footnote{Commission of the European Communities, “A People’s Europe: Proposal for a Council Directive on Voting Rights for Community Nationals in Local Elections in Their Member State of Residence,” \textit{Bulletin of the European Communities}, Supplement 2/88, 1988, p. 26.} During the French referendum on Maastricht in 1992, some voters were appalled by the prospect that a non-French EC citizen could be elected mayor of a French city. Thus, the rule of \textit{jus sanguinis} impedes integration. However, to the extent that Maastricht weakens
this rule, EC integration may be quite fragmenting, not necessarily for nation-states but for nationalities, rendering all EC member states more multicultural. France might remain a jurisdiction within the EC; it would just be less French.

A major question in Western Europe, therefore, is whether the nation-state will be redefined as a constituent unit of a federal-type union or whether the fracturing of Belgium and the regionalization of Spain and Italy represent movement towards a Europe of the regions. It is too early to predict the outcome, and there could be several outcomes: fragmentation in some cases, devolution or federalization in other cases to accommodate regional interests, and maintenance of some unitary nation-states. These outcomes will depend not only on how nation-states respond to union but also on how the EC allocates power, structures political representation, and permits citizen participation in its institutions.

International integration does challenge many national constitutional and institutional arrangements and their underlying political philosophies. The impacts of integration on differing welfare-state policies have been of particular concern because common-market competition can weaken protectionist policies for domestic labour, capital, and land. More generally:

Community-wide consumer protection, elimination of customs barriers, free movement of migrants, elimination of work permits for Community residents, participation of ‘foreigners’ in municipal elections, transferability of university credits, Europeanization of driver’s licenses and automobile standards, creation of a common currency, and establishment of Europe-wide television — all entailed by the Maastricht pact — will directly attack the capacity of any state to pursue a distinct and independent policy for employment, welfare, education, culture, or military organization.24

Some observers argue that because of this prospect, “it is difficult to imagine Europe accepting the challenge of liberalization, competition, and more effective integration anytime soon. And it is this failure to address structural adjustment and government reform that is the greatest threat to European unity.”25

In a related area, the United States and the European Community have had difficulty agreeing on non-discriminatory bidding rules for procurement by telecommunications, power, and other utility enterprises. In Europe, where government ownership of utilities is more widespread than in the United States, governments can apply international agreements to public utilities. The U.S. government, however, has been unwilling to sign agreements that would govern the procurement practices of privately owned utilities. Similarly, because of the

constitution of its federal system, the U.S. government has been unwilling to void state and local government "Buy American" rules. The EC has complained about these rules because the non-defence federal procurement sector that would be open to EC bidders under a non-discrimination agreement is tiny compared to the huge state and local government procurement sector.²⁶

The emergence of the EC also poses challenges for international institutions. How many votes should the EC have in the United Nations if it becomes a United States of Europe? At what point does the EC cease being an interdependent system of nation-states entitled to separate seats in international forums? Should the EC receive the same kind of concessions as the old USSR? If so, would California, with the world's seventh largest economy, insist on a seat in the United Nations? Could the EC function as a political union while allowing member states independent votes in international forums?

WHITHER NATION-STATE FRAGMENTATION?

While developments in Western Europe highlight intriguing facets of the seeming paradox of international integration and national fragmentation, different conclusions can be drawn elsewhere.

First, continental regions and nation-states are differently integrated into the global economy and political institutions. Africa is the most conspicuous outlier. Nation-states respond differently to international integration, which, in turn, has variable effects on nation-states. Second, despite the upsurge in nation-state creations since 1988, national fragmentation is not widespread. Virtually all of the fragmentation producing new nation-states since the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 has been associated with the demise of the USSR. The collapse of authoritarian regimes seems to be the principal factor precipitating national fragmentation. Third, international integration does not appear to be a significant variable in intranational fragmentation. Fragmentation has thus far occurred in areas less well integrated into the global economy. It is a few cases of potential fragmentation in developed countries, especially Belgium and Canada, that have raised the most questions about the impacts of international integration on national unity. Another factor common to both of these countries, however, is a sizable, territorially clustered French-speaking population. In turn, it is difficult to attribute the possible fragmentation of Italy and Spain to international integration as opposed to international power politics, which helped to create and maintain corrupt unity in Italy and

authoritarian unity in Spain. The collapse of these regimes has unleashed centrifugal political forces and regional grievances.

The violent splintering of Yugoslavia suggests that national fragmentation may become most prevalent in areas characterized by international power vacuums rather than by high levels of integration. The inability or unwillingness of the Western powers to intervene forcefully in Yugoslavia may embolden militant nationalists elsewhere. Many nation-states in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Eastern Europe, plus Russia itself, are fragile. They are states, but not necessarily nations which have elicited in their people feelings of being a nation and having a common nationality. Instead, they are, or were, held together by autocrats who were usually tied to a superpower, or who thrived in the interstices of superpower rivalry. In a world of geo-political competition, the unity and stability of friendly dictatorial nation-states were important to the major powers, but in a world of geo-economic competition, most of these nation-states are being left to fend for themselves in the back waters of the global economy. The fragmentation of any of these nation-states, therefore, will be due less to contemporary global integration and more to the collapse of the "hegemonic stability" that imposed the bipolar integration of the Cold War.

Otherwise, the future of the nation-state in much of the world appears to be vigorous, in part because nation-state status remains the legal ticket for admission to international integration and a seat in the United Nations under international law. This may be an added incentive for secession; however, it hardly seems to be the driving force in most actual and incipient cases of national fragmentation.

DIMINISHED NATION-STATE AUTONOMIES

Perhaps the criterion of national fragmentation as the break-up or dissolution of nation-states is too strict. Short of break-up, one can conceive of a range of diminished nation-state autonomies induced by international integration.

For one, the market-based character of integration requires a divestment of certain powers exercised by more centralized, nationalized regimes. Economic liberalization may produce pressures for political decentralization and democratization. These developments may undermine the legitimacy of certain regimes but not necessarily of the nation-state itself. National governments, moreover, are called upon to exercise certain powers as guarantors of national and subnational compliance with international rules. Nation-states still have the primary role in implementing and enforcing EC rules, and the Council of

Ministers remains the EC's principal decisionmaking power, although the European Court has curbed national sovereignty in certain areas.

The world's federal nation-states face some of the most difficult political challenges in adjusting to international integration. It is precisely the role of national governments in negotiating and guaranteeing compliance with international agreements that endangers powers historically exercised by the constituent governments of federations. These international forums, moreover, even in the EC, are not democratic in the customary sense. How, for example, would one accommodate the Swiss federation's semi-direct referenda democracy, with its requirements for popular and cantonal majorities, to the governing structure of the EC, or even to a reformed structure based on a fully empowered and directly elected parliament? The federal nation-states also face internal and external pressure, especially from business interests, for greater uniformity in economically relevant policymaking across constituent jurisdictions. EC officials, for example, have criticized what they regard as a crazy-quilt pattern of independent and uncoordinated state taxation and regulation in the United States.

Second, increased international integration and decreased military threats have demonstrated that very small nation-states and quasi-states can be extraordinarily viable economically. On the territorial scale of state organization, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Israel, and Switzerland, for example, are tiny, and most are not well endowed with natural resources. Being a large resource-rich nation-state, therefore, is not itself a competitive advantage. Consequently, it is not necessarily economically irrational for subnational regions to assume that they might be better off as independent or semi-autonomous states.

Third, international economic integration tends to heighten the importance of subnational regional economies and accentuate differences between those economies. The most relevant territorial competitors in the global economy are specific regions able to capture investment, attract tourists, and produce exports. The diminished authority of nation-states that wish to participate in the global economy to control the flow of capital and commerce across their borders also diminishes their ability to function as traffic cops or central planners directing capital and commerce to specified regions. Hence, regional competition within nation-states can be accentuated, and regions that view their success in the global economy as being due as much or more to their own entrepreneurial policies as to their nation-state's policies may be reluctant to support national policies that redistribute their "profits" to laggard regions, especially through what may be viewed as a bloated central bureaucracy in the national capital. Thailand, for example, is experiencing centrifugal stress because most development is occurring in the southeast.
The decline of Cold War political competition and the rise of global economic competition are creating a kind of free market of governments, not only of national governments but also of regional and local governments. These governments are becoming more entrepreneurial, and are entering the global marketplace directly to recruit investment and tourists and to promote exports. More regional and local governments are also seeking voices in the decisionmaking of national and international institutions (e.g., German Laender in Brussels) that shape the rules of economic integration. Under the pressure of competition, therefore, regional and local governments may increasingly seek to be “deregulated” by their national governments. Such deregulation and entrepreneurial competition may be regarded by some citizens as national fragmentation.

At the same time, there is no rush to dismantle the nation-state system, and subnational governments are not eager to abandon the protections they receive from national governments. Contemporary international integration is highly pragmatic and quite segmented functionally and regionally. Aside from the vague term “globalism,” there is no overriding ideology or “ism,” even world federalism, driving integration. The process is largely one of pragmatic cost/benefit decisionmaking by business enterprises and governments. Integration is proceeding incrementally, and at different speeds and in different ways in various functional areas and geographic regions. Quasi-ideologies operate in some functional areas (e.g., environmentalism), and ideologies influence some regions (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism), but, for the most part, developed nation-states are at the helm of integration, endeavouring to respond to citizen interests in life’s more mundane “isms,” especially consumerism, tourism, and television.

As noted earlier, a certain degree of national cohesion seems necessary for international integration. In democratic nation-states, voters must approve steps towards integration, either directly through referenda or indirectly through electoral support for national leaders. When support for national leaders is weak, when confidence in national government institutions is low, when the

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29 In 1992, for example, some 476 million tourists spent about $268 billion roaming the world. In the United States alone, all travelers combined spent $335 billion in 1990. State and local “tourist” taxes generated $21 billion in 1991, compared to $8 billion in 1980.
national economy is sluggish, and when economic benefits from integration are not readily apparent, voters seem reluctant to delegate national powers to international institutions.

Much the same appears to be true of less democratic nation-states. Earlier observers of integration tended to argue that “countries dominated by a non-pluralistic social structure are poor candidates for participation in the integration process;”\(^{30}\) however, the emergence of the Asian “tigers” suggests that less pluralistic, less democratic nation-states can be aggressive participants in global integration. Simply repressive, dictatorial regimes still seem to be poor candidates for integration, but regimes that permit and support substantial entrepreneurial freedom, invest in productive infrastructure and public education, spread economic benefits across a broad section of the population, and provide a semblance of democracy or progress towards democracy seem to be good candidates for integration. Japan, for example, proceeded with gradual liberalization and privatization, beginning with textiles, which became a major export industry. Many observers also suggest that the cultural characteristics of the Asian “tigers” enable them to integrate into the global economy as cohesive nation-states without wholesale adoption of the characteristics of Western democracies.\(^{31}\)

In summary, while international integration is reducing the ability of nation-states to exercise certain traditional sovereign powers, nation-states are still the official actors in integration, they often gain certain powers and protections from international institutions, and they do not appear to be on the verge of extinction. Whether nation-states are worth preserving in the long run is another question, but given their staying power, the future of international integration and a “borderless world” remains uncertain.

GLOBAL INTEGRATION, CULTURE AND NATIONALITY FRAGMENTATION

If there is a facet of national cohesion vulnerable to fragmentation by global integration, it may be the sense of nationality and of religious community. Where the cultural space of a nationality or religious system is defined by a nation-state or would-be nation-state, any fracturing of that space by the cultural forces of global integration may be perceived as fragmentation of the nation-state as well. This may be especially true in nations like France, where

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the sovereignty of the state and of the nation are indistinguishable. As the constitution of the Fourth Republic declared, echoing Rousseau and the Jacobins: "National sovereignty belongs to the French people. No section of the people nor any individual may assume its exercise." This concept of sovereignty is "something like virginity;" it is not divisible. Consequently, efforts by international institutions, such as the EC, to acquire state powers without unduly disturbing nationality powers may nevertheless be seen as precipitating national and state fragmentation, in part by the very act of trying to separate state from nation.

In polyglot nation-states, regionally based cultures respond differently to international integration, thus producing or exacerbating intranational cleavages between cultural groups that embrace integration and those that resist integration, or at least its cultural baggage. Furthermore, those cultural groups that feel aggrieved by involuntary integration into an alien nation may seek state powers of their own.

At the same time, globalization is not genuinely multicultural. It is almost entirely Western in origin and orientation, and is dominated by the characteristics of Western modernity. It is also loaded heavily with cultural attributes associated with the United States. The major "cultural" force emanating from the United States is consumerism. The voracious appetite of American consumers significantly fueled international trade and economic development. The need of world producers to satisfy American consumer tastes — plus the U.S. military presence in Western Europe and Eastern Asia, and the ability of Americans to export their cultural icons — have all contributed to a monocultural core of international integration. As a journalist commented after the 1993 rapprochement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, "the new wars" for Israel are likely to be:

American-style and bloodless: the cola war after Pepsi (which for years had honored the Arab boycott against Israel) took the plunge and entered the fray against Coke; the pizza war between Dominos and Pizza Hut, neither of which had existed [in Israel] in 1989; and coming soon, the french fry war between McDonald’s, which has sought to break up the state-sanctioned local monopoly on frozen fries, and the local Burger Ranch.33

The consumer culture embedded in global integration is highly attractive to people everywhere, especially young people. As was said of returning U.S.


soldiers after World War I, "How can you keep 'em down on the farm once they've seen Paris?" Consumerism became the dominant motif of American life during the "Roaring '20s." To consolidate this culture in the face of massive immigration, the United States sharply curtailed immigration for some 40 years (1924-65). The country forged a melting pot fired by a combination of Americanism and consumerism, which burned the heart out of most ethnic cultures.

Only after 1965, when increased immigration from all parts of the world produced more diversity, and when civil rights movements asserted group identities for minorities, did multiculturalism reassert itself. This multiculturalism, however, has been driven largely by intellectuals and professionals. Most of its intended minority-group beneficiaries desire to learn English and generally assimilate into American society. Multiculturalism itself is being co-opted by consumerism in various ways, such as minority marketing (e.g., Asian shopping malls and Afro-American apparel in Kmart stores). Minority marketing is an astute extension of the specialized production and import targeting for proliferating market niches, such as footwear for bikers, hikers, and joggers, which has been made possible by modern technology, telecommunications, and transportation.

A multicultural United States will not necessarily be more agreeable to a multicultural world, however, because much of this multiculturalism is still consumerism. Some of it is also unrecognizable to its presumed paternal cultures, and some of it is hostile to traditional cultures. For example, much of American Afro-centrism is unrecognizable to most Africans, who are not the monocultural blur perceived in the United States. Similarly, the presumed Hispanic-American or Latino culture encompasses different peoples (e.g., Cubans, Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans). Multiculturalism in the United States also embraces feminists, gays and lesbians, witches, persons with disabilities, and persons asserting many other "cultural" identities. Thus, to an Islamic fundamentalist, American multiculturalism is still satanism.

Increasingly in the United States, "culture" is being regarded as a personal choice, much as affiliation with a religious denomination in a multidenomina-
tional society has long been accepted as a private matter. This approach to multiculturalism is partly a product of the individual rights revolution of the 1960s. This revolution originated in demands for equal inclusion into the rights and benefits of society, but as the revolution unfolded, it advanced a critique of what it regarded as a monolithic Euro-American culture. Consequently, the right to pick a culture and to be included equally in all the rights and benefits of a multicultural polity moved to the forefront of rights consciousness. The idea that individuals can shop for a culture that suits their preferences, however, extends individualistic consumerism from the profane to the sacred.
To defenders of “real” historic cultures, lifestyle shopping in a multicultural supermarket is the antithesis of culture. These defenders recognize that the conceptions of individual rights accompanying global integration threaten the cohesion of historic national and subnational cultures. Even though many traditional cultural traits remain embedded in societies that are highly integrated into the global economy (e.g., Japan), including business practices, the outward signs of seeming disintegration are ever present on radios, televisions, computer screens, video arcades, billboards, and neon lights. These are the forward thrusts of consumerism and its rights consciousness, which can induce cultural fragmentation and elicit nationalist responses from religious and secular elites, particularly intellectuals, and from leaders who employ traditional cultural symbols to marshall the dispossessed against a culture of integration to which they have little or no material access. In globally integrating societies, the spectacle of crowds flocking to what elites regard as cultural atrocities, such as McDonald’s and Disneyland, sends nationalists into a frenzy. The alien values associated with global integration must be viewed with anxious hostility by cultural nationalists because popular acceptance of this consumer culture contradicts their defence of the superiority of traditional culture.

International integration necessarily threatens traditional cultural spaces because this integration requires economic growth. Attempts to integrate nation-states simply along military and political lines have not been successful, although some alliances, such as NATO, have facilitated economic and political integration. The growth needed for contemporary integration, however, requires exports, not so much of commodities but of manufactured goods and professional services. The ability to export requires a willingness to import foreign knowledge, conform to norms in the global economy, and become familiar with business practices and consumer preferences in other cultural spaces. Both goods and services, moreover, must meet certain standards — not only of governments but also of consumers — in order to be competitive. Those standards are set mainly by the largest consumer markets, North America and Western Europe. Thus, economically driven integration requires unprecedented degrees of cultural intimacy and interchange.

In turn, the mass media exposes people to foreign events, goods, and ideas. Whatever consumer conformity is promoted by the media is offset by its individualistic character, insofar as adults and children can choose what they


watch and hear. Hence, there has been substantial resistance to open-market media policies, and national or subnational control of the media is one of the most highly charged political issues in international integration. During the 1992 debates over Maastricht, for example, some opponents of the treaty criticized EC leniency towards American television programming. Those desirous of protecting the culture of a nationality or religion against what is sometimes termed the cultural imperialism of the Western or American media seek to deny citizens the right to select any of the 500 satellite television channels that suits their preferences.

Cultural cohesion may be further unglued by uniform codes of human rights and new forums, such as the European Court, to which individuals can appeal against nation-states. Although these codes incorporate some concepts of group rights, the concepts are controversial and difficult to enforce and adjudicate, and may not prevail against consumer-driven appetites for individual rights. Uses of state powers to defend group rights may infringe on individual rights, and pressure to enact codes to protect group rights already implies that culture is becoming an object of choice.

Another feature of integration that threatens cultural spaces is freer movement of persons across borders. Even tourists can fracture a local culture; hence, some locales try to insulate themselves from tourism.\textsuperscript{36} Immigration, however, is generally seen as the greater danger; yet, an integrating world encourages migration as mobility becomes more accessible, as individuals seek economic opportunities, and as persons feel increasingly entitled by right to migrate regardless of national laws. Native perceptions of economic competition and cultural pollution from immigrants often elicit the most virulent expressions of nationalism.

Rising levels of immigration and refugee movement have made immigration a prominent issue on national agendas in two of the three principal centres of global integration: Western Europe and North America. The other major centre of integration, Japan, has not had a record of openness to immigration. Although the liberal tenets underlying Western democracy and international economic integration make it impossible to close borders in Western Europe and North America, many nation-states as well as regions (e.g., Quebec) wish to limit immigration and to select from the pool of international migrants those most likely to augment the national or regional economy and assimilate into its cultural space.

\textsuperscript{36} One example is the island of Ni’ihau in Hawaii, whose owners had long prohibited tourism in order to preserve the native Hawaiian culture. Under pressure from the state of Hawaii, the island was opened to limited tourism. Tourists fly in on a helicopter, land in a field, look around, and then fly out, never having contact with native Hawaiians.
In summary, the notion of culture as choice promoted by consumerism, spread by telecommunications, reinforced by migration, and legitimized by the individual rights required in a democratic or even semi-democratic and economically growing society constitutes a primal threat to historic cultures. Contemporary international integration exposes much more than national and regional economies to global competition; it also exposes cultures to global competition. Perhaps it is this exposure to the ruthless competition of the marketplace that most shocks defenders of cultural spaces against the rampaging individualism of unrestrained modernity. The defence of cultural space is, for some, not a defence of chauvinism but a defence of shared values and identity against alienation and anonymity, of the sacred against the profane, and of citizenship against consumerism. What is citizenship if it does not have a community located some place defined as a cultural space protected against dissipation by the marketplace?

CONSUMERSHIP VERSUS CITIZENSHIP

As a result of the trend of the consumerism of culture, international integration introduces a certain tension between citizenship and consumerism, especially in the developed liberal democracies where consumption and individual rights are now central to personal autonomy and self-actualization. Although most citizens still shop for groceries at their hometown centre, the global economy is increasingly the relevant marketplace. Standardized products, such as Coca Cola, are available virtually everywhere, and specialized products from all parts of the world are available to citizens in the developed world and to elites in the less developed world. Even where products are not directly accessible, telecommunications advertizes global goods to citizens in many of the world’s poorest and most remote villages. The advent of telecommunications shopping, moreover, allows citizens to transcend boundaries by directly entering the global market from their own home or village telephone booth. At the same time, however, in their capacity as citizens, consumers often desire to exercise powers of local and national self-government that may not always accord with the requisites of international integration.

This tension between citizenship and consumerism arises from the seeming paradox of international integration and national fragmentation. Integration allows and encourages citizens to assert consumerism interests globally,

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namely, rights to acquire the goods and services sold in the global market. Yet, the maintenance of a global market characterized by free trade and efficient resource allocations entails limits on local and national self-governance and, thereby, restrictions on the exercise of historic citizenship interests. This tension is felt by both persons and governments wishing to foster a global marketplace able to satisfy consummshion interests while still maintaining rights of local self-government able to satisfy citizenship interests in local economies, social practices, cultural preferences, and political choices. Most persons wish to be citizens of an identifiable place, ordinarily a state infused with primordial nationality sentiments, but they also desire the means and freedom to consume the goods and services available on the world market. Yet, the more that persons desire global consummship, the more they emphasize individuality as defined by their behaviour as autonomous consumers, and the more they discount their duties as loyal nation-state citizens.

The evolution of shopping in the United States offers a mundane but telling example of this tension. Despite repeated expressions by Americans of their love for hometown values and local community, consumers abandoned their Main streets for the suburban shopping malls that proliferated after World War II. Similarly, as citizens, individuals may be ardent boosters of their state of residence, but as consumers, they rarely hesitate to cross state lines to purchase goods at a lower sales tax rate or to purchase out-of-state goods by mail in order to escape state sales taxation altogether. Hence, mail-order selling is a growing industry.

A basic problem is that citizenship remains place and group specific while consummship is no longer place and group specific in the developed world, although it is still place dependent. That is, access to global goods occurs from some place, which for nearly all people is their nation-state, and some of these places afford better access than other places. Thus, while consummship is characterized by financial mobility, citizenship is still largely characterized by geographic immobility — both the voluntary immobility arising from loyalty to a place and the involuntary immobility arising from nation-state monopo-

38 Until 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited state taxation of out-of-state mail-order purchases (National Bellas Hess v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 1967). The court has now made it possible for the Congress to enact legislation allowing such taxation (Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 1992). However, there is sizable public opposition to state taxation of out-of-state mail-order purchases, especially from groups otherwise usually regarded as locally patriotic, namely, rural residents and senior citizens. With such taxes, the states would have raised nearly $3.9 billion in revenue in 1992. See, e.g., Henry A. Coleman, “Taxation of Interstate Mail-Order Sales,” Intergovernmental Perspective, 18 (Winter 1992): 9-13.
lization of citizenship. Consequently, if citizenship cannot be made mobile, then citizens must transform nation-states in order to mobilize consumership.

Such a transformation, however, leans towards disaggregation of the historic nation-state because, to the extent that consumership is place dependent for most people, it is increasingly dependent on local places rather than on the nation-state per se. In globally integrating countries, the average person’s livelihood and ability to access global goods depend first and foremost on the economic and employment viability of his or her local community, secondarily on the economic region surrounding that community (a region that may encompass communities in neighbouring foreign states), and tertiarily on the nation-state. Thus, the exercise of consumership interests triggers two kinds of citizenship concerns: the right to participate in making decisions about the destiny of one’s home-based economy and the right to participate in making decisions about the operation of the institutions that govern international integration. Citizenship itself, therefore, acquires a certain dualism, requiring persons to balance complex loyalties to diverse peoples and places. Divided loyalties, however, have been a perennial bone to social cohesion. The West resolved its classic problem of divided loyalties by empowering the state and privatizing religion. One result, though, is that Western European states have become burdened with the maintenance of cathedrals as cultural monuments while otherwise being liberated from the shackles of religious authority. If the EC were to recapitulate this history, it would empower the Community and privatize nationality.

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF INTEGRATION

The tension between consumership and citizenship seems to have different manifestations, however, and to elicit different approaches to international integration, which might be called liberal multicultural integration, defensive monocultural integration, entrepreneurial diaspora integration, and segmented communal integration.

In the developed liberal democracies many persons have drifted from traditional primordial moorings, and a culture of personal consumership and liberal citizenship has created unprecedented degrees of common interest and interchangeability across frontiers. In these countries, therefore, there has been an increasing, though cautious, openness to closer international integration on a liberal multicultural basis, where traditional cultures themselves become objects of both personal pride and personal consumption without necessarily standing as barriers to the integration required to satisfy citizens’ consumer interests. Desires for self-determination through personal consumership and self-actualization now compete with traditional desires for self-determination
nation-states (e.g., "captured nations") or dominated by foreign nations (e.g., "Yankee Go Home" sentiment in Latin America). For these peoples, national identity is important, and while they desire integration into the global economy, they resist the loss of national or communal identity, in part because they were, or felt, oppressed not as mere individuals but as members of a group sharing an identity.41

Self-determination for people trapped within alien nation-states entails either intranational autonomy through decentralization or federalism, or international autonomy through secession. The creation of nation-states, as Lord Acton noted in 1862, produced many "separated" and "oppressed nationalities," who, resentful of being demoted to the status of ethnic groups, now seek national self-determination. Although self-determination for persons in these cases is intimately tied to national self-determination, most of these nationality groups (e.g., those in Eastern Europe) seem eager to join multinational arrangements for their economic benefits as well as their protective political and security benefits.

For some peoples emerging from Western colonial or neocolonial conditions, there appears to be a desire to embrace international integration while asserting national identities without necessarily engaging in virulent nationalism. Long tied to inequitable economic relationships with Western nation-states, these peoples are accustomed to Western patterns of commerce and consumption, but seek to redefine their relationship to the global economy on terms of parity that acknowledge the integrity of their national identities (e.g., many former Asian colonies).

Another category of peoples for whom segmented communal integration would seem important are aboriginal or indigenous peoples who only recently began to acquire explicit national or international protections. For these peoples, the tension between consumerism and citizenship is perhaps the most severe. An openness to intranational, let alone international, integration exposes their cultures to the ill-effects of internal consumption by their own members and of external consumption by others of their local resources. Every aboriginal culture that has survived conquest and disease has experienced serious deterioration in its confrontation with modernity. In addition, the citizenship status of indigenous peoples is often anomalous, as in the case of Native Americans who are citizens of the United States and quasi-citizens of domestic dependent nations.

Aside from its visceral appeal to many peoples who wish to assert their national rather than merely ethnic identity, segmented communal integration can be articulated as a liberal communitarian alternative to liberal multicultural

integration. As such, it draws more from the communitarian than individualistic (or atomistic) side of the Western political tradition. The Quebec-Canada dispute, for example, might be defined as an argument between these two liberal conceptions of integration. However, whether segmented communal integration can survive the fragmenting forces of modern consumerism without becoming illiberal through coercive uses of state power to maintain "community" is a serious question. Liberal nationalism may be feasible for Quebec, which is grounded in the Western liberal democratic tradition, but it may be less feasible for peoples grounded in different traditions. Furthermore, segmented communal integration on liberal terms would require a right of emigration and, thus, coexistence with some liberal multicultural places to which disaffected members of the community could repair.

A fourth approach to international integration, which might be called entrepreneurial diaspora integration, is being facilitated by certain "tribal" peoples, such as Chinese, Indians, Japanese, Jews, and Turks, who have spread throughout the world. Persons who are members of these diaspora peoples usually retain a kinship identification with their people and often a financial relationship with their national homeland, even while accepting citizenship in their host nation-state, if permitted to do so. For these peoples, citizenship rights are very important, including, for many, dual citizenship, because these rights affect both their consumership interests and their nationality interests. These diaspora peoples have strong interests in integrative domestic political arrangements that need not necessarily be democratic but at least allow them to work and be entrepreneurs in foreign lands if not also accepted into national citizenship.

These peoples represent, in effect, the emergence of labour mobility in an integrating world. As such, they present some of the most difficult tests of just how and to what extent international integration can produce a borderless world. They also reflect the variable ways in which persons may choose to balance their loyalties to peoples and places and reconcile their citizenship and consumership interests.

CONCLUSION

Neither international integration nor national fragmentation are uniform phenomena consistently related to each other, paradoxically or otherwise. These phenomena have, however, produced tensions between consumership and citizenship interests. International integration is being driven strongly by consumer

interests in jobs, the acquisition of goods and services, tourism, environmental protection, and the like, not by an altruistic interest in world peace among nation-states. These consumer interests, moreover, are acquiring the status of fundamental rights, and personhood is increasingly defined in terms of consumption that allow persons to make so-called lifestyle choices rather than in terms of traditional culture that defines and makes those choices for persons. Historically, personhood and culture were so placed — rooted as to make peoples, persons, and places virtually inseparable, but the emergence of a global consumer-oriented economy able to penetrate all borders has unsettled these relationships, producing different responses to international integration and different needs for the accommodation of the interests of peoples, persons, and places.
Identity, Self, and Nation

Kenneth Minogue

THE PARADOX OF GLOBALIZED PARTICULARISM

It is often taken to be paradoxical that nationalism should thrive in a world that is becoming increasingly international, interdependent and "globalized." Our first task must be to elicit the logic of this paradox.¹ It works to the extent that we understand globalization to be a process of voluntary involvement with others across national frontiers. It seems to contradict the impulse of nationalism, which retreats from wider commitments into a separate world of cultural homogeneity. The crucial assumption is that consistent human conduct ought to be assimilable to a single principle. In this case, however, we find two contradictory principles determining conduct.

One only has to treat the matter in this brutally simple way to see that the paradox is an illusion. There is certainly no actual inconsistency in a Montreal merchant finding in Quebec nationalism and the global economy a combination of involvements he prefers to the state of Canada. Belgium supplies another suggestive example. Many Belgians see nothing illogical in Belgium dissolving into its two component national parts at the very same moment that it is

¹ See for example the special issue of the journal Government and Opposition, 28, 2 (Spring 1993) devoted to "Globalization: the Interweaving of Foreign and Domestic Policy-Making." Like much of this literature, most of the essays claim a quantitative change on the basis of qualitative evidence. David Held and Anthony McGrew "Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State" claim that "NATO articulates in a quite dramatic manner the internationalization of security" (p. 267) and that internationalized economic processes "often function to limit the competence and effectiveness of national economic policies." (p. 268). There is nothing very new, however, about either of these alliances, or the failure of governments to make the economy behave as they wish.
embracing a wider European destiny. The supposed paradox, then, has no real grounding in human nature. Canada is, indeed, a less striking case than Belgium because the nationalism of Quebec is not paralleled by any particular new, broader arrangement. But it may be doubted, for that matter, whether the European Community constitutes "globalization." Social scientists are often so eager to constitute a whole new field of studies for themselves that anything merely transnational is counted as evidence of the global.

Our paradox is not only false, however, but positively misleading, for it diverts our attention from the intermediate entity whose destiny links both these processes: namely, the state. Between internationality (globalization, interdependence and a variety of other polysyllables) on the one hand and the nation, strictly speaking, on the other, is the state, which (as we shall see) may be identified not with nationalism but with nationality. Flemings and Walloons have little attachment to Belgium, and Québécois are periodically restive about the federation of Canada. "Horses for courses," as the racing men say. In economic and tourist and perhaps legal life, it makes sense to go international; while for matters of culture and politics, a closer and more intimate unit might — but only might — make more sense. Perhaps the whole issue is just a matter of repackaging in which the state, as at present constituted, is "sent packing" and new arrangements made for the pursuit of interests. Or, to put it another way: are we dealing with the increasing power of nationalism — or some kind of collapse of the prestige of the state?

CLARIFYING NATIONALISM

The advantage of this intellectual move is that it offers us the prospect of not sinking too deeply into the morass that is the academic understanding of nationalism. It was for a long time one of the disaster areas of political understanding, and remains a treacherous field. The reason is that academic inquiry easily comes to be infected with the beliefs of the very thing it studies. In particular, many students of nationalism accepted the nationalist assumption that the nation was an inescapable feature of human association at all periods of history. It followed that all wars, or at least all that had a plausibly cultural content must be construed as caused by nationalism. To be was to be a member

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2 I am told, however, that Quebec nationalism tends to go along with support for NAFTA.

3 Smaller political units may be more responsive, but they may also be more interfering. The case of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire (and the later case of Czechoslovakia) are examples of this rearrangement of engagements which many people have later come to regret. But my concern is with what people believe, not with whether they believe wisely.
of one nation or another. Modern nationalism was therefore taken to be nothing less than the theory of an immemorial human drive, and equipped with roots going back to English and French in the Hundred Years War, Greek and Persian in the days of Xerxes, and so on. This mistake had the additional benefit of reinforcing one of the central propositions of those who hated nationalism: that it is the cause of aggression and war. Books about nationalism were jumbles of rhetoric and events loosely tied together, and generally underpinned by a conviction that nationalism, as equivalent to communal selfishness, caused war. The two world wars of this century were often put down to it.

In our generation, the academic situation has rather improved. I take the most notable pioneer of this improvement to be Elie Kedourie, whose small classic *Nationalism* began with the assertion that nationalism was a doctrine invented in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. Kedourie’s contribution to the subject was to emphasize the historical specificity of the phenomenon he was studying. One implication of this method is that the very term “nationalism” is a snare trapping us in the idea that the name is a reliable indicator of a single phenomenon. It is, however, a term used in practical politics, sometimes honorifically (as when political parties lay claim to it) and sometimes abusively. Any sensible academic is wary of such terms.

A second striking improvement on the early work on nationalism has been provided by philosophers and sociologists. Ernest Gellner, for example, may reject Kedourie’s emphasis on historical specificity, but in arguing that nationalism is a particular component of the process of modernization, a response to modern literacy and cultural integration answering to the need to live within a culturally homogeneous polity, he nevertheless agrees with Kedourie in rejecting the idea of the nation as immemorial. Whether or not one agrees with his assimilation of nationalism to industrialization, his argument is one that has freed itself from the nationalist illusion of its own perennial character. He has no truck with the kind of “Whig history” in which the heroes of the national past were acting for the sake of some modern conception of the nation. But being a structural theory, Gellner’s view suggests that wherever a genuinely nationalist phenomenon can be identified, it always functions in the same way. This premise is a hostage to fortune and has impelled him to a number of supplementary hypotheses in order to keep the argument in play.

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4 Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchison, 1960). In 1970, Kedourie published an anthology of nationalist writings with a very long introduction which adds a great deal to our understanding of the subject: *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York and Cleveland: World Publishing Co.). Kedourie’s extensive writings on the Middle East are constantly preoccupied with the subject.


6 For example, challenged in a radio discussion with Kedourie on the question of nationalisms that preceded the coming of industrialism, Gellner remarked that
As in dealing with any miscellaneous subject matter, a strict and continuous attention to method is a necessity. One aspect of such attention is the distinction between "nation" (which is generally understood in terms of feeling and doctrine) and "nationality" (which, whatever may be its correlates with feeling and thought, has the determinacy of being what appears on one's passport.) "British" and "French" are terms that generally refer to a nationality, and it is something that cannot be understood except in terms of the state that incarnates it; Welsh, Scottish, Basque and Breton, by contrast, are terms referring to nations. They are cultures which some members wish to promote to the status of nation-states. Any number of cultures might develop such ambitions, but most do not; nationality by contrast, is at least limited by the criterion of sovereignty. The question "Who is British?" for example, has a determinate answer in a way in which "Who is an Arab?" does not. But it should not be inferred that nationality is purely formal while nationhood is passionate and substantive. The inhabitants of the British Isles invest a great deal of passion in being "Britons" as well as in being English, Welsh, Scots and Irish. But one benefit of nationality may be understood from the remark by the journalist Bernard Levin, born of Russian Jewish immigrants, in which he describes himself not as English but as British.

To be clear about this distinction helps to disentangle ourselves from one common belief likely to obscure academic understanding: the doctrine that national sovereignty is the cause of war and that progress requires that it should be transcended by attaching our loyalties to international arrangements that are repositories of reason and morality. This is a doctrine that has, in the course of the twentieth century, led to the investment of great hopes in the League of Nations, international law, the United Nations, international declarations of rights and more recently the thing called "the new international order." Sometimes such hopes have even been directed towards projects such as the European Community which are supranational, and therefore in fact quite distinct from the objects of internationalist endeavour.

It is necessary, then, to populate discussions of nationalism with a variety of other quite distinct concepts and projects. It is only when isolated from these associates that "nationalism" promises us the explanation of why human beings are beastly to each other; and that promise is illusory. When nation-states fall

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"Industrialism and the kind of world it requires casts a shadow well before." (p. 6) He also claims Islam as a special case: "the kind of factors which lead to nationalism elsewhere, in Islam lead to successful reformation." (p. 17)

7 Anglo-Saxon England was a heptarchy, and each of the seven kingdoms of that time have left culturally distinct traces. In the 1960s it was reported that an office had been set up in Manchester to work for the independence of "Northumbria." Again, vestiges of a Cornish language have only recently disappeared.

8 The Times, 23 July 1993.
out over their interests and go to war, they call much less upon the specific passion of nationalism than upon a relatively distinct loyalty to the state which may be distinguished as nationality. Tending to run together as evil both of these drives is the doctrine of internationalism, a powerful moral endeavour shared by many of the educated classes in the West. It pursues an agenda of enlightened rationalism which may ultimately, so internationalists hope, create a peaceful world. I have elsewhere called this passion "Olympianism" and it is seldom recognized as a powerful current ideology, I suggest, because most social scientists take it for granted in the rational premises of their reasonings. As a moral endeavour, internationalism finds a kind of salvation in advancing such projects as subjecting governments to international declarations of rights and to purging history teaching of patriotic self-glorification. It is a central component of contemporary liberalism.

As a political doctrine, nationalism has a formal content allowing us to distinguish it. It takes the form of a self-conscious culture expressing itself in the idiom of grievance. The grievance has a standard formal character: that of alien oppression. The oppression may be anything from economic to linguistic, and is commonly thought to operate throughout the whole range of social and cultural affairs. Nationalism in this form belongs to the wider class of salvationist ideologies in which some abstract class (such as workers, or women, or some racial group) are taken to be oppressed, and therefore involved in a struggle for liberation. Such ideologies constitute a specific form of activity within political life, though they are political only in a derivative sense. Politics is constituted of public disagreement about what governments ought to do; for a member of the designated class to disagree with the dominant version of the relevant ideology, however, is not politics, but an act of treachery to one's nation, class, gender, race or whatever the chosen abstraction may be.

The renewed vitality of nationalism must thus, on my reading, be clearly distinguished from the activities of so-called nation-states pursuing their interests both internally and internationally. The very term "international" is, in fact, a slightly misleading one in its tendency to blur the distinction between nation and nationality. No doubt reality itself also often clouds this distinction between sovereign states pursuing national interests, and nationalist movements struggling against oppression. French nationalism after 1871, which focused on the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, for example, combined the features of both nation and nationality; and the irredentism of the Irish state (in relation to Ulster), Argentina (in relation to the Falklands), Hungary (in relation to Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania) all exemplify the messiness of the phenomena. Our distinction, however, should warn us against the theoretical collapse of seeing,

for example, the two world wars as caused by nationalism (or indeed as caused by national sovereignty).

THE CHANGING EXPERIENCE OF STATEHOOD

In terms of this distinction, there can be little doubt that nations are everywhere springing into active life to the detriment of established nationalities — as Flemings in Belgium, Québécois in Canada, and everybody in Yugoslavia and the old USSR. Kurds, Tamils and Sikhs are examples of comparable ethnic enthusiasms in Asia. Exiting from nationality in favour of nationhood, as a distinct phenomenon, clearly requires us to invoke the idea of the state. This means that we must look to recent developments in the modern European state as an important part of the context of our problem. And this is a welcome development. It allows us to look away from nationalism for a time.

And when we turn to the state from this point of view, we do indeed encounter a paradox. We might call it the paradox of ingratitude. In the last two centuries, the state has become far more responsive to its members. They are no longer the subjects of a rather terrifying power, but an electorate that elects and directs its governors. The state has become a welfare agency which supplies money and health to the needy, education to all, a safety net in times of economic depression and much else. In my schooldays, the state (in New Zealand) solemnly presented me each day with an apple and a bottle of milk to ensure that I arrived at adulthood “in the pink.”

Today, those who break the law of the state are, in most countries, no longer punished by imaginative forms of execution or long periods in some grim fortress; short sentences, abundant counselling, television and table tennis help the convict pass the time. More than this, modern states are conspicuously moral. They abide by international law, and each decade finds them entrenching more and more rights for their citizens. No doubt agencies of the state sometimes get out of hand, but there are mechanisms to discourage them from breaking the law. When they enforce it, such agencies often find their hands tied by rules intended to guarantee, with the most exquisite niceness, that the guilt of malefactors has been proven beyond the shadow of a doubt. And the other side of this new, morally improved state is that it has abandoned, at least officially, any claim to benefit from the doctrine of reason of state. Indeed, as between the state and its enemies, the state is required to sustain the highest possible moral standards, while groups seeking the overthrow of the state count themselves justified in resorting to the most repellent forms of mayhem.

10 The term “exiting” is here, of course, taken from Albert Hirschman’s, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
By the ordinary canons of human reciprocity, one might well conclude from this that the modern state, as a humane and liberal institution, could count on a level of gratitude and support from its members unique in human history. Indeed, this argument is often directly used by reformers advocating a better deal for those they judge to have been left outside the range of all this mildness and humanity. Racial minorities, for example, must be saved from prejudice and guaranteed special help in order that they too may become full (and therefore loyal) rather than peripheral (and therefore alienated) members of the community.

What we actually find is quite different. The liberalization of the state is paralleled by a falling off in the support of its members. During the First World War millions endured horrible conditions fighting for their country; most of them were volunteers. This was in the early stages of what we might call "the humanization" of the state. It is true that even as far back as the early nineteenth century, Hegel had remarked on it as a peculiarity of the British state that it could no longer fight an unpopular war. Since the end of the Second World War, most liberal democracies have encountered a growing disinclination on the part of their citizens to make serious sacrifices for the state. It was noted that the Vietnam War was largely fought by Blacks and the children of recent immigrants — the very people who had least benefited from liberalization, and who sought, by conspicuous loyalty, to achieve full recognition as patriotic Americans. Another aspect of this paradox is that the political parties most keen to liberalize, or humanize the state were also those most internationalist in their inclinations; some were positively hostile to patriotism.

The state has thus become weaker in proportion as it has become more humane. Instead of a loyal population patriotic and devoted in gratitude for the many benefits showered upon it, the peoples of the modern Western world have become increasingly distanced and querulous, while very sizeable minorities have become positively alienated, aggrieved and disenchanted with the political system in which they live. The renewed vitality of nationalism is, in my view, one aspect of this wider political situation. How do we explain that wider response?

One suggestion might be that in politics, people respond not to benefits but to power. Subjects were loyal (more or less) to their rulers in the past because those rulers had immense power to harm them, and it was a power in which they recognized some part of themselves. It is the remoteness, and even the capriciousness of power rather than its benevolence that induces loyalty, particularly in certain types of people. Orwell thought this was particularly true of intellectuals. States that have distributed everything they can are rather in the position of a woman seduced by Don Juan the morning after. Having nothing more to give, they are no longer interesting.
A development of this idea would be to say that loyalty follows the rising, not the setting, sun. For several generations now, intellectuals have been saying that the era of the nation-state is ending, and that the future lies with international organizations. Some such feeling might well explain the movement of allegiance among many Europeans away from their own governments towards the institutions of the European Community. Loyalty follows success. Thus Linda Colley argues that Britain could integrate the nations of the British Isles into one unit for just so long as it was economically and politically successful, as the power of the empire shrank, so nationalism began to rise.

There is something to be said for these various suggestions, but I think we may go deeper if we look to Hegel’s conception of the state. He warned, it will be remembered, against confusing the state with civil society because

if its specific end is laid down as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and it follows that membership of the state is something optional. But the state’s relation to the individual is quite different from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life ... the individual’s destiny is the living of a universal life.

To say that the state is “mind objectified” hardly trips off the tongue these days, but there may be something profound in it. What Hegel meant by “mind” was the implicit reason underlying day to day life. But “implicit reason” can only be symbolized by remoteness. A state can only be regarded in this way so long as the government eschews becoming involved in all the myriad contingencies of human life. The more it involves itself with such contingencies, the less universal it seems.

The point is dramatized by the fate of the office most closely identified in the past with the mystery of state: monarchy. European kings in the past were recognized as standing for their subjects to whom they were remote, mysterious, and potent. Monarchy can, indeed, be tamed and democratized, but in losing its power to intimidate, it loses not only its mystery but also (somewhat paradoxically) its representative character. The development of democracy, changes in the practices and technology of communication (especially the intimacy of the medium of television), and the growth of egalitarian mores, in which Jack’s opinion is not categorically worse than that of his ruler, all converge to destroy the authority of states in a manner similar to that which has transformed the standing (where it has not in fact abolished the office) of the monarchy. Lured

by the temptations of power and the electoral benefits to be gained from interfering in the operations of civil society, governments sink to the level of being just one more interest group in the opinionative Babel. Indeed, the state is often regarded as not merely an interest, but the most sinister interest of all. It is no longer the Hobbesian mortal god, the holder of the right of life and death over its subjects, the remote and terrifying agency in whose majesty the subject could not help but take a certain pride. It is perhaps also significant that the state no longer claims to be the upholder of true beliefs and proper rituals giving access to the world to come.

In despotic states, whose populations are accustomed to being held together by force and fear, as in what remains of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, only a little relaxation is needed to produce the dissolution of the state. In the United States, by contrast, the beginnings of dissolution may be seen as a response to the rising humanity of the welfare state in the 1960s and the rising tide of moralistic criticism emanating from the universities. Increasing numbers of Americans "exited" from their American nationality in order to adopt a notionally guiltless and rancorous identity as ethnic Americans.

IS THE STATE A DYING INSTITUTION?

My thesis is that the current outbreak of nationalism, where it is genuine at all,\textsuperscript{13} must be related to the liberalization of the state, which I interpret in Hegelian terms as the state dissolving into civil society. In those terms, the state was a concrete universal will in which a significant component of each person's identity had been invested. It was, from one point of view, the union of individual and society. The fear it generated was mixed with awe, and it stood for justice. It was from another point of view the union of Right and Power, the Hobbesian mortal god. It is now, however, a long time since it would have begun to be plausible to follow de Maistre in thinking the executioner the symbol of the power of the state; and similarly distant is the time when subjects would have given an automatic assent to the idea that the state's cause in a quarrel must be just. "My country right or wrong," however misquoted and misunderstood, is the last self-conscious stage of loyalty before the civil structure begins to crumble. Today the issue of allegiance depends on each man's private will — indeed, one might well say simply private impulse. This is something that Hobbes would have taken as \textit{ipso facto} the dissolution of the association.

\textsuperscript{13} Noel Malcolm, for example, has argued that the explanation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in terms of historic national antipathies is a complete misunderstanding. See for example, the \textit{Spectator}, (London) of 24 July 1993. A history of Bosnia is forthcoming later this year from Malcolm.
If we were to exaggerate this interpretation of the way things are going, we might turn it into a melodramatic thesis and talk of the death of the state. There would certainly be no shortage of suspects to be accused of the deed, quite apart from self-declared assassins such as Marxists. Democracy is perhaps the most prominent — indeed, on one prominent understanding of the term, its ultimate triumph would precisely entail the dissolution of the state into the people. They would in some direct, perhaps participatory way, rule themselves. Such an anarchist view of democracy would be logically self-destructive. There is, however, a more serious case which takes the form of observing that democracy has undermined the authority of rulers and forced them to become the manipulators of their electorates. Ruling parties in a democracy must periodically become supplicants for our support at elections. They sustain their popularity largely by using their power to satisfy whoever demands things from them most effectively. The benefits are usually siphoned from the economy. At election times, governments endeavour to engineer a growth in prosperity that will keep them in power. Since it is uncommon for the bribed to respect the bribers, authority declines like air slowly leaking out of a balloon. Governments come to resemble parents who abandon parental authority in favour of manipulating their children by gifts. Responsive governments, of course, are just what we all want, and they are certainly a good deal more benign than their predecessors. But every benefit has its costs. The cost here is a decline in the clarity with which we understand what is happening to us. The great benefit of order achieved by authority was that no one was in any danger of confusing it with rationality. But when governments are forced to manipulate — indeed hardly forced, since they engage in the practice with great enthusiasm — they must dress up the attitudes they seek to inculcate in their subject as if these attitudes were rationality itself.

It is hardly too much to say that we demand to be fooled rather than ruled.

Another candidate for the role of killing off the state is universal moralism. Ideas no less than luxuries can be mass produced and packaged for wider consumption. The European political tradition has always included voices speaking for God and reason — conscience, clergymen, philosophers and the like — and both voices could come into conflict with the policies of rulers. In the seventeenth century (and at times indeed rather earlier), elements of the natural law tradition escaped from the custodianship of elites and walked abroad among popular pamphleteers. In various forms they have become ever more powerful and elaborate. Democracy is one form of supposedly right universal ordering of societies, rights is another. Nor have these convictions been limited to sustaining the rule of law by declaring the appropriate relations between ruler and subject. In their recent forms, universal moral ideas constitute a clamour of voices about everything that governments do or are ever likely to
contemplate. Again, the state loses its moral authority amidst all these powerful moral convictions.

Indeed, some moral convictions have an impact on the status of governments in ways precisely relevant to our theme of globalization. Globalization is, it is true, a somewhat overblown expression used to describe a phenomenon that enthusiastic political scientists have taken up as the coming thing. It is a concept that rests upon exaggeration of the novelty of what has always characterized human life, and is now different only in scale. Trade, religion and calamity never took much notice of borders — indeed, borders themselves are, of course, largely modern inventions. Further, the central thesis of globalization depends upon first setting up the straw man of an omnipotent sovereign state capable of controlling everything within its borders, and then solemnly assembling the factors that make this account unrealistic. In actual fact, a government really determined to diminish global connections — that of socialist Burma, for example, some Islamic states, or the Chinese administration of Tibet — can do what it likes as long as it is prepared to endure certain costs. A great deal of globalization is simply the sensitivities of Western bourgeois, who find it difficult to conceive of populations so driven by a single idea as to resist such lures as trading in luxuries and electronic distraction.

The point of much of the literature on globalization is to emphasize human interdependence. Now the interesting thing about the idea of dependence is that it has two aspects. It refers on the one hand to a set of empirical relationships across boundaries; but it also has moral and religious connotations in human affairs. Christianity begins in the recognition of our dependence on God, a form of humility that overcomes the sin of pride. Similarly socialism preaches our utter dependence on society. If we human beings are all dependent on each other, then we become each others’ neighbours, and there is no doubt about the ideal relations between neighbours. Globalization, then, refers both to an observation about the contemporary world, and to an argument about the general course of conduct we ought to adopt. It is part of the moral doctrine of internationalism, and as such, it would seem to exclude nationalism.

The reason is that nationalism, if taken as collective selfishness, violates our responsibilities of interdependence. Those responsibilities are above all to deal with each other peaceably. But human beings have a history of dealing with each other very unpeaceably indeed. Internationalism as a rhetorical project thus needs either a theory to explain the causes of war, a theory such that we can eliminate those causes; or alternatively, it needs to discover that the conditions of the world have now so changed that war, which could possibly in earlier times have been accorded a certain limited rationality, has now become something not to be contemplated. The theory of globalization can usefully function as providing materials for fulfilling the second condition. It can show that territorial aggression no longer pays, that war is insanely destructive, and
that rational global management is the proper response to what it finds to be a novel and developing situation.

Our argument so far would seem to reinstate the apparent paradox from which we began. We have transposed globalization, supposedly a developmental process in the world today, into the moral doctrine of internationalism, and we have found that it implies a fundamental hostility to nationalism.

The crucial point, however, is that such a contradiction can only work if we fail to recognize the distinction we have earlier emphasized, and proceed to muddle nationhood with nationality. One simple formula helping to elucidate this point would be to say that wars and conflicts arising from national interest are driven by the nationality of a sovereign state, while conflicts arising from nationalism (nationhood strictly speaking) focus on liberation. There is on the face of it a clear difference in moral status between these two drives. If national interest is indicted as the cause of war, then wars we shall have so long as states survive. National liberation, however, is in principle a once and for all telos whose fulfilment may well even be the condition of peace.

Nationalism, then, is an attractive idea of a nation that takes the form of a cultural unity expressing itself in the idiom of grievance, and the grievance points forward to possibilities of structural change which promise an ultimate harmony. Such an understanding of political problems also happens to be the standard move in contemporary democratic politics. A grievance is something that makes a significant group of people — understood as a minority, or a community, but always an abstract class of persons — unhappy, and the business of politics is in this political idiom taken to be that of removing it. The explicit doctrine here is the nineteenth-century theory of nationalism that attributed all conflicts to imperialism, or the dominance of nations by alien rulers. It looked forward to a world of liberated nations living at peace. In these terms, it is plausible to think that some sort of national independence for Brittany, Wales, Quebec, Slovakia and similar cases would in no way increase the likelihood of wars. Quite the contrary. But the condition of this happy outcome would have to be that these nations did not become, in the full sense of the word, nationally sovereign states. The required condition of non-sovereignty would be satisfied if all national groupings become part of a well-managed international system.

It is thus clear that some forms of nationalism, at least, are not only compatible with internationalism, but may even be entailed by it. Where, then, have the causes of war disappeared to? The answer clearly is that internationalism is really concerned to eliminate not nations but the nation-states which have so often fought wars throughout European history. Internationalism picks up the theme that it is not nationalism so much as national sovereignty, or indeed perhaps sovereignty itself, which is, or certainly which facilitates, the collective selfishness that causes war.
We may now return to our search for suspects in the "murder of the state" case. We have considered democracy, universal moralism, and internationalism. They constitute a family of ideas always popping into each others' conceptual houses to borrow a cup of data. But there is another suspect to be considered before we can close the file. This is individualism. It is in fact the mirror image of the view that the state, having descended into civil society, has become indistinguishable from it. On this alternative view, it is individualism that has advanced to take over the state by subordinating it to individualist purposes. These are, of course, merely two ways of looking at the same question, and both focus on the relations between the individual and the state.

THE SOLUTION OF THE PARADOX

Individualism for the British empiricists, no less than for Hegel, involved two elements. First, desire, or what Hegel called the subjective element; and second, reason or the objective element found in the duties, commitments, rules and laws that harmonized human life within a developing historical community. Individuality involved both the state and civil society, which is why Hegel deplored the empiricist tendency to set up the state in opposition to the individual.

In the contemporary world, individuality understood in this way has been both attacked and undermined. Why and how it has been attacked, indeed often identified with mere selfishness, is a long story, not for this occasion. All our sketch can do is suggest the ways in which it has been undermined. Technology has been central. The technology of sex, for example, has rendered far less pressing a great variety of moral restraints and inhibitions which people not only suffered in past centuries but on which they actually prided themselves. Another general cause may be found in the capacity of states to redistribute an immensely increased amount of wealth. The incidental effect has been to redistribute and popularize a certain fecklessness which in the past could only be indulged by the upper classes, themselves largely disciplined by moral obligations. Changes of this kind have produced our modern Western societies, in which really hard choices are few and far between. Less noticed is the fact that it involves a radical change in the understanding of what an individual is. Individuals are no longer construed as bundles of desires made coherent by the moral seriousness of reason. They are, rather, bundles of impulses and preferences to be harmonized by external regulation.

It is this change that has transformed the state from being a remote and basically unobtrusive body into the all-embracing body of today. Our inherited conception of a human life conceived as a kind of moral trial, a test of skill in how one played the cards in one's hand, has increasingly come to be conceived
of as merely the satisfaction of a succession of needs. The state, correspondingly, functions less as a guarantor of the general fairness of the game than as an instrument for the securing of satisfactions. The resulting situation is agreeable; but the satisfactions are thin and abstract: they do not attach to anything very serious in the way of individual identity. Many people have abandoned all religious identity (and many who have not are vaguely ecumenical rather than concerned to cultivate anything substantively religious); a substantial while civil affiliation to the state is no longer so deep and exclusive as it was. Indeed, that very exclusiveness which made individuals prepared to lay down their lives for it is one of the things found most unsatisfactory in the arrangements we have inherited. We smile at Rudyard Kipling’s remark (which could no doubt be paralleled for other European countries) that to have been “born British was to have won first prize in the lottery of life,” and we remember the millions who died in trench warfare, but we forget that the conduct of passengers on the Titicaca was a moral fable of British moral identity. Benefits have costs.

Human beings are identity-bearing structures, and when for these and other reasons, states and religions cannot function as identities, other identities must be found. On offer for the last two centuries have been highly abstract ideological identities — as worker, or woman, or some particular race — and the currency of such apparently pure identities as alternative to our historical inheritance has certainly weakened the state. But these alternatives are illusory: the ideal identity must adumbrate a community, and women, for example, cannot, outside science fiction, constitute a fully formed community; nor, really, can workers, even when this identity turned into the all-embracing solidarity of comradeship. The nation or ethnic group, however, can be a genuine community: it includes men and women, old and young, rich and poor, etc. The nation is thus in many circumstances a plausible alternative to the complex and abstract affiliation Europeans have hitherto found in the state.

It is an alternative, however, which descends into particularity, and requires a corresponding adjustment of the universal element within which people understand themselves to be situated. The modern state was a brilliant fusion of the universal and the particular in its relation to the individual member of the state on the one hand, and some cosmic or theological universe on the other. As the state dissolves into national or multicultural particularisms, it requires a corresponding universal into which the new particularism may be inserted, and this place may conveniently be taken by internationalism — to which, of course, correspond many of the aspects of globalism today.

The bread and butter politics of this process are, of course, entirely transparent. In the European Community, for example, the state has a tendency to dissolve into supranational institutions based on Brussels on the one hand, and regional and ethnic units on the other. What could be more attractive to a Scots or a Breton nationalist, for example, than to get London and Paris off their
backs, and plug themselves into the Brussels’ subsidy machine at the same time: cultural integrity and cosmopolitan righteousness go together in one happy package. Eastern Europe and the successor states to the Soviet Union are awash with such dreams.

No doubt one must beware of exaggeration, and my analysis attempts to make vivid much of what I consider discernible through the mists. The world has many surprises, and there is a lot of life and mischief left in the state yet. But one ought to end on a further cautionary note. Hegel rightly thought the state a great achievement of freedom: a plurality harmonized by abstract rules allowed an immense culture to flourish. The ethnic community, though misleadingly promoted on the ground of diversity, may well be more egalitarian but it is unlikely to enhance the freedom of those who live within it. The remarkable thing about the present world is the use of the rhetoric of freedom to promote realities of unfreedom.
Comments

The Case of Nationalist Fragmentation: English Canadian Activists Respond to Economic Integration

Sylvia Bashevkin

INTRODUCTION

This paper has two main purposes. First, it provides a brief commentary on the four preceding papers paying particular attention to their implications for research on contemporary nationalism and the challenge of global interdependence.\(^1\) Second, this commentary is used as a starting point for examining English Canadian nationalism in the period since a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States became a fait accompli, and when pressures to extend this trading regime to Mexico were intense. In effect, the second part of the discussion evaluates a “test case” of nationalist responses to economic integration, using organized interests in English Canada in the post-FTA years as its empirical focus.\(^2\)

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1 This paper was prepared in July 1993 using original plenary texts rather than the revised versions that appear in this book. As a result, all quotations are derived from the initial June 1993 papers. I am grateful to Guy Laforest for inviting me to contribute and for providing the plenary texts from all four authors.

2 Earlier versions of this portion of the text were presented in seminar form at the University of Toronto and the University of British Columbia. I am grateful to colleagues at both institutions for their comments.
INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION

The four plenary papers address varied and, in some instances, conflicting notions of international integration and national fragmentation. Kenneth Minogue's paper, "Identity, Self, and Nation," argues that rather than constituting a complex paradox, globalization and nationalism are easily reconciled. He categorizes nationalism within a "wider class of salvationist ideologies" that claim to liberate oppressed groups from their oppressors; other comparable phenomena, he suggests, include socialism and feminism. Minogue maintains that contemporary nationalist efforts must "be clearly distinguished from the activities of so-called nation-states pursuing their interests both internally and internationally."4

This question of differentiating neatly between nationalisms and nation-states is one where Minogue differs from at least one other author. In identifying three streams of nationalism, Murray Forsyth refers to "the nationalism engendered by state structures."5 This type of nationalism is most common, according to Forsyth, in federal, post-colonial systems that have a history of large-scale and diverse immigration. Although he does not assess Lord Acton and state nationalism vis-à-vis the Canadian case, research on the Trudeau era suggests clear state nationalist purposes in such enterprises as the National Energy Program and, indeed, federal constitutional initiatives of 1980-82.6

Forsyth points toward an important linkage between statist and integrationist objectives, notably in his commentary on parallels between the liberal goals of the French Revolution and those of the Delors-style European Community. If "national-liberalism" of the early revolutionary period had as its aim the creation of "a single, enclosed economic space" accompanied by "a uniform economic citizenship," then this purpose remained very much alive in European Community endeavours of the late twentieth century.

How do nationalists of whatever type ground their political beliefs? In "The Reconciliation of Nationalism and Liberalism," Forsyth restricts his explana-

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3 Kenneth Minogue, "Identity, Self, and Nation," in this volume, p. 89.
4 Ibid., p. 89.
5 Murray Forsyth, "Towards the Reconciliation of Nationalism and Liberalism," in this volume, p. 19.
tion of this matter to ethnic nationalism, even though his perspective can likely be extended to liberal and statist variants as well. The in-group/out-group dynamic, he suggests following Carl Schmitt, becomes sufficiently intense as to necessitate political sovereignty. Nationalist movements may not demand statehood, yet their political assertions appeal to a shared tradition which finds itself blocked, compromised or otherwise limited by a collective outside entity. In cases where state forms emerge, Forsyth concludes, “part of the state’s function is to increase the control of the ethnic-cultural nation over its economic destiny.”

A more precise statement of the economic purposes of nationalism in English Canada would be difficult to find.

It is in their assessment of the intersection of state, economy and society that the papers diverge most clearly. Kenneth Minogue maintains that over the past two hundred years “the state has become far more responsive to its members” at the same time as “very sizeable minorities have become positively alienated, aggrieved and disenchanted with the political system in which they live.” The decline of coercive public institutions and the process Minogue terms “the liberalization of the state” help to explain growing nationalism, just as they underpin the rise of organized feminism and civil rights movements. Stripped of their traditional authority, Minogue writes, democratic governments often rule by manipulation and nationalism becomes little beyond “collective selfishness.” Because internationalism as an ideology also adopts liberal individualist principles, nationalism and internationalism together constitute closely related versions of the overpowering passion for community which many people today find as the telos of modern politics.

In “Peoples, Persons, and Places in Flux,” John Kincaid asserts that North American economic integration is unfolding without a consequent process of national fragmentation. He posits with reference to Canada that continental free trade provides a brake against Quebec independence. Kincaid’s analysis differs from that of Minogue, since the latter tends to lament but nevertheless acknowledges what he views as disintegrative collectivist movements within liberal democracies. Moreover, Kincaid appears to reject Minogue’s claim that alienation in the general public of the late twentieth century constitutes evidence of national fragmentation, in this case mass/elite fragmentation.

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7 Forsyth, “Towards the Reconciliation of Nationalism and Liberalism,” p. 17.
8 For a parallel use of the in-group/out-group dynamic as it applies to nationalism in English Canada, see Bashevkin, True Patriot Love, chap. 1.
10 Ibid., p. 91.
11 John Kincaid, “Peoples, Persons, and Places in Flux,” in this volume. For a differing view of this question, see Gordon Ritchie et al., Broken Links: Trade Relations After a Quebec Secession (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1991).
Major interpretive differences among authors are revealed most directly with the introduction of Jane Jenson’s “Mapping, Naming and Remembering.” First, Jenson appears markedly more comfortable than Minogue with the influence of non-state collectivities, particularly the new social movements of the late 1960s and following. Second, unlike both Minogue and Forsyth, she addresses a societal actor beyond classical “man.” Third, Jenson provides a counterpoint to Minogue’s view that human identity has declined, or in his words, “eroded” during the twentieth century, since her thesis speaks to a contemporary expansion or multiplication of human identities competing for political voice.

Jenson employs a modified regulation school approach to explain changing representations of state and society. From this foundation, she argues that political globalization has led to the emergence of new understandings of citizenship and of who has citizen rights. In the Canadian context, Québécois, Aboriginal Peoples and English Canadian interests have each developed a nationalist perspective that competes in the process of mapping and naming. Jenson argues that patterns of contestation among these three movements show how the public discourse of contemporary Canada is aswirl with competing styles of naming nations.

In exploring the consequences of globalization, Jenson and Kincaid reach similar conclusions. Both indicate that nation-state autonomy, particularly in federal systems, decreases as an effect of globalization. According to Jenson, federations lose national economic control and, in the case of Canada under bilateral free trade, transfer significant powers to market mechanisms. Kincaid cites the threat posed by globalization to large nation-states, particularly those that have centralized redistributive and regional development programs.

Where the two studies differ is in their perspective on individuals within globalizing economies. Kincaid addresses “a certain tension between citizenship and consumerism” and notes that traditional citizenship is more fixed or immobile than a newer globally-oriented consumerism. He proposes that “consumer interests” in many areas including “environmental protection” are driving international integration. This explanation conflicts with the literature that views consumerism (in its basic haves/wants orientation) as antithetical to environmentalism (in its focus on needs including those of the earth). Kincaid’s conclusion also differs from Jenson’s treatment of the rhetoric of consumerism: according to Jenson, equality claims and collective identities formed in the struggle for political voice tend to disappear in a discourse of

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12 Jane Jenson, “Mapping, Naming, and Remembering,” in this volume.
13 Ibid., p. 30.
competitiveness, marketism and the treatment of individuals as customers or clients rather than citizens.

INTEGRATION AND ENGLISH CANADIAN NATIONALISM

How do these four papers speak to questions of nationalism in Canada outside Quebec, which for the purposes of simplicity we refer to as English Canada?¹⁵ On the level of definitions, Murray Forsyth suggests the utility of a we/they distinction, one that focuses in this case on the organized pursuit of a more independent and distinctive Canadian in-group by limiting cultural, trade and investment influences from a U.S. out-group. Organizations attempting to reduce U.S. control of Canada since the mid-1980s include the Council of Canadians, based on individual memberships, and the Action Canada Network, an organization of organizations formerly known as the Pro-Canada Network.¹⁶ Prominent nationalist writers include Maude Barlow, Bruce Campbell, Mel Hurtig, James Laxer and Philip Resnick.

John Kincaid’s piece suggests that one response to globalization has been “segmented communal integration,” a process by which people assert their national identity in the face of foreign influences. Although English Canadian nationalism can be dated from the late nineteenth century, its contemporary response to globalization and market integration parallels the kinds of identity-seeking activities discussed by the authors in this volume.¹⁷ For example, English Canadian nationalism has been closely associated with feminist, labour and environmental organizations in a series of coalition activities; it has attempted to identify what holds Canadians of varied backgrounds together.¹⁸

How do nationalists design their future? In contrast to Jenson’s claim that they often agitate for decentralization, most English Canadian nationalists have proposed an assertion of federal powers in order to restore Canadian cultural and economic autonomy.¹⁹ English Canadian interests are therefore at odds in

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¹⁵ Jane Jenson addresses the difficulty of addressing “English Canadian” nationalism in the revised version of her paper, pp. 39-40.

¹⁶ On the history and composition of these groups, see Randy Robinson, “Democracy from Below: Action Canada, the Story of a Movement,” Canadian Forum, April 1993, pp. 8-14.

¹⁷ On the history of nationalist ideas and organizations in English Canada, see Bashevkin, True Patriot Love, chap. 1.

¹⁸ For one such effort, see Laurier LaPierre (ed.), If You Love This Country: Facts and Feelings on Free Trade (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987).

¹⁹ See Jenson, “Mapping, Naming, and Remembering.” On the centralism of English Canadian nationalism, see Bashevkin, True Patriot Love, chap. 1.
jurisdictional terms with both the decentralist preferences of Québécois nationalism as well as the marketist preferences of pro-free trade organizations.

Above all, the focal point of nationalist designs in English Canada has been the rejection of both neo-conservative ideology and its federal sponsor since 1984, the Progressive Conservative party. Conservative efforts to control the federal deficit, reduce the size of government, privatize previously public enterprises and institute closer economic and diplomatic relations with the United States have all been vigorously opposed by nationalist interests. In fact, it is difficult to identify any Conservative government policy that nationalists have not opposed.20

What these interests confronted after the 1988 majority re-election of the Conservatives was the reality of economic integration. Bilateral free trade with the United States was implemented on a timetable beginning in January 1989, and from that time forward nationalist energies became increasingly diffused. The following sections argue that this diffusion of attention created serious internal divisions over both (i) the best domestic strategy for fighting free trade, whether a non-partisan coalition, a capital “N” National Party or continued pressure on existing opposition parties; and (ii) the utility of supra-national efforts to oppose economic integration.

The thesis developed below maintains that since 1989, domestic constitutional politics combined with concurrent processes of economic integration produced a third phenomenon not addressed in this volume — namely, nationalist fragmentation. English Canadian nationalist interests could thus be more, rather than less, fragmented in the future than they have been in the past. These groups will likely remain low on resources and could become more limited in their internal cohesion than they were during bilateral free trade debates. Lacking the close intra-group solidarity that once existed, nationalists in English Canada may be unable to develop either a coherent domestic electoral strategy or a unified response to global integration.

NATIONALIST EFFORTS POST-FTA

Five core policy priorities preoccupied organized nationalists in English Canada after early 1989. The first and probably most obvious was documenting the domestic impact of bilateral free trade. Nationalists predicted substantial negative consequences from the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement, including major job losses in the manufacturing sector.21 A great deal of effort was invested in

20 See Bashevkin, True Patriot Love, chap. 8.
21 See Maude Barlow, Parcel of Rogues: How Free Trade is Failing Canada (Toronto: Key Porter, 1990), chap. 3 and appendix.
documenting what nationalists claimed to be the numbers of Canadians who lost their jobs due to free trade. Organizations including the Canadian Labour Congress, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Council of Canadians and Action Canada Network compiled list after list, detailing the dates and locations of major plant closings. According to these accounts, about 400,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector alone were lost between 1989 and 1992 due to the effects of the FTA.22

One hardly needs to add at this juncture that most proponents of bilateral and trilateral free trade disagreed with this claim. Nationalist versus integrationist or continentalist debates after January 1989 closely resembled those of earlier periods in that they covered virtually everything, including the reasons for a decline in Canadian manufacturing, the numbers of jobs lost since 1989 and the more fundamental question of what constituted a functioning economy and social system.23

A second focus for organized nationalists after January 1989 was the impact of the FTA on Canada-U.S. trade relations. Canadian news reports recounted frequent trade disputes in sectors ranging from hogs, lumber and shingles to cars, steel and beer.24 Nationalists argued that the FTA did not produce fair or expeditious resolutions to these bilateral trade disputes; many reiterated older claims to the effect that the absence of a subsidy code and the primacy of U.S. trade law within the FTA would render such outcomes inevitable.25 The continuation of so many disputes, in so many sectors, with many apparently resolved in favour of U.S. positions, thus confirmed for nationalists their pre-existing suspicions. Once again, it is important to note that supporters of free trade viewed the trade disputes question in very different terms.26

A third focus of organized nationalists was federal cultural policy. Conservative decisions to reduce the CBC budget, to curtail postal subsidies that favoured Canadian magazines, to permit foreign takeovers of Canadian publishing companies and to abandon a proposed federal policy on film distribution

23 For a view from the pro-free trade side, see Leonard Waverman (ed.), Negotiating and Implementing a North American Free Trade Agreement (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1992).
directly contradicted cultural nationalist positions. What nationalists viewed as a dismantling of the institutions and policies that had fostered Canadian identity was fought tooth and nail.

The fourth core focus of nationalists after 1989 was the looming threat posed by a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). English Canadian nationalists characterized NAFTA as a second, ever more ominous chapter in the horror story called free trade. A great deal of anti-NAFTA literature was produced in this period, including the lengthy report entitled *Which Way for the Americas? Analysis of NAFTA Proposals and the Impact on Canada*.

Nationalists argued that NAFTA would limit not only the policy capacities of the federal government, which were already circumscribed as a result of bilateral free trade, but also those of provincial governments. As well, they maintained that any harmonization of social and environmental policies would damage or reduce Canadian standards. This same focus on the importance of maintaining Canadian social welfare programs at a more expansive level than U.S. ones was central to nationalist claims during the 1988 federal election campaign. Poll data suggested that about 70 percent of Canadians disapproved of NAFTA by early 1992.

**NATIONALISTS AND THE CONSTITUTION**

Ironically, one major concern of English Canadian nationalists after January 1989 was traditionally not a core issue for this interest. It involved federal constitutional proposals, notably responses to the Meech Lake and Charlotte-

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28 The Friends of Canadian Broadcasting organized opposition to federal cultural policy and artists were encouraged to protest against a devolution of powers in the communications field. See Christopher Harris, "Artists Urged to Speak Up," *Globe and Mail*, 20 March 1992.

29 Maude Barlow and Bruce Campbell, *Take Back the Nation* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1991), chap. 2.


31 See Bashevkin, *True Patriot Love*, p. 111.

32 This poll result was kindly provided by Dr. Donna Dasko, Vice-President, Environics Research Group, from a March 1992 Environics survey.
town Accords. Not surprisingly, the intricacies of constitutional bargaining had created serious divisions among other organized interests in Canada, and these same kinds of splits emerged among English Canadian nationalists in the years following the implementation of bilateral free trade.33

Why did nationalists become entangled in constitutional debates after 1989? In large part, their purposes were linked to a sense that the jurisdictional primacy of the federal government needed to be defended even more vigorously with the advent of free trade; worded otherwise, nationalists believed that processes of economic integration and constitutional decentralization were connected to a corporate agenda that would eventually replace statist with marketist solutions.34

On the question of procedural reform, nationalists generally rejected the convention known as executive federalism, characterizing it as a closed-door, elitist, pressure-cooker process. English Canadian nationalists argued instead for an elected national constituent assembly to develop grass-roots proposals and for the use of public referenda on major constitutional changes.35 The gap between these procedural claims, on the one hand, and the actual Meech process, on the other, led many English Canadian nationalists to oppose the Meech Lake Accord. Moreover, the pro-Quebec jurisdictional changes central to this package combined with Quebec’s support for free trade and the Conservatives in 1988 provided an additional set of reasons for leading English Canadian nationalists to oppose the deal through 1990.36

In terms of the substance of reform after the Meech failure, nationalists were often divided. Most agreed on the need for an elected and more regionally effective Senate or upper house. One proposal extended this position to include 50 percent women plus aboriginal seats in a new Senate.37 Nationalists in

34 See Barlow and Campbell, Take Back the Nation, chap. 6.
35 See Bashevkin, True Patriot Love, p. 160.
English Canada also tended to agree on the need for a Canadian social charter to protect domestic programs from the threat of downward policy harmonization.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, one key element that defined Canadian identity, according to nationalists, was the existence of universal social programs including health and unemployment insurance that had not been developed in the United States.\textsuperscript{39}

It was at this point that the post-FTA constitutional consensus among nationalists began to break down. Mel Hurtig's bestselling book, \textit{The Betrayal of Canada}, presented an argument for reform that was not nearly as sweeping as other sources from the same period. Hurtig in 1991 wanted to strengthen the economic powers of the federal government and make the Canadian \textit{Charter of Rights and Freedoms} supreme except with respect to language. Hurtig proposed offering Quebec and other provinces control over language and culture, and granting all provinces the same powers over immigration as those exercised by Quebec.\textsuperscript{40}

Hurtig's ideas about constitutional change were less circumscribed than those of Philip Resnick, who in 1991 published \textit{Toward a Canada-Quebec Union}. Resnick supported joint Canada-Quebec jurisdiction (via a confederal parliament) over foreign policy, defence, international trade, currency, the environment and citizenship.\textsuperscript{41} Resnick was prepared for aboriginal representation in a constituent assembly, or what he termed a "two-plus nations vision."\textsuperscript{42}

Resnick's position was in turn less expansive than that of Maude Barlow and Bruce Campbell, whose \textit{Take Back the Nation} also appeared in 1991. Barlow and Campbell recognized three founding nations of Canada — Aboriginal, French-speaking and English-speaking — "each with inalienable rights to protect its sovereignty, historical roots and culture."\textsuperscript{43} Barlow and Campbell explicitly rejected proposals for decentralization and Quebec separation. They preferred to offer Quebec greater autonomy, including opting-out provisions, but opposed the same offers for other provinces. Within this asymmetrical

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. as well as Barlow and Campbell, \textit{Take Back the Nation}, pp. 183-186.
\textsuperscript{39} James Laxer, \textit{False God: How the Globalization Myth has Impoverished Canada} (Toronto: Lester, 1993), chaps. 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{40} Mel Hurtig, \textit{The Betrayal of Canada} (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991), chap. 38.
\textsuperscript{41} See Philip Resnick, \textit{Toward a Canada-Quebec Union} (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press), pp. 61, 117.
\textsuperscript{43} Barlow and Campbell, \textit{Take Back the Nation}, p. 158.
federalism, Barlow and Campbell endorsed a constitutionally entrenched right to aboriginal self-government.44

In turn, their proposal was less sweeping than that provided in “Three Nations Equitable from Sea to Sea,” which endorsed the three-nations concept, special status for Quebec including a constitutional veto and distinct society provisions, the constitutional entrenchment of an inherent right to aboriginal self-government, the right of Quebec to full sovereignty, and the need for a strong national government for English Canada.

IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES

Many of these positions were defended with respect to two shared themes. First, nationalists after 1989 continued to claim that the most serious threat to Quebec derived not from English Canada or the federal system but rather from the United States. Second, it was argued that nationalism presented many progressive, democratic possibilities for Canadians outside Quebec in the 1990s.45 Yet were these positions sufficient to strike a unified, coherent position in the wake of the 1992 Charlottetown Accord?

Ultimately, groups inside the Action Canada Network adopted different positions once a national referendum on Charlottetown was called for 26 October 1992.46 The seeming procedural victory of nationalists (who had clamoured for an alternative to the elitist Meech Lake ratification process) thus coincided with a major substantive difficulty. In effect, how would coalition interests act given that major federal and most provincial parties endorsed a “yes” vote on Charlottetown, while leading grass-roots interests supported a “no?”

Nationalist divisions over Charlottetown are revealed by a comparison of two vocal coalition partners, namely the trade union and feminist voices of English Canada. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) adopted a “yes” position, parallel with that of the federal New Democratic party, while the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) endorsed a “no” vote, spurred on in particular by aboriginal, immigrant and Charterist interests within the organization.47 This particular split is notable because the respective

44 See ibid., p. 145.
45 See Clarkson et al., “Three Nations,” and Resnick, Toward a Canada-Quebec Union.
47 Key internal influences in NAC’s decision to oppose Charlottetown appear to have been the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC), the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women (NOIVM) and the Ad Hoc Committee on Women and the Constitution.
presidents of the CLC and NAC in 1992, Bob White and Judy Rebick, had become popular and effective public opponents of free trade, neoconservatism and the Mulroney government.

What costs did nationalists in English Canada incur as a result of internal constitutional splits? One cost resulted from lost opportunities; that is, analysts close to the movement as well as Action Canada coalition partners diverted considerable energies away from developing a coordinated alternative to free trade. By training their attentions on domestic constitutional politics, anti-FTA interests articulated a variety of interesting but ultimately conflicting positions.48 Moreover, older partisan interests that had traditionally dominated English Canadian political discourse appeared to drive a wedge within newer formations like the Action Canada Network. If the 1990s were marked by the decline of established parties and a growing populist challenge to the ability of partisan elites to dominate political debate, this pattern was clear from the outcome of the 26 October 1992 referendum vote in English Canada.

Yet the movement versus party dynamics of the Charlottetown period produced a significant second cost. Nationalists who believed that established partisan cleavages were detrimental to their cause supported the fall 1992 establishment of the National Party of Canada, led by Mel Hurtig.49 Hurtig’s decision to create a separate political party apparently crystallized when Liberals, New Democrats and leading trade unions in English Canada publicly endorsed the “yes” side and, at the same time, worked to keep the Action Canada Network and Council of Canadians sidelined during debates over Charlottetown.50

Where nationalists would direct their future political energies was fractured three ways by the founding of the National party. Non-partisan coalitions like the Network and membership-based organizations like the Council remained active and viable critics of the Conservative government, espousing opposition to North American free trade and an abrogation of the existing bilateral FTA.51

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49 See Hurtig, A New and Better Canada.


51 For example, a spring 1993 Action Canada rally in Ottawa attracted about 60,000
Federal opposition party interests including the New Democrats and the nationalist wing of the Liberals continued to endorse similar views, albeit within a structured partisan context. The National party pursued members, candidates and workers for an electoral showdown with what Hurtig termed “established parties [that] seem to have developed hardening of the arteries.”

A SUPRA-NATIONAL NATIONALISM

The fragmentation of English Canadian nationalist energies vis-à-vis domestic politics developed alongside some questioning of its external orientation. If nationalists agreed on the general directions of their internal political agenda following 1989, this consensus clearly involved defeating the Conservative government, abrogating the FTA and rejecting NAFTA. As well, it usually contained a series of arguments for the following: first, initiating more democratic practices of public and workplace decisionmaking to replace what was viewed as a closed corporate agenda; second, establishing environmental sustainability as a criterion for Canadian development; third, developing a social equality or social justice model of economic growth; fourth, ensuring independent economic development in Canada instead of dependency on the United States; and fifth, pressing the United States to negotiate what Hurtig called “more sectoral fair trade agreements” like the 1964 bilateral Auto Pact.

Each of these proposals spoke to domestic or within-Canada objectives, in some cases involving alterations to existing continental economic relations through pressure from Ottawa, and in most cases reflecting a liberal as opposed to social democratic world view. Probably the clearest statement of this domestic nationalist agenda was found in Hurtig’s A New and Better Canada, published in 1992 as a statement of National party principles.

By way of contrast, other English Canadian nationalists questioned the extent to which political efforts within Canada alone could challenge what seemed to be a global neoconservative agenda. These interests were in many cases frustrated with what they viewed as the overly moderate or liberal tone of National party proposals. Some activists in the Action Canada Network, for example, were attracted towards a “common frontiers” opposition to NAFTA that drew together left-of-centre activists from the United States and Mexico as well as Canada.


52 Hurtig, A New and Better Canada, p. 5.
53 Ibid., p. 19.
Much of the conceptual grounding for a supra-national nationalism was reviewed in a 1993 text by James Laxer, a veteran of Waffle politics in the New Democratic party. In *False God: How the Globalization Myth Has Impoverished Canada*, Laxer argued that continental economic integration in North America was advanced by corporate neoconservative interests who failed to recognize the hegemonic decline of the U.S. The emergence of multi-polar capitalism centred in Western Europe, Japan and a weakening U.S. meant that Canada could withdraw from its continental trade alliances and look beyond North America for models of successful economic development. In essence, Laxer endorsed a rejection of the minimalist neoliberal U.S. state as a model for Canada, and an embrace of social democratic and corporatist European models in their place. In his view, rejecting North American free trade in an age of multipolar capitalism necessitated moving Canadian nationalism beyond its conventional domestic agenda.

Supra-national nationalism in English Canada in the 1990s thus looked beyond its own borders to build anti-NAFTA coalitions and to develop economic alternatives. Yet this shift was far from unanimous. Moreover, it masked fundamental differences among nationalists about their domestic political project — surely a daunting point of fragmentation for any nation-building enterprise.
Comments

International Integration and National Fragmentation: Assessing the Paradox

Stéphane Dion

One of the arguments most frequently used by opponents to the Quebec secessionist movement is that political fragmentation is irrational and obsolete at a time of global economic and cultural international integration. For years, federalist forces in Quebec argued that it would be going in the wrong sense of history to split the Canadian federation when Europe is becoming a unified house. I suspect that the same argumentation is used everywhere there is a secessionist movement, to dissuade peoples from giving their support to the collapse of existing political units. The assumption is that international integration will significantly diminish the number of nation-states throughout the world.

Yet, John Kincaid’s fascinating international survey shows that in Western Europe, nationalism has been fostered, not weakened, by globalization. Jane Jenson documents the same phenomenon in Canada. International integration may even cause the rise of the region state.1 In the words of Benjamin Barber, globalization may lead to tribalism, and “McWorld” may go hand in hand with “Jihad.”2 This is the paradox under study in this book. The issue is to assess whether or not international integration will cool or boost nationalist cleavages, thwart or facilitate additional secessions.

According to Kincaid, a paradox occurs when two seemingly contradictory phenomena coexist in a manner that is actually explainable. It implies that the


two phenomena are in fact not so contradictory. I shall follow this line of argument to comment on the contributions assembled in this book. First, I will draw from these chapters the reasons why one would logically expect the decline of nationalism and secessionism at a time of economic and cultural globalization. Second, I will list the reasons suggested to explain why nationalism and globalization are in many ways congruent rather than contradictory. Third, I will risk my own predictions about the consequences of globalization on the reemergence of nationalism.

WHY GLOBALIZATION SHOULD WEAKEN NATIONALISM

Kenneth Minogue has defined globalization as “a process of increasing involvement with others across national frontiers.” As such, it encompasses some economic changes (the rising importance of international trade vis-à-vis the internal market, new interconnected relations of production), as well as cultural changes (new feelings of international solidarity, global telecommunications, sharing of more homogeneous tastes and values) and political ones (the increasing visibility of international organizations, the spread of international agreements). One can logically conclude that these three sets of trends induce political integration, not fragmentation.

On the economic front, globalization induces strong pressures for “greater uniformity in economically relevant policymaking across constituent jurisdictions” since wide access to larger markets is the condition of performance in the international economy. Business interests, in particular, will pressure against independent and uncoordinated taxation and regulation. Thus, the weakening of existing frontiers, rather than the creation of new ones, appears to be the appropriate political answer to economic globalization.

Regarding culture, globalization means an “unprecedented degree of common interest and interchangeability across frontiers.” More similar consumers want to acquire the goods and services that are increasingly available on the world market. This striking convergence of consumership tastes and behaviours throughout the world is likely to dampen traditional distinctive national behaviours. The political answer to this global consumership seems to be the elimination or the weakening of political barriers between peoples.

The internationalization of culture affects much more than consumership. It is fair to expect that with globalization, traditional religious or ethnic cleavages will become more foggy. The rising international ethos will rival the moral appeal of nationalism and this may decrease the support for nationalist move-

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3 John Kincaid, “Peoples, Persons, and Places in Flux,” in this volume, p. 70.
4 Ibid., p. 79.
ments and parties. Internationalism induces "a moral doctrine of universal human involvement," fundamentally hostile to nationalism. The concept of international integration, putting high value on universalistic principles, cultural exchange, mutual accommodation, and tolerance for diversity, will be opposed to the very idea that homogeneous distinctive national cultures must be protected by strong political barriers. Traditional nationalism appears obsolete when compared with polyethnic and multiracial modernity, with the rising of planetary feelings of solidarity, with stronger common concerns for individual rights and environmental security. Facing these tremendous international challenges, nationalism is likely to appear as a selfishness that "violates our responsibilities of interdependence."  

On the political front, the most obvious consequence of globalization is the multiplication of formal international agreements and the increasing role of international organizations. This follows from the rising belief that the basic problems of human life now transcend the frontiers of the sovereign state and that we must respond to them internationally. Globalization emphasizes the need for rational global management. Global negotiations are made easier when the negotiating units are less, not more, numerous. This is the new dissuading factor for secession. It decreases the likelihood that a secessionist region will enjoy international support. Existing political units are opposed to the political fragmentation of their partners because it would complicate their new interconnections with them. This new reason to dislike instability and fragmentation in the political environment comes in addition to the traditional concern that the partition of a country may stimulate ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages within other countries.

Moreover, a country needs to be strong and united, in order to negotiate a good international agreement. The times are less favourable than ever for internal divisions. Once the international deal is concluded, the central government has its role strengthened "as the guarantor of national and subnational compliance with international rules." The mere existence of such international agreements adds a new uncertainty for a regional group looking to secede: a breakaway nation-state holds no guarantee that it will remain part of the agreements concluded by its former central government and may find itself in a weak position to negotiate new deals. Acrimonious break-ups decrease the likelihood that breakaway nation-states will be accepted as partners. As Kincaid suggests, the desire for international integration could have a dampening effect

5 Kenneth Minoque, "Identity, Self, and Nation," in this volume, p. 96.
6 Ibid., p. 95.
7 Ibid., p. 96.
on national fragmentation “because the countries having the best prospect for early accession are likely to be those that remain intact.”

All these considerations lead to the conclusion that nationalism and secessionism are solutions of yesterday not shaped to cope with the new challenges of globalization. Global economic interests, the rise of universalistic or integrationist principles, new macro-political ties, all these patterns suggest that the world of tomorrow will count a decreasing number of political units more regulated than ever by international rule.

WHY GLOBALIZATION SHOULD STRENGTHEN NATIONALISM

Another look on the economic, cultural, and political consequences of globalization leads to the opposite conclusion. Instead of eliminating nationalism and decreasing the number of political units throughout the world, globalization may fuel nationalism and boost the number of nation-states. Macroeconomics and micropolitics, international culture and national identities, international rule and local units, these may well be the basic features of our time.

On the economic front, the central government may well be a victim of the market-based character of global economic integration, losing out to the regional governments. “Economic liberalization may produce pressures for political decentralization.”9 This is the main idea of Jane Jenson’s paper. She argues that the economic regulatory capacity assumed by central governments during the Keynesian era has been significantly reduced since internal markets no longer dominate economic activity. Likewise, the central government’s redistributive capacity was jeopardized by the post-1973 economic crisis and subsequent restructuring. With the weakening of those country-wide economic policies and social programs, there are central means and symbols of national integration as well as a certain representation of national citizenship that may vanish. This decreasing regulatory capacity of the central government encourages regional governments to claim control over many of those levers of economic development. Consequently, the regional governments enjoy new opportunities to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis the central government. This new economic or market nationalism pushes towards more decentralization, and it may lead to the break-up of existing political units.

The same ideas are put forward by John Kincaid. “International economic integration,” he writes, “tends to heighten the importance of subnational regional economies and accentuate differences between those economies.” As a result of the diminished regulatory authority of the central government, regions “view their success in the global economy as being much more a function of

9 Ibid., p. 69.
their own entrepreneurial policies as of their nation-state’s policies.” These regions “may be less than sanguine about supporting national policies that redistribute their profits to laggard regions, especially through the medium of what may be viewed as a bloated central bureaucracy in the national capital.” Therefore, being a large nation-state “is not in itself a competitive advantage in the modern global economy.” Regions may assume that they will be better shaped for international competition as independent states than as part of a heavy, heterogeneous political union.

Regarding culture, nationalism may benefit from two patterns tied with globalization. First, the large-scale immigration of people of different ethnic and cultural background may reinvigorate ethnicity and traditional nationalism as an important political cleavage. This difficult cohabitation of various cultures is an incentive for a group that is a minority within a nation-state, but a majority within its own region, to secede in order to strengthen its majority status over its own territory and to assert its capacity of integrating immigrants.

Moreover, a closer look to the values pushed ahead by globalization reveals that they may be more congruent with nationalist values than it seemed at the outset. The main argument of Murray Forsyth’s paper is that nationalism is a very strong phenomenon that gained from forces aimed at the outset to destroy it. Liberalism and marxism are of course the most famous examples. It may well be the same with internationalism. International integration is associated with Western values, in particular democracy, pluralism, tolerance, lifestyle choices, and cultural diversity of mankind. Kincaid recalls that liberal democracy is keenly preoccupied by group rights, historic grievances, and the respect of localistic cultural identities. Similarly, Jenson writes that “universalistic citizenship have given way to one of citizenship founded on categorial equity, with rights following from differences as much as similarities.” She adds that “histories of bias, oppression, and victimization underpin the claims of such groups for new citizenship rights.”

On this ground, nationalism may not be so out of date after all, since many ethnic, cultural and regional groups may claim to be victims deserving reparation.

It is not surprising if democratization is followed throughout the world by a huge number of particularistic demands for local autonomy. Such claims are very strong in new democracies. There is strong evidence that secession is a phenomenon congruent with the transition between an authoritarian regime and a new democracy, in the confusion and instability occurring shortly after the disappearance of a regime. As Minogue points out, central governments lose a lot of their power to intimidate in the contemporary circumstances of democratic politics.

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10 Jane Jenson, “Mapping, Naming, and Remembering,” in this volume, p. 42.
On the political front, globalization reinvigorates nationalism in two ways. First, globalization is a new source of discord within nation-states, as Jenson points out. Some regions are opposed to the transfer of substantial responsibilities to foreign powers or anonymous international organizations, while some other regions support these transfers because it is an opportunity to decrease their dependence towards the nation-state’s central government. These divergent preferences about the appropriate level of international integration strengthen regional cleavages to the point of challenging the nation-state’s unity. Second, Minogue mentions that the mere existence of supranational institutions renders some regions confident that they will receive funds and help if they go on their own. By decreasing the region’s dependence on its central government, the rise of international bodies may make secession less costly.

Hence, there are many reasons why one may expect that international integration will foster national fragmentation. Global economy both diminishes the regulatory authority of the central government and heightens the importance of subnational regional economies. International culture diminishes the central government’s authority and power to intimidate, while in many ways it promotes ethnic cleavages and exacerbates historic grievances, self-determination and cultural identities. The rise of international agreements and bodies is as such a source of political discord within the nation-state: certain regions oppose them, while others come to their rescue because they are looking for more autonomy from their nation-state.

CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE PARADOX

“International integration has differential effects on various nation-states,” as Kincaid rightly concludes. In many places, the move will be towards national fragmentation while in others we may expect that frontiers will remain the same.

The most spectacular catalyst of the current national fragmentation — namely the collapse of the communist empires and the end of the Cold War — has little to do with the phenomenon of globalization as such. It recalls the earlier collapses of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires: secessions are most likely to occur in the immediate aftermath of an authoritarian regime’s downfall.

The second cause of national fragmentation is the process of democratization and the diffusion of liberal Western values that come with global international integration. Secessionists have more hope of succeeding without bloody armed conflicts whenever democratization occurs — although democratization only decreases, but does not eliminate, the risk of bloodshed. With international pressures for democratization, it becomes much more difficult for central
governments to banish and repress secessionist forces. Consequently, one may expect an increasing number of nation-states where decaying authoritarian regimes are not able anymore to keep together different ethnic, religious or linguistic groups. This pattern of democratization explains how easily Slovakia, or the Baltic republics, became sovereign states, and has certainly encouraged numerous other groups to claim their sovereignty, although they actually failed to avoid bloody armed conflicts. Likewise, one should expect that a process of democratization in Africa would lead to the partition of many existing countries kept united by authoritarian rule. The example of bloody conflicts, however, may put a prudent check on the domino-effect leading towards partition.

In South America, the process of democratization and international economic integration has no effect on the number of countries because frontiers have been well-established since the nineteenth century. One may expect, however, that the consolidation of democratic values and the rise of new international senses of solidarity will strengthen the nationalism of Aboriginal Peoples.

The pattern is less clear in Asia where, as Kincaid notes, national reintegration is part of the agenda. But once again, the forward push towards democratization, if it occurs, may increase the likelihood that political actors will advocate their case for self-determination with a new intensity in countries such as India, Sri-Lanka, and maybe China. This catalytic effect of democratization on national fragmentation is less likely to occur in the Muslim world, because Islam remains as the sole rival model to Western democracy.

It is plausible to consider secession as a phenomenon congruent with the transition between an authoritarian regime and a new democracy. In deeply-rooted democracies, however, secession has been a particularly rare outcome. As a matter of fact, there has never been a single case of secession in a well-established democracy, defined by the experience of a reasonable time of universal suffrage. The current international integration is unlikely to change this pattern and to lead to the first break-downs of modern democracies, although it may fuel new sources of regional tensions within national states. In order to split well-established democracies, globalization should be a non-equivocal phenomenon. This is not the case. As we saw, some effects of the global international integration strengthened nationalism, but others weakened it. The effects are too mixed and antithetical to move the political frontiers of stable democracies.

The economic regulatory and redistributive capacity assumed by central governments during the Keynesian era has been reduced, but it is far from being eliminated, and central governments have found a new role as the guarantor of national and subnational compliance with international rules and agreements. There are both centrifugal pressures for a more decentralized control over economic and social policies, and centripetal ones for uniformity and coordination in taxation and regulation. Particularistic claims and principles are
enhanced by international integration, but universalistic principles as well. Globalization is a new source of discord within nation-states, as illustrated in Canada towards NAFTA, or in Switzerland towards the EEC but the incentive to be strong in these new vital international bodies is in itself an incentive to stay united; it adds a new source of uncertainty on the road to secession.

Because of these mixed incentives and conflicting effects, globalization is unlikely to move the frontiers of stable democracies, where electors have the option and the habit of giving their majority support for non-secessionist politicians.